TRANSACTIONS OF THE FIFTH
WORLD CONGRESS OF SOCIOLOGY

ACTES DU CINQUIÈME
CONGRÈS MONDIAL DE SOCIOLOGIE

VOLUME IV

TRANSACTIONS OF THE FIFTH
WORLD CONGRESS OF SOCIOLOGY

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CONGRÈS MONDIAL DE SOCIOLOGIE

Washington D. C., 2-8 September, 1962

VOLUME IV

NATURE AND PROBLEMS OF SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY
SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE
THE RESEARCH COMMITTEES

NATURE ET PROBLÈMES DE LA THÉORIE SOCIOLOGIQUE
SOCIOLOGIE DE LA CONNAISSANCE
LES COMITÉS DE RECHERCHE

Abstracts of Papers and Discussions
Résumés des communications et débats

EDITORIAL NOTE

This volume contains a set of papers put within the sections: «The Nature and the Problems of the Sociological Theory», «The Sociology of Knowledge» and «The Research Committees of the International Sociological Association».

Each published paper is placed within the sub-section it was presented at the Washington Congress. At the end of each sub-section the relevant reports on the discussion are published. In other words, the structure of this volume follows the Congress organigram as reproduced at the end of this volume.

We have to deplore the absence of one of the two reports of the sub-section «Comparative Historical Studies», the appointed rapporteur having been unable to meet his obligations.

Our initial intention was to publish all the papers presented during the Vth World Congres, but considering the cost of such a project we had to abandon it. The standards of the selections have been the originality and the geographical repartition.

AVANT-PROPOS

Ce volume contient une série de communications regroupées dans les sections «La nature et les problèmes de la théorie sociologique», «La Sociologie de la connaissance» et «Les comités de recherche de l'Association internationale de sociologie».

Chaque communication publiée a été intégrée dans la sous-section où elle fut présentée au Congrès de Washington. A la fin de chaque sous-section nous avons publié le rapport des débats qui y sont relatifs. En d'autres termes, la structure de cet ouvrage a été modelée par l'organigramme du V° Congrès tel qu'il est reproduit à la fin de ce volume.

Nous avons à déplorer l'absence d'un des deux rapports de la sous-section «Études historiques et comparatives», le rapporteur désigné n'ayant pu faire face à ses obligations.

Notre intention était tout d'abord de publier intégralement toutes les communications présentées au cours du V° Congrès mais vu le coût de ce projet, nous avons dû l'abandonner. Les critères de sélection ont été l'originalité et la répartition géographique.

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RAPPORT GÉNÉRAL DU CONGRÈS

P. DE BIE

Secrétaire Général de l'Association Internationale de Sociologie
1959-63

L'Association Internationale de Sociologie a tenu son Cinquième Congrès Mondial de Sociologie à l'hôtel Shoreham à Washington D. C., du 2 au 8 septembre 1962. Le Congrès a réuni 1.000 participants appartenant à 51 pays différents; le nombre total des personnes inscrites dépassait 1.200.

Le Congrès s'est tenu sous les auspices et avec l'aide de l'UNESCO; il a été organisé avec la collaboration de l'Association Américaine de Sociologie.

L'élaboration du programme et l'organisation scientifique des séances furent confiées à un *Comité du Programme*. Il était composé des membres suivants: MM. les Professeurs T. H. Marshall (Président) et P. de Bie (Secrétaire Général) *ex officio*, R. C. Angell, S. N. Eisenstadt, G. P. Franzev, G. Friedmann, G. Germani, R. König, S. M. Lipset, T. B. Bottomore et S. Rokkan. Quant à l'organisation matérielle du Congrès, elle fut prise en charge par un *Comité Américain d'Organisation* composé des membres suivants: MM. les Professeurs R. C. Angell (Président), R. Merton, W. Eberhard, D. Bell, H. Blumer, W. F. Cottrell, Kingsley Davis, R. Faris, P. Lazarsfeld, S. M. Lipset, T. Parsons, I. T. Sanders, MM. C. Taeuber, R. O. Carlson, J. H. Hoper, D. Young et P. Myers.

Un comité local, placé sous la présidence du Dr. C. Taeuber, prit en charge l'organisation des arrangements locaux, y compris la réception des participants et le service d'interprétation. Il élabora également un programme de contacts varié et agréable, comportant plusieurs visites et réceptions à Washington, dont la plus brillante fut un banquet où l'Honorable W. W. Rostow, Conseiller et Président du Conseil pour la Politique de la Planification (Policy Planning Council), du Département d'État, invité d'honneur prononça un discours très remarqué sur la position des États-Unis à l'égard des pays en voie de développement. Les congressistes furent également conviés à un concert à la Galerie Nationale d'Art de Washington et à

une séance de films sociologiques. À l'occasion du Congrès plusieurs ambassades offrirent une réception. D'autre part un programme spécial de visites avait été établi pour les membres de la famille des participants.

Grâce aux *fonds alloués* par l'«American Council of Learned Societies» le «Social Science Research Council» la «National Science Foundation» et certains gouvernements européens, l'Association Internationale de Sociologie a pu couvrir — totalement ou en partie — les frais de voyage de la plupart des contributeurs principaux et offrir le voyage à 80 jeunes chercheurs appartenant à 20 pays différents.

SÉANCE D'OUVERTURE

Le Congrès fut ouvert par les discours prononcés par le Professeur T. H. Marshall, Président de l'Association Internationale de Sociologie, M. A. Métraux, Directeur du Département des Sciences Sociales de l'UNESCO, le Professeur G. Howard représentant des Nations Unies, et MM. A. T. Waterman et L. Wilson représentant respectivement la «National Science Foundation» et l'«American Council on Education».

Dans son discours d'ouverture, le Président de l'Association Internationale de Sociologie, T. H. Marshall a mis en évidence le caractère vraiment universel et international que l'A.I.S. acquiert en organisant pour la première fois son Congrès en dehors des pays européens. Il a en outre rappelé qu'étant donné l'élargissement du contingent des sociologues américains participant au Congrès de l'A.I.S., la présente rencontre aux États-Unis revêt une signification toute particulière. En terminant, il a remercié les différentes associations scientifiques américaines de leur appui financier et les organisateurs américains de leurs efforts pour faire du Congrès un succès.

M. Métraux a transmis un message de vœux de la part du Directeur Général de l'UNESCO et il a fait observer que la sociologie occupe une place importante parmi les activités de celle-ci. Le développement de l'Association Internationale de Sociologie, attesté par l'expansion de ses activités et par le succès de ses congrès, constitue un appui fort appréciable pour l'implantation du programme de l'UNESCO.

M. Howard a transmis les vœux du Secrétaire Général des Nations Unies. Il a souligné que plusieurs thèmes du Congrès intéres-

saient directement les Nations Unies, notamment les problèmes concernant la croissance des pays en voie de développement. Enfin MM. A. T. Waterman et L. Wilson ont dit tout l'intérêt que la «National Science Foundation» et l'«American Council Education» portaient à l'égard de ce Vᵉ Congrès Mondial de Sociologie et de son programme d'activité.

RÉUNIONS SCIENTIFIQUES

Lors du Congrès il y eut un nombre limité de séances plénières consacrées à trois thèmes majeurs, et plusieurs groupes de travail reprenant ensuite la discussion des thèmes principaux sur la base des communications présentées par leurs auteurs. Les comités de l'Association Internationale de Sociologie ont également organisé des séances publiques; un groupe a consacré ses activités à la sociologie de la connaissance. Quatre séances plénières furent organisées: une sur *Les sociologues, les «policy-makers» et le public*, deux sur la sociologie du développement comportant deux volets: *Les premières étapes de la croissance* et *Le maintien de la croissance*, et une séance fut consacrée à *La nature et les problèmes de la théorie sociologique*. Les groupes de travail ont pris en charge la majeure partie des séances; neuf groupes de travail ont organisé chacun deux ou trois séances spécialisées. Ils ont traité les sujets suivants: les relations entre les sociologues les «policy-makers» et le public, (dans le cadre du premier thème majeur); la rupture avec le traditionalisme, les rapports entre la religion et le développement, les changements intervenus dans les zones urbaines et rurales, les problèmes relatifs à la citoyenneté et l'autorité politique et enfin l'étude des élites traditionnelles par rapport aux élites modernes (dans le cadre du deuxième thème majeur); les études historiques et comparatives, le fonctionalisme, le marxisme, et l'utilisation des modèles pour l'élaboration des théories (dans le cadre du troisième thème majeur).

Les comités de recherche de l'Association Internationale de Sociologie sur la sociologie industrielle, la sociologie de la famille, la sociologie urbaine et rurale, la sociologie des communications de masse, la sociologie politique, la sociologie psychiâtrique, la sociologie des religions et la sociologie du loisir et de la culture populaire ont organisé chacun deux séances de travail. Le groupe de la sociologie de la connaissance a aussi organisé deux séances de travail. Enfin, des réunions officieuses sur la sociologie du droit, de la médecine et de l'éducation eurent également lieu. La collaboration ac-

tive des comités de recherche au Congrès est précieuse car ils sont les plus indiqués pour aider les sociologues à mieux réaliser les buts qu'ils doivent atteindre sur un plan international ou inter-culturel. De ce point de vue le Cinquième Congrès a innové par rapport aux Congrès précédents.

L'information des contributeurs et des participants sur le déroulement des séances a été assurée de deux façons: d'une part les communications qui ont fait l'objet des séances plénières ont été publiées avant le Congrès et envoyées aux participants qui en avaient fait la demande. D'autre part, les communications prévues pour les différents groupes de travail ont été envoyées à Washington par le soin de leurs auteurs et ont été remises aux participants au moment de leur arrivée.

RÉUNIONS ADMINISTRATIVES

Pendant le Congrès le Conseil de l'A.I.S. s'est réuni les 2 et 8 septembre. Le Comité Exécutif s'est réuni les 1, 2 et 8 septembre.

Le Conseil et le Comité Exécutif reçurent des rapports sur l'affiliation des membres, l'espacement des congrès, les publications, les comités de recherche et sur les finances. Deux nouveaux comités de recherche ont été officiellement constitués: l'un sur la sociologie du droit et l'autre sur la sociologie de l'éducation.

Les affiliations à l'Association Internationale de Sociologie concernent 54 pays et se répartissent comme suit:

Associations régionales	2
Associations nationales	34
Instituts	24
Membres associés	5
Membres individuels	24

Le Secrétaire Général a présenté un rapport sur les publications de l'Association. Les deux premiers volumes des Actes du 5° Congrès ont été vendus de façon très satisfaisante; la vente des Actes des 3° et 4° Congrès se poursuit également de façon régulière. La publication de la Sociologie Contemporaine est assumée par l'Association. Depuis le Congrès précédent ont paru les numéros suivants:

Vol. VII, n° 3. J. Floud et A. H. Halsey, «The Sociology of Education».

Vol. VIII, n° 1. M. Freedman, M. G. Swift, A. Pal, et M. A. Jaspan, «Rural Sociology in South-East Asia»

n° 2. L. D. Cain, «The Sociology of Ageing»

n 3. M. N. Srinivas, Y. B. Damle, S. Shahani et A. Beteille «Caste»

Vol. IX, n° 1. S. M. Miller, «Comparative Social Mobility»

n° 2. N. Birnbaum, «The Sociological Study of Ideology»

n° 3. E. F. Borgatta, «Small Group Research»

Vol. X/XI n° 1. W. G. Friedmann, «Sociology of Law»

n° 2. E. Freidson «The Sociology of Medicine».

Le Conseil a accepté la démission du Professeur P. de Bie, Secrétaire Général.

Le Conseil a élu le Professeur R. König Président de l'Association Internationale de Sociologie pour une période de quatre ans, il a élu des nouveaux vice-présidents et a veillé au remplacement des membres dont le mandat était expiré. La composition du Conseil exécutif est actuellement la suivante:

Président: M. le Professeur R. König (Allemagne)

Vice-Présidents: M. le Professeur H. Blumer (U.S.A.)
                 M. le Professeur G. Germani (Argentine)
                 M. le Professeur R. Treves (Italie)

Membres: M. le Professeur R. Aron (France)
                 Dr. H. Friis (Danemark)
                 M. le Professeur F. V. Konstantinov (U.R.S.S.)
                 M. le Professeur C. Madge (Royaume-Uni)
                 M. le Professeur K. Odaka (Japon)
                 Dr. S. Rokkan (Norvège)
                 M. le Professeur J. Szczepanski (Pologne).

SÉANCE DE CLOTURE

La séance de clôture a suivi immédiatement la dernière séance plénière. Le Professeur T. H. Marshall a remercié les contributeurs et tous les participants et il a mis l'accent sur la signification particulière de l'étape atteinte. Le Cinquième Congrès Mondial de Sociologie représente la fin de la période de croissance de l'Association. La socio-

logie ayant été reconnue comme discipline scientifique à travers le monde entier, l'Association est arrivée au point où plus d'énergie peut être utilisée pour l'avancement de la recherche sur le plan international. Pour mener à bien ce nouveau rôle, le Conseil de l'Association a décidé d'organiser dorénavant les Congrès tous les quatre ans. Dans l'intervalle, les différentes activités scientifiques de l'Association seront confiées à ses comités de recherche.

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS

PROFESSOR T. H. MARSHALL
University of Cambridge

Ladies and Gentlemen,

My task this evening is not to deliver a learned lecture, but simply to open this Fifth World Congress of the International Sociological Association. You may feel that in fact the Congress opened this afternoon with the Joint Session with the American Sociological Association, and in a sense you are right. The papers presented at that Session appear in the Transactions of the Congress. But we decided, in consultation with our American colleagues, to treat the Joint Session as a unique event and a thing in itself and to hold the formal opening of the Congress proper this evening.

We are meeting here in Washington on the invitation of the American Sociological Association and with the help of grants obtained through their good offices from a number of American sources. I wish, on behalf of the ISA, to thank these organizations most warmly for their generous help, and also the American Committee — or I should rather say the several American Committees — for all they have done to prepare for the Congress and for our entertainment while we are here. Among the many who have been concerned I will mention only three — Bob Angell, our former President, and Chairman of the American Organizing Committee, and Conrad Taeuber and Paul Myers of the Washington Committee, who, I know, have had the heaviest job to contend with. On the other hand, on behalf of all the participants of this Congress and also of the Executive Committee, I thank Pierre de Bie, General Secretary of the ISA, for his efficient work and the perfect organization of our scientific meetings. Thank you all very much.

Our presence here has, I think, a special significance. When the Association began its work in a small and modest way in 1949, there was a danger that it might be a predominantly European organization. It is true that its first President was an American, and several distinguished non-European sociologists took part in its affairs from the start. But its first four Congresses, from 1950 to

1959, were all held in Europe, where it was easy for Europeans to attend, but harder and more expensive for others. And it was also convenient that its office should be in Europe, in close touch with the headquarters of UNESCO, to whose inspired initiative it owed its existence and on whose financial support it depended, and still depends. But if it had remained European, or even predominantly so, it would have failed to fulfil the purpose for which it was founded.

A crucial point was to secure the full collaboration of sociologists in the United States, whose output exceeded in volume and variety that of any other region of comparable size. Not unnaturally there was, I think, a feeling among many American sociologists that their home market was so vast and rich that they had little need to engage in international trade, unless the commodities offered were of quite exceptional value. At the same time there were some European sociologists who adopted the fashion of speaking as if their kind of sociology and the American kind were in sharp antithesis to one another. This nonsense was nourished by a good deal of ignorance and misunderstanding on both sides of the Atlantic, and what was needed to dispel it was closer contacts, more exchange of ideas, and more co-operation in joint enterprises. I will not claim for the ISA the sole credit for breaking down the barriers because many individuals were working vigorously to the same end, but it has played its part. The contingent of American sociologists attending its Congresses has steadily grown, and now, with this meeting here, and the Joint Session that preceded it, the fusion is complete.

Meanwhile the Association was busy extending its coverage in other directions, and coping with very different problems. In Asia, Africa and the Middle East, instead of there being too many sociologists to be easily absorbed in an international organization, there were too few to carry the weight which the importance of their work and of the subjects to be studied in their countries merited. Whereas for crossing the Atlantic the need was to strip away the superficial differences of style and method in order to uncover the fundamental unity of the science as practised in two basically similar cultures, in order to build a bridge between Occident and Orient the reverse process was required. In this case it was necessary to penetrate through the superficial similarities, caused by a considerable importation of Western concepts, methods and literature, in order to identify and take stock of vital cultural differences. The sociologists of Occident and Orient could then, in collaboration with

each other, make the mutual adjustments needed to enable all to work together for the development of a truly universal science of society. And at this point I must remind you of the grave loss this cause of mutual understanding has suffered by the death of our Indian Vice-President Professor D. P. Mukerji. Although for some time past ill health had prevented him from taking an active part in our affairs, we were very conscious of his presence as one of our most distinguished and respected members, and it is sad to think that he is no longer with us.

There was a third bridge to be built, or barrier to be surmounted, in order to achieve full international status, and that is the one between the first nucleus of sociologists who met together at the 1950 Congress and their colleagues in the countries of Eastern Europe which in English we habitually refer to, inaccurately, perhaps, but unambiguously, as Communist. In this case the obstacles to full and free collaboration have at times seemed to be more serious, because they appeared to involve the very nature of our science. But, speaking frankly, I hope we shall not allow our proceedings to be too much dominated by the confrontation of Marxist and non-Marxist sociology. The bridges have been built and there is continuous traffic over them. When the subject under discussion is in fact sociology, it does not prove difficult to find the common ground on which a fruitful exchange of ideas and experience, and valuable co-operation in comparative research, can take place. But if we start by over-dramatising the situation, we shall end by talking, not sociology, but politics, and that will get us nowhere.

I have dwelt on this point in order to impress on you that the achievement of true international status is not merely a question of geographical representation. It is, of course, a fact of importance that the ISA now has members in 54 countries, and that more than 1000 sociologists attend its Congress. But more important still is the combination of hard work and good will that has made of these members a true cosmopolis. Judged by these standards the ISA can undoubtedly claim to be the only fully international organization of professional sociologists.

Turning now to the present state of sociology itself, I find rather less to be happy about. Its reputation in the world at large is not as high as it should be, and we all know it. And yet never before was there such lively interest in the problems that sociologists study, nor such urgent demand for answers to the questions that sociology poses. But sociologists cannot, or do not, produce enough of the

answers fast enough. It is not altogether their fault, for many of the questions are unanswerable without more knowledge and better tools than we as yet possess, and the questioners are impatient. And what they throw to us is often the intractable residue left after the economist, the political scientist and the psychologist have taken all the plums, that is to say the relatively easy questions. We are then asked to fill in the «social factors» and explain the «why» of it all after the others have dealt with the «how». And if we fail to satisfy them, they naturally turn to those writers who stand somewhere between cheap sociology and expensive journalism and who have no inhibitions about offering often highly sophisticated impressions as a substitute for the findings of scientific research. From them they can at least get what has been neatly described as the «low-down on the high spots».

It was because of the pressing need to communicate to the public, and to the politicians, an understanding of what sociologists have done, are doing, can do, and cannot do, that we and our American Member Association chose the theme which was debated in the Joint Session. I will not attempt to summarize the discussion, since most of you heard it. My concern is rather to consider how this Association can help sociologists to do more of what they ought to be doing and to do it on an international, or cross-cultural, footing. One answer, I am sure, is through its Research Sub-Committees. The point about these committees is that they are all devoted to the promotion of research on outstandingly important aspects of contemporary life — the kind of research that is most likely to provide the answers to the questions posed by the public and the politicians. In view of the importance of their work and the difficulty they have in meeting to discuss their affairs, it was decided to put one whole day of the Congress at their disposal during which they could organize group discussions on a theme or themes of their choice, while in addition time would be found for them to hold business meetings about their future activities. The response has been excellent, and we hope that the outcome will be programmes of future research some of which may attract the attention and win the support of Organizations or Foundations which have funds at their disposal for assisting enterprises of this kind. So I appeal to representatives of such bodies here present to take a look at these Research Committees; they will show you what they have done already and what they propose to do next, and you can judge them on the merits of their performance and their promise.

The main theme of the Congress, to which two Plenary Sessions

will be devoted, is «The Sociology of Development». This was an almost inevitable choice in view of the enormous interest in the subject shown by all the social sciences to-day. But we were also so bold as to choose as the third major subject the present state of sociological theory. I wonder whether perhaps we were rash to submit our science to so critical a scrutiny at this time. Professor König, in his general introduction, speaks of «the convergent features» visible in the four papers; and he is quite right. But the question I put to myself as I read them was — how far are they representative of the thinking, and the practice, of working sociologists to-day? I am sure there is a growing concentration of the minds of methodologists and philosophers on the problems which they have come to regard as crucial. But is there a central body of sociological theory in which sociologists in general find inspiration, guidance, and the instruments of scientific analysis to the same extent that economists find these things in economic theory? I think not. And I mention this point only as a warning against false complacency, and in order to add the hope that in the discussions and the papers for the groups (which I have not seen) there will be plenty of divergence of views, as well as convergence, and some lively disputation.

I noticed a similar homogeneity in the papers on the Sociology of Development. This, I think, is due to the nature of the subject and not to any restriction in the choice of authors. But it is noticeable that all the studies are of the historical and institutional kind, and that there are no examples of that type of sociological research (which for the general public *is* sociology) that is quantitative in character, employs sample surveys to collect its data, and delights in putting punched cards through machines. Here again I believe that it is a feature of present trends in sociology that there is a growing body of practitioners converging on the historical and institutional study of social structure and social change, treating this not as an exercise of the enlightened imagination but as a form of genuine empirical research. And I am glad of this. But once more I must express the hope that the discussions and the group papers will bring into the picture all the schools of thought which are relevant to the subject and take account of all the methods that they use.

For sociology is a vast discipline, and sociologists are a motley crowd. Of course we want our efforts to be, as Professor König says, «more directed towards systematic integration than towards controversy». But, if we are in too much of a hurry to iron out our differ-

ences, we may lose something that is precious. Let me illustrate this point by looking at two rather different situations, and our reactions to them. First, let us take the case of Professor X and Dr. Y. who are pursuing lines of research whose methods differ critically, but whose subject-matter is broadly speaking in the same field. They are suspicious of one another, because neither quite understands what the other is up to. But, in their more charitable moments, they see that they are colleagues, because they are both operating on the same kind of stuff and they both have the same kind of curiosity about it. So, although they are not close enough to team up and start a joint project — and nobody should try to make them — they will, if they are wise, keep in touch and exchange information for the benefit of both. Some day and somehow, perhaps, their work will become fused in a common result. This, I think, is the kind of situation George Homans had in mind when he compared the industrial sociologist with the social psychologist. In that article he enunciated a principle to which I heartily subscribe, that «the idea that there is only one way of going to work will be the ruin of our science». Hear ! hear ! This, then, is the case of two people, or sub-disciplines, moving along parallel lines. Of course parallel lines, if they behave as they should, will not meet in a point. But in sociological research they can both hit the same target. For the target is large; it is broader than the distance between the two lines. Life would be dull if everybody aimed all the time at the bull's eye. In the present state of our science we shall do well to scatter our fire a bit; we are more likely to hit something.

My second situation is one in which the interests of sociologists, and their methods, are so different that they seem to have little in common. They are not moving on parallel lines, but along different radii from the central core of sociology out to the periphery, perhaps in order to join hands with scholars in neighbouring disciplines having affinities with sociology — with the psychologists, the historians, the mathematicians, the lawyers or the biologists. And that is a very laudable aim. Where the divergence is as great as this, the most we can hope for is peaceful co-existence. I am not fond of this concept, because it is so unconstructive, but it may be a necessary station on the road to fruitful co-operation. There is no use in bringing two people together if they are acutely allergic to one another. It is better that they keep their distance and preserve the peace. Not that I disapprove of academic warfare. It can be most stimulating and enjoyable, provided it takes place between near neighbours and not between strangers or distant acquaintances.

In this respect the moral code of academic behaviour differs from that of ordinary social life. For when the antagonists are near neighbours, scientifically speaking, they understand what they are fighting about and both may emerge from the conflict wiser than they were before. Or at any rate their juniors may learn a lot from watching the battle of the champions. But if, shall we say, an earnest student of Durkheim's theory of the origin and nature of religion gets involved in a battle with somebody who is drawing careful maps of the catchment areas of all the churches in a great city, and each says that what the other is doing is futile, the conflict is bound to produce more heat than light and may, if one side wins, result in the impoverishment of our science. It is only when you are very sure of your faith that you can afford to denounce heretics, and it is only when you belong to a truly homogeneous community that you can think of issuing deportation orders against dubious-looking characters. Sociology has not got that far yet.

So, if we have a rough house on Wednesday morning, with the sociological holists and the methodological individualists flying at each other's throats, don't let's start chucking anybody out. It may be the duty of a scientific association to expose and denounce charlatans, but it should welcome honest disagreement, and the fruitful arguments it provokes, and be tolerant even of wide divergences of interest. For unity without diversity is tyranny; diversity without unity is chaos. And for sociologists the fundamental unity that solves this dilemma by preserving us from chaos without subjecting us to tyranny is the unity of our subject matter, the unity of mankind. If we ceased to believe in that, our science would dissolve into thin air.

THE NATURE AND PROBLEMS OF SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

LA NATURE ET LES PROBLÈMES DE LA THÉORIE SOCIOLOGIQUE

PLENARY SESSION
SÉANCE PLÉNIÈRE

REPORT ON THE DISCUSSION

Chairman: R. König, University of Köln
Rapporteur: F. J. Stendenbach, University of Köln

In this session R. König, P. Sorokin, H. Lefèbvre, E. Gellner, A. K. Saran presented the essential points of their papers which are entirely printed in the first volume of the *Transactions*.

The discussion was opened by L. Goldman who commented on P. Sorokin's and E. Gellner's papers. With reference to P. Sorokin he said that each time one introduces the historical dimension one has to distinguish between structure and function as well as between «verstehender» and explicative analysis. He postulates furthermore that the cultural sciences do not follow the same rules of investigation as the natural sciences, a view mostly held in the European countries. With respect to E. Gellner's paper he criticized the use of dichotomies instead of scales and pointed out that each structure has its own logic. It must not lead to relativism.

J. Galtung thinks that E. Gellner's is one of those rare papers which will be read and reread. He says it is an improvement of the anthropological methodology through application of a functional approach. The consideration of the concepts in their own culture gives more clarity to the culture itself and enables a much more adequate understanding. Variation of meaning is, however, not only between cultures or between individuals but also within a culture or within an individual, and even at the same time: namely on different levels of consciousness. The levels obviously have to be understood as different meaning contexts. More will be gained in explanatory power by stressing also the dissensual instead of merely giving a unified sensible picture obtained by projecting an idealized picture of the own culture on foreign cultures.

R. Mayntz gave some refinements of the concept of functionalism as used by Gellner. She says that being part of the context is different from contributing to the survival of the whole. She pointed

out that the evaluations in E. Gellner's paper were made on the basis of standards which have not been made explicit. She then distinguishes at least three standards and corresponding goal types: 1) the features of the goal state actually exist; 2) the properties are hypothetical only; 3) the system automatically produces such a goal state.

M. Crozier agreed with E. Gellner in the main points and reported about some aspects of his own research done in a functionalist frame.

One of the most interesting contributions to the discussion was a report given by G. V. Osipov which revealed a change in the attitudes toward empirical research and toward «Western» sociology. G. V. Osipov postulated that sociological research will be useless if it is not based on theory. This theory is as yet only of «middle range». In Russia where many social programs are under way «concrete research» has the important role of giving information on the facts which then can be applied in the development and the accomplishment of the social programs. Such programs exist on family, industry, personality (probably also including delinquency). The methods used are objective, quantitative as well as qualitative: statistical reports, social experiment, polls, expert interviews, personal documents, etc. The results should be checked through the utilization of other methods. G. V. Osipov pointed out that there is a tendency toward interdisciplinary research and that statistical and mathematical tools should be used for the sake of greater precision. — With respect to Lefèbvre's paper G. V. Osipov pointed out that Marx had only one theory, not, however, a sociological one and a philosophical one. Lefèbvre's considerations he thinks are one-sided. Furthermore he criticized L. Goldman for his evolutionary genetical structuralism. He also disagrees with L. Goldman with respect to the denied universality of logical norms.

Finally W. J. H. Sprott commented on A. K. Saran's paper which, however, was not read because of lack in time. W. J. H. Sprott criticized that too many different types of scientists are listed under the term positivism which makes it difficult to understand the paper. He also criticized the dichotomy of methodological individualism and methodological / collectivism. In conclusion he was dealing with the problem of the derivation of the «ought» from factual behavior or from a transcendental essence. In case of a derivation from the latter we should have a perfect knowledge of the whole cosmology.

HISTORICAL AND COMPARATIVE STUDIES
ÉTUDES HISTORIQUES ET COMPARATIVES

COMPARATIVE SOCIOLOGICAL STUDIES

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In sociology, as in other disciplines, concepts are formulated to ensure their universal applicability. A concept like «division of labor» refers to some principle according to which the labor performed in a collectivity is subdivided among its members. Where further reference is made to the persistence of this principle over time, irrespective of the particular individuals performing the labor and of the way labor is subdivided (whether by sex, age, skill or what not), we get one meaning of the term «social organization». Since we know of no society in which these two concepts are inapplicable, it is proper to consider them universal in scope. It is possible to remain at this level of universality. One can elaborate deductively a whole series of mutually related concepts in the belief that in this way a framework of concepts applicable to all societies can be constructed. However, efforts along this line (especially those of Talcott Parsons) have been criticized for their tendency to elaborate concepts without a prior formulation of a problem and hence without a periodic check of the concepts in terms of their analytic utility.

Such criticism points to a persistent problem in sociology. Concepts and theories which are difficult to relate to empirical findings, are juxtaposed with empirical research which is more or less devoid of theoretical significance. Every sociologist deplores this hiatus between theory and research, but the difficulties of relating the two persist. One reason for these difficulties is that, to be analytically useful, universal concepts frequently require a specification which divests them of their universality. There is an intermediate level between what is true of all societies and what is true of one society at one point in time and space. This level is the special province of comparative sociological studies.

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In the absence of strong historical interests sociologists often neglect the fact that many, widely used terms are not universal in scope, but concepts of socio-historical configurations. Thus, stratification is present in all societies, but stratification by «estate» is present only in some; the exercise of authority requires subordinate agents everywhere, but their organization into a «bureaucracy» is a more specific phenomenon. Concepts like class and bureaucracy or urbanism, the state, status, contract, and many others vary considerably in their historical «reach», i.e. in the time-and-space dimensions of their applicability. For example, bureaucracy in the sense of Max Weber's concept of governmental organization under the rule of law applies principally to the countries of Northwestern Europe from the 19th century onward. However, several *elements* of bureaucratic organization can be found centuries earlier as T. F. Tout has documented in his five volume work deceptively entitled *Chapters in the Administrative History of England*; also elements from the complex of bureaucracy have been adopted in several countries since the 19th century with varying success to be sure. Again though all societies are stratified, stratification by «class» is of a special type. Classes depend on the coalescence of interests among individuals who are legally free to conclude valid contracts, and thus they differ from stratification by «estate» or Court-rank, or clan-affiliation, and so forth. The «historical reach» of the concept is then determinable in principle in the sense that modern Western societies have been distinguished for a time by the degree to which «the market» has governed class-relations among individuals.

Such historical delimitation is clear only in principle or by definition, but very vague in application. It may be possible to date the inception of «bureaucracy» in England from the Northcote-Trevelyan Reforms in 1861, but even so marked an institutional innovation is no more than a «high water-mark» of changes in English governmental administration whose century-old continuity can be documented easily. The delimitation in time and space of other sociological concepts would present even greater difficulties since most such concepts do not refer to actions directly reflected in legal or administrative documents. (No doubt it is due to these difficulties of chronological delimitation, among others, that sociologists and historians do not get along well intellectually; yet they need each other, for historians use sociological concepts and sociologists ought to derive part of their evidence from history.) Thus we have the awkward situation that it is difficult to identify the space-and-time dimension of certain sociological concepts and difficult to deny that they

possess a historically limited applicability. Usually, we meet this situation by constructing a contrast-conception. «Bureaucracy» is hardly a usable concept as long as it stands alone. It gains clarity when we contrast it with the «patrimonial» form of government as Max Weber has done because in this way we learn of a non-bureaucratic type of governmental administration that has a century-long development of its own. Again, stratification by «class» is a better analytical tool when contrasted with alternative types of stratification, say, by caste or estate or party-membership in a totalitarian state. While such paired concepts are never wholly satisfactory, they do enable us to delimit the space-and-time dimension of a given concept to some extent [1].

Comparative analysis reveals also that many concepts are generalizations in disguise. Urbanism is a case in point as are other concepts of complex structures like industrial society, bureaucracy, democracy, feudalism, caste society, etc., together with such related terms as urbanization, industrialization, and so on. These concepts define social structures in terms of their several distinguishing characteristics and the importance of such definitions may explain the lasting influence of certain expositions like Louis Wirth's «Urbanism as a way of Life», Robert Redfield's «The Folk Society», Max Weber's chapter «Bureaucracy», even on scholars who have criticized these formulations. If we are to refer to social structures, we must conceptualize them and that means a definition of a cluster of attributes which distinguishes one structure from another [2]. It is not a fiction to suppose that these attributes occur together; after all the definition, say, of urbanism puts into abstract terms what we have learned about major Western cities as distinguished from non-urban types of settlement. However, comparative sociological studies are needed to delimit the applicability of those attributes; here we are back to the space-and-time dimension of sociological concepts. Even

[1] I avoid the term «ideal type» since it requires too many explanations of its meaning to be useful. Cf. the earlier discussion of «paired concepts» in Reinhard BENDIX and Bennett BERGER, «Images of Society and Problems of Concept — Formation in Sociology», in Llewellyn GROSS, ed., *Contributions to Sociological Theory*, Evanston, Row, Peterson & Co., 1959, pp. 92-118.

[2] The «pattern variables» as formulated by Talcott Parsons are an aid in this regard, provided their application to specific structures is spelled out. «Universalism», for example, may be an attribute of urbanism and of bureaucracy, but it is necessary to explain how this characteristic, which distinguishes urban from folk and bureaucratic from patrimonial administration, becomes manifest in each, and how these manifestations may be linked.

more important: such studies would enable us to examine critically the implicit and, in my judgment, unjustified generalization, according to which the several attributes of «urbanism» tend to occur and vary together.

Recent observations in India suggest that the generalizations and expectations which we associate with the term «urbanization», may be excessively culture-bound. In India kinship ties between urban and rural residents remain strong. Examples: in a recent flood disaster in Poona about one-third of the people made homeless (some 30,000) simply rejoined their families in the villages; in Bombay, textile workers on strike go back to their villages for the duration of the strike; in many cities husbands go to work by themselves, leaving their wives and children in the countryside. A recent survey of the «urban social situation in India» concludes that rural-urban differences with regard to such key factors as caste and joint family have not in fact developed as expected [3]. Since we know about similar Kinship-ties between urban and rural areas from the earlier history of Western cities, it is tempting to predict that with sufficient economic development and urbanization this tie to the country will be broken in India as well. But what began as a definition has subtly turned at this point into a prediction based on a generalization about «urbanism», though this prediction is hazardous and probably false. For in the West the religious consecration of family-ties had been broken long before urbanization of the modern type occured. If by individualism we understand *this* destruction of the fetters of kinship, then individualism was a precondition as much as a consequence of modern urbanism. And as urbanization in India occurs in the absence of comparable preconditions we must expect that it takes forms with which we are not familiar. Naturally it is difficult to anticipate these. In the UNESCO Seminar Report on this subject we read the following:

«Although the great cities of Asia have large size, high density and heterogeneous populations these characteristics (which according to Wirth essentially give rise to the urban way of life), have not produced the basic changes in interpersonal relations, the nature of human beings and the social institutions, as in the Western context. Despite these relatively high densities, life has not necessarily become largely secularized, great differentiation of function has not taken place and

[3] N. V. SOVANI, «The Urban Social Situation in India», *Artha Vijnana*, III, June-September, 1961, pp. 85-105, 195-222.

the way of life has not changed markedly for many of the indigenous population groups» [4].

Although the report goes on to deny «increased sophistication, rationality of behavior, cosmopolitanism in outlook, or innovation and social change» with regard to these cities, these qualities of «urbanism» surely exist. But they may be more suffused with elements from the tradional culture than would be the case in Western cities, and at the same time certain Sections of the urban elite may live at a greater social and cultural distance from the common people in the Indian than in European or American cities. In addition, as an outsider examines the statistics of unemployment, housing conditions and population with sympathy for the human condition, he naturally wonders whether the resilience of kinship- and caste-ties even under urban conditions represents the one remaining social security the individual has left to fend off the mass of others who compete with him for the scare opportunities available. And if these impressions are near the mark, then every increase in population, every further crowding of the cities will militate against that individualism which is most needed to curb population and make Indian cities «urbanized» in our sense of that word. To dismiss all this as a transitory phenomenon which will give way to more familiar features of city-life presupposes what most needs examination, namely that the cluster of attributes constituting «urbanism» represents a valid generalization of a pattern of interrelated social changes. Is it not possible and indeed probable that the cities of India, for example, have structural antecedents of their own which will eventually blend with the familiar physical attributes of cities under the impact of modern industry — and in this way create a distinctive type of urbanism ?

If we admit this possibility (and I do not see how we can exclude it), then we must face up to difficult questions of nomenclature and social theory. We would have to conclude that terms which sociologists have adopted or adapted from ordinary speech (like city, village, industry, bureaucracy, etc.) are not readily applicable in their usual connotations, since such terms have more connotations than we are aware of in ordinary usage, it is indispensable for scholarly purposes to make these connotations explicit. As a result, when we use the term «urbanism» with reference to India, we would not also

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[4] *Urbanization in Asia and the Far East* (Proceedings of the Joint UN/UNESCO Seminar, Bangkok, August 8-18, 1956, Calcutta, Tensions and Technology Series, 1957), p. 87.

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apply connotations of the term which are inappropriate. Some social theorists would cite these difficulties as their reason for discarding ordinary terms altogether and substituting for them a language of their own. But that approach faces even greater difficulties; for it is remote from ordinary experience and since it makes references to that experience unnecessarily obscure, it interferes with effective communication. These and related terminological questions do not exist in isolation. As often as not they are a symptom of unresolved theoretical questions, to which comparative sociological studies can, I believe, make their own specific contribution. I would distinguish at least three such contributions, which are closely interrelated.

1. Comparisons and contrasts between «related» phenomena in different societies are made possible by reference to some sociological universal. What is true of all societies cannot tell us much about any, but it is not on that account without interest. For «sociological universals» are another word for the problematics of the social condition, they are not generalizations in the ordinary sense but definitions of what is at issue, what must be resolved. A very detailed, deductive elaboration of these «universals» such as that of Talcott Parsons deals with these issues or problematics in terms of their logical attributes; it does not, nor does it intend to, deal directly with the way in which such issues have been resolved by men in societies. That, however, is precisely what comparitive sociological studies have attempted. When Max Weber writes his comparative sociology of religion on the secular causes and consequences of religious doctrines he identifies one such issue; we may call it the inner-worldly orientation of Western religions culminating in Puritanism. When, in his *Ancient City,* Fustel de Coulanges writes of the steps by which a consecrated deity of the community gradually prevails over the worship of separate deities of family and tribe, he identifies another; we may call it the social or in this case the religious precondition of civic unity. Again, to take a modern work, when Hannah Arendt discusses the pattern of race-relations in South Africa and the Jews in Central Europe, she identifies a third; we may call it the moral crisis of those who lose, or are made to lose, their humanity by virtue of their skin-color, religious belief or group-affiliation [5].

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[5] I note in passing, but with emphasis that all these are moral issues and that it greatly curtails the «sociological imagination» in my judgment if this moral dimension is neglected. Some sociologists manage to write even about values or power, as if values existed outside a moral framework or as if power involved simply a distinction between a few «bad guys» and the masses of the people whose deprivations are a synonym of their virtue. The intellectual

In these and similar studies a recurrent issue of the human condition is identified for the purpose of examining empirically, how men in different societies have encountered that issue and resolved it as they did. Note that the emphasis in these studies is on *men acting* in societies and while the conditioning of these actions is given full weight, so in principle at least are the men who have acted in face of the agonizing dilemmas which confront them. The point is worth emphasizing because comparative studies tend to highlight the contrasts existing between different human situations and social structures and hence underemphasize the contrasting patterns encompassed by each situation and structure. It was this feature which prompted Max Weber to underscore the inescapable artificiality of conceptual distinctions and the consequent need to move back and forth between the empirical evidence and the benchmark-concepts which he called «ideal types» [6].

2. Many sociological concepts are composite terms. In using them we assert the co-existence of the several elements that make up a given configuration like urbanism, folk society, the village, caste, bureaucracy, and others. It is probable that inadvertently such terms conceptualize a limited body of evidence and are culture-bound for that reason. Comparative studies help us transcend this limitation. For example, if city-life as we know it goes with secularism, are there types of city-life which go with the maintenance of religious beliefs ? More generally, if X goes with Y, can we also find evidence that X can go with non-Y ? The second type of evidence would not invalidate the first; both would have to be considered. And by considering both we may protect ourselves against spurious generalizations.

A neglect of this approach appears to be the issue in the debate which has appeared in the pages of *Contributions to Indian Sociology* [7]. The question is raised, on one hand, whether the term «village» is applicable to Indian society; on the other hand, it is asserted that

challenge of sociological concepts can only gain if the moral issues inherent in them are laid bare.

[6] Perhaps the simplest statement of this issue is contained in Max WEBER, «Agrargeschichte des Altertums», *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Sozial und Wirtschaftsgeschichte*, Tübingen, J. C. B. Mohr, 1924, p. 280, where an enumeration of different varieties of craftsmen is followed by the assertion that it is necessary, nevertheless, to make do with one concept of the «ancient Greek craftsman» to refer to all of them.

[7] Cf. the discussions of the editors, Louis DUMONT and D. POCOCK, and of F. G. BAILEY in *Contributions to Indian Sociology*, I, April 1957, pp. 26-27 and *passim*; III, July 1959, pp. 88-101; and IV, April 1960, pp. 82-89.

«caste» is a generic phenomenon which would not be worth studying in India unless it was considered along with «caste» in South Africa or the American South. But dogmatic assertions are out of place here. With regard to the village the people's orientation towards kin and caste always competes to some extent with the demands of the village as a community which more often than not are articulated by political authority, even if the interests of the villagers are served thereby. Two relatively antagonistic principles of «community» are at work here, and a typology of villages in terms of these or other principles might well reveal the special features of Indian villages which intensify this antagonism in their case [8]. Similarly, caste is certainly unique to India in the sense that no other major civilization has witnessed a comparable elaboration of the caste-principle over a three-thousand year period. But caste is also an aspect of social stratification, and without a comparative approach to the study of stratification it is quite impossible to understand the uniqueness of the Indian experience [9].

3. Sociological concepts have a time-dimension even in one and the same society, as mentioned earlier. The elements which we select to form a concept like «urbanism» in the sense of «modern city» coexist for a time only, whereas at an earlier time in our urban history different elements would have to be chosen to characterize a city. Accordingly, we formulate two concepts of «urbanism», say a «medieval» and a modern, industrial type, and indeed each of these types encompasses a range of variation which must be conceptualized in turn [10]. Mid-nineteenth century American cities certainly differed

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[8] See the striking characterization of these distinguishing features of the Indian village in B. B. MISRA, *The Indian Middle Classes*, London, Oxford University Press, 1961, pp. 310-312.

[9] For example, the emerging interest of Indian sociologists in the phenomenon of caste-dominance can be enriched by studies of domination in other systems of social stratification without in any way detracting from the special features of the Indian situation. Cf. the use of general criteria of dominance in M. N. SRINIVAS, «The Dominant Caste in Rampura», *American Anthropologist*, Vol. 61, February 1959, pp. 1-16, with the emphasis on the incomparability of the Indian caste-system in the introduction by E. R. LEACH, ed., *Aspects of Caste in South India, Ceylon and N. W. Pakistan*, Publication of the Department of Anthropology, Cambridge University Press, 1960.

[10] This need for conceptualization may not be satisfied by Gideon SJOBERG's book *The Pre-industrial City*, Glencoe, The Free Press, 1960. The author opposes the modern, industrial city by an allinclusive category encompassing cities in all times and places prior to the last 100 years together with all «pre-industrial» cities that exist today. Basing himself primarily on considerations of technology Sjoberg is, thereby, compelled to treat social structures of the

from their mid-twentieth century counterparts, but they are of the same type nevertheless. On the other hand, neither of them posesses the relation between residential areas and the churches, castle and market-places so characteristic of medieval towns. The contrast becomes more difficult to make, as we compare the medieval and the modern type within Europe; but the task is clearly to find the elements common to twentieth-century cities in Europe and America and commonly distinguishing both from, say, fourteenth-century cities in Europe [11]. What is said here concerning the concept «urbanism» has implications both for our understanding of «social structure» and for the study of social and political development.

To formulate concepts appropriate to «social structures» it is necessary to allow for the variations in space and time which are compatible with, or even characteristic of, each type of structure. A model for this kind of conceptualization is provided, for example, by Max Weber's analysis of legal domination. A belief in legality means first and foremost that certain formal procedures must be obeyed, if the enactment and execution of a law or regulation is to be considered legal. But while legal rule-making tends to eliminate the idiosyncrasies of personal rule, it also militates against the exercise of judgment in the individual case — in the interest of developing a consistent body of rules that are the same for everyone. Yet disregard of the person in the interest of equity constantly threatens to become disregard of the person in the interest of rule-making — just as too much regard for equity in the individual case can jeopardize the integrity of the rule-making process. Hence, the rule of law endures as long as piece-meal solutions for these conflicting imperatives are found and neither the concern with equity nor with the formal attributes of rule-making is allowed to predominate. In this way a social structure is understood not as a natural system with defined limits and invariant laws governing this equilibrating process for example, but rather as a system of historical dimensions which we can examine in terms of the piece-meal solutions which men have found for the characteristic problems of that system [12]. Where analysis emphasizes the chronology and individual

greatest diversity as if they and their cities were similar. One may consider such a procedure unwise, even though one may be unable to «refute» it.

[11] Some 20 years ago Professor Meyer Schapiro did just that in a lecture at the University of Chicago. I am not aware that this material has been published.

[12] Cf. the lucid statement of this difference between natural and historical

sequence of such solutions, it belongs to the province of the historian; where it emphasizes the structure or pattern of these solutions, it belongs to the province of the sociologist. Comparative sociological studies are especially suited to elucidate such structures because they tend to increase the «visibility» of one structure by contrasting it with another. In his way, they may help us identify the issues confronting a country in its social and political development, although they will hardly make us optimistic with regard to our ability to predict that development.

By their exposure of concepts and generalizations to a wider range of evidence than is sometimes customary, comparative sociological studies are likely to impart a salutary degree of nominalism to the terms we use. By confronting each sociological concept with the time-and-space limitations of its applicability, such studies may make our generalizations more cautious. But they will also have the merit of pointing up that peculiar combination of limitation and flexibility, of social conditioning and innovation which, to me at least, is the meaning and fascination of sociological studies generally.

systems in E. E. EVANS-PRITCHARD, *Social Anthropology*, London, Cohen & West, 1960, pp. 56-62.

HISTORY AND THE SOCIOLOGICAL METHOD

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In a paper written twenty-three years ago, entitled *Sociology and Canadian Social History*, I argued for a greater use of history by the sociologist. What was said in that paper by way of criticism of sociology was largely directed at what seemed to be certain dominant characteristics of the discipline as it had grown up on this continent. Developing in reaction to the philosophical tradition of nineteenth century European sociology, American sociology, so it seemed, had moved so far in the direction of being concerned about scientific methods of investigation that it had lost the capacity to deal with the really significant problems of a sociological character. Too much of the research being done was directed simply to the end of testing the methodological tools being employed. The result only too often was the reporting of things already known about society or, if not known, of such trivial character that they were scarcely worth being made known. Theory as well as research suffered from this concentration upon the study of small, narrowly defined problems of a sort which lent themselves readily to the use of certain approved methods of scientific enquiry. In particular, there was an almost complete failure to grapple with the major problems of historical development.

However justified may have been such criticism of American sociology twenty-three years ago, there would seem to be little basis for similar criticism today. Sociological method, with its vastly improved techniques of investigation, has been made to grapple with problems of almost unlimited scope while theory building, as undertaken by a Talcott Parsons, has become a task which knows no empirical bounds. With this development in theory and method has come a greatly strengthened interest in the use of history. There are few sociologists today who would subscribe to the view that the sociological method limits investigation to the contemporary society. There is nothing in history any longer which would be considered beyond the reach of sociological analysis.

The growing literature in the field of sociological history attests to how effectively history has been made to serve the ends of sociol-

ogical analysis in the work of a number of American sociologists. To mention the names of Reinhard Bendix and Sigmund Diamond should not be taken to imply that the list could be quickly exhausted.

Yet what was said twenty-three years ago with reference to the anti-historical bias of American sociology may not be wholly inappropriate today. Though there has been much talk in recent years about the importance of history to sociology, it is perhaps not unfair to suggest that a good deal of this talk has come from sociologists who themselves have done little or no history. It is now fashionable to pretend an interest in history and so long as such an interest demands nothing more than making use of work already done by the historian it can be subscribed to at no great cost. The question has to be asked, however, whether a good many American sociologists have not become so unhistorical in their way of thinking, and in their methods of investigation, that, in turning to history, they find themselves unable to become sufficient of historians to make effective use of what history has to offer. In effect, the sociologist too often wants to use history without doing history. However much he may talk about the importance of history, the conviction remains strong that there is a difference between sociology and history, that is, between the method of the sociologist and that of the historian.

Park and Burgess had stated this difference, in their textbook which has now become a classic in American sociology, as one between *natural history* and history and, though the difference would not be expressed in this way today, the notion that there is a difference persists. What the historian presumably is interested in are the facts of history; what the sociologist is interested in is the way these facts are related in some sociologically significant pattern. It is unnecessary to argue here how impossible it is to logically distinguish between these two exercises. If pressed probably no sociologist could be found who would insist upon such a distinction. Yet implicitly, whenever they turn to history, many sociologists proceed on the assumption that such a distinction in fact exists.

The result only too often is that the sociologist will not let himself do in the study of past society what he is quite prepared to do in the study of society here and now: be guided to his theory by the facts he discovers as well as to the facts by the theory he has formulated. He will not let himself do this because its doing appears to involve turning himself into an historian. He may, in the manner of the grand theorist, so enclose himself in the armour of his theory that only that part of history which fits into his analytical and empirical framework is taken notice of; the theoretical boxes are filled before

the task of historical investigation is begun. Or he may, like the functional anthropologist, avoid entirely the tangled problem of motion or movement in history by making a study of a society or institution of the past fixed in time. More usually, however, resort is made to what is called the comparative historical method, where developments in one place or time are compared with developments in another. Here the sociologist appears to be exploiting to the full what history has to offer while still avoiding the awful charge that he has become an historian.

There is no suggestion here that great gains have not come from any of these sociological approaches to history. But involved in all of them is the danger of taking on faith a part of the history used. The result can be a gross distortion of the facts upon which the sociologist bases his generalizations. Indeed, what were some of the worst faults of the nineteenth century evolutionists, in the methods they employed, appear in the work today of some of those sociologists who in this fashion have turned to investigation of the historical past. It is perhaps in no way surprising that when Talcott Parsons seeks to incorporate within his general theory a theory of change it is upon the sociology of Herbert Spencer that he largely relies. Spencer was no historian, and with the example of biological evolution before him he perhaps can be forgiven for viewing change in society as being one in the direction of increasing structural differentiation. But by building the process of structural differentiation into his model of social change, Parsons from the very beginning seriously limits the range of historical investigation. Among the changes taking place in society can be discerned certainly changes in the direction of increasing structural differentiation. But so also can be discerned changes of the very opposite character. The fact that the model used excludes consideration of changes of this latter sort cannot be taken as sufficient answer to the charge that what is offered is a distorted picture of what is happening to society as it changes over time. Movements in the direction of increasing structural differentiation (and as well social integration) are intimately related to movements in the opposite direction and any theory of change must be able to account for the one type of movement as well as the other.

Among those sociologists who make no claim to having a general theory of change there is, of course, no such effort as that represented by the sociology of Talcott Parsons to fit all the facts of history into a tight theoretical framework. The problems of investigation undertaken are of a much more modest character. Here what is sought are

theories of social organization or development of what a Merton would call the middle range. Work of this sort thus appears much more defensible than that undertaken within the framework of a general theory.

What cannot be overlooked, however, is that there is here involved, in the effort to select out of history only that part which is considered sociologically relevant, the same danger of forcing the facts of history into a pre-conceived theoretical framework. On the assumption that the peculiar method of sociology is that of comparative analysis, the sociologist only too often proceeds from the very beginning by reliance upon this method, considering the task which comes before, of discovering what are the facts of history, as already done.

Thus can occur that curious joining together of comparative sociological analysis with the most conventional kind of historical analysis. This is not the place to attempt an assessment of work done by the historian as such but this much certainly can be said, that only a small part of that work has been directed towards the investigation of problems of concern to the sociologist. The result is that the latter, where he limits his investigation by the method of comparative analysis, only too often finds himself relying upon what is far from complete information. Meanings of facts change when viewed within a different kind of context. What to the historian may not have been recognized as a fact, or if recognized considered so trivial that it was not taken notice of, may to the sociologist be a fact of enormous significance. Yet such a fact lies buried, unknown to the sociologist, if reliance is placed upon only those facts which come to be reported by the historian. What this can mean is the building up of a body of sociological generalizations on the basis of comparison when what is being compared is not really comparable.

Efforts to examine over a period of time reaching back into history the relationship of social class to voting behaviour afford an example of the hazards involved in this type of comparative sociological analysis. Here the sociologist approaches his task with a fairly good idea of what social class means in his contemporary society and so long as he confines himself to an analysis of the relationship of class to voting in this society as a result he can avoid getting into trouble. Not only is his definition of social class based upon a very substantial knowledge of present-day societies but he can be expected to revise it, in the course of his investigations, if new facts come to light. The moment, however, he turns to history his definition no longer is amenable to change for the reason that he now makes himself dependent upon it for selecting from the facts of history—as set

forward by the historian — those which he considers relevant to the problem at hand. The almost inevitable consequence is the formation of conclusions about the relationship of social class to voting behaviour on the basis of facts which have come to be known through the employment of two very different definitions of social class, the definition of the historian and that of the sociologist.

If Canadian history can be taken as representative, it is not hard to see how seriously misled the sociologist can be who proceeds in this fashion to make a comparative sociological analysis of the relationship of social class to voting behaviour. Canadian history has tended to be written as if social classes were something almost which didn't exist. There are a number of reasons for this. The historian's bias which leads him to place a heavy emphasis upon the role of ideas and leaders may be one. Another are the techniques of investigation upon which he relies resulting in a failure to distinguish clearly between the interests of social class and those other much more prominent interests such as regionalism and religion. But whatever may be the reasons, the fact certainly is that what the historian has done offers no clear picture of the part social class may have played in the forming of men's thoughts and actions in the Canadian political society of the past.

On the other hand, the techniques employed by the sociologist in the study of contemporary society tend perhaps to exaggerate the role played by social class. A man's position in the status hierarchy is something which can be measured and the temptation thus is strong to seize upon such tangible attributes in seeking an explanation of why people behave in the way they do. Be that as it may, certainly few sociologists can be accused of giving insufficient recognition to the fact of class in the organization of society about him. What this can mean, however, the moment he seeks to draw comparisons between the role of social class in society of the past and its role in present day society is the forming of generalizations on the basis of very different kinds of facts. Even more treacherous can be the effort to cast the comparative net beyond the society of one country and treat as meaning the same thing what the historians of different countries have written about social class. To compare the role of social class in the political development of two or more countries assumes a knowledge of the history of these countries such as the sociologist is scarcely likely to have if in his investigations he has strictly limited himself to the problem at hand.

This is not to argue, of course, that the sociologist, in the manner of the antiquarian, should allow himself to be guided by no theory

in his historical investigations. Nor is it to argue, indeed, that in turning to history he should not attempt to take advantage of work already done by the historian if by chance what the historian has done serves fully the purposes of sociological analysis. In the end, sociological historian and historian may become one and, where that happens, the division of labour which results would naturally be on the level of generality of analysis. But this clearly is far from the case today. Historians have not become sociologists and as a consequence sociologists, seeking to use history, have no real choice but to become historians.

It is no answer that the sociologist has no time to do the painstaking task of historical research and that in the interests of an economy of effort it is better that this part of the task of historical comparative analysis be left to the historian. It involved a life-time of work on the part of the late H. A. Innis to re-write the economic history of Canada but economic theory, particularly as it relates to problems of economic development, would be vastly poorer today if work such as this had not been done. It is perhaps no exaggeration to say that what is written into the textbooks of sociology comes almost wholly from the study of contemporary societies, literate and non-literate. The consequences are certain serious misjudgements about the character of society and social change.

The effect in developing within sociological theory a static bias, where emphasis tends to be placed upon the phenomenon of social order at the expense of the phenomenon of social change, is a consideration which need not be gone into here. Of greater concern is the nature of the theory of change which has come out of the way many sociologists have approached the task of historical investigation. Parsons is not alone in his use of a kind of nineteenth century evolutionary theory to account for the character of change over time. There is in the work of a number of sociologists a curious mixture of the sociology of Spencer, Weber and Durkheim which becomes particularly pronounced the moment there is a turning to consideration of developments taking place in the past. It was a crude kind of Spencerian sociology which got written into the Park and Burgess notion of *natural history* but even today, if it is not Spencer alone, it is a compounding of his ideas with those of Weber and Durkheim which determines in large part the nature of the theory of change in much American sociology.

Thus comes the emphasis in the study of American society upon the role of values as a conservative force in social development. Values as they find expression in written records and the speeches of public

men appear as something which change little over time. If attention is fastened upon such values, what Americans believe today seems not greatly different from what they believed almost two hundred years ago when, having got rid of the British with their aristocratic notions of government, they proceeded to establish the institutions of their society on the basis of principles of liberty and equality. Change as it has taken place since in these institutions can be made thus to appear as involving little more than the giving of fuller expression to the basic values of American life.

It is in terms of such a concept of change in American society that what had been elaborated as a theory of social order with a heavy dependence upon Durkheim has been made into a theory of social development with a heavy dependence upon Spencer. In particular, the sociology of Talcott Parsons would appear to have undergone a transformation of this character. This is not the place to argue whether any useful purpose can be served by the effort to erect a general theory of society in the manner undertaken by Parsons. What must be noted, however, is the fact that the Parsonian theory maintains its character of generality only at most in so far as it has to do with the problem of order in society. The moment it becomes a theory of change rather than order it loses its character of generality and takes on a highly particularistic reference. It is a theory which accounts for certain kinds of changes taking place in society but quite clearly not for other kinds.

Given the high rate of growth and general prosperity which has been characteristic of American society in recent years, it is perhaps not surprising that sociologists such as Parsons should mistake as general patterns of change in society certain developments taking place within their own. Something of the same sort of mistake had been made in their different ways by Marx and Weber, and, of course, even more by Herbert Spencer. Thus in the treatment, for instance, of such social phenomena as bureaucracy or social stratification, there is the implicit assumption that what is being looked at is a reflection of tendencies or patterns of change in the organization of society in general. It is hard not to believe that American society compared with other societies represents in some fashion or other a higher stage of development in forms of economic, political and social life.

The difficulty in part comes from the failure to look at the society of the United States as an integral part of a larger society. It is easy enough to believe, for instance, that wide differences in income and styles of life between social classes, and class conflict, are disap-

pearing if attention is confined to the example of American society. Nor is this impression little corrected if what consideration is given to societies in other parts of the world is in the way of comparing these societies with the American rather than treating them as part of the same society. It is in this manner that account can be taken, for instance, of the kinds of developments taking place in Latin America or in the newer nations of Africa without any modification of the conception of development occuring in the American society. No attempt is made to examine what is happening outside the United States as a response to what is happening within and to explore the possibility that social class conflict now finds expression less through the existence within American society of social classes with sharply divided interests than through the existence within the larger society of which American society is a part of such classes. To a very considerable extent the United States has become an area of residence of a privileged social class. To find the people living across the tracks it is now necessary to look beyond the boundaries of the United States.

Much the same can be said of power and the bureaucratic organization of society. To talk of a power vacuum and to describe society in terms of an impersonal bureaucratic structure operating almost automatically without any manifest exercise of power may appear to make sense to an American looking at the state of politics and the organization of economic life within his own society but to a Canadian residing across the border from the United States conscious of the might of the neighbouring republic and of its large industrial and financial corporations there can be little doubt where power resides. What American sociology perhaps needs more than anything else is a new Frederick Jackson Turner to call attention to the importance of the forces developing within what have become the new frontiers of the western world. A greater recognition of these forces would result certainly in the treating more skeptically conclusions regarding the nature of bureaucratic organization, social stratification and such other features of modern society drawn from the study of the society of the United States. There is the very real danger that a whole generation of American sociologists will be misled by Parson's insistence on treating American society as a boundary maintaining social system.

It is not ethnocentrism alone, however, which accounts for this failure on the part of a number of American sociologists to recognize that what they are treating as developments of a general character are in fact developments of a highly particularistic kind. The determination to view society as an orderly social system has led to an

unwillingness to look beyond those nice comfortable segments of the American society itself where talk about integration and consensus appear to have some meaning and examine within the same theoretical framework those areas of the society characterized by disintegration and conflict. A sociology of deviance has been made to account for what it is in the society that is not liked. Thus emerges a conception of change as development in the direction of increasing rationality in human affairs. It is this sort of conception of evolutionary change which has largely determined the way in which a number of American sociologists have approached the study of the development of their society.

It would be beyond the limits of space imposed on this paper to attempt to indicate the kind of things the sociologist can learn from history if prepared to explore all the various avenues of historical investigation without regard to where those avenues may lead. But this much perhaps can be said. What he almost certainly can learn is that what has happened in society in the past was not greatly different from what is happening now. There has always appeared to man something mysterious about his past and from this feeling many sociologists have not escaped. What spreads back behind—the society of the past—seems much more forbidding than what spreads before—the society of the present. Thus methods of investigation which are used with great confidence in exploring the society today come to be considered inadequate when there is a turning to an exploration of the past. What now seems to be required is not a theory to guide the way but a theory which will determine the precise route to be followed. Even Barrington Moore Jr., though arguing valiantly the need for the sociologist to make greater use of history, feels nevertheless compelled to advance as a condition of such use a general sociological theory of historical development. Long scorning history, the danger in sociology today perhaps is in expecting from history more than it has to offer.

In the end, the chief contribution which can be made by investigation of a sociological historical character may be that simply of calling into question many of the theories about society now held. But if this is so, it is as it should be. History has not one social theory to offer, the study of present-day society another; which is simply another way of saying that there is no such thing as a theory of social change as such. In studying the past the sociologist must find himself doing nothing different from what he is doing when studying society here and about. And he must expect no more miraculous results from his investigations. There is no theory to be discovered

which will unlock the gates of history. The most any theory can do is guide the investigator to certain historical facts. If such a theory is not to be made a dead thing investigation must be pushed on to other facts and to the development of other theories.

What this means is that there is nothing in history that the sociologist can safely disregard. If he is to use history he must be prepared to do history without fear of being charged that he has become an historian. There are involved, of course, perils of no inconsiderable sort. It is easy to get bogged down in historical facts. But so as well is it easy to get bogged down in facts about society of the present. There can be no abandonment of theory in investigation of an historical or non-historical character. But, on the other hand, there can be no enslavement to it.

This paper began with a reference to American sociology as it was twenty-three years ago. It can well conclude with a similar reference. In their concentration upon the problems of the immediate society about them the instincts of sociologists of that time were essentially sound. The whole vast American continent was a problem area and particularly that part of it of which Chicago was the centre and it would have been strange, indeed, if American sociology had assumed a character very different from what it did. The sociology of Park has led naturally to the sociology of Parsons with the kinds of changes which have taken place within American society over the past quarter century. There has grown as could be expected an increasing concern with the character of the forces which have shaped this society. Out of micro-sociology has developed a macro-sociology. The new approach has given emphasis to new kinds of limitations not too unlike those characteristic of the sociology of the grand theory of the nineteenth century. The growing interest in historical investigation has been a welcome consequence of the new macro approach but it is in the type of historical investigation undertaken that the limitations of this approach most clearly show up. This paper has been concerned with these limitations. It can scarcely overlook, however, the importance of the advance which has been made. Whatever the limitations of some of the work now being done, there has come from the new strengthening interest in historical investigation a greatly strengthened sociology. And the move forward is not likely to stop at the point of advance now reached. It is hard to believe that the sociologist who has turned to history will remain for long so little curious about the facts of history that he will be content to leave to others the task of historical research. The sociologist who uses history is almost bound in the end to find himself doing history.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIAL POLICY
IN ENGLAND, 1800-1914

Notes on a sociological approach to a problem in historical explanation

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I

«Social policy» is used here to refer to the various public provisions which were made during the period in question in response to such recognised social problems as mass povery, insanitary living conditions and high rates of mortality, inadequate educational standards, and iniquitous and debilitating conditions of work. It thus embraces the whole range of social security legislation, public health and housing legislation, legislation relating to educational provision, and factory and labour legislation generally.

Both sociologists and historians have brought out in various ways the importance of the ideological and institutional changes which were involved in this process of ever increasing state intervention in social and economic affairs. Several writers, for example, have been concerned to show how the development of social policy in the nineteenth century was largely responsible for a transformation in the functions and structure of executive government in Great Britain. It has been described how, at the same time as the rate and scope of legislative activity increased, an extensive and intricate system of public administration was built up. One marked legislative tendency was, in fact, that towards the continual development and improvement of the mechanism of government itself. Thus, by the early twentieth century, a large and complex governmental bureaucracy had come into existence and administrative authorities had been given both quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers [1]. Other writers, looking at the matter from a somewhat different angle, have drawn attention to the way in which social welfare

(1) See, for example, K. B. SMELLIE, *A Hundred Years of English Government*, 1950.

legislation brought about a fairly drastic redefinition of the powers attaching to private property. Public health and factory legislation, for instance, imposed considerable restrictions on the individual's right to «do what he liked with his own». Again, provision for social security and state education not only helped to lessen inequalities in individuals' economic life-chances but were also associated with increasingly heavy and graded taxation which itself both further reduced economic inequality and further limited the extent to which property could be used for private profit. Thus, as W. Friedmann has pointed out, legal developments in Great Britain from the nineteenth century onwards provide the first effective answer to the Marxian view of the functions of law in capitalist society: instead of serving solely to buttress the existing economic and political order, law can in this be clearly seen as «an increasingly active and articulate agent of social change»[2]. Finally, one might note, the development of social policy has also been seen as important in regard to the integration of industrial societies. T.H. Marshall, for example, has argued that through the social welfare legislation of the nineteenth and earlier twentieth centuries, Englishmen were guaranteed *social* rights which complemented and made more meaningful the civil and political rights they had earlier secured; parallel, thus, with an inegalitarian money economy there was established an egalitarian system of «citizenship», implying the full and equal membership of all in the national community[3]. This and similar developments in other western countries have been regarded by a number of writers as specially relevant in accounting for the fact that, contrary to Marxian theory, capitalist society has not been disrupted by proletarian revolution: rather than the proletariat being driven by increasing misery into rebellion against the existing order, this order has been sufficiently modified to make possible what Reinhard Bendix has called «the civic reintegration of the industrial work force»[4].

The growth of social policy in nineteenth century Britain must then on several counts be recognised as a highly significant process of social change. Yet it is the case that at the present time an adequate interpretive account of this process is still to be given. For the

(²) Cf. W. FRIEDMANN, 'The Functions of Property in Modern English Law' in *Law and Social Change in Contemporary Britain*, 1951. See especially pp. 32-33.

(³) T. H. MARSHALL, *Citizenship and Social Class*, 1950.

(⁴) See his *Work and Authority in Industry*, 1956, pp. 434 ff. See also in this connection Ralf DAHRENDORF, *Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society*, 1959, pp. 61-64.

most part, the conventional history which has dealt with the transition from *«laissez-faire»* to «state interventionism» has been essentially descriptive — written, in fact, chiefly in terms of major legislative landmarks — and where explanation *has* been attempted, this has been of a highly *ad hoc* kind. Only recently have certain historians sought to go beyond this and to provide at least a basis for a more systematic treatment. In this paper it is hoped to show that this new approach rests upon a specific sociological orientation which, while pointing the way to far more thoughtful and revealing history, has at the same time created difficulties and dangers for historians which must be recognised and overcome if the promise of the new departure is to be fulfilled.

II

In order to appreciate the value of recent developments in the historiography of the nineteenth century «revolution in government» it is important first of all to have some idea of its previous unsatisfactory state. The loose and confused nature of historical thought in this connection was in fact frankly pointed out by a practising historian, Dr. Oliver MacDonagh, in a paper published as late as 1958 [5]. MacDonagh notes that most historians take it for granted that in nineteenth century England a profound transformation in government occurred; but, he argues, this assumption is made far too casually, with little consideration given to its meaning and implications:

> «If my hypothetical (but, I trust, existent) historians were asked why they believed the nineteenth century change [in government] to be revolutionary, they would very likely think of the terminal conditions — the *ancien regime* of the early nineteenth century and the current paraphernalia of the collectivist state — and truly observe that so extraordinary contrast implies a revolution in the middle. But if they were pressed to explain its cause or nature, they might well find that the answers sleeping in their minds are unco-ordinated and interminable. A common list might run as follows: the Northcote-Trevelyan inquiries and recommendations; the Crimean scandals; the doctrine of utilitarianism; the sentiment of humanitarianism; the new economic relationships and the living and working conditions born of wages contracts, urbanization and industrialized environments; and

[5] 'The Nineteenth-Century Revolution in Government: A Reappraisal', *The Historical Journal*, Vol. I, no. I, 1958.

the implications for executive government of the process of political change initiated by «economical reform» or 1832 or what one will» [6].

As MacDonagh points out, however, such simple enumeration of «factors», no matter how extended, can never constitute satisfactory explanation. To begin with, the «factors» listed in such cases are usually on quite different levels of analysis. In some instances the reference is to specific historical events, in others to trends of thought or belief summed up in a single word, and in others still to complex processes of social change similarly conceptualized on a relatively high plane of abstraction. This, however, goes for the most part unrecognised, and there is no attempt made to clarify matters by suggesting how various «factors» are articulated one with another, or how exactly they operated, or how they might be ordered in terms of their respective «weights».

Furthermore, a particularly serious danger which arises from such an haphazard and uncritical approach is that certain explanatory elements may be given great prominence (others being perhaps thereby neglected) for no explicit or well considered reason. In the case in point this has, I believe, happened in one notable respect: that is, in regard to the emphasis which has commonly been placed on the influence of certain social and political «thinkers» and the «schools» with which they are associated. The source of this emphasis is probably to be traced back to a single outstanding work; namely, A. V. Dicey's *Law and Public Opinion in England in the Nineteenth Century,* which was first published in 1905. This book represents in fact the only major study which has so far been specifically devoted to the changing functions of the British state during the period in question. But, significantly, Dicey was not a conventional historian: primarily he was a lawyer and a student of political ideas, and this particular orientation manifestly colours his entire treatment of his subject.

The major thesis advanced by Dicey was that in the recent history of England the course of legislation had in general been closely related to trends in public opinion or, at least, to trends in the opinion of those citizens who took an active part in public life. In addition to this, however, Dicey put forward the further argument that, for the most part, the dominant forms of such «legislative opinion» had originated in the thought of some small number of pre-eminent intellectual figures — philosophers, jurists, social theorists etc. In

[6] *Ibid.,* p. 53.

his view it was only rarely, if ever, that «a widespread conviction has grown up spontaneously among the multitude»: it was rather the case that, in the words of John Stuart Mill, «The initiation of all wise and noble things, comes and must come, from individuals; generally at first from some one individual» [7]. It is true that Dicey saw the need to show how the ideas of the great thinkers were propagated, and that he recognised that whatever their intellectual cogency, such ideas would not achieve their fullest power until their relevance was made manifest by changing «circumstances». He also made the qualification that while law was basically dependent upon opinion, laws could in turn «foster and create law making opinion». Nevertheless, in Dicey's account of the nineteenth century revolution in government, of which the making of social policy is seen as a central feature, it is still individual thinkers who are the heroes and it is their philosophies and doctrines which appear as the ultimate agencies of social change.

Now few would wish to deny that considered as a study of the interrelationships between social, political and legal ideas in nineteenth century England, Dicey's work has distinctive merit and value. But what is extremely dangerous about *Law and Opinion* is that it was intended to be more than simply intellectual and legal history; or, at least, it is so written as to give a quite definite impression of seeking to be more than this. Indeed, as has been implied, one can easily derive from Dicey's book a fairly well defined «model» of the actual way in which the transformation of government is supposed to have been brought about: briefly, law is chiefly shaped by trends in public opinion, and these in turn are ultimately determined by the new ideas conceived and propounded by great men; thus, as social and political thought became in this way redirected from individualism towards collectivism, a collectivist «legislative opinion» was formed and, subsequently, a collectivist state emerged [8].

If, however, Dicey's work is to be judged on *this* basis, then undoubtedly it must be regarded as a far less impressive contribution — if only on account of its very obvious and serious omissions. Clearly, for example, an adequate explanation of the transformation of British government in the nineteenth century cannot be given without extensive reference to the concurrent transformation of British society: yet Dicey has very little indeed to say about population growth, the development of industrial organization, urbani-

[7] *Op.cit.*, p. 22.
[8] Dicey's views in this respect are most clearly and systematically set out in the second chapter of his book (pp. 22 ff.).

zation and so on. It is also quite apparent that there were many other kinds of men than social and political thinkers who had an important part to play in the changes in question — but Dicey virtually ignores the civil servants, the doctors and engineers, the social investigators, the organizers and managers of reformist pressure groups. Still further blank spots in Dicey's work are that we learn nothing at all about the conditions of success or failure in the political in-fighting which determined whether legislative measures were passed or defeated, given «teeth» or rendered innocuous; and nothing either about the internal dynamics of governmental bureaucracies, which would certainly appear a far from negligible matter in accounting for their increasing sway[9].

Considered then as an attempt at a systematic explanation of the nineteenth century revolution in government, *Law and Opinion* is unquestionably inadequate. Yet the significant point remains that Dicey's work has exercised an influence from which historians of the nineteenth century have found it hard to escape. As MacDonagh has remarked, Dicey's book was «first in the field (and) has dominated it ever since». Thus, until very recently at any rate, in the majority of interpretations offered of «the decline of *laissez-faire*» it was still changing currents of articulate opinion and sentiment which figured most prominently, and the names which were most frequently encountered were either those of the intellectual heroes themselves — Bentham, John Stuart Mill, Owen, Kingsley, Southey, T. H. Green — or of men such as Chadwick or Lord Shaftesbury who were treated as being virtual incarnations of a philosophy. The way in which any discussions of the changing economic and social structure of Britain entered into such accounts was usually as a kind of backdrop against which the thought and actions of these giants could be displayed; and, as was indicated earlier, where the importance of any other «factors» was acknowledged, these were generally left quite uncoordinated with the main line of argument.

III

Here then was the point of departure for a more sociologically oriented approach: an approach, that is, which would treat the growth

[9] See in this respect MACDONAGH's study of the development of the Emigration Office, *A Pattern of Government Growth: The Passenger Acts and their Enforcement, 1800-1860*, 1961; also, Roger PROUTY, *The Transformation of the Board of Trade, 1830-1835*, 1957.

of social policy in nineteenth century England as a complex process of social change to be interpreted as an integral part of a general pattern of development of the society as a whole, rather than as the resultant, simply, of shifts in dominant modes of thought and belief.

Significantly, perhaps, the historians who pioneered such an approach did so not in a strictly academic capacity but to some extent at least as participants in a political controversy. They were in fact men of generally left-wing sympathies, writing during the later years of the second world war and the subsequent period of Labour rule, and concerned with counteracting an extremist liberal view of the origins and implications of the planned economy and the welfare state. Three contributions which may be taken as being of particular note are Karl Polanyi's *The Great Transformation*, published in 1944, H. L. Beales' Hobhouse Memorial Lecture of 1945 on «The Making of Social Policy» and E. H. Carr's *The New Society*, published in 1951.

The position against which the animus of all these writers was commonly directed was one that had been taken up by a series of die-hard anti-collectivists from Herbert Spencer down to contemporaries such as Ludwig von Mises and F. A. Hayek. In brief, the argument of the latter was that collectivist policies had become prevalent in England primarily as the result of the concerted pressures exercised by a number of powerful interest groups — trade unions, manufacturers' associations, monopolists, agrarian interests, etc. — all of which were hostile to a system of economic liberalism that would allow them no more than their due share in the growing prosperity of their society. By pursuing their own narrowly conceived ends, often under the name of nationalism or socialism, these groups, it was argued, had brought about a continual increase in the power of the state which had not only destroyed the possibility of a genuinely free society and opened the way to totalitarianism, but which had also blighted the prospects of further material advance; the economic difficulties experienced by Great Britain from the later nineteenth century onwards, stemmed, in this view, not from «unregulated capitalism» but rather from collectivist interference with the self-regulating market system [10].

In opposition to this argument the men of the left put forward a powerful counter-interpretation. Basically, this rested on the thesis that the idea of a society organized strictly in accordance with the principles of economic liberalism was entirely Utopian. Thus, the

[10] See, for example, Herbert SPENCER, *The Man versus the State*, 1884; Ludwig VON MISES, *Socialism*, 1936; and F. A. HAYEK, *The Road to Serfdom*, 1944, especially Ch. I, 'The Abandoned Road.'

development of different forms of collective action which denied these principles was not to be explained in terms of any supposed anti-liberal conspiracy but simply in terms of its necessity. Polanyi, for example, claims as «the one comprehensive feature» of the history of the nineteenth century the fact that «Society protected itself against the perils inherent in a self-regulating market system»[11]; such action was inevitable, otherwise the system «would have physically destroyed man and transformed his surroundings into a wilderness»[12]. In Beales' essay particular stress is laid on the necessity for state action to counteract the uncertainty and insecurity of life in the new industrial society and also to reduce the enormous social waste and inefficiency to which *laissez-faire* had given rise[13]. In Carr's work the main emphasis is on the crucial importance of state intervention in preventing class antagonism from resulting in open rebellion and the complete disruption of the prevailing social order[14].

The starting point of all these writers is then with the condition of English society in the period following the industrial revolution — with the facts of the vast increase in population, the spread of factory production, the anarchic growth of towns, mass illiteracy, the existence of widespread poverty in the midst of growing plenty and the deep and threatening social cleavages which were thus produced. Given these facts, the argument then runs, the development of social policy, implying the greater power of the state and the limitation of property rights, was no less than a social imperative.

Consistently with this general approach, thus, the writers in question give little place in their analysis to the influence of abstract ideas or principles or for that matter to the growth of humanitarianism and of a generally more refined social conscience. In their view social policy was made not in accordance with any body of articulate thought or belief but rather in an essentially *ad hoc* and piecemeal manner — as and when its necessity became manifest. To quote Polanyi:

> 'The legislative spearhead of the countermovement against a self-regulating market as it developed in the half-century following 1860 turned out to be spontaneous, undirected by opinion, and actuated by a purely pragmatic spirit'[15].

[11] *Op.cit.*, p. 76.
[12] *Ibid.*, p. 3.
[13] *Op.cit.*, pp. 5-6 esp.
[14] Cf. *op.cit.*, p. 26.
[15] *Op.cit.*, p. 141.

and then a little further on,

> 'The antiliberal conspiracy is pure invention. The great variety of forms
> in which the collectivist countermovement appeared was not due to
> any preference for socialism or nationalism on the part of concerted
> interests, but exclusively to the broader range of the vital social in-
> terests affected by the expanding market mechanism. This accounts
> for the all but universal reactions of predominantly practical character
> called forth by the expansion of that mechanism. Intellectual fashions
> played no role whatever in this process...' [16].

Beales and Carr would both, it seems, largely support contentions
of this kind, and both show a particular concern with playing down
the significance of increasing humanitarian sentiment among the
British ruling class. In the words of Beales, for example,

> 'The various branches of our social policy are not mere sweeteners
> of the hard rigours of a system of individualist compulsions. They
> represent social provision against waste of life and resources and
> against social inefficiency — not concessions' [17].

Finally, one should note that in seeking to confirm the validity of
this general interpretation, its exponents have characteristically ad-
vanced two further arguments, both of which are also of interest
here. In the first place they have pointed to the fact that by the end
of the nineteenth century «collectivist» legislation covered an amazing
diversity of matters and that a series of instances are to be found
of sudden, but usually unapplauded, shifts from «liberal» to col-
lectivist solutions of persistent social problems. Moreover, it is noted
that often in such cases the collectivist measures taken had the sup-
port of men who were themselves, in principle, firm adherents of the
liberal creed. Here, then, it is claimed is detailed evidence of the
essentially pragmatic — yet inevitable — way in which collectivism
developed: a wide range of problems existed which *had* to be dealt
with, and the collectivist approach consistently proved to be the
most, if not the only, effective one. In other words, social problems
came first, social philosophy after [18].

The second of the arguments in question rests on comparisons
made between developments in England and in other European coun-
tries which also became relatively highly industrialized during the

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 145.

[17] *Op.cit.*, p. 9. Cf. CARR, *op.cit.*, pp. 46 ff.

[18] Two instances of the abrupt but virtually general acceptance of collec-
tivist principles in legislation which are frequently used relate to the in-
troduction of workmen's compensation and wage regulation.

nineteenth century. In all these latter cases, it is pointed out, there took place a marked increase in the extent of state intervention in economic and social affairs basically the same as that which is to be observed in England. Although there were differences in timing and many variations in the particular forms of the measures taken, it would still be true to say that «The same broad developments occurred in all the leading industrial countries...» [19]. Thus, it is held, one has here still further proof that the creation of an effective social policy is a necessary process in an advanced society; and, by the same token, that this process is not ultimately dependent upon any particular political or ideological configuration. As Polanyi puts it:

'Victorian England and the Prussia of Bismarck were poles apart, and both were very much unlike the France of the Third Republic or the Empire of the Hapsburgs. Yet each of them passed through a period of free trade and *laissez-faire*, followed by a period of antiliberal legislation in regard to public health, factory conditions, municipal trading, social insurance, shipping subsidies, public utilities, trade associations and so on... The supporting forces were in some cases violently reactionary and antisocialist as in Vienna, at other times «radical imperialist» as in Birmingham, or of the purest liberal hue as with the Frenchman, Edouard Herriot, Mayor of Lyons... Thus under the most varied slogans, with very different motivations a multitude of parties and social strata put into effect almost exactly the same measures in a series of countries in respect to a large number of complicated subjects. There is, on the face of it, nothing more absurd than to infer that they were secretly actuated by the same ideological preconceptions or narrow group interests as the legend of antiliberal conspiracy would have it. On the contrary, everything tends to support the assumption that objective reasons of a stringent nature forced the hands of the legislators.

Thus, in their attempts to discredit the extreme liberal view of the origins of the collectivist state, the historians of the left arrived at an interpretation of the making of social policy which in the language of modern sociology would be termed «functionalist». Some form of relatively extensive public provision against the disruptive, wasteful and debilitating tendencies within industrial, and particularly capitalist, society is taken as being in some sense a functional «prerequisite» or «imperative» for the continuing existence and development of such society. In this view, then, the explanation of the growth of such provision is *ultimately* to be given not in terms of the ideas and beliefs of individuals, nor yet in terms of particular group interests and pressures; but, rather, in terms of the objective

[19] CARR. *op.cit.*, p. 29. Cf. also BEALES, *op.cit.*, p. 7.

«demands» of certain social situations which are seen as virtually imposing particular courses of action.

IV

As most sociologists would perhaps now agree, however, a functionalist orientation may at the same time be both rewarding and misleading; in certain respects it may result in thought and research being directed into new and more profitable lines, while in others it may serve merely to confuse and obscure important issues. At all events, this would seem to be true in the case in question. The approach which is taken up in the work of Polanyi, Beales and Carr has been reflected in a number of recent and much more detailed studies of the growth of social policy, and it is through these, in particular, that both the value and the difficulties which are implicit in this approach have been most apparent[20].

On the positive side, undoubtedly the main point is that much more attention than previously has been given to the description and analysis of actual social conditions and the social problems which arose out of these; also, to the study of the men who were called upon to grapple with these problems firsthand and in a practical manner — administrators, government inspectors, technical experts and professionals of various kinds[21]. In this way the previous overemphasis on great thinkers and their influence on what must have been a relatively small circle of opinion has been usefully corrected[22].

Furthermore, through starting with objective social realities, rather than with the discussion of ideas and beliefs in the abstract, historians have achieved a more balanced and refined understanding of the relationship of ideas and beliefs to action. It has been recognized,

[20] See, for example, M. Bruce, *The Coming of the Welfare State*, 1961; also the important study of David Roberts, *Victorian Origins of the British Welfare State, 1960*. A further useful discussion of developments in the middle decades of the nineteenth century is provided in G. Kitson Clark's *The Making of Victorian England*, 1962.

[21] In this respect Roberts' book is outstanding. Another recent study, Herman Ansubel's *In Hard Times*, 1960, is devoted to the analysis of the aims, motives and methods of late Victorian «reformers» of all kinds.

[22] Several recent writers have in fact been explicitly concerned to point out the danger of 'over-intellectualizing' the account of how the 'revolution in government' occurred. Cf. Mac Donagh, *art.cit.*, p. 65; also Kitson Clark, *op. cit.*, pp. 19-20.

for example, that the conduct of many of those who played a leading role in the making of social policy was directed far more by convictions which sprang immediately from their own social experience than it was by the economic and political doctrines to which they would have acknowledged allegiance; and, moreover, that this was so even when, as frequently happened, experience and doctrine were in head-on conflict [23]. In other words, it has been appreciated that, *pace* Dicey, new and compelling ideas and beliefs *can* arise «spontaneously» among a relatively large number of persons, given that they are regularly confronted with, and required to act in, social situations which pose essentially similar problems and challenges. Instead, then, of modes of thought and opinion being treated as virtually autonomous elements in the process of social change, historians have now moved on to consider how changing social conditions and ways of life can *force* men to think in new ways and to adopt new attitudes and values in relation to the world about them, at the same time as the inadequacy and irrelevance of old conceptions are being effectively demonstrated.

Finally, one should note one other highly favourable consequence of the shift in emphasis from currents of thought and opinion to social conditions and problems: that is, the increased interest in *comparative* studies of the changing functions of government in course of industrialization. Dicey's work, through its very conception, was essentially insular; but, as was seen earlier, it is extremely important to a functionalist interpretation of the growth of social policy to show that this occurs in response to certain basic needs which are common to industrial societies generally. From this point of view, thus, it is desirable, in order to understand correctly the experience of England, to see this in relation to the experience of other countries such as Germany, Belgium, France and the United States [24].

These, then, are probably the chief ways in which the new approach has proved of value and has led to more sophisticated and illuminating history. Next, however, one must consider the difficulties and dangers which arise in the functionalist argument and what is required if these are to be overcome.

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[23] Cf. ROBERTS, *op.cit.*, pp. 181-183 esp.

[24] Cf. Asa BRIGGS, 'The Welfare State in Historical Perspective', *Archives Européennes de Sociologie*, Tome II, No. 2, 1961.

V

The first of the difficulties will have a familiar sound to students of sociological theory: it concerns the meaning that is to be given to the idea of a functional imperative. In the case in point, what exactly is to be understood by the claim that in an industrial society, such as England became in the nineteenth century, some form of social policy is «necessary» ? The answers which have so far been given to this question (and most often no answer has been offered at all) are far from clear. In some cases, notably with Polanyi, the suggestion would seem to be that if the state had not increasingly intervened in economic and social affairs in the way in which it did, then the result would have been one of complete social collapse. Polanyi has, for example, already been quoted to the effect that, in the absence of state intervention, the self-regulating market system «would have physically destroyed man and transformed his surroundings into a wilderness». But the problem here is that there appears to be no way of ever confirming or invalidating an argument of this kind. As critics of functionalism have repeatedly pointed out, it is hard to see how one could ever *demonstrate* that *particular* social processes are essential for the actual physical survival of a society in the same way as one can demonstrate the necessity of particular biological processes for the survival of an organism; for leaving aside the impracticability of controlled experiment in sociology, one could never be sure that one had taken into account the full range of alternatives to the process in question which could conceivably make societal survival possible at some level or other [25].

However, what the notion of the «necessity» of social policy is most commonly intended to imply is probably something a good deal less extreme than Polanyi's contention. It is, one would suggest, that the development of social policy was necessary for the maintenance of a certain kind of society conducive to the achievement of certain ulterior ends held to a large extent in common by the members of that society: for example, such ends as political stability, continuing technical and economic progress, the preservation of national power and prestige and so on. In other words, when it is said by historians that a particular social problem «*had* to be dealt with» or that a particular piece of legislation was «imperative» or «inevitable», what, apparently, is meant is that the alternative to action of the kind

[25] See, for example, the recent criticism of functionalism by John REX in his book, *Key Problems of Sociological Theory*, 1961, Ch. IV.

taken was such as to be clearly incompatible with the ends of those, at least, who were in a position to make the effective decision. In this case, then, the argument is not that without the development of social policy in nineteenth century England the very existence of society would have been threatened; but, rather, that without this, certain goals to which a general public commitment had been made could not have been attained [26].

If this is in fact the way in which it is intended that the «necessity» of social policy should be understood (and it would seeem to be the only useful way), it is then important that this should be recognized and made quite explicit. For once this is done, historians will no longer be able to offer «explanations» of the making of social policy in such terms as «Inevitably, society took measures to protect itself...», or «Industrialisation forced reformation in government», or (in regard to some abuse) «the nineteenth century would not allow it to continue» [27]: — that is, explanation of a metaphysical and entirely uninformative kind to which an unthinking and uncritical functionalist approach is always likely to give rise. They will find it necessary, rather, not only to show the existence of a social problem but, also, how this was made known to contemporaries and how the gravity of its consequences was brought home to those in positions of influence and authority. Furthermore, it will be an important part of their explanation to make clear what were the kinds of conditions under which decisive state intervention in economic and social affairs *would tend to be regarded* as imperative. In other words, they must consider such questions as: what kind of case had reformers to be able to make out in order to prevail against vested interests opposed to reform, or even simply inertia ? What, in fact, were the ends to which social policy had convincingly to be related before its «necessity» was accepted ?

A second difficulty which arises with a functionalist interpretation of the growth of social policy derives from the fact that an explanation of this kind must, it seems, remain on a fairly high level of generality. Thus, it is not in itself sufficient to account for the specific institutional forms in which the historian, at least, is primarily interested. For example, it may on one level be adequate to explain the development of the English educational system in the nineteenth century by saying that in a society committed to continuing technological and economic progress, it is functionally necessary that

[26] Cf. REX, *op.cit.*, p. 72.
[27] See, for example, POLANYI, *op.cit.*, p. 3; PROUTY, *op.cit.*, p. 106; ROBERTS, *op.cit.*, p. 99.

provision should be made to ensure both mass literacy and a growing supply of persons with advanced and specialist training. Such an argument could be supported through comparisons with the experience of other industrializing countries. But an explanation in this form would not be very enlightening in regard to the particular nature of the educational institutions which were evolved in England as opposed, say, to those established in France or Germany [28].

What one would suggest here is that in order to account for the specific pattern of educational development in England it is again necessary to move away from a funtionalist frame of reference and to think, rather, in terms of the purposive actions of individuals and groups in pursuit of their ends — though in this case with the emphasis on the diversity of these. In other words, it would seem necessary to take into consideration the prevailing cleavages and tension within English society in the period in question and to examine the part played in the making of educational policy by the contending interest groups which arose out of these. For it is indeed evident, even from a cursory examination of the history of English education in the nineteenth century, that the pattern of institutional change was at all times and to an important degree determined by the shifting balance of power between rival factions, set in opposition to each other by difference of class, religion and culture as well as of politics [29]. And similarly it is clear in regard to other aspects of social policy that the particular course of development followed must again be interpreted as in large part the outcome of successive encounters between various sectional groups pursuing different and often conflicting objectives. Public health legislation, factory and labour legislation, the provisions made for social security were all to some degree or other created out of a process struggle and compromise.

This fact has not, of course, entirely escaped the historians; every account of the development of social policy contains some reference to the public controversies and parliamentary battles which were fought out over crucial issues. Nonetheless, there still remains much to be done by way of clarifying what exactly was the range of interests involved in given cases, how these were aligned, and how the resulting configuration of forces determined the specific form

[28] The highly general, and thus 'incomplete' nature of functional explanation in sociology has been rigorously demonstrated by Carl HEMPEL. See his paper 'The Logic of Functional Analysis' in L. GROSS (ed.), *Symposium on Sociological Theory*, 1959. See p. 296 esp.

[29] Cf. REX, *op.cit.*, pp. 182-183.

of policy made. The danger in a too crudely functionalist approach is that these matters will be neglected and that it will be implicitly assumed that «whatever was, was necessary» [30]. A related danger which should also be noted is that inadequate attention may be given to cases where there were serious «lags» in the development of social policy — that is, where obvious and acute social problems existed over long periods without any effective counter-measures being taken. Here, in particular, it would seem important to think in terms of contending interest groups and the balance of power between them.

It is then suggested that in two different ways a functionalist explanation of the development of social policy requires to be refined and supplemented through analysis which takes an «action» frame of reference; that is analysis in terms of the ends of individuals and groups rather than in terms of the «needs» of society considered as a whole. The «necessity» of social policy, it has been argued, must be seen as necessity in relation to certain ulterior objectives to which the members of a society are committed, and must also be taken to refer only to the general nature of the provisions in question, not to the specific institutional forms through which such provisions were made in any given case; these, rather must also be interpreted as the outcome of purposive action, but action directed towards a diversity of ends. If these modifications can be incorporated, the sociological approach to the problem of the development of social policy can become still more effective and direct the way to still more sophisticated and penetrating history.

[30] Cf. Gertrude WILLIAMS, review of Bruce, *op.cit.*, in *British Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XIII, No. 2, June 1962, pp. 177-178.

REPORT ON THE DISCUSSION

Chairman : R. BENDIX, University of California, Berkeley
Rapporteur: J. BURNET, University of Toronto

In this session S. D. Clark, J. H. Goldthorpe, A. Okulov, R. Bendix, D. Rüschemeyer presented the essential points of their papers.

The discussion was opened by T. H. Marshall who pointed out that the papers had all had a bearing upon the problem of functionalism. He commented particularly on J. H. Goldthorpe's and D. Rüschemeyer's papers, indicating that the development of social policy and of the legal profession could fruitfully be related in Great Britain and in Germany. J. A. Ponsioen raised the question of what conclusions concerning the nature and problems of sociological theory and especially concerning the historical and comparative approach, could be drawn from the morning's papers. He held that only A. Okulov's touched upon basic methodological problems, although he felt that Marxism should be regarded as a hypothesis rather than a necessary assumption. S. Kincheloe questioned statements made by S. D. Clark concerning the difference between natural history and history and by R. Bendix concerning the concept of ideal types. In reply S. D. Clark asserted that there was no clear distinction between sociological history and history, although in practice they might aim at different levels of generality. R. Bendix expressed his unwillingness to argue over words, suggesting, however, that since «ideal type» had some awkward connotations he preferred «bench-mark», and concluded by reiterating the importance of comparative studies for clarifying concepts, which was an essential step in the development of satisfactory theories to explain the transformations of society. The Chairman then declared the session adjourned.

FUNCTIONALISM
FONCTIONALISME

NOTES ON FUNCTIONALISM AND SCIENTIFIC ANALYSIS

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INTRODUCTION

As points of departure in these notes I shall take two groups of
concepts: (a) «functionalism», whose literature commands such great
attention in sociology and anthropology; (b) the method of scientific
explanation. By scientific explanation I refer to the creation of
models of necessary and sufficient conditions (independent variables)
that account for posited or observed empirical regularities (dependent
variables). Although the functionalist literature is purportedly scien-
tific, it is frequently so polemical, unwieldy, and confused that the
scientific relevance of the discussions escapes the reader. My objective
is to explore the relevance of many concepts associated with function-
alism for the scientific explanation of social phenomena.

This approach is a limited one. I shall not investigate the historical
background of functionalist thought, its philosophical foundations
or its moral implications. Nor shall I summarize the elements com-
mon to all functionalist thought. (In any case this would be an almost
insurmountable task, since, as Professor Martindale has observed, al-
most everything modern in social science has been called «function-
alist» at one time or another.) I shall illustrate my remarks mainly
by referring to the functionalism associated with Radcliffe-Brown and
his followers, and the «structural-functional» analysis associated with
Parsons, Merton, Levy, and others.

First we must distinguish among three aspects of the functionalist
literature itself: (a) discussions of the criteria for scientific expla-
nation; (b) discussions of functionalism as a «school»; (c) actual re-
search conducted by those who call themselves — or who are called —

functionalists. Later these distinctions will be helpful in sorting out some of the reigning confusions about functionalism.

(a) Discussions of the criteria for scientific explanation. These discussions, methodological in character, occur frequently in the writings of proponents and opponents of functionalist thought. The criteria in question involve the formation of logically interrelated propositions that are to be tested empirically under controlled conditions. Common modes of controlling empirical conditions are experimentation, statistical manipulation, and comparative systematic illustration.

(b) Discussions of functionalism as a «school». The functionalist literature contains many assertions about the objectives of social science, statements justifying the use of certain categories, and statements defending or attacking functionalism or some alternative school. Such statements, however important they may be from some standpoints, are not scientific in the above sense.

(c) Actual research. In practice, functionalists have chosen to analyze structures that persist in societies, rather than those that change. In addition, functionalists have chosen to engage in a sort of «partial equilibrium» analysis, in which the relations of only a few institutional complexes — rather than whole societies — are explored. As we shall see later, neither of these choices follows necessarily from the logical categories developed in the functionalist literature; rather such choices reflect either the preferences of individual analysts or the expedient of beginning with simple rather than complex social situations.

In these notes I shall first describe what is meant by a problem in the analysis of social phenomena, and then indicate the operations that are performed in constructing an explanatory model for this problem. Throughout the discussion I shall refer to central features of functionalism and attempt to assess their relevance for the operation at hand.

THE SCIENTIFIC ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL PHENOMENA

Locating a scientific problem

All analysis must confront a problem; otherwise scientific operations cannot begin, for we do not know what is to be explained. Posing a problem means identifying some variation in human behavior and framing a «why» question about this variation. Such

variation becomes the dependent variable that which is to be explained. The variation may involve a single event (Why did violence erupt in the Congo when it did ?); it may involve presumed regularities in the occurrence of events (Why are colonial societies emerging from domination prone to outbursts of hostility ?); or, at a higher level, it may involve questions of structural variations in large classes of events (Why do feudal land patterns arise and persist ? Why do they break down ? Why do they break down sometimes in one way, sometimes in another way ?).

When it comes to identifying scientific problems the functionalist literature abounds in confusion. This confusion arises from two sources: (a) Ambiguity resulting from the fact that two or more discussants may have different dependent variables in mind. For instance, one analyst may be attempting to account for the universal presence of stratified positions in society; a critic may be more interested in explaining why some stratification systems inhibit social mobility more than others. Since the discussion has started from different views of the essential dependent variable, confusion and controversy inevitably arise. (b) Inadequate specification of dependent variables. This may occur when the problem is phrased vaguely (e.g., «why do cultural items persist ?») or when the investigator is so preoccupied with abstract categories that he neglects to locate specific problems.

Identifying concrete units for analysis.

Once an investigator of social phenomena isolates a certain problem, he must specify concrete units that identify the dependent variable [1]. These concrete units are found in the *units of social structure* and in *variations of human behavior oriented to social structure*.

Because the units of social structure vary in their degree of crystallization, it is necessary to specify several different levels: (a) sets of activities that occur regularly but are not subject to formal, explicit sanctions (e.g., in an experimental small group, the units of analysis are frequently types of activities — supplying information, making suggestions, and so on); (b) roles, which refer to organized clusters of such activities that have become subject to relatively stable expectations for performance; (c) organization, which refers to patterned

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[1] In practice the operation of posing problems and the operation of specifying concrete units proceed simultaneously and interact with one another.

clusters of roles (e.g., a clique, a family, a bureaucracy). The unit of analysis in all cases is not the person, but a unit derived from the interaction among persons. Many dependent variables, then, are stated as follows: Why are the units of social structure patterned the way they are?

Another class of dependent variables is specified in terms of systematic variations in human behavior oriented to social structure. Given some structure, when can conformity be expected? What are the consequences for the social structure of conformity? When can deviance from structured behavior be expected? What are the different forms of deviance, and why does one type of deviance rather than another arise? What are the consequences of different kinds of deviance for the social structure? Specification of the possible «consequences» of conformity or deviance involves the identification of a further range of dependent variables — reactions to deviance (social control), changes in social structure, persistence of structural patterns, collective outbursts, conflict, and so on.

Selecting a system of constructs to describe and classify concrete units of social structure

Description and classification are in certain respects two aspects of the same operation. By description we refer to the successive application of generic or «class» terms to an individual unit to yield a distinctive combination of such terms. Description is, in short, the result of a number of successive classifications.

Units of social structure (activities, roles, organizations) are frequently described in terms of a relationship they bear to their social environment. For instance, in describing a role as «political» we assert that control of and by other units is a central focus of this role. One of the marks of the immaturity of sociology as a science is that agreement on the language most appropriate to describe the units of social structure is not universal. Nor is the language for describing variations in behavior *vis à vis* social structure firmly established. The literature of social science, including the functionalist literature, contains many suggested languages. Rather than submit yet another set of suggestions at this point, I shall merely mention a number of categories that, for purposes of argument, I consider essential to describe the concrete units of social structure.

Particular units of social structure, then, may be assigned to the following general categories:

a. Modes of creating, maintaining, and transmitting the cultural values of a system. For some systems such as societies, this involves long periods of socialization and complex institutional structures such as families and schools; for other systems such as experimental small groups, the processes and structures are much less elaborate (sometimes called the pattern-maintenance function).

b. Modes of producing, allocating, and consuming scarce goods and services (sometimes called the economic function).

c. Modes of creating, maintaining, and implementing norms governing interaction among units in the system (sometimes called the integrative function).

d. Modes of coordinating and controlling the collective actions of the system as a whole (sometimes called the political function).

These categories are not tied to any particular units of social structure. In fact, this is the source of value of such terms; they constitute a set of invariant, general concept to be utilized in describing highly variable concrete units.

Description of any concrete unit of social structure proceeds by applying the general categories *at several system-levels.* I would classify the role of a business executive, for example, as «economic» with reference to society as a whole. With reference to the business firm alone, however, I would characterize it as primarily «political». Finally, I consider the role itself as a system of variables. By what values is it legitimized ? By what norms is it regulated ? By what sanctions are these norms implemented ? By what means are scarce goods and services acquired, processed, and consumed in this role ? Description of any concrete role, then, involves the successive application of several concepts at different system and subsystem levels.

Many of these general, invariant concepts have emerged in the functionalist literature (though not exclusively in it). Frequently they are meant not only to describe the units of social systems but also to denote certain «functional requisites», «functional exigencies», or even «needs» of social systems. *By using these concepts in the latter sense an analyst carries them far beyond their classificatory and descriptive uses.* Each kind of activity (political, integrative, economic cultural, etc.) is held to be «necessary» if the system is «to be maintained», «function adequately», «exist», or «survive». The biological analogy — viz., that an organism will not survive if, say, circulation is stopped — is frequently invoked to support these assertions. Such assertions, moreover, are central to the functionalist approach.

I would submit that general, invariant concepts like those just reviewed are «necessary» for a social system in only a very restricted

sense. They are necessary for classifying and describing its concrete units; but in no way should this conceptual necessity be extended to the generation of propositions concerning the system's empirical survival. Even in biology, where indices of survival are relatively easy to ascertain, such propositions lead to tautology. As Ernest Nagel puts it:

> ...the word [function] is commonly used by biologists (as well as others in an analogous sense) in the phrase «the vital functions» to refer to certain inclusive types of organic processes occurring in living organisms, such as reproduction, assimilation, and respiration. These processes are frequently regarded as being carried on by the organism «as a whole» rather than by just some of its parts, even though some of the processes are intimately connected with operations of certain special parts of the organism. Moreover, these functions are uniquely characteristic of living things, and are usually said to be indispensable for the continued life of an organism (or for the continuance of its species). In consequence, the vital functions can be taken to be the *defining* attributes of *living organisms*, so that if an organic body lacks one of these attributes it does not count as a living organism... Accordingly, if respiration, for example, is such a defining attribute, to say that respiration is essential or indispensable for the survival of living thing is to utter an obvious tautology [2].

If the analyst has made an assertion a definitional matter, it adds nothing new to speak of empirical indispensability, necessity, and survival. As Nagel shows, in the biological sciences such an addition is tautological. At least in biology, however, it is possible to restate the tautology as an independent empirical proposition, to set up an adequate working index of «survival», and to test the proposition by experimental manipulation, e.g., by cutting the supply oxygen from living organisms in a laboratory setting where other conditions are controlled. In the social sciences indices of survival or death are very difficult to locate, and the experimental removal of, say, the political function is impossible.

One felicitous consequence of avoiding assertions about the necessity of functions for survival is that the analyst simultaneously avoids empirical assertions about the degree of integration, or functional unity of a system. To say that «integration» is a concept that must be used in describing a system is not to make any particular empirical claim about the degree of integration. In fact, variations in the integration of systems constitute important variables that demand empirical explanation. But genuine explanation must await

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[2] *The Structure of Science,* Princeton, 1961, pp. 523-524.

further scientific operations (which we shall review presently); it should not be put forth as a simple extension of the defining characteristics of a system.

Two problems concerning the general descriptive concepts remain: (1) Which categories should be selected to describe social systems ? By what criteria should we accept or reject any given category ? The obvious criterion is the utility of such categories in generating verifiable empirical propositions; in the social sciences, unfortunately, we are not as yet able to apply this criterion unambiguously. Two other criteria come to mind: (a) The canons of logical consistency. For any given list of descriptive concepts, we may ask: Are they mutually exclusive: Or do they involve overlapping that make unambiguous description impossible ? Are the categories cognate, or do they represent many different levels of abstraction ? Such questions provide the rules for determining the logical excellence of any set of descriptive concepts. (b) The relations between social systems and other kinds of systems. Some basic characteristics of social systems stem from biological, psychological, and cultural exigencies [3]. For instance, social systems institutionalize structures for protecting the child during a long period of biological and psychological dependency. Social systems are not in any way completely reducible to the «needs» imposed by, say, the physiological and psychological characteristics of individuals (Malinowski at times approached such a reductionist position); these other systems provide only broad conditions that limit the variation of social systems.

(2) By what canons can highly variable concrete units be identified as «instances» of general descriptive concepts ? Is a ward boss in an American immigrant community «political» in the same sense than an African tribal chief is «political» ? This comparative problem is not peculiar to functional analysis; it appears with any attempt to use general categories in social analysis. The degree to which any given descriptive category measures up to the canons of comparative identifiability is, then, an additional criterion for accepting or rejecting this category.

Tracing relations among the units of social systems

By applying the general, invariant concepts we are able to identify,

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[3] Talcott PARSONS, *The Social System*, Glencoe, Ill., 1951, Ch. II.

classify and describe the concrete units of a system. The next question concerns how these units affect one another. This question breaks into two levels, analytic and empirical.

(1) Analytic. The relations among the general categories themselves may be explored without reference to any particular units of social structure. What, for instance, are the general relations among the concepts «political» and «integrative» ? How can these relations be formulated in as tight and consistent a way as possible ? Do these relations suggest the derivation of any testable hypotheses ? Such questions deal with the realm of «pure theory», or the study of systems of categories [4].

(2) Empirical. How do activities performed in one structural complex of roles empirically affect another structural complex ? Does the institutionalization of a certain type of extended family constitute an obstacle to the institutionalization of certain types of business enterprise ? Does an ascriptive class system inhibit political authorities in mobilizing support for policies of progressive taxation ? These questions concern the consequence of certain activities in a system for other parts of the system [5]. Moreover, these consequences can be described *in the same language as the original concrete units of social structure* — norms, rewards and deprivations, facilities, etc., specified by the general descriptive concepts.

Any assessment of consequences of one kind of activity for other parts of the system rests on assumptions about cultural and psychological standards. Suppose, for instance, we wish to trace the societal consequences of structured inequalities between two races. In the United States, the inequalities between white and black are a source of strain because of the cultural values of civil liberty and equality of opportunity. In a society with different cultural standards — classical India, for instance — such caste-like inequalities were not a source of such strain at the social level. Another example: in general, unemployment created in an unregulated economy is a source of stress on households. These effects are, however, clearly dependent on the psychological standards of those affected. One unemployed worker may be flooded with anxiety because losing his job is threaten-

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[4] An example of this kind of theoretical work is found in Talcott PARSONS, Robert F. BALES, and Edward A. SHILS, *Working Papers in the Theory of Action*, Glencoe, Ill., 1953, Chapters III, V.

[5] The assessment of consequences is very close to what Robert K. MERTON considers the central focus of functionalism — «interpreting data by establishing their consequences for larger structures in which they are implicated.» *Social Theory and Social Structure*, Glencoe, Ill., 1957, p. 47.

ing to his masculine self-picture. Another may view unemployment as a temporary hardship to be endured calmly until business improves. The cultural and psychological standards in these illustrations are, in short, variables that intervene between a social activity or structure and its consequences for other parts of the social system.

Constructing explanatory models

All the operations discussed thus far confront the problems of definition, classification, and description of social systems. Solutions for these problems are necessary for the construction of a scientific theory, but they themselves do not constitute a theory. It is necessary also to produce a system of explanatory models, which arrange a number of necessary and sufficient conditions so as to «guarantee» certain empirical outcomes, then to «test» the models by examining them under as rigorously controlled empirical conditions as possible. Almost all the literature of functionalism stops short of the creation of models.

In creating explanatory models it is customary to rely on some notion of equilibrium. Equilibria may be of many types — stable, moving, oscillating, unstable, partial, etc. No concepts discussed thus far create a presumption in favor of any one type. Indeed, depending on the scientific problems confronted, different types of equilibrium model may be chosen. For instance, to account for the differential incidence of divorce among various social groups, we would set up the necessary and sufficient conditions for the termination of marriages (an unstable equilibrium model, for the end point is the dissolution of a social system). If, however, we wish to examine the «safety-valve» function of divorce in preserving the whole society's marriage system from more disastrous consequences, we would employ a stable equilibrium model. Again, by selecting the appropriate type of equilibrium, it is possible to «build» cumulative sources of instability into a system, much as Marx did in his model of capital accumulation.

What operations must be performed to construct an explanatory model ? The first step is to identify a scientific problem. For purposes of illustration in the next few pages, we pose the following problem: Under what conditions will overt class conflict arise in society ? The second step is to decide what groups should be considered as classes, and on what bases they should be so considered. Should classes be limited to groupings which reflect the differential

distribution of wealth ? Should they include political groups ? Should they include groups with unequal access to knowledge and expertise ? Or should they be groupings which result from a combination of such indices ? Part of the problem of identifying classes involves a selection from among a number of possible indices. Part of the definitional problem rests, however, on the basic categories devised for the description of social systems in the first place. The third step is to select some reliable index or indices of class conflict that will permit comparative analysis; possible indices would be the incidence of property destruction, refusal of identifiable groups to cooperate with one another, output of hostile class literature, or a combination of these.

Having identified a problem, we would then set up a model containing the conditions under which overt class conflict might be expected to appear. In arranging these conditions we might proceed from the more general (indeterminate) to the more specific (determinate) conditions. By this procedure we would establish an increasingly greater probability for the occurrence of overt class conflict rather than some other kind of outcome (e.g., cooperative relations, smouldering hostility, etc.).

What kinds of conditions would typically enter such an explanatory model ?

(1) The first and most general condition would involve a statement of the kinds of outcomes that are *structurally possible* in the social systems under consideration. Is it possible for persons low in the hierarchy of reward distribution to move upward ? Or if not, is it at least possible for them to have their grievances heard at higher levels ? If such possibilities do not exist in a system, we consider them «ruled out» as possible outcomes. Since these outcomes are alternatives to overt class conflict, the fact that they are ruled out increases the probability that class conflict, rather than something else, will occur in the system. It should be noted that the statement of what is structurally possible in the system is made in terms of the basic categories — values, norms, rewards, etc — by which the concrete structural units of the system are classified and described.

(2) Another important but also indeterminate condition in the genesis of overt class conflict concerns the conditions that lead persons to protest — in general conditions of *strain* in the system. Examples of strain are perceived maldistribution of rewards, failures of communication, competing definitions of legitimacy, etc. These strains are described in terms of the basic descriptive categories used to characterize the units of the system. The difference between

the condition of strain and the first condition is as follows: Strains refer to structural discrepancies that predispose persons to engage in protest and related kinds of responses; the structural possibilities of the system reveal the opportunities available for expressing the various types of responses arising from strains.

(3) If the system in question produces a high degree of strain on, say, the working classes, and also provides few avenues for reducing this strain, the probability for the development of overt class conflict is high. Given these two sets of conditions, we then turn to more specific conditions which increase this probability even more. These specific conditions concern the ability of leaders to articulate protest, develop ideologies, and mobilize the combatants in class conflict. These depend in turn on two conditions: (a) the presence of leaders capable of channeling the general protest in the direction of class conflict rather than some alternative kind of activity; (b) the reaction of various agencies of social control — governmental bodies, courts, police, religious leaders, etc. — to the appearance of signs of overt class conflict. Do they react belligerently, by tightening the controls on the lower orders ? Or conciliatorily, by trying to meet the new demands of protest groups ? Different reactions by authorities and other agencies of social control obviously produce different consequences, and these in turn affect the extent to which class conflict develops.

The model for overt class conflict, then, consists of a number of conditions, related to one another in an order of increasing specificity. Each condition is conceived as operating within the scope of the previous, more general conditions. By arranging the necessary conditions in this way, we rule out alternatives other than class conflict, and thus make the positive explanation of class conflict itself progressively more determinate.

Finally, any model must be put to the test in the light of the best available experimental, statistical, and comparative data. Operational indices for the various conditions must be devised, and all the data called up by these indices subjected to rigorous analysis. The aim of such investigation is to discover if the posited conditions in the model are in fact associated — individually and as a pattern of conditions — with the development of overt class conflict. The degree of success of this investigation depends on the problem selected, on the data available, and on the care with which the canons of empirical investigation are observed.

In constructing other models, we may use overt class conflict itself as an independent variable. If, for instance, we wished to account

for the differential incidence of certain types of revolutionary move-
ment, the existence of a high degree of class conflict might be one
of the contributing conditions in a model explanation for these move-
ments.

SUMMARY

In these notes we have inquired into the logic of scientific ex-
planation at the social-system level. We have specified the issues
that confront the analyst as he proceeds through the operations neces-
sary for creating a determinate explanatory model. As a kind of run-
ning commentary, we have indicated the relevance of some of the
material that has emerged in the functionalist literature in the past
decades. Evidently much of this literature is either irrelevant to
scientific explanation or leads to unproductive byways in the analysis
of social-system phenomena. The persistent emphasis on the concept
of system, however, as well as some of the substantive concepts
emerging from the functionalist tradition are helpful in constructing
genuine scientific models of social-system processes.

REPORT ON THE DISCUSSION *

Chairman : N. SMELSER, University of California, Berkeley
Rapporteur: J. BEN-DAVID, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem

The discussion was divided into two parts. The first five speakers and F. Barbano spoke about functional theory in general, while the others raised specific points connected with the application of the theory.

Following E. Gellner's commentary on his lecture given at the plenary session, N. Smelser outlined his views on the needs of functional theory. He suggested a codification of its language: functionalists always refer to some unit of the social system, such as roles, organizations, etc. These are treated in relation to a set of social functions: economic, political, integrative and cultural. «Function» is a descriptive term; it is, therefore, tautological to assert that the «functions» are necessary for the survival of society. It is not possible to translate functions into empirical propositions either — as this is done in biology — since propositions about the death of societies cannot be tested. Functionalism should concentrate on the building of explanatory models specifying the conditions under which one of several structurally possible outcomes, such as conformity with or deviance from the norms of the social unit, or conflict between the units, will occur.

According to K. Davis, the functional approach is useful only for some purposes. The explanation of marriage, e.g., as a function of the maintenance of social order through public confirmation of the marital status and the consequent regulation of behavior, is a good explanation. But viewing religion or social stratification in terms of the maintenance of social order would be incomplete. Functionalism is, therefore, not the sociological method *par excellence,* and other methods should be employed as well. Explanations relating social phenomena to non-social factors, such as ecological ones, are often superior to functional explanations.

R. Dahrendorf argued that functionalism tends to become a

* *Participants*: E. Gellner, N. Smelser, K. Davis, R. Dahrendorf, R.K. Merton, S. N. Eisenstadt, P. Chombart de Lauwe, F. Barbano, E. Vogel, J. Ben-David.

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personal belief rather than a theory submitted to verification. The codification of classificatory schemes is not useful. There are several possible schemes, none of which is at present exhaustive. Choosing one of them only, functional analysts only divert attention from problems that are not implicit in functionalist language. Furthermore, the pre-occupation with the conflicting claims of abstract schemes diverts attention from empirical reality and substantive questions.

R. Merton distinguished between «functionalism», which, like any «ism», has no place in science, and functional, or rather structural-functional analysis. Serious investigation of the latter can only be done by analyzing concrete problems in the alternative frameworks of structural-functional, Marxian, interactional, and ecological methods. A suitable topic for such comparative analysis would be the maintenance and change of authority systems. Functional analysis would assume that the operation of such systems would involve adherence to norms regulating the rights and obligations of the rulers. Weakening of the authority would be connected with transgressions of these norms, or the emergence of situations not covered by them. This method of explanation, R. Merton suggested, should then be compared with other methods.

F. Barbano stated that the functional analysis of social systems as wholes has led to a misleadingly static and integrated picture of society and to evaluative distinctions between changes of the system and within the system. He suggested, therefore, that functional analysis should concentrate on the changing interrelationships between the parts of society rather than the coherence of the whole.

S. N. Eisenstadt and E. Vogel brought forth examples showing that functional analysis — in contrast to some prevailing views — is well suited to the explanation of conflict and change. S. N. Eisenstadt investigated centralized empires. It is possible, he maintained, to make empirical statements about the structural conditions of the maintenance of centralized rule by (a) comparing societies which evolved this kind of rule with similar societies failing to evolve it; and (b) studying the conditions of stability of such rule in different societies.

Structural-functional analysis, S. N. Eisenstadt continued, is also able to predict in which parts of society conflict will occur. Given a state of equilibrium, the institutionalization of a new system of rule necessarily changes this equilibrium in specific ways.

E. Vogel showed that the inability of the Chinese communists to

eliminate the professional bureaucracy or army and to subject the economy to political control could have been predicted from the functional principle according to which basic social functions involve different norms of behavior which are increasingly differentiated in the course of social development. The same principles explain the longterm success of Japanese family firms as compared with the failure of the Chinese ones: the former managed to keep economic considerations apart from family obligations, the latter did not.

P. Chombart de Lauwe and J. Ben-David commented on specific aspects of functional theory. P. Chombart de Lauwe distinguished between different conceptions of needs, those which are considered necessities and those which are considered as merely desirable. The latter are often transformed into social necessities. This, for instance, is what happened to education which, from a luxury, became a social necessity. In order to understand this process, we have to study, in addition to behavior, peoples' perceptions and images. These indicate which desires are bound to turn into necessities.

J. Ben-David drew attention to the difference between functional and structural-functional analysis. The former is the method of advanced sciences where all the relations between the variables can be expressed in mathematical equations. This usually cannot be done in sociology. We describe the phenomena we are dealing with in words and are unable to forego qualitative distinctions between political, economic, religious, etc., functions. Speaking about functions and variables in a language implying precise quantitative relationship is, therefore, misleading and may result in quasi-precision. By trying to adopt the logical models of much more advanced sciences, sociology commits the same mistake as the biological sciences did to their great disadvantage during the eighteenth century, when under the impact of the successful Newtonian physics they tried to develop abstract theoretical models, rather than engage in empirical investigation.

MARXISM
MARXISME

LA CONCEPTION DU PROLÉTARIAT CHEZ MARX

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I

Marx est venu au mouvement ouvrier avant d'épouser une doctrine socialiste quelconque, avant même de commencer l'étude de l'économie politique. Quand on sait l'importance que ces doctrines et cette étude ont pris aussitôt dans l'œuvre de Marx, on est amené à se demander quelle fut la raison qui l'a poussé à faire sienne la cause prolétarienne.

En situant chronologiquement les faits qui ont précédé la publication à Paris du manifeste prolétarien [1], on voit d'abord Marx envisager la carrière académique, à l'exemple de son ami Bruno Bauer, puis exercer la fonction de rédacteur à un grand journal démocratique et libéral, la *Rheinische Zeitung*, 1842-1843, enfin prendre une retraite studieuse à Kreuznach: Marx y parfait sa formation d'historien en étudiant particulièrement l'histoire des Révolutions française et anglaise.

Rien, dans ces études, ne laisse présager une adhésion si ardente et si subite à la cause ouvrière. Il existe, pourtant, un document qui marque une certaine rupture avec son passé libéral ou tout au moins l'abandon d'une croyance absolue dans la vertu de la démocratie moderne. C'est l'essai sur *la Question juive*, inspiré à Marx par la lecture de deux écrits de Bruno Bauer sur l'émancipation politique des juifs allemands. Bien qu'il n'y soit question ni de prolétariat ni de socialisme, c'est en lisant ces trente pages que l'on s'explique la nouvelle prise de position, qui a toutes les apparences de la soudaineté [2].

[1] Sous le titre «Introduction à la critique de la philosophie du droit de Hegel», dans *Annales franco-allemandes*, Paris, 1844.
[2] «La Question Juive», dans *Annales franco-allemandes*, Paris, 1844.

II

Bauer, qui voulait éclairer les Allemands de confession israëlite sur les chances de leur émancipation, n'avait dans l'esprit qu'une réforme de l'État prussien. Marx ne se livre pas dans *la Question juive*, à une étude théorique du sujet, mais il y voit un prétexte et une occasion pour se livrer à un réquisitoire sévère contre les deux principales entraves de l'émancipation humaine: l'État et l'Argent, et contre leur base juridique commune: la propriété privée.

Ce réquisitoire n'a rien de «scientifique», bien qu'il résulte d'une analyse serrée de la philosophie politique de Hegel. Marx s'y était livré dans un important travail qu'il avait commencé à Kreuznach et emporté à Paris, où il pensait le terminer. C'est une double expérience vécue qui a inspiré à Marx la haine de l'État et de l'Argent: l'absolutisme prussien, et sa situation de paria et d'exilé, après son mariage avec Jenny von Westphalen. Si Marx n'a pas tenu à achever le manuscrit antihégélien commencé à Kreuznach, c'est qu'il entendait poursuivre la lutte sur un plan plus général: la critique de la politique et de l'économie politique. Tel fut d'ailleurs le titre primitif de l'ouvrage qu'il voulait écrire. S'il a modifié ce titre, c'est parce que les circonstances l'ont obligé de faire tout d'abord du journalisme politique: homme de parti, Marx a combattu pendant toute sa carrière les trois formes contemporaines les plus typiques du régime de l'État: la prussianisme, le tsarisme et le bonapartisme. Et lorsqu'il pourra enfin s'adonner à l'étude et à écrire l'œuvre projetée quelque vingt ans après en avoir choisi le thème, le fétiche de l'argent prendra le nom de *Capital*. Dans cette œuvre, on voit apparaître, telle Némésis, la force appelée à extirper les deux tares de la société humaine, dénoncées dès 1844. Cette force, c'est le Prolétariat, antipode de l'État et du Capital.

III

L'idée d'un prolétariat investi d'une mission émancipatrice est, par conséquent, antérieure dans l'esprit de Marx au concept sociologique de la classe ouvrière, tel qu'il apparaîtra dans le *Capital*, où il est lié à tout le système de production capitaliste au même titre que le concept de la bourgeoisie. Pourtant le concept sociologique de la classe ouvrière n'est nullement vidé de ce que l'on peut appeler la substance éthique du concept du prolétariat: l'idée de mission prolétarienne, conçue par Marx avant ses études économiques, réap-

paraît dans l'œuvre maîtresse, où il s'agit d'exposer sans idée préconçue la «loi économique du mouvement de la société moderne» [3]. La question se pose: comment concilier cette loi avec l'idée d'une classe qui a pour «vocation historique» d'abolir le mode de production capitaliste et les classes sociales elles-mêmes. Cette question est d'autant plus légitime que Marx ne se contentait pas d'élaborer une théorie sociale ni même de faire la critique des institutions bourgeoises, mais qu'il s'est consacré avec passion à une activité politique, allant jusqu'à assumer les responsabilités d'un chef de parti.

Le *Streit um Marx,* les controverses autour de l'interprétation de la pensée marxienne — à l'intérieur de l'école marxiste aussi bien qu'entre adeptes et adversaires du marxisme — ont leur origine dans une ambiguïté fondamentale: Marx a bâti une théorie, il a dégagé des «lois» de la société; d'autre part, il a entendu conformer une praxis à cette théorie; et dans les deux démarches, on décèle des postulats, des présuppositions d'ordre *éthique.* La littérature critique consacrée à Marx a rarement pu franchir cet obstacle; on comprend moins facilement encore qu'une œuvre de l'esprit n'est féconde que par ses ambiguïtés: c'est même le secret de sa force libératrice.

IV

L'aliénation humaine dans ses deux formes — politique et économique — tel est le visage du prolétariat qui s'offre à Marx exilé dans le Paris des révolutions. Dans ce visage, il découvre les traits de sa propre existence en marge de la société officielle. Mais il y perçoit en même temps le refus d'une condition qui fait de l'homme une bête de somme au service de l'État et de l'Argent. Deux faits précis pourraient expliquer, outre sa propre condition précaire d'intellectuel exilé, le geste de Marx: ses rencontres avec les milieux ouvriers et la publication, quatre mois avant son arrivée à Paris, de l'*Union ouvrière* de Flora Tristan [4]. Il a dû être, on peut le dire aussi, fortement impressionné par les articles pleins de prescience que Heinrich Heine avec qui il se lia d'amitié pendant son séjour parisien, avait publiés sur les idées et les écoles socialistes en France.

Marx a donc lu sur les visages des ouvriers français autre chose et plus que le refus d'une condition inhumaine; il eut comme l'intuition d'un besoin plus fondamental, parce qu'universel. A-t-il sim-

[3] Karl MARX, *Le Capital,* livre Ier, Préface.
[4] *Union ouvrière,* par Mme Flora TRISTAN, Paris, 1843.

plement déchiffré dans ces visages sa propre nostalgie, nourrie aux sources philosophiques de ses années universitaires ? Quoi qu'il en soit, c'est sans doute pour la première fois dans l'histoire du mouvement ouvrier que des attitudes et des actions collectives de refus et de révolte se sont vu attribuer des mobiles et assigner des objectifs aussi élevés. Des mobiles: le prolétariat résume toutes les tares de la société; son état est celui du scandale général; il représente le crime notoire de toute la société; son être profond est chargé de chaînes; il représente la dissolution de tous les états de la société bourgeoise; il a un caractère universel, parce que ses souffrances sont universelles; il subit non un tort particulier, mais le tort absolu, il représente la perte totale de l'homme.

Telle est la première image du prolétariat dans l'œuvre de Marx. Elle ne se représentera plus, dans les écrits ultérieurs, dans les mêmes termes pathétiques, mais elle restera sous-jacente dans toutes les utilisations théoriques que Marx fera du concept du prolétariat, lorsqu'il décrira les luttes de classes dans la société moderne. L'image du prolétariat en lutte sera alors implicitement chargée des éléments affectifs révélés dans la description pathétique des premiers écrits.

V

Cette image sera pourtant modifiée en un point essentiel, lorsque Marx abandonnera le plan purement éthique pour aborder le plan des luttes sociales et politiques. Dans sa première rencontre avec le prolétariat, Marx n'a vu dans celui-ci que l'élément passif de la révolution, la matière tendue vers la pensée comme son animatrice, la force latente que la théorie est seule capable d'éveiller. La révolution lui apparaissait alors comme la synthèse de deux mouvements: l'action des masses et l'activité de l'esprit, plus exactement d'une certaine philosophie radicale, d'un humanisme qui pose la disparition du prolétariat comme la condition *sine qua non* de l'émancipation générale.

Cette idée, Marx la critiquera quatre ans plus tard dans le *Manifeste communiste*: il avait, dans l'intervalle, étudié l'économie politique et les doctrines socialistes et s'était rangé dans une certaine tradition du mouvement ouvrier et de la pensée sociale. Lorsqu'il reproche aux utopistes, inventeurs de systèmes communistes, de ne voir dans le prolétariat que la «classe la plus souffrante», Marx a déjà abandonné son idée initiale d'un prolétariat qui n'est que matière

passive de la spéculation révolutionnaire. Son nouveau point de vue est tout à l'opposé du premier: la théorie révolutionnaire n'est que l'expression du mouvement spontané, autonome de la classe ouvrière, de la *Selbsttätigkeit* historique du prolétariat.

L'idéologie allemande — écrite en collaboration avec Engels en 1845-1846, mais abandonnée faute d'éditeur à la «critique rongeuse des souris» — fonde ce qu'on pourrait appeler la sociologie «matérialiste» de Marx et représente comme tel un progrès sensible sur la conception du prolétariat exposée dans la *Sainte Famille* (1844). Ce dernier ouvrage offrait la conception ambigüe d'un prolétariat rigoureusement déterminé par l'histoire; et c'est là que Marx s'est exposé le plus au reproche d'historicisme que lui ont adressé certains critiques [5]. Engels qui rédige certaines parties du pamphlet, penche dans le sens opposé: ce n'est pas l'esprit, fût-il le génie de la critique, qui crée l'histoire, mais la masse populaire qui prescrit à l'histoire sa tâche, et qui gagnera en importance à mesure que son action gagnera en profondeur. Engels écrit: «L'histoire ne fait rien... C'est plutôt l'homme réel et vivant qui fait tout cela...». L'homme n'est pas l'instrument passif de l'histoire, changée en personne poursuivant ses propres fins. «L'histoire n'est que l'activité de l'homme poursuivant ses propres fins». Telle n'est pourtant pas, à première vue, la pensée de Marx, principal auteur de la *Sainte Famille*. En effet, ce qu'il y dit du prolétariat ressemble assez, par le style, à la déclaration pathétique des débuts. Le nouveau réside dans l'utilisation que Marx fait de ses études économiques. Son raisonnement peut se réduire à ceci: l'institution de la propriété privée est condamnée à disparaître en vertu de sa propre dynamique, puisqu'elle engendre la force qui représente sa négation: le prolétariat. Dans les conditions d'existence du prolétariat se trouvent condensées toutes les conditions inhumaines de la société moderne. A ce degré de misère, le prolétaire prend conscience de sa situation et il est poussé par sa détresse extrême à choisir la solution extrême: pour se libérer, il doit libérer la société tout entière; ce n'est qu'en abolissant les conditions d'existence inhumaines de la société qu'il réintègre sa propre humanité, dont il était déchu.

Nous tenons dans ce texte de 1844 l'essentiel de la fameuse loi de la paupérisation du prolétariat que nous retrouverons plus de vingt ans plus tard dans *le Capital*, formulée en termes plus savants, plus techniques. Nous y trouvons en outre, sous une forme pathétique, la

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[5] Cf. par exemple K. R. POPPER, *The open society and its enemies*, London, 1945.

fameuse dialectique de la négation, également reprise dans le *Capital*. Mais nulle part ailleurs, Marx n'a révélé avec autant de force le fond *éthique de* sa théorie du mouvement social que dans ces quelques lignes de la *Sainte Famille*: «Peu importe ce que tel ou tel prolétaire ou même ce que le prolétariat tout entier *s'imagine* être son but, momentanément. Ce qui importe, c'est ce qu'il *est* réellement et ce qu'il sera historiquement contraint de faire conformément à son *être*. Son but et son action historique lui sont tracés visiblement et irrévocablement dans les circonstances mêmes de sa vie, comme dans toute l'organisation de la société bourgeoise actuelle» [6].

VI

Le postulat de l'autoémancipation prolétarienne se retrouve constamment dans l'œuvre de Marx, depuis le manifeste antihégélien et *la Sainte Famille* de 1844 jusqu'à l'*Adresse inaugurale de l'Internationale ouvrière* — avec sa devise: «L'émancipation de la classe ouvrière sera l'œuvre de la classe ouvrière elle-même» — l'*Adresse sur la Commune* et les ultimes méditations sur le sort de la commune paysanne dans la révolution russe. On retrouve ce même postulat dans les conceptions proprement sociologiques que Marx avait de la classe ouvrière et des partis ouvriers.

Le facteur de la spontanéité dynamique est, aux yeux de Marx, essentiel dans les diverses étapes de la lutte émancipatrice du prolétariat. A la différence de la bourgeoisie, dont la genèse et le développement historique en tant que classe sociale obéissent à un automatisme aveugle, inhérent au fonctionnement même du mode de production capitaliste, le prolétariat connaît au cours de son développement une métamorphose structurelle: à l'origine, masse inerte «vis à-vis du capital», il finit à travers ses luttes à «se constituer» en «classe pour lui-même» [7].

Le *Manifeste Communiste* donne une description schématique de ces luttes et de cette «auto-constitution» sociale du prolétariat. Marx y parle même d'«Organisation der Proletarier zur Klasse», et il ajoute aussitôt «und damit zur politischen Partei». Et là encore la vocation révolutionnaire du prolétariat est soulignée dans sa spécificité historique: seule classe «vraiment révolutionnaire», le prolétariat «porte l'avenir (de l'humanité) dans ses mains», puisque son

[6] Karl MARX, «Die Heilige Familie», dans *Werke*, vol. II, Berlin, 1957, p. 38.
[7] Karl MARX, *Misère de la philosophie*, édit. Pléiade, 1963, p. 135.

mouvement, à la différence de tous les mouvements sociaux du passé, est celui de l'«immense majorité dans l'intérêt de l'immense majorité». Ainsi la bourgeoisie en développant la grande industrie et l'accumulation des richesses entre les mains d'une minorité détruit en même temps elle-même la base sociale de son existence: elle produit ses propres «fossoyeurs», les prolétaires dont la victoire est aussi inéluctable que le déclin de la classe possédante [8].

VII

Classe, conscience de classe, parti de classe: ces trois concepts sont étroitement liés dans l'enseignement sociologique et politique de Marx. Appliqués au prolétariat, ils constituent le fondement de sa théorie politique, qui n'est pas exempte d'ambiguïté. Une meilleure connaissance de cette théorie, due surtout à la publication posthume d'importants travaux de Marx restés inachevés, et d'une nombreuse correspondance, permet d'y déceler deux aspects contradictoires: la croyance en la spontanéité créatrice des ouvriers d'une part, et une tendance à surestimer le rôle du leadership politique dans le mouvement ouvrier. Ce dernier aspect est surtout visible dans les attitudes de Marx, homme de parti, chef moralement reconnu plutôt qu'officiellement investi, d'un groupe de communistes allemands fréquemment appelé le «Parti Marx» par certains adeptes aussi bien que par la police. Il n'est pas étonnant que le second aspect se soit greffé sur le premier au moment même où Marx a décidé de ne pas se borner à une activité de théoricien du prolétariat, mais de participer à des actions politiques ou tout au moins de prononcer des jugements ou de donner des directives politiques au nom du parti dont il se considérait comme le chef. Ce sont ces attitudes qui ont conduit certains interprètes et critiques à parler du «jacobinisme» de Marx et d'y trouver l'origine de telle idéologie de parti (le léninisme, par exemple) [9]. Parallèlement, la conception primitive du dynamisme spontané de la classe ouvrière a donné naissance à deux courants du marxisme antipolitique, tels que le syndicalisme révolutionnaire et le communisme des conseils.

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[8] Karl MARX, *Le Manifeste communiste*, édit. Pléiade, 1963, p. 170 et suiv., *passim*.

[9] Cf. Karl KORSCH, *Karl Marx*, New York, 1938.

VIII

En l'absence de la sociologie des partis que Marx se proposait d'écrire en conclusion du livre III du *Capital,* le recours obligatoire aux écrits épars, tant théoriques que politiques, permet de reconstituer une conception assez cohérente du prolétariat, telle qu'elle se dégage des diverses formules employées par Marx pour définir sa théorie de l'histoire.

Une des rares définitions concises nous est présentée dans une note du *Capital,* livre I: «Par prolétaire, au sens économique, il faut entendre le travailleur salarié qui produit du capital et le met en valeur; il est jeté sur le pavé aussitôt qu'il est sans utilité pour l'appétit de plus-value du... capital.»

Lorsqu'il parle de la misère ouvrière, Marx l'envisage sous ses deux aspects social et individuel. La misère sociale de l'ouvrier est curable, parce que relative, historiquement déterminée. La chaîne qui attache l'ouvrier au capital peut être «dorée» et une sécurité relative et temporaire peut lui être assurée au sein même du système qui le rend esclave. C'est pourquoi les syndicats ouvriers qui ne mènent qu'une lutte revendicative (pour l'amélioration des conditions de vie des salariés) trahissent leur mission historique: l'abolition du salariat et la création d'une société où le «libre épanouissement de chacun est la condition pour le libre épanouissement de tous» [10]. En ce sens, l'abolition de la misère sociale est la condition de la disparition de la misère individuelle.

On peut dire en conclusion que la conception du prolétariat revêt chez Marx le caractère d'un enseignement éthique, adapté aux conditions faites à l'homme par suite du développement vertigineux de la technique. L'originalité de cette éthique — héritée en partie de toute une pléiade de précurseurs français et anglais — consiste dans son fondement sociologique. Mais l'enseignement éthique de Marx n'est pas exempt d'ambiguïtés: en tant qu'homme de parti, Marx était inférieur au théoricien révolutionnaire.

[10] *Le Manifeste communiste, op.cit.,* p. 183.

MARXISM AND THE HEGEMONY
OF THE INTELLECTUAL CLASS

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It is a remarkable fact that Marx and Engels provided no theory of the intellectual class. Why do intellectuals join the socialist movement ? To this question, Marx and Engels had a parenthetical reply in a brief sentence in the *Communist Manifesto*: «a portion of the bourgeoisie goes over to the proletariat, and in particular a portion of the bourgeois ideologists, who have raised themselves to the level of comprehending theoretically the historical movement as a whole». This is as near as Marx and Engels came to providing a theory of the intellectual class, especially its revolutionary group. As a theory, it carries little psychological conviction, for it asserts a purely intellectual causation; it says that quite apart from any personal involvement of emotion, economic interest, or desire for power, the mere understanding of the laws of social development suffices to bring a section of the intellectuals to the proletarian side. As far as intellectuals are concerned, in other words, it affirms that existence does not determine consciousness, but that rather a purely theoretical consciousness determines existence. The revolutionary intellectual evidently then stands with Promethean exceptionalism against the whole materialist conception of history.

The motivations of revolutionary intellectuals would scarcely however fit into a pattern of determination by a theoretical consciousness. Can one say that all the personal sacrifices which intellectuals have endured have been motivated by a desire to conform to a theoretical comprehension of the laws of social evolution ? A profound dilemma however would have confronted Marx and Engels if they had tried to develop a theory of the intellectual class. They would not have been able to do so without abandoning either their materialist conception of history or their idea of the self-emancipation of the working class. In the first place, to have granted that revolutionary intellectuals are basically moved by ethical feelings, by principles of justice and equality, would have been a decisive departure from historical materialism. Marx and Engels utterly re-

fused to acknowledge an independent role to ethical idealism in human history; they could never formally affirm that the ethical consciousness in history can transcend its material base. On the other hand, to have said instead that the revolutionary intellectuals were moved by the desire for power or economic self-interest would have meant raising a new spectre to confront the proletariat — a new ruling class of intellectuals which availed itself of the workers' unrest to place itself in power. This was the dilemma which the intellectual class posed for Marx's sociology: either historical materialism was false or the advent of a new class society was likely, a problem for the Marxian system far more deepseated in its significance than technical disputes concerning the law of the falling rate of profit. Marx and Engels met this dilemma by choosing not to discuss it.

The question of the intellectuals' hegemony, it must be remembered, was raised sharply in Marx's time. Marx's adversary, Bakunin, charged that the latent content of the Marxist program was «government by scientists (the most distressing, odious, and despicable type of government in the world)» which would constitute «notwithstanding its democratic form, a veritable dictatorship». Marx could only write the marginal note alongside Bakunin's words, *quelle rêverie*, and repeat his general view that class domination must last as long as the economic basis for classes is not destroyed[1]. But what if it were not a reverie ? What if the workings of modern technology were compatible with the hegemony of a technomanagerial class ?

Curiously, throughout their lives, Marx and Engels were sensitive to the authoritarian motivation of socialist intellectuals whom they characterized in probing, sardonic terms. Lassalle, the intellectuals of 1848, the German socialist students in 1879, the English Fabian intellectuals, were all, according to Marx and Engels, trying to establish themselves as dictators and managers over the workers. Lassalle's goal, said Marx, was «that of the future workers' dictator»; the people were to elect those «like himself armed with the shining sword of science into Parliament». Lassalle had indeed boasted to Bismarck that «the working class is instinctively inclined to dictatorship», and taken pride in his own dictatorial powers as president of their Association as an example of the leadership of the learned. Sixteen years later, in 1879, Marx and Engels wrote gloomily that the «educative elements», the university graduates, all be-

[1] Henry MAYER, «Marx on Bakunin: A neglected text», *Études de Marxologie*, Serie S, n. 2, 1959, p. 114.

lieved that the working class «of itself is incapable of its own eman-
cipation» and «must be freed from above» The later socialist student
movement in Germany in 1890 similarly aroused little enthusiasm
in Engels; these men were arrogant young declassed bourgeois, he
said, «arriving just in time to occupy most of the editorial positions
on the new journals which pullulate and, as usual, they regard the
bourgeois universities as a Socialist Staff College which gives them
the right to enter the ranks of the Party with an officer's, if not a
general's brevet...» They were evidently akin to the students, «those
'representatives of intellect', as they liked to call themselves», who
in 1848, according to Engels, «were the first to quit their standards,
unless they were retained by the bestowal of officer's rank». The
English Fabians finally were regarded by Engels with foreboding.
They were, in his judgment, socialists who planned to establish the
rule of the intellectuals over the proletariat; the Fabians, wrote
Engels, «have understanding enough to realize the inevitability of
the social revolution», but they are above all concerned with «making
their own leadership secure, the leadership exercised by the 'eddi-
cated'» [2].

There were two components of historical inevitability as Marx
and Engels conceived it, first, the economic inevitability of a plan-
ned economy, and second, the sociological inevitability that the
workers emancipating themselves would achieve a social democracy.
What theoretical ground could Marx and Engels provide, short of
their own ethical aims and hopes, for asserting a sociological inevita-
bility which would exclude the possible hegemony of the intellec-
tual class ? Marx and Engels, intellectuals themselves, believed that
they had identified themselves wholly with «the proletarian outlook»,
but the intellectual authoritarians challenged the historical neces-
sity of their identification with the working class. Then too, there
was the vague, troubling doubt that even their own motives were
mixed, that behind Marx's «Promethean complex» was also an
authoritarian ingredient. The stormy Bakunin had not been the only
one to rail against Marx's authoritarian ways. The English trade
union leaders who were delegates to the International Workingmen's
Association were men accustomed to discussion, consultation, and
democratic procedure. They found Marx impatient of discussion, in-

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[2] Karl MARX and Friedrich ENGELS, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1953,
pp. 388-394, 530, 537. Frederick ENGELS, *Germany: Revolution and Counter-
Revolution*, New York, 1933, p. 103. Frederick ENGELS, Paul and Laura LAFAR-
GUE, *Correspondence*, Vol. 2, transl. Yvonne KAPP, London, 1960, p. 386.

sistent on ideological orthodoxy, and unilateral in decisions which disregarded democratic process.

Where intellectuals predominated in the Marxist movement, there authoritarianism became most pronounced. The Russian Social Democratic Labor Party, in which Lenin's authoritarian politics found its most fertile soil, was pre-eminently a party of intellectuals. «The intellectuals», wrote Lenin in 1904 in polemic with Rosa Luxemburg, «in our Party made up a much larger percentage than in the West-European parties» [3]. Lenin on the face of it seemed to accept unreservedly Kautsky's theory that the intellectuals were not a class but a privileged social stratum. Kautsky like Marx had, however, continued to doubt the intellectuals, and advised the German Social Democrats to keep them in a subordinate position. Lenin, on the other hand, called on the intellectuals to transform themselves psychologically, to rid themselves of their liberal individualism, and to prepare themselves for the role of dictatorial, authoritarian rulers. This was indeed the most basic rupture of Lenin with classical Marxism, for he took on the character of spokesman for the hegemony of the intellectual class.

Karl Kautsky was indeed the first to use the formulation, later adopted by Stalin as well, that the intellectuals are not a class but a stratum: «the intellectual workers have this peculiarity of not having any common class interest and of having only professional interests; moreover, they are a privileged social stratum in opposition to the proletariat which wishes to put an end to all privilege». There was no hope, said Kautsky, of winning the «aristocracy of the 'intelligentsia'» to the workers' movement; many no doubt were being driven by declining economic circumstances into a situation which united them with the proletariat. Among the students, Kautsky agreed, there was an enthusiasm for socialism, but he placed little confidence in them. The student, he wrote, usually abandons his socialistic convictions as «childish ideas» when he enters «serious life». During his socialist phase, the student's superior education enables him to impose on the workers. A socialist student movement, Kautsky noted, may therefore become a danger to the movement as a whole: «where the proletarian movement is feeble and confused and where there exists alongside it a strong student socialist movement, the latter may come to dominate the former». The unreliable young intellectuals, said Kautsky, can

[3] V. I. LENIN, *Collected Works*, Vol. 7, transl. Abraham FINEBERG, and Naomi JOCHEL, Moscow, 1961, p. 479.

then lead the movement into insane experiments. Fortunately, he added, such an outcome was not to be anticipated in Germany or in the greater part of the civilized world where the student movement would remain only an «annex» to the workers [4]. With unconscious prescience, however, Kautsky had stated the condition which in backward countries would assist the intellectual class to assume the hegemony of the socialist movement.

Lenin, on the contrary, explicitly called upon the intellectuals to become the bearers of bureaucracy. The word «bureaucracy» had no terrors for him; Lenin welcomed bureaucracy, and espoused it. He was the first, said the youthful Lenin, to analyze the concept of bureaucracy. «Bureaucracy *versus* democracy», he wrote, «is the same thing as centralism *versus* autonomism; it is the organizational principle of the revolutionary Social-Democrats as opposed to the organizational principle of the opportunist Social-Democrats». He ridiculed the «outcry against bureaucracy and autocracy» on the part of the Girondist-like Martov and *Iskra*. He extolled the alleged virtues of the factory-disciplined proletariat as compared to the «flabbiness and instability» of the intellectuals. The factory, said Lenin, was not only a means of exploitation; it was also a «means of organization» which inculcated discipline. Lenin had no use for the intellectuals' bemoaning of the alienation of man under modern technology: «Division of labor under the direction of a center evokes from him a tragi-comical outcry against people being transformed into 'wheels and cogs'» [5]. He defended outright the authoritarian procedures of «excommunication», a «dreadful word» to the democrats. Thus, Lenin invoked a myth of proletarian discipline to impose a sense of guilt on those intellectuals who had imbibed the liberal tradition. Men like John Stuart Mill had painfully built during the nineteenth century a counterweight to authoritarian tendencies. Now Lenin, working to unleash the repressed will to authoritarianism, sanctified it by an appeal to the psychology of the proletariat. The party of the intellectuals was thus to rationalize its authoritarianism.

The authoritarianism of the intellectual class is a recurrent historical theme, yet its traits, characteristics, and sources have been little studied. When Lenin portrayed the authoritarianism of the working class, he was in large part projecting upon the workers

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[4] Karl KAUTSKY, «Die Intelligenz und die Sozialdemokratie», *Die Neue Zeit*, Band II, 1895, pp. 10-16, 43-49, 74-80.

[5] V. I. LENIN, *One Step Forward, Two Steps Back*, reprint transl., Moscow, 1947, pp. 52, 53, 81, 91, 94, 96, 103.

traits peculiar to himself; the contemporary emphasis on working class authoritarianism is perhaps similarly in large part a projection of the latent authoritarianism of intellectuals. What then are some of the evidence and sources of intellectuals' authoritarianism ?

1. There is an impressive tradition of philosophical Utopias beginning with Plato's *Republic,* going on through Campanella's *City of the Sun,* to the social diagrams in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries of Edward Bellamy's *Looking Backward* and H. G. Wells' *The Open Conspiracy.* These Utopias, a mixture of fantasy and blueprint, illumine the unconscious strivings and direction of the intellectuals. The Athenian philosopher, the Renaissance man, the American Nationalist, and the English social evolutionist all shared the same vision of the rule of the scientific intellectuals. It diffused into the most distant regions as an awakener of intellectuals from social torpor. José Vasconcelos, ideologist of the Mexican Revolution of 1911, pondered Plato's *Republic,* and aspired to be the philosopher-king of Mexico. The rule of the scientist-philosophers was always to be authoritarian rule.

2. From what psychological source does the authoritarian longing of the intellectuals arise ? To answer this question, we must distinguish between the universal source of authoritarianism common to the intellectuals of all societies and those more situational roots of authoritarianism which are found in the frustrations peculiar to intellectuals in modern times. The intellectuals, in Marx's term, the «ideological class», have in all societies felt themselves an aristocracy, an elite. Ancient Greek analogies of the state as an organism told how the head directed the hand. The intellectuals, from the time of the Pythagorean governing elite, regarded themselves as the representatives of the mind. They were indeed god-like; thought was, for instance, the unending joy and prerogative of Aristotle's God, and thought was likewise man's distinctive attribute. The intellectual, the philosopher, was the representative of man at his highest. Immortality itself was made proportionate to intellectual acquirements by medieval Aristotelians; it was the lower classes who claimed eternity for the illiterate who were kind in heart.

The intellectuals conceived of themselves as meant to rule men. That was the purport of their philosophical knowledge. They were not warriors; they could not claim the right to rule by force and might. Yet in every age they have claimed that «the pen is mightier than the sword». They were often not men of property, yet they would claim, as Keynes did, that the power of ideas far exceeded

that of vested interests. They were neither merchants nor artisans nor tillers of the soil, but stood somehow outside all conventional class systems. Without the laborer's skill or the rich man's wealth, they had only their intelligence and culture, but theirs was the calling to rule. The touchstone of the rational and just society from Socrates' time on was the rule of the intellectuals.

In China, where the intellectual class ruled for two thousand years, their self-awareness as the elite most fit to govern was incorporated in the wisdom of proverbs:

«Without leaving his study, a Bachelor of Arts may understand the affairs of the empire».
«As a student — under one man; in office — over ten thousand».
«All scholars are brethren» [6].

Such was the intellectual's vocation to rule over all classes, — his universal authoritarian propensity. Situational circumstances in modern times, however, ranging from his deprivation of power and employment, have bred in intellectuals a more acute authoritarianism. Situational frustrations have reinforced the role of ideas as the aggressive vehicles of dominance over others.

3. The intellectual as a man of words has often suffered from a prolonged deprivation from action. There is a normal biological pattern in the confrontation of problems; the problem provokes ideas, plans of action, which in the normal biological process find fulfillment in action. The rise of an intellectual class often means, however, a proliferation of thinkers who do not become doers. Thinking which does not culminate in action is, from the biological standpoint, a psychological anomaly. The very situation of the intellectual then carries with it a high degree of frustration — the outcome of a life in which important initiating stimuli to action are presented without any of the termini and consummations. The frustration of the intellectual breeds its counterpart of heightened aggressive energy. When social circumstances are most unfavorable and the hope of social action has dwindled, this aggression may be turned against one's self; the self-aggression of intellectuals is manifested in movements as diverse as monasticism and beatnikism. But where the desire for action is not subdued, it becomes imbued with the characteristics of behavior which has long been frustration-contained. The intellectual then tends to dictatorial, impatient, and ruthless modes

[6] Rev. W. SCARBOROUGH, *A Collection of Chinese Proverbs*, Revised by Rev. C. Wilfred ALLAN, Shanghai, 1926. pp. 74-75.

of action. Pent-up aggressive energies tend to drive ideas to an extreme which they would not have reached if those energies had been expended in action. Tocqueville said that the French intellectuals of the eighteenth century were led to the most extreme ideas because «their very way of living,... quite out of touch with practical politics», deprived them of the experience which would have tempered their ardor [7]. What is important, however, is not that experience confutes the schematic simplicities of a few general ideas. Rather it is that the frustration of inaction tends to make ideas into a displaced means of agression. An extreme ideology is an idea suffused with displaced aggressive energy. The situation of the intellectual tends to make him into an ideologue.

The most eminent Fabian intellectuals thus became increasingly authoritarian as in the course of their long lives they saw the transition of their ideas into action disrupted. Bernard Shaw in his play *On the Rocks* expressed the intellectual's self-disillusionment: «I am not a man of action, only a talker. Until the men of action clear out the talkers we who have social consciences are at the mercy of those who have none». Shaw went the gamut of an admiration for strong men which included Mussolini and Hitler, and gave way to an inner violence in which he justified the extermination of a social and political opposition. Sidney and Beatrice Webb, towards the end of their lives, had an unashamed reverence for Stalin's methods. The sundering of the thinking-action sequence made authoritarians of the most distinguished socialist intellectuals in democratic, industrial England.

4. Movements whose membership has consisted primarily of intellectuals have tended remarkably towards an authoritarian pattern, and to exhibit traits of intolerance and procedures of excommunication. This has been true in science as in politics. One would have expected for instance, that the psychoanalytical movement, born of the desire to liberate men from irrationalities, would have been characterized by a friendly exploration of differences and an overriding sense of common purpose. An intellectual movement, however, invariably centers around a strong father-figure; a scientific or philosophical school is usually defined methodologically by its adherence to a common method and basic hypotheses, but in a more basic psychological sense, it is constituted by the dominance of a particular kind of super-ego personality. Freudian psychoanalysis, for instance, was (in Erich Fromm's words) a «'movement', with an

[7] Alexis DE TOCQUEVILLE, *The Old Regime and the French Revolution,* transl. Stuart GILBERT, New York, Anchor Ed., 1955, pp. 140-141.

international organization on strictly hierarchical lines, strict rules for belonging, and for many years guided by a secret commitee consisting of Freud and six other members. This movement has on occasion and in some of its representatives exhibited a fanaticism usually to be found only in religious and political bureaucracies» [8].

From a psychological standpoint, moreover, the intellectual can be said to have about him something of the feminine. The bookish boy growing up invariably finds himself at some odds with his less intellectual companions who regard him as «sissy» in his tastes. The young thinker later on finds that the battle of ideas has a terrible reality, and in the struggle of ideas, he finds his manhood as others did in physical conflict. Always however, as compared to «practical» men, the man of ideas is under a kind of onus to demonstrate his manhood. To do so he makes of his ideas weapons; he tries to be tough, and this indeed lends to his thought a strain of authoritarian compensational strength [9].

5. Political sects arise because intellectuals cannot stand differences in politics. The history of political sects is a history of intellectuals' intolerance and authoritarianism. By contrast, the large non-ideological American political parties, which embrace a variety of sections, classes, interests, and ethnic groups, and which are not led by intellectuals, have not shown a tendency to sectarian fission. In the American non-ideological parties, intellectuals have been relatively uninfluential.

Engels in 1847 noted that the socialistic sects were primarily composed of men outside the working classes, and that they looked to the «educated classes» for support [10]. During the Second Empire, when two socialist schools, the Blanquist and the Proudhonist, competed for the allegiance of Frenchmen, it was noticeable that the Blanquists, organized as an authoritarian secret society, were drawn primarily from students, while the loosely organized Proudhonists were chiefly composed of workingmen active in mutual aid, credit, and cooperative societies [11]. The law of the extremism of the revolutionary intellectual in authoritarian sects was cogently formu-

[8] Erich FROMM, «Freud, Friends, and Feuds: 1. Scientism or Fanaticism», *The Saturday Review*, Vol. XLI, June 14, 1958, p. 11.

[9] Max LERNER, *Ideas for the Ice Age*, New York, 1941, pp. viii, 15, 98-99.

[10] Karl MARX and Friedrich ENGELS, *Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy*, ed. Lewis S. FEUER, New York, 1959, pp. 4-5.

[11] Samuel BERNSTEIN, *The Beginnings of Marxian Socialism in France*, New York, 1933, pp. 17, 28.

lated by James P. Cannon, the leader of the American Trotskyist sect, who wrote on the basis of a lifetime's experience: «It seems to be a peculiar law that the greater a party's isolation from the living labor movement, ... all the more radical it becomes in its formulations, its program, etc... You see it in the split-offs from the Trotskyist movement — our own 'lunatic fringe'. The less people listen to them, the less effect their words have on the course of human events, the more extreme and unreasonable and hysterical they become in their formulations» [12].

The revolutionary intellectual, in other words, is especially prone to secretarian behavior because he has been deprived of the continuous consummation of the transition from thought to action. An intolerant purity of principle enables him to make a virtue of his action-inhibited asceticism. His authoritarianism is the eruptive obverse of his impotence.

6. The intellectual in the so-called backward areas tends to develop an authoritarianism which is proportionate to the gap between his ideas and the social environment; social reality for him is an ever-present obstacle, stubborn and recalcitrant to his ideas. As an intellectual, his consciousness seeks to determine his existence; the more existence frustrates him, the more aggressive in idea becomes his consciousness. Both Mill and Marx observed that the intellectuals of materially backward countries adopted the most advanced ideas. A doctrine such as Saint-Simonianism, with its program of rule by the intellectuals, could only have arisen, wrote Mill, in a relatively under-developed country like France [13]. Marx remarked that the young Russian intellectuals in Germany and Paris «always run after the most extreme that the West can offer» [14]; his books, he observed, «had a greater sale in Russia than anywhere else. And the first foreign nation to translate *Kapital* is the Russian».

Ideas and practices which are found only among the most extreme sectarian, isolated intellectuals in the West have found a fertile transplantation among governing intellectuals in Africa and Asia. Kwame Nkrumah, Prime Minister of Ghana, tells how while associated in America with the Trotskyites, especially «one of its leading members, Mr. C. L. R. James», he learned «how an underground

[12] James P. CANNON, *The History of American Trotskyism*, New York, 1944, pp. 10, 12.

[13] Richard K. P. PANKHURST, *The Saint-Simonians: Mill and Carlyle*, London, 1957, p. 15.

[14] Karl MARX, *Letters to Dr. Kugelmann*, New York, 1934, pp. 77-78.

movement worked». A mode of organization out of place in America became the model for The Circle, a revolutionary African student group which Nkrumah helped found; its members added a touch of tribal blood ritual to their dedication to an emancipated Africa. Later, when they were ministers of government, they synthesized Marxism with tribalism, and frankly expressed «the tribal impulse to destroy those who are out of step». The African intellectual elite quickly became, as K. A. Busia wrote, a ruling class [15]. In Ceylon, young intellectuals who had imbibed their doctrine from Trotskyite circles in London and from the eccentric authoritarian Scott Nearing in America emerged similarly from their underground Trotskyite movement to become members of a coalition government [16]. Debarred for years from participation in the political life of Ceylon, they had concentrated on ideology, and developed their ideological puritan intolerances. The most influential Cabinet minister in 1957, Philip Gunawardena, disciple of Scott Nearing, had a simple question and answer: «Where do you find democratic socialism? On the moon» [17]. One hears much nowadays that authoritarianism is a necessary political means for the industrialization of a backward country. The facts, however, suggest that the authoritarian traits of intellectual chiefs lead them to choose that mode and speed of industrialization which is most expressive of their own authoritarian psychology.

7. The intellectual class in modern times, furthermore, in both advanced and backward societies is most vulnerably situated with respect to the economy. England in the eighteen-eighties was already producing a surplus of intellectuals which the economy could not absorb. The «intellectual reserve army» was more articulate, resentful, and less resigned than the «industrial reserve army». William Clarks described the new «intellectual proletariat» in the first *Fabian Essays:*

> «Fifty years ago you could have gathered all the press writers of
> London into a single moderate sized room. Today all told they number

[15] Kwame Nkrumah, Ghana: *The Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah*, New-York, 1957, p. 45; K. A. Busia, «The Present Situation and Aspirations of Elites in the Gold Coast», *International Social Science Bulletin*, Vol. VIII, 1956, p. 429; Peter Abrahams, «The Blacks», *African Tressury*, New York, ed. Langston Hughes, 1961, pp. 55-56.

[16] Calvin A. Woodward, «The Trotskyite Movement in Ceylon», *World Politics*, Vol. XIV, 1962, pp. 310-311, 315, 317.

[17] *The New York Times*, November 23, 1957, November 25, 1957.

ten thousand. Everybody with a pen, ink and paper and any capacity for turning out 'copy' is a journalist; and you see at once that it is impossible for all these men to earn a living. They don't, and can't... Now, while a workingman who has never known comfort, whose father has never known it before him, can often stand a frightful amount of poverty without getting desperate, the well-bred young man cannot; and the result is that the keenest and most dangerous discontent comes from the educated classes, who are leading the Socialist masses all over Europe» [18].

Where the intellectual experienced an economic system whose very workings deprived him of a livelihood or status, he tended to respond with a critique which was not only socialist but, in proportion to his frustration, authoritarian. Whether it was students in New York's city colleges or Kerala, India, facing the dismal prospects of a superflous existence, or young teachers faced with insecurity, an authoritarian socialism emerged as a response [19]. The intellectual proletariat is probably the most authoritarian of all.

It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that economic resentment alone has moved intellectuals into the direction of authoritarian socialism. The few thousands of intelligentsia in Russia during the middle of the nineteenth century «could easily have been absorbed by the constantly expanding bureaucratic apparatus of the state or the growing range of the liberal professions». There were tremendous aspirations too of altruism, mixed with guilt-feelings at the people's lot, a desire to give one's self to the people almost sacrificially, combined with the longing for a free expression of one's individuality and talents. «It was a 'class' of expelled students and censored journalists, who in desperation were driven to conspiratorial extremes» [20]. A psychology of «revolutionary asceticism» came to characterize the young Russian intellectuals [21]. Interwoven, however, with the ascetic self-denial was the conception of the intellectual

[18] William CLARKE, «The Fabian Society», in *Fabian Essays in Socialism* ed. G. Bernard Shaw, reprinted, Boston, 1911, pp. xxxvi-xxxix. Also Ernest Belfort BAX, *The Ethics of Socialism*, London, Fourth Ed., 1902, p. xi.

[19] Robert W. IVERSEN, *The Communists and the Schools*, New York, 1959, pp. 150-152. On the Indian student, cf. *The New York Times*, July 15, 1959, February 8, 1960.

[20] Martin MALIA, «What is the Intelligentsia ?», in *The Russian Intelligentsia*, ed. Richard Pipes, pp. 14-15. For the later period, cf. Vera FIGNER, *Memoirs of a Revolutionist*, transl. Camilla CHAPIN DANIELS, New York, 1927, pp. 36-37, 76-77. I. STEINBERG, *Spiridonova: Revolutionary Terrorist*, transl. Gwenda DAVID and Eric MOSBACHER, London, 1935, pp. 32-33.

[21] Nicolas BERDYAEV, *Dream and Reality*, an essay in autobiography, transl. Katharine LAMPERT, New York, 1951, p. 113.

as the historically creative individual, the one who bore the historical mission to redeem and rule [22].

Authoritarian traits showed themselves among the Russian revolutionary intellectuals in a variety of ways. The anti-Jewish feeling, for instance, of the Narodnaya Volya in the eighteen-eighties went as far as a positive endorsement of pogroms. French socialist sects were similarly involved in anti-Semitism. Curiously the more proletarian German Social Democratic Party, much less intellectual in its composition and leadership, was relatively free of anti-Semitism. Although the academic *Kathedersozialisten* were decidedly tinged with anti-Jewish prejudice, «there were occasions when the Social Democratic workers made it a point of honor to demonstrate the feelings of devotion and solidarity with leaders who were attacked twice, for being Socialists and being Jews» [23].

Lenin insisted in *What is to be Done ?* that it was the intellectuals who brought socialist consciousness to the workers who otherwise would not advance beyond trade union consciousness. Was the conception of a socialist society so difficult that it demanded much scientific training ? In many places and many times, in Germany, for instance, in the early eighteen-thirties, small groups of working-men had periodically from their own ethical and intellectual resources sought to fashion for themselves communistic societies [24]. What the intellectuals brought to the socialist movement was not socialist consciousness but the notion of their own elite authoritarianism. The socialist consciousness itself does not require any elaborate theoretical analysis but springs up indeed spontaneously from the ethical aspirations of all exploited people. What Lenin was doing was rather to provide an ideological basis for the hegemony of the intellectual elite.

Two impulses have always warred within the socialist tradition, an authoritarian and a democratic, for socialism indeed has emanated from two basically different psychological sources — one the desire of the intellectuals to be the ruling class, the other the desire of the working class for a society of equals. Engels called Saint-Simon an Utopian Socialist, but Saint-Simon, a child of the *philosophes*,

[22] Vera FIGNER, *op.cit.*, p. 63.

[23] Edmund SILBERNER, «Two Studies on Modern Anti-Semitism», *Historia Judaica*, Vol. XIV, 1952, pp. 104-106. Paul W. MASSING, *Rehearsal for Destruction: A Study of Political Anti-Semitism in Imperial* Germany, New York, 1949, pp. 202-203.

[24] Boris NICOLAIEVSKY and Otto MAENCHEN-HELFEN, *Karl Marx: Man and Fighter*, transl. Gwenda DAVID and Eric MOSBACHER, New York, 1936, p. 78.

plainly advocated the authoritarian rule of the intellectuals, and won numerous adherents among the engineering graduates of the Ecole Polytechnique, the new «industrial priests». Can it be that Marxism with its faith in a democratic, liberal working class, achieving its own emancipation, was daring to be far more Utopian ? The authoritarian and liberal components were both present in the socialism of Marx and of Engels from their earliest writings in an unstable equilibrium. Engels indeed first claimed in 1843 that German socialism was superior to the French because of its freedom from democratic prejudices, and he envisaged the socialist society not as a workers democracy but as ruled by a technical intelligentsia chosen «not by a majority of the community at large» but by an examination system [25]. Two years later, impressed by the reports of the American socialist communities, his socialism became more communitarian, less elitist. And Marx's socialism evolved in a more democratic spirit from the time when he wrote in 1844 in typical elitist fashion: «The head of the emancipation is philosophy, its heart is the proletariat».

But this is the eternal strife in the heart of socialism itself, the problem of the future, the strife between the authoritarian and liberal elements; it sets for the intellectual class the question how it will define its own character.

[25] Friedrich ENGELS, «The State of Germany», in Karl MARX, Friedrich ENGELS, *Historisch-Kritische Gesamtausgabe*, Erste Abteilung, Band 4, Berlin, 1932, p. 494.

MARXISM AND OUR TIME

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No other teaching in our world has caused during the last 50-70 years such fervent debates, discussions and passionate speeches «for» or «against» as Marxism. And it cannot be otherwise for Marxism, as a world outlook, as a social theory and political trend of thought affects the basic problems of the present, the basic interests of the battling forces of the modern world, forces of progress and reaction, forces of peace and war, forces interested in perpetuating the moribund social and political order and forces fighting for the new and progressive, fighting for socialism and communism.

In our epoch Marxism has long ceased to be only a teaching, a theory, an idea. It has grown to be a real movement and is embodied now in a system of society in the world system of socialism covering one third of mankind, i.e. over a milliard of people.

All thinking peoples can see that the influence of Marxist ideas continues to grow with each decade. Of course, the greater the successes of the Communist construction in the USSR and of Socialist construction in the countries of the People's Democracy, the more the magnetic force of Marxism and its ideas will increase among the advanced social forces.

Today even such an event as the flight of the Soviet spaceships contributes to the popularity of the ideas of Marxism-Leninism.

An American sociologist, Professor Rossister Clinton, of Cornell University though an opponent of Marxism, nevertheless admits in his book «Marxism: the American Outlook», that «there can be no doubt as to the triumph of Marxism». And Professor R. Clinton states that «our whole trouble is that we have no Marx of our own; we have no teacher, whom we would refer as the herald of truth».

But the force of influence of Marxism-Leninism lies precisely in its truth, in the fact that it truthfully reflects the laws of social development, the basic needs of our epoch, the vital interests of advanced social forces fighting for durable peace, real democracy, socialism and communism. In our epoch it is precisely Marxism that presents the knowledge of the objective laws, the moving forces of

social development and clear outlook and bright hopes for the people of all countries and all progressive mankind.

The opponents of Communism advance against Marxism the argument that this teaching originated in the nineteenth century, but now we are in the twentieth century. The world, these critics of Marxism insist, had changed radically during the last 50-70 years and therefore Marxism is archaic. But the vital strength of Marxism consist in the fact that it is in constant development, and its development in the present as well as the past closely follows the development of social life. This is of primary importance. And secondly, Marx's discovery of the laws of development of society remains in force. Socialist revolutions, workers' and national liberation movements against imperialism have been established throughout the world to confirm Marx's theory.

All great teachings, if they discover not the imaginary, but real laws of development of nature or society, remain in force, though they undergo changes in the development, are enriched by new laws, new data and new statuses.

In the sixteenth century Copernicus' theory upset all ordinary and traditional ideas of people as regards the earth's revolution around the sun and its place in the solar system. This great revolutionary theory forced its way in to the minds of millions people for two to three centuries. There was a time when one had to be a Galileo to dare to defend Copernicus' theory.

But who in our time but ignoramuses can doubt that the Earth revolves constantly around the Sun. Copernicus' teaching became generally accepted.

After Kepler and Newton and after the creation of the theory of relativity by Einstein, we know more about the laws of the Earth's rotation and of the solar system, but the essence of the brilliant Polish scientist's teaching remains also today.

The same can be said of Marx too, of his teaching and his discovery the laws of social-historical development, of the ways of mankind to socialism and communism.

Life does not stand still. Society is developing.

Marxism developed and is developing creatively on the basis of new experience and new data. Theoretical generalization of experience of historical development, the enrichment by new statuses can be seen, as in the fields of philosophy, sociology and as in the fields of political economy. Lenin's works *Materialism and Empiriocriticism, Imperialism as the highest stage of Capitalism, State and*

Revolution and so on, present new and great contributions to the treasury of Marxism. New phenomena and the processes of a new epoch, the epoch of imperialism and proletarian revolution were summed up and generalized in them.

After the discovery of the laws of social development by Marx and Engels, which had the greatest influence on the course of the development of Russia and all mankind, the most remarkable discovery was the discovery of the law of irregularity of the economic and political development of capitalism and the creating on the basis teaching of possibility of victory of socialist revolution and socialism in one separate country.

After Marx and Engels' discovery the history of social science has not witnessed another discovery of this sort that would have such powerful influence on the historic futures of Russia, as well as on the course of development of Europe and world history.

The opponents of Marxism advance different facts that, by their opinion, refute Marxism as if the previsions of Marx had not been realised.

Society and historical development are the most complicated phenomenon and research subjects. Here, as not in nature, we see people endowed with consciousness and will to act. Here are many unknown phenomena acting in each country. Of great importance as well are historical causes, the role of some historical leaders, and their traits. Who would foresee, for example, that such a monster as Hitler would appear in the twentieth century in the centre of Europe at the head of the German State ?

But in spite of these causes, the general course of historical development followed namely the direction that had been forecast by Marx and marxism.

The changes which had taken place during the past 50 years fully bear out Marx and Engels' previsions, the previsions of Marx's theory about the main trend of the course of social development, the historical transient nature of capitalism, unavoidable replacement of capitalism by socialism, the historical role of the working class, and of the inevitability of the widest dissemination of Communist ideas throughout the world among masses of people, the unavoidable bankruptcy of colonialism, etc.

Have not all these brilliant forecasts come true ?

Marx wrote about the working class as a class called to be the great, transforming, revolutionary force. Namely the working class is called to carry out the socialist revolution and build up socialism.

The calling of the working class, its world-historical mission is to liberate society from exploitation of man by man, from poverty and lack of rights by the masses, political and national oppression, militarism and then, in the long run, wars and causes of wars. «The main point in Marx's teaching — V.I. Lenin wrote — is the definition of the world-historical role of the proletariat as creator of socialist society».

Has not the working class of a number of countries of Europe and Asia proved its great historical role and carried out the age-long aspiration of mankind about the upbuilding of socialism, and, then communism, the most just social system on the earth, with homogeneous social structure without classes of rich and poor.

Socialist society is being built up in Poland, Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, the DDR and Czechoslovakia, China and Vietnam and other countries of the People's Democracy.

In the USSR socialism has already been built up and won complete and final victory. The Soviet people proceeded to building up communism. It is an easier task that building up of socialism, and the people headed by the working class proved its ability to make miracles, an ability of historical creative work as in the economic social and political fields as well as in the fields of science and culture.

Facts inevitably show that in the capitalist countries the working class increasingly demonstrates itself as a political force resisting the bourgeoisie. This phenomenon is manifested differently in France, Italy, Japan, England, Sweden and Norway.

Since the days of Marx and Engels capitalism has also undergone enormous changes. It has transformed capitalism into monopolistic state and ceased to be the world's undivided and dominating system. The colonial system has collapsed. Many once powerful empires have disintegrated, scores of new states have   come into being in Asia and Africa. But the most important change in the world is the socialist system.

Naturally, Marx had no knowledge of this. He never saw this and, to our regret, could not observe all this. But does it mean that what had taken place in the world disproves Marxism ? No, on the contrary. It fully bears out the historical previsions of Marx.

Some people may say that capitalism still exists in Great Britain, USA, France, Italy and Japan, but that is no proof against Marxism. Capitalism, too, vanquished feudalism but not in one decade in all countries. To do this capitalism needed 200 more years after the

seventeenth century. But even by the twentieth century Asia, Africa and South America, with their enormous populations, remained backward in technical, economic and cultural relations and in a feudal or semifeudal state.

The transition from capitalism to socialism is surely a deep overturn in economy, social relations and culture, in comparison with the revolutionary overturn in time of the transition to capitalism. And although in our epoch the tempo of historical development has considerably increased, nevertheless, the socialist revolution covers the whole historical epoch.

In our epoch the trend of historical development is defined quite clearly. The fact that capitalism has no historical future is not only proved by the socialist revolution which has taken place in Europe and Asia, but even by such a fact, of small significance at first sight, as that the word «capitalism» has become unpopular everywhere and frequently an abusive word. In our days the word capitalism is hostilely and negatively regarded not only in the countries of Asia and Africa, but also in the advanced capitalist countries. The capitalist ideologists themselves are ashamed to call capitalism by its own name. In many countries sociologists, economists and publicists are working hard to find new names for capitalism.

Does it not indirectly demonstrate the fact that capitalism has no historical future and has discredited itself and has no moral authority over the peoples of the world ?

As regards the periods necessary for the transition of these or other countries to socialism, concrete ways and peculiar forms of future transition depend, as Marxism teaches, on many factors and specific conditions prevailing in different countries.

When critics of Communism speak of the «obsolescence» of Marxism, they judge Marxism in comparison with those doctrines which appear and disappear by the dozen from life, leaving no trace. These critics forget that Marxists never regarded their teaching as something set, finished and petrified, as something that must be learned by rule.

F. Engels, one of the founders of Marxism, wrote on dialectics: «Dialectical philosophy rejects all ideas about final, absolute truth, and absolute states of mankind corresponding to it. There is nothing set forever, absolute and sacred to dialectical philosophy. Everywhere it finds the trace of inevitable falling, and nothing is able to avoid it, except the continuous process of appearance and destruction, the endless advanced development from lower to higher stage. The

dialectical philosophy itself is a simple reflection of this process in consciousness».

This is how Engels, together with Marx and following Marx, understood dialectical method, the core of Marxism. That is how Engels approached his studying of the phenomena and processes taking place in nature and society.

Marxist-Leninist were and will always remain truthful to this understanding of the laws of development of the objective world. And Marxism reflecting in scientific form the laws of development of the objective world, does not stand still and it cannot stand still.

Marx, Engels and Lenin always stressed: «Our teaching is not a dogma, but a guide to action».

Could Marxism serve as a scientific guide to action if it stood still in a developing, changing society ? No, of course not.

V.I. Lenin, the most outstanding marxist, wrote at the beginning of his scientific and political activity: «We do not consider at all the theory of Marx as something set and inviolable; we are convinced, on the contrary, that this theory laid the corner-stone of the science that the socialists *must* develop in all trends if they do not want to lag behind life. We think that for Russian socialists it is especially necessary to elaborate their own theory of Marx because this theory gives only general leading trends used in England and Germany differently than in Russia».

Lenin and leninists always understood and understand that that is why they won and win and are moving ahead. But dogmatics and revisionists did suffer and are suffering defeat.

The opponents of Marx, knowing Marxism by hearsay or second-hand sources, do not know or forget that Leninism triumphed in the USSR in its struggle not only with the revisionism but also with the doctrinaire and dogmatic conceptions of Marxisms of Kautsky, Plekhanov, Martov and their followers. Leninism is the creative Marxism, enriched by new discoveries statuses and conclusions, made during the epoch that followed the epoch of Marx and Engels.

In response to the criticism of Marxism and to the reasoning upon its incompatibility with the present epoch I would like to cite the opinion of the opponent of Marxism and marxist sociology.

In 1961 the *Washington Post and Times Herald* published a letter of James B. Hodgeson, professor of philosophy at one of the American universities.

«A brilliant German philosopher, — he says, —sitting in the British Museum has worked out a powerful social philosophy. We mean Karl Marx, surely. He had not had a single tank or single jet plane

or rocket. But, nevertheless, his voluminous scientific works present the main force threatening the West nowadays. I think that the profound conviction of Mr. Khrushchev in the final victory of communism follows from the works of the brillant creator of ideas.

As far as I understand at present there is no similar movement among Western philosophers to work out any response to Marx, which might have been effectively used in this increasing crisis». «Marx is expecting a response from the West», Professor Hodgeson says in closing his letter.

The esteemed professor of philosophy is not alone in his evaluation. Well-known British philosopher Bertrand Russell has expressed similar views. To the question of one American magazine as to who was the most influential philosopher at present, Bertrand Russell answered «Karl Marx, unfortunately».

What is the force, the source of influence of Marx's ideas in our epoch ? Why after endless «denials» of Marx the influence of his teaching is not only not weakening but growing ?

While the time, the course of history were and are so pitiless to many sociologists, philosophers and even to entire schools and trends of social and philosophic ideas, they not only spare Marx and marxism but on the contrary they play the role of his allies, giving new evidence of the truthfulness and vitality of Marxism.

We think his question should have been of great interest first of all to Professor Hodgeson and people having identical ideas.

Myths, legends, superstitions, anti-scientific teachings contradicting reality increasingly lose their influence, their power over people's minds in the epoch of revolutionary transition from capitalism to communism, of atomic energy and space problems. And science, scientific truths checked and corroborated by practice gain more and more recognition.

Sociologists-marxists may be proud of the fact that the sociological theory created by Marx and then developed by V.I. Lenin and his disciples has provided the possibility to anticipate the victory of a new social system in the USSR and in many countries of Europe and Asia.

We Soviet sociologists are proud of the fact that our country, old Russia, which had been treated and defied for its economical and cultural backwardness in former times, has made a gigantic leap from former backwardness towards the heights of modern progress in the new Soviet Russia. In the West, in sociological and philosophic treatises and especially in the press, they write much about the

reasons for the economic and scientific progress in the USSR, and express various suppositions and many fantasies and fables.

We may say that one of the most important reasons for this unparalleled economic, social, cultural and scientific-technical progress accomplished during the life of only one generation lies in the fact that our people and our communist party were guided in their activity by the laws of social development discovered by Marx and Lenin.

None of the social sciences can anticipate everything without exception: all events in every detail, details and zigzags of social development, all situations that can appear and appear in the course of a specific historical movement of peoples. A real science about society may pretend and has the right to pretend to foresee and to determine correctly the principal direction of social development, to reveal its laws and main motive forces, to give the possibility to discern correctly the nature, the essence of events, of historical processes. But it cannot pretend to anticipate literally everything in every detail.

A social science cannot equip political figures and scientists with finished recipes for every case of life. Marxism cannot release and does not release political figures from the study of active life, political reality, historical process but equips them with a scientific method of approach to social reality and to processes going on in it. Marxism gives the possibility to see tendencies of development, to understand the nature of different social forces, social classes and their possible, probable behaviour, that is to foresee the course of social development. And was not Marx right in affirming that society was advancing to communism, that capitalism as well as feudalism was not everlasting but one of the transient social systems, that the replacement of capitalism by socialism was inevitable ? Does not the present confirm this truth ?

The whole course of world events carries conviction of the growing influence of the powerful socialist camp on world development. If in the twenties some short-sighted politicians regarded the USSR only as an episode in world development, now the formation and achievements of the world socialist system, covering one third of the mankind is a fact that one cannot help taking into consideration and which clearly demonstrates the principal content of our epoch, that is the transition from capitalism to socialism, and to communism.

And capitalism itself, its state, its cataclysms, contradictions, crises, antagonisms becoming more and more profound, do not they confirm

the conclusion of marxism about natural character and irreversibility of changes in the correlation of class forces in the present world ?

The general crisis of capitalism becoming more and more intensified, the increase of class struggle of the proletariat in capitalist countries, the break up of the colonial system — all that does not allow a man with common sense to question the correctness of the communists' conclusion about the radical change of correlation of forces, about important qualitative changes in the general correlation of class forces on the international scene.

Marxism has not become petrified and is not standing still. We Marxists struggle not only against revisionists, who are discarding principles, the essence of Marxism, but also against dogmatics, sectarians and doctrinaires, who pedantically have learned by rote these or other citations and formulas of Marx and Marxism, but are unable to apply Marxism in life and to develop it further.

In this lies the power of Marxism-Leninism. If Marxism had not been developed by Lenin and other Marxists, if it were not a creatively developing teaching, which is being enriched by fresh data and conclusions, it would be at variance with reality and would cease to be an effective revolutionary teaching.

Let us take, for instance, the question of war. In 1916 Lenin wrote that in the epoch of imperialism wars were inevitable, they resulted from its very nature. But can this view on the inevitability of world wars be considered a correct one today, when the world socialist system is in existence, when the interrelation of forces between those who are interested in beginning wars and those who fight for peace has changed, when all peoples of the world fight for peace ? In new conditions the thesis of the inevitability of wars cannot be true. This is the concrete historical approach that Marxism teaches.

To-day the most exciting question of vital importance arises with a particular acuteness before all peoples and of course before political figures and sociologists: how to prevent a new world war fraught with a real catastrophe for many and many peoples, with terrible disasters for the whole mankind in the time of modern nuclear weapons ? How to ensure peaceful co-existence of States with different social systems ? How to help mankind to ascend the upper stage of social development ?

Marxism has shown that for preventing the danger of a new world war peoples should know the real and not the false reasons which provoked imperialist wars; it is necessary to know those real aggressive social forces that provoke wars. As is known, such forces, first of all in capitalist monopolies profiting from wars, the production

of arms of death, and destroying and resisting disarmament and the prohibition of production of atomic bombs.

It is widely known that there are sociological and political theories that deduce wars not from the nature of societies based on social and political antagonisms but from the nature of man himself, from virtue of his natural pugnacitiy.

One of the defenders of such views on war affirms in the magazine of the German Social Democracy *Neue Gesellschaft* (GFR issue) that Lenin's teaching about imperialism as the source of wars «does not see any way in which vanity, self-interests, rapaciousness, national and religious fanaticism are not characteristic of human nature and will remain even when means of production will no more be in the private hands. And these qualities of a man, the evil of a human nature are in the end more direct reasons of the beginning of wars — and they will remain as such».

Here is this «sociological» substantiation of wars. These are pernicious anti-popular theories and views. They are reactionnary and fatalistic, they smell of dark pessimism.

This is against such barbarian theories and outlooks that sociologists of all countries must lead an uncompromising struggle.

From such theories follows that wars existed and will exist, that they express everlasting laws because according to the partisans of these views the human nature is invariable. And racialist, geopolitical and other theories substantiating and even justifying wars are still in use.

We know also some American and West-European sociologists who see the reason and the source of wars in our epoch in the national sovereignty of States. And they affirm it when after centuries of colonial enslavement dozens of peoples have won at last national sovereignty in a hard struggle and are fighting for their national independence.

If such views were correct and political leaders at the head of states maintained these positions the future of mankind would be sombre. Partisans of marxist sociology, communists political leaders of socialist countries reject these fatalistic pessimistic views as unscientific and reactionary and carry on a decisive struggle against them. Under present conditions with the actual correlation of the forces of peace and the forces of war the peoples of all countries can prevent war and ensure the peaceful co-existence of states with different social systems if they know the real sources and reasons of wars.

The Programme of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union

adopted by the XXII Congress of the CPSU is an example of marxist sociology, its role in the elaboration of social problems and realization of scientific previsions of the trend of social development and corresponding orientation of all policy.

The new Programme of the CPSU gives sociological, economical and political foundations for building communism in the USSR. This Programme is based on the profound study of real processes taking place in the USSR, real possibilities and forces that are at the disposal of the Soviet country.

The new Programme is a scientifically elaborated plan for the development of a big country. It is based on the preliminary study of objective laws of social development, the real laws of the building of communism. In this Programme all sides of new society development, its economy, policy, culture are considered in strict internal correlation, interdependency. The Programme outlines the real ways of development of socialist State, socialist democracy, the all-sided flourishing of personality, its complete liberation from inherited survivals of old society.

The bright possibilities of the future lie not only in the creation of a material-technical base of communism, but the development of a new, completely developed, harmonious personality.

The establishment of the most advanced form of social organization of society itself develops unlimited creative abilities of man and his creative work. Here lies a way to unlimited moral and intellectual development of personality.

The new Programme results from a deep study of Marxist method, Marxist-Leninist theory as a whole, Marxist political economy, Marxist philosophy, historical materialism, in particular their application to the solution of the problems of communist building incomparable in their scope and importance. This Programme serves as a basis for all policies of the Communist Party and the Soviet State, being the most important theoretical and political document.

The policy of the Soviet State is based on the tasks put forward and theoretically grounded in the Programme. We can clearly see from this example the role that Marxist-Leninist theory, marxist sociology, plays in the elaboration of the policy of the Soviet State.

Conclusion: further developed in our epoch by Lenin and his followers, Marxism, which found its highest expression in the new Programme of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, gives the scientific answer to the vital problems of the present thus demonstrating its invulnerable vitality.

REPORT ON THE DISCUSSION

Chairman : E. FROMM, University of Mexico
Rapporteur: N. BIRNBAUM, University of Oxford

FIRST SESSION

Convened by the chairman, E. Fromm, the group at his request rose for a moment in tribute to the late C. W. Mills, who before his death had promised to participate in its work. It then heard contributions from L. S. Feuer and F. V. Konstantinov and from N. Birnbaum, M. Rubel and V. S. Semenov. The subsequent discussion in fact was concentrated on the issues raised, in the view of the participants if not invariably in that of the two contributors themselves, by the papers given by L. S. Feuer and F. V. Konstantinov. These may be crudely summarized as the problem of the political uses of Marxism and of its universal character, respectively. The other papers, of course, attracted a certain amount of attention; the following account attempts to sketch only the main lines of the session.

A number of participants advanced a variety of views on the political uses of Marxism. F. V. Konstantinov suggested that the development of Communist societies was in itself a proof of Marxism's efficacy as well as a source of its continuing influence. The irregularities of development in these societies was explicable in Marxist terms, and Marxism, further, was a doctrine capable of change. D. Bell expressed his own difficulties in following changes in the criteria of social truth in the Communist societies; was there any way, he asked, of knowing when a position declared incompatible with the views of the Communist Party might be declared acceptable again ? T. H. Goriely insisted on the ideological — in Marxist terms — utilization of Marxism as a state and party ideology in Communist countries. There, it concealed the reality it attempted to justify. Answers of several kinds came from Communist participants. Y. A. Zamoshkin held that a dogmatic or religious attitude to Marxism was not characteristic of the Soviet Union, where indeed a critical spirit had developed. I. Wiatr thought that a certain sort of political intervention in the current debate was regrettable; it

was better to concentrate on Marxist contributions to the under-
standing of political phenomena, as of the changing social-political
structure of socialist society. He expressed his agreement with F. V.
Konstantinov's depiction of Marxism as a changing doctrine, and
noted that Marxism could fulfil different social functions in different
contexts. L. Goldmann declared that static conceptions of truth and
falsity could not be applied to Marxism, as F. V. Konstantinov had
attempted; Marxism had to be interpreted in terms of its total histor-
ical context, which implied that it had not a historical essence but a
variable historical meaning.

M. Rubel then argued that Marx's initial description of the
proletariat and analysis of its historical role was based on a series
of observations of early nineteenth century capitalism and on the
fusion of ethical with historical analysis.

L. S. Feuer's views on the presence in Marxism of a doctrine of
the hegemony of an intellectual class, which appealed to authoritar-
ian tendencies in intellectuals, provoked dissent. L. Goldmann held
that this conception of «intellectuals» was abstracted from actual
historical process, and therefore without value. K. Lenk presented
a typology of intellectuals which, he thought, showed that they had
no uniform characteristics. Marxist intellectuals in Communist
countries, for instance, were «revisionist» and socially critical when
they were opposed to the party and state apparatus, but «authoritar-
ian» when they served as its spokesmen. Similarly, western intel-
lectuals sometime identified themselves with what C. W. Mills ter-
med «the power elite» but sometimes opposed it. E. A. Arab-Ogly
asked if future increases in productivity might not produce a society
characterized by not the hegemony but the omnipresence of intel-
lectuals, that is, in which everyone could be an intellectual.

A certain amount of additional discussion was given to the prob-
lem of «alienation» in Marxism. M. Rubel thought that Marx had
good reason for not publishing the texts which had recently been
used to explicate his early views. A. Davydov declared that the social
psychological notion of «alienation» derived by Marx from Hegel
had been transmuted by him into a concept in political economy
— which, in his view, bourgeois sociology preferred to ignore. E.
Fromm intervened *contra* N. Birnbaum to present a psychological
equivalent for the notion of alienation which was in his view more
universal and empirically applicable than the extrapolation from
Freudian theory attempted by the latter. According to E. Fromm,
alienation occurred wherever men conceived of themselves not as

subjects of their acts but as externalized manifestations of them. E. A. Arab-Ogly, finally, spoke of a Soviet interest in the problem, which he saw as due to the division of labour and not to private property alone. The latter having been abolished in the U.S.S.R., attention was now being given to the former. It might be impossible to eliminate the division of labour entirely but the general level of the people could be raised.

Other participants in the discussions were A. Kolman, L. Labedz, I. Szigeti, A. Siracky.

SECOND SESSION

This discussion continued the work of the previous session. J. Srovnal disputed M. Rubel's ethical interpretation of Marxism and criticised, further, an abstract utilization of conceptions from the early Marxist treatises. Scientific aspirations and a party spirit were, in his view, reconcilable within Marxism. S. Minc criticised some western colleagues for ignoring what was essential in Marxism: the study of changes resulting from changes in property relationships, which did allow a Marxist analysis of changes in socialist society. P. Gonzales-Casanova said that he spoke as an intellectual from the third world and as such he was bound to note that L. S. Feuer and F. V. Konstantinov were not communicating with one another; he supposed that the really important communications occurred within ideological groups. E. Walter said that there were really two sorts of Marxist, eastern and western, and that an immanent critique of Marxism was needed which would deal with recent social changes; this was possible only if over-simplifications were avoided. Concretely, he wished to see investigations of the social consequences of the expansion of the secondary and tertiary sectors in the economy and an examination of the Leninist theory of the development of a labour aristocracy based on colonial exploitation. F. V. Konstantinov said that he had not analysed the negative elements in the development of Marxism but had left these for D. Bell and L. Goldmann. Marxism had developed through its contradictions which he listed as revisionism, dogmatism, staticism and it was necessary to see that each of its historical epochs (Marx's own period, Lenin's and the present phase of World-wide Marxism) had its own peculiarities. It was true that concrete sociological investigations were perfectly possible within other tendencies of sociological analysis

and no one uniform analysis uniting Marxism and non-Marxist thought was possible: sociology could not be equated to mathematics and physics.

Replying to his critics, L. S. Feuer said that much had been made of the alleged abstractness of his conceptions, but his critics had supplied no empirical data. This was precisely the way in which Marxism had been converted into an ideology. Marx did advance universal, i.e. testable, propositions and this was indispensable to any sociological theory; he called for studies of possible antagonisms between the Soviet intelligentsia and the Soviet people. L. Goldmann, dealing with F. V. Konstantinov's remarks, said that negative facts about the development of Soviet society could not be studied — if they were to be studied in a Marxist sense — in isolation from one another or the total development in which they were embedded.

A. Joja finally presented an analysis of the logical structure of Marxism, in contradistinction to its Hegelian antecedents F. Arasteh suggested that Marxism, like Freudianism, Darwinism, and Ghandiism had its strength in the adumbration of the unconscious forces governing man in society. The present crisis, however, emphasized the need for a new integrated theory of man's potential for communal action, to supplant theories based on the observation of what men had been.

MODELS AND THEORY FORMATION
UTILISATION DES MODÈLES POUR L'ÉLABORATION DES THÉORIES

A THEORY OF SOCIAL INTERACTION

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I

Not because it limits the generality of the theory but simply because it may help us visualize what is going on, I shall begin by describing a characteristic situation to which the theory applies[2]. Two men, whom I call Person and Other, are both employees doing similar clerical work in the same office, but Person, who has been there for some time, is more experienced at the work than Other, who is a relative newcomer. Each of the two may perform, or, as I shall say, emit *activities,* which I shall describe as any discriminable units of behavior, which may be directed to the other person or to the non-human environment, and which may be *repeated.* Each of the two men has at least two *alternative* activities open to him in the sense that, aside from the considerations incorporated in the theory, there is nothing to prevent his emitting either one of them while he is in the office. Each of the two activities may be *rewarded* (reinforced) or punished by the environment or by an activity of the other person; and the environment, the persons themselves, and the

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activities they emit present certain discriminable cognitive *stimuli* to both Person and Other.

In particular, Other may either emit the activity of doing his own work, or, since he is relatively inexperienced, he may go to Person, ask him for advice on how to do the work, and give him thanks or other forms of what I shall call social approval in return. Likewise, Person may either do his own work or give advice to Other. When either man does his own work it is rewarded to the degree that the work is successfully advanced. When Other asks for advice, his activity in doing so is rewarded by the advice he gets; when Person gives advice his activity is rewarded by social approval, and since I have assumed that the activities may be repeated, Other's giving social approval now may be regarded as an activity rewarded by getting advice on the next occasion.

My use of words like *stimulus* and *reward* indicates that my theory is based on the propositions of behavioral psychology, sometimes called learning theory[3]. It is, in fact, an attempt to apply behavioral psychology to the social situation, in which at least two persons are interacting with one another. I shall take the propositions of behavioral psychology for granted, except for certain propositions, which, because they take a key position in my theory, I shall try to spell out.

A theory is nothing if not an explanation of the empirical relations among observed events, and what my theory has first to explain is why Other should ask for help at all and why Person should give help upon being asked for it. For this and other purposes I introduce Proposition 1: If in the past the occurrence of a particular stimulus-situation has been the occasion on which a man's activity has been rewarded, then the more similar the present stimulus-situation is to the past one, the more likely he is to emit the activity, or some similar activity now. This I shall call the *stimulus proposition*. A stimulus-situation is any set of stimuli perceived by a person as attending his activity. Looked at broadly, the proposition says that any explanation of human behavior must bring in the past histories of the persons concerned. In this respect social theory differs from physical theory, which need not so often take into consideration the past histories of the materials it deals with.

Given Proposition 1, the explanation why Other asks Person for help might take the following deductive form:

[3] See especially B. F. SKINNER, *Science and Human Behavior*, New York, Macmillan, 1953.

1. Americans are apt to have experienced occasions such that, when they have perceived that they are inexperienced and that experienced persons are present, their requests for help from the experienced have been rewarded with help.

2. Other is an American; he perceives that he is inexperienced and that Person is experienced.

3. Therefore, by Proposition 1, he is apt to ask Person for help now.

A similar explanation might be given for Person's giving help. The explanation is a bit plonking, and I spell it out simply because I think it corresponds to the general form of the explanations we do in fact use in similar circumstances, even though we are generally unwilling to make them explicit.

If Proposition 1 is sufficient, under the assumed circumstances, to explain why Person and Other exchange help for approval the first time, it is not sufficient to explain other features of their behavior that we shall be interested in. For this purpose I introduce three propositions containing variables other than similarity of stimulus-situations. All of them assume that an activity may be repeatedly emitted. Proposition 2: the more often within a given period of time a man's activity has been rewarded, the more likely he is to emit the activity. This I call the *success proposition* because it says, in effect, that to the degree an activity is successful in getting a reward, the more likely a man is to emit it. Thus if Other is unsuccessful in getting help from Person he is likely in time to cease asking for it.

Proposition 3: The more valuable to a man is a unit of a reward, the more likely he is to emit an activity so rewarded. This I call the *value proposition*, and I shall discuss the definition of value later. The proposition relates the frequency with which an activity is emitted to the value of its reward. In general both the success and the value proposition are necessary for the explanation of human behavior, for a man may find a particular reward very valuable, yet if his activity is unsuccessful in getting it, he may not emit the activity very often. Note how both variables come into the normative theory of decision-making. In deciding between two courses of action, a man should consider (a) how successful in getting a particular outcome each action is likely to be, and (b) how valuable to him the outcome would be if attained. He should choose the course of action for which the probability of success multiplied by the value of the outcome is highest. It is important to emphasize that in Proposition 3 the value term refers to the value of a unit of the reward, because, as we shall see, the value in general varies with successive units. I do not see that it makes much difference how the

unit is defined, except that it must be rewarding in itself. In our example, a unit of advice must be enough advice so that Other can get some good out of it.

Proposition 4: The more often in the recent past a man's activity has been rewarded, the less valuable any further unit of that reward becomes to him. This I call the *satiation-deprivation proposition*. It relates the past frequency of the reward to its present value. It says, to use our example, that the more advice Other has gotten from Person in the course of an hour or so at the office, the less valuable any further advice is apt to become, though of course, after he has gone for a period of time without advice, advice may return to its pristine value for Other. And as advice becomes less valuable, some alternative reward becomes relatively more valuable. It is relative value that counts in human behavior.

I wish now to make some comments on the nature of the first four propositions. They take the form of saying that x is a mono-tonically increasing (or decreasing) function of y, without specifying further what the function is. The relationship certainly need not be linear. Consider, for instance, proposition 2, the success pro-position. The evidence is that, if the frequency of reward goes to zero, if, that is, the activity is never reinforced, the frequency of emission of the activity will not go immediately to zero but will fall off gradually. Our inability in the present stage of the science to state more specific functions obviously makes for difficulty in detailed explanation and prediction.

The variable, frequency of emission of an activity, is in fact stated in terms of probabilities: «the more *likely* he is to emit the activity». Practically I think this variable could be treated as actual frequency, for if, at a given point in time, the probability that a man will emit a particular activity is high, he will emit it often over a period of time.

I think of the propositions as running concurrently with one another, forming a set of simultaneous propositions. Therefore we must consider what the propositions imply when combined. Thus proposition 1 relates the similarity of the stimulus-situation on an occasion in the past when an activity was rewarded to the stimulus-situation occurring at present. But this does not take into considera-tion the value of the reward in the past; that is, proposition 3 must be brought in. Accordingly, if a certain stimulus-situation has at-tended the occasion in which an activity has fetched a particularly valuable reward, the recurrence of that stimulus-situation may be

even more likely to elicit the activity at present than it would have been if the past reward had been less valuable.

Though I think of the propositions as simultaneous, this does not mean that, under certain circumstances, we cannot afford to neglect some of them. Take proposition 1 again, and consider the case in which activities are emitted repeatedly. In the course of the interaction between Person and Other, a request for help has been the occasion on which giving help has been rewarded with approval, and therefore by proposition 1, the next request for help becomes a stimulus that is likely to elicit help, but when Other goes on asking for help we can often afford to take for granted the stimulus he presents to Person, and in explaining the latter's behavior consider only the frequency and value of the rewards he receives.

Of the two main variables that enter the propositions, frequency can, I think, be directly measured, that is, it is operationally or explicitly defined. This is not always true of the value-variable. In researches on the behavior of men, we can often ask them whether they find one reward more valuable than another. The use of this operational measure of value might often lead to good predictions and explanations, though there would always be the danger that our subjects would say that they found one reward more valuable than another because they thought, by the standards of their group, that they ought to find it so, whether or no they really did. Yet the fact is that we seldom do use this measure, but we still think we can, however crudely, measure value. How do we do so?

Consider first the value of the same reward on two different occasions. By proposition 4, a reward is more valuable to a man, the less of it he has received in the recent past. Thus advice is less valuable to Other when he has just received a lot of advice than when he has gone without advice for some time. In this case proposition 4 may be looked on not as a contingent proposition, that is, one in which both variables are independently measured, but rather as a definition of *value*, and our system of propositions would be reduced by one. This would do us no harm if all we were concerned with was the value of a single reward on two different occasions, but we are not. We must also be concerned with the relative value of different rewards on the same occasion of time, as when Other compares the rewards gotten from doing his own work with those gotten by asking help from, and giving approval to, Person.

What reason do we have to feel any confidence when we say that a man finds one reward more valuable than another reward? Why, for instance, do we feel any confidence when we say that

Other finds getting help more valuable than doing his own work ? It is, I think, because we have implicitly constructed a deductive system of the following sort:

1. Men who are unskilled and help is available are more likely to ask for help instead of doing their own work than are men who do not possess these characteristics.
2. Definition: we shall say that such men find getting help more valuable than doing their own work.
3. Other is unskilled and help is available.
4. Therefore, Other will find help more valuable than doing his own work.

That is, we make a general statement (1) about the behavior of a particular class of men, men in particular circumstances, a statement based on either common knowledge or specific research, and we then assert that the particular person or persons whose behavior at the moment we are interested in is a member of the class. Of course we may be factually wrong about the general proposition or about the membership of the person in the class, but there is nothing circular about the argument itself. There would be, of course, if the person himself were the only man on whose observed behavior statement 1 was based.

In statement 2 we define the word *value*, because there is a very large number of propositions about men that take the general form of statement 1; and we want a single word to designate the classes of men to which they refer: we say that they are all classes that find certain rewards more valuable than others. And we use the word *value* rather than some other word because the variable in question has the same effect on the frequency of the activity emitted as does *value* as defined by the degree of deprivation of a single reward at two different occasions of time.

Note that in statement 1 the classes of men are still related to the relative frequencies of the activity emitted; there is still, so to speak, no measure of value *per se*. The status of the value variable is a little like that of mass in classical mechanics. Just as value and frequency are distinct variables in the present theory, so both mass and acceleration are distinct variables in classical mechanics, and yet the masses of bodies are always measured by the accelerations they produce. The curse of circularity is taken off by the fact that the value to be assigned to the mass of a particular body is measured in a different situation from that in which explanations or predictions are to be made. In the same way our argument has the

curse of circularity taken off it by the fact that we make the general statement (1) on the basis of independent evidence before applying it to Other. In Braithwaite's language *value* is a theoretical term that is implicity, rather than explicitly, defined, whereas frequency is explicitly defined [4].

II

Let us return now to the situation in which each of two men has alternative activities open to him and in which at least one of these activities may be rewarded or punished by the activity of the other. Remembering that our general propositions apply to both the men, let us see what further propositions follow.

Specifically, let us return to our illustrative situation, in which both Person and Other are present in the office. Person has two activities open the him: doing his own work (p1) or advising Other how to do his work (p2). Similarly Other has two: doing his own work (o1) or giving approval to Person (o2) in return for his advice. Let us agree that we can assign numbers representing at least the ordinal values of the rewards obtained by the two men from their activities, depending on which activity each emits. These rewards, or outcomes, may be represented by a matrix like the following [5]: The figures in each of the four cells are supposed to represent the rewards to each of the two persons in each of the four possible

TABLE I

[4] R. B. BRAITHWAITE, *Scientific Explanation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1953), pp. 76-79.

[5] For the use of matrices in these conditions, see J. W. THIBAUT and H. H. KELLEY, *The Social Psychology of Groups*, New York, Wiley, 1959, pp. 13-18.

contingencies: when Person emits p1 and Other emits o1, when Person emits p1 and Other emits o2, and so forth. In each cell the figure in the northeast half, as divided by the diagonal, represents the reward to Person and the figure in the southwest half represents the reward to Other. Thus the pair of figures 2,3 says that Other gets reward to the value 2 and Person gets reward to the value 3 in the contingency that Person advises Other while Other returns him approval. According to Proposition 3, this choice is the one each man is most likely to make, given the values are what they are. The reason why Other values getting advice more than doing his own work I have already given. I shall assume that the reason Person values getting approval more than doing his own work at this particular point in the exchange is that men in general find approval rewarding and Person can do his own work so quickly that he can easily afford to spend some time helping Other. The reason I have assigned a higher value to Person's own time than to Other's is simply that he can use it more effectively, but this is not particularly important to the argument.

I have used the matrix method of representation because others have used it, and it is often illuminating. But there is something a little silly about it in the present case. The trouble lies in the cells off the major diagonal. Consider, for instance, the cell p1, o2, when Person should be doing his own work and giving no advice, while Other, nevertheless, is giving him approval. How could this outcome in fact occur ? This failure of realism derives from the origin of the matrix form of representation in the theory of games. Most present forms of game theory assume that there is no communication between the players, that each chooses his alternative uninfluenced by messages from the other. But communication lies at the heart of most actual social behavior, and the reason why contingency p1, o2 is not apt to occur is, of course, that Other would first ask Person for advice, would enter however briefly into negotiation with him, and only if Person agreed, however tacitly, would Other give him any approval. Though I shall continue to use matrices to illustrate the argument that follows, only the cells on the major diagonal have any real significance.

What count in social behavior are relative values, but values also can be negative: that is, the effect of a particular activity can be positively unrewarding, aversive, or in ordinary language punishing. Now that the matrix is before us, let me clarify these statements by introducing from economics the notion of cost. The cost of any activity is the reward to be obtained from some alternative activity for-

gone in emitting the activity in question. Thus in my illustration the cost to Person of emitting advice is the forgone value of doing his own work. Thus we can say that the net value, or profit, to Person from giving advice under the contingency that Other gives him approval is $3 - 2 = 1$. Under this extension of value to mean net value, it follows from Proposition 3 that, the less the profit obtained from a given activity the more likely a man is to change to some alternative activity. But there is nothing in this statement that is not already implied in Proposition 3. Note that in the matrix I have chosen the figures in such a way that Person and Other each get the same profit: $(3 - 2) = (2 - 1)$.

As for negative values, always remember that they necessarily create positive values, for it is a principle of behavioral psychology that any activity that allows a man to escape or avoid punishment becomes by that fact rewarded. Thus a bully who can withhold punishment from another — which must mean that he possesses a capacity for punishing that he *can* withhold — is in a position to reward the other. This is obvious but in fact often forgotten.

I now want to introduce the notion of power, but first I must introduce the notion of authority. I shall say that one man has authority over another to the extent that the other does what the man suggests or commands[6]. And one man has power over another to the extent that he can by changing his behavior affect the other's profits for better or for worse and so, by Proposition 3, change the probability of the other's emitting some particular activity, including his probability of doing what the first man says. Power is often a determinant of authority but it is not necessarily one, for a man may take another's suggestion simply because he has found taking the other's suggestion to result in his getting rewards from the environment in the past, and not because the other has any power over him. This is an instance of Proposition 1.

In the illustrative matrix Person has power over Other because by giving advice he can increase his rewards over what they were when Other was doing his own work, and so, by Proposition 3, induce Other to give approval. And in the same way, Other has power over Person. In fact I have set up the matrix in such a way that Person and Other have equal power in the sense that each one by emitting p2, o2 can cause the other to increase his rewards by 1 over p1, o1. In short, equal profit is equal power.

[6] *Ibid.*, pp. 100-125; see also R. M. EMERSON, «Power-Dependence Relations», *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 27, 1962, pp. 31-41.

But suppose the matrix, instead of looking like Table 1 looks like Table 2.

TABLE II

	p1	p2
o1	1 2	1 0
o2	0 2	4 3

This matrix says that Person now gets less profit from p2, o2 than does Other, and so, by the definition of power, Person has greater power in the exchange than Other. It is true that o2, p2 is still the best outcome for both, but Person by giving advice can now increase Other's reward by 3 over his best alternative, while Other by giving approval is still only increasing Person's rewards by 1. The less a man's profit in an exchange, the greater his power.

How does Person get into the situation represented by Table 2 as compared with Table 1, so that he has more power over Other than Other has over him ? This amounts to asking why Other should find advice more valuable in Table 2 than he did in Table 1. There may be many reasons but one is particularly important for an understanding of social structure. Suppose that a Third Man. unskilled like Other. also wants advice from Person and is prepared to give approval in return. To the extent that Person gives the advice he will, at least initially, be distributing among two persons the same amount of advice that he formerly gave to only one. This means that at any given time Other is likely to have received in the recent past less advice than he did in the situation represented by Table 1, and so, by Proposition 4, the value to him of any unit of advice is likely to increase. In short, as most men know, the power of one person over another is likely to depend on the degree to which he monopolizes the capacity to reward — or the capacity to punish, for that is also the capacity to withhold punishment. That is, it depends on the degree to which many men want what he alone provides. Note that the other «good» being exchanged, social ap-

proval, is not in this case a scarce good: everyone can give approval, but not everyone can give good advice.

But I have not yet shown how one man's greater power actually produces a change in the other's behavior. Since in Table 2 Other values getting advice more than he did in Table 1, he is likely, by Proposition 3, to increase the amount of approval he gives in return. That is, Person will get more approval per unit of advice given than he did in Table 1: the terms of the exchange will have changed in his favor. Or Other can readily learn to give o3, a warmer unit of approval, a more fulsome praise, and in this case too the exchange will be more favorable to Person. In short, Other will increase the value of the expression (fv), where f is the frequency of emission and v is the value to Person of a unit of approval received, by operating on either or both of the variables. This argument provides the intellectual support for, the explanation of, the principle that many men have perceived and that has been called «the principle of least interest»: «That person is able to dictate the conditions of association whose interest in the continuation of the affair is least» [7]. In the situation represented by Table 2, Person has less to gain, relative to his best alternative, by entering into the exchange o2, p2 than has Other, and therefore it is Other who is most likely to change his behavior.

The increase in the value or frequency of the approval Other gives to Person will in turn, by Propositions 2 and 3, tend to increase at least the frequency with which Person gives advice to Other. But the spiral cannot go on up indefinitely. As the amount of the rewards exchanged increases, satiation with them is likely to set in and decrease their value (Proposition 4). Their costs, the value of the alternatives, are also likely to rise, as Person spends more and more time away from his own work and as Other, by giving more and more approval to Person, confesses more and more clearly his own inferiority. I shall have more to say later about the determinants of this latter kind of cost.

Where will the exchange stabilize, in terms of the values of the rewards and the amounts of time each man devotes to each of his alternative activities ? The argument so far, together with the argument from economics, suggests that equilibrium should exist when, for each man, the marginal values of his alternative rewards are equal (the greatest individual profit condition) and when the power of the two men is once more equal (the equal profit condi-

[7] THIBAUT and KELLEY, op.cit., p. 103n.

tion). I am not sure at the moment that the second condition is not redundant. At any rate the equilibrium situation might be represented by the payoff matrix in Table 3 as compared with Tables 1 and 2.

TABLE III

	$p1$	$p2$
$o1$	2　　3	2　　0
$o3$	0　　3	4　　5

In Table 3 the powers of the two men are equal as they are in Table 1, but the profits per unit-exchange are greater in 3. In Table 2 the powers of the two men are unequal and Other is getting more profit per unit-exchange than he is in Table 3, Person getting less. That is, Table 3 satisfies both conditions of equilibrium in the sense that the profits of both men are greater than they are in Table 1 and more equal than they are in Table 2.

Let me go back briefly to the Third Man. When we introduce him, we greatly complicate the problem of specifying where the exchanges among the three men will stabilize. I suspect that there is no general solution to the problem, any more than there is a general solution to the three-body problem in classical mechanics. But if we set specific conditions the problem may be solved in special cases. Implicitly we have set the following conditions in our example of work in the office: Other and the Third Man are both so unskilled and so equally unskilled that neither of the two can give useful advice to the other, and the two do not conspire to withhold approval from Person. At least under these restrictions we have seen that from processes described by the propositions of behavioral psychology a stabilized set of social relationships, that is, of repeated exchanges, might arise. To show this seems to me the central problem in the reduction of sociology to psychology.

III

The theory as set out so far is obviously a far from sufficient explanation of the development of a small-scale social structure. I shall now bring in, by way of illustration, three of the kinds of things that ought to be taken into consideration in making it more complete. Since the statement of the theory has already become fairly lengthy, I shall introduce all three in a more sketchy fashion than I have adopted so far. All three have to do with men's perception of the stimuli attending exchange and the effect of these stimuli on their behavior.

The first problem is that of relative deprivation — to use a negative phrase — or distributive justice — to use a positive one. Men may stabilize their exchanges at the point where their powers are equal, and yet either or both may be dissatisfied with the exchange. Men cannot compare their values: Other, since he is not inside Person's skin, cannot know how valuable Person finds a unit of approval, nor can Person know how valuable a unit of advice is to Other. But if they cannot know the actual values, they often can and do perceive the actual amounts and kinds of rewards each is obtaining and the costs each incurring: these things are visible. Other knows he is giving Person a great deal of warm approval and that it costs him something in self-respect to do it. He also perceives that Person is giving him a great deal of good advice, that Person is giving up, in order to help him, a certain amount of time he could have spent doing his own work, and that, since he is skilled, Person could use that time to good advantage.

In perceiving the different outward signs of reward and cost that enter into the exchange, each man also compares them along several dimensions. He may not be well able to compare them cardinally, but he certainly can compare them ordinally: he can put them in rank order. Other may thus perceive that Person is getting more approval than he is himself, but that he is getting more advice; he may perceive that it costs Person more to give the advice than it does himself to get it, since Person's time is more valuable. Under these circumstances, the evidence is that we must introduce a new proposition to describe a certain kind of emotional behavior that our earlier propositions do not take account of. Proposition 5: The more a man perceives that the profit of another man, with whom he is in exchange, is greater than his own, the more likely he is to emit emotional behavior of the kind called anger. This is the *justice*

proposition. Actually he seems to take into account a third and residual kind of stimulus, which is strictly neither a perceived reward nor a perceived cost and which I have elsewhere called an investment: [8] such as, for instance, the other's age in relation to his own. When investments are introduced, Proposition 5 becomes a statement that a man's anger rises as he perceives that the other man's profits, in proportion to his investments, are greater than his own. But I shall not complicate matters by going further into this more general question. Nor shall I bother to consider the case in which a man perceives his own profits to be greater than those of the other. Proposition 5 is stated in terms of relative deprivation, but it also implies — only a single variable is involved — that when a man perceives that the other's profits are equal to his own, the more likely he is to display the emotional behavior we call satisfaction. This is the condition of distributive justice.

I want to be very clear that the problem is not one of actual rewards or costs, which are private, but the outward and visible signs of rewards and costs, which are perceived by both men. The actual profits of the two may be equal and yet neither party perceive them so; or the actual profits may be unequal, and yet both men perceive them as equal. An obvious question is that of the degree to which both men perceive the same stimuli in the same way. I shall simply make the assumption that they are more likely to do so, the more similar their past learning experiences have been. In our everyday words, they are more likely to do so, the more fully «they speak the same language».

The importance of Proposition 5 comes from the fact that relative deprivation adds to and changes the values being exchanged. For it is a finding of behavioral psychology that the more angry a man is, the more valuable he finds the result of any activity that punishes another. The best target for punishment is the man perceived as unjust in the exchange, the next best anyone like him, and if the first two are not available, any person at all, even a stone that can be kicked. This is the frustration-aggression hypothesis.

If the man perceives himself to be very unjustly treated, he will be very angry. But if he also perceives the other's power to be much greater than his own, so that he still has much to gain in exchange with the other, he may smother his anger and continue, for instance, to express approval, which we should now call insincere flattery.

[8] G. C. HOMANS, *Social Behavior,* New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1961, pp. 74-75.

If, on the other hand, he is more nearly equal in power, the reward he gets from a hostile action may be great enough to outweigh its obvious costs. But the more nearly he is equal in power to the other, the less likely he is to be angry, for justice is perceived equal profits and equal power is actual equal profits, and the perceived and the actual may not be too far distant from one another. I infer, therefore, that the actual expression of anger is most apt to occur at medium degrees of difference in power.

A man's anger may naturally affect the behavior of the other with whom he is in exchange. He may directly punish the other's activity, and so, by Proposition 3, cause the other to decrease the amount he gives. Or, since the withholding of a reward is a punishment, one of the kinds of behavior that may become rewarding in anger is the breaking off of exchange with the other, so that to the degree that the other still has reward to get from the first man, the more likely he is to do himself a hurt by creating conditions that the first man perceives as unjust, and therefore the more likely he is to act so as to decrease the sense of injustice, by increasing the first man's rewards and increasing his own costs.

The degree to which he will do himself a hurt is apt to depend on the degree to which third parties provide him with the same reward. If they are few, he may forgo much when he loses his exchange with the first man. If they are many, he may sacrifice little by forgoing what only one man has to give him. This is the reason why the question of the just price has become irrelevant in institutionalized markets, where there are presumed to be many buyers and many sellers. But the conditions of the market are seldom realized in social behavior, and so injustice, relative deprivation, is seldom irrelevant.

For the same reason a tyrant, who has many subjects and who has monopolized power, is tempted in dealing with any one of his subjects to avoid the costs of doing justice, though if he yields to the temptation often enough he may build up an enormous reservoir of resentment.

I turn now to another question that I left hanging in the earlier discussion. I said that Other would incur costs by going to ask Person for help. The question is what costs and how great. I spoke of Other's confession of inferiority, and I now propose to consider what determines its variation in amount. I assume that Other, like all other men, has had a long past history of discriminating between the stimuli presented by other men and by himself and, what is more, of relating these stimuli to one another. I assume that he

has learned to make these discriminations because they have enabled him to differentiate his activities in ways that have turned out to be rewarding.

He has, moreover, learned to rank these stimuli along different dimensions: ranking is a form of discrimination. In work situations like that of the office he may have learned to discriminate between the stimuli presented by himself and by other men and to rank them along a series of dimensions such as age, seniority, skill, responsibility, and job-title. He may also have learned certain relationships that often hold good between the stimuli along the different dimensions. Thus he may have learned that a man who is more skilled than another is apt to get more pay than the other. Note that this generalization depends on the fact that distributive justice has often been maintained. He may also have learned to apply a set of words, again lying in a single dimension, in summing up situations like this. Thus he may have learned to speak of a man who gets more pay and has more skill than another as being the other's «superior». Finally, he may well have learned that others rank the stimuli in much the same way he does. Indeed, since the rewards for making these discriminations are often social, he is not apt to have learned many discriminations that are unlike those made by the people around him.

Upon this background of established stimulus-discrimination, Other's own action in asking Person for help and giving him approval adds a new stimulus, for Person and Other and also, so far as the stimulus is visible to others in the room, like the Third Man, for these others too. Now if Proposition 1 is true, that the stimuli presented by men make a difference in eliciting behavior from others toward them, then the presentation of stimuli that elicit rewarding behavior becomes in itself a reinforced activity. For instance, a person's presentation of a stimulus that leads others to say, «He's a better man than Joe», or leads others to give him more respect than Joe, becomes an activity that is rewarded. And the presentation of a stimulus that leads others to say, «He's not as good as Joe», becomes punished. Accordingly the frequency with which these special activities are emitted varies, like the frequency of all other activities, with the frequency with which they are rewarded and with the value of the reward. The value — or the cost, forgone value — is determined by the other stimuli and the established cognitive relations between them.

Suppose, in the case we have been considering, that a relationship has been established, similar to the relationship I mentioned earlier

between skill and pay, saying in effect that a man who is another's
equal does not generally go to him to ask for help, but that a man
who is the other's inferior often does. If then Other is perceived
as equal to Person on such stimuli as skill, pay, seniority,
and job-title, his act in going to ask Person for help will
incur him some cost, for so far as the act is seen by others, it will
cast his equality with Person in doubt, and so may change for the
worse in subtle ways the behavior of others toward him. In the
ordinary language of the sociologist, Other will tend to lower his
status: a man's status is a matter of the way others rank the stimuli
he presents. If the rewards of getting the help are great enough, he
will still ask for it, but the likelihood of his doing so will be de-
creased. If, on the other hand, he is already cognitively established
as the other's inferior, going to ask him for help will not further
lower his status in the eyes of the others, and so will not cost him
nearly so much. Incidentally, the same process operates in reverse for
Person, for to the extent it is cognitively established that a superior
is a man who can help others, then his giving help confirms his
superiority in the eyes of the others and so may be rewarding. In
short, the presentation of stimuli is itself an activity that may be
rewarded or punished; the value of the reward is positive to the
extent that, in the context of established stimulus relationships,
the new stimulus will tend to raise his perceived status, and the
value of the reward is negative to the extent that it will tend to
lower his status.

Let me now turn to the last of my examples of the way the theory
might be extended. In discussing how Person and Other reached
some stability in the terms of their exchange of advice for approval,
I made no assumption that deliberate bargaining took place between
them, but of course in many real situations more or less conscious
bargaining does take place and may result in terms of exchange
that are somewhat different from those that would have been
reached without bargaining. Bargaining, like the enhancement of
status, brings in the manipulation of stimuli, and the nature of the
manipulation depends on the nature of the underlying cognitive
relationships.

We have seen that a man in an exchange relationship has more
power than another to the extent that the other values what he gets
from the first man more than the first man values what he gets
from the other. Accordingly he has less to lose than the other does
from reverting to the alternative activity. Under these circumstances,
the other is more likely to change his behavior, so as to make it

more valuable in amount or kind to the first man than is the first man to make a similar change.

This may be the actual power position, and yet either or both men may not know it is, and for their knowledge they are dependent on the stimuli attending the situation, especially those presented by the parties themselves, as interpreted by their past experience. We must assume that both men have had much experience in exchange situations, for social behavior *is* exchange, and have learned that, besides emitting the actual behavior being exchanged, the parties also present other stimuli. They have learned, for instance, to say that certain of these stimuli mean that the person emitting them «wants» something very much, or does not «want» something very much, or to say that certain of them mean that a man «does not care» whether he goes on with the exchange or not. The stimuli may of course be verbal as well as behavior of other sorts.

Moreover they may have learned to recognize certain relationships between the stimuli, such as that a man who shows he wants something very much is apt to be a man who will give much to get it. That is to say, they may know our Proposition 3 behaviorally, even if they would not express it in our terms. And this allows them to adopt as a special kind of activity the manipulation of appropriate stimuli in ways that may be rewarding. To put the matter in terms of Proposition 1, they may have learned that an occasion on which another presents stimuli interpreted as his wanting something is apt to be an occasion when the failure to give it will be rewarded by the other's increasing what *he* gives, or that an occasion when the other indicates eagerness to exchange is apt to be an occasion when the simulation of indifference will be rewarded by the other's increasing what he gives. To the degree that either party is successful in these activities, he is, of course, more likely to emit them again. Either one is more likely to be successful, the less the other has learned to adopt these activities. If both adopt them, the result is likely to be not very different from the one that would have been reached without bargaining. Neither is likely to be successful if the other stimuli attending the situation are so unambiguous that they contradict the manipulated stimuli. Finally if either party learns that the other, by adopting these tactics, has gotten better terms of exchange than justice would require, he is apt to be angry, and so the tactics are unlikely to be adopted in situations in which anger might make a big difference.

Note that in these cases the reward gotten from the manipulation of stimuli depends on the prior truth of the underlying propositions

about behavior that I presented in the earlier part of this paper. Accordingly these may be called second-order effects or secondary effects. They are responsible for much of the complexity in human social behavior. Indeed the complications become too great for a brief paper like this one. I have introduced them here only to show that I am aware of them and to show how they are related to the core of the theory.

ON THE USE OF THE EQUILIBRIUM CONCEPT
IN SOCIAL SYSTEM ANALYSIS

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INTRODUCTION

In the criticism directed against system theory and structural-functionalism, the equilibrium concept has become identified as an essential part of the system analysis frame of reference, together with other concepts such as integration, adjustment, and functionality. In its more pointed form, the critical argument regards this set of concepts as properties which are logically implied in viewing society or one of its parts as a system, thus necessarily preventing system analysis to take into account change, disintegration, conflict, and disfunctionality. The conclusion is drawn that the system frame of reference distorts reality because it can grasp only one aspect of it, and that a second and opposed theoretical frame of reference is needed in sociology. This has sometimes been called the conflict model of society (e.g. by Dahrendorf), in contrast to the harmony or integration model of system analysis. Against this we would argue that even if some versions of system analysis admittedly do so, a system frame of reference need not focus on equilibrium, integration, adjustment, and functionality. On the contrary: if such properties as equilibrium, integration, adjustment, and functionality are to be treated adequately system analysis *must* incorporate into its framework of concepts and propositions the very phenomena which its critics think it is unable to deal with. In particular, equilibrium must not be postulated if we treat something as a social system; nor must equilibrium be necessarily linked with the other properties often associated with it.

The following remarks will be limited to the equilibrium concept. It will be shown that the equilibrium concept does not preclude but on the contrary requires the treatment of change within the same frame of reference. The contribution of this paper is limited to conceptual clarification. No new equilibrium model will be offered. Even the critical discussion of existing equilibrium conceptions will

be restricted to a few selected examples without any claim to exhaustiveness.

Basic Types of Equilibrium

In spite of the large number of seemingly different equilibrium concepts in use, it is sufficient to begin by distinguishing two major types. The first refers to a condition in which the variables of a system are so related to each other that in the course of their interaction, their values remain constant. This is how Hagen has described what he calls the simplest and most general notion of equilibrium [1]. Instead of constancy in the values of variables, other writers talk of constancy in the structural arrangement or constancy of the interaction patterns of the system. While these definitions may be on different levels of abstraction — relationships between concrete elements, or between analytical variables of the system — they refer to the same notion of equilibrium, a notion well known from physical science. The second type of equilibrium refers to what Hagen treats under the heading of homeostasis and what Easton [2] identifies with the «steady state» defined by Bertalanffy. In terms of Nagel [3], this homeostatic equilibrium is the maintenance of a specific property G by the interaction of several state-coordinates, and characterizes functional systems.

The difference between these two forms of equilibrium lies mainly in the fact that in the first case, constancy in the relationships between the values of *all* variables of a system (or of its whole structure, or all interaction patterns) is stipulated, while in the second case reference is only made to the achievement or maintenance of *one* specific property. Of course, there is the conceivable limiting case that the G of homeostatic equilibrium is defined as «constancy in the values of all system variables». But this possibility should be excluded from the definition of homeostatic equilibrium, since it is its distinguishing mark that no overall constancy is presupposed. Change in variables, other than the G in question, can even be a prerequisite of homeostatic equilibrium.

[1] Everett E. Hagen, «Analytical Models in the Study of Social Systems», *Am. Journal of Sociology*, LXVII, 2, 1961.

[2] David Easton, «Limits of the Equilibrium Model in Social Research», in Heinz Eulau, ed., *Political Behavior*, Free Press, 1956.

[3] Ernest Nagel, «A Formalization of Functionalism», in *Logic without Metaphysics*, Free Press, 1956.

We may now ask whether both forms of equilibrium imply the positively evaluated properties usually assigned to the «harmony» model, e.g. integration, adjustment, absence of conflict, functionality. The answer is simple for homeostatic equilibrium. The G in question may itself be a «negative» as well as a «positive» property: acute class conflict as well as social harmony, dissolution of some established order as well as high consensus, economic inefficiency as well as high productivity. Depending on the nature of G, the conditions of its maintenance may in turn include or not include any of the positive properties of the «harmony» model. The answer is less simple for the constancy type of equilibrium. We may assume that constancy (of pattern, of structure, of the values of variables) per se is not regarded as a necessarily positive quality. With respect to the other properties of the «harmony» model it is impossible to say whether constancy equilibrium implies any of them before we know upon what conditions this equilibrium rests.

Constancy Equilibrium: its Nature and Forms of Reaction

Most «equilibrium theories» in social science seem to employ the first concept outlined above. The condition of a system described by constancy equilibrium is a state of rest or no-change, though of course not a static condition in the sense that no interaction takes place. This equilibrium concept usually implies that no change in the values of the variables (the interaction patterns, etc.) will occur *unless* some outside force introduces a disturbance into the system. In other words: the basic condition of constancy equilibrium is the absence of all *internal* sources of disturbance, or the absence of all causes of endogenous system change. There are some equilibrium definitions which refer to some overall constancy but do not make the assumption that only outside influences can disturb the constant pattern. Such conceptions should not be subsumed under the heading of constancy equilibrium; what is involved is rather the notion of factual stability. It is important to keep these notions apart.

A number of equilibrium concepts can now be identified as subcategories of constancy equilibrium. There is first the distinction between stable and unstable forms of equilibrium. What is usually called «stable» equilibrium introduces the additional assumption that, if the constant pattern (of values of variables, of interaction etc.) is disturbed from outside, the system will react in such a way that either the status quo ante is regained, a new equilibrium is established, or

a moving equilibrium results. It is the nature of the outside dis-
turbance, and nothing in the system itself, which determines the
reaction:

  1. if the outside factor causes only a momentary change in the system
  variable which it affects, the system regains its status quo ante after
  a certain period;
  2. if the outside factor continues affecting the system variable,
  changing its value permanently, the system settles into a new equilib-
  rium state different from the previous one;
  3. if the outside factor keeps changing itself, thus exerting a con-
  tinuously changing influence upon the system variable, the system
  shifts successively from one equilibrium state to the next; since this
  process of change would terminate with the change in the outside
  variable producing it, it is still externally induced change, and does
  not lend itself to the defensive contention that with the concept of
  moving equilibrium, change in general has been introduced into the
  framework of equilibrium analysis.

The condition of these three forms of reaction of a system in stable
equilibrium, i.e. the possession of appropriate re-equilibrating mech-
anisms, is a purely logical and abstract one and does not tell us
anything about the nature of these mechanisms.

In contrast to stable equilibrium, unstable equilibrium is a con-
dition of the system where the values of the variables remain con-
stant up to the moment where some outside influence acts as dis-
turbance, but if that occurs, the system does not react in one of the
ways just described. Stability once lost, the process of change would
feed upon itself and would continue even after the outside dis-
turbance is terminated. Obviously, a given system may react in a
stable fashion to one type and/or strength of outside disturbance, and
in an unstable fashion to another.

STABLE EQUILIBRIUM AND OBSERVABLE STABILITY

Social systems in the concrete and inclusive sense according to
which this term may be applied to a society, or to certain parts of a
society like an organization, a family, a community etc., can hardly
be observed at rest in unstable equilibrium. Every concrete social
system is continually affected by changes in external factors. If we
do observe a concrete social system to be actually not changing at
the moment, we might *either* be dealing with a system in stable
equilibrium *or* with factual stability which not only presupposes mech-

anisms to neutralize the effects of external disturbances, but rests also on a temporary balance between inside forces working toward change. This balance may at a later time be upset by the sub-threshold accumulation of some disturbing internal factor. An interaction process, stable for the moment, may for instance change after a prolonged period of tension build-up, of accumulation of clues leading to a re-definition of the situation, and of accumulation of opinions which eventually suggest action departing from and disrupting the so-far stable pattern. A concrete system which remains observably constant for a time is a stable equilibrium system only if the system *does not contain in itself* any sources of change.

If *all* observable stability were to be explained as due to the system being in stable equilibrium (the disturbing forces being of the kind noted under 1) above), then all cases of observed change would consequently appear as either the result of unstable equilibrium, or of the second and third noted forms of reaction of a stable equilibrium system to outside disturbance. This would mean that change is always and only induced externally, i.e. that social systems do not possess internal sources of change. As a proposition about real social entities this is clearly false, nor does anyone seriously make such an assumption. But it has been argued that concrete social systems must, or can most fruitfully be analyzed *as if* they were equilibrium systems, because some measure of order = stability must be assumed if something is regarded as a system, or because change can only be conceptualized relative to some fixed point or constant state. This is a circular argument. For the purposes mentioned, any kind of stability no matter on what it is based should suffice. It is not necessary to treat social systems as equilibrium systems for analysis.

It can now be seen that without the phrase «...unless disturbed by outside influence» in the equilibrium definition, we would lose the clear distinction between equilibrium stability which presupposes only mechanisms to cope with external disturbances, and factual stability also based on mechanisms momentarily keeping internal forces working toward change in check. With this we would lose the distinction between externally induced and endogenous system change. A conceptual framework which *includes* these distinctions makes us recognize that social systems need not be equilibrium systems, and that equilibrium is only a hypothetical state which a social system may reach under the condition that it contains in itself no sources of change. This conceptualization of equilibrium has the important consequence of forcing our attention to be turned to the causes of endogenous system change. In order to be able to become

more specific in talking about the equilibrium condition «absence of internal causes of change», these causes must be specified first. Thus, system analysis which works with the concept of constancy equilibrium as one hypothetical state of the system, must necessarily include categories to conceptualize and propositions to explain causes of endogenous system change. *Quod erat demonstrandum.*

APPLICATIONS OF THE CONSTANCY EQUILIBRIUM CONCEPT

The constancy equilibrium concept lends itself to a mechanistic interpretation of social processes. It has often been applied without giving a concrete meaning to the highly general condition that there should be no internal sources of disturbance, but mechanisms to counter the effects of external disturbances. A good example is given by the Russian A. Bogdanov, who might be called a fore-runner of present general system theory[4]. He defines an equilibrium system as one which, once structured, maintains its structure unchanged. If a structure is maintained, this is the result of the fact that each incipient change is at once counteracted by another change which neutralizes the first. Applying this to a system in stable equilibrium, Bogdanov says that it is the characteristic of such systems to comprise within them oppositely directed processes which neutralize each other at a given level where the force of these opposed processes is equal. If through some outside influence one of the forces within the system rises above its neutralization level, the tension of the opposite process rises and releases more energy, so that this force, too, rises until it again neutralizes the first one. We may interpret Bogdanov to say that causes of endogenous change are absent in a system if every inside force potentially making for change is opposed by another force within the system and thus neutralized in its effect, the balance being of such a nature that only outside influences can disturb it. But it is hard to imagine what properties a system would have to possess in order to guarantee that all inside forces potentially working toward change will indefinitely be held in check (unless some outside influence upsets the balance). Bogdanov did not offer any explanation. Neither did he succeed to translate his equilibrating mechanism into sociological terms.

Different in nature and possibly more fruitful is another con-

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[4] A. BOGDANOV, *Allgemeine Organisationslehre — Tektologie,* Berlin, S. Hirzel, 1926/28 (2 vols.).

ception of what determines equilibrium. We find it in Easton's definition of the equilibrium state, which for him implies that «... the component variables (of the system) will interact in such a way that if the interaction is allowed to continue without further disturbance, ultimately a state will be achieved in which no variable changes its position or relation to the other variables» [5]. In the last part of this definition, Easton presumably means the same as Hagen talking about the values of variables remaining constant, or others talking of interaction patterns remaining unchanged. Easton's definition then contains an explanation of how a system *reaches* equilibrium (simple constancy type). This explanation, expressed in a postulate, seems to be identical with the postulate of interdependence from which Pareto derived his conception of equilibrium.

Pareto [6] thought of equilibrium as a state of the social system in which all its elements have had their full effects, that is, have worked themselves out in interaction with each other. The terminal point of this process of interaction is a state of constancy. Change would first be the path which a system takes in moving toward equilibrium; after that it would only be generated by the introduction of new elements, i.e. outside disturbances. The movement towards equilibrium follows from the postulate of interdependence between all elements of the system. But Pareto also saw social systems as constantly changing, and the tendency to maintain equilibrium was for him only a logical, not a factual one. If this last statement is taken to mean that social systems *actually* do not achieve equilibrium, this can be explained as due to the constant introduction of new elements.

This summary may well do violence to Pareto. It is, for instance, a question whether the terminal state he envisaged is really a static one, and whether the merely «logical» tendency toward equilibrium really refers to the same interdependence process as that mentioned in Easton's definition. We shall leave these questions open. But at least in Easton's version, the interdependence postulate comes very close to the contemporary notion of structural constraint, which may be taken to mean that the elements of a system influence each other through their interaction in the direction of becoming mutually compatible. It follows that the properties of a system cannot be random-

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[5] EASTON, *op.cit.*, p. 399.

[6] This presentation of Pareto's equilibrium concept is based on Hans Wolfram GEBHARD, «Gleichgewicht als sozialwissenschaftliches Modell bei Vilfredo Pareto, in *Jahrbuch für Sozialwissenschaft*, Band 4/10, 1959.

ly combined; if the strain toward compatibility is given way, a specific combination or pattern of properties must result [7].

It is the question whether the tendency of structural constraint is of such a nature that it would lead to equilibrium constancy if left undisturbed by outside influences. If it is, this tendency as well as Pareto's interdependence postulate in the formulation of Easton serve to specify the basic equilibrium condition: there are no internal causes of change if the nature of the system variables and their interrelations are such that through their interaction, the variables will reach constant values. But the assumption that the variables of social systems and their interrelations are such that through undisturbed interaction equilibrium will be reached, is empirically untenable. The opposite assumption, i.e. that the variables of social systems and their interrelations are such that through undisturbed interaction the values of the variables change continuously, has at least as much to say for it. This assumption specifies causes of endogenous system change, causes which lie in the nature and the interrelation of the system variables. Equilibrium is again shown to be a hypothetical state of the social system which has an equally hypothetical state as its opposite, and the conditions of the second state are the negation of the conditions of the first state. Thus, a dialectical element is introduced into system analysis which makes use of the equilibrium concept.

The hypothetical nature of equilibrium as a state of concrete social systems is well illustrated by Chapple and Coon. They use the definition of stable constancy equilibrium [8], regarding the interaction pattern of a group as that which remains constant. The tendency toward such a stable state rests on an assumed individual need to maintain constant interaction rates. The group's interaction pattern may be disturbed by external forces, e.g. a natural catastrophe, exhaustion of physical resources, a foreign invasion. Institutions, es-

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[7] This notion has often been used in social science, for instance recently for the construction of types of organizations around one focal property; see Amitai ETZIONI, *Complex Organizations*, Free Press, 1961.

It might be mentioned that another possible version of the tendency toward mutual compatibility can be found in small group theory, not on the level of analytical elements of a system but on the level of concrete interaction. This tendency would be expressed in the assumption that through a series of action — reaction cycles, complete with reinforcing positive and deterring negative sanctions, a stable pattern of behavior and mutually adjusted expectations eventually result.

[8] Eliot D. CHAPPLE and Carleton St. COON, *Principles of Anthropology*, New York, Henry Holt, 1942, p. 43.

pecially economic and political, arise to cope with these threats and to re-establish a constant pattern. Another source of disturbance lies in the disruptions of individual interaction rates following illness, maturation, giving birth, and death. Again institutions, e.g. religious ones, are seen to arise to cope with such disturbances and re-equilibrate the group. The institutions arising as re-equilibrating mechanisms are often not mutually adjusted. Conflicts between them further disturb the group's interaction pattern so that again new institutions, this time especially associations, must arise to stabilize it. The process does not stop here, even if no new external disturbance occurs, because the formation of one association may accentuate cleavages in other institutions and produce a new disturbance which in turn calls for the emergence of yet another association. The very movement toward a stable interaction pattern generates continuously new disturbances which prevent the goal from being reached. Social development is seen as the consequence of this process. Talking on the level of concrete social entities thus reveals the hypothetical, actually unattainable nature of the state of equilibrium. Nor is the process of constant change simply a moving equilibrium, because it is not only induced by external disturbances. The internal conditions of equilibrium constancy would be, first, that group members remain completely unchanged. If such changes are considered as an external disturbance, there is still the second condition that the re-equilibrating mechanisms necessary to cope with these and other external disturbances do not themselves continuously upset equilibrium. Because they do, the resulting process of change may not even be called a moving equilibrium. In explaining why constancy is never achieved in reality, Chapple and Coon have clarified at least one important source of endogenous change.

There is one approach to find the conditions which make a system achieve equilibrium and maintain it which, at first sight, does not seem to require an investigation into the causes of endogenous system change. An example for this approach can be found in Simon's formalization of Homan's theory of human groups[9]. Simon has abstracted four variables from the basic elements of behavior which constitute Homans' conceptual frame of reference, and has formulated dynamic relationships between these variables in the form of equations which supposedly reflect propositions and conclusions contained in Homans' own analysis. For the system of interrelated va-

[9] Herbert A. SIMON, «A Formal Theory of Interaction in Social Groups», in *Models of Man*, New York and London, Wiley, 1957.

riables thus constituted, Simon proceeds to determine the conditions of equilibrium, which he understands — deviating from Homans' own definition — as absence of change in the values of the variables over time, as long as none of the constants are changed, i.e. no outside disturbance occurs. Given the equations, the equilibrium conditions can be expressed in certain numerical values which the three dependent variables must possess (the fourth being wholly determined by outside factors). Subsequently the conditions of stable equilibrium are determined, meaning the conditions under which the dependent variables will return to their equilibrium values if they start out by differing from them to some small extent, or, if the independent variable is changed, will achieve a new state of rest. Stable equilibrium presupposes that the constants used in the equations must have certain values, or must stand in a specific numerical relation or ratio to each other.

Mathematical formalization of this sort can show under what conditions a particular system could be in equilibrium. If the system model is supposed to reproduce reality, and if it turns out that the necessary equilibrium values of the variables fall outside the range of what is realistically possible, or that the equilibrium values of the constants are not achieved in reality, or that a stable reaction is prevented for instance because positive feedback cycles are contained in the stated relationships, one can by implication point to those features of the real system which make equilibrium impossible for it to be achieved or maintained. This means that it is also possible to derive the *hypothetical* conditions of equilibrium for this system, e.g. what values the variables must be able to have, what the constants must be like, and how the relationships between the variables and the constants would have to be. But this is in fact the same as saying that we must specify the nature of and relationships between variables which must obtain if equilibrium is to be possible; and here we are back where we were before. Formalization as such cannot discover anything about the equilibrium conditions of a system which is not already contained — though possibly not clearly realized — in the information which must be furnished before the model can be constructed.

THE SOCIAL SYSTEM AS AN EQUILIBRIUM SYSTEM BY DEFINITION

So far, the term social system was used in the inclusive sense, as it is usually applied to real social entities. But it is possible to define

the social system in such a way that it includes only elements which by their very nature — i.e. by virtue of their definition — constitute equilibrium. A social system thus defined excludes endogenous change. Parsons has come very close to such a conception of the social system. The following remarks about the Parsonian version of the social system will do some violence to Parsons by intentionally neglecting the qualifying terms in some of his definitions (e.g. «relatively» stable interaction patterns, or «more or less» institutionalized...). This shall be done to develop more stringently a conception of the social system which *must* be an equilibrium system.

This social system is characterized by including only structures, or stabilized interaction patterns (or processes) as elements. Parsons believes indeed that concrete systems can be fully described in terms of structural elements [10]. By definition, structure refers only to patterned relationships of actors playing roles, i.e. normatively oriented behavior. Stable systems of interaction, or stabilized interaction processes are synonyms for structure. Stabilized interaction patterns as elements of the system are and remain constant (unchanged) unless disturbed. The disturbances of stabilized interaction patterns can only come from outside of the system constituted by such patterns, since the conditions which must be met for an interaction process to be stabilized in the sense of Parsons' definition are located outside the social system. Such conditions are for instance the integration of the actor's personality system with the cultural system in the process of socialization; the functioning of the reinforcing circle of conformity and reward which rests on certain motivational assumptions; and the existence of an integrated set of norms on the level of the cultural system, norms which define roles in a complementary fashion, which do not give rise to norm conflicts, and which do not violate basic need dispositions [11]. The non-fulfillment of these ex-

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[10] Talcott PARSONS, *The Social System*, Glencoe, Free Press, 1951, p. 483; IDEM, *Essays in Sociological Theory Pure and Applied*, rev. ed., Glencoe, Free Press, 1949, p. 216; this view of the social system as composed of structural elements is already suggested in the definition in: *Social System, op.cit.*, p. 5.

[11] It is a question to what extent «stabilized interaction pattern» implies that the nature of an interactive relationship may not change. If norms demand some specific patterned change in a relationship, say between parents and children as the latter mature, and if these norms are fully internalized, shared, and do not produce frustrations nor conflict with other role expectations, the resulting change should be a stabilized interaction process. It seems that Parsons does not exclude such an interpretation of «stabilized interaction», though it does not stand in the foreground of his expositions. A similar question was asked above with respect to Pareto's

ternal conditions would constitute *outside* disturbances, while without such disturbance the system must necessarily remain in a state of constancy (equilibrium). Parsons thought it necessary to introduce the equilibrium property of the social system by means of an additional assumption, expressed in his law of inertia [12]; but this is in fact superfluous since the system's equilibrium property derives already from the definition of its elements and its delimitation against the cultural, personality, and organic systems [13].

Disturbances of the social system are manifested in deviant behavior. This may occur for a number of reasons which can all of them be reduced to causes extraneous to the social system. For instance, the conditions of stabilized interaction which rest in the cultural and personality systems and *their* interaction in the process of socialization may not be met. There may also be situational changes, located in the physical or in the social environment of a particular social system. Finally, there is the accumulation of knowledge and the rise of new ideas — both processess located in the cultural and personality systems — which may lead to a change in culturally defined goals and in the norms governing interaction, possibly via a change in the individual's perception of the situation. If behavior deviating from the established interaction patterns occurs for any of these reasons, and the system is to react in a stable (re-equilibrating) fashion, an additional assumption about the existence of re-equilibrating mechanisms must be made. This assumption can be found among the general conditions of equilibrium which Parsons formulated in the Working Papers [14]. The first of the four equilibrium conditions stated there is the «Principle of Inertia», the basic condition of equilibrium constancy as such which was shown to be implied in the definition of the social system's elements. The other three laws or principles which Parsons formulates can be shown to refer to conditions of *stable* equilibrium. Elsewhere and more concretely, Parsons conceived of social control as the basic re-equilibrating mechanism of the social system disturbed by deviance.

understanding of the terminal state of equilibrium in a system. Note, however, that this is not moving or dynamic equilibrium as defined here.

[12] *Social System,* op.cit., p 204.

[13] Accordingly, if Parsons in: *Toward a General Theory of Action,* Cambridge, Mass., 1951, p. 107, says that the order in the relationship among the components which enter into a system «must have a tendency to self-maintenance which is generally expressed in the concept of equilibrium», this is a *logical* conclusion following from the nature of the elements.

[14] Talcott Parsons, Robert F. Bales, Edward A. Shils, *Working Papers in the Theory of Action,* Glencoe, Free Press, 1953, pp. 99-103.

Social control, seen as such a mechanism, must exclude negative sanctions like force, which might produce behavioral conformity but would not get the deviating actor to internalize the role norms and to feel bolstered in his self-esteem if rewarded for his enforced conformity. These are the effects which social control must have if interaction is to return to the stable state as defined by Parsons.

If social control as re-equilibrating mechanism always eliminates deviance from the established interaction pattern, the stable reaction of the system would always mean a return to the status quo ante. This is not assumed by Parsons, who envisages also the other two possible forms of stable equilibrium reaction. For instance, after a change in norms the social system may settle into a different, though again constant interaction pattern. The mechanism of this re-equilibration involves an interaction between elements which do not all belong to the social system itself. New interaction patterns would be determined by a change in an external factor (norms), and their stabilization would depend on the fulfillment of the previously stated external conditions, which the social system itself cannot control. The mechanism which re-equilibrates the *social* system thus seems to belong to the whole action system.

In constructing a model of a social system which possesses the equilibrium property, Parsons has pointed to important sources of social change. By being quite specific about the equilibrium conditions themselves, he gives more clues to the factors which can prevent this state than other theorists using the equilibrium concept. Since a stabilized interaction system rests upon such conditions as an integrated system of norms and a personality system integrated with the former, the equilibrium of the *social* system in fact presupposes a completely integrated action system. In starting from the concept of the social system, the equilibrium property of a concrete action system can be found: it is the absence of whatever constitutes a disturbance for the *social* system. What is an outside disturbance for the social system can be a cause of endogenous change to the concrete action system. If Parsons excludes non-normatively oriented, though regularly recurring behavior as well as interactive relationships based on force from his social system, this is precisely because neither fulfills the equilibrium conditions implied in the definition of stabilized interaction. It follows that such behavior and such relationships constitute potential sources of change — endogenous, if a concrete action system is considered. Authority relations, on the other hand, where the governed accept the governing group's claim to legitimation, fit the definition of stabilized interaction; they can

be included in the social system and are thus *in themselves* no potential source of change.

Parsons does not assume that concrete systems are generally stable equilibrium systems. He conceives of the state described by his social system as one end of a dimension the other end of which is anomie, or the absence of structured complementarity through lack of an integrated normative order[15]. Concrete systems will be located somewhere between these two extremes. Anomie, of course, is no longer a possible state *of* the social system. Here it becomes clear that Parsons' social system, if it is to be used in the analysis of concrete social entities, requires indeed a second model of a state which is opposed to that described by the social system. But anomie as defined above is not a satisfactory opposite, since the lack of an integrated normative order is only one possible cause of the non-fulfillment of the conditions of stabilized interaction.

POSITIVE QUALITIES LINKED WITH CONSTANCY EQUILIBRIUM

It is now amply clear that constancy equilibrium implies any of the «positive» qualities of the harmony model only in case that the absence of this quality constitutes a cause of endogenous system change. A review of the examples discussed so far shows that a clear answer to this question is rarely given. Bogdanov, for instance, explicitly included a balanced conflict between opposed forces in his equilibrium concept. His fragmentary exposition leaves it open whether or not other properties of the harmony model must be present for equilibrium. If the equilibrium state is conceived as based on the principle of interdependence leading to constancy in the values of the system variables, a mutual adjustment of the system's elements is implied. But it is again not clear whether this mutual adjustment presupposes specific «positive» properties of the harmony model. There is for instance no implication that conflict, dissatisfaction, or relations based on force must be absent from a concrete social entity characterized by a combination of properties resulting from structural constraint. Only if applied to whole societies viewed in terms of traditional functionalism, the structural constraint tendency might imply qualities like a reciprocity of contributions in the relations between elements, or some overall functionality of the

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[15] *Social System, op.cit.*, p. 39.

consequences of each element not eliminated from the system. Chapple and Coon, finally, assume that a constant interaction pattern of a group must be of such a nature that the interaction rates resulting from this pattern for the individual satisfy the conditions of his internal equilibrium, conceived of in terms of survival needs and psychic need dispositions.

Parsons, being most specific about the conditions of equilibrium, gives the most complete answer to our question. He equates the equilibrium state with many «positive» qualities; first of all, with the fulfillment of all prerequisites of stabilized interaction. This excludes also conflict, whether it is the consequence of lacking satisfaction with one's own role, or of lacking complementarity in role expectations, or — finally — of the institutionalization of conflicting goals in the different sub-systems of a larger system. Equilibrium also is connected with the solution of the four system problems.

Equilibrium Conceptions approaching the Homeostasis Model

For Parsons, the «positive» qualities mentioned are *conditions* or logical implications of equilibrium. We shall now examine some equilibrium conceptions which deviate from the previous ones, partly in that they see in equilibrium a state or property which is more than or distinctly different from constancy, and partly in that they do not imply the absence of causes of endogenous change as basic and defining criterion of equilibrium. Such conceptions come close to what has been labelled — for lack of a better term and realizing the unhappy proximity to a biological concept — homeostatic equilibrium. They «come close» rather than «belong to» it because it will be seen that the specific features of this alternative equilibrium concept are more implied than clearly brought out, and because there is still an admixture of elements from the constancy equilibrium concept.

For a first example we turn to Durkheim, who used the term equilibrium frequently (particularly in «De la Division du Travail Social»), though without giving concise definitions, so that his meanings must be largely inferred. Nevertheless it can be shown that equilibrium meant two things for Durkheim: constancy of established ways of behavior, *and* adjustment or a healthy state of society (as a second property, not as condition of constancy). The health property is already suggested when he states that an organism is said to be in equilibrium if it responds in an appropriate manner to all external

forces which affect it [16]; by analogy, this likewise applies to social entities.

For Durkheim, certain ways of behavior are wide-spread and/or recur regularly because they are determined by norms. Such normatively regulated behavior constitutes the «faits sociaux». The norms which regulate behavior are not taken as a given. Durkheim saw them, and consequently the behavior determined by them, as deriving ultimately from and reflecting the special characteristics of the morphological type of a society. This type, which also refers to the mode and extent of social differentiation, is constituted by the internal social milieu with its main variables of density and volume [17]. As long as the social milieu remains constant, the system of norms corresponding to it would also remain constant, and there would be constancy in the normatively regulated behavior. Tendencies toward deviance which arise due to imperfect socialization or individual idiosyncrasies would release the social control mechanism of punishment, which has also the latent consequence of reinforcing the violated norms and thus maintaining the strength of their pressure on the members of the social system. If the social milieu changes, there should be a corresponding change in the norm system and in the normatively regulated ways of behavior.

This is the equilibrium conception one would derive from Durkheim's treatment of mechanic solidarity in the simply structured (segmented) society with its all-pervasive *conscience collective*. It seems to fit the concept of constancy equilibrium, where change is introduced from the outside and the system settles into a new constant pattern determined by the new environmental conditions. Changes which only momentarily affect the system, i.e. individual deviance, are counter-acted in a re-equilibrating fashion maintaining the status quo.

But the seeming fit disappears upon closer analysis. A norm system (and normatively regulated behavior) which is an appropriately a-dapted expression of the needs to survive under the conditions of a particular social milieu, constitutes social health. But societies can also be in a pathological state, which means that their norm system is not appropriately adapted to the social milieu. As elaborated in the

[16] Emile DURKHEIM, *De la Division du Travail Social*, Paris, Presses Universitaires, 1960 (7th ed.).

[17] *Ibid.*, p. 232: «...c'est dans le milieu social qu'il faut aller en chercher les conditions originelles». Similarly in Emile DURKHEIM, *Regeln der soziologischen Methode*, Neuwied, Luchterhand, 1961, p. 194: the ultimate origin of every social phenomenon rests in the constitution of the internal milieu.

«Rules of the Sociological Method», the normal or «healthy» social element is one which in a particular developmental phase of a particular society or group is widespread *because* it is *either* a socially useful «fait social», i.e. one which is adapted to the survival conditions in the particular milieu, *or* an inevitable result of the given social and non-social conditions of life. The second class of normal social elements we may disregard because they are by definition always in correspondence with the conditions of life. The «faits sociaux», however, even if wide-spread, need not be socially useful; they can be ill-adapted to the conditions of the social milieu and hence pathological.

Equilibrium is expressed for Durkheim in a norm system which, being adapted to the social milieu, constitutes social health. Since norms contain an element of duration, constancy of normatively regulated behavior is implied in the equilibrium state thus conceived of. But constancy in itself does not mean equilibrium. Nor does constancy presuppose adaptation, in the same sense that stabilized interaction in Parsons' theory presupposes normative integration. Since there may be *constancy* (of norms, of normatively regulated behavior) in a *pathological* state, non-adaptation is not a cause which necessarily disturbs constancy. If norms and ways of behavior remain unchanged while the milieu changes, constancy is a cause of disequilibrium, i.e. maladjustment. This shows that «health» is in fact the more important, dominant criterion in Durkheim's equilibrium conception.

These considerations also show that Durkheim did not conceive of the causes of equilibrium disturbance as located only outside the system. Since Durkheim used the term equilibrium with reference to whole societies, the social milieu would be an internal variable. Milieu changes without corresponding changes in norms and ways of behavior cause maladjustment, i.e. disequilibrium. The social milieu may change due to external causes located in the social or physical environment of a society, or in the biological factor of reproduction. But it may also be changed by factors or processes inside the system (society), e.g. because norms influence the form of association, or because norms or accumulated knowledge produce means which facilitate contact and hence change the density of the internal milieu. But even if the milieu were to be regarded as extraneous to the social system, there would still remain at least one endogenous cause which could disturb equilibrium: the punishment — reinforcement mechanism which maintains the constancy of norms and can therefore become the immediate reason for their non-adaptation to a changed milieu.

Our second example of an equilibrium conception approaching the homeostatic type brings out the characteristics already apparent in Durkheim's work more clearly. This is Bales' analysis of the equilibrium problem in small groups [18]. Though never sufficiently defined in that essay, equilibrium seems at first sight to stand for some state of overall constancy, consisting of a certain balance between different types of acts (expressed in a profile of activities of different categories) and of a patterned distribution of action of different types among the group members. In the course of Bales' discussion it quickly becomes clear that this two-dimensional distribution pattern of action is not identified with a *constant* state *over time* (even in the absence of external disturbance). For instance, that balance between different types of acts which expresses equilibrium consists, among other things, in a higher frequency of positive than negative acts. The rationale for this characteristic of the equilibrium pattern is roughly the following. The movement of a group in the direction of goal-attainment (task solution) proceeds in a sequence of orientation → evaluation → control (decision and implementation). These successive phases present a rank order of increasing disturbance in the sense of stimulating negative reactions. Unless the interaction is to break down under the influence of these negative acts, and the group is to fail in the solution of its task, these disturbances must be off-set, i.e. the tensions created by the very movement of the group in the instrumental-adaptive direction must be reduced. If each negative act is merely neutralized, as it were, by one positive one, this is insufficient for the maintenance of adequate levels of individual satisfaction and accomplishment. Hence, the equilibrium distribution of action must contain a preponderance of positive over negative acts.

Similar arguments are used to explain the equilibrium features of the second dimension of the interaction pattern, a differentiated distribution of action among the group members. One of the features noted is the differentiation between a task leader, serving the function of problem solution, and a most popular member, serving the function to drain off tension produced by the movement toward goal attainment. It is quite clear from these examples that equilibrium in the analysis of Bales stands for the fulfillment of those conditions upon which the success of the group in solving its task depends. Moreover, the disturbances of equilibrium are not caused by outside factors affecting the group (though such disturbances are possible, too), but

[18] Robert F. BALES, «The Equilibrium Problem in Small Groups», in *Working Papers in the Theory of Action, op.cit.*

they arise within the group and out of the interaction process itself, constituting threats to the achievement of the group goal. The similarity with Chapple and Coon's idea of the tendency toward equilibrium itself creating obstacles to the achievement of equilibrium is striking. But for Bales equilibrium does not mean constancy, and it *can* be achieved provided that the threats to the attainment of the goal-state «task solution through group interaction» are successfully counteracted [19]. It requires only a small reformulation to fit Bales' analysis completely into the frame-work of Nagel, where «task solution through group interaction» would be the G toward which the system is directively organized, and the equilibrium features of the group's interaction pattern would be the state-coordinates of G [20]. What is missing is only a systematization of the compensating mechanisms for variations in each state-coordinate, and a statement of the limits of variation beyond which compensation is no longer possible.

HOMEOSTATIC EQUILIBRIUM

Homeostatic equilibrium means that a specific system property is maintained. This is not merely a hypothetical state, but one which real systems may attain. Absence of endogenous causes of system change need not be assumed because the maintenance of G rests on the cooperation of several factors which jointly and in different combinations can produce G. Therefore the factors producing G must not remain unchanged for G to be maintained, and if there are more elements in the system than are state-coordinates of G no assumption about their stability need be made for equilibrium to be maintained. As long as G is maintained, this means that the interplay of its state-coordinates neutralizes all forces which affect G directly from the outside, or from within the system through one of the state-coordinates. The biological model giving rise to this conception is known. Another model for such a mechanism can be found in cybernetics,

[19] This view is also clearly expressed in the following quotation from *Small Groups*, A. Paul HARE et al., eds., New York, Knopf, 1955, p. 433: «The problem of equilibrium is essentially the problem of establishing arrangements whereby the system goes through a repetitive cycle, within which all of the disturbances created in one phase are reduced in some other».

[20] An attempt — not explicitly referring to Bales — to present the small, task-oriented group as a functional system in Nagel's sense, taking task-oriented activity and emotionally-supportive activity as state-coordinates of the G «task solution», has been made by Francesca CANCIAN, «Functional Analysis of Change», *Am. Soc. Rev.*, 25, 6, December 1960, p. 280.

where a desired output of a system is guaranteed by negative feed-back control.

It is not only true that the maintenance of one G, or homeostatic equilibrium, does not presuppose that the rest of the system remains unchanged, but the maintenance of a G may directly involve certain types of change [21]. G itself may be some specific process of change, a case clearly different from moving equilibrium which is due to the continued influence of some external factor. The state-coordinates of such a dynamic G would be factors which jointly produce this change, and through their compensating reactions can off-set influences impeding the continuance of such change. The maintenance of any given G, including a static property, presupposes change in the state-coordinates as compensation for influences affecting G. The state-coordinates of some G_1 can of course be regarded as G's themselves, with their own sets of state-coordinates working to maintain them. This would impede compensating changes to maintain G_1 if it is threatened, and a test of strength between different maintenance mechanisms may ensue. The analysis of a system directively organized to maintain several G's, whether on the same level like multiple goals in an organization, or whether on different levels like goals and sub-goals (means) in an organization, opens interesting avenues for research and theory.

Nagel's as well as the cybernetic model conceptualize the *maintenance* of some G and its prerequisites. But there is also the possibility that a system is directively organized to *achieve* some G which it does not possess (and, conceivably, may never reach). In such systems there occur, on the one hand, changes which are the successive approximations to the goal-state, and on the other hand changes which are the byproducts or unintended consequences of the very attempt to approach the goal-state. This second kind of change may not only produce obstacles in the path toward the goal, but may even change the path which the system must take toward the goal, i.e. the prerequisites of achieving G. With these notions we again touch on ideas found with Chapple and Coon.

[21] See for this also Francesca CANCIAN, *op.cit.*

CONCLUSION

It has been shown that both equilibrium conceptions distinguished in the beginning can be fruitful in the analysis of concrete social systems. The conditions for a fruitful use of the constancy equilibrium concept were discussed at some length and need not be repeated. The usefulness of the homeostatic equilibrium concept lies in its focus on single system properties and the mechanisms which maintain them or direct the system to achieve them. This approach seems best fitted to investigate actual cases of maintenance of a specific system property, though broadness of view in perceiving the system as a working whole may have to be sacrificed for the specificity gained. On the whole, system analysis using the homeostatic equilibrium concept still faces at least as many open questions as the previously discussed approach. There is as yet no sociologically meaningful theory about the origin and nature of G-maintaining mechanisms; there is no solution of the problem how to distinguish between the state-coordinates of a specific G and other system elements which, through chains of interdependence, may also be connected with G, if ever so indirectly, and there is as yet no systematization of causes which may affect the maintenance of G and bring the compensating mechanisms into play. Since the G may be any one of a vast variety of properties, including change processes, it seems moreover inconceivable that these questions could be answered in a general way, without reference to concrete cases. A system's tendency to achieve some G may be traced back to some imperative need or an unchangeable quality of the members of the system. But this tendency may also — and this seems to be the more promising approach — be found in the intentions and values of (a certain group of) the members of a social system, as in the case of Bales' small group, or in the analysis of organizations. It seems that analysis using the concept of homeostatic equilibrium can be most fruitfully incorporated into the structural functional approach *without* having to fall back upon the unproven assumptions of traditional functionalism about the nature of the social system. This may be its most important promise for future use.

NOTES ON THEORY CONSTRUCTION AND VERIFICATION IN SOCIOLOGY *

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Contrary to some common beliefs, sociology has an abundance of propositions. The task of bringing some order into this abundance is an assignment that equals in priority the task of discovering new propositions. The achievement of this ordering of propositions is a main concern of theoretical sociology. A successful ordering of our propositions enhances not only the intellectual clarity of our field, but is also most helpful when we want to confirm our theories. As we will soon see, certain ways of ordering propositions make it possible to use sophisticated ways of checking them against facts.

A TYPOLOGY OF PROPOSITIONS

Confronted with a proposition some sociologists have the habit of saying, «Is it true ?», and others have the habit of saying, «What does it mean ?». The former asks for the *empirical evidence* behind the proposition, the latter asks for the *informative value* of the proposition.

Methodologists have taught us a great deal about evidence, some of which will be discussed later. For the moment, let me merely note that propositions supported by evidence are called *invariances* and propositions for which more evidence is needed are called *hypotheses*.

The question of informative value has been given much less attention by methodologists of sociology than has the question of evidence. In general, the larger the number of different ways in a proposition can be proven false, the higher its informative value. Put differently, the higher the informative value of a proposition, the greater is the variety of events for which it can account. A

critical task for the theorist in any science is to subsume a large number of propositions of low informative value under a few propositions of higher informative value. When the theorist asks about a proposition, «Want does it mean ?», he wants to know (1) what are the less informative propositions that are implied in the one under consideration, and (2) what are the more informative propositions that imply the one under consideration.

Propositions of low informative value are legion and I shall simply call them ordinary propositions, while propositions of high informative value deserve to be called theoretical propositions. This distinction crosscuts our previous one between hypotheses and invariances and we can now distinguish four different types:

	Low informative value	High informative value	
Empirical support wanting	Ordinary hypothesis	Theoretical hypothesis	Hypotheses
Empirical support sufficient	Ordinary invariance: Finding	Theoretical invariance: Law	Invariances
	Ordinary propositions	Theoretical propositions	

An ordinary invariance is what we know as a *finding*, a theoretical invariance is what we know as a *law*. (Our current speech habits do not give separate words for ordinary and theoretical hypotheses.)

There is an embarrassment of riches of ordinary hypotheses about social life. Most sociologists at present take this as a great challenge to test the hypotheses and turn them into findings of high probabilities. However, as Popper points out:

Science does not aim, primarily, at high probabilities. It aims at high informative content, well backed by experience. But a hypothesis [read:

proposition] may be very probable simply because it tells us nothing, or very little [1].

I think we should allow ourselves a little more courage in taking the abundance of propositions available about social life as a challenge to turn ordinary hypotheses into theoretical ones without first maximizing the evidence that supports them. This is one way in which sociology can avoid its current painstaking triviality. In particular, I think sociology should make a more serious effort to incorporate in its theories the best thoughts (theoretical hypotheses) of the human condition found in Homer, Dante, Shakespeare, Cervantes, Twain and other great writers, who now provide the lion's share of any educated layman's conception of the human drama [2]. In the end, however, the outcome of the theoretical enterprise should be «high informative content, well backed by experience», that is, laws. Only experience through trial and error can teach us whether we arrive from ordinary hypotheses to laws more easily via findings or via theoretical hypotheses.

SOME VARIETIES OF CAUSAL LINKAGE

Any person trained in inductive logic can, of course, give formally correct answers to the query: How do two or more ordinary propositions become subsumed under the same theoretical proposition ? In practice, the problem is difficult.

One source of difficulty is that there are a variety of possible causal linkages in a proposition. Every proposition, of course, relates a determinent (independent variable) to a result (dependent variable). In many theoretical statements in sociology the relation between determinant and result is left vague. The reader is given only a general idea that two variables go together by phrases such as: division of labor «leads to» organic social solidarity; the protestant ethic «contributed to» the emergence of capitalism, affective neutrality is «functional to» the client-professional relationship. In stricter theorizing we must spell out in greater detail what kind of relation is assumed in a given proposition. We cannot normally assume that

[1] Karl POPPER, «Degree of Confirmation», *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*, Vol. 5, 1954, p. 146.

[2] One of the few efforts along these lines is found in Hugh Dalziel DUNCAN's new book *Communication and Social Order*, New York, The Bedminster Press, 1962.

one proposition is implied or implies another without also assuming that both have the same type of linkage between determinant and result. Our first task, then, is to present a typology of causal linkages.

A relation may be *reversible* (if X, then Y; and if Y, then X) or *irreversible* (if X, then Y; but if Y, then no conclusion about X). Reversible propositions are not unusual in sociology. A well-known one is Homans' law about frequency of interaction and liking: the higher the frequency of interaction between two or more persons, the greater their liking for one another, and conversely, the greater the liking for one another among two or more persons, the higher the frequency of their interaction [3]. When we say that a proposition is reversible, we assume, in fact, that it contains two separate ideas requiring two separate tests.

Second, a relation may be *deterministic* (if X, then always Y) or *stochastic* (if X, then probably Y). Deterministic relations seem very rare in sociology. A possible example might be given by Simmel's proposition: if there is an increase in the number of members in a completely unstructured group, then there is always an increase in the anonymity of the actions in the group [4]. Stochastic relations are more common and they range from quite strong ones to highly attenuated ones. Consider, for instance, this hypothetical statement: if a person must choose between conforming to a norm and abandoning a high rank he is likely to keep the high rank. There are, of course, many men who would choose to obey the norm in such a dilemma, but in a large aggregate of men, a majority is predicted to deviate from the norm and keep the rank.

Third, the relation may be a *sequential* one (if X, then Y) or a *coextensive one* (if X, then also Y). An illustration of the former might be Lazarsfeld's crosspressure proposition: if voters are subject to contradictory influences in their primary groups during an election campaign, then they are likely to delay their voting decision [5]. A coextensive relation is illustrated by the statement: The higher the rate of social mobility, the less the extent to which the lower classes accept a militant class ideology [6]. No assumption is made here that

[3] George C. HOMANS, *The Human Group*, New York, Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1950, p. 112.

[4] Georg SIMMEL, *Soziologie: Untersuchungen uber die Formen der Vergesellschaftung*, Leipzig, Dunkar & Humblot, 1908, Ch. 2.

[5] Paul F. LAZARSFELD and others, *The People's Choice*, 2nd ed., New York, Columbia University Press, 1948, p. 60.

[6] Cf. Werner SOMBART, *Warum gibt es in den Voreinigten Staten keinen Sozialismus ?*, Tübingen, J.C.B. Mohr, 1906.

mobility occurred before or after the spread of a working class ideology. (It might be noted in passing that reversible coextensive relations are often called «functional» ones. In sociology, however, «functionalism» has so many special meanings that I will not use the word «functional» in this context.)

Fourth, a relation may be *sufficient* (if X, then Y, regardless of anything else) or *contingent* (if X, then Y, but only if Z). Sufficient propositions are rare in sociology and contingent propositions are the rule. For instance, all propositions about interpersonal influence assume some kind of interpersonal contact (e.g., social visibility) to be valid [7].

Fifth, a relation may be *necessary* (if X, then, and only then, Y) or *substitutable* (if X, then Y; but if Z, then also Y). Halévy appears to assume that the presence of groupings located between the state and the family, such as non-conformist sects, was a necessary factor in the process that spared England from the bourgeois revolutions that occurred in France and other parts of Europe [8]. Propositions with substitutable determinants are otherwise very common in sociology, as attested to by the wide usage of the phrase «functional equivalence». For example, in work groups paid on a piece-rate basis we find that norms prescribing restriction of output, and norms prescribing secrecy about earnings and production records may be functional equivalents in one specific sense: both are likely to reduce interpersonal tensions resulting from invidious comparisons of work achievement [9].

Any proposition may now be characterized according to the above check list of attributes. For example, Max Weber's famous thesis about a relation between the protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism [10] is best interpreted as an irreversible, stochastic, coextensive, contingent, and necessary proposition. Unfortunately, Weber was somewhat vague about what relation between determinant and result he had in mind, and some of his critics were even more hazy on this score. Perhaps much argument would have been spared

[7] Cf. Hans L. Zetterberg, «Compliant Actions», *Acta Sociologica*, Vol. 2, 1957, pp. 183ff.

[8] Elie Halevy, *Histoire du peuple anglais au XIXe siècle: L'Angleterre en 1815*, 2nd ed., Paris, Hachette, 1913.

[9] This was one of the hypotheses in an unpublished study of garment shops in New York conducted by Dr. Louis Kriesberg and the author.

[10] Max Weber, *Gesammelte Aufsatze zur Religionssoziologie*, Tübingen, J.C.B. Mohr, 1924, Vol. 1, pp. 1-206.

in sociology and economic history if the character of the proposition had been more clearly stated and understood.

The above five attributes of a causal relation are well-known in identifying an additional type of relation. It is actually a combination of a reversible, sequential, and contingent relation but it is so uniquely applicable to sociological subject-matter that it deserves a special name and a separate discussion. It is the *interdependent* relation.

Let $\triangle x$ and $\triangle y$ be small increments in variables x and y, respectively. An interdependent relation is present when the following conditions are met:

> If x changes from x_1 to x_2 and $x_2 = x_1 + \triangle x$, then and only then, y changes from y_1 to $y_1 + \triangle y$; further, when y changes from y_1 to y_2 and $y_2 = y_1 + \triangle y$, then and only then, x changes from x_2 to $x_2 + \triangle x$, etc.

Thus in an interdependent relation, a small increment in one variable results in a small increment in a second variable; then, the increment in the second variable makes possible a further increment in the first variable which in turn affects the second one, and so this process goes on until no more increments are possible. Note, however, that an immediate large change in one variable will not bring about a large change in the other variable. The only way a large change is brought about in an interdependent relationship is through a series of interacting small changes. It is as if the two variables are flirting with each other; an almost imperceptible hint in one encourages the other to make a less imperceptible hint, which in turn gives the first encouragement for a braver hint, and so on. A big initial hint, however, would have no effect.

The operations of an interdependent relation underlie many social processes [11]. It is said, for example, that voluntary associations develop with the urbanization and industrialization of a society. Migration to cities creates tensions for the former rural resident which are resolved by his membership in a voluntary association, and the latter makes him a more effective urbanite and industrial employee, which in turn generates further tensions and further involvement in voluntary associations [12]. Thus membership in volun-

[11] For an illustration, see Albert Cohen, *Delinquent Boys*, Glencoe, The Free Press, 1955, pp. 59-65.

[12] A study of the interplay between membership in voluntary associations and adjustment to industrial and urban life is found in Torgny T. Segerstedt and Agne Lundquist, *Manniskan i industrisamhallet*, Vol. 2, Studieforbundet Naringsliv och Samhalle. Stockholm, 1955, Ch. 7.

tary associations and participation in urban and industrial life stand in a kind of piecemeal give-and-take relation that we call an inter-dependent relation.

The types of causal linkage should be kept in mind in all manipulations of propositions. So long as all propositions we use in our theorizing are of the same type, there are few dangers involved. However, when they are of different varieties pitfalls appear and one must proceed with caution.

FROM THE ORDINARY TO THE THEORETICAL

If we want to investigate whether two or more ordinary propositions can be assumed under the same theoretical proposition we first must establish whether they have the same type of causal linkage. If such a similarity in type can reasonably be assumed, we may proceed by analyzing the terms in the ordinary propositions which indicate their determinants and results. If these terms have common elements we can then formulate a theoretical proposition by using these common elements. An illustration may clarify this procedure.

Suppose we have the following findings:

> Students at Bennington College in the middle 1930's, who were elected worthy by popular vote of representing the school in a meeting with other colleges, were more affected by the liberal values predominant among their teachers and fellow students than were others [13].

> Subjects in a social psychological experiment in Ann Arbor in the late 1940's who were told that their instructor-experimenter selected them as a model group agreed with each other more than did others in writing a story connecting three pictures [14].

From reading the studies by Newcomb and by Bach which report these findings, it seems reasonable to assume that we have in both instances a stochastic substitutable proposition, contingent on social visibility of attitudes and cognitions. It is less easy to say from the studies whether the findings are sequential or coextensive, reversible or irreversible. My guess would be that they are reversible and coextensive. I shall, however, assume that whatever one is, the other is the same.

[13] Theodore M. NEWCOMB, *Personality and Social Change*, New York, The Dryden Press, 1943.

[14] Kurt BACK, «Influence through Social Communication», *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, Vol. 46, 1951, pp. 9-23.

The findings state that whatever happened took place in «a college» and in a «social psychological experiment», among «students» and ««teachers» in one instance and «subjects» and «instructor-experimenter» in the other instance. We subsume college and social-psychological experiment under the term «group» and all the persons involved under the term «group member». If a single theoretical proposition can be found that implies the two findings, it will be one that deals with groups and group members. However, all measures were taken among the rank-and-file members of the groups (the students), so the effects should be stated as valid only for the rank-and-file.

We now analyze the determinants in the findings. They are:

> «elected worthy by popular vote of representing the school in a meeting with other colleges»

> «told that their instructor-experimenter had selected them as a model group...»

Both of these may be subsumed under:

> «received more favorable evaluations».

Proceeding to the results we have in the findings:

> «more affected by the liberal values predominant»
> «agreed with each other more in writing a story»

Both of these may be assumed under:

> «their ideas converged more with those of other group members».

We can now formulate a theoretical proposition which contains our two findings:

> The more favorable evaluations rank-and-file members receive in a group, the more their ideas converge with those of other group members.

This proposition, as its component findings, is assumed to be a stochastic contingent one with a substitutable determinant.

Note that in the process of formulating the theoretical proposition we dropped references to Bennington and Ann Arbor and to the

fact that the studies were made in the 1930's and 40's. In theoretical propositions we do not make references to time and space; theoretical propositions are presumed valid in all places at all times.

In reviewing our illustration it is clear that we arrived at our theoretical proposition by a process of analyzing terms used in the finding. If we had had no terminological schema into which the words of our findings could have been fitted, it would not have been possible to arrive at the theoretical proposition. Here, then, is a type of problem, the solution of which requires a good taxonomy.

FROM THE THEORETICAL TO THE ORDINARY

If we reverse the process described in the previous section we spell out all special cases covered by a theoretical proposition. Since theoretical sociology is already very abstract, it is essential for both researchers and practitioners to learn to draw the ordinary propositions from theoretical ones.

Suppose we ask for the ordinary propositions implied in this theoretical one:

> A person tends to engage in actions that help maintain the evaluations he receives from his associates at or above a level he considers favorable [15].

A key term here is «evaluations». Like so many other terms in sociology, it is a broad front covering a multitude of phenomena that look different to common sense. We find the special cases of this proposition by searching in our taxonomy for all terms that have «evaluations» as a component. We find, among many others, the following [16]:

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Approval  = df evaluation of an action
Esteem    = df evaluation of a person
Rank      = df evaluation of a position
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[15] Cf. ZETTERBERG, op.cit., pp. 188-189.

[16] «Approval» and «esteem» are included in Talcott PARSONS' taxonomical schema *The Social System*, Glencoe, The Free Press, 1951, p. 108. Parsons includes also the attribute of «affective neutrality» in these concepts. On the whole it seems to be the experience of sociologists engaged in theory construction that Professor Parsons' extensive terminological suggestions are of little use, since his terms are defined without reference to any propositions in which they may occur. Cf. George C. HOMANS, *Social Behavior: Its Elementary Forms*, New York, Harcourt, Brace & World, 1961, pp. 10-11.

We can now specify our theoretical proposition so that it deals separately with these three instances:

> A person tends to engage in actions that maintain the approval he receives from his associates;

> A person tends to engage in actions that maintain the esteem he receives from his associates;

> A person tends to engage in actions that maintain the rank he enjoys.

If we assumed that the original theoretical proposition was an irreversible, stochastic, coextensive, sufficient one, then its ordinary implications would have the same causal linkage.

FORMATS FOR THE ORDERING OF SEVERAL PROPOSITIONS

Any sociological topic is likely to bring to mind many propositions. These propositions are identified and presented in a variety of ways in theoretical publications. Some writers present them in the normal course of a paragraph, and the reader is warned merely by the surrounding text that a proposition has been advanced. Some authors help their readers by presenting their propositions in italics. Still others set them apart by identations or other typographical devices. Some present them as listings under special subheadings such as «Hypotheses». Many give them numbers or proper names to facilitate their identification. No uniform rules prevail here, nor are they needed so long as the reader is made aware of what sentences are propositions and what are surrounding text.

Regardless of how propositions are identified the problem of ordering them becomes important as soon as they reach a number beyond two or three. While it is possible simply to list the propositions — as do the authors of *Voting* in a useful appendix [17] — more efficient modes of ordering propositions are often possible. Let me illustrate some currently used formats.

INVENTORY OF DETERMINANTS

All factors that effect a certain phenomenon are systematically

[17] Bernard BERELSON and others, *Voting,* Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1954, pp. 237-247.

listed in an inventory of determinants. A good illustration is provided by a paper by Kingsley Davis and Judith Blake containing propositions of factors determining a society's fertility rate [18]. The factors are sorted into three main categories: (1) those affecting the likelihood of sexual intercourse, (2) those affecting the likelihood of conception, and (3) those affecting the likelihood of fetus survival. Each one is subdivided to allow formulation of a specific proposition. The first category contains a variety of propositions:

1. The higher the customary age for entry into marriage (or other sexual union), the lower the fertility rate;
   For example, property rates in Ireland, where a father does relinquish control over farm property at his son's marriage, make for a high marriage age (29 years for women) and this factor depresses the fertility rate.
2. The greater proportion of women in permanent celibacy the lower the fertility rate;
   For example, the low proportion of never married women in Ceylon (.8 %) and India (3.4 %) make for high fertility, while the high proportion in Ireland (26.3 %) or Sweden (20.9 %) make for low fertility rate.

3. The longer the lapse of celibacy time after or between unions, the lower the fertility rate;
   For example, prohibition of remarriage of widows and divorcees in some societies or religions depresses the fertility rate. The time lapses between women's common law marriages in Jamaica reduces the fertility rate by 37 %.

And so the authors continue to develop over a dozen propositions in which the determinants (independent variables) vary but the result (dependent variable) is always fertility.

INVENTORY OF RESULTS

A list of propositions in which the determinant is one and the same but the dependent variables are different is an inventory of results. An illustration is furnished by a paper by Janowitz on consequences of mobility [19]. The author organizes his propositions

[18] Kingsley DAVIS and Judith BLAKE, «Social Structure and Fertility: An Analytic Framework»,*Economic Development and Cultural Change,* Vol. 4, 1956, pp. 211-235.
[19] Morris JANOWITZ, «Some Consequences of Social Mobility in the United States», *Transactions of the Third World Congress of Sociology,* Vol. 3, 1956, pp. 191-201.

into two categories: (1) those dealing with consequences for primary groups, and (2) those dealing with consequences for secondary groups. To sample:

> The greater the social mobility of a family, the greater the instability of a family.
> The greater the social mobility of a person, the stronger his ethnic and racial prejudices.
> Upward mobility produces the political behavior typical of the new (higher) stratum.
> Downward mobility produces the political behavior typical of the old (higher) stratum.

Janowitz is able to show that all propositions about mobility and primary groups can be subsumed under one more informative proposition first suggested by Durkheim: «Increased social mobility leads to increased disruption of primary relations». No such theoretical proposition can subsume his statements about the consequences of mobility on secondary groups.

CHAIN PATTERNS OF PROPOSITIONS

When we deal with two or more sequential propositions in which a result in one reappears as a determinant in another, we can order them as a chain. An illustration is furnished by Terence Hopkins [20]. Hopkins has reviewed studies of small groups focusing, among other things, on four aspects:

1. The *knowledge* possessed by a person of the needs and attitudes of other group members;
2. The *prestige* of a person, that is, the extent to which others give him a favorable evaluation;
3. The *authority* of a person, that is, the extent to which he issues directions to the group acceptable to the group members;
4. The *centrality* of a person in the group, that is, the extent to which he maintains interaction with many other group members.

Studies can be cited showing that all these variables are positively correlated. If a person possesses one of these attributes he is likely to possess the others as well. Twelve separate propositions — or, better, six reversible propositions — can be written to cover these facts.

[20] Terence K. HOPKINS, *The Exercise of Influence in Small Groups*, Totowa, N.J., The Bedminster Press, in press.

However, the studies make it reasonable to assume that we deal here with sequential propositions. One possible flow of determinants and result is the following:

1. Persons who occupy *central* positions, that is, interact with many other group members, tend to obtain a better *knowledge* of their needs and attitudes;
2. Persons who have better *knowledge* of the needs and attitudes of others can more easily issue directives acceptable to others and thus tend to obtain higher *authority*;
3. Persons of higher *authority* tend to receive more *prestige*;
4. Persons with *prestige* become sought-after interaction partners, and thus tend to obtain *central* positions in the group.

Chains like these can be illustrated by a schema of arrows:

One should not expect that every chain in this way becomes a circle; all kinds of geometric patterns are possible. Even for the problem at hand, Hopkins has suggested several alternatives.

Chain patterns of great complexities can be simulated by electronic calculators. I will not discuss this here, except by noting that electronic simulations are most useful when we deal with complex patterns of causal linkages of the sequential type. Their usefulness when the causal linkages are of other types is less certain.

MATRICES OF PROPOSITIONS

Another form of presenting propositions is the matrix. Here a certain number of factors are given and all their interrelations are specified. An example is furnished by the early part of Homans' book, *The Human Group*. Three variables are given: «activity», «interaction», and «sentiment». They are all considered both as determinants and results. Thus we get the matrix:

		Result Variables		
		Activity	Interaction	Sentiment
Determinant Variables	Activity	——	H_{ai}	H_{as}
	Interaction	H_{ia}	——	H_{is}
	Sentiment	H_{sa}	H_{si}	——

In various parts of his text Homans can then spell out the six possible interrelations between these variables. They happen to be three reversible propositions presumably of a coexistensive type:

H_{is} and H_{si} : «If the frequency of interaction between two or more persons increases, the degree of their liking [sentiment] for one another will increase, and vice versa» [21].

H_{ai} and H_{ia} : «If the scheme of activities is changed, the scheme of interaction will, in general, also change, and vice versa» [22].

H_{as} and H_{sa} : «A motive [sentiment] gives rise to an activity... but if either side of the relationship is changed, the other will be affected» [23].

It is plain that if we read across the rows of the matrix of propositions we obtain inventories of results, for example, «if high interaction, then much activity»; «if high interaction, then much sentiment». If we read down a column we have an inventory of determinants, for example, «if much activity, then high interaction»; «if much sentiment, then high interaction». Unlike an arrow schema of a chain pattern, a matrix like this one is not restricted in its usefulness to sequential propositions.

AXIOMATIC FORMATS WITH DEFINITIONAL REDUCTION

Inventories and matrices list every relevant proposition. A sophisticated theorist, however, might want to reduce the size of the matrix. Such a reduction can be done by manipulating the definitions or by manipulating the propositions. Normally, both are done at the same time; however, it may be more instructive for us to discuss each separately.

[21] HOMANS, *The Human Group, op.cit.*, p. 112.
[22] *Ibid.*, p. 102.
[23] *Ibid.*, p. 99.

A brief example of a definitional reduction in a list of propositions can be constructed on the basis of a discussion of social aggregates by Arnold Rose [24]. Let us assume as given this inventory of propositions about the emotional excitement and membership turnover in social aggregates:

1. Groups have less turnover than publics
2. Publics show less emotion than crowds
3. Groups show less emotion than masses

We begin the reduction of these propositions by an analysis of the key terms:

a. Groups are social aggregates interacting in terms of specified roles and with a common leader (e.g., a voluntary association).
b. Masses are social aggregates interacting (if at all) in terms of unspecified roles but with a common leader (e.g., a radio audience).
c. Publics are social aggregates interacting in terms of specified roles but without a common leader (e.g., a market).
d. Crowds are social aggregates interacting in terms of unspecified roles and without a common leader (e.g., milling in Times Square).

In short, the social aggregates are fitted into a simple attribute space:

Social aggregate	Common leader	Specified roles
Group	+	+
Mass	−	−
Public	+	+
Crowd	−	−

Comparing this with our original propositions, we find that the aggregate with common leader is assumed to have less turnover, and the aggregates with interaction in terms of specified roles show less emotion. Thus our original propositions are reduced to two theoretical propositions:

I. If a social aggregate has a common leader then its turnover is low.
II. If a social aggregate interacts in terms of specified roles, then its level of emotion is low.

The most interesting part of this procedure is that these two pro-

[24] Arnold M. Rose, *Sociology*, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1956, Ch. 9.

positions do not merely imply the three that we had as our starting point but also a fourth. Proposition (1) and Definition (b) imply that «masses have less turnover than crowds». This is a novel hypothesis which to the best of my knowledge, is presented here for the first time. Thus we see how an axiomatic format not merely organizes existing propositions but generates new ones implicit in the existing ones.

AXIOMATIC FORMATS WITH PROPOSITIONAL REDUCTION

In the previous example we obtained a reduction in a list of propositions by combining propositions with definitions. It is also possible to obtain a reduction by combining propositions with other propositions. From the list of original propositions (inventories or matrices) a certain number are selected as *postulates*. The postulates are chosen so that all other propositions the *theorems,* are capable of derivation from the postulates and no postulate is capable of derivation from other postulates. One generally strives to use as few postulates as possible. Assume, for example, that given are the following propositions [25]:

1. If national income increases, then the middle classes expand;
   Economists are fairly well in agreement that the ranks of service occupations, dealers and brokers, expand during periods of prosperity and in countries with a growing GNP.
2. If the middle classes expand, the consensus of values in the society increases;
   While disproportionate expansion of lower or upper classes leads to a polarization of values (as Marx argued), a similar expansion of the middle classes promotes the convergence of values in the society.
3. If the middle classes expand, the social mobility increases;
   The expanding ranks of the middle classes must be filled by persons from other classes, thus promoting mobility.
4. If social mobility increases, the consensus of values in the society increases and vice versa;
   Social mobility creates families in which fathers, sons, and brothers belong to different classes and family loyalties modify class ideologies. This is a reversible proposition: if there is much consensus of values between social strata then social mobility between them becomes easier.

[25] These propositions were assembled by the author in the context of a writing project in theoretical sociology; in their final publication they will be modified in several ways.

From this list we may select propositions (1), (2), and (4) as postulates. Let us restate them with roman numbers:

I. If national incomes increases, the middle classes expand.
II. If the middle classes expand, the consensus on values increases.
III. If social mobility increases, the consensus on values increases, and vice versa.

The implications of these propositions can now be spelled out in the form of theorems. Postulates II and III combine into the familiar:

3. If the middle classes expand, the social mobility increases thus completing the set of propositions we had at the beginning. In addition, Postulates I and II render this theorem:
5. If national income increases, the consensus on values increases. Furthermore, if Theorem 3 is combined with Postulate I, we obtain:
6. If national income increases, the social mobility increases.

The last two theorems are novel in the sense that they were not included in our original set. Theorem 5 is not trivial; it suggests, for example, that if we want to promote social stability in the form of less political and ideological cleavages in a society, we should maximize its national income. (This is one way in which foreign aid to less prosperous societies may be argued.) Theorem 6 has been mentioned — in fact, by Lipset and myself — in the literature [26]; I was just not aware of its logical ties with our original propositions.

Our experience in axiomizing sociological propositions is limited. However, I believe the above instances are fairly typical: attempts toward axiomization often generate some propositions that were not explicitly mentioned in the original set. Some of these added propositions may be novel, others may be well-known by themselves but not in their connections with other propositions. Axiomizations render this service because they make visible *all* ideas implicit in some given ideas [27].

[26] S. M. LIPSET and H. L. ZETTERBERG, «Social Mobility in Industrial Societies» in S. M. LIPSET and R. BENDIX, *Social Mobility in Industrial Society,* Berkeley, University of California Press, 1959, p. 27.

[27] This advantage is usually claimed for mathematical models. However, whether the propositions are phrased in some artificial language, such as mathematics or symbolic logic, or ordinary language, such as an educated English is not crucial to this advantage. Without any serious loss in clarity and with retained accessibility to a mathematically untrained audience, ordinary disciplined language can be used by the writers of axiomatic theories in sociology. In Chapter 6 of *On Theory and Verification in Sociology, op.cit.,* I have reviewed some other advantages of axiomatic theories. A critique of the approach is found in Door P. THEONES, «Anti Zetterberg», *Sociologische Gids,* Vol. 6 (1959), pp. 162-183.

I therefore have no hesitations to recommend that a theorist does well to arrange his propositions in the axiomatic way: it forces him to spell out his assumptions, makes explicit his deductions, reminds him of any bypassed implications. This does not necessarily mean that his final publication should have an axiomatic organization. The way propositions are presented to the public is an editorial question. There may be instances in which axiomatic thinking is most efficient but an axiomatic editorial format becomes so cumbersome that it gets in the way of efficient communication. Theoretical sociology can never surrender logic to taste or style; however, as soon as we know that our logic is good, there is every reason to proceed in the best of taste and style.

CONFIRMATION OF A THEORETICAL HYPOTHESIS

As an illustration of the confirmation of a single proposition, let us discuss a test of the hypothesis: «The more a member conforms to the norms of a formal organization, the greater the likelihood that he will be promoted». This will be called the Conformity Promotion Proposition. Relevant data for testing are available in *The American Soldier* [28].

The operational device measuring *conformity to Army norms* consists of six questions, for example: «In general, how serious an offense do you think it is for a soldier to go 'AWOL' (Absent without leave)» ? The conformist answer to this question is «very serious», while all other answers are rated as non-conformist. The conformist answers to all six questions were fitted into a Guttman-type quasi-scale with a reproducibility coefficient of .82. In all, the operational device measuring conformity to Army norms appears valid and fairly reliable. It was part of a questionnaire given in November, 1943 to privates. According to their scores on the scale they were classified as Strict Conformist (score 5-6), Medium Conformists (score 3-4), and Poor Conformists (score 0-2). To record *promotion* a search was made in the records to find out whom of the same privates had made the rank of non-conmissioned officer (mostly, corporals) by March, 1944. There is no need to question the validity or reliability of this simple operational device. The sample consisted of 374 men from an Infantry division who had entered the Army during the summer of 1943.

[28] Samuel STOUFFER, *et al.*, *The American Soldier* (*Princeton*: Princeton University Press, 1949), Vol. 1, pp. 258-265.

We now proceed to check whether the data trend fits the trend predicted by the hypothesis. The following summary gives the necessary information:

Conformity to Army rules	Prediction from hypothesis Likelihood of promotion	Data Per cent promoted
Strict conformists (N-68)	High	31%
Medium conformists (N-138)	Medium	28
Poor conformists (N-112)	Low	17

Thus, we find that the trend in data parallels the trend predicted from the theoretical proposition.

The fact that data and proposition point in the same direction is comforting. To be more certain, however, we might also want to appraise not only that this parallelism exists but also to what extent it exists. In our case the differences appear small, particularly between the strict and medium conformists. Ours is not precise enough to allow a strict test of the «goodness of fit»; sociological models rarely make detailed predictions about the behavior of operational devices, only over-all predictions. In our case, we can at best check how often differences of the magnitude we found occur as chance fluctuations in sampling. A chi-square test renders $x^2 = 5.916$, which corresponds to the probability $.05 < p < .06$ with a two-tail test of significance. This gives us only a modest assurance that that trend in our data would be replicated in new samples. The representativeness of the sample could not be checked but may be judged as fair. In general, representativeness is a rather minor virtue in verificational studies — in contrast to descriptive studies in which it is very important. A theoretical proposition is expected to hold in both biased and representative samples, and all we should watch for here is the possibility that the predicted relationship is inadvertently introduced through the procedure of selecting a sample. The scope of the population — the U. S. Army in World War II — is a more serious limitation; ideally we would like to see the hypothesis tested with data from other institutional realms, e.g. a religious hierarchy, a business enterprise, a civilian government bureaucracy, a university.

The most intriguing problem of appraising our test remains: to control for alternative explanations. We know from other parts of

the Army study that likelihood of promotion increases with length
of service, and that it increases with education [29]. How can we
make sure that seniority or educational qualifications (or any other
known or unknown factor) cannot account for our finding ? As to
seniority we know that it could not play any part since all our sub-
jects have been in the Army equally long. The part played by edu-
cation was checked in this and two other samples through the
technique of elaboration [30]. The tables are not published but the
authors report the result in the text:

> When the data... are broken down into two educational classes, the
> same consistency appears in all three samples for high school graduates
> and college men and in two of the three samples for other men in
> spite of the small number of cases [31].

Thus we have some assurance that differences in educational quali-
fications do not account for the findings about likelihood to be pro-
moted. Whether other alternative factors, unknown at present, can
account for the trend in our data remains a question. Only experi-
mental designs can control for unknown alternative hypotheses.

Most research workers would probably stop their test at this point.
However, one more appraisal ought to be done: how well integrated
is the tested proposition in available social theory ? We know from
a large number of studies that the proposition «the more a mem-
ber conforms to the norms of his group, the more favorable valua-
tions does he receive from his group» [32] is valid. Let us call this
the Sanction Proposition. There is also a well-known sociological
proposition about rank equilibration: a person with high rank in
one sphere of life tends to move toward high ranks also in other
spheres of life [33]. This proposition can be generalized into one
about Evaluative Generalization which has higher informative
value: «the more a person receives favored valuation on one dimen-
sion, the greater the likelihood that he receives favored valuation also

[29] *Ibid.*, pp. 240-250.

[30] Paul F. LAZARSFELD, «Interpretation of Statistical Relations as a Research
Operation», in P. F. Lazarsfeld and M. Rosenberg (eds.), *The language of So-
cial Research* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1955), pp. 115-125.

[31] STOUFFER, *op.cit.*, p. 263.

[32] Henry W. RIECHEN and George C. HOMANS, «Psychological Aspects of
Social Structure» in G. Lindzey (ed.), *Handbook of Social Psychology* (Cam-
bridge, Mass.: Addison Wesley, 1954), pp. 786-832.

[33] Emile BENOIT-SMULLYAN, «Status, Status Types, and Status Inter-relations»,
American Sociological Review, Vol. 9 (1944), pp. 151-161.

on other dimensions». However, «rank» is a social valuation of a po-
sition. Thus we can specify our derivation to read: «the more a mem-
ber conforms to the norms of his group, the greater likelihood that he
is given higher rank». Now we only have to note that a «formal
organization» is a kind of group and that to be «given higher rank»
is to be «promoted» and we have the proposition of our test: «the
more a member conforms to the norms of a formal organization,
the greater the likelihood that he will be promoted». Thus we see
that the hypothesis we test is consistent with other confirmed pro-
positions. This greatly adds to our confidence in accepting it as plau-
sible.

The steps in our appraisal of this study are illustrated in the flow
chart on the next page.

In summary, we base our decision to call the Conformity-Promo-
tion Proposition confirmed on the following criteria:

1. the validity (internal and/or external) of the operational devices;
2. the reliability (precision and objectivity) of the operational devices;
3. the 'fit' between the trend of the data and the trend predicted by
   the tested proposition:
   (a) the extent the direction of the trends coincide;
   (b) the likelihood that the data trend in a chance fluctuation;
4. the control of alternative hypotheses;
5. the representativeness of the sample and the scope of the population
6. the extent to which the tested proposition is an integral part of es-
   tablished theory.

All these criteria have to be weighted into a composite judgment of
acceptance or rejection. No presently known mechanical or mathe-
matical device can help the sociologist on this score: only good
training and much experience. The fact that we can get quantitative
estimates of criteria(2) and (3b) should not tempt us to give undue
emphasis to them. The beginner would probably reject the tested
hypothesis because the reproducibility .82 is not quite the desired
.90, or, the significance level .06 is not the customary .05 used in
his text-book. In our opinion, a rejection would be a mistake. The
validity seems good, the fit (3a) is fair, one important alternative
hypothesis is ruled out, and the proposition is integrated in estab-
lished theory. The reliability and statistical significance are not
so far off that they subtract much from the good impression the
test gives on these more important criteria. Thus we accept for the
time being the Conformty-Promotion Proposition as tentatively con-
firmed.

Sanction Proposition +
Halo Proposition =

Integration into theory

Determinant

Conformity

Proposition

Result

Promotion

— Validity —

.86 — **Reliability** — ?

Indicator I

Scale based on 6
questions asked
November, 1943

Indicator II

Check promotion
received as of
March, 1944

Testing Device

Survey +
records

— **Data trend** —

	Promoted
High conf.	31%
Med. conf.	28%
Poor conf.	17%

— **Confidence appraisal** — $X^2 = 5.9$; d.f.$= 2$; p.$= .06$

— **Control** — When the data ... are broken down into two educational classes, the same consistency appears ...

Sample

376 Infantry
men

— **Representativeness** — Not checked; fair

Population

U.S.A. Army
in
World War II

— **Scope** — Small

At this point a lingering doubt might occur: shouldn't we after all play it safe and reject it ? Even if we are 85 per cent sure it is correct, isn't it, in the name of science, best to reject it ? The answer is «No». Scientific advance is as much hampered by the error of rejecting something true as by accepting something false.

SELECTING STRATEGIC HYPOTHESES FOR TESTING

As we have seen, the confirmation of an hypothesis is a complex and rather tedious enterprise. Since the proofs are so long while life is so short, it is essential to devote our research efforts to hypotheses that are strategic. Some of the more sophisticated ways of ordering our propositions can aid us in selecting the most strategic hypotheses and guide us in the expenditure of research efforts.

Inventories of determinants and results give us listings of factors to include in an empirical study. It is important to make sure that the recurrent variable — the result in the case of inventories of determinants and the determinant in the case of inventories of results — is given the best possible measurement and that special research efforts are made in constructing its operational device. The reason for this is simple: this variable occurs in all tests and if it is faulty the entire research effort is wasted.

More important, axiomatic ways of organizing propositions can result in research economies. The principle here is that we should give priority to the testing of those hypotheses that have the largest pay-off value in the form of deduced hypothesis. The simplest case is perhaps that a successful test of the postulates alone by implication is a test of all theorems. However, in any concrete instance, we will probably work with theories in which some of the postulates and theorems are already adequately supported by data. Here we may proceed differently. First, we assess the amount of support that past research give to each proposition. Second, we make selections of unsupported propositions that in combination with each other and supported propositions can derive the largest number of unsupported propositions. The shortest selection then becomes the one with the highest research priority. However, the shortest selection may not contain propositions that are easily subject to test, and we may for practical reasons consider some of the longer selections. In short, we make compromises between the difficulty of testing a proposition and its deductive power. In this way we get the most out of our research effort, the most in the form of direct or deduced

support to previously unsupported propositions in our theory. The key virtue of a theory is that it coordinates many weak research findings into a more trustworthy whole. In no instance should we have to test every proposition in an axiomatic theory [34].

TESTING TOTAL THEORIES THROUGH THEIR GROSS PREDICTIONS

An impressive way of testing a theory is to use its component propositions to make one joint prediction and to demonstrate that this is an accurate prediction. Scientists in a hurry and with a flair for the spectacular have done this in several instances, and the theories so tested have become accepted by their colleagues. However, convincing as this method may appear, it always contains large elements of risk: several wrong premises may, of course, render the correct prediction. A critical colleague is never quite sure of the solidarity of theories confirmed in this fashion. However, since we sociologists are in a hurry to deliver something else than promises and hopes to the society that supports us, a moderate encouragement of this procedure may be in order.

The joint predictions from several propositions can be arrived at through a careful use of theories phrased in ordinary language [35]. Since deductions are sometimes complex, it may be most efficient to restate the propositions as mathematical equations, and let the gross prediction be a solution to a series of equations. This is not because the mathematical language adds anything of substance to theoretical propositions; it does not. However, mathematical language has stricter rules for making derivations than the usual scholarly prose, and the derivations needed for gross predications may be complex and in need of this extra precision.

Another way of making gross prediction makes use of allegories. These allegories, or *simulations,* as they are often called, are either verbal, mechanical, or electronic. A «utopia» is a verbal allegory. The «census clock» in the lobby of the Department of Commerce in Washington, D. C. is a well-known mechanical one which predicts the size of the population of the United States at any given time.

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[34] I regret the somewhat abstract nature of this section but I have not been able to find a good case in the published literature which can serve as an illustration.

[35] The theories of Homans (*The Human Group, op.cit.*), Hopkins (*op.cit.*) and Zetterberg («Compliant Actions», *op.cit.*) all end with attempts to make gross predictions to new topics.

It is a machine analogous to the simple proposition that any change in the size of population depends on a change in the number of births and deaths and/or the number of immigrants and emigrants. Each decennial census provides a check on the adequacy of this simulation. It has recently been found that electronic calculators can be wired to function as flexible allegories to social processes. So far only a few electronic simulations have been tested as to their accuracy in gross predictions; however, the development in this field moves very fast and carries great promise [36].

We may illustrate simulation procedures by using a form of verbal allegory.

Consider the following stochastic propositions relevant to voting behavior:

1. Members of a primary group (family, friendship clique, informal work group) tend to vote for the same party.
2. The higher the occupational stratum of the members of a primary group, the greater the likelihood that it votes for a rightist (conservative) party.
3. The more a primary group takes on the style of life of an occupational stratum, the more likely it is that it votes like other primary groups in this occupational stratum.
4. The higher the proportion of salaried or wage-earning (as opposed to self-employed) persons in an occupational stratum, the more likely it is that members in its primary groups vote for a social welfare party.

Add to these, the following findings:

5. At present families in the higher occupational strata in western countries have fewer children than have families in the lower occupational strata.
6. At present, the proportion of people in all occupational strata in western countries who work for salary or wage is increasing, and the number of self-employed is correspondingly decreasing.

Can we test all these propositions in one master stroke by checking how well they can account for the outcome of elections ? Well, we need facts about location of primary groups in occupational classes, the style of life of these groups, the mobility between occupational classes, the extent to which people adopt styles of life of various occupational classes, the party preferences in various occupational

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[36] Cf. Ithiel de Sola Pool and Robert Abelson, «The Simulmatics Project», *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 25 (1961), pp. 167-183, and William N. McPhee, «Note on a Campaign Simulator», *ibid.*, pp. 184-193. The journal *Behavioral Science* carries a regular department called «Computers in Behavioral Science» which deals also with other uses of computers than simulations.

classes, the trends away from self-employment, and information about differential fertility in these classes, and attitudes toward welfare policies among salaried and self-employed. All this makes a number of tables, which, however, happen to be available in a large Swedish study from 1954-55 (N-2554) [37]. Furthermore, we need to make some assumption of the time element in several of the above propositions. This is not readily available and must be subject to some guessing. Finally, we need to know which parties are Leftists and Rightists, and which parties are in favor of social welfare measures. An allegorical statement of the behavior of the electorate in Sweden may now read as follows:

> The age group that during 1950-55 has seen their children move into voting age consists of 51 % Leftists (Social Democrats and Communists) and 49 % Rightists (Conservatives, Liberals, and Agrarians). To avoid speaking in percentages let's put it this way: We have 51 Leftists homes and 49 Rightists homes with children who become voters. Let us see what happens to them over the next four national elections.
>
> During a few years 54 children growing up in Leftist homes come of voting age. Fourteen of these children happened to get Rightist friends or workmates at an early stage. Three of them cannot resist the attraction of these friends or workmates and convert to the bourgeois view before they cast their first ballot. Remaining are thus 51 who at their first election opportunity vote with the Leftist, their parents' party.
>
> Fifteen of these advance to become white-collar workers or entrepreneurs or marry into this group. Nine of them keep their past style of life; for example, they do not acquire an automobile. Three of them adopt Rightist party preferences. Remaining are 48.
>
> The remaining six who become white-collar workers or entrepreneurs buy a car, drink wine instead of beer with their food now and then, and four of them become bourgeois also in political respects. Remaining are 44. One dies. Remaining are 43. However, four were gained from other parties so their final count becomes 47.
>
> During the same time the following happened in the 49 Rightist homes. Their standard of living is more costly and one of their ways to pay for their higher standard is to have fewer children than the Leftists. Only 48 grew into voting age in the bourgeois homes. Four of these children got Leftist friends of workmates and one converted to the left before he went to his first election. 47 are left.

Ten fell below their parents' station. Of them, four failed in their studies or married below their station. But they kept their style of life and enjoyed a car. One — a woman — deserted. however, to the Leftists. Remaining were 46.

Six others moved from their parents' middle or upper class into the working class. Some abandoned their family farm in the country and appeared in the cities as workers or workers' wives. Their money did not allow a car. Two became Socialists. One died which makes 44 for the Rightists. However, as mentioned, they gained ten from the Leftists' parties which gives them a final count of 53.

Not much seems to have changed but the apparently calm electoral surface conceals a great deal. In the beginning the forecast for the Socialists seems good. The parental vote had been 51 for the Leftists against 49 for the Rightists. The Leftists had more children than the Rightists, and the children vote at their first election 52 against 49 for the Socialists. The difference could have been even greater. In the course of time three times as many desert the Leftists as the Rightists. Rightist politicans are thus more successful than Leftist politicians as political evangelists and get the upwardly mobile as converts in their nets. However, the Leftists keep afloat as more diligent midwives. The final score after 20 years becomes 47 against 53 in favor of the Rightists. During the years that this process has taken, the socialist parties in this age cohort have declined from 52 to 47 and the bourgeois parties increased from 49 to 53.

So far we have told this story assuming that the Rightist and the Leftist parties have identical policies about social welfare. This was true in 1952 and virtually true in 1956. Let us amend now by admitting that the Leftists in 1958 and 1960 proposed more generous social benefits in the form of pensions than did the Rightists. This has consequences. In the course of every four-year period one of our 20 families with a self-employed member in the middle class faces a major problem: the man gives up being on his own, sells his shop or farm, and starts working for someone else. This makes for more people during the period here considered who become concerned over their pensions and get attracted to the welfare program of the Leftists, half of whom, or 2 persons, get to the point of voting for them. Furthermore, this greater generosity of the Leftists makes it a little harder to get converts from them among the upwardly mobile. Only 6 are gained for the Rightists instead of 10 before. All this changes the balance of our age cohort:

	In 1968 if parties have identical welfare program	In 1968 if Leftists have more generous welfare program
Rightists	53	48
Leftists	47	52

In 1968 the all-important majority is solidly among the Leftists. The difference introduced by the different welfare programs is shown in the adjoining charts. If the parties had maintained virtually identical welfare programs there would have been a Rightist majority in by 1962; the more generous Leftist program of the late '50s served to solidify and increase the Leftist majority.

If Leftists and Rightists have identical welfare programs

If Leftists and Rightists have different welfare programs

This is, admittedly, a rather freely constructed story which is anchored in statistical facts from 1954-55 at some points but not at others. Its gross prediction is fairly accurate. The actual division of the popular vote for the entire Swedish electorate is shown in the following table:

	Per Cent	
	Bourgeois Parties	Socialist Parties
1952	49.6	50.4
1956	50.4	49.6
1958	50.4	49.6
1960	47.7	52.7

Source: For 1952-58, *Statistisk Arsbok* 1960, (Stockholm 1960), table 420, p. 339. For 1960, newspaper reports.

Separate figures for the age cohort we considered are not available.

Our allegory can be further used to reveal that even if the parties to the right in 1962 change their mind — as has been done by some — and adopt the Socialist welfare plan they will not gain a majority until the '70s, if present rates of mobility and differential fertility and spread of the middle-class way of life prevail. This type of conclusion indicates a key feature of sociological simulations. They can estimate outcomes of alternative possibilities and give guidance in policy choice. And once a simulation is established one can keep it realistic by adjusting the rates of the variables involved and by adding new variables as they become relevant.

It would take us too far afield to discuss how simulations are done on an electric computer. Sufficient to say that this way of formulating and testing theories can be done with ease and great speed on the standard models of electronic calculators that are now available.

REPORT ON THE DISCUSSION

Chairman : H. L. ZETTERBERG, Columbia University
Rapporteur: Richard FAUST

The papers which were presented and discussed were of four kinds: 1) propositional theories, 2) stochastic models and simulations, 3) methodological problems in theorizing, and 4) conceptual analyses.

The Chairman's introductory remarks stressed the paucity in sociology of generally accepted «sociological laws» or «law-like propositions», and the desirability of developing propositional theories and theoretical models of a more rigorous methodology to fill this gap. His paper, *Notes on Theory Construction and Verification in Sociology,* dealt with several methodological problems in formulating and testing propositional theories.

The paper generating the most discussion was presented by G. Homans and entitled *A Theory of Social Interaction.* This paper was a summary and extension of his book *Social Behavior: Its Elementary Forms* and it consisted of a series of propositions based upon concepts and laws of behavioral psychology and classical economic exchange theory, reformulated with novel implications to apply to human interaction at the micro-sociological level. G. Homans also used his scheme to analyze such traditional subjects of social inquiry as «justice» and «power». An energetic discussion centered on the feasibility and desirability of psychological «reductionism» for sociological theory (with G. Homans in favor of it), and on the question of the level of abstraction appropriate for such a theory.

A section of A. Malewski's paper *On Generality Levels in Social Theory* was read into the record; the section dealt with the advances possible in G. Homans' theory due to efforts to enhance the generality of its propositions.

F. J. Stendenbach presented his paper titled *A Sociopsychological Interaction Model.* This paper also consisted of propositions concerning individual interaction and utilizing concepts and laws from behavioral psychology. The discussion centered on the similarities and differences between the formulations of F. J. Stendenbach and G. Homans. Considerable similarity was noted though the papers had been independently written.

K. Rainio's paper *A Stochastic Model of Social Interaction* sought to formulate social psychological processes in the language of probabilistic mathematics rather than to formulate «social-psychological laws». Among the issues discussed was whether the concept of «motivation» could be used in such a scheme, with the author taking the affirmative position.

G. Karlsson's paper *A Model of Information Spread* also presented a stochastic model (in this case of a simplified communication process) rather than «propositions». The author emphasized some difficult problems in the empirical verification of such a model.

The second session of the Working Group began with J. S. Coleman's paper *Individual Autonomy in Theories of Social Systems* which discussed the author's attempts to simulate social systems on computers so that the perspectives of the actors are not artificially substituted for by parameters which are themselves empirically unobtainable.

I. de Sola Pool's paper *A Simulation Model of Sample Surveys* utilized data from election surveys to illustrate methodological problems involved in simulating surveys, especially the problem of using data from independent surveys.

R. Dubin's paper *Process and Outcome in Theoretical Models* was a methodological analysis of the relations between the twin scientific goals of prediction and understanding. Its distinctions proved useful in clarifying the difference between the propositional, stochastic, and simulation models presented by others in the work group.

A section of S. Nowak's paper *Types of Relationships Between Propositions in Social Theory* was read into the record. The paper dealt with methodological issues involved in the relations among propositions, especially with regard to levels of generality, rules of inference, and modes of definition.

J. Galtung's paper *Notes on the Mathematics of Norm, Role, and Status* sought to apply certain areas of mathematics, such as matrix algebra, to the description of basic sociological concepts (e.g. role set and status set). The inadequacies of presently existing mathematics for sociological taxonomy were illustrated. Discussion raised the point that the social sciences may presently play the role of stimulating the invention of useful new forms of mathematics that the physical sciences have historically played.

A. Touraine's paper *Travail et Organisations* was a conceptual analysis of the sociology of work.

R. Mayntz's paper was the final one considered in the public meetings of the Working Group. Titled *On the Use and Usefulness of the Equilibrium Concept in the Analysis of Social Systems*, it was

an extensive conceptual analysis which especially considered the part played by the concept in the structural-functional conceptual scheme.

The Work Goup was organized so that the participants had been in written communication with each other for half a year prior to the meeting. Thus they had acess to each other's papers, and in many instances also to comments on the papers in advance of the meeting. This made it possible to have a structured discussion. A selection of the papers from the Working Group containing propositional and stochastic models, and discussions of their methodology will be published by The Bedminster Press,, Totowa, N.J., U.S.A. under the title «Theory Construction in Sociology - A Symposium».

THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE

SOCIOLOGIE DE LA CONNAISSANCE

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

Kurt H. Wolff
Brandeis University

The meeting was the outcome of a half-day supplementary session on the topic that took place at the suggestion of the then Executive Secretary of the I.S.A. Mr. T. B. Bottomore, at the preceding. Fourth World Congress, 12 September 1959; its proceedings were published as Vol. IV of the *Transactions* of that Congress. The quality of the papers, the contributions to the discussion, and the interest of the audience encouraged Professors Lucien Goldmann, Talcott Parsons, Alexander von Schelting, Werner Stark, and myself to suggest to President Marshall that in 1962 a full day be set aside for the sociology of knowledge and we were pleased when this request was granted.

Invited to organize the meeting, I asked some outstanding scholars to participate and solicited suggestions of additional contributors. In the letters of invitation, the topic of his paper was left to the author: it might be an analysis of the field or a study in it; it would also be desirable, however, that it be related to one or more of the three general themes of the Congress as a whole. In thinking of persons to be invited, the main criterion, aside from excellence, was geographical distribution so that the contributions would teach us something about the spread of the various conceptions and practices of the field. The response was gratifying, in regard to both the quality of the papers and their geographical representation — more than twenty from thirteen countries.

In our letter to President Marshall, we made two suggestions concerning the meeting. The first was one of an introductory paper that would develop notions about the significance of the sociology of knowledge we had outlined — the sociology of knowledge as a perspective on sociology itself and as a means of understanding among sociologists in different cultures and political settings. The other was that the remaining papers might be research reports in the field. There was no introductory paper of the sort alluded to, but much that is relevant to it can be inferred from the contributions actually prepared.

Nor would most of these be classified as reports on research — which itself is instructive. Of the two papers selected by the Executive Committee of the I.S.A. for publication here, Dr. Klausner's is indeed a research report, and Professor Gurvitch's is an important analysis of an aspect of the sociology of knowledge in need of clarification.

SOCIOLOGIE DE LA CONNAISSANCE ET ÉPISTÉMOLOGIE

GEORGES GURVITCH
La Sorbonne

De toutes les œuvres de civilisation, c'est la connaissance qui paraît, à première vue, la plus détachée de la réalité sociale. Ne semble-t-elle pas prétendre à la validité universelle et se fonder sur des jugements vrais, habituellement considérés comme l'apanage de la conscience individuelle ? Il n'est pas contestable, en effet, que la religion, la vie morale, l'éducation et surtout le droit entretiennent avec les cadres sociaux des rapports plus manifestes, plus directement observables, enfin, en principe au moins, plus intenses et plus intimes.

Si l'on ajoute que, selon une longue tradition qui vient de l'antiquité classique, lorsqu'on parle de connaissance, on pense en premier lieu, sinon exclusivement, à la philosophie et aux sciences, on ne s'étonnera pas que le terme même de «sociologie de la connaissance» n'ait pas été sans provoquer des inquiétudes aussi bien chez les profanes que chez les savants et les philosophes. Tous se demandent avec impatience, voire avec irritation, si la «mise en perspective sociologique» de la connaissance n'est pas un nouveau moyen inventé par le *scepticisme* et le *nihilisme* pour invalider tout savoir.

Le désarroi s'est encore accru du fait que, de Bacon à Pareto, les coefficients sociaux de la connaissance ont été interprétés comme des *idola fori,* des *dérivations* des résidus émotifs qui seuls dominent dans la société où ils obscurcissent le savoir. Il n'a été entièrement dissipé ni par Comte, ni par Marx. Tous les deux firent grand cas de la sociologie de la connaissance, le premier en identifiant à celle-ci toute la sociologie, le second en la rattachant au problème de l'idéologie et de l'aliénation. Car l'un comme l'autre (en revenant chacun à sa manière à l'idéal de Condorcet), rêvaient de libérer la connaissance de son enracinement dans les cadres sociaux, de sorte que ces derniers seraient, dans la phase finale, commandés par le savoir. Plus récemment, Mannheim, avec sa *frei-schwebende Intelligenz,* succombait à la même tentation et, sans même attendre l'avènement de la société sans classes et de la désaliénation, faisait naïvement confiance aux intellectuels et à l'«éducation généralisée».

Seul Durkheim, partant à la fois de Saint-Simon (qui a bien vu

l'implication mutuelle des modes de connaissance et des structures sociales), de Condorcet et de Comte, mais dépassant les préjugés de ces derniers, ne croit plus que la mise en perspective sociologique de la connaissance puisse compromettre la validité de cette dernière. Attribuer, dit-il, des cadres sociaux à la connaissance, «*ce n'est pas la rabaisser ou en diminuer la valeur*». Mais Durkheim devait payer ce pas en avant, de sa tendance à voir dans la conscience collective l'incarnation de la raison et de son désir de passer de la sociologie de la connaissance à une épistémologie à base sociologique qui réconcilierait l'empirisme et un apriorisme de nuance kantienne. En réalité, il ne retrouvait dans la réalité sociale que les préconceptions philosophiques qu'il y avait auparavant introduites.

La contribution la plus féconde et la plus originale à la sociologie de la connaissance fut celle de Max Scheler. Elle consiste dans la découverte d'une *multiplicité de genres de connaissances* dont les accentuations varient en fonction des cadres sociaux et dont *l'intensité de liaison avec ceux-ci est différente*. Mais ici encore des préconceptions philosophiques viennent compromettre les résultats. En effet, Scheler affirme un ordre stable et immobile de genres de connaissances que couronne la connaissance théologique, suivie de près par la connaissance philosophique. Les variations des rangs et des accentuations des genres de connaissances ne concernent que les «*a priori subjectifs*» ou les symboles propres aux cadres sociaux et non pas les essences qui restent immobiles, comme restent d'ailleurs immobiles la réalité étudiée et l'échelle unique des valeurs. Le platonisme et l'augustinisme de Scheler limitent sa sociologie de la connaissance, dont le but final est d'aider «l'élite intellectuelle» à détacher des cadres sociaux l'ensemble des aspects du connu, en rétablissant l'ordre essentiel entre genres de connaissances, essences, modes de réalités.

Sorokin, dans le second volume de son fameux ouvrage, *Social and Cultural Dynamics,* se fonde sur une analyse de matériaux empiriques très riches. Mais il se sert de cette analyse aussi bien pour faire ressortir les «fluctuations des systèmes de vérités» en fonction des divers types sociaux, que pour marquer sa préférence pour les époques *ideate* (spiritualistes) et son mépris pour les époques *sensate* (sensualistes), et pour accorder partout la prééminence à la connaissance philosophique. Enfin, si à ce qui précède on ajoute sa conception des cycles, on doit convenir que la sociologie de la connaissance de Sorokin dépend plus encore que celle de Scheler d'une épistémologie préconçue.

Je considère donc qu'une des principales raisons des difficultés jusqu'à présent rencontrées par la sociologie de la connaissance ré-

respondant au mouvement d'ensemble des phénomènes sociaux où ils sont intégrés.

L'explication causale ne peut ici intervenir que par l'intermédiaire de ces derniers. Ce qui n'exclut pas l'explication causale de l'intensité et de l'orientation des actes mentaux cognitifs, qui relèverait de la psychologie collective et sociale en tant que branche de la sociologie. Ceci présuppose cependant que l'explication par les corrélations fonctionnelles et les régularités tendancielles soit déjà accomplie.

2. En tant que telle, la sociologie de la connaissance ne peut servir directement à invalider le faux savoir, à le démystifier, à le démasquer, à le «désaliéner». Ces tâches doivent entrer dans la vocation de l'épistémologie, de l'épistémologie utilisant les riches matériaux que peut lui fournir la sociologie de la connaissance. Les recherches de cette dernière conduisent certes à révéler l'existence de connaissances *inefficaces* et *inadaptées* aux cadres sociaux dans lesquels elles se maintiennent; elles mettent en relief les *sublimations dogmatiques* des hiérarchies des genres de connaissances qui ne correspondent qu'à un cadre social particulier; elles font ressortir le rôle des idéologies, et dans leur sein, des utopies et des mythes, dans certains genres de connaissances, en particulier dans la connaissance politique. Mais dans tous ces cas, il n'appartient pas à la sociologie de la connaissance de juger de la mesure de la véracité de tous les éléments; elle ne peut que poser cette question aux philosophes.

3. La sociologie de la connaissance doit renoncer au préjugé fort répandu selon lequel les jugements cognitifs doivent posséder une validité universelle. La validité d'un jugement n'est jamais universelle, car elle se rattache à un cadre de référence précis. Or, il existe une multiplicité de cadres de références correspondant aux cadres sociaux. Si la vérité et les jugements étaient toujours universels, on ne pourrait établir de distinction ni entre les sciences particulières, ni entre les genres de connaissances; or, même les sociologues les plus dogmatiques distinguent deux, sinon trois genres de connaissances; la connaissance philosophique, la connaissance scientifique et la connaissance technique. Nous considérons quant à nous, qu'il existe un plus grand nombre de genres de connaissances, dont doivent tenir compte aussi bien la sociologie du savoir que l'épistémologie, et que chacun de ces genres s'affirme comme un cadre de référence, éliminant ainsi le dogme de l'universalité, c'est-à-dire le dogme de la validité universelle des jugements cognitifs prétendant à la véracité. Sinon, la connaissance se réduirait à une axiomatique relevant de la

logique formelle, dont la valeur est plus que douteuse. Ce qui nous conduit au point suivant.

4. La sociologie de la connaissance doit renoncer au préjugé philosophique et scientiste selon lequel ces deux genres de connaissances occupent toujours la première place dans la hiérarchie des genres de la connaissance. Ce préjugé vient de la situation qui existait dans les cités antiques devenant ensuite Empires d'une part, et dans les sociétés correspondant au début du capitalisme d'autre part. En fait, cette situation ne se retrouve dans aucun autre type de société.

De plus, la connaissance philosophique et la connaissance scientifique sont les genres du savoir relativement les plus détachés des cadres sociaux et dont la sociologie de la connaissance est le plus difficile à faire. Si la liaison de la connaissance scientifique contemporaine avec l'enseignement organisé, les laboratoires de recherches, les experts, les techniques... procure quelques points d'appui nouveaux pour son étude sociologique, il n'en est pas de même pour la sociologie de la connaissance philosophique. En effet, la réapparition des mêmes positions philosophiques à des siècles d'intervalle et dans des types de société très différents, augmente la difficulté de la sociologie de la philosophie. Seuls, le caractère partisan de la connaissance philosophique, qui la rapproche quelque peu de la connaissance politique, et les variations intenses des interprétations des doctrines philosophiques donnent une prise plus directe aux études sociologiques.

La nécessité de distinguer une multiplicité de genres de connaissances, formant des hiérarchies variables en corrélation fonctionnelle avec les diverses structures sociales, s'impose à la sociologie de la connaissance d'autant plus que cette dernière doit tenir compte non seulement des cadres sociaux globaux, mais des cadres sociaux partiels: classes sociales, groupements particuliers, éléments microsociaux (Nous: Masse, Communauté, Communion; rapports avec Autrui: de rapprochement, d'éloignement et mixtes).

5. Nous sommes ainsi conduits à notre cinquième constatation. La sociologie de la connaissance doit d'abord concentrer son principal effort sur les genres de la connaissance les plus intensément impliqués dans la réalité sociale et dans l'engrenage de ses structures. Telles sont la connaissance perceptive du monde extérieur, la connaissance d'Autrui, la connaissance politique, la connaissance technique, la connaissance du bon sens enfin. Ce sont des domaines où la recherche et les enquêtes empiriques peuvent être largement développées. Et c'est ce dont la sociologie de la connaissance a particulièrement besoin en ce moment, ainsi d'ailleurs que d'investigations

historiques concrètes. Il va de soi que les genres de connaissance liés avec une intensité particulière (et variable en degrés) avec l'engrenage de la réalité sociale se rangent, comme tous les autres genres de la connaissance, dans une hiérarchie ou système mouvant, pour autant qu'ils sont mis en corrélation fonctionnelle avec des structures partielles ou globales.

6. L'espace nous manque pour préciser la différence entre les divers genres de connaissances dont la distinction me paraît indispensable pour entreprendre des recherches dans le domaine de la sociologie de la connaissance, d'autant plus que la variation de leur hiérarchie selon les types de structures sociales nous paraît le thème majeur de cette branche de la sociologie.

Je dois à ce sujet renvoyer à mes publications où les caractères de la connaissance perceptive du monde extérieur, de la connaissance d'Autrui et des Nous, des groupes et des sociétés, de la connaissance du bon sens ou du sens commun, de la connaissance technique, de la connaissance politique, de la connaissance scientifique, de la connaissance philosophique, me paraissent suffisamment précisés [2]. Je n'ai qu'à rappeler que pour autant qu'elles se rangent en une hiérarchie ou un système, elles s'interpénètrent d'une certaine façon, car le genre de connaissance qui domine a tendance à imprégner tous les autres.

Par ailleurs, à l'intérieur de chaque genre de connaissance, j'ai proposé de rechercher les dichotomies, différemment accentuées selon les cadres sociaux, des formes de la connaissance: la connaissance mystique et la connaissance rationnelle; la connaissance empirique et la connaissance conceptuelle; la connaissance positive et la connaissance spéculative; la connaissance intuitive et la connaissance réflexive; la connaissance symbolique et la connaissance adéquate; la connaissance individuelle et la connaissance collective. Ici encore, je dois renvoyer à mes commentaires déjà publiés [3], et je ne peux qu'insister sur le fait que les variations de formes de la connaissance en corrélation avec les cadres sociaux sont bien plus importantes que ne l'imaginent habituellement les sociologues de la connaissance.

Toutes ces constatations et précisions préalables admises, j'en arrive à la définition suivante de la sociologie de la connaissance:

La sociologie de la connaissance est l'étude des corrélations fonctionnelles qui peuvent être établies entre, d'une part les différents genres, les différentes accentuations des formes à l'intérieur de ces genres, les différents systèmes (hiérarchies de ces genres), et d'autre

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[2] Cf. *Traité de Sociologie* (sous ma direction), Tome II, pp. 122 et suiv.
[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 126 et suiv.

*part, les cadres sociaux: types de sociétés globales, classes sociales,
groupements particuliers et manifestations diverses de la sociabilité
(éléments microsociaux). Parmi les cadres sociaux, les structures so-
ciales partielles et surtout globales fournissent le point de repère prin-
cipal pour ces études, facilitées par le rôle que le savoir peut jouer
à côté des autres œuvres de civilisation et règlementations sociales
dans l'armature d'une structure — cet équilibre précaire de hiérarchies
multiples.*

C'est là également que peut intervenir, par l'intermédiaire des
structures sociales, dans leur mouvement d'ensemble et dans leurs ré-
gularités tendancielles vers la hiérarchisation des genres de connais-
sances, l'explication causale qui, par ailleurs, peut avoir trait direc-
tement à l'intensité et à l'orientation des actes mentaux cognitifs.

Une fois sa tâche principale réalisée, la sociologie de la connais-
sance devrait étudier en détail: a) Le rapport entre la hiérarchie va-
riable des genres de connaissances et la hiérarchie, elle aussi mou-
vante, des autres œuvres de civilisation, y compris les différentes
règlementations sociales (dites contrôles sociaux); b) Le rôle du sa-
voir et de ses représentants dans les divers types de sociétés; c) Les
manières variées d'expression, de communication et de diffusion du
savoir, toujours en corrélations fonctionnelles avec les sujets collec-
tifs récepteurs et émetteurs; d) Enfin, les régularités tendancielles,
de différenciation d'une part, de conjonction d'autre part, des divers
genres du savoir correspondant aux types de sociétés globales, de clas-
ses, et parfois même de groupes particuliers, ce qui constituerait la
sociologie génétique de la connaissance.

Nous avons, dans ce qui précède, répudié toute dépendance unila-
térale de la sociologie de la connaissance par rapport à l'épistémo-
logie et réciproquement. Cependant, nous estimons que les deux dis-
ciplines possèdent un *seuil commun* qu'elles étudient d'une manière
différente, ce qui conduit à leur rencontre, à la possibilité d'une con-
tribution réciproque aussi bien négative que positive, donc à une col-
laboration loyale, bien qu'elles restent irréductibles l'une à l'autre.
Cette situation favorise une dialectique entre sociologie de la con-
naissance et épistémologie, dont nous essaierons de préciser briève-
ment les termes dans la conclusion de ce rapport.

Le seuil commun principal entre sociologie de la connaissance et
épistémologie est constitué par l'existence des connaissances collec-
tives, aussi valables que les connaissances individuelles. Elles peuvent
être constatées avec différentes accentuations, au sein de tous les gen-
res de connaissances, et leur importance varie en fonction des cadres
sociaux.

Toute connaissance présupposant à la fois des expériences médiates et immédiates, et des jugements qui affirment la vérité ou la fausseté de leurs données, nier la possibilité de la connaissance collective c'est se fonder sur la théorie de la conscience close, repliée sur elle-même, dont une des conséquences patentes serait l'élimination des actes mentaux collectifs: expériences, intuitions et surtout jugements collectifs. Mais les conceptions de la conscience contenante ne sont nullement obligatoires, ni pour la sociologie, ni pour l'épistémologie. Sans intuitions et expériences collectives, aucune civilisation, et aucun Nous, groupe, classe, société (à la fois producteurs et bénéficiaires de toute civilisation), ne pourraient exister, ce qui tranche la question pour la sociologie. En effet, comment contester la réalité du fonctionnement social des religions, des moralités effectives, des règlementations juridiques efficaces, des styles d'art, des systèmes d'éducation et, pour le secteur spécial de la connaissance, des expériences collectives cognitives portant sur les ensembles cosmogoniques, les images cohérentes du monde extérieur, des engrenages de techniques, des enchevêtrements de sciences et finalement des hiérarchies des genres de connaissances qui varient en fonction des types de structures sociales ? Quant à l'épistémologie, seuls des préjugés subjectivistes ou idéalistes (l'affirmation d'un Je se superposant à la conscience et fonctionnant comme levier des actes mentaux) s'opposent à la reconnaissance de la validité des intuitions et expériences collectives. Toute conception de la conscience ouverte, immanente au monde, les favorise au contraire, comme elle favorise plus largement les interpénétratrations — qui admettent différents degrés — entre les actes mentaux collectifs et les actes mentaux individuels. Même si l'on maintenait la nécessité de la première personne comme centre des actes mentaux, il est illogique de la limiter au «Je» en oubliant que les «Nous», de même que les groupes, les classes, les sociétés globales, structurés ou non, peuvent également jouer le rôle de la première personne et de centres unificateurs.

Les principales difficultés concernant la possibilité des connaissances collectives paraissent donc se concentrer autour du problème des *jugements collectifs*. On dira que, même si l'expérience et l'intuition peuvent être collectives, le jugement, lui, reste toujours individuel. Cela pour cette double raison: a) que le jugement est lié à la réflexion, et que les Nous, les groupes, les classes sociales, les sociétés globales ne peuvent réfléchir; b) Que le jugement est lié à une proposition exprimée dans une parole et qu'il n'existe pas d'organe collectif de la parole.

Pour répondre à ces objections, il faut distinguer trois aspects du

jugement que l'on confond souvent: a) Les critères du jugement; b) L'acte de juger; c) L'expression du jugement dans une proposition liée à la parole.

A propos des critères du jugement, en discernant entre: 1) le critère de cohérence formelle, 2) le critère de rectitude formelle, 3) le critère de véracité [4], il serait aisé de montrer que les deux premiers de ces critères sont essentiellement collectifs et varient avec les types de structures sociales globales ou partielles. Par exemple, si l'affirmation d'avoir été présent en plusieurs endroits à la fois ou d'avoir communiqué avec les esprits paraît cohérente dans certaines structures sociales, elle paraît incohérente dans d'autres; de même, si la constatation: «Voilà un habitant d'une autre planète», ou «Voilà un appareil de transport interplanétaire» paraissait naguère contraire au critère de la rectitude du jugement, elle ne l'est plus aujourd'hui. Reste le critère de la véracité du jugement; c'est là que s'affrontent les différentes positions épistémologiques dont le conflit est en dehors de la sociologie de la connaissance. Celle-ci n'est intéressée que par le fait que le critère de la véracité du jugement peut être aussi bien collectif qu'individuel et que, dans certains genres de connaissances (ainsi la connaissance perceptive du monde extérieur, la connaissance des Nous, des groupes, des sociétés et même des Autrui, la connaissance technique et la connaissance politique), le critère de la véracité du jugement est plutôt collectif qu'individuel. Ce n'est que la connaissance scientifique et la connaissance philosophique qui s'appuient soit sur l'équivalence des critères collectifs et individuels, soit sur la prédominance de ces derniers.

Quant aux actes de juger, la référence au fait que ceux-ci soit liés à la réflexion — elle-même étant le monopole de la conscience individuelle — amène une confusion fâcheuse entre des constatations justes et des interprétations erronées. D'une part, le jugement, comme l'a indiqué Descartes, est l'intermédiaire entre «l'entendement» et la «volonté» ou plus précisément entre l'intellection (qui peut être intuitive) et le choix (ou la décision), la réflexion ne faisant que la liaison entre les deux. Or, rien n'empêche l'intellection et la volonté d'être collectives.

D'autre part, la réflexion elle-même peut aussi bien être collective qu'individuelle. Que veut dire réfléchir, sinon débattre le pour et le contre ? Réfléchir, c'est confronter les arguments, c'est-à-dire participer à un dialogue, à une discussion, à un débat. Mais alors la

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[4] Nous empruntons cette distinction à E. LASK, *Die Lehre vom Urteil*, 1912.

réflexion, loin d'être l'apanage de la conscience individuelle, a un aspect collectif si nettement prononcé qu'on pourrait plutôt dire que dans la réflexion personnelle figurent différents «moi» qui discutent entre eux; en d'autres termes, il s'agit, partiellement au moins, d'une introjection du collectif dans l'individuel. En réalité, la réflexion est le plus souvent à la fois collective et individuelle; c'est un des domaines où la «réciprocité de perspective» trouve une de ses applications les plus incontestables.

Les jugements collectifs sont donc parfaitement possibles et très répandus. Ce qui trompe, c'est l'identification gratuite de l'acte de juger avec la proposition grammaticale, et de cette proposition avec la parole, elle-même confondue avec l'élocution comprise comme mouvement de la langue en tant qu'organe physiologique. Il est évident que les collectivités, qu'elles soient un Nous, un groupe, une classe ou, une société globale, ne possèdent pas d'organe physiologique d'élocution. Cependant, cette constatation élémentaire ne conduit à nier la possibilité des jugements collectifs que par une série de confusions successives. Bien des logiciens se sont révoltés contre le «parallélisme logico-grammatical» et ont détaché le jugement de la proposition syntaxique. Cette dernière, d'ailleurs, est elle-même très pénétrée par le collectif, car le langage est composé de significations et de symboles sociaux, ce qui est également vrai de la parole, les deux servant à la communication, impossible sans intégration dans les phénomènes sociaux totaux. Par ailleurs, un jugement individuel peut être exprimé par des paroles collectives, et des jugements collectifs admettre une expression verbale individuelle. Même l'élocution qui, en tant que telle, reste individuelle, subit une forte influence du collectif, tous les organes physiologiques de l'homme étant soumis à l'emprise des «techniques du corps» [5] venant du collectif.

L'existence des connaissances collectives constituant le seuil commun principal entre sociologie de la connaissance et épistémologie, pose devant cette dernière un problème nouveau auquel elle est seule en mesure de répondre: celui des sujets collectifs de la connaissance, de la validité de leurs actes cognitifs, et de la valeur de ces derniers par rapport aux connaissances individuelles. Voici donc un exemple de la collaboration positive possible entre les deux disciplines qui peuvent s'entraider sans se confondre.

Un autre secteur du seuil commun entre la sociologie de la con-

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[5] Cf. la fameuse étude de Marcel MAUSS, «Les techniques du corps», 1936, reproduite dans *Sociologie et Anthropologie,* 1950, pp. 355-356.

naissance et l'épistémologie, est celui du monde symbolique de coloration intellectuelle et plus précisément de caractère cognitif. En effet, un nombre considérable de symboles, tels que les images cohérentes du monde extérieur, les conceptualisations variées des différentes durées et étendues concrètes, les catégories logiques, les grandeurs mathématiques qui évoquent l'infini, l'appareil conceptuel des différentes sciences, etc., relèvent à la fois de l'épistémologie et de la sociologie de la connaissance. Si la première se propose d'établir et de vérifier les conditions de la validité de ces symboles, la seconde décrit leurs variations et le renversement de leurs hiérarchies en fonction : a) des émetteurs collectifs, b) des récepteurs collectifs, c) des obstacles à franchir, d) des changements de hiérarchie des genres de connaissances correspondant aux structures, e) des fluctuations des conjonctures sociales.

Enfin, un troisième secteur du seuil commun entre sociologie de la connaissance et épistémologie est celui du rapport entre signe et signifié cognitif. Il s'agit d'un domaine beaucoup plus large que le précédent, car le signe se distingue du symbole en ce qu'il n'a besoin ni d'être inadéquat au signifié, ni de pousser à la participation à ce dernier. Les signes sont des substituts purement expressifs dont le nombre est légion. Nous ne citerons que les mesures de tous genres (poids, longueurs, volumes, etc.), les chiffres, les lettres, les termes, les phrases, les graphiques, les dessins, etc. Ces véhicules de la transmission et de la diffusion de la connaissance varient en fonction autant du contenu de celle-ci, que des cadres sociaux où la connaissance doit être répandue. C'est à l'épistémologie qu'il appartient de nouveau de justifier la validité et la valeur des divers signes cognitifs, et c'est à la sociologie de la connaissance qu'incombe la tâche d'étudier leurs variations dans les différentes structures et conjonctures sociales.

Après avoir constaté qu'un seuil commun très large existe entre la sociologie de la connaissance et l'épistémologie, résumons brièvement en quoi elles peuvent se venir en aide sans se confondre et sans chercher à s'absorber réciproquement.

En quoi consiste, en l'occurrence, l'apport de l'épistémologie à la sociologie de la connaissance ? En premier lieu, dans la collaboration de l'épistémologie avec cette branche de la sociologie dans son effort pour circonscrire la connaissance en tant que fait social distinct d'autres faits sociaux, et pour différencier les genres et, dans leur sein, les formes de la connaissance. En second lieu, l'épistémologie aide la sociologie de la connaissance à poser le problème en termes de corrélations fonctionnelles, en lui permettant une mise en

perspective sociologique de la connaissance qui n'ouvre pas le débat sur la validité de cette dernière. En troisième et dernier lieu, l'épistémologie, au moyen des concepts de totalité, d'infini, de multiplicité, de pluralité des cadres de référence et de généralité limitée à ces derniers, ouvre la voie à une explication sociologique des orientations de la connaissance qui ne se confond nullement avec le problème de sa «distorsion».

Il n'est pas difficile de voir que cette contribution positive de l'épistémologie à la sociologie de la connaissance n'implique aucune doctrine épistémologique particulière et n'exige à aucun moment une prise de position philosophique quelconque. Il peut y avoir en principe n + 1 justifications philosophiques de la collaboration de ces deux disciplines, par exemple, le réalisme absolu, le spiritualisme fichtéen ou hégélien, le matérialisme dialectique, le pragmatisme de nuances diverses, l'empirisme radical ou l'empirisme dialectique (tous deux opposés à l'empirisme dogmatique, sensualiste ou positiviste); ou bien la phénoménologie de différentes obédiences et les philosophies de l'existence; ou encore la théorie du «renouvellement perpétuel de la raison» engendrant toujours de nouvelles catégories «adaptées aux obstacles à vaincre» (Brunschvicg) et même peut-être la «philosophie du presque» se liant à une «théologie négative de l'Absolu» dont on a connu des formes variées. Seules seraient exclues les doctrines épistémologiques qui poussent à ne voir dans la collaboration entre philosophie et sociologie qu'un cercle vicieux et qui nient d'une façon gratuite la possibilité des expériences et des connaissances collectives (par exemple, l'empirisme de Locke, le rationalisme de Descartes et le soi disant criticisme de Kant). On voit ainsi la contribution négative de la sociologie de la connaissance à l'épistémologie. Il nous reste à préciser sa contribution positive.

Le premier de ces apports déjà mentionnés consiste à poser devant l'épistémologie le problème de la validité de la connaissance collective et de la relation entre le sujet collectif et le sujet individuel de la connaissance. Étant donné que ces deux sujets peuvent se présenter l'un à l'autre comme des objets, la nécessité de la révision des relations entre sujet-objet-réalité qui se trouvent en rapports dialectiques surgit devant l'épistémologie. C'est bien ici que cette dernière pourrait tenir compte de la sociologie de la connaissance. La dichotomie sujet-objet a déjà été très fortement ébranlée par les théories de la conscience ouverte se projetant dans le monde, et par la constatation qu'on ne peut arriver à la subjectivité qu'en passant par la crise de l'objectivité (par les œuvres culturelles par exemple), et réciproquement. Cette dichotomie se trouve une fois de plus mise en question

par la dialectique entre connaissance collective et connaissance in-
dividuelle à laquelle la sociologie de la connaissance donne du re-
lief. C'est évidemment à l'épistémologie et à elle seule qu'il incombe
de répondre à la question de savoir si la dialectique entre le connu,
le connaissable, l'inconnu connaissable et l'inconnaissable — ces
quatre secteurs faisant, tous, directement partie de la réalité — ne
constituerait pas un meilleur point de départ pour cette discipline
que la dichotomie classique; c'est également l'épistémologie qui est
seule compétente pour décider si les cadres de référence du vrai cor-
respondent, oui ou non, aux cadres du réel...

La seconde contribution positive de la sociologie de la connaissance
à l'épistémologie consiste à déposer aux pieds de cette dernière un
trésor de matériaux concrets et empiriques accumulés au cours des
investigations sur les variations: a) de la hiérarchie des genres de la
connaissance, b) des accentuations des formes de connaissance au
sein de chacun des genres, c) des rapports entre les systèmes de con-
naissance et les autres règlementations sociales, c'est-à-dire du rôle
effectif du savoir dans les différents types de structures sociales. En
se proposant de trancher le problème du vrai et du faux ou, en
d'autres termes, d'apporter une justification de la validité du savoir,
l'épistémologie se trouve contrainte de répondre d'une manière de
plus en plus affinée et souple aux questions posées par la sociologie
du savoir, en évitant la sublimation et la dogmatisation d'une situa-
tion particulière, en somme, toute solution de facilité.

En troisième lieu, la sociologie de la connaissance pose à l'épis-
témologie le problème de la véracité d'une multiplicité quasi infinie
de perspectives de la connaissance. C'est à l'épistémologie de ré-
soudre par ses propres moyens la question de savoir si ces perspec-
tives sont toutes également valables, ou si certaines d'entre elles
le sont moins que les autres (étant par exemple «idéologiques», «uto-
piques», «mythologiques», etc.). C'est encore à l'épistémologie de
décider si, au pluralisme des perspectives du connu, du connaissable,
de l'inconnu connaissable et de l'inconnaissable, correspond la même
richesse des mondes réels ainsi que des idées, ou s'il s'agit de la
profusion dynamique du devenir, ou enfin peut-être, si l'unité et la
continuité de l'être ou des idées sont plus grandes que celles de la
multiplicité de leurs perspectives. Ici encore, la sociologie de la con-
naissance ne collabore avec l'épistémologie qu'en lui posant des pro-
blèmes dont elle doit lui laisser le soin de trouver les solutions.

Nous allons maintenant reformuler nos conclusions à la lumière
des procédés dialectiques opératoires que nous avons mis au point

afin de dédogmatiser la méthode dialectique et de la libérer de tout parti pris.

Sociologie et épistémologie sont en rapports de *complémentarité dialectique* en ce sens que l'analyse philosophique vient épauler la sociologie des œuvres de civilisation, lorsqu'il s'agit de différencier dans la réalité sociale les faits moraux, cognitifs, esthétiques, juridiques, etc. A son tour, la sociologie aide l'épistémologie à se rendre compte des variations concrètes et effectives de ces phénomènes dans leur infinie multiplicité. Mais ceci ne présuppose aucune prise de position particulière ni de la part de l'épistémologie, ni de la part de la sociologie de la connaissance.

Sociologie et épistémologie sont en rapports d'*implication dialectique* mutuelle, puisque l'épistémologie ne peut ignorer les *sujets collectifs* des actes cognitifs et moraux, tels les Nous, les groupes, les classes et les sociétés entières, et que la sociologie ne peut ignorer les significations, les symboles, les idées et les valeurs, dont elle constate l'efficacité dans la réalité sociale.

L'*ambiguïté dialectique* entre épistémologie et sociologie ne concerne pas seulement les représentants des deux sciences, ni même leurs prétentions à l'impérialisme réciproque. Elle intervient aussi dans le fait que certains sociologues, en voulant dissoudre l'épistémologie dans la sociologie, ont en réalité subordonné la sociologie à une doctrine philosophique précise (Comte, par exemple, à celle de Bossuet et de de Bonald, et Durkheim à celle de Kant) et que des philosophes tels que Hegel ou Dewey, en voulant dissoudre la sociologie dans la philosophie, rendirent au contraire sociologique un secteur de leur épistémologie.

La *polarisation dialectique* entre épistémologie et sociologie s'applique soit à des interprétations dogmatiques de l'épistémologie (y compris l'idéalisme kantien), soit à des interprétations mécanistes ou behavioristes de la sociologie qui appauvrissent arbitrairement son domaine, soit à l'opposition entre la tâche explicative de la sociologie et la tâche justificative et vérificative de l'épistémologie.

Enfin, la *réciprocité de perspectives* entre sociologie et épistémologie, rendues parallèles et symétriques dans leurs résultats, ne peut être considérée que comme une directive bien éloignée. Celle-ci n'admet que des solutions très approximatives, fruit d'une collaboration prudente et diligente entre philosophes et sociologues, toujours prêts à constater le surgissement de nouvelles antinomies inattendues, demandant le recours à des polarisations possibles.

Il s'agit donc d'une collaboration loyale de la sociologie de la connaissance et de l'épistémologie qui, tout en restant irréductibles,

se rendent de mutuels services. L'impérialisme ne saurait être de mise entre elles: elles se surveillent et s'incitent mutuellement au travail. C'est un vis-à-vis inquiétant mais fructueux. Ici s'imposent la fraternisation et la politique de la main tendue, ce qui n'exclut pas moins toute fusion et toute confusion entre ces deux disciplines qui doivent rester autonomes.

ON SOME DIFFERENCES IN MODES OF RESEARCH AMONG PSYCHOLOGISTS AND SOCIOLOGISTS *

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INTRODUCTION

Books in sociology include sections on motivation and personality development. Books in psychology review research on group processes. Both present material on attitudes. Both psychologists and sociologists are engaged in assessing public opinion, describing a mental hospital, studying a tribal group, preparing military training manuals and evaluating the effects of mass communication. Some members of both professions call themselves social psychologists [1].

Where is the boundary between the fields of psychology and sociology ? Does an analytic distinction between the fields also apply to the practice of those who call themselves psychologists and sociologists ? What difference does it make whether a problem of human behavior is investigated by a psychologist or by a sociologist ? C. Wright Mills argues that there is little distinction among the various social sciences [2]. Similarly, some find it difficult to define the roles of

[1] Allport notes that of 52 American social-psychology texts published between 1908 and 1952, two-thirds were written by psychologists and a third by sociologists. Gordon W. ALLPORT, «The Historical Background of Modern Social Psychology», *Handbook of Social Psychology* (Gardner LINDZEY, editor), Cambridge, Mass., Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., Inc., 1954. Practice in this common subfield of psychology and sociology has implications for the professionalization of sociologists. See William J. GOODE, «Encroachment, Charlatanism, and the Emerging Profession: Psychology, Sociology and Medicine», *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 25, 1960, pp. 902-914.

[2] «There is neither a distinction in method nor a boundary of subject matter that truly distinguishes anthropology from economics and sociology today».

the several types of social scientists. Nettler [3] attributes the difficulty in defining a sociologist to the broad scope of the subject, the inchoate status of techniques, and the confusion of roles of the scientist and moralist. Others have distinguished the fields in terms of subject matter. The most common subject-matter distinction is that between the study of collective and individual behavior. E. R. A. Seligman [4], for example, in his introductory article to the *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences* classes both as mental or cultural sciences. Psychology, he writes, deals with a separate individual, conceived of as dissociated from his fellow human beings, while sociology treats of man as a member of a group. Others — Sherif [5], for example — describe a difference between the level concerned with individual motives or perceiving and the level concerned with social organization and value systems. Earlier, Durkheim, in an effort to establish sociology's autonomy justified the study of the group as such. Durkheim [6] argued that just as individual representations, though rooted in a biological substratum, have a *sui generis* existence, so collective representations, produced by the action and reaction of these individual representations, are more than these individual representations. The collective representations exist *sui generis*.

Some ten years ago, a group of members of the Department of Social Relations at Harvard attempted to delineate the fields [7]. They distinguished personality as «the organized system of orientation and motivation of one individual actor» from the social system as «a system which is organized around the problems inherent in or arising

Presumably this statement also applies to that part of psychology concerned with the social. *The Sociological Imagination*, New York, Oxford University Press, Inc., 1959, p. 137.

[3] Gwynne NETTLER, «Toward a Definition of the Sociologist», *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 12, 1947, pp. 553-560.

[4] «What are the Social Sciences ?», *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, New York, The Macmillan Co., 1930, Vol. 1, pp. 1-7.

[5] Muzafer SHERIF, «Integrating Field Work and Laboratory in Small Group Research», *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 19, 1954, pp. 759-771. Another distinction is that between concern with collective and individual adjustment to an environment. See   W. F. OGBURN and Alexander GOLDENWEISER, *The Social Sciences and Their Interrelations*, Boston, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1927.

[6] Emile DURKHEIM, «Individual and Collective Representations», *Sociology and Philosophy*, Glencoe, Illinois, The Free Press, 1953, pp. 1-34.

[7] «Some Fundamental Categories of the Theory of Action: A General Statement», signed by Talcott PARSONS, Edward A. SHILS, Gordon W. ALLPORT, Clyde KLUCKHOHN, Henry A. MURRAY, Richard C. SHELDON, Samuel A. STOUFFER and Edward C. TOLMAN, *Towards A General Theory of Action* (Talcott PARSONS, and Edward A. SHILS, editors), Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1951.

from social interaction of a plurality of individual actors». Social psychology would presumably be concerned with the articulation of personality and social systems.

Do the activities of members of these two professions correspond to these analytical distinctions ? This question may be answered by comparing the research of sociologists with that of psychologists. Such a comparison will be made of research in a single field — that of religion[8]. The above distinctions will be found to but partly reflect practice; in effect, psychologists and sociologists together are often concerned with studying individual personality or culture. They will be shown to differ, moreover, in research style, in their way of evaluating and describing what they study, and, most significantly, in their modes of research inference.

A list was compiled of the empirical studies in the psychology and sociology of religion appearing in the principal American sociological and psychological professional journals between the years 1950 and 1960. Excluding a few which, though listed in *Sociological Abstracts, Psychological Abstracts,* and the *Education Index,* were inaccessible, this search produced 131 articles written by 114 different authors. Information on educational attainments was available for 97 of these authors. Two of the 97 hold only a Bachelor's degree, 7 only a Master's degree, while 88 have reached a Doctorate. Their principal fields of interest are distributed as follows[9]:

Sociology	56
Psychology	31
Theology	8
Medical Psychiatry	7
Education	5
Anthropology	2
Philosophy	2
Humanities	1
Unknown	2
	114

[8] Sociologists and psychologists working in the field of religion are not typical representatives of their professions. Nevertheless, in comparing the professions one would want to maintain some common frame of concrete problem reference. An analysis now in progress similar to this present one but concerned with studies in the area of stress is producing similar findings regarding the contributions of sociologists and psychologists.

[9] Education and field of interest were classified according to information

For the following analysis the sociologists and the anthropologists are combined as a group of 58 «sociologists» and the psychologists and psychiatrists combined as 38 «psychologists»; a total of 96 individuals. Some of these individuals wrote more than one article during the period. To avoid biasing the analysis, only a single article of each of the 96 researchers will be considered. Thus, the findings to be presented refer to the empirical research of American psychologists and sociologists who published professional articles on religion between 1950 and 1960 and cannot be generalized beyond these limits.

System Levels

To what extent do these psychologists study the personality and these sociologists study the social system ? The principal dependent variable in each research was taken as defining the system level to be elucidated by the study. Following the definitions of the Harvard group, these dependent variables were classified according to whether they referred to concrete behavior or to an abstraction from concrete behavior on the level of personality, society, or culture. The variable was coded as referring to concrete behavior where it provided an immediate image of individuals engaged in some kind of activity. Thus, church attendance and voting were classed as concrete behavior. Concepts such as attitude and ego strength were classified as personality variables because they refer to a process or state of an individual actor. The dependent variable was coded as concerned with society if it referred to a relation between individuals or to a group characteristic. Thus, the teacher-pupil role, social mobility, and the religious institution were coded as concepts referring to the social system. References to systems of norms and values as such, without reference to a particular personality that internalized them or to a relationship in which they were institutionalized, were classified as cultural — as, e.g., the Protestant ethic, or intellectualism or authoritarianism as «ideas» [10]. Table 1 shows the proportion of articles written by psychologists and by sociologists with each type of dependent variable.

contained in the Directories of The American Medical Association, The American Psychological Association, American Sociological Association, and *American Men of Science*.

[10] Some concepts do not fit into this fourfold classification. These include concepts with a physiological referent. Classificatory attributes such as age or sex would also not fit these categories unless the researcher specifically referred to the meaning of age for an individual, in which case the referent is

TABLE I

*System Level of Dependent Variables in Articles by
Psychologists and Sociologists*

| | System Levels | | | | | |
	Concrete Behavior	Personality	Society	Culture	Total	N
Psychologists	8%	81%	3%	8%	100%	38
Sociologists	28	30	19	23	100%	57

It is not surprising that most articles written by psychologists deal with personality. It is striking, however, that less than a fifth of those written by sociologists treat society. In fact, the interest of the sociologists is about evenly distributed among the four levels. Apparently psychologists who investigate religion are considerably more specialized in their focus than are the sociologists. Psychologists study personality but sociologists too are more likely to study personality than society. This finding reminds one of Comte's view in his *Cours de Philosophie Positive* of the superordinate position of sociology in the hierarchy of the sciences. In this view it is as if sociology defines not a field of study but a perspective which may be assumed in studying many fields. Some fifty years ago M. M. Davis [11] summed up this sociological perspective. He saw the essence of society as adaptation expressed as cooperative action. A study of the physical and biological conditions of this cooperative action is the field of biological sociology; of the forms of institutions through which it passes is the field of historical and analytic sociology; and to look inwardly to the feelings, thoughts, brain states and impulses which accompany, illuminate and guide the action is the work of psychological sociology. Perhaps it was this type of approach which, at an earlier stage of the field, evoked Kroeber's remark that «Sociologists have preferred as-

personality, or to the age or sex structure, in which case society is the referent. The term «variable» is used loosely in this study although some of the concept referents, e.g. role, are non-ordered categories.

[11] M. M. DAVIS, *Psychological Interpretations of Society* (Studies in History. Economics and Public Law, Vol. XXXIII, N° 2), New York, Columbia University, 1909.

serting sovereignty over a vast domain to exercising it in a fragment thereof. In consequence they have been pretenders when they might have been governors» [12].

The Harvard group's distinction between system levels blurs subordinate but concretely meaningful differences within the general area of personality [13]. Psychologists and sociologists who study personality are not necessarily employing the same concepts. A sociologist, for example, would not be likely to explore «drive reinforcement». However, both might execute research on the «authoritarian personality» by using the F-scale.

The scope of interests among sociologists may explain their concern with defining the field as well as the criticism leveled at «psychologizers» among sociologists [14]. This critique regarding the limitations of psychology in explaining social phenomena is a legitimate concern. One should certainly be cautious about explaining the rise of Nazism in terms of the authoritarian role of the German father [15]. Aside from this substantive question, the discussion about psychologizing may serve as professional social control. Since the autonomous status of sociology is threatened at the boundary with psychology, this is the boundary which the group guards. Psychologists on the other hand, more concerned about the boundary with physiology, write considerably less about «sociologizing» among psychologists but are concerned about the distinction of psychological from neurological explanations.

That over a fourth of the sociologists but less than a tenth of the psychologists, deal with concrete behavior is interesting in view of the stereotype of psychologists as relatively more operationalist and criti-

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[12] A. L. KROEBER, «The Possibility of a Social Psychology», *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 23, 1918, pp. 633-651.

[13] Paradoxically, in some ways, the differentiation among psychologists is sharper than that among sociologists. A psychologist would have greater difficulty in understanding all sections outside his specialty at a meeting of the APA than a sociologist would at the ASA.

[14] See, for example, Robert K. MERTON's introductory paragraphs to «Social Structure and Anomie», *Social Theory and Social Structure*, Glencoe, Illinois, The Free Press, 1957, pp. 131f. Psychologizing was used as a «good» word by R. H. LOWIE, «Psychology and Sociology», *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 21, 1916, pp. 217-229.

[15] Alex Inkeles believes that some social scientists go too far in separating psychological from sociological explanations. See his article «Personality and Social Structure», Chapter II, *Sociology Today* (Robert K. MERTON, Leonard BROOM, and Leonard S. COTTRELL, Jr., editors), New York, Basic Books, Inc., 1959.

cal of abstract concepts than sociologists [16]. In another paper [17] it was noted that psychologists feel more at ease with direct observations than with the concepts used to summarize them. They accept responses as «hard data» but debate the common factors underlying these responses. Sociologists, on the other hand, tend to be less troubled about abstract concepts, such as social stratification or social mobility, and more about the validity of the observable indicators by which they are measured. Juxtaposing these observations with the present finding suggests that psychologists both use abstract concepts and engage in a critique of them. Sociologists tend to deal with the concrete and are concerned about the legitimacy of inferences from these observables. Each field is uneasy about the form it most frequently uses [18].

The relatively more specialized interests of psychologists are even more apparent when the independent and dependent variables are considered together. Referents of the independent variables were coded according to the same four system levels as were those of the dependent variables. By cross-classifying dependent and independent variables, the studies may be organized according to whether they deal with the influence of personality on personality factors, culture on personality, personality on society, etc. This is shown in Table II.

Half of the psychologists study the impact of one personality factor on another. These are strictly psychological studies. Another fourth are social-psychological studies of the influence of social upon personality factors. The interests of sociologists are considerably more scattered. Only 5 out of 47 are strictly sociological studies of the influence of one social factor on another. As many or more are social-psychological studies concerned with the impact of society on concrete behavior. Nine out of 47 are psychological studies which in-

[16] Objections to the use of «hypothetical constructs» are considerably more common in the psychological than in the sociological literature. See the excellent review article by W. W. MEISSNER, «Intervening Constructs-Dimensions of Controversy», *Psychological Review*, 67:1, January, 1960, pp. 51-72.

[17] Samuel Z. KLAUSNER, «A Typology of Concept-Indicator Relations», Washington, D. C., Bureau of Social Science Research, 1962, unpublished.

[18] C. WRIGHT MILLS studied textbooks on social problems and found that «The level of abstraction which characterizes these texts is so low that often they seem to be empirically confused for lack of abstraction to knit them together». He attributes this to the fact that these books are written for student audiences and that almost all the authors came from small towns and moved in homogeneous social circles. The suggestion is that complex urban environment produces abstract thought. «The Professional Ideology of Social Pathologists», *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 49, 1943, pp. 166 ff.

vestigate the influence of personality on concrete behavior or upon other personality factors.

Sociologists are distinguished by their tendency to view society as an independent variable, that is, as an influencing factor. Though only nine are concerned with society as a dependent variable, almost half of the sociologists use a societal independent variable. Little more

TABLE II

*System Levels of Dependent and Independent Variables among Psychologists (N=32) ** *

Independent Variable	Dependent Variable			
	Concrete Behavior	Personality	Society	Culture
Concrete Behavior	1	2	0	0
Personality	1	16	1	0
Society	1	8	0	0
Culture	0	1	0	1

*System Levels of Dependent and Independent Variables among Sociologists (N=47) ** *

Independent Variable	Dependent Variable			
	Concrete Behavior	Personality	Society	Culture
Concrete Behavior	2	4	2	0
Personality	5	4	0	4
Society	7	7	5	4
Culture	1	0	2	0

* The N's in this table are smaller than in Table I because some of the studies were descriptive and so had no principal independent variable.

than a fourth of the psychologists take society as an independent variable. Sociologists seem less interested in explaining the social than in looking to the social for an explanation.

Thus, within this sample, the distinction between theoretical system levels, while adequately defining the activities of psychologists, does not clearly discriminate what sociologists are doing. The suggestion, however, that there may be a peculiar «sociological view» or «perspective» remains. Part of this is reflected in their tendency to look to society as an explanation if not as an object to be explained. Moreover, though not clearly distinguishable by their objects of study, sociologists may exhibit distinctive conceptual grasps of their material. They may differ from psychologists in methods of data gathering, in the way of speaking about or evaluating their objects, and in using differing types of inferences in dealing with them. In short, the difference between psychologists and sociologists, in practice, may be more methodological than substantive [19].

METHODS OF DATA GATHERING

Methods of data gathering are partly dictated by the object of inquiry and partly by the tradition of the profession. Psychologists and sociologists show certain preferences for particular procedures of gathering data. Table III shows the methods of data gathering employed in the 96 studies under consideration.

Three things stand out [20]. The psychologists are strongly committed to the use of questionnaires — largely attitude measures and standardized and projective psychological tests. Sociologists show a slightly greater tendency to use interviews. Sociologists, more than psychologists, prefer to analyze documents, examine records, and synthesize previous studies. Observational methods, including controlled experimentation, are rarely used by either profession in studies in this field. In view of the heavy training in questionnaire construction and interviewing given sociology students and of the emphasis on experi-

[19] Basing their thoughts on experiences in interdisciplinary work, Simmons and Davis have come to a similar conclusion. They say: «During the initial period of field work, the major divergences often seemed to be conceptual or theoretical, but the basic differences were methodological not conceptual», Ozzie G. SIMMONS and James A. DAVIS, «Interdisciplinary Collaboration in Mental Illness Research». *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 63, November 1957, pp. 297-303.

[20] The over-all distribution is influenced by tradition in studies of religion. Had the sample been drawn from small-groups studies, there would have been more observational methods used; or if demographic studies were under consideration, the examination of records would have been the significant category.

TABLE III

*Data-Gathering Methods of Sociologists and Psychologists
in Empirical Studies of Religion*

Methods	Psychologists %	Sociologists %
Group Administered Questionnaires	81	40
Personal Interviews	21	28
Observations	8	9
Analysis of Documents	3	11
Examination of Records	11	26
Synthesis of Previously Gathered Data	0	12
	124 *	126 *
	N 38	N 58

* The totals exceed 100 % because some studies employed more than one method.

mental methods in training psychologists, one might have anticipated a greater reliance on these methods.

The differences may be due to the differences in system levels. Since method is, in part, related to object of study, it is necessary to hold system level constant to assess the influence of the professions. Since few psychologists in this sample study society and culture, the comparison must be limited to psychologists and sociologists who study personality. This is shown in Table IV.

The psychologists' preference for questionnaires still remains. Sociologists, however, are more likely to use questionnaires in studying personality than in studying other system levels. This might be a consequence of the important position questionnaires, particularly in the form of standardized tests, have assumed in the personality area. Psychologists provide the methodological direction in personality study. The psychologists' preference for questionnaire over interview methods may derive from their general preference for standardized methods. The wording of the questionnaire is standard and responses may be validated [21]. Sociologists still show more of a tendency than

[21] Ruesch has contrasted the approach of psychologists and psychiatrists in a clinical setting and was disturbed by what appeared to be the psychologists' relative lack of interest in the welfare of patients. He remarks: «Psychologists who are trained to deal with theory and with statistical control are frequently

TABLE IV

*Data-Gathering Methods of Sociologists and Psychologists in
Empirical Studies of Religion when Personality is
the Dependent Variable*

Methods	Psychologists %	Sociologists %
Group Administered Questionnaires	76	63
Personal Interviews	19	38
Observation	13	13
Analysis of Documents	0	6
Examination of Records	10	0
Synthesis of Previously Gathered Data	0	6
	118 *	126 *
	N 31	N 16

* The totals exceed 100 % because some studies employed more than one method.

psychologists to use face-to-face interviews. The interpretation of interview schedules tends to be somewhat more qualitative. In data gathering, psychologists apparently prefer to be more systematic, though less flexible, than sociologists [22].

The greater likelihood of sociologists synthesizing previous research is of interest. Psychologists have a special journal, *Psychological Bulletin,* for synthetic reviews. This has tended to channel review articles by psychologists into this single outlet—where no reviews on

more versed in coping with data than with people». Jurgen RUESCH, «Creation of a Multidisciplinary Team Introducing the Social Scientist to Psychiatric Research», *Psychosomatic Medicine,* Vol. 18, 1956, p. 106.

[22] Sorokin has criticized both professions for their reliance on questionnaires and interviews. He says: «The bulk of recent psychological research deals with speech-reactions, gathered by speech-reactional operations, centered around wishful, hypothetical, «syndromatic», and subjective utterances, rarely checked for their accuracy, sincerity and correspondance to the facts. This sort of «hearsay» is the material out of which most of the recent psychosocial theories and «research conclusions» have been manufactured». Pitrim A. SOROKIN, *Fads and Foibles in Modern Sociology and Related Sciences,* Chicago, Henry Regnery Co., 1956, p. 298.

religion appeared during the decade. Sociologists may publish review articles in several journals and having less rigid standards for the reviewing, do more of it [23].

TECHNICAL TERMINOLOGY

There has been heated discussion about the use of «jargon» in these fields [24]. Judging by popular comment, sociologists are the greater «offenders» [25]. Is this due simply to the fact that sociological terms are less familiar to the public than psychological ones, or do sociologists actually use more technical terms ?

Since the behavioral sciences designate their concepts linguistically rather than by symbolic notation, colloquial vaguenesses, connotations, or surplus meanings attach themselves to the basic, defined, or operational meanings of the scientific concepts. Technical terms may be introduced where there is a feeling that, because of these types of difficulties, the scientific must be set off sharply from non-scientific terms [26].

Terms used to designate the concepts in the articles reviewed were classified according to whether they were technical or non-technical. Scientific neologisms were coded as technical. Where the use of the term in scientific discourse is so radically different from its common use that a lack of definition would cause serious error, the term was called technical. «Libido» [27] was coded as a technical term, but «personal energy» was coded as nontechnical. «Regression» with respect to behavior was classified as technical, but «childishness» as nontechnical. Sometimes the technical and nontechnical appear in

[23] This explanation was suggested to me by my colleague Albert Biderman.

[24] See, for example, the attack on the use of technical terminology on the basis that «social phenomena and relationships have been so long known and new ones so rare that activity in term coining can be spared» by Albert G. KELLER, «Terminology», *American Sociological Review*, 8:2, 1943, pp. 125-132.

[25] See, for example, R. N. RAPOPORT, «Notes on the Disparagement of «Sociologizing» in Collaborative Research», *Human Organization*, 16, 1957, pp. 14-15. SOROKIN remarks vitriolicly on this issue in a chapter entitled «Verbal Defects, Obtuse Jargon and Sham Scientific Slang», *op.cit.*, Ch. II.

[26] A sober review of this problem is that of George MANDLER and William KESSEN, *The Language of Psychology*, New York, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1959.

[27] Psychoanalytic theory written in German uses common words such as «Ich» and «Es». These would also be coded as technical since the psychoanalytic referent of the terms has little in common with their everyday usage.

combination as in «childish-ego» or «anticipatory socialization». Table V shows the proportions of psychologists and sociologists who used technical and nontechnical or combined terms to refer to their dependent variables.

TABLE V

Use of Technical and Nontechnical Terms and Combined Forms to Refer to Dependent Variables among Psychologists and Sociologists

	Technical	Technical-Nontechnical	Nontechnical	Total	N
Psychologists	37%	34%	29%	100%	38
Sociologists	23	24	53	100%	57

Sociologists are considerably more likely than psychologists to designate their concepts with nontechnical terms. Might this finding be an artifact of the psychologists' interest in personality, an abstraction not given to observation, and the sociologists' interest in concrete behavior, which more easily lends itself to colloquial expression ? This possibility may be checked by comparing psychologists and sociologists who study personality as a dependent variable. Doing this, we find that while 19 % (N=31) of the psychologists use nontechnical terms in reference to personality factors, 63 % (N=16) of the sociologists do.

Terminology is part of the culture of an institution. Perhaps the differences might be accounted for in terms of the immediate settings of the authors. The psychologists and sociologists are differently distributed in the various types of institutions, that is, have differing proportions of scientifically and practically oriented members [28].

[28] Both sociologists and psychologists have been developing scientific practitioners within the universities and academic research settings and applied practitioners principally in nonuniversity settings. Problems of sociologists in policy capacities are discussed by Stuart A. QUEEN, «Can Sociologists Face Reality ?», *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 7, 1942, pp. 1-2, and by Robert K. MERTON, «Science and the Social Order» and «Science and Democratic Social Structure», Ch. XV, XVI, in *op.cit.* Broad statements of the relation of the scientific and professional roles of sociologists are examined by Gwynne NETTLER, *op.cit.*, and by Talcott PARSONS, «Problems of Sociology as a Profession», *American Sociological Review*, 24:4, 1959, pp. 547-559.

Among sociologists, contrasts between the interests of various specialists

Table VI reports the settings in which the sociologists and psychologists in this sample are employed [29].

TABLE VI

Institutional Milieux of Psychologists and Sociologists

	Psychologists %	Sociologists %
Hospital	24	2
Research	3	2
University	58	86
Government	0	3
Church	0	3
Foundation	0	2
Self-employed	12	2
Other	3	0
Total	100	100
	N 34	N 57

Few among the sociologists writing on religion are outside the academy and those who are are evenly scattered among the several institutional settings. Over a third of the psychologists, however,

are discussed by Robert L. THORNDIKE, «The Structure of Preferences for Psychological Activities Among Psychologists», *American Psychologist*, Vol. 10, 1959, pp. 205-208. The orientation of psychologists to the public or to professionals as a basis of their job satisfaction is discussed in F. N. JACOBSON, S. RETTIG, and B. PASAMANICK, «Status, Job Satisfaction and Factors of Job Satisfaction of State Institution and Clinical Psychologists», *American Psychologist*, Vol. 4, 1959, pp. 144-150. Training for professional and scientific roles is traced by Stuart W. COOK, «The Psychologist of the Future: Scientist, Professional or Both», *American Psychologist*, Vol. 13, 1958, pp. 634-644, and by R. L. VAN DE CASTLE, and O. J. EICHHORN, Jr., «Length of Graduate Training for Experimental and Clinical Psychologists», *American Psychologist*, Vol. 16, 1961, pp. 178-180. A number of articles have appeared in the American *Psychologist* concerning psychologists in specific institutional settings. Much of this material is summarized in K. E. CLARK, *America's Psychologists*, Washington, D. C., American Psychological Association, 1957.

[29] Based on directory information. See footnote 9.

are outside of universities. These tend to be clinical psychologists
in clinical practice. Industrial psychologists, the other large extrauni-
versity group, do not contribute to studies in religion [30].

Table VII compares psychologists and sociologists with work setting
held constant.

TABLE VII

*Proportion of University and Nonuniversity Employed Psychologists
and Sociologists who use Nontechnical Terms in
Reference to Dependent Variables*

	University Employed		Nonuniversity Employed	
	%	N	%	N
Psychologists	47	19	6	18
Sociologists	52	42	55	11

Among the university-employed, the difference between psycholo-
gists and sociologists almost disappears. Whatever linguistic dif-
ference there are among the professions, the culture of the university
is a considerably more powerful influence. Among the nonuniversity-
employed, the differences are accentuated. Reading horizontally, we
find that among psychologists, though not among sociologists, there
is a sharp difference between the university- and nonuniversity-em-
ployed. It is the nonuniversity psychologists writing about religion
who use the technical terms and who are thus sharply distinguished
from the other three groups in the table. This is opposite to that
which might be anticipated. The university with its reputation for
theory and abstraction would, it would seem, be the home of the
technical terms. Nevertheless, psychologists working outside the uni-
versity are considerably more prone to use technical terms than are
those within universities. The technical terminology appears among
clinicians in hospital and private practice. Perhaps this is related to
their need to establish themselves as academicians in a nonacademic

[30] Comparing this with the tables on system levels, it is interesting that
psychologists are working in various settings but concentrating on a single
analytic level, while sociologists are concentrated in a single type setting,
but are not uniform in what they study.

environment. The contrast is so striking that it would appear neces-
sary not simply to compare sociologists to psychologists but to make
separate comparisons for each of these two types of psychologists [31].

IMPLICIT VALUE JUDGMENTS

The scientist strives toward statements of fact rather than of
value [32]. Once this ideal is stated, however, we are faced with the

[31] This finding may also be a function of the type of sample. Learning
theorists would probably use many more technical terms. A colleague, Ivor
Wayne, for whom English is the second language, recalls his experience in
reading books on psychology and sociology as a graduate student. He reports
that he would find many words in the books on psychology that he would
not understand. When he looked these words up, however, he could grasp the
material. The difficulty was primarily lexical. In reading sociology, on the
other hand, he felt he understood all of the words and yet could not grasp
the material. The difficulty was primarily syntactical. Secondarily, it was
related to the use by sociologists of common words in only slightly strange
ways.

[32] The distinction between fact and value, and the position that science is
concerned with the former, follows, for example, W. M. URBAN, *Language
and Reality*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1939, Ch. XI, «Science and
Symbolism», and Ernst CASSIRER, *The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms*, Vol. III,
New Haven, Yale University Press, 1955. This position has been stated with
respect to the social sciences by Max WEBER, «The Meaning of 'Ethical Neu-
trality' in Sociology and Economics» and «Objectivity in Social Science and
Social Policy», *The Methodology of the Social Sciences*, Glencoe, Illinois, The
Free Press, 1949. The problem is especially acute because the social sciences
study values. See, for example: Clyde KLUCKHOHN, «Values and Value-Orien-
tations in the Theory of Action: An Exploration in Definition and Classifi-
cation», *Towards a General Theory of Action* (Talcott PARSONS, and Edwards
SHILS), editors, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1952; Robert K.
MERTON, «Studies in the Sociology of Science», Part IV of *op.cit.*; and Paul
KECSKEMETI, *Meaning, Communication and Value*, Chicago, University of Chi-
cago Press, 1952, Ch. XI, «The Validation of Judgments of Value».
A plea that sociologists concentrate on neutral techniques and avoid «legal-
istic-moralistic thought ways» is made by George A. LUNDBERG, «Sociologists
and the Peace», *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 9, 1944, pp. 1-13. This
followed an appeal for sociologists to involve themselves in social betterment
by Robert S. LYND, *Knowledge for What ?*, Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton
University Press, 1939. Howard BECKER believed that both the «meliorists»
and the «purists» have stated their cases in indefensible ways. Becker held
that both must agree with «the supreme value judgment that control is ulti-
mately desirable and ethically permissible by the scientist in his specifically
scientific capacity». See his «Supreme Values and the Sociologist», *American
Sociological Review, Vol. 6*, 1941, pp. 155-172. A recent supporter of a modified
Lynd position is N. N. FOOTE, «Anachronism and Synchronism in Sociology»,
Sociometry, Vol. 21, 1958, pp. 17-29. A review of some of the arguments for

reality of value involvement on the part of social scientists. Beard considered this inevitable, because «owing to the relation of the thinker in the social sciences to the things thought about, the thought of the thinker in the social sciences is colored and formed more or less by the ideas and interests which he himself brings to bear upon subjects under consideration» [33]. This may be restated in more recent sociological terms as the problem of the individual who occupies the social status of scientist and also belongs to social institutions which assume a value stance toward his objects of study. It is particularly difficult to avoid contamination of the social-scientific by these other statuses. Further, the very use of linguistic terms of designate concepts makes it difficult to avoid judgments of value.

Psychologists and sociologists will be compared on the extent to which they realize the ethic of «value neutrality», that is, refrain from introducing value judgments [34] into their work. The classification is based on the value connotations of the terms they select to designate the principal concepts of the studies under review. The judgment was based on whether the activity designated by the term and its connotations would be considered «good», «bad», or «indifferent» in American culture.

For example, an observation may be made of an American prisoner of war in Korea carrying food for his Chinese captor. Describing this as collaboration suggests disapproval. If the observer evaluates the act positively he might call it cooperation. If it is termed prisoner-

and against this issue are given by Hans REICHENBACH, *The Rise of Scientific Philosophy*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1957, Ch. IV, «The Search for Moral Directives and the Ethico-Cognitive Parallelism».

Representatives of the position that science should be a source of values include Sigmund FREUD, *The Future of an Illusion*, New York, Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1957, and Bertrand RUSSELL, *Religion and Science*, New York, Oxford University Press, Inc., 1935, Ch. XI, «Science and Ethics». Pertinent to the groups being studied here is a recent article by M. BREWSTER SMITH, «Mental Health Reconsidered: A Special Case of the Problem of Values in Psychology», *American Psychologist*, Vol. 16, 1961, pp. 299-306. An argument for approaching social science in the context of Judeo-Christian values is advanced by William KOLB, «Images of Man and the Sociology of Religion», and commented on by Talcott PARSONS, *The Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, Vol. I, 1961, pp. 5-29.

[33] Charles A. BEARD, *The Nature of the Social Sciences*, New York, Scribner's Sons, 1934, p. 20.

[34] The kind of values of concern here are what PARSONS and SHILS in *Towards a General Theory of Action, op.cit.*, p. 60, refer to as moral standards (i.e., judgments of good and bad rather than the cognitive judgments of correct or incorrect or the appreciative judgments of desirable or undesirable from the point of view of immediate gratification).

captor interaction, then the behavior is not judged as either desirable or undesirable. The terms mental disorder, aggression and propaganda suggest negative evaluations. Mental health, friendship and education are positively toned terms.

TABLE VIII

Proportions of Psychologists and Sociologists using Negatively, Positively or Neutrally toned Terms to Designate Dependent Variables

	Negative	Positive	Neutral	Total	N
Psychologists	34%	32%	34%	100%	38
Sociologists	18	33	49	100%	57

Psychologists tend to use more negatively evaluative terms than sociologists do, and sociologists more neutral terms than psychologists do. The negative evaluations may reflect the interest of psychologists in pathology of personality. The neutral terms of sociologists might result from their use of functional social theory [35]. Since psychologists are more likely to study personality, it is important to check whether it is the pathological bias of personality theory, rather than something inherent in the professional perspectives, that accounts for the difference. Table IX shows the distribution of evaluative terms among sociologists and psychologists who study personality.

TABLE IX

Proportion of Psychologists and Sociologists Variously Evaluating Personality as a Dependent Variable

	Negative	Positive	Neutral	Total	N
Psychologists	32%	30%	38%	100%	31
Sociologists	6	44	50	100%	16

[35] It has been argued that there is an ideological element in functionalism. See the exposition on this by MERTON, *op.cit.*, pp. 37-46. A distinction should be made between the value implications of function and dysfunction for an analytical system or for a concrete behavioral system. Social values are involved primarily in the latter.

Taking studies of personality alone, the difference is accentuated. Sociologists are even less likely to use negative terms and more likely to use positively valued terms. Perhaps the greater polarization between the professions here is due to the fact that sociologists tend to view personality as a function of social roles and their internalization [36], whereas the psychologists concern themselves with the internal dynamics of the personality system. The personal locus of the latter concern, even though its model is as deterministic as that of the former, leads more readily to the attribution of personal responsibility for action and to a value judgment of that action.

Religion has been conceptualized by social scientists as a value integrating institution [37]. Religious groups may socialize their members in differing value climates. Might the finding be due to the effect of religion [38] ? Table X examines this question.

TABLE X

Evaluational Terms among Psychologists and Sociologists According to Religion *

	PROTESTANTS				JEWS			
	Negative	*Positive*	*Neutral*	N	*Negative*	*Positive*	*Neutral*	N
Psychologists	27%	27%	46%	26	60%	30%	10%	10
Sociologists	9	28	63	32	25	33	42	12

* Too few Catholic psychologists in the sample for separate classification.

With religion held constant, psychologists still are more negative than sociologists. In both cases, Jews are more negative than Protestants. Protestants are the more neutral. This finding, though inconsistent with the respective theological positions, may be related to

[36] This view, espoused by George H. MEAD. *Mind, Self, and Society,* Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1934, seems common among American sociologists. See also, Ralph LINTON, *The Study of Man,* New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1936, Ch. VIII.

[37] This position is not atypically formulated by Talcott PARSONS, *The Social System,* Glencoe, Illinois, The Free Press, 1951, pp. 163-167.

[38] This classification by religion is to be regarded rather tentatively. Judgments of the religion of the authors were based on personal acquaintance of some informant or inferred from the content of their writing or from their academic affiliation when it was denominational.

the minority status of American Jews and the well known relationship between minority status and assumption of the role of social critic. It might also be related to the fact that the Jews are the more likely to be urban. Mills notes the positive stance as more characteristic of rural America [39].

We have already seen relations between work setting and use of technical terms. Let us check the relation between work setting and evaluative tendency. Table XI compares psychologists and sociologists with work context held constant.

TABLE XI

Evaluating Terms among Psychologists and Sociologists According to Employment in University or Nonuniversity Settings

| | UNIVERSITY | | | | NONUNIVERSITY | | | |
	Negative	Positive	Neutral	N	Negative	Positive	Neutral	N
Psychologists	42%	32%	26%	19	28%	28%	44%	18
Sociologists	14	35	51	42	18	27	55	11

With occupational context held constant, psychologists still use more negative and sociologists more neutral terms. It is interesting that among psychologists those in universities are more likely to use negative terms. Perhaps the meliorative orientation to therapy and mental health in the clinical setting reduces negativity on the part of psychologists.

The uses of negatively evaluative terms by psychologists and of more neutral terms by sociologists who study religion seems fairly clear. Kurt Wolff might feel that this shows that «man's tragic nature does not inform American sociology». Since sociology overlooks one side of man, it would not be truly objective [40]. Sorokin condemns negativism as part of the mentality of the disintegrating sensate

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[39] C. Wright MILLS, *op.cit.*, p. 172, attributes the more positive or optimistic judgments of sociologists to their rural background and its image of primary-group communities, where the terms «socialized» and «adjusted» seem to operate ethically as against «individual» and «selfish».

[40] Kurt H. WOLFF, «Notes Toward a Socio-cultural Interpretation of American Sociology», *American Sociological Review*, Vol. II, 1946, pp. 545-553.

culture [41]. At any rate, the findings are clear enough to suggest that psychology and sociology, as practiced in this sample, represent two ideological stances. Psychologists are like social pathologists, ever aware of the nature and causes of the disease. Sociologists are sometimes social diagnosticians who distinguish and describe and sometimes social therapists ready to apply the remedy. Yet, the proposed remedies tend to be less than radical. C. Wright Mills has pointed out that sociologists define a social problem in terms of deviation from a norm, and implicitly sanction the norm rather than face the implication of social transformations involving shift in the norms [42].

MODES OF INFERENCE

A proposition relates at least two concepts. Research may hypothesize, for example, a relationship between suicide rate and anomie. The research operations, however, deal not with anomie, the concept, but with some observable indicators of this concept. For example, one might assess anomie by the consistency of opinions in a population. An inference is implied that an inconsistent pattern of opinions corresponds to what is meant by the concept of anomie. This inferential process is at issue when a sociologist asks about the adequacy of indicators for his concepts or a psychologist seeks to establish the validity of his tests. If psychologists and sociologists have differing methodological perspective, might they be expected to differ in the types of inferences they make between observable indicators and the referents of their concepts ?

The question will be examined with respect to three types of inferences. These are, in essence, three types of indicator-concept relations [43]. The first is the case where, for example, a researcher observes the changing height of a column of mercury and makes a judgment about temperature or about the presence of infection in the body. The empirical conjunction of these two events, change in volume of mercury and amount of heat, can be explained in terms of a law relating heat and molecular motion. This type of relation which is established empirically and explainable in terms of inter-

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[41] «Directly and indirectly, the negativistic ideologies have notably helped in the mental, moral and social disorganization of humanity, and in bringing about the existing tragedy». SOROKIN, *op.cit.*, p. 304.

[42] *Op.cit.*, p. 169.

[43] A detailing of twelve types of indicator-concept relations may be found in Samuel Z. KLAUSNER, *op.cit.*

vening mechanisms will be called *lawful*. Another example is using the observation of cars stopping at a red light to infer the existence of a social norm. Here two correlate phenomena are connected by a law of symbolic reference. The red light conveys a meaning to the drivers which leads them to think about and obey the norm. The observer grasps the drivers' interpretation of the light. This type will also be called *lawful*. The difference between these two cases termed lawful is that in the first a law regarding a functional relation is applicable while in the second case the law refers to a symbolic relation.

A second type of relation is one in which the indicator belongs to a set of items designated by the concept. For example, apples, pears, and bananas are members of the set called fruit. A civil war, a revolution, and partisan action belong to the set called armed conflict. The indicators are examples of what is meant by the concept. This will be termed the *set relation*. The relation is established by syllogistic reasoning.

In the third type of relation, the indicator is an attribute of the event designated by the concept. Red bears this relation to a red apple. Light is related as such a quality to an incandescent lamp. The indicator is not an example of the concept but part of the description of it. Both the example of redness and of light are illustrations of the *attributive relation*. The difference between the two examples is that red is a static descriptive of the apple, while light is the product of a process going on within the lamp. The static descriptive is established by definition or syllogistic deduction in the way the set relation is established. The process relation is established by a functional rule as in the lawful case. The lawful and set relations, on the one hand, involve a plurality of «events.» These similar types of attributive relations, on the other hand, involve only a single «event».

The principal dependent and independent variables used by the sociologists and the psychologists were coded according to this typology of indicator-concept relations. Table XII shows the types of indicator-concept inferences among sociologists and psychologists for the dependent variable.

The lawful relation is preferred by psychologists, while sociologists prefer the set and attributive relations. This might be a consequence of different system levels of their research. Sociologists, we remember are more likely to study concrete behavior, while psychologists tend to study personality, an abstraction from the concrete. In studying concrete behavior there may be more likelihood of grouping indivi-

TABLE XII

Indicator-Concept Relations among Sociologists and Psychologists for the Dependent Variable

	Lawful	Set	Attributive	Total	N
Psychologists	41%	35%	24%	100%	38
Sociologists	17	43	40	100%	57

duals or acts by their membership in a class or set. Psychologists, dealing with personality, an unseen process, might be forced into dealing with previously established correlates of that process. Consequently, the comparison should be made with the object of study held constant. Table XIII compares psychologists and sociologists who investigate personality.

TABLE XIII

Types of Indicator-Concept Relations among Psychologists and Sociologists who Study Personality as a Dependent Variable

	Lawful	Set	Attributive	Total	N
Psychologists	47%	25%	29%	100%	31
Sociologists	37	37	26	100%	16

With the system level of study held constant the preference of psychologists for lawful relations and of sociologists for set relations holds. The original difference in the attributive relation which has now disappeared seems due to the sociologists' concerns with other than personality studies.

Types of inferences, modes of thought, or styles or argument might be due to cultural background. Individuals from different religious backgrounds may have been differently socialized in inferential processes. Table XIV examines the differences between the professions with religion held constant.

TABLE XIV

*Types of Indicator-Concept Relations among Psychologists
and Sociologists According to Religion*

	PROTESTANTS					JEWS				
	Law-ful	Set	Attri-butive	Total	N	Law-ful	Set	Attri-butive	Total	N
Psychologists	35%	42%	23%	100%	26	70%	10%	20%	100%	10
Sociologists	15	41	44	100%	32	25	50	25	100%	12

With religion held constant, psychologists still show a marked preference for lawful relations. Among Jews, sociologists are more likely than psychologists to prefer the set relation, but this difference disappears between Protestant members of the two professions Among Protestants, the sociologists prefer the attributive relation [44].

The institutional setting, as another from of cultural context, might affect there thoughtways. Table XV shows the difference with work setting held constant.

TABLE XV

*Types of Indicator-Concept Relations among Psychologists
and Sociologists According to Employment Setting*

	UNIVERSITY					NONUNIVERSITY				
	Law-ful	Set	Attri-butive	Total	N	Law-ful	Set	Attri-butive	Total	N
Psychologists	44%	34%	22%	100%	18	44%	34%	22%	100%	18
Sociologists	11	43	46	100%	46	36	36	28	100%	11

Essentially the differences hold. Psychologists in both situations prefer lawful indicator-concept relations. In nonuniversity settings there is a very slight preference among sociologists for the attri-

[44] Among both psychologists and sociologists, Jews show a preference for lawful relations. The influence of religious groups on the mode of inference should be investigated further.

butive relation. In university settings, the sociologists are more sharply marked off from the psychologists by their preference for both the set and attributive relations.

A significant difference between the lawful and both the set and attributive relations is that the reasoning involved in the former follows the propositional form of the generalizing sciences. The lawful inferences are of the «if-then» form and are validated by empirical generalizations. The set relation involves deductive argument, description and classification rather than empirical generalization.

The way of thinking about the indicator-concept relations seems to parallel the way propositions are generally developed in the two fields. The observation that psychology tends towards being a generalizing science, while sociology remains descriptive and classifactory, has been made numerous times. Over forty years ago, Kroeber [45] defined culture history as the viewing of data directly as they present themselves, while psychology views the data in terms of processes and mechanisms. Nevertheless, he believed in the possibility of developing a generalizing science of sociology. A few years before, assuming that the only mechanisms that could explain social phenomena were psychological, Leuba [46] pointed out that sociology must either concern itself with the interpretation of social action in terms of consciousness or must limit itself to the observation of the external activities. Some years later, Cuber [47], examining textbooks in sociology, could not find principles stated as such. He proposed a list of sociological principles. These turn out to be principles dealing with culture rather than society. One of Talcott Parsons' principal efforts, has been to push toward a nomothetic sociology by developing dimensions of classification on the analytic level [48]. With reference to interdisciplinary teams, Luszki [49] found that «sociologists tend to be concerned with descriptive variables of the content of behavior rather than with process and the relation between certain kinds of behavior».

[45] A. L. KROEBER, «The Possibility of a Social Psychology», *op.cit.*, pp. 635 ff.

[46] J. H. LEUBA, «Sociology and Psychology», *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 19, 1914, pp. 323-342.

[47] John F. CUBER, «Are There 'Principles' of Sociology ?», *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 6, 1941, pp. 370-372.

[48] See, for example, *The Structure of Social Action*, Glencoe, Illinois, The Free Press, 1937, and *The Social System*, op.cit.

[49] Margaret B. LUSZKI, *Interdisciplinary Team Research*, New York, New York University Press, 1958. A growing literature on the experience with interdisciplinary work provides a good source of data for further studies such as the present one. Aside from the items previously footnoted see William

SUMMARY

A picture emerges of sociologists and psychologists who have written empirical reports in the field of religion in the United States during the fifties. These sociologists, relative to the psychologists, tend to prefer face-to-face interview methods, to designate their concepts with non-technical terms, to be either neutral or positive in evaluating the behavior they observe, and to think in classificatory and descriptive terms. Psychologists, relative to the sociologists, prefer more standardized questionnaire methods of data gathering, use technical terms to designate concepts, are concerned with the negative side of their objects of study, and think in terms of inductive generalizations. These methodological differences no doubt condition whatever substantive differences exist between the fields.

The greater abstractness and technicality among psychologists than among sociologists may be accounted for in terms of the cultural tradition from which the fields have emerged, the social structures from which the practitioners are recruited, and the internal structural differentiation of the fields. Psychology has grown from the more technical areas of philosophy, especially metaphysics. Sociology, on the other hand, may be traced back to political theory and, more recently, to social reform. Both of these have been concerned with concrete problems. With reference to recruitment, though the evidence is not immediately available, it seems that psychologists are more likely to be recruited from the urban and sociologists from the rural environments. As Mills pointed out, the latter may be conducive to less abstract thinking and to a more positive evaluation of man and society. Finally, the population of psychologists far exceeds that of sociologists. Following Durkheim's thinking about the progress of the division of labor, one would anticipate increased specialization and abstract technical terminology. One might even conjecture about a negativistic attitude where there is greater «density» and «competition» for space. These are but speculations to be tested in future research.

If the explanatory conjectures are valid and if these findings turn

CAUDILL, and Bertram H. ROBERTS, «Pitfalls in the Organization of Interdisciplinary Research», *Human Organization Research* (R. N. ADAMS and J. J. PREISS, editors), Homewood, Illinois, Dorsey Press, 1960, pp. 11-18; Dorothy Swaine THOMAS, «Experiences in interdisciplinary Research», *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 17, 1952, pp. 663-669; and Clyde KLUCKHOHN, «An Anthropologist Looks at Psychology», *American Psychologist*, Vol. 3, 1948, pp. 439-442.

out to be applicable to other areas of sociological interest [50], one might hazard a guess about the future of sociology. The membership of the sociology profession is increasing rapidly. More and more, members are being drawn from urban environments. The proportion of practicing sociologists who are engaged in research outside of the university setting is increasing. All of this suggest that sociologists may well follow the path of the psychologists: increasing use of standardized data gathering methods, use of technical terminology and employment of indicators lawfully related to the referents of the concepts. At the same time, if the boundary with psychology, which sociologists are concerned to define, is indeed primarily a methodological one, sociologists might be expected to become increasingly interested in developing a distinctive methodology. These methodological concerns may well contribute to retaining the value-neutral position in sociology. Finally, the very concern of sociologists with their border with psychology may well increase the chance that they will become more like the psychologists.

[50] As pointed out in footnote 8, the methodology used in this paper was developed for analyzing studies of behavior under stress. Delays in the coding of that material prevented its inclusion in the present paper. Preliminary runs, however, on a small sample of the stress studies show results essentially consistent with those presented in this paper. A parallel report on stress material is forthcoming.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES, PROBLEMS AND METHODS
OF THE SOCIOLOGICAL RESEARCH IN THE U.S.S.R.

G. V. Osipov, M. T. Jovchuk

For all who are even hardly acquainted with the main principles
of the marxist sociology is well known, that in the research of
social problems in the soviet, sociologists lean against the general soci-
ological theory which is the materialistic comprehension of history —
Historical Materialism.

There is no doubt that the concrete sociological research will be
useless if it is not based on the general sociological theory.

Our respected colleague Professor Merton in his well known book
Social Theory and Social Structure writes, that as war, exploitation,
poverty, discrimination and psychological uncertainty in security of
mankind are pests in the contemporary society, social science is
obliged to furnish a solution to each of these problems, if it does not
wish to be totally useless.

Referring principally to the West European and American soci-
ology, Merton expressed a remarkable point of view that sociology
is not yet ripe for a comprehensive integral theory and that there
are only a few theories known as the theories of the middle rank,
whose significance is rather relative and passing — this opinion is
universally known. And they fully merit the following lines from
Tennyss: «Our small systems are true in their own days after which
they vanish».

We are justified in believing that this definition cannot be applied
to the marxist sociology. We cannot also agree with the main
principles of the reports of our colleagues P. Sorokin and the former
marxist H. Lefebvre.

P. Sorokin tries to prove that the modern sociology is not now
a science, that the only use of the method of historical research will
make it a science in the nearest future.

We think that P. Sorokin has forgotten the well known fact that
there is a sociology, which is based on the use of the historical
method in its research. That is the marxist sociology.

H. Lefebvre cannot ignore the fact that the marxist sociology is
based on the historical method. He recognizes this fact, but as well

as P. Sorokin tries to prove that marxist sociology is not yet a science.

K. Marx, writes H. Lefebvre, has not created a scientific sociology, he only created a project of «concrete sociology» and then stopped the investigation of sociological problems.

In his report H. Lefebvre ignores the fact that materialistic comprehension of history first described by Marx approximately one hundred and twenty years ago, has been time-tested and has been proved by the entire process of historical development.

The basic principle of materialistic understanding of history is the concrete study of social life. Emergence of Marxism in the forties of the 19th century and its further development is organically linked to and supported by research on specific social problems.

Basing himself upon his personal observations and authentic reports Engels wrote his work on the *Condition of the Working Class in England.* While at work on the *Capital,* Marx had analyzed stacks of «blue notes», where he found positive statistical material and documentation on the staggering state of capitalist exploitation. Lenin, for his book *The Development of Capitalism in Russia,* studied statistical records referring to the State, district and county matters, as well as the budgets of individual peasants' households. The scientific basis of these and numerous other social studies, which have received acclamation for their world-wide historical significance, is the theory of historical materialism and the method of materialist dialectics, which constitutes the living soul of Marxism.

Concrete social study became possible in the Soviet Union only after the victory of the October Socialist Revolution. During the first twenty years in the twenties and the thirties, over 300 various books and pamphlets were published, which threw light upon the results of specific analysis of new social processes. Ways and methods were also being developed, among which are the works of S.G. Stroumilyn on the influence of culture and education upon productive capacity of common labour in the USSR, a book by A. I. Todorovskiy *With Rifle and Plow,* a monograph by S. M. Vasileyskiy *Methods and technique of Social Studies,* as well as others.

Definite social research may be directed towards the study of the various facets of the diversified process of public life, such as concrete research on economy, statistics, demography, ethnography, law, social-psychological and other subjects. But certain social research, which bears direct sociological character and studies the process of social-historical development, when taken in totality and interdependence of its various aspects, provides a scientific analysis

of the general laws of this development, which manifests itself in this or that social process or occurrence. In other words a regularity of a sociological nature can be established. In our opinion not every definite social study may be termed sociological. But when taken in their totality and in conjunction with other problems, and after having them scientifically supported, these concrete social studies provide the foundation for scientific sociology and serve as substance for scientific sociological generalization.

The personality cult of Stalin had to a certain degree slowed down the progressive advancement of concrete social research. Nevertheless the Marxist sociology in the USSR, insofar as our opinion is concerned, has aided through its research in the finding of daring theoretical and practical solutions to most important problems of building a new society. Thus, development of economically and culturally underdeveloped nations was being directed immediately towards Socialism, although they had not yet experienced the capitalist stage in their development at the time of the Socialist Revolution in Russia. This was done in conformity with the main principles of the scientific sociology.

Following the principles of this sociology the Soviet scientists with representatives of the public education system have evolved and experimentally tested and carried out in practice the various forms of general, specialized and industrial education and training of both the young generation and adult population; the obtained information furnished valuable material for the solution of a most difficult problem of eradicating differences between physical labour and intellectual work.

At present the science of sociology in the USSR aids society in the solution of social problems, with which mankind has never met before. The essence of these problems lies in the task of creating a class-free Communist society, which falls into three inter-connected categories. First is the problem of creating the material and technical basis of Communism, with the changing of the character and significance of labour evolving from the progress in the scientific and technical fields. Secondly there are the problems of evolution of Communist social relations and a corresponding change in the social structure of the society through complete liquidation of the last vestiges of inequality between social sections and groups, between men and women, and so forth. And lastly, the problems of formation and manifold development of a new man, as well as his scientific outlook and the new moral standards, which are to be

based upon the elimination of substantial differences between intellectual and manual labour, between urban and rural life, while striving and attaining a higher cultural level of members of the society.

Such a daring plan with the scientific forecasts on solving the cardinal problems of social progress has received its substantiation in the new Programme of the CPSU. Putting into practice the realization of these problems demand a constant cooperation of theory and practice. Numerous new processes and events are now developing in the USSR. These are, to name a few, the fast growth of producing forces, a further advance in Socialist democracy, an upsurge of culture, formation of new morale, and many others.

In the course of this evolution one demands new solution and numerous trial quests. Both provide a vast amount of new experiences which require generalization and intelligent comprehension. These rich and varied social experiences open wide possibilities for concrete sociological researches, which are gaining momentum in the USSR.

The importance of concrete sociological researches in the USSR is primarily determined by the fact that they offer the possibility of studying general regularity in the development of society in the concrete forms that they manifest themselves, and to notice the emergence of new processes and occurrences in the economical, social, political and spiritual life of the Socialist society. Secondly, these research programs are live and possess the practical yield in that they accumulate and propagate positive life experience, bring forth corrections into the practice of society.

If the general sociological theory of Marxism embraces the entire social-historic process, general laws of its development, the concrete social researches are capable of covering certain sections and aspects of this process applicable to a definite time, place and a certain historical situation.

Works like the *18th Brumaire* and *The Civil War in France* by Marx, the *April Theses* by Lenin are brilliant examples of such scientific analysis of particular historic situations from the point of view of scientific sociology of Marxism. The mentioned works reveal revolutionary situations in one or another country at a definite period of time. Other works that merit as high a value are the *Housing Problem* by Engels, *Immediate tasks of the Soviets,* the *Great Start* by Lenin, and many other works of the Marxist science, where exactness and scrupulousness in research match the genius of theoretical deductions and inferences.

A specific historical situation represents a link in the chain of social-historical process. It has its beginning in the past, and its development and conclusion either in the present or in the future. The term «historical situation» has a definite scientific meaning, which allows to better understand the particular and general traits of each concrete individual event.

Social development has the form of co-operation of various facets of social life, in which economical drive sooner or later finds its way through an endless multitude of chances, but which, in turn, is influenced by different sub-structures. These latter constitute the political forms of class struggle and its results and embrace political, juridical, philosophical and other theories, religious outlooks, etc. When this takes place, social co-operation, is accomplished not of its own accord, but, and only, in the process of industrious activity of people. Hadn't it been for this complicated, hardyielding to research co-operation, it would have been easier to apply scientific theory to any historical period, than solving a most elementary simple equation.

Under the conditions of creating a classless society, during the transition period from capitalism to socialism, spontaneous social development makes way for a planned and conscientious development. New social factors, as public ownership, appear and develop. New, objective laws, the laws of socialism, permitting the planning of social development begin to function in the economic life of the society. And it is on this objective basis that spring out new shoots of what may be called the general will, acting along a single general plan.

Analysis of concrete social situations plays a vital methodical significance for concrete sociological research. First of all, when studying a certain concrete situation the whole aggregate of acting forces, is considered, and not any single one. Social phenomenon are analysed as complex and varied facts, which are submitted to numerous influences. Secondly, all specific circumstances of life are carefully analysed. These are the elements, that determine intelligence, will and actions of people, in other words — those, that, in the end, determine the relations in the economic life of a society and the laws of its development.

Thirdly, such a new social factor as general will, acting along a single general plan, is taken into consideration. This last factor is the social, political and spiritual unity of the Soviet society, which presents itself as a powerful lever in the transformation

of social reality. Such systematically developing force of social reconstruction was not, and could not have been, known to any preceding social-economic formation.

The Soviet sociologist is a part of the united Socialist body. When certain of its support, he can conduct social experiments, research, he can work out practical recommendations that become the subject of discussion, and which, if scientifically supported and practically sound, may be approved and carried out by the society.

In the process of studying social development of concrete social situations in the Soviet society, a large place is reserved to a scientific determination of the method and the technique of research.

Sociology in the Soviet Union combines the various scientific methods of sociological research, which the Western sociology usually subdivides into objective and the so-called subjective methods.

The methods of sociological research in the USSR include analysis of statistical reports and official papers; analysis of forms and methods of activity of workers' organizations and discussions with them on the topics of sociological problems; social experiments; outward and inside observation; written and oral polls; study of personal documents, etc.

Omitting a detailed analysis of all the above-named methods it would be wise to note, that some Western sociologists tend to see a similarity between concrete sociological research and conducting popular polls. Public polls cannot be the universal, single and principal method of concrete sociological research. It can provide valuable results only if scrupulously prepared and conducted, and that in conjunction with other methods of sociological research. Questionnaires become valid instruments of sociological science only if they allow comparison of mass subjective answers to definite objective data, if they allow to expose the natural link between the objective and the dependent upon them subjective processes, the processes of comprehension. All information gathered from polls should be checked, supplemented and completed with data received through other scientific methods of sociological research.

We believe that research on important sociological problems should be based primarily upon objective scientific methods and be highly representative, i.e. cover the widest possible cross section of the population. Moreover, it should make use of mathematical and statistical methods of handling all obtained material.

The use of mathematical and statistical methods (law of averages, law of multitudes, theory of game, etc.), have a good future in con-

crete social research, for it allows a more accurate and objective revelation of the quantitative side of social processes and happenings. Laboratories for mathematical methods in economics, created at the Section of Economic of Academy of Science of the USSR and at the Siberian Section of the Academy, are beginning to use mathematical methods more and more as a means of analysis of concrete social processes.

The empiric sociology, we omit all its concrete achievements, studying human intelligence and social behaviour of people as an independent and self-directing element — in reference to material factors and conditions, are attempting to present this intelligence and behaviour on mathematical formula, that is trying to mathematize human behaviour. Such use of mathematical methods in sociology cannot, we feel, be considered genuinely scientific and will not provide the expected effect, as it ignores the peculiarities of social life.

A large role is reserved for mathematics in modelling social processes and events, as well. Economic science has already started work upon social modelling, which is deemed a matter of utmost importance with a promising future. Sociology is also setting out along the same path. By feeding data into an electronic computer it is possible to obtain comparisons on social events and concrete social conditions within the confined spaces of laboratories. It becomes possible to conduct these experiments to aid in the finding of ways of influencing these events through public opinion and support.

A still larger part in sociology is reserved to the generalization of social procedure not under laboratory conditions, but in actual life.

Concrete sociological research in the USSR has another characteristic trait. This research is unthinkable if taken in the confinement of philosophers' and sociologists' studies, isolated from scientists of other branches of learning, or practical staff. Concrete sociological research includes bordering spheres of social and natural sciences and therefore demands the closest co-operation of scientists from various branches. It will be fruitful only if there is the joint effort of philosophers and sociologists, economists, lawyers, statisticians, ethnographers, demographers, psychologists and other representatives of social sciences, as well as specialists from other fields, such as mathematics, electronic computation, city planning, physiology, medicine, tuition and many other branches of learning. That is why concrete sociological research in the Soviet Union is based upon co-operation of scientists and practical staff in the

governmental, economic, trade-union, co-operative, social and other organizations, as well as the staff of statistical bureaus, and so forth. This amalgamation of efforts on behalf of scientists of various branches of learning and workers in practical fields was achieved during research conducted in studying the problem of augmentation and application of free time of workers and employees in the U.S.S.R., conducted by the Siberian Section of the Academy of Science of the Soviet Union. The same may be said of the Institute of Philosophy of the above Academy, pooling its effort with the Gorky Sovnarkhoz in quest of new formula in the labour and daily life problems of workers, or the Pedagogical Institute and the Sovnarkhoz in the city of Krasnoyarsk working on the problem of transforming labour into a vital necessity.

The last few years witnessed a good many concrete sociological experiments on the basis of a newly created network of scientific centres and an able staff.

A sample of concrete research conducted by sociologists-Marxists is the new Programme of the CPSU. The Programme is based upon profound and varied eeconomic, sociological, statistical and other social research conducted by Party, governmental and scientific organizations. It represents an example of scientific planning of major social changes for a rather considerable historical period — for the next twenty years.

The great role is being played by the concrete sociological research in the social planning. Social planning, for example, the planning of the social development for 20 recent years in the USSR receives its support from preliminary study of materials, selective inspection, tests, etc. Such a study is, first of all, systematic, as it is conducted at certain intervals upon certain objects in order to obtain comparative information. On the other hand, this type of study is exploratory, aimed at examining manifestations of new shoots in the Soviet society.

Soviet sociological science has acquired a certain experience in conducting systematic and exploratory concrete research which aids social planning and social progress. Thus, in the last few years scientists and the staff have been studying professional standards of workers at industrial plants in the Sverdlovsk economic region. As a result of this research was published a separate work entitled *The Rise in Cultural and Professional Level of the Soviet Working Class.*

Extensive research with the use of mathematics is being con-

ducted at the Institute of Economic of the Siberian Section of the Academy of Science of the USSR on the problem of free time.

The Sociological research division of the Institute of Philosophy of the same Academy (A. A. Zvorykin), is studying problems of developing new principles of work and conditions at plants of the Moscow, Gorky and other regions, Moldavian Republic, etc. The Sociological research sector of the Moscow University chose social problems of automation at the 1st Ball-bearing plant and other works. Problems of general development of personality and the change in the social structure in Soviet Society are being studied at sociological research sectors of the Ural University (M. H. Routkevitch, L. N. Kogan and others) and the University of Kiev. A similar sector of the Leningrad University (V. P. Roshin, V. A. Yadov and others) is studying processes of transforming work into the primary life requirement and development of socialist consciousness; work is being conducted at Leningrad plants. Problems of family relations in a Socialist society are examined at the Leningrad philosophical section of the Academy of Science of the USSR (A. G. Kharchov and others). Co-operation and sharing gathered experience in sociological research, conducted by various scientific establishments and universities, is being carried out through the Soviet Sociological Association under President Y. P. Frantzev.

The program of concrete sociological research conducted in the USSR envisages, for the immediate future, scientific analysis of the following problems:

1. *Alteration of the social structure of society in the process of building Communism.* Problems under study include processes of eradication of class distinction among the working class, peasants and intellectuals, processes of bringing closer and joining manual and mental labour. Other problems include equalizing economic and cultural conditions of urban and rural districts, developed and outlying districts of the country, and especially the formerly backward districts, narrowing differences in the standard of living of various sections of society in connection with the rise of their income and a sizeable increase in distribution from public funds, etc.

2. *Modifications in the character of work.* The change in the professional structure of the working class and farmers is being studied, as well as the change in the meaning of labour, development of diversification of functions per worker, the freeing of a part of workers due to automation and their transference to new types of work, alternation of types of work, and so forth.

Because of this it becomes imperative to study the processes of elevation of the cultural and professional level of workers and farmers, the ways and methods of general polytechnical and professional education of the growing generation and of the working population, the processes of joining education with productive work.

3. *Transfer of Socialist State functions into the hands of public self-government organizations*. This idea is being studied and tried at different levels, covering management of public affairs, management at industrial plants, the organizing of public education and cultural work, aiding to improve upon living conditions and health problems, maintaining public order, and many other aspects.

4. *Problems with the way of life, of Soviet family and its functions* in conjunction with the living, material and social conditions. This point also includes the problem of women participating in productive work, development of public relations and public service, augmentation of public consuming power and spare time of workers and employees, etc.

In this connection problems of housing and rational planning of living and auxiliary quarters are also studied.

5. *Problems of spiritual life of people, maximum development of personality*. This aspect touches upon the subject of the influence that an increase in public work and development of culture, education, public opinion, scientific outlook, new moral code, and so forth, has on the spiritual life of various groups of the population in the Soviet society, as well as overcoming the inheritance of old morale in the consciousness and behaviour of people.

This list of problems on sociology which is being studied in the Soviet Union could be greatly extended. Soviet Marxist sociologists have every opportunity to carry out a large programme of research and thus contribute to the solving of the lofty problems of contemporary life.

REPORT ON THE DISCUSSION

First session

Chairman : K. H. Wolff, Brandeis University
Rapporteur: F. Blum, University of Minnesota

L. Recaséns-Siches started the discussion with comments on F. H. Blum's paper which he considered as a sort of x-ray picture regarding the assumptions of the sociology of knowledge. He felt that the three laws mentioned in this paper, the laws of opposites, of compensation and of balance, were not only empirically verifiable generalizations concerning the dynamic of social processes but were also expressions of life's structure as analysed from the viewpoint of the philosophy of existence. L. Recaséns-Siches also felt that the idea of the numinous was valuable for the sociology of knowledge but warned not to confound it with «objective spirit» or «volksgeist» — a warning which F.H. Blum fully agreed.

As regards the paper by D. N. Levine, L. Recaséns-Siches felt that D. N. Levine's examination of the problem of ambiguity was most important. Ambiguity is not a rational attitude in Aristotle's sense but it belongs in the realm of reason. Social action must be analysed within this broader context of reason rather than within the more limited framework of rationalistic means and ends.

J. Kolaja asked D. N. Levine whether his proposition could be applied to all agricultural societies where communication is verbal. D. N. Levine indicated that absence of writing was related to ambiguity only in the sense that writing facilitates the development of science, etc. But there also was ambiguity in the Western tradition.

W. Cohn questioned whether the concept of ambiguity could meaningfully be applied to different cultures. He felt that there were differences in the level of consciousness which made a direct comparison of meaning hazardous if not impossible. D. N. Levine felt that W. Cohn's criticism amounted to a rejection of the applicability of scientific concepts to non-Western societies and expressed strong disagreement with such a position.

V. Gioscia spoke in more general terms about the problem of dichotomy pointing out that one does not need to dichotomize philosophy. He considered this was a Western failure.

F. Adler questioned A. K. Saran's critical comments on the relativistic position of traditional thought in the sociology of knowledge. He felt that in spite of its relativism the traditional approach to the sociology of knowledge is valid as long as it has a conception of truth and a model of verification. A. K. Saran pointed out that often different criteria of truth are to be compared. If we are confronted with such a situation we need a criterion which transcends them, that means we need an absolute reference point.

F. Adler also questioned the approach chosen by J. Drysdale. He felt that it would be most fruitful to examine the humanist-epistemological implications of a sociology of knowledge after more empirical research had been done.

J. Szbet commenting on the paper of K. Lenk felt that K. Lenk related too closely the philosophy of Hegel and the school of law of the German historians whose attitude to revolution differed greatly. In Hegel the concept of revolution had a place, while in the historical school of law the conception of organic development prevailed. In addition, there were epistemological differences. Hegel had a dialectic unity of categories and he criticized the concept of historical development of the historical school. J. Szbet also pointed to differences between Marx on the one hand and Mannheim and Scheler on the other hand. When Marx spoke about ideology he did not mean that there was no absolute point of reference. Ideology was a mode of consciousness formed as a whole. Marx did not deny rational-objective aspects within the bourgeois ideology. Marxism got rid of illusionism.

E. Arab-Ogly pointed out that there were three marxist conceptions of ideology which were not necessarily identical. First, ideology as false consciousness, second, ideology as the whole social consciousness and third, ideology as class consciousness. Social consciousness might be classified according to major historical periods, each of which had its peculiar class consciousness. The social consciousness of the period of slavery was a political consciousness, of feudalism a religious consciousness, of the bourgeoisie a juridical consciousness, and the social consciousness of the present historical period was a scientific consciousness. During each of these historical periods class consciousness was only a part of the social consciousness. It was important to say more clearly to what mode of consciousness one was referring. What K. Lenk had shown was that Mannheim and the whole German school was much more ideological than the Marxist theory.

K. Lenk did not feel there was enough time to discuss the differences between Hegel and the German historical school of law. He felt that German sociology of knowledge fell back behind the position bourgeois ideology reached with Hegel. He agreed that Marx did have more than one concept of ideology and indicated that he stated that all profound thinking had true and ideological elements. K. Lenk's main point was that many present-day marxists no longer dealt with the problems of alienation and were in this respect closer to non-marxist theories of the sociology of knowledge than to Marx himself.

A. J. F. Köbben felt that L. A. Costa Pinto presented a caricature of anthropology rather than a true picture. He felt it was wrong to criticize anthropology for neglecting statistical sources when in fact anthropologists gathered statistical data under the most difficult circumstances. He agreed that anthropology had a great deal to learn from sociology but emphasized that sociologists could learn a great deal from anthropology.

J. Kolaja asked F. Adler whether his paper was concerned with social control and with science, art and religion as symbolic products. F. Adler said that he was primarily concerned with social control and culture. He would like to be able to make predictions of the conditions under which certain types of art and science were most likely to arise.

Second session

Chairman : K. H. WOLFF, Brandeis University
Rapporteur: J. GOUDSBLOM, University of Amsterdam

1° Discussion following papers by L. Goldmann, J. Srovnal and E. Arab-Ogly

F. Fligelman, recommends the proposed science of enthymenology as closely related to the sociology of knowledge.

K. Lenk, questions the assumption of E. Arab-Ogly that there is no difference between natural and social science. Nature does not possess the dialectic of history as an outcome of human activities.

J. Ponsioen, emphasizes that the sociology of knowledge is not

concerned with the truth of beliefs, but with the problem of why people hold these beliefs. Its purpose is not to sort out objective and subjective knowledge.

P. Rolle, asks for clarification from L. Goldmann whether developments in Russia such as the rise of a bureaucracy are to be ascribed primarily to ideology or to social structure.

J. Kolaja, takes issue with J. Srovnal's assertion that Western sociologists are unaware of total social structures. This judgement stems from an outdated conception of Western sociology.

L. Goldmann answers P. Rolle to the effect that in historical problems one must distinguish between description and explanation. Also, it is hazardous to speak of bureaucratic structure in general. There are many variants; and here the element of ideology can make for decisive differences. As to E. Arab-Ogly's remarks on social and natural science, sociology may become a natural science in future, but it has not reached that stage yet. Social structures differ historically; sociology requires a historical mode of knowledge.

E. Arab-Ogly defends his position that sociology does not essentially differ from the natural sciences. Like biology, it deals with living beings; and like biology, it can do so in a scientific manner. The maturity of the social sciences depends upon the maturity of society.

2° Discussion following papers by S. Ossowski, T. Z. Lavine, and J. Maquet

J. Srovnal replies to J. Kolaja that his criticism of Western sociology went deeper than the latter implied. A system employing formal Aristotelian logic is unfit for the subject-matter of sociology. The method of explanation must be adapted to the dialectic properties of society.

T. Z. Lavine draws attention to H. Marcuse's thesis that the process of production in itself is ideological. Controversial though this may sound, it gives a valid insight into our contemporary situation.

K. Lenk points out that Hegel's and Mannheim's views of history differ: to Hegel history was a process in which human reason could discern a meaning, whereas Mannheim took a far more skeptical view, leaving no room for an objective synthesis.

A. Ponsioen deplores that in T. Z. Lavine's paper the image of Mannheim as concerned with diagnosis of our time seems to

disappear in an analysis of the terms function and structure. In relation to J. Maquet's paper he points out that the interrelationship between thought and society is twofold: thought follows structure, and structure follows thought.

T. Z. Lavine agrees with both K. Lenk's distinction between Hegel and Mannheim, and A. Ponsioen's description of Mannheim as primarily concerned with a diagnosis of our time. In her paper she meant to deal with one aspect only.

J. Maquet apologizes for perhaps having simplified the relation between thought and society. It is indeed difficult to specify «causes»; in the sociology of knowledge there is, however, a dominant tendency to look for the existential basis of mental phenomena.

3° *Discussion following papers by S. Z. Klausner, S. Marcson, J. Kolaja and A. Izzo*

M. E. J. Rowan names as the most vital concern of the sociology of knowledge the problem of ideology. Its dominant purpose is to make sociologists aware of their own subjectivity.

E. Wey, asks the chairman to what extent the sociology of knowledge is an empirical science, as American sociology claims to be, and to what extent it belongs to the realm of philosophy.

K. H. Wolff answers that this question is indeed basic to the sociology of knowledge. European sociologists have attempted to grope with it. American sociology, however, has always tried to remain aloof of the philosophical issues involved, and to relay the most fundamental problems about social reality to the philosophers.

A. Ponsioen points out that the impulse to the sociology of knowledge must have originated from the fact that we live in a pluralistic society. We try not to fight, but to understand each other.

RESEARCH COMMITTEES

COMITÉS DE RECHERCHE

INDUSTRIAL SOCIOLOGY
SOCIOLOGIE INDUSTRIELLE

AUTOMATION AND THE NON-MANUAL WORKER
An interim report on an international comparative study

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INTRODUCTION

The project discussed in this report has been planned and co-ordinated by the International Committee for Social Research in Industry. This Committee was established in 1953. Earlier informal contacts between several of the individuals concerned led in that year to the suggestion that a formal body should be set up to co-ordinate industrial research at centres in a number of countries. Research institutes in England, France, Sweden, Holland and Germany have taken part in the present project. An earlier project, concerned with the social aspects of technical change in the steel industry [1], included representatives of Italy and Belgium. The research has been financed from domestic sources in each country, but the expenses of meetings to facilitate co-ordination have been borne by the European Productivity Agency of the former O.E.E.C. (now O.E.C.D.). With the termination of E.P.A., this support has ended, and endeavours to find a new source, to permit the Committee's activities to continue, are being urgently pursued.

THIS PROJECT

This project has been concerned with the relations between office automation, as a technological development, and the structural, organizational and social context in which it is introduced.

[1] Olive BANKS, *Steel Workers and Technical Progress*, Paris, E.P.A., 1959.

The original plan envisaged that at least one large manufacturing and one large commercial establishment should be covered in each of the countries, as it was expected that the conditions and consequences of office automation might well differ in each of these two sectors. It was not found possible to adhere precisely to this plan, but over Europe as a whole a fair balance has been achieved between studies of these two kinds of enterprise.

They are essentially «follow-through» studies of an on-going change, and thus attempt to complete a systematic analysis of the pre-change situation, the conditions during the period of installation, and the post-change situation.

The studies commenced in 1959. Analyses of the pre-change and installation periods have been undertaken, but in most cases insufficient time has yet elapsed for definitive post-change studies to be completed. As will be seen, the installation of computers in the firms studied has been prolonged rather than hurried. The apparently lengthy nature of social research projects has occasionally aroused comment; this at least is one case in which research has been slowed to the pace of developments within industry itself.

An interim report on this project has just been published by O.E.C.D. [2], and some copies are available to-day for Section participants. This interim report is a systematic account of the research to the end of 1961. It is therefore unnecessary for me to-day to repeat much of the background detail, and it would be inappropriate simply to summarize the interim report, although any aspects of it can be dealt with in discussion. I propose to select a few of the empirical findings which seem to be of particular practical and theoretical interest, and to add a sociological comment. Colleagues from Sweden, France and England, where the researches are continuing, will then present progress reports on their more recent work.

SOME EMPIRICAL FINDINGS

The advent of a computer involves a number of stages. I propose to say something about three of these — the decision to introduce one, the installation period and the stage immediately following this, when the computer has been brought into operation.

[2] W. H. SCOTT, *Automation and the Non-Manual Worker.* An interim report on an international comparative project, Paris, O.E.C.D., 1962.

Introduction of a Computer

A complete analysis of the motivation and dynamics of a major business decision is always difficult. It is seldom possible to observe top level discussions directly, and reliance must be placed on interviews with key persons and inferences from behaviour. Nevertheless, a fairly accurate picture can usually be constructed. In our researches, three sets of conditions were present in most cases to precipitate a decision to introduce a computer. Firstly, concern about, or at least an awareness of, the tendency for administrative costs to constitute a steadily mounting proportion of total costs. Secondly, the presence within the organization of a key individual or sub-group cognisant of the potentialities of a computer and prepared to canvass support for its introduction — a course of action which is very likely when, as was usually the case, the status of the individual and the function he heads may be enhanced thereby. Thirdly, the organization is an innovating «pattern-setter» and its controllers wish to maintain this position, or it is one of several large units in the same industry which aspire to this position in the public eye. With the decline of price competition, the desire for prestige, or to be a leader of fashion, must not be under-estimated.

In some of the firms studied, the increase in administrative work and staff had in fact reached the point where any further expansion would have required not only additional staff but also physical extensions of the accommodation available. Against this background, a technological innovation which promises both greater efficiency of operations and a reduction of staff — or at least a halt to its increase — is bound to be attractive. In about one half of our firms a reduction in the number of clerical workers was expected, and commercial organizations, such as insurance companies whose work is largely administrative and clerical, predominated amongst these. In most cases, the initiative was taken by a manager below Board level. The firms were fairly large to large, so that differentiation of managerial functions had occurred, and «the office» was usually headed by a manager equal in status to other departmental heads. In most cases the initiative came from the office manager or chief accountant, although in two cases it was taken by the head of an organization department: It is not difficult to see why this should be so. Probably already on the defensive to some extent because of criticisms of rising administrative costs, the difficulty of maintaining an adequate supply of trained clerks, and the cost of the high turn-

over amongst them, they are the individuals likely to be best informed about the potentialities of computers; they also head functions whose present status and importance have only recently emerged, and are still somewhat equivocal. They see office automation therefore not only as of value to the firm, but also as a development which should consolidate and extend the importance and influence of their function in the organization. In convincing top management, the innovators relied largely on a combination of the economic and «prestige » arguments noted earlier. The «prestige» factor however may operate in its own right, and result in inadequate consideration of the purposes for which the machine is to be used and thus of the precise type of model required for these purposes. In one firm, for example, so little attention was paid at the outset to other considerations that the computer, having been installed and having completed a trial run, was found to be technically inadequate for the purpose for which it was obtained, and incapable of the necessary modification.

On the other hand, a minority of the managements appreciated at the outset that a computer offered the possibility of more effective control by higher management of certain economic aspects of the enterprise, by the development of integrated data processing. As firms have grown in scale and complexity, top management has sought to develop «indirect» controls — such as more refined accounting and costing systems — in order to evaluate and control performance and to plan changes in policy. These systems depend upon the quick availability of accurate information, for the practical value of the analyses made usually varies inversely with the lapse of time which occurs after the events to which they relate have taken place. A computer offers not only the clear prospect of speedier collation and analysis of the information, but also the probability of being able to relate it to other data not utilized previously. Although only a minority of managements seemed aware of these broader «control» implications at the outset, they will grow in importance.

The Installation Period

Responsibility for effecting the installation was placed upon the key person who had taken the initiative or upon a small team which included him. It was probably unfortunate that this team was usually drawn from the administrative departments, and did not include representatives of other functions likely to be affected. Once a de-

cision to order a particular machine had been taken, further steps, both technical and administrative, then tended to be based on collaboration between the supplier's experts and this team.

As regards the relations between management and manual workers, the climate of opinion, and to some extent experience, now favours the view that consultation before changes are introduced is desirable. Most of the managements studied do not appear to have acted on this assumption in dealing with their clerks, or even their managers, during the transition to office automation. During the installation period, a considerable measure of secrecy was maintained, at least about the details of what was to occur. Some very general information was usually announced, but only in Sweden did the amount given seem adequate. Consultation was confined to the heads of sections to be directly affected, but even then it was often a question of seeking their co-operation to implement changes already decided upon, rather than a free and equal consideration of how changes might best be effected.

This fairly general preference for secrecy and a minimum of consultation seemed to spring from top management's own uncertainty and anxiety. Unsure of the likely course of events, they were unable to allay anxiety and rumour by giving accurate, detailed information. This does not, however, explain management's reluctance to consult once the need for a particular move had become apparent. It may be that only top management's basic view of the relations between themselves and clerks explains this. More consultation with manual workers has come about mainly as a result of employee pressure. Although group consciousness is growing among clerks, effective pressure of this kind is still absent so far as most clerks are concerned, and top management is still prone to regard them simply as managerial ancillaries, rather than as a group in their own right.

Partly for this reason, the achievement of the re-organization necessary to establish new procedures and to bring the computer into operation was often a protracted process. The unco-operativeness of branch and section managers was partly responsible — an attitude which the failure to involve and consult them from the outset simply reinforced. But some section heads perceived the computer's activities as a treat to their status, authority and functions. These attitudes sprang partly from a lack of involvement and consequent misunderstandings, but the more insightful managers saw clearly that the computer might in time reduce their discretion and decision-taking powers.

In most of our firms, the problem of manning the computer installation itself was seen in broadly similar terms. The new routine jobs which arose in connection with the computer were filled by transfers from existing repetitive jobs. The smaller number of new technical jobs, such as programmers, were also filled from the existing clerical labour force, both in these and other firms. Although one or two firms considered the recruitment of mathematicians, none did so apparently because aid could always be obtained from the supplier about programmes, and mostly persons of good general intelligence and varied clerical experience, with a modicum of mathematical ability, were appointed. In all cases, with the exception of Sweden, no reductions of clerical staff occurred during the installation period other than through the non-replacement of normal «leavers», and in some cases, even the latter was not necessary, particularly as «double» working was often required during this period.

Effects

Most of the firms being studied have not entered the stable postchange period, and our researches therefore have not yet been able to achieve their main objective — to reach a clear understanding of the longterm changes and problems which a transition to office automations brings. All that can be done at this stage is to summarize the conclusions which have emerged from our observations of the installation period, and to ask, in a tentative way, how far the trends observed are likely to continue or to be modified in the future.

With the exception of the Swedish firms, no redundancy appears to have occurred in the firms studied in other countries directly as a result of office automation. Any reductions, and so far in other cases they appear to have been small or non-existent, have been absorbed by normal wastage. In Sweden, the non-manual work force had contracted by about 20 % in the first firm studied towards the end of the installation period; and this contraction was achieved not simply by normal wastage but by terminating the employment of some temporary clerks. As aforesaid, it is to be expected that reductions will be greatest in large commercial firms, and particularly insurance companies, where the major sector of the organization's activities may be affected directly by a computer; in manufacturing firms, and even in banks, there are more possibilities for the transfer of employees affected to other jobs. The long-term effect is not easy

to assess. On the one hand, as the number of computers and the functions assumed by them grow, the present small impact on employment in firms other than insurance companies may become greater; on the other, the present labour market for clerks in most countries is «tight» and wastage is high, and moreover technical innovations which lead to some immediate direct redundancy often create new jobs in indirect ways in the longer run. In the case of computers, for example, it may be that an increasing number of persons will be required to handle, to interpret and to act upon the data produced as their functions become comprehensive and integrated. At the moment, the conclusions reached by the I.L.O. survey seem justified[3].

As regards conditions of work for clerks, it appears overall that office automation may have the effect of assimilating the relations between management and clerks more closely to those which now obtain generally between management and manual workers. On the one hand, computers are producing a relatively small number of new higher-grade positions — programmers, analysts and supervisors, including supervisors who will co-ordinate the flow of information within the organization. But this development at best only consolidates the existing tendency for the clerical labour force to divide into the few higher-grade and the many routine clerks. On the other hand, computers seem destined to advance further the process of routinization of many clerical jobs. Although office mechanization has already made many of these jobs specialized and repetitive, we noted earlier that there is still often an element of time-discretion and of variety, with an attendant absence of undue constraint whether deriving from supervisors or from tight time-schedules. It seems probable that computers will reduce these advantages for many clerks. They will increase the number of jobs that are purely repetitive yet demand continuous concentration — such as punching, perforating and tabulating; at the same time the need to maintain an integrated flow of information and the emphasis on producing results speedily will increase feelings of pressure and constraint, probably not only for routine clerks but also for most others associated with the operation of the machine. Conditions of work may well be changed in other ways. A growing cleavage within the clerical ranks between a relatively small elite and a large body of routine workers will influence status evaluations and promotion channels and prospects. The status of clerical work in general will probably continue to decline, whilst

[3] *Effects of Mechanisation and Automation in Offices*, Geneva, I.L.O., 1959.

the prestige of those responsible for the computer will be high and their rank will increasingly become managerial rather than clerical. In the future, it may be harder for the routine clerk than for the manual worker to gain promotion to a supervisor's job. The routine jobs will probably be manned almost entirely by women, whilst the higher grade posts, as qualifications become more formalized and if their rank become more managerial, will be filled largely by men. Finally, shiftwork will certainly extend among clerks.

For these various reasons, it seems clear that the position of a majority of clerks, and their relations with management, will come closer to those of manual workers. As this occurs, compensatory demands will probably arise, particularly in connection with pay and other material conditions of employment, and in regard to fuller consultation and negotiation with representatives of the group. Whatever the impact of computers on clerks, however, it seems possible that the implications for management may be equal or greater.

It is commonly assumed that a computer with comprehensive functions will lead to a greater centralization of managerial decision-taking, thus reversing the erstwhile trend towards more delegation and devolution. In this as in other aspects of the development, however, we must not rush to facile conclusions. The present tendency towards decentralization has really occurred only in very large organizations, as an administrative necessity. In the large organization there will still be an obvious limit to the number of *particular* decisions which top management can take and can transmit without undue delay. To endeavour to increase their present load unduly could simply mean that the saving in time achieved in receiving information would be more than offset by the delay in carrying out particular decisions. The actual re-distribution of decision-taking responsibilities will probably depend on top management policy, particularly as a computer will in any case make available only some of the information relevant to decisions — that which is readily quantifiable, such as financial data.

SOCIOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS

If a statement of the likely direct effects of office automation must be tentative in the present stage of our studies, it follows that overall conceptualization must be even more so. Nevertheless, three possi-

bilities are discernible, and these concern the closer assimilation of the conditions of routine clerks to those of manual workers, the likely course of inter-group relations between management and clerks, and the changing composition of the managerial group itself.

Much of what has been said in this brief report about the routine clerks suggests a progressive proletarianization. The majority of jobs becoming highly routinized, the consequent elimination of all but the most elementary skills, the subjection of the work to tighter schedules with the reduction of the element of personal discretion, and the probable rapid curtailment of the possibility of promotion and upward mobility — all these point to a decline in status and an inferior role.

With the manual workers, these developments have often provoked compensatory mechanisms, expressed in demands for the recognition of the distinctiveness of the group and its problems, and often accompanied by fairly rapid unionization and the establishment of negotiating machinery. Clerks may well move further in these directions, but change may be slow, for at least two reasons. Firstly, it seems likely that the routine clerical group will come to consist almost entirely of women, and probably predominantly of younger women. The apathy of women towards collective action and unionization, and the reasons for this, are now well-recognized. In industry, the exceptions seem to have occurred where proletarianization has been accompanied by low financial rewards and adverse physical conditions of work. With technological development in offices, there seems no reason to assume that either of these conditions will occur. It may be that many women will accept highly routinized work without major complaint if the financial reward is deemed satisfactory. In this case, the prior change of attitudes necessary for greater group solidarity and collective action may not emerge. Moreover, the reluctance of many managements to recognize clerks as a distinct group for purposes of negotiation will of course be supportive of these other inhibiting conditions.

The, as yet, small but important body of specialists who control the computer installation represent a new element in the managerial ranks. Although often recruited in the first place from the existing clerical labour force, it seems probable that qualifications for entry will soon be formalized. Thus the professionalization of management will be taken a step further, as a new group of technical specialists is added to existing ones within management. This new group may indeed become an elite within the managerial ranks. As integrated

data processing develops, their role will become increasingly crucial to policy formation; at the same time, the need to devise procedures and programmes to make integrated data processing more effective will require at least the senior computer staff to become more «generalist» in their approach and outlook.

But we are becoming increasingly speculative. Particularly as regards these managerial implications, even more than other aspects of office automation, more conclusive answers must await the completion of the post-change studies.

CONFLICT AMONG INDUSTRIALIZING ELITES IN A SASKATCHEWAN COMMUNITY

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The present paper discusses the process of industrialization in a small rural town in Saskatchewan, Canada, in terms of the strategies of the new industrializing elites.

It was found that conflict in the process of industrialization could be interpreted in terms of the strategies of the various elite groups involved in the process, and that their respective strategies related to their various ideological orientations. This analysis is done largely in terms of the ideal types of elites distinguished by Clark Kerr, John T. Dunlop, Frederick H. Harbison, and Charles A. Myers in their book *Industrialism and Industrial Man.*

SETTING OF STUDY

The study was conducted in the community of Esterhazy in southeastern Saskatchewan. The town population of a little over a thousand was of heterogeneous ethnic background. Fifty per cent of the 633 adults were of Czechoslovakian or Hungarian descent, twenty per cent British, and the rest German, American, Swedish, and others. Twenty-three per cent were still more fluent in either Czech or Hungarian than they were in English, and seven per cent were more fluent in some other language. Fifty-three per cent of the adults belonged to the Catholic Church, thirty-three per cent to the United Church (Protestant), and the rest to the Anglican, Lutheran, and others. The greatest concentration of Protestants was found in the town among those of British and Czech descent, while the rural area of mainly Hungarian background was predominantly Catholic.

* Research for this paper was done under the auspices of the Center for Community Studies, University of Saskatchewan. The author, and not the Center for Community Studies, is responsible for all statements and conclusions in the paper.

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Until the potash plant was built the town was largely a trading center. The industries were primarily concerned with the shipping and processing of agricultural products, mainly wheat, and the storage and distribution of fuel and building supplies. Many of the town residents were retired wheat farmers.

In the spring of 1957 one of the largest producers of potash in the United States, International Minerals and Chemical Corporation (IMC), decided to invest $ 40 million in the «world's most modern and efficient potash mine» at Esterhazy. Since construction is still continuing at present (spring, 1962) the full economic impact of the potash industry cannot yet be ascertained. Data for the present paper were collected during 1959-60.

LEADER STRATEGIES

In an attempt to find a uniform pattern in the variety of types of industrialism over the world, Kerr and his associates came to the conclusion that all these patterns could be interpreted in terms of the ideologies, values, and strategies of the elites. They were struck by the fact that the industrial relations patterns in other countries differed from that of the United States from which they often originated. They found these differences were due to differences in leadership:

> «The ideological conflict which is so characteristic of our age is a natural accompaniment of the diverse routes taken toward industrial society under the leadership of diverse elites. Contending ideologies are fashioned as men seek to guide this historical process by conscious effort, to explain it to themselves, and to justify it to others» [1].

Although they emphasized the role of managers, they did recognize the important role of other types of leaders: «political leaders, industrial organization builders, top military officers, associated intellectuals and sometimes leaders of labor organizations» [2].

The authors identified five ideal types of elites, and according to the nature of these types, they organized the diversity of industrialization patterns into certain systems. Each type has a strategy based

[1] Clark KERR, John T. DUNLOP, Frederick H. HARBISON, and Charles A. MYERS, *Industrialism and Industrial Man*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1960, p. 47.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 8.

on its central ideological orientation by which it seeks to order the surrounding society in a consistent and compatible fashion:

1. The *dynastic elite* held together by a common allegiance to the established order; oriented toward preservation of tradition in a *«paternal community»*.

2. The *middle class elite* favoring a «structure of economic and political rules which best permits them to pursue their gains» in an *open market*. Their ideology is «economically individualistic and politically egalitarian». There is «more social mobility, less class-consciousness, and a freer hand for progress». «Each individual is held to be morally accountable to and for himself, within the limits of the law... Each man's responsibility begins and ends with the injunction to make the best use of his opportunities. ... Emphasis is on progress and on the individual... on personal self-interest instead of community welfare»[3].

3. The *revolutionary intellectuals* and associated activists favoring the elimination of existing leadership and cultural arrangements and replacement with a new ruling class and a brand new culture with a new ideological orientation emphasizing the *centrialized state* as the only mechanism which can undertake the process of industrialization.

4. The *colonial administrator* representing the *«home country,»* in full control of the administration of the whole indigenous society.

5. The *nationalist leaders* as charismatic heroes of unstable chiliastic masses, predisposed towards state-directed effort. The economic strategy is likely to lie somewhere between the private initiative of the middle class and the state control of the revolutionary intellectuals. «Once power is attained there must be a mechanism through which to work and this mechanism is likely to be the state. There may be no theory in advance, but there must be a practice which will involve the state. ... This tends to lead to the planned economy, to state or state-sponsored investment, to state-controlled labor organizations... to state guidance of the new industrialists»[4].

In sum, Kerr concludes:

> «The dynastic elite offers continuity; the middle class, individual choice; the revolutionary intellectuals, high velocity industrialization; and the nationalist leaders, the integrity and advancement of the nation»[5].

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 55.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 68.
[5] *Ibid.*, p. 76.

It should be noted that these types are ideal types, and none of the cases in this study corresponds fully to any one of them. Kerr indicates the utility of these types:

«But most individual cases may be understood better in relation to one of these types. They abstract from reality, but by reducing complexity and by making comparisons they can also illuminate reality. They give order to our task of comprehending the forms of industrialization and their varying impacts in the labor-management-state area»[6].

Four main industrializing elite groups or factions were distinguished in the present study.

1. The *Co-operative Commonwealth Federation*, Government of Saskatchewan, as a left-wing movement, with emphasis on the centralized state. The development of the C.C.F. Party out of a co-operative agrarian movement has been well described by S. M. Lipset in *Agrarian Socialism*. The nationalist rural movement had gradually attained a pronounced socialist character. As government of a rural and «under-developed» country it inevitably had to assume responsibility for economic development and industrialization. On the other hand, without private capital it could hardly finance big enterprise. Furthermore, state-controlled industries had to compete on the free market with other private concerns. Quite naturally, not all government enterprises in Saskatchewan turned out to be successful.

Lipset described the predicament of the C.C.F. leaders who were forced to make «nonsocialist» concessions in order to promote industrial development in the province. Somehow they had to justify private enterprise as legitimately fitting into socialist doctrine.

«They must praise certain segments of private industry, and thereby weaken the force of their long-term socialist arguments. It is difficult for C.C.F. leaders to invite private industry into the province — even subsidize it — and, at the same time, to denounce as exploiters the industrialists or bankers whose money they need»[7].

Underhill, a supporter of the CCF, explained the differences between socialism of the 1930s and socialism of the 1950s. The socialism of the 1930s aimed at economic reforms by means of governmental control to combat the potential dangers of anarchy and chaos

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 51.
[7] Seymour M. LIPSET, *Agrarian Socialism*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1959, p. 282.

«inherent» in the free enterprise of capitalism. At that time the economic situation was such that socialism and capitalism could be seen as two irreconcilable entities which had nothing in common. In the Regina Declaration of Principles in 1932 the CCF claimed that it would not rest till it had eliminated capitalism from the Canadian economy.

By the 1950s, according to Underhill, the «irresponsible power» of the capitalists had been checked by state regulations and by the new countervailing power of the trade unions. It became clear that free enterprise was not «inherently irresponsible,» and that it was compatible with socialism. And experience has demonstrated that state enterprise did not necessarily produce the society of fellowship that the socialists had hoped for [8].

Thus, in 1956 the CCF drew up a new Declaration of Principles at Winnipeg in which it dropped the clause on the elimination of capitalism. However, under a subheading titled «Capitalism Basically Immoral,» it stated: «A society motivated by the drive for private gain and special privilege is basically immoral.»

Zakuta described the transformation of the CCF as a process of institutionalization in which the CCF became more «wordly,» losing its socialist character: «And when the early faith in utopian socialism withered, no stimulating *raison d'être* was available to replace it» [9].

Present evidence indicates that the CCF, though left-of-center, is a welfare party, but not socialist. The party is neither for nor against «private enterprise» or «public ownership» as a matter of principle.

However, when, during the 1961 elections, the leader of the New Democratic Party (a merger of the CCF and Labor) was challenged by the Prime Minister, who called the issue that of «Free Enterprise versus Socialism,» he answered: «I accept the challenge... the issue is economic planning in the interest of all the people, or every man for himself and the devil take the hindmost.»

In an interview with the *Liberal Democrat* of California, Harold Winch, NDP Member of Parliament, stated: «We have had a democratic socialist movement in Canada since 1898. Its philosophy and objectives have remained the same, but the name has changed, and

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[8] Frank H. UNDERHILL, *In Search of Canadian Liberalism,* Toronto, Macmillan, 1960, p. 246.

[9] Leo ZAKUTA, 'The Radical Political Movement in Canada,» in S. D. CLARK, editor, *Urbanism and the Changing Canadian Society,* Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1960, p. 147.

so has the structure and approach» [10]. In other words, though their *strategies* have changed, the *ideology* is still the same.

2. *Anti-socialist community,* supporting the Canadian Liberal Party, strongly opposing the state-oriented policies and socialized services of the provincial government. Public support for the CCF government is seldom heard. There is considerable emphasis by the leaders on the advantages of free enterprise in an open market.

Several factors may account for the non-CCF character of the community:

a. Lack of national Saskatchewan sentiment and identification with the national purpose.

b. Lack of common political activity at the grass roots.

c. Lack of experience in co-operative economic enterprise.

d. Low educational level of older residents who formed their opinions according to the policies of leaders whom they respect or admire.

e. Community leaders traditionally were more often Liberal. Of the twenty leaders identified as most influential in the past history of the community, nine were Liberal, three Conservative (anti-CCF), and only two were CCF. The Liberal leaders exercised considerable political influence in the community.

f. Merchant leadership in Esterhazy, as in most small towns in Saskatchewan, encouraged a strong anti-CCF sentiment. Merchants are the real «free enterprisers» and they fear left-wing parties. An attitude typical of that of many Esterhazy leaders was expressed in an editorial of the local paper of another town, the *Estevan Mercury*. The paper emphasized that businessmen in small communities have always taken the greatest interest in the betterment of their communities, and sparked local pride. «This local pride is being gradually eliminated and replaced by discouragement through the inroads of Socialistic planning, based mainly on centralization and dictatorship... More and more has socialism taken away from the community and the individuals in it, interest in their own affairs».

3. Free-enterprise, private-capital, *«open-market» American corporation* (Kerr's middle class) strongly opposed to state control over industry. The local mine management, as representative of the corporation, propagated the ideology of the «middle class» which calls for a free hand in economic development with a minimum of government intervention. In their publication, *The Perspective of Canadian-American Relations,* the Canadian-American Committee singled out

[10] *The Liberal Democrat,* III, November, 1962, p. 6.

five areas «that may give rise to real problems between Canada and the United States.» One of these was «... particular clashes of interests tend to be inherent in new forms of governmental intervention within the domestic enterprise system of each country» [11].

4. *Labor union* opposed to exploitation of the workers in the open market; relying on centralized state mechanisms to protect the rights of the workers. Since the time of the investigation, the agrarian CCF Party has fused with the labor movement in Canada to form the New Democratic Party in a united political front. During visits to the community the international representative of a labor union made several remarks denouncing the «prosperity and luxury» of the «wealthy American capitalists», and deplored the state of «poverty and despair of the underpaid workers». He promoted a feeling of hostility against the capitalist system and its proponents.

Although no evidence was collected to ascertain whether the labor union concerned was officially affiliated with the New Democratic Party, it is obvious that the labor union had more to gain from a centralized state policy and planned economy than from a free enterprise system.

At the merger convention of the two major labor movements in Canada in 1956, the TCL and the CCL, resolutions were passed commending, though not officially endorsing, the CCF for its pro-labor stand. Up to 1957 the CCF has been the only party in Canada to endorse the legislative recommendations of the new Canadian Labour Congress [12].

In their Winnipeg Declaration of Principles in 1956 in which the CCF leaders called capitalism «basically immoral», they welcomed «the growth of labour unions» as the right step toward «building a living democracy».

Since the workers were separated from management in terms of all crucial criteria of social class (wealth, education, prestige, and power), nationality, and often ethnic background, and since there were traditional social distinctions in the community, the labor leader could hope for support from the workers.

[11] CANADIAN-AMERICAN COMMITTEE, *The Perspective of Canadian-American Relations,* Washington, National Planning Association, 1962, p. 11.

[12] Stuart MARSHALL JAMIESON, *Industrial Relations in Canada,* Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1957, p. 98.

MANAGEMENT-LABOR CONFLICT

The Labor force at the local plant was largely of rural background, and labor unions found little enthusiasm and at first no support. The Rock and Tunnel Division of the Construction and General labor Union of the American Federation of Labor (RTD-AFL) gained support from the miners by promising them wage increases. The union consequently demanded such increases from the company contractors and, while negotiations were still going on, decided to strike. The picket line of the shaft workers was not honored by all surface workers, and not even by all shaft workers and construction at the mine continued at an impeded rate. Junior and senior executive men of the company performed the most essential tasks in the shaft.

After four weeks the union agreed to return to work for an increase of ten cents per hour and a few other benefits. It had demanded an increase of almost $ 2.00 per hour.

In spite of diligent union organization the strike failed because of lack of support from the community and especially from the workers themselves.

The success of management in ending the strike much in its favor was largely due to its effective strategy, the failure of union leaders to gain support of the workers, and the anti-socialist leadership in the community.

COMMUNITY SUPPORT FOR MANAGEMENT

Community leaders in general gave enthusiastic support to the potash industry and to management. In terms of ideological and political orientation the corporation made a wise choice in selecting Esterhazy from several surrounding towns as its head-quarters.

Management followed an effective program of public relations and «sold» the company to the community. A recent device of the company was reported in the local newspaper. *The Esterhazy Miner* (formerly *Observer*):

> «Expectant parents in Saskatchewan ... will have babies late this spring who are born capitalists. Some of these newcomers (if he is born on the day that the shaft sinkers reach potash) will receive a share of common stock in International Minerals and Chemical Corporation».

The community saw the company as an agent of prosperity.

The local instigators of the strike were not respected in the community. They were labeled as bad workers who seldom satisfied their employers and whose families often had lived on relief. The community thought the miners were too well paid to have reason to complain.

The community was suspicious of the labor union which was regarded as an undesirable foreign element and socialist-inspired. A retired professional in town exclaimed: «That's Communist influence ! These men don't know who they are working for. Before they know where they are, Khrushchev will   be their boss !» Opposition to the labor union was reinforced by the latter's association with the C.C.F. Government.

Lack of Worker Support for the Union

The employees at the plant were apparently never very enthusiastic about the strike. Most surface workers did not honor the shaft workers' picket line. Those who did, felt frustrated for they struck not in sympathy with the shaft workers but for fear that their own union might take action if they did not strike. Although none of the miners voted against the strike, only a few actively supported it. It was premature in the sense that it was called before the workers had gained sophistication in labor strategy and before community understanding had been attained. Many workers were bewildered. It is also doubtful whether most of the workers thought their current economic position was as bad as pictured by the union leaders. Compared with management salaries they were «poverty-stricken», but compared with current local standards and previous salaries they were doing well.

The ambivalence in workers' attitudes is interpreted in terms of a three-way allegiance: to their community, to the company, and to the labor union.

The workers identified first with the community of which they themselves, their relatives, and their friends have formed an integral part for most of their lives.

They felt an obligation to the company which paid relatively high wages and brought prosperity to their families and to their community. The company followed a labor policy which favored recruitment in the local community and the promotion of local employees to high-level positions, and it maintained a relatively high

wage scale. Relations between workers and management were friendly and amicable.

The workers similarly felt an allegiance to the union which was their bargaining agent for higher wages and job security and which had promised them such benefits. Although the workers lost substantial amounts in wages for a cause that seemed to many of them unworthy, some of them believed it was worthwhile to sacrifice for the general cause of the worker and to strengthen the bargaining power of the union — «the only hope for the worker in his struggle against exploitation by the capitalists». There was, however, little support for this collective approach to labor problems. Many workers were worried and alienated in a labor union which, as a force from outside, was controlling their lives. They felt much closer to the American company than to the «foreign» Saskatchewan union. The provincial union leader who initiated and led the strike sensed this situation and did his best to keep the community out of the strike and to antagonize the workers against the company. He did not succeed in convincing the great majority of the local labor force.

GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR THE UNION

The affinity in ideological orientation between labor union and government has been indicated. It was quite natural that the union would rely on state mechanisms in its struggle against the corporation. At a hearing before the Saskatchewan Labor Board a company contractor was accused by the union and was found guilty of unfair labor practices. It was felt by people in the community that the Board's decision was unfair and «was formed more by expediency than by the merits of the case».

In spite of stringent «socialist» laws and government action the company succeeded in continuing a labor policy molded largely on its own ideology and strategy. By agreements with various contractors who changed over time, it impeded the certification of unions, eliminated their power, and thus gained a free hand in setting the wage scale. It dismissed workers and lowered wages according to its own discretion. Workers who had been laid off by the company arranged delegations to the Saskatchewan Government to plead for better job protection. Eventually almost all local workers who had been involved in the strike obtained employment as construction workers at the plant and refinery. The confidence of management in local workers was expressed in the establishment of

a local training school to equip them for positions in the local mine and mill.

CONCLUSION

The present analysis supports Kerr's thesis that the specific course that industrialization takes will be determined by the strategies of the elite groups that gain control over the process. In the case of Esterhazy, the strategies of the corporation and community elites seem to have been successful and especially relevant in determining the specific direction of development.

Theoretically, on the basis of current thought, one could have predicted quite different alignments during the strike. Differences between mine management and the community led to several disagreements in the beginning, but affinity in ideological orientation and other factors mentioned above brought the two factions together in their joint struggle against «socialism». The few dissenting voices among the workers were successful in winning a vote to strike, but could not gain moral support among lower-class workers for the protest movement against ingrained, traditional upper-class community leadership and against effective, well-planned management strategy. This also lends credence to the main theme of the Duke of Edinburgh's Study Conference on the Human Problems of Industrial Communities in 1956 that elaborate welfare provisions and higher wages are not so important as personal contacts and concern in ensuring a healthy industrial situation.

It is suggested that empirical investigation in terms of Kerr's ideal types should distinguish clearly between ideology and strategy. By including both ideology and strategy under the same ideal type, a necessary relationship is suggested which may not be true for empirical situations. It is an open question to what extent strategy is based on ideology. They may be at variance because of variables like vested interest and self-interest.

A distinction between ideology and strategy or practice is especially relevant in three respects in the present study:

1. Through propaganda, public images of ideological types of elites are created which do not correspond with realities in practical policy. Although the C.C.F. Government is regarded as a socialist government, in practice it is only little more socialist that the opposition parties which are in power in other provinces.

The Saskatchewan government met with violent and bitter op-

position to its «socialist» medical care program. But it is evident that the Liberals and Conservatives are only two steps behind the CCF in advocating government provision of medical insurance. The most right-wing party, the Social Credit Party, recently nationalized the power utility company of British Columbia, and maintains a provincial publicly-owned telephone system in Alberta. In «welfare» *strategy* there is little difference among the parties in Canada.

The public image of the CCF as «socialist» seems to have sprung, first, from the historical tradition, and, second, from the fact that its *ideology* has more of a socialist slant. Though the Winnipeg Declaration of Principles of the CCF does not explicitly state an aim to eliminate capitalism, it ends with a paragraph titled «Socialism on the March», referring to the CCF as a «democratic socialist party». In the same spirit Underhill talks about the «socialism of the 1950s», and Winch confirms that «the philosophy and the objectives» of the «democratic socialist movement» have remained the same.

2. Kerr claims that the essential characteristic of the «middle-class» society is the open market, but the evidence of present «middle-class» economy points toward the reverse. Big corporations espouse and promote the «middle-class» *ideology* of open-market, free enterprise, but in their *strategy* they prefer and seek a monopolistic position and the «freedom» they seek is often freedom from government restraint.

3. While people may be strongly opposed to «socialist services» ideologically because of certain associations, they may want such services in practice. In many western countries there have been and are the «stages of ideological opposition», and subsequent «practical acceptance». This was illustrated by opposition in the community to the «socialist» *ideology* espoused by the CCF Party, while the same people support or welcome «welfare» *strategies* of opposition parties.

AUTOMATION AND THE NON-MANUAL WORKER
A progress report on research at the Business Research Institute

GUNNAR WESTERLUND
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I would like to begin with a very general statement: «Workers try to control their work situation» — and we all know that management also tries to do so. When the whole work situation changes all feel uneasy — and this is precisely what happens in connection with the sometimes dramatic introduction of Electronic Data Processing Machinery, particularly in offices.

What we need are studies of the *general* impact of automation on the organization of the firm where it is introduced, the many small changes in jobs rather far removed from the particular point where the electronic data processing machines are put to work, the changes in the hierarchy within the firm, the ascendancy of the EDP specialists and the consequent diminution of the need for special jobs and leadership that existed before the introduction of automation, etc. We also need studies of how *a number of different groups* within the firm react to the introduction of automation. They have to some extent been neglected in the specific researches that we have today.

First and foremost we have studied the managerial group, specifically the policy-making leaders at the top. It is they who decide, on the advice of specialists within the firm, or consultants from outside, to introduce automation for certain functions within the firm. This is not a problem of business economics only. Many precise economic data are not available. Other data that the decision makers would like to have simply cannot be produced. To some extent the decision must be based on hunches or very subjective evaluations of future happenings, arrived at by members of this group. They arrived at what looks like a very rational decision which is based on acceptable data as well as on hopes and fears. It would be very interesting to know precisely what happens within a company when a revolutionary decision like this is arrived at. It would be interesting not only to know how the managers come to the first important decision. There are a number of consequences, decisions that necessarily follow from the first one, but which cannot all be arrived at in a way

which is accepted as businesslike. Some of these decisions are en-
forced. They must be arrived at in a hurry or in other cases a
decision, one way or the other, must be made on the spur of the
moment. It would be very interesting to follow this up, or rather the
interaction between the very rational, logical thinking that goes into
the installation and detailed use of the EDP machines as well as this
more haphazard type of decisions. Incidentally, one may wonder
whether management will be able to handle all the data that the
future will provide. They may have so many variables that the
selection problem may become difficult.

Secondly, middle management has much at stake when EDP is
introduced. The hierarchy of the firm is subjected to what could
almost be called an earthquake. Some middle management jobs
disappear; new ones are created. Specialists come into being and
become very important within the firm. They form a group which
the original middle management never has met before. This is quite
an unusual thing within a firm, where specialists usually grow up
from needs felt within the firm and also often from talent within it.
This reshuffling of jobs, this disappearance of old functions and of
needs for specially developed talents can quite well cause deep-felt
fears among members of middle management in a firm where
automation is introduced. They have to co-operate in the intro-
duction of EDP which may mean that their own particular job may
disappear or be to a very great extent changed. The usual way of
recruiting middle management members tends to make some of them
rather old and set in their ways and thus particularly unhappy when
great changes are made.

Thirdly, labour organization leaders as well as the officers of
local labour organizations view the change towards automation with
reasonable uncertainty. It may be that a number of their members
become redundant, jobs are changed, people have to fit into new
contexts, new jobs, or greatly changed jobs. This makes trouble for
the labour organization leaders. It would be interesting to know their
primary reaction. Parenthetically it is necessary to mention that in
Sweden not only the workers' trades unions are very strong but also
the white collar workers' ! Even academically trained people have
formed their own unions, so that a number of strong organizations
at various levels are interested in the development within the firm.

Fourthly, the workers themselves, whether white collar or blue
collar, are of course directly hit by EDP. They may become re-
dundant. Their jobs may be changed completely, or to a greater or

lesser extent. The changes make them feel insecure. They also look forward to something which is new to them, where there are no historical precedents. It is too early to talk of a changing labour market, but if automation goes on, it may quite well change our concept of who is the marginal worker.

Up to now most attention has been concentrated on the fourth group, the workers. It seems to me necessary to have the general picture of reactions within the firm as well as of the organizational changes, the new personnel, and the changes in types of jobs mapped out clearly. A global picture would, of course, also cover the reasons behind the change and how the decision was arrived at.

The area of problems which we study could perhaps be called the interaction of man and automation. Firstly, we have the interaction between the employee and the physical structure of his work environments. Particular problems are fitting equipment to human physiological and physio-psychological capacities, physiological and physio-psychological problems in selection of personnel, a new type of safety and hygienical problems as well as the adaptation of special groups of workers, e.g. elderly people and physically handicapped.

A second field consists in the interaction between employees and the organizational and administrative structure of the firm. Under this heading we find such problems as the organizational and administrative consequences of EDP in the firm, of centralization, control and division of labour, the number of management levels, etc. We have also met the problems of formal and informal organization and of restructuring of work groups. The change-over has also entailed problems of information and communication and very probably also changes in the salary system. There have been changes in hours of work, particularly the introduction of shift work, also in offices. In this connection we should perhaps also take up the rôle of trades unions.

A third field consists of the interaction between the employee and the social psychological structure of the working place. There we find problems of selection, training and adaptation to the new job and problems of human relations to colleagues, supervisors and specialists.

Fourthly, another large area contains the repercussions of automation on the social structure in general. Here we find problems of employment, its volume, structure, mobility in the labour market, training for new jobs, occupational advice and training as well as the responsibility of industry for employment and unemployment.

The changed hours of work, the new needs of training for special jobs are other problems.

In Sweden, quite separately from what happened in the International Committee for Social Research in Industry, the subject of automation was first brought up within the research program on insurance problems at the Business Research Institute at the Stockholm School of Economics as a technical problem. Later the Institute was approached by leaders of one of the big white collar unions (in metal manufacturing) in Sweden, asking whether the Institute could help them in clarifying what automation could mean to personnel and to administration and organization within the firm. The Board of the Institute won support from employers as well as employees in financing a piece of research in the repercussions of automation on white collar workers in insurance company offices. This financing of the research also means acceptance of it from all sides. We are, as a matter of fact, received with no reservations — by management and employees alike.

We selected automation in insurance companies as an area for study since this is probably one of the most dramatic instances of a sudden, thoroughgoing change in a well organized firm. There is hardly a single job within the company that is not in some detail changed through the introduction of EDP. Of course, some jobs disappear entirely and others are changed radically, while others undergo a modicum of change. The metal manufacturing industries' with collar salaried employees' union understood our way of thinking and were willing to finance research within the insurance companies. The union of insurance company salaried employees, too, contributed to the financing of the research.

We decided to study changes in recruitment of personnel, possibly changed recruiting policies, and ways of finding suitable candidates within the company or outside, for the new types of jobs introduced by electronic data processing. We also wanted to cover education and training and changes within these areas as a consequence of EDP. Possible redundancy of personnel was of course one of the areas of study as well as changed placement within the firm. Information regarding the change was to be carefully studied in form as well as in content and effect. The changes in jobs were to be investigated in all aspects, from the instances where the job was radically changed to those where only minor details were subjected to alteration. Work hours were to be followed closely. Changes in supervision, the need for it and the form in which it took place were also to be studied.

Promotion within the firm in the present and in the changed organization was to be closely followed. Work environment, social contact and individual status were to be investigated.

Clerical workers as a group, group leaders in middle management, top management and employee representatives were four sources of information to be utilized. Information was to be gathered by individual planned interviews, questionnaires, and personnel statistics; analyses of jobs, organization, promotion and supervision were to be undertaken.

We have decided to collect data in three phases, the first one before the change has taken place. Ideally we would like to start before even the first rumour has spread that management has arrived at the decision to introduce electronic machinery in the company, in order to obtain a «zero-point». We then follow the information given out by management, its effect and the long range development of the program for changing over, the decisions made by management during this period and their effects. In the second phase we go on collecting data during the transition period proper, in order to find out what has happened to employees' attitudes and opinions when the physical change took place, followed by swift changes in jobs and recruitment as well as redundancy of personnel, ending in the discharge of some employees. In a third phase we collect data after the change has been carried out completely and the company as a whole has had time to return to equilibrium and the electronic machinery is regarded as part of the ordinary equipment within the company.

A sequence of insurance offices has been studied. We have started in the first company in which we have completed our study before the change and on the transitional period and are working on the third phase. In the second company we have begun with the first part of our study so that we can carry over experience and information from one company to the other. There seem to be possibilities of informal experimentation in the third and fourth company, where we can introduce ideas from our first studies.

There is also research going on at the Business Research Institute on the economic background and consequences of office automation. This has just started in the first two companies.

The first company, consisting of two affiliated firms, autonomously managed, was facing special problems in 1955. In one of the firms, the office organization and mechanization was conservative, and the punched-card equipment (Powers) needed replacement. The other firm

had been mechanized to a high degree (punched-cards IBM), but was facing problems arising from ordinary growth.

Enthusiastic reports (from the management point of view) regarding the success of techniques of electronic data processing were coming from USA. Management then decided that only a complete overhaul of the work process would solve the existing problems; an electronic data processing system was also to be introduced.

According to the first plans, the change-over to the new system would be completed by Jan. 1, 1958. As the most striking result of the conversion in that company, a reduction of the total workforce by about 15-20 % would be possible.

To meet natural anxiety and conceivable resistance from the employee side, management took certain steps. On the very day the purchase was decided a communiqué was issued by the managing director to each employee. This specially emphasized that the conversion to EDP would not affect the employment of personnel already permanently on the staff. It was also pointed out that the company's personnel turn-over was high enough to take care of the calculated reduction and that necessary transfers within the company would be attended to with all possible consideration. The news of the conversion to EDP was also released to the Press.

The reduction in personnel by about 15-20 % was planned to be effectuated by practically no hiring, by having retired personnel remain on the job for additional length of time and by employing personnel temporarily. To follow the «no hiring» principle in detail has, however certain risks as to the effect on the personnel structure. In this case the company was helped by the fact that it was not possible to follow the time-table for the installation. The delivery of the computer was delayed for about two years.

Besides the communiqué from the managing director more general information about what was to happen in the company has been given at various lectures and above all in the house organ.

More specialized information has been given in training courses for middle management, supervisors and categories of ordinary clerks to be specially affected by the change-over, as well as in the small planning groups earlier mentioned. The company has also tried to give personal information to every employee likely to be transferred.

The training courses varied in length and layout from general instruction for two hours to courses for supervisors, intended to give a thorough knowledge of the new system.

With these facts in mind we can present some preliminary results

from the investigation of attitudes and opinions made in the pre-change situation.

According to the opinion of the management of the company, no serious personnel problems have manifested themselves. Some employees, however, have left the company for the reason that they did not like the idea of office automation.

The overall impression from the questionnaire material was that no outspoken fear of automation existed. In an open-end question about possible reasons for leaving the company, the coming change-over was stated by only three employees as the first and foremost reason. The majority of the answers had the salary or the job content as given reasons.

The employees were, however, quite aware of that a motive for the change-over was reduction of personnel. 40 % said in an open-end question that «to reduce the staff» was the most important reason for management in deciding to introduce office automation.

One of the objectives of the information from the company was to reduce fear and anxiety among the employees. In spite of management's efforts to give as much information they possibly could, many employees seem to have a very hazy idea of office automation. This indicates that it can be difficult to inform about technically complicated changes, especially if their possible effects are more or less unknown.

Most of the functions within the company were affected in one way or the other. Some jobs disappeared, while others changed radically. Some of the highly qualified jobs in the actuarial department were affected and given a more routine content. The usual repercussion on the jobs was in the form of changed equipment, forms etc.

The planned reduction in personnel had to some extent been effectuated already in the period before the actual change-over. The many delays, amounting to about two years, made careful planning possible and vacant jobs within various departments could be filled by employees likely to become redundant, at the same time as recruitment from outside the company was held at a minimum. Personnel employed on a temporary contract and retired employees still working had been told that their employment would last only just over the transition period.

As far as we can see from our data, the conversion to the new methods of work seems to have been relatively painless. The frequency of errors was very high during the first months, but after careful instruction and training, the number of errors fell to an acceptable level.

The introduction of EDP and the thorough re-working of all data processing performed within the company, has made it possible to reduce its staff. The number of employees shows a reduction of about 28 % from 1957 to 1960. Its detailed effects can be seen in the following table.

Stratification	1957		1960	
	N	%	N	%
Top management	8	1.7	8	2.3
Middle management	39	8.3	39	11.4
First line supervisors	45	9.6	33	9.7
Unpromoted employees	378	80.4	262	76.6

As to the recruitment of white collar workers the turnover is, as usual in all western European countries, great within the category of young unmarried or recently married female clerical workers. When the first company investigated has employed younger women of this category during the first phase, they have been informed that they could not count on steady employment with the firm. Actually the turnover has greatly diminished the problem of redundancy. A re-allocation of the workers whose jobs had been changed or eliminated has also contributed to this. Nevertheless a certain number of workers has been discharged, mainly among the younger female office workers. Employees who have been with the insurance company for a certain length of time have, according to collective agreement, a right to job tenure.

It has been possible to recruit programmers for electronic data processing in the first company to an extent that has been surprising to its management. Both male and female employees have been trained for and promoted to this job.

Within the first company there has been an important re-organization so that a large number of the employees have had their jobs changed. For the running of the machine proper only two shifts of six people each are needed while about twenty are needed to feed data into the machine. More auxiliary work has been created so that the final personnel reduction is difficult to evaluate. No information on cost is as yet available. It is also difficult to evaluate the

fact that more prompt, recent and detailed data are available earlier than before the introduction of EDP.

One very important aspect that we have been able to observe is the complete going over of the obtaining of data and their handling within the company. We know of no other comparable instance of a thorough re-working of all paper work that is performed within a company. This integrated processing of data, apart from EDP, is a very important element in the evaluation of the effect of introduction of automation.

A more serious development is the fact that those few employees who have left on their own accord are the more active and intelligent ones, making a negative selection from the point of view of management.

The reactions of the different groups can be summarized in this way. The information given by management has resulted in no overt expressions of anxiety by employees. On the whole their reaction has been less noticeable than we expected. As to the representatives of the employees' organizations, they seem to have regarded the evolution with equanimity and are interested in getting better information on what is happening within the company, without expressing any definite points of view. One of the reactions from management is that some uncertainty as to the economic consequences of automation has been observed. Great satisfaction from this side has been noted with the effect of the general going over of data processing within the company.

REPORT ON THE DISCUSSION

Chairman : G. WESTERLUND, Stockholm School of Economics
Rapporteur: W. H. SCOTT, University of Liverpool.

First Session

This session was devoted to a series of papers on a cross-national comparative research project on «Office Automation and the Non-Manual Worker». A report on the first three years work of this project was given by W. H. Scott, and progress reports on recent work in England, France and Sweden were presented by E. Mumford M. Crozier and G. Westerlund, respectively.

The papers raised a number of important and interesting issues. In all countries, the transitional period seems to have aroused considerable stress and strain, not only among the staff directly responsible for the computer installation, but more particularly among the employees — both managerial and routine clerical — directly affected by the changes in the organisation. Several factors have contributed to this. Most of the changes have been tentative and experimental, and managerial uncertainty about the precise course of the changes to be made together with other factors, has led to inadequate information-giving and consultation. The lack of adequate prior preparation for the installation of a computer has been partly due to management's reluctance to draw on experience elsewhere, or to utilise consultants — almost all the firms relied exclusively on the supplier of the machine, and the latter seldom gave the advice necessary for prior reorganisation and preparation. It seems clear that computers will increasee the routinisation of office work, apart from the small elite immediately responsible for the machine. There was some difference of opinion about the reactions of clerks to this situation. On the one hand, it may set up compensatory demands for the negotiation of improved rewards and conditions, although the preponderance of women may limit this; on the other hand, the French report suggested that there was a fair degree of satisfaction with these routinised jobs, the employees being content not to exercise initiative, and to accept directive leadership. There was general agreement that in the longer run the implications for

managerial organisation and policy-making may be the most important development.

A number of points to which more investigation should be devoted were raised in discussion. These included the implications of office automation for the general educational system; the importance of assessing the indirect effects of this development on the general employment market; the effects on middle management and supervisors, and the future role of the «computer elite» in relation to higher management.

Second Session

E. L. Malone's paper was a searching critique of the widely-held assumption, both within and without under-developed countries, that rapid industrialisation is in their best interests. He questioned this in terms of the likely effect both on employment and the standard of living. The case of Puerto Rico was quoted against him in discussion, but he countered by saying that, despite a very high level of emigration to the U.S.A., employment had in fact declined during the past ten years, and the impact on the standard of living of the masses had been small, although gross national income had increased.

H. W. van der Merwe analysed the case of a mining company which had established itself in a Canadian township, and how managerial goals had triumphed against the trade union. This was attributable in large measure to the ideological support of local community leadership. He discussed the important theoretical point of the extent to which strategy and practice coincide with or diverge from ideology.

L. H. Orzack discussed the importance of more systematic study of the establishment and development of organisations. In particular, the initial setting of the division of labour, and how changes in it occurred thereafter, should be analysed. He illustrated this by reference to a study of an experimental hospital.

B. Abu-haban gave a detailed account of a study of leadership in a Pacific community in Canada. His findings were, in general corroborative of earlier research. All of the community leaders had high ranking occupational positions, a relatively high educational standard, long residence in the community, and higher average age.

URBAN / RURAL SOCIOLOGY
LA SOCIOLOGIE URBAINE / RURALE

REPORT ON THE DISCUSSION *

Chairman : R. GLASS, University College, London
Rapporteur: J. H. WESTERGAARD, London School of Economics

There were two main themes of discussion at the meeting. One was that of the images held of urban and rural society, and the variation of such images in different social and historical contexts. The other concerned the strategy of development, and in particular the place of urbanisation in processes of planned social and economic change. Papers were contributed on each of these questions. But the discussion brought them into a common focus, and emphasized the close link between the two themes. Different strategies of development imply different images and evaluations of town and country, which condition the priorities given to urban and rural development respectively. These images in turn reflect differences in social structure, and differences in the historical experience and contemporary problems and prospects of the different countries.

A contrast had often been drawn between the image of a static and parochial rural society and that of the city as an emancipating force. Yet this view of the town as the source of progress and opportunity went side by side with another which stressed the risks of impoverishment, tension and *anomie* associated with urban life. Both perspectives had a long history in Western countries; their relative strength, and that of other and more subtle expressions of the values and symbols of urbanism, varied from one country to another, from group to group and from time to time. Such symbols could be explored by direct field surveys concerned with individual attitudes to the city as a centre of employment, services and culture, as had been done experimentally in France (P. Chombart de Lauwe).

* *Contributors*: J. P. Bhattacharjee, L. Braithwaite, C. Charles, P. Chombart de Lauwe, F. Edwards, E. Isomura, O. Kudi-Abor, S. Nowakowski (absent), M. Pohoski, G. Pourcher, G. W. Roberts. V. S. Semenov, Y. Talmon-Garber.

But comprehensive comparison of the variety and changing character of urban images, and understanding of their roots, required also historical and documentary study. The variations found could often only be explained in terms of class structures and their changes. Thus in Russia, relations between, and views of, town and country had been shaped in the past by the concentration of power, privilege and culture in the cities; but the traditional urban exploitation of the countryside, accentuated by capitalist development before the revolution, was not a permanent and inevitable phenomenon, and the Soviet Government was pursuing a policy of reducing, and eventually eliminating, the remaining inequalities between town and country (V. S. Semenov). In Britain, by contrast, industrial capitalism had had different effects: the Victorian upper and middle classes had feared the threat to the social order posed by the concentration of working class people in the new towns, and their physical and ideological flight from the cities had strengthened and perpetuated a native tradition of anti-urbanism. Elements of a similar kind of rural romanticism in Scandinavia, on the other hand, seemed to have been checked, or at least modified, by the history of political conflict between town and country in these still partly agrarian countries (J. A. Westergaard). Poland showed marked internal contrasts in urban-rural images, and in the attitudes of native towns people to migrants from the country-side. In Warsaw, the middle strata especially had inherited from the pre-revolutionary bourgeoisie a contempt for the peasant and for rural migrants; but in Silesia, with a long history of industrialism and townward migration, where in the past ethnic differences had accentuated the main line of stratification between German bourgeoisie and Polish working class such divisions between migrants and natives in the towns were not evident (S. Nowakowski).

The experience of rural migrants to towns illustrated not only the differences, actual and assumed, between town and country, but also the extent to which such experience was conditioned by the class context of migration. The absorption of migrants was thus influenced by their origins and occupational careers — as was pointed out through examples of recent research from France (G. Pourcher) and Poland (M. Pohoski), in which the link between geographical and social mobility was stressed — and by the general socio-economic situation facing the migrants in their new environment. In the northern cities of the United States, for example, rural Negro migrants — their numbers increased by changes in the southern agri-

cultural economy — bore the brunt of the high rates of unemployment, which were accentuated by changes in technology and consequently in industrial and occupational structure. Their situation was in some respects akin to that of migrants to the towns of underdeveloped countries — and their unemployment conditioned the common image of the Negro (F. Edwards). In the West Indies — where patterns of social stratification (and of political conflict in British Guiana at present (C. Charles) largely followed ethnic lines and were reflected in the territorial distribution and segregation of ethnic groups (G. W. Roberts) — the towns had often played the dominant part in forming popular images of these groups. Thus the stereotype of the East Indian was that of the poor urban Indian, although the rural element was numerically, economically and culturally the strongest in the East Indian populations of the Caribbean territories (L. Braithwaite).

The association of development with urbanisation, of townward migration with social and individual advancement, was questioned by several contributors. The Soviet Union had given priority to early and rapid industrialisation, both in the towns and of agriculture. The policies adopted had stressed the large-scale expansion of the urban economic base, and thus of the capacity of the towns to absorb rural population displaced by the mechanisation and rationalisation of agriculture. These had been regarded as the essential prerequisites for the gradual elimination of economic and cultural differences between town and country (V. S. Semenov). But was a rigid model of the kind underlying Soviet planning the most appropriate one ? It might be unsuitable, it was suggested, especially for such countries as Ghana (O. Kudi-Abor) or India. While Japan's experience of industrialisation was exceptional outside the west, and her rapid urbanisation not only the result of the 'push' of surplus rural population but also a product of 'pull' factors (E. Isomura), in countries like India the necessary preconditions of industrialisation were weakly represented and the economic base of the towns as yet, and for long likely to remain, inadequate for absorption of a still greater influx of migrants on the scale implied by the Soviet Model. In fact, the Indian approach was to reject rigid theoretical models of development in favour of a flexible empiricism, inspired but not tied by a socialist orientation (J .P. Bhattacharjee). Israel, too, it was claimed, might offer examples of a flexible mode of development. In addition to centrally directed measures, schemes of voluntary, 'regional' cooperation had grown up between rural settlements:

their aim was to pool resources for development, while preserving the independence of the settlements from bureaucratic, city-centred. outside direction (Y. Talmon-Garber).

The discussion thus tended to throw up one model of development, one view of urbanisation, one set of images of town and country, against another; and also to stimulate an empiricist reaction against all models. Pointing this out, the Chairman asked if the empiricist rejection of all models and the perfectionist advocacy of a single model were not equally inappropriate. The discussion had illustrated the diversity of experience, problems and historical antecedents involved in urban and rural development in different contexts; it had in effect demonstrated the need to establish models based on genuine and detailed comparative study of this diversity of experience. Hitherto, attempts at such comparison usually resulted only in a «phoney perfectionism»: in looking at other societies, social scientists tended to become apologists for their own; rather than compare, they applied as a yardstick of evaluation a model derived mainly or exclusively from their own parochial history. The explicit formulation of value premises was necessary. The world was not as yet united by a common set of values; and social scientists were not a «free-floating intelligentsia» detached from national and class allegiances. But what was far more important was that they should 'fall out' of their own societies, liberate themselves from the narrow horizons of their own native models, in order genuinely to compare the experience of diverse societies.

SOCIOLOGY OF THE FAMILY
SOCIOLOGIE DE LA FAMILLE

RECHERCHE INTERNATIONALE SUR L'IMAGE DU RÔLE DE LA FEMME ET LA PERCEPTION DE SON ÉVOLUTION [1]

Problèmes généraux, premiers résultats et organisation du travail

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Le choix d'un sujet d'enquête internationale sur l'image du rôle de la femme dans la société et la perception de son évolution est lié à plusieurs hypothèses:

1. Comme l'ont souligné divers auteurs, en particulier des auteurs socialistes, l'évolution de la situation de la femme est une des clés de l'évolution des structures sociales.

2. La représentation de la société et de son évolution a également une importance capitale dans la transformation de la vie sociale. Diverses études du Groupe d'Ethnologie Sociale depuis 1952 nous avaient incités à développer des recherches dans ce sens.

3. La représentation du rôle de la femme et la conscience de son évolution est un aspect essentiel de la représentation de la société et de sa transformation.

4. L'étude d'un tel sujet est particulièrement favorable à des comparaisons entre cultures différentes et milieux sociaux différents.

Dans cette perspective, le sujet proposé à un groupe de chercheurs en 1957, a abouti à une première série de travaux dont les résultats partiels ont été publiés dans la Revue des Sciences Sociales de l'UNESCO [2]. En vue des développements ultérieurs, l'examen de

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[1] Deux courtes interventions ont déjà été faites au Congrès de Stresa au moment où les enquêtes commençaient en Pologne et en France.

[2] Image de la femme dans la société par Paul-H. CHOMBART de LAUWE, Marie-José CHOMBART de LAUWE (France), Antonia KLOSKOWSKA, J. PIOTROWSKI (Pologne), Nelly FORGET, Khadidja NOUACER (Maroc), Guy ROCHER (Canada), R. CLIGNET, N'SOUGAN AGBLEMAGNON (Afrique Noire), Léopold ROSENMAYR (Autriche), Oliveira BURIC (Yougoslavie), dans *Revue Internationale des Sciences Sociales*, UNESCO, N° Spécial, Vol. XIV, n° 1 - 1962, pp. 3-178.

quelques aspects théoriques et de quatre problèmes mis en relief par l'étude sur le terrain permettront de mieux aborder les questions de principe et d'organisation des recherches internationales dans ce domaine.

QUELQUES ASPECTS THÉORIQUES ET MÉTHODOLOGIQUES

L'étude de la représentation en général et de la perception de l'évolution, la liaison entre l'image de la femme et celle de la famille, le décalage entre les modèles et les comportements posent du point de vue théorique une série de questions auxquelles nous ne pouvons pas répondre ici en quelques mots, mais qu'il importe de poser clairement.

Entre la perception et la représentation des faits sociaux, il n'existe pas de limites précises mais les deux mécanismes, même s'ils sont souvent liés, doivent être clairement distingués. Une femme se perçoit elle-même ou perçoit une autre femme, dans une certaine situation, dans un certain rôle. La représentation de cette situation et de ce rôle entre dans un système plus large de représentations qui dépend non seulement de l'expérience du sujet, mais de sa culture, de son milieu social... Ici se trouvent posés d'une façon nouvelle, les vieux problèmes des rapports entre les représentations individuelles et les représentations collectives, entre les représentations et les attitudes, entre les représentations et les modèles de référence.

Lorsque nous parlons de conscience de l'évolution, il s'agit de la représentation de faits sociaux entre lesquels nous établissons des comparaisons. L'intervention de la mémoire, comme l'a montré en particulier Maurice HALBWACHS a une importance plus grande encore qu'on ne le dit généralement [3]. Dans toute notre étude nous insistons moins sur les différences sociales de la perception que sur la représentation des faits sociaux, trop souvent confondue avec la perception. Les images auxquelles se refèrent les sujets dans leurs comportements, et des modèles auxquels elles se rapportent montrent leur force active. Nous parlons alors d'images guides, d'images dynamiques liées à la culture des sujets comme les «patterns» de comportements [4].

[3] M. HALBWACHS, *Les Cadres sociaux de la Mémoire*, Paris, Alcan, 1925.
[4] Ces problèmes seront étudiés dans le volume en préparation, qui rendra compte de l'enquête française *La femme dans la Société. Son image dans différents milieux sociaux en France*, Paris, Éditions du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Travaux du Groupe d'Ethnologie Sociale (à paraître en Juin 1963).

L'image de la femme et de son rôle dans la société est liée à l'image de la famille, aux images du monde du travail dans lequel la femme peut prendre place, à l'image de l'autorité, des institutions judiciaires et politiques, etc. Une recherche sur ce sujet doit donc être rapprochée d'autres enquêtes sur les représentations, et située par rapport à celles-ci. En France, notre équipe a tenté de le faire d'une manière précise dans l'ensemble du travail entrepris par les divers chercheurs qui ont choisi des thèmes d'observation assez voisins les uns des autres pour permettre des recoupements. Ainsi une enquête sur l'image de la famille a été effectuée dans une population d'habitations nouvelles, où les changements de situations pouvaient faciliter l'adhésion à des modèles nouveaux. D'autres études sur la représentation de la société chez les étudiants et chez les jeunes d'autres milieux, sur le modèle d'enfant idéal, sur la représentation de la ville, etc... permettront de réaliser ces rapprochements. En Pologne, il en est de même pour les travaux d'Antonina KLOSKOWSKA.

L'image du rôle de la femme et de ses changements ainsi replacée dans un système complexe de représentations est un sujet brûlant. Les variations de cette image correspondent à un bouleversement des échelles de valeurs, et impliquent une transformation de l'ensemble des structures sociales. Elles soulèvent aussi des réactions affectives liées à la fois aux rapports entre les sexes et aux adhésions idéologiques, qui rendent souvent les discussions difficiles, même entre chercheurs. Mais les passions soulevées soulignent d'autant mieux l'importance du sujet pour l'étude de l'évolution sociale.

A ces réactions affectives est lié le problème du décalage entre les images de référence et les comportements. Comme nous l'avons constaté dans les divers pays, les conflits entre les modèles anciens et les modèles nouveaux font que de nombreuses personnes interrogées se réfèrent à une image nouvelle du rôle de la femme et décrivent elles-mêmes un comportement qui est en contradiction avec cette image. Mieux étudié jusqu'ici en France, en Pologne et au Maroc, ce problème est déjà soulevé ailleurs et demanderait à faire l'objet d'une recherche plus systématique dans l'avenir. Il peut ainsi arriver que l'image de référence soit au contraire une image traditionnelle qui persiste, alors que le comportement, lié à une situation de fait, est déjà décalé par rapport à elle.

L'observation des conséquences de ces discordances pour l'équilibre psychologique des sujets [5] et d'un point de vue sociologique

[5] Ce problème rejoint celui qui est soulevé à propos de l'image de l'enfant et du comportement des parents par M. J. CHOMBART DE LAUWE. Voir la communication présentée au Comité de Psychiatrie Sociale de ce même congrès.

pour le passage à des structures nouvelles, s'avère d'un grand intérêt. L'évolution des images, la dynamique des comportements, et le changement de la société sont trois éléments de la transformation de la vie sociale entre lesquels il est nécessaire d'observer constamment des décalages significatifs.

QUATRE PROBLÈMES-TYPES

A partir des premiers résultats déjà obtenus, la mise en relief de plusieurs problèmes permettra de mieux préciser l'orientation du travail pour l'avenir. Il s'agit de l'image de la femme au travail, de l'égalité entre les sexes, de la conscience de l'évolution et de l'image de la femme dans les pays en voie de développement.

L'image de la femme au travail était le thème choisi par priorité au départ de l'enquête. Il a été étudié systématiquement en France, en Pologne et au Maroc avec des questionnaires comparatifs. Nous en avons déjà rendu compte en partie dans le volume sur «l'image de la femme dans la société» dont nous avons parlé plus haut et nous n'y reviendrons pas longuement ici. Trois faits sont cependant utiles à rappeler pour la discussion. Premièrement, si l'opinion favorable au travail de la femme en général se développe en Pologne, en France et même au Maroc, l'opposition au travail de la femme mariée avec des enfants petits est quasi-unanime (85 à 95 %). Deuxièmement, les raisons qui poussent la majorité des femmes à travailler sont d'ordre économique. Il faut atteindre un niveau de vie élevé et des conditions encore trop souvent exceptionnelles pour que les femmes mariées, et surtout les mères de famille puissent travailler par goût et choisir le métier qu'elles désirent. Les sociétés industrielles ne paraissent pas avoir prévu réellement la place de la femme mariée dans l'entreprise. D'immenses réformes semblent souhaitées. En troisième lieu, l'image de la femme ayant un travail, surtout si elle parvient à occuper des postes élevés, apparaît en revanche comme une réhabilitation.

Cette question va de pair avec celle de *l'égalité des sexes*. Si la majorité des sujets se représente la femme comme l'égale de l'homme, la plupart estiment que son rôle peut être ou doit être différent. Les partisans les plus convaincus de l'égalité sont parfois les premiers à défendre le principe de la différenciation. Égalité et identité ne peuvent pas être confondues. Dans l'étude de cet aspect de l'enquête c'est tout le problème de la conception du couple qui se trouve posé.

La conscience des changements des rôles et des comportements des deux sexes l'un à l'égard de l'autre est un des aspects les plus instructifs de l'étude pour mieux comprendre cette évolution du couple. En fait, le changement est représenté en référence à une image ancienne ou à une image future. L'intervention de la mémoire est ici évidente. Ce que nous appelons conscience des changements est, comme il a été dit plus haut, une comparaison entre deux représentations particulières liées à toute une série de représentations de l'ensemble des structures sociales. En France, par exemple, les droits de la femme paraissent, pour la plupart des sujets, s'être nettement accrus (Femmes 85 %, Hommes 74 % en milieu ouvrier et classes moyennes). L'ouverture des nouveaux débouchés pour les femmes sont supposés par la moitié des sujets, provoquer des changements dans les rôles. Les modifications de la vie familiale sont liées à des changements de préoccupations et à des transformations des activités d'une génération à l'autre [6].

Les changements de comportements de l'homme à l'égard de la femme sont moins remarqués (47 %) que les changements de comportements de la femme à l'égard de l'homme (64 %). Des différences significatives apparaissent en fonction du sexe, de l'âge, du milieu social. La cause de changements de comportement de la femme la plus souvent évoquée est la participation à la vie de travail. L'évolution qui, dans l'esprit des sujets, tend à rapprocher les sexes, est envisagée à la fois comme juste en droit et comme inquiétante dans ses conséquences psychologiques. Tout dépend alors de la vision que les femmes ont du bonheur [7]. La grande majorité des sujets pensent que la femme est plus heureuse qu'autrefois (75 à 80 %). Les progrès matériels, l'augmentation des loisirs, la liberté plus grande, la considération, l'égalité avec l'homme, sont les faits les plus souvent cités. Une contradiction est alors signalée: le travail paraît être à la fois la cause principale de libération et de considération et un «malheur» pour la femme. Est-il alors considéré comme une phase transitoire d'évolution, comme un instrument de promotion et non comme une fin [8] ? Le problème d'un nouvel aménagement des structures sociales pour permettre à la femme de travailler ou de ne pas travailler et pour lui offrir des activités compatibles avec ses besoins et ses aspirations sur d'autres plans, se trouve posé.

[6] *Images de la femme dans la société, op.cit.,* pp. 47-54, article de M. J. CHOMBART DE LAUWE.

[7] *Ibid.,* pp. 54-61.

[8] *Images de la femme dans la société,* op.cit., p. 62.

Dans les pays en voie de développement, cette évolution du rôle de la femme prend une importance encore plus grande qu'ailleurs. L'enquête menée par N. Forget et une équipe marocaine, les comparaisons de R. Clignet sur les populations Abouré et Bété en Côte d'Ivoire, le programme de travail établi par F. N'Sougan Agblemagnon pour le Togo, permettent déjà de s'en rendre compte [9]. La vision de la femme dans le système matrimonial traditionnel est brusquement bouleversée par la transformation des conditions d'existence et l'attachement à des images nouvelles qui naissent spontanément au contact de la civilisation industrielle. L'évolution des représentations dépend à la fois des structures propres à la société envisagée, du degré de développement économique, et des événements qui ont accompagné les changements de statut politique du pays. L'enquête marocaine montre que, malgré certaines réticences, la majorité des sujets sont déjà prêts à s'engager dans une voie irréversible où le travail de la femme est reconnu comme normal. Le rôle joué par certaines militantes dans les luttes de libération, la vie syndicale, l'action sociale, la vie politique, mettent en relief une extraordinaire rapidité des transformations. Mais il n'est pas étonnant que des conflits personnels ou sociaux apparaissent à cette occasion. L'étude de la conscience de l'évolution et des changements d'images guides est donc partiellement utile pour essayer de les éviter.

ORGANISATION ET DÉROULEMENT ET L'ENQUÊTE INTERNATIONALE

La complexité des problèmes et l'aspect passionnel qu'ils revêtent dans de nombreux pays, ont rendu difficile l'organisation de l'enquête internationale. L'étude des origines de la recherche, de son déroulement et de son développement actuel en donneront une idée.

A l'origine, les préoccupations de notre groupe ont rencontré celles de chercheurs d'autres pays au cours d'une première discussion pendant laquelle nous avons proposé ce sujet, lors d'un séminaire international. Mais le projet n'a pris corps réellement que dans une période de travail en commun à Paris entre les membres de notre équipe A. Kloskowska et G. Rocher. Le premier questionnaire élaboré alors avec l'aide de O. Miret a dû être complètement révisé ensuite pour l'adapter aux différents pays. L'idée d'un questionnaire unique, même préparé ainsi par des représentants de plusieurs pays,

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[9] *Ibid.,* Articles de N. Forget, K. Nouacer, R. Clignet, F. N'Sougan Agblemagnon.

a dû être abandonnée. Nous ne croyons pas aux questionnaires internationaux, sauf pour un nombre de questions très limité.

Le déroulement des enquêtes, en Pologne et en France, a pu alors s'effectuer dans de bonnes conditions. Il s'agissait d'enquêtes-pilotes au sens strict du terme. La sélection d'un nombre relativement restreint d'hommes et de femmes à Varsovie, à Lodz (en Silésie), et dans l'Agglomération Parisienne, ne permettait pas de constituer des échantillons nationaux. En France, la méthode a consisté, comme pour d'autres enquêtes, à constituer une population expérimentale en prenant 360 sujets au hasard dans des strates définies par hypothèse dans des quartiers anciens et des quartiers nouveaux, et dans trois milieux sociaux différents. Les hommes et les femmes des mêmes couples étaient interrogés simultanément et séparément par deux enquêteurs. En Pologne, la comparaison entre les différents terrains a permis également des remarques intéressantes.

Au Maroc, l'adaptation du questionnaire a demandé un effort plus grand encore en fonction des problèmes particuliers à la civilisation musulmane et de la rapidité des changements qui s'opèrent. L'enquête a été moins systématique, et l'aspect qualitatif de la recherche a pris une place plus importante.

Pendant ce temps, l'enquête canadienne avait dû être retardée en raison de nouvelles responsabilités qui empêchaient G. ROCHER de s'y consacrer, jusqu'à nouvel ordre. En revanche, de nouveaux terrains pouvaient être inclus dans le plan de recherche en Afrique Noire et en Europe, car le développement des comparaisons Est-Ouest et Nord-Sud restait une préoccupation constante.

Un projet entièrement nouveau était envisagé au Togo par F. N'Sougan AGBLEMAGNON, qui avait participé aux toutes premières discussions en 1957, rejoignant certains problèmes posés pour le Maroc et soulignant la nécessité de travaux dans les pays en voie de développement en tenant compte des modèles et des structures traditionnelles. Des projets de ce genre doivent permettre dans l'avenir d'établir des comparaisons entre cultures très différentes.

En Afrique Noire également, Remy CLIGNET, qui avait commencé des recherches sur la parenté et la situation de la femme, a repris un projet permettant de coordonner son travail avec le nôtre. D'autres chercheurs, comme le Docteur Anne RETEL, qui avait travaillé sur le problème de la femme en Afrique, s'intéressent également à notre recherche collective. Madame Denise PAULME, qui avait dirigé une série de travaux sur la femme africaine, a accepté de coordonner avec nous les recherches pour cette partie du monde.

En Europe, nos préoccupations rejoignaient aussi celles de plusieurs chercheurs. Des liaisons de travail s'imposaient. En Angleterre, par exemple, les recherches de Viola KLEIN, nous apportent des éléments de réflexion intéressants et des confrontations seront indispensables dans l'avenir. Pour l'instant, nous sommes limités à la coordination des recherches avec Léopold ROSENMAYR de Vienne, l'un des premiers à avoir participé aux discussions préliminaires et Olivera BURIČ en Yougoslavie, qui a accepté de modifier son plan de travail pour tenir compte de notre programme.

C'est en fonction de cet ensemble de travaux, dont les premiers aspects ont été présentés dans le numéro spécial de la Revue des Sciences Sociales de l'UNESCO, qu'un projet plus large peut être discuté.

PRINCIPES ET MÉTHODES DES ENQUÊTES INTERNATIONALES

Les premières enquêtes déjà effectuées et les projets élaborés pour l'avenir permettent de souligner certains problèmes qui se posent dans les comparaisons internationales.

L'utilisation des questionnaires uniformes, utilisables dans différents pays, sans prévoir de sérieuses adaptations, nous paraît devoir être rejetée. Comme nous l'avons dit plus haut, seules quelques questions communes peuvent être posées de la même manière dans des contextes culturels différents. Des méthodes d'approche beaucoup plus souples doivent être mises au point; les remarques qualitatives ont autant d'importance dans bien des cas que les analyses quantitatives.

Une étude très sérieuse du milieu culturel et de la conjoncture économique et politique de chaque pays est nécessaire pour bien situer les enquêtes. Les représentants de chacun des pays sont en général mieux placés à ce point de vue que les chercheurs étrangers. Ce sont eux à notre avis, qui doivent le plus possible avoir la responsabilité des enquêtes nationales. Mais ils peuvent être aidés très utilement par les représentants des autres pays qui leur permettent de mieux voir les problèmes de l'extérieur.

Comme dans les recherches à l'intérieur d'une seule culture, nous pensons que la convergence des approches propres à diverses disciplines (en particulier sociologie, psychologie, ethnographie, économie, histoire) est essentielle. Mais il ne faut pas se dissimuler la difficulté d'organisation qui en résulte. Il s'agit de la collaboration entre des séries d'équipes différentes. Il importe alors sur le plan inter-

national que les délégués de chaque équipe puissent apprendre à se connaître pour former eux-mêmes une nouvelle équipe de coordination.

C'est à partir d'une expérience de recherche dans un pays déterminé que peut être défini un premier projet d'étude à discuter sur le plan international. L'élaboration d'un projet plus poussé ne peut avoir lieu que si plusieurs chercheurs peuvent travailler en commun pendant un temps assez long. Lorsque les premières recherches ont commencé, il est possible, comme cela s'est passé dans l'enquête dont il est question ici, de susciter de nouveaux développements et de coordonner les travaux déjà entrepris avec ceux d'autres chercheurs dont les sujets sont voisins. Au bout d'un certain temps une nouvelle étape peut être franchie en tenant compte des premières enquêtes-pilotes pour élaborer un projet plus vaste.

Dans cette perspective, l'avenir des recherches internationales sur l'image de la femme dans la société, est lié maintenant surtout à une question de moyens et de temps disponible pour les chercheurs. Mais ces moyens et ce temps seront trouvés si le sujet paraît en valoir la peine et si les premiers résultats sont assez prometteurs. C'est pourquoi l'avis du Comité de Recherche sur la Famille et de l'Association Internationale de Sociologie seront très utiles comme éléments de réflexion pour les chercheurs qui se sont engagés dans cette voie.

FAMILY AUTHORITY AND CHILD BEHAVIOR IN WEST GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES
SOME PROBLEMS AND STRATEGIES IN A CROSS-NATIONAL VALIDATION STUDY *

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When the results of a research project turn out neatly in line with prior hypotheses or expectations, most of us have little trouble in convincing ourselves of their validity. But usually, if my own experience is at all typical, there are additional, unexpected «findings» which somehow emerge from the statistical stewing pot.

How seriously should we take such unanticipated findings, and how may we deal with them? If we can persuade ourselves that there is some pattern in these findings, we will be clever enough to invent some *ex post facto* theory to explain why we really should have expected such results in the first place. And perhaps we will also be clever enough to make some additional secondary analyses with the same data, to lend convincing support to our *post facto* interpretation.

In this process, however, there is clearly a point of diminishing returns. Whatever chance elements have got into the data are still there, and no amount of sophisticated re-analysis can ever really get rid of them. At some point it becomes clear that the only real way to break the bind is to get a fresh lot of data, in short, to replicate. But while everybody seems to agree in principle that replication is a fine and honorable thing, my impression is that — in the social sciences, at least — very little of it actually gets done. Usually we are much too eager to go on to something else.

In the present paper I propose to discuss a few of these issues as they presented themselves in the context of a program of research being carried on at Cornell jointly by Urie Bronfenbrenner, George Suci and myself. Some puzzling and unanticipated findings concerning the consequences for the children of varying patterns of au-

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thority in the family, which turned up in a pilot study, led us first into channels of *ex post facto* theorizing and secondary analysis and then into the problems of replication. In place of a straight-forward replication study, however, we selected an alternative strategy: cross-validation in a foreign setting. Here I shall try to say something about the rationale of this decision, about the problems of strategy and tactics encountered in designing such a cross-validation study, and about the outcome of our strategy.

FAMILY AUTHORITY AND CHILD BEHAVIOR IN AMERICAN PILOT STUDY

In the pilot study from which the puzzling findings emerged, 450 students in the 10th grade of the Ithaca High School responded to a series of self-administered questionnaires in which they were asked to report in some detail upon family composition, on the differentiation of roles and authority between their parents and, separately for fathers and mothers, upon 100 specific child rearing practices as employed by their parents in the home. Rough measures of the behavior and personality of the subjects were obtained from teachers' ratings.

The methods and principal findings of this study have been reported in an earlier publication [1] and need not concern us here, except for one particular unanticipated result. On the basis of the children's responses to a set of questions about which parent had the «final say» in various areas of decision, we classified the families as tending towards patriarchy, towards matriarchy or towards egalitarianism. In America, as everyone knows, the egalitarian approach to family authority has been widely recommended and accepted, on the ground that warm democratic homes would produce better adjusted children. In our Ithaca sample, children from the egalitarian families were indeed rated as relatively more spontaneous, outgoing and friendly; but they were also seen as more undependable and childish, and they tended rather consistently toward low school achievement. In contrast, children from the homes we had classified as patriarchal or matriarchal rated relatively high on responsibility and achievement.

Substantively, these results seemed to fly in the face of many theories and a good deal of research evidence regarding the ad-

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[1] See in particular Urie BRONFENBRENNER, «Some Familial Antecedents of Responsibility and Leadership in Adolescents», in L. PETRULLO and B. L. BASS, eds., *Leadership and Interpersonal Behavior*, New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1961, pp. 239-272.

vantages of the egalitarian approach to child rearing and the dis-
asterous consequences of either patriarchal or matriarchal auto-
cracy. The literature abounds with dismal accounts of children from
homes with autocratic fathers and smothering mothers, or with
cold, domineering mothers and indulgent fathers [2].

On methodological grounds, moreover, the findings of this rather
crude pilot study were hardly beyond reproach. The research instru-
ments were new and largely unvalidated, and the employment of
teachers' ratings for our sole measure of effect obviously left much to
be desired. The sample was small and, with its heavy middle-class
bias, offered a rather constricted range of variation on many of our
key variables. And the findings, though rather consistently patterned,
were mostly of low statistical reliability. Consequently, when we
reported these tentative results at the Psychological Congress in
Bonn, in 1960, we suggested that they should not be taken very
seriously until some further evidence could be marshalled in their
behalf [3].

However, the results did appear worthy of some speculative
theorizing and some additional secondary analyses. It occurred to us
that, because of the constricted range of our sample, most of the
families we had classified as patriarchal or matriarchal were in fact
only moderately so. Certainly we had few if any families resembling
the authoritarian autocracy of the traditional German family, and it
seemed to us that in this respect, the matter of degree might be of
crucial importance. To test this notion, we undertook a reanalysis of
our data concerning the consequences of a variety of specific parent
practices for child behavior and found that in virtually all instances
an important curvilinear component was present. Very briefly, it
appeared that either too much or too little discipline, coupled with
either too much or too little support, produced harmful results in
the children. Between these extremes of too much or too little, there
appeared to be an optimum level of discipline and support which
produced the most responsible and effective children [4].

[2] For a recent review and discussion of relevant research and theory, see
Philip E. SLATER, «Parental Role Differentiation», *American Journal of Socio-
logy,* LXVII, No. 3, Nov. 1961, pp. 296-311.

[3] Urie BRONFENBRENNER and E. C. DEVEREUX, Jr., «Family Authority Structure
and Adolescent Behavior», in *Proceedings of the XVIth International Congress
of Psychology,* Bonn, 1960; Amsterdam, North-Holland Publishing Company,
1962, pp. 414-418.

[4] For a discussion of this phase of the analysis, see Urie BRONFENBRENNER,
«Toward a Theoretical Model for the Analysis of Parent-Child Relationships

The pattern of parent behavior characteristic of the egalitarian families in the Ithaca sample, it appeared, erred in the direction of too little discipline and too much support. We hypothesized now that the relatively extreme patterns of either patriarchy or matriarchy described in the clinical literature would generally represent the combination of too much discipline and too little support. But in our Ithaca sample, and elsewhere in America, such extremes are relatively rare today. The moderately differentiated «patricentric» and «matricentric» families caught in this sample actually seemed to come fairly close to an optimum balance of discipline and support. Consequently, we formulated a new set of hypotheses which in general predicted optimum results for children from homes with moderate degrees of parental authority differentiation, and different kinds of dismal results for children from homes with relatively extreme differentiation or with none.

THE PROBLEM OF REPLICATION VERSUS CROSS-VALIDATION

It was in this context that we faced the problem of replication *versus* cross-validation. Narrowly defined, replication would entail a repetition, with a new and larger sample, of essentially the same study, employing the same questionnaires and procedures, and repeating the same pattern of analysis. Even the population selected for a replication study should be analogous to that employed in the original study. The major advantage of such a replication study, it seems to me, is the opportunity it affords to shake out any purely chance relationships present in the original set of findings. On the other hand, a replication study, almost by definition, provides a minimum of new information. If there are any systematic biases built into the instruments, they are still there. If some sort of response sets are operative, they would presumably affect the results of the new study as well. If «hidden variables» affect some of the apparent relationships in the original findings, their masked effect will still remain operative. For all of these reasons, a strict replication study provides a minimum of leverage for new analyses and interpretations.

Cross-validation, as I conceive it, entails an attempt at replication with some strategic changes. A cross-validation study would include the same basic variables employed in the original study, but may

involve others as well. The instruments and procedures used to operationalize these variables and the pattern followed in the analysis, however, may be modified and hopefully improved. Ideally, a different research setting and a differently constituted population should be employed, to break up any accidental or hidden linkages which might have been operative in the original setting. Supplementary variables and hypotheses may be built into the cross-validation study, to provide leverage for choice among alternative interpretations of the original findings, should they reappear.

It should be clear that a cross-validation study, as here conceived, involves a much greater element of risk than a simple replication study. For if the expected results do not reappear, it is much more difficult to say why. It could be that the re-designed research instruments have subtly modified the variables themselves; it could be that the variables somehow interact differently in the new research setting or in the new population studied. Hence negative findings in a cross-validation study cannot be interpreted as invalidating the findings of the original study. On the other hand if the expected findings are in fact replicated in a cross-validation study, you are very much farther ahead toward substantive generalization: for now it will be established that certain relationships among variables are not a function of any particular set of instruments and procedures, and that they hold across different populations and settings.

For us, the balance of advantage seemed to be clearly on the side of a cross-validation study. We did not wish to abandon the original instruments altogether but we did believe that they could be substantially improved. We wished to retain most of the variables from the original study, but we wanted to add a number of new ones as well, in keeping with our new hypotheses. And in order to catch our old and new variables in the desired ranges and in new combinations, we needed a differently constituted population and a different research setting. It appeared that these values might best be realized in some foreign culture. The rich literature on the authoritarian German family and its post-war transitions suggested that a contemporary West German sample should present the ranges and combinations desired [5].

[5] Max HORKHEIMER, *et al.*, *Studien über Autorität und Familie: Forschungsberichte aus dem Institut für Sozialforschung*, Paris: Librarie Felix Alcan,

SOME PROBLEMS OF STRATEGY AND TACTICS IN PLANNING OF CROSS-VALIDA-
TIONS STUDY

Once this basic decision was made, we had to face the numerous
details of strategy and tactics in planning the cross-validation study [6].
Incidentally, I use the terms strategy and tactics here because I be-
lieve that in practice research design involves a good deal more of
this than of general principle. As he struggles with the agonizing
constraints of time, money, feasibility and fieldability, the research
planner becomes painfully aware of the interconnectedness of his
decisions. What are gains in terms of any one value have an exasper-
ating tendency to appear again as costs with respect to another.
Strategy in research planning, as I see it, entails charting one's route
through a series of frustrating compromises in such a way that the
end product is optimum for his own values, under the given circum-
stances.

In our case, the constraints of time and money suggested that we
shoot for a sample of about 1200 cases. There were certain apparent
advantages of a nationwide, random sample, but as we analyzed
our own values, it became clear that we did not really need to be
able to estimate the actual parameters of parent or child behavior
for Germany as a whole or for any specific area thereof. Our major
requirement was merely that the sample should provide adequate
representation of the widest possible ranges of family situations. It
appeared that this requirement could be adequately met by concen-
trating our sample in a single, large urban center; and doing so af-
forded important tactical advantages: a single administrative
clearance could provide access to a large number of schools, and a
trained, native-speaking field staff could be conveniently and eco-
nomically moved about from school to school. To control the urban

1936; B. SCHAFFNER, *Fatherland: A Study of Authoritarism and the German
Family*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1948; Gerhard WURZBACHER,
Leitbilder gegenwärtigen deutschen Familienlebens, Dortmund: Ardey Ver-
lag, 1951; G. BAUMERT, *Deutsche Familien nach dem Kriege*, Darmstadt:
Eduard Roether Verlag, 1954; H. SCHELSKY, *Wandlungen der deutschen Fa-
milie in der Gegenwart*, Stuttgart; Ferdinand Enke Verlag, 1954; R. FRÖHNER,
et al., Familie und Ehe: Probleme in der deutschen Familien der Gegenwart,
Bielefeld: Maria von Stackelberg Verlag, 1956; and Rene KÖNIG, «Family and
Authority: The German Father in 1955», *Sociological Review*, ns, 1957, 5,
107-127.

[6] A detailed account of the development of this research design is set
forth in U. BRONFENBRENNER, E. C. DEVEREUX, Jr., and G. J. SUCI, *Family Struc-
ture and Personality Development: Report of Progress*, dittoed progress report
to National Science Foundation, 1962.

bias of such a sample and to explore possible additional ranges of family types, we decided, in addition, to run a small parallel study in some rural area of Germany.

If strict replication had been our goal, we should have attempted to carry out the new study with the same age group employed in the pilot study. In Germany, however, by the 10th grade, only a fifth of the children are still in school; the balance would not be available for class-room testing. Luckily, we had already decided to focus on a younger age group, for it appeared to us that the effects of varying systems of child rearing should be more readily apparent in younger children than among teen-agers who have already experienced extensive influences from the peer group. In the end we decided to sample sixth graders, mostly 11 to 12 years of age, old enough to answer our questions but still closely controlled by their parents.

After these basic strategy decisions were taken, there still remained a mass of tactical details to be worked through. Basically the following kinds of tasks were involved: 1) attempts to improve and strengthen the instruments to be carried forward from the pilot study; 2) the development of new instruments and procedures as relevant for the shifting focus of the project; 3) the adaptation of the new instruments and procedures to the capacities and vocabulary levels of a much younger population; 4) the tailoring of the entire operation to a sixty-minute test period, the most we realistically dared to demand, and 5) the translation and adaptation of the entire procedure to the intended German setting. All this, of course, involved extensive pretesting with populations of sixth graders, first in America and ultimately in Germany.

THE USES AND LIMITATIONS OF THE CROSS-NATIONAL VALIDATION STUDY

Let me go on to illustrate, in terms of outcomes, some of the uses and limitations of our cross-validation strategy. Consider first the problem of mapping parental behavior. In the Ithaca study we had asked our teen-aged subjects to rate each parent on 100 specific items of parental behavior, as characteristic of the parent «while you were growing up». These items were intended to index 20 more general *a priori* variables of parental behavior — e.g., nurturance, achievement demands, etc. — with five items each. For the German study it was essential to shorten and simplify this procedure. On the basis of inter-item correlations and factor analyses performed on the

Ithaca data, we selected what appeared to be the fifteen best variables and decided to index each with the three best items. In this way, the parent-practices schedule was cut from 100 to 45 items. Many of these needed to be reworded to sixth grade vocabularies — e.g., «compared me unfavorably with other children» became «says other children behave better than I do». The younger children were asked to rate each parent's behavior only during the current school year.

We thus have a selection of the «same» variables, somewhat differently operationalized, being rated by subjects in a different age group and a different culture. We may ask: is anything really cross-validated? On the new German data four matrices of inter-item correlations were run, dealing separately with the description by boys and girls of their fathers and their mothers, and each of these four matrices was independently factor-analyzed. The results were most encouraging: all four matrices generated highly similar factor structures, and the parent behavior factors which emerged proved to be in substantial agreement with our original *a priori clusters*. Nine factors were common to all four matrices. Of these, two included all three of the items originally grouped together in *a priori* sets, and all but one of the remainder included at least two of the three original items. From this we are inclined to conclude that our study has successfully tapped some basic dimensions of parent behavior which are common to both cultures and both age groups.

Consider next the rather tricky problem of cross-national comparisons. Suppose, for example, we wish to compare the role of physical punishment in the upbringing of German and American children. Note at once that since we do not have random or cross-section samples either for America or for Germany, we cannot estimate the actual frequencies of spanking for either culture as a whole. Note also that in the two samples, physical punishment was indexed with somewhat different items, and that the time reference was different. The German children reported only on spankings received during the current year, while the Ithaca teen-agers referred to spankings received during a more generalized period of childhood. Since it is probably true that younger children are spanked a good deal more often than 12 year olds in both cultures, the data cannot be directly compared.

Our own solution of this problem involved the utilization of our American pretest sample, a group of 134 sixth grade children in Dryden, New York, who filled out identical English-language ver-

sions of all questionnaires later employed in Germany. But of course these two samples are still not truly representative of their cultures nor comparable to each other. We have attempted to render these samples more directly comparable by the device of precision matching. For each child in the Dryden sample we sought a particular mate in the German sample who matched him with respect to age, sex, religion, intact family, socio-economic status, number of siblings, and working status of mother. To the extent that this procedure controls potentially contaminating demographic variables, we can argue that differences between the sets of matched pairs reflect genuine cultural differences. On this basis, without knowing anything about the absolute incidence of physical punishment in either culture, we can still state with considerable confidence that 12 year olds in Germany receive significantly more spankings than do comparable peers in America[7].

While we have thus been able to make explicit cross-national comparisons of parent behavior, it is instructive to observe that we cannot do the same with our measures of child behavior. In the original Ithaca study, it will be recalled, these were indexed by teacher ratings. In the German study and the Dryden pre-test, in addition to the teacher ratings we employed a system of sociometric ratings. On both instruments, individual children were ranked on various attributes, relative to the other children in the same school class. Whereas this device works very well indeed for estimating whether Johnny is more responsible or more aggressive than his class-mates, unfortunalety it provides no basis whatever for saying whether the children in one group or culture are more responsible or aggressive than children in another. In later work, we have been trying to correct this strategic deficiency by developing more absolute and objective measure of child behavior.

But let us recall that making comparisons of this sort was not a primary purpose in our research design. The more crucial question, for a cross-validation study, is whether certain hypothesized relationships between variables, observed in one setting with one set of measurements, will still hold in another setting, with a differently constituted population and with differently constructed measuring

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[7] A detailed account of this phase of the analysis appears in E. C. DEVEREUX, Jr., Urie BRONFENBRENNER, and G. J. SUCI, «Patterns of Parent Behavior in the United States of America and in the Federal Republic of Germany: A Cross-National Comparison», *International Social Science Journal*, Vol. XIV, N° 3, 1962, pp. 488-506.

instruments. Our major question is not, for example, whether German children are more responsible than American children, but whether the particular kinds of parental treatments which appear to produce responsible children in America have the same effect in Germany.

On the basis of the analyses completed thus far, our answer is that apparently they do. In the Ithaca study, for example, it will be recalled that children from egalitarian homes were rated as far less responsible than children from patricentric homes. Patterns of child rearing were quite different in these two types of families. Egalitarian homes were characterized by high levels of warmth, a generally permissive, non-punitive approach to discipline, and a minimum of role differentiation between the father and the mother. In contrast, patricentric homes were more disciplined and demanding; and they were characterized by a pattern of role differentiation in which the father was seen as the more demanding and punishing parent, while the mother was seen as the principal agent of support. In the German sample, when an analogous classification of family authority types was made — based, incidentally, on a wholly new and different set of questions about the locus of family authority — the correlative patterns of parent behavior for the egalitarian and patricentric homes were virtually identical. And in the German sample, children from egalitarian families were rated — by their peers, incidentally, as well as by their teachers — as significantly, less dependable than children from patricentric families. Incidentally, our new predictions about the dismal effects of extreme patriarchy or matriarchy were also generally borne out in the German data.

Precisely because these strikingly parallel results have been established with different instruments, in a different age group and in a different culture, it seems to me that they are far more impressive than if they had turned up in a straight-forward replication study. Although the risk is higher, cross-national validation studies would appear to have considerable value as a device for disentangling truly general relationships from the mesh of particular circumstances in which they originally appeared.

RELIABILITY OF DATA OBTAINED ON FAMILY AUTHORITY
WITH A CULTURE FREE INSTRUMENT

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The need for good measures of interaction is great in sociology, in particular in small group research, a special case of which is marriage and family research. The oldest and most common methods rely on self-reports and self-ratings of the people studied. These methods have serious drawbacks, however.

One difficulty is that we don't know how honest people are in their reports. For a variety of reasons — cultural values mostly — they may prefer to give another picture of the interaction than the one they themselves perceive as the correct one. Another difficulty is that people in general are not very competent to act as raters of interaction. Even if they report the picture as they perceive it that picture is not necessarily the correct one according to canons of science.

For these and other reasons interaction measures based on direct observation of the relevant interaction have been constructed. Since we almost never can observe all the interaction we are interested in the measures are constructed on a sample of the relevant behavior. One of the knottiest problems of this approach is to what extent the observations on the behavior sample can be generalized to the behavior «population».

These measures can all be said to be based on some kind of role-playing by the observed group members. If the members are asked to imagine a situation we have role-playing proper, if they are put into a definite situation their roles develop as they would in a natural context. Either way, in this context the observed behavior is used in order to draw conclusions about the interaction in general between the persons involved.

It is well known, of course, that people often behave differently in the presence of another person, be he an observer or somebody else. It is believed, however, that it is more difficult to pretend with one's total behavior than to pretend verbally. Some experimenters have tried to overcome this possible bias by making the group

members believe that they were left alone whereas they were in fact observed.

The interest in intercultural studies is a further incitement to use direct observation for the measurement of interaction. Verbal measures are inextricably bound to the language and are thus culturally specific. The comparison between different cultures becomes very difficult. The direct observational techniques would seem much more applicable, at least in theory.

Foote and his staff at the University of Chicago developed an observational technique for use in family research. An attempt to use the technique in Sweden and to test its reliability was made at Uppsala University [1].

The technique is devised for the study of interaction patterns of a married couple. The main idea is to put the couple into certain situations by asking them questions which they have to discuss in front of the interviewer. The spouses are asked to try to agree on a common answer. The interviewer observes the interaction and rates the marriage along a number of dimensions: relative degree of dominance of the spouses, harmony versus conflict, relative degree of initiative versus passivity, and relative amount of talking.

The Uppsala study was planned as a partial test of the reliability of the technique in a slightly different culture. It took place in the spring of 1957 and was done on student marriages. i.e. at least one of the spouses was a student at Uppsala University during the spring semester of 1957. This limitation of the sample diminishes the value of the study, but economical and other practical reasons forced us to accept the restriction.

The sample was a simple random sample. The interviewers were students of sociology. They were trained for the interviews and the interviewing was done as part of their regular curriculum in sociology. Because of the institutional setup the training given was not very extensive.

The interviews consisted of two parts. During the first part the spouses sat together with the interviewer and tried to give common answers to six different questions. Discussions developed for each question and the interviewer rated the marriages along the different dimensions on the basis of these discussions plus other indications of interaction patterns given during the interview. During the second part of the interview the spouses were given forms with questions of

[1] A report was published in *Recherches sur la famille, III.* Göttingen. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1958: Georg KARLSSON, «A Reliability Test of the Foote Observational Technique for Studying Interaction in the Family».

the usual type about their marriage and they were asked to fill them out separately.

The questions in the first part of the interview concerned economic problems in the marriage, the division of household duties, tastes regarding home equipment, the way vacations should be spent and how studies and work should be divided between the spouses.

The interviewer reliability of the ratings was tested in three ways: 1) by having all interviewers rate a recorded interview. 2) by having new interviewers re-interview the couples with a parallel form of the questionnaire, and 3) by having two students, one of which acted as interviewer, observe and rate simultaneously the interaction of a married couple.

The percentage of the interviewers who agreed on the modal positions in the ratings of the recorded interview was: dominance 60 per cent, harmony-conflict 83 per cent, initiative — passivity 67 percent, and amount of talking 73 per cent.

The results of the test-retest and simultaneous observation measures of reliability are seen from Table I.

TABLE I

Percentage Tests of Reliability

RATING	TEST-RETEST		TWO OBSERVERS	
	Per cent in same category	Per cent in adjacent category	Per cent in same category	Per cent in adjacent category
Dominance	25.3	73.3	45.7	89.1
Harmony-conflict	45.9	87.8	56.5	93.5
Initiative-passivity	53.3	98.7	47.8	97.8
Relative amount of talking	68.0	93.3	80.4	97.8

It is evident that the reliability with the procedures used is not as high as desirable. It can probably be raised by better training

of the interviewers. This means, however, that anyone who wishes to use these techniques for studying interaction has to take into account an extensive and expensive program for interviewer training.

So far we have talked only about intracultural reliability between interviewers. Ideally the reliability should be intercultural. However, since the observational situations are created verbally, the technique can never be completely culture free. An observer making observations in different cultures must at least know the different languages of these cultures. To require such intercultural reliability thus seems a little bit exaggerated. Since the distinction between reliability and validity is vague anyway, it seems preferable to deal with these matters as validity problems.

In the Uppsala study we considered the validity problems only to a very small extent. The intercorrelations between the ratings give some hints as to their validity. Dominance should be associated with initiative and a large amount of talking according to empirical evidence and theoretical considerations. In the Uppsala data the correlations between dominance and relative amount of initiative was $r = .69$ and between dominance and relative amount of talking $r = .51$ These correlations are reasonably satisfactory since we do not expect perfect correlations. The spouses also were asked to give self-ratings on who was the most dominant in economic matters, recreation, Christmas customs, etc. The associations between these self-ratings and the interviewer ratings of dominance were slight. On the whole it must be admitted that no satisfactory test of the validity of the technique was included in the study.

The validity of the technique within a given culture depends on a) the extent to which the observed sample of interaction can serve as a basis for the rating of the total interaction of the couple, and b) the extent to which the raters give ratings that agree with the ratings along the theoretical variables involved.

If ideal conditions prevailed the behavior observed in the interview situation could be considered an unbiased random sample of the couple's behavior in general. If that were the case all we had to do would be to make sure that the observational situations were set up so as to give us these random samples of behavior from which we could immediately infer the general behavior of the couples. However, we know that this is not the case. The behavior is verbal, it takes place in front of an outsider, etc. The behavior sample thus must be very biased. This complicates things, but it does not mean at all that the validity of the technique is disproved.

The observed behavior sample may be biased in any other way as long as it enables us to make the correct ratings along the variables we are interested in. In particular, if we use comparatively few values of the variables we are rating the task becomes easier both with regard to reliability and validity. The Foote technique uses only few values of each variable. This means that precision in the sense of ability to make fine discriminations is sacrificed for reliability and possibly validity.

If we take only the relative prevalence of the spouses into account, e.g. husband more, wife more, or both about the same, then all that is needed is that the behavior sample gives rise to the same relative ratings of the spouses as a complete study of their behavior would give. It is possible and indeed not unlikely that an otherwise very biased sample would reproduce truthfully these relative relations.

If we try to use the technique for intercultural comparisons the problems are still further complicated. If we could count on the unbiased representativeness of the behavior samples in all cultures no further complications would be introduced through the intercultural comparisons, since we could set up the observations so as to get such unbiased samples in each culture studied. This is not a realistic case, however, as we have already agreed.

If, on the other hand, we assume that the behavior sample is biased but that the relevant ratings are not affected by this bias, we have to make sure that the observational situations fulfill these conditions in all the different cultures studied. It is not important under these conditions that the questions used to elicit the discussions deal with the same problems, but it is important that they produce a behavior sample with the attributes required. We thus have a much larger number of possibilities to adjust the observational instrument to different cultures than we would have with a purely verbal instrument. At the same time it is most important that we keep in mind what we are doing when the instrument is applied to a different culture.

The other main problem of the validity of the technique is the correspondance between the ratings of the raters and the theoretical ratings. This is a question of the training of the interviewer-raters, of course. The better the researcher manages to instil his ideas of the theoretical variables in his interviewers the better this correspondance. In the case of the Foote technique the theoretical ideas are fairly simple and it would seem that the training of the interviewers in this respect would not be too difficult.

The same is true of the intercultural use of the technique. Care has to be taken that the interviewers in the different cultures use the same theoretical variables in their ratings, but with the simple variables that are used in the technique this should not offer insurmountable difficulties.

In summary it can be said that the Foote technique for observation of marital interaction patterns is quite promising. It requires well trained observers for satisfactory reliability and validity. We still need a good amount of research to assess its validity, but there are no theoretical reasons why it should not be a valid instrument, at least in a limited sense. It offers greater promise for intercultural comparisons than most other observational techniques.

SOME PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED IN AN INVESTIGATION CONCERNING THE EUROPEAN RURAL FAMILY

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Sociologists normally publish the scientific results of their investigations, but not the practical problems which they encounter in the course of obtaining the said results. It has a sound reason in that the first and not the latter is customary among sociologists. The scientific results of their investigations, in so far as these conclusions contribute to a cumulation of a systematic insight into social relationships, are of interest to their colleagues. The practical difficulties experienced in research are, however, often *einmalig,* thus ungeneralizable, and therefore only have limited instructive value to colleagues. Nevertheless, it has been a very good idea of Reuben Hill to raise the matter also, of the practical problems that are associated with cross-national research, during the international family seminar held at Opatija in September 1961. The outline given by him then, on the practical problems, that often arise in cross-national research, has been of considerable «prophylactic» value to the other seminar participants[1]. To prevent any misunderstanding: this outline has not weakened the participants' enthusiasm to undertake this kind of research, but it was a contribution in that mistakes concerning tactics could be averted in advance. Hill succeeded in clarifying for the others, what they should avert at any rate in case of possible, future cross-national research undertakings. The practical problematics of cross-national research obviously still haunts Reuben Hill up to the present day. Although this may be an encouraging situation, it sets us up against a very difficult task. Due to this enthusiasm, the task has been given to us to deal here with some problems that have arisen in the course of a project which we undertook some

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[1] Reuben HILL, *Cross-national family research; attempts and prospects* (seminar paper Opatija 1961).

years ago. This task is not easy for at least two reasons. The first one is that, for a comprehensive outline of only one of these problems we have to deal rather extensively with our objective, hypotheses and methods, while the time at our disposal is very limited. The second one is that our problems were so numerous that we have to make a selection, while it can hardly be determined in advance which problem holds a warning for the majority of future cross-national researchers. We would not like to give the impression of an apology for what is to follow and the best would be to deal with the investigation as such immediately.

During the 1956 congress of the International Union of Family Organisations held in The Hague a resolution was accepted which aimed at setting up a Working Group of experts to advise the board of the Union as to the policy for the rural family in modern rural society. The Working Group that was set up soon after the congress, came to embrace mainly representatives of family policy. These members — «policy makers» were of Belgian, French, Spanish, Italian and Swiss nationality. Only two representatives of social science were nominated as members of the Group, namely the authors of this paper; the one a German, the other Dutch. One can probably imagine that the functioning of this Working Group was not a simple matter. There had to be co-operation between individuals who belonged to five different linguistic groups and whose objectives and way of thinking differed considerably. Concerning the latter: full mutual understanding between policy-maker and sociologist is really not easily attainable. In the meantime it was perfectly clear that this working group had to make some recommendations for a useful policy.

In the course of the discussion it soon appeared that most of the group's non-sociologist members, notwithstanding a certain vagueness in definitions, had the following convictions about the rural nuclear family:

1. that it would be essentially different from the urban nuclear family;

2. that it would, much more than the urban family, embody these values of which the preservation is a necessity for a really human society;

3. that the relative value-surplus of the rural family would be

threatened by the expansion of urbanization and industrialization in modern society[2].

The two sociologists could not support the majority of the group in their negative viewpoint of nuclear family development in modern rural life. Notwithstanding their rural background the two sociologists were far more positive in their judgment of that development. However, they personally felt that only by scientific research could it be determined whose opinion — that of the majority or if theirs — was the correct one, and that on the outcome of this the policy proposals should be based. Hesitatingly the members-policy makers now accepted at last that social-scientific research was a necessity for a sound policy. After prolonged discussions the sociologists were invited to design a project that could be the subject of the group's «negotiations» during its next meeting. In spite of the total lack of money, as well as fairly long geographical distance separating them, they succeeded in tabling a common plan for the next meeting. Comprehensive detail: a plan drawn up by a German and a Dutchman, originally written in English, and for the convenience of the majority of the group translated in French. This research which was received with many criticisms, was eventually unanimously accepted by the Working Group.

The investigation proposed by the two sociologists and later accepted by the Working Group, was based on the problem whether the rural nuclear family in the modern, urban-industrial society was characterized by a specific problem of existence. It was hypothesized that, if such a problem really existed, the reason for it could be threefold. Whether it was a result of a collision between urban and typically rural values; or whether it was as the result of a discrepancy between aspirations present in the rural nuclear family, and possibilities to fulfil these aspirations under the given objective circumstances in the rural milieu; or whether it was an outcome of both collision and discrepancy. The problem of the investigation, although probably clear enough, was so wide that without «directing» hypotheses the project would be a «mer à boire». The researchers had

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[2] Although the appreciation of the modern socio-cultural development of these members was strikingly similar to that of the «classic» German sociologist who wrote «Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft», their motivation was no doubt different from his. They clearly represented the *conservative*-Catholic view upon society which apparently still exercises a thorough influence among a part of both the clergy and the laymen in several European countries.

such hypotheses in mind for a long time. They are briefly considered now.

As a first directing hypothesis, it was proposed that a rural nuclear family *sui generis* would not exist, which appeared to cause some concern among a number of the group's non-sociologists. Directly continuing on this: that the sociologically relevant characteristics of nuclear families in the modern Western society would be narrowly related to the sociologically relevant characteristics of the community. More specifically, there would exist a continuum of nuclear family characteristics between the extremes of the most closed rural life and the most open urban life. For the sake of clarification: the most closed rural life was considered life in the still extremely isolated rural community, and the most open urban life that of the new middle class. Schematically the hypothesized family characteristics of these two extreme levels can be placed opposite each other as follows:

MOST CLOSED RURAL LIFE	MOST OPEN URBAN LIFE
a so-called open nuclear family, i.e. a nuclear family being hierarchically integrated in an extended family, neighbour-group, and ecclesiastical community;	a so-called closed nuclear family, i.e. a nuclear family living in the awareness of its morally justified liberty and autonomy.
Situationsehe (marital integration by objective factors);	*Neigungsehe* (marital integration by subjective factors);
patriarchial-parental structure of the nuclear family;	equalitarian structure of the nuclear family;
economic and reproductive functions emphasized;	emphasis upon mutual affection between the members of the nuclear family;
stability in the psychic climate of the nuclear family.	instability in the psychic climate [3].

It needs no further illumination that as a result of the foregoing, briefly circumscribed hypothesis, the researchers' attention during the execution of their project would in the first instance concentrate on values embodied in the rural nuclear family, not on circumstances to this family. In the opinion of the two sociologists their initial occupation with the value aspect was otherwise fully defendable.

The second (and last) «directing» hypothesis formulates that as the

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[3] The 2 nuclear family types have been described more extensively in G. A. Kooy, *Het veranderend gezin in Nederland* [The changing nuclear family in the Netherlands], Assen, 1957, 243 p.

rural nuclear family tended to resemble in character to the urban middle class family, the former would more easily experience the presence of a «specific» problem of existence. Trying to illuminate this hypothesis very briefly, it may be added that the rural nuclear family which appears to show more similarities in its value system to the family in the urban middle class, will be more frustrated by the rural life circumstances than the less modern nuclear family in the rural milieu. The reason for this presumption was a simple one: the most modern type of nuclear family in rural society was supposed to be more inclined to compare its local life situation with that of the urban nuclear family, so that it would also understand most deficiencies in its own situation. As such deficiencies were presumed, relatively difficult availability of institutions for secondary and academic education, the limited presence in the local milieu of recreation facilities in some standards, the housing situation, etc.

Normally it is easier to create hypotheses, than to test them. This found no exception in this case. Relatively unimportant problems would have arisen, if the object had been to test some of the hypotheses on the nuclear family in one or two, geographically restricted rural areas. The object, however, was to test hypotheses on the rural nuclear family in the modern, urban-industrial society. Therefore, a representative sample of rural nuclear families of a larger number of countries had to be considered as an absolute necessity. The researchers felt the first step was that an endeavour should be made to collect official statistical data concerning both the urban and the rural families in at least ten European countries. In spite of all that has been said by experts on rural life in general, the sociologist is still confronted with a tremendous shortage of definite and exact data. In fact our real empirical knowledge about similarities and differences between urban and rural life on the same side of national boundaries, and between rural regions separated by national boundaries, is depressingly low. The researchers did not believe that their search for relevant statistical data would deliver a fully representative sample. All they hoped for in their collection of statistical data on a wide scale, was to find a few hundreds or thousands of rural nuclear families more or less representative of Europe on the Western side of the Iron Curtain. By means of interviews with these families (in two or more rural communities, and in four or five different countries), the German-Dutch team hoped, both hypotheses could be sufficiently tested.

Thus the project was an investigation in two phases, a phase of

extensive collection of statistical data and one of field work *whereby the former was considered as an indispensable condition for the success of the latter*. The reason for repeating and emphasizing this, is because of the disappointment, that the data collected in the first phase appeared to be absolutely worthless as a means to draw the sample. Contrary to the researchers' hopes and expectations mailed «interviews» to 14 European countries did not result in a satisfactory collection of data from a number of these countries. Thus the first step, although it produced an impressive number of statistical data, was actually a failure. However, their disappointing experience did not deter the researchers from continuing with the already planned second step, i.e. questioning some 400 nuclear families in the European rural milieu. «Ignoring» the problem, whether these families, indeed, expressed a possible common shift in life appreciation of European rural life on the Western side of the Iron Curtain, they continued their investigations until the beginning of 1961. Notwithstanding their uncertainty concerning the representativeness of their 400 families, they obstinately insisted that they had to get more clarity upon the correctness of their two hypotheses in the field work stage. So they have at least tested the validity of their assumption in four rural communities in which the tendencies might be more or less representative of a possibly common mental development in Western rural life. They do not feel completely satisfied in their stubborn perseverence to «save» a project that appeared to be too ambitious, but they have the satisfaction of proving the validity of their hypotheses in four «normal» European communities.

The field work has been done in respectively two German and two Dutch rural municipalities, in each of the two neighbouring countries having practically an identical historical background, but since recent years being different in their degree of socio-cultural differentiation. The German municipalities were homogeneously Roman Catholic, the Dutch municipalities were predominantly Protestant. Neither ethnic, nor religious difference appeared to affect the tendencies: in both the German and the Dutch milieu of investigation, geographic and social «disclosure» mean nuclear family individualization, a more subjective marital integration, democratization of internal nuclear family relationships, etc. Furthermore in both milieux the disclosure implies a growing consciousness of the limitations caused by rural life, although neither in Germany nor the Netherlands did the families find their own local milieu seriously frustrating. Because the results of this cross-national investigation were published — as regards Germany in German and as regards

the Netherlands in Dutch, as well as in French — a more extensive report on them seems to be superfluous at this moment[4]. Moreover it is desirable to deal with the practical problems now, which was the original intention of this review as was mentioned some time ago.

In the foregoing, a brief outline has been given of an investigation that, although some practical hints for family policy resulted, became a failure considered from the viewpoint of the researchworkers' original objectives. It is intended to deal now with all those more important problems, possibly having a generalized character, which were encountered in the course of this investigation. In relation much attention has to be given to the failure of the collection of useful statistical data, because subsequent researchers who would occupy themselves with the European rural milieu in its unity and diversity will encounter the same *unsurmountable* difficulties. Because this point is of more interest than the rest, it seems justified to deal with the other difficulties first.

Besides the unsurmountable difficulty of large scale collection of statistical data on the family in European rural life the researchers met with some five surmountable, but fairly serious problems. These were problems concerning:

1. communication between the researchers on the one hand and the other members of the Working Group on the other;

2. communication between the researchers themselves;

3. the communication between the German and the Dutch assistant who did the field work;

4. design of homonymous questionnaires in different languages (in phase 1 in three languages, English, French and German; in phase 2 in two languages, German and Dutch);

5. financing of the project.

It seems desirable to go more extensively into each of these five points, and mainly because they hold a lesson. As regards the first point — the communication between researchers and other members of the Working Group — some remarks have already been made. If literal linguistic difficulties are neglected at this moment, another difficulty worth mentioning in this context still remains. It is the

[4] See: Bernd van DEENEN, *Die ländliche Familie unter dem Einfluss von Industrienähe und Industrieferne*, Berlin, 1961, 96 p., and W. H. DOUMA: *Het gezin op een verstedelijkend platteland»*, Wageningen, 1961, 117 p. (with English summary).
IDEM, *Enquête sur la famille rurale aux Pays Bas* (mimeographed translation of *Het gezin op een verstedelijkend platteland*).

delay in the work of the researchers as a consequence of repeated intervention of the other group members. Why did these other group members intervene during the course of the investigation and then especially in these instances, where the researchers found intervention to be most annoying? The answer does not seem to be difficult. Probably it is mainly the object of sociological research which encourages the layman to meddle with the work of the researcher. No layman will try to correct the ideas and activities of the researcher in the field of physics, biology and linguistics. He is fully prepared to recognize his absolute ignorance in these scientific fields. However, the sociological object is an object with which he as a member of society, is rather well acquainted and which object is, therefore, not particularly mysterious to him. Isn't it true that most laymen have already answered what has remained so untransparent to sociologists that they (sociologists) feel obliged even at this moment to make it a subject of strenuous research efforts? Isn't it also true that many laymen are fully convinced of what the outcome of *expert* sociological investigations will be, viz. a further confirmation of the correctness of what they already knew with absolute certainty? Therefore, it is nearly unavoidable — this is an insight gained from personal experience — that the sociological researcher places himself in a difficult position by accepting any duty of responsibility towards the laymen during the time in which an investigation is conducted. The IUFO investigation has taught the researchers in a rather painful way that the sociologist should have the « a priori» of stipulating his independence towards laymen during the execution of each research undertaking but particularly during a cross-national object.

The second point — the communication between the researchers — has not been mentioned because of scientific disputes or personal difficulties between the German and the Dutch sociologist. Nevertheless it might be useful to say something here about scientific preferences and the personal character of co-operating researchers. The two researchers were able to co-operate perfectly from the very beginning, as their personal relationship could not have been better and their scientific opinions appeared to be remarkably similar. Meanwhile, both mutual sympathy and scientific concord are important conditions for the success of a cross-national project undertaken by a team. Future cross-national researchers should not overlook this. The co-operation with a brilliant foreign partner is not predestined by the partner's brilliance as a pleasant and scientifically fruitful co-operation. Those who consider mutual co-operation, will

do well in not accepting anything before a clear picture of the other person and his scientific procedures, has been obtained. This is only just a hint. The factors which interfered with the smooth communication between the researchers in this case, were geographical distance and language. For the determination and the then ensuing execution of real mutual intentions, contact by correspondence is without doubt, insufficient. Occasional face-to-face contact is absolutely necessary. If the distance between the partners, as in the instance of the German-Dutch team, is more than 200 miles, one having also to fulfil other tasks besides a common project, the distance is not easily overcome. Relatively the meetings cost a good deal of time and money. The language difference between researchers was even more of a problem. Discussions requiring hours had sometimes to be held on very subtle questions. There were two possibilities: either the one partner tried to communicate in the mother tongue of the other, or both partners expressed themselves in a foreign language. Both alternatives were used. The discussion always started in German, but it most frequently finished in English. For the two partners the several discussions were not only mentally extremely tiring, but it also left them with the impression that they had failed to express their thoughts properly. It seems that the problems mentioned — distance and language — is another lesson, and no less important than the one concerning communication problems between researchers and other members of the Working Group. In the first place, co-operating researchers from different countries must have the opportunity to meet at any time in the course of the investigation when necessary. In the second place it is at least desirable that the partners fairly master each other's mother tongue. In many cases this desirability appears to be unrealizable, but in all cases a fair requirement can be realized: this requirement is good temperament and patience towards the partner who is in the disadvantageous position in that he has to express himself in a language which is not his own.

As the researchers lacked the time to execute the field work personally, they brought in the help of two co-operators who where sufficiently capable of doing this work. The communication between the German and the Dutch field worker had to be as close as that of their «employers». It will not be found surprising that distance and language were also hampering factors in the field workers' mutual communication. The lesson which can be learned from their experiences concerning co-operation, is about the same as the foregoing. As in the case of their «employers» the field workers have to under-

stand each other both as person and scientist, they have to be on hand if the correct progress of the work is in danger, and their mutual linguistic understandability has to be fair. In this connection it is worth mentioning that the field workers learned to know each other's (geographic) field of study by common operation. The latter seems to be an absolute necessity, if optimal results in the field are one of the objectives. In fact it is superfluous to add that the members of the research team should define by mutual deliberation what type of co-operators will assist in the execution of the common project.

The fourth point — the design of homonymous questionnaires in different languages — forms a problem that is apparently not limited to the correct translation of a term or sentence. Translation as such can already be difficult enough, even in the case of closely related languages. This applies, for instance, to the Dutch term *gezin* (nuclear family), for which one would in vain search for a German equivalent, at least in common parlance. To give a second example: it applies for the German terms *Vetter* and *Neffe* (respectively cousin and nephew), for which the Dutch language has one and the same term: *neef*. Homonymousness of the questionnaire is necessary for the sake of the comparability of the collected data. Thus linguistic problems have to be solved in order to be able to reach «formal» homonymousness. On the other hand, it appears to be necessary to strive for an indicative similarity instead of a «formal» homonymousness. Because the investigation embraces different cultural milieux, it is possible that a question being justified in the one milieu is absolutely irrelevant, or worse: absurd in the other. To put a question to the Dutch Protestant families about their participation in processions is totaly irrelevant, if one tries to determine their degree of religiousness. For the determination of the religiousness of the German Catholics the question might, however, be very important. A problem of equal importance as that of direct translation, is that of difference in questioning which would guarantee that, for considerably different cultural milieux, the same phenomenon or aspect is clarified. It is a problem, indeed, which is not typical of cross-national research. However, it is clear, that it is often more serious in the cross-national than in the national or regional level. On the former level it is a problem which forms another argument in favour of the necessity of a mutual exploration in the research field by those who have to execute the field work.

The financial history of the investigation undertaken by the Working Group could be made the subject of a long and depressing story. It would be a story of promised amounts which either did not

arrive at all, or were delayed. The IUFO itself was unable to give any financial support to a project of the Working Group, but after some time granted 500 Dutch florins or the equivalent of approximately 140 American dollars. For the execution of the first phase of the investigation (collecting of statistical data in 14 countries) nothing more was put at the group's disposal. After the termination of the unsuccessful first phase it appeared that from neither the IUFO itself nor through this organization further financial support could be expected. The researchers then on their own applied to the ministry in their respective countries. In Germany the amount of 3000 marks or the equivalent of 750 American dollars was obtained and in the Netherlands the «profit» amounted to 12.500 guilders or 3470 dollars. None of the ministries could accept an application of its subsidy outside their country. Thus, the field work in the Netherlands could be done much more extensively than the parallel work in Germany, but on the other hand, the execution of the work in the Netherlands had to be justified towards a «supervising council». The necessary co-operation with this council led to serious problems for a while because of mutual role misunderstanding. (An outsider succeeded in clearing the misunderstanding which had arisen). It is difficult to give in full the lesson the researchers learned from the constant financial difficulties. They are much more aware of it now than some years ago, however, that, both timely certainty of the total of financial means budgeted for a project, and a clear definition of each other's rights and duties towards the financier: researcher relationship, are indispensable. In the meanwhile the question arises whether the International Sociological Association could further cross-national research by a world-wide exploration of eventual pecuniary sources. It appears that many researchers even have no possibilities of obtaining financial aid for an intra-national project.

The attention may now be concentrated on the collection of statistical data in the 14 European countries. Why, then, did the researchers fail in collecting those data which were indispensable in drawing a representative sample of European rural families ? There were a number of causes. The main one, however, was not the lack of money or assistance, but the character of the statistical data obtainable from the national statistical bureaux. This was the only real cause responsible for the total failure of what the researchers had hoped to accomplish.

The questionnaire designed for the first phase of the investigation embraced 27 questions. The exordium of the list reads as follows: «Before returning this list, will you, please, add to every answer the

statistical source from which you obtained your answer. Under every question/table we left room for «remarks». Be so good to fill in here all the explanations which appear to be necessary for a right interpretation of the answer. We are particularly interested in: a) the definition and implications of the different terms (in some cases we explicitly asked for a definition of the terms under «remarks»); b) titles of scientific publications and research projects related to the question/table». It would be time-consuming to go into any of the 27 questions. (A questionnaire can be placed at the disposal of those who are interested in the questions.) The list was sent to those persons from whom, as a result of their position or personal interest, full assistance could be expected [5]. Most of them had been approached in advance during meetings of the European Society for Rural Sociology and the IUFO, which, they and the researchers attended. After two years 11 of the 14 respondents had answered. Among those 11, one, however, could not obtain the data in his country. (Inspection of the non-published material would have cost a considerable amount.) Thus, at last the researchers had at their disposal the more or less fully completed questionnaires from 10 different countries: Austria, Switzerland, the Federal Republic, Sweden, Norway, Ireland, The Netherlands, Belgium, France. and Spain. The comparability of the data of these countries in the first place appeared to be less than had been hoped, because the dates on which the figures were collected were sometimes considerably divergent. The Swedish data were taken from a census of 31-12-1950, the Belgian data from a census held on 31-12-1947, while the Irish data were (partly) from 8-4-1956. (These dates were the most recent census dates of each of the countries.) Thus the researchers had to be very cautious and reserved in their interpretation of international similarities and differences, since in the course of nearly 10 years important changes in population characteristics can take place. Another source of trouble was the incompleteness of lists. Notwithstanding loyal assistance, some of the respondents did not succeed in giving more than the half of the desired figures.

So at least four factors caused that the investigation *could* never *have* become a complete success:

1. lack of co-operation of some of those who had promised their assistance;

[5] The researchers were fully aware of the danger of misunderstanding between researcher and respondent which the «mailing method» could involve, but they had no choice. Their budget made it impossible to travel to 14 national statistical *Bureaux*.

2. the actual inaccessibility of statistical data of 1 of the 14 countries;

3. the — strictly taken — non-comparability of data from several of the countries, due to the gathering of data in different years;

4. the lack of a considerable part of the desired data in most countries.

The reason for the total failure of the undertaking, however, was another one. The undertaking became a complete failure because *the differences between urban and rural families — the aim of the researchers — were not reflected at any of the lists.* More specified, the endeavour to collect relevant statistical data taught the following:

1. although all countries distinguish between municipalities according to size (number of inhabitants), most of them completely fail in arranging their statistical data in such a way that the *family* sociologist interested in the rural: urban dichotomy or continuum could make profitable use of them;

2. furthermore the official statistical sources very seldom offer the possibility to delineate the characteristics of the agrarian nuclear family as against the non-agrarian one.

The recently developed Dutch typology of municipalities according to their degree of urbanization, did not open any perspective for the researchers, as a comparable typology could not be obtained in any of the other countries [6]. In the meantime this typology appears to be the only acceptable basis until now on which urban and rural families can be compared statistically. (It needs no argument among sociologists that a rural: urban dichotomy according to municipal size classes — the normal picture until now — is sociologically unsatisfactory). The conclusion seems to be justified that the investigation could only have been more or less successful, if at least *some* of the countries had statistically distinguished between an urban and a rural milieu on the basis of sociologically relevant and similar criteria. This pessimistic remark should not be misinterpreted. It does not intend it to be any criticism towards the national statistical bureaux in Europe. These bureaux are often open-minded enough, but the way in which they arrange their basic data will not be changed to suit the needs of sociological research as long as sociological research does not communicate its principal needs to them. The disappointing experiences of the German-Dutch team to obtain useful data by means of the official statistical bureaux in a number of European

[6] See: CENTRAAL BUREAU VOOR DE STATISTIEK, *Typologie van de Nederlandse gemeenten naar urbanisatiegraad 31 mei 1947 en 30 juni 1956*, Zeist, 1958 (with English summary).

countries, could contain a lesson for organized sociology. The lesson is that a systematic effort should be made to influence the different statistical bureaux in such a way that sociology could profit more from their work in the near future.

What generally can be learned by future cross national researchers from the painful experiences of two European sociologists, who believed in cross-national research as a means of improving the well-being of the rural family ? To begin with, it seems that enthusiasm is not sufficient for successful cross-national undertakings. Those who are going to cooperate will be partners in an adventure which is no doubt much more of a real adventure than that of an investigation in one and the same country. On the one hand difficulties will be met with which are more serious than the identical difficulties arising in research on the national level, while on the other hand problems will have to be mastered which never would arise in the latter case. Safe-guarding from intervention of outsiders in the course of the investigation, sufficiently commodious pecuniary means (notwithstanding the first), resolution of linguistic difficulties, communication with foreign colleagues, and probably limited possibilities to draw a representative sample — all these points have to be considered previously.

This dissertation, although being too lengthy already, can not be concluded before some further suggestions regarding cross-national research on the rural family have been made. These suggestions might also be of some use for cross-national study of any other rural phenomenon. In the first place, researchers can probably expect most, for the time being, from small-scale studies such as those that have been made in Germany and the Netherlands. Particularly where a larger number of countries are the subject of study, the use of official statistics is rather perspectiveless. This, however, gives special reason for the second and last suggestion. This suggestion reads: taken into account the unsatisfactory outcome of the inquiry undertaken in 14 European countries, it would be desirable if the ISA formed a working committee for the furtherance of the international comparability of statistical data. Insufficiently equipped with adequate and comparable statistical data from a large number of countries, the sociologist in his professional diligence to generalize, runs a considerable risk to do violence to truth.

DEVELOPMENT OF CROSS-CULTURAL EQUIVALENCE OF MEASURE OF MARITAL INTERACTION FOR U. S. A. AND JAPAN [*]

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To the naive researcher, the problem of cross-cultural survey research seems relatively simple. Especially when dealing with such comparable forms of social organization as nuclear families living in American and Japanese metropolitan environments, the task of replication seems straightforward. All that seems necessary is to translate the interview schedule from English into Japanese and the project is ready to go. However, in actual practice four methodo-

logical problems arise: (1) terminological non-equivalence; (2) normative non-equivalence; (3) non-equivalent variability; and (4) pragmatic non-equivalence. Each of these problems requires the researcher to proceed with caution as he attempts to replicate his domestic research in foreign cultures.

TERMINOLOGICAL NON-EQUIVALENCE

Our attempts to translate the American interview schedule into the Japanese language forced us to realize how culture-bound language is. The social scientist who has always worked in a single language tends to take for granted that there is a one-to-one relationship between words from language to language. It turns out, however, that other languages sometimes have several potential equivalents for an English word or, worse *still*, sometimes none !

Where several possible translations are available, each has a different shade of meaning which affects the potential responses. For example, the word «family» can be translated as either *iye* or *kazoku,* the former referring to the transcendental and all-inclusive family of traditional Japan, the latter to the nuclear family. But to confuse cross-cultural investigators further, when *kazoku* is used in compound nouns as in *kazoku-seido* (the traditional family system) or *kazoku-shugi* (familism), it loses its modern connotations.

Birth control is rendered *sanji-seigen* in Japanese. But *sanji-seigen* is a generic term including both contraception (*jutai-chosetsu*) and induced abortion (*ninshin-chuzetsu*). Some of Takeshita's respondents disapproved of *sanji-seigen* because to them it implied induced abortion rather than contraception. A Westerner relying on an English-Japanese dictionary would find the word *datai* for induced abortion but is unlikely to obtain reliable responses as that particular rendering has the same negative (disapproving) connotation as the word «abortion» in the United States. *Ninshin-chuzetsu* (literally, «interruption of pregnancy») is a new term, not even found in a standard Japanese dictionary published in 1955, and is preferred since it is neutral in its connotation. Using this term, Takeshita could ask a direct question on induced abortion in Japan.

The selection of the best translation is a matter of judgment. Usually foreign nationals can judge which of their own words is the best equivalent of a single English word because they are more familiar with the connotations of the several alternatives. However, since connotations are partly affected by individual experience, one

can seldom rely on the judgment of a single expert. So a number of bilingual nationals must be consulted about the best alternative to be selected — both sociological experts and laymen equivalent to the respondents to be interviewed. Ultimately it is to be hoped that consensus will emerge about the best foreign word to be equated with the English one. Even so, it must be recognized that connotations are seldom identical in any two languages. All that is accomplished by this selection process is to minimize the connotational problems which the alternative words presented. The Japanese and English schedules are still not «the same».

The translation problem is even more difficult when the foreign language contains no equivalent term at all. Such linguistic blanks are sociologically important since they symbolize either the absence of a corresponding culture trait or its newness. In the latter event, cultural lag seems to be occurring. Overt behavior changes comparatively easily by cultural diffusion, but considerable time may elapse before a Japanese term is invented to fit the new practice. Sometimes Japanization of the English word occurs, so that not only the foreign artifact or activity but the foreign label is diffused. *Aisu kurimu* (ice cream) is a good example.

Sometimes, however, the English word used in Japanized form is not the one used in the United States. For example, Takeshita, in making up a list of birth control methods to be checked by his respondents, discovered that the Japanese commonly refer to the diaphragm as the *pessari* (pessary) and the condom more often as *sakku* (sack) than *kondomu*. Similarly the acculturated word *mikisa* applies not to what we would call a mixer but rather to a blender.

If the process of social change is not yet completed, the average respondent may not have learned the new word and hence would not understand a question in which it was employed. Therefore, when a neologism is employed in a questionnaire, it must be thoroughly defined for the sake of those unfamiliar with the term. Sometimes a foreign derivative is offensive to certain respondents. If so, the solution may be to present the definition without the word at all. Under these circumstances, the foreign edition is more cumbersome than the domestic original.

For example, Blood was interested in studying the mate selection process in Japan. The custom of dating is becoming widespread in the younger generation, only 3 % of his sample never having had any dates prior to engagement. Nevertheless, the word, *deito,* is not in general usage in the population. He finally decided to use the nearest equivalent Japanese word, *otsukiai* (which literally means «as-

sociation» or «fellowship» without any specifically hetero-sexual connotations) and then illustrated it with typical dating activities, «for example, go to a movie, concert, or dine together». We hope that we communicated succesfully with our respondents !

The terminological problem was even more difficult with respect to marital «companionship». Here was a concept which our Detroit respondents said was the single most important facet of American marriage. Yet our Japanese informants told us that no such term existed in their language. This vacuum reflects a basic contrast in the two family systems. For many years American marriage has emphasized husband-wife companionship whereas the Japanese husband found his companionship largely outside the nuclear family. Indeed the idea of the possibility of such companionship has only recently begun to enter Japanese minds. The absence of any word for marital companionship partly reflects the low priority attached to it (last among the Tokyo respondents, first on the list in Detroit). However, since the Japanese have no word for the idea of companionship in marriage, the idea cannot be discussed or communicated easily. Under the circumstances, perhaps we should not have tried to translate it at all. Perhaps this should have been classified as an area of non-equivalent variablity instead. What we did, however, was to try to get the idea across through the following phraseology: «Oshigoto no nai toki niwa, yoku okusan no oaite o shite kudasaru koto». «To do many things together with you (the wife), when he (the husband) isn't working». An alternative translation would be, «To be a good companion to you when he isn't working». On the surface this sounds like what we were after, but the problem is deceptive because the connotations to Japanese ears are homo-sexual rather than heterosexual.

Other difficulties in translation stem from the complexities of variation in Japanese terms of reference and of address. For example, husband may be translated *otto*. But this word is impolite to use when referring to a respondent's husband. *Otto* is used only when one is discussing the role of the husband in an impersonal way such as «the duty of a husband is... (*Otto no gimu wa...*)». Instead, we must say *Otaku no go-shujin* (the honorable master of your house). An even more polite form, *Otaku no danna-sama*, is not so frequently used now as the former. The choice between such terms may determine whether the respondent is insulted or flattered by the interview schedule, particularly in a cross-section sample where some respondents have a higher social status and others a lower social status than the interviewer. In any society still emer-

ging from a highly stratified feudal past, such complexities can baffle the naively casual American researcher.

Readers of Ruth Benedict's *Chrysanthemum and the Sword* will recall that she despaired of finding English equivalents for the many Japanese words for «duty» and finally used *gimu, giri,* and *on* untranslated in her monograph. Imagine how difficult it would be for a Japanese scholar to devise an interview schedule for use in America which would tap these distinctions !

Normative Non-Equivalence

Sometimes equivalent words for a particular practice exist in both vocabularies but referring to the practice may not be equally permissible. The problem is most acute when a given behavior is legal in one society and illegal in the other. For example, the legalization of induced abortion in Japan enabled Takeshita to ask about it directly. However, its illegal status in the United States prevented Takeshita's predecessors from obtaining equally direct information here [1]. Even if Americans were asked about induced abortion, information about deviant behavior is difficult to secure from respondents. Hence the presumed cross-national gap in frequency of induced abortion made possible by differential legality of the behavior is likely to be widened by differential willingness to report the behavior.

Normative non-equivalence may affect the propriety of studying behavior which is equally legal in both countries but which is considered differentially private. Japanese and American respondents presumably differ in their willingness to discuss certain facets of family living. Unfortunately we can give no testimony on this subject because of the excellent cooperation of our respondents on both sides of the Pacific. What we can report, however, is that differential norms exist in the minds of research sponsors, due not only to cross-national factors but to pragmatic situational factors. Despite the doubts of some of our Japanese consultants, we experienced no difficulty in questioning Japanese respondents on their sexual satisfaction. However, the fact that our American research was carried out through the facilities of the Detroit Area Study of the University of Michigan left us unable to ask equivalent questions

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[1] Ronald FREEDMAN, P. K. WHELPTON, and Arthur A. CAMPBELL, *Family Planning, Sterility, and Population Growth,* McGraw-Hill, 1959.

here: (1) the D.A.S. administration did not wish to jeopardize its public relations with its on-going research site, and (2) the predominantly male composition of its interviewing staff made such questions seem beyond the bounds of propriety for female respondents. To be sure, equivalent research organizations would have reduced this normative variation, yet crossing national boundaries often introduces variations in research facilities.

Non-Equivalent Variability

By non-equivalent variability we mean that some areas of variance in family structure and functioning are significant for one society but not for another. We have already suggested that this is largely true of companionship. Companionship is a central value in most American marriages. However, in traditional Japanese marriages, companionable activity seldom occurs and there is little awareness of the concept or idea of companionship. If companionship in all the Japanese marriages to be studied were known to be zero, there would be no point in asking questions about it. There being no variability, there is nothing to be measured, though there is much to be compared.

The researcher abroad is forcefully confronted with such nonequivalence when significant variables from his own culture do not operate as variables within the foreign culture. More difficult to anticipate, however, are the opposite problems. If something is not a variable in his own culture, the researcher tends to take its existence (or non-existence) for granted and not be concerned with its measurement. Only by immersing himself thoroughly in the foreign culture can he become sensitive to new variables which must be added to his research instruments if his foreign investigation is to be complete. By reading the foreigners' own descriptions of their family system and by unstructured interviewing and observation, the American abroad may become sensitive to sociological variables which escaped his attention at home. Indeed he may sometimes discover variables whose domestic variance is not as close to zero as he had assumed, and thereby bring home new cross-cultural sensitivities to the analysis of American family life.

In America, «ladies first» is taken for granted as the norm of marital behavior (though perhaps not always observed in practice). In Japan the feudal norm was «gentlemen first» but contemporary family practice is highly variable. Hence no study of Japanese mar-

riage would be complete without measuring a variable («prece-dence») which was completely missing from our American study. The questions Blood selected included «When you and your husband are taking a taxi, who usually gets in first ?» and «When you and your husband board a bus or local train, if only one seat is left, which one of you usually sits down ?» [2].

Other questions which seem strange to American ears but are important in the Japanese context are:

1. «Who was the chief promoter of your marriage — yourself, your father, or your mother ?» (in U.S., always self ?)

2. «How often does the wife feel like a servant to her husband ?» (the traditional role of the Japanese wife).

3. «How often does the wife converse with the husband's visiting friends ?» (traditionally never).

4. «What is the husband's family status — first son or not first son ?».

The first three questions are assumed not to vary in American marriages. The last varies but is not expected to have significant consequences, and therefore is never studied here. In Japan the status of first son is sharply demarcated from younger brothers and hence may be expected to affect such a man's relationship to his wife. Cross-cultural research involves both unilateral variables and variables which are unilaterally significant.

PRAGMATIC NON-EQUIVALENCE

Power structure and the division of labor are significant vari-ables in both American and Japanese marriages. Problems arise, however, in measuring these variables since some decisions and tasks are unique to one culture.

In Detroit two batteries of eight questions each were construc-ted to measure family authority and role differentiation. In actual practice, some of the issues or tasks relevant to American marriages do not occur in Japanese homes, and vice versa. This does not mean non-comparability of variables (e.g., power) but simply non-compar-able operationalization of measurement of variables.

Measuring family authority. Among the American battery of family decisions were three which are irrelevant to the Japanese scene:

[2] After reading such questions, one Japanese sociologist commented that he was surprised that any American could ever devise questions which so aptly fitted the Japanese situation.

What car to get ? (only the wealthy own cars in Japan); Where to go on vacation ? (again an elite option); What house or apartment to take ? (the housing shortage in Tokyo means little choice is available).

The second question could be modified into a question about where to go on a holiday outing since one-day trips are popular in Japan. Unique to the Japanese situation is «Who decides how much to spend for an obituary gift or congratulatory gift ?»

It is not intended to suggest that either the American or the Japanese battery contains the best possible items for measuring family power [3]. The point is that items which are good in one society may not «work» in another, so that the task of cross-cultural replication is complicated.

Within a single society, valid comparisons can be made between families on whatever power index is used. However, even within a given society, research projects using diverse indices of power reach contradictory conclusions insofar as those indices are composed of different proportions of the various dimensions of power [4]. For example, indices with a heavy loading of major economic decisions

Battery of Decisions

American	Japanese
What car to get.	———
Where to go on vacation.	...on a holiday outing.
What house or apartment to take.	———
Whether to buy some life insurance.	(Identical)
What job the husband should take.	———
Whether the wife should work.	...may buy new clothes.
How much to spend on food.	...for an obituary or congratulatory gift.
What doctor to have.	———
———	When sexual relations will occur.
———	What radio or TV program to hear ?
	(Plus three questions on children)

[3] Indeed, subsequent analyses have emphasized the need for the development of more complex instruments which would differentiate between various dimensions of power such as economic, domestic, and recreational.
[4] See BLOOD, «The Effects of the Wife's Employment on the Husband-Wife

show a significant increase in the wife's power when she goes to work, whereas those composed mainly of domestic decisions may show a decrease. Hence the nature of the measure of family power structure affects the nature of research findings.

When we turn to cross-cultural comparisons, the problem is greatly complicated. The use of manifestly different items makes comparison difficult. But even if a least-common-denominator battery were developed, there would still be hidden differences. For example, the possibility of choosing between doctors is affected by the patient/doctor ratio in the particular community. Again, the frequency of holiday outings varies by social custom and legislative fiat. Hence the relative importance of the same item in two countries may differ appreciably. If an index of marital power is a simple aggregation of responses to individual items, the net effect of the component parts will be altered accordingly.

For such reasons it is precarious to use such measuring instruments as a basis for reporting the proportions of families in two societies who are «patriarchal» or «equalitarian». The cutting point between such classifications is arbitrary even within a single society) though reliable distinctions between *more* patriarchal and *less* patriarchal families can be made). Between two societies it is impossible with our present methods to determine equivalent cutting points for making these distinctions. Hence, as of the present time, only the crudest generalizations can be drawn from international statistical data in such complex and elusive areas as family authority and the division of labor. Though tentative generalizations may be hazarded, we need to concentrate our analyses on the behavior of particular decision-making items, with full reporting of methodological details so that subsequent scholars can have a basis for judging the comparability of our work.

Measuring the division of labor. In analyzing the allocation of household tasks, similar problems of pragmatic non-equivalence of items arise.

Since Japanese homes do not have lawns, we could not replicate our question about who mows it. Nor does it snow often enough in Tokyo to make our Detroit question about who shovels it practically relevant. «Who keeps track of the money and bills ?» is hardly relevant to the cash-and-carry Japanese economy in which few families have checking accounts. Grocery-shopping in America is increasingly

Relationship», in Ivan NYE and Lois HOFFMAN, editors, *The Employed Mother in America*, Rand McNally, 1963.

shared by husbands as the neighborhood grocery store gives way to the shopping center supermarket. In order to increase the husband's participation in this area, we decided to restrict the item to shopping for the husband's favorite foods on the assumption that traditionally patriarchal Japanese men might wish to indulge their tastes by choosing such delicacies themselves. In Japan the first supermarket in the whole country opened while we were there, so that ordinary shopping is still a neighborhood pedestrian function, concentrated in the hands of women. «Who straightens up the living room when company is coming ?» is far less relevant to Japanese families who get together with friends only a few times a year than for American families who entertain several times a month. Even this comparison minimizes the difference since overcrowded Japanese homes are proportionately less often the locale of such socializing when it does occur.

The Japanese variance in two more items is too small to make them useful. Getting the husband's breakfast and doing the evening dishes are too exclusively the wife's function in Japan to differentiate among Japanese families.

This process of elimination left only one item of the original American eight capable of being used in the same form: «Who repairs things around the house ?» Even this question is hardly comparable, however, in view of the fact that the entire Japanese sample lived in apartments whereas most of the American sample cared for their own homes. Hence the American frame of reference included structural repairs missing from the Japanese situation.

Battery of Household Tasks

American	Japanese
American	*Japanese*
Who mows the lawn ?	———
Who shovels the sidewalk ?	———
Who keeps track of money and bills ?	———
Who does the grocery shopping ?	...for husband's favorite foods ?
Who gets the husband's breakfast?	———
Who does the evening dishes ?	———
Who repairs things around the house ?	(Identical)
———	Who puts away the *futon* in the morning ?

—————— Who buys ordinary clothes for the husband ?

—————— Who puts away the husband's clothes after he undresses ?

—————— Who carries a heavy object (suitcase or child) when the couple are walking together ? (*Plus* three questions on children)

In searching for household tasks relevant to the Japanese family, we chose some which have no American equivalent. A uniquely Japanese task is putting away the *futon* bedding every morning [5]. More variable in Japan than in the United States are such wifely services as buying the husband's ordinary clothes like underwear and handkerchiefs, and putting his clothes away after he undresses at night. Perhaps more variable too is the husband's willingness to carry a heavy object when the couple are walking together in public. In any case, some items from our Japanese battery of household tasks would be no more usefully replicable in an American study than were some of our Japanese decision-making questions.

CONCLUSIONS

Behaviors which conform completely to a cultural norm are not usefully measured by interview methods when studying a single society. Respondents are likely to resist «foolish questions to which everybody knows the answer». However, in cross-cultural replication, it is important to capture foreign variables which do not vary at home and vice versa. Yet if one studies America first and Japan later, one will rarely be sensitive to such non-equivalent areas of variability.

In order for cross-cultural research to be most effective, it is desirable to design both phases of the study simultaneously. If the researcher can immerse himself thoroughly in both cultures before undertaking his definitive study of either, he can incorporate in his total scheme the relevant parameters of both societies. For this purpose the ideal research instrument is not the least common denominator but a comprehensive synthesis of the significant features of

[5] *Futon* are heavy quilts which must be removed from the floor and stored away in closets.

both societies. Designing such a comprehensive instrument requires more than usually elaborate exploratory interviewing and pretesting in both societies before the final schedules can be prepared.

Even with such intentionally-designed cross-cultural instruments, however, problems of terminological non-equivalence and pragmatic non-equivalence require the utmost caution in interpretation of results. Apparently similar statistics seldom mean identical phenomena, while diverse statistics may mask «real» similarities.

Despite the difficulties, however, cross-cultural research is to be encouraged by social scientists because it widens our intellectual horizons and extends our scientific knowledge. The hard problems involved richly deserve our best efforts to progress from the present crude state of cross-cultural survey methodology.

REPORT ON THE DISCUSSION

Chairman: G. BAUMERT, Divo Institute †
Rapporteur: L. ROSENMAYR, University of Vienna

After the presentation of E. Devereux' paper L. Rosenmayr as a
«prepared discussant» described the present stage of comparative
studies in family sociology. Comparative family sociology some 25
years ago was still viewed mainly from a systematising historical
angle: the classical Greek, the Jewish, the Roman, the Chinese and
other family systems were described from legal sources and some
socio-historic data. Some 15 or 10 years ago prominent sociologists
were invited to furnish essays on the family in their respective coun-
tries in general terms. The present scene of comparative studies is
characterized in the following way: 1) the problems are more spe-
cialized, 2) instead of the essayistic approaches, data are presented
or at least plans for data collection are discussed to widen the scope
of comparative research. 3) A more critical level of methodology
and theory formation has been reached.

L. Rosenmayr paid tribute to the sophistication of the research
strategy and methodology of E. Devereux' paper and proposes for
further discussion of what appear to him some methodological and
theoretical shortcomings. In order to compare family authority and
child behaviour in the U. S. with Western Germany a group of 134
sixth grade children in Dryden, New York, was matched with
children from a Cologne sample with respect to age, sex, religion,
intact family, socio-economic status, number of siblings and wor-
king status of the mother. E. Devereux argues that differences be-
tween the sets of matched pairs reflect «genuine cultural differen-
ces». L. Rosenmayr hesitated to accept this explanation on three
grounds: 1) In family and youth research *other* than the above
listed 7 demographic variables have been found which account for
differences in behaviour and attitudes. The degree of religious prac-
tice, greater or less intensive participation in youth organizations,
acquaintances with the other sex are only some of them. It may
therefore be that the observed differences between the two groups
are due to a variable or to a cluster of variables which have little
to do with the fact that one group happens to be from Dryden and

the other from Cologne. The two groups are too small and too much concentrated regionally to permit the assumption that at least some of these factors would have been eliminated by sheer sample size. 2) Even if the difficulties just mentioned could be brought under better control in future research, the question still remains as to whether differences between a certain region of one country and a certain region or city of the other may be generalized in terms of differences between these two countries. 3) The term «culture», particurlarly as used in the so called cross-cultural comparisons, needs careful conceptual and theoretical clarification or else bundles of less well identified and different variables, «remnants of variation» otherwise not accounted for, will be presented as a factor labelled «culture».

The cultural comparisons contain (and tend to conceal) another difficulty. Although the researcher may make it clear — as E. Devereux does — that the two samples used for matching are in no way «true cross sections of the cultures from which they were drawn» and are therefore not used to estimate «the actual parameters of various parent behaviour in Germany or America as a whole», in the course of explaining the differences (which he sees as «cultural» ones) he is bound to revert to notions like *the* German family, *the* American mother, as if he was talking on the basis of national samples.

In his reply E. Devereux pointed to a second German sample of his study from a rural background which controls the regional variable, as the results from the rural sample are very close to the Cologne sample. In other matters he agrees with L. Rosenmayr on the necessity of methodological progress; however, on the question of the term culture he is less hesitant to use it for denoting strong differences in research results from different countries not accounted for by the usual set of basic variables.

G. Baumert raised the problem how the behaviour of parents can be measured by the reports of children. E. Devereux replied that the response items of the children were of a concrete nature and oriented towards the actual activities, not towards the attitudes of the parents and this would guarantee a relatively high amount of objectivity as some studies demonstrate. Distortions would occur also in parents' perceptions and perhaps even more so, because of the greater sensitivity of adults to the existing social standards concerning educational norms and procedures.

The paper of G. A. Kooy and H. Kötter describing practical

difficulties (lack of comparable statistical and demographic background material) and underlining the necessity of a well founded mutual personal sympathy between researchers from different countries engaged in comparative research (in order to endure the strains and frustrations of such undertakings) was generally accepted.

Also P. Chombart de Lauwe's idea that comparative, cross-national research can only develop in *stages* was agreed upon. P. Chombart de Lauwe, in his paper, elaborated that some identical questions in questionnaires varying from country to country will already present an important progress in the direction of cross-national research.

The paper of R. O. Blood and J. Takeshita on the terminological and normative non-equivalences encountered in comparative research in Japan and in the United States and the other papers delivered in the Family section gave rise to a basic criticism expressed by E. Vogel. He called the papers «success stories», inasmuch as they are dealing with special problems. He said, however, that they did not represent general solutions or guidelines for future research and therefore expressed the following three major criticisms: 1) The papers tended to treat response error as a problem in itself, as if it could be entirely separated from the problem they were working on. E. Vogel rejected this separation between methodology and theory. In the paper by R. O. Blood and J. Takeshita, at the end, there was finally a very frank comment: that many of the subtle nuances considered in their paper were irrelevant to the problem they were concerned with in their research: the problems of internal differences within Japanese society. 2) E. Vogel suggested that consideration of problems of reliability in the abstract without consideration of the general problems one is investigating may lead to developing a highly reliable instrument which has very low validity. If one takes as his criteria for a good study whether one has used a reliable instrument, then we may be overlooking the problem of whether or not we are really answering the questions we are asking in our research. The asking of questions about reliability in the vacuum tends to set up inordinate concern with developing of nice neat reliable instruments to the neglect of major substantive problems. E. Vogel therefore suggested that the only way to develop instruments which one is sure are valid is to use a *variety* of different instruments or observations. 3) The third and final general problem to raise concerns the underlying strategy with which one approaches cross-national studies. By and large the

strategy represented in these studies is that there are general principles or findings in one culture and that one then develops an instrument which can test the same problems on another culture. Obviously, this is a sound and rewarding approach. But there is another approach which may make cross-national research even more rewarding. That is, as R. O. Blood and J. Takeshita suggest, learning a great deal about the second culture in the first place, then revising the entire questionnaire used in both cultures to attempt to get a much broader picture. E. Vogel exemplified this approach.

Finally, E. Vogel suggested that in the search for instruments with a high degree of reliability, two important instruments used by other disciplines have been relatively neglected by most family sociologists: these are 1) the imaginative use of demographic data and 2) the use of kinship terminology as used by anthropologists.

C. LePlae emphasised the necessity of developing an adequate knowledge of the religions and philosophies with which family ideals and behaviour are connected in different cultures; J. Mogey pointed out the interrelation between «linguistic holes» and «social holes» in cultural comparison. Ch. Glock elaborated on the utilization of demographic data for comparative purposes.

The power structure in the family, according to Ch. Glock, may be studied by analysing demographic material, independent of direct questions on who makes decisions — the husband or the wife. Thus since fertility is inversely correlated with education, and since the amount of education of husbands and wives in any segment of population is not always the same from family to family, we may investigate the question as to whether fertility (or family size) is more closely related to the education of the husband or to that of the wife. If it is more closely related to the education of the wife, then we may infer that there is a tendency for women to exercise dominance in determining family size. Variations in this general pattern may be sought by classifying the fertility data further by occupation of the husband and still further by family income within occupation groups. Statistics which permit such an analysis will be available in the reports of the 1960 census of population in the United States.

MASS COMMUNICATIONS
LES COMMUNICATIONS DE MASSE

SUR L'INFORMATION ÉCONOMIQUE ET LE MESSIANISME ÉCONOMIQUE DANS LES PAYS EN VOIE DE DÉVELOPPEMENT

MICHEL MATARASSO
Université de Caen

Le sujet est d'une ampleur considérable. Aussi, n'en traitera-t-on que quelques aspects. Il serait pratiquement impossible de l'aborder exhaustivement en une seule communication. Il s'agit d'expliquer comment un outil d'analyse — un de ces outils que nous croyons objectivement identifiable — est apparu avec le fait du sous-développement et a trouvé, par un choc en retour, comme il advient souvent, un champ d'application sur les métropoles elles-mêmes.

C'est l'idée d'information, *d'information économique,* flottante et imprécise. Elle a subi de nombreuses vicissitudes. La plupart d'entre nous pourrait la trouver naturelle. Au vrai, elle fait problème, puisque ses métamorphoses nous conduiront à examiner, à approfondir aussi, le thème du messianisme économique — sorte de distorsion de l'information économique dans ce qu'elle a de plus collectif, fondant dans un même creuset les résultats de la science et de la technique, et leur réinterprétation au plan du mythe de l'âge d'or, de l'attente collective du royaume d'opulence des biens économiques, puisant dans l'imaginaire collectif les symboles que les images de la science et de l'industrie contemporaines rendent tangibles.

UN MOT SUR L'OBJET ET LA MÉTHODE

Aujourd'hui, le terme et la spéculation concernant l'information renvoient, d'ordinaire, à un traitement cybernétique. On raffine. On

distingue cybernéticiens et spécialistes de l'information; disons: in-
formationnistes. Ici, il ne sera question ni de l'information trai-
tée par les cybernéticiens et les informationnistes, ni d'acceptions
approchées.

Comme le remarque François Perroux, à la différence de l'infor-
mation cybernétique, *l'information économique est pourvue d'un
sens*. C'est précisément le caractère profondément symbolique de l'in-
formation économique qui nous retiendra. Pareil propos pourrait
sembler pur pléonasme si la quantification de l'information ne don-
nait à croire le contraire. Car, l'information c'est du symbole, plus
ou moins brut ou plus ou moins élaboré, certes, mais du symbole au
premier chef.

L'information ne sera guère entendue, non plus, comme un en-
semble de données fournies à un être vivant par le seul «milieu exté-
rieur». Outre que cette interprétation recourt au schéma quasi-re-
flexologique: *stimuli-réponses,* ou mieux, *situations-réponses,* elle
élimine, bien entendu, le sens des données sans élucider d'ailleurs
la nature de ce «milieu». Au surplus, elle lamine, pour ainsi dire,
cette information de toutes ses dimensions temporelles et historiques.
Et nous présente, en définitive, une *information réifiée* peu apte à
satisfaire l'investigation.

Au reste, les travaux de psychologie expérimentale tendent, de plus
en plus, comme le montre avec une étonnante justesse Raymond
Ruyer, à attester des rapports très étroits entre, d'une part, un flux
d'«informations sensorielles», d'autre part, des objets perçus dans
leur spécificité, à partir d'un autre niveau, proprement séméiologi-
que: le cadre, la situation, le fond, le milieu socio-culturel... «Les in-
formations sensorielles brutes sont décomposées en deux savoirs: un
«savoir ce qu'est l'objet», un «savoir ce qu'est le cadre de l'objet»...
«Mais les savoirs agissent, une fois constitués, comme des facteurs
autonomes sur les informations...ils les transfigurent et les trans-
forment». Qui plus est: ce processus informationnel déborde les
problèmes de la perception. Il permet — nous dit-il — d'in-
terpréter les phénomènes de croyance. La croyance, en effet,
implique une affirmation de réalité, un dépassement du psycholo-
gique, elle affirme des objets et elle affirme un cadre[2]. Rien n'in-
terdit de repenser l'économique en ce sens. Autrement dit, un as-
pect économique, quel qu'en soit le niveau, superficiel ou profond,
pragmatique ou théorique, n'est *perçu* ou *cru* qu'a travers un sys-

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[2] R. RUYER, «Perception, croyance, monde symbolique», *Revue de Métaphy-
sique et de Morale,* Janvier-Mars 1962, pp. 1-24.

tème de significations. Aussi bien, ce qui nous préoccupe est de reconnaître ce qu'il advient quand un élément économique passe d'un système de significations à un autre, d'un code à un autre; et comment s'opère le *recodage*.

D'un point de vue plus formel, semble-t-il, le terme d'information désigne «la mise en forme en vue de la mise au courant» (Fernand Terrou), à travers les techniques de diffusion collective. Mais ici encore, cette acception recevable au sein d'une même aire de culture, l'est-elle autant entre des cultures différentes ? Comment en effet s'opère cette «mise au courant»: si les systèmes de significations sont distincts ?

Ce qui fait problème, au niveau le plus profond, n'est autre que *ce qui se communique* et ce qui se communique d'un sytème de signification économique à l'autre; autrement dit: les séquences informationelles «inter-culturelles».

On l'aura deviné: le premier point sur lequel nous nous efforcerons de jeter quelque clarté concerne ce que nous appelons les *régulateurs symboliques* grâce à quoi l'activité économique entière de toute une société permet d'*adapter cette société à elle-même*. Le second: l'information économique remplit-elle cette fonction adaptative par une simple transposition dans les «sociétés différentes» ?

INFORMATION ÉCONOMIQUE ET SOUS-DÉVELOPPEMENT

L'intérêt porté au problème de l'information économique rencontre, sans nul doute, aujourd'hui, une considérable audience. La prise de conscience qui a emporté un tel mouvement d'opinion coïncide avec la découverte, dans l'immédiate après-guerre, du fait de sous-développement. Certes, des signes avant-coureurs avaient déjà mis l'attention en éveil; citons: les statistiques de douane, les enseignements de la balance des comptes avec l'étranger, et sur un autre plan, la publicité des objets de consommation, plus tard les Public-Relations, etc... Mais, la notion tout imprécise encore n'était guère, tant s'en faut, conceptualisée. La problématique du sous-développement emporte un renversement de perspectives.

Quels qu'aient été, d'ailleurs, les motifs profonds qui présidèrent à la découverte de celui-ci — fait, notion, valeur — une règle de méthode en a résulté: la complémentarité nécessaire des différentes sciences de l'homme pour en élucider l'objet, mettre en œuvre les mesures propres à en pallier les maux. Les principaux d'entre eux sont bien connus; ils se nomment: croissance démographique galo-

pante par rapport au niveau des ressources — entraînée, on le sait par l'apport des techniques médicales très modernes; et par conséquent la diminution sensible du taux de mortalité et de morti-natalité; sous-production vivrière des pays du Tiers-monde; malnutrition, quand ce n'est quasi-famine sur des aires économiques considérables. Enfin, en dépit d'une assistance technique et financière des métropoles industrialisées, une *profonde maladaptation économique*.

D'une manière générale, le symptôme le plus frappant semble être la *désarticulation de l'économie* (François Perroux), malgré l'implantation d'entreprises sidérurgiques ou minières, la mise en place de circuits bancaires et monétaires, l'apport de machines perfectionnées. Ainsi divers rapports relèvent en quelques régions du Brésil, un sous-emploi des terres, un sous-emploi des hommes, alors que se pose de façon pressante le problème de la faim. En deça de la sous-production vivrière, l'agronome déchiffre des faits d'organisation juridique et politique — régime foncier, réformes agraires —, des faits de morphologie sociale — dispersion trop grande, ou inversement, trop forte agglomération des masses humaines et de leur habitat matériel et social —, des traits de psychologie collective — attitudes, normes en matière de travail —, des symboles, des problèmes religieux. En bref, divers niveaux de l'épaisseur sociale resurgissent, comme d'un biais, dans les conduites économiques des hommes. On comptait trouver des mécanismes économiques, on rencontre des faits humains, opaques qui remettent en question l'objet des disciplines scientifiques et leur domaine. L'économiste, l'agronome en appellent au savoir du sociologue et de l'anthropologue. Et vice-versa.

L'Économique serait-elle une science essentiellement humaine ? La rationalité des circuits économiques ne serait-elle pas, transposée, comme *l'équivalent d'une rationalité collective* qui se reformulerait en fonction de la praxis collective des hommes dans leurs conflits et leurs concours ? Et le modèle normatif de cette rationalité, n'est-ce pas aux yeux de bien des observateurs, celui que propose l'Occident ? On pourrait le croire, lorsque Gunnar Myrdal[3] conseille d'importer dans les pays sous-développés, outre l'équipement industriel moderne, *nos propres manières de penser, notre culture et nos comportements rationnels*. Toutefois, ne peut-on pas légitimement opposer à ce modèle celui — ou ceux — des sociétés traditionnelles ? Qui plus est: importer notre culture dans les pays sous-développés attesterait, s'il en était besoin, que l'économique n'a pas, d'emblée, de vocation

[3] G. MYRDAL, *Une économie internationale*, Paris, P.U.F., 1958.

universelle; qu'elle n'est pas un système fonctionnel indépendant d'une culture qui lui donne sens, et de structures sociales au sein desquelles elle se déploie.

Si l'économique n'est pas strictement ce système identiquement observable en tous lieux, conceptualisé dans les ouvrages, représenté et schématisé dans les «modèles de fonctionnement» économiques, *quelle en est sa nature ?* Autrement dit, pourquoi l'économie du Tiers-monde resterait-elle, en bien des pays, si déprimée puisqu'un ajustement fonctionnel par un apport en capitaux, en industries diverses devrait en avoir raison ?

C'est en partant de ces considérations que des économistes ont mis l'accent sur *l'absence d'information économique* dans les pays du Tiers-monde. «L'économie sous-développée — note François Perroux — ne constitue pas sur un territoire défini un *réseau homogène* de prix, de flux (réels et monétaires) et d'*informations»;* par conséquent un investissement additionnel ou une innovation ne se propagent pas, et quand, d'aventure, ils se propagent, provoquent des «déséquilibres de blocage». En bref, ces économies apparaissent selon ses termes comme des *«économies désarticulées* qui, pour des raisons structurelles sont exposées continuellement à des blocages de développement ou de croissance.»

INFORMATION ÉCONOMIQUE ET DIVERSITÉ DES CULTURES

L'information économique, c'est-à-dire, ce qui se communique touchant tout fait ou toute pensée économiques n'est jamais autre chose, croyons-nous, qu'un flux de significations économiques référées à une culture. Aussi bien, communiquer une série d'informations, aux fins de conférer à une économie sa pleine efficacité, présuppose une *communauté de culture* entre le pays émetteur et le pays récepteur. Sinon, ce que certains appellent information économique qui n'est, au fond, à leurs yeux, que relations d'événements économiques, autrement dit qu'information de conjoncture, risque de rester lettre morte. A quoi bon ces renseignements sur le niveau général des prix, le niveau d'activité des secteurs-clés, les politiques sociales, le niveau des salaires et traitements, la politique économique des gouvernements, les mouvements revendicatifs des diverses catégories sociales, le niveau des épargnes et des investissements, le niveau des valeurs boursières, le taux de croissance économique, les analyses prévisionnelles, etc..., pour ne prendre, au hasard, que quelques éléments de la conjoncture économique si ces renseignements sont *dépourvus de*

sens pour tel pays sous-développé qui a une autre pensée économique, d'autres attitudes économiques d'autres circuits économiques: *ceux du potlatch,* par exemple, ou encore *ceux de la thésaurisation sans investissement...*

Au vrai, l'information économique n'est pas qu'une information de conjoncture. Elle est, comme le dit François Perroux «communication efficace d'une structure», si l'on veut bien admettre que la *structure,* c'est *la compréhension du sens* des diverses variables socio-économiques entre-liées, référées à un pôle unitaire qui est précisément *la culture.*

Autrement dit, *la culture* dans cette perspective, *foyer du sens* des actes des hommes, coextensive à ce que nous appelons la *rationalité collective* — reformulée par la praxis collective et les projets dominants — ne s'oppose pas aux structures socio-économiques mais, tout au contraire, en présente le sens *comme elle fonde l'information qui en retour l'objective.* Si l'on nous accorde cette conclusion sur quelques thèmes de laquelle nous sommes penché dans un travail précédent (L'économique et la Sociologie),[4] on saisira plus aisément que la *désarticulation* caractérisant les pays sous-développés ne procède que du *clash* entre *cultures économiques hétérogènes.* Compte tenu de cette analyse, il devient possible de dégager le *concept d'acculturation économique.* Dans cette perspective, le sous-développement n'est rien d'autre qu'une *acculturation économique imparfaite,* (soit inachevée, soit entièrement manquée) qu'on pourra comparer aux *acculturations économiques réussies,* comme l'atteste l'exemple historique japonais.

L'information économique qui nous préoccupe, c'est, entre autres, celle que «diffusent les institutions elles-mêmes, qui prédisposent les agents à des types de conduite et à des attentes déterminées» (François Perroux). Elle est, d'emblée, de nature symbolique; elle s'objective ensuite dans une information porteuse de sens. Ce sens, croyons-nous, est coextensif aux efforts humains, aux conflits et aux contributions, aux attentes collectives aussi. «Chaque institution, déclarait Maurice Merleau-Ponty, est un système symbolique que le sujet s'incorpore comme configuration globale et comme style de fonctionnement sans qu'il ait même besoin de le concevoir lui-même.» Il précisait: «Le sens n'est ni chose ni idée parce que le sens est une modulation de notre coexistence».

Un pays sous-développé présente précisément l'exemple d'une so-

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[4] M. MATARASSO, «L'Économie et la Sociologie», *Revue Française de Sociologie,* 1961, vol. II, n° 3, pp. 177-190.

ciété au sein de laquelle l'information économique se trouve dépour-
vue de sa fonction fondamentale d'*adaptation* en raison de *la perte
ou de l'aliénation du sens* provoquée par le clash des cultures. L'in-
formation y prolifère, certes, mais comme masse in-signifiante, hété-
rogène — qui masque, obstrue le sens des institutions. Cette masse
d'information étrangère et obstruante les informationnistes l'appel-
lent: *bruits*. Ici, le bruit devient *sens* acculturé et le sens: *bruit*.

NOTE SUR LE CONCEPT D'INFORMATION ÉCONOMIQUE

L'information économique renvoie et à la culture, foyer du sens,
et à l'activité symbolique de la conscience qui l'alimente, et qu'en
retour elle objective. L'activité symbolique de la conscience se donne
comme saisie directe de la prolifération d'images coextensives à l'ef-
fort collectif humain, aux actes économiques, aux attentes collectives,
et dont le caractère de *communicabilité* au sein d'une même culture
suggère qu'ils procèdent d'un *imaginaire collectif*.

Avec une intuition qui nous étonne encore tant elle préfigure les
recherches les plus modernes sur *l'imaginaire collectif,* Marcel Mauss
anticipait de 30 ans environ sur des conclusions, aujourd'hui, de plus
en plus accréditées.

«Nous pensons, disait-il, que l'activité de la conscience est avant
tout *un système de montages symboliques»,* ou encore: «Les états
mentaux sont des signes et des symboles de l'état général, ils sont
utilisés comme tels par les mécanismes les plus profonds de la cons-
cience»... «Voilà longtemps que Durkheim et nous — notait-il encore
— enseignons qu'on ne peut communier et communiquer entre les
hommes que par symboles, signes communs permanents... par des
signes de groupes d'états, *pris ensuite pour des réalités.* Nous étions
allés jusqu'à supposer pourquoi ils s'imposent: parce que, en retour,
par la vue et par l'audition, par le fait qu'on entend le cri, que l'on
sent et que l'on voit le geste des autres en même temps que le sien,
on les prend pour des vérités. Voilà longtemps que nous pensons
que l'un des caractères du fait social est précisément son *aspect sym-
bolique...»* ...«L'activité de l'esprit collectif est encore plus symbo-
lique que celle de l'esprit individuel, mais elle l'est exactement dans
le même sens»... «Ce foisonnement gigantesque de la vie sociale,
de ce monde de rapports symboliques que nous avons avec nos
voisins, ne peuvent-ils pas être comparés directement à l'image my-
thique, comme elle, ne se réverbèrent-ils pas à l'infini ? car nous
avons à notre disposition, surtout en mythologie, de ces cas que

j'appelle de réverbération mentale où l'image se multiplie, pour ainsi dire, sans fin...» ...«le symbole a sa vie propre, il agit et se reproduit indéfiniment...» [5].

N'est-ce pas une théorie de l'information que Mauss nous propose ? Ces signes et ces symboles proliférant *pris ensuite pour des réalités* s'imposant par la simultanéité et la similitude des signes des autres ? plaçant au centre même de la communication ce foisonnement de signes et symboles doués d'une vie autonome et se reproduisant indéfiniment ?

Aussi bien, mettant à profit cette contribution, nous poserons, en première approximation, que *l'information économique est une coordination de symboles économiques.* Ils procèdent de la simultanéité de la saisie de la propre activité du sujet et de celle d'autrui. Cette information présuppose «un système symbolique que le sujet s'incorpore comme configuration globale et comme style de fonctionnement» (Maurice Merleau-Ponty). On peut distinguer:
— L'information intuitivement saisie, à travers l'acte économique: effort, coût en vue d'obtenir un produit social (bien, service),
— l'information élaborée, construite selon certains cadres opératoires,
— l'information intermédiaire: l'information de vulgarisation scientifique.

La première se rapporte à l'effort, à l'activité économique qui engendre une saisie symbolique, coextensive à l'acte même. La seconde est entièrement construite, liée à une succession systématisante de schèmes opératoires. Elle est un symbolisme au second degré: elle opère au niveau des représentations et des conceptualisations. La troisième, ou vulgarisation de la connaissance économique tend à se présenter en *système de justification du régime économique.* Elle est, en un sens, de nature idéologique. C'est aussi la plus fréquente.

Aussi bien, l'information économique peut être vécue et saisie, symbolisée et représentée, conceptualisée et, à un certain degré, mesurée.

Si l'on admet qu'une économie développée présente une *articulation optimale* entre les flux réels et monétaires, les prix et les anticipations des sujets et des groupes socio-économiques l'information économique n'est autre que cette *articulation.* Elle est, en d'autres mots, *un engrenage symbolique* (au premier et au second degré) entre les différents plans de l'activité économique; ou encore, un ensemble de *régulateurs symboliques* propres à assurer l'efficacité des actes économiques collectifs, soit à courte échéance, soit à long

[5] M. Mauss, *Sociologie et Anthropologie,* Paris, P.U.F., 1950.

aller; autrement dit, propres à assurer une maîtrise des temps sociaux et économiques. Ce faisant, ces régulateurs symboliques ont pour fonction d'adapter la société globale à elle-même, en raison des types de temps qui lui sont propres.

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L'information économique constitue un aliment indispensable à la psychologie collective. Et, selon l'expression empruntée à Raymond Ruyer, elle équivaut à une nutrition psychique, aussi nécessaire que la nutrition physiologique.

«La nutrition physiologique, écrit-il, utilise des aliments matériels et matériellement consommés, des substances énergétiques hautement organisées, ayant... beaucoup de neg-entropie, c'est-à-dire apportant à l'organisme un courant d'ordre ou d'anti-désordre qui compense la marche spontanée au désordre de tout système obéissant ou désobéissant aussi aux lois de la physique ordinaire...»

«La nutrition *psychique* utilise (pour sa part) des aliments immatériels et non-matériellement consommés: spectacles et sensations diverses, exercices variés correspondant à des besoins psychologiques et à des instincts qui risquent de s'étioler et même de ne pouvoir s'édifier faute de ces aliments formels, comme le corps dépérit faute d'aliments matériels.»

En justifiant les systèmes de production de régimes économiques distincts et rivaux, l'information économique engendre et alimente les idéologies corrélatives à ces régimes. D'autre part l'information économique imprègne de merveilleux, à travers la consommation de masse, les biens nouveaux qui prétendent fournir, comme le remarque Edgar Morin dans «L'esprit du temps», confort et beauté, jeunesse et bien-être; «merveilles» de la science et de l'industrie qui sont partie intégrante de la culture de masse. Le même auteur souligne d'ailleurs que cette culture «entretient, certes, des rêves projectifs mais en même temps, elle transforme certains rêves projectifs en aspiration. L'aspiration au bien-être, à la vie individuelle prend forme, en même temps que l'insatisfaction, la revendication, la révolte»[6].

Ainsi, l'information économique apparaît-elle comme *manipulation de symboles* propres à accroître les productions — optique de la croissance industrielle — et les consommations de masse, tout en justifiant les systèmes productifs en vigueur dans les deux gran-

[6] E. MORIN, *L'esprit du temps. Essai sur la culture de masse,* Grasset, 1962.

des sociétés industrielles. Cette justification, toutefois, n'est pas re-
çue comme telle par les pays du Tiers-monde qui — semble-t-il —
portent plus leur attention sur les réalisations *quasi-mythiques* des so-
ciétés d'opulence que sur un système d'idées qui tend à les justifier.
La nutrition psychique que dispense l'information économique cor-
respond, pour le Tiers-monde, aux aspects consommatoires de la civi-
lisation industrielle et la culture de masse qui y est assortie. De telle
sorte qu'on se trouve au fait de la contradiction suivante: les sociétés
industrielles, notamment la plus avancée d'entre elles — les Etats-
Unis — incitent les particuliers à un style de consommation qui frise
l'esprit de dilapidation: «Le peuple américain — nous confie Vance
Packard, dans son dernier ouvrage — devient, en un sens, une na-
tion sur un tigre. Les américains doivent *apprendre à consommer
de plus en plus* ou bien leur magnifique machine économique
se retournera et les dévorera» [7]. En ce sens, l'auteur ne fait que pro-
longer certaines reflexions de J. K. Galbraith sur *l'effet de dépen-
dance*: «Les besoins sont en réalité le fruit de la production»... «re-
connaître cette interdépendance... c'est accorder au producteur la dou-
ble fonction de faire les produits et de *créer le désir de les avoir*»;
aussi, les pays sous-développés, informés à travers les *mass-media*
de ces types de consommation tendent à *ajuster* leurs niveaux de
besoin à ceux qui se réverbèrent sur ses *écrans* et manifestent, par
conséquent un certain nombre d'attitudes économiques que les au-
teurs, à la suite de J. Duesenberry, désignent sous le terme de «de-
monstration effect».

INFORMATION ÉCONOMIQUE ET MESSIANISMES ÉCONOMIQUES

«Le nombre et la richesse des significations dont dispose l'homme
— écrivait Maurice Merleau-Ponty — excédent toujours le cercle des
objets définis qui méritent le nom de *signifiés,* parce que la fonction
symbolique doit toujours être en avance sur son objet et *ne trouve
le réel qu'en le devançant dans l'imaginaire...*»

Ce devancement dans l'imaginaire collectif rejoint les échos de
civilisation d'opulence. Il procède aussi des métamorphoses de l'in-
formation économique qui, même dépourvue de sens dans les «sociétés
différentes», même présente sous forme de «bruits» parasitaires et
proliférants, se réinvestit d'un *sens nouveau,* fruit de réinterprétations

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[7] V. PACKARD, *The waste makers,* New-York, D. Mac Kay, 1960.

successives et réverbérées — à travers les *mass-media* — du «display» de la civilisation industrielle et de la culture de masse.

Ce double mouvement par quoi l'imaginaire collectif de l'âge d'or joint les échos et les images de la civilisation d'opulence, nous l'appelons *messianisme économique* en ce qu'il puise dans cet imaginaire le ressort d'une *attente collective* du royaume d'opulence des biens économiques.

Il ne s'agit pas, tant s'en faut, d'une utopie au sens de G. Sorel en raison du caractère trop intellectualiste que celle-ci présuppose, puisque le *messianisme économique,* à la différence de l'utopie, nous place d'emblée au niveau même de la ligne de flottaison de l'imaginaire. Reste un second type d'utopie: l'utopie au sens de K. Mannheim, ou plus précisément la «mentalité utopienne», savoir: «tout processus de pensée qui reçoit son impulsion non de la force directe de la réalité sociale, mais de concepts tels que symboles, rêves, idées, qui sont, au sens le plus compréhensif du terme, *non-existants».*

Le messianisme économique, tel que nous le dégageons, s'y apparente fragmentairement en ce qu'il reçoit, d'une part, son impulsion de «symboles, rêves, idées... non-existants», mais s'en différencie, autant, puisqu'il puise dans les civilisations industrielles de consommation de masse, à travers les réinterprétations, l'autre partie de son impulsion et les formes de son développement.

Le messianisme économique, voisin certes du messianisme religieux, s'en distingue par certains traits. Il a, en commun avec celui-ci, d'être animé essentiellement par une attente collective de la période charismatique. Comme celui-ci, également, il s'affirme comme mouvement et croyance collective d'un peuple déshérité au regard des autres, interprétant cette situation avec le sentiment d'être privé de privilèges. Toutefois, le messianisme économique ne présuppose pas la venue d'un héros civilisateur ou d'un émissaire divin doté de pouvoirs charismatiques.

Ce que nous appelons messianisme économique c'est l'attente collective du règne de l'opulence en le devançant imaginairement, et en empruntant la forme et le contenu dans les images de la civilisation industrielle de haute consommation. Il procède d'une vision mythique de la vie économique en ce qu'il présente un renversement des conditions socio-économiques existantes dans le pays considéré. Bien entendu, il peut se trouver entrelié d'un messianisme religieux.

Bien souvent, les mythes sont objectivés dans la civilisation industrielle. Et cette objectivation, c'est le spectacle que la conscience imaginaire se donne à elle-même par l'intermédiaire de l'objet éco-

nomique qui n'est autre qu'une œuvre culturelle. Mais c'est aussi, à défaut de capacité d'acquisition de ces objets, le spectacle que la conscience imaginaire se donne par l'intermédiaire du contenu des mass media. Il conduit à une surdétermination de la consommation imaginaire (nutrition psychique), en l'absence de capacité de consommation réelle. «Cette tension, remarque Edgar Morin, entre d'une part la grande demande (de consommation) et d'autre part la réalité qui n'offre presque rien peut s'immobiliser dans une sorte de catalepsie spectatorielle, comme chez ces paysans des Abruzzes sous alimentés qui vont tous les soirs au cinéma s'évader fictivement de la vie».

Dans l'incapacité actuelle de promouvoir son développement à la même vitesse, avec la même intensité et au même niveau que les nations industrielles, le pays sous-développé présente un terrain particulièrement fertile en types de messianismes économiques. C'est donc de cette typologie, qu'il conviendrait de se préoccuper dans une communication ultérieure, en mettant à profit les études concrètes d'acculturation économique.

RAPPORT DE LA DISCUSSION

Première Séance

Président: E. Morin, École Pratique des Hautes Études, Paris
Rapporteur: V. Morin, École Pratique des Hautes Études, Paris

Nous appelons Olympiens les plus Grands des héros de la culture de masse, qu'ils viennent du cinéma, des cours royales, du sport, des sciences, du music-hall... Ce sont les plus grands parce qu'ils s'imposent à nous par une présence plus assidue dans les têtes d'affiche. la presse magazine, la presse à gros tirage, les informations filmées. L. Lowenthal a signalé depuis longtemps l'importance croissante des biographies des héros dans la presse d'information depuis la dernière guerre. Ces héros, dit-il, sont de plus en plus des héros de consommation et de moins en moins des héros de production. Cette progression vers le héros de luxe coïncide, devons-nous remarquer, avec l'ampleur croissante des moyens de diffusion dans les divers secteurs des Communications de masse. Ceux que nous désignons comme Olympiens sont donc les plus luxueux de tous les héros de consommation dont nous parle L. Lowenthal. Le problème est de savoir si le fait d'être «le plus grand» donne à l'Olympien une originalité par rapport aux héros moins grands, étant donné ce côté indubitable, indiscuté et absolu que tous les attributs olympiens se mettent à avoir dès qu'ils cessent de qualifier le héros moyen pour qualifier l'Olympien.

Qui sont-ils? Après avoir fait au Cecmas le recensement des Olympiens les plus présents dans les principaux journaux et magazines de la presse parisienne, nous avons obtenu la liste suivante découpée en secteurs hiérarchisés par quantités d'Olympiens fournis: 1) *Les Familles royales*: tous les sujets à marier, mariés depuis peu, mariés amoureux ou mal mariés des cours royales. 2) *Le spectacle:* a) Le cinéma: 8 Olympiens (dont Marilyn Monroe, Brigitte Bardot, Sophia Loren, Elizabeth Taylor, etc...) b) Le music-hall: 8 Olympiens (dont Johny Halliday, Sacha Distel, etc.) c) Théâtre: 0. 3) *Le Sport:* 4 dont R. S. Robinson, Fangio, etc... 4) *Les intellectuels et artistes:* Sagan, Hemingway, Picasso. 5) *Les politiques:* Kennedy. 6) *L'argent:* Onassis, Karim-Aga Khan, la Begum. 7) *L'aventure:* Lindbergh, Ga-

garine. 8) *L'industrie:* 0. 9) *L'armée:* 0. 10) *Le sacerdoce:* 0.

Comment y parviennent-t-ils ? On constate 2 grands facteurs d'O-lympianisation:

a) Un facteur d'ordre psychologique qui est la vie sentimentale du héros. L'amour ne fait pas l'Olympien mais on est ou on reste difficilement olympien sans amour. Analyse des coordonnées sentimentales propres aux candidats olympiens, et aux professions olympiennes. Analyse d'autre part de la non-sentimentalité et de ses causes, propres à certains secteurs sociaux comme les secteurs politiques, militaire ou ecclésiastique qui fournissent peu d'Olympiens.

b) Un facteur d'ordre sociologique, c'est la spécialité «superlative absolue». Analyse des significations prises par les records techniques successifs du héros dans sa spécialité, lorsqu'il est en voie d'olympianisation. Il devient «le plus grand... (quelque chose: cycliste, mathématicien) du monde». Ce superlatif, à son tour, ne devient olympien que lorsqu'il est absolu, c'est-à-dire lorsqu'il n'apparaît plus avec le pourquoi et le comment de son record. On assiste à un processus d'incarnation de la spécialité dans le spécialiste: «le plus grand trompettiste du monde» l'est même pour celui qui ne sait pas ce qu'est une trompette. A ce degré le langage devient ontologique; il porte désormais sur «l'être promu» en tant qu'«être promu» et non sur l'être existant et luttant pour garder son titre. Analyse ici des difficultés d'olympianisation et de leurs causes dans certaines spécialités (comme la philosophie, les mathématiques...) que le langage mass-media n'arrive pas à capter à cause de leur côté spectaculairement et verbalement inaccessible pour le profane.

Comment sont-ils ? L'Olympien est un animal grégaire: mise en place des carrefours olympiques de la planète: Beverley Hill, Saint-Tropez, etc... L'Olympien est un animal homogénéisé: tout en gardant sa spécialité superlative il capte par osmose les radiations des spécialités superlatives des autres: poète fort comme le boxeur, le boxeur lettré comme l'écrivain, le cycliste beau comme un Don Juan etc... Ce sont des Olympiens «complets» parce qu'ils se ressemblent un peu en ayant chacun des activités spécifiques propres. L'Olympien est bon. Il fait le bien partout où il passe. De sa présence se dégage la richesse comme une manne. Il inaugure. Il couronne. Il préside les Kermesses. L'intervention olympienne est le contraire de l'intervention divine elle introduit clarté humaine, rentable dans le mécanisme magique et redoutable du monde d'aujourd'hui. L'Olympien est présent en personne, sa vie est synchronisée avec la nôtre. Il doit apparaître tel qu'il est. Analyse des difficultés de la star par

exemple, pour s'échapper de ses rôles lorsqu'elle devient olympienne.

Que font-ils ? Ils travaillent. Puisque ils sont riches sans être ni paresseux, ni parasites, ni gangsters. Le travail olympien se situe en dehors de la routine quotidienne — il est un savoir-faire pur, exercé dans une succession d'instants privilégiés. — Il est un geste simple (les gestes olympiens du cinéma: téléphone, baiser) qui n'a aucune mesure avec l'ampleur des résultats (répercussion dans toute la société). Ils ont «un métier». Mot particulièrement utilisé aujourd'hui pour les Olympiens. L'olympien moderne se libère dans un travail où le métier en tant que tel se renforce au fur et à mesure que l'homme s'automatise dans un travail où le métier en tant que tel s'amenuise: «métier de poète», «métier d'acteurs»... et le plus dur de tous, «le métier de roi». Ce dernier est même le symbole de la réussite; il sert de laisser-passer olympien: «le roi du pétrole», «le roi de l'étain», «le roi du Jazz». Ils sont conformistes. Intégrés dans la société ils ne peuvent pas la renier ironiquement. On peut avoir des Olympiens rebelles, des Olympiens révolutionnaires mais non des Olympiens qui riraient d'eux et de nous. Analyse d'exemples de grands comiques devenus olympiens.

Que ne font-ils pas ? Ils ne font pas n'importe quoi: l'Olympien n'est pas un rôle. En s'élevant il a fait craquer les cadres initiaux de sa profession qui précisément lui en donnaient un. Il n'est pas non plus un leader d'opinion puisqu'il n'a plus le titre socialement compétitif de «premier», de «tête de file». Il n'a pas de fonctions directement rentables ni pour lui, ni pour les autres. Il n'y a aucun rapport de cause à effet entre le geste olympien et l'argent qui l'accompagne. Il est l'homme des activités gratuites: haras, champs de courses, parties de tennis. Analyse des risques qu'il court s'il descend dans une arène quelle qu'elle soit.

Les névroses: des processus de saturation peuvent apparaître. Grandes personnalités pour tous et personnalités conformes à tous, ils doivent être et ne pas être: Analyse de l'équilibre olympien entre Dieu et l'homme. L'Olympien doit aussi aimer un partenaire et se garder pour nous. Analyse de l'équilibre entre le Tristan envoûté et le Don Juan disponible. Il peut se révolter. Apparaîssent alors 2 sortes de révolte: la révolte montante et la révolte descendante. La première, de jeunesse si l'on veut, présente les symptômes d'une névrose qui reposerait sur le besoin d'anonymat: «Je veux être comme tout le monde». Elle apparaît méthodiquement réglée dans toutes les cours royales. La seconde, d'âge mûr, si l'on veut, présente les symptômes d'une névrose qui reposerait au contraire sur la peur de

l'anonymat et de la solitude. C'est la plus grave, celle qui peut conduire les stars au suicide.

Les Olympiens sont différents des Demi-Dieux, Héros et Grands de l'Histoire. Ils ne sont plus le miroir d'ambition de fortune, d'héroïsme, de domination, de victoire. Ils ne sont plus le miroir des rêves de grandeur ou de conflit tant décrits à propos des stars entre un imaginaire glorieux et la réalité sordide. Ils sont globalement le miroir de nos rêves d'en finir avec le comment et le pourquoi barbare des choses d'aujourd'hui, le miroir de notre désintéressement, de notre désengagement, de notre manque d'ambition. Ils sont puissants sans responsabilité, efficaces sans activités, riches sans gains, uniques sans solitude, disponibles sans oisiveté, amoureux sans accoutumance, oisifs sans dimanches, occupés sans semaines. C'est la classe des plus grands citoyens de jours fériés que l'histoire ait produit jusqu'à ce jour. Nous faisons avec nos Olympiens un rêve d'arrivisme naïf ou d'enfant vieux: être des citoyens respectés et puissants dans les plaisirs d'une vie qu'on laisse aux autres le soin d'organiser.

Deuxième séance

Président: E. Morin, École Pratique des Hautes Études, Paris
Rapporteur: C. Bremond, École Pratique des Hautes Études, Paris

A

On peut considérer que 66 % de la population mondiale vit dans des régions où ni la Presse, ni la Radio, ni le Cinéma, ni la Télévision n'ont atteint le développement considéré comme le minimum souhaitable d'après les critères fixés par l'UNESCO. Parmi les facteurs qui conditionnent cet aspect du sous-développement, citons en particulier: 1) *La faiblesse du pouvoir d'achat*. Ce facteur joue sans doute plus contre la Presse que contre les techniques audio-visuelles, et plus contre les techniques d'information que contre les techniques de divertissement. 2) *L'analphabétisme*. L'absence d'éducation de base n'entrave pas seulement l'extension de la Presse. Elle joue aussi, semble-t-il, contre la communication purement auditive de la radio. En revanche, les techniques audio-visuelles, cinéma et télévision, connaissent un succès immédiat auprès des populations analphabètes. 3) *Eloignement géographique et dispersion de l'habitat*.

Alors que 60 %/o des habitants des pays sous-développés vivent dans des régions rurales, les moyens d'information sont presque exclusivement concentrés dans des zones urbaines. Ce handicap affecte particulièrement la Presse et le Cinéma. Il y a encore en Afrique et en Asie des millions de personnes qui n'ont jamais vu un film de leur vie. Au contraire, la radio et la télévision seront sans doute demain deux agents d'une importance considérable pour maintenir le contact avec les populations isolées et dispersées sur d'immenses territoires, favoriser leur modernisation et leur intégration aux communautés nationales dont elles dépendent. 4) *Manque d'équipement technique et de personnel qualifié.* Il y a pénurie de cadres qualifiés non seulement en ce qui concerne la conception et la réalisation des messages (articles de presse, émissions de radio, films) mais aussi défaut de techniciens pour la mise en place et l'entretien de l'infrastructure, et carence d'administrateurs capables de gérer sainement les entreprises. 5) *Cloisonnements linguistiques.* La diffusion des media qui utilisent essentiellement la parole est naturellement celle qui souffre le plus de ce cloisonnement linguistique. Mais le handicap n'est guère moins grand pour les media audio-visuels. 6) *Diversité des niveaux culturels.* Les pays asiatiques ou africains, par exemple, ne peuvent se contenter d'avoir deux ou trois chaînes distinctes, correspondant aux différents goûts. Il leur faut des services distincts, de nature entièrement différente et s'adressant à des publics qui n'ont aucun rapport entre eux. 7) *Entraves politiques.* Dans bien des cas le rôle des communications de masse ne peut être d'informer une opinion publique que n'existe pas encore, mais de préparer l'éveil d'une conscience politique et nationale. Les gouvernants de ces pays considèrent avant tout la presse et la radio comme des instruments d'unification nationale, de modernisation, d'administration directe. Ils ne résistent guère à la tentation d'utiliser la presse ou la radio à des fins de popularité personnelle. Une des conséquences de la dépendance politique des communications de masse est l'entrave qui en résulte pour la coopération internationale, à l'échelon des échanges d'informations ou de programmes.

B

Dans un système de communications de masse normalement équilibré, les emprunts à l'étranger restent l'exception, et la grande masse des messages est produite localement, par des hommes du pays qui traitent des problèmes de leur pays à l'usage des hommes de ce pays.

Dans les pays en voie de développement, la proportion est faussée, ou même renversée. Les communications de masse, au lieu de s'associer au sentiment naturel de chaque homme d'être au centre du monde, et de mettre les événements en perspective à partir de ce centre, conditionnent l'individu à voir le monde, et à se voir lui-même, avec des yeux et dans une optique qui n'est pas la sienne.

C

On peut entrevoir quelques-uns des principaux facteurs qui sont appelés à intervenir dans la fixation des formes de la culture de masse dans les pays en voie de développement. Il y a: 1) Les traditions culturelles locales qui tendent à se perpétuer en utilisant les mass-media. 2) Les formes de la culture de masse à dominante américaine dont la diffusion mondiale tend à submerger les traditions locales. 3) Les impératifs moraux, les interdits et les tabous qui limitent les moyens d'expression dans les pays où l'individu reste solidement intégré à la société traditionnelle. 4) Les besoins nouveaux, liés à la dissolution des formes sociales traditionnelles et à la constitution d'un prolétariat urbain coupé de ses racines culturelles, et particulièrement perméable à l'influence des mass-media.

Là où les structures traditionnelles gardent leur cohésion et leur emprise sur les individus, les mass-media demeurent sans influence; là au contraire où un ferment de dissolution travaille la société traditionnelle, les communications de masse trouvent un terrain favorable, et elles accélèrent les processus de désintégration amorcés. Elles sont par elles-même symbole de modernité, et elles sont reçues ou rejetées solidairement avec d'autres catégories de la vie moderne dont il n'est pas possible de les dissocier.

Ainsi les communications de masse dans les pays en voie de développement ne serviront pas à préserver les formes de la culture traditionnelle, mais au contraire à accélérer leur disparition. Leur mouvement propre les conduira à supprimer les particularismes régionaux et même nationaux pour conquérir le marché unifié dont elles ont besoin pour prospérer.

D

Les communications de masse dans les pays en voie de développement sont caractérisées par une prépondérance écrasante des moyens audio-visuels sur les moyens scripturaires. Des millions

d'hommes seront touchés par la radio, le cinéma et la télévision, ou par les magazines et les comics, informés et formés par l'image et la parole, avant même de savoir lire un journal. Il y a là un problème qui se pose à l'état latent dans les pays développés, et à l'état de crise aiguë dans les pays en voie de développement. Il n'est pas exagéré de penser qu'il met en jeu l'avenir même de la civilisation.

POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY
SOCIOLOGIE POLITIQUE

INSTITUTIONALIZED VERSUS DIFFUSE SUPPORT OF RADICAL POLITICAL MOVEMENTS

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Studies of Communism in Finland seem to suggest that in the development of a radical political mass movement there occurs some kind of structural differentiation [1]. In the early stages of its development a political mass movement performs mainly expressive functions for its members. As the movement continues to exist it has to train its members and adherents for instrumental activities aimed at distant goals. A different degree of differentiation is characteristic of the difference between industrial communism in the Southern and Western parts of Finland and the backwoods communism prevailing in the Northern and Eastern parts. The industrial communism in the South and the West is of older origin; ecological analyses show a connection between old Socialist traditions and the strength of the Communist vote. The backwoods communism in the North and the East is of a more recent origin; to a large extent it has emerged after the Second World War. Studies of leisure habits seem to suggest that political activity among Communists in the South and the West is usually tied to many other kinds of activities such as work within associations, whereas the activities of the Communist voters in the North and the East are restricted to political behavior of an expressive kind [2]. The results may be said to indicate that the Communist movement in the South and the West has organs concerned with adaptation and tension-management, whereas the Communist movement in the North and the East mainly performs a goal-attainment function as it expresses its adherents' millenial hopes.

It is not possible in this paper to explore the process of structural

[1] On the concept of structural differentiation, see N. J. SMELSER, *Social Change in the Industrial Revolution,* London, 1959, pp. 7-17.

[2] E. ALLARDT, «Community Activity, Leisure Use and Social Structure», *Acta Sociologica,* 6: 2, 1962.

differentiation very much in detail. However, the results concerning the differences between the «old» Finnish industrial and the «new» backwoods communism at least suggest the importance of the developmental process in analyses of political radicalism. Studies aimed at explaining the kind of social order and structure that is vulnerable to political radicalism do not always differentiate between variations in political support and variations in changes of political support. This is perhaps due to the fact that radical political mass movements either are fairly shortlived or they make for an establishment of a one-party system while in power. However, after the Second World War several non-Communist European countries have had a strong Communist movement for a considerable period. In the six parliamentary elections held in Finland in the years from 1945 to 1962 the Communists gained between one fifth and one fourth of the vote of the total electorate. Changes have occurred, however, in the Communist voting strength. In 1948, when the Communists lost voters as well as parliamentary seats, they got 19 per cent of the total vote, whereas in 1958 they received more than 23 per cent of the vote. Simultaneously there occurred much greater changes in particular areas and groups.

A FACTOR ANALYSIS OF ECOLOGICAL DATA

This paper aims at explaining by the method of factor analysis variation in the Communist vote and variation in the Social Democratic vote as well as variation in the changes of the Communist vote. The data are ecological and the unit of analysis is the commune of which there are about 550 in Finland. However, the communes will be divided in five areas or groups, for each of which a separate correlational and factor analysis is done. Altogether 37 variables are included in the study. Some of them describe traditions or happenings in the past such as the rate of killed «Reds» in the Civil War in 1918; some measure economic conditions, as the variance of the per capita income in 1950; some measure religious behavior, as the frequency of church attendance, etc. Of particular interest for the objectives of this study are the Communist vote in 1954, the Social Democratic vote in 1954 and the rise (change) in the Communist vote from 1948 to 1958.

All variables were normalized separately for each of the five areas before the correlation coefficients were computed. The method of factoring has been Thurstone's centroid factor method and the cen-

troid structures have been rotated by what is known as Varimax orthogonal solution [3]. In all five areas 6 factors were extracted. They explain 55 per cent or more of the total variance on each of the five areas.

The study aims of course to explain the differentials in the social base of political radicalism by comparison of the factor structures of the five areas. However, in this paper no exact method for comparison will be attempted.

The five areas (or groups) studied are the following:
1) cities and towns, 2) rural communes with a Swedish speaking majority, 3) rural communes in Southern and Western Finland, 4) rural communes in Eastern Finland and 5) rural communes in Northern Finland. In general, industrial communism has prevailed in the three first mentioned areas, whereas backwoods communism has characterized the rural communes in the East and the North. More precisely the five areas are described by rank-ordering according to the variables indicated in Table I.

TABLE I

Five geographical areas in Finland rank-ordered according to some political and economic variables

	Social Democratic vote in 1954	Communist vote in 1954	Rise in Communist vote 1948-1958	Income per capita 1950	Variance in income per capita	Rise in income per capita 1950-56
Cities and towns	1	2	2	1	1	5
Swedish rural communes	5	5	5	3	5	4
Rural communes in the South and the West	3	3	4	2	2.5	3
Rural communes in the East	2	4	3	4	2.5	2
Rural communes in the North	4	1	1	5	4	1

[3] The matrices have, by courtesy of Professor Charles E. Osgood, been run at the Illiac, the University of Illinois' electronic digital computer.

In the following discussion the rural communes with a Swedish speaking majority are omitted from the comparisons. As table I shows, the group of Swedish communes has the lowest frequency in all three political variables. This is due to the fact that Swedish speaking people as a rule vote for the Swedish people's party. Only in industrial centers do Swedish speaking workers vote for either one of the Socialist parties. The factor matrix for the Swedish communes is not very revealing as it mainly shows that Communist strength and the increase in Communist strength go together and are explained by the degree of industrialization. Also, as an exception from the pattern in the whole country, the Communist strength did not increase in the Swedish communes from 1948 to 1958, but on the contrary declined.

Table I also indicates that Communist strength and the increase in Communist strength are highest in Northern Finland and second highest in cities and towns. The economic conditions, however, in these two groups of communes are in a way reversed. Northern Finland has a very low income per capita and variance in income per capita, but it displays the highest rise in per capita income. The Finnish cities and towns have the lowest rise in per capita income while the per capita income and the variance in per capita income are highest in this group of communes. In a simple way this confirms results from earlier studies. Radicalism in already industrialized areas is often strong when unequality prevails while radicalism in backward areas tends to be related to sudden rises in the aspiration level. However, more detailed results may be obtained from the factor analyses.

In order to save space the complete factor matrices are not presented here. Instead only the factors and the variables with the highest factor loadings will be listed below:

CITIES AND TOWNS

Factor 1: *The factor of Metropolitanism.* Highest loadings in following variables: Proportion of crowded dwellings (+ .82), *Social Democratic vote in 1954* (+ .63), City size (+ .62), Proportion of Unemployed 1931-32 (+ .59), Proportion of people cared for by the commune (+ .58), Social Democratic vote in 1916 (+ .50), Frequency of telephones (— .42), Proportion of Unemployed 1948-53) (+ .41), Increase of new housing facilities (+ .38), High school attendance (—. 36), Variance of per capita income (— .33), Rise in income per capita (— .33).

Factor 2: *The factor of Small Town Backwardness.* Highest loadings: Popu-

lation density (— .69), Rate of electrified apartments (— 65), Divorce rate (— .55), Income per capita (— .50). Unemployment 1948-53 (+ .46), City size (— .34).

Factor 3: *The factor of Anomie.* Highest loadings: Inflow migration (+ .82), Outflow migration (+ .79), Fascist vote in 1936 (+ .79), Thefts (+ .50), People cared for by the commune (— .48), *Rise in Communist vote 1948-58* (+ .46), People not belonging to the church (— .39).

Factor 4: *The factor of Socialist Traditions.* Highest loadings: Voting participation (+ .72), *Rise in the Communist vote 1948-58* (— .56), Social Democratic vote in 1916 (+ .55), Frequency of killed Reds in Civil War 1918 (+ .40), Social Democratic vote in 1939 (+ .38), People not belonging to the church (— .38), Per capita income (— .35), Unemployment 1948-53 (— .34), City size (—. 33), Divorce rate (—. 30), *Communist vote in 1954* (+ .30).

Factor 5: *The factor of Anti-Religionism.* Highest loadings: Sunday school attendance (— .72), Frequency of people taking Holy Communion (— .70), Church attendance (—. 56), Income per capita (+. 54), Increase of new housing facilities (+ .48), Voting participation among women (— .47), Divorce rate (+ .37), City size (+ .34), Variance in income per capita (— .33).

Factor 6: *The Gemeinschaft factor. Highest loadings*: Rise in per capita income (— .74), Thefts (— .58), Killed Reds in Civil War 1918 (+ .55), Homicides (— .51), Frequency of telephones (—. 42), Proportion of industrial workers (+ .40), Proportion of manual workers (+ .35).

RURAL COMMUNES IN THE SOUTH-WEST

Factor 1: *The factor of Disorganization.* Highest loadings: Homicides (+ .65), Thefts (+ .63), People working in retail trade (+ .52), Church attendance (— .47), People cared for by the commune (+ .40), Voting participation (— .38), Divorce rate (+ .35), Inflow migration (+ .34), Proportion of industrial workers (+ .32).

Factor 2: *The factor of Modern Urban Conditions.* Highest loadings: Proportion of electrified apartments (+ .77), Proportion of forestry workers (— .73), Voting participation (+ .61), Population density (+ .59), Proportion of industrial workers (+ .53), Proportion of small farms (— .51), People working in retail trade (+ .46), *Communist vote in 1954* (+ .32), Library loans (+ .32), Proportion of manual workers (+ .30).

Factor 3: *The factor of Socialist Traditions.* Highest loadings: Frequency of Killed Reds in Civil War 1918 (+ .79), Frequency of crofters in 1910 (+ .73), Social Democratic vote in 1916 (+ .72), Social Democratic vote in 1939 (— .59), Fascist vote in 1936 (+ .45), Outflow migration (+ .42), People cared for by the commune (+ .36), Inflow migration (+ .33), Sunday school attendance (— .32), *Social Democratic vote in 1954* (+ .31), Library loans (+ .31).

Factor 4: *The factor of Agrarianism.* Highest loadings: Income per capita (— .77), Rise in income per capita (+ .65), Inflow migration (—

.60), Outflow migration (— .57), *Social Democratic vote in 1954* (— .44), Population density (— .40), Proportion of small farms (+ .33), Proportion of manual workers (— .32).

Factor 5: *The factor of Insecurity.* Highest loadings: Proportion of crowded dwellings (+ .75), Frequency of telephones (— .73), Unemployment 1931-32 (+ .55), Variance in farm size (— .55), Unemployment 1948-53 (+ .52) *Social Democratic vote in 1954* (— .40), *Rise in Communist vote 1948-58* (+ .37), People not belonging to the church (+ .36), Library loans (— .34), *Communist vote in 1954* (— .31).

Factor 6: *The factor of Class Differences.* Highest loadings: Variance in per capita income (+ .61), *Rise in Communist vote in 1948-58* (+ .49), Proportion of small farms (+ .48), Divorce rate (+ .43), People not belonging to the church (+ .42), Proportion of manual workers (+ .39), Proportion of industrial workers (+ .34), People working in retail trade (+ .34).

RURAL COMMUNES IN THE EAST

Factor 1: *The factor of Change in Deprived Conditions.* Highest loadings: Proportion of forestry workers (+ .80), Income per capita (— .78), Population density (— .77), Proportion of small farms (+ .76), Proportion of electrified apartments (— .69), Rise in per capita income (+ .66), Proportion of crowded dwellings (+ .62), Frequency of telephones (— .56), *Communist vote in 1954* (+ .47), Voting participation (— .42), *Rise in Communist vote 1948-58* (+ .39), Variance in per capita income (— .39). Outflow migration (— .39), Frequency of killed Reds in Civil War 1918 (—. 38), Proportion of industrial workers (— .33), Proportion of crofters in 1910 (+ .31).

Factor 2: *The factor of Anti-Religionism.* Highest loadings: Frequency of people taking Holy Communion (— .75), Church attendance (— .70), Sunday School attendance (— .62), Proportion of people not belonging to the church (+ .51), Social Democratic vote in 1916 (+ .33), Communist vote in 1929 (+ .33), Frequency of killed Reds in Civil War 1918 (+ .31).

Factor 3: *The factor of Social Security.* Highest loadings: Unemployment 1948-53 (— .84), Unemployment 1931-32 (— .82), Voting participation (—. 60), proportion of crowded dwellings (— .53), *Rise in Communist vote 1948-58* (— .50), Communist vote in 1929 (—. 38), Fascist vote in 1936 (+ .34), People not belonging to the church (— .30).

Factor 4: *The Gemeinschaft factor.* Highest loadings: Homicides (— .78), People cared for by the commune (— .55), Thefts (— .48), Fascist vote in 1936 (— .40).

Factor 5: *The Migration factor.* Highest loadings: Library loans (— .68), Inflow migration (+ .48), Frequency of crofters in 1910 (— .47), People not belonging to the church (— .47), *Social Democratic vote in 1954* (— .45), Outflow migration (+ .44), Divorce rate (— .39).

Factor 6: *The factor of Socialist Traditions.* Highest loadings: Social Democratic vote in 1916 (+ .76), Social Democratic vote in 1939 (+ .69),

crofters in 1910 (+ .33), Proportion of manual workers (+ .31).
(— .36), Proportion of forestry workers (+ .35), Proportion of
Communist vote in 1954 (+ .47), *Rise in Communist vote 1948-58*

RURAL COMMUNES IN THE NORTH

Factor 1: *The factor of Modernization.* Highest loadings: Proportion of in-
dustrial workers (+ .75), Proportion of manual workers (+. 74),
Variance in per capita income (+ .50), Per capita income (+ .46),
Frequency of killed Reds in Civil War 1918 (+ .41), *Rise in Com-
munist vote 1948-58* (+ .37), Inflow migration (+ .37), Proportion
of people working in retail trade (+ .36), *Social Democratic vote in
1954* (+ .34).

Factor 2: *The factor of Subsistence Farming.* Highest loadings: Proportion
of small farms (+ .79), Frequency of forestry workers (+ .74, Po-
pulation density (— .71), Variance in farm size (— .70), Proportion
of electrified apartments (— .70), People not belonging to the
church (— .48), Outflow migration (— .42), Variance in per capita
income (+ .34).

Factor 3: *The factor of Socialist Traditions.* Highest loadings: Social De-
mocratic vote in 1939 (+ .79), Social Democratic vote in 1916
(+ .77), People cared for by the commune (+ .68), Unemployment
1948-53 (— .63), *Rise in Communist vote in 1948-58* (— .59), Pro-
portion of crofters in 1910 (+ .55), People not belonging to the
church (+ .46), Frequency of killed Reds in Civil War 1918 (+ .45),
Social Democratic vote in 1954 (+ .42).

Factor 4: *The factor of Anti-Religionism.* Highest loadings: Sunday school
attendance (— .76), Church attendance (— .73), Homicides (+ .63),
Frequency of people taking Holy Communion (— .60), Thefts (+
.59), Proportion of people working in retail trade (+ .40).

Factor 5: *The Communism factor.* Highest loadings: *Communist vote in 1954*
(+ .82), Communist vote in 1929 (+ .81), Proportion of crowded
dwellings (+ .64), Unemployment 1948-53 (+ .45), Unemployment
1931-32 (+ .44), *Social Democratic vote in 1954* (— .44), Frequency
of telephones (— .41), People working in retail trade (+ .35),
People cared for by the commune (+ .32).

Factor 6: This factor is hard to label and interpret. Highest loadings: Library
loans (+ .59), Fascist vote in 1936 (— .54), Divorce rate (+ .52),
Unemployment 1931-32 (— .41).

INTERPRETATION OF THE RESULTS

Two kinds of comparison are involved. First, the areas are to be
compared. Second, the loadings of the key political variables in the
different factors have to be compared. Already the correlation matri-
ces show clearly that the Communist vote and the rise in the Com-
munist vote do not correlate at all, as indicated in table 2.

TABLE II

*Correlations between some political variables in
four areas in Finland*

	Cities and towns			South/West		
	Social Democratic vote in 1954	Communist vote in 1954	Rise in Communist vote	Social Democratic vote in 1954	Communist vote in 1954	Rise in Communist vote
Soc. Dem. vote 1954	—	—.03	—.28	—	—.01	—.05
Communist vote 1954		—	+.04		—	+.02
Rise in Communist vote			—			—

	East			North		
	Social Democratic vote in 1954	Communist vote in 1954	Rise in Communist vote	Social Democratic vote in 1954	Communist vote in 1954	Rise in Communist vote
Soc. Dem. vote 1954	—	+.08	+.11	—	—.42	—.12
Communist vote 1954		—	+.14		—	+.10
Rise in Communist vote			—			—

Generally, all correlations in table II are close to zero. The only exception is the negative correlation between Social Democratic vote and Communist vote in Northern Finland indicating that these two parties are strong in different communes. However, the most crucial thing is the fact that Communist strength and the rise in Communist strength do not correlate. This indicates that the variations in these two variables have to be explained by quite dissimilar sorts of factors. This conclusion is supported by the factor analysis. In *cities and towns* the variable or rise in Communist strength has a high positive loading (+.46) in the factor of Anomie and a high negative loading (—.56) in the factor of Socialist Traditions, whereas the Communist vote on the contrary has a positive loading (+.30) in the last mentioned factor. In the *South-West* the rise of Communist strength has loadings in the factor of Insecurity (+.37) and in the factor of Class differences (+.49), but the Communist vote in 1954 has a high positive loading (+.32) in the factor of Modern Urban Conditions and a negative loading in the factor of Insecurity (—.31). In *Northern Finland* the rise of Communist strength is best explained by the factor of Modernization (—.37) and by absence of Socialist Traditions as the loading in the factor of Socialist Traditions is negative (—.59). The Communist vote, however, is almost completely explained by the factor of Communism (+.82). In *the East* Communist strength and the rise in Communist strength have positive loadings in the same factor of Change in Deprived Conditions, the loadings being +.47 and +.39, respectively. However, simultaneously the rise of Communist vote has a negative loading (—.50) in the factor of Social Security, whereas the Communist vote has a positive loading (+.47) in the factor of Socialist Traditions. In this last mentioned factor the rise of Communist vote has a negative loading of —.36.

Apparently rise in Communist strength is occurring in communes and milieux with uprooted individuals. The factors of Anomie (Cities and Towns), of Insecurity of Class Differences (South-West), of Modernization (North, and of Change in Deprived Conditions and of Insecurity (East) all describe environments in which uprooting occurs. Likewise, the rise in Communist strength occurs in milieux characterized by the absence of traditions no matter whether these traditions are Socialist or reminiscences of class struggles around the time of the Civil War. Some kind of discontinuity in the community accounts for the rise in Communist strength. The results concerning the rise in Communist strength strongly support earlier results con-

cerning politics in mass society, for instance those put forward by Kornhauser [4].

However, theories of mass society do not explain the differences in the strength of Communist vote. While the rise of Communist strength usually has negative loadings in the factors of Socialist Traditions, the Communist vote on the contrary almost always has a strong positive loading in these factors. The existence of Socialist Traditions even when they go back to the time of the Civil War usually indicates rather stable conditions. The strength of Communist vote can perhaps best be explained by reference to Lipset's theory of legitimacy crises [5]. The Communists have strength in areas where the struggle around class matters was hard when the working class movement made its entry into politics. In the more industrialized and modernized parts of the country there are individuals and groups who by tradition do not consider the present rule as legitimate in all respects and therefore also traditionally vote for the Communists. In the East and the North the entry into politics by the poor farmers and workers is of a later date. Although the Communist had already gained a rather strong following in Eastern and Northern Finland in the 1920's, voting participation and political activity remained extremely low in these areas. Since the Second World War voting participation has on the contrary been very high in the poor, unemployment-ridden communes in the East and the North. On a large scale the population in these areas first entered politics after the second World War. Their obstacles were not political, as they were for the participants in the working class movement in the 1920's, but these people were prevented from entering politics by their poverty and difficult living conditions.

DISCUSSION

The introduction of the concept of structural differentiation in the first sentence of this paper was not an expression of mere verbal gibbering. There has been a tendency to explain Communist strength as well as rises in Communist strength by reference to uprooting and mass conditions. In studies of the so-called mass society the Com-

[4] W. KORNHAUSER, *The Politics of Mass Society*, London, 1960.

[5] S. M. LIPSET, «Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy», *The American Political Science Review*, Vol LIII, No. 1, March, 1959.

munist vote at a certain time has often been correlated with various indices of social conditions, when it would have been more adequate to operate with some measures of the changes in Communist strength. As conclusions may be stated:

1. The popular strength of a radical political movement, on one hand, and the rises or changes in its strength, on the other, have to be explained by different factors and conditions.

2. The so-called theories of mass society contribute to an explanation of rises in the strength of a radical movement, but they fail in explaining already existing strength of a radical movement.

If Finland can be considered a satisfactory test case, the results from this country suggest that the developmental process in radical political mass movements should be studied in closer detail. The importance of studying this developmental process has been pointed out or at least implied in theoretical statements [6]. Nevertheless, many recent results blur the fact that political mass movements, when they have existed for some time, operate on a strongly instrumental basis. This is of course an every day truth for all those who have lived in a country with a strong Communist movement. The Communist parties develop not only political organs, but also organs for all kinds of social and political activities. Therefore, their adherents in all areas and in all groups can not be described as a mass characterized by activity in politics and passivity in all other fields of life. This seems to be the case only in areas where the Communist movement is beginning to gain strength. As a conclusion:

3. It is important to distinguish between already *institutionalized support* for a radical movement, and *diffuse, expressive support* for a movement.

Alienation and isolation are often thought of being typical for adherents of radical political movements which question the legitimacy of the prevailing order. If there is any truth in such a proposition, different types of alienation and isolation have to be distinguished. It may well be that ideological inclusiveness and restrictions in the perception of social reality are characteristic of radical or revolutionary political movements at all stages of development. The adherents of movements attacking the existing political system may therefore be to some extent isolated from the community

[6] H. BLUMER, «Collective Behavior», in J. B. GITTLER (ed.), *Review of Sociology*, New York, 1957, pp. 145-150.

at large. However, the isolation occurs in different ways at different stages of the development of the movement. As a conclusion:

4. The adherents to institutionalized revolutionary movements tend to belong to groups which are isolated from the community at large. whereas the supporters of diffuse and expressive forms of radical political mass movements tend to be isolated as individuals.

THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM AND ELEMENTS OF PLURALISM IN A «ONE-PARTY» SYSTEM: POLAND

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The political system of socialist Poland is defined here as a one-party system, but in a specific sense of the term. There are now in Poland three organizations that are called parties: The Polish United Worker's Party, the United Peasant Party and the Democratic Party [1].

Moreover, several social organizations, representing various forms of public opinion, also participate in political life. Thus, this is not a classical one-party system. Nevertheless, the use of that term with reference to the Polish system is justified by the role played by one party, namely the Polish United Workers' Party, in the system of power.

All the parties and social organizations taking part in Poland's political life accept as indisputable the principle that the Polish United Worker's Party «plays the leading role in the state». They do not compete with it for power, but on the contrary, they participate in the exercise of power by taking part in the government or in the work of the Seym (the Polish Parliament) and of the people's councils which are the local forms of a uniform state authority [2]. In that sense the two parties allied to the PUWP do not function in the Polish system in the same way as classical parties in a multi-party system. The Polish system may be called a one-party-system if this term is made to mean a permanent concentration of power in one party and a lack of a struggle for power within the system in question.

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[1] In Polish there are two words for a political party, *partia* and *stronnictwo*; the latter is Slavic, while the former ultimately goes back to Latin, but there is no clear difference of meaning between them. Yet only the Polish United Workers' Party has the world *partia* in its Polish name, the remaining two parties calling themselves *stronnictwo*, so that in current Polish usage the expression which corresponds to the English «*the* party» means the Polish United Workers' Party.

[2] The people's councils may be referred to as local government authorities, but it must be borne in mind that in the Polish system there is no opposition between the state authorities and the local government (if the latter is understood to be something distinct from the state authorities).

Yet the Polish «one-party» system includes elements of political pluralism, which manifests itself for instance in the existence of social and political organizations representing various sections of public opinion. The electoral system, especially as it has worked over the last five years, reflects that combination of a one-party system with elements of political pluralism, and hence is an interesting form of solving political issues of democracy in the contemporary world. Although other aspects of political pluralism are more important than the electoral system, it is nevertheless worthy of some attention.

Elections were held three times in Poland in the period 1957-1961. On January 20, 1957, those elected were deputies to the Seym; on February 2, 1958, members of people's councils of all levels[3]; on April 16, 1961, both deputies to the Seym and members of people's councils of all levels. The results were as follows:[4]

Year	Number of electors on electoral list	Percentage of actual voters in relation to number of electors	Percentage of votes for the candidates of the National Unity Front
1957	17.944.081	94.14	98.40
1958	18.116.428	85.68	96,92
1961	18.615.185	94.83	98.34

In all these cases the principles of the electoral law were the same. Candidates may be nominated by political and social organizations which may avail themselves of that right either separately or in coalitions. In all the three elections the political parties and social organizations formed coalitions to nominate candidates who were placed in the lists of the National Unity Front. The country is divided into constituencies and these, in turn, are for technical purposes subdivided into wards. Each constituency has its separate list of

[3] The people's councils are local agencies of the state authority (cf. note 2 above); the lowest level is formed by village or commune councils, the middle by district councils, the highest level by voivodship councils or city councils (in the case of those cities which have a status of voivodship).

[4] The present paper is based on the data pertaining to election to that body which ranked highest in the given case; hence for the 1958 elections these are the data about the voivodship councils, and in the 1961 elections, the data about the Seym. The percentage of the votes for the National Unity Front is calculated in relation to all valid votes (the number of votes declared invalid in no case exceeded one per cent).

candidates, whose number is greater than that of the persons to be elected from one constituency, the number being proportional to its population. The voter may either cancel the names of all the candidates on the list (such a vote is interpreted as being against the list submitted by the National Unity Front), or cancel the name(s) of some candidate(s) (it is then understood that he voted for those candidates whose names have been left uncancelled, in the order in which they are placed on the list), or vote without cancelling any name (such a vote is understood to be passed for as many candidates as there are seats in a given constituency, in the order in which the candidates' names are placed on the list). In the 1957 elections the political parties called upon the voters to manifest their support for the policy of the state by voting without cancelling any names, that is, by voting for those candidates whose names were placed on the seat places. This resulted in an interesting phenomenon: the selection of candidates made by the voters became explicitly political, and its intensity was in the inverse proportion to the support offered to the policy of the state.

Under Polish conditions it is not possible to know precisely how many voters cancelled no names of candidates, and how many cancelled some of them, since one voter may cancel one or more names, and the electoral statistics show only the number of votes passed on a given candidate.

Nevertheless the number of votes won by the various candidates whose names were written on the seat places shows the intensity of selection (although it does not reveal the number of those voters who cancelled at least one name). In the 1957 elections the selection was considerable: the average for those candidates whose names were written on the seat places was 89.37 of all votes, but in many cases it varied between 50 and 60 per cent. One candidate whose name was written on a seat place received only 45.77 per cent of votes and hence was not elected, since the electoral law requires for election an absolute majority of votes. Selection in the 1957 elections may only be compared with that in the elections to the Seym in 1961, since in the elections to the people's councils in 1958 the total number of candidates amounted to nearly 300.000 which makes all computations too complicated. In the 1961 elections the selection was very small: only two candidates from the seat places received less than 90 per cent of votes — 88.32 and 78.90 per cent. respectively. The small intensity and the small differentiation of selection in the 1961 Seym elections accounts for the fact that it is reasonable to confine an analysis of the trend in selection (i.e.

whose names were cancelled most) to the 1957 elections. The nature of selection at that time makes it possible better to explain the issue of political differentiation in those elections [5].

The appeal, issued by the political parties, that the voter should not cancel any candidates' names, resulted in the fact that the selection in the 1957 elections only indirectly reflected the political differentiation of the electorate. While the members of the Polish United Workers' Party (and probably also the members of the remaining two parties, fewer in numbers) complied with the appeal and thus did not give preference to the candidates from their respective parties, some of the other voters cancelled some of the names, in doing which they were guided not only by the personal qualifications of the candidates, but also by their candidates' party membership. On the national average, the candidates from the seat places who were PUWP members obtained 87.95 per cent of all valid votes; members of the United Peasant Party 89.17 per cent members of the Democratic Party, 90.80 per cent; non-party candidates, 94.26 per cent. Thirteen non-party candidates, who appeared officially as «Roman Catholic leaders» obtained on the average 93.35 per cent of all valid votes, which shows that some voters, few in number, were inclined to cancel these names more often than the names of other non-party candidates [6].

The selection of candidates varied in strength and trends according to the parts of the country. On the average, the candidates from the seat places obtained the highest percentage of all valid votes in Warsaw (96.05), and the lowest in Lodz Voivodship (83.33). Those candidates who where PUWP members obtained the highest percentage of votes in Warsaw (95.57) and the lowest in Opole Voivodship (80.22) which had a relatively strong German population then. These data show the degree of differentiation of these two indices of selection of candidates in the 1957 elections.

In the 1957 elections the selection of candidates was correlated with two social and demographic characteristics that differentiate the various voivodships. There was a positive correlation between the

[5] These data are analyzed in greater detail by J. WIATR in «Some Problems of Public Opinion in the Light of the Elections of 1957 and 1958» (in Polish, with summaries in English and in Russian), 228 pp. That paper fills n° 4/1959 of *Studia Socjologiczno-Polityczne*.

[6] In the 1957 elections (including by-elections) the results were: Polish United Workers' Party, 239; United Peasant Party, 118; Democratic Party, 39; non-party deputies, 63; total, 459. In the 1961 elections: PUWP, 225; UPP, 117; DP, 39; non-party, 49; total, 460.

number of votes obtained on the average by the candidates from the seat places in general and by those candidates from the seat places who were PUWP members, on the one hand, and the percentage of urban population in the various voivodships on the other. The correlation index for the degree of urbanization and the average percentage of votes obtained by the candidates from the seat places was +0.76, and for the degree of urbanization and the percentage of votes obtained by PUWP members it was +0.71. In other words, the greater part of the electorate consisted of urban population, the more the electorate complied with the appeal not to cancel any names of candidates, and if some names were cancelled, the less the electorate was guided by prejudices against PUWP members. No sample data are available which would show whether in fact the urban population voted more in accordance with what the political leaders expected, but these correlations make such a hypothesis highly probable.

There was also a correlation, although a weaker one, between the nature of selection and the fact that a given region belong to the territories regained by Poland after World War II. In those territories which are inhabited mostly by people resettled from other regions, a slightly higher percentage of voters was revealed than the national average. The percentage of votes cast for the National Unity Front was also higher there. Pearson's measure of fit, computed for a region's belonging to the regained territories and the average percentage of votes obtained by the candidates from the seat places was +0.38, and for a region's belonging to those territories and the percentage of votes obtained by PUWP members who were candidates from seat places was +0.48. Thus, there was a certain tendency, though not a very strong one, on the part of the voters from the regained territories to comply more with the appeal and thus to vote more in accordance with the expectation of the political leaders, than in the other parts of Poland. This tendency is even more evident if two voivodships with strong pre-war populations are excluded from the number of those belonging to the part of Poland regained in 1945. Thus, one may say that the voting of resettled populations was the most and the voting of populations living prior to 1945 in Germany the least favourable to the policy of the Polish government.

Analysis of voting statistics shows that under Polish «one-party» system political behaviour reflects the political differentiation of society. Hence elections of such a type may be an element of pluralism in political life, since they help publicly to express the existing differentiation of opinions and political preferences.

Under certain conditions such a differentiation may play an essential political role. The electoral system in Poland assumes an essential coincidence of interests of all social strata and a lack of sharp conflicts.

It also favours consolidation rather than increased political fragmentation. On the other hand, however, it includes some elements of the check and balance system, since it makes it possible to reveal conflicts and antagonism, should such take considerable dimensions. It also makes it possible to appraise the varying degree of political approval, expressed in voting, for the governments' policy. That approval may be measured by attendance in the elections, the percentage of the votes cast for the National Unity Front, the intensity of, and the trends, in the selection of candidates. The investigation of those issues makes the study of electoral behaviour not only theoretically interesting, but also politically important for the development of the concept of socialist democracy [7].

[7] In addition to the paper quoted above, there are three major publications concerned with elections in Poland. The 1957 elections are analyzed by Z. A. PELCZYNSKI, «Poland, 1957», included in *Elections Abroad,* ed. David E. BUTLER, London, 1959. The 1958 elections are discussed by S. BEREZA, «A Sociological Analysis of the Election to the District People's Council at Ochota, Warsaw, 1958» (in Polish. with summaries in English and Russian), *Studia Socjologiczno-Polityczne,* No 2/1959, and Z. GOSTKOWSKI, «The Interest of the Lódz Population in the 1958 Elections to the People's Councils», *The Public Opinion Quarterly,* Fall, 1959. Postwar elections in Poland and researches on them are described by J. WIATR in the chapter on «Elections and Voting Behavior in Poland», in *Essays on Behavioral Study of Politics,* ed. Austin RANNEY, Urbana, The University of Illinois Press, 1962.

REPORT ON THE DISCUSSION

First Session

Chairman: S. M. LIPSET, University of California, Berkeley
Rapporteur: Juan J. LINZ, Columbia University

R. R. Alford presented a paper on *Stratification and Politics in the Anglo-American Countries*. This comparative analysis of the basis of cleavage in Great Britain, Australia, U.S.A. and Canada, is based on over 50 surveys over the period 1936 to 1961. Using data on political preferences by occupation, religion and region of residence, indices of class-voting (measured by the difference between the support of the leftist party or parties among manual workers and non-manual occupations, excluding the rural occupations), and of religiously and regionally based voting were constructed. Wherever religious differences were found in both manual and non-manual occupations, it has been assumed that this was actually a religious difference, and not one which could be accounted for by other non-religious factors. The same was assumed in the case of regional differences.

This analysis was applied to the four democracies — all characterized by a common political culture, the weakness of threats to constitutional government and a limited range of political cleavage. The main findings were: In Great Britain nothing else seems to matter except class, whatever Welsh and Scottish regional loyalties exist, they heighten rather than weaken class voting. An effect that is very different from the U.S. South and Quebec, where they align both strata behind one party. It was suprising to find that class-voting did not decline between 1943 and 1959: workers being no less Labour while non-manual occupations have turned away. In Australia the level of class voting is somewhat lower, but higher than in the U.S. and Canada. Regional loyalties are not important, but Catholics of both strata are more likely to support Labor. However, with ethnic and religious loyalties becoming less important upward mobile Catholics have found the Democratic Labor Party — a split caused by the «Communism issue» — a welcome opportunity to break old ties. In the U.S.A. the level of class voting has vacillated

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between high points in 1940 and 1948, and lower ones in 1956 and 1960, but even then remaining higher than in 1936 when both manual and non-manual strata voted for Roosevelt. The importance of religious voting has changed from 1952, when non-manual Catholics voted almost as non-manual Protestants, to 1960 when in both strata Catholics turned back to their long-time Democratic preference. The low class voting in the South has not changed over the period studied. In Canada, due to the economic and cultural heterogeneity and the political veto power of French-Catholic Quebec, non-class factors are paramount, even when there are signs of a swing towards class politics.

The paper ends with the prediction that class politics will decline in Britain and to a lesser extent in Australia, while the decline of regional and religious cleavages in the U.S.A. and Canada would lead to an increase in these countries. A moderate level of class voting in a fairly integrated society — even without other cross-cutting cleavages — can be the basis of stable democratic politics.

J. J. Wiatr presented a paper on *The Electoral System and Elements of Pluralism in a One-party System: Poland.* Even when the role played by the Polish United Workers Party justifies to speak of a one-party system' it should not be forgotten that there are two other parties and other organizations that present candidates, and that the electoral system allows the voter to cancel the names of all or some candidates on the lists submitted by the National Unity Front. Since in 1957 he was asked to manifest his support for the policy of the State by voting for the candidates at the head of the list — the seat places — it is possible to study the extent to which the electorate complied with this appeal. On the national average the PUWP candidates from the seat places obtained 87.95 % of all valid votes, non-party candidates 94.26 %, with minor variations for the other two parties. The variations in strength from district to district allow an ecological analysis using different social characteristics. So, the correlation for the degree of urbanization of the voivodships and the average % of votes obtained by the candidates from the seat places was 0.76, and that with the % of votes for the PUWP 0.71. Similarly the support for the government was somewhat stronger in regions regained in the West. Such differences are significant indications of the variations and trends in public opinion within the assumed essential coincidence of interests of all social strata on which the system is based.

E. Allardt presented a paper on *Factors Explaining Variation in*

Strength of Political Radicalism. The study of Communism in Finland seems to suggest a kind of structural differentiation — to use N. Smelser's idea- beween a stage in which it performs mainly expressive functions and another in which it serves its members for instrumental purposes. The recent Communism in the backwoods, in the North and East seems to be in the first stage and the industrial Communism in the South and West in the second. A factor and correlational analysis of the variations in social-democratic and Communist votes for 550 communes, and for them grouped in five areas, using 37 variables, supports a number of conclusions. Radicalism in already industrialized areas is strong when unequality prevails, in the backward areas it tends to be related to sudden rises in aspiration level (resulting from a high rise in p.c.income in a poor area). The rise in Communist strength does not correlate with Communist vote. Apparently the Communist rise is in milieu with up-rooted individuals, described by factors of anomie (in cities and towns), insecurity and class differences (South and West) of Modernization (North) and change in deprived conditions and insecurity (East) and the absence of Socialist or class war traditions. The rise is linked with discontinuity in the community to use Kornhauser's analysis. The South-West vote reflects quite different factors: traditions of class conflict. In the discussion H. Eulau commented on the methodology and value of systematic comparative analysis and questioned the use of occupation as the best indicator of class. He also noted that the absolute level of working class support for conservative parties and its fluctuations should not be disregarded. R. McKenzie noted the perplexing fact that the British two-party system was maintained by the «deviants» of the working class in a country with «pure class politics» — according to R. Alford — when that class constituted approximately 2/3 of the electorate. And mind you not of the Lumpen-proletariat, but of a sector of that class high in information and feelings of political efficacy. The UAW could deliver more votes in Detroit than the unions in Coventry. He noted that the New Deal changed the Democratic party in a way the Canadian Liberal party never was and this would account for some present and future differences between the two countries. A. B. Ulam distinguished different meanings of «pluralism»: awareness of the rulers of the different effects of their actions on different sectors, situations in which a dominant power coexists with others, limiting it but not competing with it (the Church in Poland) and open competition for power. The elections in Poland contribute to the first,

but have essentially symbolic value as a form of social mobilization, but do not represent pluralism as competition for power. For him the elements of pluralism are elsewhere, in the Church preserving claims and within the Party itself. R. Mackenzie, in a similar vein, insisted on the pluralistic elements that made Poland non-totalitarian, but which were not necessarily reflected in the elections, but in a relatively autonomous public opinion and interest groups. Elections are neither the only nor the most important aspect of Polish pluralism. J. Wiatr in a rejoinder noted that they were however considered significant by the leadership as indicators of acceptance, even when they were certainly not the only, nor perhaps the most important, factor of pluralism.

Second Session

Chairman : R. T. McKenzie, London School of Economics
Rapporteur: Stein Rokkan, Michelsen Institute, Bergen

M. Abrams presented a paper on *The Political Division of the British Middle Class*. His organization had been able to carry out a series of sample surveys during the 1950s and tabulations from these indicated marked differences in political preferences between the «upper» and the «lower» middle class and between the professional and the business sectors.

M. Dogan presented a paper on *Les Bases Sociales des partis politiques en France et en Italie*. He had been able to assemble survey data and other statistics on the distributions of party support within major occupational groups in the two countries and presented a synoptic table of similarities and differences between the countries.

The French working class was found to vote in greater proportion for the Communist party than the Italian. There were also marked differences in the political preferences of voters in the agricultural sector. In France, the largest left votes in this sector would come from the *petits cultivateurs* and the agricultural workers, while in Italy the left strongholds would be among the *mezzadri*, and not among the small freehold farmers. Such differences could only be understood against the background of the historically given cleavages within each region and each locality. The agricultural votes were not necessarily cast in *support* of the national party but in *protest*

against economically dominant groups in each region: the central bureaucracy, the large landowners or, in Italy, the Catholic Church. Comparative research should focus on such within-nation differences, not on aggregated tables for each country as a whole.

J. Linz read a paper on *The Cleavage Structure of West German Politics*. He had re-analyzed the data from a large sample survey carried out in 1954 by the UNESCO Institute in Cologne and had compared the findings of that survey with a variety of other findings for Germany, France, Italy and the Netherlands. He situated the German case on the two principal axes of European politics as follows:

Strength of the Catholic Church

		None		*Dominant*
Regional differences	*Minor*		U.K.	W. Germany
in extent of		Sweden		
industrialization		Norway		France
	Large	Finland		Italy

The economic cleavages characteristic of industrialized countries are cross-cut, therefore, by a broad line of cleavage over issues of religion. The rural - urban cleavage was important in Wilhelmine and Weimar Germany but counts for very little in the Bonn Republic. Survey findings indicate clearly that the Socialist SPD has its primary in the working class and among the lower salaried employees. The party has, however, proved unable to mobilize more than about half of the total vote potential from workers and *Angestellten*. Surveys indicate again and again that loyal Catholic workers will vote CDU rather than SPD, even when unionized.

Comparisons with France and Italy, however, indicate that the religious cleavages in Germany do not tend to intensify socio-economic contrasts, but on the contrary provide a basis for the development of cross-class consensus. Detailed breakdowns of responses to questions about the policies of the de Gasperi and the Adenauer governments tend to support this interpretation.

In the ensuing discussion, J. Gould dealt with the findings reported for Great Britain by M. Abrams and stressed the need for detailed breakdowns by sex, position in household and trade union member-

ship. He also emphasized the need for detailed differentiation by type of employer: the recent increase in Liberal votes seemed mainly to have resulted from grievances among *public* employees, less from among private ones: R. Rose stressed the need for a study of the upper middle groups by type of school and military experience.

A. Pizzorno discussed Dogan's paper and stressed the need for a dynamic approach: what happens to the hundreds of thousands of agricultural workers and smallholders now moving into industrial and urban environments ?

R. Mayntz stressed the need for a systematic approach to comparisons: the juxtaposition of descriptive data did not help much. A central problem for comparative analysis concerned the factors making for moderation or radicalism among workers. Religious factors as such did not explain the moderation of the German SPD. Linz's analysis did not take sufficiently into account the *multiplicity of churches* in Germany and their effects on the politics of the workers.

A. Touraine discussed the difficulties of the type of class-party analysis attempted in the three papers. There were not only within — nation differences in the sense of the party vote but also in the *sense of each occupational classification.* This might perhaps be remedied through detailed attitude tests built into sample surveys. He distinguished four lines of analysis:

a) differences in politics between clearly distinct *subcultures,* whether religiously or socially defined; b) differences between groups adhering to different *ideological* traditions (orleanist — legitimist etc.) c) differences according to patterns of *social mobility;* d) differences between *status categories* in similar types of organizations.

Replying to points made in the discusion, M. Dogan emphasized that his attempt to establish estimates for the distributions of political preferences by occupational categories only represented a first and necessary step towards a dynamic analysis of changes brought about through industrialization and migration into the cities: this was an essential task in future research. J. Linz similarly emphasized the need for concerted action to collect and to evaluate descriptive data country by country, not only for recent years, but whenever possible for longer time series. National aggregates were clearly of no use in comparative research: the more detailed the data, the more breakdowns they would allow and the better the possibilities of comparison.

PSYCHIATRIC SOCIOLOGY
SOCIOLOGIE PSYCHIATRIQUE

CRIME AND ILLNESS

THOMAS MATHIESEN AND VILHELM AUBERT,
University of Oslo

TWO MODELS OF DEVIANCE

Society is full of misfortunes. Some are characterized as crimes, others as disease or accidents. The classification of such deviant events does not depend only upon the objective properties of the events as they appear to a disengaged scientific observer. The classification of general categories of symptoms also depends upon the properties of the society within which they occur, upon the duties, skills and resources of its agents of social control. And the classification of individual cases may depend as much upon the social context and the perceiving and reacting agent as upon the event itself.

At first glance, the way one becomes sick or a criminal may seem too obvious to merit discussion. But it is a fact in an increasing number of instances in modern society there is dispute over whether a particular behavior sequence should be classified as «criminality» or «illness».

From the sociological point of view, criminal law is one among several regulators of values. The criminal law either orders priorities between values (ends) or between roads (means) to values. It gives the value of life to A priority over the value to B of getting rid of A, say by killing him. It gives the owner's road to his property priority over the thief's road to the same property.

This inevitable characteristic of the criminal law necessarily bestows a specific attribute upon any criminal. A criminal is someone who strives, or has been striving, towards a value. Whatever theories we may entertain about what he actually achieves, a necessary condition for his being a criminal is that, in some fashion, he is or was out to obtain a value. The change that takes place in a person's si-

tuation when he becomes a criminal is due to a motivated act — a choice.

Medical science defines illnesses. It is no necessary condition of a definition of disease that it should be concerned with interpersonal regulation of values and the ordering of priorities. The only necessary assumption about values in medical literature is that illness is negatively valued. One becomes sick by undergoing a change for the worse. Further, the presumption is that one becomes sick in spite of strivings for a value — in spite of attempts to stay healthy.

Where the entrance criteria of the sick and criminal roles are difficult or impossible to perceive a deviant performance will be rendered ambiguous along the dimension of crime-illness. The understanding of a given deviant performance as crime or illness is linked to the situation in which the performance takes place, including the social characteristics of the performers and observers.

Any situation in which an individual stands to gain from withdrawal is such as to render suspect his claim to illness. Generally, the army stands as a situation in which the value of withdrawal, particularly for enlisted men, is so patent as to render claims to illness routinely suspect. Absence from school, factories, etc., in short, any situation in which the observer ordinarily assumes that the person claiming illness may be motivated to withdraw, is such as to render claims to illness suspect.

The reverse situation may be observed as well. That is, it is easier to be categorized as ill when a significant deprivation follows validation of a claim to illness. For example, the child on his way to a party is suspect in this way.

The thesis also suggests that the criminal basis of the performance becomes suspect in any situation in which ends of doubtful value to the performer of the deviant performance are achieved. Petty theft by the wealthy are of this sort. Arson, except where insurance is involved, is another example of a situation in which the basis of crime seems as likely to be «illness» as «criminality».

It would not be very misleading to construe the evolution of modern ideologies of criminal law as an elaboration upon the ambiguities that are attached to deviant acts along the dimension crime-illness. The catchword has been to «treat the deviant, not the deviance», or even more specifically, to look upon crimes as symptoms of disease.

There are several general reasons why such a development should increasingly present itself as a rational solution to the problems of deviance. Possibly the most general and fundamental of all these

reasons springs from a need for scientific predictability. The criminal as a model of deviance is threatening in its traditional juridical form, not only because of the criminal's capacity to do harm, but also because the legal verdict offers no certainty with regard to his future behavior. He may repeat his crime, or he may not. The law and the legal decisions are concerned with retroactive justice and not with predictability. In a society with a growing reliance upon science and forecasts in other vital areas, the absence of predictability becomes increasingly problematical. In this situation we find the development of a whole new science, criminology, which attempts to link the individual criminal act to processes that have a time dimension, allowing predictions to be made on the basis of more or less measurable criteria.

The simplest way in which to make an offence predictable is to connect it with relatively stable, although not necessarily unalterable traits in the offender. The development of such schemes of interpretation ranges from stress on inborn organic traits, Lombroso's deformed and born criminal, to personality defects or defects due to enduring social stimulations. Since such theories derive their support from a social need, they have blindly assumed the dictate of everyday logic that «like causes like»: A negative consequence (an offence) must have a negative cause (a defect in the offender). In other words, the offender must be sick or he must be in a state much like disease. Such a definition brings his disturbing display of deviance in touch with elaborate schemes of prediction based upon a naturalistic model of man. In principle. his behavior is predictable table.

Closely linked to the above is a stress on the need of society to «do something in advance». Since the legal system is essentially past-oriented, or retroactive, it is potentially closed. Presumably, all relevant data that can be gathered are in hand. On the basis of these data, it is possible to mete out punishment that restores balance in the social moral account and that is considered strong enough to prevent future criminal acts.

But in some cases the relevant criminal acts are of such a nature that the future becomes more pressing as a problem. In such cases. there is not only a need to predict. There is also a felt need to do something in advance — *before* a given deviant performance occurs — both in order to protect society against future crimes and to change the performer of the deviant act. At this point, forensic psychiatry and similar disciplines are brought in as an attempt to fill a white spot on the legal map. If society wants to do something in advance, a

basic principle of legal justice has to be set aside. The probabilistic nature of sciences such as forensic psychiatry as well as their orientation towards illness make them well suited to fill the need for action in advance.

Related to the need for predictability and advance action there is a need for explanations. In Western society we no longer feel satisfied with only moralistic interpretations of crime. Furthermore, it is difficult to employ rationalistic interpretations in terms of means-ends schemes when confronted with a rising juvenile crime rate, crimes of violence and sexual crimes. The weird character of such crimes, coupled with a lack of satisfaction with moralistic interpretations, creates a need for specialized advisory «explainers». Again, analogies with the sick are easy to use. When it is established that the criminal is ill, he falls into order. Entering the social role of the sick, lack of fulfilment of every-day expectations is in fact only to be expected Thus, in terms of a change in social role the deviant performance becomes «understandable» even to the layman.

Now a property crime committed, let us say, by a poor laborer, may easily be interpreted as a rational and wilful act. Such a criminal may be viewed as a man striving towards a value. Yet, to an increasing degree one is searching for causes of even such apparently rational acts, thus pulling them into the sphere of criminology, forensic psychiatry, and medicine in general.

Another necessary condition for this transformation of deviants to take place is the sanction of imprisonment, prevalent in Western society during recent centuries. Extensive use of imprisonment for deviants is an innovation of modern industrial societies. Once it becomes usual, however, to sentence criminals to prison, it also becomes «natural» to deal with criminality as if it were a state capable of manipulation or modification over time.

The transformation in conceptualization from criminality to illness must also have been eased by the helpless and physically deprived state of the inmate. If he does not appear much like a patient in need of treatment when outside the prison walls, he often does so when he is reduced to a prison inmate.

Such analogies with the sick and the patient are of course mixed with an increased stress in Western society on humaneness in dealing with criminals. Such notions about humaneness have led to a drastic liberalization of punitive reactions in Norway. However, associated with such liberalization, the public has had to face a rising crime rate, especially among juveniles. This has been interpreted as a cause-

effect relationship. As a reaction to pressure from the public, protective, specialized, reactions that formally were not punishment are increasingly used. In this connection, let us look more closely at the development of forensic psychiatry in Norway.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY IN NORWAY

In criminal cases in Norway, two psychiatrists are called in as advisers of the court. They are not expert witnesses for the prosecution or the defense. Psychiatrists are appointed by the court whenever the crime is of a serious nature or if there are some obvious symptoms of mental instability on the part of the defendant. In cases where the prosecution (or much more rarely, the defense) wants the defendant «secured» — a special type of preventive measures used in Norway — psychiatrists must be appointed. However, the criteria of appointment of the psychiatrists are relatively not clear, and rather little is known about the conditions under which preliminary decisions with respect to appointments are made. Such preliminary decisions are important, because the conclusions of the forensic psychiatrists are today highly predictable.

So-called «security» or preventive measures range from relatively mild reactions, such as probation or abstention from alcohol, to detention in a special institution or in a regular prison. The court has final authority with regard to the question of which preventive measures, if any, may be applied by the prosecution. The formal purpose of preventive measures is protection of society against future crimes, and in connection with this, rehabilitation of the deviant. Formally, these measures do not constitute punishment.

The psychiatrists are asked by the court if the defendant can be placed in one of three categories (with some subcategories that need not concern us here): «unconsciousness», «insanity» and «mental immaturity or decline».

The first two categories imply exemption from criminal responsibility, though it should be noted that there is no M'Naughten rule in Norwegian law. While insanity comes close to a psychiatric category the third category does not correspond to any known psychiatric system of classification. It comprises deficient intelligence, alcoholism, severe neuroses, and above all, psychopathy. In view of the imprecision of this concept, it is *a priori* probable that it will be applied, irrespective of specific findings, wherever the consequent reaction seems appropriate. This conclusion is not exempt from

responsibility. It furnishes a basis for preventive detention after the prison-term has been served.

In addition to these conclusions the psychiatrists are asked to predict whether the defendant presents a risk of recidivism. This question is put and answered before the question of guilt has been definitely settled by the court. It is obvious that the answer may influence the jury's finding, although this is by no means intended.

Table I shows the kinds of criminality that have led to psychiatric intervention and the previous criminal record of the defendants, while table II shows what kinds of conclusions the psychiatrists have reached, and their estimates of the risk of recidivism. The absolute figures in table I shows a great increase in the use of forensic psychiatrists over time (though the war years show a temporary decrease). This can no more than raise a suspicion that redefinitions of crime are taking place, since the change might be due to an increase in the proportion of criminals who suffer from some recognizable mental disease or deficiency. However, considering the public debates during recent years, the inference that the increasing use of psychiatrists is due to a change of ideology seems more likely. This inference is strongly supported if we look at the internal shifts of emphasis appearing in table I.

In the 1930's crimes of violence constituted a large proportion of the cases which led to psychiatric participation in the decision. Second in importance were sexual crimes. It may be added that the majority of both of these types of crime were committed by previously unconvicted persons. Crimes against property occurred much more rarely, and were as likely as not commited by a recidivist. Thus the distribution of crimes in this sample of cases was highly unrepresentative of the general distribution of crimes. The emphasis lay upon the more threatening and «crazy» offences, the crimes that most easily could be seen as committed by sick persons.

In harmony with this we find that a large proportion of the early offenders were characterized as insane and consequently exempt from criminal responsibility (table II). A fairly large proportion may be inferred to be normal (no positive conclusion). Furthermore, the psychiatrists at that time were obviously hesitant to state that there was a danger of recidivism when compared with later years. Thus, if the legal decision-makers at that time, for purposes of the protection of society or of just retribution, wanted an extended incarceration of the defendant, they would ordinarily have to sentence him to a prison term on the basis of purely legal considerations, or to a special type of detention in prison that earlier was used for

dangerous, but presumably normal offenders. Their major alternative to this was acceptance of a conclusion of insanity, which put the offender under a purely medical regime.

All this has gradually changed, some of the changes starting already in the thirties, others appearing only in more recent years. The composition of the clientele and the distribution of conclusions are today drastically different from what they were in the early thirties. The change suggests that a new type of clientele has been pulled into the medical-psychiatric orbit, a clientele which in earlier times was dealt with on the basis of purely legal considerations. It suggests that the definition of mental disease has been extended so as to include types of deviants, and of deviance, which have traditionally been considered as crimes in a more pure sense.

The proportion of recidivists among the psychiatrically examined criminals has steadily increased. In 1953, 55 % of this clientele were recidivists. And this is in particular due to an increase in the proportion of certain kinds of recidivists. It is above all due to a large increase in the number of recidivist property offenders, while the crimes of violence still occur mainly among people without previous criminal record.

The large proportion of sexual offenders, both in recent years and before the war, supports the notion that a deviant act is most readily defined as a symptom of disease when its purpose appears unintelligible or where the goal appears to be undesirable. Most people would consciously claim this with respect to the majority of sexual offenders.

But why should recidivism become increasingly linked to suspicions of mental disease ? One very simple reason is that repetition gives the appearance of a natural law. It establishes a time link between discrete events in the past and provokes extrapolations into the future. This, the establishment of recidivism, which any police officer or judge could undertake, is the first step in redefining the criminal from someone grasping for rewards in concrete acts, to someone whose general state of mind is such as to *cause* crimes. The question which presents itself, is why this extrapolation should have to be done by psychiatrists.

There are probably several reasons. First of all, the modern humanitarian ideologies of punishment find it increasingly difficult to throw people into prison for long periods of time simply because of interference with other people's property. We must reckon with changes in the conceptions of the sacredness of property, and of the need to defend the rich against theft from the poor. Much fear on this score

has probably disappeared. Since the amounts of money involved are rarely of crucial significance to the victim, harsh prison sentences clash with modern conceptions of justice. Nevertheless, many of these criminals constitute a permanent challenge to the police, the prosecution and the courts. If nothing else, they repeatedly demonstrate by their recidivism the impotency of the authorities. The present practice of calling in psychiatric experts, obtaining a statement about mental deviance upon which preventive measures may be prescribed, may ease some of these tensions. It gets the offender out of the way for fairly long periods of time, and under conditions that give the appearance of scientific rationality and humane concern for treatment and cure.

Secondly, while such crimes may have appeared rational earlier, an ideological change has taken place with regard to our conception of criminal rationality. Presently, even the property criminals and certainly the recidivists among them, require explanation. The trends in our data may be seen as an increasing quest for causes.

There may be a third factor in operation. Although these offenders are convicted of specific illegal acts, they may present a general picture of deficiency in social, psychological and even somatic medical terms. Many of them appear to be in a helpless, deficient state of a rather chronic kind, which evokes the notion of disease and treatment. Combined with the need to protect society and the authorities against the recidivist, this general social condition of the group in question makes it seem natural in common sense terms to have the defendant diagnosed as sick. It is less clear why the psychiatrists *themselves* should want to participate in this process of decision, since they know that nothing like a real program of treatment awaits the detained convict.

Table II shows a great shift in the distributions of psychiatric conclusions, which is consonant with the above interpretation. If we are correct in attributing so much importance to protective purposes and to common sense logic in the definition of deviance, we should expect psychiatric conclusions to be increasingly of a less clear-cut kind. We should also expect a relative decline in the insanity conclusions, because they would not take care of the protective function. Insane criminals will remain in their hospitals only so long as they are, strictly speaking, insane. Detained convicts stay at least for a certain minimum period, and are under supervision by legal authorities for long periods of time.

And in fact, the absolute number of «insane» conclusions has been dropping in recent years, while the conclusion «mental immaturity

or decline» has become the dominant outcome of psychiatric examination of defendants. The decline in the absolute figures for the insanity conclusions may possibly be due to an increased tendency to get people straight to the mental hospitals without any criminal trial. But we rather doubt that this could account for the surprising trend. It seems more likely that some defendants who were previously diagnosed as insane are now classified in the intermediary category of mental deviance.

During a period with a considerable increase in the number of criminals exposed to psychiatric examination, the proportion who received no positive conclusion, here termed «normal», has decreased considerably (The absolute number of such normal defendants has remained fairly constant). It supports the general conclusion that the increase in our sample is due to a great addition of recidivists, most often property offenders, who are characterized as being in a state intermediary between insanity and normality. To repeat, probably these are mainly people who were previously sentenced to long-term imprisonment or detention based upon purely legal, punitive considerations.

Table III shows the distribution of psychiatric conclusions by type of crime (This table is based on a sample of every third male examined by psychiatrists in connection with criminal trials.) Three crude patterns can be discerned in the data; one for crimes against property, one for crimes of violence and one among sexual offenders. The shifts over time have been dealt with already, and here we shall primarily be concerned with results from more recent years. *Those who commit crimes against property are very largely, and increasingly so, classified in the intermediary psychiatric category: mental immaturity or decline.* Very few are today classified as insane, nor are many classified as normal. Among the sexual offenders the pattern is perceptibly, but not very much, different. More offenders are classified as normal, and fewer as belonging to the intermediary category. For crimes of violence, we find a tendency to polarization. An appreciable proportion are found to be normal, but also a significant proportion are considered insane and therefore likely to be exempt of criminal responsibility.

In short, then, our data indicate major changes in the employment of forensic psychiatry. The changes may best be interpreted in light of ideological shifts. In particular, an increasing number of criminals who were previously defined as «pure criminals» are now placed closer to the role of the sick. However, they are not placed close

enough to receive the rights that follow from this role, such as exemption from criminal responsibility and placement in a hospital. Rather, they are categorized in a hazy intermediate zone between crime and illness, whereby they are criminally responsible as well as subject to protective measures for long periods of time.

TABLE I

Forensic psychatric statements 1930-53. Distributed according to earlier criminal record and type of crime
(Percentages)

Year			Recidivist	Previously unconvicted	Total	N
1930-35			31	69	100	693
1936-40			32	68	100	833
1941-45			33	67	100	634
1946-53			41	59	100	1991

Year	Property crimes	Crimes of violence	Sexual crimes	Embezzle- ment	Others	Total	N
1930-35	17	42	25	6	10	100	693
1936-40	19	37	26	6	12	100	833
1941-45	29	33	24	8	7	101	634
1946-53	27	25	30	9	10	101	1991

TABLE II

Forensic psychiatric statements 1930-53, by psychiatric conclusion
(Absolute figures *)

Year	Un- conscious- ness	Insanity	Mental immaturity or decline	No posi- tive con- clusion	Probable risk of recidivism	Number of persons
1930-35	24	199	258	182	171	693
1936-40	27	183	430	122	472	833
1941-45	19	104	388	105	406	634
1946-53	38	168	1341	275	1344	1991

* The total number of conclusions does not correspond to the total number of persons, since each person may get more than one conclusion.

TABLE III

Sample of forensic psychiatric statements: Psychiatric conclusions by types of crime (Percentages *)

	Property crimes	Crimes of violence	Sexual crimes
	1931-45		
No positive conclusion	12	23	20
Insanity	18	26	17
Mental immaturity or decline	69	41	60
Others	1	10	3
	100	100	100
N	125	219	142
	1946-55		
No positive conclusion	10	18	21
Insanity	3	19	7
Mental immaturity or decline	85	58	69
Others	2	5	3
	100	100	100
N	180	181	200

* Some very rare types of crime as well as persons charged with more than one type of crime have been omitted.

CONFORMING AND DEVIANT IMAGES OF YOUTH IN A NEW SOCIETY

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I

In old established societies individual morality is mainly concerned with interpersonal or intra-personal obligations. Positive acts of loyalty to the community are required only under exceptional circumstances, such as wartime or other emergencies. In everyday life, however, collective loyalty is only a latent condition of the effective maintenance of interpersonal obligations. Matters are different in newly established societies which came into being as a result of national and/or social revolutions. These societies were created for the realization of a common purpose: freedom from subjection, social justice, the expression of national culture. During the period of struggle for the new society, adherence to this common purpose is the supreme moral command. Personal obligations and rights are all subject to the collective interest. They are honored as a condition for the effective functioning of the group fighting for its collective goals. The attainment of the goal, such as independence or the establishment of a permanent revolutionary regime, creates, therefore, a gap in the moral consciousness: the purpose having been achieved there is no effective unifying force left for society.

Things are made worse by the sudden surge of division of labour. The subject group or nation fighting for its rights is relatively equalitarian; the positions of highest prestige and greatest power belong to the «others» (the rulers) and status differences among the members of the revolutionary group seem unimportant and temporary because of the unifying force of the common goal and the expectation of imminent change in all social relations following the victory. Victory indeed brings about social changes, but not those which had been expected. Instead of establishing revolutionary fraternity and equality there emerge new social inequalities and tensions. The assumption of supreme power and the other functions of the previous-

ly ruling group by the revolutionaries creates among them great differences of status. These differences are now permanent and, therefore, invidious. As a result, the collective goals, in the name of which the new society exists, seem to lose their hold on the minds of people. They appear now as abstract principles far removed from reality. The attempts, of which there are many, to revive revolutionary values through moral condemnation of the prevailing apathy are ineffective, since they do not touch the problem of social differentiation which is the root of apathy towards these values. As a result, there emerges a feeling that the moral basis of the society is disintegrating [1].

One of the areas where this moral discontinuity is most clearly observable is the socialization of the second generation. This generation is brought up on the collective values of the revolutionary movement. At the same time, however, the struggle for these values has never been a part of their personal experience. They know of this struggle as a sacred myth, and variously admire their parents, for having taken part in it, or are irritated by them for having thus achieved moral accomplishments barred from their children born already in a «good» world. In either case, the supreme values placed before them have little practical relevance for their own conduct. Living in a relatively stable world, their moral problems are of an individual personal kind, to which the collective goals of a past period seem to be of little relevance. The feeling that the official values of the society lost their validity is, therefore, particularly acute in their cases. The older generation may at least derive some righteous consolation from condemning the «decadent» present in the name of their own heroic past; the same way to moral justification is not open to the youth lacking such a past.

II

There are of course variations on this common theme in different new societies. Here we shall present only one aspect of the development of such a discontinuity in moral consciousness in one new society, namely the problem of the second generation in Israel as reflected in the changing image of that generation in folklore, and literature. In a way, of course, Israel is a very old society, since

[1] One of the better known documents of such post-revolutionary moral crisis is Milovan DJILAS, *The New Class*, London, Thames and Hudson, 1958.

there is direct continuity between the present-day Hebrew language and Jewish religion and those of two thousand years ago. But the majority of Jews now living in Palestine are immigrants who came to the country from which their fathers had been evicted by a series of conquerors. Jews had never accepted the right of conquest and drifted back to the country whenever there was an opportunity, but there were few opportunities. The modern Jewish settlement of the country started, therefore, only about 1880 when the age-old traditional attachment to the land received new contents from ideas of modern nationalism and, later, also from socialism. Between the beginning of the Zionist migration and the establishment of the State of Israel there had elapsed almost seventy years (1881-1948). Most of this period was full of deprivations for the settlers who arrived in growing numbers. This was due partly to the poverty and backwardness of the country, partly to the violent resistance to the Jewish settlement of the Arab population, which, like the Jews, regarded the country as their own, and partly to the oppressiveness of the British colonial rule.

During these long years of struggle there developed a strong collectivistic ideology. The Jewish community lacked any power of coercion, so that it became the moral duty of the individual to contribute voluntarily to the upkeep of Jewish institutions and participate in (illegal) military training which was necessary due to repeated Arab attacks. But the most arduous pioneering task was the transformation of a nation of small shopkeepers, itinerant traders, traditional artisans and moneylenders, as Jews overwhelmingly had been in Eastern Europe and the Middle East, into a nation with a large proportion of manual workers. It was believed, that without such a «normalization» of its social structure, the Jewish people would never be capable of becoming an independent nation. Thus being a manual worker, especially in agriculture, was considered as the most praiseworthy occupation. This gave rise to a strongly ascetic and collectivistic ideology: behaviour that would have been considered everywhere else in the world as reasonable and legitimate care for one's future was denounced as «careerism» and «egotism»; and the *halutz* (pioneer), living in a communal or cooperative settlement, *kibbutz* or *moshav*, became the human ideal.

This austere ideology was widely accepted not only because it served the interests of society, but also because of its appeal to a great part of Jewish youth in Eastern Europe. They were alienated from traditional Jewry by its poverty and rigid religious ritualism; and from European bourgeois ideals by anti-Semitism and social

injustice. The glorification of manual work and idealistic communism were genuine expressions of their feelings. Thus migrating to Israel and becoming a *halutz* was not perceived by them only as a sacrifice for the collective future of their nation, but also as a moral redemption, or as they used to call it, a «realization» of their personal values. There was thus a nearly perfect harmony between individual values and the needs of the collective.

III

This has been the background to the education of the youth born in the country. Due to constant immigration it took a long time until the locally born became a sizeable proportion of the population — they are today slightly more than a third of the total. Only among the very young did the local born always predominate. Until the late twenties the stereotype of the local born referred, therefore, mainly to the nursery school age [2].

There is always an atmosphere of hopefulness about small children. Parents tend to project on them the fulfilment of their own wishes and envisage for them a better future than their own present. This is particularly so in immigrant countries where there is some objective justification for this hopefulness. Small children are superior to their parents in many an important thing such as the mastery of the language, knowledge of local lore, adjustment to the physical surroundings, and all the innumerable things which determine the feeling of «being at home».

Indeed, the image of the second generation, as reflected in various writings during this period, was usually very optimistic. It was widely believed that the new generation would be intellectually as well as morally superior to their parents, or to Jews living abroad. Educators argued that the native born who would not experience the conflicts ensuing from the social and cultural marginality of the Jew,

[2] The nursery school has been a much more widespread institution in Israel than elsewhere. Children of immigrant parents had to learn the language before going to school, and parents needed all the help they could get with the upbringing of their children. There has been, therefore, practically general attendance in Kindergartens (attendance is now compulsory for the five-year-old). Nursery school in Israel is, therefore, an age group with much more marked social and cultural features of its own than elsewhere. The image of the native born was deeply influenced by this very young «youth» culture.

would be able to devote more mental energy to new intellectual creation than their parents who had grown up abroad. Freedom from persecution and from feelings of inferiority would release the spontaneity of the children, and would also provide better conditions than those existing for Jews living in inimical surroundings for the development of upright moral character. It was assumed, therefore, that Israel youth would possess all the virtues that Jews traditionally attributed to themselves, such as willingness to help their neighbour, love of learning and sobriety; but also qualities which Jews felt relatively deficient in because of their deprivations: spontaneity, physical prowess and love of nature[3].

<div align="center">IV</div>

Even before 1914, however, there was a small group of young men grown up in the country, and the fact that they were disappointingly different from the imaginary picture of the early educators could not pass unnoticed. The contrast became increasingly conspicuous with the passing of time. Young men of the same background, and inspired by the same *halutzic* ideals, as the first generation of settlers, continued to come to the country in great numbers. Their problems, once in the country, also resembled those of the first generation. They had to contend with loneliness and poverty, and found in the idealistic cooperative and communal settlements a framework suited to their needs.

The native born had no such problems; they could find jobs easily, they had friends, and families, and their interests were similar to those of other young people all over the world. They were, therefore, not worried about creating an ideal society, or resolving the

[3] For the irrealistic expectations about the educational capacity of children growing up in the country cf. the projected programme of the Hertzliya Gymnasium from 1905/6, four years before teaching in the secondary classes actually began, cf. Joseph AZARYAHU, «Haḥinukh Haivri B'eretz Yisrael» [Hebrew Education in Palestine], in D. KIMHI, ed., *Sefer Hayovel shel Histadruth Hamorim,* 1902/3 - 1927/8, Jerusalem, 1928/29, pp. 84-85. The extremely favourable stereotype about the very young native born had persisted into the late twenties when the attitude towards the *Tzabar* in general became very critical. Cf. Yaakov KOPILEVICZ, «Yaldei Atidenu» [The Children of our Future], *ibid.,* pp. 14-18. The author is very pessimistic about the intellectual and moral qualities of the native born. But he asserts that they are only deteriorating with age; «in the Kindergarten they are really wonderful and show signs of real genius» (p. 17).

problems of Jews. There was some animosity between the two groups: the immigrant youth envied the local born, while the latter felt, or rather were made to feel by public opinion, morally inferior to the idealist immigrants [4].

Under these circumstances there arose a new stereotype entirely different, and even contradictory, to that of the early idealized one. This is the stereotype of the *Sabra* or in writing, and nowadays increasingly in everyday speech, *Tzabar*. The former is the Arabic, the latter the Hebrew word for «prickly pear». According to popular etymology this is because the native born, like the *Tzabar*, have a prickly surface, but are sweet inside. The real etymology is not known, but according to one source the nickname arose in the twenties among native born students of the Hertzliya Gymnasium in Tel Aviv, the first Hebrew secondary school in the country. Feeling inferior to their serious and sophisticated immigrant classmates, they prided themselves with being able to open a prickly pear — which the immigrants could, of course, not do. In any case the expression symbolizes the way the immigrant majority felt about the native born youth in the twenties and in the thirties: the new generation was a wild growth moulded by the rough conditions of the pioneering country, rather that the traditions of their parents. They were tough, able to get on, and — hopefully — good inside. But it was better not to touch them [5].

V

This hostility and scorn mixed with envy of the *Tzabar* lasted until the early forties. About that time a subtle change occurred in the meaning of the term, due to a number of circumstances. The first *Tzabarim* were children of wealthy farmers and well-to-do town-dwellers, whose parents came to the country at the turn of the century. The contrast between this middle class youth and their immigrant age mates was, as said, glaring, and the difference invidious. In the late thirties and early forties, however, children in the cooperative and communal settlements started to grow up. Like

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[4] These ambivalent feelings which prevailed between the native born youth and the young «pioneering» immigrants are reflected e.g. in the short story of M. Sico, «Tzafrira», *Moznayim*, I, 14, 1928/29, pp. 6-10.

[5] Cf. for instance Kopilevicz, *op.cit.*, «Hashittuf bein Mosdoth Hahinukh v'hamishpaha» [Cooperation between the Educational Institutions and the

their urban age mates, they were rather different from their parents and educators, or from the young idealist immigrants who came to join their villages. They were, however, not middle-class. They did not look forward to becoming successful businessmen or obtaining good jobs, but joined in the work of the «idealistic» co-operative and collective settlements. Of course, there was nothing idealistic for them in living and working in the settlements where they were born; it was just part of their inherited way of life. Nevertheless, here were *Tzabarim* who were active members of communities which were looked upon as the realization of the loftiest Zionist ideals.

This impression was enhanced by the growing requirements of defense. The country had been practically in a state of war between 1936-1949 (1936-1939 Arab terror directed mainly against the Jews; 1939-1944 World War II in the Middle East and Europe; 1944-1947 Jewish terror directed against the British; 1947-1948 War of Liberation). During the disturbances of 1936-1939 *Tzabarim* were still a barely noticeable minority. By the end of World War II, however, they became the most conspicuous element in the Jewish fighting units, since on the one hand more and more of the native born came of age and, on the other, there was only a trickle of immigration during the World War. In the *Palmah* which had been the striking force of the illegal Jewish defense organization, and subsequently in the newly formed Israel army, *Tzabarim* played a central role. Some of the highest ranking army officers, and a disproportionate part of the field commanders were *Tzabarim*, and they acquitted themselves most creditably in the fighting.

The word *Tzabar* about that time lost all its negative connotations. It still meant something tough and rough, unrefined and unsophisticated. But the emphasis was now on the capability of the *Tzabarim* for rapid decisions and effective action, and on their patriotic reliability. Their apparent lack of idealism was regarded as merely superficial mannerism; it was assumed that they only disliked to talk about ideals and ideology, but that their actions proved that they were willing to bring greater sacrifices for the community than the rest. The *Tzabar* now became an ideal image, closely related to that of the *halutz* (the altruistic pioneer).

The attitudes of the first generation as expressed in the numerous writings and sayings of educators and politicians around 1950 became again extremely positive. Instead of their critical view of the *Tzabar* in the thirties, they became now his main admirers. Educators boasted of having been the creators of the new generation, and politicans seemed to have unbounded confidence in the character and ability

of the *Tzabar*. Being a typical *Tzabar* was a very good recommenda-
tion for any kind of job, and many young people made meteoric
careers [6].

There has been a corresponding change in the self-image of the
youth. Influenced by the deepest experience of this generation, the
long years of service in the Palmah and later in the army, they
started referring to themselves as the *hevra* (actually society, but
colloquially, with Yiddishized pronunciation, used for «group») and
ehad mehahevra (one of the group). Both expressions can be used
for any group, but in the slang of the youth culture around 1946-
1953 it usually described what was considered at that time the right
kind of youth: those who grew up in the country, possessed the per-
sonality traits attributed to the *Tzabar*, and, in addition, belonged to
one of the Zionist-socialist youth movements, served in the *Palmah*
and the army, and maintained informal but intensive social ties with
their circle of friends from the movement, the *Palmah*, and the
army [7].

This honeymoon period in the image of the second generation
was based on deception. During the period of struggle the native
born youth seemed to share the collectivistic ideals of the first gene-
ration. There is after all, always much devotion and altruism during
war-time. But with the return of settled conditions the moral dis-
continuity between the generations became even more conspicuous
than before. The first generation politicians and ideologists still regard
the traditions of pioneering, equalitarian and ascetic socialism as
the moral foundation of society. The proper role of youth in their
scheme of things is that which the young people fulfiled during the
time of struggle for independence: accepting the leadership of the
representatives of the old-timer pioneering groups, identifying with
their ideology, and effacing their individuality like soldiers. The
young people, on the other hand, perceive their situation quite dif-
ferently. Achievement of independence and the general expansion
which came in its wake, were perceived by them as an unprecedented
opportunity to express their individuality. They were eager to make

[6] For the transition from a negative to a positive reinterpretation of the
stereotype of the *Tzabar*, see Menashe DUVSHANI, «Hazkhuth V'hahova» [Cre-
dit and Debit], *Gilyonoth*, 21, 4, 1946/47 - 1947/48, pp. 139-140; S. SHMUELI,
«Avoth Uvanim» [Fathers and Sons], *Gilyonoth*, 22, 11-12, 1949/50, pp. 218-
220.

[7] For the new self-image of the *Tzabar* cf. Yigael MOSSINSON, *Afurim Kas-
sak*, Merhaviah, 1946; Moshe SHAMIR's popular novel «*Hu Halakh B'sadoth*»
[He Went in the Fields], Merhaviah, 1947.

up for the time lost during the long years of fighting, by studying, seeking careers, enjoying themselves, and establishing families.

As a result another change in the self-image of the second generation occurred which became noticeable first around 1953-1956 in the writings of some Israel humourists who enjoyed at that time unprecedented popularity[8]. The image of the *hevra* was turned in their writings to ridicule, undergoing a transformation, which was — with due respect to differences of literary merit — somewhat similar to that which had occurred to the image of the knight in Cervantes' writings.

The hold of ideology on official thinking has, however, continued. Schools, youth movements and media of mass communication still place before young people the ideal of the old-time pioneer, the *halutz,* and youth is criticised again for falling short of this ideal, and/or for not possessing any ideals[9]. The reaction to this newly growing gap between official expectations and individual motivation has been reflected in recent literature. Instead of the mild or biting irony of the humorists in the early fifties, there is now a great deal of programmatic alienation. Novels dealing with the problems of young people in Israel do not present them any more according to the more or less idealized image of «one of the *hevra*». The young heroes have become sworn individualists, deliberately setting themselves against everything accepted in society, in some cases not even stopping at crime[10].

Thus while the reaction of official ideology to the renewed individualism of the second generation has been nothing but a return to the views prevailing about the *Tzabar* in the twenties and thirties, the self-image of the youth — or more precisely, the literary expression of the image — is new. There were deviant elements in the self-image of the *Tzabar* and the *hevra,* but these only reflected youthful pranks, such as one finds in all conforming youth culture.

[8] Amos KENAN, *B'shotim Uv'akrabim,* Tel Aviv, 1953; Dan BEN-AMOTZ and Haim HEFER, *Yalkut Hakzavim,* Tel Aviv, 1956.

[9] Critical discussion of the character of the second generation was crystallized around the war novel of S. YIZHAR. *Y'mei Tziklag,* Tel Aviv, 1958 and the first appearance of a member of this generation, Mr. Moshe Dayan (former chief of staff, now Minister of Agriculture) as a major political figure on the Israel scene. Cf. the interesting article of Dan HOROVITZ, «Y'lidei Haaretz - Bitzua bli Ideologya ? [The Native Born - Action without Ideology ?], *Davar,* 28.958.

[10] Pinhas SADE, *Hahayim K'mashal,* Tel Aviv, 1958; David SHAHAR, *Yerah Hadvash V'hazahav,* Tel Aviv, 1958/59; Yael DAYAN, *New Face in the Mirror,* London, 1959.

The image of the *hevra* was that of a youth group somewhat ir-
responsible, but basically accepting the values and the world of the
pioneering generation. The image appearing in the recent literature,
however, is one of basic alienation. With the second generation
reaching adulthood and accepting permanent responsibilities in civic
life, the problem of moral discontinuity between the collectivistic
values of the pioneering period on the one hand, and the complex
present-day situation on the other, is perceived as increasingly
acute[11].

Two questions pose themselves at this point:

First, are these literary manifestations of moral discontinuity in-
dexes of a process of anomie which one would expect to manifest
itself in actual behavior as well ? There are some signs — although
the exact connections have still to be investigated — that this indeed
may be the case, since there has been a steep rise in juvenile delin-
quency during the last few years, including some beginnings of
middle class delinquency.

The second question is, what is the relationship between the
development of this stereotyped image of youth and literary creativity.
The answer to this is unequivocal; neither the stereotype nor the
antistereotype have produced good literature, except on occasion.
But the disintegration of the stereotype and the emergence of indi-
vidual consciousness out of the confines of collectivistic images seems
to have accelerated considerably the volume as well as the variety
of literary production.

It is worth while noting that this rise in literary productivity — and
perhaps creativity — has been parallel to the rise in the rates of
delinquency.

[11] An obvious objection to this analysis would be that the deviant themes
in Israel literature are but imitations of similar trends in Western literature.
But then the heroic literature about the *hevra* in the forties and early fifties
can also be regarded as an imitation of certain kinds of Russian examples.
Israel has all the time been open to American and Western European, as
well as Eastern European influence, and its official values — though not
the way these values are actually being pursued — are still nearer to the
collectivistic values of the communist bloc of countries than to Western
individualism. There has been, therefore, imitation all the time, and there
have always been several models to be followed. The question is why one
model is chosen at one time and a different one at another time.

THE PREVALENCE OF MENTAL DISORDERS IN ITALY

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It would probably be generally agreed that an understanding of the causes of mental diseases would be aided by statistics on the prevalence of these diseases. While the statistics could not be used to prove any theory, they should reflect the causes of the diseases and thus serve to *disprove* erroneous theories. Further, they provide *clues* as to what lines of enquiry concerning causes might be fruitful to pursue.

Statistics on mental diseases are notoriously inadequate, especially those based on the number of persons hospitalized: Not all ill persons are ever hospitalized, not all ill persons are recognized as such, what constitutes mental illness is uncertain in borderline cases, some older persons (and occasionally even others) are hospitalized to get them out of civilian society even when they are not significantly ill. When it comes to statistics on the prevalence of the various *types* of mental illness, these are even worse: Not all doctors use the same basis of diagnosis and classification, the doctors' inclination to assign patients with given symptoms to certain classifications varies over time and region depending on social-economic influences; not all the criteria of classification are clear, so that it is often arbitrary how borderline cases are classified.

The inadequacies in the statistics are largely the result of the proclivities of physicians. Thus it may fairly be said that the statis-

tics on mental illness reflect the physicians' perceptions of mental illness. While these should not be confused with «true» prevalence, they are nevertheless valuable.

Statistics from Italy are subject to all the forementioned inadequacies except one: Physicians are expected to report all cases of mental illness whether they hospitalize them or not, and this removes one source of bias usually found in the statistics from other countries — the United States, for example. Despite the obvious interest which statistics on the prevalence of mental illness in Italy have, they seem never to have been compiled and published. If I can guess the reason for this, it is that the schedules prepared by the physicians on their cases are deposited in the provincial hospitals, where no one has the time or skill to tabulate and analyze them [1]. Italian statisticians — and there are many highly-skilled ones — generally work with already compiled statistics, usually provided by government offices, and prior to 1957 statistics on mental diseases were not compiled centrally. Beginning in 1957, the government of Italy ordered the regional hospitals to forward the physicians' schedules to its central statistical institute, and it may be assumed that they will be compiled in the future. In the meanwhile, we have anticipated this move, and have compiled statistics from the schedules of a single regional hospital — that of Lazio. Lazio is roughly equivalent to ancient Latium, and of course includes the city of Rome. It cannot, without further study, be considered representative of all Italy (no province could), but Lazio is certainly Italian, and has a very wide range of people living under all kinds of conditions found in other parts of Italy. In order to gain some stability for our statistics, we have compiled all cases for the years 1951 to 1955, inclusive. In order to cut down on the amount of work, only every second schedule in the alphabetical file was tabulated. The physicians did not always answer all the questions on each schedule, which accounts for the (relatively minor) variations in the totals in the tables presented.

Despite the efforts of international congresses of psychiatrists, there are differences among the nations in the classifications used in the diagnoses of mental illnesses. Nevertheless, the physicians of at least the Western world have enough of a common tradition to use roughly comparable classification schemes, and to be able to point

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[1] The only statistical compilations known to the author are those of time trends.

out concretely how one nation's system differs from another's[2]. Using the article of Professor de Giacomo as a guide, I have sought to translate the terms of the Italian Statistical Office of Mental Illnesses into categories that will be understandable to psychiatrists in the English-speaking countries, although this translation suffers from my own lack of complete understanding of Italian medical practice.

What the Italians call phrenasthenia, psychiatrists in other countries call psychasthenia, Dr. De Giacomo tells us. Psychopathic personality includes «true» paranoia, sexual psychopathology, as well as less distinctive forms of psychopathy. The epileptic psychoses and the affective psychoses (manic-depressive) can be translated directly. Schizophrenia includes sensory or hallucinatory psychoses, as well as the standard hebephrenic, catatonic, and paranoid varieties. The endogenous toxic psychoses presumably result from constitutional deficiencies in the functioning of the endocrine glands. The exogenous toxic psychoses are the alcoholic and drug psychoses, as well as psychosis associated with pellagra. The infective psychoses are those associated with various infectious diseases: syphilis (general paresis), tuberculosis, encephalitis, typhus, and others. The senile psychoses include involutional melancholia (a category which Italian physicians seldom use), arteriosclerotic dementia, as well as senile dementia proper. Finally there are the «psychoses of organic encephalopathy», which are the result of physical damage to the brain or other parts of the nervous system (trauma, tumors, etc.).

In order to permit a better understanding of the prevalence figures, they are compared with statistics on the general population, as reported in the Italian Census. There are significant errors of data collection in the Census, the Italian experts seem to agree, but for our purposes of gross comparison, they are useful. Only the persons for whom the pertinent characteristics are known are included in our tables; thus the totals are not identical because complete information is not available for all persons covered by the census. The mental illness data, as suggested earlier, are based on all cases in the province of Lazio treated by physicians, whether they have been in the regional hospital or not. To cut down on the work of tabula-

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[2] This has been done for Italy in the article by Professor U. De Giacomo, then director of the Provincial Psychiatric Hospital of Genoa, «Questioni Psichiatriche di attualitá, la nomenclatura ufficiale delle malattie mentali», *Neuropsychiatria*, IX, No. 1-2, 1953, pp. 87-98.

tion, a sample of every second case in the alphabetical files was chosen for analysis.

Table I shows the distribution of mental illnesses according to the categories set up by the Italian Statistical Office of Mental Illness. The category most frequently utilized by the Italian physicians in classifying mental illnesses is that of the manic-depressive (or affective) psychoses. These illnesses claim 30 per cent of all males and 32.2 per cent of all females treated by physicians for mental illness in Lazio. This high concentration gives factual support for the frequently-heard observation that Italians have a tendency to manic-depressive reactions [3].

Men have a greater tendency to get treated for mental illness than do women: 118 men for every 100 women. The differences between men and women in the types of mental illness they get, according to the diagnosis recorded by the physician on the official schedule, are not great. Males have a slightly greater tendency to get phrenasthenia, psychopathic personality, exogenous toxic psychoses and infective psychoses. Women are recorded as having a slightly greater tendency to get manic-depressive psychoses, endogenous toxic psychoses, and senile dementia.

Mental patients in Lazio are somewhat older, on the average, than are the general population, but the concentration of mental patients in the over 65 years group is not as great in Lazio as would be true in the United States (see Table II). Either the older people do not so frequently become mentally ill in Lazio or the Italian people do not so frequently regard the mental aberrations of older persons as requiring medical attention.

In Lazio, a mentally disordered child, particularly a male child, is likely to be categorized as having «phrenasthenia», although some older patients are given this label also. As already noted, Professor De Giacomo considered that this would be called «psychasthenia» in other countries. On the other hand, schizophrenia — which is also called «dementia praecox» as in the English-speaking countries — is relatively much more concentrated among the middle aged and older people. Senile psychoses, of course, are concentrated in the older population, but it is of interest to note that a full 25 per

[3] Such a contention is made, for example, by Dr. Ignacy A. LISTWAN, «Paranoid States: Social and Cultural Aspects», Medical Journal of Australia, May 12, 1956, and reprinted in World Mental Health, 11, November, 1959, p. 171.

TABLE I

Distribution of Mental Patients by Type of Mental Illness *
and by Sex: Lazio, 1951-1955

	Male	Female
1. Phrenasthenia (oligophrenia, psychasthenia)	14.3	11.6
2. Psychopathic personality	6.1	4.0
2a. Paranoia	0.0	0.4
3. Epileptic psychoses	3.6	3.2
4. Manic-depressive psychoses	30.0	32.2
5. Schizophrenia (hebephrenic, catatonic)	12.5	11.5
5a. Schezophrenia (paranoid)	5.4	6.5
6. Endogenous toxic psychoses (with glandular disturbances	0.6	2.7
7. Exogenous toxic psychoses (including alcoholic and drug psychoses)	7.8	4.3
8. Infective psychoses (with physical disease)	9.1	6.0
9. Senile psychoses	9.1	17.1
9a. Involutional melancholia	0.0	0.1
10. Psychoses of organic encephalopathy (includes tumors and trauma)	1.5	0.4
Total cases in sample	2,639	2,326
0/o of each sex in total population	48.95	51.05

* Classification and numbering scheme are those of the Italian Statistical
Office of Mental Illnesses.

cent of those males classified as senile are under 65 years of age.
Older people also have a disproportionate amount of the toxic psy-
choses (especially the alcoholic and drug psychoses) and the infective
psychoses (especially general paresis).

The marital condition of the mentally disordered in Lazio is very
much as it is in the United States except that there are practically
no divorced persons in the general population in Italy and many
fewer widowed persons (see Table III). Phrenasthenia and schizo-
phrenia (of the non-paranoid types) are heavily concentrated among
the single people; among single females there is also a dispropor-
tionate number of the epileptic psychoses. The toxic and infective

psychoses are disproportionately found among married people; among female paranoid schizophrenics there is also a disproportionate number of married and widowed persons.

There is a surprisingly large difference according to place of birth between the general population of Lazio and its mental patients (see Table IV). The mental patients are overwhelmingly migrants to Rome whereas over three-fifths of the general population live in the community of their birth (including Rome). Over 50 per cent of the male patients and over 45 per cent of the female patients have come from elsewhere in Italy (probably particularly from Southern Italy and the islands) to Rome and its environs. The figures are to be compared with only 29 per cent of the general population. Even the migrants *within* the province of Lazio are disproportionately represented among the mental patients (30 per cent of the mental patients have moved their residence from the community of their birth in the province, as compared to only 7.6 per cent of the general population. Clearly, mobility is in some way linked to mental disorder, either through «selection» of the mentally disturbed as migrants or through migration being a «cause» — direct or indirect — of mental disorder.

The illnesses which claim an especially large proportion of the long-distance migrants are paranoid schizophrenia and the psychoses of organic encephalopathy. This relationship of migration to paranoid schizophrenia is especially interesting in the light of a fact that will be noted in a subsequent table — that these schizophrenics include a disproportionately large number of educated persons. It would seem that those rising in social status — as indicated by both education and migration to the nation's capital — have a tendency to become paranoid schizophrenics. The migrants within the province are especially well represented among those with exogenous toxic psychoses (mainly alcoholics) and epileptic and senile psychoses.

In general, there are few large differentials in the distribution of persons with specific mental disorders according to the size of communities of origin (see Table V). The major exception is that the males with endogenous toxic psychoses tend to come predominantly from big cities. Among females with the same illnesses, the concentration is in small towns (5-10,000 inhabitants), with relatively few coming from the purely rural areas. The big city is the source of a disproportionate number of females with exogenous toxic psychoses (particularly alcoholic and drug psychoses). The small communities contribute heavily to the rate of infective psychoses among females. Minor distortions in the distributions for males are to be

found in the slight underrepresentation of paranoid schizophrenics from large cities and of the epileptic psychotics from medium-sized cities (10-50.000). The Italian population census did not report on size of community of origin so there is no way of comparing the mentally disturbed with the general population according to this variable.

In comparing the educational levels of the mental patients with that of the general population, there is the difficulty that the classi-fications of educational achievement used by the census office and by the Statistical Office of Mental Illness are not quite identifical. The census office reports on the schools *completed* by the general population, while the Statistical Office requires reports on the schools *left* by the mental patients. This discrepancy results in a higher educational level of 12.2 per cent of the male patients and 5.4 per cians than by the census office. The statistics are further rendered somewhat incomparable by a failure of the physicians to record the educational level for any identical population reported by the physi-cent of the female patients.

The Italian school system is organized into a lower elementary school (5 grades usually beginning at age 6), an upper elementary school (3 grades usually at age 11), a secondary school or *liceo* (6 grades usually beginning at age 14) completed with a *diploma*, a university (4 grades usually beginning at age 20) completed with a *laurea*. These schools form the basis of the categories indicated in Table VI.

Despite the above-mentioned difficulties in making comparisons of the mental patients with the general population, the table suggests that the mental patients have a lower average educational level than do residents of Lazio in general. This difference seems to be more marked in the case of males than of females. The clearest evidence is provided by the proportion of illiterates; among males there is well over twice the proportion of illiterates among the mental patients than in the general population, among females the proportion is half again as large among the mental patients as in the general population. The educational differential has been found in many other countries, and may actually be somewhat less in Italy than in the United States. It is not clear whether it indicates higher incidence of mental disorder among the poorly educated, or simply less medical attention, less «cure», longer stay in the hospital, and hence higher prevalence rates.

When we examine the specific categories of mental illness, we

note gross differences by educational level. This may either reflect actual differences indicating some direct or indirect causal association or it may simply indicate that physicians are inclined to paste different labels on mentally ill persons of different educational levels. In either case, it is significant that, among males, the concentration of mental disorder in the lowest educational levels is found primarily among those classified as having «phrenasthenia». In the United States schizophrenia is found mainly among the poorly educated, but in Lazio it tends to be somewhat more characteristic of the better educated. Other mental disorders especially characteristic of the better educated men in Lazio are the endogenous toxic psychoses. Alcoholism is not particularly a problem among Italians, and these figures show that it leads to pathology to an unusual degree primarily among the slightly educated men. Among the uneducated women, there is not only a high rate of phrenasthenia, but also of psychopathic personality and epileptic psychosis. The sex difference in psychopathic personality is most curious. Among women this is found mainly among the poorly educated; among men it is found relatively much more among the well educated. The senile psychoses are concentrated among the poorly educated, and this is usual throughout Western society because the elderly tend to have less education than do younger people.

The Italian census classification of occupations is sufficiently different from that of the medical authorities as to make impossible any statistical comparison between the general population and mental patients as to occupation. Nevertheless, the distribution of mental patients in Lazio according to occupation, as shown in Table VII, suggests an unusually high prevalence of mental disorders among servicemen, and probably among housewives (although probably this latter category is meaningless as physicians probably categorize all women not currently employed as housewives). Managers, merchants, and professionals seem to have little tendency to mental disorder.

There are striking relationships between occupational groups and the specific categories of mental disorder. The epileptic psychoses and the exogenous toxic psychoses are found disproportionately among unskilled workers. The toxic psychoses generally are heavily prevalent among the peasants. Manic depressive and infective psychoses are found among the skilled workers and artisans with disproportionate frequency. Clerical workers are characterized by a relatively high prevalence of psychopathic personality and paranoid schizophrenia. Managers and merchants—who have few mental

disorders in general—have a disproportionate frequency of epileptic psychoses. Professional men, on the other hand, have a noticeable tendency to get schizophrenia, whether of the paranoid type or others. Armed servicemen—who, as noted, have high prevalence of mental disorders—show a marked tendency to acquire the manic-depressive psychoses. Priests and monks show up with disproportionate frequency in the category of epileptic psychoses. The unemployed show greatest prevalence in the categories of phrenasthenia and senile psychoses, but this is simply a reflection of their extreme youth or age; they should not properly be classified as unemployed. However, since there is another occupational category for the «retired», and since a significant proportion of those with senile psychoses are under the age of 65 years, it is very possible that unemployed men in the pre-retirement years (45-65) who have mental disorders receive the diagnosis of «senile psychosis» even though they are not particularly old. The retired men show up heavily among those with senile psychoses, of course, but also heavily among those with infective psychoses. Among students there is a disproportionate number with schizophrenia.

These data on the prevalence of mental disorders according to social categories of the population of Lazio, compiled and published for the first time, offer much food for speculation as to the influence of Italian culture on manifestations of mental disorder. The high associations with occupation and region of origin (reflecting migration), as compared to the low associations with sex and marital status, suggest something about the etiology of mental disorders in Italy. Collections of comparable data from other countries will permit further interpretation of the development of mental disorders in a cultural context [4].

[4] The major work in cross-cultural comparison of mental illnesses is compiled in: Marvin K. OPLER, ed., *Culture and Mental Disorder: Cross-cultural Studies.* New York, Macmillan, 1959.

TABLE II

Age Distribution of Mental Patients and General Population by Sex: Lazio, 1950-55

| | MALE | | | | | | | | FEMALE | | | | | | | |
	-15	16-25	26-40	41-50	51-65	66-75	76	Number	-15	16-25	26-40	41-50	51-65	66-75	76	Number
General Population	27.7	17.6	22.8	13.3	12.2	4.5	1.9	1,635,392	25.4	17.1	23.2	13.0	13.8	5.2	2.4	1,705,406
Total Mental Patients	11.5	22.3	23.5	15.3	15.6	7.2	4.6	2,639	8.4	17.2	24.2	14.7	17.2	9.5	8.8	2,326
Phrenasthenia	73.3	17.7	5.8	1.3	1.8	0.0	0.0	378	57.7	15.4	16.1	4.5	6.3	0.0	0.0	267
Psychopathic Personality	6.8	19.8	35.2	23.5	11.7	3.1	0.0	162	9.6	13.8	42.6	22.3	9.6	2.1	0.0	94
Paranoia	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	50.0	0.0	50.0	0.0	8
Epileptic Psychoses	8.3	33.3	35.4	14.6	8.3	0.0	0.0	96	12.0	40.0	21.3	14.7	9.3	2.7	0.0	75
Manic-depressive Psychoses	0.1	30.3	25.4	18.1	19.2	5.6	1.4	791	1.3	21.9	30.7	17.9	23.6	4.0	0.7	750
Schizophrenia:																
Hebephrenic & Catatonic	1.2	45.0	43.2	7.3	1.8	1.5	0.0	329	2.2	41.9	34.1	13.5	6.7	1.1	0.4	267
Schizophrenic (Paranoid)	0.0	10.6	56.3	18.3	13.4	1.4	0.0	142	0.0	4.6	30.5	40.4	21.2	2.6	0.7	151
Endogenous Toxic Psychoses with																
Glandular Disturbances	0.0	26.7	26.7	13.3	20.0	6.7	6.7	15	9.8	14.8	29.5	13.1	13.1	11.5	8.2	61
Exogenous Toxic Psychoses (Inc.																
Alcoholic and Drug Psychoses)	0.0	2.4	15.0	38.6	33.3	10.1	0.5	207	0.0	5.9	29.7	22.8	25.7	11.9	4.0	101
Infective Psychoses (with																
Physical Disease)	0.8	16.5	19.1	22.4	26.1	9.1	5.8	241	1.4	12.9	31.5	19.3	23.6	7.2	4.3	140
Senile Psychoses	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.9	22.1	36.7	38.3	240	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.8	17.5	36.1	45.6	399
Involutional Melancholia	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	0.0	1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	3
Psychoses of Organic Encephalo-																
pathy (Inc. Tumors & Trauma)	2.7	16.2	10.8	30.0	32.4	2.7	5.4	37	0.0	10.0	40.0	10.0	40.0	0.0	0.0	10
76 Number																

TABLE III

Marital Status Distribution of Mental Patients and General Population, by Sex: Lazio. 1951-1955

	MALE							FEMALE						
	Single	Married	Widowed	Divorced	Separated	Unknown	Number	Single	Married	Widowed	Divorced	Separated	Unknown	Number
General Population	53.8	43.0	2.9	0.0	0.3		1,641,392	49.5	41.5	8.7	0.0	0.3		1,705,406
Total Mental Patients	53.4	35.1	5.7	0.0	0.1	5.6	2,493	44.5	37.7	15.5	0.04	0.4	1.8	2,360
Phrenastenia	95.8	2.9	0.3	0.0	0.0	1.1	376	94.2	5.1	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.4	274
Psychopathic Personality	50.3	39.6	0.0	0.0	0.6	9.4	159	42.5	42.5	2.8	0.0	0.0	12.3	106
Paranoia	25.0	75.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	4	50.0	41.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	8.3	12
Epileptic Psychoses	54.7	34.7	5.3	0.0	0.0	5.3	95	67.6	21.1	4.2	0.0	0.0	7.0	71
Manic-depressive Psychoses	47.6	44.4	3.4	0.0	0.0	4.5	617	44.1	47.3	7.0	0.0	0.5	1.1	730
Schizophrenia:														
Hebephrenic & Catatonic	73.9	18.0	0.7	0.0	0.0	7.4	283	61.9	32.0	4.0	0.4	0.0	1.8	278
Schizophrenic (Paranoid)	58.2	35.1	0.0	0.0	0.7	6.0	134	30.5	51.3	15.6	0.0	1.9	0.6	154
Endogenous Toxic Psychoses with														
Glandular Disturbances	27.8	55.6	16.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	18	18.1	55.6	22.2	0.0	2.8	1.4	72
Exogenous Toxic Psychoses (Inc.														
Alcoholic and Drug Psychoses)	17.4	65.8	9.9	0.0	0.5	6.5	184	21.6	54.9	19.6	0.0	1.0	2.9	102
Infective Psychoses) (with														
Physical Disease)	36.9	49.6	5.6	0.0	0.0	7.9	252	34.8	47.1	14.5	0.0	0.0	3.6	138
Senile Psychoses	35.3	35.0	21.4	0.0	0.0	8.2	331	15.8	30.7	53.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	404
Involutional Melancholia	0.0	50.0	50.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2	0.0	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	4
Psychoses of Organic Encephalopathy (Inc. Tumors & Trauma)	28.9	55.3	15.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	38	0.0	40.0	60.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	15

TABLE IV

Place of Birth Distribution of Mental Patients and General Population, by Sex: Lazio, 1951-1955 (Persons born outside Italy excluded)

	MALE				FEMALE			
	Community of Residence	Other Communities of Same Province	Rest of Italy	Number	Community of Residence	Other Communities of Same Province	Rest of Italy	Number
General Population	642	7.3	28.6	1,610,059	62.4	8.0	29.6	1,672,103
Total Mental Patients	22.3	27.2	50.5	2,670	21.0	33.6	45.4	2,372
Phrenastenia	34.1	21.9	44.0	384	26.8	34.5	38.7	261
Psychopathic Personality	24.4	22.4	53.2	156	21.9	33.3	44.7	114
Paranoia	0.0	0.0	0.0	0	0.0	7.1	92.8	14
Epileptic Psychoses	25.5	30.8	43.6	94	20.5	42.3	37.2	78
Manic-depressive Psychoses	16.4	28.7	54.9	791	19.0	30.9	50.1	711
Schizophrenia:								
Hebephrenic & Catatonic	27.0	27.6	45.4	326	20.1	33.3	46.5	318
Schizophrenic (Paranoid)	15.9	16.6	67.5	151	27.0	26.4	46.5	159
Endogenous Toxic Psychoses with								
Glandular Disturbances	27.8	16.7	55.6	18	20.8	37.5	41.6	72
Exogenous Toxic Psychoses (Inc.								
Alcoholic and Drug Psychoses)	24.2	34.2	41.6	219	33.0	33.0	34.0	106
Infective Psychoses) (with								
Physical Disease)	17.1	27.2	55.7	246	21.6	32.1	46.2	134
Senile Psychoses	21.7	35.7	42.6	244	16.4	40.5	43.1	385
Involutional Melancholia	100.0	0.0	0.0	1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
Psychoses of Organic Encephalo-								
pathy (Inc. Tumors & Trauma)	17.5	7.5	75.0	40	20.0	25.0	55.0	20

TABLE V

Distribution of Mental Patients According to Size of Community of Origin, by Sex: Lazio, 1951-1955

	MALE							FEMALE						
	-5000	5000-10000	10000-50000	50000-100000	100000-500000	500000-	Num-	-5000	5000-10000	10000-50000	50000-100000	100000-500000	500000-	Num-
General Population														
Total Mental Patients	24.2	20.1	19.9	5.7	3.9	26.2	2,482	23.3	22.3	20.3	7.1	3.8	23.2	2,475
Phrenastenia	17.7	18.8	24.7	6.6	4.4	27.7	361	24.6	19.5	17.3	7.7	3.7	27.2	272
Psychopathic Personality	23.1	18.1	18.8	7.5	4.4	28.1	160	19.3	20.2	16.5	12.8	4.6	26.6	109
Paranoia	25.0	25.0	0.0	25.0	0.0	25.0	4	15.3	15.3	15.3	15.3	7.7	30.8	13
Epileptic Psychoses	29.3	21.7	11.9	2.2	4.3	30.4	92	28.0	23.2	17.1	2.4	2.4	26.8	82
Manic-depressive Psychoses	28.9	23.4	19.0	5.7	2.3	20.8	794	29.1	22.1	21.5	5.0	3.3	19.1	787
Schizophrenia:														
Hebephrenic & Catatonic	19.9	17.9	21.4	5.7	4.5	30.7	336	19.1	19.1	22.6	7.5	3.4	28.2	319
Schizophrenic (Paranoid)	20.8	20.1	24.3	6.9	8.3	19.4	144	18.4	25.5	24.1	5.7	2.8	23.4	141
Endogenous Toxic Psychoses with Glandular Disturbances	8.7	4.4	1.4	1.4	0.0	84.1	69	15.1	39.6	18.9	1.9	5.7	18.9	53
Exogenous Toxic Psychoses (Inc. Alcoholic and Drug Psychoses)	27.1	22.7	19.4	5.7	4.9	20.2	247	16.5	22.3	14.6	5.8	1.9	38.8	103
Infective Psychoses) (with Physical Disease)	26.1	19.0	20.6	4.9	2.2	27.2	184	29.7	28.3	17.4	4.3	2.2	18.1	138
Senile Psychoses	29.6	18.5	20.4	5.6	3.7	22.2	54	17.7	22.0	21.6	11.9	5.7	21.1	436
Involutional Melancholia	21.6	8.1	21.6	2.7	18.9	27.0	37	28.6	28.6	14.3	0.0	14.3	14.3	7
Psychoses of Organic Encephalopathy (Inc. Tumors & Trauma)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0	20.0	26.7	20.0	0.0	6.7	26.7	15

TABLE VIᴀ

Educational Distribution of General Population by Sex: Lazio, 1951-1955

	Illiterate	*Literate without graduating elementary school*	*Lower elementary school graduation*	*Upper elementary school graduation*	*Secondary school graduation (diplomati)*	*University degree (laureati)*	*Number*
Male	6.7	16.7	56.6	10.3	6.1	3.6	1,445,415
Female	13.6	18.7	54.6	7.6	4.8	0.8	1,524,464

Educational Distribution of Mental Patients by Sex: Lazio, 1951-1955

	Illiterate	Lower Elementary	Upper Elementary	Secondary	University	Unknown	Number	Illiterate	Lower Elementary	Upper Elementary	Secondary	University	Unknown	Number
	MALE							**FEMALE**						
Total Mental Patients	15.2	35.2	18.5	12.7	6.1	12.2	2,609	19.7	48.9	16.4	6.3	3.3	5.4	2,229
Phrenastenia	67.4	19.6	6.4	0.3	0.0	6.4	377	75.7	22.0	1.9	0.0	0.0	0.4	264
Psychopathic Personality	3.2	24.4	14.7	25.0	9.0	23.7	156	42.6	36.0	14.8	0.0	0.0	6.6	61
Paranoia	0.0	0.0	25.0	25.0	50.0	0.0	4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
Epileptic Psychoses	11.1	40.4	17.2	9.1	3.0	19.2	99	26.0	47.9	15.1	4.1	0.0	6.8	73
Manic-depressive Psychoses	4.7	41.6	22.8	14.6	6.6	9.8	789	10.5	49.0	19.6	7.9	5.4	7.7	699
Schizophrenia:														
Hebephrenic & Catatonic	3.1	28.7	22.4	18.9	9.4	17.5	286	5.2	52.9	21.3	7.2	6.9	6.5	291
Schizophrenic (Paranoid)	0.7	23.2	14.8	28.2	16.9	16.2	142	3.8	37.4	26.0	16.8	6.9	9.2	131
Endogenous Toxic Psychoses with														
Glandular Disturbances	5.6	27.8	16.7	16.7	27.8	5.6	18	11.9	55.9	18.6	8.5	0.0	5.1	59
Exogenous Toxic Psychoses (Inc.														
Alcoholic and Drug Psychoses)	7.5	50.7	26.8	6.1	3.8	5.2	214	3.9	59.8	14.7	7.8	3.9	9.8	102
Infective Psychoses) (with														
Physical Disease)	8.1	47.6	16.7	11.0	4.5	12.1	246	7.1	72.8	12.9	6.4	0. 0	0.7	140
Senile Psychoses	16.2	35.0	18.3	10.4	3.7	16.2	240	20.4	56.6	15.1	4.6	0.5	2.8	392
Involutional Melancholia	0.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2	0.0	66.7	33.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	3
Psychoses of Organic Encephalo-														
pathy (Inc. Tumors & Trauma)	16.2	27.0	18.9	10.8	8.1	18.9	37	7.1	71.4	21.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	14

Occupational Distribution of Male Mental Patients: Lazio, 1951-1955

	Unskilled Workers	Peasants -Farmers	Skilled Workers- Artisans	Clerical Workers	Merchants	Mana- gers	Profes- sionals	Armed Servi- cemen	Priests & Monks	Unem- ployed	Retired	Stu- dents	Num- ber
Total Mental Patients	12.9	13.2	13.7	10.0	2.9	0.3	3.0	10.4	1.3	21.1	7.9	3.5	2,610
Phrenastenia	2.6	4.6	4.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.7	0.0	84.3	0.6	1.4	345
Psychopathic Personality	5.9	7.9	14.5	19.1	2.0	0.0	3.9	11.8	0.7	11.2	15.1	7.9	152
Paranoia	0.0	25.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	25.0	25.0	0.0	25.0	0.0	0.0	4
Epileptic Psychoses	23.9	13.5	11.5	11.5	8.3	2.1	0.0	2.1	10.4	0.0	14.6	2.1	96
Manic-depressive Psychoses	11.9	14.7	18.2	11.0	4.3	0.4	2.8	21.1	1.4	7.1	5.2	1.7	786
Schizophrenia:													
Hebephrenic & Catatonic	14.5	14.2	12.7	11.7	1.5	0.3	6.5	8.0	1. 9	13.9	4.3	10.5	324
Schizophrenic (Paranoid)	6.9	9.7	16.6	24.1	2.1	0.7	6.2	7.6	3. 4	9.0	4.8	9.0	145
Endogenous Toxic Psychoses with													
Glandular Disturbances	0.0	22.2	16.7	16.7	0.0	0.0	5.6	11.1	0. 0	11.1	0.0	16.7	18
Exogenous Toxic Psychoses (Inc.													
Alcoholic and Drug Psychoses)	32.6	18.1	12.1	8.8	5.1	0.0	3.3	3.3	0.0	7.9	7.4	1.4	215
Infective Psychoses) (with													
Physical Disease)	13.4	17.9	19.1	6.5	3.7	0.0	2.4	10.2	0.4	11.0	13.0	2.4	246
Senile Psychoses	15.5	16.3	7.1	3.3	1.3	0.0	1.3	1.3	0.0	31.8	22.2	0.0	239
Involutional Melancholia	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	50.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	50.0	0.0	2
Psychoses of Organic Encephalo-													
pathy (Inc. Tumors & Trauma)	10.5	2.6	21.0	15.8	0.0	0.0	5.3	13.2	0.0	18.4	10.5	2.6	38

TABLE VIIв

Occupational Distribution of Female Mental Patients: Lazio, 1951-1955

	Unskilled Workers	Peasants -Farmers	Skilled Workers- Artisans	Clerical Workers	Merchants	House- wives	Profes- sionals	Nuns	Unem- ployed	Retired	Stu- dents	Un- known	Num- ber
Total Mental Patients	2.9	1.9	2.6	3.8	0.3	77.4	3.1	0.9	4.3	0.6	1.6	0.6	2,350
Phrenastenia	1.9	1.6	0.4	0.0	0.0	65.8	0.0	0.0	30.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	257
Psychopathic Personality	3.3	3.3	3.3	6.7	0.0	66.7	5.6	0.0	6.7	0.0	4.4	0.0	90
Paranoia	0.0	0.0	0.0	7.1	0.0	92.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	14
Epileptic Psychoses	0.0	1.5	2.9	0.0	0.0	88.2	0.0	0.0	7.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	68
Manic-depressive Psychoses	3.2	3.7	4.6	5.2	0.4	73.8	4.9	1.3	1.0	0.3	0.4	1.1	710
Schizophrenia:													
Hebephrenic & Catatonic	4.1	0.6	2.5	8.9	0.6	67.5	3.8	2.2	0.0	0.0	8.3	1.3	314
Schizophrenic (Paranoid)	3.2	1.3	3.9	5.8	0.0	76.6	5.8	1.3	0.0	1.9	0.0	0.0	154
Endogenous Toxic Psychoses with													
Glandular Disturbances	2.3	3.4	1.6	3.4	0.0	87.1	0.0	2.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	86
Exogenous Toxic Psychoses (Inc.													
Alcoholic and Drug Psychoses)	3.8	1.9	3.8	1.9	0.0	79.8	5.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.9	1.0	104
Infective Psychoses) (with													
Physical Disease)	4.2	1.4	0.0	2.8	1.4	82.4	3.5	0.0	1.4	0.0	2.1	0.7	142
Senile Psychoses	2.0	0.0	0.8	0.0	0.0	93.9	0.0	0.0	0.8	2.3	0.0	0.3	393
Involutional Melancholia	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.4	4
Psychoses of Organic Encephalo-													
pathy (Inc. Tumors & Trauma)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	14

REPORT ON THE DISCUSSION

First Session

Chairman : A. Rose, University of Minnesota
Rapporteur: K. Bruun, Finnish Foundation for Alcohol Studies

In opening the meeting the Chairman explained the organization of the discussions: due to the great number of papers only a short oral summary of papers was given and a discussion, limited in time, was permitted after each paper.

J. L. Moreno gave in the first paper his interpretation of the role concept and stressed the importance of a psychiatric dimension of that concept. He argued for a conceptual distinction between a socio-logical role and a psychodramatic one.

J. Ben-David started from the general problem of the socialization of the second generation in a new society. His empirical case was the second generation in Israel as reflected in the changing image of that generation in folklore and literature. He pointed to the different value-orientations of the first and the second generation: the strongly ascetic and collectivistic ideology of the immigrants is in conflict with the goal orientation of the second generation, for whom indi-vidual goals gain increasing importance. In the discussion the author explained that because of the limited volume of Israeli literature he was able to read practically all of it and base his picture of the second generation on a categorization of this material. The author concluded that the results point to the importance of social and eco-nomic factors rather than ideological ones.

R. H. Turner advanced in his paper an alternative approach to the usual treatment of the primary group as opposing the norms of the larger society. Empirical data from a student population supported his hypothesis that the friendship relationship incorporates the major norms of the larger group rather than opposing them. He developed further a typology of responses distinguishing between primary and secondary group means of exercising responsibility for society norms.

M.J. Chombart de Lauwe discussed in her paper *Discordance entre*

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les modèles d'«enfant idéal» the models presented in urban societies in France and the effect of discrepancies on the child.

A. Halbertsma in his paper *The Social Behavior of a Schizothyme Leader A case study* started from the observation by W. R. Bion that among a number of patients appearing for non-directive group-psychotherapy, the most disturbed grasp the leadership in the group. By empirical study of a hobby-club of young adolescents the author further elaborates this generalization.

The Prevalence of Mental Disorders in Italy was the title of A. M. Rose's paper which was based on a statistical study of all known mental illnesses in the Province of Lazio 1951-55. Even if the statistics cannot prove any theory of causation they can disprove erroneous ideas. The author argued for comparative statistics for different countries in order to detect cultural variation.

R. L. Derbyshire gave a summary presentation of his and E. B. Brody's paper *Personal Identity and Ethnocentrism in American Negro Students* aimed to test among other things the hypothesis of congruency of stereotypes among Negro students towards Jews, Negroes and Americans. The hypothesis was not supported by empirical data. This lack of congruency is interpretated as indicating that these students perceive Jews as members of the out-group while Negroes are considered to be approaching in-group status. Since Negro stereotypes are not acceptable to these students, they promote an identity which views Negroes as individuals. The lack of adherence to Negro stereotypes does not indicate Negro-centrism. The adherence to chauvinistic stereotypes for these subjects indicates a strong American-centric feeling.

J. H. Meyerowitz's paper *Environment and the Educationally Re-Leader: A case study* started from the observation by W. R. Bion that in the environment which are associated with performances in intelligence tests when entering school for the first time. These factors seem to be related to deprivation of stimulation through limited contact.

Second Session

Chairman: A. Rose, University of Minnesota
Rapporteur: Th. Mathiesen, Institute of Social Research, Oslo

It was asked V. Aubert and T. Mathiesen whether the historical changes observed might be due to changes in actual psychiatric knowledge, and how the borderline cases are defined by the authorities. To the first question the authors answered that since the changes have not been followed by any significant changes in psychiatric facilities, increased psychiatric knowledge can hardly be the whole explanation. To the second question the authors answered that seemingly «rational» criminals are now increasingly pulled into the forensic-psychiatric orbit.

Furthermore, it was pointed out that clear illnesses are in some contexts viewed as crimes. Some examples of this were mentioned. The rest of the discussion mainly dealt with this problem.

About A. W. Siegman's paper the discussion focused on two main topics: The question of the reliability of the methods used, and whether some of the findings reported orally were checked on a sample of delinquents.

T. Markkanen's and K. Bruun's papers were discussed jointly. Some methodological questions were clarified. Furthermore, it was asked whether the authors could comment on differences in the background of alcoholism in men and women. One of the authors answered that little work has been done on alcoholism among women. He emphasized that alcoholism among women would probably be *defined* differently. The incidence and definition of alcoholism among children were also discussed.

Furthermore, it was pointed out that alcoholics and criminals have in common, that they are difficult to change and that this is perhaps somehow connected with the fact that both activities are rewarding to those who engage in them.

About J. C. Grad's, J. C. Collins', P. Sainsbury's papers it was asked whether the authors felt that one might advance rehabilitation by going earlier into the community, taking care of social needs. The authors answered that this is a widespread opinion, and that it is propagated by the Mental Health Act.

A discussion followed, of the way in which the community service plan is worked out, as well as of how families with general pathologies react to having the patient in the home. Lastly, it was

pointed out that one had had similar experiences as those pointed out by Grad *et. al.* in USSR.

The discussion about H. Flegel's paper primarily focused on the effect of the patients' taking on the dominant mood of a group when regrouped. Some methodological questions were also discussed.

The discussion about C. Sofer's paper focused on the problems involved in evaluating the efficiency of «socio-therapy» of organizations. Various possible criteria of success were discussed.

SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGIONS
SOCIOLOGIE DES RELIGIONS

HAS THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN PRIMITIVE AND HIGHER RELIGIONS ANY SOCIOLOGICAL SIGNIFICANCE ?

K. A. Busia

One could raise several questions of definition before tackling such a subject, in order to make clear to oneself, as well as to others, the scope and limitations of the subject under discussion. One could begin by asking, for example, how one defines and distinguishes «primitive» from «higher» religions, or what «sociological» is intended to cover in this context. At meetings dealing with the comparative sociology of religion, such questions are inevitable, and unavoidable, and will no doubt frequently arise in the course of the discussions of this section.

But it would be stifling to attempt the definitions and distinctions at the beginning, and in order to avoid a tardy take-off by undertaking what I do not feel competent to do, I leave these questions for discussion at the Conference.

In what follows, I may state at the outset, that I write from a rather limited experience, against the background of what I know of the «primitive» religions of Africa, and of the invasion of Africa of two «higher» religions: Christanity and Islam.

Our subject compels us to try to grasp, as far as possible, the relations between religions and the social structures out of which they have grown or within which they are practised.

Africain traditional religions are polytheistic and animistic; their world is peopled with many gods and spirits. Islam and Christianity are on the other hand monotheistic religions, and one may ask whether the difference has any sociological significance.

The religions of Africa have grown among communities that were generally small in size, more or less self-contained, and isolated from other communities. It may be postulated that changes in a people's religious concepts, from polytheism to monotheism, follow

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changes in social organisation, from the growth, by peaceful means or otherwise, of isolated tribes into nations. From the ancient world of Africa, the history of Egyptian religion would support this hypothesis. Egyptian religion was polytheistic; a particularly marked feature was the worship of animals: the ape, the bull, the cat, the cobra, the cow, the crocodile, the dog, the fish, the goat, the goose, the grasshoper, the hawk, the hippopotamus, the lion, the pig, the scorpion, and the vulture, were all worshipped as gods. One theory advanced for this is that each clan considered itself to have descended in the remote past from the particular animal which its clan members worshipped. So with the many tribes of the Egyptians were as many gods.

When later the tribes were consolidated into city-states, some of the tribal gods lost in importance, and one or other of the gods gained ascendancy as the supreme god of the new political unit. When the city-states were united into a nation, a similar development took place. The gods of a city-state that was conquered were subordinated to the gods of the victor. Thus a tendency towards monotheism paralleled the development toward nationhood; and when Egypt became an empire, the national gods, in order to be acceptable to the other nations of the empire, became international.

One might venture to discern a similar development in the religion of the ancient Hebrews from which christianity sprang. During the patriarchal period, from the days of Abraham to that of Moses, the unit of social organisation was the clan; and each clan had its own god, whose interests were identical with those of the clan. One of the tasks of Moses, when he led the tribes of Israel out of bondage in Egypt to the borders of the «promised» land was to weld the tribes into a nation. Yahweh not only required political unity among the tribes of Israel, but also religious unity; they must all discard their tribal gods, and worship only Yahweh. The Ark of Covenant was a symbol of the relation between the One God and his people, who were one nation.

It was after the return of the Hebrews from the Babylonian Captivity of the Sixth Century B.C., during the process of national reconstruction, that the sense of mission to the Gentile became manifest. Yahweh was conceived as the God of all peoples, and not only of the Hebrews. This internationalism owed something to the experience of the Captivity, and the contact with other peoples. The monotheism of the Hebrews can be said to have grown out of their historical experience.

By contrast, Mohammedanism started off as a monotheistic re-

ligion, because Mohammed borrowed much from the Jews and the early Christians; but it is noteworthy that he aroused the hostility of his own people because he did not recognise their many gods; and after the Hejira of 622 A.D., he had to resort to force to build a nation as well as establish a national, monotheistic religion among his people.

In many parts of Africa, polytheistic religions still exist; they are essentially tribal religions. Will these survive the nation building that is going on in Africa today, or will the «emergent nations» discover or evolve national religions, albeit rooted in African traditions ? That such a search is going on is discernible in contemporary «traditionalism», the self-conscious search for African Culture. Whether it will result in monotheism is a moot question, but political pressures, social change, and the impact of Christianity and Islam compel modifications to religious practice and belief. Contemporary means of communication break down isolationism, and make possible an enlargement which is a threat to traditional polytheism.

Traditional African religions strongly express a sense of dependence on the deities and spirits which are worshipped through many religious rites to propitiate the gods and spirits, or to avert evils, or bring blessings. Traditional religion is primarily participation in ritual. The ritual is indeed an expression of belief, but this is implicit rather than explicit, secondary rather than primary.

This is in sharp contrast with Christianity, and to a less degree with Islam where the creed, or the affirmation of belief, is primary, and ritual is secondary. The emphasis on belief is historical and significant. It stems from the Western tradition where the Greeks long ago introduced the principle of reason into religion. The Greeks sought a religion that satisfied the intellect, and originated a tradition which had something to do with the doctrinal disputes of the early church. Christianity originating in the Near East, spread to the Western part of the Roman Empire. The two parts of the empire were different in many ways, and disputes arose in religion and politics alike. The West developed the Church's law and organisation; the speculative East busied itself with doctrine. The first of the ecumenical councils, that of Nicaea (A.D. 325), exemplifies the disputes which gave emphasis to belief and doctrine. Fundamentally, the schism was due to the division between the Western and Eastern parts of the Roman Empire; to racial and linguistic differences, as well as to different habits of thought. The plurality of religions, interpretations, doctrines, and heresies that ensued caused emphasis to be placed on doctrine and belief. The disputations, much of which was in writing, point to

another important difference between the Primitive religions of Africa, and Islam or Christianity. The latter are «Religions of the Book». They have the tradition of writing and written disputation; and writing is of sociological significance. It makes it possible to reach an audience beyond the tribe, clan or even a nation, and consequently to take account of other peoples. It is note-worthy that the higher religions are universal in their scope, and missionary in their vision, each considering it its duty to gather all humanity into its fold. It is perhaps not stretching the point too far to see in the struggles between Church and State in the Middle Ages, the medieval Church struggling to become the religious counterpart of the Empire. Thus historical experience gave the principle of universality a meaningful, realizable vision. Not having had such historical experiences, traditional African religions have remained limited in scope and vision. They meet the needs and yearnings of the groups to which they belong.

It used to be held that only the higher religions were specially concerned with morality and that primitive religions had no such concerns. This has been challenged by students of primitive religions In traditional African societies, religion supports the laws and customs and the accepted rules of conduct. What is noteworthy, however, is that the morality sanctioned by primitive religions enjoins good behavior within the family, tribe, or nation with which the deities or spirits are particularly identified; whereas Christianity or Islam and the other world religions, in line with the principle of universality, each arrives at a rule of conduct which is universal in scope. They all teach universal kindliness and goodwill such as «What is hateful to you, do not do to your fellow creature» (Hebrew: Hillel, Sab. 319), or «Always treat others as you would like them to treat you» (Christian, Matthew 7, 12).

Not that such universalism is incompatible with the morality of primitive religions; but that religion on the one side, and the other institutions of society on the other, are so closely united and interdependent and coterminus that the attention of the gods and spirits are thought to centre almost wholly on the particular tribe or nation they protect. Self-contained, isolated tribes conceive the activities of their gods to be limited to their own needs and aspirations.

Religion concerns itself with the relations between the Deity and man, between man and man, and with the relations of man with his universe. Behind much of the ritual of primitive religions lie implicit assumptions of the nature of the universe. The science, technology, and philosophy of a people influence their religion and

vice-versa; and it is in this sphere that the distinction between primitive and the higher religions has the most arresting sociological significance. The primitive religions of Africa envisage a world in which the spiritual and the material, the living and the dead, all interact on one another and belong to the same universe; it is largely a universe of spirits in which the rigid compartmentalisation into sacred and secular and the barrier between the living and the dead are not created. This is not because there is absolute ignorance of causality in the realm of nature; within the limits of their own science and technology, they understand causality; but the more limited the scientific knowledge of a people, the wider the events which are ascribed to deities and spirits, and the greater the events which are covered by religious ritual.

In the sociology of religion, a great deal of research has still to be done on the cosmology of primitive religions; on their concepts of nature, human society and the supernatural world, and of the place of man in Nature and Society. Not being «Religions of the Book», we can only hope to arrive at the cosmology from empirical studies of rituals; but it seems to me distinctions of important sociological significance between primitive and higher religions can be found through comparative studies of the cosmologies of primtive and higher religions.

There are those who having studied some primitive religions have contended themselves with the conclusion that these religions perform a social function, but that the social function of a religion does not depend on its truth or falsity, but on the sentiments of solidarity it evokes or promotes among those who participate in its rituals.

The sociology of religion cannot stop at this conclusion, for consideration must be given to the cosmology implied or expressed by rituals. In 1954, the International African Institute published *African Worlds,* a volume of studies in the Cosmological Ideas and Social Values of African Peoples. The nine essays portray not only that concepts of the universe of the peoples concerned are closely related to their social organisation, but also that their myths, rituals, and beliefs postulate subtle metaphysical concepts.

Hence I would contend that truth and falsity are relevant to religion, primitive or higher, for, as the Greeks taught through their enquiries, religion must satisfy the intellect, if it is to survive. It must make sense of human experience and knowledge. This leads me to submit that the criteria for distinguishing between primitive and higher religions must include rationality. Religious beliefs or rituals that knowledge or experience shows to be false or irrational are

eventually discarded. Hence it is that those higher religions that claim to embody *the truth* have increasingly had to emphasize creed and doctrine. African primitive religions make no claims to a monopoly of truth; polytheism is an acceptance of the fact that other religions may be equally true, or even more so; that is why polytheism is a hospitable religion prepared to embrace other gods and creeds; nevertheless, primitive religions too must meet the challenge both of reason and experimental science, and face consequential adaptations and even the threat of extinction from the encounter. For sociological theory at least, this could be of important significance It would offer more case studies for testing the hypothesis that there is continuous reciprocal adjustment between the religious beliefs, ethical standards, and social experience of a people; and hence further illuminate the sociological significance of the distinction between primitive and higher religions which have developed in different social contents. On the basis of this hypothesis, we would answer the question posed by the title of this paper in the affirmative, as a tentative deduction from what is known already.

REPORT ON THE DISCUSSION

Chairman: Y. M. YINGER, Oberlin College, Ohio
Rapporteur: N. BIRNBAUM, Nuffield College, Oxford

The Session was convened by the chairman, Y. M. Yinger. K. Busia presented his paper on *Has the Distinction Between Primitive and Higher Religions any Sociological Significance?* His answer was a qualified affirmative, which emphasized the universal moral postulates of the higher religions — his examples were taken from Christianity and Islam — and their efficacy in situations in which processes of fusion between social units were under way, and in which animistic and polytheistic cults had lost their cohesive function. T. Parsons suggested that K. Busia had under-emphasized the evolutionary nature of the processes at issue. Durkheim had provided the classic statement of the attributes of primitive religion: 1) the predominance of kinship in social organisation and 2) religion as the primary means of social control. This required modification for advanced societies. Our knowledge of these processes was considerable but needed codification. W. Pickering regretted that neither K. Busia or T. Parsons had dealt with Buddhism and Chinese religion. He also questioned the utility of the dichtomy between book and liturgical religions, which he thought had been utilised by K. Busia; the New Testament was now viewed by historians as a liturgical book. F. Houtart held that universal religions — e.g. Christianity and Islam — had great variations in form themselves and this made the distinction between higher and primitive forms somewhat *simpliste*. Finally, the chairman said that were we to grant K. Busia's hypothesis, that contact between societies produces higher religions, we must examine the alternatives in situations like the African one for the development of these religions.

F. Vogt, next, presented his methodological views on the sociology of religion: the way to avoid the biases and ideological assumptions, as well as the personal psychological distortions, sometimes involved in it was to construct a theoretical model which would take account not alone of the obvious subject matter of the discipline but of the sources of distortion. D. Goldschmidt made four points with respect to a conceptual model in the sociology of religion. 1) The establish-

ment of a single framework for a single religion is relatively easy but in itself not without difficulties — e.g. the problem of the sociological characterization of a Christianity which includes Catholicism and Protestantism. 2) E. Vogt's proposal ignores the extreme variation in personality factors so they cannot be accounted for in any standardised way. 3) The critical question for a sociology of religion is that of the historical meaning of religion. 4) Can a sociology of religion also deal with secularised societies, with functional equivalents for religion ?

H. Desroche then presented his paper on the multiple and complex relationship between atheism and the process of secularisation. He insisted that the conventional depiction of Marxism as a «substitute religion» was hardly consonant with the view of Marx and Engels that atheism as well as Christianity had to be transcended. The tasks of a sociology of religion had to commence with a precise analysis of the continuities and discontinuities between religion, atheism and secularization. Commenting, P. Rieff held that value judgements in the sociology of religion were required and, indeed indispensable. He suggested that analysis could profit from a distinction between the credal and moral aspects of religion. Finally, he remarked that the opposition of technology to religion had been enunciated by both parties to the early modern controversy. W. F. Wertheim observed that some recent non-western messianic movements expressed social protest and revolutionary aspiration in a religious form, as indeed had similar western movements in times past; both types could be studied to illuminate the problems posed by H. Desroche. Finally, the chairman asked when did social conflict assume a secular form and when was it defined religiously ? He suggested that when power is centralized in a society, it can oppose religious change; when power is diffused, religious interpretations of social conflict can become explosive.

J. Maitre suggested that mathematical approaches in the sociology of religion were not alone useful in establishing certain external aspects of religious practise and attitudes; they allowed us to hypothesise certain social psychological — in other words, spiritual — regularities. His paper was commented upon by C. Y. Glock, who acknowledged the principle involved but stressed the difficulties. C. Y. Glock offered his own schema for a quantitative analysis of religious attitudes which, in response to a question from the chairman, he said could be extended to religious groups as well. President Kincheloe observed that there appeared to be no remarkable distinc-

tion between C. Y. Glock's classification and the well-known one developed by Bales for small group analysis.

F. Houtart then presented his paper on *Priestly Vocation as a Perception of Value,* followed by F. Fichter who presented his on *A Comparative View of the Parish Priest.* Based on a study of American parish priests and their parishioners, this established five types of image (and self-image) of the priest: the executive, the insolvent businessman, the overburdened professional, the spiritual leader and the personal friend. He noted a certain discrepancy between the executive and administrative functions of the priest and the latter's preference for a more pastoral and spiritual role. W. Goddjin regretted that only nuclear Catholics were taken in the lay sample; further more, he thought that F. Fichter had confused the analysis of the role system of the priest with the knowledge of that system that happened to be held by those participating in it.

B. Wilson gave his paper on the Church-Sect typology as applied to a variety of organisational forms and to a variety of developmental processes within religious organisations. P. L. Berger said that typologies were matters of taste as well as of utility. Further, he believed that sectarianism was a countervailing force to global secularization; it could be studied in connection with the problem of the localization of modern religious consciousness. J. Matthes suggested ways in which the typology had to be altered to deal with certain contemporary development in religious organisation.

A. J. F. Koebben held that the discussion had been ethnocentric; it overlooked the variety of sectarian phenomena — not necessarily opposed to «churches» — in non-western societies. The chairman said that with an increase in the amount of available data in the sociology of religion, systems of analysis tended to become increasingly complex until the requirements of comparison force us to develop a typology pointing to underlying variables.

N. Berkes, giving the last paper, dealt with the problems of a comparative scheme for the analysis of the relationship of religious to secular institutions. In particular, he adduced data from Turkey to document his contention that the processes peculiar to western Christendom could not be understood as model for secularization elsewhere. E. J. Pin thought that N. Berkes had over-emphasized the distinction between processes in the west and those elsewhere, especially with respect to those aspects of secularization which did not concern the relations of Church and State. Finally, in a comment, B. Yanagawa proposed to extend the analysis from Islam to Asiatic religions lacking a «Church».

In his concluding remarks on the day's work, the chairman then said that the papers and other contributions had shown the way forward for the sociology of religion: a theoretical analysis based on wide comparative work.

Other papers were tabled by N. Greinacher, C. Barash and A. Grumelli. Finally, we regret to have to add that the denial of a visa to L. Werner deprived us of his participation.

SOCIOLOGY OF LEISURE AND POPULAR CULTURE
SOCIOLOGIE DU LOISIR ET DE LA CULTURE POPULAIRE

LEISURE-TIME ACTIVITY
OF TURKISH UNIVERSITY STUDENTS

NERMIN ABADAN
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One of the major characteristics of industrialized societies is the fact that individuals are surrounded with an extremely dense and closely woven technical network. This surrounding is shaped by such factors as production, communication, transportation, social relationship, entertainment, etc. Thus technological civilization increases on one side the effectiveness of mass media and causes the disappearance of traditional mores and ways; on the other side it provides standard knowledge and equal orientation toward leisure-time activities. No doubt that transitional societies, such as countries in the process of a deep transforming development, are taking a middle-way place in this regard.

Since Turkey can be regarded as a typical transitional society, moving quickly toward rapid urbanization, industrialization, a higher degree of social mobility and a greater amount of national income, there is no doubt that leisure-time activities have also changed since the introduction of Ataturk's reforms. These changes are even more significant as they indicate a free choice between traditional and modern values.

The purpose of this modest research — A Survey of Leisure-time Activities among 426 Students of Ankara — was to investigate the impact of a series of social reforms upon a limited group of students through the glasses of their spare-time activities. Although this topic has become the subject of numerous researches in Western industrialized societies, our survey is the first of its kind in the Near East. The various reforms applied during the last forty years in Turkey have drastically changed by means of legalistic measures certain sections of its public life, its calendar, judiciary system,

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political setting, laws, etc. But all these reforms aiming to introduce Western thinking and manners, have not been able to introduce and foster new social habits and attitudes with the same speed and equal extent. Yet, as one of Turkey's remarkable political scientists has stated: «To become modern and Western-minded has always been for Turkey a vital goal». The purpose of this study has been to analyze and interpret the reaction of university students toward leisure-time activity and thus to detect the average ideas and attitudes of an important minority group within the social structure of the country.

The Particularity of Leisure-Time Activity in Turkey

As in other transitional societies, in Turkey too, family life and strongly rooted traditions are still deeply influencing the behaviour of young people, except in questions of education, where definite rules and regulations are setting the pace. Although the difference between the sexes does not play any role within the competitive entrance examinations for the universities, the use of free time varies greatly according to the sexes. Again, factors such as belonging to an urban or rural community creates an extreme different approach to leisure-time activities. It also should be mentioned that certain sport activities, which are considered in all Western countries as a most natural and normal teenager activity, as well as social gatherings, are creating in certain parts of Anatolia — where seclusion and veiling of women still persists — serious and important problems. On the other hand, liberal-minded students in metropolitan areas are tending to swing to the other extreme by shocking certain stratas of public opinion with their extremist views and behaviour. As an example, the fact might be mentioned that, although Turkey's shores are surrounded by three different seas, even to swim in summer on a public or private beach may create deep moral conflicts (See Table III). Like other fast-changing countries, Turkey too has a dynamic, sensitive, explosively-minded university youth, whose love of freedom and democracy have been noticed, especially prior to the overthrowing of the Menderes régime. The findings of our modest research aim to help to understand some of the preferences, attitudes and habits of Turkey's future community and opinion leaders.

METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

One of the major goals of our research project was to investigate the impact of institutions, in other words, the products of secondary systems versus the role of primary systems such as the family, neighbourhood, etc. Our major hypothesis has partly been within the expectation that especially transitional societies which, prior, were not subject to any foreign rule, such as colonialism or any kind of protectorate, mandate, etc., and where public institutions are not carrying any stigma of overt foreign domination, the role and function of secondary systems are far-reaching and deep. In such a setting these institutions are carrying easier progressive ideas and are able to indoctrinate them faster than by media of traditional clusters of family bonds. Furthermore, there is no need to recall that even in a society as conformist as the United States, studies such as the Bennington College research project of Professor Newcombe have clearly indicated that, especially an academic climate sponsoring a different set of value judgements, is easily apt to change the whole set of attitudes and opinions of young people.

Leisure-time activity in connection with youth can be treated and analysed under three major headings:

1. *Basic Social Institutions*

With this term we refer mainly to the major social institutions which regulate the behaviour of adults and minors in any society. For example, the initiation rites in primitive societies versus the granting of the right to vote in modern societies. Our survey has not dealt in particular with these questions.

2. *Contemporary Social Institutions*

This criteria leads us to the investigation of the specific character of each society, its degree of agrarian or industrialized structure, the pattern of social relationships, political socializations, etc. The impact of these institutions enables us to classify the subjects of our sample under three major categories such as introvert, extrovert or tradition-bound personalities. This was particularly the area we tried to investigate in order to place a transitional society such as Turkey within the range of industrialization and modernization, to explain the highly controversial and sometimes contradictory behaviour of its

youngsters and to show the roots of sociological and partly psychological changes of students of a given community. Since our sample included both students who were studying only in the Turkish language and others, who in spite of their Turkish citizenship, were completing their higher education in a foreign language, namely English, the findings are quite revealing. Thus, we included in our survey, besides variables such as urban or rural origin, sex, age, income categories, also the impact of a foreign language. This evidently throws a new light upon the different value-systems of the various groups included in our study.

3. *Contemporary Political Ideas and Conditions*

The ideological and historical aspect of each period no doubt leaves a deep impact on its most promising actors. However, within our survey we only slightly touched this topic. It can be said that we rather preferred to remain on purely empirical sociological grounds, without leaving much place for ideological interpretations. However, the final breaking-up in to a threefold typology slightly touches upon these themes.

It also has to be stated that, due to particularly unfavourable political conditions at the time the survey was carried out (May 1959), the questionnaire was overloaded with certain questions which might have been treated under a slightly different title, such as questions concerning religious practice, friendships, projects for a career and for the future. However, one might add that the fact that religion was treated within the framework of leisure-time activity permitted us to locate the small percentage of deeply religious elements versus a large mass of adherents without any deep attachment, proving once more that traditional and religious values attain a higher value as *social control forces* than moral and ethical considerations.

SIZE OF THE SAMPLE

Our project has been limited to a group of university students, whose common characteristics are 1) their residence in Ankara, the Capital, 2) their registration in various branches in the field of social sciences. The total figure of the public selected was 426 respondents. They belong to different academic institutions of Ankara: a) The

Faculty of Political Science and the Faculty of Law, both attached to the University of Ankara and b) the Faculty of Administrative Sciences at the Middle East Technical University. The most important distinctive feature between these two institutions is as follows: Ankara University includes eight faculties all teaching solely in Turkish. This University, together with the Universities of Istanbul. Izmir and Erzurum, are regulated by a common law unifying the operation of all these state-subsidized universities. The Middle East Technical University is in accordance with the Turkish constitution, which upholds the monopoly of establishing universities solely on behalf of the government, also a Turkish public corporation, similarly subsidized by the government. But the important difference lies within the fact that the latter carries on all its teaching in English (The University has 877 Turkish and 86 foreign students). The reason for the adoption of a foreign language was the expectation to establish a regional university. This provided us with a most interesting means of comparison. We were thus able not only to compare the differences between various faculties, but also the different approach of Turkish students due to their education within highly different frames of reference.

Our sample contained 76 women and 350 men, all belonging to the second and third years.

The questionnaire was elaborated by a group of six students under my supervision and first used on a pilot test. The survey itself was carried out in the faculty buildings under supervision and without coercion. Participation was almost complete. The questionnaire consisted of 115 questions.

Finally, it has to be added that two of the faculties included in our sample, namely the Faculty of Political Science (S.B.F.) and the Faculty of Administrative Sciences of the Middle East Technical University are accepting their students on the basis of a highly competitive examination. The Law Faculty, on the other hand, started to apply an examination system only recently and registered every applicant at the date of the survey, thus ending up with an undefinable number of attending students.

SOCIAL BACKGROUND OF THE STUDENTS

Here again, without entering into details, it is sufficient to state that the greatest amount of social mobility is to be seen within the student body of the Faculty of Political Science, where 62 % of the

students are coming from small towns and rural areas, whereas this percentage stands in the Faculty of Law at 31 % and in the Middle East Technical University at 45 %. However, the students of the English-speaking Technical University come, almost without exception, from the three major metropolitan areas, such as Istanbul (2 million inhabitants), Ankara (650.000) and Izmir (300.000 inhabitants). The Law Faculty students, although they do not come from purely rural areas, have as their origin the newly-emerging 100.000 population cities of Anatolia. In other words, they come from less urbanized centres than their fellow students at the M.E.T.U. Furthermore, the students of the Technical University, which requires a fair knowledge of English, have 38 % of fathers in business and private enterprise, whereas the same percentage at the Faculty of Political Science — which incidentally carries the record of being the oldest academic institution in Ankara, having been established as a training centre for the civil service in Istanbul in 1859 by the sultan — have fathers in the higher civil service. Thus, it is clearly visible that expensive private education, providing a good knowledge of a foreign language, remains within the capacity of the upper middle class parents and reflects itself in the structure of the student bodies of each respective faculty.

TYPOLOGY

As a comparative result of the findings of the survey a threefold typology was elaborated with a more or less equal distribution at each institution but sponsoring each time a dominant type, who acts at the same time as an illustration of the impact of various institutions.

1. *Emergent administrator — leader type.* These students are attributing priority to national and political problems, they show an eager interest in the political aspect of public affairs, they take their concepts of thinking from Turkish sources but are able to use one of the most important Western foreign languages without any major effort; they belong according to the level of their general knowledge and cultural background to the intellectual class, they have sincerely adopted the reforms of Atatürk and defend the necessity to reach toward Western type civilization with the help of an integrating approach; they estimate that their future field of activities lies within a governmental career (public bureaucracy) or state enterprise.

2. *Career-minded type.* The students belonging to this category are considering their professional training as the most important item of their university education, they try to solve the problems of a transitional society by means of traditional orientated value judgements, they consider the solution of public matters not with rational thinking, but rather in concordance with the commentators of mass communication media, their knowledge of Western languages is very restricted. Their adoption of Ataturk's reforms indicates only a formal adherance, their preference for the future goes against a position requiring an intensive amount of decision-making and heavy responsibilities and in favour of moderate positions without heavy duties and risks. The origins of these students are mostly newly-emerging Anatolian cities (population over 100.000). The major goal for these students is a steady social-climbing within hierarchical echelons.

3. *Successful manager type.* The students of this category consider inspite of their studies within the realm of social sciences, that technical and economic problems are of the greatest importance. They have no interest whatsoever in political matters. They apply standards and values of highly industrialized countries to their private lives, their mental world contains only frames of references and facts from the Anglo-American sphere, they look upon the results of Atatürk's reforms as extremely natural and take them for granted without feeling the need to carry them further or investigate their effectiveness. After completion of their higher education these students are rather attracted by highly paid jobs instead of slowly evolving careers, they attribute the highest social value to businessmen. These students are coming almost without exception from upper middle class families and are looking for a lucrative job rather than a public function. They represent the Turkish «extrovert» types.

In summing up it can be said that the first type represents a rather «creative, idealist and dynamic» type, the second a «traditional bound, executing, static» type and the third a «successful, materialistically-minded, dynamic, manager» type. Of course this typology serves solely as a guide for differentiation; in reality there is a great deal of cross-breeding among these three major types.

MAJOR RESULTS OF THE SURVEY

Apart from the above-stated attempt to shape certain definite types

as products of various institutions from among our 426 respondents, the survey brought to our attention the following major results:

1. The distribution of active, passive, and purposeless leisure-time activity among Turkish university students, indicates that the «passive» or «soft» type of leisure-time activities occupies the most important place. Thus it induces us to reach the conclusion, that mass-communication media occupies a predominant situation regardless of the degree of industrialization of the respective country immediately after the setting up radio stations, the building of cinemas, the distribution of popular newspapers and reviews. On the other hand, leisure-time activities such as dancing, attending theatres and the opera which require, at the same time, the adoption of modern ways of living and which have been introduced in Turkey along with the other reforms of Ataturk, have largely been adopted only by foreign indoctrinated youngsters or, at least, the predisposition for the acceptance of such new ways of behaviour is the highest where it is accompanied by adequate frames of reference and thinking. Another important feature within this distribution lies in the fact that the high percentage of absolutely wasted leisure-time activity, such as strolling on the street, time spent in coffee-houses, etc., is due to the limited alternatives offered to them.

2. Our investigation of the effect of economic ressources — self-supporting students versus scholarship holders, or pocket money receivers — indicates that limited financial ressources exercise some restriction on expensive sports (tennis, ski-ing, cycling) travelling, the acquirement of many books, attendance at the theatre and opera. On the other hand the socio-economic status does not play any role in the high frequency of coffee-house attendance, thus proving that such a habit is rather the result of social attitudes and habits.

3. The survey also attempted, if only briefly, to throw some light on the type of socialization which Turkish students prefer. In other words, we tried to find out whether in a country like Turkey, which represents the passing of traditional society, personal relationships are tending to evolve toward small groups or dual friendship. The findings have shown that Turkish youth prefers a more close, individual association rather than the conformist, collective social grouping prevailing in many industrialized societies. However, here again, a deviant factor emerged from the fact that wherever institutions represent an intensive *esprit de corps* (such as the Faculty of Political

Science) or a total absorbtion of Western standards (such as the Middle-East Technical University) collective socialization forms are gaining the upper hand.

4. Another facet which we attempted to treat, is the impact of primary groups, as well as urban and rural communities in regard to adopting social changes. In this respect the most important differentiation can be witnessed with students from a rural background, As is well-known in other countries too, the small cities are the most conservative centres and permit a very insignificant amount of tolerance. In this regard it is mainly the male students who are clinging fervently to their inherited and preserved attitudes and opinions. As the survey indicates, the sweeping reforms of Atatürk in regard to the emancipation of women are still exercising a strong incentive upon young girls who, under the benevolent and encouraging atmosphere of various institutions such as dormitories, faculties and big cities, are able to adapt themselves faster psychologically and mentally than the boys towards more modern ways of thinking and living.

5. Finally, we tried to find out which were the leisure-time activities which Turkish students wanted to undertake and which were those they actually engaged upon. One interesting finding shows that the desire to learn at least one foreign language in their spare time is extremely high. Here again we find another proof showing the trend toward modernism, translated by the urge and consciousness that a different way of living and thinking can more easily be acquired by adopting one of the universally accredited languages. Some other unfulfilled wishes are to be able to travel more, listen to music, engage in sports. However, another remarkable feature in the enumeration of realized and unrealized leisure-time activities remains within the relatively narrow range of choices. Turkish university students have remained — partly due to the Second World War, political crises, traditionalism, as well as the spreading of the Iron Curtain over the Balkans — rather severed from Europe and our other neighbouring countries. On the other hand, most of our universities have not been able to build sufficiently well-equiped cultural centres of recreation, where university students can spend their free time in a more creative and satisfying way.

TABLE I

Passive leisure-time activities of Turkish University students

	Pol. Sc. Fac.	Law Fac.	Middle East T.U.
	%	%	%
Cinema attendance	100	98	98
Radio listening	98	95	91
Theatre attendance	96	90	89
Dancing	69	37	91
Opera attendance	67	36	75
Purposeless strolling	61	47	30
Coffeehouse attendance	56	63	26
Sports	46	43	36

TABLE II

Active leisure-time activities of Turkish University students

	Pol. Sc. Fac.	Law Fac.	Middle East T.U.
	%	%	%
Reading:			
a. Newspaper	88	94	91
b. Reviews	50	47	59
c. Books	36	24	57
d. Technical books	43	36	43
Activity with students or			
organisations	48	45	45
Sports	40	35	52
Music (performing)	53	45	47
Handicrafts	65	68	66
Drawing	45	44	59
Attending lectures	74	68	52
Language courses:			
a. Attended	46	29	69
b. Attending	48	8	27

TABLE III

Swimming and Traditionalism

	Pol. Sc. Fac. %	Law Fac. %	Middle East T.U. %
Would you permit your wife or sister to swim in your company ?:			
a. On a public beach	31	25	50
b. On a lonely beach	25	30	20
c. Within a family camp	26	28	20
d. Nowhere	7	17	7
e. Without answer	11	—	—
	100	100	100

REPORT ON THE DISCUSSION

Chairman: M. KAPLAN, School of Fine and Applied Arts, Boston
Rapporteur: VITO AHTIK, École Pratique des Hautes Études, Paris

In his introductory remarks J. Dumazedier underlined some major trends taking place during the last decade, among them: a) a rapid increase in the volume of published studies, both in the United States and in Europe; b) a new orientation in approaching the subject matter: studies on social and cultural functions of leisure are replacing studies of isolated leisure activities; furthermore, leisure is studied in relation to other fields of human activities, such as work, family life, education, etc.; c) elaborated study designs and technique of analysis (e.g. mathematical models, factor analysis, semantic analysis) are used more and more often.

M. Kaplan described in his paper some salient characteristics of industrialized societies and proposed five general hypotheses to be used as a platform for empirical research on leisure: 1) leisure arising from industrial conditions becomes a stimulation towards increasing classlessness; 2) mass leisure in its initial stages threatens established values, but serves as a source of value discovery in situations where traditions and social controls are relatively unfelt; 3) the mass media, in relation to leisure, function as competitor, as a source of vicarious experience, as tradition to direct experience, as personal history and memory; 4) as social roles within the family become less defined, leisure interests become increasingly central as unifying agents; 5) as the proportion of time increases free from work commitment, distinction between leisure of the employed and of retired decrease.

E. van den Haag defined four prolegomena to the study of leisure in a mass society: 1) mass produced goods are accessible to all strata of population, but a standardization of taste is a concomitant of mass consumption; 2) mass media foster entertainment and passive spectatorship at the expense of cultural creativeness; 3) cultural and moral elites are disappearing as influence groups, due to the commercialisation of cultural production; 4) as a result of the high psychological and economic costs of individuality and privacy, gregariousness has become internalized.

G. V. Osipov described the work of a group of sociologists and economists of the Federal Academy of Sciences in Moscow who study leisure activities and leisure needs of working people of the Soviet Union. Among the methods used are large scale surveys of industrial workers and statistical estimations of various indexes of energy output of individuals in various industrial and non-industrial occupations. The results of this research help the Soviet authorities in planning leisure activities and cultural equipment on the level of states, of local units and of industrial plants all over the country.

During the discussion, which closed the morning session of the group, some of the propositions advanced by the speakers were questioned, others were illustrated by the results of empirical studies or by everyday observations; finally, D. Riesman drew some general conclusions concerning the topic discussed. The sociologists of today are rediscovering the «folk» in the post-industrial societies. At the same time, the enormous development of mass production and mass consumption of various goods point at new problems: contemporary societies are facing the results of their own progress in production and should prepare themselves to cope better with its consequences.

Six papers, reporting on various empirical studies of leisure were presented to the afternoon session. The first two discuss the limits of leisure. R. Meyersohn drew attention to some consequences for interpretation of different types of definition of leisure, depending on whether the starting point is the time free from occupational work, or the set of leisure activities, or the attitudes associated to them. In a study on gardening he measured all three aspects and examined the relationships between them. A considerable part of his sample engages in gardening — an activity traditionnally considered as leisure activity — an important amount of time and energy, without any particular satisfaction, simply because of a widespread practice of it in their neighbourhood or in their reference strata of population. This result simulated a second study, on leisure activities of housewives, in which the variable of social obligation has been built into the study design.

E. Scheuch discussed the conditions under which the free time becomes leisure. The results of a series of community studies conducted in Cologne point to a direct relationship between the occupational roles of individuals and certain leisure activities, a relationship which transforms many leisure activities into «functional necessities» of professional activities. Even the very private and non-reglemented family conversations were found to bear an important in-

fluence of occupational determinants, and to be, on their part, in the service of the social integration of the individuals into the social structure of the society.

Y. Littunen found in a panel study that annual vocation constitutes a certain intensified, concentrated form of autonomization. This detachment from the usual social norms reinforces the individual activity, creativity, and economic initiative, whereas it reduces the various forms of group activity, regulated by social and professional norms of individuals.

V. Ahtik studied political participation of industrial workers in the context of everyday routine behaviour. He found the highest degree of active participation to social and political organizations with the individuals whose behaviour is oriented by conflicting types of social norms.

J. London described the design of a survey on the attitudes towards the adult education which is being conducted in California, and Z. Gostskowsky reported on the first results of a nationwide survey of leisure activities of urban population conducted by the Polish Census Bureau and analysed by Z. Skorzinsky.

In his concluding paper J. Dumazedier presented a summary of descriptive results of a research on leisure, conducted simultaneously in nine European towns. During the discussion which followed this paper, possibilities of an efficient co-ordination of leisure research done in Europe and in the United States were examined. It was decided that a bulletin, containing progress reports on current studies, will be created.

SOCIOLOGY OF MEDICINE
SOCIOLOGIE DE LA MÉDECINE

REPORT ON THE DISCUSSION

Chairman: G. G. Reader, Cornell Medical Center
Rapporteur: S. W. Bloom, State University of New York

This report summarizes the proceedings of the informal discussion session on the Sociology of Medicine, held at the Shoreham Hotel, Washington, D. C., on September 3, 1962. Part I describes the arrangement of the meeting, including brief summaries of the five prepared presentations which were the focus of the session. Part II is an interpretation of some of the broader sociological implications of the prepared papers as conceived by the discussant, William A Glaser.

I

One meeting was held, combining five prepared presentations with informal discussion G. G. Reader organized and presided over the session.

Social Origins and Career Orientations of Medical Students: Some Anglo-American Comparisons, was presented by F. M. Martin. This paper is a study of trends in the selection of type of medical practice by medical students during their medical studies. Questionnaires were distributed to medical students from 24 British and one Eire medical schools at the beginning of study; 9,356 students completed the questionnaire, representing a 94 per cent return. A preliminary analysis was conducted of the information from 2,234 students at five schools, one in London, one in Scotland, and three in the provinces. The findings are compared particularly with similar studies conducted by the Bureau of Applied Social Research of Columbia University; direct comparisons were possible because F. M. Martin used the questionnaire developed at Columbia University.

F. M. Martin found that the trend in Britain appears to be towards general practice more than to speciality practice. He notes the contrast with the United States, where the opposite trend has been ob-

served. This finding was interpreted in terms of the special conditions of practice in Great Britain under the Public Health Service. Other findings included: 1) the commitment to a decision occurs very slowly. A large majority delay a final decision until the last two years of study, with many remaining still not finally committed until the final four months. 2) At the beginning of study, surgery ranked highest as a career choice; by the beginning of clinical studies, internal medicine was ranked highest, and at the time of final examinations, general practice was first. 3) In prestige, hospital speciality work persists throughout the period of study in the highest rank. 4) There is little variation in the pattern of these findings between medical schools.

Medical Sociology in Germany, was presented by R. König,. R. König devoted himself mainly to an exposition of the contribution which medical sociology offers to an understanding of the interpersonal dynamics of the doctor-patient relationship. Studies of the effects of socioeconomic class on communication were reviewed, and their usefulness particularly in problems of psychotherapy were explained.

N. Grashchenkov presented a paper, *The Struggle for People's Health as a Most Important Problem.* The importance of preventive medicine for Soviet medicine, N. Grashchenkov asserted, has led to the highest development of medical services in the world. In the meantime preventive services have suffered in their development in the capitalistic countries because of the dehumanizing influence of the profit motive. As evidence, N. Grashchenkov cited demographic figures on the number of hospital beds and the number of doctors per 10,000 of the population. Comparison was made between the pre-revolutionary period (1913) and the present (1960) within the U.S.S.R. and between the U.S.S.R. and countries of the West. Other demographic variables were also considered in the presentation of the argument.

A paper by M. Sokolowska *Socio-Medical Problems of Industrial Enterprise in Poland,* was presented by H. Menzel. This paper presents the view that social and medical factors have not been considered jointly in the conception of industrial health problems. The development of this general thesis may be summarized in the following outline: 1) profound demographic changes were indicated in Poland together with medical statistics which show trends similar to Western countries; 2) thus, there are suggested opportunities to demonstrate the sociological significance of level of industrialization

and urbanization as compared with political organization; 3) at the same time, unique developments in Poland have only begun to be studied in refined sociological terms towards the understanding of cross-cultural differences as well as similarities in medico-social problems; 4) this leads to a list of problem areas which seem to offer special promise for investigation in a country like Poland.

Supervisors Views of Physicians from Abroad was presented by A. L. Hopson. This is a report of a study of foreign physicians training in the U. S. both as interns and residents. It is recognized at the start that these physicians from other countries come to the U. S. via two overlapping channels: first, they come for their own education because this country has become the outstanding medical center of the world, and second, the U. S. encourages them to come because of the shortage of sufficient physicians to meet the service requirements of our hospitals. The basic question of this study therefore, was: are the U. S. facilities for graduate medical education meeting the needs of the 8500 foreign physicians who came to this country in 1960-1961 ? and, do these physicians meet the needs of the U. S. hospitals which they serve ? By both questionnaire and interview, a test group of 140 foreign doctors and a control group of 70 American doctors are to be included in this study. Altogether, a battery of twenty-three instruments are to be included. In addition, the supervisors of the foreign physicians were asked to rate performance on a number of criteria. The most striking preliminary findings of the study is that knowledge of the English language does not appear to be related to the quality of performance as a resident physician. Despite the language barrier and despite gaps in medical knowledge relative to United States' physicians, the clinical performance of foreign physicians may compare favorably to that of our own medical graduates.

II

An interpretive summary of the formal presentations was prepared by W. A. Glaser. His own rendering of this summary follows:

Each of the papers read at this meeting reports conceptual viewpoints, research results, and policy problems from the authors' respective countries. Medical sociology has developed in this way; since each scholar's range of operations and clients are limited to his own national boundaries, he concentrates on the theoretical issues and practical problems within his country. But international exchanges

are beginning, as we have seen at this meeting. For example, when trying to explain the career choices of British medical students, M. Martin compares his findings with those from the earlier sociological studies of American medical students. When developing a conceptual framework and hypotheses for future research about doctor-patient relations in Germany, R. König turns for ideas to earlier theoretical writing by an American and an Englishman.

As sociologists, we seek insights about the structure and function of social systems, and such knowledge can best be derived from studies of variations, either by tracing short-run or long-term changes in one system or by comparing a series of contemporaneous systems. Therefore, by crossing national boundaries, medical sociologists now can begin to explain the interrelations between medical and other social institutions. We may find certain invarient structural characteristics of medical organization that «resist» variations in the rest of the social system; in some ways medical organization is strong enough to override a set of weaker social constraints or to force other social institutions to make re-equilibrating changes. When we find certain constant medical characteristcs in supposedly dissimilar social systems, such an unexpected fact might lead us to discover previously unnoticed institutional similarities among these societies. When we find cross-national differences in medical institutions, we might discover which other institutional variables vary similarly and thus are the principle causes and consequences.

This is the spirit that will guide my comments on the papers given at this meeting. I shall select a few illustrations of how certain facts or hypotheses true in a single national setting may or may not be true elsewhere, and I shall suggest certain sociological implications. My comments are based on my own present cross-national study of medical institutions, a project involving informant interviews, hospital visits, and literature reviews in seventeen countries and at offices of the World Health Organization[1].

For example, the itinerant medical sociologist soon discovers that many tasks of doctors are alike in numerous, different countries, despite differences in the administrative structure of medicine and despite differences in the social system. The reason is that many of the medical problems and medical techniques are the same, regardless of national frontiers. This becomes evident when we make

cross-national comparisons of M. Sokolowska's Polish data. She says that cardiovascular illness is the leading cause of industrial absenteeism and is increasing; cardiovascular illness and cancer are the leading causes of death; infectious diseases are declining in incidence and as cause of death; psychosomatic complaints are numerous and are increasing. The same facts are true in all other developed countries [2]. Illness profiles and trends in industrial countries are much alike; it is the under-developed countries that have local diseases and local illness profiles. As a result, at the same level of industrialization, urbanization, and living standards the constraints of similar medical problems and similar medical techniques produce great similarity in many medical tasks and work organization, and these constraints override certain variables of culture and social structure that might be expected to make a greater difference.

Certain epidemiological facts are much alike throughout the world, despite great differences in the formal organization of the total society. For example, M. Sokolowska reports that the white collar, managerial, and skilled jobs in Poland have a higher incidence of coronary disease than blue collar jobs. Similar correlations have been found in the United States, England, the Soviet Union, Israel, and elsewhere [3]. «Of course», the traveller says upon hearing each such report, «how reasonable». But then one suddenly realizes that the same sequence of occupational experience, mode of life, psychophysical strain, and illness have occurred in occupations in very different kinds of social system. White collar workers in capitalistic enterprise engaged in competitive market activity and white collar workers in departments in a planned socialistic society may experience similar role strains, lead the same kind of sedentary life eat similar diets, and react alike. Thus an interesting study in cross-

[2] James MACKINTOSH, «Frist Report on the World Health Situation», Official Records of the World Health Organization, Number 94, 1959; Statistiques Epidémiologiques et Démographiques Annuelles 1960, Geneva, World Health Organization, 1962; COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, Patterns of Incidence of Certain Diseases Throughout the World, Washington, United States Government Printing Office, 1959.

[3] John YUDKIN, «The Epidemiology of Coronary Disease», Progress in Cardiovascular Diseases, Volume I, October 1958, pp. 121-123, 132, and sources cited therein; Henry I. RUSSEK, «Emotional Stress and Coronary Heart Disease in American Physicians, Dentists and Lawyers», The American Journal of the Medical Sciences, Volume 243, June 1962, pp. 716-725, and sources cited; J. N. MORRIS and Margaret D. CRAWFORD, «Coronary Heart Disease and Physical Activity of Work», The British Medical Journal, 20 December 1958, pp. 1485-1496.

national medical sociology would be a careful functional comparison of the tasks, medically relevant strains, and total subculture of comparable jobs in very different societies, such as the industrial manager in the Soviet Union and in the United States. One might find that stresses and psychosomatic responses are more alike than could be expected from differences in the overall social organization and official ideologies of such countries; probably one might find that many functional differences in role strain and in role occupants' medical responses are due to institutional facts that could not have been predicted from the countries' overall social organization and ideologies.

Another paper suggesting a possible universal sociological fact is R. König's. He hypothesizes that communication barriers resulting from social class differences hamper the therapeutic success of the encounter between psychiatrists and most patients. Such communication barriers have been found and studied in America[4]; in all industrial countries probably many doctors meet some patients of lower education with whom they cannot communicate succesfully; and in under-developed countries, the urbanized and educated doctor lives in a different world from the mass public. A sociological question is what institutional conditions reduce the communication barriers between doctors and lower stratum persons and what conditions can produce successful therapy despite surviving barriers. Doubtless we would learn much of sociological interest by studying doctor-patient relations in the Soviet Union. N. Grashchenkov says that the Soviet medical profession has been expanded and changed in character in order to improve services. Sociologically, one may add that doctor-patient social stratum differences may have been reduced by wider recruitment than before the Revolution, by abolishing fee-for-service and making the doctor a salaried worker like the patient himself, and by teaching the doctor to be considerate to all patients. Research in a society that deliberately tries to minimize class differences between doctor and patient might show whether there are any functional requirements for professional work that inevitably produce such differences and resultant communication barriers, such as the need for advanced scientific training and the doctor's need to play a charismatic scientific role in the patient's presence.

The itinerant medical sociologist soon notices that although some medical institutions are often alike in many different countries, their

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[4] August B. HOLLINGSHEAD and Frederick C. REDLICH, *Social Class and Mental Illness*, New York, John Wiley and Sons, 1958, Chapter 9.

social consequences differ, both for the society and for the medical personnel themselves. The reason is that the functional requirements for the stable operation of essentially different social systems must themselves differ. An example in medical sociology is doctor-patient relationship described by R. König and by the American and English authors cited in his paper. Throughout the developed countries, the doctor is an expert who solves the therapeutic needs of individual patients by means of applied natural science and by an attitude of detached concern; the patient willingly accepts the doctor's guidance and strives actively to learn the patient role, to progress steadily, and to regain his normal occupational and family roles. All doctors in underdeveloped countries learn the same therapist roles. But while these roles are highly functional in Western societies, they are not in underdeveloped countries, except when caring for the small elites. For the social systems of under-developed countries the therapist roles may be nonfunctional, since most citizens are not effective role partners — they may lack the necessary strength, knowledge, and habits of active self-help; they may lack family and occupational roles capable of inspiring recovery, etc. Indeed, the therapist roles may be nonfunctional in under-developed countries by diverting scarce personnel and, scarce resources away from public health and preventive medicine[5]. In order to gain further knowledge about what sorts of medical role are functional for what kinds of society the medical sociologist might study the exceptional case where the traditional medical role has been altered, namely the Soviet Union: Not only have Soviet public health services been expanded, as N. Grashchenkov says, but also the typical doctors — the *uchastok vrach* and the *rayon* hospital specialist — do public health teaching, sanitary inspection, and certain other nonclinical tasks in addition to patient care. It would be informative to see how this unique role set is organized and whether it is or is not perfectly functional for Soviet society.

Noting differences between countries in basic facts can lead to sociological explanations of how variations in social structure produce variations in medical institutions, and vice-versa. For example, F. Martin notes that general practice gains in popularity during the later years of medical school in England while it declines in America. He explains the difference by comparing the structure of graduate

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[5] This difference between developed and underdeveloped countries is elaborated in William A. GLASER, *Social Contexts and Health Institutions*, forthcoming.

medical education in the two countries; while speciality careers are highly desirable in both countries, graduate education in England provides fewer openings than in America and has greater risks. In addition, one can explain the English results by noting that general practice there may be a more prestigeful, stable, and predictable part of the medical profession; the general practitioner is guaranteed a number of patients by taking a panel in an under-doctored region, he is guaranteed a minimum and predictable income by the capitation fee system, and he can look forward to a placid and respected life in one of England's stable localities. The generality of F. Martin's findings might be supported by research in some other countries; for example, one might predict that general practice becomes increasingly attractive to Dutch medical students for the reasons as in England, while specialization might become increasingly popular in Swedish medical schools for the same reasons as in America. On the other hand, different results might be found in other countries where the opportunity structures are different from both the English and American types. For example, how do medical students make career decisions in Italy, Germany, France, or Spain, where speciality education is just as risky and costly as in England while general practice is riskier and more competitive than in America ?

A. L. Hopson's paper suggests another set of variables that show some cross-national variations and therefore can shed light on sociological determinants. How professional and personal characteristics affect performance in a different social system is a widespread issue in medical institutions today. One finds foreign born doctors working in the hospitals of America, England, West Germany, Sweden, Spain, Israel, and several under-developed countries. Cross-national comparisons might show that some routes of migration are more difficult than others; for example, most of A. L. Hopson's migrants are citizens of less developed countries and less prestigeful medical institutions trying to succeed in American hospitals, but migrants in the other direction might meet fewer problems of acceptance even if the language barrier were equal. Other comparisons could involve countries where all the migrants naturally speak the host country's language (Spain, Canada, and England), countries where none of the migrants speak the host country's language until arrival (Sweden and Israel), countries where the technical demands of the host country's hospitals are greatly unequal (compare America and Spain), and other types. Such comparisons could pass beyond the factual description of adjustment experiences of one group of

doctors in one country and could provide sociological explanations of the adjustment of different types of migrant in various settings.

In short, the appropriate time has come for some cross-national studies in medical sociology, as well as continuations of the existing types of intensive research within individual countries. The cross-national studies could develop generalizations about macroscopic social processes and also could contribute a deeper understanding about the facts adduced in individual countries. Ideally, important sociological problems would be selected, and a few countries would then be picked because they best, provide the data about the variables in question. One research center or one team might gather all the data, or research groups in different countries might collaborate. Many sociologically important topics readily come to mind, and the International Sociological Association is a ready framework that potential collaborators might use.

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LISTE DES COMMUNICATIONS

LIST OF SUBMITTED PAPERS *
LISTE DES COMMUNICATIONS **

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* The list of papers is established with regard to those given to the secretariat and really presented during the Congress. If, by accident, an author is omitted, we emphasize the fact that this is not intentional on our part but it is completely inadvertent. We apologize in advance very sincerely.

The numbers [1], [2], [3], [4] indicate the volume of transactions where the paper is published.

** La liste des communications a été constituée d'après celles qui ont été remises au secrétariat et effectivement exposées lors du Congrès. Si par hasard un auteur a été omis, nous insistons tout particulièrement sur le fait qu'il n'y a aucune intention de notre part et qu'il s'agit d'un oubli dont nous nous excusons bien sincèrement.

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C. Y. Glock	On the Measurement of Religious Commitments
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M. Barash	Roger Caillois and the Sociology of Religion

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La sociologie du loisir et de la culture populaire

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M. Kaplan	The United States as a Laboratory for International Issues in Leisure
N. Abadan	Leisure Time Activity of Turkish University Students [4]
Y. Littunen	Activity and Social Dependence
V. Ahtik	Participation socio-politique des ouvriers d'industrie
E. Scheuch	Consequences of Leisure Time Activities for Social Integration
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                  en Pologne
G. V. Osipov   Leisure in URSS

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LA SOCIOLOGIE DE LA MÉDECINE

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                  Factor of Social Progress

LIST OF REGISTERED PERSONS

LISTE DES PERSONNES INSCRITES AU CONGRÈS

LIST OF REGISTERED PERSONS *
LISTE DES PERSONNES INSCRITES AU CONGRÈS **

Argentina — Argentine

CRITO, A. C.	University of Buenos-Aires
GERMANI, G.	University of Buenos-Aires
GRACIARENA, J. P.	University of Buenos-Aires
DI TELLA, T. (s)	University of Buenos-Aires

Australia — Australie

ZUBRZYCKI, J.	Canberra. The Research School of Social Sciences, Canberra.

Austria — Autriche

ROSENMAYR, L.	University of Vienna

Belgium — Belgique

BOLLE de BAL, M.	Université de Bruxelles
CAIMO, M.	Université de Louvain
CHAUMONT, M.	Université de Louvain
DELCOURT, J.	Centre de Sociologie Religieuse, Bruxelles
GORIELY, G.	Université de Bruxelles
GORIELY, T. H. (Mme)	Bruxelles
HOUTART, F. H.	Centre de Sociologie Religieuse, Bruxelles
JANNE, H.	Université de Bruxelles
LEPLAE, Cl. (Mlle)	Université de Louvain
MINON, P.	Université de Liège

* This list was established according to the indications found in our registration forms and information given by the American Committee.

All omissions are absolutely unintentional.

(s) with his spouse

(o) with members of his family.

** Cette liste a été établie d'après les indications recueillies sur les feuilles d'inscription et les documents qui nous ont été remis par le Comité Américain d'Organisation.

Toutes omissions sont absolument involontaires.

(s) accompagné de son épouse

(o) accompagné de membres de sa famille.

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Van Mechelen, F.	Université de Louvain
Verdoodt, A. F. P.	Université de Louvain
Versichelen, M.	Université de Gand

Brazil — Brésil

Aguior	Rio de Janeiro
Costa Pinto, L. A.	Université de Brésil
Fernandes, F.	Université de Sao Paolo
Glaucio Ary, D. S.	Escola de Sociologia e Politica da Pucrs, Copacabana
Goldman, F. P. (Mᵐᵉ)	Rio Claro
Moreira, A.	Université de Rio de Janeiro

Burma — Birmanie

| Thein, Aung | Université Libre de Bruxelles |

Cameroun — Cameroun

| Bekombo, M. | Musée de l'Homme, Paris |

Canada — Canada

Belanger, P.	Québec
Berkes, N. (s)	Mc Gill University, Montréal
Breton, R.	Mc Gill University, Montréal
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Dallyn	University of Manitoba
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Falardeau, J. C.	Université Laval, Québec
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Keyfitz, N.	Toronto
Leblanc, E.	Ottawa
Leblanc, N.	Université Laval, Québec
Levin, A. E.	Winnipeg

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Montany, J. D.	Université Laval, Québec
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Walker, M. R.	London, Ont.
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Ceylan — Ceylon

| Picvis, R. | University of Ceylon |

Chile — Chili

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Dominguez, O.	Santiago
Medina, E. J.	Santiago
Poblete, R.	Santiago
Patinoff, L. C.	Santiago
Vekemans, R. E.	Santiago

China (Taiwan) — Chine (Formose)

Chang, Jen-Thi	Taipei
Chu, Hao-Jan	Taipei
Fu, Shang-lin	Taipei
Hsieh, Chen-Fu	Taipei
Hsu, S. L.	Taipei

HUANG, Wen-Shan   Taipei
YANG, M. C.   Taipei

Colombia — Colombie

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Costa Rica — Costa Rica

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SCHWARZ, E. (Mme)	Rome
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SERRALUNGA, C.	Aoste
TENTORI, T.	Association Italienne des Sciences Sociales, Rome
TREVES, R. (o)	Université de Milan
VALLARDI, R.	Aoste

Jamaica — Jamaïque

BRAITHWAITE, L.	Mona
ROBERTS, G. W.	Mona

Japan — Japon

AOYAGI, L.	Tokyo
DAIDO, Y.	Hyogokan
ISOMURA, E.	Tokyo
JANNARI, H.	Nishinomiya

Kikughi, A.	Tokyo
Koyama, E.	Tokyo
Koyano, S.	Tokyo Woman Christian College, Tokyo-To
Namba, M.	Kote College, Nishinimiya
Ninohiya, T.	Kochi City
Nori, T.	Osaka University
Odaka, K.	University of Tokyo
Oshio, S.	Ohtaku-Tokyo
Takashima, Z. (s)	Tokyo
Takeshita, J.	Santiago, California
Tamatdu, T.	Tokyo
Watanuka, J.	University of Tokyo
Yasuda, S.	Tokyo
Yanagana	University of Tokyo

Jordan — Jordanie

| Qutub, Y. I. | East Lansing, Michigan |

Korea — Corée

| Seong Hi, Yim | Chunyang University, Seoul |

Mexico — Mexique

Cuba Jones, R.	Mexico, D.F.
Gonzalez-Casanova, P.	Université du Mexique, Mexico, D.F.
Recasens-Siches, L.	Mexico, D.F.

Malaya — Malaisie

| Alatas, S. H. | Hoarken |

Netherlands — Pays-Bas

Busia, K. A.	The Hague
Chabot, H. T.	The Hague
Constandse, A. K.	Wageningen
de Moor, R. A.	Tilburg
den Hollander, A.N.J.	University of Amsterdam
Goddijn, W.	Rotterdam
Goudsblom, J. (s)	Amsterdam
Groenman, S. J.	Utrecht
Halbertsma, H. A.	Amsterdam-Z

Hofstee, E. W.	Wageningen
Hofstra, S.	Amsterdam
in 't Veld - Langeveld H. M. (Mme)	Leiden
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Köbben, A. J. F.	Amsterdam-Z
Kooy, G. A.	Bennekom
Kruyt, J. P.	Bilthoven
Oldendorff, A.	Eindhoven
Ponsioen, J. A.	The Hague
Tenhaeff, F.	Scheveningen
Thoenes, P.	Leiden
Valkenburgh, P.	Groningen
van de Vall	Amsterdam
van Doorn, J. A. A.	Rotterdam
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Pakistan — Pakistan

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Philippines — Philippines

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