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ACTES DU QUATRIÈME CONGRÈS MONDIAL DE SOCIOLOGIE

VOLUME IV

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General Theme

SOCIETY AND SOCIOLOGICAL KNOWLEDGE

LA SOCIÉTÉ ET LA CONNAISSANCE SOCIOLOGIQUE

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Editorial Note

Kurt H. Wolff
Brandeis University

Once it is put in this fashion, it will be agreed by many sociologists, though perhaps even more readily by outsiders, that it is difficult to identify the historical meaning of sociology. One of the reasons for this is the variety of views concerning the nature of the discipline — whether, for instance, it is, can be, should be exclusively a science, or whether it also partakes of the nature of philosophy, politics, historiography, art. Nor is it clear that the question of its nature must be answered before the question of its historical meaning can be answered, for it might also be that we can know what sociology is only as we locate it in our history.

Perhaps we are only occasionally aware of the difficulty of determining this historical meaning because sociology is so well established and organized, especially in the United States of America; and routinization does not invite analysis. Be that as it may, surely the sociology of knowledge, by comparison with sociology itself, is even more precarious to locate. And this, not only in the literal sense of the word — e.g., where, by whom, with what import it is taught, or what results it can show — but also, and more so, in the definitional and historical senses referred to in respect to sociology generally. What is the sociology of knowledge, and what does it mean historically ? I personally believe that it is intimately connected, in nature and meaning, with our time; and one might say that, like this time itself, it has been in danger of abortion, although in its particular case, of abortion by verbiage. Still, it has avoided the threatening fate and, in fact, is now in its late thirties, even though it is in a sense not conspicuous by its vitality. The following papers and discussions, presented at a supplementary session of the Fourth World Congress of Sociology on Saturday morning, 12 September 1959, may be considered as an attempt to look, diagnose, and prescribe, if possible, for more proper growth. The first sign of it would be ensuing international discussion.

Both Professors Raymond Aron and Robert K. Merton, in their papers presented to the first plenary session of this Congress (and published, respectively, in Volumes I and III of its *Transactions*), have mentioned the need for a sociology of sociology. This (among many other proofs) is proof that the sociology of knowledge is with us, if not in all desirable clarity of subject matter and theory, at least as a perspective: the proposal was to apply this perspective, and to

apply it to sociology itself. In this respect, of having engendered a point of view that is widely diffused though largely anonymous in its parentage, the sociology of knowledge, on a much smaller scale and for a much more restricted public, resembles such movements as Marxism and Freudianism, with both of which, for that matter, it is of course intimately related in content, and with the first of them, by at least partial filiation. But, to go back to Aron's and Merton's proposals, we must avoid the helplessness we should feel if we were to proceed from the sociology of sociology to the sociology of the sociology of sociology — as we would were we to engage in a sociological analysis of the social conditions of the effort to analyze the social conditions of the fate of sociology — and beyond that, to the sociology of the sociology of the sociology of sociolgy: we must learn the means and grounds of arresting this potentially infinite regression. That is, fully aware of the seductiveness and apparent justification of such a regression, we must, nevertheless, learn to find, argue, and affirm its limits. To put it differently, we must espouse such limits as yet do not betray the enormously expanded modern consciousness or play false to the secularization that has been central to the fate and the mission of the West: we must affirm limits that are footholds in reality — only, however, when reality threatens to be lost; guarantees of sanity — only, however, when sanity would be endangered in their absence.

This picture is overdrawn, and on two grounds. The degree of heightened consciousness, alertness, sensitivity it demands is an ideal-type more closely approximated by art than by science, for by its very structure, science is less free from received notions, is more cumulative, than art. In the second place, the claims that this picture makes on the sociologist are premised on a historical conception of his task; but this conception is only one of the roots of sociology and sociology of knowledge. In the latter case, in particular, it goes back, above all, to Marx and Hegel, while another root, largely and more exclusively stemming from the tradition of the Englightenment, is rather oriented toward psychology[1]. The former conception looks to history to glean meaning; the latter, to human nature to obtain scientific knowledge.

The approaches taken in the papers that follow (as well as in the discussions) may be roughly allocated to these two traditions. Clearly, those by Lucien Goldmann, Werner Stark, and Guenther Roth are more evidently in the former; that by Fred H. Blum, in the latter. Without being predominantly psychological, the papers by Talcott Parsons and Harold Garfinkel give us a historical (not, of

[1] Cf. Ernst GRÜNWALD, *Das Problem der Soziologie des Wissens: Versuch einer kritischen Darstellung der wissenssoziologischen Theorien*, Wien-Leipzig: Wilhelm Braumüller, 1934, 1. Kapitel, "Die Vorgeschichte der Wissenssoziologie", pp. 1-51.

course, antihistorical) pictures of the social world such as appear in perspectives rooted, respectively, in an 'action' frame of reference and in phenomenology. Roth's (it will be obvious) is the only paper that does not outline a proposal or program but is addressed to tracing a particular piece of social reality.

These papers were presented and are here printed in a sequence justified not so much by their approaches alone as by a mixture of approach and subject matter. Goldmann's approach is broadly Marxian and more specifically Lukàcsian; as his subject matter, Roth has chosen certain aspects of a Marxian development. In this sense, their papers belong together, and following them, there is a break before we take up the next group, Parsons', Garfinkel's, and Blum's. In their approaches, the first two of these are perhaps more closely akin to one another than either of them is to the third, which in an important respect is what its title promises, the beginning of an inventory of contributions, actual or potential, to the sociology of knowledge by 'dynamic' psychology. But there is a link between it and the last paper, by Werner Stark; this is the pronounced moral concern that both Blum and Stark associate with sociological investigation and theorizing. And in its historical approach, Stark's, the last paper, though characterized by a Judaeo-Christian or more particularly Catholic outlook, is cognate to the first, Goldmann's, despite the latter's Marxian orientation; thus, as it were, it closes the circle of these presentations.

All but the first and last contributions were revised for print. As to the discussion, the first two speakers (Girod and Goudsblom) had prepared their statements; the remaining nine (as it happens, from as many different nations) took the word from the floor. I wish to record my sincere gratitude to all of the speakers for having permitted me to edit their statements (which had been recorded and transcribed) — some of them severely, and one, indeed, to the point of reducing it to a one-sentence paraphrase. These statements, including the prepared ones (in fact, all but Adorno's, Aubert's, and Chu's, though most of them only in part), deal with one or more of the papers or with other contributions to the discussion, or they call attention to topics or problems of the sociology of knowledge, whether previously treated at the meeting or not — e.g., ideology (Adorno), culture vs. civilization (von Schelting), types of religious leaders and social positions of religious groups (Honigsheim), socially conditioned perspective vs. objective knowledge (Joja), modern professions as models for the sociologist (Aubert), *Gemeinschaft* vs. *Gesellschaft* (Shimmei), cultural relativism vs. the cultural unification of mankind (Luporini).

This meeting was suggested by Mr. T. B. Bottomore, then Exec-

utive Secretary of the International Sociological Association, who invited the editor to organize and chair it. As has been the custom at previous ISA Congresses, on this occasion, too, papers were prepared mimeographed, and distributed ahead of time. No limit was imposed on their length, since at the meeting itself they were not to be read but only highlighted, those in the audience presumably having familiarized themselves with them beforehand. For purposes of publication, however, some approximation to equality in length was deemed desirable, and authors were asked to keep this in mind when revising their papers.

Mr. Bottomore himself had expected to contribute an essay, *Marxism and the Theory of Ideology,* but his other, heavy responsibilities in connection with the Congress unfortunately prevented him from completing it. This circumstance was recorded at the meeting, with gratitude to Mr. Bottomore for having initiated it. Mr. Bottomore had then hoped to make the paper available for the present publication, and it is to everybody's chagrin that this hope, too, had to be abandoned.

Deep grief, far beyond our meeting, was caused by the death of Professor Alfred Schutz, on 20 May 1959. As late as half a year before, Professor Schutz, despite his poor health, had expressed his hope that he would be able to contribute a paper, *A Program for the Sociology of Knowledge.* Less than two months later, he had to give up this hope. His death is terrible for those who had the good fortune to know him; it is a great loss to social science and philosophy at large; to sociology in particular, in setting an abrupt, premature end to the ongoing phenomenological analysis of the scientific study of social life that had come to us from him. One of us who has learned from him and his work, Professor Harold Garfinkel, has dedicated his contribution to this volume to Alfred Schutz's memory; and there is some comfort, at least, in the fact that his principal work, *Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt* (orginally published in 1932 and long out of print), has been reissued [2], and in the plan for collecting his essays in volumes to be edited by one of his students and friends, Professor Maurice Natanson.

I wish to thank, most cordially, the International Sociological Association and its present Secretary General, Professor Pierre de Bie, for undertaking the publication of the papers and the discussions that follow. As far as I know, this is the first time that a meeting on the sociology of knowledge has been sponsored by an international learned society. My gratitude, therefore, will be shared not only by sociologists everywhere but, beyond them, by all those who are concerned

[2] Alfred SCHÜTZ, *Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt: Eine Einleitung in die verstehende Soziologie* (zweite, unveränderte Auflage), Wien: Springer-Verlag, 1960.

with the fate of man and society. It is deeply gratifying to announce that this preliminary meeting, which showed that a large number of sociological concerns have at least some of their loci in the sociology of knowledge, and in which a considerable number of sociologists from many countries, of heterogeneous cultures and political outlooks and regimes, participated in various ways, will be followed at the next Congress (Washington, 1962) by a full day's working sessions on the sociology of knowledge.

It is hoped that the present publication will elicit comments. They should be sent to contributors, participants in the discussion, officers of the ISA, or the editor.

Contents

PART ONE

Papers

Conscience Réelle et Conscience Possible
Conscience Adéquate et Fausse Conscience

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En commençant ce texte nous nous sommes aperçu que la conscience était une de ces notions clés impossibles à définir de manière précise, ayant un objet dont on connaît très mal l'étendue et la structure, et dont cependant ni les sociologues, ni les psychologues ne sauraient se passer et qu'ils emploient sans craindre des malentendus sérieux et graves. En résumé, nous savons tous assez bien ce qu'est la conscience tout en étant incapables de le dire avec précision.

La difficulté provient probablement du caractère réflexif de toute affirmation sur la conscience, du fait que lorsque nous en parlons, celle-ci se trouve être le *sujet* et l'*objet* du discours ce qui rend impossible toute affirmation à la fois purement théorique et rigoureusement valable.

Il nous faut néanmoins partir d'une définition sinon rigoureuse tout au moins approximative et provisoire. Aussi, en proposerons-nous une qui nous paraît avoir le double avantage d'élucider la relation étroite qui existe entre la conscience et la vie sociale et d'éclairer en même temps certains problèmes méthodologiques.

Il nous semble en effet qu'on pourrait caractériser la conscience *comme un certain aspect de tout comportement humain impliquant la division du travail.*

Précisons cependant la portée et les limites de cette définition. Il n'est nullement certain qu'elle recouvre le champ total du concept qui nous intéresse. Il peut y avoir des faits de conscience dans des vécus purement individuels; il y a peut-être, nous n'en savons pas grand chose, des éléments de conscience chez certains animaux.

Il est sûr néanmoins que toute forme humaine de division du travail suppose un minimum de planification et implicitement la possibilité de *désigner* les êtres et les choses *sur le plan théorique* pour se mettre d'accord sur le comportement qu'il faut avoir envers eux. Ajoutons que, la sociologie s'occupant en premier lieu et même exclusivement des actions humaines fondées sur la coopération et la division du travail, cette définition explique l'importance fondamentale du concept de conscience pour toute recherche sociologique.

Essayons maintenant d'avancer quelque peu à partir de cette dé-

finition provisoire. Les mots 'un certain aspect' peuvent être précisés dans le sens d'un aspect qui implique toujours un *élément cognitif* ce qui suppose *dans tout fait de conscience* l'existence d'un *sujet* connaissant et d'un *objet* sur lequel porte la connaissance. Ici se pose d'ailleurs un des problèmes épistémologiques les plus complexes que nous nous contentons pour l'instant de mentionner celui de:*La nature du sujet connaissant, qui n'est ni l'individu isolé ni le groupe sans plus, mais une structure extrêmement variable dans laquelle entrent à la fois l'individu et le groupe ou un certain nombre de groupes.*

Quoiqu'il en soit lorsque *l'objet* de la connaissance est soit l'individu lui-même, soit n'importe quel fait historique ou social, sujet et objet coïncident en tout ou en partie et la conscience acquiert un caractère plus ou moins *réflexif.*

Mais, même lorsque l'objet de la connaissance relève du domaine des sciences physiques, la conscience, toujours étroitement et structurellement liée au comportement et à l'expression d'une relation dynamique entre le sujet et l'objet ne saurait être un simple reflet de l'objet tel qu'il existerait en dehors de toute action humaine.

D'autre part, cependant, notre existence même prouve l'efficacité relative de l'action des hommes, et dans la mesure où cette action a toujours été liée à certaines formes de conscience, il faut admettre que celle-ci a fourni dans l'ensemble aux hommes une image plus ou moins fidèle, plus ou moins adéquate, de ses objets tels qu'ils existent à l'intérieur de cette structure dynamique embrassant les sujets et les objets qu'est l'histoire de l'humanité.

Un premier problème qu'il faut donc poser lorsqu'il s'agit d'étudier n'importe quel fait de conscience est *celui de son degré d'adéquation à l'objet* dans le sens que nous venons de préciser, degré d'adéquation qui ne saurait jamais être total, — il faudrait pour cela que la conscience portât sur l'ensemble du cosmos et de l'histoire — mais qu'il faut néanmoins établir avec le maximum de précision possible. Et comme (nous venons de le dire)

a) tout fait social est par certains de ses côtés essentiels un fait de conscience et
b) toute conscience est avant tout une représentation *plus ou moins* adéquate d'un certain secteur de la réalité, *une sociologie différentielle* de la connaissance centrée sur le degré d'adéquation devient le fondement indispensable de toute sociologie qui se veut réellement opératoire.

Encore faut-il préciser qu'aucune étude sociologique d'un objet partiel et limité ne saurait aborder l'aspect conscient de cet objet autrement qu'en l'insérant dans un ensemble, non pas global sans doute, mais en tout cas plus vaste que l'objet proprement dit. Prenons deux exemples au hasard, la coopération et la pratique religieuse. Aucun travail sociologique ne saurait établir un inventaire épistémo-

logique *compréhensif et explicatif* des faits de conscience qui dans les divers groupes sociaux portent sur la coopération ou la pratique religieuse ou agissent sur le comportement des membres du groupe dans ces deux domaines sans *insérer* ces faits dans des ensembles plus vastes et notamment dans la manière dont les membres des différents groupes constituant les sociétés globales pensent l'ensemble de la vie sociale et la structure du groupe, ou plus exactement des groupes dont ils font partie.

Résumons nos premières conclusions:

a) tout fait social implique des faits de conscience sans la compréhension desquels il ne saurait être étudié de manière opératoire.

b) le principal trait structurel de ces faits de conscience est leur degré d'adéquation et son corollaire leur degré d'inadéquation à la réalité.

c) la connaissance compréhensive et explicative de ce degré d'adéquation ou d'inadéquation, de vérité ou de fausseté, ne saurait être établie que par l'insertion de ces faits de conscience dans des totalités sociales relatives plus vastes, insertion qui seule permettra de comprendre leur signification et leur nécessité.

Il ne suffit pas de savoir qu'entre 1933 et 1945 tels groupes sociaux allemands croyaient à la durée millénaire du III[ème] Reich alors que d'autres se sont montrés moins perméables à l'idéologie national-socialiste, que l'idéologie stalinienne a dominé plus facilement tel pays de démocratie populaire que tel autre, il faut encore savoir:

a) ce qu'il y avait *d'illusoire ou de véridique* dans chacune de ces idéologies et

b) *pourquoi* tel ou tel groupe social tombait nécessairement ou tout au moins plus facilement victime de ces illusions.

Et le problème se complique par le fait que la conscience étant elle-même un élément de la réalité sociale, son existence même contribue à rendre sont contenu adéquat ou inadéquat, le caractère réformiste de la pensée ouvrière anglo-saxone augmente les chances du réformisme et diminue celles de la révolution dans les pays anglo-saxons, inversement, le caractère révolutionnaire du prolétariat ou de la paysannerie dans tel autre pays augmente les dernières et diminue les premières.

C'est cependant seulement après avoir compris et accepté cette analyse que se pose le principal problème opératoire de toute étude sociologique des faits de conscience, celui des relations entre la *conscience possible* et la conscience *réelle* d'un groupe.

A chaque instant, en effet, tout groupe social a sur les différentes questions qui se posent à lui et sur les réalités qu'il rencontre une certaine conscience *de fait, réelle* dont la structure et le contenu s'expliquent par un nombre considérable de facteurs de toute nature, lesquels ont tous à un degré divers contribué à sa constitution.

Il serait cependant difficile de les mettre sur le même plan étant donné que certains d'entre eux sont passagers, d'autres plus ou moins stables, et que seuls quelques-uns se trouvent liés *à la nature même du groupe,* de sorte que si les premiers et les seconds peuvent se modifier ou disparaître sans entrainer ou supposer la disparition du groupe lui-même, les derniers par contre sont essentiellement liés à son existence.

Envisageons à titre d'exemple la conscience *réelle* des paysans français entre 1848 et 1851 qui fut un facteur particulièrement important pour la réussite du coup d'État de décembre. Elle est le résultat de l'action d'un grand nombre de facteurs historiques et sociaux dont l'enchevêtrement est extrêmement complexe. La plupart d'entre eux pourront cependant se modifier ou disparaître par la suite, sans que le groupe cesse pour cela d'être constitué de paysans; inversement, l'exode rural vers la ville transforme la nature même du groupe dont un certain nombre de membres deviennent ouvriers, fonctionnaires, commerçants etc. ce qui entraîne des changements de structure non seulement de leur conscience *réelle,* mais aussi de leur conscience *possible* qui est le fondement de la première. C'est dire que lorsque nous essayons d'étudier les faits de conscience collective, et plus exactement le degré d'adéquation à la réalité de la conscience des différents groupes qui constituent une société, il faut commencer par la distinction primordiale entre la conscience *réelle,* avec son contenu riche et multiple, et la conscience *possible,* le maximum d'adéquation auquel *pourrait* parvenir le groupe sans pour cela changer sa nature.

Sur ce point, il faut indiquer un fait qui paraît particulièrement important pour la recherche sociologique. Il arrive en effet très souvent que la conscience *réelle* d'une partie plus ou moins notable des membres d'un groupe aspire à changer de statut ou à s'intégrer à un autre groupe, plus encore que les individus qui le constituent s'efforcent en partie *dès maintenant* à adopter les valeurs de ce dernier. Des jeunes paysans voudraient aller en ville, un certain nombre d'ouvriers dans les pays capitalistes veulent monter l'échelle sociale et essayent de se comporter dès maintenant comme de petits bourgeois. Le sociologue ne doit pas oublier cependant que ces éléments de la conscience *réelle* restent dans le cadre des distorsions de la conscience *possible des groupes* paysans ou ouvriers respectifs et ne sauraient pratiquement, tant que le changement de statut ne s'est pas produit réellement, porter sur les points qui distinguent les *consciences possibles* des deux groupes (effectif et désiré). Il serait par exemple difficile d'imaginer qu'une partie notable de petits paysans qui aspirent à aller en ville se mettent, tant qu'ils restent petits propriétaires ruraux, à défendre la collectivisation des moyens de production (ce qu'ils feront peut-être 10 ou 20 ans plus tard, une fois devenus ouvriers) ou bien qu'une partie notable des ouvriers qui aspirent à monter l'échelle sociale deviennent tout en restant ouvriers, op-

posés à toute hausse de salaire pour éviter la montée des prix, etc. Or ce ne sont pas là des considérations purement spéculatives, mais des problèmes théoriques et pratiques de toute première importance. Aucune analyse, *limitée à la conscience réelle* des paysans russes en 1912 par exemple, n'aurait pu prévoir leur conscience et leur comportement entre 1917 et 1921, alors qu'il est d'une importance capitale à la fois pour le sociologue et l'homme d'action, de connaître le cadre à l'intérieur duquel des modifications de conscience sont possibles à courte durée, et en dehors duquel toute modification autre que tout à fait passagère suppose un changement préalable du statut social des individus composant le groupe. C'est de ce problème de la *conscience possible* qu'il s'est agi par exemple, lorsque Lénine rompant avec toute une tradition de la doctrine marxiste et au grand scandale de la plupart des penseurs socialistes de son temps, favorables à la grande entreprise agricole collectivisée, donna le mot d'ordre: distribution des terres aux paysans, seul capable de gagner ces derniers — tant qu'ils restaient paysans — à la cause de la révolution, alors que tout essai de collectivisation antérieur à l'existence d'une technique suffisamment avancée pour assimiler l'agriculture à l'industrie, devait se heurter aux résistances paysannes, et eut, s'il avait été entrepris avant la victoire des révolutionnaires, et la consolidation du nouvel État empêché cette victoire et cette consolidation.

De même, il nous paraît extrêmement important de constater le caractère peu rationnel et à prédominance affective de la pensée et du comportement de certaines couches individualistes des classes moyennes, caractère lié à leur place périphérique dans la production qui les rend incapables, sauf exceptions individuelles naturellement, de comprendre l'ensemble du processus économique et social. Cela signifie que dans ces couches des oscillations idéologiques extrêmement amples et rapides sont possibles et que les différents programmes sociaux et politiques les attirent moins par la compréhension que par l'affectivité, c'est-à-dire par l'impression qu'ils expriment le secteur offensif et gagnant des conflits.

C'est donc à l'intérieur de ce cadre de la conscience *possible* des groupes particuliers, du maximum d'adéquation à la réalité dont leur conscience est capable, que doit être posé par la suite le problème de leur conscience *réelle,* et des raisons pour lesquelles celle-ci reste en deçà de la première.

Soulignons encore que, de même qu'il est important d'établir sur la base d'un grand nombre de recherches concrètes, une *typologie des consciences possibles* fondée sur leur *contenu* au moment historique où celui-ci atteint son maximum d'adéquation, il importe aussi d'établir une *typologie structurale* des *modes* (et non pas des contenus) d'inadéquation réelle allant des distorsions secondaires et périphériques par rapport à *la conscience possible du groupe* à l'épo-

que où celle-ci atteint son maximum d'adéquation à la fausse conscience et dans les cas extrêmes à la mauvaise foi. Cette typologie ne doit cependant pas avoir un caractère phénoménologique et descriptif, elle doit essayer de rendre compte sociologiquement de ces types de fausse conscience. Il nous semble que c'est seulement par un appareil conceptuel de cet ordre que des analyses concrètes des phénomènes sociaux, et en tout premier lieu une sociologie politique de caractère positif deviennent possibles. C'est dire qu'au delà de toutes les méthodes purement descriptives — monographies, enquêtes etc. qui sont, personne ne pourrait le nier, des instruments utiles, mais qui ne se suffisent pas à elle-mêmes, une sociologie philosophique et historique est la seule manière d'accéder à la compréhension des faits sociaux.

Permettez-moi d'espérer que la discussion nous amènera à éclaircir les concepts un peu trop théoriques que je viens de vous proposer.

The Radical Ideology of a Moderate Labor Movement

The Role of Deterministic Marxism in Imperial Germany [1]

by Guenther Roth

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The sociology of knowledge arose in Germany largely out of a concern with the Marxist doctrine that consciousness is a superstructure of social and economic conditions, especially of productive forces and class structures. In contrast to this doctrine, it emphasized the reciprocal influences of "real" and "ideal" factors.

This paper is concerned with investigating, from the perspective of the sociology of knowledge as a field of historical-sociological research, some conditions and consequences of the first adoption of Marxism by a major opposition movement, that is, by the labor movement in Imperial Germany, a country then undergoing rapid and large-scale industrialization. This case has a complexity that is of interest to the sociologist of knowledge: a relatively radical ideology was adopted by a labor movement with basically democratic commitments and a moderate practice. My thesis is that the political and social structure of Imperial Germany made the labor movement both receptive to deterministic Marxism and committed to a moderate practice by affecting its underlying value orientation, organizational requirements, and survival interests so as to initiate and perpetuate this split between theory and practice.

In dealing with the relationship between the political and social structure of Imperial Germany and the Marxist propensity of the labor movement, another problem pertinent to the sociology of knowledge comes to the fore: the relation between Marxism and the political and social structure of a country undergoing industrialization.

[1] This paper is part of a study of the Social Democratic labor movement in Imperial Germany. The focus of the study is the problem of the integration of a new industrial work force into the national community. The study grows out of research on class relations in societies undergoing industrialization, under the direction of Professor Reinhard Bendix (Institute of Industrial Relations, University of California, Berkeley). This research was part of the Inter-University Project on Labor and Economic Development financed by the Ford Foundation. I am indebted to Professor Bendix for guidance in this research and for advice on the present paper. For an elaboration of the present paper, see my unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, *The Social Democratic Labor Movement in Imperial Germany,* University of California, Berkeley, 1960, chapts. II and VII.

At least within the European context, the appeal of Marxism seems to have depended on two factors: the pace of economic development and the degree of political and social recognition accorded to the working class [2]. Historically, the appeal of Marxism seems to have been weakest in those countries in which the working class received political and social recognition along with a substantial improvement of its standard of living. A rise of the standard of living alone could well be paralleled by a high level of dissatisfaction with political and social conditions, as was the case in Imperial Germany.

In order to elucidate the relationship between Imperial Germany and the rise of Marxism in the labor movement, two perspectives may be employed: one represented by Hendrik de Man, who analyzed Imperial Germany from the viewpoint of democratic evolutionism as a "politically underdeveloped" country; the other represented by Joseph Schumpeter, for whom Imperial Germany was politically a relatively "advanced" country in terms of its ability to cope with the social problems of industrialization [3].

De Man compared Germany's economic and political development with that of politically more democratic Western countries that had industrialized less precipitously. He concluded that Germany, "politically speaking (current Marxist theory notwithstanding), appears rather as a young and backward country than as an advanced country", and Marxism as "a typical form of proletarian socialism in countries without democracy, or at any rate without a democratic tradition" [4]. Thus, de Man postulated a direct relationship between receptiveness to Marxism and "political underdevelopment", that is, the absence of a functioning democratic system that granted political and social recognition to the masses. For de Man, Germany was "backward" for two reasons, the dominance of an authoritarian state, and the social and political consequences of a relatively late but very rapid industrialization. The first factor explains the emphasis of the labor movement on the fight for political power. The second factor was the mushroom growth of an industrial ruling class which adopt-

[2] On the relation between leftwing radicalism, rapid industrialization and national wealth, see Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics*. Garden City: Doubleday, 1960, pp. 61-72; see also Val R. Lorwin, "Working-Class Politics and Economic Development in Western Europe", *American Historical Review*, LXIII: 2, Jan. 1958, pp. 338-351; on the implicitly anti-Marxian theory that in Europe industrialization initially created a revolutionary threat which was either dissipated by the civic reintegration of the industrial work force or perpetuated by the failure of integration, see Reinhard Bendix, *Work and Authority*, New York: Wiley, 1956, pp. 437 ff.

[3] Cf. Hendrik DE MAN, *The Psychology of Socialism*, New York: Holt, 1927, chapt. XV, and Joseph SCHUMPETER, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*, 2nd ed., New York: Harper, 1947, pp. 341-347.

[4] DE MAN, *op.cit.*, p. 428.

ed the military values of the Prussian aristocracy rather than the traditions of compromise, as did the English bourgeoisie. The general impact of rapid economic change and the acquisitive drive and recklessness of this entrepreneurial class made the workers receptive to an ideology which maintained the paramount importance of economic factors. All of these circumstances intensified the militarization of political and economic conflict and the belief in the effectiveness of "blood and iron" politics [5].

For Schumpeter, Germany was in some respects "backward" not even in comparison with England. He pointed to the very substantial welfare achievements of the monarchy, the bureaucracy, and the academic social reformers, which seemed to him superior to the English accomplishments until Lloyd George [6]. He also acknowledged the moderate practice of the labor movement, the respectability and soundness of its leaders, and the law-abiding mentality of the rank and file. He recognized the existence of serious economic group conflicts, but maintained that they were not serious enough to explain the severity of the class cleavage and the prevalence of Marxism within the labor movement. Schumpeter attributed the split between the labor movement and the dominant system primarily to the divergence of attitudes on nationalist and militarist values and to Bismarck's attempt to suppress the labor movement between 1878 and 1890.

[5] Cf. DE MAN, *op.cit.*, pp. 436 ff. The belief in power politics was not only adopted by industrialists, but also by the majority of the educated and propertied middle classes as the result of historical developments which made for significant differences between Germany and Western Europe. German idealism contributed greatly to the exaltation of a 'state of power, culture and law' above religion and society. Marx shared the belief of German idealism in ultimate cultural values which were largely individualistic, and in the use of power in any form for realizing these ideals. For an excellent discussion of these developments, see Hajo Holborn, "Der deutsche Idealismus in sozialgeschichtlicher Beleuchtung", *Historische Zeitschrift*, vol. 174, 1952, pp. 359-384. Holborn emphasizes that the adoption of Marxism was not at all an inevitable result of industrialization despite some affinity between socialist demands and the aspirations of the working class. He argues that the rise of the German labor movement as a class movement, strictly separated from the rest of society, consummated the split within the German people, that was the product of the long development towards the *Obrigkeits- und Machtstaat* of the civil servants and the military. This state was inherently handicapped in integrating the old and new classes into a common value system after industrialization had begun. This is in line with the reasoning of this paper.

[6] Schumpeter uses here, with some modifications, arguments of Gustav Schmoller, who extolled the virtues of a monarchy with strong prerogatives and obligations and with a conscientious civil service independent of interest groups. Cf. G. SCHMOLLER, "Die englische Gewerkvereinsentwickelung im Lichte der Webbschen Darstellung", *Jahrbuch für Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung und Volkswirtschaft*, vol. 25, 1901, p. 313.

Both Schumpeter and de Man stress the great importance of the Empire's authoritarianism for the direction of labor protest. For de Man, the attenuated authoritarianism of monarchic constitutionalism was a backward feature. Under this system the ministers carried the responsibility for the government policies, but were only subordinate to the monarch, not to parliament. For Schumpeter this system increased, rather than diminished, the chances of social reforms since they could be carried through by the competent, honest, and efficient civil service of the basically patriarchal monarchy [7]. Schumpeter's perspective directs attention to the importance of the degree of authoritarianism which characterized the dominant system. The authoritarian monarchy accepted parliamentary institutions and permitted the development of a labor movement independent of the government and the liberal middle classes. Even during the anti-socialist legislation, when the Social Democrats were not permitted to have a party organization, they could still send deputies into parliament. The authoritarian state also accepted responsibility for promoting the rise of industry and for improving the lot of the working man. However, it limited the influence of democratic institutions, permanently blocked any access to the centres of power, isolated the labor movement, and refused most of the political and social recognition for which the Social Democratic part of the working class fought.

The turning of the Social Democrats to Marxism can be considered, as de Man suggests, to "correspond" to, or to "reflect" (another term used by de Man), the rigid power and class structure of the Empire and the isolation and powerlessness of the labor movement. But this raises the question of the seeming lack of "correspondence" between radical theory and moderate practice. The answer to this must be sought in the mixture of repressive and permissive conditions within Imperial Germany, to which Schumpeter implicitly calls attention. This mixture furthered the adoption of Marxism; it also explains the moderate practice. The sheer repressive power of the dominant system, to which de Man points, was great enough to discourage extreme activities as long as another way seemed open: because of the attenuated authoritarianism emphasized by Schumpeter, another way did seem open.

The mere correspondence to the crude power relations in Germany does not causally explain the adoption of Marxism. Reception and retention were dependent on various ideological, situational, and or-

[7] For a brilliant comparative analysis of the system of monarchic constitutionalism, see Otto Hintze, "Das monarchische Prinzip und die konstitutionelle Verfassung", *Preussische Jahrbücher*, vol. 144, 1911, pp. 381-412. It is important to note that monarchic constitutionalism, as seen by Hintze and also Schumpeter, was not just an "imperfect" transition to parliamentarianism as it often appeared to Western observers like de Man and to German liberal adherents of parliamentary government.

ganizational factors such as the clash of greatly differing values, specific historical events, and general organizational requirements for safeguarding the survival of a complex organization. In attempting a causal explanation, I will first examine the value conflict between the dominant system and the labor movement, and the resulting situation, which was greatly aggravated by specific events such as national unification and the anti-socialist legislation. Schumpeter is correct in pointing out that the most aggravating immediate issues between the labor movement and the dominant system were nationalist and militarist and, as will be shown presently, democratic, rather than specifically socialist or welfare issues.

The Cleavage Between the Dominant System and the Labor Movement

The relation of the early labor movement to its political environment was shaped by two major conflicts: the conflict with the liberal middle classes beginning in the sixties, and the antagonism during the seventies towards a Reich established by Prussia. The labor movement came into being after a clash of a few dozen workers and some intellectuals with the Liberals over issues of democratization. A handful of politically interested workers had heard just enough about socialism to demand independent workers' associations, which would concentrate on the general improvement of the worker's living conditions. When they asked for political equality they were rejected by the Liberals who emphasized property and education as qualifications for responsible citizenship. The situation was aggravated by the conflict between the Prussian monarchy and the Liberals about the privileges of the king and the rights of parliament. The Liberals were afraid that the uneducated masses, if given equal and universal suffrage, might support the Conservatives or a Bonapartist solution as they had done in France.[8] Thus the class-conscious policies of the Liberals were important in creating classconsciousness on the part of a small group of politically active workers. Since the labor movement had democratic goals, the fight for democratization became a class struggle between the Social Democratic proletariat and other classes. Democratic interests were instrumental in bringing the labor movement into being. Two democratic middle-class intellectuals, Lassalle and Liebknecht, believed that democratization depended on the mobilization of working-class interests. Political democracy would have to become social democracy; it would have to encompass the economic and social interests of the working class if it were to regain a social base. A few socialist and diffuse Marxist tenets were added to what was essentially a radical democratic creed. The Social Demo-

[8] Cf. H. GOLLWITZER, "Der Caesarismus Napoleons III. im Widerhall der öffentlichen Meinung Deutschlands", *Historische Zeitschrift*, vol. 173, 1952, pp. 23-75.

cratic Workers' Party of Liebknecht and Bebel stood for the abolition of the exploitation of labor through capital, but the fight for democratic liberties and against the "feudal classes" remained paramount for Liebknecht. The Lassallean leaders, while also demanding a unified Germany with a parliamentary government, concentrated on the effects of industrialization on the individual and on the economic reorganization of society.

The unification of Germany under Prussian leadership greatly deepened the split between the labor movement and society-at-large. The labor movement intransigently attacked this form of unification, the enthusiasm of the middle classes about it, the prestige of the army and the strong-arm methods of Bismarck. Its bitterness grew as the persecution of leaders and repression of organizations mounted in response to their hostility and to the increasing number of votes the movement received. The liberal middle classes, whose cherished goal of national unification had finally been achieved at the expense of some constitutional aspirations, reacted with horror and indignation to the attacks on national prestige symbols and to the defiant, but purely rhetorical, glorification of the Paris commune. To Bismarck, this rhetoric did not appear very dangerous, although he overestimated, along with many other heads of governments, the influence of the First International. What made him an irreconcilable foe of the Social Democratic labor movement was the support which it would lend to democratization, specifically parliamentarism, in the long run. He had established the Reich on the basis of a compromise between the liberal middle classes and the king of Prussia and his army, but he firmly believed that he could not tolerate long-term adjustments toward a parliamentary government. He considered an authoritarian monarchy necessary in order to repress the pervasive regional, religious, and political cleavages with which the Empire had to cope. Furthermore, in his estimation the middle classes were incapable of defending the Reich against foreign intervention and the rise of the masses. Thus a permanent constellation came about in which a powerful government and a strong bourgeoisie, on the one side, and an isolated and powerless labor movement, on the other were aligned one against the others. It was because of this situation that some labor leaders turned to a deterministically articulated Marxism.

Deterministic Marxism and Moderate Practice

The early Social Democrats considered themselves revolutionary because they wanted a new type of society, but they had to realize that the triumphs of Bismarck and the Prussian army constituted giant obstacles to their democratic and socialist aspirations. For the first time, the Marxian ideas about the inevitable breakdown of capitalist

society became of great tactical and psychological importance to Liebknecht and Bebel. Liebknecht was so deeply involved in the issue of unification that for several years socialist aims were of secondary importance to him; yet he was not demoralized by the unification of Germany through Bismarck, as were so many South German democrats. He and Bebel retained their confidence by relying heavily on the eventual breakdown, for inherent reasons, of the contemporary society.[9] They embraced Marx and Engels' conviction that the economic and social developments following unification would first enable the full development of capitalism as well as of the proletariat and then bring about the ruin of the former and the triumph of the latter. They were also encouraged by Marx and Engels' anticipation that Germany's military victory would result in a shift in the leadership of international socialism from the French to the German workers and in a victory of Marxian theory over that of Proudhon. Liebknecht and Bebel were subjectively quite sincere in their belief in the correctness of Marx's prediction of the inevitable breakdown of capitalist society. They did not have the learning necessary to understand Marxian economics critically, though Liebknecht recognized that the first volume of *Das Kapital,* which appeared in 1867, did not prove Marx's case and did not provide the kind of guide to political action which he had hoped for.[10] They accepted many of Marx's assumptions

[9] For decades Bebel stressed the objective tendencies of capitalist society which, as he used to argue, created the Social Democratic labor movement to begin with and which would insure its ultimate victory by increasing continuously the working class and strengthening its political organization. The theme was, e.g., repeated pointedly in a Reichstag speech made close to the 45th anniversary of the labor movement in 1908. See *Stenographische Berichte über die Verhandlungen des Reichstags,* 132nd Session, March 27, 1908, p. 4350.

[10] Only the academically educated leader of the Lassalleans, von Schweitzer who did not consider himself a personal follower of Marx like Liebknecht, has a good grasp of Marxian economics. He was the first to present it to the Reichstag of the North-German Federation in 1869. Since he retired from politics at the same time that Liebknecht and Bebel fell back on deterministic Marxian assumptions, there was nobody left among the Lassalleans with much understanding of or much interest in Marx's work. Some Marxian ideas had been diffused through Lassalle's writings, but there was little awareness of their origin and meaning. Bebel's adoption of socialist ideas was typical in its slowness, as Michels has pointed out, of the most active members of the labor movement. (See Roberto Michels, "August Bebel", *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft,* vol. 37, 1913, p. 675). He had been drawn away from the liberals by Liebknecht and acquired his knowledge of socialism first from reading Lassalle. In the sixties Liebknecht and Bebel even deemphasized the doctrine of the inevitability of the class struggle. They wanted to mobilize working-class interests, but they did not want a class barrier between the workers and the democratic petty-bourgeoisie. However, the sectlike Lassalleans were so succesful in preserving Lassalle's insistence on class-conscious associations that even those workers who left the Lassallean associations because of their authoritarianism still adhered

about the mechanisms of capitalist economy and a good deal of his psychological assumptions about the reactions of an exploited working class which was to develop a class-conscious and revolutionary mentality. They propagated class-consciousness, but they denied, largely for tactical considerations of self-preservation, that this would result in revolutionary conspiracy. This reasoning furthered the development toward deterministic Marxism [11].

The period of the most intensive repression from 1878 to 1890 had the dual effect of fortifying the moderate policies of the labor movement and of strengthening the role of deterministic Marxism as an instrument for the external and internal defense of the party's moderate policies and of its very existence. Two examples may be given: In 1878

to it. Under this pressure Liebknecht and Bebel were forced in the late sixties to speed up the separation from the bourgeois left, to affirm uneasily the program of the First International in 1868 and, in 1869, to name their party hesitatingly the Social Democratic Workers' Party.

[11] When the two socialist parties merged in 1875 Marxian influence was still very weak. This became clear shortly afterwards, through the first major controversy about Marxism. At the unification congress at Gotha, Liebknecht had avoided such a controversy by suppressing Marx's critique of the proposed party program. Marx and Engels persistently overestimated their influence and did not realize that Liebknecht was responsible for much in the program which they assumed was put in by the Lassalleans. They were finally shocked into action by Dühring's success within the party. Thus the first Marxist propaganda wave within the party originated as a defensive move by Liebknecht and others; it resulted in Engels' *Anti-Dühring,* the first Marxist book to exert major influence. At first Liebknecht, Bebel, the young Bernstein and other Eisenachers had welcomed Dühring's writings, though they contained attacks on Marx personally and on his theories. Bebel recounts in his memoirs that nearly all leaders in Berlin were strongly impressed by Dühring, including Fritzsche, one of the two proletarian labor leaders who has first advocated class-conscious organization in the sixties. Fritzsche attacked Liebknecht, who had taken up the fight against Dühring under Marx and Engels' pressure, at the Gotha convention of 1876 for suppressing an article by Most on Dühring only because the latter had written against Marx. At the third convention in Gotha in 1877, Most first won a majority of the delegates for a motion which would have discontinued Engels' articles against Dühring in the *Vorwärts* because they were for most readers without interest and even offensive. Vahlteich, the other early class-conscious proletarian leader of the sixties, termed at the same convention the theoretical differences between Marx and Dühring a dispute between professors. Though Engels and Liebknecht just barely managed to hold their ground, the campaign proved decisive for the further advance of Marxism because the *Anti-Dühring* convinced Bebel, Bernstein, and a few others, of the superiority of Marxism as a *system* of ideas. From now on, theoretical interest in Marxism was sustained by a small group which grew very slowly. For documentation, see especially the correspondence between Marx, Engels and their Social Democratic friends in the editor's introduction to the Anti-Dühring in the Marx-Engels-Gesamtausgabe, Moscow, 1935, pp. XIX-XXXII, and Engels' introduction, pp. 5-7.

Liebknecht pleaded before parliament that "the party is a reformist party in the strictest sense of the word", and denied that "our intentions are directed toward the overthrow of the existing political and social order" [12]. In the last year of the anti-socialist legislation, when there was still the possibility of a renewal, he repeated again the argument in the Reichstag that the Social Democrats were abstaining on principle from the use of force. Marx, he said, had shown that "political forms are not arbitrary but are the necessary products of economic conditions". Therefore, Social Democracy, which acts according to this "scientific recognition", cannot be legitimately accused of aiming at the violent overthrow of the existing society. Marx showed that "today's economic system" cannot last but will necessarily become more and more socialist. "A natural law, an organic law of development" can neither be changed by the party nor by the ruling groups. There will be a revolution: The only question is whether it will be legal or violent [13].

It is important to realize that these were not only tactical arguments used vis-à-vis the government and the public. Bebel and Liebknecht and their closest collaborators strove hard to instill these views into the members in order to diminish the pressures toward radicalization. Some leaders were so embittered by the anti-socialist legislation that they wanted to become more aggressive toward the government; some even began to play with anarchist ideas. The united party, the product of the merger of Lassalleans and Social Democrats in 1875, was without official leadership because the executive had actually abdicated and formally dissolved the party. There was a possibility that the two most extreme orators, Hasselmann, an antisemitic Lassallean, and Most, an ardent admirer of the anti-Marxist philosopher and economist Dühring, might succeed in pushing the members, who were accustomed to revolutionary rhetoric and incensed about the repression, into actions resulting in complete suppression. Bebel and Liebknecht succeeded in getting the two expelled in 1880 by appealing to the importance for party discipline under the repressive legislation. Hasselmann and Most had been influential in shaping a good deal of the revolutionary rhetoric of the time; they were popular with the masses but they lost just as they would turn the party into a revolutionary action group. In their fight against the more radical elements, Liebknecht and Bebel also claimed the direct support of Marx and Engels. Though greatly dismayed. Marx and Engels sided with them when they recognized that their group was still making fewer concessions to petty-bourgeois dissatisfactions and appeals than other groups were [14]. It may also be assumed that they

[12] Quoted in Kurt BRANDIS, *Die deutsche Sozialdemokratie bis zum Fall des Sozialistengesetzes*, Leipzig: Hirschfeld, 1931, p. 56.

[13] See *Stenographische Berichte über die Verhandlungen des Reichstages*, 8th Session, Nov. 5, 1889, pp. 136 f.

[14] Cf. Eduard BERNSTEIN, *Sozialdemokratische Lehrjahre*, Berlin: Bücher-

did not want to break with the only group open to their influence.

When the anti-socialist legislation fell in 1890, the labor movement gave itself a more radical program, which for a long time was to be regarded as a Marxist model program. However, its political practice became more moderate for several reasons. A continuous over-all increase of votes, which might one day provide the party with a parliamentary majority, appeared as the only long-term chance to break up the "iron ring" of the powerful dominant system. This required considerable legal freedom and, especially at election times, an aggressive rhetoric which appealed to wide-spread dissatisfactions while being basically reformist [15]. Soon other moderating forces came to the fore, such as the rise of the unions, which resolutely worked along reformist lines, and the slow increase of possibilities for party and union functionaries to gain influence in municipal and state parliaments, labor exchanges, and the administration of sickness funds. In the nineties, the party and the Social Democratic unions expanded rapidly because of the fast growth of industry and the unwillingness and inability of the other parties, with the exception of the Catholic Center Party, to compete for the allegiance of the proletariat. However, the rapid economic growth not only swelled the ranks of the proletariat, but also strengthened big business, which successfully refused to negotiate with the unions until the end of the Empire and often managed to keep active Social Democrats out of the factories. Since the government after 1890 neither tried seriously to suppress the labor movement nor to give it major concessions, there was no basic change in the latter's isolated position.

How Radical Was Deterministic Marxism ?

The inability of the labor movement to break out of its isolation as well as its seemingly inexorable advance within a large isolated realm, made a deterministically accentuated Marxism a particularly fitting ideology for the Social Democratic labor movement. It held out the image of a better world to come, it promised ultimate victory, it gave "scientific" meaning to the frustrations and resentments of the workers toward society-at-large. It did not demand active preparation

kreis, 1928, pp. 113 ff. In his report of Bebel's and his own trip to London to appease Marx and Engels, Bernstein recalls that Bebel assured Marx of the good prospects for the breakdown of capitalist economy in Germany in the near future. On his private business trips, Bebel had found many businessmen complaining about the bad economic conditions and had understood this as a confirmation of Marx's prognosis about capitalism.

[15] There was no clear idea what would happen if this majority was won because the government was responsible to the Emperor and not to the parliament. Concern about the legal status of the movement discouraged any specific discussion of solutions for this problem.

for a revolution; it provided a convenient defence of parliamentary inactivity when desired, and it could even be combined with a reformist practice. This compatibility raises the question: How radical was deterministic Marxism ? The Marxism of the Erfurt program was indeed less radical than the communism of 1848 or Lenin's voluntaristic interpretation, which were inspired by the anticipation of an imminent revolution. This does not mean that one or the other emphasis is necessarily a falsification of the spirit of the masters, as Marxists have often charged against one another. Characteristic of the "Marxism" of Marx and Engels is a rather flexible or "dialectic" relationship between determinist and what may be called "activist" elements. The Marxian theory of the proletarian revolution is based on the determinist assumption that capitalism is doomed to destruction for inherent reasons. The activist element consists in the expectation that the proletariat will overthrow capitalism in a crisis situation after it has developed a mature revolutionary class-consciousness. It is fully compatible with Marxist assumptions to expect the prominence of the deterministic component in the absence of a revolutionary situation. After the failure of the revolution of 1848, Marx himself toned down his revolutionary phraseology since, as he wrote in a letter of November 4, 1864, on the Inaugural Address, "time is needed until the reawakened movement will allow the old audacity of language" [16].

A number of Marxist writers in the nineteen-twenties and thirties applied a Marxist approach to the non-revolutionary situation of the second half of the 19th century when Central Europe, in particular, was tranquil in this respect. They concluded that the deterministic component of Marxism was bound to become more prominent than the activist component. Thus Arthur Rosenberg held that the absence of a revolutionary situation made it impossible for the labor movement to adopt Marx's theories in their revolutionary intent [17]. Karl Korsch expressed in strictly orthodox terms that "from the standpoint of materialist dialectic, it is very well understandable that this first Marxist theory could not exist unchanged during the long and practically non-revolutionary epoch of the second half of the nineteenth century in Europe" [18].

Even though the deterministic Marxism of the Erfurt Program appears less radical than the Communist manifesto before it, and Leninism after it, it was radical relative to the practice of the movement. The Erfurt program abandoned the Gotha program's Lassallean demand for state-supported producers' cooperatives, emphasized more strongly the international character and commitments of the labor

[16] Quoted in Brandis, *op.cit.*, pp. 36 f.

[17] Cf. Arthur Rosenberg, *A History of Bolshevism*, London: Oxford University Press, 1934, pp. 18 f.

[18] Karl Korsch, *Marxismus und Philosophie*, Leipzig: Hirschfeld, 1930, p. 77.

movement, and, most important, openly accepted the thesis of the increasing struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie as the basis of the movement. This was the beginning of a decade which saw the first extensive advances of specifically reformist policies beyond the general moderation and law-abiding character of the movement's practice. Despite the attenuation which the prevailing "orthodox" Marxism underwent in the work of Kautsky and his group, it remained radical within the setting of the time. Kautsky was one of the caretakers of Marx and Engels' literary remains and did much to make them accessible to the party members and the public. As a party theoretician he had to pay greater attention to practical problems than they had been forced to do. Marx and Engels purposively had refrained from spelling out concrete solutions for the problems of the transition from capitalism to socialism. Kautsky, on the other hand, addressed himself to these problems, but he did so by fusing radical images with more moderate meaning. An example is his definition of the dictatorship of the proletariat. As early as 1893 he wrote to Franz Mehring that he could think of no better form for the dictatorship of the proletariat than a powerful parliament after the English pattern, with a Social Democratic majority and a strong proletariat backing it [19]. He considered a violent revolution possible but visualized as its aim the establishment of parliamentary democracy. In a country without parliamentary government, this was still a rather radical definition, though it admitted implicitly the possible survival of the monarchy and was thus less radical than the republicanism of the early Social Democrats. This relative attenuation continued to antagonize the ruling groups and left many persons dissatisfied who were opposed to the dominant system as well as unsympathetic to parliamentary government.

Another radical aspect of deterministic Marxism was its acceptance of major political decisions as the outcome of all-out struggle and not of compromise. A distinct feature of Marxian theory, this view was accentuated in later years and may therefore be considered another "correspondence" to Bismarck's *Realpolitik* and to the power of the Reich. Reflecting on the fate of his party after its downfall in 1933, Rudolf Hilferding noted that the Marxism of the labor movement in Imperial Germany had, in fact, the tendency to become sometimes a kind of "Bismarxism": "The decision between the contestants seemed to be a mere matter of power, and power appeared quite concretely party's practice because it affected adversely the will to fight for as army, police, capital" [20]. This had a moderating influence on the what could be attained within the given political system.

[19] Cf. Paul FRÖLICH's introduction to Rosa Luxemburg's *Gesammelte Werke*, Berlin: Vereinigung internationaler Verlagsanstalten, 1922, vol. III, p. 24.

[20] Rudolf HILFERDING (alias Richard Kern), "Revolutionärer Sozialismus", *Zeitschrift für Sozialismus*, I; 5, Feb. 1934, p. 147.

Consequences of the Dualism of Theory and Practice.

Deterministic Marxism served as an aggressive as well as a defensive instrument against the ideologies of the dominant groups. It may be an understatement to call the Marxism of the Erfurt Program merely "a kind of theoretical defence and metaphysical consolation". as Karl Korsch did, but ultimately it was not much more than a means for the consummation of an ideological differentiation from the middle classes and for establishing an independent class existence within the dominant system [21]. The radical ideology had to be combined with a moderate practice to insure the survival of the independent, although isolated and powerless, labor movement. The resulting dualism entailed lasting advantages, along with increasing disadvantages. It was bound to mobilize those against the leadership who wanted either the party's policies to conform to its radical creed or its creed to the moderate policies. Within a few years a permanent right and left wing developed and made the top leadership "Centrist" as it continued its attempt to strike a balance between radical rhetoric and moderate practice. This explains much of the contradictory and ambiguous nature of the views expressed by the Centrist leaders. Their tactics contributed as well to the phenomenon of driving members first to the left and then to the right. Bebel said that left-wing radicals often moved to the extreme right within a short time, but, as Robert Michels writes in his necrology, he did not understand how much the discrepancy between his verbal radicalism and his cautious practice contributed to making young members, especially intellectuals, first radical and after their disillusionment, opportunistic [22].

The first Marxist opposition against the leadership revealing the tendency of believers to make the party's policies conform to its radical creed arose at the same time that the Erfurt program was adopted, which had been written exclusively by Bebel, Liebknecht, Kautsky, and Bernstein and which had the blessing of Engels. The opposition maintained that the party's policies were petty-bourgeois and that, in the words of one of the intellectual representatives of the opposition, "party programs don't prove anything about the character of the party" [23].

The opposition hoped for support from Bebel and Engels and suffered the bitter disappointment of both vigorously opposing it. Bebel, who had adjusted himself skilfully to the radical mood in the previous years, was willing to speak in a more radical vein but was not interested in a further radicalization of urban members. The radicalization of urban districts could not improve the chances of winning

[21] KORSCH, *op.cit.*, p. 15.

[22] Cf. MICHELS, *op.cit.*, pp. 697 f.

[23] Hans MÜLLER, *Der Klasssenkampf in der deutschen Sozialdemokratie*, Zürich: Verlagsmagazin, 1892, p. 10.

more seats in parliament, but might very well induce the government and the bourgeois parties to enact new repressive legislation. Bebel and the majority of the functionaries fought the opposition with the argument that the party had become more radical and referred to the Erfurt program as proof. Though this first organized Marxist opposition was easily crushed, the radical sentiments did not subside. In fact, the Centrist leaders could not be interested in suppressing such sentiments because they provided much of the driving force of the movement. However, radicalism in the ranks and the parliamentary goals of the party forced upon the leadership a conflicting pattern which prescribed, on the one hand, a specific radical rhetoric at the party conventions and, on the other, moderate demands and a more diffuse rhetoric in parliament and during election campaigns.

The process of institutionalization here involved may be called the process of self-maintenance [24]. It may be suggested that this is a particularly critical problem for a political movement. By definition, radical political movements aim at large-scale social reconstruction, and usually encounter strong resistance from the dominant system. The leadership has to take into account the possibility of severe restrictions or total suppression. Because of the strength of the dominant system, the leaders used only those possibilities of political action which would not jeopardize the survival of the movement. Furthermore, the expansion of the movement into a large subculture made the party more vulnerable to repressive policies and this, in turn, strengthened the reasons for moderation. On the other hand, considerations of organizational self-maintenance also made the leadership stick to its radical rhetoric which had become "infused with value" (Selznick) for the members. Once Marxism had been accepted on various levels of comprehension, any sacrifice of principle would have disorganized the followers without improving the strategic position of the party. And because the external situation of the movement, particularly its isolation within a powerful dominant system, did not basically change over the years, there were not any definitely compelling reasons for changing the ideology. There were, however, some good reasons, and they were presented by the Revisionists. Theirs was an attempt to free the party from some of its ideological impediments and to adjust its ideology to its political practice. The strength of reformist sentiment was even taken into account by Engels, shortly before his death, in his preface to the 1895 edition of Marx's *Class Struggle in France*. While this indicated a willingness to make concessions to the exigencies of the party, Bernstein's challenge, three years later, went too far for the Centrist leaders. Bernstein called on the party "to find the courage to free itself from a phraseology which is indeed outdated; and to appear as it really is today — a

[24] On this concept, see Philip SELZNICK, *Leadership in Administration*, Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson, 1957, pp. 20 f.

democratic, socialist reform party". The executive quickly moved to keep the Revisionists in check, fearing that the morale of the faithful in the lower echelons and among the rank and file would be weakened. In addition, Bernstein's revision of Marx had its weaknesses which were exposed by Kautsky; since the practical issues were complex, there was much room for genuine disagreement with Revisionism. The continued growth of the party organizations and their very remoteness from the centres of power enabled the party to keep the right wing and the new left wing in the fold. The latter arose partly as a reaction to Revisionism, expecting a new revolutionary situation to emerge. The party controlled its internal dissensions because the practicability of the radical as well as the Revisionist theories could not really be tested. Unlike the French socialists, it was never confronted with a decision to accept or reject governmental responsibility. As long as the labor movement grew, no showdown was precipitated, and radicals and Revisionists developed a system of division of labor within the party. The existence of a Revisionist wing enabled the Centrist party leadership to appear radical and provided it with new opportunities for verbal radicalism which preserved the allegiance of the orthodox delegates at the conventions, as well as of the extreme left-wing minority. However, since the Revisionists and the Centrist Social Democrats were both genuine supporters of a parliamentary system, they had ultimately more in common than the Centrists had with the left. The major issue between Revisionists and Centrists was the degree of democratization reached in Imperial Germany, with the Centrists arguing that a revolution in some form was probably necessary. The orthodox Marxist rhetoric of the Centrists prevented both sides from recognizing their specific similarities fully, and only the events of 1918 revealed clearly that the Centrist leadership had actually embraced the theory of "bourgeois revolution", that is, the goal of parliamentary democracy.

Conclusion

I have dealt with two empirical problems pertinent to the sociology of knowledge: the German labor movement's adherence to both a relatively radical ideology and a consistent but moderate practice; and, closely connected with this problem, the relation between deterministic Marxism and the political and social structure of Imperial Germany. I have suggested that a constellation of repressive and permissive features of the dominant system propelled the theory and the practice of the labor movement into divergent paths. The resulting incongruence between theory and practice was compatible with the over-all strategic interests of the labor movement under the given conditions, although it did involve increasing disadvantages. I have also suggested that the attenuated authoritarianism of the dominant system made the Marxist ideology desirable to the labor movement only in a deterministic

form. It seems that only in such a form was the ideology acceptable to the dominant system as a tolerable challenge.

Both the character of the radical ideology and the moderate practices of the labor movement corresponded to, and were strongly influenced by, the peculiar combination of repressive and permissive policies of Imperial Germany when she was undergoing rapid and large-scale industrialization. It was of great importance for theory and practice that the authoritarian state did not attempt to repress the labor movement completely, but that it did permit a parliamentary framework within which it could achieve tangible successes. Thus, there was a strong incentive to pursue moderate policies and an equally strong interest in legal status, although moderation appeared also advisable in view of the overwhelming power of the state. In fact, the repressive power of the state became so great after the establishment of the Empire that all chances of realizing the democratic and socialist goals of the movement were relegated to an indefinite future. Therefore, the most influential leaders, intransigently committed to these goals, turned to a deterministic theory of history and industrialization which seemed to offer a way out with its "scientific" proof that the contemporary society was, for inherent reasons, doomed to destruction and that the proletariat would become the founder of a millennium. Any actively revolutionary version of this radical ideology appeared unrealistic because it invited complete repression. Even the antisocialist legislation was not felt to be severe enough to suggest a more radical alternative (such as the organization of a nucleus of professional revolutionaries on the basis of a voluntaristically accentuated Marxism). By denying the possibility of integration of the labor movement into the dominant system and by prophesying the latter's doom, deterministic Marxism was a radical enough ideology to strengthen some of the very factors which had made for its adoption. The independent class-conscious labor movement may be called a response to the rigid class structure and the weakness of parliamentary institutions in Imperial Germany, but it was also prevented by its own radical ideology from appealing effectively to lower-class groups other than the non-Catholic proletariat and to sections of the middle class. While the belief in a unique mission was perhaps a response to the lack of social and political recognition, it contributed to prevent such recognition. After 1890 the labor movement was free to expand into a huge mass movement, but because of the limitations imposed by the dominant system and its own ideology it could only develop into an isolated class-bound subculture. Once this process was under way it perpetuated the reasons for adhering to a moderate practice as well as to deterministic Marxism.

An Approach to the Sociology of Knowledge*

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It seems to me that the tradition most explicitly associated with the concept of the sociology of knowledge, that in which the names of Marx and Mannheim are most prominent, has operated with too undifferentiated a conceptual scheme. The main framework of the problem has grown out of the tradition of German idealist-historicist thought and has concerned the relations between what are often called *Idealfaktoren* and *Realfaktoren*. The tendency has been to argue over which was the "most important", as for example in the case of Hegel's "idealism" versus Marx's "materialism", and further, to neglect adequate differentiation of the components on either side of this "equation". Connected with this tendency to dichotomous, either-or thinking has been a strong tendency not to pay adequate attention to the methodological distinction between existential and evaluative judgments, a tendency to relativize all "objectivity" to a base in values or "interests". I should rather follow Max Weber in his insistence on distinguishing between the motives for interest in problems, which is inherently value-relative, and the grounds of the validity of judgments, which in the nature of the case cannot be relative in the same sense. In attempting to emphasize this and several other distinctions I consider basic to the sociology of knowledge, my approach is grounded in Weber's views as expressed both in his essays in the methodology of social science and in his studies in the sociology of religion, but also draws on other sources, notably Durkheim's analysis of social structure in relation to the problems of social solidarity. My general position is relatively close to that taken by Werner Stark in his recent book[1].

Some Preliminaries

In order to place in context what I consider the relevant problems of a sociology of knowledge, I should like first to sketch a framework

* This paper constitutes a considerable condensation of the version submitted for the International Sociological Congress in Stresa, September, 1959. The difficult work of condensation has been very ably carried out, with complete fidelity to the author's meaning, by Mrs. Carolyn Cooper.

[1] Werner Stark, *The Sociology of Knowledge*, Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1958.

for the analysis of all human action conceived as a system. Action, so conceived, is an ordered system of components that root in the physical world and the living organism and that are controlled by cultural patterns and symbols. For the most general analytical purposes it is necessary to break action down into four primary subsystems which I should call the cultural system, the social system, the personality of the individual, and the behavioural organism. These four constitute a hierarchical order of control in the order named, i.e. from the cultural system "down". I see the problem area ordinarily known as the sociology of knowledge as involving the interdependence and the interpenetration of what I have called the social system and the cultural system. But it should not be forgotten that the other two subsystems — personalities and biological organisms in a physical environment — are also concretely involved at every single point, for this classification is clearly analytical and not a classification of concrete entities. *All* human behaviour is concretely at the same time cultural, social, psychological, and organic. Any concrete system of interacting persons is hence above all both a social system and a cultural system at the same time; these subsystems are only analytically distinguishable, not concretely separable except so far as cultural content can, for example, be "embodied" in physical artifacts like books or works of art.

To show how the cultural system and the social system are analytically distinct even though concretely interpenetrating, let us analyze each in turn into *its* four primary subsystems.

The Social System [2]

A social system is that aspect of action which is organized about the *interaction* of a plurality of human individuals. Its structure consists in the patterning of the relations of the individuals, and may be analyzed on four levels of generality so far as its units are concerned: (1) Individuals in roles are organized to form what we call (2) collectivities. Both roles and collectivities, however, are subject to ordering and control by (3) norms which are differentiated according to the functions of these units and to their situations, and by (4) values which define the desirable type of system of relationships. Like the subsystems of action, these four primary structural subsystems of the social system are both analytically distinguishable and concretely interpenetrating. Thus every social system in one sense "consists in" roles organized to form one collectivity, and if it is a complex system, many subcollectivities. But every role and collectivity is "governed" by

[2] Cf. "An Outline of the Social System", Part II of General Introduction, *Theories of Society*, Talcott Parsons, Edward A. Shils, Kaspas D. Naegele, and Jesse R. Pitts (eds.), Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1961.

norms and values, each of which category constitutes a differentiated system.

The Cultural System

A cultural system, on the other hand, is organized about patterns of the *meaning* of objects and the "expression" of these meanings through symbols and signs. Thus the "structure of culture" consists in patterns of meaning as such, i.e., what have often been called "ideas", "forms", etc. I would like to suggest four basic structural components (i.e., units) of cultural systems: (1) patterns of empirical existential ideas, defining the conceptual schemes in which empirical objects are "cognized"; (2) patterns of expressive symbolization defining the "forms" and "styles" in which objects are cathected and symbolically represented, or through which they acquire and express emotional meaning; (3) patterns of evaluation, or the patterns through which objects are evaluated as better or worse than each other, and (4) patterns of the grounding of meaning, or the modes of orientation in and to the world in which the "major premises" of all other components of culture are grounded. Like the above classifications of action subsystems and social subsystems, this classification also constitutes a hierarchy of control [3]. Similarly, these components must be conceived as interpenetrating with each other, as always all involved, though in different modes of relation.

But culture not only has a structure; it "functions" in action. As a component of action — as when defining roles and collectivities, or the goals and interests of persons — cultural patterns do not function "automatically" by some kind of "self-actualization" or "emanation", but only through integration with the other components of action, most importantly through what has come to be called institutionalization in the social system and internalization in the personality.

The Institutionalization of Values in the Social System

The primary focus of articulation between the social system and the cultural system is the institutionalization of patterns of evaluation from the cultural system into the social system to constitute its top-

[3] In one sense this classification is organized about the subject-object relationship. Seen from this point of view, empirical existential ideas and expressive symbol systems are patternings of the meaning *of objects*. Evaluative patterns and the grounding of meaning, on the other hand, put primacy in the orienting activity of the actor *as* subject; they are patternings of orientation which may be classified in such a way as to cut across any classification of the objects to which they are oriented.

On the general basis of this classification, cf. "Culture and the Social System", Introduction to Part IV of *Theories of Society, op.cit.*

most controlling component. Thus every social system, even a total society, has a paramount value-pattern. This in turn is differentiated, by a process I shall call "specification", to constitute values for the various differentiated and segmented subsystems of the larger system.

The concept of institutionalization is not confined to values in its relevance. The other three cultural components — empirical existential ideas, expressive symbols, and groundings of meaning — are also institutionalized, but they do not all have the same kind of relation to the social systems which are their "bearers". Though they ordinarily play secondary parts in most subsystems of a society, they can play a primary part in special types of subsystems which cannot subsist independently of the society. Thus for example, what I call the grounding of meaning is the primary cultural component of religious collectivities, while the patterning of empirical knowledge is the primary cultural component of universities.

Values I conceive to be, in Clyde Kluckhohn's phrase, "conceptions of the desirable" [4], which I interpret to mean definitions of the directions of action-commitment which are prescribed in the culture. The institutionalization of values is, sociologically considered, a complex matter; it constitutes an area of interpenetration of cultural and social systems. As components of the cultural system, values must be related to the rest of that cultural system, and hence to the modes of institutionalization of these other three cultural components. Secondly, however, as components of the social system itself, they must be related to the non-cultural components of social system functioning in such ways as to regulate the mechanisms by which social process occurs. Hence we need a double paradigm; on the one hand, one which places institutionalized values in the context of the rest of the institutionalized cultural system, and on the other hand, a paradigm which places the value components in their relations to the non-cultural components of the social system.

First Paradigm: Relating Values to the Other Cultural Components

As mentioned above, institutionalization of values in a society requires their specification to different subsystems of the society. On the highest level of cultural generality, values are couched in terms which are relevant to the comparative evaluation of different categories of object, both social and non-social. On the social level of specification, however, these more general bases of comparison are taken for granted and what is compared is different categories of

[4] Clyde KLUCKHOHN, "Values and Value-Orientations in the Theory of Action: An Exploration in Definition and Classification", in Talcott Parsons and Edward A. Shils (eds.), *Toward a General Theory of Action*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951, esp. p. 395.

social object. A societal value system, then, is the evaluative preference for a given type of society as compared to others. Further specification will lead to the conception of desirable types of subsystems within what is evaluated as a good society, in each case taking account of the place of the subsystem within the society.

Empirical ideas. For these evaluations to take place, however, there must be some basis for discriminating empirically between the properties which are more and less highly evaluated. This means that the same cultural system must include, along with a value system, a set of empirical conceptions of the nature of the social systems and subsystems which are being evaluated, *and,* explicitly or implicitly, a set of empirical conceptions of the differences from and similarities to other social systems, historical or contemporary or even potentially occurring, which are differently evaluated.

It is in the *relation* between institutionalized values and empirical conceptions of the evaluated social systems that the problem of ideology arises. Clearly the actual evaluation of current social facts may vary on a positive-negative axis. Hence a whole society's value system may condemn certain aspects of a social status quo, such as crime and illness; these are by definition things the prevalence of which ought to be reduced. On the other hand, different groups within a society may evaluate the same social facts differently, resulting, for instance, in a bifurcation into "conservative" and "radical" values and ideologies.

Grounding of meaning. Since values are always problematical with respect to their legitimation, societies also institutionalize patterns of meaning in terms of which their values "make sense". Here too there is a problem of specification in that there are different levels at which the problems of meaning can be raised. The one which is most directly relevant here is the meaning of the obligations and commitments of collectivities like the nation or profit-making business firms. It is a question of how the evaluation, positive or negative, can be backed by some sort of answer to the question why this evaluation should be accepted. In the most general terms, this meaning-complex is institutionalized in the religious system of the culture, but on occasion it may be a very prominent component in ideological systems which act as "political religions".

Expressive symbolization. Finally, all social action requires motivational commitment on the part of individuals. No system of values can be adequately institutionalized unless it is integrated with a patterning of appropriate rewards and punishments that are contingent on various courses of behaviour and hence the *meanings* of the objects, *individual* and *collective,* which reward and punish. Culturally these rewards involve the whole realm of expressive symbolization, and institutionalized patterns of style and taste are of

course central to it. By definition, the moral component of institutionalized values must be distinguished from the reward component, but this does not negate the great importance of the relationship between them.

In my view, all four of these components of a cultural system are closely interdependent, so that no one of them can be institutionalized without important institutional questions being raised about the other three. But sociologists have historically tended to see the relation between values and empirical facts in terms of the problem of ideology, while the relation between grounds of meaning and personal motivation, as it was treated by Weber, has been seen as a problem of religious interests. Both pairs of relationships are rightly the concern of a sociology of knowledge, in my opinion, but in this paper I shall, for reasons of space, confine my attention to the former.

Second Paradigm: Relating Values to Non-Cultural Components

The second paradigm referred to above concerns the problem of institutionalization at the level of functioning of the social system itself. Institutionalized values may of course be undermined at the cultural level, by changes focusing at any one or any combination of the four components just discussed, for instance by questioning the grounding of meaning, or by questioning the empirical tenability of conditions alleged to be necessary for implementing the values. Given legitimation through articulation with the cultural system, however, the institutionalization of values depends further on relative effectiveness in meeting the non-cultural conditions of their implementation.

Norms. First there is the need for spelling out the general values in terms of sufficiently specific operative norms which can adequately define the situation for the different categories of actors in the society. One might say that the value system must become incorporated in a "constitution", formal or informal, for individual commitment to values is not alone adequate to their implementation.

Collectivities. The second basic condition concerns the functions of the many types of collectivities within a society. Just as values need to be legitimated, so in turn they must, through legal or informal norms, legitimate the goals of different categories of collectivities, provided that the collectivities function so as to contribute to the maintenance and/or development of the society.

Roles. The final major condition for the implementation of values in the social system concerns individuals in roles. Through the socialization process the necessary congruence must be established between personal interests and responsibilities to the larger system.

In sum, values are only fully institutionalized when they have become adequately articulated with a differentiated system of normative order; with legitimation of the goals and functions of collectivities; and with the motivational commitments of individuals in roles, as internalized through the process of socialization.

Where the Sociology of Knowledge Fits

As noted above, it seems to me that the main concern of the sociology of knowledge, especially in the tradition of Marx and of Mannheim, has been with the relation between two components outlined in the first of the two paradigms — between institutionalized value systems and empirical conceptions of societies and their subsystems. But in my opinion the sociology of knowledge should also (though not here) consider the relation between the cultural motivation of individuals and religious grounds of meaning, as this problem was analyzed in Max Weber's work in the sociology of religion.

The fact that Mannheim's attention was focused primarily on the former problem may have something to do with some of the ambiguities which have plagued discussion in this field, certain of which ambiguities start with the very term *Wissen,* which is the German word usually translated as "knowledge" in the phrase "sociology of knowledge". The focus has usually been on the concept of ideology as a structure of ideas, to be appropriately judged by the standards of empirical science. This clearly is at the centre of Mannheim's thinking—the problem of the ways in which evaluative considerations enter into the allegedly empirical ideas current about societies, notably the societies in which the ideas themselves are produced, and how these may lead to distortion and selection and may or may not vitiate objectivity. The term *Wissen* is, however, also applicable in contexts which refer not to empirical objects, but to the grounds of meaning, in what Weber would call "religious ideas". I should like to argue that the relation of this kind of *Wissen* to the social system is altogether different from Mannheim's problem of ideology.

But while both empirical science and the grounding of meaning are alike in referring to matters of what "is", of what "exists", in analytical independence of imperatives for action, the other two cultural categories—patterns of evaluation and of expressive symbolization—are so different from both of these that it is of dubious utility to include values and expressive symbols at all as forms of "knowledge". The essential issue is whether the sociology of knowledge should be treated as the "sociology of culture" in the most general possible sense, or whether it could reasonably be restricted to the aspects of culture here singled out. I shall proceed on the assumption that this restriction is reasonable.

The Relation of Values to Empirical Science

Having pointed out two areas of study for a sociology of knowledge, I shall narrow the scope of this discussion to one of them—the relation of values to empirical knowledge. My starting point is the conception that empirical-rational knowledge is an authentically independent component of all cultural systems, even in the most definitely nonliterate societies[5]. The levels of its development of course vary enormously; modern science represents a phenomenon altogether without precedent in any other civilization. Science is characterized as a body of knowledge not only by its extension of the knowledge of facts, but just as importantly, by its *organization* of facts in terms of generalized conceptual schemes.

Empirical knowledge is, furthermore, differentiated in terms of its objects of study, notably into physical, biological, psychological, social, and cultural sciences. While it is obvious that these "levels" of the empirical world interpenetrate intimately with one another, the older forms of positivistic reductionism, which would deny any genuine theoretical significance to such distinctions of level, must be regarded as definitely out of date and superseded.

Values, as was mentioned above, I understand to be *conceptions of the desirable,* applied to various objects and standing at varying levels of generality. Societal values are specified to the society itself as object; they are conceptions of the good type of society. When institutionalized, they are such conceptions as are held by the members of the society themselves, and to which they hold motivational commitments.

Within the cultural system—i.e., in terms of the first paradigm—values must meet certain imperatives. First, they must be *legitimized* through their relations to the ultimate grounds of meaning of the human situation. Secondly, they must be made motivationally meaningful through articulation of the desir*able* with the desir*ed*, i.e., through definition of appropriate rewards. The third imperative is, however, the one of most direct concern here. This concerns the relation between values and empirical knowledge. In this connection we should keep in mind that within a culture, the mutual relation to each other of empirical science and of values is only one of several contexts in which each of these cultural categories is involved. Science is in particular also related to practical problems through its capacity for prediction and control, and to the cultural bases underlying the structure of theory. And social *values* are also related to the motivational commitments of individuals and to the grounds of the meaning of the values.

[5] Bronislaw MALINOWSKI's well-known analysis in *Magic, Science and Religion* (1925) is perhaps the best reference point for this assertion.

It should also be made clear at the start that both value systems and systems of empirical knowledge are graded into levels of generality. While for empirical knowledge the relevant scale is the hierarchy of the sciences from physical through biological to psychological, social, and cultural science, for values, it is the valuation of objects in these spheres, and of course in their subspheres. Therefore somewhat different problems arise according to what level of objects is being scientifically analyzed, on the one hand, and according to what level of specification in the system of values is involved, on the other. Our primary interest, in this paper, is clearly at the level of the relation between the values of the social system, on the one hand, and the scientific analysis of the social system, on the other. It is clear, further, that the social system referred to here is the total society. When we consider social classes or other subcategories of social structure, such as occupational status or ethnic groups within a society, another order of problems arises.

Bearing in mind these qualifications, we may say that there are here involved two fundamental problems—the "Kantian" problem and the "Weberian" problem. The Kantian problem relates in the first place to the basic scientific standards of empirical validity, which Weber called the "schema of empirical proof" [6]. These basic standards are spelled out in three directions. The first, concerning the structure of the theoretical system, says that any inconsistency at theoretical levels is ground for questioning the validity of a given proposition, i.e., if this proposition is inconsistent which others believed to be validated. The other two sets of standards both concern particularized assertions about empirical objects. One concerns the empirical validity of the proposition, in terms of the well-known criteria of prediction and control; the other concerns the theoretical significance of the particular statement of fact. Put in the simplest terms, these two essential questions about a statement of fact are, "Is it empirically true ?", and "Is it scientifically important ?".

Empirical proof, however, is irrelevant without some conception of *problems* relative to which empirical propositions may be formulated. I would suggest that Kant's famous categories of the understanding constitute the formulation of the most general framework of the questions which are addressed to the empirical world. These categories are at the cultural level evaluative because they concern the categorization of what, for human beings, it is important to know about the empirical world. Clearly, the Kantian categories are rooted

[6] Cf. WEBER, " 'Objectivity' in Social Science and Social Policy", in *Max Weber on the Methodology of the Social Sciences*, Edward A. Shils and Henry A. Finch, trans. and ed., Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1949; Alexander von v. Schelting, *Max Webers Wissenschaftslehre;* Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1934; also my own *The Structure of Social Action* (1937), Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1949, Chapter XV.

in the highest-level grounds of the validity of empirical knowledge, in what Kant called transcendental considerations. Thus the Kantian categories represent the level which comprises the significance of knowledge in all the empirical sciences—although clearly Kant was thinking primarily of physical science; in his time, problems of social science were hardly yet receiving serious philosophical consideration. This level would thus comprise interests in *all* categories of objects—physical, biological, social, etc.

In what sense could it be said that the Kantian categories are relative ? I think the most likely sense is an evolutionary one. It is only when empirical knowledge becomes sufficiently developed and technical that such an elaborately differentiated scheme of categories becomes relevant. Such a relativity, however, does not affect the problem of validity as such, but rather the problem of human interests, i.e., the value of knowing different kinds of answers. Interests in this sense are subject to a process of differentiation through the development of culture [7].

What I am calling the "Weberian" problem, as distinguished from the Kantian, arises at a lower level of generality which is more immediately relevant for the sociology of knowledge. This concerns the sense in which relatively specific social value systems (those of a particular society, or sub-group in it) affect relatively specific bodies of knowledge. Here Weber's crucial concept is "value-relevance" (*Wertbeziehung*). Essentially what Weber said was that no matter how fully any given empirical propositions are validated, their inclusion in a body of knowledge about society is never completely independent of the value perspective from which those particular questions were asked to which these propositions constitute answers.

Weber's formulation could be said to be simply a statement of considerations at least implicit in the Kantian position. Weber, however, had the methodological problems of social science directly in mind, so it seems that there is a significant difference of level involved. In the study of a society by its own members, there is a different order of integration between values and empirical knowledge from that which exists between values and knowledge of the physical world. This is because the institutionalized values of a society constitute not merely a basis of selective *interest in* its phenomena, but are directly constitutive of the society's structure itself. This means that a different subject-object frame of reference is involved from that in the study of the physical world. The object is both "out there"—in Durkheim's sense an external object—and part of the observer himself, i.e., is

[7] In our formal terms, this may be interpreted to mean that the canons of scientific *validity* root in the cultural complex which focuses on empirical knowledge, whereas the problem of the *importance* of empirical propositions roots in the evaluative complex.

internalized. There is doubtless a sense in which this is also true of physical objects, but it is somehow a remoter sense.

I should, however, not hesitate to apply the general methodological canons of scientific method to social theory as well as to physical theory. The position of the observer is in principle inherently involved in conceptualization of all objects—both social and physical—even though in social science it becomes in practice so much more salient that it must be explicitly analyzed to avoid serious implicit biases [8].

These considerations do not seem to imply the *epistemological* relativism with the possibility of which Mannheim played. That this should be so depends on the conception of a fundamental unity of human culture and of the conditions of human orientation to the world. This is to say that there are universal criteria of empirical validity, a position taken clearly, following Weber, by both von Schelting and Stark. Within this framework, there is certainly variability, but it is not random variability, because neither human values nor the human situation vary at random. They vary on definable dimensions over limited ranges, ranges which are defined by the *relations* of empirical knowledge to the other three dimensions of cultural systems we have distinguished [9].

[8] It is partly for reasons of this sort that social science develops later, in the evolution of culture, than does physical, and that successful handling of it requires higher levels of maturity in individual scientists, at least in the absence of full institutionalization. It might further be inferred that the establishment of an institutional framework for its handling was more difficult and more important than in the case of physical science.

[9] It has been suggested above that there are three different bases of such variability, namely, institutionalized values, relations to the grounds of meaning, and to the interests of individuals in rewards for "acceptable" conduct. There are formal reasons to place these sets of selective factors in a hierarchy of control in the order named. For the benefit of those familiar with my analytical scheme it may be pointed out that the system of empirical knowledge is considered to be the adaptive subsystem of a system of culture. Its basic standards will be considered to be institutionalized in turn in *its* "pattern-maintenance" subsystem and thus relatively immune from influences emanating from other cultural subsystems. Of the three types of interchange with other cultural systems, however, the interchange with the value system should have the primarily *integrative* function. The relation to the grounding of meaning, then, should be particularly concerned with goal-attainment of an empirical system, and that to the cultural patterning of the reward system should have primarily adaptive significance to it. If this formal set of relationships holds, it should follow that values should, in a cybernetic sense, control the other two sources of the variability relative to the basic cultural standards, the canons of validity. This might be regarded as a formal justification of Weber's emphasis on *value*-relevance as the primary focus of the problem of relativity of social-scientific knowledge. The formal scheme referred to here has been developed most fully so far in published form in Talcott Parsons and Neil J. Smelser, *Economy and Society*, Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1956, Chapter II.

The relativity of the empirical knowledge of social phenomena is thus not in essence, i.e., epistemologically, different from the relativity of physical knowledge [10]. We can, therefore, legitimately think in terms of an ideal type of objective scientific knowledge about a society, which is subject to all the fundamental canons of science, but which in selectivity (as distinguished from distortion) of content, and in the basis of its meaning within the society, is relative to the values of that society at a given time. This set of considerations merges with those previously discussed concerning the methodology of science itself, modifying them only by introducing explicitly the sense in which the content of any science, but most particularly of social science, contains an element of relation (and hence in one sense, "relativity") to values.

The Value-Science Integrate and Ideology

What Mannheim meant by the "general" conception of ideology [11] is very close to this ideal type of social science, relativized to the nature of the society in which it has arisen and gains some kind of acceptance. Interpreted in the present terms, it seems to me that Mannheim's "general ideology" should be regarded not just as a scientific explanation of the current state of the society, but as a "value-scientific integrate" at the cultural level. This is to say it is a body of "ideas" which combine a conceptual framework for interpreting the empirical state of a society, with a set of premises from which this state is evaluated positively or negatively. A "general ideology" is the most directly relevant general cultural framework within which a social system can be "seen" as an empirical object. It explicitly shows the relevance, besides the empirical scientific component itself, of the evaluative component, but it should not be forgotten that relations to the grounding of meanings and to expressive symbolization are also always implicitly relevant, even if they are not made explicit.

The value-science integrate, unlike Mannheim's "particular" conception which I will refer to as "ideology" [12], should be interpreted as

[10] A point of which Weber unfortunately was not fully clear since he was deeply imbued with the methodological importance of the distinction between the natural and the socio-cultural sciences which was so prominent in the German intellectual milieu of his time.

[11] Karl MANNHEIM, *Ideology and Utopia* (1929), New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1936, esp. p. 68, n. 2.

[12] To avoid confusion with the more common conception of ideology (Mannheim's "particular" conception, which will be outlined below), I propose to avoid the use of the term "ideology" when referring to Mannheims general conception, by substituting the phrase "value-science integrate".

theoretically independent of the degree of integration of the actual social system with the values which constitute the premises of the value-science integrate. It is compatible with variations from the most "conservative" defence of the status quo to the most revolutionary repudiation of it in the name of an alternative state. Its essential criterion is consistency at the *cultural* level between empirical conceptions of the "social reality" and those evaluative patterns which define the *desirable* social system.

As we have noted, this conception does not impugn the objectivity of empirical social knowledge. It suggests that the *selection* of problems to which answers are given is a function of the values of the society in which such knowledge arises and becomes significant. In this sense, every social theory is relative to the society in which it belongs. But selection in this sense must be carefully distinguished both from a secondary type of selection and from *distortion*, which is realistically always present, but which analytically must be attributed to quite a different order of factors. Weber's concept of *Wertbeziehung*, in my opinion, adequately takes care of the concept of what may be called the "primary selectivity" involved in the value-science integrate. This is to say that even apart from limitations on the empirical resources available for validation, no social science integrated with the value system of a society can give answers to *all* the possible significant problems of societies, but only to those which have meaning within this integrate.

The more usual conception of ideology, which is close to what Mannheim meant by the "particular" conception, must be approached in terms of our *second* paradigm of institutionalization, which concerns not the sense in which different components of the institutionalized cultural system are integrated with *one another*, but the sense in which the normative culture thus institutionalized in fact determines concrete social action. What I have called the value-science integrate provides the essential set of standards for identifying a particular ideology, and the points of reference for analyzing its interdependence with those components of the social system which are by definition non-cultural.

Particular ideologies deviate from the value-science integrate in two significant respects. On the one hand they involve a further *selectivity*, in that among the problems and phenomena known to be significant for the social science of the time, they select some for emphasis, and neglect or play down others. Thus the business ideology, for instance, substantially exaggerates the contribution of businessmen to the national welfare and underplays the contribution of scientists and professional men. And in the current ideology of the "intellectuals", the importance of social "pressures to conformity" is

exaggerated, and institutional factors in the freedom of the individual are ignored or played down [13].

This type of selectivity, which may be called "secondary" to distinguish it from the "primary" type referred to above, shades off into *distortion*; indeed, the distinction between them depends on the level of generality at which the problem is considered. Thus, from the point of view of a full sociological analysis of American society as a whole, the "intellectuals" neglect of the institutionalization of freedom could be called distortion, whereas at lower levels of generality, in discussions of particular organizational or peer group phenomena, it may be considered to be selectivity. The criterion of distortion is that statements are made about the society which by social-scientific methods can be shown to be positively in error, whereas selectivity is involved where the statements are, at the proper level, "true", but do not constitute a balanced account of the available truth. It is clear that both secondary selectivity and distortion in an ideology violate the standards of empirical social science, in a sense in which the value-science integrate does not.

If these deviations from scientific objectivity are essential criteria of an ideology in this present sense, it does not follow that values have ceased to be relevant factors. The *relation* between values and empirical beliefs about the society continues to constitute the main axis of the problem. But in considering an ideology, values must be specified to the level of different subsystems of the society, like businessmen or intellectuals, and the degree of their compatibility with each of the non-cultural components distinguished in our second paradigm becomes problematical, whereas in the first paradigm it was not.

It should be made clear that my insistence on the indispensability of a standard of empirical validity for the analysis of ideology does not imply that such analysis is possible only when the social sciences have reached perfection. What is required is not a standard of absolute correctness, but of relative validity, since the problem of ideology arises where there is a *discrepancy* between what is believed and what can be scientifically correct. Naturally the range over which such discrepancies can be demonstrated is a function of the advancement of social science. Science and ideology can be only analytically distinguished from each other; in its development, social science differentiates out from ideology since it emerges from the same roots in common sense.

Common sense is not necessarily ideological in the present meaning

[13] Cf. F. X. Sutton, S. E. Harris, C. Kaysen, and J. Tobin, *The American Business Creed;* Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1956; and Clyde Kluckhohn, "Have There Been Discernible Shifts in American Values During the Past Generation?", in Elting Morison (ed.), *The American Style*, New York, Harper, 1958.

of the term, for it may formulate highly condensed and simplified versions of knowledge which can be scientifically demonstrated to be correct. The standard which is relevant here is not scientific proof or form of statement, but scientific correctness (including adequacy to the relevant problems). Persons who act on common sense may be themselves quite unable to explain why it is true, but so long as it *is* correct and neither selected nor distorted relative to the relevant action problems, it is not ideological.

The above discussion heads up to the proposition that the *problems* of the sociology of ideology cannot be clearly stated except in the context of an explicitly *cultural* reference. Secondary selection and distortion can only be demonstrated by reference to their deviation from the cultural standards of the value-science integrate, and if there is no such selection or distortion, the empirical beliefs in question must be classed as common sense, technological knowledge, or science. But once an ideology has been clearly identified by reference to deviation from these cultural standards, then the non-cultural considerations included in the second paradigm can be brought into play. Two aspects of the non-cultural problem may immediately be discriminated. One is the problem of explaining the *sources* of ideological selection and distortion; its reciprocal is the problem of the *consequences* to the social system of the promulgation and acceptance of ideological beliefs.

The Sources of Ideological Selection and Distortion: the Concept of Strain

The starting point for treatment of both of the above problems clearly lies in the relation of values to social structure through institutionalization. In terms of the second paradigm, it will be remembered, in order to be institutionalized, values have to be (1) specified not only to the society but to the relevant subsystems within the society; (2) legitimized as directly motivationally relevant to the particular groups involved and spelled out in terms of norms; (3) integrated, through the relevantly specified norms, with the goals of the collectivities concerned; and (4) integrated with the motivational commitments of individuals in roles [14].

Since our concern in discussing ideologies is with deviance from an ideal type defined by a value-science integrate, the problem of locating the elements of deviance and their underlying sources can

[14] It follows from his general description of the relations of values and norms to social structure that for the operative units of that structure—collectivities and persons in roles—their position in the structure is for most purposes the same thing as their relation to the societal value system and to its various subsystems specified to the relevant levels.

be broken down in terms of the above four subproblems. First, there is the possibility of malintegration of the value structure itself. This would take the form of a discrepancy in pattern between the society's higher-order values and the values of one or more relevant subsystems. This, for example, would be the case for an incompletely acculturated immigrant group that comes from a society having different values from those in the host society.

Second, even where values are adequately specified, there is the problem of defining norms the terms of which can be implemented in relatively concrete situations. Since social systems are systems of interactive *relationships* between units, a set of norms governing the action of two or more such units can never be tailored totally to the values, goals, or situation of *any one*. Norms thus have, above all, the function of integrating the "needs" of operative units with each other and of reconciling them with the needs of the system as a whole. In more detail, then, norms spell out expectations for collectivities and for persons acting in roles, and, in doing so, may bring to light discrepancies among these expectations.

Third, there may be discrepancy in the definition of the functions and goals of collectivities. A particularly prominent case has been the "profit motive" in modern Western society, which in my opinion is properly conceived as a goal of the business firm as a collectivity, not a "motive" of individuals. It is one of two primary institutionalized goals of firms, the other being "production" of goods and/or services. It has, of course, been an important focus of ideological preoccupation in modern society, particularly since the industrial revolution.

Finally, a discrepancy may be located at the role level in terms of the motivation of the individual. A prominent example is the problem of institutionalizing commitment to marital patterns both as "love objects" and as co-leaders of the family. Thus the problem areas of sexual freedom and of divorce are foci of ideological thinking; comparable problems, though very different in specific content, concern commitment to occupational responsibilities, for instance, in discussions over the relative importance of work and leisure, such as Veblen's ironic treatment of the "leisure class".

In most concrete cases, discrepancies will exist at all four of these points, but they will have differential impacts on different groups in a society. All of them are, however, foci both of institutionalization and of internalization. Since social systems, cultural systems, and personality systems are independently variable, there will never be complete correspondence between them; some degree of discrepancy is inevitable.

Where these discrepancies can be shown to be specifically "built

into" the social system, we may use the concept of *structured strain* [15]. So far as structured strain underlies ideologies, it can be said to focus on the relation between empirical conceptions of the society and its subsystems, and societal values and their subspecifications. It should be remembered, however, that the concept of strain is not in itself an explanation of ideological patterns, but a generalized label for the kind of factors to look for in working out an explanation. The above frame is meant to contribute to the interpretation of what underlies this label and its use in certain contexts.

In the above sketch, the point of reference is the factors involved in the orientations of certain categories of individuals. Persons looked at in this way are oriented in, and to, a situation external to themselves. It is, however, the crux of social-system analysis to keep continually in the forefront of attention the fact that what is a given category of actors is a set of patterned orientations from the point of view of the persons who compose that situation, and vice versa. The distinction between orienting actors and situation is hence inherently a relative distinction, relevant only at one level of analysis. This distinction is cut across by the distinction among institutionalized values, their grounding of meaning, motivational commitments, and empirical knowledge. All of these concepts apply, with different empirical content, of course, on *both* sides of the actor-situation dichotomy in any given case.

The imperatives described above for maintaining the ideal type of integration of objective social science with values entail certain balances in rates of input and output between particular roles and collectivities and other elements of the social system. The primary functional concern may be the maintenance and development of empirical knowledge, for instance, or the maintenance of values. Let us take empirical science, with special reference to social science, as an example.

Strains Affecting Social Science

The scientific community may be thought of as a social system which is organized about a type of *cultural* interest and commitment, in this case, the maintenance and extension of empirical knowledge. In analyzing such a system it is essential to distinguish clearly between institutionalized cultural standards themselves, on the one hand, and the institutionalized modes of their implementation in the corresponding social system, on the other. The first problem be-

[15] Cf. SUTTON, HARRIS, KAYSEN, and TOBIN, *op.cit.*, for an important recent work which makes extensive use of this concept.

longs in the first paradigm, the second in the second paradigm [16].

Thus the cultural standards outlined above as "the schema of empirical proof" must be implemented in concrete processes of action. First, a system of scientific investigation must be organized to maximize the probability of attaining its goal of "discovery", i.e., of making possible the statement of new empirical propositions. Secondly, however, discovery can only contribute to the cultural corpus of science through a process of empirical validation, in which the criteria of objectivity are paramount. Thirdly, the contribution of the isolated proposition, however valid, is limited unless it can be fitted into generalized conceptual schemes; hence building theory is just as important in investigation as a social process as is making empirical discoveries, or validating them.

The problem now is how far and by what processes the non-cultural conditions impinging on this process are successfully controlled in the interest of the cultural standards. Crucial though the creativeness of the individual scientist is, if he is to be a specialist in science, he and his family must find some basis of support in the division of labor. His incomprehensible, often uncanny and sometimes disturbing or dangerous activities and ideas must somehow be tolerated in the community. He must be provided with adequate facilities to do his work, including books and periodicals, laboratory equipment, and many other things. Scientists themselves must form a subcommunity with media of communication, modes of organization, and so on.

Clearly the basic mode of institutionalization of science in the modern Western world has come to be in the university, which provides scientists with a system of fully institutionalized occupational roles having a respected status in the community, financial support, facilities, and access to students and to a community of competent colleagues. Of course, a further highly significant development is the spilling over of science into other sectors of society, notably through its relation to the various kinds of technology employed in industry and in government.

The sociology of science, then, studies the conditions under which the cultural criteria of science can become institutionalized according to the first paradigm, and once they are institutionalized, the conditions necessary for their implementation in the concrete investigative process according to the second paradigm. Further, it deals with problems having to do with how far these scientific canons and implementing activities are accepted in the society outside the scien-

[16] The scientific role must be institutionalized, but roles must fit into collectivities—in this case the most important is the university. Further, universities must enjoy freedom and encouragement under the normative order of the society. All these are steps of institutionalization *under* the cultural pattern of *valuation* of science.

tific community. It is in the nature of social systems that this acceptance cannot be limited to the scientific community itself; there must be articulation with more generalized values and the institutional structures in which nonscientists participate.

Broadly speaking, tolerance of the scientific attitude becomes more difficult, the closer its subject matter comes to the direct constitution of the society and the personalities of its members. It seems highly probable that it is not only for technical, but also for societal, reasons that physical science, with its more remote subject matter, has been the first branch of science to achieve a high level of development, and that the development in our own time of the sciences dealing with human action documents a crucially important development in the society itself, as well as in science. It is not too much to say that in no previous society would this development have been possible. It is a fact, however, that social science has been a recently and rapidly developing thing; thus, the full institutionalization of the more general values of science, as defining the empirical role of the social scientists, cannot be taken for granted. There are "insecurities". Social scientists may lack support for scientific standards from their university as a collectivity which, to varying degrees, may have stable commitments to the goals of science. Or their own motivational commitments may be in varying respects and degrees incomplete and ambivalent, e.g., they may be more concerned with practical usefulness than they are with scientific achievement as such, or they may be overly "success"-oriented. Finally, the technical state of their own field may be so imperfect that it is difficult to use genuinely technical standards to resist these pressures when the primary rewards for genuine scientific achievement — self-respect or recognition from colleagues or both — may be too sparse for full efficacy over a long period.

There are thus built-in vulnerabilities to ideological "bias" at the vere core of the social-scientific endeavour itself (and indeed, in somewhat lesser degree, in all science). But beyond this, what I have called the scientific community is at best only partially insulated, both culturally and socially, from those other elements in society which in the nature of *their* structural positions cannot give primacy to scientific subvalues and standards of empirical investigation. In these outside circles, commitments to other subvalues in the society are likely to be reflected in ambivalent or negative attitudes toward the scientist's role-commitments (or, what in some respects is as disturbing, in the over-idealization of the scientist as a "magician"). And the layman is likely to hold positive empirical beliefs which more or less disagree with those of scientific specialists in various fields.

This is essentially to say that the input-output balance between the scientific community and other societal subsystems is likely to be precarious, with an almost inherent tendency for strong pressures

to exact "concessions" from the scientific community to these outside orientations. Underlying this situation is the fact that scientists are not as such politically powerful or in command of large economic resources; they are inherently dependent on other structural elements of the society for these resources as well as for their ultimate legitimation.

It is thus clear that members of the scientific community are in the nature of the case subject to such a complex of strains that it is not surprising if they are unable to control completely either their own belief systems or the currency of beliefs in the society at large about their fields of competence. The other side of the picture is, of course, the operation, over the long run, of selfcorrective mechanisms. Empirical propositions do get validated; the valuation of truth in this area does get progressively farther institutionalized. At certain points, practical "pay-offs" result in benefits which would not be available without such knowledge. Were these positive mechanisms not operative, it would be difficult to explain why the symbol "science" is clearly a modern prestige symbol which is widely, if sometimes dubiously, appropriated, as in the phrases "Christian *Science*" or "*scientific* socialism". Without the prestige of science, this would not make sense, and it would be difficult to understand that prestige if authentic science in fact had no independent importance.

It is also to be expected in terms of our analysis that as one goes from the inner core of what is here called the scientific community toward other groups in the social structure, there should be increasing prominence of selection and distortion relative to scientifically objective standards. Further, certain of these outside groups have special relations to selected portions of the scientific community because of their common "interests" in a particular subject matter. In the American type of society, there is first an obvious and natural relation between natural science and technology. Among the social sciences, then, a special relation obtains between the business community and economics, so that economics is peculiarly vulnerable to the operation of strains as between the scientific and the business communities Similar considerations apply to the relations between political science and the political elements of the society, and between the legal system and academic law as a discipline. Finally, sociology, with values as a central part of its subject matter, stands in a relation of strain to those elements in the society that are particularly concerned with the guardianship of its values.

Since the strain to which the scientific community is inevitably subjected is likely to be fairly definitely structured rather than random, the chances are minimized of a completely "stark" confrontation of the scientific community with antithetical outside groups. This point calls attention to the very important role of the applied professions as "buffer institutions" in modern society. Historically, this has certainly

involved the development of a professional clergy and a legal profession for the application of cultural values and norms in the social system, but more recently, the striking development is that of professions involving the application of various sciences. Medicine and engineering have taken the lead as applications of physical science, but there has been a steady spread of this development, above all to the psychological and social sciences [17]. It is commonplace to regard these applied professions as channels through which technical knowledge, generated in the scientific or otherwise predominantly cultural community, is diffused to and applied in sectors of the society which are not primarily devoted to cultural functions. This, of course, is correct, but it is only one side of the coin. The other is the sense in which the "applied" professions act as a buffer mitigating the pressures which impinge on the cultural community and which would otherwise constitute more seriously disturbing sources of strain.

These considerations are important for the study of ideology. The applied professions should constitute particularly strategic points for the study of the balance of forces operating on the scientific underpinnings of the intellectual culture of modern society, for these are the groups whose professional training has anchored them in the academic disciplines but who at the same time are in direct contact with the related nonacademic sectors of the society.

This point may be illustrated by mentioning a few empirical problems concerning American society, without attempting to enter into their analysis. One would be the problem of why "organized medicine" has come to be ideologically so closely assimilated to the predominant business ideology, thereby tending somewhat to cut itself off from university medicine. Another would be the problem of why, as documented in a recent study, the academic profession in the social sciences has leaned politically considerably to the left of other population groups of comparable income and social prestige status [18]. Still another would be why the "intellectuals", particularly those outside the academic core, and with humanistic, literary interests, were so attracted by an ideology emphasizing the less attractive features of "mass culture", the dangers of "conformity", and the presumptive loss of "values" in contemporary society [19].

Consideration of the ideologies of various professions connects with

[17] A further most important development has been the increasing structural integration of these applied professions with the university, especially through their training and through research. Cf. my paper "Some Problems Confronting Sociology as a Profession", *American Sociological Review*, 24 (August, 1959), pp. 547-559.

[18] Paul F. Lazarsfeld and Wagner Thielens, Jr., *The Academic Mind*, Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1958.

[19] Cf. Winston R. White, *The Ideology of American Intellectuals*, Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1960.

the problem of the ways in which groups not specifically trained in academic disciplines are predisposed to different orders of belief systems in the relevant areas. Examples would be the beliefs of the businessman or the trade unionist about the functioning of the economy, or the beliefs of the lay public concerning methods of child rearing and elementary education. With the increasing prominence of the intellectual disciplines in such areas, however, we cannot speak of ideological belief systems without reference to the ways "popular" beliefs attempt to articulate with those beliefs current in the relevant professional circles, which may themselves, of course, be ideologically selected and distorted.

Some Social Consequences of Ideology

We may now turn briefly from the analysis of the *determinants* of ideological patterns to the obverse problem, that of the possible *effects* on a society of the currency of different ideological patterns. Systematic theoretical analysis of the articulation between cultural social systems is as necessary for this side of the problem as it is for dealing with the determination of ideas. In such analysis the two essential points of reference are again, on the one hand, the methodological criteria for objective empirical knowledge and, on the other hand, the conception of an integrated, institutionalized system of values.

The process by which a *new* value system may become institutionalized in a society or in one or more of its subsystems is clearly one version of the "influence of ideas", though not as I see it, directly of "knowledge" [20]. Here I would suggest, first, that in dealing with problems of ideology it is useful to treat the higher-level values of the society as given. Since the stability of such values is in general very important indeed for a social system, we may presume that perhaps the primary function of ideology is either to protect the stability of the institutionalized values, or conversely, in the case of a revolutionary ideology, to undermine the values, at least of such subsystems as the "upper" classes and the business community, if not of the so-

[20] This process in the social system is directly analogous to that of the internalization of values in the personality through socialization. I have attempted to deal with an important societal case in "Christianity and Modern Industrial Society" in E. A. TIRYAKIAN (ed.), *Essays in Honor of Pitirim A. Sorokin*, Glencoe, Il.: Free Press, 1961. A full discussion of the relation of subsystem values to the process of structural differentiation within a society is given in N. J. SMELSER, *Social Change in the Industrial Revolution*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959. A paradigm for the case of personality was worked out in Talcott aPrsons and James Olds, Chapter IV of Talcott PARSONS and Robert F. BALES, *Family, Socialization, and Interaction Process*, Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1955.

ciety as a whole; the latter case would present a different order of theoretical problem.

Broadly it can be said that within Western society there is at a high level a *common* value base underlying both conservative and radical ideologies. Instead of attempting to undermine these high-level values, the radical ideology tends to assert the unacceptability of the existing society from the point of view of values which everybody takes for granted, whereas the conservative ideology tends to assert that broadly the state of the society is acceptable, and that deliberate attempts to usher in change will be dangerous. Thus, questions of empirical fact about the state of the society have become especially salient with the emergence of the "ideological age" in the last century. An illustration that a radical ideology does not seek to overthrow the *whole* value complex of Western society is to be seen in the high value which "socialism", in *common* with "capitalism", places on economic production. This circumstance is one essential consideration for explaining the fact that the more radical version of socialism tends so drastically to lose its appeal in those societies which have achieved a relatively high level of industrial development and of economic welfare for the masses [21].

A second social function of ideology is to facilitate acceptance, in the broader society, of scientific professionals and of the bodies of empirical knowledge they "produce". In spite of an ideology's selection and distortion, which are necessarily disturbing to those professionals, it may be conceived as a mechanism which mediates between their scientific standards and the values of those nonprofessional subgroups who also have an "interest" in various scientific fields. That is, *up to a certain limit,* which should be approximately definable in empirical terms, selection and distortion can still serve the function of integrating the main bearers of scientific culture with the other groups who have an "interest" in the subject matter. But somewhere there is a threshold beyond which the effect will tend to be the opposite. In contemporary society, the location of this threshold will affect the character of various versions of "anti-intellectualism". Thus the McCarthyite version of populism, for example, seems to have been clearly beyond this threshold with respect to demands for political loyalty in a democracy under severe political pressures.

A third function of ideology, vis-à-vis the maintenance of role-commitments by individuals, emerges when, in the process of structural differentiation within the framework of a relatively stable institutionalized value system, subsystem values no longer jibe sufficiently with the actual nature of those subsystems, thus raising questions about

[21] Cf. Seymour Martin Lipset, "Socialism—Left and Right—East and West", *Confluence,* 7 (Summer, 1958), pp. 173-192, and *Political Man,* Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co., 1960.

what is expected of classes of persons in different role-positions in the society. When expectations are not adequately defined, it is impossible for performance and sanction to be accurately matched, and hence motivation to role-performance is likely to be disturbed. Then, as psychological rationalization, adherence to an ideology can, within the personality, serve as a mechanism for bridging the gap. But here it is important to distinguish conceptually the consequences *for the social system* of this function of ideology, from its consequences in psychological terms *for the individual personality*, as well as more generally to discriminate between value problems at the cultural-system level and role-commitment problems at the social-system level. We might indicate the distinction by saying that ideology is a category of culture more or less institutionalized in social systems, whereas the corresponding category for the personality in rationalization in the psychoanalytic sense. The degree to which rationalizations are socially shared is in principle problematical; for ideologies it is a defining criterion. Many discussions of ideology do not make these distinctions, which in terms of the present approach are crucial.

If it is indeed the case that ideology has a special relation to the process of structural differentiation in the society, it follows that it is in turn related to the problem of organic solidarity in Durkheim's sense. Perhaps it is not too much to say, in summary, that ideology is a special manifestation of the strains associated with the increasing division of labor, and that in turn it is an integrative mechanism which operates to mitigate those strains. More specifically, the strains particularly associated with structural differentiation are those of *anomie*, again in Durkheim's sense [22]. They concern inadequate clarity in the "definition of the situation", particularly at the normative level, since this level stands between values and the more specific goals of collectivities and role-obligations of their members. On the whole, I would strongly suggest that a great prevalence of ideology is a symptom that the main disturbances in a society are *not* at the highest level of institutionalized values, but rather concern the integrative problems associated with the process of differentiation.

Unfortunately it is impossible, within the limits of this paper, to take space to follow out the implications of this interpretation further with the analysis of a few concrete examples, but such an attempt would be essential to a real demonstration of the usefulness of the approach.

[22] Cf. my paper, "Durkheim's Contribution to the Theory of Integration of Social Systems" in Kurt H. WOLFF (ed.), *Emile Durkheim, 1858-1917: A Collection of Essays, with Translations and a Bibliography*, Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1961.

Conclusion

This discussion has necessarily been a mere sketch of an exceedingly complicated area of problems. Its primary objective has been to try to put some problems which have grown up within the sociology of knowledge into a somewhat wider perspective made possible by the theory of action, which calls for the careful analysis of both cultural and social systems and their relations to each other. The term "knowledge" has seemed to me to refer to cognitively ordered orientations to objects, with reference both to empirical facts and to problems of meaning. The problem of ideology has been interpreted to concern the first context, especially when the social system itself is the empirical object; Weber's problem of the sociology of religious ideas concerns primarily the second context. It seems important to keep these two problem areas clearly distinct, but also to relate them as the two primary branches of the sociology of knowledge.

Both involve fundamental relations to the values institutionalized in the social system. Indeed this relation to values is the focus of the sociological problems which arise with respect to these two fundamental components of cultural systems. However, neither values nor motivational commitments and their symbolization in expressive terms are, by my definitions, legitimately referred to as forms of "knowledge". The sociology of knowledge should not be identified with the sociology of culture, which is a wider category. Only through an analysis of both social and cultural systems and of their interpenetration and interdependence, however, can an adequate sociology of knowledge be worked out.

Aspects of the Problem of Common-Sense Knowledge of Social Structures*

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Sociologically speaking, "common culture" refers to the socially sanctioned grounds of inference and action that people use in their everyday affairs [1] and which they assume that other members of the group use in the same way. Socially-sanctioned-facts-of-life-in-society-that-any-bona-fide-member-of-the-society-knows depict such matters as conduct of family life; market organization; distributions of honour, competence, responsibility, goodwill, income, and motives among persons; frequency, causes of, and remedies for trouble; and the presence of good and evil purposes behind the apparent workings of things. Such socially sanctioned facts of social life consist of descriptions of

* This paper is heavily abridged from an 80-page mimeographed version prepared for and distributed at the session on the Sociology of Knowledge, Fourth World Congress of Sociology, Stresa, Italy, September 12, 1959. Because of space limitations it was necessary to omit materials dealing with the general set "corpus of knowledge" and the procedures for constituting it and its several subsets among which is the corpus of common-sense knowledge; descriptions of the work of the documentary method and a report of an experiment that permitted these workings to be explored; Schutz's descriptions of the attitude of everyday life; the problem of whether the documentary method is a necessary feature of sociological inquiry; the consequences for stable features of social structures of several types of transformations of the presuppositions of the corpus of common-sense knowledge. These materials are treated at appropriate length in the author's book in preparation, "Common-Sense Actions as Topic and Feature of Sociological Inquiry".

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Readers who are acquainted with the magnificent writings of the late Alfred Schutz will recognize the debt that anyone writing on this topic owes to him. The paper is respectfully dedicated to him as an esteemed teacher and sociologist.

[1] The concept "everyday affairs" is intended in strict accord with Schutz's usage in his articles, "On Multiple Realities", *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,* 4 (June 1945), pp. 533-575; and "Common Sense and Scientific Interpretation of Human Action", *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,* 14 (September 1953), pp. 1-37.

the society from the point of view of the collectivity member's [2] interests in the management of his practical affairs. For the moment, call such knowledge of the organization and operations of the society "commonsense knowledge of social structures".

The discovery of common culture consists of the discovery *from within the society* by social scientists of the existence of common-sense knowledge of social structures, and the treatment by social scientists of this knowledge, and of the procedures for its assembly, test, management, transmission, etc., by members of the society as objects of mere theoretical sociological interest.

This paper is concerned with common-sense knowledge of social structures as an object of theoretical sociological interest. Its subject matter is the descriptions of a society which its members, sociologists included, as a condition of their rights to manage and communicate decisions of meaning, fact, method, and causal texture without interference, use and treat as known in common with others, and with others take for granted.

Several aspects of this topic will be sketched: (1) the constituent meanings of the feature "known in common with others" that for a member is "attached" to his descriptions of his society; (2) features of common-sense situations of choice within which the factual status of descriptions of society is decided; (3) Mannheim's "documentary method of interpretation" as an approximation of a method whereby factual status of common-sense descriptions is decided and managed in the face of challenges to adequacy of meaning and evidence; and (4) some logical properties of the corpus of common-sense knowledge of social structures.

I. *The Definitive Features of Propositions Which Compose a Common-Sense Description*

A common-sense description is defined by the feature "known in

[2] The concepts "collectivity" and "membership" are intended in strict accord with Talcott Parsons' usage in *The Social System*, The Free Press, Glencoe, Illinois, 1951, and in Part II, General Introduction, *Reader in Sociological Theory*, dittoed mss. by Talcott Parsons, 1959.

[3] SCHUTZ, Alfred, *Der Sinnhafte Aufbau der Sozialen Welt*, Julius Springer, Wien, 1932; "The Problem of Rationality in the Social World", *Economica*, 10 (May 1943), pp. 130-149; "Some Leading Concepts in Phenomenology", *Social Research*, 12 (February 1945), pp. 77-97; "On Multiple Realities", *loc.cit.*, "Concept and Theory Formation in the Social Sciences", *Journal of Philosophy*, 51 (April 29, 1954), pp. 257-274; "Symbol, Reality, and Society", *Symbols and Society, Fourteenth Symposium of the Conference on Science, Philosophy, and Religion*, edited by Lyman Bryson and others, Harper and Brothers, New York, 1955, pp. 135-202.

[4] The material in the following two pages is based almost entirely upon Schutz's writings. See n. 3.

common with any bona-fide member of the collectivity" which is attached to all the propositions which compose it. The late Alfred Schutz, in his work on the constitutive phenomenology of situations of everyday life [3], analyzed the compound character of the feature "known in common" into its constituent meanings. *Whatever a proposition specifically proposes* — whether it proposes something about the motives of persons, their histories, the distribution of income in the population, the conditions of advancement on the job, kinship obligations, the organization of an industry, the layout of a city, what ghosts do when night falls, the thoughts that God thinks — *if for the user the proposition has the following additional features, it is called a common-sense proposition* [4].

1. The sense assigned to the description is, from the member's point of view, an assignment that he is required to make; he requires the other person to make the same assignment of sense; and just as he requires the same assignment to hold for the other person, he assumes that the other person requires the same of him.

2. From the user's point of view, a relationship of undoubted correspondence is the sanctioned relationship between the-depicted-appearance of-the-intended-object and the-intended-object-that-appears-in-this-depicted-fashion.

3. From the usur's point of view, the matter that is known, in the manner that it is known, can actually and potentially affect the knower's actions and circumstances, and can be affected by his actions and circumstances.

4. From the user's point of view, the meanings of the descriptions are the products of a standardized process of naming, reification, and idealization of the user's stream of experiences, i.e. the products of the same language.

5. From the user's point of view, the present sense of whatever the description describes is a sense intended on previous occasions that can be intended again in an identical way on an indefinite number of future occasions.

6. From the user's point of view, the intended sense is retained as the temporally identical sense throughout the stream of experience.

7. From the user's point of view, the description has as its contents of interpretation:

   (a) a commonly entertained scheme of communication consisting of a standardized system of signals and coding rules, and

   (b) "What Anyone Knows", i.e. a pre-established corpus of socially warranted descriptions.

8. From the user's point of view, the actual sense that the description has for him is the potential sense that it would have for the other person were they to exchange their positions.

9. From the user's point of view, to each description there corresponds its meanings that originate in the user's and in the other person's particular biography. From the user's point of view, such mean-

ings are irrelevant for the purposes at hand of either: for the user, both he and the other person have selected and interpreted the actual and potential sense of the proposition in an empirically identical manner that is sufficient for their practical purposes.

10. From the user's point of view there is a characteristic disparity between the publicly acknowledged sense and the personal, withheld sense of the description, and this private sense is held in reserve. From the user's point of view, the description means for the user and the other person more than the user can say.

11. From the user's point of view, alterations of this characteristic disparity remain within the user's autonomous control.

These features have the following properties that make them particularly interesting to the sociological researcher:

1. From the standpoint of the collectivity member, these features are "scenic" features of his behavioural environment of objects. By "scenic" I mean that if, for example, we say with respect to the expected correspondence of appearance and object that the member doubts the correspondence, we must assign to the correspondence its feature of a doubted one. Another example. If we say that the member expects that what is known can affect and be affected by his actions, we must assign to what is known, as an object in the member's behavioural environment, its integral feature that it can potentially affect and be affected by his actions. To each of the expectancies that comprise what Schutz called the "attitude of daily life" [5] there is the corresponding expected feature of the object.

2. These constitutive features are "seen but unnoticed". If the researcher questions the member about them, the member is able to tell the researcher about them only by transforming the descriptions known from the perspective and in the manner of his practical ongoing treatment of them into an object of theoretical reflection. Otherwise the member "tells the researcher about them by the conditions under which severe" incongruity can be induced. A reflective concern for their problematic character, as well as an interest in them as objects of theoretical contemplation, characteristically occurs as an abiding preoccupation in the experiences of cultural "strangers".

3. They are used by the collectivity member as a scheme of interpretation in terms of which he decides the correspondence between actual appearances and the objects intended through their successive actual appearances.

4. These expected features are invariant to the contents of actual descriptions to which they may be attached.

5. The sense of described social structures as unified ensembles of possible appearances is supplied by their constituent feature, "known in common".

6. The withdrawal of this feature by alter from ego's descriptions

[5] Cf. SCHUTZ, "On Multiple Realities", *loc.cit.*

modifies the logical mode of ego's description for alter in a radical way by transforming fact into fiction, conjecture, personal opinion, and the like. Insofar as alter, while retaining this feature for his own accounts, withdraws the feature from ego's descriptions, he removes the enforceable character of ego's claim to competence.

7. Modifications of these constituent meanings of "known in common" transform environments of intended objects to produce the descriptions of social structures of games, of scientific sociological theorizing, of art, of high ceremony, of the theatre play, of official histories, of dreaming, and the like. Dramatic modifications occur in brain injuries, mental deficiency, acute sensory deprivation, hallucinatory drug states. Such modifications are accompanied by corresponding modifications of the social structures produced by actions directed to cultural environments altered in this fashion.

Contrary to prevailing opinion, the common-sense character of knowledge of social structures does not consist in the ironic comparison of such knowledge with "scientific descriptions". Instead, it consists entirely and exclusively in the possibility that (a) the sensible character of what these descriptions decribe about the society, and/or (b) their warranted character as grounds for further inference and action, is decided and guaranteed by enforcement of the attitude of daily life as ethical and moral maxims of conduct in theorizing and inquiry. We must suppose that the attitude of daily life operates in the sociological inquiries not only of the members of a society but of professional sociologists as well. Just as sociological inquiries are not confined to professional sociologists, neither is the attitude of daily life confined to "the man in the street".

In Section II and III I shall show how the method of common-sense thinking and conduct occurs in professional sociological inquiry.

II. *Many Situations of Sociological Inquiry Are Common-Sense Situations of Choice*

There are innumerable situations of sociological inquiry in which the investigator — whether he be a professional sociologist or a person undertaking an inquiry in the course of managing his practical everyday affairs — must choose among alternative courses of investigative procedure, and must sort his results among the alternative statuses of fact, hypothesis, conjecture, fancy, and the rest, despite the fact that in the calculable sense of the term "know", he does not "know" and under certain conditions apparently cannot "know" what he is doing. His decisions are made in "common-sense situations of choice". Field workers are well acquainted with such situations. Other areas of professional sociological inquiry, however, are not exempt.

By referring to "common-sense situations of choice," I mean to call attention to the following features [6]:

1. The investigator may be addressed to a succession of present states of affairs each of whose future states that his actual or contemplated actions will produce are vague or even unknown. I wish to stress a distinction between a "possible future state of affairs" which is related to a present state as a "desired goal" — this future is ordinarily a very clear one indeed — and a "How-to-bring-it-about-future-from-a-present-state-of-affairs-as-an-actual-point-of-departure". It is this latter state — we might call it an operational or a programmed future — that is characteristically vague or unknown.

2. Even where *a* future is known in a definite way, alternative paths to actualize the future state as a set of step-wise operations upon some initial state are characteristically sketchy, incoherent, and unelaborated. Again I wish to stress the difference between an inventory of available procedures — investigators can describe these definitely and clearly — and the set of predecided "what-to-do-in-case-of" strategies for the manipulation of a succession of actual present states of affairs *in their actual course*. In actual sociological research practices, programs of "what-to-do-in-case-of" are characteristically unelaborated and incapable of elaboration.

3. It frequently occurs that the investigator takes an action, and only upon the actual occurrence of some product of that action do we find him reviewing the accomplished sequence in a retrospective search therein for their decided character. Insofar as the *decision that was taken* is assigned by the work of the retrospective search, the outcome of such situations can be said to occur *before* the decision.

4. The investigator is frequently unable to anticipate the consequences of his alternative courses of action and may have to rely upon his actual involvement in order to learn what they might be.

5. Frequently it occurs that only in the course of actually manipulating a present situation, and then as a function of his actual manipulation, does the nature of an investigator's future state of affairs become clear to him. Thus the goal of the investigation may be progressively defined only as the consequence of the investigator's actually taking action toward a goal whose features, as of any present state of his investigation, he does not see clearly. It is not unusual to find, therefore, that an investigator obtains a grasp of the problems he has investigated only after he has completed the investigation.

6. Frequently, after encountering some actual state of affairs, the investigator may count it desirable, and thereupon treat it as the

[6] I wish to thank Drs. Robert Boguslaw and Myron A. Robinson of the System Development Corporation, Santa Monica, California, for the many hours of discussion that we had about calculable and non-calculable situations of choice when we were trying together to work through the problem of how consistently successful play in chess and double-blind chess is possible.

goal toward which his previously taken actions, as he reads them retrospectively, were directed "all along" or "after all".

In their actual investigative activities, researchers characteristically must manage situations with the above features, given the additional conditions that some action must be taken; that the action must be taken by a time and in pace, duration, and phasing that "gears" into the interests and actions of others; that the risks of unfavourable outcomes must somehow be managed; that the actions taken and their products will be subject to review by others and must be justified to them as according with expected outcomes ascertained by procedures of "reasonable" review; and that the entire process must occur within the conditions of and respect for corporately organized social activity. In their "shop talk", investigators refer to these features and to the necessity for managing them as their "practical circumstances".

III. *The method of Common-Sense Thinking and Conduct.*

Somehow a corpus of sociological knowledge is constructed by activities of inquiry undertaken in such situations. Somehow propositions are assigned the status of warranted grounds of further inference and action. How is the warranted character of findings decided in common-sense situations of choice?

A prominent rule that is used to decide adequacy of meaning and evidence for the findings of researchers undertaken in situations with common-sense features is the rule of the documentary method of interpretation[7]. The rule is prominent in and characteristic of both social-scientific and daily-life procedures for deciding sensibility and warrant. In use, the rule itself *defines* the method of common-sense thinking and conduct. Not only does it contrast with the rule of literal observation, but it frequently enjoys priority over the rule of literal observation as a method for assigning propositions their status as correct grounds of further inference and action, i.e. their status as fact[8].

According to Karl Mannheim[9], the documentary method involves the search for "an identical, homologous pattern underlying a vast variety of totally different realizations of meaning". This involves the treatment of an appearance as "the document of", as "pointing to", as standing on behalf of a presupposed underlying pattern. Not only

[7] MANNHEIM, Karl, "On the Interpretation of Weltanschauung, *"Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge*, translated and edited by Paul Keeskemeti, Oxford University Press, New York, 1953, pp. 53-63.

[8] KAUFMANN, Felix, *Methodology of the Social Sciences*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1944, pp. 166-167.

[9] MANNHEIM, *op.cit.*, p. 57.

is the underlying pattern derived from its individual documentary evidences, but the individual documentary evidences, in their turn, are interpreted on the basis of "what is known" about the underlying pattern. Each is used to elaborate the other.

Examples of the use of the documentary method can be cited from every area of sociological investigation [10]. Its obvious use occurs in community studies where warrant is characteristically assigned to statements by the criteria of "comprehensive description" and "ring of truth". Its use is found also on the many occasions of survey research when the researcher in reviewing his interview notes or in editing the answers to a questionnaire has to decide "what the respondent had in mind". When a reseacher is addressed to the "motivated character" of an action, or a theory, or a person's compliance with rules of conduct and the like, he will use what he has actually observed to "document" an "underlying pattern". The documentary method is used whenever selected features of an object are used to epitomize the object. For example, just as the lay person may say of something that "Harry" says, "Isn't that just like Harry", the investigator may use some observed feature of the thing he is referring to as a characterizing indicator of the intended matter. Complex scenes like hospital establishments or social movements are frequently described with the aid of numerical tables or with "excerpts" from protocols which are used to epitomize the intended events. The documentary method is used whenever the investigator constructs a life history or a "natural history". The task of historicizing a person's biography or an establishment's past consists of using the documentary method to select and order past occurrences so as to furnish the present state of affairs its relevant past and prospects.

The use of the documentary method is not confined to cases of "soft" procedures and "partial descriptions". It occurs as well in cases of rigorous procedures where descriptions are intended to exhaust a definite field of possible observables. For example, in reading a journal account for the purposes of literal replication, researchers who attempt to reconstruct the relationship between the reported procedures and the results frequently encounter a gap of insufficient information. The gap occurs when the reader asks how the reporter decided the correspondence between what was actually observed and

[10] In his article, "On the Interpretation of Weltanschauung", Mannheim argued that the documentary method is peculiar to the social sciences. There exist in the social sciences many terminological ways of referring to it, viz. "the method of understanding", "sympathetic introspection", "method of insight", "method of intuition", "interpretive method", "clinical method", "emphatic understanding", and so on. Attempts by sociologists to identify something called "interpretive sociology" involve the reference to the documentary method as the basis for encountering and warranting its findings. Whether its widespread use in necessary to sociological inquiry is an open question.

the intended event for which the actual observation is treated as evidence. The reader's problem consists in having to decide that the reported observation is a literal instance of the intended occurrence, i.e. that the actual observation and the intended occurrence are identical *in sense*. Since the relationship between the two is a sign relationship, the reader must consult some set of grammatical rules to decide this correspondence. This grammar consists of some theory of the intended events on the basis of which the decisions to code the actual observations as findings are recommended. It is at this point that there frequently occurs an investment of interpretive work and an assumption of "underlying" matters "just known in common" in terms of which readers are invited to treat a column heading and the counted occurrences as synonyms. Correct correspondences is apt to be meant and read on reasonable grounds. Correct correspondence is the product of the work of reporter and reader as members of a community of co-believers. Thus even in the case of rigorous methods, if a reporter is to recommend, and the reader is to appreciate, published findings as members of the corpus of sociological fact, the documentary method is employed.

IV. *Some Properties of the Corpus of Common-Sense Knowledge* [11]

Irrespective of what a proposition proposes, it is a member of the common-sense corpus if its use as correct grounds of inference and action is, for a user, a condition of his bona-fide status as a collectivity member. Descriptions of social structures whose use is governed by the user's expectation that he will be socially supported for using them may be called, following his own way of referring to them, "reasonable" descriptions. Reasonable descriptions consist of propositions which are members of the common-sense body of knowledge.

Reasonable *procedures* are procedures which make use of the documentary method in deciding membership in the corpus, i.e. in deciding fact. Given common-sense situations of choice, whenever the documentary method is used, the interpreter's task of deciding the factual character of a description is identical with his task of assigning to what the description describes its values of typicality, likelihood, causal texture, technical efficacy, and moral necessity, while using the institutionalized features of the collectivity as a scheme of interpretation.

The specific features of descriptions that are meant by a user when he speaks of their reasonableness are displayed in the logical properties of the common-sense corpus. Several such properties consist in

[11] The general concept of the set "corpus of common-sense knowledge" is developed from Kaufmann's concept of the corpus of a science. The concept of corpus is developed in Kaufmann, *op.cit.*, pp. 33-47.

the use of occasional expressions; the essential and sanctioned vagueness of expressions; and the sanctioned expected pretence of agreement.

Occasional expressions. Prominently and characteristically, the sense of propositions in common-sense descriptions is delivered through the use of what Edmund Husserl [12] referred to as "occasional expressions". Occasional expressions are those whose sense cannot be decided by an auditor without his necessarily knowing or assuming something about the biography and the purposes of the user of the expression, the circumstances of the utterance, the previous course of the conversation, or the particular relationship of actual or potential interaction that exists between the expressor and the auditor. Occasional expressions are to be contrasted with expressions whose references are decided by consulting a set of coding rules that are assumed to hold irrespective of the characeristics and biography of the user. Kaufmann calls these "objective expressions" [13].

The contrasting use of occasional expressions and objective expressions may be illustrated in the story of the groom who turns to his newly wed wife as soon as the ceremony is finished and says, "I love you. My terms are defined in Webster's dictionary. Please remember what I have just said because I am not going to tell you again".

That persons in the course of ordinary conversation can convey information to each other without undue loss, distortion, misrepresentation, or misunderstanding, or that they can sustain a line of concerted interaction with each other while using "occasional expressions" seems to mean that they subscribe to the "unstated common understandings" that "any person like us" could be assumed to know in a more or less similar and typical way. The possibility of continuous discourse that involves small amounts of incongruity or error means that persons converse through the use of occasional expressions by employing as tacit schemes of interpretation and expression such matters as assumed mutual biographies, or various stereotyped notions about the regularities of group life that persons assume govern their participation with their fellow-conversationalists.

Since everyday discourse is the place where occasional expressions abound, their presence in professional sociological discourse is of particular interest because their occurrence points immediately to the possibility that routinized, collectivity-governed, stable interactions between sociologists are critical conditions that sociologists require each other to consult in assigning sensibility and warrant to each other's reports.

[12] FARBER, Marvin, *The Foundation of Phenomenology*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1943, pp. 237-238.

[13] KAUFMANN, *op.cit.*, pp. 166-168.

Sanctioned essential vagueness. Another important logical property of empirical constructions in common-sense descriptions is their specific vagueness in referring to phenomena of social life. By specific vagueness is meant that such constructions do not frame a clearly restricted set of possibilities. By the property of *essential* vagueness, I mean that described objects include as their invariantly intended feature an accompanying "surplus" of meaning, and that this "surplus" is a feature for the adequate recognition of the described object. Further, this essential vagueness of such constructions is expected and sanctioned as a condition of their correct use.

Within the rules of ideal formal scientific discourse, this property is counted an unfortunate error. According to the actual rules of formal scientific discourse, this property is counted a practical nuisance. In both cases remedies are urged according to the ideal that "primitive" terms be acknowledged and their number minimized.

By contrast, attempts to remedy this feature in common-sense discourse by "cutting away the surplus" through insisting, for example, that discourse abide by the ideals of rational clarity, consistency, and literalness, is commonly experienced by interactants as a withholding or withdrawal of solidarity, affection, and approval. The person who insists on such canons for the use of descriptions *in conducting his everyday interactions* may be treated as unreasonable, a pedant, a boor, a showoff, impractical, disloyal, other-wordly, obstinate, egotistic, distrustful — in effect, lacking in common sense in the sense that he is an outsider to the normative order of proper discourse in the group that defines how one must talk if he is to fulfil his obligations to be understood and be entitled to be understood. He is the person who does not appreciate reasonable discourse; he does not engage in "plain talk".

"Pretence of agreement". In conveying "matters known in common", persons convey them while entertaining as a legitimate expectation that the other person *will* understand. The speaker expects that the other will assign to his remarks the sense intended by the speaker, and that thereby the other will permit the speaker the assumption that both know what he is talking about without any requirement of a check-out. Thus the sensible character of the matter that is being discussed is settled by a fiat assignment, which each makes to the other and expects the other to make in return, that as a condition of competent membership each will have furnished whatever unstated understandings are required. Much, therefore, of what is actually being talked about in "reasonable discourse" is not mentioned, although each expects that the adequate sense of the matter that is being talked about is settled. Edward R. Rose[14] has suggested

[14] Personal communication.

that this legitimate expectation of understanding be called the "pretence of agreement".

Departures from the use of occasional expressions, essential vagueness, and the pretence of agreement call forth immediate attempts to restore their use as a desired state of affairs. Their socially sanctioned use may be illustrated in the results of the following procedure.

Students in the author's course were instructed to engage a person in ordinary conversation and, without indicating that what the experimenter was saying was in any way out of the ordinary, to insist that the person clarify the sense of his commonplace remarks. Twenty-three students reported twenty-five instances of such encounters. The following are typical excerpts from their accounts.

Case 1. The subject was telling the experimenter, a member of the subject's car pool, about having had a flat tire while going to work the previous day.

(S) I had a flat tire.
(E) What do you mean, you had a flat tire ?
"She appeared momentarily stunned. Then she answered in a hostile way: 'What do you mean, "What do you mean ?" A flat tire is a flat tire. That is what I meant. Nothing special. What a crazy question !' "

Case 2.

(S) Hi, Ray. How is your girl friend feeling ?
(E) What do you mean, how is she feeling ? Do you mean physical or mental ?
(S) I mean how is she feeling ? What's the matter with you ? (He looked peeved).
(E) Nothing. Just explain a little clearer what you mean.
(S) Skip it. How are your Med School applications coming ?
(E) What do you mean, 'How are they ?'
(S) You know what I mean.
(E) I really don't.
(S) What's the matter with you ? Are you sick ?

Case 3.

On Friday night my husband and I were watching television. My husband remarked that he was tired. I asked, "How are you tired ? Physically, mentally, or just bored ?"
(S) I don't know, I guess physically, mainly.

(E) You mean that your muscles ache, or your bones ?
(S) I guess so. Don't be so technical.
(After more watching.)
(S) All these old movies have the same kind of old iron bedstead in them.
(E) What do you mean ? Do you mean all old movies, or some of them, or just the ones you have seen ?
(S) What's the matter with you ? You know what I mean.
(E) I wish you would be more specific.
(S) You know what I mean ! Drop dead !

Case 4.

"My friend said to me, 'Hurry or we will be late'. I asked him what did he mean by late and from what point of view did it have reference. There was a look of perplexity and cynicism on his face. 'Why are you asking me such silly questions ? Surely I don't have to explain such a statement. What is wrong with you today ? Why should I have to stop to analyze such a statement ? Everyone understands my statements and you should be no exception'."

Case 5.

"The victim waved his hand cheerily".
(S) How are you ?
(E) How am I in regard to what ? My health, my finance, my school work, my peace of mind, my...
(S) (Red in the face and suddenly out of control.) Look. I was just trying to be polite. Frankly, I don't give a damn how you are.

Retrospective-prospective sense. The sense of propositions that make up the corpus is commonly arrived at through a retrospective-prospective appreciation of their meanings. This means that as of any present moment of an exchange, the sense of the matter being referred to is decided by an auditor by assuming not only what has been said so far but what will have been said in the future course of the utterances. Such sets of propositions require of the auditor that he assume, as of any present accomplished point in the interaction, that by waiting for what the other person says at a later time, the present significances of what has already been said or done will have been clarified. Such propositions have the property of being progressively realized through the further course of the interaction.

The foregoing properties may be summarized by saying that the propositions of the common-sense corpus do not have a sense that

is independent of the socially structured occasions on which they are used.

Further properties of the set of such propositions may be mentioned briefly.

(a) The propositions that comprise common-sense accounts typically are unwritten, uncodified, and are passed on from one person to a successor through a system of apprenticeship in their use. (b) Various social-psychological researches have demonstrated the sense of a proposition to be a function of the place of the proposition in a serial order; of the expressive character of the terms that comprise it; of the socially acknowledged importance of the events that are depicted; of the relevance to the need dispositions of the user, of what is being referred to — to mention a few. (c) Their sense is structurally equivocal, being dependent upon the developing course of the occassions of their use. Like a conversation, their sense is built up step by step over the actual course of references to them. (d) As of any present state of affairs, the sense of what a proposition now proposes includes the anticipated, though sketchily known, future further references that will have accrued to it. Its present sense for a user is informed by the user's willingness to continue in the progressive realization of its sense by further elaboration and transformation. This feature is commonly referred to as the "spirit" of the proposition.

Conclusion

All scientific disciplines have their great prevailing problems to which the methods of the particular discipline represent solutions. In sociology, in the social sciences generally, as well as in the inquiries of everyday life, a prominent problem is that of achieving a unified conception of events that have as their specific formal property that their present character will have been decided by a future possible outcome. Motivated actions, for example, have precisely this troublesome property. It is a matter of great theoretical and methodological import that Max Weber should have defined sociology as the study of human activities insofar as they are governed in their course by the subjective meanings attached to them. In this programmatic statement, Weber provided for this troublesome feature as an essential property of sociology's fundamental occurrences.

The documentary method consists essentially in the retrospective-prospective reading of a present occurrence so as to maintain the constancy of the object as a sensible thing through temporal and circumstantial alterations in its actual appearances. Thereby it shows its particular usefulness as a method that is capable of handling events having this particular time structure. The documentary method occurs as a feature of situations of incomplete information in which effective

actions nevertheless must be taken, matters of fact decided, and interpretations made. The method would seem to be an intimate part of a social process wherein a body of knowledge must be assembled and made available for legitimate use despite the fact that the situations it purports to describe (1) are, in the calculable sense of the term, unknown; (2) are in their actual and intended logical structures essentially vague; and (3) are modified, elaborated, extended, if not indeed created, by the fact and manner of being addressed.

Some Contributions of Dynamic Psychology to the Sociology of Knowledge

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The paper presented under this heading at the meeting on the sociology of knowledge held at the Fourth World Congress of Sociology was an attempt to show the implications of dynamic psychology for some key problems of the sociology of knowledge. Dynamic psychology was defined as the various streams of thought emerging from Freud which have found expression in the theories of Freud's more orthodox followers, as well as in Karen Horney, Harry Stack Sullivan, and in Erich Fromm (the school of psycho-analysis), and in C. G. Jung and his more or less orthodox followers (the school of analytical psychology). Sociology was defined as the science of man's social existence, and knowledge was considered to be the result of man's cognitive encounter with reality. The central problem of sociology of knowledge was formulated as the question: "How does man's social existence affect his cognitive encounter with reality?" I pointed out that this question cannot be examined without also posing some correlate ontological question as to the nature of reality in general and the problem of true natural functions in particular. I also indicated that it is a task of the sociology of knowledge to be an aid in the realization of a true consciousness, thus posing the question of true and false consciousness. The necessity to cut my paper to roughly one half of its original length makes it impossible to deal with the various aspects of these problems included in my presentation at Stresa. I have, therefore, decided to focus this paper exclusively on my central argument, to omit the discussion of the ontological implications, and to mention only in passing the question of true and false consciousness. Readers interested in these questions may obtain the original version of my paper from me.

For this paper I am selecting only two of many insights of dynamic psychology which are important for the central problem of a sociology of knowledge as defined above: (1) Recent clinical findings suggest a theory of mental health based on criteria which are objective in the sense of applying to all people irrespective of individual peculiarities or "subjective" factors, and which are universal in the sense of referring to the human species rather than to particular cul-

tures. They may be considered "absolute" in the sense of being the ultimate reference point of all other insights and considerations in regard to man and the human community. But—and this brings us to the second point — 2) these criteria are "relative" in the sense that they are part of a developmental process in which not only the individual person but mankind as a whole participate.

These findings have not yet been brought together in the form of a coherent theory substantiated by methods generally accepted by social scientistis [1]. But there is sufficient evidence to deal with them as hypotheses of great fruitfulness for further research and theorizing. The newly emerging conception of mental health starts from experiments showing that man is not a *tabula rasa,* not merely an impressive film neutrally accepting the impress of outer stimuli and forming a pattern of attitudes expressing purely subjective needs and/or conforming to peculiar patterns of culture [2]. Psychic processes are not "merely subjective" but partake of the objectivity of lawful events. Though they are inner processes, they show certain transpersonal and transcultural characteristics. There are not only definite processes which are of such a nature [3], but man has needs and purposes given to him by nature which a culture and society can disregard only up to a certain point without imposing a price of illness. Man has a true nature which is expressed in his highest potential and he has inherent needs and drives to realize this nature. Whether we speak about "self-actualization", as Maslow does [4], or about "centroversion"

[1] What A. H. Maslow says about his "new concept of normality" applies here:" The new frame of reference... is still in process of development and construction. It cannot be said to be clearly seen yet or reliably supported by incontestable evidence at the moment. It is fair to characterize it rather as a slowly developing concept or theory that seems more and more probably to be true direction of future development... Specifically my prediction or guess about the future of the normality idea is that some from of theory about generalized, species-wide, psychological health will soon be developed, which will hold for all human beings no matter what their culture and no matter what their time. This is taking place on empirical as well as on theoretical ground. This new form of thinking has been forced by new facts, new data"... See A. H. Maslow, *Motivation and Personality,* New York, 1954, p. 339.

[2] No attempt can be made here to list the relevant literature. Experiments made by Gesell and Ilg are significant in this context. The observations made in Bruno Bettelheim's *Symbolic Wounds: Puberty Rites and the Envious Male,* London, 1955, are particularly relevant because there is nothing in Bettelheim's psychological-philosophical orientation which may have steered him in this direction. See Bettelheim, *op.cit.,* particularly pp. 27-45.

[3] Many of the expressions of what Freud called "the archaic" and Jung the "collective" unconscious are of this nature. See Sigmund Freud, *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego,* London, 1922, p. 18, and C. G. Jung, *Two Essays in Analytical Psychology,* London, 1928, pp. 94 ff.

[4] See Maslow, *op.cit.,* pp. 199 ff.

as Neumann does [5], or about "the heterogenic drive", to use Mayman's terminology [6], clinical and ethnographic evidence has clearly shown compensatory processes manifesting themselves *inter alia* in a tendency for growth, for self-realization and fulfilment of the inherent potentialities and purposes of man. The basic causes of many types of neurosis are not lack of adjustment to cultural standards but conflicts between man's "self" (in C. G. Jung's terms) or his "real self" (in Erich Fromm's terms), on the one hand, and his cultural adaptation, on the other hand. These tendencies centred around the "self" express forces tending toward fulfilment, balance, and harmony which are not rooted in the peculiarities and relativities of human culture but which are rooted in man as a human being [7].

There would indeed be no sociology of knowledge if man did not have an inherent striving for unity and harmony of proportions. Man strives for a unity between his existence — which is always social existence — and his understanding of his existence. This is the basic psychological premise of every sociology of knowledge since it accounts for the intimate relationship between "reality" and "thought". But the existence of universal psychological processes and phenomena has a much more far-reaching significance. It necessitates a new conception of society as a unity in which two basic forces interpenetrate. On the one hand, there are the universal forces which are generally human in character and emanate from what I shall call the *human collective*. On the other hand, we are familiar with a variety of forces peculiar to a specific culture and emanating from what I shall call the *cultural collective*. The *social collective* or society, that is, the reality of social life in which man exists, consists of an indivisible dynamic unity of the human collective and the cultural collective. It is an indivisible unity because the cultural collective is a derivative of the human collective and can exist only in relation to the human collective. And it is a dynamic unity because the cultural collective derives its ultimate dynamics, its basic driving forces, from the human collective. The human collective contains not only the roots of the dynamic forces shaping society. It also "contains" the universal, objective criteria of health. Hence every culture must satisfy the basic needs and purposes given to man as man — at least to a minimal degree necessary for the maintenance of mental health. As is well known, the specific manner in which basic human needs are satisfied varies greatly from culture to culture. Every culture concretizes the forces of the human collective in its own way. Yet this process of concretization is not simply a shift from the universal and general to

[5] See Erich NEUMANN, *The Origins and History of Consciousness*, New York, 1954, pp. 286 ff.

[6] M. MAYMAN, "The diagnosis of Mental Health", published, n.d., Menninger Foundation. Quoted in Marie Jahoda, *Current Concepts of Positive Mental Health*, New York, 1958, p. 33.

[7] See, for example, Gerhard ADLER, "Notes Regarding the Dynamics of the Self", *British Journal of Medical Psychology*, Vol. XXIV, Part 2, 1951.

the specific of a time-bound culture. All concretization means selection. A culture takes, so to speak, one of the manifold potentials of man and molds it according to specific criteria for selection. Selection, again, does not consist only in choosing one or several aspects of a universal. It also implies an attribution of proportion to what is chosen. It would be quite wrong to interpret this as indicating that the human collective contains all that is true, good or beautiful and that culture is, as such, estranging man from these positive values. Health and sickness, truth and falsehood, beauty and ugliness are part of both the human and the cultural collective. Whatever the possible relationship between these forces may be, what matters here is the basic distinction between, on the one hand, the forces emanating from the human collective which entail universal, objective standards of truth (or of falsehood and estrangement) and, on the other hand, those forces emanating from the cultural collective which form selective, relative and hence one-sided and usually disproportioned standards of what is true and false, genuine and estranged.

Speaking in terms of dynamic psychology, we may say that two psychic entities bind the forces shaping man's conception of right and wrong, true and false: man's conscience and man's superego. In the superego, those forces are bound which express the cultural standards of right and wrong, true and false. In the conscience, those forces are bound which express the corresponding human standards. Superego standards are relative, a product of the cultural collective, expressing what has been called the "social character" [8]. Standards of conscience are absolute-universal, rooted in the human collective.

Though we do not have any large-scale studies to indicate the exact nature of the strength of superego- and conscience-bound forces, it seems likely that men may be distributed along a bell-shaped curve of distribution (a normal curve of error resulting from pure chance), as far as the determinative influence of the human and cultural collectives are concerned. The large number of people at the centre of the bell-shaped curve are predominantly influenced by the cultural collective. At one extreme of the curve we find those — a minority — who deviate from the cultural norms of truth and righteousness because they have bodily-psychic characteristics which make it impossible for them to identify with the culturally determined norms. Their superego formation is inadequate, and they are symbolized by the psychopath. At the other extreme of the curve are those who have transcended the developmental stage where the superego rules supreme (since it does rule supreme for all people at a certain stage of their development) [9] and have achieved a relatedness to the human

[8] A good summary of the implications of this concept can be found in Erich FROMM, *The Fear of Freedom*, London, 1942, Appendix.

[9] See Jean PIAGET, *The Moral Judgment of the Child*, London, 1932, pp. 56 ff.

collective in which an autonomous conscience predominates though none of us is free from elements of superego determination). This part of the curve is symbolized by the prophet.

Though existential reality and conceptual awareness vary according to man's distribution along this curve, everybody (and everything) that exists has two interpenetrating yet distinct structures: (1) a true and universal nature which contains the forces tending toward the realization of man's true values, and which may be conceived in terms of natural functions; and (2) a relative nature containing forces tending toward the realization of the concretized-specific values of a culture. These forces are bound to express the true nature only partially and hence to deviate to some extent from man's true nature. These relative forces may be conceived in terms of cultural functions.

In order to understand better the interpenetration of the forces of the human and of the cultural collective and the problems which their interplay poses for society, we must now introduce the second major finding of dynamic psychology with which we are dealing in this paper, namely the developmental aspects of psychic processes. The history of man gives evidence of a development of consciousness which manifests itself in the life of the individual as well as in the life of mankind. The infant's world is at first relatively undifferentiated, that is, his interaction with his world is determined primarily by affective emotional components of the psyche; he is totally bound in psychic as well as physical dependency on the family-group around him; and he only gradually learns rudimentary distinctions between himself, other people, and objects. As the child gradually matures he passes through various stages of development, each representing a state of more conscious differentiation of his own potentialities and corresponding integration centred on newly-conscious "powers" or elements of the psyche. As his consciousness develops step by step, molded by the world of culture but also following inherent needs and potentialities, elements of his dependent affective infantile psyche are brought into interaction with the world under the guidance of a more independent, individualized ego-consciousness; a child cannot, without psychological illness, be restrained beyond a certain point from growing psychically according to his own inner laws any more than he can be restrained from growing physically.

The history of man shows significant parallels with the history of the individual in the dynamic processes which are at work. At the dawn of man's history, collective or group consciousness and dependence prevailed, and interaction involved primarily the affective-emotional components of the psyche. As man's history unfolded, we see a *differentiation* of man's collective consciousness and the emergence of new types of *integration* centred on the individual or person rather than on the group. With this differentiation came the possibility of distinguishing different types of cognitive encounters with different

elements of reality. Until a certain stage of development of consciousness had been reached it was as impossible for historical man as it is for the young child to be aware of the possibility of distinguishing between "inner" and "outer", between spheres of "nature" and "spirit", between "the collective unit" and "the individual", between "affect" and "thought", etc. The greater the differentiation, the greater the possibility for "reason" [10] to guide "passion", for the "reality principle" to control the "pleasure principle", while still retaining the essential values of the earlier forms of integration.

But it is of utmost importance to recognize that this gradual development of a higher consciousness capable of guiding and integrating more "primitive" elements of the personality is not simply a unilinear process, as unsophisticated theories of progress tend to assume. It is a process in which destructive-disintegrative forces may prevail and lead to the decline of a culture. Nor is it a short-run phenomenon which could be measured in a few generations or fractions of a century. New stages in the development of consciousness are hard-won achievements, the fruits of long, psychologically and often socially dangerous struggles during which old modes of consciousness break down — that is, are differentiated — while new forms of integration may be formed only with a considerable time lag. Each stage of integration in the individual, as each major cultural system in history, is centred on some particular potentiality in man which is rooted in the human collective, to the partial or temporarily nearly complete exclusion of other inherent potentialities. But because of the inherent movement toward wholeness, "health", or "salvation", these "other potentialities" outside the major centre of integration cannot be permanently excluded from consciousness (repressed, arbitrarily ignored by the cultural collective). They form a counterpole, in the unconscious, to the major centre of integration, tending to break down the exclusive and relatively overdeveloped control of the major centre. They initiate a compensatory process to the overdevelopment of the one potentiality, and thus usher in a new period of differentiation, breakdown, and struggle. There is as little reason to assume that the "final" stage reached by any specific culture is the ultimate which man can achieve as there is reason to assume that the insights presently reached by natural scientists will be the final insights into the nature of the universe.

These insights into developmental aspects of psychic processes again suggest the need for a new conceptualization of the nature of man and his society, a conceptualization based on the interplay of the forces emanating from the human, and those emanating from the cul-

[10] Reason, in this context, should not be confused with analytical-logical rationality. Rather it is an attribute of man which applies to affect as well as to thought. A conscious-differentiated emotion is "reasonable" in the sense here used.

tural, collectives. We must now deal explicitly with the interplay of these forces in so far as it is relevant for an understanding of the interrelationships between man's social existence and the systems of thought which he develops. I shall deal in this discussion with total systems of thought, that is with major world views as developed by the great cultures and/or by major epochs of various cultures.

The fact that every system of thought reflects the stage of the development of consciousness which has been achieved in a particular society is most important. The development of consciousness must be attributed to the human collective since it expresses structures of being which are universal potentials. Every system of thought must, therefore, first be understood in terms of the degree of its differentiation and the nature of its integration. Great caution is necessary in making such an assessment. We cannot say — to illustrate this point — that Western culture, as distinguished from Eastern culture (these terms understood to be analogous to Max Weber's distinction based on the process of rationalization), expresses a higher or lower development of consciousness. In the West, analytical rationality is certainly much more differentiated than in the East — a distinction, however, which is quickly disappearing in our time. But in the East, the differentiation of what Northrop calls the aesthetic continuum has been much more developed than in the West[11]. However, we can say that certain African cultures are at a lower stage in the development of consciousness because their general level of differentiation is lower and hence the nature of integration is less conscious.

Speaking in general terms, we may say that the degree or general level of differentiation is expressed, and must therefore be examined, in terms of the respective development of (1) projections, rationalizations, etc., (2) symbolic associations, and (3) analytical-conceptual associations.

(1) Since the development of consciousness is an ongoing process and since there are always elements in our psyche of which we are unconscious, each system of thought — each world view — is a composite of conscious, differentiated elements and unconscious elements, the latter entering into the world view as one form or another of projections, rationalizations, etc. Unconscious elements are an integral formative element of every system of thought, and the processes of projection through which unconscious elements participate in a world view are far more varied and subtle than is commonly realized. The most familiar type of projection is (a) that by which we impute to other people or groups of people motives, tendencies, or attitudes which they may not, in fact, have. Unconscious, that is undifferentiated, elements may manifest themselves also by (b) giving psychic

[11] F. S. C. Northrop, *The Meeting of East and West: An Inquiry Concerning World Understanding*, New York, 1946, pp. 375 ff.

reality to entities which do not have reality in the sense of having consciousness of their own, such as tribal or national entities. Furthermore, they may manifest themselves in society (c) as idealizations of what exists (this type of projection may reveal a thwarted need for security or wholeness which is not in fact possible within the reality of the existing social structure, and can be seen as a significant element in the psychical mechanisms maintaining "ideologies"). Rationalizations also contain an unconscious element since they are rooted in some affective aspect of personality which is not recognized.

The so-called *a priori* assumptions of scientific thought belong to the borderline between unconscious-projective and conscious-rational thought. We are aware of them (or at least of some of them) but cannot derive them from anything else by a rational analysis nor prove their rightness or wrongness. As our consciousness is broadening, certain *a priori* assumptions lose their *a priori* character and enter the realm of verifiable conscious elements.

It is important to emphasize that not all projections are "negative" (that is, involving undesirable or destructive elements), nor are projections necessarily false or untrue. Revisions of Freud's concept of the "id" have led to the recognition that the unconscious, undifferentiated sphere of the psyche contains powerful potentialities, not only for "primitive" instinctual behaviour, but also for the growth and development of constructive, creative life forces. It follows that the projected elements of the unconscious may include positive, socially constructive elements or psychic truths which cannot at a given stage be fully realized in conscious, differentiated thought. However, the main point in this context is that it is the relatively undifferentiated contents of the psyche which are projected, and hence by examining the nature and extent of the projections we have a key for understanding both the general level of consciousness and the peculiar orientation of a particular cultural system. Since only some elements of the potentials of the psyche are clearly differentiated, it follows that the extent of differentiation is inversely related to the extent of projections. The more differentiated and conscious psychical elements become, the less will they be projected. This is the first key in evaluating and understanding the level of development and nature of consciousness of a given cultural pattern.

(2) As elements of the psyche become differentiated and enter the realm of consciousness, they may be experienced as symbolic or analytical forms of associations. So-called primitive cultures are characterized by a prevalence of symbolic associations integrally admixed with a great degree of projection. This is reflected in certain primitive languages which have a concrete symbolism. It would be quite wrong, however, to identify symbolic associations with the primitive mentality as such. Poetry, painting, art and literature owe their

ferentiated symbolic associations. And the basic insights of dynamic psychology used in this paper owe their existence to interpretations of symbolic associations, and many of the problems of validation and refinement of dynamic psychology must be worked out with the cooperation and "cross-fertilization" of other students concerned with the role of the symbol in anthropology, philosophy, history, sociology, etc. — perhaps especially sociology of knowledge.

We cannot do more here than to point out that symbolic association is an important form of consciousness, and may be a major element in a system of thought. Symbolic thought is subject to differentiation, development and reintegration, as shown in the various types of oriental world views. That it is not a static phenomenon is also shown by the historic development of various art forms. Since symbolic thought expresses an important aspect of the structure of consciousness, the differentiation and development of symbolic thought is a second index of the general level of the development and the peculiar nature of a given culture.

(3) The third aspect of systems of thought with which we are dealing here is the analytical-conceptual associations which form the analytical logical aspects of a world view or system of thought. A division of systems of thought into "pre-logical" and "logical" systems should not be misinterpreted as indicating absence of logic in the pre-logical stage nor exclusive prevalence of logic in later stages. Malinowski has clearly shown the ability of so-called primitives to think logically [12]. But it does mean, and is justified as a distinction in this sense, that in the development of consciousness there may be such a shift in the central type or form of thought processes that clearly distinguishable patterns of culture and thought emerge. Western culture, for example, is in central areas of its life and thought so dominated by analytical-logical thought forms, so separated from creative consciousness of the realm of symbolic associations, that symbolic thought is experienced as belonging only to alien ("irrational") cultures rather than being a common heritage of man rooted in the human collective. Actually, all existence has an analytical-logical and a symbolic aspect, but as we pointed out earlier, the aspects or human potentials which are not realized consciously in a given world-view are manifested as projections and may be experienced as "irrational" elements.

It may be of value to trace the development of patterns of analytical-logical thought as seen from the point of view of Western civilization along the following lines: (1) unconscious-instinctive

[12] Bronislaw MALINOWSKI, *Magic, Science, and Religion,* New York, 1925, quoted in *Personality, Work, Community: An Introduction to Social Science,* selected, written, edited by A. Naftalin, B. N. Nelson, Mulford Q. Sibley, and D. C. Calhoun, Chicago, 1953, pp. 121 ff.

distinctive nature to their integration into meaningful forms of dif-knowledge, corresponding to absence of any world-image and almost identity of perception and response; (2) vaguely differentiated knowledge which is archetypal in nature, the archetype expressing the first awareness of an image (animism, totemism, etc., illustrate this stage); (3) knowledge which takes the form of "ideas", illustrated in the Platonic idea, which is much more differentiated and more abstract than the belief in spirits but which lacks the precision of (4) the concept which is most differentiated and universal and most clearly defined in terms of an analytical-logical-operational language — culminating in the operational "language" of mathematics. Such a classification contains generally human lines of development but it also contains peculiar elements of the relatively one-sided development of Western culture. By contrast, the East has developed a differentiation of symbolic thought patterns more articulate than anything developed in the West. Yet though each culture has developed one form of thought-pattern more than the other, there are elements of both symbolic and analytical-logical associations in any total system of thought.

Just as music is an art form which has mathematical elements conceptually expressed in the theory of harmony, so all social realities, as suggested before, have *both* an analytical-conceptual and a symbolic aspect. Yet at different stages of the development of consciousness, the nature, the role, the "distribution", and the type of experience of these elements differ greatly. Numbers provide a simple illustration of this fact. They are the elements of the most abstract analytical thought. But throughout history, they have played a major symbolic role. The number three, for example, has had potent symbolic meaning as the Trinity in Christian culture, and as triads of spiritual forces in early Greek and in ancient Egyptian cultures. The number twelve has had a special symbolic meaning in most cultures. At a certain stage of Chinese development, this symbolic meaning was so prevalent that the number twelve was experienced as "more" than the number thirteen. This has been taken as an illustration of the relativity of all knowledge since it was supposed to show that even the most basic categories of thought, such as number, differ in different cultures. What it rather illustrates is that there are common attributes of the human collective which may be emphasized quite differently in different cultures but which are always "there" in some form. Though the Chinese emphasized the symbolic meaning of twelve, they are able to use mathematical quantifications when necessary, and though in our culture the prevalent form of consciousness of numbers is mathematical, nevertheless twelve has many associations with "wholeness" (twelve disciples and other Judeo-Christian symbolism, counting by dozens, number of hours and months, etc.). This illustrates the point we have been making, that different forms of thought (symbolic or analytical-logical) express different types (and hence different degrees) of consciousness of spe-

cific aspects of reality [13], and that no one form of thought is equivalent to the total potential of consciousness.

We may, therefore, conclude that the examination of the degree of consciousness, or the general level of consciousness, as it manifests itself in the (1) absence or presence of projections, (2) the development of symbolic, and of (3) analytical-logical thought is the first stage of analysis of a sociology of knowledge. As an actual empirical procedure, this process is inseparable from what is here considered to be the second stage of analysis: an actual indication of what areas of the total potential consciousness are differentiated, and in which way. As we have pointed out repeatedly, systems of thought differ not only in terms of the general level of differentiation but also in terms of those aspects of reality which are brought into consciousness and those which are not. The emphasis of any culture on certain aspects of reality which are brought into consciousness and the relative neglect of those which are left in the unconscious is tantamount to a selection and development of certain value-potentials which exist universally in the undifferentiated unconscious. Patterns of culture and patterns of thought are essentially patterns of values which differ in terms of the locus and intensity of differentiation and the nature of integration. It follows that a system of thought must be examined in an interrelated analysis of (1) areas, (2) modes, and (3) degrees in which (1) projective, (2) symbolic and (3) analytical thought elements occur.

Some examples have been given and innumerable more could be presented to illustrate how different systems of thought and types of culture can be better understood by a systematic development of the kind of interrelated analysis suggested. But it is not only a question of a better understanding of culture, or total world views, as such. What we are concerned with in this paper is a better understanding of the interrelationship between these world views as expressed in systems of thought and the social reality. I believe that we cannot begin to explain in which way and to what extent a system of thought is "determined" by society or "correlated" with it unless we analyze the forces emanating from the cultural and the human collective along the lines suggested here. And without a differentiation between these two collectives, one encompassing the universal characteristics of human nature and the other embodying its partial, particular cultural manifestations, the term "social" remains as ambiguous and unsatisfactory as it is in a good deal of the literature on the sociology of knowledge.

The second reason why this kind of analysis of man's social existence is essential consists in the need for a dynamic understanding of

[13] For a different interpretation, see Werner STARK, *The Sociology of Knowledge*, London, 1958, p. 161.

society. Such a dynamic understanding requires an examination of the forces emanating from the human and cultural collectives because we can understand the social process only if we have at least a general understanding of the laws which influence this process. Of particular importance to the understanding of social dynamics is the compensatory tendency effective in the human collective. The need for balance, for a redress of one-sided emphasis, usually activates a counter-movement to the over-emphasized process. If this were not so, we could not find the elements of a dialectic movement in history.

Let us examine how some recent historical elements may be understood in terms of the suggested framework of social dynamics, and, in particular, how compensatory processes are involved. We have already pointed out that Western culture has differentiated, developed, and used as a central point of integration, analytical-logical patterns of thought (though elements of other types of thought have to some extent existed alongside the central tendency). But the more, analytical-rational thought has dominated the central consciousness of truth in the West, the more it has tended to exclude awareness of other elements of human reality, leading to a markedly one-sided emphasis on rationality combined with a shallow and limited conception of human nature. Tendencies compensatory to this one-sidedness are to be found in the outbreak of irrationality which marked the first half of the twentieth century. Rationality, combined with atomization of the individual and similar one-sided processes, helps explain the rediscovery of the group, the rise of the organization man, etc. In order for these specific manifestations to become meaningful, it is necessary to examine them as part of a broad counter movement which must be understood in its general dynamics. The neglect of a significant element in the human psyche usually provokes a counter-movement, which is generally the more irrational, the more deeply the element in question is repressed. Erich Neumann has given us a broad analysis of the compensatory forces which are activated in our time in terms of the trend toward "recollectivization" [14]; Erich Fromm has analyzed similar aspects in terms of man's "escape from freedom" [15]; and Gerhard Adler has combined these two types of analysis in the last chapter of his *Studies in Analytical Psychology* [16]. These are a few illustrations of compensatory processes which — in connection with specific modes of differentiation and integration — help to understand the transformation of cultures and changes in world-views.

[14] NEUMANN, *op.cit.*, Appendix II, "Mass Man and the Phenomena of Recollectivization", pp. 436 ff.

[15] FROMM, *op.cit.*, particularly pp. 89 ff.

[16] Gerhard ADLER, *Studies in Analytical Psychology*, New York, 1948, pp. 217 ff.

These processes are part of the laws and dynamics of the human collective and must be considered as an independent variable or variables since they have a dynamic of their own. I am, therefore, questioning the whole conceptualization, of the society-thought relationship in terms of "substructure" and "superstructure". Although it it is not possible even to begin to examine the full implications and meaning of this challenge, a few important points pertaining to the broad substructure-superstructure problem must be made here. First, we should point to a fundamental problem involving a circularity of reasoning which occurs in the many writers — Karl Mannheim not excepted — who have mystified the "social substructure" and given it a dynamic power without a clear indication of the locus of this power [12]. In fact, a good deal of the social substructure consists of what Max Weber called "artifacts" — dead instruments which have no power except as means for the achievement of social purposes. But we must point out that to become such a means presupposes that the artifacts enter into a context of means and ends which is, at least potentially, as much determined by man's ideas as by what may be called the material-technological elements in the social process. Yet as soon as we admit the presence of "ideas" or "value-facts" in the substructure, we are lost in a circularity of reasoning which needs more than a "functional analysis" to be overcome [18].

I believe that a good deal of the mystification of the role of the social substructure must itself be explained in sociological terms. The sociology of knowledge based on Marx and Mannheim has been influenced by a culture and a consciousness in which man has given up his power of determining his fate to "substructural" forces outside his control. Marx espoused this consciousness because he was sure that the dynamic forces outside man's control would bring the proletariat into power and would thus transform (rather mysteriously) the realm of necessity into the realm of freedom. His acceptance of the technological-social-action patterns had a "utopian" significance, in Mannheim's terms. The bourgeois "ideologists", on the other hand, seem to have been so dazed by the society whose most basic premises they reflected in their thought that they could not visualize an alternative relationship between thought — as expressed in consciously chosen values — and the unconscious dynamism of the society of which they were a part.

No matter what we may think on this point, there is no evidence

[17] See, for example, Karl MANNHEIM, *Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge*, London, 1952, Chapter IV, "The Problem of a Sociology of Knowledge", particularly pp. 185 ff.

[18] See a discussion of these points in STARK, *op.cit.*, esp. pp. 105, 245 ff. What Werner Stark considers his "chief and crowning argument" as regards individual freedom and social determination can hardly be considered as a proof of his thesis (see p. 295).

to say that a specific social situation evokes clearly determinate thought patterns. The closer certain strata of the middle classes came to a "proletarian" existence, for example, the more they refused to espouse a proletarian ideology. It remains true that there is a correspondence, and in a more limited sense a "determination", of social situations and the modal thought patterns. But we cannot explain the dynamics of the social process in terms of a succession of modal thought patterns unless we want to espouse a purely mechanistic explanation of successive technical changes inducing changes in thought. Furthermore, we prejudice our insight into the relationship between man's social existence and man's world view if we interpret this relationship within a conceptual framework that excludes historical situations in which thought-patterns and world views play an important and perhaps decisive role. Can it be denied that the "Marxist consciousness" is an element in the present world situation which has an "autonomous" influence of its own ? Or that historians explaining the failure of the West to stem the rising tide of communism will have to refer to the "false consciousness" of America's identification of "free enterprise" with "freedom" — that is, that they must take into consideration not only personal and group interests and power problems, not only "capitalism", revised or otherwise, not only the pattern of social relationships which buttress the false consciousness, but that false consciousness itself as an independent variable operating in a specific historical situation ? Or, to go one step further, who would deny at least the possibility of man's gaining that degree of control over his own destiny that would allow him to shape the forces determining society in terms of those values which constitute his world view ? It is this problem of the autonomy of consciously chosen values — and hence autonomy of thought — which raises the most basic issues in regard to the substructure-superstructure conceptualization.

One of the reasons for the scepticism of many sociologists of knowledge in accepting any autonomous role of "ideas" is that they conceive thought in terms of some abstract ideas, some analytical-logical conceptualization. This is partly due to the neglect of the role of the human collective. It could also be that there is too much of a reaction against Hegelian idealism. The sociology of knowledge should not take identifications of the absolute with the Prussian state as a model of thought against which to react, since it is obviously a false model. The sociology of knowledge should be concerned with total systems of thought or world-views which are deeply rooted in man's whole affectual side and hence presuppose an understanding of the totality of man as expressed in the differentiation and integration of consciousness. The sociology of knowledge should turn its attention to total systems of thought which are or may become vital forces in society.

The functionalist point of view and those supporting the theory

of elective affinity have gone a long way in that direction. I am suggesting as a further step that we should eliminate the substructure-superstructure conceptualization and think in terms of *forces* emanating from the various spheres making up man's social existence. Systems of thought and world views originate in a field of forces. This field, which is society, is constituted by the interrelationship of the forces emanating from the human collective and those emanating from the particular cultural collective. The constellation of these forces varies greatly at different periods of history. Since it is one of the tasks of the sociology of knowledge to determine the peculiar relationship between social existence and systems of thought typical of various periods in history, the relationship between the manifold forces operative in the field of society should not be prejudged. However, it would be unsatisfactory to leave the formulation of a framework within which the sociology of knowledge should operate in such an indefinite shape. This framework can, indeed, become much more definite by deriving from the general psychological processes, discussed previously, two further basic postulates: (1) Among the multitude of forces which shape society, we can usually detect one or a few central forces which are of decisive importance for an understanding of the pattern of values forming both society and the predominant world views. In all historical situations, this central force, or forces, are the most "cathected" forces — those most charged with psychic energy. (2) These most cathected forces are those which are central to man's experience of his social existence, and they are or become the central integrating points of a particular culture.

These two postulates are interrelated in the sense that they express, respectively, the psychological and the sociological aspects of one and the same reality. They can, therefore, be formulated in one statement: the central problems which man faces in his social existence constitute the most cathected forces determining both the structure of society and the structure of those world views which are significant from the point of view of the sociology of knowledge. In our time, industrialism poses the central problems. Hence the forces emanating from industrialism are the most powerful determining factors in our life — both in our actual daily social life and in the ideas which we form about this life. This is quite different from saying that industrialism is the substructure determining the superstructure of thought. In fact, industrialism is a developing, dynamic force, and the direction in which it is developing is not just determined by the structure but by our own reaction to the basic forces contained in this cultural problem-area. These reactions cannot be separated from our world view; and the autonomous element in this world view — which is rooted in the forces emanating from the human collective — is a significant aspect which must, in my opinion be consciously articulated.

In some situations, thought may merely reflect the pattern of

social relationships which may be called the "substructure". But in other cases, we notice the breakthrough of a new conception, of new values. An explanation in terms of substructure-superstructure is therefore inadequate or merely mystifies the dynamic process of change by endowing the substructure with some autonomous, creative power whose locus is not identified. As contrasted with such an approach, an explanation in terms of the central problem or problems which man faces in the reality of his social life gives us a firm sociological reference point, while leaving the actual determination of the constellation of forces to empirical research. The central question of the sociology of knowledge. — What is the interrelationship between man's social existence and man's world view ? — can then be examined in terms of the general laws whose rudimentary aspects this paper has touched upon and which should be developed and clarified by further thought and research.

But the "central-problems" approach suggested here must be carried one step further by introducing an element not explicitly mentioned so far: the personality structure of the individual developing or espousing a system of thought. We have said above that people are likely to be distributed according to a bell-shaped so-called normal curve of error reflecting the extent to which their personality structures are molded by cultural forces and by forces deviating from those of the culture. Modal elements of consciousness are clearly correlated with and, once established, determined by, the cultural collective. The forces which autonomously emerge from the human collective pull man away from the centre of gravity of the curve. This situation, which remains true no matter how the shape of the curve may have to be reformulated has a decisive influence on the individual's awareness of the problem or problems which constitute the central forces of the social situation: the more modal the individual's consciousness the more he merely reflects the problem as the culture defines and evaluates it. The more there is a deviation toward the "right" side of the curve, the more the individual will define the problem autonomously in terms of human values which may or may not be reflected in the specific cultural pattern of values.

It is true that the approach suggested here emphasizes the possibilities of autonomous choice. But it does in no way introduce a vague idealism — quite to the contrary. If a world view has little or no reference to the central problems of man's social existence and hence to the value and power structure within which these problems are solved, it cannot retain its vital character or its intimate link with social existence and becomes, indeed, "mere thought". It must also be emphasized that a world view, to be dominant, must correspond to the values which the dominant power group espouses. To change anything one needs power — organized power. But without the creative-autonomous consciousness directed toward the central problems

of man's social existence, the history of man can neither be consciously enacted nor scientifically understood.

In summary, we may say that the task of the sociology of knowledge presupposes a trans-cultural analysis, an anthropology, in the true sense of the word, which combines insight into the nature of man with a wide historical knowledge and/or knowledge of different cultures now existing. Without such a general reference point, our knowledge of a specific society remains fragmentary or, if a culture very different from our own is considered, impossible. The insights of dynamic psychology are central to such an anthropology. Without knowledge of the attributes of the human collective, of basic psychological mechanisms, we cannot understand the interrelationship between total systems of thought and man's social existence.

As mentioned above, total systems of thought, or world-views, are never purely intellectual phenomena. They, therefore, cannot be adequately understood in purely formallogical terms. Man's affects, their relationship to his thought, the nature and the extent of projections, idealizations, rationalizations, etc., must be understood. But this very task is not an abstract intellectual endeavour. The sociologist of knowledge cannot be freed from the basic presupposition of his very field of concern, namely, that knowledge is existential in its essential character and not simply logical-abstract-ideal. Hence the analysis of projections, idealizations, rationalizations, etc. presupposes that the sociologist of knowledge free himself from these projections, etc., at least in the sense that he recognizes what they are. Without such a higher insight, sociology of knowledge is not possible. Nor can we meet this task without realizing that the sociologist of knowledge performs himself an existentially relevant — and in this sense potentially therapeutic — task. Such a task is intimately related to the problem of true and false consciousness — a problem with which this paper cannot deal [19].

[19] Though not dealing directly with this specific theme, Kurt H. Wolff has a number of relevant and significant comments in his essay "A Preliminary Inquiry into the Sociology of Knowledge from the standpoint of the Study of Man", *Scritti di Sociologia e Politica in onore di Luigi Sturzo*, Terzo Volume, Bologna, 1953, pp. 617 and 618.

The Sociology of Knowledge and the Problem of Ethics

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It is generally agreed, both by those who welcome and by those who regret this development, that the last three hundred years have brought a growing secularisation of life, that is to say, an evolution of science and an involution of religion. And there seems also to be fairly widespread, if not indeed universal agreement as to the causes of this consummation: science and religion are regarded as hostile and irreconcilable principles locked in deadly combat; their war, like any other war, must end in the victory of the one party and the defeat of the other. But though the facts of the matter are beyond doubt, the explanation habitually given for them is problematic. If we go back to the origins of the great conflict, to the closing years of the medieval and the opening years of the modern period, we find no peremptory bar to the coordination and cooperation of religious and scientific thought, simply because science deals with the physical, and religion with the metaphysical, two easily distinguishable realms. Even Galileo was not condemned for his physics, but only for his metaphysics — not for statements which can be proved, but for speculations which cannot be proved. To the master mind who dominated the Middle Ages, St Augustine, the Bible was not so much an account of actual events as a collection of metaphors and symbols, of lessons presented, for our better comprehension, in imaginative form. To give but one example which will presently occupy us for a different reason: if the Book of Genesis tells us that the patriarch Noah planted a vineyard, that he was drunk after the harvest and lay naked and incapacitated in his house, that he was exposed and ridiculed by his son Ham but covered up and respectfully treated by his sons Shem and Japheth, the true meaning of the story is to St Augustine prophetical, and not historic. Noah is to him a figure, a prefiguring, of Christ, who emptied himself of all power and allowed himself to be nakedly exposed on the cross. Ham stands for the unbelievers and heretics who do not understand and deride the mystery: Shem are the Jews and Japheth the gentiles who have embraced the faith; they approach the Passion of the Lord in a spirit of true awe, humility and devotion. The cloak which they lay on their father is the sacrament of the altar; the house in which this happens is the church; their going into the house signifies the inwardness of

their worship, the prayer of the heart; their going backwards into the house expresses the fact that what they worship, God's self-sacrifice for man, is an accomplished thing, a thing remembered and looked back to; and so on, and so forth. The first two chapters of the sixteenth book of the City of God, in which all this is explained, are a good example of the consistent treatment to which St Augustine subjects the Old Testament. He calls it a "prophetic history", a "foreshadowing of future events". There is little here that would foment the kind of head-on clash between science and religion which developed, for instance, in nineteenth-century England after the publication of Bishop Colenso's fateful book, *The Pentateuch Critically Examined* (1862-79), when the subject of discussion was the question whether the events of which the sacred book speaks were fact or fiction. A symbol, a metaphor, a parable is neither fact nor fiction: criticism, whether higher or lower, cannot get its teeth into it. A scientific, severely factual world-view necessarily excludes a fundamentalist conception of Holy Writ, but it is not absolutely irreconcilable with its moral and metaphysical interpretation.

Perhaps the true reason why the traditional religious spirit has weakened and tended to wane since the Middle Ages is not intellectual, but moral, and the sociologist is the proper person to bring it into prominence. Since about the year 1500, society has increasingly come to conform to the pattern which Ferdinand Tönnies has called associational, and which in less technical language could also be described as atomistic or individualistic. The individual is regarded as the prime reality, society as merely a secondary phenomenon. But the basic conceptions of the Old Testament, or at any rate of the five Books of Moses, are rooted in, and the product of, the communal way of life under which, as Aristotle has classically expressed it, the whole is prior to the parts — under which, in other words, society is regarded as the prime reality, and the individual is merely a secondary phenomenon. The two social systems are so contrary to each other, and the forms of thought and feeling respectively belonging to them so antagonistic, that the discrepancy between the old doctrine and the new world and world-view was bound to be felt, and felt with increasing urgency. Indeed, it is not too much to say that under the changed conditions, the ethic of Genesis and Exodus was very widely experienced as downright unethical.

We see the whole matter with exceptional clarity in the story of Noah's drunkenness to which we have already adverted. The ninth chapter of Genesis introduces us first of all to the five persons involved: Noah, his three sons, Shem, Ham and Japheth, and his grandson, Ham's son, Canaan, who plays an unexpectedly important part in the drama. "And Noah began to be a husbandman, and he planted a vineyard: And he drank of the wine, and was drunken; and he was uncovered within his tent. And Ham, the father of Canaan, saw the nakedness of his father, and told his two brethren without... And

Noah awoke from his wine, and knew what his younger son had done unto him. And he said" — now this is what must surprise, shock and pain all who read the story nowadays — "And he said, Cursed be Canaan; a servant of servants shall he be unto his brethren". Can there be anybody today who would not cry out at once: why should Canaan be cursed ? why should he be condemned for ever to servitude ? He had apparently done no wrong. His father had, but is this a reason to punish him ? Who of us would think it right that he, or anybody else, should go to prison for a felony of his father ? Clearly, the condemnation of Canaan is an affront to the deepest ethical convictions of modern man.

Indeed, even those to whom the Bible is sacred have been unable to reconcile themselves with the cursing of Canaan, the boy Canaan as he is often called. The protestant *Dictionary of the Bible* edited by Hastings (I, 1898, p. 347) has this to say: "The passage... does not agree very well with the context, as the wrong to Noah had been committed by Ham, and not by Canaan, and it has therefore been supposed that it is taken from an ancient poem". To appreciate the seriousness of this surmise, we must remember that Protestantism in general has had a tendency to believe in the total and literal inspiration of the Bible, even if not all Protestants have gone the length of Fundamentalism. If this be poetry, that is to say, fiction rather than fact, what, one must ask, about the rest of the Old Testament ? Where then does fiction stop and fact start ? The Catholic *Biblical Encyclopedia* of Steinmüller and Sullivan (1956) also tries to remove the apparent injustice inflicted on Noah's innocent son: "After the Flood", we read (p. 221), "Ham acted immorally on the occasion of his father's drunkenness and was cursed by Noah in his son Canaan, who perhaps participated in his own father's wickedness". The "perhaps" here is a tell-tale word: it indicates that the interpretation of the passage which is tried on is entirely gratuitous. But even if we were to accept this suggestion, or rather this guess, we should not radically change the moral implications. If Ham was the main criminal and Canaan a kind of accessory, why be harder on a mere participant in the crime than on the perpetrator of it ? Noah's injustice would appear a little less flagrant, but it would still be there.

It is of course, not surprising that modern men, like these commentators, should try to argue their way out of a difficult situation; and yet it is surprising, for inside the Old Testament itself the fate of Canaan appears entirely natural and his condemnation altogether justified. Surely, the commentators should have remembered, in dealing with this passage, what is undoubtedly the central part of the Books of Moses, namely the Dekalogue, and the Dekalogue states in quite unambiguous fashion that the children are involved in the misdeeds of their parents as if they were their own. "Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image", says the twentieth chapter of Exodus, "or any likeness of any thing that is in heaven above, or

that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the water under the earth: Thou shalt not bow down thyself to them, nor serve them: for I the Lord thy God am a jealous God, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children unto the third and fourth generation of them that hate me; And shewing mercy unto thousands [of generations] of them that love me, and keep my commandments". And as if this were not definite enough, the same statement is again made, in very similar words, in the thirty-fourth chapter of Exodus, verses 6 and 7. We are here manifestly up against one of the most fundamental conceptions of the oldest part of the Old Testament — a conception which we must not try to argue away, but on the contrary confront and try to understand.

Nor is this understanding difficult to achieve, if only we remember that the tribes whose life and being the Books of Moses reflect were closely integrated societies, that is to say, communities in Tönnies' meaning of the term. A community, as we have already emphasised, has a specific ontology of its own which conforms to, and expresses, its social essence and principle of organisation. According to this ontology, and indeed according to the reality which underlies it, the social whole is more real than its individual parts. However strange it may seem to us, children of the twentieth century, in a world of community even justice is meted out to social wholes and not to individual persons. In blessing and in cursing as few distinctions are made as in life generally. A simile may partly help us to enter more deeply and sympathetically into this long-abandoned way of thinking and feeling. If a man today steals an article, we should never dream of blaming or accusing the hand which has done the deed: the blame must lie on the whole personality. Our ontology reckons, as far as such matters are concerned, with integrated bodies whose parts have no independent being. But this is exactly the light in which the primitive tribesmen of early Hebrew history regarded a society. The word "body social" meant to them as much a basic unity and totality, and as little a diversity and plurality, as the word "body physical" means to us. Noah's malediction lies on a lineage — on the *clan* of Ham, which is also the clan of Canaan. It is almost a matter of indifference which name you use in describing it.

Almost, but not quite. There appears to be a very good if secondary reason why the ninth chapter of the book of Exodus should speak of Canaan rather than of his father Ham or, for that matter, of his brothers Cush, Mizraim and Phut. We find it in the eighteenth chapter of Leviticus which deals from beginning to end with Ham's misdemeanour, the uncovering of nakedness. "And the Lord spake unto Moses, saying, Speak unto the children of Israel and say unto them... after the doings of the land of Canaan, whither I bring you, shall ye not do: neither shall ye walk in their ordinances... None of you shall approach to any that is near of kin to him, to uncover their nakedness: I am the Lord". And then there follows a long list of those who are

to be regarded as near kinsfolk in this respect, beginning with father and mother and working outward from them, a list which goes through twelve verses. We have here simply the core of a code of sexual behaviour, and it winds up with a prohibition of adultery, homosexuality and sodomy. Now, all these abominations are ascribed to the Canaanites, the offspring and clansmen of the eponymous Canaan and the inhabitants of the country which bears the same name and which the Jews had apparently just conquered. "Defile not ye yourselves in any of these things: for in all these the nations are defiled which I cast out before you: And the land is defiled: therefore I do visit the iniquity thereof upon it, and the land itself vomiteth out her inhabitants". We cannot be wrong in regarding this passage of Leviticus as a commentary on the passage in Exodus which interests us most[1]. Canaan is mentioned rather than Ham or Cush because Canaan and Canaanites are foremost in the lawgiver's mind, and understandably so, if the Jews are to share their habitat and yet keep their identity in spite of the common country and the common life. Assuming the position of detached observers and speaking in modern sociological language, we can say that the folkways of the aboriginal Canaanites were so different from the folkways of the invading Hebrews that the one system of custom and culture had to appear repulsive to the carriers of the other — a typical situation in which there is nothing at all unfamiliar. The Semites and the Hamites, here, because of the local implications, called Canaanites, regarded each other in roughly the same light as the MacDonalds and the Campbells of more recent times. The salient point is again the basic ontology involved. It is a collectivistic — as *we* should perhaps say, a generalising — ontology, an ontology of community.

Under an associational form of life, this ontology must needs appear unacceptable, nay wrong, and so must the morality coordinated with it. Insofar as the last three hundred years came as near to the ideal-type association as the Mosaic age came to the ideal-type community, a clash between the two world-views was unavoidable and bound to be sharp. But there is no need to think of the extreme case of modern society in order to see that the typical community sentiment of the Book of Exodus is unacceptable outside the social system which bore it: the relatively newer parts of the Old Testament prove it as convincingly. For Jewish society, too, moved from community to association, from a life predominantly rural and agricultural and carried on within closely knit clans, to a life predominantly, or at any rate largely, urban and commercial, and consequently of relatively loose social texture. Two great and commanding figures appeared who tried to wean their countrymen from the old communal ethic:

[1] Cf. the *Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche*, originally edited by Buchberger and now by Höfer and Rahner, 1958, *sub verbo* Cham. Cf. also Deuteronomy, 7, 1-6.

Jeremiah and Ezekiel, both living around the year 590 B.C. Jeremiah, in the thirty-first chapter of his book, prophesies a better future for his people, and he endeavours to draw the outlines of the life which will be led by God's children then. "In those days", he says, "they shall say no more, The fathers have eaten a sour grape, and the children's teeth are set on edge. But every one shall die for his own iniquity: every man that eateth the sour grape, his teeth shall be set on edge". There is no more thinking in holistic terms here, but in atomistic terms: the individual person is to be the subject of praise and blame, not the clan. Yet the eighteenth chapter of Ezekiel is still more interesting in our context than the thirty-first of Jeremiah. It contains convincing proof of the correctness of our interpretation of the origin of moral conceptions from the point of view of the sociology of knowledge — as convincing proof as one can possibly desire. It shows in no uncertain manner that the Jewish people, or to say the least, the Jewish towns, had drifted into an associational life with its attendant individualism in ontology and ethics. The great preoccupation of Ezekiel is usury — a sure sign that commerce had developed on a broad front. Who is the good man, asks the Prophet, and he answers: "He that hath not given forth upon usury, neither hath taken any increase, that hath withdrawn his hand from iniquity, hath executed true judgment between man and man, hath walked in my statutes, and hath kept my judgments, to deal truly; he is just, he shall surely live, saith the Lord God". Now, from this definition of the good man, which demonstrates that the Jews had left the primitive tribal era far behind, Ezekiel moves directly on to the formulation of an associational ethic: if a wicked person has a righteous son, he says, "a son that seeth all his father's sins which he hath done, and considereth, and doeth not such like... that hath not received usury nor increase, tath executed my judgments, hath walked in my statutes; he shall not die for the iniquity of his father, he shall surely live". There is no imputing to him, as in the Books of Moses, of his progenitor's errors and faults and merits. Unlike Jeremiah, Ezekiel puts the new moral teaching forward, not in prophetic but in a more positive form, as a set of principles already in force: "The words of the Lord came unto me again, saying, What mean ye, that ye use this proverb concerning the land of Israel, saying the fathers have eaten sour grapes, and the children's teeth are set on edge ? As I live, saith the Lord God, Ye shall not have reason any more to use this proverb in Israel. Behold, all souls are mine; as the soul of the father, so also the soul of the son is mine: the soul that sinneth, it shall die... The son shall not bear the iniquity of the father, neither shall the father bear the iniquity of the son: the righteousness of the righteous shall be upon him, and the wickedness of the wicked shall be upon him". Everyone will, so to speak, have his own account, and stand and fall by it, and it alone.

We are here far nearer to modern ideas than in the Dekalogue,

simply because we are within a society which is far more comparable and far closer to our own than is the tribalism of the early days. Yet the old collectivistic and communal ontology never lost its grip because capitalism and commercialism never succeeded in invading and occupying the citadel of Jewish life. The finest flower of that life, Christianity, is sociologically understandable only in terms of community. What is the essence of the Christian doctrine, if we strip it of all accessories? Surely this: that the clan of Adam fell through the sin of Adam, as the clan of Ham fell through the sin of Ham; in other words, that by dint of the fundamental and indissoluble unity of the social whole, the fate of one is the fate of all. And further: that the family of Christ, incorporated in the Church, rose through the merits of Christ, the new Adam, because the deed of one is in its effects the salvation of all. Take away the basic ontology of community, and the doctrine dissolves: keep to that ontology, and all difficulties of the faith vanish. In the Christian religion which conceives all men as one lineage, bound together for better and worse, bound together both in sin and salvation, the principle of community has found its finest incarnation.

It is in the last analysis because of the gradual transition of Western society to an associational system of social life that Christianity split in the sixteenth century into a Catholic and a Protestant branch. For Protestantism is essentially a reinterpretation of the message in terms of association, whereas Catholicism has kept to the traditional spirit of community. We see this in many facts and features, such as the disappearance of the pantheon of saints, the abolition of the prayers for the dead, the introduction of a contractual theory into ecclesiological thinking, and so on, and so forth. A systematic enumeration and discussion of all these aspects would grow into an enormous volume — would, indeed, constitute a comparative sociology of the Christian church or churches, which cannot be attempted here. There is no need of it, however, for the pivot of Protestantism is by common consent the *solus-cum-solo* doctrine. The essential relationship is no longer that of God and all men, but that of God and one man, even if this one man is potentially each man. As the Protestants themselves have often expressed it: it is necessary to take Christ for one's own personal saviour in order to be saved. The community, which dominates the scene within Catholicism, has faded, comparatively speaking, out of the picture. Of course, insofar as the merits of one (Christ) are made available to others, even Protestantism still has its taproots in the subsoil of community: it is indeed adjusted to associational reality, but it has not surrendered to it altogether: it could not do so without ceasing to be Christian, for Christianity, as we should like to repeat, is a meaningful doctrine only if it is seen as an application of the ontological principle which constitutes and expresses community.

Of course, Protestantism was, and could be, no more than a half-

way house, a stop on the road. As Western society developed further and further towards a more fully associational life, the community-type conceptions of traditional Christianity were bound to raise ever greater and graver difficulties, until they appeared well-nigh incomprehensible. The climax was reached in the Victorian age which came as near to a fully fledged associational form of society as humanity ever did and probably ever will. What a typical Victorian thought of vicarious guilt and vicarious merit, can easily be seen from the "Essay on Atonement and Satisfaction" and the "Essay on the Imputation of the Sin of Adam" contained in the second volume of Benjamin Jowett's book, *The Epistles of St. Paul to the Thessalonians, Galatians and Romans*. It is quite sufficient to quote the first three lines of the former paper to show in what spirit Jowett approached the subject. "The doctrine of the Atonement", he writes, "has often been explained in a way at which our moral feelings revolt. God is represented as angry with us for what we never did...". And then he tries, as best he can, so to reinterpret the doctrine as to make it acceptable to an associational, atomistic, individualistic generation. Needless to say, he thereby completely destroys its original and proper meaning, a fact which is obvious to all who read his argument, and understandably raised the ire of the ecclesiastical authorities. The religious crisis of the Victorian period can be and must be explained from the sociological point of view, for it was in the last analysis due to the survival of community-bred ideas into an associational society.

We can sum up our discussion by saying that within the history and pre-history of our system of ethico-religious conceptions there are present two different and seemingly irreconcilable moral principles, the one centred on the concept of collective, the other on that of individual responsibility. The great problem of ethics, as we see it, consists in this: that we must either accept these two principles as final, in which case we fall into the slough of relativism — an alternative which is in principle inadmissible because a true ethic ought to reveal the absolute difference between absolute right and absolute wrong; or that we must overcome the contrast between communal thinking and associational thinking in matters moral, which seems hardly feasible since it would appear to take us outside the area, not only of actual, but even of possible experience. We are here manifestly up against one of the last questions — a question of the limit, as the Kantians would say, meaning the limit between the knowable and the unknowable. But before we try to tackle it as best we can, there is one further preliminary question which we may legitimately raise, namely whether the Bible is, in the duality of its ethics, revealing a universal problem, in other words, whether similar forms of thought, and a similar conflict between forms of thought, appear wherever we find community and association, and development from the one to the other. There are the strongest indications that this is indeed so, although the facts are not sufficiently

known: this is one of the matters which, in our opinion, sociologists and social anthropologists ought to investigate in the most comprehensive manner possible by inductive research. Here we can do no more than cast a passing glance at one additional field of observation, that of ancient Greece. Even a cursory investigation is sufficient to show that there is a striking parallel between Mosaic and Hellenic history both in social fact and in moral thought.

The subject has been treated in two works of high quality, Gustave Glotz's *La Solidarité de la famille dans le droit criminel en Grèce* and Louis Gernet's *Recherches sur le développement de la pensée juridique et morale en Grèce*. The very size of these tomes — they comprise 608 and 464 pages respectively — proves how much there is to study and to discuss. One of the many legends of Greek mythology which, like a stroke of lightning, sheds light on it all, is the well-known story of Niobe and Leto. Niobe had slighted Leto, and the children of Leto determine to avenge their mother, not on Niobe, but on Niobe's sons and daughters. They do not rest until they are all exterminated and Niobe is left childless to cry over their tombs. What makes this pathetic tale so interesting for us is the fact that it shows with particular clarity the essential coherence of forms of thought and forms of action, on which the sociology of knowledge has always insisted, and which it has used and is using as the master key to the understanding of the total life-process of alien societies. What goes on between Leto's offspring and Niobe's offspring is quite simply a blood-feud such as is characteristic of primitive societies from the beginning of time, down, in such countries as Scotland or Albania or Corsica, into comparatively recent centuries — that gruesome warfare of clan against clan of which the Book of Genesis, too, shows traces where it speaks, in its fourth chapter, of Lamech, of the clan of Cain, who admits, nay boasts, that he has slain a man and swears that he will be avenged — presumably for the harm which the dead man had done him — seventy-and-sevenfold. Ideas and institutions are one, simply because they both emerge from the same parent reality, the basic process of social action and interaction, here cast into the mould of community.

A deeply impressive, nay classical statement of our theme is to be found in Aeschylus's trilogy on the House of Atreus. Four lines from his *Agamemnon* are sufficient to show that he is filled by the same conviction of the involvement of the future generations in the deeds and misdeeds of their elders as the Dekalogue, even though he seems to be somewhat troubled about its implications:

> ... whensoe'er the sire
> Breathed forth rebellious fire ...
> His children's children read the reckoning plain,
> At last, in tears and pain.[2]

[2] E.D.A. Morshead's translation, *The House of Atreus*, 1881, p. 19.

What Aeschylus spreads out before our eyes is essentially a story of original sin, the sin of Tantalus: the gods lay a curse on him which is not exhausted by his personal punishment but passes to his son, Pelops, from Pelops down the lineage to Thyestes and Atreus, and from Atreus on to his family, engendering crime after crime and catastrophe after catastrophe. Now Aeschylus, like the other two great tragedians, was an Athenian, and it was Athens which developed furthest towards what we sociologists call an associational form of social life. Witness the great development of trade and commerce in Athens; witness also the coming of a far-reaching democracy. Euripides, born only forty-five years after Aeschylus, in 480 B. C., could not feel in matters moral as Aeschylus had done: he could not reconcile himself to the idea that guilt should be imputed to, and punishment visited on, the guiltless. In his play *Orestes* he puts the following outbreak against Phoebus Apollo, who is the real culprit, the wire-puller behind the scenes, into the mouth of his hero:

> Go call *him* 'Godless' and procure *his* death;
> *His* was the sin not mine...
> Is he not bounden to take off my curse
> And carry it for me?... [3]

Clearly, like Jeremiah and Ezekiel, Euripides felt that he who had eaten the sour grapes should have his teeth set on edge, and nobody else.

This short side-glance at Greek developments must suffice here to show that the issue of individual *versus* collective responsibility is a generically human problem, a problem of universal application. Further proof could easily be provided, but it will hardly be demanded. Anybody who is acquainted with the drift of social and cultural history knows full well that it has everywhere gone from community towards association, and from a world-view attuned to the facts of community to a world-view attuned to the facts of association. Yet the victory of association over community has nowhere been complete. The nineteenth century revolted against the Christian conceptions of original sin and vicarious satisfaction but it could not throw them off. Though driven from the centre of the stage, the ideas characteristic of the Dekalogue and of Aeschylus, the ideas characteristic of primitive tribalism, have held on to a corner of the field, and this indicates that the problem of ethics cannot be solved by a simple either/or, as so many people naively assume.

Those who know their Tönnies will neither be surprised by the persistence of the idea of collective, communal responsibility, nor yet will they hesitate, when asked, in which direction a decision between the two rival systems of morality must be sought. Tönnies has made it clear that a purely, as it were ideally consistent or ideal-typical associational life is impossible. A society will always be

[3] H.O. Meredith's translation, *Four Dramas of Euripides*, 1937, p. 206.

more than merely a number of men standing side by side: it will always presuppose an objective pattern of folkways, endowed, as Durkheim expressed it, with externality and exercising constraint. Certainly, the binding power of that pattern is sometimes very strong and sometimes very weak: that is the reason why we distinguish community and association. But however associational a society may become, however strong the free-moving individual and however weak the controlling social forces within it, an irreducible element of community remains, and for that reason conceptions like those of Christianity can never fail to survive. More than that: conceptions like those of Christianity can never fail to appeal, for where the social pattern has become loose, counter-tendencies will always be released which will reassert the centripetal principle of community against the centrifugal principle of individuality. We are, after all, a social species, and human life is inescapably a matter of adjustment between individual freedom and social ordering — two sides of it which can as little be separated as the converse and the obverse of a coin. We see here the sociological reason why the ever-repeated prediction of the Encyclopaedists of all ages that Christianity, with its conviction that all fell in one man and were by one raised up again, Christianity with its collectivistic idea of responsibility, will disappear, nay must disappear, has again and again been disproved by subsequent events. Christianity suits man because it expresses in a dramatic form the communal element which is basic to all social life and hence to all human thought and sentiment. But however closely knit a community may be, there is always an associational side to it as well; every society is in one sense a collection of individuals, even if in another sense it is more than that. But if this is so, then we see at once, and without long argument, what an ideal society would be like: it would be a society which would bring to the fullest possible realisation both the principle of community and the principle of association, both the principle of selfhood and the principle of sociality. Under such a dispensation, and only such a dispensation, would a man feel spontaneously responsible both for his own actions and for the actions of those who belong to the same system of life. The gap which yawns, and has always yawned, between communal ethics and associational ethics, both of which are unsatisfactory because they onesidedly stress one of the concomitant features of man, selfhood and sociality, at the expense of the other, would then be closed and in their place there would reign a balanced, or rather an integrated, generically human morality.

Now it can be argued that this concept of a society which is both a fully developed community and a fully developed association, and not like the societies which are to be found in ordinary life, either a community with some associational, or an association with some communal features, is no more than a theoretician's fancy — at the

very best a vision in the sky which cannot be brought down to earth. To this criticism, if criticism it be, one must plead guilty. We are here up against a last limitation of man: man must always choose between alternatives even if he knows full well that his alternatives are really equally unacceptable because they only realise one possibility out of many which are initially equally possible, equally attractive and equally justified. In speculating about the problem of ethics, and especially the sociological side of it, I have been led to the same conclusion as in my book *The Sociology of Knowledge*, where I speculated about the problem of truth: each society has its own system of knowledge which is appropriate to and true in it, but beyond these separate truths (plural) there must also be an integral truth (singular) in which they are all contained and reconciled. If we cannot grasp this integral truth *in terminis*, so much the worse for us: the philosopher must acknowledge that man is a creature of limitations. But the ideal of this integrated truth is by no means useless even if we cannot attain it, for we can always work towards it. It gives us a direction in which we can travel, even if we know that we shall not be able to get to the end of the road. And so it is with ethics as well. We must pursue an ideal society as we must an ideal of knowledge, and in either case the ideal must be a synoptic one and not one of onesided exclusiveness — a humanitarian ideal in the deepest, widest and fullest sense of the word.

PART TWO

Discussion

Intermission of Ten Minutes

WOLFF

We have nine requests for the floor and before that, we have two prepared statements, so we may not be able to honour all nine requests because the time may run out. The first speaker will be Professor Roger Girod of the University of Geneva, who will speak on Professor Goldmann's paper.

ROGER GIROD

Monsieur le Président, Mesdames, Messieurs, étant donné le peu de temps disponible, je me bornerai à indiquer un point de vue, sans développer aucun point. Il m'a semblé que dans l'exposé extrêmement intéressant de M. Goldmann, comme d'ailleurs dans certains autres exposés, des traces de métaphysique étaient présentes, et je serais heureux d'avoir à ce sujet le commentaire de M. Goldmann lui-même; je dis traces de métaphysique en ce sens qu'il m'a paru évident que dans les catégories utilisées par M. Goldmann, plusieurs sont hors du domaine de l'observable, à commencer par ces deux catégories fondamentales: celle de conscience elle-même et ensuite celle d'adéquation, adéquation supposant objet, et par conséquent une réalité qui est affirmée sans jamais être effectivement constatée. Quant à la conscience, il me paraît, comme M. Goldmann l'a d'ailleurs fort bien marqué lui-même dans les premières lignes de sa communication, quelle est indéfinissable, et elle est indéfinissable pour la bonne raison qu'elle échappe à toute observation méthodique.

Et cette position métaphysique m'a semblé à un certain moment, je dis bien à un certain moment, s'aggraver dans le déroulement de la pensée de M. Goldmann dans le sens de l'idéalisme pur. J'entends par là qu'à un certain moment il m'a paru attribuer à la conscience un rôle moteur dans les événements historiques, alors que, par ailleurs, toute sa pensée est orientée dans une autre direction. Je pense en particulier à l'exemple qu'il nous a donné des paysans qui, n'étant capables de parvenir qu'à un certain degré de conscience, ou mieux, de conscience du possible, agissent par là-même par l'état de leur esprit, en quelque sorte, sur le déroulement des évènements; en telle sorte que, puisqu'il s'agissait de

Lénine, Lénine lui-même a dû modifier sa politique pour s'adapter à ce principe qui aurait été la conscience du paysan, conscience réelle et conscience possible, alors qu'il me semble qu'il serait plus conforme même au principe du marxisme et de la science empirique plus généralement, d'envisager l'influence non pas de la conscience du paysan pris individuellement mais de l'organisation sociale, des groupes qui étaient en jeu en ce moment là en Russie. Je pense donc à l'organisation de classe elle-même, indépendante de la conscience, comme principe, comme force politique, alors que la conscience, enfin, si j'ai bien compris d'autres travaux de M. Goldmann et des penseurs de la même école, est à considérer plus généralement comme un épiphénomène.

Je passe sur les détails et j'en viens au fond à la question principale qui est celle des rapports entre la conscience et l'action tout court. M. Goldmann, dans son texte écrit, a une phrase qui m'a beaucoup intéressé parce qu'elle correspond exactement à ma propre conception de la sociologie, à savoir, que la sociologie est l'étude de l'action humaine considérée dans ses connections ou encore de la coopération, de la co-action. Il me semble que ceci est tout à fait réel, mais que malheureusement il n'y a pas place pour l'idée de conscience dans cette définition, et que tout ce que l'on peut espérer atteindre, ce sont des opérations. Il est impossible de faire une science du sujet, il est impossible de faire une science de l'objet; en revanche il est possible de faire une science du comportement de l'homme par rapport à la réalité qu'il affronte et de son interaction — ce n'est pas du tout ma position, vous aurez tous reconnu sans doute la position de Piaget — mais de l'interaction par laquelle l'activité humaine en même temps que la réalité qu'elle affronte se modifient mutuellement sans que l'on puisse jamais faire aucune affirmation autre que métaphysique, tant sur l'objet que sur le sujet.

WOLFF

The second speaker will be Mr. Joop Goudsblom, Amsterdam, who will comment on the paper by Professor Talcott Parsons.

JOOP GOUDSBLOM

Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen, anyone who has seen the paper by Professor Parsons, which is more than fifty pages long, will realize that it is impossible to do anything that even resembles justice to it in a ten minutes' talk. I shall try to focus on the two distinctions that seem to dominate his paper, namely, the distinctions that Professor Parsons has just made in his talk, the one between culture and society, and, secondly, that between what he calls the

Marx-Mannheim problem area and the Max-Weber problem area.

Now I will begin with a few comments on the second distinction. I may recapitulate, in a few words that the Marx-Mannheim problem area is concerned with the relation of what might be called the evaluative notions and the empirical knowledge of a society, while the Max Weber problem deals essentially with the problems of meaning. Now I think the distinction is very clear and very useful when we approach it in a not too exact way, when we see it, for instance, as a distinction between the sociology of science and the sociology of religion. And to substitute these terms for the terms Professor Parsons has proposed has the advantage that it fits with the conceptual scheme of action theory. But I wonder if when we make this substitution, we do not take upon ourselves a burden of certitude which I do not know that our knowledge can bear. The contrast comes, down essentially to empirical versus non-empirical. And if I interpret Professor Parsons' paper rightly, I think that the purpose of this distinction is to establish the fact that an emipirical science of society is possible. We all agree immediately that, at a certain level, this is very true; for instance, demography is a perfectly empirical study of social factors. But when we reach a more comprehensive level, when we try to get a more comprehensive view of society, it is doubtful whether we can still achieve such true empiricism; there seems to be a sort of ebb-and-flood line between empirical and non-empirical knowledge of society.

We know the controversies we enter when we deal with the bigger systems of society, such as that of Karl Marx, and, more recently American systems such as Sorokin's or even that of Professor Parsons himself. The latter I know, does not claim to be truly empirical, but it tries to take into account as much empirical knowledge as possible.

I would say people strive after a kind of lucidity: and I can imagine several kinds of it — I don't want to give an exhaustive classification, I will just mention three that might be distinguished — vital lucidity, mystical lucidity, rational lucidity. And it seems to me rather obvious that the sort of lucidity sought by the sociologist has to do with social relations. I shall try to say something about this very briefly. There is evidence, as presented very strongly, for instance, in the book by Norbert Elias on the process of civilization *Über den Prozess der Zivilisation, Bern,* 1937, that in what is customarily called a primitive society, there is great freedom for the expression of individual impulses — people can react spontaneously, genuinely; we might say that they have much vital lucidity and therefore less need for rational lucidity. But, as we all know, there has been a process of rationalization going on in the western society, both in society and in personality, and as a result the needs for rational lucidity seem to be much greater then they used to be.

Thus, there exists beyond any doubt a relationship between lucidity, the kind of lucidity people seek, and the social conditions they live in. And I think the whole fact of ideology is closely tied up with certain stages of rationality. Paraphrasing La Rochefoucauld's famous definition of hypocrisy — the tribute vice pays to virtue — we might define ideology as the tribute that interests pay to rational integrity.

This question of rational lucidity and rational integrity brings me to a second distinction that Professor Parsons has made between culture and society, which I think is a most useful distinction. I have been working on a subject closely connected with the sociology of knowledge for the last year and I have found that a good distinction between society and culture, such as is attempted by Professor Parsons, is indispensable. It is also relevant in that it shows that the sociology of knowledge belongs, as a separate branch, to the sociology of culture. In every society, knowledge, or rational lucidity or whatever name one would like to give it, is to a great extent traditional; it belongs to social heritage, to culture. Parsons' view of culture fits in very well with the perception of many cultural anthropologists, but culture carries a certain momentum of its own; it is essentially, of course, a social phenomenon, but it is also qhat the ethnologists like to call in a sense *sui generis*. Language may serve as an example. It would really be a rather farfetched reductionism that would want to explain the differences in, say, the words *chair* and *Stuhl* on purely sociological grounds.

I think, therefore, that we should distinguish very clearly — and Professor Parsons' system gives us a lead here — between (1) the study of culture, and (2) the sociology of culture. What we call the sociology of knowledge belongs to the second category; it studies how culture, in the case of knowledge, fits into society, how it is institutionalized. But I think that a sociology of culture is never in a position to explain social phenomena from necessary social causes; it can only point at certain plausible connections. We must also realize that the critique of knowledge belongs essentially to the critique of culture, not to its study. The critique of knowledge or culture is certainly tempting to many sociologists, but it lies beyond the boundaries of sociology proper. Thus, the observation that social groups have an ideology based on a one-sided selection, or even distortion, of empirical facts belongs to the critique of knowledge. Only, once we have established the fact of selectivity and distortion we may try to understand how these came about in relation with social factors as strain. We might compare this case with that of linguistic accents: we can assess them only by referring to generally accepted standards of linguistic observation.

Now this is more or less paraphrasing what Professor Parsons has himself said just now, that we refer again and again to standards of

empirical research, to what I have more loosely called standards of rational lucidity. These standards of rational lucidity are in our culture, and one outstanding feature of this part of our culture is that, whereas in most branches of culture, a great variety of alternatives is known, many languages and quite a few alphabets, the sort of rational lucidity that is based on scientific method is unique. We are in a position to compare many different kinds of interpretation and orientation to reality, but it turns out that wherever scientific objectivity can deal with aspects of reality, it yields more rational lucidity than any other approach does. Therefore, if we really are after rational lucidity, we must rely on scientific method as much as we can. This scientific method always leaves us uncertain at a certain point, and in a way it is rather puzzling why sociologists should be bothered so much more by this than physical scientists are. And I may venture the hypothesis that it is because the distinction between empirical and non-empirical is not so clear-cut in human society as it is when we are dealing with physical matter.

But there is one last point I want to make, which fits in again with the theory of culture. While we cannot really explain culture by society, neither can we say that knowledge is determined by culture. Rather, knowledge being part of culture, our knowledge may be limited because our culture is limited, or, perhaps, because our view of our culture is limited. Here the sociology of knowledge may enter to inquire, together with psychology, what prevents people from making full use of the standards of rational lucidity that are available in their culture.

WOLFF

Thank you very much. I have arranged the requests for the floor, no doubt in a somewhat arbitrary manner, by the topics which have been suggested, and I propose that we start with the more general ones. I should like to call on Professor Hao-Jan Chu, National Taiwan University, Taipei, Taiwan (Formosa), who will speak on "Prerequisites for the study of the sociology of knowledge." And I must ask you to stay within five minutes; I am sorry.

HAO-JAN CHU

[expressed his regret over the fact that in his assessment of the present World Congress, the prerequisite for international discourse, namely, the participants' temporary detachment from their societies, has not been met.]

WOLFF

Thank you very much. I should now like to call on Professor Th. W. Adorno of the University of Frankfurt, who will comment on some general questions of the sociology of knowledge.

THEODOR W. ADORNO

Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen, I don't want to take up much of your time. I wish first to draw your attention to the fact that the sociology of knowledge is a much older branch of social thinking than is generally assumed. Its ultimate roots in modern thinking may be found in Francis Bacon's theory of the idols. It was rather highly developed during the period of the French Enlightment, by Helvétius and by the so - called "Idéologues", in particular Destutt de Tracy and Maine de Biran. It seems to me that we can grasp something pertaining to the matter itself from its history, which shows a strange trend in the thinking about ideology. It was first assumed that human nature necessarily produces what might be called a *conscience fausse,* false consciousness. Then, in the French Enlightenment, the source of false consciousness shifted to social conditions and interests, and Helvétius located it, not in any individual bad will or other psychological factor, but in the structure of society itself.

The concept of ideology is fully evolved in Marx; but it seems to me that there are two different emphases in Marxian theories of ideology which in general are not clearly enough distinguished. One of them is the definition of ideology as *gesellschaftlich notwendiger Schein,* socially necessary illusion; the other is the thesis against Feuerbach, that *Sein* (being) in general determines *Bewusstsein* (consciousness). I cannot go into the very intricate problem of the relation of the two concepts in Marxian theories. But it seems to me that the first is the more important of the two because it goes beyond the assertion of some general interrelation or dependence and applies the concept of ideology, but only to false consciousness, not to any kind of consciousness. In addition, Marx tried actually to deduce this false consciousness from concrete economic data, that is to demonstrate the necessity of illusion by reference to the basic act of exchange that produces surplus value, in such a way that to the entrepreneur every thing appears to be exchanged for its true value, whereas according to the theory of labour value this really is not so.

What I want to say is that this central concept of Marx has not been followed up, except in very few studies, such as the early one by Lukács (when he still was an autonomous thinker) on *Verdinglichung* (reification), where he tried to analyze the concrete interconnection between certain philosophical categories and basic charac-

teristics of commodity society. What has taken place instead is that this concept of ideology has undergone a kind of retrogression to the older level of a general attribution, *Zurechnung* or *Zuordnung*, of ideology, on the one hand, and social reality, on the other. You can find this very clearly in Pareto, and even more so in Scheler and Mannheim. What is characteristic is, that by the generalization that every consciousness, no matter whether true or false, depends on being and is mere ideology, the sting has been taken out of the originally critical concept of ideology. This concept has become so all-comprehensive that it can mean everything, and therefore nothing. At the same time it can be seen very easily that the technique of *Zuordnung*, of imputation, such as it was practised, for example, by Scheler, leads invariably to erroneous statements, such as the Scheler's allegation that the upper class is by necessity realistic (in the sense of mediaeval realism) and the underlying population nominalistic, which obviously does not correspond to the facts.

The concept of ideology can be fruitful only if it is no longer employed in such a vague, all-comprehensive sense, without an analysis of concrete determinants, on the one hand, and of the problem of inherent truth or falsity, on the other. The theory of ideology is possible only if one can concretely show that a given ideology is inherently wrong, and if one can concretely show the functions their very wrongness fulfils in our society. If the sociology of knowledge wants to be more than just one more sociological speciality, it is most important not to forget this, what I might call classical, concept of ideology.

WOLFF

It gives me a particularly great pleasure now to call on Professor Alexander von Schelting of the University of Zurich.

VON SCHELTING

Having just arrived I have no clear picture of what has been going on in this session. Still, I would like to make a few remarks in response to what I have just been listening to.

I. As far as I understand, there was some discord between Professor Goldmann and Professor Girod. It shows how difficult it is to treat our problems without going into details. To comment on the term Professor Girod insisted on "observable": what is "observable"? If sociology were reduced to the "observable": in the proper sense, that is, in the sense of physical, "outer" observation (including counting, measuring, weighing things, etc.), it would not only be made a natural science in respect to its *method*, but it would also lose *its*

very subject matter. "Observable" is one thing; "given to our experience and consciousness" is another thing: even any physical quality we become aware of in our experience—for instance a colour, blue red, black, white—is absolutely certain to us as a qualitatively peculiar part of our experience of reality, but *as such and in itself* it is not really "observable" and "definable" in the sense in which physical phenomena are observed and defined in natural science. The same applies, and especially so, to innumerable phenomena with which social life is "filled", such as "honour", "piety", "pride", "deference", etc. *It is another category than "observation" and "observable" that is adequate, fundamental and decisive* in social life and in its sociological study; and this category is *"understanding of the understandable"*, of the understandable *meanings* of human (inner and outer) actions (in Max Weber's sense) — even though we cannot "get" at these meanings without some sort and some amount of "outer" observation, without, for instance, listening to words, looking at gestures, reading letters and other sources, etc. — What I am pointing to here, is *not*, of course, the "absolute", "objective", metaphysical, ethical (or other normative) meaning, but the subjective meanings actually meant by real persons (and groups of such) in their real actions. *It is by these meaningful understandable mutually orientated human actions that social reality is constituted. Without reference* to their understandable meanings, we could *not* participate in our own social life; there is *no social life without it;* there is, hence, *no subject of sociology without it; there would be no sociology without it.* This should be clear, I think.

II. As for the critique made here of the ideas of Professor Talcott Parsons, I should like to state the following: I believe that a distinction should be made, not only between "society" and "culture", but also between "culture" and "civilisation"—approximately in the sense, in which Alfred Weber used these terms. If we make this second distinction, science, the pursuit and the acquisition of objectively valid cognition and its results, will appear, together with technology and technique, as a part of "civilisation". At the same time, this sphere of human activity shows also a *societal* aspect:

1) Societal forces are at work in it, for instance, in determining the direction of scientific interest and the choice of subjects and methods;
2) social formations and institutions in which and through which scientific knowledge is striven for (individually or collectively), through which it is acquired, disseminated, distributed, propagated and indoctrinated, vary according to different societies and their structures.

Finally, there is still another, a *cultural* aspect to it, namely,

1) the kinds and degrees of evaluation and appreciation of scientific cognition and its various parts in a given society, and

2) certain ethical attitudes; for instance, the feeling of obligation toward cognition, of responsibility for its adequate and correct pursuit, the intellectual honesty, the "love of truth", etc.—in other words, there is (or can be) *a scientific ethic, as a part of "culture".*

III. My third point can be circumscribed by three terms: *social structure, "intelligentsia"* and *cognition*. The bearer of intellectual, especially scientific, pursuits has often been a socially more or less class, estate, caste, or status-group; for instance, of a priesthood, unified group, that is, the representatives (members) of a definite aristocracy, nobility, patriciate, bureaucracy, "bourgeoisie". In nineteenth-century Germany (and in other European countries of that period), this was mainly the so-called "bürgerliche Rentnerschicht", relatively independent, specifically detached from economic activities and interests, devoting a great and genuine effort to the acquisition of objective knowledge, highly successful in this effort, the members of this class or "estate" being rooted in the *same* "natürliche Weltanschauung" (in Max Scheler's sense) of their societal stratum, and sharing among themselves the same sort of intellectual and general culture (and ethics). Things have changed since that time everywhere: in its social origins, the "intelligentsia" (including the scientific "intelligentsia") has increasingly become a conglomeration of members of various (or of all) societal classes and "estates" with their *divergent "natürliche Weltanschauungen"*, without a common, profoundly rooted spiritual basis. Highly divergent "ideological" elements entered the field of scientific activity, elements irreconcilable with one another, and along with this appeared divergent scales of underlying values; divergent visions of problems and divergent directions of interests in theory and research; a certain lack of reciprocal understanding and confidence among the members of the intellectual group; a diminishing feeling of mutual trustworthiness and reliability; different "mores" and social "conventions" in everyday-intercourse, whereby even fruitful personal contacts have been rendered more difficult, less deep and less frequent. All this has meant, of course, a considerable amount of stimulation for the sphere of cognition in all its branches, for empirical research and theory; it has meant an enrichment with "points of departure" and "perspectives". But it has *also* meant a growing disorientation and an increasing difficulty to arrive at generally relevant, acceptable and accepted cognitive results (objectively valid achievements or achievements at least generally considered such). Needless to say, these statements apply especially to the social sciences and to the "Geisteswissenschaften" in general. In any case: the sociological study of scientific thought and its development (at any historical moment and especially at the present time), that is, the sociology of knowledge, requires *not only* a reference to (and a taking into account of) the *immanent* movements and changes within science itself (as a part of "civilisation") but also, at the same time, a reference to "society"

with its particular structures and transformations, on the one hand, and to "culture", on the other. For factors emerging *from all three* main spheres of human social life are at work in intellectual (especially scientific) endeavours and developments.

WOLFF

Now Professor Paul Honigsheim of Michigan State University will deal with the sociology of sociology and with the sociology of some kinds of religious knowledge.

PAUL HONIGSHEIM

Ladies and Gentlemen, the sociologist of sociology seeks to explain why in that particular epoch or country, sociology in general or some special sociology began, was developed, accepted, rejected, etc. In doing so, he, of course, must draw on the history of sociology in order to show that such and such economic factors, religious groups, etc., account for the fact that sociology of such and such a kind had the fate it had. But he also has to deal with something else, which is less obvious, but equally important, namely the nature of sociology as an occupation (as against, say, botany or mathematics) in its bearing on, and as reflected by, the society in which it exists.

In the sociology of religion, I should like to call attention to the type of man whom I have suggested to call the "second one". He is the one who, according to the hierarchy of values of a given religious group, ranks immediately below the prophet or founder; but psychologically speaking, he is a completely different type. After Mohammed came Abu Bekr; after Joseph Smith, the founder of Mormonism, Brigham Young; after Luther, Melanchthon. None of these "second ones" claims a unique kind of knowledge like, or different from, the founder's instead, they claim exact knowledge of the founder's true meaning and, accordingly, may try to eliminate contradictions found in his words and to build up something like a dogma. But in doing so, they are taking a step in the direction of assimilation to the surrounding society, because in order to develop a dogma, they must utilize elements taken from their social environment. The "second one" very often will say in effect: "Well, what our founder or prophet has said — he is dead now and can no longer protest — was not so radical, so dangerous, of such a revolutionary character as you believe, after all". In other words, this beginning assimilation toward the surrounding world means the elimination of a special kind of religious knowledge — eschatological knowledge. Countless leaders predicted an essential change of the world, which did not come about; hence the need for the elimination of their eschatology, which, in turn, involves a change in the attitude toward the surrounding world.

But I should like to observe that when a religious group shifts away from the original dogma of its leaders and becomes "positivistically-minded" or "assimilated", it takes on, or takes on again, the social ethic of its society. It is easy to understand why this should be so; it can largely be explained by the theories of Gabriel Tarde. In particular, this fact explains, for instance, why within his family, the French radical socialist is just as patriarchally-minded as the traditional French Catholic, or why the German state official who is formally a Lutheran is as loyal to his state as is the true Lutheran who has been taught and believes such loyalty is the will of God. And you could find countless other examples.

WOLFF

Professor Athanase Joja, of the University of Bucharest, will comment on Professor Goldmann's paper.

ATHANASE JOJA

Puisque j'ai le privilège de pouvoir parler en trois minutes, je vais parler sténographiquement, et vous m'excuserez. Je crois qu'il y a trois systèmes, trois positions dans ce domaine de la sociologie de la connaissance: la position réaliste d'Aristote, qui considérait que les formes logiques sont contenues dans les formes matérielles ou sensibles; la position subjectiviste, qui se rattache à Hume et à Kant et qui considère que les catégories logiques ont seulement une validité subjective et intersubjective et la position des sociologues et des logiciens sociologues qui pensent que les catégories logiques sont des catégories sociales.

Je pense qu'ici on n'a pas encore assez rendu justice à l'œuvre des sociologues français, à l'école française de Durkheim et de Lévy-Bruhl. Je ne suis nullement un adepte de Lévy-Bruhl et de Durkheim; au contraire, je suis un marxiste, mais je pense que quand même en sociologie de la connaissance ils ont rendu de grands services. Ils ont eu le grand mérite de faire ressortir ce fait élémentaire que nous connaissons le monde objectif à travers la société, que nous sommes des «zoa politica», des animaux politiques, des animaux sociaux. Mais je pense qu'on peut faire une objection à leur position en affirmant que nous, à travers la société, nous connaissons le monde objectif, et que les catégories psychologiques, métaphysiques et logiques, et les principes comme, par exemple, le principe d'identité, le principe de contradiction etc., ont une valeur objective, ils reflètent la réalité objective. Je pense que le principe de contradiction reflète des faits objectifs que l'homme a saisis à travers la société, à travers le processus social, à travers la division sociale dont parlait M. Goldmann. A tra-

vers le social nous saisissons la réalité objective, et non pas seulement la réalité directement observable comme le voulait M. le Professeur Girod, qui, je pense, est positiviste logique, mais la réalité qui même n'est pas directement observable.

Je pense, Messieurs, que l'homme a inventé les catégories logiques dans le processus de travail social, lorqu'il a inséré entre la nature détentrice des moyens de production et de la force physique, l'outil. C'est pourquoi Benjamin Franklin définissait l'homme «a tool-making animal». Et Marx a déjà cité cette formule «l'homme est un animal fabricant d'outils»; parce qu'il est devenu fabricant d'outils il a inventé des outils logiques, psychologiques, sociologiques, etc. C'est le travail social qui est le facteur moteur de l'évolution humaine, qui nous a distingué des autres animaux. Aristote dit avec raison que l'homme est un animal raisonnable, mais nous pouvons ajouter qu'il est devenu un animal raisonnable parce qu'il est devenu un animal fabricant d'outils. Et c'est par conséquent sur une philosophie matérialiste qu'il faut appuyer la sociologie de la connaissance, parce que je pense que même à la section où l'on a parlé des méthodes il aurait fallu parler de la nécessité d'une philosophie pour la sociologie. On ne peut pas entreprendre des recherches sociologiques ou autres sans avoir une conception philosophique. Je pense, moi personnellement, que c'est le matérialisme dialectique et le matérialisme historique qui ont cette conception philosophique et que la sociologie de la connaissance doit constater non seulement l'existence, non seulement la provenance sociale des catégories métaphysiques et logiques mais qu'elle doit constater aussi que ces catégories ne sont pas de simples conventions, comme le pensent par exemple les positivistes logiques, les sémantistes généraux, M. Carnap, M. Bertrand Russell et d'autres savants, mais que ce sont des reflets de la réalité objective, qu'à travers la société nous appréhendons la réalité objective. Parce que nous autres qui nous occupons des sciences sociales, nous avons parfois un complexe d'infériorité par rapport aux savants qui s'occupent des sciences physiques, mais nous aussi nous appréhendons une réalité objective.

WOLFF

I shall now call on Professor Irena Dubskà, University of Prague, who will speak on the relation between the sociology of knowledge and Marxism likewise in reference to the paper of Professor Goldmann.

IRENA DUBSKÀ

The sociology of knowledge that deals with the problem of objective truth has aroused extraordinary interest, but it has not succeeded in

solving it. The Marxist conception, unlike the limited position of the Enlightenment concerning the social origin only of false ideas, starts from the proposition that all ideas are functions of this concrete positions of their bearers in society. The sociology of knowledge, particularly in certain writings of Karl Mannheim, comprehends the problems of ideology on a much higher level than do rationalist or immanentistic philosophies. But the sociology of knowledge is not capable of resolving this problem of the relation between the subjective and the objective, since for it, every social cognition and every ideology is always subject to historical and social limitations: each is equally onesided, relative, subjective, equally valid and equaly false. Numerous criticisms have been directed to this most vulnerable aspect of the sociology of knowledge and have accused it of ending up in hopeless relativism and skepticism. Mr. Goldmann, too knows this weakness of the sociology of knowledge and tries to show a proper way of solving the problem of the relation between the subjective and the objective. But he does not, in my opinion, clearly explain the interrelation between human thought and social totalities.

Marxism points out the solution of this problem by pointing to its own concrete historical, practical movement. It overcomes the absolute relativity of the class element by placing it in relation to the general tendency of social movement and the totality of historical process, that is, by guaranteeing truth on an ontological basis. In order to pass from the subjective, socially dependent to the objective, it understands the class element as derived from a more fundamental relation of subjective and objective, namely their unity in the process of practice. As long as we remain, on the contemplative level, we shall not get beyond finding out that the different classes and groupings of capitalist society have different ideas about the nature of the capitalist order and their position in it, and that these ideas are transformed into categories of philosophy, economics, sociology, etc. The objective content, the truth element of social consciousness is veryfied and deepened in the same process of practice from which it arises.

As to the speech of Mr. Adorno, I would like to discuss with him the problems of the meaning of ideology in Marxism and the changes of this meaning in the history of Marxism. But because we have no more time, I suppose it would be possible, after the meeting is over (of course only in case Mr. Adorno is interested and kind enough to excuse our very bad English), for him to meet with some members of the Czechoslovakian delegation.

WOLFF

Professor Vilhelm Aubert, University of Oslo, now wishes to speak on the modern profession as a laboratory for study in the sociology of knowledge.

VILHELM AUBERT

I want to state agreement with what I took to be the underlying basic assumption of Harold Garfinkel's presentation, that the most significant aspect or task of the sociology of knowledge is the description and analysis of what we could call the thought structure, the intellectual structure of every day life, or what goes on between people in ordinary life situations. But how and where can we do such studies of such a vast and diffused subject matter? It is necessary somewhere to find a kind of laboratory. Garfinkel's paper pointed to some very profound elements of what goes on between people when they try to understand each other and structure their understanding. An approach which I myself have tried for some time is to use modern professions as tentative explicit models of what is going on in a more diffused and less institutionalised way in everyday life. I will give you just a brief talk about law and medicine.

Both of these, apart from what they contribute in a more technical sense, present images of man, possibly images of society, which differ in some basic respect. Thus professionally, the medical man works with an image of man as an organism continuously undergoing processes, and he draws certain ethical conclusions from this image, such as have been described by Professor Parsons. If we then go to law, we find a very different structuring of the human situation, a moralistic view of man. Here, man is an actor who is choosing freely, rather than undergoing processes all the time, and the basic concern, or one of the basic concerns of the lawyer is to determine guilt and merit as historic facts on which to base his decision.

Now I think — but I can't elaborate it — that these few basic elements of the medical and the legal image of man are parts of much larger patterns. That is to say that a similar basic distinction, though not nearly as elaborate and formalized, seems to obtain in everyday life, where under certain conditions people may waver between looking upon others as organisms or entities undergoing processes, and looking on them in a way in which comparisons of guilt and merit, of what is deserved and what is not, are relevant.

There is thus a relationship between the thought structures or intellectual structures such as I have suggested in respect to the professions, and what actually goes on in terms of everyday interaction, decision making, communication. I think there may even be a relationship between these thought structures and certain numerical facts of interaction. Thus, the medical situation appears to involve a diatic relationship, while legal relationships are essentially, I would claim, triadic.

The most fruitful approach in this field might be the study of those professionals who find themselves, as it were, between two different social worlds. For instance, the legal psychiatrist has to absorb both

the legal and the medical worlds with their respective rules of conduct, and has to make some kind of compromise between them. I think such places in society might be crucial points for studying the thought structures of everyday life.

WOLFF

Now we will hear Professor Masamichi Shimmey from Toho-Ku University, Japan, in remarks on Professor Stark's paper.

MASAMICHI SHIMMEY

I heard with great interest what Professor Stark said about *"Gemeinschaft"* and *"Gesellschaft"*. As you know, Tönnies was a sociologist, but as far as I know he has been widely discredited and "reduced" to the status of "social philosopher" even in Germany. Thus I did not expect him referred to at this World Congress. Still, I have some questions concerning his concepts of *"Gemeinschaft"* and *"Gesellschaft"*. These concepts are very well elaborated and can be used in the interpretation of history and even as a tool for the sociology of knowledge. *"Gesellschaft"* or Society, is fairly clear, but *"Gemeinschaft"*, or Community, covering as it does all stages prior to rise of modern society, does not enable us to distinguish among them — among, for instance, prehistoric societies and feudal societies. But such distinctions must be made, and if they are, the concept of *"Gemeinschaft"* will be much more useful for interpreting knowledge.

I would be very glad if Professor Stark would tell me what he thinks about this matter.

WOLFF

Senator Cesare Luporini, professor of moral philosophy at the University of Florence.

CESARE LUPORINI

Monsieur le Président, dans ce que je vais dire je veux me rattacher un peu à ce que M. Goldmann a dit, dans un certain sens, et aux critiques qui ont été faites au sujet de ce qu'a dit le Professeur Girod. Je pense que, en général, il y a tendance à confondre, en ce qui concerne le marxisme, la critique de l'idéologie, qui a été faite par Marx, avec ce qu'est le rôle de la conscience dans les actions humaines. Il s'agit là d'une distinction profonde et décisive, ce sont deux choses

qui ont des fonctions tout à fait différentes. Dans ce deuxième cas, en ce qui concerne le rôle de la conscience dans l'action humaine, on ne peut pas parler d'épiphénomène. C'est un malentendu radical du marxisme. Le but que les hommes se posent dans leurs actions sont pour tous les marxistes, en commençant par Marx, des conditions essentielles de l'action humaine même, et c'est un élément qui distingue l'action humaine et l'action de tout autre être vivant. Le décalage qui peut exister entre les conditions objectives, c'est-à-dire, pour les marxistes, l'état des rapports de production etc., et les conditions subjectives, non des individus mais des groupes sociaux et des classes, est un élément décisif pour l'action marxiste.

Un grand marxiste italien militant, Gramsci, observait que, en ce qui concerne l'état de la conscience subjective des groupes sociaux et des masses, il se passe normalement que certains individus appartiennent en même temps à divers groupes sociaux. Ils sont dans une place déterminée dans le rapport de production, dans les conditions objectives, mais appartiennent en même temps à des groupes différents au point de vue de l'idéologie, de la culture, de l'état de la conscience, dans les conditions subjectives. Naturellement cela comporte des contradictions dans la conscience même, et Gramsci attribuait une grande importance au concept du sens commun: pour lui, la correction, la modification, la réforme du sens commun étaient des éléments fondamentaux de toute l'action marxiste. D'autre part, naturellement, cette action ne pouvait pas s'appuyer sur l'état réel comme produit du résultat historique du sens commun même, bien que toute l'action idéologique des classes dominantes s'appuyait sur cette situation historique des contradictions, des stratifications différentes et contradictoires qui sont dans le sens commun des différents groupes sociaux. Et c'est pour cela qu'il voyait comme élément essentiel du mouvement de l'histoire moderne, l'unification culturelle de l'humanité.

Peut-être ne suis-je donc pas tout à fait d'accord avec M. Goldmann en ce qui concerne les limites de la conscience si on ne considère pas toujours en même temps ces éléments contradictoires qui existent dans la conscience limitée des groupes dans cette circonstance historique déterminée. Lénine même n'aurait pas pu faire cette action que M. Goldmann nous a rappelée si les paysans étaient seulement liés à cette idéologie du Tsarisme et il n'y avait pas d'autres éléments contradictoires dans leur conscience.

J'aimerais ajouter encore une chose qu'observait Gramsci, et c'est qu'il considérait le développement de la science, des sciences de la nature surtout, comme élément moteur dans l'histoire moderne pour l'unification culturelle de l'humanité. C'est dire que cette grande tâche historique dans laquelle il considérait que l'action révolutionnaire marxiste avait un rôle décisif, l'unification culturelle de l'humanité, avait déjà un point d'appui dans le développement des sciences de la nature.

WOLFF

I want to thank all who have participated in the discussion and have attended the meeting. I hope there will be more meetings privately, such as Professors Dubskà and Shimmei have suggested. I think we have shown that there are enough problems and concepts to be discussed and clarified to warrant a full day's regular session on the sociology of knowledge at the next World Congress. Thank you very much.

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