

TRANSACTIONS  
OF THE SEVENTH  
WORLD CONGRESS  
OF SOCIOLOGY

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ACTES  
DU SEPTIEME  
CONGRES MONDIAL  
DE SOCIOLOGIE



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WORLD CONGRESS OF SOCIOLOGY

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CONGRES MONDIAL DE SOCIOLOGIE

VOLUME III



WORKING GROUPS  
ROUND TABLES

GROUPES DE TRAVAIL  
TABLES RONDES

INTERNATIONAL SOCIOLOGICAL  
ASSOCIATION

ASSOCIATION INTERNATIONALE DE  
SOCIOLOGIE

INTERNATIONAL SOCIOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION

ASSOCIATION INTERNATIONALE DE SOCIOLOGIE

1950

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# TRANSACTIONS OF THE SEVENTH WORLD CONGRESS OF SOCIOLOGY

## ACTES DU SEPTIEME CONGRES MONDIAL DE SOCIOLOGIE

Varna, September 14-19, 1970

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INTERNATIONAL SOCIOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION  
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1972

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### **GROUPE DE TRAVAIL**

**Le Septième Congrès Mondial de Sociologie a été organisé par l'Association Internationale de Sociologie en collaboration avec le Comité d'Organisation Bulgare sous l'égide de l'UNESCO et sous le haut patronage du Président du Conseil des Ministres de la République Populaire de Bulgarie S. E. Monsieur Todor Jivkov.**

VI PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT  
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VI PLANIFICATION ET DÉVELOPPEMENT  
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## VII. PLANNING IN URBAN AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT

### VII. PLANIFICATION POUR LE DEVELOPPEMENT URBAIN ET RURAL

The sociologists themselves showed a greater interest in sociology for town planning than in sociology of town planning. This may be explained, at least in the Czechoslovak context, by the fact that they endeavoured to prove the existence of sociology in socio-ecological terms in order to improve their position among social sciences.

The reflections on the town-planning process started by studying its geographical aspects and its methodology. The character of these studies was predominantly normative and they showed clearly an Indian and Chinese character. Never rigorous, these studies began with a social and sociological analysis, but had always several sociological elements.

Sociological research in the town-planning process is only making its first steps in Czechoslovakia now and therefore this study cannot be more than an attempt to raise systematically the problems of sociology of town-planning in Czechoslovakia.

#### What is meant by town planning?

The notion of planning being loaded with semantic ambiguity in the Czechoslovakian society as a result of various historical and political conditions of the concept of town planning having undergone rapid changes, it may be useful to define explicitly what is meant by town planning in our author's context.

The term town planning is used here to denote complex activities aimed at organising and forming the human environment in cities. Town planning results in general city plans, in master plans.

## TOWN PLANNING AS A SOCIAL PROCESS

JIŘÍ MUSIL  
CZECHOSLOVAKIA

The relationship of sociology to town planning has taken two forms, namely sociology for town planning and sociology of town planning. The absolute majority of contacts between these two disciplines has been hitherto concentrated on the application of sociology in town planning, while town planning as a social phenomenon has been as yet studied very seldom. The reasons of this state of things are obvious. Town planners have always been interested in that part of sociology which could help them in their tasks and felt rather uneasy whenever sociologists tried to analyze the planning process itself, or the values underlying the normative planning models of cities.

The sociologists themselves showed a greater interest in sociology for town planning than sociology of town planning: this may be explained, at least in the Czechoslovak context, by the fact that they endeavoured to prove the usefulness of sociology in socio-technical terms, in order to improve their position among social sciences.

The reflections on the town planning process started by studying its organizational aspects and its methodology. The character of these studies was predominantly normative and they aimed directly at finding and introducing better organizational frameworks. *Sensu stricto* it was not yet a sociological analysis, but had already several sociological elements.

Sociological research of the town planning process is only making its first steps in Czechoslovakia now and therefore this study cannot be more than an attempt to map systematically the problems of sociology of town planning in Czechoslovakia.

### *What is meant by town planning*

The notion of planning being loaded with semantic ambiguity or else being understood merely as a variant of rational behaviour, and the content of the concept of town planning having undergone rapid changes, it may be useful to define explicitly what is meant by town planning in our further comments.

The term town planning as used here describes complex activities aimed at arranging and forming the human environment in cities. Town planning results in general city plans, in master plans.

### *Two possible approaches*

In literature dealing with town planning analysis, two different trends can be distinguished: one could be labelled as normative, the other as sociological. The normative approach deals with the ways planning should be done in order to achieve best possible results with respect to established goals. Within the normative approach, five main groups of problems are usually examined:

1. The goals of planning and the procedures used when defining goals and purposes, the operationalization of goals and purposes;
2. The definitions of the individual phases (steps) in the forming of the plan and their most efficient sequence and linkage;
3. The relationship between plans for the various functional elements of the city and the various parts of the city;
4. The relationship of town planning to other kinds of planning, mainly linking up with economic and social planning;
5. The most effective forms of cooperation between disciplines participating in town planning.

Contrary to the normative approach, the sociological one deals with town planning as it actually occurs. In this approach the planning system is a structure formed by: values, goals, roles, actors, organizations and their clients, rules, norms regulating the relationship between individual and collective participants of planning.

Let us stress, however, that there is no sharp line separating the sociological and the normative approaches, on the contrary, they are in permanent interaction. Concrete tasks determine the structure of the actors, the types of social conflicts arising in the planning process. Vice versa, the structure of actors and the composition of the planning team often influence the substance of the plan. Under certain circumstances and in certain situations it may be even more important who is planning than what is being planned. The overlapping of the normative and the sociological approaches is also evident from the fact that one of the latent functions of sociological research of planning is indeed the improvement of normative methodology of planning.

A plan is the result of many actors' cooperation, its forming is among others also a communication process, and, moreover, some of its most important phases — the phases may be called in Bolan's terms also process steps — are political actions in which simultaneously with the choice of values, interests of different groups of the population or interests of individual communities, interpreted by individual social groups, play an important role.

On the other hand, however, due to the very fact that planning is a kind of rational behaviour, its sociological study cannot be separated from a sound knowledge of its rational "logical backbone". Expressed with some simplification: sociology studies the way how the rational action model is modified, sometimes even infringed and how it thus becomes a real social process. But planning being essentially rational — if it lost this rationality it would cease to be planning at all — we think it is useful to start the

sociological analysis from the ideal type of the rational model. In sociological analysis the individual logical steps become, however, social actions.

The sequence of process steps is in fact a sequence of social actions which perform certain functions without which the realization of the plan would not be possible. For a better conceptualization of the process which we are trying to describe we think it appropriate to use a term introduced in studies of the family cycle. It is the term of developmental tasks, used by R. Havighurst, E. Duvall and R. H. Rodgers. The individual phases of planning have also certain developmental tasks and the quality of the plan depends on their satisfactory fulfilment.

In Czechoslovakia there have not yet been made any empirical studies on sociological problems connected with planning when fulfilling the sequence of developmental tasks; neither is the literature of other countries rich in concrete analyses of sociological problems in the various phases of planning. We must therefore limit ourselves to the sociological interpretation of documents, to the results of participating observation and to the insights acquired when cooperating with town-planners.

### *System elements of planning*

We consider the basic system elements of the planning process to be

1. The values, goals and ideologies.
2. Concrete tasks, which are solved by planning.
3. The carrying out of developmental tasks.
4. The organizational units in which the developmental tasks are realized.
5. The actors and professions participating in planning.
6. The roles of the actors.
7. The norms regulating the relations between the individual participants (actors) and between the organizational units.

In the following discussion stress will be laid on the problem of goal-finding, sequence of developmental tasks, value orientations, on the professions, on the description of roles in planning and last but not least on the environment in which the town planning is performed.

Before describing concrete institutional forms of the goal defining processes in Czechoslovak town planning let us mention the basic categories of goals and purposes directly or indirectly relevant to this planning.

1. In societies with a centrally planned economy, the goals and purposes of the national-wide economic and social growth (e. g. the intentional growth of a certain branch of industry etc.) are projected into the master plans of the individual towns. The latter depend also on general political decisions concerning the regulation of urban growth, on the acceptance or rejection of decentralization or polarization theories of economic growth etc.

These most general principles of the policy of town planning are formulated by central political and governmental bodies, i. e. organizations of the Communist party, Parliament, the Government, the State Planning Commission etc.

2. The second category of goals which indirectly intervene into town planning are the plans of the various productive and non-productive sectors of national economy, represented by the respective ministries. In this connection appears often the term of "sector goals".

3. These "sector goals" have a very important counterbalance corrective in the goals of the central state body concerned with the formulation of the development goals of large areas or of a state-wide development plan. In this third category of goals are taken into consideration ecological aspects (balance of water resources, protection of agriculture against industry etc.), as well as the socio-political demands (balanced economic activities, providing employment for women as well as for men etc.).

4. The fourth category of goals entering into the game are the purposes, ambitions and aims of the individual towns or regions. They vary in nature: sometimes it may be an endeavour to make central planning bodies invest into the town or region, or to interest industrial enterprises to found new factories there; sometimes it may be quite the opposite, e. g. trying to limit industrial or mining activities in towns which may be called overindustrialized or where excessive industrial development threatens other functions (e. g. spas) or leads to the deterioration of the environment.

5. The fifth group is formed by what Pahl calls visions of experts, the conceptions of research institutes and other "idea factories" and by professional ideologies penetrating consciously or unconsciously into the planning process. From the institutional aspect, this category of goals is of a very diffuse nature. It asserts itself by means of design activities, as well as by means of professional organizations. Visions of experts can be detected in the formulation of state-wide principles of regional and physical planning, yet also — and perhaps even more often — on the microlevel of development plans in the individual plans for new cities.

6. The sixth category of goals, having also a very diffuse impact, is that of the users — the public. A more or less institutionalized form of their communication are negotiations in representative bodies, another one are sociological surveys of living environment, of housing preferences, of demands concerning urban facilities, and public opinion pools organized by the mass communication media. Yet the channels of the public's communication and impact are undoubtedly much more numerous, as they penetrate unconsciously into the theories of experts and the individual planning professions.

7. A greater extent of institutionalization, mainly in large and old cities with historical monuments, has been achieved as far as goals aiming at the conservation of cultural and historical values are concerned. All development plans of cities in Czechoslovakia and major interventions into cities are subject, in various phases of the planning process, to the commentary proceedings of the State Conservation Care of Historical Monuments. Moreover, in some cities, e. g. in Prague, there exist pressure groups — The Club for Old Prague — which show activity in individual cases of reconstruction or clearance. A similar function is performed by some influential personalities, e. g. historians of art or of architecture, who criticize insensitive interventions into the historical parts of cities.

The goal-defining process of the plans in Czechoslovakia is formalized to a great extent and regulated by legal norms. Before the plan itself is designed, the so-called "Political, Technical and Economical Principles" (PTEP) must be worked out. These include the analysis of the contemporary situation: as well as a sort of "list of the goals" and aims of industry, the non-productive sectors (education, Health service etc.), the transport and energetic networks, the aims of the town's National Committee etc.

During their elaboration there arise conflicts between some of the goals and aims, which appear mainly in two process steps, namely when revising the first version of the PTEP and when approving the final version by political bodies, i. e. various departments of the National Committees. The substance of the conflict determines at the same time its participants. What becomes a subject of conflict? It may be e. g. the prospective size of the city, about which the local authorities have another idea than higher bodies of public administration (Regional National Committee): this is an example of a conflict between local purposes and larger regional or even State purposes. The goals of a local authority may further not be in accordance with those of a certain industry which wants to enlarge its production; there arise also controversies between the various groups of industries settled in the town, who e. g. compete for advantageous sites for new buildings: these are examples of conflicts or competitions between economic activities. There are frequent controversies between the representatives of heterogeneous activities and functions, e. g. trade and administration, transport and recreation organizations and agriculture.

### *Process roles*

The developmental tasks form the framework within which the planning process roles are carried on. The developmental tasks can be classified into five basic categories:

1. Formulation of planning goals.
2. Situation analysis.
3. Evaluation of the results of analysis in the light of the goals.
4. The choice of the best alternative.
5. The elaboration of the development plans.
6. The implementation of the plan.

The process roles through which the tasks are performed are highly specialized and differentiated as are the specific functions determining the actors' positions and their roles.

As the description of the process roles shows, it is evident that the classic rational and technocratic model of planning does not correspond to reality. According to the technocratic model, the roles of the planner are limited to functional rationality and therefore the planner is predominantly "Expert", "Analyst", "Surveyor", "Model-Maker". His contact with the outside world is small and he considers this contact to be rather a hindrance in his work. In accordance with this model, which J. Friedmann calls "coolly rational and antiseptic", the planner's function was to design the

TABLE. DEVELOPMENTAL TASKS, SPECIFIC FUNCTIONS AND PROCESS ROLES IN PLANNING

Developmental Tasks	Specific Functions	Process Roles
1. Formulation of planning goals	Ordering of the plan, specifying its kind, stating goals, contacting interest representatives, getting information on goals of interest-representatives, transforming information into planning goals.	Initiator
		Organizer
		Information collector
		Goal-setter
2. Situation analysis	Gathering and evaluating available data, performing special surveys, analysing social, economic etc. situation.	Surveyor
		Analyst
		Expert
3. Evaluation of the results in the lights of the goals	Coordination of the surveys' results, synthesis of planning goals, consensus formation, conflict resolution, formulation of recommendations for designing the plan, approving the principles of the plan.	Coordinator
		Synthetizer
		Mediator
		Negotiator
		Arbiter
4. The choice of the best alternatives	Working out the principles of possible alternatives, comparing the alternatives, deciding between alternatives.	Expert
		Analyst
		Spokesman
		Arbiter
5. The elaborating of the development plan	Working out the proposal for the plan on the basis of agreed principles and the chosen alternative, transforming the social, economic, functional and other principles into spatial concepts, organizing the cooperation of different professions, approving the proposed plan, revision of the plan, working out the definitive version of the plan.	Team-Leader
		Strategist
		Analyst
		Surveyor
		Expert
		Specialist
		Organizer
Designer		
6. The implementation of the plan	Working out directives for the implementation of the plan, decisions on land use according to the approved plan alternative, other forms of using the plan, publicity of the plan, finding support for it.	Gestor
		Commentator
		Enforcer
		Controller
		Adviser
		Publicity-Maker
Supporter		

plans, the fate of which was to be decided by the politician or by political institutions.

In reality, however, the planner has many other roles, depending, on the one hand, on his participation in a team of various professions, and his membership in large complex organizations, on the other hand, on the fact that plan-making in several of its decisive phases is a communication process and a political process.

A good quality of the development plan is not enough. It would be a Socratic error to assume that good technical and professional qualities of a development plan suffice to assure its implementation. On the other hand, however, there are many examples showing that the planners' motivation, strengthened by the existing modes of their education, favours their inclination to technocratic roles and their reluctance to perform "social" roles. It is well known that the architect feels best at his drawing-desk and that he considers his other activities as secondary ones.

The specialization of the role processes is not the only aspect of planners' role playing. Bolan is right to stress the fact that the ability to influence decision-making also depends on motivation, opportunity and skills

### *Actors and Professions*

The structure of the professions which take part in town planning reflect the quickly progressing division of labour and at the same time the changes in the planning philosophy. The activity, which not a long time ago was predominantly performed by architects, has become in a short period a most complicated activity system with many new participants; participants therein have not only a very different specialization, but also varied social backgrounds, modes of thought and ideologies.

The participation of new disciplines in the planning procedures leads to new patterns of relations between occupational groups.

One of the most serious problems are the differences in occupational cultures e. g. differences between analytically oriented professions (sociologists, statisticians, etc.) and design oriented professions, mainly architects. The growing participation of analysts and experts, though having its advantages, leads to certain difficulties. It seems that the planners lose courage to make value decisions, to create and to overcome uncertainties. Schmidt-Relenberg calls this new attitude of some architects "resignation through science".

On the other hand, the analytically oriented professions themselves have in the recent years difficulties in defining their own functions and roles. Some of them abandon the coolly aseptic role of analysts and advocate the necessity of institutionalization of imagination processes leading to the formation of social values.

The growing division of labour in town planning and organizational structures following therefrom lead to difficulties in interaction and to new status problems. Also the institutional and formal structure of team work in planning is in flux.



No wonder that the status of architects changes and that the architects feel uncertain. In spite of the growing number of other professions participating in planning, the architects in Czechoslovakia and in other Eastern European countries remain in top positions with most decision power, expressed by such facts that e. g. they are directors of design institutes, heads of planning teams designing master plans.

The strong position of architecture is quite understandable. It is an old profession with traditionally high status in Czechoslovakia and has achieved moreover a higher degree of professionalization than other planning professions.

#### *A note on planning units*

Developmental tasks of the planning process in Czechoslovakia are carried out in different types of complex organizations but mainly in the design institutes. In these institutes (which are in all administrative regions of the country, and their analogues in all largest cities) most of the actual work on master plans is carried out. They are also an arena where the confrontation between the professionalism and the system of complex organizations takes place.

The mere size (some of them employ 600 people) not to talk about the complexity of their tasks, necessarily makes of them typical complex organizations. Their specific feature is a big concentration of highly qualified and heterogeneous professions. There are therefore few organizations on which Kornhauser's juxtaposition can be applied with such adequacy: "Professionalism has as its primary function the protection of standards for creative activities; organization has as its primary function the efficient coordination of diverse activities."

The values of creativity, artistic individuality, are traditionally a part of the architects' professional culture and many among them are not satisfied with the organization of the institutes. The other specialists accept bureaucratic standards with more conformity, as the functional rationality of complex organizations is in a lesser conflict with their professional culture.

The specific problem of the design institutes is the fact that the top managers are also professionals and that therefore no marked alienation between managers and the professionals developed as in other types of bureaucratic organizations. This pattern, however, leads to a considerable strain among the top managers who face the task of reconciling sometimes rather incompatible professional and managerial roles. There are signs that the professional codes prevail.

#### *Planning and environment*

For classification purposes, environmental elements can be divided into extra-community factors and intra-community factors. Town planning is strongly dependent on the following extra-local environmental elements: socio-economic structure of the society, structure of ownership, type of eco-

nomy or type of planned economy, formal legal framework, administrative division of the country, political system (degree of centralization or decentralization of power), governmental structure.

Some authors include among extra-community factors also regional differences and moreover attitudes to planning, which vary considerably from country to country.

Among intra-community factors are in the first place those which can be called community morphology factors: the size of the city, the demographic structure, the rates of migration, the structure of occupations, the number of employed women, dependence of the town on commuting labour force, size, number and kind of industrial plants, standards of living and cultural level of the population.

A very important element of environment is the structure, communication patterns and quality of local government. Other important factors are the quality, degree of knowledge and activity of the National committees councillors and the executive departments of the National committees responsible for physical planning; these factors are again dependent on the size of communities, their type and structure of their population. Larger cities have as a rule a more competent bureaucracy, a larger choice of technicians and the influence of experts is stronger. Equally important is the mobility of the councillors and experts working in National committees.

Environmental factors include also value orientations of local authorities and their departments, which reflect the social structure and the power situation in the communities. The continuity of organizational structure and of legal responsibility proves to be a very important feature. The looking for new forms of organization leading to frequent reorganizations resulted in a deterioration of the quality of planning. Planning output is also dependent on the mutual relationship of industry and local authorities. The situation is completely different in towns with a monopoly position of one industrial branch or one enterprise and in towns with a diversified industrial base. In the first case partnership relations are formed, in the second case local authorities perform to a larger extent a coordinating, integrating function. The output of planning departments depends on the existence or non-existence of a strong local tradition and identification. In towns with a so-called "big history" or with significant historical monuments, the public is generally more town-planning minded than in towns lacking these characteristics.

The environmental factors influencing the elaboration of master plans and their implementation are manifold and from the experience available, the most relevant are: formal and informal social structure of the design institutes, procedural rules in allocating plans to different chief planners and different departments, professional structure of the design institutes, communication patterns with the clients, the public and other participants, and last but not least the demand for planning.

\*

Town planning as a social process in undoubtedly one of the most complicated tasks urban societies face. Many of us only start to understand the basic shapes of it and the presented paper has tried to arrange the existing problems into a more manageable form, to enable further discussion and research.

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## URBANIZATION AND CONFLICT AMONG BLACKS IN RELATION TO SOCIAL PLANNING IN THE UNITED STATES

JOSEPH S. HIMES

USA

In the United States racial conflict is now a leading political and social issue. As an issue of national concern, racial conflict may be said to have begun with the Supreme Court decision of May 17, 1954 prohibiting segregation of blacks in public schools and with the bus boycott of 1955 in Montgomery, Alabama. These dramatic events initiated a course of aggressive struggle whose most sensational manifestation was the massive riots in Watts (Los Angeles), Detroit, Newark and other large cities. However, perhaps the most significant aspect of struggle was acceptance by black people of deliberate conflict as an instrument of group policy.

Racial conflict must be seen as another episode in the American democratic revolutionary process. Other chapters in this saga of man's struggle to be free include the fight for universal male suffrage, the abolition of slavery, the women's rights movements, and the struggle of labor for organization and recognition. The fact that some of these historic conflicts have been "institutionalized", i. e., legitimized and regulated, may speak with significance to the current racial conflict in American society.

Racial conflict is a phenomenon of urban life. Therefore at the outset the topic of urbanization of the black population in the United States is examined briefly. Urbanization constitutes a useful framework within which to consider socio-economic developments that functioned to establish the preconditions of modern racial conflict. The second part of the paper constitutes a search for the causes of modern racial conflict. It formulates in theoretical form the syndrome of preconditions that led to the massive outbreak of racial conflict in the middle of the 1950 decade. The paper concludes with an analysis of the implications of racial conflict for social planning in American society. It notes that ineptness and inadequacy of planning permitted conflict-inducing conditions to develop. The discussion points out that deliberate racial conflict is planning-oriented, and concludes with brief reference to the possibilities of "institutionalizing" racial conflict by use of planning resources already available within the American social system.

## I.

The figures in Table 1 show that the black population of the United States has been urbanizing at an increasing rate. In each of the decades between 1940 and 1960 the proportion of blacks living in cities increased by more than 10 percent. By 1960, date of the latest census report, almost three fourths, 73.2 percent of all blacks lived in cities. Table 1 also shows that in 1960 nine-tenths and more of all blacks living outside the South resided in urban places.

The United States Bureau of the Census classifies people as "urban" if they reside in incorporated places with 2,500 or more inhabitants. Summary population figures thus do not distinguish between people who live in small places and those who reside in large metropolitan areas or conurbations. However, the data indicate that most black people tend to live in large cities.<sup>1</sup> Thus, Table 2 shows that in 1960 there were 18 cities, each with 100,000 or more black inhabitants. These 18 cities had 5,891,000 black residents, or over a quarter of the total black population of the United States.

The black population in the large metropolitan areas is concentrated in "central city", or the older, congested and settled section.<sup>2</sup> Half or more of all residents in some of the cities listed in Table 2 are black. In these cities black citizens control, or could control the political power of the city. Concentration of blacks in central city reflects two related ecological processes. First, as noted, black people continue to enter the area by migration from other regions and/or from other cities. Second, middle-class whites are leaving central city for residence in the suburbs. As a consequence, the proportion of blacks in the central city areas of the large metropolitan communities has increased steadily and the character of these cities has continued to change. Change of the character of central cities results in part from the youthfulness and poor adjustment of in-migrants and in part from progressive congestion and deterioration of the areas.

In combination, these and other changes of central cities comprise a complex social process sometimes referred to as "ghettoization". Leading aspects of ghettoization, in addition to those already mentioned, include growth of racial and/or ethnic homogeneity, social and cultural isolation, sense of powerlessness and socio-economic deprivation. These characteristics are among the factors that constitute the preconditions of modern racial conflict. Our analysis of urbanization of American blacks prepares us for the inquiry into the causes and consequences of racial conflict.

<sup>1</sup> See Daniel O. Price, *Urbanization of the Blacks*, in ed. Clyde V. Kiser, *Demographic Aspects of the Black Community*. The Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly, 48, 47-58, Part 2 (April 1970), especially Tables 5 and 6.

<sup>2</sup> Karl E. and Alma F. Taeuber, *Negroes in Cities: Residential Segregation and Neighborhood Change*, New York, Atheneum, 1969.

TABLE 2. CITIES OF THE UNITED STATES THAT HAD MORE THAN 100,000 BLACKS IN 1960

City	Black Population	Percent Black
New York	1,088,000	14
Chicago	813,000	23
Philadelphia	529,000	26
Detroit	482,000	29
Washington, D. C.	412,000	54
Los Angeles	335,000	14
Baltimore	326,000	35
Cleveland	251,000	29
New Orleans	234,000	37
Houston	215,000	23
St. Louis	214,000	29
Atlanta	186,000	38
Memphis	184,000	37
Newark	138,000	34
Birmingham	135,000	40
Dallas	129,000	19
Cincinnati	109,000	22
Pittsburgh	101,000	17

pical of life within big city ghettos.<sup>3</sup> The racial structure also functioned to produce intense feelings of frustration and alienation.<sup>4</sup> The system tended to withhold recognition and respect from black people. Deprivation, frustration and lack of respect functioned to make black people restive, angry and aggressive. The racial structure also fostered longings for security, respect and freedom. Dr. Martin Luther King argued that the black people's quest was for freedom, respect and opportunity within the democratic American system.<sup>5</sup>

Thus motivated, black people were set in the American social structure in the classic conflict position.<sup>6</sup> Blacks and whites, separated and motivated, faced one another. The blacks were ready to attack and the whites were prepared to defend.

Spread of belief in substantive change through self help was stimulated by two dramatic conflict events.<sup>7</sup> One

<sup>3</sup> Herbert Hill, *Demographic Change in Racial Ghettos: The Crisis of American Cities*, *Journal of Urban Law*, 44, 231-285 (Winter, 1966).

<sup>4</sup> William H. Grier and Price M. Cobbs, *Black Rage*, New York, Basic Books, 1968.

<sup>5</sup> Martin Luther King, *Why We Can't Wait*, New York, Harper and Row, 1963, pp. 77-100.

<sup>6</sup> Ralf Dahrendorf, *Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society*, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1959, p. 126.

<sup>7</sup> Neil J. Smelser, *Theory of Collective Behavior*, New York Free Press of Glencoe, 1963, p. 16

was the Supreme Court decision of May 17, 1954 forbidding further segregation of blacks in the nation's public schools. The other was the Montgomery bus boycott of 1955-56. These and similar events sent the winds of change blowing through the black ghetto. It was now evident that black people could change major social institutions by their own efforts. More than this, even the lowliest man, woman and child could have a hand in the important and exciting business of changing the world.

At the same time, black people were not only stimulated by dramatically rising levels of aspiration; many of them also had resources that could be expended in the business of racial conflict. As a consequence, memberships, funds, volunteers and all the material of struggle increased in the conflict organizations. The boycott technique demonstrated that people themselves were an important conflict resource, available in growing and enthusiastic numbers.

By the early 1960's these and other elements were fused and stabilized into an ideological system that legitimized and institutionalized the thrust toward racial conflict. The goals of collective struggle were clarified and communicated in such slogans as "first-class citizenship", "we shall overcome" and "black is beautiful". Heroes and villains were identified and labelled. A rationale to condemn the existing racial order and to justify struggle for change was generated and diffused. A myth of the new racial world was created and dramatized by Martin Luther King when he exclaimed from the foot of the Lincoln Memorial "I Have a Dream".

*Power* is crucial in racial conflict because, as H. M. Blalock has observed, race relations are power relations.<sup>8</sup> However, typically, black people were poor, impotent and badly organized. This fact was consistent with their inferior and collateral position within the American social structure. Although some black leaders engaged in the deliberate search for social power, sometimes discovery was fortuitous.<sup>9</sup>

These newly discovered forms of residual social power can be classified as follows:

Withholding purchasing power — the boycott, selective buying programs, etc.

Focused voting power — bloc voting, "single shotting", etc.

Latent moral commitment — public display of abuses of fair play, humanity, etc.

Public opinion—latent power of the mass media, especially television.

Due process — legal redress, the power of the law and the courts.

Intimidation — massive demonstrations, confrontations, threats, violence, etc.

These forms of social power were peculiarly available to blacks in the American social structure. By combining their limited economic or political resources or by challenging the ethical and moral commitments of the general community, blacks could activate and control significant amounts of social power. When harnessed and focused in terms of a problem or issue

<sup>8</sup> H. M. Blalock, *A Power Analysis of Racial Discrimination*, *Social Forces*, 39; 53-59 (October 1960)

<sup>9</sup> M. L. King, *Stride Toward Freedom*, New York, Harper and Row, 1958, pp. 40-45.

they exerted a decisive influence on the state of social organization and the course of social affairs.

*Organization* in racial conflict is an instance of what Everett E. Hagen has called "innovation" and includes an instrumental and a social dimension.<sup>10</sup> At the instrumental level the core task consisted of collecting and combining the myriad, dispersed minute units of potential power residing in the black masses. Each minute and discrete unit of power had, so to speak, to be dissociated from its individual possessor and set in motion. This diffuse and in some measure unwieldy power reserve had to be organized, managed and focused. In every case this task involved the management of large numbers of relatively undisciplined and often untutored individuals.

At the social, or human relations level, organization presented some special problems. The individual possessors of minute units of social power were required to act, not for immediate and visible self-interest, but rather to make sacrifices in the present for future and problematical rewards. Initially, therefore, organization at this level had to accomplish the following four ends:

1. Inspire and galvanize the sacrificing individual power possessors.
2. Fit them into a division of labor by assigning to each a role that he could understand and perform.
3. Impose control over relevant behavior and as soon as possible generate self-discipline.
4. Sustain the morale and enthusiasm of the power-possessing, sacrificing individual participants.

The organizational innovation in this situation was the mass-participating conflict activity pattern. This basic organizational instrument has been modified many times, though its typical manifestations are the boycott, the sit-in, the silent march and the demonstration. Its basic working parts include a conflict-oriented ideology, a leadership mechanism and an indefinitely expansible role structure that defines membership in terms of overt activity. This organizational device permitted blacks to mobilize and apply the power resources available to them in the prosecution of racial conflict.

*Tactics* were required in the process of racial conflict for the activation and delivery of the available resources of social power. Some were obviously borrowed from other conflict groups and situations. Others, however, were either adapted or invented to meet the special requirements of racial conflict. The major conflict tactics can be usefully classified into four main types: direct action, confrontation, intimidation and controlled violence as shown in the following list:

A. Direct Action

1. Boycott, strike
2. Bloc voting, single-shotting, etc.
3. Demonstration, sit-in, march, picket, freedom ride, etc.
4. Civil disobedience

<sup>10</sup> Everett E. Hagen, *On the Theory of Social Change*, Homewood, Illinois. Dorsey, 1962, pp. 86-87.



## B. Confrontation

1. Student vs. university administration
2. Black people vs. building construction unions

## C. Intimidation

1. Calculated use of threats

## D. Controlled Violence

1. Calculated and controlled attacks against person or property

## III.

For present purposes social planning may be defined as a collective enterprise in the management of social change to insure achieving desired social arrangements.<sup>11</sup> It introduces the factor of rational prevision into the social process and envisages the calculation of ends and means. Moreover, by implication the concept social planning also understands that collective effort should redound to the general welfare, not to the advantage of one sector and the disadvantage of others.

Racial conflict and social planning in American society are related in at least three ways. First, inept and inadequate planning has functioned to permit a racial conflict situation to develop within the general social structure. Second, racial conflict itself constitutes a collective effort to remedy a dysfunctional situation by the enforced application of the planning process. And finally, it seems clear that one possible solution to the general problem signified by racial conflict is "institutionalization" of racial struggle through the application of planning methodology.

Like the poor, American blacks have been ignored, concealed and repressed. The pattern of conflict that was analyzed in the foregoing section of this paper emerged from historical processes that were not controlled and directed by rational calculation of social ends and means. Pushed off the corporation farms of the South, rural blacks gathered in big cities where they tended to huddle in the central city ghettos. No inclusive policy or plan illuminated or guided their urbanization and their subsequent experiences in the ghettos of big industrial conurbations. Since the end of the Reconstruction, nearly a century ago, all social institutions and public agencies have maintained rigid practices of racial segregation and discrimination. The informal social policy of segregation, disfranchisement, discrimination and degradation express widespread consensus regarding the place and treatment of blacks in the American social system. These agreements reveal little rational consideration of the general welfare and slight disposition to avoid favoring the white sector to the disadvantage of the black.

One consequence of this process of societal drift was development of the structural and psychic conditions of conflict that were examined above. This is a curious commentary on the American political system, for in other important areas planning and control have been exercised under direc-

<sup>11</sup> See J. S. Himes, *The Study of Sociology*, Glenview, Illinois, Scott, Foresman, 1968, pp. 444-457.

tion of the national government. For example, in the middle of the nineteenth century a plan was formulated and implemented for disposing of the public domain, i. e., the Homestead Act. At about the same time the Morrill Act was passed to use public lands to encourage and direct the development of higher agricultural and technical education. In the mid 1930's, during the Great Depression, the national government established a comprehensive welfare system, the Social Security plan.

On the other hand, insofar as racial conflict is deliberate rational action, it is an enterprise in the advocacy of social planning. What is germane here is not the quality of planning methodology but rather the fact that the conflict process is utilized as the instrument to inject planning methodology into the process of social change. Indeed, the most extreme forms of conflict behavior have been shown to contain a significant element of deliberateness, or planning.

As shown above, the racial conflict groups mobilized and applied social power in the effort to bring about desired social changes. The focal point of attack was the "power structure", the "establishment" or the "key decision makers" of both government and non-governmental bureaucratic agencies. In planning terms, key decision makers included both legislative and executive officers of government at all levels and the policy makers and executives of the non-governmental bureaucracies. In addition, racial conflict activity was aimed at influencing the citizens who were seen as the ultimate referent of public policy and action. In these and other ways social power was utilized through racial conflict to influence the course of social change.

As a manifestation of social planning, racial conflict sought to achieve collectively defined goals that varied in several respects. Although most conflict organizations envisaged the goal of struggle as some reform of the existing racial structure, others espoused racial reconstruction of the total social system. Some organizations sought change through progressive stages, while others insisted on sudden modifications. Sudden social change was sometimes linked to the use of violent methods and the achievement of radical social reconstruction. On the other hand, progressive change was often viewed as limited to the racial structure and as achievable through non-violent methods of persuasion and negotiation.

More than all this, though, racial conflict has gone far toward changing the planless orientation of American society toward the deprivations and discontents of blacks that initiated the conflict. The Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon federal Administrations have formulated and sought to apply general policies on "civil rights" that set in motion many types of planning activity in all sectors of the society. Building on the Supreme Court decision of May 17, 1954, the Government (including all branches) has constructed a plan for directing the development of the nation's public schools. In addition, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 embodies planning schemes for progressive change of the economy and other institutional bureaucracies in relation to issues of race relations. At the same time, state and local governments have also responded to the pressures of racial conflict by adapting

the social planning orientation to the myriad conditions and issues which constitute the starting point of racial conflict itself.

The consequences of these developments establish the prelude to the future of racial conflict in the United States. First, events of the last decade and a half have heightened awareness of the conditions and deprivations that constitute the basis of racial problem and conflict. This development has etched these deviations and abuses clearly against the traditional moral orientation of the society and thus dramatized the great "American dilemma". From this moral antithesis has emerged the perception of irreconcilable trends and forces within the social system. In this situation social planning appears as one, though not the only road into the future.

#### IV.

As pointed out by Lewis Coser, Ralf Dahrendorf, Wilbert Moore, Peter Odegard and others, the religious, political and labor conflicts that at various times have threatened virtually every modern society, have in time been "institutionalized" or "stylized".<sup>12</sup> For example, many nations in addition to the United States have established the principle of "freedom of religion". Divergent faiths and sects have learned to live together, continuing to struggle for survival and followers, but no longer threatening to tear the social structure apart. In some regions of the world political contests often turn into violent revolutions. Yet, in many other places, intense political rivalries are fought out on a public arena that functions in the end to solidify, not to weaken the social order. Political struggle is normative, hence its form and intensity have been regulated and controlled. At one time in every industrializing nation, the conflict between labor and management tended to be internecine, threatening the very social order in some instances. However, in most of these societies labor-management conflict has been brought under regulation, and made a part of the way of life.

Students of social conflict have suggested that a plan to institutionalize or stylize social conflict must include at least three interconnected phases. First is normative legitimation of the conflict itself. That is, planning would bring the social order around to the recognition that the combatants have divergent and clashing interests. Conflict between them is built into the social structure. Expression of this conflict is accepted as justifiable as well as inevitable. Moral norms become modified into conformity with social

<sup>12</sup> See Lewis A. Coser, *The Functions of Social Conflict*, New York, Free Press of Glencoe, 1956.

Lewis A. Coser, *Continuities in the Study of Social Conflict*, New York, Free Press of Glencoe, 1967.

Ralf Dahrendorf, *Op. Cit.*

Wilbert E. Moore, *Social Change*, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, 1963.

Peter Odegard, *Political Power and Social Change*, New Brunswick, Rutgers University Press, 1966.

Kenneth Boulding, *Conflict and Defence*, New York, Harper and Row, 1962.

Ronald Lippitt, *The Dynamics of Planned Change*, New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1958.

reality and behavior that at one time was tabooed comes to be regarded as acceptable.

Second, a plan to institutionalize social conflict includes rules that regulate the expression of that conflict. The rules will specify the times, conditions, forms, participants and so on of struggle. The rules will also specify forms of conflict that are prohibited. Legitimate conflict is thus regulated. For instance, political campaigns may be as heated as the candidates like, but defamation, physical attacks, or vote stealing are forbidden by law. Workers may advance their struggle against management by use of the strike, but they may not attack persons who wish to work or destroy property of the company against whom they are striking. Pickets may parade up and down announcing the arguments for their cause, but they may not obstruct traffic, either automotive or pedestrian.

Finally, and most crucially, the plan that institutionalizes conflict has built into it some guarantee of compromise as the acceptable, indeed the standard model of conflict resolution. That is, the social order undertakes to assure the combatants that each will win something and each will lose something. Conflict cannot be institutionally regulated if the arrangements ensure that one side will always lose and the other will always win. It cannot function either if it indicates that no change will issue from the struggle. Through the principle of compromise the "general welfare" is kept relevant as an important factor. The change permitted, the gains and losses of demands are thus made relevant to the interests and concerns of the entire community, even though only a sector of the community may be directly involved in the struggle. Thus, for instance, although in a political election one candidate or one party only wins, the system guarantees both that the loser will be treated as a respected member of the community and that he can try again in the next election. Moreover, the system often provides ways for taking the views of the vanquished candidate or party into account in fashioning new policies and programs. Or again, the settlement of a labor dispute almost always represents something between the demand extremes of the conflicting parties. Moreover, the contract is a term agreement that may be reopened for negotiation at the end of the specified period.

There is some evidence to suggest that this planning approach to social conflict speaks meaningfully to the issue of racial conflict in the United States. In situations where flexibility has characterized the conflict situation, change has come with some ease and conflict has been limited in intensity and violence. On the other hand, where the structural situation has been characterized by rigidity, conflict has been accentuated in both intensity and violence. Already substantial areas of racial conflict, say employment and voting behavior, have been brought under institutionalized regulation. In addition, important steps are being made to institutionalize the struggle over desegregation of the nation's educational system.

## PLANNING RURAL-URBAN GROWTH CENTRES IN INDIA

PRODIPTO ROY, C. PRESTON ANDRADE  
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### I. PREAMBLE

Twenty years ago India embarked on an era of planned development. As a means of creating a minimum frame of development for the millions in the countryside, the Community Development Block-comprising some hundred contiguous villages and a population of about 100,000 was conceived. To meet minimum basic needs of the rural areas, the Community Development (CD) programme sought to provide a uniform pattern of administrative apparatus, extension services, and infrastructures of material and monetary inputs. Over a period of ten years, 1951-1963, governmental departments at the Centre and in the States mutually expanded their organizations and activities to reach out to all districts and villages. Today, the CD programme covers virtually all of rural India.

In addition, special programmes of intensive agricultural development and of industrial development were undertaken, aimed at creating diversified employment in selected areas, such as the Industrial Estates, Rural Industries Projects, etc. Since these sectoral and temporal programmes have seldom had a strong methodological foundation for promoting integrated development, their impact has been uneven. In comparative terms, the success of the various agricultural programmes, particularly in recent years, has been more significant. Undoubtedly, India has entered a period of rapid, accelerating agricultural development. The "green revolution" offers the prospects of self-sufficiency in food production, of new opportunities and support for industrial growth, of increased employment and income for both rural and urban workers, and of an improved quality of life for India's people.

The improvement of planning techniques and the management of development has become urgent, to ensure that the present buoyancy and prosperity in agriculture does not create rural unemployment, increase migration to the cities, and cause social dislocation. Planning in the rural areas must now be increasingly designed to serve continued agricultural progress, and at the same time, to preclude the evils which could result from loosely managed agricultural prosperity and to ensure optimal economic and social returns on the investments made within any sector. For this, it is necessary

to relate sectoral and temporal programmes to spatial constraints and physical needs.

Rural India is characterised by a vast number of villages, predominantly devoted to cultivation, dispersed rather uniformly in space, with a very small number of trade and service centres and with poor road linkages for the movement of goods and people among these places. Great deficiencies in linkages and services also exist in agro-industries, motorable roads and vehicles, railroads, cooperative and credit institutions, banks, schools, health centres, and other activities. To strengthen the pull of the rural environment for its inhabitants it is essential to overcome these institutional deficiencies if only to provide alternative local employment opportunities for the rural landless and those cultivators who will be forced out of agriculture as a result of technological change and population growth. The provision of the missing vital ingredients will call for, as urgently as possible, provision of an infrastructural network of systems composed of a hierarchy of places with particular service functions, effectively distributed in space, and with efficient linkages for the movement of goods, people, and ideas.

It is important to recognise in this context that research and planning for development must be based on the study of areas with social, economic and spatial interrelationships which have functional or systematic wholeness. Within India, the minimum scale at which functional and systematic wholeness exists is an area consisting of a primary growth or service centre and a surrounding group of related villages. Such localized viable rural communities are the nodal points in infrastructural networks which form the activity systems of a micro-region and ultimately, of the nation. It is important always to keep in mind that in the larger framework, this functional viable rural community is the essential building block. The identification and deliberate promotion of these viable rural communities not only fits in well with the concept of integrated District Planning but can draw upon resources and personnel of the District, region or state and make planning at various levels more scientific and meaningful. It is the purpose of this Pilot Project to give a lead to this kind of meaningful integrated rural area planning.

## II. OBJECTIVES

This Project is a research-cum-action experiment designed to develop, test, and apply a methodology for the optimum provision of the economic and social activities of all people in a given spatial area. The study focuses on the identification of a hierarchy of viable rural "growth centres" and their related communities, and attempts to provide for present needs and to predict future needs.

More specifically, the objectives of the Project are:

1. To study, in selected rural areas, primary centres of growth and the ecological settlements within their ambit, and to suggest the optimal hierarchy of growth centres for the most economic, efficient provision of goods and services.
2. To specify, for present and future needs, the functional gaps in the physical and institutional infrastructures of these centres and related settlements.

3. (a) Taking cognizance of the resources available and likely trends in the spatial and temporal patterns, plan courses of action for selected functions such as agricultural markets, agro-industries, credit institutions, industries transportation education, and health.

(b) Coordinate the planning function with the implementation process so as to secure the integration of programmes into the process of decisions leading to their adoption and implementation.

4. Develop methodologies for the selection and refinement of relevant planning variables and for the collection and analysis of data which would facilitate comprehensive and scientific planning of overall development for the subsequent rounds of study, analysis, and planning.

5. Conduct evaluation studies to assess the impact of infrastructural investments made as a result of plans implemented in study areas.

### III. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The Project attempts experimentally to develop a methodology for planning and developing rural growth centres in India. It collects data on a wide range of physical, social, and economic factors affecting development. After data processing and analysis plans will be prepared and presented to various levels of policy-makers and officials responsible for development programmes. Precisely which data are useful, how best to gather, analyse, use it in planning and present the results so that they may be incorporated effectively in the process of implementation will be the major contribution of this project to the development process.

Theoretically, all human settlements should provide the basic day to day social necessities and employment mix, within a small communication-determined hinterland. From time immemorial the Indian village republics have been idealised as socially self-sufficient entities. The artisan castes provided all the essential services and needs. The Community Development programme's emphasis on felt needs, has in many ways created modern definitions — and has thus made villages look outward for these felt needs which are constantly growing. The unfulfilled standards set by a modern state today, become the "basic" needs of that society tomorrow. Thus actual or planned norms established in one village or community are imitated and become the standard norms for contiguous communities. Villages compete for institutional facilities to meet these needs.

The design of this study requires that selected socio-economic data on the human and material resources of a given ecological area be gathered: the size of human settlements, births, deaths, migration; the total economic activity in terms of agricultural and industrial goods bought and sold; and much of the social and political activity which affect the movement of people, money and materials in and out of ecological settlements. In short, the study attempts first to appraise *accurately* the related human, physical, social political and economic resources and needs of a given area as a basis for rationalizing planning for those needs.

More specifically, this study will concentrate on the felt and emerging economic and social needs symbolised in the basic social institutions of man.

*Demographically*, the size of settlements, their major occupational divisions, migration and growth will be determined through the census data of 1951, 1961 and 1971. *Economically*, the volume of crops grown and other goods produced and the markets where they were sold, the agricultural and other inputs bought, and all the occupations in which people worked would manifest the inter-dependence of the village. Data from industries, cottage industries and shopkeepers will be gathered to get information about commodity flows. The total physical, personal and mass *communication* network will be studied: first, in terms of distance from roads and transport facilities and the volume of different modes of vehicular traffic; second, in terms of government official contacts and the travel of village people to outside places; and third, in terms of number of radios, newspapers, cinema attendance and letters going and coming. All these would provide information on the degree of external linkages. *Educationally*, the number and capacity of different educational institutions in or near the village and the number of pupils attending them would give the norms and the flow of services required to provide educational needs. For *health*, the distance from health facilities, the incidence and consequences of diseases, the number of patients attending sub-centres, doctor visits, medical supplies and where and how many people went for illness, confinement or operations, etc. would be indications of present norms. The *political* parties operating in the area, the active workers and institutions in each village, where elected representatives come from, the number of government officials who come from the village or visit the village, etc., would be indications of the state of political growth. *Religious* centres, the major fairs and festivals of various religions, castes and tribes, the number of marriages and size of marriage parties or death ceremonies and expenses incurred would give a pattern of movement for these social needs. Finally, where do village people go for *recreation* — traditional forms or modern cinemas, where are the pubs and how much investment and services are needed in these different activities.

The study then attempts to define the social, economic and political service areas of different sectors of human activity both by gathering inflow and outflow data to determine how all settlements relate to each other and consequently deduce how these systems and the social institutions which they include can best be structured and spatially located to effect maximal savings in infrastructure investment, traffic and transport costs and to plan to for more efficient management of all resources for human life.

The historical development of the present ecological settlements and service institutions will shed light on the pattern of social economic and political activity under existing technological conditions. All trend data which can be gathered accurately, particularly during the last decade, will show historically the growth and sequential effects of various sectors of social and material development. These trends will provide data for the realistic appraisal of potential growth of all sectors of life and permit the design and evaluation of alternative courses of planned action. Specifically this study will attempt to work out replicable ways to integrate the growth of these sectors and thereby identify and encourage the development of rural-urban communities which can offer a variety of economic opportunities and a range



of social services and institutions at least comparable to those provided by larger cities which now attract rural immigrants.

#### IV. SAMPLING

*Selection of Study Areas.* The size of sample area which each of these 20 pilot projects can adequately cover was limited by the staff provided for this pilot research project, the budget and the five-year time-span. The village no longer can be viewed as the social entity which provides all basic social needs and would be too small an entity to spend these resources. The next larger ecological unit for which socio-economic data are available is the taluqa or the block, which comprises of about 100-150 villages and 100,000-200,000 population.

Hence each of the pilot projects selected one district to operate within, but in its first round of survey and planning activities should gather data from a limited *study area* of one or two blocks. In order to make this project useful both to the state and the nation, a wide range of district areas should be selected — perhaps a district representative of the state's major development problem. In this manner some districts which are facing problems of rapid growth in green revolution areas (both in wheat and rice growing areas), some districts which have problems from growth of industries, some districts with problems with new irrigation projects and some districts with tribal development problems, will provide a wide range development situations and varying conditions of political and economic growth. The data gathering and analysis procedures should be flexible enough to encompass all these situations. Theoretically the distribution of 20 blocks in the first round of study should include: (a) 5 green revolution blocks, (b) 5 blocks with high potential of green revolution, (c) 5 blocks with some industrial growth and (d) 5 blocks from distinctly backward or tribal areas.

One district has been selected by the Development Commissioner of each state according to certain criteria.\* Within the district one block (or taluqa) manifesting the development of that district has been selected for the first round of data gathering. After the first round, the questionnaires and procedures will be refined and a second block will be surveyed using fewer variables but with more accuracy and the data will be analysed and plans prepared. Then, perhaps a third round using a minimal number of variables but a wider area like a subdivision will be surveyed, analysed and planned for. Subsequent rounds of data gathering will parsimoniously delete variables to refine and finalise the methods most useful at the block, subdivision and ultimately the district level. In this manner data gathering, pro-

\* Included in Community Development Ministry Paper circulated on October 24, 1969 for meeting of State Development Commissioners under D. O. No. 20/14/68-Trg. dated September 29, 1969. p. 6. The number of criteria for the selection of districts was sent to all Development Commissioners: (1) market-oriented agriculture; (2) developed agricultural infrastructure; (3) developed social infrastructure; (4) enlightened local leadership and public participation; (5) mobile population; (6) high migration rate; (7) trained manpower and (8) presence of trade-centre.

cessing and planning procedures for the block, sub-division and district will have been designed during the life of the project.

#### V. PROJECT PHASES

The Project has been designed as a five-year work plan involving a number of rounds of mapping, data gathering, processing, analysis, and planning. The first round should take about 12 to 14 months; the second about 9 to 12 months; the third about 6 to 9 months. Each successive round will gather less data and increase its study area. Thus, each round will be designed for an increasingly parsimonious deletion of study variables and refinement of methodology — data gathering, processing, analysis, and planning — most useful at the block, sub-division, and ultimately the district level. Hence, each cycle will develop methodology for succeeding cycles, and during the life of the project the procedures will articulate to a method useful for block, sub-division, or district planning.

The first round is divided into three phases:

*Phase I* consists of a general description of the study area and its orientation to the district and state. An extensive mapping operation is undertaken to show major political divisions, governmental agencies, land use and other topographical characteristics, social institutions, markets and their service areas, etc. Different questionnaires have been designed for the *block, towns, markets* and *large service* villages. The first phase lasts about three to five months.

*Phase II* consists of approximately four to six months field interviewing. In this Phase, the field teams survey all *villages* within the steady area, using questionnaires that include data from secondary sources, key informants, and group interviews with village leaders. The village questionnaire is the heart of the study in that it obtains data on local socio-economic and political characteristics as well as on movement among villages. In addition to the census of villages, a questionnaire has been designed for a census of all *large-scale industries*, particularly to show changes in scale of operations and the inflow and outflow of goods. Other questionnaires have been prepared for *households cottage industries*, and *shopkeepers*. Given the larger numbers of these later units, including *small-scale industries* which have the same questionnaire as large-scale industries, samples rather than censuses are obtained.

*Phase III* consists of a three to four month period for the analysis and planning from these data. Once processed, tabulated, and analysed the data are sent back to each Field Cell and a block planning programme is developed with some technical assistance from the Project's central research cell.

In short, the first phase is an orientation and impressionistic description of the study area. In the second phase, the major portion of the more detailed socio-economic data and locational specification for the flow of all goods and services will be determined. In the third phase, these data will be analysed and plans for specific services prepared along with a comprehensive report incorporating all the maps, basic data, and plans.

## VI. DATA ANALYSIS

During the first round an enormous amount of data is being gathered from each cell. It is nearly all pre-coded and will be transferred to cards and magnetic tape. The data thus stored will be used in several ways.

First, a basic *tabulation analysis* of all the socio-economic data collected through all questionnaires has been designed. The purpose of the tabulation is to provide data in convenient form for planning. All data will be related to primary service centres, secondary service centres and non-service centres. Based on selected criteria and norms, all places will be classified into 4-6 primary service centres and 10-15 secondary service centres. All the remaining villages will be designated as non-service centre villages and will be allocated either on a single function or by several functions into the service area of either a primary or secondary service centre. In this manner data will be cumulated and a first approximation of norms and standards determined and functional gaps estimated. With these theoretical considerations in the background, data for all institutional services will be tabulated and sent back to the field cells.

Second, since the field cells have all received some training in planning seven functions have been selected and specific planning models prepared for Round One data: (1) Agricultural markets; (2) Agro-industries; (3) Credit institutions; (4) Industry; (5) Education (one level); (6) Health Centres and (7) Transportation system. These functions are selected for Round One from the large number which must eventually be studied because of their importance and also because of the limitations in time and analytical capability expected to be developed for this First Round.

For each of these functions, analysis will yield the following quantified information for each function at each service centre where it is provided: (a) Capacities or thresholds; (b) Present norms of use; (c) Present tributary areas and populations; (d) Present travel time/distance norms; (e) Quantity and location of un-met demand; (f) Standards of goals for use (example: school attendance) and for travel T/D in relation to state, district and other standards viz. local norms, expectations and resources position; (g) The effort of the application of these standards, i. e. identification of 'standard' tributary areas and populations and capacities required by 'standard' uses; (h) Gaps and deficiencies in the provision of each function in terms of (i) quantity, (ii) distribution or, alternatively in (iii) the transport system of social, economic and political conditions of India will provide a data base from which a number of practical and theoretical questions can be answered.

## VII. IMPLEMENTATION AND IMPLICATIONS

The plans prepared for different development blocks and sub-divisions will provide the major priorities for the various sectoral plans. As resources become available in each state parts of these plans may be executed. The plan itself may be an instrument to obtain finances for investments which are clearly viable for the resources of the area.

As the entire cycle of the methodology of scientific data gathering, analysis and planning become efficient and functional, more districts or areas may adopt the procedures evolved. The collection, storage and retrieval of a data base will provide a bank for a wide range of possible social planning.

The data will also be analysed socio-economically to determine mathematically the major 'factors' which constitute 'development' and the relative contribution of various institutional services toward these factors. By a process of mathematical and logical deletion the most parsimonious indicators contributing to development can be deduced. Further, the intersectoral social and economic cohesion between different functions can be established. The data would also permit the analysis of the effect of different functions on one sector of development. In this manner a comprehensive integrated analysis of all variables gathered can be undertaken along with sectoral functional analyses.

For the second and subsequent rounds of data gathering a rigorous parsimonious deletion of variables will be undertaken in order to reduce the amount of data being collected and used for planning. All questionnaires will be revised and re-designed for the second cycle of data gathering, analysis, and planning. This pilot project will then evolve a methodology, and identify the critical indicators needed to effectively plan for different spatial and functional levels.

If the project proved to be an efficient method of more scientific planning that results in plans which are actually implemented, the procedure will create a demand for this process of integrated area or sectoral planning. The burden of success of this pilot project, thus, lies clearly in the pragmatic proof of its own utility. The measure of success would be the number and size of plans actually executed expeditiously against the costs of data gathering and analysis.

# INFORMATION PROBLEMS IN SOCIAL RESEARCH RELATED TO URBAN AND RURAL PLANNING IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

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## I. THE CASE FOR INFORMATION IN SOCIAL RESEARCH RELATED TO PLANNING

### *1. The role of social research for planning purposes in developing countries*

In most developing countries, the abilities of professional social scientists are usually required by planning agencies only to solve problems of immediate relevance for very concrete planning objectives.

Those social scientists engaged in applied research related to planning confront in such countries a serious constraint. It is widely recognized that, in research applied to planning, the stages of data collection and analysis cannot be extended beyond a strong temporal barrier, if only because, otherwise, the analyzed social situation may have changed to such an extent that the analysis would no longer be valid were it not rapidly concluded.

In most developed countries this constraint on the academic quality of research applied to planning is not too serious. Special applied investigations can be developed on the basis of previous research, which usually serves as a general frame of reference; and can use sufficiently reliable data, already collected, classified and, to some extent, analyzed by governmental offices. Rapid complementary surveys can be easily effected, if necessary, since censuses or other statistical material are readily available to serve as a basis to design a sample of the smallest possible size and most economic type consistent with the problem to be solved. Finally, planning activities in many cases enjoy sufficient funds to overcome some if not all of the problems arising from the time constraint.

Of course, the role of social research in planning is of a far richer scope than providing *ad hoc* conclusions for specific planning problems. The cumulative character of scientific knowledge about a particular society provides a continuous source of information which is available, in principle, for all the specialists who work on research applied to planning, even before the first steps in research for a concrete planning process are taken.

This broader role of social science in planning has to be emphasized if some of the current problems of social research related to planning in developing countries are to be understood.

## 2. *The gap in communication between social scientists and sources of data*

In developing countries there are at present excellent empirical studies<sup>1</sup> but, from the viewpoint of social scientists concerned with planning problems, their usefulness is rather limited. In fact, they generally are either *case studies* or *cross sectional* ones which employ areal units of analysis, inadequate to be of use in concrete urban or regional planning problems.

As an example of case studies Schnore's revision of six main studies on the spatial structure of cities in Latin America can be mentioned.<sup>2</sup> He notes, as methodological considerations, that (1) none of these studies examines a sample of cities; (2) almost all are "byproduct" studies; (3) there is relatively little use made of statistical data. Schnore looks for corroboration or falsification in Latin America of Burgess's zonal hypothesis of city structure. His difficulty in arriving at generalizations on the basis of available individual case studies is a typical situation of social research in developing countries.

And only by comparative research of a good sample of cities empirical generalizations and, even more, theoretical advances, can be expected in this area.

Examples of cross sectional research employing areal units of analysis inadequate for urban and rural planning purposes are abundant. All of the reports on international urbanization which depart from the country as a whole considered as unit of analysis are a case in point.<sup>3</sup> The national proportion of population living in cities of 100,000 or more (or even 20,000 or more) people is a very rough measure for planning purposes. Instead, planners need empirical studies of city structure on the basis of samples of individual cities having some features in common (e. g., size, location, functional characteristics, growth rate) so that at least some important variables may be controlled.

The applied social scientist in developing countries is in a tremendous need of comparative analyses, both synchronic and diachronic, referring to areal units of data grouping far smaller than is commonly the case. In contrast, even the existing limited stock of empirical research is not easily

<sup>1</sup> As is revealed by a recent bibliography: Gerald Breese, *Modernization and Urbanization: Existing and Potential Relationships in the "Third World"*, Monticello, Illinois, Council of Planning Librarians, March 1969.

<sup>2</sup> Leo F. Schnore, *On the Spatial Structure of Cities in the Two Americas*, in Philip M. Hauser and Lee F. Schnore (editors), *The Study of Urbanization*. New York, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1965, Chapter 10. See, in particular, pp. 359 and 360.

<sup>3</sup> One single example: John D. Durand and César A. Peláez, *Patterns of Urbanization in Latin America*. In: *Components of Population Change in Latin America*, Proceedings of the 60th Anniversary Conference of the Milbank Memorial Fund, New York, April 5-7, 1965, ed. Clyde V. Kiser. Published in *Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly*, Vol. 43, No. 4, part 2 (October 1965), pp. 166-196.

available to apply or simply to serve as a reference when engaging in research for concrete planning purposes. This is so because communication within the scientific community and, even more, between social scientists on one hand, and governmental authorities in charge of statistical and census collection of data on the other, is very deficient.

In Latin America — considering the geographic area better known to the writer — a substantial amount of completed social research reports and of compiled official data is never published. Its very existence comes to be known, if ever, to potential users of such information, only through casual personal contact with those privileged persons who have had direct contact with the corresponding source of information or research report. To some extent this is also the case for reports published only in mimeographic or similar form and for a number of printed reports published in very limited editions by local authorities, small institutions or modest publishing houses. They have no chance to appear in the current catalogues of book distributors.

In addition, reports published by official institutions are frequently distributed at no charge. Paradoxically, this apparent advantage is one of the most powerful barriers for the diffusion of information. For free published official material is usually printed in a very limited number of copies which are sent to a few public officials and institutions, without much chance for the specialized public at large to realize its appearance and even less to obtain a copy — which one could always buy if it were sold in bookstores as well as advertised in professional journals.

Finally, after publication of research reports, the data and tabulations which constituted their empirical basis are disposed of (sometimes intentionally simply because room is needed), or kept in strict secrecy for supposedly security reasons.

These practices are more than unfortunate, to say it mildly, as research reports rarely exploit but a few potentialities of original data for social research. On the other hand, such practices prevent anyone from checking the quality of available data.

### 3. *The unreliability of available information*

It is well known that existing libraries and documentation centres in most developing countries are scarce, incomplete and badly organized. Well organized libraries and data files could be created or improved if funds were available; however, this is only part of the story — as it was shown, even under such desirable conditions, it cannot be expected to rescue more than a small part of the information compiled in the past which has been lost, intentionally destroyed or arbitrarily labelled as secret.

In addition, from the viewpoint of social research *applied to planning problems*, the sheer availability of existing data is not enough. New problems arise when such data are already available, problems which are not so pressing for basic research not directly related to planning.

Among these problems, three intermingled ones at least, are crucial: (1) the quality of data has to be checked carefully before employing them for the purpose of deriving conclusions leading to decisions affecting the

social life of a community or a region: (2) the areal units of analysis of current censuses and statistical compilations of data are not appropriate for such an aim; (3) data for different units of analysis, or for the same unit at different points in time, are not homogeneous in respect to the delimitation of areal units of analysis and the classification of items.

These three problems ought to be faced before data are used in research if they are to be employed efficiently for planning purposes. Otherwise, existing data for a specific piece of research have to be either accepted at face value without checking their quality and relevance because of time constraints (thus taking the risk of arriving at wrong conclusions) or, if possible, simply disregarded and obtained anew at a great cost in money. The second alternative is never possible for data referred to the past, and it is convenient to remark that, in planning, the study of historic trends is crucial. However, one may ask whether, at least in synchronic studies, the lack of good statistical data could be replaced by social surveys designed *ad hoc*.

#### 4. Census and statistical data versus survey data

In an ideal situation, any social researcher would like to make the design of his investigation on purely theoretical grounds and, from this design, determine the kind of data he will need, data to be obtained directly from field work in each case. In most cases the universally employed procedure for such an end is the sampling survey. But it is an expensive procedure. In addition, it has been remarked already that its time requirements make it useless in the planning process, except as a complementary tool. These drawbacks of the survey are greatly diminished when good data on crucial variables for all and well designed units of analysis are readily available. In this way at least it is easier to organize quickly a good inexpensive statistical sample and, on this basis, the sampling survey can be handled far more efficiently.

Therefore, it is easy to understand that even in synchronic studies qualitative reports and common sense very frequently take the place of sophisticated analytical techniques which methodological advances in the whole realm of social science make available today — on the unavoidable condition that the researcher has good data to use as inputs in the first place. If this condition is not fulfilled but the researcher still insists upon introducing sophisticated techniques into his work, he induces the audience, and himself, to believe that the quality of his conclusions is far better than it really is the case.

The temptation to employ advanced methodological devices when basic available information cannot bear such kind of treatment is always present;<sup>4</sup> to yield to this temptation, however, implies a whole misconception

<sup>4</sup> The nearly sacred character taken frequently by published data is eloquently depicted by Davis: "The uncritical use of international statistics encourages the multiplication of data banks and tertiary collections drawn from secondary sources. By what might be called the "law of false purification of transferred data", the more a given statistic gets



of the scientific endeavour. Moreover, when decisions affecting people will be taken on the basis of research conclusions, this kind of attitude raises not only a moral problem of intellectual integrity (as is the case in the scientific enterprise at large) but also a pressing moral problem of a different kind.

The risk of professional frustration carried out by assuming the correct intellectual and moral standpoint on this matter should not be dismissed. Frustration, however, is overcome as soon as one realizes that even in pure research it is not a necessary scientific condition to employ the most advanced existing technical devices but it certainly is so in order to establish adequately the correct balance between the quality of data and the selection of the technical instruments of analysis to be employed. This balance can be achieved, depending on the problem at hand, either by devoting time, funds and intelligence to the revision and correction of existing data, or by reducing the level of sophistication required from analytical tools.

The former is the ideal. But it cannot usually be done in the process of applied research for concrete planning purposes; rather, as it will be shown later, it has to be considered as a type of research in itself. The latter is what should be done when results are required quickly, particularly when concrete planning objectives are imposed. Of course, the cumulation of systematic work of the first type would lead to a continuous improvement of the quality of the second one.

### *5. The crucial role of census and statistical information*

On the basis of the previous discussion, it can be concluded that the relevance of information from statistical and census sources for social research related to planning is pervasive. For even to get the most from survey research procedures, the amount and quality of previously available data are crucial, especially when time and financial resources are scarce. The rest of this paper will be devoted, therefore, to discuss, first, some problems arising from the use of such sources and, second, the tremendous benefits which can be derived from taking into account planning research needs to improve the quality of statistical and census official procedures. The discussion will be limited to examples taken from the field of the writer's recent research, namely, urban population in the Argentine Republic. It might easily be extrapolated, however, to other kind of data and to the situation of other developing countries.

transferred from one publication to another, the more it tends to lose any qualifications it had to start with, and the more the conclusions drawn from it seem laws of nature." See Kingsley Davis, *World Urbanization 1950-1970*. Volume I: Basic Data for Cities, Countries, and Regions. Berkeley, California, Institute of International Studies of the University of California, 1969, p. 4.

## II. INFORMATION FROM CENSUS AND STATISTICAL REPORTS

1. *Types of errors present in data from census and statistical reports*

Demographers have paid strong attention to the development of methods to test the level of coverage of a census, methods usually applied to data referred to relatively large areas limited by precise boundaries, whole countries in the first place. Such methods need such an obvious requirement that the fact that the boundaries of the area have to be *precise* tends not to be noticed. A whole set of additional problems arises in trying to test the quality of a census when such is not the case, problems which derive from deficiencies not necessarily present in the collection of census data but in their areal grouping based on inadequate census definitions.

In the Argentine Republic the definition of "urban place" is of such a vagueness that the correct use of the 1960 census figures of the population of any particular town implies a previous analysis for which no standard techniques are available. Both errors of *coverage* (which will not be discussed here), and errors in the *areal assignment* of population must be corrected before employing figures of urban population in research.

The only feature the 1960 census official procedures require to consider a place as urban is its population size — it has to be 2000 or more. The census definition is not a *legal* one, since it does not mention municipal boundaries at all, but in fact census figures for some cities refer to the legal entity. However, the definition can perfectly be interpreted as referring to the physically urbanized area of a town or city. But, since no uniform set of rules is established in the census procedures to determine the boundaries of such *physical* entity, it is theoretically possible for a census officer to consider any point in geographic space as the focus of an "urban place", provided that a sufficiently large area around it is taken in order to fulfil the corresponding counting of people. As a consequence of differing interpretations of the definition of urban place, the official listing of urban places includes some figures which in fact refer to the legal city, others which approach rather the urbanized area, others which include only the population within the original layout of the city, which is smaller than either the legal or the physical entity, etc.

2. *The need for revision of data from census and statistical reports*

One single example could be used to illustrate the resulting inconsistency of official census figures on urban population. A town, Roque Saenz Peña, in the Northern province of Chaco, is reported as having 23,100 population in the 1947 census, but only 14,381 in the following 1960 census. The writer studied this case at some length. Several hints showed him that the figure for 1947 probably represented the correct population of the whole physical urbanized area of this town. As to 1960, a careful study of the cartographic census material (which luckily in this case was not thrown away or distorted as is frequently the case after the census is taken), showed that the official population figure corresponded to the original layout of the

town, to which new developments were added even before the previous census date, 1947. Analyzing provisional unpublished census figures still available in provincial sources of information, it was noticed that the population of the actual urbanized area in 1960 was of about 29,000 people. The serious decline in population during the intercensal period evidenced by the official sources was, therefore, false. It is easy to imagine the kind of conclusions a researcher can arrive to when trying to understand the regional role of that town (the second in importance in the province) if he naïvely trusts official figures.

The point to remark on the basis of this very simple example is that, though the official figure was unreliable, original census material remained (allowing that it was of a provisional character), which provided a way of checking the official figure before employing it as an input for research. With respect to the same variable, i. e., population size of urban places, a thorough analysis of all Argentine official figures for 1960 was made by the writer<sup>5</sup> and it proved that (1) in some cases the "official" figure was correct; (2) in others it was not, although "provisional" ones could be accepted; (3) in others, finally, no original census material of any kind was left to check the quality of census figures, but alternative methods of making acceptable estimations were available — especially, methods implying the use of aerial photographs.

In this way the official listing of urban places for 1960 could be replaced by another which both responds to a uniform operational definition of "place" as a physical entity and exhibits figures of population which, whether or not originated in census material, are sufficiently reliable for studies on the structure of regional urban systems in the country and, consequently, for regional planning.

The writer's expectations when beginning this work were only to overcome an inescapable difficulty before engaging in more substantial regional research. However, the task proved to be a labor of patience but a rewarding one, far beyond the original expectations. It posed conceptual and technical problems which are not usually contemplated in countries where the final results of such kind of research are easily available in the published volumes of census reports. Therefore, practically no literature exists to deal with this kind of checking census errors of areal assignment. The diverse methods developed in this research are eclectic, sometimes rough, outside the usual subject matter of demographic and methodological treatises; the gain in reliability, however, proved to be substantially high.

### 3. Revision of data as a subfield for research

On the basis of this experience a suggestion is made in this paper: that the critical revision of census and other statistical material in countries without good statistical tradition should be considered *per se* a specific sub-

<sup>5</sup> César A. Vapnarsky, *La población urbana argentina: revisión crítica del método y los resultados censales de 1960*, Buenos Aires, Editorial del Instituto, 1968

field of social research. First of all because it is unavoidable if quantitative results are looked for and both funds and time are scarce, which is usually the case in social research for concrete planning purposes. Secondly, because only after achieving homogeneity for the heterogeneous information referred to multiple units of analysis, comparative research and, consequently, the generalization of results, can be achieved. Thirdly, in addition, this kind of research poses methodological and technical problems interesting enough to cast some attention on from a purely academic point of view, beyond the practical benefits obtained.

A program for research of this kind, referred to any kind of statistical and census material, should be developed by both institutions devoted to planning and to basic research. Better still, regional documentation centres should pay strong attention to this type of research, which is the logical final stage of combined efforts to overcome the current difficulties in obtaining fundamental information for social research in developing countries. In social research for planning purposes such a task is simply unavoidable.

#### *4. The role of social scientists in improving the quality of future censuses and statistical reports*

This does not mean that a sustained effort is not to be made to improve the quality of future censuses and other statistical information in developing countries. On the contrary, it is precisely through developing and applying methods of testing the quality of existing information of that kind, that social scientists can best influence governmental agencies responsible of collecting such information.<sup>6</sup>

As a rule, official statistical information is collected without a purpose other than purely administrative. The requirements of consumers of data other than the government, such as social scientists or planners who are not public officials (and even those who are), are not taken into account. There is a deep gap in communication between the authorities in charge of collecting statistical information and the academic and professional community which employs such data in scientific research, either "pure" or "applied". The situation is worse, it is maintained in this paper, in the case of applied research for planning purposes. In any case, one consequence of this gap is that the allocation of more funds for statistical and census purposes, when such thing happens, does not always result in an improvement of the quality of the information collected. It frequently goes in an undesirable direction, namely, collecting more items of dubious quality rather than improving the quality of a restricted set of badly needed data.

In order to consider a particular type of research needs, quite common in regional planning, and to take again the previous example, it is useless

<sup>6</sup> As is shown in César A. Vapnarsky, *Población urbana población metropolitana: criterios para el relevamiento de información censal en la Argentina*, Buenos Aires, Editorial del Instituto, 1969. In fact, it seems that the 1970 census greatly improved the procedures for computing urban population.

and, even worse, misleading, for intercity comparisons, to have data on the age structure of the town of Roque Saenz Peña if, without any explicit reference in the census report, the figure of the supposed total population of that town refers in fact only to its downtown area, whereas for other towns it may refer to the whole physical entity or even include rural farm population. The investigator who employs these data would not be comparing the age structure of different towns, but that of areas arbitrarily delimited.

To consider another case, the physical agglomeration of Mendoza, one of the largest in Argentina, spreads over a territory divided into five different municipal jurisdictions. The central one, a separated legal city without agricultural land, has a far more aged population than any of the others. If one intends to compare the age structure of Mendoza to that of other cities in Argentina, it has to be taken into account that the census lists this particular one as if it were five or more different urban places, whereas some other agglomerations of comparable size are listed as individual cities. No reasonable interpretation of intercity differences in age structure can be given unless a complete reinterpretation of census figures is previously done. The researcher may choose to compare, say, either legal cities or physical agglomerations; in any case he has to correct at least some of the census figures if he wants to have homogeneous units of analysis. Otherwise, in the given example, no theory relating age structure, city size and city growth (among other variables), would give account of the data, even on the assumption that there is no census omission.<sup>7</sup>

On the contrary, the collection of data on a few crucial variables, accomplished on the basis of unequivocal census operational definitions, with cartographic material which preserves areal boundaries from one census to another (and which employs the same boundaries for other statistical purposes) allows to make reliable comparisons either over-time for some unit or at one point in time for the whole country. In addition, a restricted but reliable set of census data covering the whole country partitioned into small and well delimited areal units, greatly facilitates the design of small statistical samples on whose basis additional information not provided by the census can be collected by way of relatively inexpensive and expeditive surveys.

### *5. Some conclusions*

To sum up, census reports as well as reports on other statistical data are not a present from the gods which obliges anybody. Rather, they are the final results of long and complex social processes. And the inadequacy of census results is by no means only a problem of scarce resources. First

<sup>7</sup> Except for Buenos Aires, there are no published censal figures for 1960 on the age structure of individual Argentine urban places. It is possible to obtain unpublished data, at a considerable cost; but before buying these data it is necessary to study for each individual case which is the set of small census areal units one is going to consider a "city" since, it was remarked above, the official definition of "urban place" is of no help for this task.

of all, the usual lack of sufficient training of the enumerators is responsible for many errors of coverage, incorrect formulation of questions to the interviewed, and incorrect report of correct answers. Secondly, the scarcity of well trained personnel in the stages of tabulation and processing of data originates new possible sources of error. But, thirdly, the lack of a fully scientific approach in the design of the census itself is responsible for the presence of sources of mistakes at the very initial stage of the process.

As any other social process, the collection of census and statistical data can be scientifically studied and, on this basis, the errors committed throughout the different stages of the process can be evaluated. Thus, the official reports need not be considered the final, untouchable end of the process; rather, it can be continued by way of planned scientific social research directed toward turning dubious data into reliable estimations which could be trusted upon in current social research. Simultaneously, the continuous working on the revision of results and design of past censuses and statistical material, the resulting remarks about the social costs involved in committing each particular kind of error in the design and in the collection of data for censuses for other types of information material, are the most concrete contribution that social scientists can give to the improvement of future censuses and other statistical procedures. It is a task for social scientists to remark these points, since science is not the frame of reference within which governmental officials usually make decisions. However, in developing countries the case of social scientists who do perceive the relevance of these problems for the advancement of both pure and applied social research is rare.

As it was remarked above, the general empirical knowledge of society is immediately relevant for concrete planning purposes; hence the importance for planning of social science at large, not only of *ad hoc* research directly applied to specific planning objectives. At the same time, to overcome some of the difficulties in obtaining basic information for social research, both pure and applied, is a task to which the whole community of social scientists in developing countries is concerned. This is not simply a heavy burden to add to the innumerable constraints to which social scientists are usually subjected in developing countries; rather, it is a task valuable in itself on purely academic grounds, a task to which it is not enough to allocate funds for research but also human resources within the scientific community.

## PLANNING AND OBJECTIVES FOR RURAL ADJUSTMENT AND DEVELOPMENT IN AUSTRALIA

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Until very recently, the rural sector of the Australian economy has been a developing one. Between 1948 and 1958 the operation of land settlement schemes and development of new land more than compensated for the outmovement of farmers from other sectors of agriculture and the number of farmers actually increased from 240,992 to 241,247.<sup>1</sup> In a similar time period from 1950 to 1959 the number of farmers in the USA declined by 30% from 5.4 million to 3.7 million.<sup>2</sup> Nor was development in Australia confined to existing farming areas in the temperate zones. For example, in 1958-59 a scheme for large scale irrigated agriculture was initiated in the far north of Western Australia, on the Ord River, and in the post-war period other irrigation and large scale tropical agricultural developments were initiated by the Queensland Government.

Of all these developments, the only ones which could be said to involve long-term integrated planning based on clearly stated objectives were the schemes for soldier settlement which were undertaken subsequent to World War II. These objectives were clearly social and political to implement pledges made to reward with a livelihood on the land those who had served the country during the war, to reward for their support country party voters, and to maintain the voting strength of rural areas. Although much greater care was taken than in the settlement schemes subsequent to World War II to ensure that the settlers were given sufficient land and capital resources to make a living, the product base of the settlement schemes was related to availability of land and demand for settlement schemes from different states, regions and types of farming rather than to assessment of long-term markets.

Other development schemes, and particularly those for expansion of irrigated areas and for tropical and sub-tropical agriculture in various parts of Northern Australia were undertaken in response to pressure from political and vested interest groups either upon States or upon the Commonwealth.

<sup>1</sup> Year Book of Australia, 1961, Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics, 1961.

<sup>2</sup> Pocket Data Book, USA, 1967, US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Census, USA, 1967.

Until very recently, rural development in Australia has not been planned in relation to long term objectives, whether economic, social or political. Rather it has occurred in response to prevailing pressures upon government and the development which has resulted has been the outcome of the triumph of one set of pressures over the others or of a compromise between countervailing pressures. Given an overall expanding agricultural economy, compromises, decisions resulting from expediency, errors of judgement and downright mistakes in developing some sectors of rural industry have often been covered up, nullified or compensated for by favourable movements in the terms of trade for other sectors. Faced by a general downturn in the economy of agriculture and uncertain markets for many of its major products the agricultural industry and governments, both State and Federal, need to examine much more carefully the basis for decision making in agricultural planning, whether for development or for adjustment.

### *Conflicting Social, Economic and Political Objectives*

Ultimately, the prime objective of the planning and management of natural resources — whether for agriculture or other uses — is the welfare of the people. But such an apparent laudible and simple objective begs the question — welfare of which people? In the past, decision on the use of the natural resources of Australia for agriculture have often benefited farming people, or a sector of the farming industry, but at a cost to the urban consumer. In the changing economic and political climate in Australia relative to agriculture, safeguards are going to be necessary to ensure that, in giving more attention to the effects of agricultural policies on the majority of the population not engaged in agriculture, the ten per cent of people dependent directly on agriculture and the twenty per cent or so of people living in country towns and indirectly dependent for their livelihood on agriculture are not disadvantaged through no fault of their own.

In an economic and political system such as pertains in Australia, only the broadest of goals are set up as objectives for national or regional planning. Thus we have a *pot pourri* of social, economic and political objectives, expressed in such phrases as

'Increase the rate of growth of GNP'

'Increase population growth'

'Fully utilised natural resources of water, land and minerals'

'Develop the North'

'Decentralise population and industrial activities'

'Increase trade, aid and defence in Asian and Pacific regions'

and, much more recently:

'Conserve our environment'

Many of these broad objectives have conflicting elements within them and their implementation frequently depends on a variety of agencies — commercial organisations, State and Federal Governments, Departments or Ministries of Industrialisation, Agriculture, Decentralisation, Immigration, Water Conservation and the like.



An example of conflicting social objectives illustrates some of the problems. This is taken from my research experience with an irrigation community 600 miles north of Perth at Carnarvon in the North-West of Western Australia.<sup>3</sup> It concerns conflicts between five social objectives:

- (a) Increase in population.
- (b) Increase in welfare of indigenous aboriginal inhabitants.
- (c) Develop the North.
- (g) Increase real per capita income.
- (k) Increase public service amenities.

Carnarvon prior to the NW iron ore boom exhibited almost a perfect example of the population generating effect of the application of innovation to a cluster of natural resources. The natural resources were deep silt loam soil on the banks of a normally dry river bed; sand lenses in the river bed which stored water each time the river flowed as a result of cyclonic rains, and a mild sunny winter climate with no frosts occurring for a distance of ten miles inland up-river from the sea.

Since the late 1930's, the area had grown bananas under irrigation using up to twelve feet of water per acre pumped from the storage pockets in the dry river bed. In the early 1950's, market gardeners from the Perth metropolitan area moved into the area and started to grow out-of-season vegetables on what was for Carnarvon a large scale — anything up to twenty acres or more per holding. From 1950 through to 1963 the influx of growers and then of sharefarmers continued with the graph of numbers of growers and sharefarmers following very closely the rise in the acreage of crops grown. Growth of the total plantation population, and of the town, closely followed the growth in number of growers and sharefarmers with the town population about double that of the plantation area. Furthermore, the increased demand for fertilisers, sprays, consumer goods and transport of bulky vegetables to markets, as far removed as Adelaide, encouraged the development of transport and requisite firms to service the farms.

From the point of view of politicians and others who subscribed to the social objectives of 'populate the North by development of the use of its natural resources', Carnarvon was doing its bit. But, in so doing, other social objectives were being adversely affected.

Firstly, the growth in acreage of crops was not matched by an equivalent growth in gross income obtained for the crops from the area. This was due partly to falls in prices of crops, being marketed in Perth and Adelaide and partly to falls in yields per acre associated with sharefarming and with lower productivity arising from salt damage to the soil caused by excess pumping from limited supplies of water increasing the salt content of the water used. As a result, more people were living in the area but their per capita income was lower than for the smaller number of people living there previously and the standard of housing and amenities had deteriorated, particularly amongst the sharefarming population. Thus, a popu-

<sup>3</sup> Nalson, J. S. & M. L. Parker. Irrigation on the Gascoyne River, University of Western Australia Press, 1963.

lation objective was being achieved, but at the expense of the standard of living of a part of that population.

Secondly, the influx of growers consisted largely of Southern Europeans, either single men or married people with wives and children who were prepared to help with the work of the properties. Often these people took on sharefarming propositions on parts of the holdings of the original banana growers, who were mainly Australians. These latter had in the past spasmodically grown vegetables. For some of the work associated with this vegetable growing they had used for casual labour local aboriginal families. The influx of European migrants prepared to operate a sharefarming system reduced the employment opportunities for the indigenous aboriginal population, thus adversely affecting their welfare.

Under pressure from the people of the area and with the strong advocacy of the Irrigation Division of the Public Works Department, the State Government was contemplating building a large storage dam to provide much larger quantities of irrigation water for the area. Our analysis indicated, however, that, whilst this would increase the activity of the service organisations, public and commercial, in the region, it would adversely affect the welfare of the local growers and plantation workers, indigenous and migrant, black and white, in both the short run and the long run. In the short run this would occur because almost unlimited availability of water would cause an initial boom in land values, and an influx of further settlers whose production of crops would depress the market. If, on the other hand, only enough water was allocated to the plantation area to adequately meet the needs for the existing production and the rest was used for cotton growing up-river, this would store up trouble for the future. Large-scale cotton growing up-river, involving mechanisation and high capital investment, would be likely in one generation to compete successfully for a fixed water supply with peasant-type market gardening down-river, yet the number of families with sons at risk would be considerably greater down-river than up-river. Thus the objective of developing the North by increase in public service utilities (a dam and associated irrigation scheme) would only be achieved at the expense of the standard of living and general welfare of existing settlers and their children on the original plantation area.

This example illustrates the conflicts that can occur between social objectives for natural resource utilisation, but does not indicate the full complexity of the real-life situation where social, political and economic objectives are being pursued simultaneously. In the ideal world, social, political and economic objectives should probably coincide but, in practice, they are frequently in conflict. The more they conflict the less the likelihood of successful outcomes. Conversely, the more there is a positive interrelationship between a particular social objective and general political and economic objectives the greater the likelihood of that objective appearing high on a list of National or State priorities in a situation where countervailing pressures from different agencies, entrepreneurial, public and political, influence governmental decision-making processes. A simplified model may help to indicate the processes at work:

*Model of Conflicting Objectives*

1. Assume for a country like Australia a fixed set of social objectives and assume that these are :

- A. Maintain rural incomes.
- B. Increase population.
- C. Increase welfare of indigenous aboriginal inhabitants.
- D. Assimilate aborigines.
- E. Decentralise in South.
- F. Develop the north.
- G. Increase priority for education.
- H. Increase real per capita income.
- I. Provide extra leisure time.
- J. Increase health provisions.
- K. Provide areas and facilities for recreation.
- L. Increase public service utilities.
- M. Reduce pollution.

2. Assume a fixed set of political objectives and assume that these are as set out across the top of Table 1.

3. Assume a fixed set of economic objectives and assume that these are as set out across the top of Table 2.

We can now look at the array of social objectives relative to the array of political objectives (Table 1) and to the array of economic objectives (Table 2) and finally we can look at combined interrelationships (Table 3).

Table 1 does not purport to be exhaustive in its listing of either social or political objectives, but it does indicate that some social objectives have a low proportion of positive interrelationships with political objectives and that some political objectives do not impinge over as wide a range of social objectives as do others. Similarly with Table 2 the positive interrelationships of some social objectives with economic objectives are low. When the combined effects are examined it is clear that those social objectives with high scores relative to both political and economic objectives, for example maintain rural incomes, are at the top of the list and those with low scores on both counts, for example reduction of pollution, are at the bottom of the list. In addition, however, a social objective may have a high positive score on political objectives, but a low one on economic objectives and thus end up low down on the list and vice-versa.

The obvious fault in the model is the assumption of equal weighting for all objectives, which is certainly a departure from reality. Nevertheless, the model may provide the basis for a more sophisticated examination of the interrelationships between social, economic and political objectives within defined social, economic and political systems. Such a model would need both State and Federal dimensions; should allow for changes in political and economic circumstances and policy; should widen the range of objectives considered, and should attempt some weighting of objectives.

Changing economic and political circumstances and climates would obviously affect the relative scores of particular social objectives. Conse-

TABLE 1. POSITIVE INTERRELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN POLITICAL OBJECTIVES AND SOCIAL OBJECTIVES

Social Objectives	Political Objectives						Proportion of objectives which are positive
	1 Rewards to supporters	2 Gaining seats	3 Placating powerful vested interests	4 Placating international critics	5 Defence strategies and resources for defence	6 Advance political careers	
(a) Maintain rural incomes	+	+	+			+	4/6
(b) Increase in population			+	+	+	+	4/6
(c) Increase welfare of indigenous aboriginal inhabitants		+		+		+	3/6
(d) Assimilation of aborigines				+		+	2/6
(e) Decentralisation in South	+	+				+	3/6
(f) Develop the North		+	+	+	+	+	5/6
(g) Increase priority for education	+	+		+		+	4/6
(h) Increase real per capita income	+	+		+		+	4/6
(i) Extra leisure time	+	+				+	3/6
(j) Increase health provisions	+	+	+	+		+	5/6
(k) Provide areas and facilities for recreation	+	+		+		+	4/6
(l) Increase public service utilities	+	+	+	+	+	+	6/6
(m) Reduce pollution		+				+	2/6
Proportion of objectives which are positive	8/13	11/13	5/13	9/13	3/13	13/13	49/78

TABLE 2. POSITIVE INTERRELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES AND SOCIAL OBJECTIVES

Social Objectives	Economic Objectives				
	Increase GNP by direct production where there is comparative advantage	Increase GNP by multiplier effect or development of tertiary activity	Encourage investment from overseas	Encourage Federal investment in States	Proportion of objectives which are positive
(a) Maintain rural incomes	+	+	+	+	4/4
(b) Increase in population	+	+	+	+	4/4
(c) Increase welfare of indigenous aboriginal inhabitants		+		+	2/4
(d) Assimilation of aborigines	+	+		+	3/4
(e) Decentralisation in South					0/4
(f) Develop the North	+	+	+	+	4/4
(g) Increase priority of education		+		+	2/4
(h) Increase real per capita income		+	+	+	3/4
(i) Extra leisure time					0/4
(j) Increase health provisions		+		+	2/4
(k) Provide areas and facilities for recreation					0/4
(l) Increase public service utilities		+	+	+	3/4
(m) Reduce pollution				+	1/4
Proportion of objectives which are positive	4/13	9/13	5/13	10/13	28/52

TABLE 3. INTERACTION EFFECTS OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES WITH SOCIAL OBJECTIVES

Social Objectives Arranged in Order of Average Proportions Positive	Proportion	Objectives	Positive
	Political Objectives	Economic Objectives	Average Proportion
<i>High Group</i>			
(f) Develop the North	5/6	4/4	9/10
(d) Maintain rural incomes	4/6	4/4	8/10
(l) Increase public service utilities	6/6	3/4	9/10
(b) Increase in population	4/6	4/4	8/10
<i>Medium Group</i>			
(h) Increase real per capita income	4/6	3/4	7/10
(j) Increase health provisions	5/6	2/4	7/10
(g) Increase priority for education	4/6	2/4	6/10
<i>Low Group</i>			
(d) Assimilation of aborigines	2/6	3/4	5/10
(c) Increase welfare of indigenous aborigines	3/6	2/4	5/10
<i>Very Low Group</i>			
(k) Provide areas and facilities for recreation	4/6	0/4	4/10
(m) Reduce pollution	2/6	1/4	3/10
(i) Provide extra leisure time	3/6	0/4	3/10
(e) Decentralisation in South	3/6	0/4	3/10

quently I propose to look a little closer at the first and the last social objectives listed because I consider that they illustrate the restrictions on effectiveness which may arise for particular interest or pressure groups and also they can be used to indicate a possible strategy for an interest or pressure group.

The score on political and economic objectives for both the social objective of 'maintaining rural incomes' and of 'reducing pollution' was based, subjectively, on my assessment of their degree of positive interrelationship with political and economic objectives in the recent past. It is very likely, however, that the score for 'maintaining rural incomes' will drop in the future with a shift in the balance of voting power away from rural areas, declining terms of trade for agricultural products and a reduced dependency on agriculture either for its contribution to Gross National Product or to export earnings. Even if rewards to supporters were still important and some political careers could still be advanced by maintaining rural incomes, the chances are that the number of seats to be gained could be small and that the countervailing pressures from industrial and mineral vested interests could nullify the pressures from rural interest groups as also could changes in the 'product mix' of those joint stock companies with agricultural, mineral and industrial activities. In such circumstances, the score of 'maintaining rural incomes' on political objectives could quickly change to  $2/7$  and on economic objectives to  $2/4$  or even less, giving an average proportion of  $4/10$  and putting the objective into the low group in Table 3. The use of a more refined model allowing different weights for different economic and political objectives could pull this objective even lower down the list.

Turning to the social objective of 'reducing pollution', I suggest that the economic and political forces reducing the score of the objective 'maintaining rural incomes' would tend to increase the score of 'reducing pollution'. Furthermore, strategies for pressure groups could be designed so as to increase the score still further. Recently in discussing pollution<sup>4</sup> I suggested that those people concerned about it would need to work through the institutions of our society rather than against them if they wished to change public and governmental attitudes and policies. Briefly, I advocated emphasis upon the economic multiplier effects of pollution control technology using the analogy of space technology. In addition, I advocated the establishment of a Federal instrumentality for pollution control, which through bureaucratic self-interest and growth would ensure that a proportion of Federal and State resources were devoted to this objective and would encourage the build up of industries and research establishments employing a corps of professionals and specialists with their own self-interest in advancing the cause

<sup>4</sup> (a) Pollution and Society, Address to Conference of Health Surveyors, Armidale, April 30th, 1970.

(b) Pollution relative to man and his environment. Address in lunchtime series on Man and Environment, University of New England, Union, June 16th, 1970.

of pollution. With such measures, 'reduction of pollution' could well score on 4/4 on Table 2 relative to economic objectives. Given that pressure groups for pollution control concentrated on issues in sensitive political seats, convinced industrialists that there was a new technology to provide for and ensured that political careers could be made from pollution control, the score in terms of political objectives could rise to as high as 5/6. Thus, an overall average proportion of 9/10 could be possible lifting 'reduction of pollution' to the top of Table 3.

### *Conflicting Agencies and Organisational Resistance to Change*

In the development of the use of natural resources the pursuit of one set of objectives may be to the detriment of another set of objectives of another agency. What the public gets as a result may not be either what it wants or even what might be considered good for it by government at State or Federal level.

I am not arguing here for a national planning authority nor for an Australian Federal equivalent of 'Le Commission du Plan' or the types of national organisations which control '5-year plans' in a number of countries of the world. Rather, I am somewhat pessimistically concluding that, in developed economies, *irrespective of the system of government*, planning objectives which are achieved may owe more to the organisational strength, political power and leadership of the often bureaucratic agencies responsible for them than to any rational ordering of priorities or preferences. Whatever the type of government, competition for the scarce power to allocate and use resources is going to occur between the large-scale organisations, entrepreneurial, public and political whose policies, or even existence, are in part dependent upon the continuing allocation of those resources for the particular purposes of each of the organisations.

In Australia the political power of the country vote has not only resulted in governmental policies at State and Federal level which have favoured agriculture, but has led to the establishment of a great variety of large-scale organisations concerned with agriculture. These organisations are staffed by professionals and specialists and/or are controlled by elected representatives or politicians, all of whom have a vested interest in the continuance of the organisations. All these persons wield power in relation to the use of natural resources by reason of their expertise or their position or the opportunity their membership of the organisation gives them to influence others in positions of authority. Once established, an organisation is not easily replaced, even though its functions may no longer be as relevant as when it was established. Thus, for example, dam building may become a primary goal rather than an instrumental objective, and may continue long after there is any economic justification for certain types of irrigation development. Similarly, I suspect that Departments of Agriculture will be continuing to research and advise on means of making two blades of grass grow where one grew before, long after the major objective of agricultural policy has changed to one of limiting agricultural activities and preventing indiscriminate expansion of the industry.



Within organisations there are in-built resistances to change. Some of these resistances are associated with the division of labour. Extreme specialisation of function has been an integral part of the organisational success of modern society, but at the same time it limits the versatility of individuals and of sectors of organisations. The presence of a separate division of dairying within a Department of Agriculture, for example, involves the employment of experts in various aspects of dairying whose collective and individual interests and advancement depend on the continuance of dairying and the maintenance and growth of the dairying division. Such people are likely to be as reluctant to alter their life chances and radically change their jobs, promotional prospects, and professional interests as are the farmers with whom they have a symbiotic relationship.

Any plans for agricultural adjustment that are confined to farmers and do not take account of organisational resistance to change are not likely to meet with a great deal of success. Indeed, extremely specialised division of function in applied research, teaching and extension for agriculture could be a major limiting factor in preventing the rapid adjustment of agricultural systems to market circumstances and political and organisational change.

## THE URBANIZATION PROCESS IN THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF RUMANIA

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In 1967, the Sociology Department of the University of Bucharest started to study the process of urbanization in Rumania, the change in position of certain social strata in the socialist process of production, the exodus of certain rural masses to the urban life, the transformation of agricultural labour into industrial labour, the modified mentality, the restructuralization of the relationship between people — a social problem of great importance in our country. This process involves both aspects of industrial and rural sociology. Implicitly, problems of family sociology, sociology of culture and education, etc., are also touched upon, making up a particularly complex area of study of social relationships.

The urbanization process accompanies and at the same time contains certain essential aspects of the process of *socialist industrialization and cooperativization of agriculture*; also, it is closely linked to the *growing standard of living and cultural level of the population*. Urbanization implies a continuous movement between social milieus, between the different sections of the national economy, social regrouping, actions of professional training as well as retraining, currents of social and territorial migrations, etc.

In order to examine the correlation between the urban and the rural milieu, we shall present the table that specifies the population figures and the percentages for the years 1930, 1948, 1956, 1966 and 1969.\*

We must specify that in the censuses of 1930 and 1948, the urban milieu included the municipalities, the cities and the suburban communities existing at the time of the census; in 1956, the urban milieu included the new communities within the jurisdiction of the cities, of the urban milieu; finally in 1966, the municipalities, the cities and the suburban communities existing at that time were included, but grouped according to the administrative-territorial division in force starting from June 1, 1968. (Therefore, the data are those of the 1966 census, but grouped according to the new administrative division.)

\* The following three tables have been elaborated on the basis of the population census by the Central Board of Statistics of the Socialist Republic of Rumania.

THE POPULATION OF THE URBAN MILIEUS IN RUMANIA IN THE YEARS  
1930, 1948, 1956, 1966 AND 1969

Date and year	Total population	Urban milieu	% to the total	Rural milieu	% to the total	Growth of urban pop.	Aver. annual rate of pop.
		population number		population number		1930=100	in %
Dec. 29, 1930	14,280,729	3,051,253	21.4	11,229,476	78.6	100.0	—
Jan. 25, 1948	15,872,624	3,713,139	23.4	12,159,485	76.6	121.7	+1.2
Feb. 21, 1956	17,489,450	5,474,264	31.3	12,015,186	68.7	179.4	+5.0
March 15, 1966	19,103,163	7,462,519	39.1	11,640,644	60.9	244.6	+3.1
July 1, 1969	20,010,178	8,096,261	40.5	11,913,917	59.5	265.3	+2.75

What is characteristic is the fact that the urban population has grown from 3,051,000 which represented 21.4% in 1930, to 8,096,000, which represented 40.5% in 1969. Not only did its share grow quickly, but the absolute figure has more than doubled (from 3 to 8 million people, 266%). Concomitantly, the absolute figure of the rural milieu has remained higher than that of the urban one (11,200,000 in 1930 to 11,900,000 in 1969), though decreasing in proportion from 78.6% to 59.5%.

It is also significant that the average annual rate of growth of the urban milieu population was stabilized during the last five years at 2.75-3%.

The structure of the total population by social categories and milieus, as it appears in the censuses of 1956 and 1966, is equally interesting (see Table on p. 64).

What is worth noticing is the fact that the percentage of workers in the urban milieu has grown from 47.7% in 1956 to 59.2% in 1966 and is continually growing; concomitantly, percentage of workers in the rural milieu has grown from 12.7% to 27.5%.

As far as the number of cooperative farmers is concerned, it was marked by a rapid rate of growth during this decade in the rural milieu from 9.9% to 57.1%, which clearly expresses the cooperativization process in Rumania.

Finally, the relative decrease of the category of intellectuals and office workers is explained by the reduction of the number of office workers and the parallel increase in the number of intellectuals; in absolute figures, in the urban milieu the total number of intellectuals and office-workers has grown from 1,754,000 to 1,836,000.

THE TOTAL POPULATION STRUCTURE BY SOCIAL CATEGORIES AND MILIEUS  
IN THE CENSUSES OF THE YEARS 1956 AND 1966

	Urban milieu				Rural milieu			
	1956		1966		1956		1966	
	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
Total pop. of which	5,474,264	100.0	7,462,510	100.0	12,015,186	100.0	11,640,644	100.0
Workers	2,611,117	47.7	4,418,385	59.2	1,531,755	12.7	3,207,596	27.5
Intell. office wrk.	1,753,898	32.0	1,835,836	24.6	578,148	4.8	520,246	4.5
Coop. farmers	74,668	1.4	723,755	9.7	1,185,808	9.9	6,641,421	57.1
Indiv. farmers	581,526	10.6	92,927	1.3	8,364,463	69.6	903,673	7.8
Craftsmen total	348,918	6.4	286,972	3.8	282,927	2.4	327,687	2.8
Coop. indiv.	164,349	3.0	224,492	3.0	20,242	0.2	213,971	1.8
	184,569	3.4	62,480	0.8	262,685	2.2	113,716	1.0

We must mention that in this table on p. 65 there appear two apparently contradictory tendencies:

a) the tendency of increase in the population of cities of between 20,000 and 50,000 inhabitants, as well as in that of cities of between 100,000 and 200,000 inhabitants, and

b) the tendency of decrease in the population of cities of under 20,000 and of between 50,000 and 100,000 inhabitants.

Actually, these are two facets of the same urbanization process:

a) The cities ranging between 50,000 and 100,000 inhabitants have grown, have developed and have entered the category of over 100,000 inhabitants, that of great cities and municipalities, while the cities of the middle category, that is of between 50,000 and 100,000 inhabitants, have not been able to take their place by growing both in the same number and proportion; this explains the percentage decrease in this category.

b) The small towns of under 20,000 inhabitants have grown, entering the category of between 20,000 and 50,000 inhabitants (which accounts for the increase in this category), a social phenomenon of the greatest importance, as shown by the research done at Slatina and Vaslui. Their leaving the category leads to the diminution of its proportion and to the growth of the middle category (20,000 and 50,000 inhabitants).

## DISTRIBUTION OF THE POPULATION OF MUNICIPALITIES AND CITIES BY SIZE GROUPS IN THE CENSUSES OF THE YEARS 1930, 1956, 1966 AND 1969

Size group of municipalities and cities by number of inhabitants	Censuses			
	Dec. 29, 1930	Feb. 21, 1956	March, 15 1969	July 1, 1969
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Municipality of Bucharest	19.9	24.8	20.3	19.9
100,000—199,999 inhabitants	7.1	18.1	26.4	26.8
50,000—99,999 inhabitants	25.2	13.8	8.9	10.6
20,000—49,999 inhabitants	14.1	15.5	18.9	20.0
10,000—19,999 inhabitants	18.5	18.5	16.1	14.6
Under 10,000 inhabitants	15.2	9.3	9.4	8.1

Finally, the Municipality of Bucharest has rapidly grown during a certain period of time (to the end of the 60's), after that, as a result of the policy of avoiding overcrowding, it has preserved an almost constant absolute figure, while showing a slight decrease in proportion.

These preliminary statistical considerations were useful in our practical sociological research carried on over a period of three years in different areas of Rumania.

The team of sociologists who studied the Braşov zone, chose as object of investigation, urban integration in this zone, considered to be on a superior level of socialist industrialization in this country, as compared to the Slatina-Olt zone (medium level) or to the Vaslui one (incipient level). The research workers of the Department of Sociology of the University of Bucharest and of the Sociologic Laboratory of the University, in collaboration with the Institute of Philosophy of the Academy of the Socialist Republic of Rumania, have had as objectives the study of three essential aspects: the socio-professional integration (The Factory), the integration in the hostels of the enterprise of people from rural areas (The Workers' Hostel) and finally, aspects of the urban integration in the new apartment buildings in the "Steagul Roşu" neighbourhood (The Neighbourhood).

Research workers have laid a special stress upon the study of the enlisting and professional training of the labour force, on the relationship bet-

ween the demands of technical progress and the make-up of the training, on the dynamics of socio-professional mutations among the workers and the fluctuation of the labour force. It was established that people from the rural milieu, who settled in town, or those who are commuting daily between their rural home and their place of work have the greater share among workers. The fluctuation of the labour force has certain special aspects in this area. It is largely characteristic of unskilled workers, or of those with little training, insufficiently integrated in the activity of the enterprise where they are working.

The continuous perfecting of the production processes, the complex modernization and automatization of working operations radically transform the work structure and the structure of industrial professions. A great number of traditional professions have disappeared or are about to disappear. Others change their structure and beget new contents, as numerous new specialized occupations appear. Certain autonomous, directly productive trades, the practicing of which requires great physical efforts and long hours are restricted or disappear. Their place is taken by new, specialized occupations, demanding an ever greater amount of general knowledge, as well as an unusual specialized training. The new occupations are generally characterized by a higher intellectual character of labour, greater personal responsibility, as well as by the growing dependence of the workers on the technological progress.

The interest of the workers in widening their professional and cultural vistas, demonstrated by the investigation, is accompanied by a high morale within the enterprise. *The possibilities of education and promotion, of alternating occupations, of changing one's speciality constitute the principal conditions of satisfaction with one's work. Contrary to the results obtained by some Western research workers, the percentage of investigated workers who stated that they are fully satisfied with their work is 92.1%.* This also proves the existence of human relations (horizontally and vertically) in the investigated enterprises. Part of the workers from the industrial enterprises from the Braşov zone live in workers' hostels. The team of research workers who followed closely the life of the workers in hostels reached the conclusion that the specific life of hostel inhabitants makes them follow a special trajectory in their urbanization, because they find there all they need; this also accounts for the fact that their way of spending their wages and free time is different from that of non-hostel workers. A tendency for a prolonged unmarried state is noticed in the case of those living in the hostels.

Different aspects of the urbanization process were pointed out by research workers who investigated the population living in the new apartment houses of the neighbourhood. Following closely their way of life, the man-to-man intercourse, the educational practices of the buildings' population research workers identified a series of traits characterizing the transition from formal to real urbanization.

If we look at the directions of the evolution in the Braşov zone taken as a whole, we can make out several traits characterizing the transition from formal to real urbanization.

If we look at the directions of the evolution in the Braşov zone taken as a whole, we can make out several traits characterizing its moving forward towards urbanization. In the first place we must underline the unusual dynamism of this area, which is rapidly industrializing, continually attracting and assimilating fresh forces from the rural milieu. The new neighbourhoods of Braşov are not sufficiently endowed from a managing and cultural point of view; their urbanistic, economic and cultural endowment is not sufficient, for the time being; in order to meet certain important requirements, people have to go to the centre of town, wasting time and crowding public vehicles.

The homogeneity of the Braşov population has not been reached as yet; in certain neighbourhoods the conscious "we" ("wir", "mi" or "mink") has not developed enough and, as a result, the population does not care enough for the goods and aspect of their neighbourhood.

In the "Steagul Roşu" neighbourhood 75% of the population is directly engaged in production, this being the greatest proportion of all Braşov neighbourhoods. At the same time, there evidently appears the tendency of industrial workers for pluritraining, a form of professional training to be expected in the near and even in the not-so-near future, when industry will demand flexible professionals, with large possibilities of adaptation to the ever growing rate of evolution. We can point out another continuous tendency to be found with a growing number of workers, that of bettering their professional culture, and at the same time, their general culture. The fact that parents make considerable sacrifices for the schooling of their children under the best of conditions shows that this tendency is becoming more and more general. We can also notice that the city as an assimilating factor, "urbanises" in a differentiated way the immigrants who adopt the city way of life at a different rate, depending on the place they come from and their socio-cultural level.

If we follow the urbanization process comparatively in the Slatina zone and in the Braşov zone, we immediately perceive differentiating characteristics.

In the first place, Braşov is an old industrialized centre, where one can follow historically the transformation from manual production to the modern, industrial one, whose last stage, socialist industrialization, under the new — socialist — relations of production, represents a time of acceleration and modernization on the background of older traditions.

The Slatina zone is a new industrial centre, where modern life penetrates dramatically, together with the implanting of new works, giving birth not only to a massive migration from the rural milieu to Slatina, but also to all phenomena that accompany the industrialization process.

The teams in the factories of Braşov attract and assimilate around the old nucleus new elements, coming rhythmically to the city, as production increases. Under this aspect, Slatina does not have as yet solid teams of workers, taking into account that the oldest teams of its factories are at the most ten years old.

Braşov, a historical city and an old commercial centre, often mentioned in historical documents, represents an ever renewing city keeping though

its age-long roots. Characterized by intense trading and organized storing, it is evidently different from Slatina, which in spite of its documentary existence of over six centuries, has been up to this, socialist industrialization only a small transit and cereal-trading centre.

On the cultural level there are also clear differences between the two zones. Because of its economic position,<sup>8</sup> Braşov is an old cultural centre with age-long cultural institutions, that have developed and flourished with unusual vigour during the years of socialist construction. Slatina, on the other hand, does not enjoy such a past and only during the past few years has started to form its cultural institutions, to lead its own cultural life, as a result of the economic and cultural onset, characteristic of socialist industrialization.

The Braşov zone has a specific feature — beside the Rumanian majority, there live people of German and Hungarian nationalities. Not only the Rumanian population has cultural traditions in this area, but also the other nationalities have their own traditions and institutions, which have been especially developed lately, taking into account the Marxist-Leninist way in which the problem of the coinhabiting nationalities has been solved by our government.

Under this aspect, Slatina has another structure, homogeneous as far as the national composition is concerned, other nationalities being absent from this area. In both areas, in spite of the different industrialization levels, through the building of houses, schools and social, cultural and administrative buildings, there is a growth in population, a raising of the training and cultural level, an increase in the income of the whole population and, as a result, an increase in the demand for material and cultural goods. *The interaction between needs and their meeting through production, storing and trade is taking place on a large scale.*

\*


The sociological problems investigated at Braşov and Slatina can also be examined in view of some aspects of the mathematical theory of graphs. The attempt presented by Raymond Boudon\* in a work about the sociological application of mathematics has prompted us to elaborate a *graph of the urbanization process in Rumania*.

The data gathered by sociologists during the three years of investigation permit certain generalizations as far as the urbanization process is concerned. We shall study further on the fundamental correlation industrialization — urbanization with its main peaks (knots) and arches (arrows), following the examination of the critical road of this process. We shall insist on the practical application of the mathematical theory of the graphs in the investigation of social processes.

\* Raymond Boudon. *L'analyse mathématique des faits sociaux*, Paris, Plon, 1967.



THE URBANIZATION PROCESS GRAPH, DEPENDING ON THE PROCESS  
(PRELIMINARY MODEL)



Of the many variables studied in the correlation industrialization — urbanization, we have chosen twelve from  $x_1$  to  $x_{12}$  — which seemed the most characteristic; these are:

- $x_1$  — the implanting of factories and works
- $x_2$  — the growth (agglomeration) of population
- $x_3$  — professionalizing
- $x_4$  — industrial units, systematization, transports
- $x_5$  — the health network
- $x_6$  — new schools
- $x_7$  — change of position in production
- $x_8$  — increase in population income
- $x_9$  — housing
- $x_{10}$  — public and administrative buildings
- $x_{11}$  — way of life
- $x_{12}$  — changes in the social consciousness

The inner logic of these variables is determined by the direction of development of the social process. It starts with the implanting of the works (the factory, the site) in a certain area of the country ( $x_1$ ), which leads to a growth in population ( $x_2$ ), to the raising of industrial buildings ( $x_4$ ), new schools ( $x_6$ ), housing ( $x_9$ ) and public buildings ( $x_{10}$ ).

In order to satisfy the demands of the sites and the industrial production, the professionalizing of the people, the training and retraining of the labour force becomes a necessity ( $x_3$ ), which leads to a change of position in production ( $x_7$ ). As a result, there is an increase in the population income ( $x_8$ ) and a profound change in the way of life of the people takes place ( $x_{11}$ ). *All these changes are part of the transformation of the social existence which in their turn give birth to modifications in the social consciousness ( $x_{12}$ ) directly linked to the change of position in production ( $x_7$ ) as well as to the change of the way of life ( $x_{11}$ ).*

As a general result of all of these transformations the urbanization process takes place  $x_1 - x_{12} - y$ . What is the make-up of this process?

In our opinion — based on investigations carried out in several areas of the country — it is in the first place a process of social restructuralization, of passing from one class to another, from one profession to another, as the result of the change of position in production. The fact that people from the rural milieu come to the production sites, to factories and works asks for their new training, their technical schooling, the change of their place in production. Working in new production units, going to new schools, living in new houses, having higher incomes — all these make their way of life change. This leads to a change of mentality and the transformation of the social consciousness. These changes, however, are not abrupt and total; in the way of life and in the social consciousness as well, the new elements cannot take the place of the old models, ways and mentalities all at once.

*The urbanization process is contradictory under two aspects: on the one hand, as the fight between urban and rural and, on the other, as the interpenetration of the urban and rural.* On the new sites and in the new works, the leaders of the industrialization and urbanization process are the engineers, technicians, economists and the trained workers — they are promoters of the economic and social progress. Concomitantly, great masses of rural people come to these sites, start working in the factories and works, bring an immense contribution to the new constructions; but these very people bring with them certain habits and mentalities which counteract the urbanization process for whose achievement they are acting themselves. Urbanization is a fight not only between different social milieus, but also within each milieu and even within every man. The transformation process is not linear and simple, but contradictory, with its continuous ups and downs. It is essential that the direction of the development is represented by industrialization, by new training of people, by modernization, urbanization, progress. Important economic, social, intellectual and ethical transformations have taken place; in all these changes there are profound interpenetrations, intercourses and interactions between the social existence and the social consciousness.

As it was mentioned, Y represents the multiple, complex result of the action of variables within the totality of a process sociology calls the urbanization process. The examination of this critical road consists, in the case of the investigation of this social process, in pointing out the knots and the arches, whose linking allows for the reaching of the best formula for displaying the social process.

In the concrete case of urbanization, we are interested in the amount and the direction of the investments necessary for the opening up of new sites and the implanting of new works, for the building of new houses, of sanitary, administrative and cultural buildings, as well as in the amount and rate of the budgetary expenditures needed for ensuring the schooling, training and retraining and the raising of the cultural level. So, this oriented graph has not only an illustrative, symbolic significance, but also a practical value, as it is possible to insert in it the respective figures and values in order to express important correlations which interest the socialist economic planning.

The urbanization process is in fact a process of *social restructuration* and urbanization is in essence a problem of social dynamics structure.

Urbanization is not an aim by itself; here we disagree with some Western sociologists who see in urbanization its very aim; *urbanization under our given conditions is a constituent of the great social revolutionary transformation process which accompanies socialist revolution and the construction of socialist society.*

## OBJECTIVES AND METHODS IN PLANNING RURAL-URBAN MIGRATION

T. I. ZASLAVSKA

USSR

1. Natural reproduction, training, distribution and redistribution of workers are integral parts of national-economic planning in the socialist countries. Annual, five-year and long-term plans of national economy growth are always based on some model of regional redistribution of labour.

But current methods of planning population migration are not quite adequate. It is estimated as a rule on the basis of the demands of separate regions and industries for additional labour and, hence, is considered as a direct function of industrial location.

Indeed, the geography of migrational flows represents to some degree the distribution of unmet demand for labour. But this representation is not exact. A gap between the demand for labour and directions of migrational flows is explained by the fact that individuals make their decisions about migration voluntarily and are motivated as a rule by the expectation for improving their individual living conditions. The opportunities to take a job according to one's training, to get social and official promotion are very important incentives, but not the only ones. Migration is motivated by a rather wide range of motives. They may be ideological, socio-psychological and other. This deviates direction and intensity of migrational flows and calls for a specially guided activity on trying to match their parameters with the needs of the national economy. The more complicated becomes the national-economic organism in the course of its growth and the higher the technological level of production and of standard of living, the higher requirements are set to planning and regulation of migrational processes.

2. The general goals of migration regulation may be stated only on the basis of main socio-economic functions performed by this process. These are, in their turn, determined by the fact that migration is the main form of spatial mobility of the population and the most important channel of job and social mobility.

As a type of spatial mobility, migration contributes to the territorial redistribution of the population, its socio-demographic composition, develops and improves the system of settlements, increases geographical mobility of the members of the society, broadens their outlook, life experience and so on.

As a channel of job mobility, it provides the redistribution of labour force among the industries and enterprises, located in different regions and settlements as well as qualitative selection of labour force according to spatially distributed demands of manufacturing.

As a channel of social mobility, rural-urban migration facilitates actualization of abilities in rural inhabitants, their ability to perform more complicated work, accelerates socio-occupational promotion and ascending into other social groups.

The socialist society is not indifferent to any of the above mentioned functions of migration, but they are not equally significant. In current conditions a paramount importance is assigned to those functions of migration which are connected with increasing economic efficiency of public production. It is on this basis that the goals of migration planning are to be stated.

While giving priority to economic objectives of planning migration, it is necessary to bear in mind its social consequences as well. Thus, for example, the socialist society must encourage social mobility of rural population and levelling off of the opportunities for persons both in urban and rural communities. But social and economic criteria in estimation of the migration consequences may in principle contradict each other. Thus, intensive exodus of youth from the countryside to cities though detrimental in a number of cases to the agricultural growth is still favourable from the social viewpoint.

3. In the context of Siberia, forecasting and planning of migration of rural population is of special importance as the rates of labour redistribution from the countryside to cities exceed here the rates of mechanization in agriculture. The characteristic feature of the agriculture in Siberia as distinct from other areas of the country is its high level of mechanization. The fleet of machinery in Siberia is annually replenished by dozens of thousands of tractors, combines and other agricultural equipment. This seems to permit to liberate a number of workers engaged in it. But it should be kept in mind that the labour provision in agriculture is here 1.5-2 times less than in other areas. This leads to underutilization of the land, underharvesting and in a number of cases to direct losses. In order to raise the economic efficiency of agricultural production, the number of its workers should be stabilized for some period of time. Meanwhile, actually it is being reduced 2-3 times faster than the average for the USSR [1].

The crucial effect on this process is made by the high demand for labour in manufacturing and construction industry. The situation is aggravated by not entirely favourable population exchange with Western areas of the country. The balance of migration of rural population in Siberia is neutral, and of urban population it is negative [2]. Fig. 1 shows desirable, from the national-economic standpoint, and actual directions of migration.

## THE DIRECTIONS OF POPULATION REDISTRIBUTION




Fig. 1

The agricultural output of Siberia in the nearest future must increase at more rapid pace than it has been so far. Meanwhile, any substantial increase in the number of workers in agriculture of the region is unreal under current conditions. The only thing to be discussed is the decrease of excessive outflow of rural population to the cities which is not justified by growth in productivity. The only possible solution to the problem is an accelerated introduction of technological innovations into the agriculture of Siberia, above all, the combination of machines which would permit to exclude manual work in grain growing and cattle breeding, electrification and chemization as well as scientific management. The solution of these tasks will substantially diminish the need in great numbers of workers in agriculture, but at the same time it will sharply raise the requirements to their training and skills. To improve age and occupational-training composition of labour for next years, it is necessary to plan not only size, but the qualitative composition of rural-urban migration flows as well.

4. In the USSR the regulation of migration is made directly and indirectly. Direct forms are exemplified in various forms of publicly organized migration. But under the conditions of improved standard of living and increased geographical mobility of people, a decisive role is played by unorganized independent migration [3]. Such migration may be regulated chiefly by indirection, i. e. by creating better living conditions in underdeveloped areas with labour shortage. The advantages may be of economic as well as of social nature.

The direct methods of regulating migration are connected mainly with the organization of migration, formation of necessary flows, the indirect ones — with the increase of their efficiency and, above all, with the prevention of migration from arriving places. In a sense, both methods complement each other. We guess that some migrant families moving by themselves would be glad to have some organization help from the state. On the other hand — and this is the main thing — publicly organized forms of migration have proved to be efficient only if living conditions in arriving areas provide for high adjustment of the migrants.

The surveys carried out under the leadership of this author at the Institute of Economics, Siberian Department, USSR Academy of Sciences, were based on this methodological principle.

5. At the first stage of the study we concentrated on the most pressing problem, i. e. on searching reasonably efficient ways for lowering rural population exodus from the Western Siberia. The task was to determine specific indices of living conditions of population at which planned rates of rural labour increase would be realized. The study was based on the statistical data of territorial redistribution of rural population and of regional differential in living conditions. Different units of observation have been used: provinces and areas of the Russian Federation, territories of large agricultural enterprises, rural settlements. Summarized data on the provinces of the RSFSR have been obtained from the state statistical bodies, and the data relating to smaller territorial units were collected in the sampling surveys of rural population migration which covered 5 thousand households.<sup>1</sup>

To solve the above mentioned task, methods of correlation analysis were used. The statement and solution of some scores of tasks differing by methods of evaluating the consequences of migration, by the type of social objects, by a range of considered living conditions of people, made it possible to arrive at some general conclusions.

a. Though multifactorial regression analysis cannot provide for absolutely accurate and reliable predictions, it does provide us with reasonably adequate judgements about most probable intensity of migration with regard to certain regional differentials in living standards. On the strength of this it may be successfully employed as an auxiliary or control means in planning migration.

When using seven independent variables, multiple coefficients of correlation between the intensity of migration and the indices of living conditions were 0.72 for collective farms population, 0.88 for state farms population and 0.76 for rural population as a whole.

b. The crucial effect on the intensity and direction of rural population exodus is made by the differentials in economic and cultural conditions.

Initially, the complex of living facilities of rural population was described by several dozens of indices. Then with the help of formal algorithms for computers some small number of factors have been selected which were most informative concerning the consequences of migration. It is these factors that underwent regression analysis.

Most informative, i. e. most closely connected with the intensity of migration of population proved to be 6 factors. Among these, the first place was held by pay level, cinema attendance frequency and retail turnover per capita of rural population. The second place was taken by: an average population of a settlement, number of medical and teaching workers per 1000 inhabitants.

c. The tool for planning and forecasting migration must not be a single (actually arbitrarily chosen) regression equation, but a whole series of such equations differing by a range of independent variables and checking mutually each other. The prediction values average for the whole series of equations will characterize most probable consequences of migration, and the

<sup>1</sup> The description of this survey techniques has been published [5].

variance of these values will characterize the validity of prediction for a respective region.

d. The combination of regression and factorial analyses seems very promising for introduction into the planning practice.

The point is that different indices of living facilities, social and cultural services in different areas and settlements are not independent in the statistical sense, they change conjugately to a considerable degree. This provides a basis for the application of Thurstone's analysis [6]. The latter makes it possible, using the data on variability of many specific variables to discover one or more underlying generalizing latent factors.<sup>2</sup>

6. In 1969 the members of our collective body made a mathematical-statistical analysis of the bulk of information on 212 rural settlements in the Novosibirsk province, where the intensity of exodus to cities was rather sharply differentiated. In this connection a hypothesis was stated that the consequences of migration may be changed by regulating living conditions in settlements of different types and, besides, by settling the inhabitants of small settlements in large well-built modern villages. For each settlement, its net migration and major living conditions were known. The task was to find a form of relationship between these variables.

For analysis 10 basic factors of social and cultural servicing were selected. Further calculations were made by three steps. Initially, individual settlements were united in ten large groups, each of them characterized by a certain set of considered living conditions. For this purpose an algorithm of taxonomy relating to the pattern recognition methods was used which permitted to classify objects according to many variables simultaneously [9].

Then a matrix of pair correlations between the indices of living conditions in each group of settlements was obtained. It has shown that majority of variables were rather closely related to each other. This has shown that individual variables of servicing may be considered as special manifestations of some factor which characterizes a more general level of servicing.

To find out this factor Thurstone's factorial analysis has been used, by means of which, first, quantitative values of the general level of servicing for each selected group of settlements were obtained, then, second, the system of relationships between generalizing factors and individual indicators analyzed were obtained. The generalizing factor was most closely related with the indices of school, medical and sale facilities, retail trade turnover per 1 inhabitant and frequency of showing films. A weaker relation was found with the private housing fund and average private plot of land; the weakest relation existed with the quality of drinking water, distance from the bus stop and provision with communications (telephone, broadcasting, television).

The closing step was the analysis of relationships between the level of servicing and migration consequences among the population of different settlements. The ranking of settlement groups according to both factors has coincided entirely.

<sup>2</sup> The application of factorial analysis methods to the solution of sociological tasks may be exemplified by [7, 8].



7. The idea that living conditions directly determine consequences of rural-urban migration is obviously extremely simplified. For illustration of such simplifications let us consider a scheme of the social mechanism of an individual migrational act (Fig. 2). While trying to avoid detailed comments,<sup>3</sup> we cannot but note some important points not covered by the above described models.

First of all, migration of people is motivated not so much by an *absolute level* of living conditions and servicing in leaving places, as by *differentials* of these variables for leaving and arriving places. That is why it is necessary to form such models which would predict the change in rural-urban migration taking into account the changing conditions both in rural and urban places, agriculture and industry, including long-term expected territorial redistribution of the demand for labour. In this way the objectively existing opportunities for settling rural migrants in urban areas would be considered too.

Further, the described models of migration do not tell us where the rural population of different regions will move to, in the cities of what regions they will settle, although from national-economic viewpoint it would be very important to know this.

The directions of migration are determined, to a considerable degree, by regional differentials in urban living conditions, in the demand for labour, in the opportunities for getting some housing, etc. Along with this, the directions of migration are influenced by expected costs of migration, difficulties in adaptation to a new environment, and by the knowledge available for rural dwellers about living conditions existing in some or other city. And all these factors are closely connected with the distance between leaving and projected arriving places. Migrants come most intensively to the cities located in their provinces, their economic regions and less intensively to other areas of the country.

It should also be noted that migrational behaviour is a function of a personality structure of an individual as well manifested in needs, goals and value orientations. On this ground, under the same conditions and with the same knowledge, the attitude to migration and migrational behaviour itself will be different in different groups of population.

Therefore, it is expedient to forecast and plan urban migration differentially for each category of rural population which is characterized by different socio-psychological properties. Since it is impossible however, to make deep socio-psychological studies whenever a prediction of migration is required it is necessary to predetermine what types of population may be singled out, on the one hand, on the basis of several simplest socio-demographic attributes (sex, age, educational background, occupation, marital status, etc.) which, on the other hand, essentially differ in the structure of their needs, interests and values. These types of population must be used as basic ones for differentiated study and planning of migration. The first results of such work carried out by our research team have been already published [9].

<sup>3</sup> For a full discussion of this see [5].

SOCIAL MECHANISM OF AN INDIVIDUAL MIGRATIONAL ACT




Fig. 2

The second conclusion from the above said is that in forecasting and planning migration one should take into consideration expected changes in not only objective living conditions, but in the conscientiousness of rural population as well. The latter follows the changes, first, in the structure of rural population and, second, in the development of personality indicators for each socio-demographic group. Our studies show that the subjective factors of migration in rural population of Siberia are highly dynamic.

8. The prediction of most probable migrational flows and the development of the methods for their active regulation is one of the most important tasks of social planning in socialist countries. The main directions of scientific research dealing with the solution of this task are, in our view, the following:

First, exploring the role of migration in economic growth of a nation (region), defining its economic functions and, on this ground, developing methods for optimal planning of migration.

Second, studying social (non-economic) functions of migration and developing methods of introducing corrections into the plans with the major purpose to meet demands for labour.

Third, studying social and socio-psychological mechanism of migration with the purpose to find those elements which can be most effectively influenced by the society and state.

Fourth, developing a system of models representing the dependence of migration upon controllable factors, estimating and appraising possible ways for obtaining necessary migrant flows instead of available ones, as well as giving recommendations to planning bodies concerning the most effective ways to solve a certain problem.

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VIII. EDUCATION AND CULTURAL PLANNING

VIII. ÉDUCATION ET PLANIFICATION CULTURELLE

## FACTEURS DE CHANGEMENT ET FORCES D'INERTIE\*

PIERRE BOURDIEU

FRANCE

O. La structure et le fonctionnement d'une institution telle que le système d'enseignement dépendent des fonctions différentes et même contradictoires que les différents groupes ou classes objectivement intéressés au fonctionnement de ce système lui confèrent implicitement et explicitement en fonction de leur position dans la structure des rapports de classe (et, secondairement, dans la structure du système d'enseignement), i. e. varient en fonction des intérêts que ces groupes ou classes ont au fonctionnement du système, mais disposent d'une autonomie relative par rapport à ces demandes ou à ces contraintes externes qui sont toujours retraduites conformément à la logique propre du système d'enseignement.

Par là se trouvent exclues d'emblée deux illusions très répandues, jusque dans les travaux scientifiques, soit d'une part l'illusion réductionniste, selon laquelle la structure, les fonctions et le fonctionnement du système d'enseignement pourraient en quelque sorte se déduire directement de l'état du rapport de forces entre les classes, et d'autre part l'illusion de l'autonomie absolue qui est commune, par un paradoxe tout apparent, aux universitaires les plus attachés à servir la tendance du système à l'auto-conservation et à la conservation, et à ceux qui voient dans l'université un foyer de critique et de contestation de la société dans son ensemble.

Se trouvent exclues aussi toutes les formes de l'illusion fonctionnaliste du consensus sur les fins qui conduit à attribuer au système d'enseignement des fonctions universelles et à expliquer toutes les caractéristiques de son organisation ou de son fonctionnement par les fonctions qu'il est censé remplir pour la „société globale“. Tout choix en matière d'éducation et de culture a des implications politiques dans la mesure où il est le produit de la pression différentielle des intérêts sectionnels des différents groupes ou classes qui sont (objectivement) intéressés au fonctionnement du système d'enseignement.

\* Ce texte qui a été conçu comme une introduction à l'ensemble des communications présentées dans le cadre du groupe de travail consacré aux problèmes de l'éducation et de la culture au congrès de Varna, ne donne qu'une idée très imparfaite des recherches empiriques qui ont été menées dans la ligne de ces hypothèses (cf. P. Bourdieu, L. Boltanski et P. Maldidier, La défense du corps, Information sur les sciences sociales, oct. 1971.

D'un point de vue méthodologique, il suit de cette proposition que tout trait caractéristique de la structure et du fonctionnement du système d'enseignement peut et doit faire l'objet d'une double lecture; par exemple, la hiérarchie qui s'établit en nombre de systèmes d'enseignement entre l'enseignement général et l'enseignement technique (1) reproduit la hiérarchie des professions et des conditions sociales que ces deux types d'enseignement contribuent à reproduire et d'autre part (2) représente la retraduction proprement scolaire de cette hiérarchie sous la forme de l'opposition entre le théorique et le pratique qui se retrouve à tous les niveaux du système (e. g. dans la hiérarchie des disciplines). Cette retraduction que rend possible l'autonomie relative du système d'enseignement est un des facteurs qui expliquent que les enseignants aient une aussi faible conscience des fonctions externes du système d'enseignement (illusion de l'autonomie absolue) et que, quelles que puissent être leurs représentations conscientes ces fins du système, ils contribuent si bien dans l'ensemble à servir ses fonctions objectives.

1. Les fonctions objectives que le système d'enseignement remplit pour les différents groupes ou classes, i. e. ce que l'on peut appeler les intérêts pédagogiques de groupe ou de classe, et, en particulier, le degré auquel les différents groupes ou classes dépendent du système d'enseignement pour leur stabilité (reproduction) ou leur mobilité se révèlent dans les chances d'accès de ces groupes ou classes aux différents niveaux des différents types d'enseignement et aux profits matériels et symboliques qu'ils sont en mesure de retirer des titres qu'il décerne, bref aux pouvoirs et aux privilèges qui se transmettent par son intermédiaire.

Les statistiques d'accès à l'enseignement et, en particulier, à l'enseignement supérieur, lorsqu'elles sont adéquatement construites (i. e. en termes de probabilités d'accès et non de taux de représentation) et adéquatement interprétées (i. e. en prenant en compte la signification positionnelle de chaque institution dans le système des institutions d'enseignement) constituent sans aucun doute l'indicateur le plus indiscutable de la vérité objective d'un système d'enseignement et plus précisément, de la structure des relations qui l'unissent à la structure des rapports de classe.

1. 1. Les intérêts pédagogiques (tels qu'ils se manifestent dans les chances d'accès au système d'enseignement) commandent les espérances subjectives que les individus forment à propos du système d'enseignement et des profits qu'il peut offrir.

1. 1. 1. Il s'ensuit que les différents groupes ou classes exercent une pression d'autant plus forte sur le système d'enseignement qu'ils sont plus fortement intéressés objectivement, donc subjectivement, au fonctionnement de ce système et, par conséquent, que la probabilité pour un groupe ou une classe d'avoir une opinion explicite et cohérente sur le système d'enseignement, i. e. sa prétention à agir sur le système d'enseignement, soit pour le conserver, soit pour le transformer, dépend directement de la probabilité d'accès au système d'enseignement qui lui est attachée.

De toutes les informations fournies par l'analyse secondaire d'un ensemble de questions concernant l'enseignement qui ont été posées au cours des dernières années par différents instituts français de sondage, la plus importante est sans doute enfermée dans les variations des non-réponses en fonction

d'une part ces caractéristiques sociales et scolaires des personnes interrogées (catégorie professionnelle, niveau d'instruction, etc.) et d'autre part des caractéristiques des questions posées : en effet le taux de non-réponses croît très fortement, beaucoup plus fortement qu'en tout autre domaine, quand on descend dans la hiérarchie des professions et des niveaux d'instruction. L'analyse selon les mêmes critères de la structure d'un échantillon spontané de répondants à une enquête administrée par l'ensemble des organes de presse français fait voir, de manière encore plus évidente, que l'opinion mobilisée (dans la logique de la pétition politique) à propos de l'éducation se superpose à peu près à la population des utilisateurs présents ou futurs, directs ou indirects, de l'enseignement supérieur.

1.1.2. Du fait que l'intérêt qu'un groupe ou une classe porte au fonctionnement du système d'enseignement est fonction du degré auquel ce système sert ses intérêts, les membres des classes dont les chances d'accès au système d'enseignement sont les plus faibles ont aussi les chances les plus faibles d'accéder à une opinion explicite et systématique sur le système d'enseignement et, lorsqu'ils y accèdent, ils n'ont que des chances très réduites d'apercevoir les fonctions objectives du système d'enseignement, i. e. d'apercevoir clairement que leurs besoins pédagogiques ne pourraient être à la fois produits et satisfaits que par un système d'enseignement radicalement transformé.

L'analyse secondaire d'une enquête d'opinion portant sur les facteurs de la réussite scolaire confirme directement que l'idéologie charismatique qui fait dépendre la réussite scolaire des aptitudes naturelles, masquant du même coup l'efficacité déterminante des facteurs sociaux et, en particulier des dispositions à l'égard de l'école et du capital culturel transmis par la famille, s'impose de plus en plus fortement à mesure que l'on descend dans la hiérarchie sociale : le système d'enseignement parvient en effet à faire reconnaître par ceux qu'il exclut sans examen la légitimité de leur exclusion en les conduisant à assimiler à un échec l'auto-élimination imposée par tout un ensemble convergent de facteurs sociaux. On serait dans la logique de la reproduction parfaite si la transformation apparente ou fictive des chances d'accès aux différents niveaux de l'enseignement n'était pas de nature à affecter les représentations et les aspirations, au moins à court terme : l'École étant toujours investie de deux fonctions antinomiques dans la mesure où elle doit élever les aspirations, même fictivement, pour obtenir de ceux qui lui sont confiés les investissements (au double sens du terme) indispensables sans pour autant encourager un surinvestissement (ici encore au double sens du terme, économique et psychanalytique) de nature à engendrer la frustration et la révolte résultant du décalage entre les aspirations inculquées et la réussite scolaire et sociale réellement offertes, on peut se demander si l'accroissement généralisé des chances d'accès à l'enseignement ne risque pas, en dépit de l'apparition corrélatrice de mécanismes de relégation ou de désinvestissement, d'engendrer une élévation des aspirations et, du même coup, une prise de conscience des fonctions conservatrices que le système d'enseignement remplit objectivement. L'accès à l'École conservatrice qui est au moins en partie le produit de la foi en l'École libératrice pourrait conduire les bénéficiaires de la "démocratisation" apparente du système d'enseignement à découvrir les fonctions conservatrices jusque là inaperçues.

2. La science de la dynamique du système d'enseignement a pour objet la construction des lois définissant les rapports entre 1. les lois qui régissent tendanciellement le fonctionnement interne de tout système d'enseignement (en raison de l'autonomie relative qu'il doit à sa fonction propre) et 2. les lois qui régissent les relations entre le système d'enseignement et les forces externes, ces dernières pouvant agir soit dans le sens des tendances propres du système (lorsque le conservatisme social rencontre le conservatisme scolaire), soit en sens inverse.

Ignorer les lois tendanciennes qui font que tout système d'enseignement tend à reproduire la structure des rapports établis entre les groupes ou les classes (et, dans le cas du système des institutions d'enseignement supérieur, entre les fractions de la classe dirigeante) en reproduisant la structure de la distribution du capital culturel, ce serait se condamner à l'*utopisme* qui confère à l'École le pouvoir de modifier, par son fonctionnement propre, la structure des rapports établis entre les classes (par exemple en favorisant la mobilité sociale des classes ou des groupes défavorisés socialement et culturellement). Eterniser ces lois tendanciennes ou, si l'on veut, poser comme absolues les propositions conditionnelles que permet d'établir la science des lois internes du fonctionnement du système d'enseignement, ce serait succomber au *sociologisme* consistant à ignorer que 1. la tendance du système d'enseignement à remplir une fonction de conservation culturelle et, par là, de conservation sociale ne s'accomplit complètement que dans une structure des rapports de classe où il lui est objectivement demandé de remplir cette fonction et 2. que la science qui met au jour ces lois tendanciennes fournit par là même un moyen d'enrayer les principes de leur efficacité.

2.1. Les conflits à propos du système d'enseignement opposent toujours des intérêts pédagogiques qui ne sont et ne peuvent être autres que ceux des différentes fractions de la classe dirigeante (par 1.1.1).

2.1.1. Les intérêts pédagogiques des différentes fractions de la classe dirigeante dépendent dans leur intensité et dans leur contenu du degré auquel ces différentes fractions dépendent du système d'enseignement pour leur reproduction (i. e. pour la transmission de leur pouvoir et de leurs privilèges aux générations suivantes) et pour la légitimation de leur position dominante.

Ainsi, une enquête menée en France sur les attitudes à propos du système d'enseignement permet d'opposer, très grossièrement, 1. les fractions dominantes de la classe dominante (i. e. les patrons de l'industrie et du commerce) qui, attendant fondamentalement et presque exclusivement du système d'enseignement qu'il assure le maintien de l'ordre symbolique et de reproduction de la force de travail, sont disposés à souhaiter ou à accepter toutes les transformations d'inspiration technocratique destinées à assurer l'adaptation du système d'enseignement aux „besoins de l'économie“, ceci dans les limites de la sauvegarde des mécanismes de reproduction et de légitimation de l'ordre établi,<sup>1</sup> et 2. d'un autre côté, les membres des professions

<sup>1</sup> C'est ainsi que, comme l'a bien montré M. de Saint Martin, l'archaïsme pédagogique et scientifique de certaines des plus grandes écoles françaises s'explique, au moins en partie par le primat conféré aux fonctions sociales de reproduction et de légitimation, au détriment des fonctions techniques. M. de Saint Martin. Les fonctions sociales de l'enseignement scientifique. Paris, la Haye, Mouton, 1971. Cahier du C. S. E., No. 8



libérales et, à un moindre degré, de la haute fonction publique qui, dépendant plus directement, tant dans leur valeur sociale que dans la valeur sociale de leurs produits, de la „certification“ scolaire et du marché que le système d'enseignement contribue à reproduire en produisant des consommateurs pour les produits qu'il légitime, sont attachés à maintenir inchangée l'institution chargée de reproduire le marché de la culture à laquelle ils s'identifient.

2.1.2. Du fait que l'ensemble des forces qui tendent à se mobiliser pour agir de façon expresse sur le devenir du système d'enseignement sont fondamentalement définies par la relation d'appropriation qui les unit à ce système, elles tendent à exercer sur lui une action qui est conservatrice dans son principe, même lorsque la sauvegarde de l'essentiel, à savoir l'exercice des fonctions de reproduction sociale et de maintien de l'ordre symbolique, imposent la transformation du système d'enseignement.

Bien qu'il ne soit pas aisé de lui assigner une base sociale bien déterminée, même au sein de la classe dominante, la problématique technocratique tend aujourd'hui à s'imposer à tous ceux qui „pensent“ et qui „parlent“ les questions d'éducation et c'est dans ses catégories et dans son langage que s'énonce le conflit entre les partisans d'un enseignement réservé à l'élite et les tenants d'un enseignement de masse ou entre les partisans d'une culture scientifique et technique, mieux adaptée aux „besoins de l'économie“, et les défenseurs de la tradition des humanités.

2.1.3. Les changements morphologiques par l'intermédiaire desquels l'effet des transformations de la structure des relations objectives entre le système d'enseignement et la structure des rapports de classe s'exerce sur le système d'enseignement exercent à leur tour leurs effets par l'intermédiaire de la structure du système d'enseignement.

Si la tradition durkheimienne met fort justement en lumière l'effet propre de l'accroissement de la taille sur les transformations des relations établies, pour une taille définie, entre les structures et les fonctions d'une institution, elle tend à ignorer que tout changement de la taille est lié à des changements de la structure sociale des populations concernées (soit, dans le cas particulier, la clientèle du système d'enseignement et le corps même des agents), donc à une transformation, qui peut demeurer cachée aux yeux des agents, de tout le fonctionnement de l'institution.

2.1.3.1. L'accroissement différentiel des différentes institutions d'enseignement et la transformation corrélative de la composition sociale de leurs publics sont fonction de la position de ces institutions dans la structure des institutions d'enseignement, donc dans la division du travail de reproduction, qui commande aussi la forme des effets que ces transformations introduisent dans l'institution.

Sans parler de ceux qui identifient directement l'accroissement de la population scolarisée à la „démocratisation“ du recrutement, tous les analystes qui omettent de prendre en compte la position des différentes institutions dans la structure des institutions d'enseignement, i. e. dans la hiérarchie scolaire et dans la hiérarchie sociale (définie par la valeur sociale des produits scolaires) et la dynamique de cette position, résultat de l'ajustement incessant des hiérar-

chies scolaires et des hiérarchies sociales, s'interdisent de comprendre l'accroissement différentiel, seul pertinent sociologiquement, de la population scolarisée dans les différentes institutions et la transformation de la qualité sociale de leur public. La scolarisation quasi-totale des enfants de la classe dominante et l'intensification de la scolarisation des enfants des classes moyennes, prédisposés, les uns et les autres, à aller grossir les institutions situées au bas de la hiérarchie scolaire, parce que moins „sélectionnés“ ou moins „sursélectionnés“ (selon les normes mêmes du système) ne pouvaient qu'entraîner l'accroissement de la population des facultés, institutions de second ordre visant à produire des techniciens de l'enseignement et de l'industrie, plutôt que des grandes écoles, institutions d'élite visant à reproduire la classe dirigeante, et, à l'intérieur des facultés, la population des facultés des lettres et des sciences plutôt que celle des facultés de droit et de médecine, conduisant à des positions plus élevées dans la hiérarchie des fractions de la classe dominante, et enfin, à l'intérieur des facultés des lettres, la population des disciplines nouvelles, proposant de grandes ambitions intellectuelles sans exiger de grands titres scolaires, plutôt que celle des disciplines canoniques. Il s'ensuit que le degré d'anomie d'une institution scolaire et la probabilité d'apparition d'une crise ouverte sont fonction, indissociablement, du volume de la population enseignée (et corrélativement, de la population enseignante) et de la composition sociale de cette population (ainsi que de la population enseignante correspondante). La scolarisation quasi-totale des classes supérieures et l'intensification de la scolarisation des classes moyennes concourent à introduire dans les institutions offrant un refuge aux étudiants de second choix (du point de vue des normes du système) qui, en un état antérieur du système, se seraient eux-même éliminés, des individus dépourvus du capital culturel et des dispositions tacitement exigés jusque là: peu identifiés au système et à ses valeurs, peu sensibles aux sanctions scolaires, donc peu disposés à entrer dans la dialectique de la consécration de la reconnaissance qui attire au système d'enseignement les individus les plus aptes à le reproduire sans altération, relativement dépourvus de capital culturel, ils épousent les aspirations inscrites dans la définition traditionnelle du rôle et se trouvent donc condamnés à un décalage entre les aspirations et la réussite qui est d'autant plus impatiemment ressenti qu'ils sont portés, par leur origine sociale, à des aspirations plus hautes. L'accroissement de la population enseignée tendant à être de plus en plus important à mesure que l'on s'éloigne des institutions conduisant aux positions sociales les plus élevées, l'apparence de „démocratisation“ pourrait n'être que le produit d'une translation de toute la hiérarchie qui est bien faite pour produire un effet de déplacement et assurer la relégation discrète des nouveaux venus dans des institutions primordialement vouées, comme les sciences humaines, à fournir un refuge aux moins consacrés scolairement des enfants de la bourgeoisie. Ainsi, la révolte des enfants de la bourgeoisie menacés de déclassement manifeste la contradiction spécifique d'un système dans lequel la reproduction de la structure des rapports de classe passe de plus en plus par le système d'enseignement, en sorte que le diplôme concentre naturellement la révolte de ceux que leur classe doit sacrifier au nom du diplôme parce qu'elle a fait de celui-ci un des principes de sa perpétuation.

2.2.1. La tendance interne du système d'enseignement à l'auto-reproduction et à la reproduction ne s'accomplit complètement que lorsqu'il est soumis à une demande externe de reproduction et qu'il réussit à produire des reproducteurs parfaitement disposés et aptes à le reproduire sans altération.

Un des objets de la sociologie comparative en matière d'éducation est de déterminer comment s'actualise la tendance propre du système d'enseignement lorsque varient les conditions politiques de son actualisation et en particulier la fonction explicitement assignée au système d'enseignement va à l'encontre de sa tendance propre.

2.2.1.1. Le degré auquel la tendance interne du système d'enseignement à l'auto-reproduction et à la reproduction peut s'accomplir est fonction 1. de la force dont disposent dans les rapports de force les groupes ou les classes entendant assigner au système d'enseignement des fonctions opposées à celles que sa logique propre l'incline à servir et 2. de la conscience et de la connaissance que ces groupes ou classes ont des lois tendanciennes du système d'enseignement.

Dans la mesure où il suffit de „laisser faire“ pour que la tendance du système à remplir sa fonction conservatrice s'accomplisse, la conscience des mécanismes par lesquels le système d'enseignement remplit cette fonction est la condition de l'efficacité d'une politique visant à enrayer les effets de ces mécanismes. Mais une politique tout à fait réaliste doit prendre aussi en compte le fait qu'un des effets du système d'enseignement consiste à produire l'inconscience des mécanismes par lesquels il assure sa fonction de reproduction.

2.2.1.2. Le degré auquel les agents du système d'enseignement (enseignants ou enseignés) sont identifiés au système d'enseignement, i. e. le degré auquel la satisfaction de leurs intérêts propres dépend de la perpétuation ou de la transformation du système d'enseignement dépend de la position qu'ils occupent, actuellement ou potentiellement, 1. dans la structure des rapports de classe et dans la structure des rapports entre les fractions des classes dirigeantes (la distance par rapport au pouvoir étant un des facteurs les plus décisifs des dispositions politiques des membres de la classe dirigeante) et 2. dans la structure des institutions d'enseignement.

Ces variables structurales sont au principe de l'efficacité de facteurs tels que les opinions politiques qui, parce qu'elles sont étroitement corrélées (inégalement d'ailleurs selon la position dans le système) avec les prises de position sur les questions universitaires et, en particulier, sur la crise de l'université, sont souvent tenus pour le principe de ces prises de position et de leurs variations.

2.2.1.2.1. Les enseignants sont d'autant plus enclins à défendre le système d'enseignement ou telle ou telle de ses institutions que leur valeur et la valeur de leurs produits dépendent plus étroitement de la conservation du système dans son ensemble ou de telle institution particulière.

2.2. L'auto-reproduction parfaite du système d'enseignement supposant que les structures du système, et en particulier les mécanismes par lesquels il assure et contrôle sa propre reproduction, soient assez puissants pour produire des reproducteurs (et en particulier des reproducteurs de reproducteurs) disposés et aptes à reproduire avec le minimum d'altération possible

les structures dont ils sont le produit, toute transformation des mécanismes tendant à assurer la formation et la sélection des nouveaux membres du corps professoral est de nature à introduire des contradictions entre les structures du système et les dispositions des agents chargés de le faire fonctionner et de le reproduire et, par là, des transformations, au moins à terme, des structures du système.

Dans ce que l'on peut appeler les phases organiques de son fonctionnement, le système d'enseignement tend à assurer sa propre reproduction en produisant des enseignants dotés de caractéristiques à peu près constantes et identiques, donc interchangeableables aussi bien dans le temps que dans l'instant: la transformation des pratiques et, peut-être, à terme, la modification des normes de recrutement, qu'impose le recrutement accéléré des maîtres indispensables pour faire face à l'accroissement de la population enseignée (c'est là un des effets les moins aperçus des transformations morphologiques), est au principe de la division du corps enseignant en groupes antagonistes qui sont séparés moins par l'âge et par la génération au sens commun du terme que par une concurrence d'intérêts et surtout peut-être par l'ensemble systématique des différences opposant deux systèmes de compétences et de dispositions produits par deux *modes de génération* universitaire différents qui coexistent dans le même système: la division du corps enseignant en deux catégories au moins séparées par le type de carrière qui leur est tacitement réservé s'observe toutes les fois que la transformation des critères de recrutement imposée par l'urgence ne s'accompagne d'aucune transformation des règles régissant l'avancement dans la carrière.

## QUALITATIVE VERSUS QUANTITATIVE FACTORS IN CULTURAL PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT

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Conceptual clarification is indispensable at the outset in all considerations of cultural development. For the use of this paper culture will be considered in the narrow and selective sense as part of human communication, i. e., interaction by means of signs and symbols bearing no immediate instrumental character.<sup>1</sup> Art, knowledge and symbolic forms of popular entertainment are included within this concept. Education, however, is excluded from further considerations, not so much on grounds of definition but rather because of the essential difference between formal educational institutions and other forms of culture in relation to the possibilities of social planning and prediction.

While education is justly regarded in the whole developed and developing world as a powerful factor of economic and social growth culture, in the sense indicated above, is often left out of consideration, wholly or partially, for several reasons.

It is both indispensable and comparatively easy to set targets for development in terms of quantities of teachers, pupils and schools, their type and level of organization, with the stress being laid on this last point. The situation is only partially comparable in other fields of culture.

Not everything can be directed and predicted in the development of sciences, still less in that of humanities and creative arts, although cultural policy could provide conditions facilitating this development. Highly industrialized countries devote up to 50% of their national income to the promotion of sciences and technical research and applications. Informations about the allocation of such economic resources and the extrapolation of the actual trends of scientific growth make the prediction of future achievements at least highly probable.

The case of creative arts is not so clear. It is not easy to explain the superiority attained by one branch of art, e. g., present-day Polish music, in

<sup>1</sup> Cf. A. Kłoskowska, *Mass Culture. Criticism and Defense* (1964 in Polish); *From the History and Sociology of Culture* (1969 in Polish) and the articles in English: *The Semiotic Criterion of Culture*. *The Polish Sociological Bulletin*, No. 1, 1968, and *Symbolization Process and Social Interaction* (*Toward the Definition of the Sociology of Culture*). *The Polish Sociological Bulletin*, No 2, 1966.

relation to other branches in terms of a more favourable allotment of grants, scholarships, or other conditions arising out of an uneven distribution of social incentives. Any extrapolation in this field would be even more difficult and hazardous.

Considering the present state of sociology of culture in regard to the prediction of the quality of artistic creation it would be most prudent, for the time being at least, to be satisfied with the old Latin saying "Spiritus fiat ubi vult".

The main concern of the sociology of culture is therefore one aspect of cultural participation generally described as cultural consumption or reception.

Economic development and political and social democratization tend to reduce the cultural differentiation of society. But even in highly developed and democratized societies culture is not quite evenly distributed among different regions, social classes and other categories of the population. The differences should be analysed in their quantitative and qualitative aspects. In regard to the first, differences tend to diminish with economic and social growth and they disappear completely in certain fields after society has reached a high technical, economic and social level. The most convenient data illustrating this process are furnished by the potentially ubiquitous media of mass communication.

E. g., in pre-war Poland the indice of radiofication in urban areas was six times as great as in rural communities. At present the urban indice is less than twice as great as rural one. The gap has diminished considerably. Though it still exists, its elimination is planned and its disappearance can be safely predicted. In the case of television the gap is wider, but a forecast of its narrowing in a short time could be reasonably made.<sup>2</sup>

In 1956 in the USA 87% of upper income families were the owners of TV sets while the percentage in the lowest income group was 58. In Japan in the same period 80% of TV viewers belonged to the upper and middle classes, while peasants constituted only 1.9% and industrial workers 1.3% of the viewing public. In France in 1960 television was in possession of about 30% of upper class families as against 3.3% of peasant families.<sup>3</sup>

The degree of urbanization represents in many countries an important factor of internal cultural differentiation. Other factors of this kind are social classes (socio-professional and income categories), the type and level of education, age and sex. These factors will be called cultural gap variables.

<sup>2</sup> The ratio of watching, not necessarily owning, of television in Poland varies with regard to education from 55% in the lowest educational category to over 90% in the category of higher technical education. It is the widest variation range found between the ratio of viewers and not-viewers, other variables under control being: age, residence, income groups and socio-professional categories.

<sup>3</sup> L. Bogart, *The Age of Television*. New York, 1956; J. Cazeneuve, *Sociologie de la Radio-Télévision*. Paris, 1965, *passim*; B. Sternberg, E. Sullerot, *Aspects sociaux de la Radio et de la Télévision*. Paris, 1966. UNESCO. The last named publication contains a quite astonishing statement about the alleged lack of studies on mass communication and absence of sociology as a distinct discipline in East European countries (p. 35).

Mutual interdependence of these variables can be often detected, as between education and residence or education and age, but they can also act independently.

It can be planned and predicted that in the next 20 or 30 years each rural as well as urban family in developed countries will be provided with a radio and television set and that listening and viewing will become a constant habit of a large majority in all age, sex and residence groups. In developing countries the saturation point will probably not be reached, but the proportions will grow considerably.

Cultural activities, motivated by the need for information and entertainment, have developed so rapidly and spontaneously during this century that it seems safe to assume their further growth leading to near satiation.

Large areas of cultural activity are, however, neither directly instrumental to practical values, nor do they satisfy the craving for entertainment. Such is partly the case of reading books, visiting theatres, museums and philharmonies. In this field the effects of cultural gap variables are particularly evident and the reserves for cultural development are considerable. Yet, it would not be wise to expect an automatic filling of such gaps by the process of spontaneous growth. We cannot expect, e. g., that the ratio of theatre-goers to the total population with elementary or secondary vocational education will grow automatically till the end of the century, at the same speed as the ratio of TV viewers.

The main source of differentiation lies in the qualitative factors of culture. Theatres, museums and philharmonies are traditional institutions of higher level culture. And while it is comparatively easy to plan and predict the quantitative development of mass media, it is much more difficult to influence and foresee radical changes in the qualitative standards of cultural consumption.<sup>4</sup>

Education is at present the main variable determining both the scope and the level of cultural participation, but it is often tied to other factors. An example of the interdependence is supplied by readership research carried out in two Polish communities. This research forms a part of a comprehensive study on cultural life of a small town in central Poland compared in some respect with a big industrial city in the same region.<sup>5</sup>

For the use of that research as book readers were described all persons who declared that they had read at least one book in the previous two months, and were able to name the titles of the books read. This criterion was more strict than those used in several other readership studies, but less strict than the one accepted by B. Berelson, i. e., at least one book a month.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>4</sup> It is assumed that the homogenization, characteristic for mass culture, is not necessarily a source of degradation of culture.

<sup>5</sup> The research was carried out in a town of 8000 inhabitants in the region of Lodz (Central Poland) and in Lodz itself (750,000 inhabitants). Lodz is a centre of textile industry. Its position of cultural centre dates only since 25 years, and its indices of cultural consumption are still often lower than those of old cultural centres of the country.

<sup>6</sup> B. Berelson, *Who Reads, What Books and Why* (in *Mass Culture* (B. Rosenberg, D. M. White eds.), 1957, The Free Press.

In accordance with the criterion applied in our research 25% of adult population qualified as readers in the small town and 42% in the big city. It could be hypothesized that this disparity is due to the differences of average educational level of the two communities. In fact, the proportion of readers in both populations varied markedly with the educational level. When, however, education was introduced as a test variable, it was found that on the level of full primary education and below it, it was still a statistically significant difference in the readership of the two localities.

The same difference was found in regard to the qualitative aspect of the readership. The titles of books named by the respondents were classified according to four types and levels, elementary, popular, classical and high-brow. In both communities there was the preponderance of the classical type, but in the small town there were found twice as many elementary type readers as in the big city and not one reader in the high-brow category as compared with 5.4% in this category in the sample of the big city population. The last result presents "a rare — zero difference".

It is clear that the small town lags behind the big city in qualitative as well as in quantitative aspects of the readership. Main cultural lag variables are in this case education and the type of residence. The small town has evidently great cultural reserves to be filled. And it could be reasonably forecasted that in the span of a generation, with the disappearance of older age categories of uneducated people, with the rise of the ratio of higher education and progress of urbanization, these reserves could be brought down to the city's level. But the city itself possesses considerable reserves, especially in relation to the quality of readership.

Is it possible to predict any evolution in this sphere?

Is it possible to plan "the up-grading" of the free cultural consumption just as the development of the educational system is planned all over the world?

Were we to accept the opinion of numerous critics of mass culture in the West, our predictions concerning the qualitative factor of cultural development would be necessarily gloomy. But nobody has yet proved that high culture is in fact driven out by low, "prefabricated" culture in the *absolute* sense, and not only relatively — if at all.

Institutionally accepted values of classic and academic culture have been never probably so easily accessible, if not wide-spread, throughout whole societies, as they are now due to mass media of communication, cheap editions of pocket book classics, recorded music and reproductions of works of art. This trend of popularization of traditional values is not necessarily overbalanced by the proliferation of the low-grade cultural production. In socialist countries like e. g. Poland, where commercial motivation of mass culture is held in check, there could be no danger of absolute overflowing of lowest level cultural production.

The results of the research on book reading, quoted above, have shown that with the rising levels of education and urbanization there takes place a growth of consumption of classic literature and approximate book categories in this case rising from 57% of the books read in the small town to 64% of those read in the city.



However, the same study has shown clearly that the readership of high level, avant-garde and philosophical literature in the big industrial city was not considerable.

We come now back to the question whether and to what extent prediction concerning the filling of cultural gaps and lifting up free cultural consumption is possible. The rising average educational level is not necessarily conducive to the development of tastes and ability of aesthetic and general intellectual comprehension, because progressing specialization may result in further separation of scientific-technical knowledge from the humanities and arts.<sup>7</sup>

It is assumed, however, that changes of qualitative aspects of cultural participation could be planned and realized under conditions of cultural policy which aims not only at education but also at other spheres of cultural consumption, and which is not only restrictive but creative as well.

Predictions of qualitative changes of culture must take into account the aims and mechanisms of cultural policy. But on the other hand, to avoid wishful thinking, cultural policy must be based on the knowledge of cultural gap variables and of the different social and psychosocial mechanisms of the growing cultural needs and aspirations.

Sociology has scarcely touched this field in regard to the qualitative factors of cultural experience. Future research and conceptual and theoretical efforts should go in the direction both for practical and theoretical reasons.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. the concept of "two cultures", put forward by P. C. Snow.

## FACULTY RESPONSES TO STUDENT ACTIVISM: SOME FINDINGS FROM A SURVEY OF AMERICAN PROFESSORS\*

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The eruption on American college and university campuses of active, often disruptive, political or quasi-political student protests and demonstrations has been accompanied by a spate of sociological studies. Few have attended, as does the present study, to the ways in which faculties have become engaged with student activism.

The American universities are said in many ways to be prototypical of modern academic organization. (See most recently, Ben-David, 1968.) Organized by specialist disciplines, with a decentralized and loosely-knit authority structure (Clark, 1961), they stress universalistic criteria in the recruitment of faculty and provide well-articulated professorial careers. Accompanying these developments in university organization has been the emergence of the scholarly and scientific disciplines as major centres of faculty loyalty and as prime agencies for the allocation of the recognition and esteem that form reputations and tend to govern academic careers. Thus the disciplines have become organized on both a scholarly and a professional basis. As they form markets for employment and reputations, they stand outside the universities and tend to weaken the hold of the universities on their faculties.

At the same time, the American universities have grown up in an environment that has provided ambivalent and uncertain support: demands for and acceptance of services (certification, knowledge application, and the like) coupled with a mixture of indifference and populist antagonism toward their intellectual and scholarly functions (cf. Trow, 1970). Consequently, the American universities — whether controlled by public or private bodies — have developed an entrepreneurial, enterprising quality. They have for many years had close ties to external clients; the present difference lies in the number and scope of these ties, the tendency of national governmental and quasi-governmental agencies to predominate among the clients, and the sudden challenge to the legitimacy of these ties by students.

The position of the universities in relation to student activism is peculiarly fragile. The universities can neither entirely sever their ties to clients

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to satisfy activist demands, nor can they wholly ignore the activists who, though relatively few in numbers, often enjoy wide-spread attitudinal support among their less-activist fellows. Yet student demonstrations on a campus tend to alienate donors, governments, and the public.

Under these conditions, the faculty appears as a potential third force of some significance, but its loyalties and probable actions cannot be seen clearly, given the decentralization and weakening of authority in universities and the multiple pressures and pulls on individual professors — from their disciplines, their students, their local colleagues and administrators, and their own extra-academic clients.

The foregoing discussion suggests several possible factors, results of the conditions of academic work in the American universities, that may affect faculty response to student activism.

(1) *Faculty recruitment.* Given the professionalization of the professoriate, American academic men have become more diverse in their social origins, and therefore presumably in such correlates of social origins as political beliefs. It is possible that these beliefs are translated directly into attitudes toward student activism and also affect the tendency to convert these attitudes into actions. If faculty members are allocated differentially by social origins across types of schools, fields of study, or academic positions, social origins then could account for differing responses to student activism that were apparently a function of variables more immediately germane to the professorial role.

(2) *University structure.* There are, however, good reasons to expect that variation in the structure of universities will itself affect modes of faculty response to student activism. The disciplines and other fields of university study may differ in values, in norms governing conduct in the academic role, or in relations to extra-university clienteles or audiences. These factors are potential determinants of faculty response to student activism.

The same point can be made concerning variations between forms of control of universities (e. g., whether they are public or private, and if private secular or religious, in sponsorship) and the eminence of universities. The more eminent, for example, may be firmly integrated around values of rational discourse and inquiry, their faculties thereby less favorably disposed toward student activism. On the other hand, the more eminent schools may also embody certain humanistic values that could have the opposite effect.

Such structural variables as size, differentiation of subunits, and centralization of authority seem less likely to produce effects in themselves than either to be correlated with certain determinants of faculty response to student activism (e. g., type of control or differential faculty recruitment) or to form distinctive conditions under which other variables may affect faculty response.

(3) *Collegueship and departments.* Our speculations about the significance of the disciplines for American academics and tendencies toward departmental autonomy in the American universities suggest that this source of influence may be quite widespread — especially where decentralization is high and, perhaps, where the faculty is distinguished and therefore discipline-centered. Moreover, departments and applied fields may show marked

variations in the strength of their ties to external clienteles and in the nature of those clienteles, with differing consequences for faculty response to student activism.

(4) *Types of student activism and faculty interests.* We must not ignore the variety of student protests and demonstrations. They differ with respect to both issues and tactics. Protest tactics may vary from the highly disruptive and destructive to the peaceful and orderly. Protest issues can be viewed as varying between those directed internally against the university and those directed externally (e. g., against a government). It is especially important to distinguish among internally-directed protests according to the degree to which they seek to rearrange the distribution of authority (e. g., with respect to matters of faculty appointment, attempts simply to insert new criteria into decisions, or attempts to increase the scope of student participation in these decisions).

A university faculty can be viewed as a self-interested organizational stratum. In the normal course of affairs its interests may be hidden, but in a crisis, which may be precipitated by a student protest, these interests are likely to become clearer and more visible and pluralistic ignorance among faculty about their stratum interests reduced.

Hence one would expect faculty reaction to externally-directed protests to be governed by variables other than the nature of the protest itself and for non-academic traits, such as social origins, to have strong effects on these reactions. One would expect faculty reactions to internally-directed protests to be determined more by variables intrinsic to the professorial role, but for such varying effects to be reduced and replaced by general faculty opposition the clearer the threat of student protests to faculty stratum interests.

But because faculty interests vary from field to field (e. g., in the prevalence of externally-funded research or of external clienteles), we should expect the degree of interest-determination to vary with the faculty member's field. Similarly, since faculty interest in maintaining existing authority structures (at least with respect to appointments) should vary directly with the level of decentralization of authority, interest-determination of faculty response to internally-directed protests (especially those concerned with student participation in faculty appointment decisions) should also vary directly with decentralization.

*Methods of the Study.* The data that we shall report come from a spring, 1969 survey of a two-stage sample of the faculties of colleges and universities in a ten-state area of the northern central United States. This sample was a straight random sample of the Arts and Sciences and certain professional school (Business, Engineering, Medicine, Law and Education) faculties selected, as applicable from a sample of universities and colleges stratified by type (college or university), type of control (public, secular private, religious private) and selectivity of students (see Astin, 1965). Some strata were oversampled, and the following data are weighted to correct for oversampling. Response rates by stratum varied between 61 and 76 per cent, yielding 1,291 usable questionnaires. On standard demographic and status characteristics, non-respondents and respondents are very much alike.

The questionnaire included items that provide the following information about each respondent: (1) social origins (paternal occupational status, parental religion, ethnicity), age, and sex; (2) political orientation and religious affiliation; (3) academic rank and department of professional school affiliation; (4) perceived attitudes of departmental colleagues toward student protest; (5) own attitudes toward student protest; and (6) self-reported participation in student activist affairs.

In addition, certain items of information are available for each school in the sample: the number of local student protests; the issues involved and the nature of the student tactics (incidence of violence and disruption of campus order) employed in each, and an index of authority decentralization (a factor-weighted index of the number of levels in the hierarchy of the school that "have a voice" in a series of academic decisions).

From the most recent catalogues of the universities only, we derived a rough index of structural differentiation: the number of non-departmental units for instruction (e. g., inter-departmental committees) or research (e. g., institutes). We also made use, for the universities, of the over-all eminence of the university's faculty, based on Cartter's (1966) survey of the standing of the university arts and science departments in the US.

The findings that follow are limited to data from the universities (33 universities and 629 faculty respondents). They provide a clearer test than the colleges of the ideas that we have described.

*Findings.* Table 1 reports the zero-order relations between a series of faculty and university characteristics and summative indexes, based on the questionnaire, of the favorability of each respondent's attitudes toward and of his involvement in student activism. The number of at least moderate coefficients is striking. Consider first associations with the attitude index. Of the measures of personal traits, social origins, age, and political orientations (but not party voting) are strongly associated with this index.

Of the associations with variables describing the respondents' academic positions and universities, the following are strong: those with academic rank, departmental or professional school affiliation, and perceived colleague attitudes. Moderate associations with the index are observed for university size, differentiation, decentralization, type of control, selectivity and eminence. The gammas with the involvement index are consistently weaker than those with the attitude index, though they display the same pattern. This finding is not surprising in view of uncertainties surrounding the conversion of attitudes into actions; indeed the two indexes are related only weakly ( $\gamma = 0.18$ ).

The associations with departmental or professional school affiliation require comment. When these fields are categorized according to conventional American practice (humanities, social science, pure science, applied fields), the social science and humanities respondents are most favorable to activism and most likely to have been involved in an activist incident, those in the applied fields least favorable and involved. However, when the fields are ordered with respect to the "human content" of their subject-matter (i. e., its degree of concern with the affairs of men and society), the coefficients are substantially larger and would be even stronger were the applied fields to be removed from the analysis. These

TABLE 1. ASSOCIATIONS BETWEEN RESPONDENTS' PERSONAL TRAITS AND FACULTY AND UNIVERSITY STATUS AND THE INDEXES OF ATTITUDES TOWARD AND INVOLVEMENT IN STUDENT ACTIVISM (GAMMA)

	Index of	
	Attitudes <sup>k</sup>	Involvement <sup>k</sup>
<b>A. Personal Traits</b>		
Paternal Occupation <sup>a</sup>	-0.53	-0.31
Parental Religion <sup>b</sup>	0.58	0.40
Own Religious Affiliation <sup>b</sup>	-0.06	0.05
Sex	0.11	0.07
Ethnicity <sup>c</sup>	0.12	-0.04
Age <sup>d</sup>	-0.55	-0.40
Party Voting Preference <sup>e</sup>	0.13	0.01
Political Orientation <sup>f</sup>	0.68	0.49
<b>B. Faculty Status</b>		
Departmental Affiliation (traditional) <sup>g</sup>	0.47	0.36
Departmental Affiliation ("human" subject-matter) <sup>h</sup>	0.59	0.48
Department Colleague Attitudes <sup>i</sup>	0.42	0.26
Academic Rank	-0.59	-0.36
<b>C. University Status</b>		
Type of Control <sup>j</sup>	0.32	0.20
Faculty Eminence <sup>k</sup>	0.28	0.16
Student Selectivity <sup>k</sup>	0.33	0.14
Differentiation <sup>k</sup>	0.37	0.21
Decentralization <sup>k</sup>	0.35	0.24
Size <sup>k</sup>	0.30	0.21

<sup>a</sup> Based on the Duncan occupational prestige scale, score distribution trichotomized at the tertiles.

<sup>b</sup> Ordered from high to low: Jewish, Protestant, Catholic, other. "None" omitted from the computation.

<sup>c</sup> Ordered from high to low: "Old American", "White Ethnic", Other (including Negroes).

<sup>d</sup> The age distribution was trichotomized at the tertiles.

<sup>e</sup> Ordered from high to low: Left Splinter Parties, Democratic, Republican, Right Splinter Parties.

<sup>f</sup> Ordered from liberal to conservative (left to right), with the score distribution trichotomized at the tertiles.

<sup>g</sup> Ordered from high to low: Social Science, Humanities, Pure Science, Applied.

<sup>h</sup> Ordered into four groups with the most "human-centred" the highest.

<sup>i</sup> Ordered into three groups according to proportion of colleagues reported as favoring student activism, the breaks coming at the tertiles of the percentage distribution.

<sup>j</sup> Ordered from high to low: Private Secular, Public, Private Religious.

<sup>k</sup> Scores on this variable were trichotomized at the tertiles of the score distribution.

findings suggest that the conventional grouping of fields is associated with the indexes because the "human content" fields are concentrated in the social sciences and humanities. Whether these data indicate primarily effects of some attribute intrinsic to the fields (e. g., values or beliefs related to the subject-matter, perhaps formed into disciplinary sub-cultures) or variability in patterns of recruitment to the fields is not clear.

These zero-order associations do not carry us very far into the issues with which we began. But certain first-order tables will provide some tentative answers to two questions. To what extent are the respondents' personal traits, aspects of their academic appointments, and characteristics of their universities independent correlates of the attitude and involvement indexes? How do variations in the activist incidents on a respondent's campus affect his response to activism?

Table 2 reports the net partial gamma coefficients from a series of cross-tabulations of either the attitude or involvement index and, successive-

TABLE 2. ASSOCIATIONS BETWEEN CERTAIN PERSONAL TRAITS AND THE ATTITUDE AND INVOLVEMENT INDEXES, CONTROLLING FOR POLITICAL ORIENTATION (NET PARTIAL GAMMA)

	Index of	
	Attitudes	Involvement
Paternal Occupation	-0.31	-0.22
Parental Religion	0.40	0.31
Age	0.13	0.09

ly, paternal occupational status, parental religion, and age. Political orientation is the test variable. These coefficients show that social origins have a continued effect on both indexes, though somewhat weakened from the zero-order gammas of Table 1. The relations with age, however, are severely reduced, suggesting that the zero-order association between age and the indexes is largely a matter of the inverse relation between age and political liberalism ( $\text{gamma} = -0.43$ ).

The next step in our analysis was to examine the first-order relations between the attributes of the respondents' department and university affiliations and the attitude and involvement indexes. (See Table 3). Here we were especially interested in the effects of faculty rank, departmental subject-matter, and departmental collegueship under varying university attributes.

Although the measures of size, differentiation, and decentralization were themselves only moderately related, they have similar effects as test variables. The relations between perceived colleague attitudes and respondents'

TABLE 3. ASSOCIATIONS BETWEEN FACULTY STATUS AND THE ATTITUDE AND INVOLVEMENT INDEXES, CONTROLLING FOR UNIVERSITY STATUS (NET PARTIAL GAMMA)

	Index of	
	Attitudes	Involvement
Control : size		
Rank	-0.54	-0.33
Department subject-matter ("human-centered")	0.58	0.41
Colleague attitudes	0.13	0.04
Control : differentiation		
Rank	-0.50	-0.32
Department subject-matter	0.53	0.40
Colleague attitudes	0.18	0.09
Control : decentralization		
Rank	-0.55	-0.31
Department subject-matter	0.50	0.41
Colleague attitudes	0.21	0.08
Control : control type		
Rank	-0.11	-0.03
Department subject-matter	-0.09	0.03
Colleague attitudes	0.38	0.22
Control : faculty eminence		
Rank	-0.17	-0.10
Department subject-matter	0.13	-0.02
Colleague attitudes	0.41	0.20
Control : selectivity		
Rank	-0.09	-0.02
Department subject-matter	0.18	0.06
Colleague attitudes	0.36	0.19



own attitudes and involvement are severely reduced. The associations of academic rank and academic field with either index are unaffected by these test variables. Table 3 also shows that the control type, faculty eminence, and student selectivity of the respondents' universities, as test variables, weakened the effects of rank and subject matter. These were specified to the secular and the "better" universities. But colleague attitudes were unaffected in their relations to the indexes. (These test variables themselves were moderately inter-related, though only weakly related to size, complexity and decentralization.)

Our next step was to use respondents' personal traits (letting political orientation act as a surrogate for age) as test variables in first-order tables of relations of rank and the attributes of the respondents' universities and departments with the two indexes. In Table 4 we see that the effects of rank on either index essentially vanish when political orientation is controlled, while the effects of field are not altered. Table 4 also shows that there is a minor tendency for the effects of the other variables, especially faculty

TABLE 4. ASSOCIATIONS BETWEEN FACULTY AND UNIVERSITY STATUS AND THE ATTITUDE AND INVOLVEMENT INDEXES, CONTROLLING FOR POLITICAL ORIENTATION (NET PARTIAL GAMMA)

	Index of	
	Attitudes	Involvement
Rank	-0.03	0.01
Department subject-matter ("human-centred")	0.57	0.41
Colleague attitudes	0.40	0.23
Type of control	0.28	0.17
Faculty eminence	0.20	0.13
Selectivity	0.24	0.08
Size	0.26	0.15
Differentiation	0.33	0.18
Decentralization	0.32	0.21

eminence and university selectivity, to be reduced when the test variable is political orientations. But the results of other cross-tabulations, omitted for the sake of economy from Table 4, show that the effects of personal traits of faculty and attributes of their universities on the two indexes are in the main independent.

Thus we come to the following conclusions. First, the personal traits of faculty do not account primarily or consistently for effects of university structure or of academic appointment. Differential recruitment by social origins or politics to the professoriate is not *the* major factor in faculty response to student activism. Second, however, political orientations do interpret the effects of faculty rank. This finding strongly suggests age-linked differential recruitment, though it may also reflect generational variations in experiences subsequent to university appointment. Rank, however, varies in its association with response to activism as a function of university control type and prestige, suggesting the greater prerogatives of rank in secular and eminent schools and showing that rank has organizational as well as demographic meaning.

Third, the respondent's academic field appears as a key variable (among those specific to the professorial role) influencing response to activism. As a *subject-matter* field acts independently of either faculty traits or aspects of *internal* university organization. This finding raises the strong possibility of pervasive disciplinary subcultures that constrain faculty attitudes and behavior with respect to student activism. But these constraints are stronger in the secular and more prestigious universities (aspects of *external* university organization), those universities in which we would expect cosmopolitan disciplinary involvement of faculty to be the greatest.

As a local *collegium*, the academic field is a potent factor affecting faculty response to activism, but primarily in the large, decentralized, and differentiated universities, that is, in those universities in which *internal* organizational structure gives to the fields organizational primacy for faculty. Thus certain cosmopolitan aspects of academic fields affect faculty response to activism primarily as a function of the position of the university in the university system, their local aspects as a function of intra-university organizational structure.

Our final question concerns variations in types of student protest in relation to the stratum interests of the professoriate. Table 5 presents the relevant findings. We have classified student protests at the respondents' universities in two different ways: according to the issues involved and the tactics used. To conserve cases, each classification was made dichotomous: for issues, student participation in curriculum or personnel decisions or withdrawal from research *vs.* all others; for tactics, peaceful or orderly *vs.* disorderly. If a university had protests reported in both categories of either classification scheme it was placed in the more interest-threatening category: student participation issues or disorderly tactics.

With the sample partitioned according to each set of categories, the initial gammas were re-calculated. The results are interesting. With respect to differences in the protest issue, we now find that under "high threat" all the associations are smaller than those of Table 1, most of them substantially. Under "low threat" they are larger. When the sample is partitioned

TABLE 5. ASSOCIATIONS BETWEEN SELECTED MEASURES OF RESPONDENTS' PERSONAL TRAITS AND FACULTY AND UNIVERSITY STATUS AND THE ATTITUDE AND INVOLVEMENT INDEXES, CONTROLLING FOR TYPE OF LOCAL STUDENT PROTEST (GAMMA)

Interest threat:	Protest :							
	Issue				Tactics			
	High		Low		High		Low	
Index	Attitude	Involvement	Attitude	Involvement	Attitude	Involvement	Attitude	Involvement
Parental occupation	-0.41	-0.20	-0.58	-0.40	-0.51	-0.33	-0.55	-0.26
Parental religion	0.49	0.34	0.61	0.43	0.62	0.41	0.51	0.37
Age	-0.13	-0.10	-0.72	-0.66	-0.68	-0.51	-0.43	-0.31
Political orientation	0.21	0.15	0.74	0.60	0.75	0.63	0.52	0.30
Dept. subject-matter ("human-centred")	0.40	0.31	0.64	0.53	0.56	0.45	0.62	0.52
Dept. affiliation (traditional categories)	0.43	0.30	0.51	0.38	0.66	0.58	0.31	0.23
Colleague attitudes	0.14	0.09	0.62	0.39	0.40	0.22	0.38	0.29
Academic rank	-0.11	-0.08	-0.70	-0.56	-0.71	-0.49	-0.35	-0.24
Type of control	0.25	0.12	0.38	0.27	0.30	0.23	0.35	0.17
Faculty eminence	0.20	0.11	0.34	0.21	0.26	0.11	0.31	0.19
Student selectivity	0.22	0.09	0.41	0.23	0.37	0.18	0.26	0.12
Differentiation	0.28	0.16	0.40	0.28	0.41	0.23	0.34	0.18
Decentralization	0.13	0.04	0.51	0.41	0.34	0.26	0.37	0.21
Size	0.25	0.16	0.38	0.26	0.34	0.18	0.28	0.25

by protest tactics, the differences by rank, age, and political orientation are increased under "high threat". So are differences by conventional categories of departmental affiliation. The pattern reverses under "low threat".

These findings indicate that the less the distance of protest issues from faculty prerogatives in academic decision-making, the more likely are faculty to unite in opposition, overriding variation in rank and university organization. When protest tactics pose a threat to the internal order of the university, it is perhaps those faculty with the strongest commitment to the university—the senior men—and those faculty whose research activities cannot easily be pursued away from the campus—the scientists in their laboratories—who are most likely to oppose student protests. These findings and one other, that under conditions of threat to either faculty prerogatives or order, the association of attitudes and involvement is strengthened ( $\gamma=0.63$  and  $0.59$  respectively), support the argument that stratum interests powerfully affect faculty response to student activism.

*Envoi.* Our findings are consistent with the ideas that launched the paper. They not only help us to understand how faculty members respond to student protests, but point more generally to factors underlying the conduct of professors as members of university organizations.

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## COMMENT PERÇOIVENT LES ENSEIGNANTS LA RELATION ENTRE L'ÉCOLE ET LA SOCIÉTÉ

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Dans le cadre de l'Institut de sociologie nous avons entrepris, il y a un an et demi, une série de recherches sur l'école en tant qu'institution sociale. Les deux interrogations fondamentales orientant les travaux sont les suivantes :

1. Quelle est la nature de la relation entre la dynamique de la société et celle de l'école, ou autrement dit, comment le système scolaire, en général plutôt rigide, peut-il s'adapter aux exigences d'une société plutôt dynamique, et

2. Comment évoluent les différenciations et les hiérarchies scolaires dans une société qui se veut égalitaire ?

Deux enquêtes de grande envergure nous servent pour point de départ ; l'une sur les résultats scolaires, et l'autre sur les enseignants. Jusqu'à présent nous ne disposons que des premiers résultats de cette seconde enquête qui se rapportent aux 500 enseignants que l'on a interrogés à Budapest, dont je propose d'analyser un aspect qui est, du moins en Hongrie, insuffisamment étudié : comment perçoivent les agents travaillant dans la structure scolaire, structure par excellence sociale, puisque soumise à des déterminismes et chargée de fonctions éminemment sociaux, le rôle social de l'école et que pensent-ils de ses fonctions et possibilités sociales ? Bien entendu, les agents sont soumis — qu'ils le veulent ou non — à la structure de l'institution dans laquelle ils travaillent. Et il paraît probable que si les enseignants sont conscients de ce qu'ils sont, de ce qu'ils font *socialement*, cela ne peut que renforcer l'efficacité de leur activité pédagogique.

En somme, je pourrais répéter ici dans un certain sens l'argumentation de Durkheim plaidant pour une meilleure conscience pédagogique des professeurs, transposée cette fois dans le champ sociologique. „Une grande réforme est annoncée comme prochaine dans notre enseignement secondaire... On a compris que, s'il est nécessaire de fixer avec discernement les différentes matières de l'enseignement,... il est encore beaucoup plus essentiel de communiquer aux maîtres, appelés à donner cet enseignement, l'esprit qui doit les animer dans leur tâche. On a compris qu'un programme ne vaut que par la manière dont il est appliqué ; que s'il est appliqué à contresens

ou avec une résignation passive, ou il tournera contre son but ou il restera lettre morte. Il faut que les maîtres chargés d'en faire une réalité le veuillent, s'y intéressent; c'est à condition de le vivre qu'ils le feront vivre.<sup>1</sup>

### 1. Comment évaluent les pédagogues le rôle actuel de l'école?

Les sociologues et les représentants de la science de l'éducation sont en général d'accord pour dire que de tous les facteurs qui influent sur le processus de socialisation et, partant, sur les jeunes, c'est la famille et le milieu social qui en est solidaire qui détiennent le rôle prépondérant. L'accord s'établit aussi en général en ce qui concerne l'école dont l'influence, dans les conditions actuelles de nos sociétés dites développées, vient en second lieu. On a l'impression à la base de nos données que les enseignants attribuent à l'école un rôle bien moindre que l'opinion publique scientifique.

Nous avons posé trois questions qui sont susceptibles d'être interprétées dans ce contexte. La première constitue une question fermée où les enseignants pouvaient affecter un score allant de 1 à 5 pour évaluer l'effet exercé sur les jeunes par *les amis, la famille, les mass-media, l'école et les organisations de jeunesse*. Les enseignants placent le plus haut — suivant les cycles — la famille ou les amis, et l'école n'occupe en général que l'avant-dernière position.

Une autre question également fermée énumérait 12 facteurs „qui sont le plus souvent causes de graves indisciplines scolaires“. De ces 12 facteurs il fallait choisir et classer les trois plus importants. Les 12 facteurs peuvent être regroupés de manière à les rendre comparables à la question précédente, en ajoutant aussi un nouveau facteur, „les mauvais instincts héréditaires“ de l'enfant.

Les réponses à cette question font ressortir la responsabilité de la famille: 96 à 98 pour cent des enseignants pensent que — d'une manière ou d'une autre — le milieu familial agit dans ces cas. Il est pourtant vrai que la responsabilité de l'école croît aussi, aux dépens de l'influence des amis.

En analysant de plus près les 12 facteurs on peut voir quels sont les éléments des conditions familiales ou scolaires auxquels les enseignants donnent le plus de poids. Les trois premières colonnes du tableau à la page 111 présentent les scores moyens affectés aux divers facteurs. (Afin d'obtenir ces scores, on a donné 6 points au facteur classé premier, 4 à celui classé second, et 2 à celui venant en troisième place, les facteurs non classés ayant reçu 0 points.)

Dans les trois dernières colonnes on fait figurer la place occupée par chacun des facteurs suivant l'ordre de grandeur des scores moyens.

La troisième question ouverte était formulée comme suit: „Selon vous, quels sont les facteurs les plus essentiels responsables pour l'échec scolaire des élèves?“

Cette question se rapportait donc à la fonction enseignante, la plus manifeste de l'école. Il est donc naturel que l'école est évoquée bien plus fré-

<sup>1</sup> E. Durkheim. L'évolution pédagogique en France. PUF, 1969. 10. old.

SCORES MOYENS CARACTÉRISANT L'INFLUENCE  
DES DIVERS FACTEURS  
(*min*=1, *max*=5)

	Ecole primaire (6 à 14 ans)	Lycées	Ecole sec. techn. (15 à 18 ans)
Amis	4,36	4,52	4,46
Famille	4,44	4,07	4,09
Mass-média	4,14	3,88	3,81
École	3,72	3,50	3,60
Organisation de jeunesse	3,46	2,88	3,00
( <i>n</i> ) =	(355)	(89)	(70)

quement que dans les réponses précédentes, et que les amis ne sont tenus pour responsables que rarement. Toutefois, l'école n'est pas seule en cause. A l'école primaire, la famille et les dispositions de l'enfant priment tout, et dans le cycle supérieur ce sont les dispositions de l'enfant qui occupent la première place.

Il est impossible de démêler dans le cadre de cette étude toute les implications pédagogiques de ces informations. Je me borne donc aux conclusions qui sont en rapport avec la question posée au départ.

La première chose à noter est *le sentiment d'impuissance des enseignants*, leur forte conviction que tout, même les effets les plus superficiels marquent l'enfant plus efficacement que l'école. Pour le moment, il est presque sans intérêt de savoir en quelle mesure ont-ils raison, si l'on accepte *que cette résignation reflète une certaine abdication*, une certaine démission. L'école croit avoir perdu sa prise sur l'enfant — et cela ne peut manquer à se répercuter sur ses aspirations. Ceci paraît d'autant plus vrai que les opinions des enseignants laissent à entendre que la faiblesse de „l'école“ en général est en rapport avec la possibilité restreinte de l'influence de l'enseignant. Le sentiment de l'impuissance entraîne donc dans une certaine mesure *le rejet de la responsabilité*.

Dans l'explication de cette abdication, les enseignants ont recours à certaines conditions objectives, telles les difficultés entraînées par la suppression des punitions corporelles, le nombre accru des élèves en partie sans motivation, ou l'effet nuisible des mass-média.

LA FRÉQUENCE AVEC LAQUELLE LES DIVERS GROUPES DE FACTEURS SONT MENTIONNÉS EN TANT QUE CAUSES DE GRAVES INDISCIPLINES SCOLAIRES<sup>2</sup>  
(En pourcentage du nombre des enseignants questionnés)

	Motifs étant en relation avec			
	la famille	l'école	l'élève	les amis
Ecole primaire	97,2	36,6	16,1	36,3
Lycées	95,5	67,4	10,1	43,8
Ecole secondaire technique	98,6	57,1	2,9	54,3

Il est clair que pratiquement toutes ces raisons évoquées sont des épiphénomènes de tendances sociales plus profondes. On ne peut pas s'étonner qu'une analyse plus poussée ne soit pas faite au cours d'une interview plus ou moins à la volée. Néanmoins, on ne peut pas tenir pour „normal“ ou „naturel“ — et c'est la deuxième conclusion importante — combien les *relations sociales sont refoulées*, et à quel degré *les expériences directes, quotidiennes* dominent le système d'idées et d'explications des enseignants.

On a l'impression donc que pour l'enseignant *l'école est un monde* plus ou moins *clos*. La responsabilité pour ce qui se passe à l'école échoit soit aux pratiques quotidiennes de l'école, soit aux enfants définis par leurs dispositions „naturelles“. *Les forces sociales sous-jacentes* en relation avec la structure sociale donnée, et qui agissent sur l'école et sur les élèves, *sont à peine entrevues*.

L'oubli des déterminismes sociaux est d'autant plus frappant que le problème „des élèves défavorisés“ occupe depuis quelques années une place de choix dans l'enseignement public.

Les directives ministérielles éditées depuis 1964 pratiquement chaque année — aussi bien que les études sociologiques — soulignaient l'importance des facteurs sociaux (territorial, matériel et culturel) dans la „production“ des „désavantages scolaires“. En effet, quand on a posé aux enseignants une question indépendante des autres, leur demandant ce qu'ils entendaient par „désavantages scolaires“, la majorité mentionnait — entre autres — des causes macro-sociologiques aussi (70 à 90%). Parmi ces

<sup>2</sup> Les résultats ainsi regroupés sont certainement biaisés par la manière dont nous avons choisi les 12 facteurs : de ceux-là 5 se rapportaient à la famille, 4 à l'école, 1 à l'élève et 1 aux amis, ce qui fait que la probabilité de mentionner un facteur relevant des deux premiers groupes est bien plus grande que celle de mentionner les deux derniers. (Ajoutons encore qu'il n'y avaient que 11 facteurs prescrits, et la personne interrogée pouvait encore ajouter un, mais cette dernière place était presque toujours laissée en blanc.)



SCORES MOYENS ET RANG DES FACTEURS MENTIONNÉS COMME CAUSE  
DE GRAVES INDISCIPLINES SCOLAIRES

(Facteurs ordonnés suivant l'ordre des scores à l'école primaire)	Scores moyens			Rang		
	éc. prim.	lyc.	éc. techn.	éc. prim.	lyc.	éc. techn.
Désorganisation de la famille	3,02	2,54	3,20	1	1	1
Soins insuffisants des parents	2,72	2,50	1,83	2	2	4
Trop d'indulgence de la famille	2,10	2,31	2,08	3	3	2
Mauvaise influence des amis	1,10	1,48	1,92	4	4	3
Mauvaises conditions matérielles et d'habitat de la famille	0,76	0,56	0,52	5	7	7
Bas niveau culturel de la famille	0,66	0,25	0,49	6	11	8
Mauvais instincts hérités de l'enfant	0,61	0,34	0,08	7	10	11
Absence de procédés scolaires fermes et sévères	0,46	0,52	0,69	8	8	6
Cumul des échecs scolaires	0,32	0,92	0,46	9	5	9
Travail déficient des enseignants	0,20	0,65	0,31	10	6	10
Imperfection du travail éducatif de l'école	0,17	0,45	0,83	11	9	5

causes, ils mettaient en avant les conditions matérielles et celles de l'habitat, mais ils soulignaient aussi l'importance des désavantages „culturels“.

En somme, quand nous avons mentionné un mot-clé, ils évoquaient tout ce qui a été dit au cours des derniers temps à ce sujet. Quand cependant nous avons formulé une question ayant à peu près le même sens mais ne contenant pas le mot-clé (c'est-à-dire nous avons remplacé „désavantage scolaire“ par „échec scolaire“) alors il est apparu que ces faits sociaux sont encore loin de former une part organique du système d'idées des enseignants.

Les résultats passés en revue jusque là nous apprennent donc que les enseignants sont peu enclins à croire en la force formatrice de l'école, en ce

## LES CAUSES DE L'ÉCHEC SCOLAIRE

La cause de l'échec scolaire peut être imputée aux	Ecole primaire	Lycée	Ecole sec. techn.
Dispositions de l'élève	53,8	65,2	64,3
Conditions de la famille (micro-sociologiques)	53,8	36,0	28,6
Travail et méthodes de l'école	26,8	62,9	57,1
Conditions sociales (macro-sociologiques)	8,7	7,9	5,7
Autres causes (mass-media, amis, etc.)	14,6	7,9	27,1

qu'elle peut être un facteur puissant dans la formation de l'individu et, par là, de la société. En même temps, ils sont peu conscients des forces et des déterminants sociaux qui agissent aujourd'hui et sur les enfants arrivant à l'école, et sur l'école comme système et structure. Il est encore à voir comment ces vues se répercutent-elles sur leurs idées se rapportant non plus à l'école actuelle mais aux possibilités, à l'effet potentiel de l'école ?

## 2. *Comment perçoivent les enseignants le rôle social de l'école dans sa virtualité ?*

Nous avons utilisé deux approches pour cerner ce problème. D'une part nous avons étudié l'opinion des enseignants en ce qui concerne l'effet social de certaines solutions pédagogiques. D'autre part nous avons essayé — par des moyens plus ou moins indirects — de relever que considéraient-ils être idéalement la tâche de l'école, et à quel point des considérations d'ordre social rentraient ici dans leur champ de vision.

Afin de répondre au premier problème, nous leur avons demandé comment ils évaluaient la formation pédagogique actuelle, que pensaient-ils des programmes d'enseignement, de la participation des étudiants dans les affaires scolaires, etc. Ici nous n'étudierons de plus près qu'une seule question, offrant les informations les plus directes, notamment celle qui se rapporte à l'organisation des classes parallèles.

Les écoles hongroises, surtout celles des villes, sont assez peuplées. Les classes elles-mêmes n'étant pas très nombreuses (30 élèves par classe en moyenne), on organise dans la majorité des cas des classes parallèles, en répartissant les élèves entre les classes. Or, cette pratique en Hongrie n'est pas soumise à des règles ou prescriptions centrales. Pourtant l'on sait, surtout depuis l'analyse approfondie faite par des éducateurs et sociologues

anglais au sujet du „streaming“ que cette répartition n'est pas seulement un problème pédagogique mais aussi un problème éminemment social.<sup>3</sup> Ils ont démontré entre autres que l'homogénéisation des classes par le niveau d'intelligence des élèves, la formation des classes „faibles“ et des classes „d'élite“ influence de près les résultats scolaires des enfants (les meilleurs s'améliorant, les faibles s'affaiblissant), et elle ne manque pas de se répercuter sur les attitudes, les ambitions, et, partant, sur toute la „carrière“ de l'enfant.

Cette question nous paraissait très utile car le problème pédagogique est chargé de contenu social, mais ses implications sociales n'ont pas encore été soulevées en Hongrie.

La question posée était mi-fermée: „Dans le cas des classes parallèles, quelle est la solution que vous préférez: a) si les enfants d'aptitudes à peu près pareilles sont réunis dans la même classe; b) si dans chaque classe il y a des enfants à aptitudes différentes; c) vous préconisez une autre solution, si oui, laquelle:..." Puis une question ouverte demandait les arguments en faveur de la solution choisie.

RÉPARTITION DES ENSEIGNANTS SUIVANT LEUR OPINION CONCERNANT  
LES CLASSES PARALLÈLES

Enseignants des	Pourcentage de ceux				total
	en faveur des classes		mentionnant les problèmes des deux solutions	cherchant une autre solution	
	homogènes	hétérogènes			
Ecoles primaires	30,0	64,3	2,0	3,7	100,0
Lycées	36,8	59,8	1,1	2,3	100,0
Ecoles sec. techniques	26,1	63,8	5,8	4,3	100,0

La forte dispersion des réponses montre déjà qu'il s'agit d'un vrai dilemme: ainsi par exemple l'efficacité pédagogique est avancée avec une fréquence à peu près indéniable dans les deux cas.

Pour interpréter les résultats obtenus, il serait très utile d'avoir des points de repaire, de connaître les opinions des enseignants soit pour le passé, soit dans d'autres pays. Faute de possibilité de comparaison nous ne pouvons pas affirmer, mais seulement présumer que le choix des enseignants est plutôt favorable si l'on l'évalue du point de vue social. A part le lycée, le type d'école le plus centré sur les valeurs et succès intellectuels, le taux des partisans des classes homogènes reste toujours inférieur à un tiers, et il n'est pas particulièrement élevé même dans le cas des lycées.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. spécialement Brian Jackson. *Streaming: An Education System in Miniature*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1964, et J. W. B. Douglas. *The Home and the School*, Panther, 1967.

L'ARGUMENTATION DES PARTISANS DES CLASSES HOMOGÈNES  
EN POURCENTAGE DE TOUS LES INTERROGÉS

	Facilite la tâche du prof.	Stimule davantage les enfants	Pédagogiquement plus efficace	Favorise les plus doués	Favorise les plus faibles
Ecole primaire	12	8	16	13	8
Lycée	15	14	24	18	14
Ecole sec. techn.	12	4	13	17	6

L'ARGUMENTATION DES PARTISANS DES CLASSES HÉTÉROGÈNES  
EN POURCENTAGE DE TOUS LES INTERROGÉS

	Meilleur pour le prof. (moins injuste)	Stimule davantage les enfants	Pédagogiquement plus efficace	Ne cause pas de conflits entre les classes	Crée un milieu social plus naturel	Favorise la mobilité sociale
Ecole primaire	9	38	12	6	6	0
Lycée	15	31	18	8	9	2
Ecole sec. techn.	4	39	13	7	7	0

En ce qui concerne cependant l'argumentation, on voit réapparaître ici un problème déjà entrevu, notamment le fait que les enseignants ne se rendent pas compte des effets sociaux à long terme ou indirects de la pratique scolaire. Même ceux, peu nombreux d'ailleurs, qui sont partisans des classes hétérogènes parce que cela permet d'éviter les tensions entre les classes d'école, pensent plus aux conflits psychologiques immédiats qu'aux tensions de caractère social.

Cependant un argument apparaît très fréquemment dans le vocabulaire des partisans des classes hétérogènes, notamment que les enfants se stimulent davantage dans ce cas. Il est vrai que cet argument est à double tranchant. S'il y a des „forts“ dans une classe, cela stimule les faibles, mais en même temps, cela facilite aussi la tâche du professeur: dans une classe où il n'y a que des „faibles“, sa tâche devient extrêmement difficile. Mais la fréquence et la formulation de cet argument, le fait que les enseignants parlent souvent explicitement du problème des „faibles“ nous permet de

décèler ici une conception sociale qui s'oppose à l'élitisme et qui veut que l'école ne se concentre uniquement aux meilleurs mais qu'elle s'occupe aussi des „médiocres“ ou des „faibles“ — de tout le monde donc.

Afin de connaître les idées des enseignants sur les virtualités et les tâches ultimes de l'école, on a eu recours à trois questions. L'une d'elles demandait d'une manière directe, sous une forme ouverte, quelles étaient, selon les enseignants, „les tâches principales de l'école primaire et secondaire, dans quelle mesure l'école pouvait-elle actuellement remplir ces tâches et quelles étaient les causes des insuffisances“. Cette question se rapprochait de par sa formulation — à dessein d'ailleurs — aux formules que les enseignants rencontrent souvent dans les programmes d'enseignement, etc.

Par là elle attirait, pour ainsi dire, des réponses-cliché. En effet, le taux des réponses que l'on peut qualifier de schématique est plutôt élevé (50 à 70%). Toutefois, les schémas offerts par la littérature „officielle“ sont bien complexes. Donc, même les réponses schématiques peuvent être très variées suivant l'élément qui a été mis en avant, et il est certes caractéristique quel était l'élément tenu pour le plus important, le plus vite rappelé. C'est pour cela que nous avons analysé cette question d'une manière assez approfondie.

Une des „dimensions“ analytiques classait les réponses suivant qu'elles faisaient allusion à des fins immédiats ou éloignés. C'est une minorité qui mentionne les fins immédiats et plus restreints (tels l'enseignement des connaissances élémentaires, de discipline, etc.), tandis que la majorité (65 à 95%) parle d'objectifs éloignés, de tâches de long terme, ou des objectifs „humanistiques“ en général (transmission de culture), la préparation professionnelle et d'autres buts généraux (formation de caractère, etc.).

Les enseignants n'acceptent donc pas l'esprit „technocratique“ qui voudrait limiter les tâches de l'école à la formation de spécialistes. Il est vrai que cet objectif apparaît fréquemment, ce qui est normal. Mais il faut noter d'une part que pour le type d'école où lui-même enseigne, le rapport entre l'objectif „humanistique“ et l'objectif „technocratique“ est toujours plus „favorable“ (en ce qui concerne les objectifs „humanistiques“) que pour l'autre type. De l'autre part il faut ajouter que le taux de ceux qui ne mentionnent que l'objectif „technocratique“ est peu élevé (de 20% environ).

La majorité paraît donc accorder une importance plus grande à l'épanouissement des talents, à la formation d'esprits ouverts et à l'éducation des caractères.

Une proportion notable des enseignants paraît attribuer à l'école un rôle éducateur. Ceci ne contredit point la sous-estimation du rôle actuel de l'école évoquée plus haut si l'on sait que d'après une très forte majorité l'école ne remplit que partiellement les tâches qui lui incomberaient (Dans les écoles primaires, près de 20% des instituteurs se déclarent entièrement satisfaits, mais cette proportion tombe à 4 ou 5% dans deux types des écoles secondaires.) Toutefois, les raisons qu'ils évoquent pour expliquer que l'école n'est pas à même aujourd'hui de remplir sa mission, nous donnent à penser encore une fois que les enseignants, de par leur situation objective, n'arrivent guère à dépasser l'horizon circonscrit de l'école. Ils considèrent que les difficultés principales proviennent des mauvaises méthodes de sélection, du libéralisme et de l'inconséquence des normes scolaires, peu nom-

breux étant ceux qui invoquent des causes de caractère général, telles que la structure du système scolaire ou le manque d'aptitude de l'école à faire face à des problèmes d'origine sociale.

De prime abord, ce résultat de l'enquête est encourageant du fait que la démocratisation de l'école passe obligatoirement par une promotion de la mission éducative. Cette vérité a été constamment proclamée depuis la grande réforme scolaire de l'après-guerre, et une partie notable des enseignants a fait sienne la conception pédagogique qui en découle. Cela dit, la prise de conscience de la mission éducative de l'école n'a pas amené une vision nette de ce que doit être l'éducation et nul consensus ne s'est établi au sujet des éléments du comportement humain, ou, en termes plus généraux, des sphères culturelles qui devraient entrer dans la zone d'influence de l'école.

Ces incertitudes ressortent de manière assez frappante des réponses données par les enseignants aux deux questions: „de quoi devrait s'occuper l'école“ et „dans quelle mesure les enseignants estimeraient utiles ou souhaitables des changements“ dans le travail scolaire. Les résultats ne peuvent pas être reproduits ici en détails, mais certains faits peuvent être notés. Les éléments dans la liste proposée pour la première question se partagent en deux groupes distincts, les uns se rapportant au comportement quotidien (comportement au foyer et hors l'école en général, comportement sexuel, hygiène corporelle et alimentaire), les autres relevant de la culture générale (activités artistiques, loisirs).

Les enseignants sont unanimes à considérer que l'école devrait s'occuper par priorité de la culture du comportement quotidien. Cette prise de position concorde sans doute avec le processus de la démocratisation de l'école (d'autant plus que le système scolaire antérieur appelé à contribuer à la conservation des monopoles sociaux et culturels se refusait plus ou moins à se charger de ces tâches). Il est cependant évident que les tâches relevant de l'autre sphère (éducation culturelle dans le sens large) font partie intégrante de la mission sociale de l'école, ne serait-ce que dans l'intérêt de la promotion culturelle générale; malgré l'appui officiel accordé à ce rôle de l'école, il faut bien se rendre compte que les résultats obtenus jusqu'à présent sont partiels et plutôt superficiels.

Mais il faut aller plus loin et examiner ce qu'entendent les enseignants par „culture de comportement quotidien“, et comment s'explique le fait que cette tâche leur tient tellement à cœur. Les motivations ne sont sans doute pas unanimes. Au-delà de la volonté de la démocratisation de l'école, cette attitude des enseignants s'explique aussi très probablement par le comportement peu acceptable et souvent très répréhensible des enfants. En d'autres termes il semble que pour de nombreux enseignants *l'éducation* se borne à ce qu'on a coutume d'appeler „la bonne éducation“.

Cette supposition est étayée par les réponses à la question relative aux changements souhaitables des méthodes et du système scolaires.

Il ressort des réponses que les enseignants témoignent d'une grande ouverture d'esprit en ce qui concerne les méthodes nouvelles, mais ne souhaitent guère de réformes essentielles, touchant les structures mêmes du système scolaire, et sont aussi réticents à envisager une participation plus

active des élèves à l'organisation des études qui entamerait le monopole traditionnel du professeur.

L'interprétation des résultats n'est pourtant pas facile, car on décèle plusieurs contradictions. Ainsi selon ces données „la combinaison souple de l'étude en classe, par groupe et de l'étude individuelle“ est favorablement commentée. Mais quoiqu'il s'agisse sans doute de la meilleure issue du dilemme des classes parallèles homogènes ou hétérogènes, pratiquement aucune réponse donnée à cette dernière question ne le mentionne. Ou encore: L'école à plein temps chez les plus petits, l'élargissement du système des foyers chez les plus grands constituent les instruments idéaux pour promouvoir la mission sociale de l'école, y compris l'atténuation des désavantages sociaux et culturels. Or, l'idée de l'école à plein temps est fermement rejetée, tandis que l'idée de la généralisation du pensionnat est favorablement accueillie. De même, le prolongement de la scolarité obligatoire est peu populaire bien qu'elle constituerait un des instruments importants de la promotion culturelle générale et ne pourrait manquer à renforcer l'influence de l'école dans la société.

En récapitulant les résultats de l'enquête, on arrive aux conclusions suivantes:

1. Les enseignants de Budapest qui ont été interrogés, estiment que le rôle et l'influence de l'école sont extrêmement limités et par conséquent ils se sous-estiment eux-mêmes. Cette sous-estimation tient sans doute en partie à certains facteurs écologiques, notamment au caractère des métropoles modernes où le rôle de l'école semble diminuer à mesure que d'autres influences complexes et diffuses se développent.

Par ailleurs, et cela est plus vraisemblable, ce phénomène s'explique par un certain nombre de problèmes de structure de caractère scolaire interne ou de caractère général. Ainsi, parmi les problèmes internes, on ne peut suffisamment souligner celui de l'autonomie du professeur: est-il appelé à prendre certaines initiatives ou est-il censé de jouer un rôle de simple exécutant? Il est probable par exemple que la sous-estimation des enseignants par eux-mêmes s'explique en partie par leur autonomie limitée, et en partie par le fait que le „prestige“ véritable de la profession, mesuré par les salaires et d'autres conditions professionnelles est bien inférieur au prestige ouvertement déclaré, à l'importance officiellement attribuée à l'école. Ou encore, il y a le problème des diverses fonctions de l'école, notamment que l'école est probablement mieux adaptée à remplir certaines fonctions traditionnelles relevant de la transmission des connaissances que certaines d'autres liées à la préparation professionnelle. Il faut souligner, de ce chef, le cas de l'école secondaire et surtout celui du lycée (qui, selon Durkheim, connaissait déjà une crise remontant à 50 ans au début du siècle), dont le rôle n'est pas bien clair. En principe, il prépare pour les études universitaires, en pratique cependant plus de la moitié des étudiants n'entreprennent pas d'études supérieures. Or, les professeurs du second degré ressentent ces incertitudes, qui entament leur assurance.

2. En ce qui concerne le rôle idéal de l'école, ils en attribuent un à l'école qui est sensiblement plus large que le rôle actuel, et ils sont en faveur d'un élargissement et d'un approfondissement du zone d'influence de

l'école. Néanmoins, cette aspiration s'exprime avec peu de netteté : pour des raisons plus ou moins connues, décrites en partie plus haut, ils s'occupent peu des possibilités réelles ou des moyens des changements souhaitables. Et même s'ils rencontrent ces problèmes, les solutions qu'ils entrevoient sont motivées davantage par leurs difficultés quotidiennes que par un système d'idées empreigné par des considérations à une plus large portée.

3. Il s'ensuit de tout ce qui précède que leur horizon est plutôt limité : l'école, cadre de leur vie quotidienne, les enferme. Ils tiennent peu compte des déterminismes sociaux qui agissent sur l'école, sur les enfants, sur eux-mêmes, et ils n'entrevoient que faiblement les effets sociaux médiats et immédiats, à court et à long terme de tout ce qui se passe à l'école et de tout ce que représente l'école. Cela ne veut pas dire que ces fins sociales — la promotion culturelle générale, la diminution des différences socio-culturelles, la démocratisation de l'école — leur soient étrangères ou qu'ils s'y opposeraient. Si l'on soulève ces problèmes d'une manière directe, les réponses ne peuvent être évaluées que favorablement. Cependant leur activité pédagogique et leur conscience sociale restent des domaines séparés et les aspects sociaux de l'activité pédagogique leur restent, au moins en grande partie, cachées.

Nous sommes loin de penser que ces problèmes puissent être facilement résolus, ou qu'il suffirait de les connaître pour y remédier. Mais la question nous paraît digne d'intérêt, si ce n'était que parce que l'attitude des enseignants et la structure scolaire sont interdépendantes, l'une renvoyant sans cesse à l'autre, l'une agissant sur l'autre.



## LES POSSIBILITÉS ET LES CONDITIONS PERMETTANT L'ÉLABORATION DES PRONOSTICS CONCERNANT LA CULTURE

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C'est précisément le pronostic concernant la culture d'une société donnée, considérée en tant qu'un système unifié, prise dans son ensemble, qui constituera avant tout le sujet examiné au cours du présent rapport. Nous nous efforcerons d'exposer de nombreuses de nos considérations, principalement d'un caractère général idéologique et théorique, concernant les orientations de la mise au point scientifique, dans tous les domaines, de ce problème complexe.

La condition principale pour le pronostic véritablement scientifique concernant la culture spirituelle d'une société consiste avant tout dans la découverte et l'évaluation des rapports intérieurs, des influences et des actions mutuelles, qui la relie à sa culture matérielle. Il convient ici d'avoir en vue l'exigence motivée déjà par Marx: „Pour rechercher le rapport entre la production spirituelle et matérielle, il est nécessaire avant tout de considérer cette production matérielle même, non pas en tant qu'une catégorie générale, mais en tant qu'une forme historique déterminée. Ainsi, par exemple, à la manière capitaliste de produire répond un autre genre de production spirituelle, plutôt que le moyen de production médiéval. Si la production matérielle même n'est pas considérée sous sa forme historique spécifique, il est impossible de comprendre les particularités caractéristiques de la production spirituelle qui lui correspond, ainsi que les actions réciproques entre les deux.“

Mais en même temps, tout en soulignant le rôle déterminant du moyen matériel de production pour le développement et la manifestation du moyen spirituel de production, de la culture spirituelle, Marx et Engels n'oublièrent jamais de souligner également en même temps l'importance et l'influence inverse des domaines spirituels sur les domaines matériels et de production de la société. Plus encore: ils avaient également en vue l'indépendance relative du développement de la culture spirituelle et de ses diverses composantes, et découvrirent de nombreuses inégalités dans l'évolution historique de la culture matérielle et spirituelle, ainsi que dans les rapports mutuels entre elles.

Les nombreuses déclarations de Marx, Engels et Lénine sur la nécessité de prendre en considération l'histoire, les événements concrets et de

tenir compte de la spécificité lors de l'examen des phénomènes sociaux et spirituels, ainsi que les faits, peuvent également servir en tant que moyen fondamental pour orienter nos études scientifiques portant sur l'élaboration de prévisions concernant la culture.

Conformément à tout cela, nous estimons qu'il est entièrement possible de mettre au point de nos jours trois types de modèles — pronostics fondamentaux, concernant le développement des diverses cultures nationales pour les prochaines deux à trois décennies (l'an 2000):

Premièrement, pour les pays avec une société socialiste.

Deuxièmement, pour les pays avec des rapports capitalistes développés

Troisièmement, pour les pays nouvellement libérés, mais extrêmement peu développés au point de vue économique, politique et culturel.

Selon mon opinion, pourrait être mis au point également un modèle séparé — l'élaboration de prévisions générales sur ce que nous pourrions appeler la culture mondiale, ses tendances et ses traits les plus essentiels.

Bien entendu, le modèle-type — les pronostics pour chacun de ces trois groupes de pays, nécessite obligatoirement une mise au point spéciale de variantes de modèles de pronostics pour le développement des sous-groupes de pays, qui manifestent une plus grande parenté entre eux dans le degré de leur évolution intérieure sous un régime d'un type unique identique. Par exemple, si ce régime est socialiste, existe une certaine différence dans la situation des pays qui s'y engageront à peine et ceux qui possèdent déjà des relations sociales développées et pour lesquels toute l'élaboration de prévisions doit tenir compte. Mais cela n'est pas suffisant. Sur la base de ces variantes, il est nécessaire de mettre au point un modèle concret — une prévision du développement de la culture de chaque pays pris séparément.

Il me semble que cela est clair en soi. En effet, chaque pays, même lorsqu'il est entièrement identique à un autre par son régime social et le degré de son développement, par suite de nombreuses conditions qui lui sont uniquement spécifiques — la situation géographique, l'histoire, les traditions etc., découvre également de nombreux traits et particularités essentiels qui ne sont caractéristiques qu'à lui seul et qui doivent être pris obligatoirement en considération lors de l'élaboration de prévisions concernant la culture.

En même temps, je voudrais de nouveau souligner qu'à l'intérieur de chacun des trois groupes de pays, il est possible de mettre au point deux types et plus de variantes de modèles de prévisions concernant la culture, avant tout conformément au degré de développement des conditions sociales et économiques, ainsi que de la culture, matérielle et spirituelle. Le troisième groupe — celui des pays nouvellement libérés, présente une diversité particulière dans ce domaine. C'est ainsi, étant donné que les uns s'engagent sur la voie d'un développement non-capitaliste, tandis que chez les autres le degré de développement des rapports capitalistes est entièrement différent, variant selon les amplitudes les plus considérables possibles, les uns disposant d'une intelligentsia, bien que peu nombreuse, mais hautement qualifiée, tandis que les autres étant complètement arriérés dans leur évolution culturelle, etc. Il est clair, par suite de cela, que là sont possibles et nécessaires quelques variantes différentes de modèles-types pour l'élaboration de prévisions concernant la culture.

Mais est-il possible d'établir des prévisions d'une manière scientifique et cela jusqu'à quel point, dans quelles conditions? On sait qu'existent d'ores et déjà des méthodes suffisamment sûres et éprouvées permettant de prévoir la croissance de la population d'un pays ou d'un autre, ou d'un groupe de pays, de la population du monde entier même. On pourrait affirmer la même chose au sujet de nombreux domaines de la production matérielle. Mais, en ce qui concerne la question de la culture spirituelle, est-il possible de prévoir à l'avance, non pas pour une ou deux années, mais pour plusieurs décennies, une immense découverte scientifique ou artistique? L'histoire ne nous dit-elle pas d'une façon convaincante, qu'en général ces découvertes surviennent pour une grande part inopinément, soudainement.

Si l'élaboration de prévisions concernant la culture est comprise ainsi, elle perd tout son sens et toute sa raison. Et pourtant, l'élaboration de prévisions est entièrement possible et nécessaire. Mais comment doit-elle être comprise, que doit-elle inclure en elle?

Le développement de toute culture est un processus complexe, qui inclut en lui trois côtés indispensables, liés mutuellement et dépendant l'un de l'autre. Premièrement, la création de nouvelles valeurs culturelles. Il va de soi que toutes ces valeurs ne résistent pas à l'épreuve du temps — les unes ont un caractère tout à fait transitoire, d'autres subsistent pendant plus longtemps, et les troisièmes, la partie la plus insignifiante, acquièrent une importance permanente nationale et aussi, parfois, mondiale. Deuxièmement, la diffusion des valeurs culturelles parmi la population. Là s'imposent deux critères fondamentaux pour l'évaluation de la quantité et de la qualité des valeurs diffusées: parmi quelle partie de la population elles ont été implantées et à quel degré elles ont été assimilées par celle-ci. Dans ce domaine sont particulièrement nécessaires des recherches sociologiques concrètes et une analyse qualitative; il est également indispensable de prendre à temps des mesures et que soit formé le processus judicieux du rehaussement culturel de la masse de la population d'un pays donné, particulièrement s'il est socialiste, étant donné que dans ce cas, les possibilités d'une telle formation sont beaucoup plus considérables. Dans le domaine de la culture spirituelle, dont il est question et pris dans son entier, dominent les fonctions communicatives. Elles acquièrent à leur tour, soit avant tout un caractère reproductif (la production de livres, de disques, la reproduction d'œuvres d'art, etc.), soit un caractère réceptif — la communication d'une valeur culturelle ne pourrait être réalisée si elle n'est adoptée par personne.

Ici, une explication partielle est nécessaire. Il est vrai que certains domaines de la culture artistique, tels que, par exemple, le théâtre et l'interprétation musicale, pourraient à un certain point être considérés également comme une activité reproductrice. Mais il me semble que dominant, prédominant chez eux les éléments de création, étant donné qu'un metteur en scène théâtral talentueux, respectivement un acteur et également un exécutant musical, ne reproduit pas simplement une œuvre artistique ou une autre et ne lui donne pas uniquement une interprétation, mais une nouvelle vie. Ou bien, nous pourrions dire autrement: il reproduit en créant, en produisant lui-même de nouvelles valeurs culturelles.

Troisièmement, l'instruction, la préparation planifiée des cadres les plus divers, le système pour le rehaussement culturel et la diffusion des connaissances parmi la masse de la population d'un pays donné.

Les possibilités, la précision et le degré de l'élaboration de prévisions dans ces trois domaines essentiels de la culture spirituelle, sont différents. Dans le premier d'entre eux, celui de la création, elles sont les plus minimales, presque insignifiantes dans leur essence même — la création de nouvelles découvertes constituant un tournant dans la science, d'œuvres artistiques les plus importantes, de nouvelles tendances artistiques, des phénomènes de style, etc. Et malgré tout, dans le domaine de la création, existent également certaines possibilités permettant d'élaborer des prévisions. Elles ont principalement un caractère de probabilité. C'est ainsi, par exemple, qu'il est entièrement clair que la formation de collectivités scientifiques importantes dans les branches les plus essentielles de la science contemporaine particulièrement lorsque à leur tête se trouvent les savants les plus éminents et jouissant du plus grand prestige, et que l'instauration d'une situation d'émulation créatrice chez elles, accélère le rehaussement des cadres scientifiques les plus hautement qualifiés, garantissant par cela de nouvelles découvertes importantes et des succès dans la branche correspondante de la science.

En ce qui se rapporte à la création artistique, pourraient être, par exemple, établies des prévisions pour un délai plus lointain par la création de conditions pour un nombre important de créateurs affirmés dans les divers genres d'art, qui représentent une base essentielle pour une création active, dirigée vers un but choisi. Ces conditions pourraient être du caractère le plus varié, comme, par exemple, la mise à la disposition du créateur d'un logement commode, doté d'un cabinet de travail, la conclusion de contrats créateurs, l'obtention de commandes pour la création d'œuvres importantes au sujet actuel, des excursions créatrices et des missions sur les objectifs les plus importants de la construction socialiste, les spécialisations et les missions à l'étranger, etc. Spécialement l'art d'opéra, du ballet et l'art cinématographique, ainsi que tous les genres d'interprétation musicale, pourraient être exprimés, en évaluant l'effet de la construction de salles de théâtre et de concerts nouvelles, beaucoup plus perfectionnées, dotées de scènes les plus modernes et les plus commodes, en inventant et appliquant une nouvelle technique d'éclairage et cinématographique, de nouveaux genres d'écrans, avec, par exemple, une représentation spatiale, avec le perfectionnement de la technique et de la qualité des films en couleurs, etc., etc.

En ce qui concerne le deuxième et le troisième domaine de la culture spirituelle, c'est-à-dire le domaine communicatif et celui de l'instruction et de la formation des cadres, là presque tout possède une caractéristique quantitative, ayant une importance essentielle. C'est pourquoi l'élaboration de prévisions dans ces deux domaines est entièrement possible.

Nous voudrions souligner encore deux importants motifs. Premièrement, l'élaboration de pronostics doit avoir pour but non pas de rétrécir, mais d'élargir constamment, tant le cercle de ceux qui utilisent les biens culturels que ceux qui se révèlent leurs créateurs. Nous sommes organiquement étrangers à des conceptions selon lesquelles aussi bien la propagation de la culture

que sa création ne seraient réservés qu'à une élite. Au contraire, plus de gens se rallient aux hautes sphères de la culture spirituelle, que s'élève le niveau de leur éducation et de leur culture, d'autant plus augmente la possibilité de se manifester dans leurs milieux des créateurs talentueux dans l'une ou l'autre branche de la culture — les sciences, les arts, etc. La société socialiste est étrangère à quelque conception que ce soit, selon laquelle la culture ne serait réservée qu'à une élite. Plus elle parvient à sa maturité, plus sa base matérielle et technique s'élargit et se consolide, plus s'enrichissent et se perfectionnent les rapports sociaux, se rehausse sa démocratisation; avec cela se créent des conditions toujours meilleures, permettant à chaque homme de manifester son talent et ses qualités. La future société communiste, selon la définition heureuse de Marx, est la seule société en état d'assurer le développement libre et original de tous.

L'expérience historique montre d'une façon convaincante que de toutes les formations sociales et économiques ayant existé jusqu'ici, la société socialiste est la plus intéressée et témoigne la plus grande sollicitude envers le développement de la culture. Et, étant donné qu'elle s'édifie sur la base de la propriété sociale des moyens de production et sur le développement planifié de son économie et de la manière spirituelle intégrale de la production, elle dispose simultanément des meilleures possibilités pour élaborer des pronostics concernant la culture. Elle utilise, en outre, des possibilités absolument nouvelles, insoupçonnées jusqu'ici. Voici un exemple particulièrement frappant: en 1897, dans les limites de l'ancienne Russie, le degré de l'analphabétisme s'élevait à 76%, et parmi les femmes à 87% de la population; dans les régions de l'Asie centrale de l'Empire russe, seuls 1 à 3% des habitants savaient lire et écrire. Il est intéressant de relever que la revue „Vestnik Vospitania“, se basant principalement sur la méthode de l'extrapolation, avait prévu en 1906, que pour supprimer entièrement l'analphabétisme parmi les hommes en Russie, seraient nécessaires 180 années, et parmi les femmes, environ 300. Qui ignore actuellement avec quelle énergie exclusive le jeune pays des Soviets et V. I. Lénine ont entrepris de liquider le plus rapidement possible cet héritage extrêmement pénible? Et en deux décennies seulement, l'analphabétisme fut entièrement vaincu, tandis que l'Union Soviétique se trouve aujourd'hui parmi les pays les plus civilisés et les plus cultivés du monde, possédant des Académies des sciences et des établissements d'enseignement supérieur dans toutes les républiques qui en font partie, y compris celles de l'Asie centrale, où il y a un peu plus d'un demi-siècle seulement régnait l'obscurantisme le plus absolu.

Dans ses prévisions et ses plans concernant l'avenir de la culture et ses diverses composantes, la société socialiste a pour base la profonde dialectique intérieure entre le développement général et dans tous les domaines de la société même (ce à quoi peuvent contribuer la culture spirituelle et ses diverses composantes), ainsi que la manifestation originale et la plus complète possible des qualités et des talents de chaque individu, sa pénétration toujours plus assurée et plus durable dans le monde des sphères les plus hautes de la culture — ainsi qu'en tant que créateur. Une tâche importante pour ce futur développement de la culture est en même temps également l'éducation des gens, l'implantation parmi eux de relations de respect et

d'aide mutuelle, de la croissance des vertus humaines les plus hautes, du respect de la dignité de chaque individu, de la beauté dans la vie spirituelle de l'homme et des rapports mutuels entre les gens. C'est pourquoi, par exemple, la propagande en faveur de la violence, l'égoïsme brutal et la pornographie, même par le moyen de l'art, non seulement n'encouragent pas, ne sont et ne sauraient être un sujet de prévisions, mais doivent être considérés de prime abord comme des activités qui anéantissent la dignité humaine.

Nous sommes témoins d'une impétueuse révolution scientifique et technique, dont les conséquences ont leur répercussion partout, même dans les pays du monde les plus arriérés au point de vue économique et culturel. Elle se caractérise, comme on le sait, par une automation toujours plus complète et par une concentration de la production, par la création de nouvelles technologies, par la cybernétisation et l'électronisation de l'économie dans ce nombre également celles des transports et des différents genres de services, etc. La révolution scientifique et technique contemporaine a un caractère complexe et embrasse toutes les sphères de la vie, dans ce nombre également la culture. C'est pourquoi, il n'est pas possible d'élaborer de véritables prévisions concernant la culture de quelque pays que ce soit, moins encore concernant la culture mondiale, si ne sont pas pris en considération les résultats et les prévisions portant sur le développement ultérieur de la révolution scientifique et technique. Elle mène inmanquablement, particulièrement dans les pays socialistes, à une importante réduction de la durée du travail indispensable et à l'augmentation des loisirs, à un allègement considérable du travail productif et autre et à l'amélioration décisive du système de sa sécurité. Elle mène à un véritable bouleversement dans le domaine des différents genres de services à la population, de l'alimentation publique, des conditions de l'habitat, etc., et tout cela permet d'économiser beaucoup de travail et de soucis aux gens, particulièrement aux femmes, tout en leur assurant simultanément des conditions beaucoup plus favorables non seulement pour le repos, les distractions et l'éducation physique, mais aussi pour leur développement spirituel. Les innovations qu'assure d'ores et déjà la révolution scientifique et technique dans les domaines tels que les transports, l'imprimerie, les moyens d'information de masse, etc., et plus encore, ceux qu'elle promet de créer dans ces domaines et cela dans un avenir prochain, découvrent des possibilités insoupçonnées permettant d'accélérer le développement de nombreuses activités spirituelles et particulièrement l'échange international des valeurs culturelles, l'immense élargissement de l'horizon culturel des gens.

Le fait que la révolution contemporaine dont il est question n'est pas dénommée simplement technique, mais scientifique et technique, témoigne du rôle incroyable accru de la science et des savants pour sa transformation en une force productive fondamentale. Cela impose des exigences nouvelles, toujours plus élevées, envers le niveau de l'instruction et de la préparation spéciale des gens. De là, le nouveau développement impétueux de l'instruction dans de nombreux pays du monde et particulièrement de l'instruction supérieure. De là également, les études des savants économistes, selon lesquels l'instruction supérieure et son organisation jouent d'ores et déjà le

rôle le plus décisif pour le rehaussement de la productivité du travail. Mais là apparaît également un certain danger, qui a donné sa répercussion même dans nos pays socialistes : l'augmentation de l'instruction technique spéciale et étroitement professionnelle de la jeunesse, ainsi que la présence d'une certaine sous-estimation de son éducation générale, particulièrement humanitaire et plus spécialement esthétique. Les études scientifiques les plus récentes et particulièrement le dernier important développement de l'esthétique technique — également le fruit de la révolution scientifique et technique — montrent d'une façon convaincante qu'une formation esthétique est indispensable, même pour l'ingénieur le plus spécialisé et cela non pas tellement pour sa culture générale que pour sa profession elle-même. Cela est identique et peut-être concerne davantage encore les connaissances sociologiques et économiques. Nous estimons expressément que quel que soit le genre de spécialistes que formera à l'avenir l'enseignement supérieur, cela représentera en même temps une question essentielle pour le développement futur de la culture spirituelle de chaque pays et devra toujours être pris en considération lors des études des modèles concernant l'élaboration de prévisions à son sujet.

Nous constatons comment, au cours des dernières années, aussi bien en Union Soviétique qu'en R. D. A., en Bulgarie et dans d'autres pays, cette certaine unilatéralité dans la préparation des spécialistes supérieurs, est surmontée toujours plus consciemment et plus opiniâtement. C'est ainsi, par exemple, que chez nous, en Bulgarie, à la suite des discussions qui ont été menées durant plusieurs années, l'orientation du type fondamental de l'école secondaire — d'instruction générale ou professionnelle spéciale — on s'est convaincu qu'elle devait être d'instruction générale. Le rôle et l'importance des disciplines humanitaires s'accroît dans tous les degrés scolaires, y compris dans le degré supérieur.

La révolution scientifique et technique crée des conditions permettant l'accélération du processus de l'urbanisation — j'entends dans son sens le plus large — non pas par la croissance d'immenses villes comprenant une population s'élevant à plusieurs millions d'habitants, mais en tant qu'un processus imposant et enracinant un type de vie urbaine moderne pour chaque localité, en effaçant les différences entre la ville et le village. Ce processus acquiert ses valeurs et sa fermeté dans les pays socialistes. Dans son ensemble, il mène à une diminution considérable et par la suite à la suppression des différences existant au point de vue culturel entre les diverses régions et localités d'un même pays, au rehaussement du niveau de l'instruction et de la culture de sa population tout entière.

La révolution scientifique et technique, la création du système socialiste mondial, la désagrégation du système colonial, constituent d'importants facteurs qui accélèrent le progrès culturel dans le monde et doivent obligatoirement être pris en considération lors de l'élaboration de prévisions concernant le développement de la culture. Sur leur base grandissent et se manifestent toujours davantage en un facteur nouveau et puissant lui aussi, dont il convient de tenir compte toujours davantage : la collaboration et la coopération culturelles, tant à l'intérieur entre les pays socialistes, qu'entre les pays possédant un régime différent et également les échanges interna-

tionaux, qui se sont particulièrement accrus, des valeurs culturelles, l'organisation de congrès scientifiques internationaux, de séminaires, de symposiums, de festivals et de concours artistiques, etc. Au près de l'ONU existe depuis longtemps une organisation internationale embrassant tous les domaines, pour la coopération mutuelle dans le domaine de l'instruction, de la science et de la culture: L'UNESCO. Ses importantes initiatives portant sur la liquidation de l'analphabétisme dans de nombreuses régions les plus arriérées du monde, le sauvetage d'immenses monuments artistiques dans la vallée du Nil, la construction et l'aménagement d'établissements d'enseignement supérieur et de centres scientifiques des plus modernes dans de nombreux pays arriérés, etc., suscitent le respect et promettent beaucoup plus encore dans l'avenir.

Dans notre rapport, nous ne nous posons pas pour tâche d'étudier le problème des méthodes qui pourraient être appliquées pour l'élaboration d'un modèle de prévisions concernant l'une ou l'autre culture nationale. Ce problème est de par lui-même suffisamment important et complexe et nécessite une étude spéciale.

Telles sont exposées d'une manière tout à fait sommaire quelques-unes de nos opinions théoriques concernant le problème des possibilités et des perspectives se rapportant à l'élaboration de prévisions portant sur la culture. Sera entreprise sous peu leur mise au point scientifique détaillée; l'élaboration de prévisions concrètes sur l'avenir de la culture ne peut être l'œuvre que d'importantes collectivités scientifiques complexes.



## ON SOCIAL PREDICTION OF YOUTH'S CHANCES FOR EDUCATION

V. N. SHUBKIN

USSR

Within the context of the scientific and technological revolution the problems of prediction are becoming more and more attractive for the scientists all over the world. There hardly exists a field of knowledge where these problems have not drawn a sharply increasing interest.

This is quite natural as predicting is one of the most important goals of the science, including predictions in the sphere of social life. The present state of sociological researches is characterised by the fact that the bulk of them is at such a stage of knowledge that only basic relationships and trends of this or that process are being revealed.<sup>1</sup> But the more firm and grounded the analytical basis of research, the broader the scope of work, the greater the volume of experimental data of both macro- and micro-processes — the more efficient are the predictions in the field of social life.

The studies of problems of employment and occupational choice of the youth in Siberia have aimed from their beginning (1962) at the prediction of chances of the youth. This was connected with the specific features of the sociological project.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> We believe that social scientists should share no inferiority complex because the difficulties in the field of sociology are entailed by the complicated character of the society itself which is their object of research.

<sup>2</sup> The studies were carried out by the workers of the Laboratory of Economic and Mathematic Research (the Novosibirsk State University), of Institute of Economics, of the Sociological Department (Institute of History, Philology and Philosophy of the Siberian Branch of the USSR Academy of Sciences). Among the workers participating in these studies were: D. Konstantinovskiy, E. Grazhdannikov, G. Kochetov, V. Kovaleva, E. Smertin, L. Matros, G. Antonova, M. Zhdanova, Yu. Karpov, L. Borisova, N. Moskalenko, N. Buzukova, Z. Baglai, V. Sennitskaya and others; these studies were directed by V. N. Shubkin.

Similar studies following these methods were carried out in Leningrad region, in the Baltic republics and in a number of regions of Central Russia.

For more detailed discussion see "Kolichestvennye metody v sociologii. Quantitative methods in sociology" eds. A. G. Aganbegyan, G. V. Osipov, V. N. Shubkin, M., 1966; V. Shubkin. Youth Starts out in Life, Soviet Sociology, N. Y., 1965-1966, vol. IV, No. 3; Quantitative Methods in Sociological Studies of Problems of Job Placement and Choice of Occupation, Soviet Sociology, N. Y., 1968, Nos. 1-2; Social Mobility in the Choice of Occupation, Sociology in the USSR, London, 1966, vol. 1; Le choix d'une profession, Revue Française de Sociologie, Paris, 1968, N. 1; Über konkrete Untersuchungen sozialer Prozesse, Gesellschaftswissenschaftliche Beiträge, Berlin, 1965, Nr. 6.

As is shown in the diagram (Fig 1), an ever increasing flow of school leavers is passing through the "gates" of secondary schools. Our job as researchers was to register annually personal aspirations, expectation, occupational inclinations, evaluations of various occupations made by thousands




Fig. 1. Diagram of Research Design. Study of life aspiration and their fulfilment by secondary school-leavers of Novosibirsk region (1963, 1964, 1965, 1966, 1967, 1968, 1969)

of young boys and girls at the time they were leaving secondary schools (usually in May). Alongside with this, we obtained detailed social and demographic information about each school leaver personally.

The diagram shows that his part of the study had been completed before their life ways "splitted". Then approximately in half a year the data about what course the life of each school leaver had actually taken was obtained (point "B" in the diagram). This study was repeated during seven years on the same object of observation and according to the same methods.

The study was carried out in a peculiar demographic situation: the number of youngsters of 17-18 years of age, graduating from secondary schools, was sharply increasing during this period (in the Novosibirsk region it has quintuplicated within five years). This phenomenon has been called "a demographic echo of the war".

The study has made it possible to reveal some regularities, brought about by social environment, affecting social behaviour of the youth. In particular, a number of research problems were closely connected with the analysis of specific personal aspirations and differences in life paths of various groups of the youth after graduating from school. In terms of theory, such differences in the choice of occupation are quite legitimate under the conditions of socialism.

While strongly opposing the social levelling which leads to mal-utilization of the intellectual potential of the society, we cannot be indifferent to still persisting inequality of educational opportunities, available for different social groups. Our aim is to achieve a deep insight into objective causes of these differences, and to anticipate their tendencies, so that these processes might be controlled on the basis of general goals of socialist development.

The attempt to predict educational chances<sup>3</sup> of secondary school leavers followed from these general tasks.

The consideration of chances for attaining higher education is usually based on the statistics of school leavers' social background.<sup>4</sup> This study has taken additional account of specially obtained data on the aspirations of school leavers, enabling us to get a deeper insight into a number of problems. According to the aims of the study, the following indices have been used: first, the proportion of the youth from a given social group, entering higher educational institution ( $K_1$ ); second, the percentage of the youth of a given social group, planning to enter them ( $K_2$ ); third, the degree of realization of aspirations of the youth in a given social group, that is, the proportion of those who actually entered the higher educational institution, to those having planned this ( $K_3$ ). Then the comparisons between the social background of the students and the structure of the country's active population were made, etc.

Thus, we speak here not of separate working definitions but of the system of interrelated indices, each characterizing one or another aspect of the process. Some indices are connected mainly with social mobility, others — with the molding of educational aspirations of the youngsters and still others — with the chances of implementation of these aspirations, etc. On the whole, the system of indices was built in such a way as to give more or less adequate description of the processes studied, and to be employed in mathematical simulation.

It is common knowledge that various methods are used in building predicting models. According to estimations made by experts, they number at present time to more than hundred. In building them, a rather complicated mathematical apparatus is employed: alongside with extrapolation, factor and correlational analyses, linear and dynamic programming, methods of pattern perceiving, Markov chains, and other methods of the theory of probability, mathematical statistics and other sections of mathematics.

Selection of a specific mathematical apparatus for building predictive models was made according to the purposes of the study and the specific character of the source of data. In the course of the work a number of methods have been tested and used, such as extrapolation, correlational analysis, pattern perceiving, etc., in order to ensure sufficient accuracy of the prediction and to obtain data which would be most relevant for the content analysis.

The factors for the model were selected on the basis of the analytical model of the process, with due consideration of the restraints, entailed by the available information and by the problems of operationalization. Thus, e. g., the predictive model of the index  $K_1$  for the youngsters from different

<sup>3</sup> The term "chance", referring to the opportunity or probability in achieving something has first entered the literature on the theory of probability. In sociological writings this term is used to denote, in particular, educational opportunities and the like.

<sup>4</sup> See, for example, D. V. Glass (ed.), *Social Mobility in Britain*, London, 1954, A. Girard, *Les diverses classes sociales devant l'enseignement*, Population, 1965, No. 2, Paris.

social groups included the time factor, the dynamics of openings in colleges, dynamics of the total number of school leavers, the number of school leavers from different social groups (urban and rural), the number of former school leavers who failed to enter a university, changes in proportions between the number of the youth of different social groups, etc. Besides, more than fifteen other factors were taken into consideration for building predicting models of the second type (for differentiated predictions within a given group).

This is not to say, of course, that at this stage of inquiry we were able to include all relevant factors when imitating the processes under study. In order to determine to what degree the models are isomorphic, a comparison between the prediction and the calculations on the basis of the actual data has been made (the latter being available thanks to the information accumulated during a number of years).

The specific character of this work lies not only in that the economic, demographic, sociopsychological factors have been taken into account and, following from this, in the arrangement of the data of national statistics, of departmental materials and special sociological studies, but also in that the prediction was made about social processes under the conditions of socialism where many essential factors, first of all economic ones, are subject to the planned control of the society. This lends to the study not only theoretical, but practical implications as well. The main idea here is not in that the individual should be included, by employing sophisticated methods into a system of manysided and rigid manipulations, but, on the contrary, in that the attainments of the Marxist sociology should be made use of the broadening of the opportunities of all the members of the society, and for further democratization of the Soviet system of education.

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The period under study is characteristic, as was mentioned above, of sharp demographic shifts which have entailed rather complicated dynamics in numbers of school leavers and produced additional difficulties for simulation.

As it is seen from Fig. 2, the number of school leavers in 1961 was the lowest. In 1962, 1963 and 1964 the number of leavers markedly increased. Since 1963 the rates of increasing grew up rapidly, and in 1966 this increase was considerably enlarged due to the fact that both the 10th and the 11th grades became the top ones. In 1966 the number of school leavers was three times higher than that in 1965, and reached 705 per cent of that in 1961. In 1967 the number of school leavers was 467 per cent of the number in 1961. Quite obviously, all this could not but show itself on the chances of the school leavers.

And if the dynamics of the number of school leavers is to be analyzed jointly with the changes in the number of openings at higher educational institutions, the general picture becomes even more obvious. Before 1965 the number of openings for the first year of college study at full-time departments exceeded the number of full-time school leavers. In 1966 the

number of school leavers became 2.8 times as high as the number of openings, in 1967 when the graduates' number was usual and not doubled, this proportion declined to 1.9. The competition at entrance examinations at full-time departments of higher educational institutions in Novosibirsk reflects these changes.




Fig. 2. Number of secondary school leavers of the region, and number of openings in higher educational institutions of Novosibirsk (as per cent of the number of leavers in 1961).

1 — Number of secondary school leavers; 2 — Number of openings; 3 — Competition (actual); 4 — Competition (estimated); 5 — Proportion of school leavers to opening

What situation is likely to be in the future? Up to 1970 the number of school leavers remains approximately the same. But starting with 1971, a new considerable increase of school leavers is expected, their number reaching and even exceeding the 1966 level: it is expected that in 1975 the number of school leavers will exceed that of 1961 by 7.5 times. The prediction of the proportion of school leavers to the number of openings in higher education institutions was made for the period up to 1975. This ratio will rise a little, beginning with 1971, as starting from this year the number of school leavers will intensively grow. But these changes, however, will not be significant as the number of openings at higher education institutions will be largely increased too. Thus, up to 1975 the situation is expected to be quite stable.

This peculiar background (both of the past and future years) gives a clue to the understanding of intricate dynamic of  $K_1$  index, both on the basis of predicting model estimation and of actual data.

First of all, let us discuss model estimations. It is not a simple extrapolation but a prediction made with the view of the system of interconnected and interdependent factors. Model estimations show us changes of  $K_1$ , if it were determined only by those factors and correlations which are considered in the model.

At the left of Fig. 3,  $K_1$  model estimations for the past years are shown for the urban and rural youth of a number of schools in the Novosibirsk region. As seen from Fig. 3,  $K_1$  in 1964 the values of  $K_1$  have markedly risen both for the urban and rural youth. Beginning with 1965, due to the increase in the number of school leavers the volume of  $K_1$  goes down




Fig. 3. The prediction of  $K_1$  for urban ( $K_{1u}$ ) and rural ( $K_{1r}$ ) school leavers  
1 — actual values; 2 — model estimations.

and reaches its minimum in 1966. Then the chances of the urban as well as rural youth increase again; during 1967-1968 the situation becomes stable. Thus, the model prediction concerning both urban and rural school leavers reflects more or less adequately the changing situation of these years.

As was mentioned above, a distinctive feature of this study lies in the fact that it makes comparisons of model estimations with actual values, characterising the dynamics of the process and obtained in large scale surveys of youth during these years on the same objects of observation.

However, in 1966, theoretical estimations were very close to the real dynamics of the process. In 1967 the difference for the rural school leavers was not significant. As to some discrepancies between theoretical and actual data of 1967 for the urban youth, they cannot be interpreted without due consideration of additional factors, such as the dynamics of personal aspirations of the youth and so on. The matter is that in 1967 personal aspirations of the urban youth (evidently due to the fact that it was in the city, where higher education institutions are located, that the youth sensed the change in the situation especially acutely) came down sharply (they were to be accounted for in  $K_2$ ), where the personal aspirations of the rural youth remained as they were.<sup>5</sup>

Since the time this study had been started (1963-1964) it was revealed that various groups of youth have different chance in competition at

<sup>5</sup> This is valid for some other discrepancies (in the previous years) mentioned above.

entrance examinations. This aroused certain fears<sup>6</sup> that the more stringent terms of the competition would minimize the losses of most advantageous groups at the expense of the rest ones. These fears were not groundless, because spontaneous development of the process might lead in a certain context to the consequences of exactly that type. In the main, these processes can be controlled. It can be done by administrative measures, by the introduction of certain percentage rates, by special forms of class representation, etc. The socialist society has the objective possibility of solving these problems quite differently — not by the introduction of percentage rates, but by speeding up the changes in objective conditions on the basis of thorough investigation of the mechanism of social processes.

Both model estimations and actual data indicate that the correlation between the chances of urban and rural youth has remained during these years practically the same. It is true of 1966 as well, when the competition requirements were the most stringent. It is necessary to note that during these years no percentage rates or other restrictions (such as social, national or the like) were introduced either for the country in general or for any of its regions. In spite of the fact that the situation became more complicated, the chances available for rural school leavers comparing with those for urban ones did not decrease owing to essential changes in family economic level, parents' educational background, places of residence, educational network, level of teaching and so on.

It is this all-round impact on the process that has proved to be very effective, withstood the test by time, and must be considered in the future as the main way of reducing social inequalities in education.

The prediction for the coming years, as is shown on the right of Fig. 3, depicts a rather stable situation:  $K_1$  index is not expected to change sharply up to 1975; the correlation between  $K_1$  for urban and rural youth will remain more or less stable in general though the gap between them if compared with 1963, the reference year, will slightly diminish.

Together with this, when analysing the prediction, it should be remembered that the model included a limited number of factors whose implica-

<sup>6</sup> It should be specially emphasized that the increase in the numbers of competition participants due to the increasing number of school leavers may lead to diminishing the proportion of labourers' and peasants' children among those entering higher educational institutions. To counterbalance this tendency, special measures should be provided for in good time. This is a rather complicated problem. On the one hand, we are to give equal educational opportunities for all the population. But on the other hand, the differences in economical conditions, parents' educational background, place of residence, distribution of educational network, level of teaching, etc. lead to the fact that the young people of equal abilities, but with different training, have actually different opportunities for tuition.

While considering this problem, it should be remembered that the main way for overcoming social differences in education lies in changing the objective conditions themselves. The attempts to solve the problem by granting privileges to certain social groups regardless of the level of training would be not only inefficient but, more than that, may lead to the deterioration of the general level of education.

Such is the contradiction. It cannot be settled at once, but it should always be borne in mind, and, in conformity with the level of productive forces development, special steps must be taken to eliminate this contradiction.

tions and values are changing. Besides, some factors which were not covered by the model may gain significant importance in the future. And, finally, the extent to which the society influences the process of reducing essential inequalities between rural and urban communities (including those between the chances of urban and rural youth) is obviously determined, in its turn, by the overall totality of domestic and international conditions. For all that, the scientific prediction of the chances of youth, must become a reference point for the society in developing concrete arrangements aimed at controlling the process, and based on a realistic evaluation of the situation.

Here we have given but a few illustrations of certain aspects of social predictions for education. But it must be remembered that a more thorough analysis requires the investigation of a whole complex of predictive models concerning the chances of the youth. As was noted above, when interpreting the findings the interaction of objective and subjective factors should not be overlooked, and all the system of indices is to be into consideration.

Thus, the study suggests that a number of regularities and interrelations may be discovered, and the chances of the youth be predicted on this ground.

This has many implications both for understanding the processes under consideration, and for discovering their specific features stemmed from the concrete historical peculiarities of a country's development, from the scientific and technological revolution, etc.

As for the methodological aspect, the possibility of building a model of chances of the youth, aiming at social prediction is, in the main, proved. The model has been tested by the data of large scale surveys of the youth. Model estimations were compared with the actual data obtained in the survey which was carried out during seven years. The relative error did not exceed 20 or 25 per cent. The predictive model calculations were brought up to 1975. The models which have been developed by now enable us to make predictions for 15 years in advance. But as the model included only some of the factors affecting the process under study, and as possible changes in the interrelations of the factors were not controlled, by the model, the prediction for only a part of this period may be held valid. The programme of the study suggests that the models should be further developed and tested along with their isomorphic values by carrying out new special surveys.

As to the application of the predicting model for social planning and control, the chances of different youth groups may be predicted for a changing situation. In the main, proceeding from specific needs of planning and control, the model may include differentiated social, ethnic and other groups of youth. According to this, the model permits to judge about the dynamics of chances in different aspects. A model envisaging indispensable changes of demographic situation, of the demand for specialists, etc., can be used for prediction of concrete values of indices defining chances of the youth and for scientific control.

The prediction of the youth's educational chances affects the crucial problems of our time. Hence, it is very important that all studies carried out in this line and associated with the exploration of the regularities and control of the prediction processes, should be humanistically oriented and should contribute to the attainment of further democratization of the educational system.



## EGALITARIAN POLITICS AND MASS EDUCATION IN INDIA AND THE UNITED STATES

JOSEPH R. GUSFIELD

USA

The idea and goal of mass education in poor and developing countries and the translation of that idea into a wider reality in the modern and rich countries is in great contrast to much of past human history, when illiteracy and ignorance were the accepted condition and education was confined to small and well-placed parts of the populations. We wish to examine the implication of this trend of education for society by comparison between two contemporary societies existing at different levels of economic growth, yet societies which are alike in certain other salient respects. Despite the disparity of economic levels and cultural history, India and the United States are both societies of highly divergent cultural groups — castes, ethnic groups, regions, races and religions often sharply separate in their histories, sub-cultures and power. Some aspects of the recent experience these nations have had with mass education is highly significant in explicating issues of economic development and equalitarian movements.

In this paper, we shall examine the diversity of goals and pressures which schools in these countries, especially colleges and universities, have experienced as electoral politics and group organizations have developed new clientele for the educational system. Our point is that, in this context, older traditions of academic culture and newer demands for technological improvement act to maintain existing social structures. The results are issues posed as those of the politicization of schools. They can also be conceptualized, we shall argue, as fundamental conflicts over the allocation of income and status values insofar as these are controlled by educational structures. This paper is then a study of the relations between equalitarian ideology, existing social structure and changing political institutions.

### *The principle of popular education*

In modern India, as in many new nations since independence, while the reality may be far from attainment, the principle of mass education is accepted. The growth of educational institutions and in numbers of students in the primary levels of education has been considerable and rapid. The need for educational progress and the value of educational equality and growth,

has been shared in the national population. As in many new nations, so too in India, the rise of social services, especially of schools and medicine has been faster than the general rise in economic standards and in capital development.<sup>1</sup> In India, as in many other new nations, the demand for education is great and the effort to meet it has been widespread. In the forty year period from 1921 to 1960, the literate segment of the population increased from 8.3 per cent to 24.0 per cent. In the decade 1951-1961 the percentage of relevant age groups in schools more than doubled for grade five, more than tripled for grade ten, and more than tripled for secondary level graduates.<sup>2</sup> In 1960 approximately 49% of the age eleven male population and 35% of the female in India were enrolled in schools.<sup>3</sup> This stands in remarkable contrast to the general history of the educational institutions in pre-Independence British India when a much smaller proportion of the population attended primary schools, although a large percentage of these went on into higher levels of education. British India utilized the educational system as a vehicle for the production of an elite of professionals and civil servants. The present government in India provides its educational facilities for a much broader segment of the total population and as we shall see, with considerably different consequences.

By mid 19th century, free elementary schooling had become a sacred principle of popular democracy in the United States. Compulsory education for everyone completed the American faith in the saving grace of education as a process which would provide equality of opportunity. The extension of popular education into the high school continued the democratization of education. It is recently, since about 1910, that a high school education has come to be a common part of the American experience. From 1890, when 6.7% of the 14-17 age group were in school, high school has become so common a part of American youth experience that in 1940, 73% of that age group were in high school. Of every ten pupils in the fifth grade in 1959-60 in the United States, 7.2 graduated from high school in 1967.<sup>4</sup> Since the close of World War II popular education has become a principle of higher education as well. To the old Labor Union model of "a childhood for every child" there is now appended "college for everyone and everyone for a college". In 1910 slightly less than 7 out of every 100 persons aged 18 entered college. By 1939 this had increased to a point where 14% of the 18-21 year olds were enrolled. In 1961 the percentage had leaped to 38%. In 1967, 28.5% of the 18-24 age group were in college in the United States and

<sup>1</sup> United Nations, Report on the World Social Situation (New York: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 1961), Ch. III.

<sup>2</sup> See Table 29 in John Laska, Planning and Educational Development in India (New York: Teachers College Press, 1968), p. 97. Based on Indian Censuses of 1951 and 1961 and unpublished data from the Union Ministry of Education.

<sup>3</sup> Tables 28 and 29, pp. 95-97. *op. cit.*

<sup>4</sup> Martin Trow, The Second Transformation of American Secondary Education, *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*, 2, 1961, 145-166; National Center for Educational Statistics, Digest of Educational Statistics, 1969 (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1969), p. 8.

40% of the students who were in the 5th grade in 1959-60 graduated from high school and entered a college.<sup>5</sup>

### *The demand for mass education*

"From each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs."

The Marxist slogan quoted above was a tacit admission that the value of social function and the degree of individual reward need not always be consistent even in a socialist economy. In his brilliant analysis of education in the welfare state, T. H. Marshall hypothesizes a conflict between these two major principles of welfare in the twentieth century.<sup>6</sup> On the one hand, it is assumed that the society, through government, must guarantee all citizens certain goods and services, such as medicine or old age assistance or open ground in the form of parks or education as a consumer good. Men should be assured equality of reward; not just equality of opportunity. It is also assumed, however, that social institutions be operated in the interest of the general public or of national goals: that is, they should be judged by their functions for the total public rather than for the benefits conferred directly on those receiving their services. From this latter viewpoint, education should be distributed in ways which best serve national needs. Both principles, that of national need and that of private need, depart greatly from the 19th century Western Liberal position of equal opportunities for all. This slogan meant that everyone should have the same chance to rise, stand, or fall in the social structure; that only talent should determine the levels of education merited by the individual applicant. This view of individualism seeks equal opportunities to pursue rewards but little to assure their attainment.

When we speak of the demand for education, in either developing or in highly industrialized societies, we need to distinguish between the "social" demand and the demand of the individual consumer. Viewed as a public interest, education must be evaluated and its content determined by its role in what are national or communal goals. Viewed from the consumer's perspective, education must be seen in terms of what it does for the person or group who receives it. The first orientation is that of the planner, the administrator, the government official, the faculty — those for whom the institution or organization is judged in terms of its performance for the economic or political functions of an abstract public. The latter orientation, the individual demand, is much more often that of the students, parents, social groups or business groups for whom the education provides the individual with something — a job, a status, a period of leisure. The distinction is a fundamental one, since individuals are by no means motivated toward the achievement of social or public goals nor are policy makers necessarily con-

<sup>5</sup> See M. Trow, *The Democratization of Higher Education in America*, Archives de Sociologie européenne, III (1962), p. 231; National Center for Educational Statistics, op. cit., pp. 8, 68.

<sup>6</sup> T. N. Marshall, *Class, Citizenship and Social Development* (Garden City, N. Y.: Anchor Books, 1965), pp. 257-279.

cerned with who it is that serve social functions as long as they are carried out adequately.

The development of mass education, on a much smaller scale in India than the United States but never the less in both countries, has then several different expectations or justifications connected with it by which expenditures of state or individuals are supported. The primary ones may be stated as follows: 1) To provide trained personnel essential for economic growth and maintenance. This social function has as its individual analogue the provision of jobs for individuals. 2) To increase the economic and social mobility of hitherto restricted social and economic groups. This public interest in equality as a value, on the other hand, has its individual analogue in the individual's need and demand for bettering his own position over that of his parents or the peers of his childhood. 3) Increased homogeneity and cultural equality of the population necessary to political stability. From the standpoint of the individual, this is a means for cultivating new styles of life and consequently for raising status.

Functional arguments for an increase in mass education have maintained that the improvement in educational levels will be beneficial to economic growth or to the political stability needed for economic growth or both taken as separate and separable values. Recent work on capital development has stressed both the role that increased education played in the economic growth in countries such as the United States and the extent to which expenditures for economic development "pay off" by increasing the productivity of the citizenry.<sup>7</sup> Viewed from another angle, the development of education can be seen as aiding the acceptance of innovations, the cultural homogeneity of the society, and the capacity of groups to develop national loyalties. In a similar way several sociologists have stressed the importance of economic mobility as a way to utilize potential talent in a society, and, consequently, by stimulating achievement aspirations help to develop economic growth.<sup>8</sup> Similar arguments have been used in advanced countries, only stating the issue in slightly different terms as that of developing the kind of educated citizenry essential for the complex technology of a post industrial society.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>7</sup> For representative statements of this perspective see the papers by Vaizy and DeBeauvais and by Schultz in J. Floud and A. H. Halsey, ed. *Education, Economy and Society* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1963), pp. 37-52 and C. Arnold Anderson and Mary Bowman, ed. *Education and Economic Development* (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1965) Pt. I. For analysis and criticism of the investment view of education see Gunnar Myrdal, *Asian Drama* (New York: Pantheon, 1968), vol. III, ch. 29.

<sup>8</sup> See the introductory essay by the editor in James Coleman, ed. *Education and Political Development* (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1965), 3-32. Also Adam Curle, *Educational Strategy for Developing Societies* (London: Tavistock Publications, 1963); Guy Hunter, *Modernizing Peasant Societies* (London: Institute of Race Relations, 1969), Ch. 10.

<sup>9</sup> For a statement of this view see the introduction by the editors in Floud and Halsey, *op. cit.*

*Meritocratic education and equalitarian goals*

There are difficulties with the 19th century liberal view that in the absence of discrimination and with equal rewards for equal merit, disparities in social and economic position resulting from birth and family, would be greatly eliminated. Data from both India and the United States indicate that the distribution of education under standards of meritocratic reward is by no means consistent with such levelling goals, even when formal opportunities are equalized.

Within India the system of educational admission and retention by merit left uninfluenced, sharply limits the equalitarian consequences of mass education even when the effects of income disparity are erased. The conclusion drawn from numerous studies of Indian educational institutions is clear: the effective demand for education and effective use of it is disproportionately that of the urban, high caste and high occupational levels of Indian society.<sup>10</sup> Not only does the city dweller have more facilities available to him, but he is drawn into secondary and higher education to a much greater degree than is the rural Indian. Within the cities, Brahmins and Kyasthas, traditionally the educated castes in India, continue to be a high percentage of student populations.<sup>11</sup> When the composition is examined by income or occupational levels, the same result emerges: those who were better situated in Indian society had more education available to them and used it more often than those less well situated. Further, the higher the caste and class of students, the more likely it is at any educational level that they will graduate and the more likely it is that they will be in the more lucrative areas of education (the scientific and technical) where jobs are more readily available and incomes higher.<sup>12</sup>

Similar conclusions seem evident from any analysis of the distribution of higher education in the United States during the past two decades. Increased opportunities have been utilized to a much greater degree by people in the upper and middle class than in the lower working classes. The education of the parent is visited upon the child.<sup>13</sup> The spiralling relations between scholastic aptitude, socio-economic class, and college attendance has, if anything, tended to increase in the past two decades so that the middle class has disproportionately taken advantage of the increase in higher education.<sup>14</sup> The California Master Plan is a good example of this. The division

<sup>10</sup> Documentation for this conclusion can be found in the analysis of a large number of monographs and studies of the social composition of Indian schools at several levels. This is set forth in Joseph Gusfield's *Equality and Development: Education and Social Segmentation in Modern India* in Joseph Fischer, ed., *Social Science and the Comparative Study of Education* (Scranton, Pa.: International Publishers, 1970).

<sup>11</sup> *Op. cit.*; also see M. N. Srinivas, *Education, Social Change and Social Mobility in India* (unpublished paper).

<sup>12</sup> See S. S. Gupta, *Report of the Socio-Economic Survey of College Students of Aligarh (1955-56)*, D. S. College, Aligarh; A. R. Kamat and Deshmukh A. G. *Wastage in College Education* (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1963).

<sup>13</sup> Christopher Jencks and David Riesman, *The Academic Revolution* (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1968), pp. 100-102.

<sup>14</sup> See the statistical materials and discussion presented in Jenks and Riesman, *op. cit.* Ch. 3.

into Universities, State Colleges, and Junior Colleges on the basis of levels of academic quality serves to structure the student body along class lines.

The reasons for the continuation of these inequalities is basic to any analysis of the distribution of skills and talents rewarded by the educational system at any given time. The interaction between aspiration levels, class environment and interaction within the school system itself strongly suggests the enormous importance that early environment implies as preparation for success in school.<sup>15</sup> This does not deny elements of overt discrimination, but it indicates that the formal definition of equality of opportunity is deeply belied by the sociological insights into how children obtain the skills which the educational systems reward. Here, as in so many other aspects of American and Indian life, "Thems that has gits." It should be pointed out, however, that even where scholastic aptitudes are high and income is not an immediate problem, the general disposition to pursue further education is more frequent among higher than lower social and cultural classes in both societies.<sup>16</sup>

Neither does the spread of education promote cultural homogeneity in unambiguous fashion. A number of village studies in India indicate how the spread of education along class lines tends to draw higher income groups apart from lower income groups by styles of life. Almost any village study today will comment on the specific role of the educated members of the village as a distinct cultural bloc.<sup>17</sup> In part this is a function of education, *per se*, but also it is a result of living away from the village in the small cities or large metropolises necessary for secondary or higher education.

Within the United States in similar fashion the division of the population along lines of education proves to be as important, if not more so, as a basic separator between diverse styles of living.<sup>18</sup> Many attitude surveys indicate the enormous split between the "diploma elite" and those who have not gone beyond high school as now a major division in American culture.<sup>19</sup> The distinction between the high school dropout and the college graduate also becomes more crucial in a society where there are many more college graduates.

This increase in heterogeneity is furthered by the greater importance which education comes to play as a basic channel allocating people to economic positions in the society. It is certainly the case in the United States

<sup>15</sup> This is a central theme in current analysis of the impact of class on education. For two somewhat different views, which nevertheless agree on the ambiguity of "equality of opportunity" see Frank Riesman, *The Culturally Deprived Child* (New York: Harper and Row, 1963) and Arthur Stinchcomb, *Rebellion in the High School* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1965). Also see S. M. Miller and Pamela Roby.

<sup>16</sup> Jencks and Riesman, *op. cit.*

<sup>17</sup> For an excellent example see Joshi and Rao, *Changes in Literacy and Education: A Study of Villages in U. P. and Punjab*, *The Economic Weekly*, July 3, 1965.

<sup>18</sup> Although education, occupational level and income are closely correlated, education also appears as a crucial independent variable, especially in matters of values, attitudes and life styles. See the evidence for the "Liberalizing" impact in B. Clark, *Educating the Expert Society* (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co., 1962), pp. 25-40.

<sup>19</sup> Bruce Eckland, *Academic Ability, Higher Education and Occupational Mobility*, *American Sociological Review*, 30 (Oct. 1965), pp. 735-46.

that in recent years the relationship between income and occupation on the one hand, and education on the other, has increased.<sup>20</sup> Unlike historical periods of greater openness, those who do not keep up with the educational increase are worse off than they were before. While the society is becoming more homogeneous in its middle, the gap between the middle and the lower sectors of the society is probably greater. The situation is less clear in India, but here too, it appears to be the case that access to expanding sectors in the economy increasingly requires education. Great expansion in the Indian economy has occurred in areas in connection with the government and government services.<sup>21</sup> These contain a high percentage of white collar jobs for which educational requirements have been growing.

### *The implications of selectivity*

The above makes clear the importance that education plays in the allocation of social and economic position. While by no means the sole, or even primary source of position in either of the two countries, increasingly schools serve as a necessary channel for social mobility and social maintenance. What is it that schools perform as a "social function" from which such consequences ensue?

It is possible to see schools as training devices to prepare people for jobs, in which case their "value added" is to be seen in an improvement in skill and capacity to perform within professional and other activities, as in engineering, medicine and law. As we tend to professionalize more and more occupations, we also tend to increase the amount of educational background required for entry into them.

There is another and also highly important function which schools perform, which may not be discoverable in their training content, but is performed by the process of admission and retention. Schools, by selecting some and rejecting others, define various members of the society as appropriate for certain social and economic positions and others as not. They thus certify by selection independent of the impact of the experience of education.<sup>22</sup> The Japanese system of tough entry into its colleges and universities but very few failures and limited academic demand after, is perhaps the best indication of a system which makes selection crucial and all-important. Certainly in the United States the distinction between colleges of different levels and the difficulties of admission into one or of ease into another means that much allocation is already performed even before the students' experience with the content of higher education. Many state universities, in part, have taken on further selective functions by coping with large and relatively open admission through high rates of failure, especially

<sup>20</sup> See the study based on census returns of Peter Blau and Otis Duncan; *The American Occupational Structure* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1962), p. 180; also S. M. Miller and Pamela Roby, *The Future of Inequality* (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1970), Ch. 6.

<sup>21</sup> George Rosen, *Democracy and Economic Change in India* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966), pp. 138-139.

during the freshman year. Thus they perform the act of selection later than admission.

While we are likely to think of the great increase in education as a response to technological demands, it is certainly the case in both India and the United States that, for the majority of students the content of education remains relatively unrelated in any direct sense to jobs and future occupational roles. While there has been an increase in the scientific and technological pursuits in Indian education, the bulk of the increase in student numbers are still to be found in the humanistic studies and in the social sciences — especially in subjects such as language, literature and government. Here the tradition of British India, with a small group oriented toward government jobs, continues in the face of an increase in demand for such jobs which is far behind the supply.<sup>23</sup>

Fundamentally the same situation is found in the United States. Analysis of what it is that students study indicates that most college graduates take their degrees in non-technical areas.<sup>24</sup> English literature and history have the largest number of departmental majors. The largest group graduating gets its degrees in fields of business or education. In the latter case, large percentages of education majors may not use their education, and fail to teach later in their lives.<sup>25</sup> In short, an educational structure oriented toward technological or economic development is by no means characteristic of either India or the United States. What high school grades often indicate is motivation and that this motivation may be of far greater importance than ability in determination of grades within college.

### *Political equality and educational demand*

Given the mechanisms described above, the educational system operates to exclude some groups from access to it and to its rewards, while it serves to include other groupings. In this situation, excluded economic, social or cultural groups can adopt a variety of strategies. They can attempt to change their life styles to meet the standards and criteria of a meritocracy and se-

<sup>22</sup> For an analysis of divergent systems of allocation through school systems see Ralph Turner, *Sponsored and Contest Mobility and the School System*, *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 25 (1960). For further analysis of the certifying role of education for status groups and for bureaucratic organizations see Max Weber, *From Max Weber*, trans. by H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), pp. 240-244; 426-434. Also Burton Clark, *Educating the Expert Society* (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co., 1962), pp. 77-84.

<sup>23</sup> The humanistic dominance in Indian higher education has continued, although technical and scientific studies have increased as a proportion of the curricula chosen by Indian students. While engineering enrollments increased by 56.8% in 1961-62, the total number of Indian students enrolled in engineering and agriculture was only twice the increase of students in the arts in the period 1960-61 to 1961-62. The "wastage" rates are higher in the sciences and smaller percentages of entering classes in these areas eventually graduate. See the discussion of this and studies cited in Gusfield, *op. cit.*

<sup>24</sup> National Center for Educational Statistics, *op. cit.*, p. 82.

<sup>25</sup> W. W. Charters, *Survival in the Profession: A Criterion for Selecting Teachers*, *Journal of Teacher Education* (1956), 253-255.



lection which are utilized in the schools, to overcome cultural deprivation. They can ignore the entire situation and seek mobility and position through other routes, such as business or government, but without degrees. They can make efforts to directly influence and effect the basic policies and, consequently, the criteria of selection and retention within the school system. It is, of course, also evident that they can do what many groups do for long periods of time, and that is, nothing. As we will see what route is chosen depends greatly upon the degree of political cohesion and organization of specific groups.

Independence has greatly quickened the political mobilization of groups in India. In the process of using political power to achieve goals of the status and income, influence on the educational process emerges as one key way in which Indian groups struggle to increase or maintain their position within the society. Electoral democracy has thus served not only to enhance many dimensions of caste structure, but has also served to distort and reshape the meritocratic character of the Indian educational system, and its past role as the breeding ground for an Indian elite.

Both through creation of new schools at all levels and through the admission of more students the Indian educational system has deviated sharply from the Indian plan first projected in the early 1950's.<sup>26</sup> That plan recognized that the high percentage of total investment in higher education was disproportionate to the needs of a developing society for a larger mass base in primary education. Despite this, Indian admissions at the college and the higher secondary levels has continued its increase. This has largely been a response to the great demands for increased academic opportunities from groups now armed with the political power of numbers and organization. In the struggle for political power and in the uses of that power, groups seek some form of "protective discrimination."<sup>27</sup> The scheduled castes (the untouchables) have achieved this through legislation, while others, as in the anti-Brahman movement of South India, have utilized various forms of quotas or informal systems of favoritism as means of imposing handicaps on rivals and achieving privileges for themselves.

As larger and larger numbers of rural youth are entering the educational system, formerly cosmopolitan universities have taken on highly local concerns and become oriented towards student bodies whose academic background and skills are less than merit systems would bring about.<sup>28</sup> This tends to make many universities less useful as vehicles for bridging a gap between highly local cultures and a wider world of economic modernization, than as points at which regional cultures are being revived. As Joseph DiBona has written, "Rather than being an elitist refuge, the university has been buffeted on all

<sup>26</sup> See Laska, *op. cit.*, *passim* and the materials presented in V. K. R. V. Rao, *Educational Output in Relation to Employment Opportunities*, with Special Reference to India, in UNESCO, *Manpower Aspects of Educational Planning* (Paris UNESCO International Institute for Educational Planning, 1968), pp. 113-123.

<sup>27</sup> See M. Galanter, *Equality and Protective Discrimination*, *Rutgers Law Review*, 16 (Fall, 1961), pp. 42-74; M. N. Srinivas, *Social Change in Modern India* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966). Ch. 3.

<sup>28</sup> For a general analysis of this process see Gusfield, *op. cit.*

sides either by the rural student enrollment or the popularly elected government elected officers . . ."<sup>29</sup> An example of this is the strengthened position of local languages as an area of study and a medium of instruction. Schools in the United States have in the past often served as vehicles for carrying out specific group needs. The development of the civil rights revolution in the United States, and the increased demand for equality of treatment by the black population in the United States, has again focused political attention on the issues which we are discussing here. Thus, a disposition to solve problems of educational exclusion by political action has emerged and has increasingly gained support and membership from other minorities who similarly are not well represented in the educational system and thus not able to utilize the increasingly necessary channels for mobility. There is also the recognition that the existence of schools and the utility of education, in turn, by furthering political cohesion in the organization of a community, increases its ability to utilize the schools still further. The demands for open admissions, for favorable discrimination and for ethnic studies can thus be seen as ways in which the underprivileged groups seek to gain power in the competition for jobs and status by attacks on the principle of merit.

From the standpoint of this paper, such movements, both in India and in the United States, are responses to the inequalitarian implications of meritocratic education. As groups obtain political power, they seek to utilize it to increase their competitive position. It is quite understandable, then, that the principle of merit, so dear to the hearts of educators, does not appear to facilitate equality for many newly mobilized political groups, but is instead seen as a barrier to aspirations. Equality itself is posed as a value, in conflict with economic efficiency, growth and development.

### *Conclusion*

This analysis of educational conflict in India and in the United States indicates the similarities in the nature of issues in both countries, despite the wide disparity in living standards and in technology between the two. It indicates the important role of equalitarian ideas and political institutions and deemphasizes the role of technological levels in determining many of the characteristic issues of education in India and the United States. In both countries mass education coupled with egalitarian group politics has provided conditions of intense conflict between public groups and the schools, especially in higher education in these two countries. As we have seen, the conflict has its origins in political institutions, in the character of the social groups and in the nature of the educational institutions in the two societies.

As long as education is "relevant" to social structure and culture, it is wishful thinking for academics to excoriate the politicization of elements of

<sup>29</sup> A detailed study of this levelling process is found in Joseph DiBona's analysis of the post-Independence changes in recruitment and their consequences at Allahabad University. See his *Elite and Mass in Indian Higher Education*, in P. Altbach, ed. *Turmoil and Transition: Higher Education and Student Politics in India*. (Bombay: LaLuan Publishing House, 1968), pp. 131-171.

the educational system by mobilized segments of the society who do not find it responsive to their needs. Where rewards and expertise are in the hands of carriers of academic culture, this may be a fairly permanent source of conflict. Economic growth and equalitarianism are by no means consistent with each other. The politicization which occurs is traumatic and even threatening to the values of academic detachment and authority, but it is rooted in the conflict of values between the elements of inequality inherent in academic traditions and in concern for social functions, on the one hand, with the demands of equalitarian ideals and group needs under conditions of electoral politics, on the other hand.

IX. YOUTH AS A FACTOR OF CHANGE

IX. LA JEUNESSE COMME FACTEUR DE CHANGEMENT

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## CLASS, CULTURE AND GENERATION

SHEILA ALLEN  
ENGLAND

A mixture of wonder, contempt, fear and romanticism is evident in adult responses to the activities of young people. Sociologists have so far portrayed in varying degrees these attitudes. They are a long way from attaining a reasoned conception which would provide both the tools for collecting pertinent empirical data and a framework for analysing the causes and consequences of these activities. Without this the "data" remain bewildering, their relevance questionable and our understanding of the relations between the young and adult members of societies one of the more nebulous areas of sociology.

To discuss only some of the recent observations on youth as a factor in social change and to attempt some assessment of the contribution which these have made to our understanding of change in the third quarter of the twentieth century is a very large subject. On the whole the influence of new generations in bringing about social change has not been as systematically analysed as some other aspects of social development. The currently popular focus on youth has grown, I would suggest, out of the spectacular events involving young people in many parts of the world. While certainly not ignoring them or prejudging their relevance we should beware of automatically defining our central problems in terms of temporary exigencies, including the interests and world views of those who select and report particular activities. In order to clarify the kinds of questions which researchers could usefully pursue it is necessary to look at the problems of conceptualisation which we face, the divisions in terms of theoretical models which exist, and the difficulties of obtaining relevant material about groups of which most, if not all of the researchers are not members.

Before discussing the specific problems involved in a systematic analysis of youth and social change I shall consider some relevant aspects of the present status of theories of change.

### *Social Change*

An adequate theory of social change must be concerned with the existing structure of society, the specification of new emerging forms and a realistic consideration of the forces capable of bringing this into being.

There is a need for clarification of the level and kind of conceptual problems which this involves and a discussion of the meta-theoretical models on which these are based. There is little agreement among sociologists themselves but the dominant approach in Anglo-American sociology is a multi-causal one, in which it is argued that all or many factors are simultaneously relevant, because change in complex societies is a complex phenomenon. This approach is not unrelated to the fact that the problem of order has been central to much sociological theorising particularly in the functional or systemic approach to sociological explanation.<sup>1</sup> An assumption of some form of social equilibrium is frequently incorporated, but this further obscures the issue since it has no explanatory value unless the social forces involved in the balance can be specified in terms of their relative strengths and modes of operation. Otherwise equilibrium is a misleading conception of no social change. Disequilibrium is by the same token, another way of saying, *ex post facto*, that change has occurred.<sup>2</sup> Such concepts together with an orthodox rejection at a theoretical level of mono-causal explanations underpin the adoption of multi-causality in approaching the question of social change. However, stubborn problems remain. If many factors are relevant then the task of the theorist is to locate the more important sources of change. He cannot abdicate from this because the phenomena are complex. Indeed the more complex the structure, the more the selection of key variables demands attention.<sup>3</sup> What these relevant factors are is determined by the type of social change to be explained. The multi-causal approach makes no methodological distinction between kinds of social change; quantitative and qualitative change and changes in structural or interaction levels are all labelled social change. Relevance does not imply an arbitrary choice among factors unless it is assumed that all factors are equally relevant, that any area of social activity can be isolated and analysed without specification of its relations to other areas of activity. The choice depends on which overall model of society is considered useful in explaining the nature of social reality.

To enter into a discussion of the relative strengths and weaknesses of competing overall models of this point would take us beyond the immediate

<sup>1</sup> The work of Talcott Parsons is the most important and obvious example, but much of the time and effort devoted to the explanation of social change has been seeking refinements which will take account of endogenous change whilst remaining within his overall framework. Such efforts occupying a considerable part of the available sociological manpower, have so far not been markedly successful in providing relevant models for analysing actual social change or postulating emergent social forms.

See Alan Dawe, *The Two Sociologies*, *British Journal of Sociology*, XXI, No. 2, June 1970 for a discussion of the centrality of the problem of social order and the problem of control.

<sup>2</sup> For a perceptive discussion of the misuse of 'equilibrium' by social scientists see C. E. Rissett, *The Concept of Equilibrium in American Social Thought*, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1966.

<sup>3</sup> The difficulty is to some extent that which J. Clyde Mitchell notes 'The apparent complexity of social phenomena frequently bespeaks a lack of theoretical concepts available for their analysis . . . simplification is the characteristic of good theory.'

'Theoretical Orientations in African urban studies' in M. Banton (ed.), *The Social Anthropology of Complex Societies*, Praeger, New York, 1966, p. 41.

concerns of this paper.<sup>4</sup> It is sufficient to note that in any formulation of theories of social change such an overall model is a prerequisite and that the rest of the paper will in part relate alternative formulations to youth as a factor of social change.

### *Relations Between Generations*

The lack of systematic analysis of the inter-relations of social change and new generations together with the relative isolation of the study of youth from mainstream sociological concerns is due to the nature of the evolution of social theory and social investigation. In social theory the aim has been to explain social facts by other social facts and to concentrate on the basic social institutions and their systematic inter-relations. Age has been given some recognition as a relevant factor in both theory and in investigation. It has been a descriptive category rather than an operative principle of social organisation, except in some simpler societies where age grades or age sects have been the basis of effective social groupings. Like sex, its relevance has not systematically been followed through but treated in an ad hoc way as it appeared to impinge on what came to be defined as more crucial social groups and relationships. Moreover, attempts at explanation in terms of age have relied heavily on "reductionist" arguments in which biological and psychological properties were stressed to the exclusion of social properties.

In theories which emphasise economic and political relations the assumption has been that these take precedence over generational relations and that changes in the fundamental structure of society are not directly related to new generations. Specifically, youth is not viewed as an actual social group unified by common structural factors in opposition to older groups. Political and economic relations cut across the age categories just as sex, religion and ethnicity do. In such analyses the class component is frequently emphasised both as differentially structuring the actual position and ideology of young people and in assessing their potential contribution to social change. Such theories are frequently linked to models which stress as crucial the conflict, co-ercion and disruptive change aspects of society.

In theories which derive largely from Talcott Parsons' interpretation of Durkheim the relations between generations are conceptualised mainly as problems of socialisation, where the main component is the institutional arrangements for maintaining and handing down shared standards for perceiving, predicting, judging and acting. The rules which generate and guide interaction and so organise experience are held common by members of groups. There are many unresolved problems of defining sub-societies or sub-systems and specifying the relations between these sub-units and the

<sup>4</sup> See S. Allen, *Some Theoretical Problems in the Study of Youth*, *The Sociological Review*, 16, 3, Nov. 1968, pp. 319-331 and David Lockwood, *Social Integration and System Integration*, in G. K. Zollschan and W. Hirsch (eds.), *Explorations in Social Change*, London, 1964.

overall system.<sup>5</sup> In socialisation three systems, relatively autonomous, but inter-penetrating, the social, cultural and personality systems are involved. The passive, adaptive view of socialisation has tended to dominate sociological enquiry and to focus 'strains' on particular periods such as adolescence. Models which emphasise commitment, value-consensus, integration and adaptive change lend support and consistency to such analyses. In recent work challenges to this view have been increasingly developed, but as yet remain largely insystematised, in comparison with Parsons' approach. Perspectives which stress creative interaction in which relevance and meaning and not external constraint are central imply a through going overhaul of the notion of socialisation. However, the ways in which meaningful interaction at a situational level is related to systems of control at an institutional or societal level are far from clear.<sup>6</sup> While there would now be general agreement that socialisation can not be usefully regarded as a passive process, in which the cultural symbols and beliefs and the skills and expectations necessary for performing social roles are handed on to subsequent generations, there is little agreement on alternative conceptualisations which also relate process and structure in a systematic model.

The influential position of these two types of macrotheory in which interest has been concentrated on the one hand on the economic system, particularly the mode of production and the structure of property relations, and the dynamics of political organisation and on the other on the equilibrating mechanisms of socio-cultural systems little significance has been attached to generational relations, at least in complex societies.

In consequence in social investigations of youth the tendency has been to treat the subject matter in an ad hoc manner, concentrating on particular characteristics of a situational or psychological kind which are assumed to be specific to youth groups. Apart from attempts to define 'youth culture' very little attention has been paid to the problems of generalisation. And those concerned with 'youth culture' have rarely specified the relations between this 'culture' and social change except in reactive terms. That is the emergence of the 'culture' has been specified in terms of changes in the wider society and not as an agency of further change. The latter tends in empirical investigations to be assumed rather than systematically explored.

I have argued elsewhere the inadequacies of reifying 'youth' as a social category and stressed the necessity of relating any examination of youth to the overall structure of society.<sup>7</sup> The distinctions made by Karl Mannheim between generational location, and generational units, for instance, can not

<sup>5</sup> This problem is discussed by A. W. Gouldner, *Reciprocity and Autonomy in Functional Theory*, in L. Gross (ed.), *Symposium on Sociological Theory*, New York, 1959.

<sup>6</sup> P. Berger and T. Luckmann in *The Social Construction of Reality*, Allen Lane, Penguin Press, 1967 when dealing with action concentrate on an a-historical, dyadic situation. Once they move from this action and meaning become objectified in institutions and socialisation becomes a process of constraint, without, however, the differential distribution of means of constraint being explicit. See also A. V. Cicourel, *The Social Organisation of Juvenile Justice*, Wiley, New York, 1968.

<sup>7</sup> S. Allen, *Some Theoretical Problems in the Study of Youth*, *The Sociological Review*, op. cit.



be neglected and in analysing youth as agent of social change account must be taken of economic, political, religious and ethnic differentiation on the structuring of groups within any generation.<sup>8</sup>

Increasingly, however, it is proposed that 'generational conflict' now takes precedence over 'socio-economic conflict'.<sup>9</sup> As such statements challenge to some extent one of the centrally developed traditions of social theory, serious consideration should be given to the theoretical and substantive issues which they raise. More generally it is claimed that 'Throughout history the struggle of generations has, like that of the sexes, formed a counterpoint with the struggle of classes, and at certain moments even taken priority over it'.<sup>10</sup> These positions stand in contrast to that of Mannheim who maintained that generational unity was not primarily of the kind which led to the formation of actual social groups. The limitation imposed by the transitory nature of youth, apart from any other divisions which might exist has been held as one of the major obstacles to the development of lasting organisations capable of entering into continuous conflict. However, against the considerable force of this argument it must be stated that until we explore whether or not the structural conditions are present for the emergence of permanent generational conflict, in spite of the turnover of membership of the groups involved, we are not in a position to contend that there are not times when generational conflict takes precedence over other conflicts nor to specify the conditions under which this has or can take place. This point will be taken up in a later section of this paper

### *Youth Culture*

Before the events of the past two or three years directed attention to the political activities of youth and in particular their revolutionary potential or lack of it, sociologists confined themselves largely to the questions of youth and cultural change. There were many attempts to define 'youth culture' and to relate its emergence to the degree and rate of social changes taking place in industrial societies and to seek remedies for its supposed consequences, many of which were the focus of moral, if not legal, condemnation by adults. In social investigation a more narrowly defined concern with social problems was frequently evident.

In one sense 'youth culture' is a product of those concerned with the consumer potential of young people. It is a stereotypical presentation of what it is to be young defined always to encourage consumption patterns which will boost the sale of products and services. The pressures from this aspect of contemporary society on young people are undeniable and the consequences of them worth serious sociological investigation. According to

<sup>8</sup> Karl Mannheim, *The Problem of Generations*, in *Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge*, London, 1952, pp. 276-320.

<sup>9</sup> See for instance Ralph H. Turner, *The Theme of Contemporary Social Movements*, *British Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XX, No. 4, December 1969.

<sup>10</sup> V. G. Kiernan, 'Notes on the Intelligentsia', in Ralph Miliband and John Saville (eds.), *The Socialist Register*, Merlin Press, London, 1969, p. 68.

Marcuse 'The products indoctrinate and manipulate; they promote a false consciousness which is immune against its falsehood'.<sup>11</sup>

Culture in a traditional anthropological sense describes 'a way of life handed on from generation to generation' providing human beings with a "design for living".<sup>12</sup> Youth culture can then conceptually be only a sub-culture within complex society. It can be interpreted in relation to social change in at least two ways. The culture can be confined to a "design for living" for each generation of young people or the innovations of such a culture can be seen as effecting groups other than young people. When the idea of culture is used in a more restricted sense some kind of autonomy is assumed. As when Bottomore maintains that 'the changes which new generations effect are mainly in the cultural sphere, in the creation of new styles of art, dress, talking and living', but do not directly influence the structure of society.<sup>13</sup> If the concept of youth culture is to have any explanatory value, attention must be directed to at least three aspects which have been insufficiently developed. First the problem of part-whole relationships must be elucidated, so that "cultures" are related to structural relationships in such a way that elements shared by different parts are distinguishable from actual subcultural distinctions.<sup>14</sup> Secondly that different ways of living may be situational adaptations to externally enforced conditions rather than the expression of culturally valued standards. The powerlessness of youth within the structure of the wider society must be set against the assumption that the way the young act is expressive of the values of the generation itself.<sup>15</sup> Third, the understanding of the nature of youth culture and its distinguishing characteristics calls for empirical investigation of a kind rarely undertaken. These could follow the approach outlined by A. V. Cicourel when he argues that, 'A simple reference to "forces" or "social structure" or "values" imposes an order instead of seeking to discover the nature of socially organised activities. Before we first assume and then directly assign motives, assume the existence of values and norms, institutional pressures and the like, the study of everyday life or history requires careful attention to the ways in which social interaction unfolds over time so that members "make sense" of "what happened" (by means of their physical, verbal and "silent" behaviour), and recount their experiences to one another and in written or some other behavioural or symbolic form. The study of

<sup>11</sup> H. Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1964, p. 12. See also Edgar Z. Friedenberg, *The Vanishing Adolescent* Dell Publishing Co Inc., New York, 1962, on the increasing problems of self-identification.

<sup>12</sup> Oscar Lewis, *The Culture of Poverty*, *Scientific American*, 215, 4, 1966.

<sup>13</sup> T. B. Bottomore, *Critics of Society*, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1967, p. 100.

<sup>14</sup> The lack of attention to this is found similarly in studies of 'black culture' or the Negro way of life where elements shared more widely are confused with ethnicity. See Franklin Frazier, *The Negro Family in the United States*, Chicago, Rev. Ed., 1966, and Charles Keil, *Urban Blues*, Chicago, 1966.

<sup>15</sup> See Charles A. Valentine, *Poverty and Culture*, Chicago, 1968, for a perceptive critique of the concept of culture with particular reference to the poor in the United States. He describes as an "intellectual fad" the development in sociology in which "culture" or "sub-culture" is attributed to almost any social category, p. 15.

practical activities provides the sociologist with a fundamental point of departure in the study of social organisation, and also becomes a basis for developing a theory of data when seeking higher order or more complicated forms of social life.<sup>16</sup> However, such an approach if it is not to be simply a series of 'snapshots' must involve attention to the first point above, otherwise the possibility of generalisation is lost. The feasibility of following the method suggested by Cicourel is an important problem which cannot be discussed here. Assuming the researcher avoids a parochial comparison with what he defines to be the dominant or established way of life, the difficulties of accessibility and the problem of an accurate portrayal of youth culture cannot be minimised.<sup>17</sup>

The three aspects discussed above may be taken, I would suggest, as the minima of a coherent framework for analysing youth culture. In terms of social change the question is not whether such a culture as a total way of life can exist as a viable autonomous alternative within the present structure of society, but how far the fragmentary culture can be linked with emergent forms of consciousness and what the social basis of such a culture is.

### *Youth and Structural Change*

Two recent attempts at such explanations have been put forward.<sup>18</sup> Though they differ on many points, both direct attention to the structural contradictions within complex industrial society as explanatory of the recent activities of youth, particularly students. The Rowntrees argue that because of widespread changes, at least in the United States, it is now useful to regard youth as a class. As such they embody some of the major contradictions of the system and could present society, if they become sufficiently conscious and organised, with a 'mortal threat'. Changes in the process of production has forced the young into the crucial pivotal class position within the United States and other groups with revolutionary potential, for instance, Black Americans, are dependent for success on revolution by the young. It is the role in production, particularly in the education and defence industries which gives the young their crucial class position. Intra-class conflicts, due to income, ethnic and social differentiation exist and can be exploited by the dominant society, but are seen largely as presenting tactical problems and not as obstacles to class formation and class consciousness. This thesis is interesting because it attempts to go be-

<sup>16</sup> Aaron V. Cicourel, *The Social Organisation of Juvenile Justice*, op. cit., p. 169.

<sup>17</sup> A comparison of youth culture and what is assumed to be an established value system is to be found in Bryan Wilson, *Youth Culture, the Universities and Student Unrest*, in C. B. Cox and A. E. Dyson (eds.), *Fight for Education: A Black Paper*, Critical Quarterly Society, 1969.

<sup>18</sup> John and Margaret Rowntree, *Youth as a Class*, *International Socialist Journal* No. 25, February 1968, pp. 25-58.

\* Tom Nairn, *Why it Happened*, in A. Quattrochi and Tom Nairn, *The Beginning of the End*, Panther Books, London, 1968.

yond the simple notion of 'generational conflict' and to identify the forces which give youth the potential for bringing into being a new social order. However, what is not at all clear in their argument is the nature of the exploitation in which the young are depicted both as absorbers of surplus within the economy and the exploited workers of the defence and education industries. Nor is the "exploitative" nature of the system shown convincingly to impinge exclusively or particularly on the young. The exploited young presumably become the disadvantaged old. Probably the most important is the dismissal of differences within the "class" as a tactical problem rather than a consideration of the structural relevance of categories which they too lightly assume to be reified and largely lacking in empirical content.

Tom Nairn sees new contradictions arising from the developmental imperatives of "enlightened technocratic neocapitalism" in which mental production plays a necessarily increasing part. In producing individuals capable of carrying out these functions a consciousness which can no longer be tied to the categories appropriate to older forces of production is also produced. He argues that within the trends towards mass education and communication is the possibility of the development of a new awareness and search for control over all aspects of life. If such an argument is useful in general terms for explaining recent student unrest, it follows that the emergent forms linked at present with the young are not attributes of youth but attributes of that part of the first, but only the first generation who in some degree take affluence for granted and seek, because of the opportunities afforded by prolonged education, an alternative conception of themselves and their society.

The student as an unincorporated intellectual is not a new idea. The gap between student life and adult life always allowed ritualised breaking of conventions and the embrace of deviant ideas, not necessarily radical in content. The processes of incorporation into the mesh of social custom surrounding the elite occupations for which the student was traditionally destined were well signposted and used. These social pressures reinforced his identification with his origins. One of the questions now to be explored is to what extent changed social and political conditions as well as changes in higher education, in occupations and the composition of student groups, render these processes inadequate to ensure the integration of new generations. Again a very different question from the formulation which seeks explanations in the activities and ideas generated within the new generations without reference to the wider society.

## STRUCTURAL CONDITIONS OF STUDENT MOVEMENTS: THE STUDENT COMMUNITY AND THE STUDENT ROLE

KLAUS R. ALLERBECK

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It has frequently been noted (see e. g. Boudon, 1969) how little research and theory on the recent student rebellions in advanced industrial societies are related to each other. I am not convinced that this is due only to the idiosyncracies of empiricists or theorists. Rather, it seems to be related to the character of both theory and research.

Theoretical explanations of student rebellions tend to seek their roots in some other conflict, be it an eternal conflict of generations, the structural-functionalist tendency to look for a personality disposition of the individual student towards conflict, or as it might be expressed in slightly Marxist vocabulary, "contradictions" in the situation within the university or in the relation of university education to career prospects.

On the other hand, the bulk of the research on students movements tends to see the supporters of student rebellions more in harmony with their environment. Activists tend to come from liberal or radical homes, to study subjects with a recognized liberal or leftist tradition and dominant climate of opinion and are aspiring to careers allowing them to live in agreement with their political convictions.<sup>1</sup> But a generalization in terms of conflict-harmony is hardly presented by these researchers. Apparently, the results would not make sense in these terms. Student rebellions are, after all, not to be explained by harmony of any kind. That is why empiricists stick to their over-and-over supported correlations without attempting to attribute any theoretical significance to their results, and that is why theorists, in my opinion, tend to ignore this research.

This paper seeks to reconcile the paradox of the conflict-prone student movements on the social system level with the empirical results that individual participation in those movements is indeed normal, conflict-avoiding behavior.

<sup>1</sup> See Auger et al. (1969), Barton (1968), Block et al. (1968), Braungart (1966), Braungart (1969), Feldman and Newcomb (1969), Flacks (1967), Gales (1966), Gamson (1969), Katz (1967), Katz et al. (1968), Keniston (1968), Keniston (1969), Lipset and Altbach (1966), Mock (1968), Peterson (1966), Peterson (1968), Smith et al. (1967), Somers (1965).

The apparent contradiction between conforming individual behavior and conflict on the system level can be resolved if we take the intermediating structural level into account. This paper will argue that conformity as individual behavior has as its frame of reference not the social system, but the immediate environments, expectations of the membership group and assumed expectations of a negative reference group. While for most groups and roles in industrial societies conformity with reference to the immediate environment is conformity with reference to the social system as well, this should not be taken for granted under all circumstances and for all groups.

This paper will describe characteristics of students as a group and the student role different from those of most groups and roles in advanced industrial societies. These characteristics are necessary, but not sufficient conditions for student movements. As structural properties of groups and roles they are necessary conditions for any similar social movement. Some evidence for this view will be presented, and the consequences for sociological theory will be sketched.

#### *A. Students as a group and the student role: a description*

The student community is highly homogeneous. Most contacts are within the student community. Students' friends are mostly other students, not only at campus universities, but also at universities where most students are commuters.

Student sports, student housing, student cafeterias, student health insurance, student travel organizations: a variety of service institutions for students makes necessary daily withingroup contacts and reduces necessary contacts with other groups to a minimum.

Most members of the group are similar with respect to a wide variety of characteristics: they are equally young, and in the same stage of the life cycle. They are recruited from similar status backgrounds, from the middle and upper classes. The order of magnitude of income they have at their disposition is similar, and differences of income and consumption do not necessarily mean differences of status within the group. The status of the professions they are aspiring to is equally high, at least in their expectations.

It adds to the equality of students that to study is not an activity characterized by division of labor as most activities in industrial societies. What is demanded of students is not so much to do a certain amount of work in a prescribed time, but to gain knowledge and abilities that are demanded of all students in their respective course of study. Work in the course of study is not demanded as an aim in itself, but as a means in the process of education. Students shall not produce something that is useful for their science, but should show that they are able to do independently scientific work.

The role "student" is not compatible with other roles. Membership in the student community and in other social groups is in modern societies not forbidden by formal rules, as it was in the middle ages, when members

of the university could not be citizens of the town the university was situated in. A crossing of memberships is nevertheless not typical.

The role "student", though temporary and limited to a few years, is "total", that is, not compatible with other roles.

The requirements of this role are peculiar. Definitive prescriptions do not exist. It is rather expected that the role bearer himself decides what the concept of his role is to be.

Students may freely decide how to use their time. Even in the most structured courses of study they may do so to a degree matched nowhere in the industrial world. One expects students to "find themselves", to explore their abilities, even to have a good time. But that is up to the student. The absence of any definite role requirements makes the role, however, compatible with almost any type of activity.

But these activities do not necessarily lead to other roles. A student who is working for his subsistence does not become a part-time worker or part-time employee *and* a student, but at the place where he is working he is seen and treated as a student.

This peculiar vagueness of the role expectations implies to some extent deviant behavior, and corresponding special norms are accepted for the behavior of students, although academic jurisdiction is not an exemption from public law. Non-students as well as students not only accept, but also expect that students sometimes tend toward mildly excessive behavior. What would be deviant behavior and prosecutable offenses for everybody else, is in the form of student pranks allowable behavior for students. For the institutionalization of deviant behavior of students in other countries witness "panty raids" etc. in the US.

There is no prescribed mode of dress for students, but the absence of these requirements has the similar effect that they can be recognized as students without wearing uniforms as bearers of other total roles do (soldiers' uniforms, priests' habits, etc.). Not being uniformed, reduces the rest of role distance that even total roles allow.

Being recognizable as a student, changes the interaction situation with non-students: interactions of persons not known to each other become categorical contacts (Scheuch, 1965).

So the so-called "autonomy" of the university has a real everyday meaning for students — but a meaning that is very different from the common use of the word which means relative independence from state influence.

The mythical academic community is real in the sense of being removed from the outside world, but the internal relations among the students are often too anonymous to fully satisfy the use of the word community as intended by Tönnies (1925).

The type of social relations we have described is atypical for advanced industrial societies, which are characterized by a high degree of division of labor (for some of the consequences, see Berger and Luckmann, 1966).

More typical is the "Kreuzung sozialer Kreise" (Simmel, 1958) where persons develop individuality through the uniqueness of the combinations of their roles. Where everyone has several roles, but none with which he

is exclusively identified, role distance becomes possible, not only as an analytical category, but as a property of social reality. Membership in different groups, combinations of roles with different role expectations in the same set tends to make situations of cross pressure and status inconsistency normal which were formerly exceptions from the role. Thus industrial societies are not offering the conditions which would make social movements and the type of social conflict Durkheim (1933) anticipated flourish.

### *B. Conditions of conflict*

If membership in the conflicting groups is not mutually exclusive, and many group members are members of several parties to the conflict, institutional mechanisms for conflict regulation have to be developed. Group conflicts are no longer conflicts of their members, but conflicts of their representatives. This is supposed to reduce the intensity of the conflict.

Real conflicts with participation of group members are possible only if the type of social organization is communal, where multiple memberships do not exist. This is not in disagreement with the statement that most individual behavior is conflict-avoiding.

As Sherif (1961) found in his famous Robbers Cave Experiment, a member of group A can better avoid conflicts with other members of his own group the more hostility he is showing toward group B, if groups A and B are not positively related to each other.

For conflicts of this type it is not a necessary condition that group B (the non-membership group) is real, as it was in the Robbers Cave Experiment. Members of community-like groups typically think in terms of a negative reference group to which all non-members of their positive reference and membership group belong. For the military men there is, for instance, a negative reference group, "the civilians", whose members are far from considering themselves as a group in industrial societies. For the clergy, there is the negative reference group of laymen, whose "members" also hardly think of themselves as a group.

These symbolic negative reference groups have an important function as they exemplify those types of behavior which are definitely wrong.

A soldier who is behaving "like a civilian" is doing something wrong: soldiers do not behave like civilians. Mechanisms of this type are operative if the negative reference group is not only different, but also perceived of as having a different (lower) value. This type of relation may be different from simply believing that the other group is inferior. A somewhat more complicated form of this relation has been empirically shown by Sodhi et al. (1958) in national prejudice studies, namely the belief that the non-membership group thinks of the membership group as inferior. If soldiers believe that civilians' opinion of soldiers is too low, it is easier for them not to behave like those civilians who are unable to appreciate the true virtues of the military.

Processes of this type can be shown to be at work in the relations of the student community to the society at large, beside the classic anta-



gonisms of "town and gown". That students believe in the existence of anti-student stereotypes in the population at large is a fact which was already firmly established before student unrest provided a reason for this assumption.

In 1965, 54% of a random sample of University of Wisconsin students in Madison ascribed negative opinions about students to the population, while only 22% believed the population held positive opinions about students. This clear majority of students, however, was not perceiving a reality, since a survey of the Wisconsin population at the same time showed that the majority of the adult population of Wisconsin (59%) had positive and only a small minority (18%) had negative opinions about students (Jacobson and Sharp, 1966).

While I have no German data gathered before the existence of the student movement, surveys taken after the beginnings of student unrest show a consensus among students that the population at large was against students and student demonstrations. In a 1968 survey of Cologne students, 82% believed that the majority of the population was against student demonstrations. And in 1969, 95% of the Cologne respondents agreed with the statement: "Actions of students and the extra-parliamentary opposition are widening the gap between students and the population at large, and their consequence is that students are treated like parias." (Allerbeck, 1970).

As a matter of fact, these assumptions of Cologne students are as wrong as those of their American fellow students. Asked about student demonstrations, only a minority of the population ascribes what they dislike about student demonstrations to "the students". A majority holds a small core of agitators responsible for excesses and is preserving by this misperception a positive image of the student majority (Scheuch, 1968; EMNID, 1968).

The cleavage between the student community and the population at large which the majority of students assume to exist cannot be explained as a consequence of the student movements. Rather, it is a condition of the existence of student movements, which were at best able to give new life to these traditional cleavages.

This reasoning is not only based on social psychological theories and post factum interpretations of survey results.

### *C. An empirical test*

The theoretical conception of the preconditions of student movements in the structure of the student community and the total role "student" was tested independently with regard to two aspects: role identification and perception of an evaluation cleavage of students and society.

Lacking data on the role configurations of non-students, it is impossible to test the concept defined only in social structural terms. In the data about students, this is not a variable but a parameter. What is a variable, however, is the identification with the role. Role as a property of the social structure does not fully determine the behavior of the role bearers. They

may perceive the role expectations differently, and may identify themselves with their role to a varying degree. This conception makes it possible to test the theory with data on students.

*Hypothesis 1:* If the student role is an important condition for student movements, support for student movements should correlate with identification with that role.

The data from the 1968 Cologne student survey are presented in Table 1, and they support this hypothesis.

TABLE 1. SUPPORT OF STUDENT MOVEMENT BY IDENTIFICATION WITH STUDENT ROLE

	High identification	Low identification
Support student movement	15.6	8.5
Somewhat supportive	44.2	38.8
Somewhat negative	32.0	38.5
Negative	8.2	14.2
<i>N</i>	(391)	(423)
$\chi^2 = 18.9$ $p < 0.001$	$= 0.23$	

There are no identical indicators in the American surveys. The question whether the student considers being a student as instrumental might be equivalent. An example of this instrumental conception is the opinion that vocational training is the main purpose of university education.

Table 2 shows that students' support for student movements is varying with their perception of the purpose of their education. Those who consider vocational training or developing skills and knowledge directly applicable to their career goals as the main purpose tend to reject student movements, while students with a non-instrumental conception tend to support it.

*Hypothesis 2:* The greater the cleavage of norms and expectations of the in-group "students" and the out-group population is perceived, the more likely is support for student movements.

An empirical test is possible only for the 1968 Cologne data. In this survey, the somewhat projective question was asked as to what type of attitude the majority of students and the majority of the population held with regard to students' demonstration. Already the marginal distributions

TABLE 2. ATTITUDES TOWARD FSM BY IMPORTANCE OF VOCATIONAL TRAINING AS PURPOSE OF EDUCATION

	Vocational training		
	Not mention- ed	2. importance	Most import- ant
Pro FSM	40.3	32.3	15.1
Slightly pro	31.0	29.0	32.6
Slightly against	12.4	17.7	17.4
Negative	16.3	21.0	34.9
N=	(129)	(62)	(86)
$r^2=19.98, p<0.01$	$=0.32$		

presented in Table 3 show the sharp cleavage seen by most respondents, who ascribe positive or mixed feelings to the students and very negative, negative or at best mixed attitudes to the majority of the population. The new variable created as a combination of these two questions measuring the discrepancy between student and population attitudes is used as a measure of perceived cleavage of norms and attitudes of both reference groups.

The correlation of this new variable with support for student movements is  $\tau_{\beta} = 0.21$  and  $\gamma = 0.29$  ( $p < 0.001$ ).

Identification with the student role and this discrepancy of evaluations variable explain about an additional 7% of the variation in the dependent variable "support for student movements", when brought into a regression equation in which parents' liberalism and political climate of field of study are already included. The virtually non-existent difference of the magnitude of partial and zero-order correlations shows these variables as unrelated to other determinants of individual support for student movements (Allerbeck, 1970).

I would like to stress that while my argument is a structural one, using data on individuals, as I did, to test it is legitimate in this case. I have argued that structural conditions such as role properties made it possible that student movements which are prone to conflict on the system level can be supported by group members without removing the social psychological laws of conflict avoidance. Role properties and group characteristics do need, however, some degree of individual identification with both group and role to be operative in this sense. Lack of that identification should reduce the structural effect. This is the rationale behind the empirical support of my argument which is not another case of an individualistic fallacy, but rather a sort of deviant case analysis.

TABLE 3. PERCEIVED ATTITUDES OF POPULATION MAJORITY AND STUDENT MAJORITY TOWARD STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS

	Majority of students	Majority of population
Very negative	1.0	36.4
Negative	12.1	55.3
Half/half	58.4	7.8
Positive	25.5	0.3
Very positive	2.0	0.0
D. K.	0.9	0.2
<i>N</i>	(855)	(855)

If the evidence presented is accepted, it should be clear that we should no longer look for an explanation of student movements in properties and behavior of individuals. Support of student movements is not individual deviance, but — if we want to use this term at all — these movements are a case of “collective deviance” rooted in the social structure. Why this “collective deviance” occurred in the present form in the last five years, is easier to understand if we consider one further aspect of the role expectations.

*D. Combining structural and historical conditions: a possible synthesis*

A part of the special role expectations not mentioned thus far concerns political activities. Independent of the actual political participation of students, it is expected of them that they should participate, as a content analysis of commencement speeches in the fifties would prove for the United States as well as for Western Germany.

There is some tendency in these expectations that students should not be conformists. They are often expected to favour dissent in an idealistic fashion. The ideal type of this expectation is illustrated by a quotation from a 1961 commencement speech of Edmund Brown, who was then Governor of California: “I say: Thank God for the spectacle of students picketing — even when they are picketing me at Sacramento and I think they are wrong, for students protesting and Freedom Riding, for students listening to society’s dissidents, for students going out into the fields with our mig-

ratory workers, and marching off to jail with our segregated Negroes. At last we're getting somewhere. The colleges have become bootcamps for citizenship — and citizen-leaders are marching out of them.

For a while, it will be hard on us as administrators. Some students are going to be wrong, and some people will want to deny them the right to make mistakes. Administrators will have to wade through the angry letters, and colleges will lose some donations. We Governors will have to face indignant caravans and elected officials bent on dictating to state colleges and faculties. But let us stand up for our students and be proud of them. If America is still on the way up, it will welcome this new, impatient, critical crop of young gadflies. It will be fearful only of the complacent and passive.<sup>2</sup>

Ironically, this said the same Governor who ordered the first major state police intervention against the Free Speech Movement on the Berkeley campus of the University of California in 1964.

This role expectation of political participation and dissent is a necessary part of an explanation of the growth of the student movements from the initial phase when only a few political activists supported non-conformist political ideas. It provided a link between the structural explanation and the historical aspects, the changes of student political participation from apathy in the fifties (Goldsen et al., 1960; Habermas et al., 1961; Musgrove, 1964) to the student movements of the second half of the 60's.

The structural characteristics of the student role and the student community are, as I said before, a necessary but not sufficient part of an explanation. The concept is a dispositional one, a parameter "which sets limits within which other variables interact to determine the precise timing" of an event like a student movement (Smelser, 1968: 121).

The growth of the movements, however, cannot be explained without reference to developments on the political system level in Western states. I will not deal with those in any detail, but just mention the aspects of these developments I consider as being necessary for explanation.

These historical "causes" include:

1. The end of the cold war (Aron, 1969).
2. A non-correspondence of cleavage structure and organization of the party system (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967), and
3. The changing nature of political conflicts: while political conflicts in the 50's were technical in nature and typically conflicts of experts, the conflicts of the 60's are moral or value conflicts, allowing mass participation.

The student of student movements has to take into account the war in Viet Nam if he really wants to explain the growth of the student movement in the US, or the deviation from normal parliamentary order in the case of the Grand Coalition and the Emergency laws in West Germany if he is looking for the causes of the West German student movement.

<sup>2</sup> See Michael Cohen and Dennis Hale, *The New Student Left*, Boston, 1967, p. 1.

While it is necessary not to neglect the political issues, it is not possible to explain the student movements with reference to their political intentions alone, as some partisans of these movements seem to believe.

If these political causes were operating as the single cause, there is no reason why the movement was restricted to students. As a variety of research keeps showing, there is not even a comparable movement among non-student youth.

The norm of political participation can be shown at work in the identification process, by which an actual minority (which was, however, larger than some outside-agitator-theorists tended to admit) of the students became identified with the majority of students and a viable social movement.

I mentioned these processes only to show in what ways a structural explanation of the student movements should be amended to give a full explanation.

This structural explanation of the student movements, however, is needed most and merits further research. The modern student movements are of no particular sociological importance in themselves. What makes them important, is their existence during the absence of any comparable movement in other social groups.<sup>3</sup> This paper has attempted to explain this difference in social structural terms.

If this attempt is supported by further evidence, a revision not only of the sociology of social movements seems in order. Deviance on the social system level is not necessarily rooted in individual deviance, be it motivation or behavior. I do believe that this is a short circuit that has to be replaced by the notion of the group as the intermediate structural level. One of the main advantages of a cross-level explanation of this type is its ability to take advantage of proven parts of sociological and social psychological theories which are generally used only for the explanation of stability and apply them to the explanation of instability and conflict.

Such a structural explanation of social movements is possible only within a conception of the social system that does not imply harmony, consensus and equilibrium by definition, but is treating harmony, consensus and equilibrium as one state of the system among others.

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<sup>3</sup> The existence of a movement among Blacks in the United States does not make this point invalid. Recent research on riots in Ghettoes is consistent with the theoretical interpretation proposed in this paper.

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# JEUNESSE: „FAIT DE STRUCTURE“ OU PRODUIT MOUVANT DE LA PRATIQUE POLITIQUE ET IDÉOLOGIQUE D'UNE SOCIÉTÉ HISTORIQUE?

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## I. LE DÉCOUPAGE DES OBJETS POUR LA RÉFLEXION ET LE DISCOURS SOCIOLOGIQUE:

### A) *Principes méthodologiques*

### B) *Examen d'un objet problématique: les rapports jeunesse-société*

A) Si la sociologie ne veut pas être une paraphrase sophistiquée des catégories spontanées du sens commun, si elle veut être une science critique qui essaie de faire des hypothèses sur les structures cachées de la vie sociale, elle doit prendre des précautions au moment de définir ses objets et les problématiques qui vont guider l'exploration sur ces objets. Ainsi, il ne peut être question de forger des concepts et des problèmes par décalque de phénomènes apparaissant de façon relativement spectaculaire sur la scène sociale. On ne doit poser que des objets et des problèmes qui peuvent avoir un rapport théorique avec la logique de la structure sociale et avec la dynamique des processus sociaux de base. C'est ainsi que le vécu et l'intentionnel propres à un acteur social qui se manifeste sur la scène sociale doivent dans toute théorie sociologique être réduits à des opérations de systèmes supposés à l'œuvre dans la société.

L'exigence d'une attitude critique à l'égard du concret apparaît particulièrement pressante si l'on admet (et les soubresauts de nos sociétés occidentales nous obligent plus ou moins à le faire) que le sociologue est un observateur tributaire d'une société qui se pense en même temps qu'elle se transforme, autrement dit que ses catégories de pensée sont étroitement dépendantes des orientations de la pratique de sa société au moment où il poursuit sa recherche. Le problème est donc de faire en sorte que l'objet de l'analyse soit défini comme le produit historique d'une pratique sociale, commandant à la fois un certain découpage des acteurs et une certaine possibilité de connaissance sociale, d'éviter ainsi de le chosifier, soit en l'identifiant aux phénomènes concrets visibles, soit en le rendant universel et atemporel.

B) De tels problèmes peuvent paraître abstraits lorsqu'ils sont formulés de façon aussi générale. Ils le sont beaucoup moins si l'on considère les développements récents de ce qu'on peut appeler „sociologie“ des rapports jeunesse-société.

## 2. LES RAPPORTS „JEUNESSE-SOCIÉTÉ“

### A) *Deux décennies de fonctionnalisme. La nécessité d'une reconversion théorique*

Tout semble se passer comme si l'on n'avait pu constituer un tel objet de recherche dans les sociétés industrielles occidentales que pendant une période caractérisée, d'une part, par une sorte de dépolitisation des rapports sociaux dominés alternativement par le mythe du consensus démocratique et par celui du „changement technique et social“, d'autre part, par la domination de la théorie fonctionnaliste parsonienne en sociologie. Cette dernière en harmonie avec un tel climat de pratique sociale, constituait sans peine les acteurs jeunes en éléments, passifs ou activateurs des rouages et des processus du système social, du fait de la position centrale dévolue, dans le fonctionnalisme, au système de socialisation, d'attribution des rôles, d'enseignement des normes. Il y a, dans la théorie fonctionnaliste, un rapport si étroit entre, d'une part, la nécessité dans laquelle se trouvent plus ou moins les individus socialement adolescents de dépasser certaines tensions au plan relationnel et certains conflits de rôles et, d'autre part, certaines exigences fonctionnelles de base du „système social“, que la constitution du fait social „jeunesse“ en fait de structure se fait par un glissement insensible, théoriquement légitime.

Mais il est clair que depuis que l'on est entré dans ce qu'on a appelé la „décennie de la protestation“ (Sampson, 1967<sup>1</sup>), c'est-à-dire depuis 1965/1966, les théorisations fonctionnalistes sur les rapports jeunesse-société perdent leur valeur de méthodes-clés aux yeux des sociologues qui en étaient les auteurs ou les adeptes avant de se trouver plongés dans des champs d'action sociale ouverts sur les conflits sociaux de base (ou sur ce que l'on peut appeler l'historicité).

La structure de la société et les processus sociaux décrits par les théoriciens fonctionnalistes apparaissent soudainement comme des modèles débordés de toutes parts, tandis que les découpages (qu'on pensait immuables) d'objets sociologiques tels que „la jeunesse“, „la société de jeunes“, „les adultes“, apparaissent comme des moules creux.

A considérer la littérature sociologique américaine sur la jeunesse des quatre dernières années, on est frappé de la différence entre la façon d'aborder les problèmes hier et aujourd'hui. S'il reste encore des auteurs pour parler de „subcultures jeunes“ (en ajoutant les termes „pop“ ou „drug“) et de „groupes de pairs“ et pour raisonner sur le rôle fonctionnel ou disfonc-

<sup>1</sup> Sampson (Edward E.), Student activism and the decade of protest, *Journal of Social Issues*, 1967, 23, 3, July, 1-33.

tionnel de ces phénomènes,<sup>2</sup> la grande majorité des écrits manifeste une prise de conscience de la nécessité d'une reconversion théorique pour aborder les faits sociaux où les jeunes paraissent jouer un rôle actif.

L'idée que l'on soutiendra ici, c'est que la reconversion entreprise n'est généralement pas menée à terme, que les théories de remplacement pèchent par le fait qu'elles substantifient „les jeunes“, „la jeunesse“; il faut, semble-t-il, voir sous ces mots non pas des concepts mais des constructions, provisoires ou durables selon le cas, de la pratique sociale, celle-ci étant définie comme répercussion des conflits de classes sur les institutions politiques et les systèmes idéologiques. Il serait sans doute possible, dans le cadre de cette approche particulière, de dépasser les limitations actuelles de la réflexion sans abandonner pour autant l'étude du fait social qu'est l'émergence des conduites collectives ou de mouvements de jeunes comme réalités ou forces sociales apparemment autonomes.

### B) Les jeunes comme innovateurs culturels

Certains auteurs, hostiles aux théorisations fonctionnalistes qui font des jeunes les produits passifs du système social ou les agents, également passifs, de processus de déséquilibre, de rééquilibrage et d'accroissement de rationalité au sein d'un ensemble articulé de sous systèmes, proposent une image renversée du rapport „jeunesse-société“ selon laquelle les jeunes deviendraient, en vertu d'une capacité créatrice endogène, des forces d'innovation arrachant la société à son inertie. Forçant la société, par leur non conformisme, à inventer une nouvelle culture, à se dépasser, les jeunes sont vus comme des ferments, des enzymes provoquant l'innovation (M. Livolsi, 1968);<sup>3</sup> porteurs du projet de la société, les jeunes essaient de forger, par le dépassement de deux idéologies aujourd'hui mutilantes: l'humanisme classique et le technicisme moderne, une nouvelle éthique révolutionnaire (E. H. Erikson, 1967)<sup>4</sup>; à l'ère de la culture planétaire et des bouleversements technologiques incessants, les jeunes luttent pour une nouvelle civilisation et l'inventent dans leur lutte (J. Jousset, 1968).<sup>5</sup>

Si séduisantes que soient ces nouvelles conceptions du rôle des jeunes dans la société, elles ont le défaut de ne pas s'appuyer sur une théorie claire de la société; en ce sens le rejet du fonctionnalisme n'amène pas ici à faire un progrès théorique. Le danger de tomber dans une conception figée et mécaniste de la société comme système social n'est écarté que pour

<sup>2</sup> Voir en particulier: Watts (William A.) & Whittaker (David), Profile of a non conformist youth culture — A study of the Berkeley non-student, *Sociology of Education*, 1968, 41, 2, Spring, 178—200; Davis (Fred) & Muñoz (Laura), Heads and freaks patterns and meanings of drug among hippies, *Journal of Health and Social Behavior*, 1968, 9, 2, Jun., 156—164; Havighurst (Robert J.), Routes to adulthood, *Journal of Cooperative Extension*, 1968, 6, 1, Spring, 7—14.

<sup>3</sup> Livolsi (Marino), Il fenomeno giovanile come sottosistema culturale, *Studi di Sociologia*, 1967, 5, 8, Juil-Sept., 248—274.

<sup>4</sup> Erikson (Erik H.), Memorandum on youth, *Daedalus*, 1967, 96, 3, Summer, 860—870.

<sup>5</sup> Jousset (Jean), *La Révolte des Jeunes*, Paris, Les Editions Ouvrières, 1968.

faire place à un autre danger, celui de céder aux visions romantiques et historicistes de la société comme sujet ou celui de faire de la philosophie de l'histoire (les jeunes sont les porte-parole du projet de la société ou les révélateurs de la vraie vocation de celle-ci). La jeunesse est alors substantifiée au point parfois de devenir messianique.

### C) *Les jeunes comme acteur de classe*

Un autre type de théories nouvelles d'inspiration marxiste tend à faire des jeunes un élément moteur de la dialectique historique, une classe ou une fraction de classe. Le biais utilisé consiste essentiellement à conférer à l'emprise totalitaire des systèmes de domination politique et idéologique associés à la domination économique du capital, une force telle qu'ils apparaissent comme un système de contrainte inerte ressemblant fort à un système de fonctions et de rôles imposés par des mécanismes de contrôle social. Ceci permet aux auteurs (Morin, 1968,<sup>6</sup> G. Mury, 1968<sup>7</sup>), de juxtaposer à la logique marxiste des concepts fonctionnalistes, tels que ceux de marginalité et de déviance potentielle et de faire ainsi de la jeunesse un élément de la structure (les non habitués, ceux qui n'ont encore qu'un pied dans le système, ceux qui ont une capacité de recul, de dégagement).

Il paraît clair que les nouvelles théories de ce genre sont insatisfaisantes pour deux raisons: elles n'utilisent pas à plein les ressources de la méthode marxiste comme méthode critique capable d'éclairer l'origine des découpages structurant les champs d'action sociale et des cristallisations idéologiques; c'est dans cette dernière perspective qu'il faut, semble-t-il, aborder le fait social „jeunesse“, ce qui permet à la fois de rompre avec des habitudes de pensée fonctionnalistes et d'éviter de tomber dans une analyse marxiste purement économiste qui dissoudrait le fait social considéré en rangeant les jeunes dans la catégorie des agents que le système capitaliste moderne fait se multiplier pour résoudre certaines de ses contradictions économiques (par exemple, pour lutter contre le risque de surproduction, détournement de producteurs potentiels de la production, fabrication de consommateurs forcés...).

### D) *La jeunesse comme objet construit par la pratique sociale, observable et analysable comme tel*

Il semble qu'on puisse faire un pas théorique en avant si l'on admet que, sociologiquement parlant, „les jeunes“, „la jeunesse“, cela n'existe pas en soi comme fait de structure, qu'il s'agit là de produits plus ou moins directs de la pratique sociale, c'est-à-dire du travail d'organisation politique et idéologique qui s'opère dans la société. C'est sans doute la méthode la meilleure pour expliquer comment une société non traditionnelle, échappant à la logique de la transmission d'un patrimoine de génération en génération,

<sup>6</sup> Morin (Edgar), „La commune étudiante“ et „Une révolution sans visage“, dans la Brèche, Première réflexion sur les événements, Fayard, Paris, 1968, pp. 13—35 et 63—89.

<sup>7</sup> Mury (Gilbert), La Société de répression, Editions universitaires, Paris, 1969.

peut être amenée à se structurer en classes d'âge, à faire de la jeunesse une catégorie universelle abstraite, à promouvoir et doter d'autonomie et de prestige les comportements particuliers des jeunes ou, au contraire, à faire fusionner les jeunes et les adultes à l'intérieur de forces sociales et politiques dont le cadre de référence est la lutte des classes. Cette démarche conduit à analyser les rapports qui existent entre, d'une part, le niveau de cohésion et le niveau de politisation de la pratique sociale, d'autre part, l'importance et le degré de prégnance des catégories „jeunes“ et „jeunesse“ dans le cadre du travail d'organisation politique et de l'élaboration des idéologies dominantes, et à expliquer en même temps le recours privilégié, soit à une théorisation de type fonctionnaliste, soit à une théorisation marxiste pour l'analyse des phénomènes mettant en action des jeunes.

La problématique d'une sociologie de la jeunesse comme fait social couvrirait un champ d'interrogation encore plus vaste: outre les conditions d'apparition d'un phénomène jeunesse en rapport avec le travail d'organisation politique et de construction idéologique opéré par la classe dominante, il faut rechercher les conditions de développement de diverses formes d'organisation politique tenant compte de l'âge et de diverses formes d'idéologie sur la jeunesse:

*organisation politique*: tolérance libérale à l'égard des „jeunesses“ à l'intérieur des forces politiques dont elles sont les „jeunes gardes“; politiques totalitaires utilisant politiquement les mouvements de jeunesse comme symbole de la volonté de puissance de l'Etat; ségrégation des jeunes accompagnée d'un travail de dépolitisation intense.

*idéologies*: libérales, messianiques, technocratiques-dépolitisantes.

La démarche proposée amène aussi à rechercher les liens qui unissent tel niveau de pratique sociale (défini en terme de cohésion et de politisation) et la dominance de telle approche théorique (fonctionnalisme, méthode marxiste dialectique,...) dans les travaux sociologiques sur la jeunesse à un moment historique donné; le problème posé est celui des conditions de la formation d'une connaissance critique des rapports société-jeunesse, par les sociologues et par les jeunes eux-mêmes. Comprise dans ces termes, une sociologie de la jeunesse serait aussi, en respectant toutefois la spécificité du domaine étudié, une application parmi d'autres d'une sociologie des mouvements sociaux étudiant le passage entre la politisation de l'action sociale et l'aliénation des acteurs dans des structures et des idéologies imposées par les classes dominantes.

#### E) Directions de recherche. Quelques modèles hypothétiques

Le type d'analyse qui semble le plus intéressant pour développer la démarche esquissée consisterait à dégager, dans une société considérée, un certain nombre de périodes caractérisées chacune par un mode spécifique d'organisation politique des jeunes, par une idéologie particulière de la jeunesse, par un mode de connaissance scientifique d'un certain type appliqué au fait social „jeunesse“, par une conscience particulière des jeunes eux-mêmes, plus ou moins aliénée dans les catégories qui leur sont imposées.

L'hypothèse générale que l'on peut faire, et qui semble validée par les illustrations que l'on donnera plus loin, est la suivante: plus est forte la capacité de l'Etat de réaliser un consensus, plus est faible le niveau de politisation de la pratique sociale dans le cadre des institutions politiques (système des partis, parlementarisme, par exemple) économiques (régulation des rapports entre les groupes professionnels et le Patronat) et culturelles (système d'enseignement, en particulier), et moins la jeunesse existe comme catégorie générale pour l'organisation politique de la société et comme thème idéologique. C'est le tableau de la France d'entre les deux guerres, dotée d'un état républicain, réalisant le consensus autour de lui, entre autre par le canal de son système d'enseignement, et libéral, pour cette raison même, à l'égard des forces sociales existantes et légalisées, d'autant qu'aucune d'elle ne trouve dans l'état des institutions un terrain favorable à l'attaque de l'ordre républicain bourgeois. La jeunesse n'existait pas alors comme fait social. Seules existaient „les jeunesses“, membres jeunes des organisations politiques et confessionnelles, formant de simples sections spécialisées dans certaines tâches. C'est dans ces termes qu'on parlait des jeunes; on en parlait peu.

On pourrait compléter cette hypothèse comme suit: lorsque la capacité de l'Etat d'assurer un consensus autour de lui s'affaiblit du fait d'initiatives politiques, économiques et culturelles qui l'amènent à provoquer des divisions entre les familles idéologiques, les classes, les groupes socio-économiques, mais sans que la légitimité des institutions soit ébranlée, l'Etat relayé par les autres institutions, tend à opérer avec succès une organisation politique sur la base des classes d'âge et à développer des idéologies sur la jeunesse qui aliènent cette dernière et enferment les sociologues dans une vision fonctionnaliste des rapports entre les jeunes et la société (des „adultes“). Deux variantes peuvent apparaître, comme le suggèrent deux périodes de l'histoire moderne de la société française:

la variante totalitaire fasciste dont la fonction est de masquer et d'étouffer les divisions politiques et idéologiques ainsi que les luttes de classes dans les périodes de crise nationale (1940—1944): la jeunesse est alors à la fois ségréguée politiquement et constituée en mythe symbolisant la force de l'Etat nouveau;

la variante technocratique ou techniciste dont la fonction est de contenir et de détourner les révoltes sociales nées dans les milieux de jeunes travailleurs (arrivée en masse des jeunes générations sur le marché du travail) à l'époque (1963—1967) où se construit le néo-capitalisme français au moyen de l'accumulation (plan de stabilisation en 1963) de la modernisation des structures et de la reconversion forcée; dans le cadre de cette variante se développe, structurellement et idéologiquement, la catégorie des „jeunes“, parfaitement universelle, abstraite et vide, uniformisant la conscience et les styles de toute une tranche d'âge, adossée à l'idéologie du développement, du progrès technique, de la fin des idéologies (politiques); dans le cadre de cette période, il y a une assez forte aliénation des jeunes eux mêmes par intériorisation du découpage pratique et idéologique qui leur est imposé; cette aliénation est observable aussi chez les sociologues qui sont alors aux Etats-Unis et dans la plupart des pays européens, fonctionnalistes ou forte-

ment enclins à substantifier „la jeunes e“, „les jeunes“ dans le cadre d'autres constructions théoriques.

Enfin, le dernier volet de l'hypothèse serait le suivant: lorsqu'à la fois la capacité de l'Etat à assurer un consensus autour de lui est très faible et que des conflits sociaux vont jusqu'à mettre en cause la légitimité même des institutions établies, on assiste à la disparition de la jeunesse comme fait social. D'abord parce que les jeunes eux-mêmes ne peuvent plus se concevoir comme jeunes mais seulement comme catégories socio-économiques ou politico-idéologiques du fait de la politisation des systèmes institutionnels désormais traversés totalement par les conflits de classes; ensuite, parce que l'Etat n'arrive plus, faute de relais institutionnels (partis politiques, enseignement, consommation), à imposer une organisation politique et surtout une idéologie dominante. C'est le tableau de la société actuelle où, avec la ré-émergence des conflits sociaux depuis la crise de mai-juin 68, on assiste à une décomposition des systèmes de contrôle et des systèmes idéologiques mis en place par l'Etat, l'enseignement, les partis politiques, la culture et les moyens de manipulation de masse. L'observation de la situation présente amène à la suggestion suivante: si la jeunesse disparaît comme fait social produit par la pratique politique et la pratique idéologique de la classe dominante, il semble que „les jeunesses“ réapparaissent dans le cadre des nouvelles organisations politiques, mais non plus comme sections des cadets: leur structuration spontanée marque seulement la volonté des organisations nouvelles d'échapper aux aliénations visibles en France et dans d'autres régions du monde: ces organisations se veulent jeunes par leur virginité politique et non par leur recrutement.

*F) Conclusion: „la jeunesse et le changement social“,  
thème de recherche sociologique?*

Se demander quel rôle jouent „les jeunes“ dans „le changement social“, ne saurait donc être une problématique satisfaisante dans la phase traversée actuellement par les sociétés capitalistes avancées.

L'activation des conflits sociaux, la politisation de l'action sociale, l'éclatement de l'autonomie fonctionnelle apparente de la plupart des institutions interdit aujourd'hui à l'Etat, aux systèmes qui régissent la culture et la consommation de masse, au système politique, au système d'enseignement, de forger et d'imposer des catégories pratiques et des modèles idéologiques neutres et universels. Les notions de „jeunes“ et de „changement social“ appartiennent précisément à ces modèles qui eurent une légitimité il y a quelques années mais qui font partie aujourd'hui d'un arsenal idéologique sérieusement miné.

La seule façon de réfléchir sur le thème de „la jeunesse, agent potentiel de changement social“ consisterait à le situer dans une problématique générale et relativisante: on se demanderait dans quelle conjoncture socio-historique, l'Etat, les institutions économiques, politiques et idéologiques, l'opinion, les jeunes, les sociologues sont amenés à la fois à substantifier la jeunesse et à consolider et systématiser la société comme un tout fonctionnel, à faire jouer aux jeunes, en droit et en fait, le rôle d'agents de rééquilibrage et d'adaptation au service des mécanismes régulateurs d'une société coupée de son mouvement historique.

## UTOPIA AND MASS MOBILIZATION IN THE ITALIAN STUDENT PROTEST

GIANNI STATERA  
ITALY

The purpose of this paper is to single out some aspects of youth behavior in Italy in relation to the sudden outbreak of student protest in 1968 as well as its fast decline as an original phenomenon of collective behavior. I shall therefore mention the result of researches carried out by Italian social scientists in the early sixties and shall then describe the main findings of a research I have been carrying out at the University of Rome in 1968-69. These findings support the hypothesis that a set of needs and values largely shared by the mass of Italian students was at the root of the utopia of the student movement until the beginning of 1969. At that time new ideologies and strategies were built by the *groupuscules* emerging from the melting pot of the movement.

In my analysis, on the one hand, I will describe the nature of those needs and values as well as their conflict with cultural norms and institutional structures, on the other. I will point to some consequences of student protest on the Italian culture and the Italian political situation. As a conclusion to this paper I will try to answer the question whether student protest was successful in producing social and/or cultural change in Italy.

### *I. Uncommitted Youth and Student Protest*

During the early sixties it was widely assumed that Italian youth was characterized by the same uncommitment found in the American and German youth. In fact, the image of the "cool student" provided by David Riesman<sup>1</sup> with reference to the United States and that of the "sceptical youth"<sup>2</sup> defined by Helmut Schelsky in relation to West Germany seemed to have their correspondent in the Italian "three M's youth", as described by Ita Italo Bertoni and Ugoberto Alfassio-Grimaldi.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> D. Riesman, *The College Student in an Age Organization*, 1958; reprinted in M. Rutenbeck (ed.) *The dilemma of the Organizational Society*, New York, 1963.

<sup>2</sup> H. Schelsky, *Die skeptische Generation: eine Soziologie der Deutschen Jugend*, Dusseldorf, 1959.

<sup>3</sup> I. Bertoni and Ugoberto Alfassio-Grimaldi, *I giovani degli anni sessanta*, Bari, 1964.



The "three M's youth" (*Mestiere* — that is job; *Macchina*, that is car; *Moglie*, that is wife) was characterized by an apparent tendency to integration within the system. (In other words, young people seemed to aim at a quiet, bourgeois life, whose satisfactions were to be found in privacy rather than in public commitment.) Indeed, even if the young Italians of the sixties were more informed and even-minded than their counterpart of the fifties, civic consciousness and political participation continued to be very low. The above generalizations were based on one research-project on high-school students of Pavia. Other researches, however, confirmed this trend in non-students too.<sup>4</sup>

The image of such Italian uncommitted youth apparently contrasts with the outbreak of the protest that upset universities in 1968. However, I believe that the image of the Italian youth they outlined was substantially accurate and may even provide us with relevant explanatory factors of student protest.

As a matter of fact, the absenteeism and political indifference emphasized by many social scientists did not prevent them from considering an increasing frustration in youth.

David Riesman maintained that privacy was seen by the students he interviewed as a sort of "compensation room" for the alienation of young people in a society shaped and directed by others: a sort of last chance to revive a *Gemeinschaft* in opposition to *Gesellschaft*. This search for *Gemeinschaft*, which the large majority of youth used to satisfy through the escape into private life, found a different outcome in the hippy protest since the beginning of the sixties. In this case, the rejection of the system was apparently total: while the "three M's youth" accepted the rules of the game, hippies aimed at breaking them provocatively; while the first sought refuge in the family, i. e. one of the institutions of the system, the latter built up communities that were supposed to be deviant with regard to the cultural norms of the system.

They experimented different channels, but their rejection of the system in fact turned into declared seclusion and their rituals and fashions, in fact, became objects of mass consumption.

The commitment of the early hippy movement to political activity cannot be overlooked. The outcome of the movement is, however, to a greater degree a renunciation rather than a confrontation.

There is little doubt that a similar search for *Gemeinschaft*, a feeling of alienation from the established system and deeply rooted libertarian drives were at the origins of student protest in Germany, France and Italy. These libertarian drives, which produced an open confrontation against the system, represented nothing but a different answer to the same condition to which the "cool student" and "three M's youth", on one hand, and the hippies, on

<sup>4</sup> P. G. Grasso, *Gioventù di metà secolo*, Roma, 1964; *Personalità giovanile in transizione*, Zurich, 1964; see also A. Carbonaro and D. Lumachi, *Giovani in provincia*, Firenze, 1963. G. Martinotti, *La partecipazione politica dei giovani*, in *Quaderni di sociologia*, No. 3-4, 1956.

the other, answered by escaping into private life or into a ritualistic sub-culture.

Undoubtedly, student protest is a phenomenon directly involving only small minorities, or "revolutionary vanguards", as opposed to a mass of young people still oriented to integration within a quiet, bourgeois way of life—a mass, however, that was mobilized, at least for a short time, by the anti-authoritarian, libertarian utopia developed by the Italian, the French and the German student movement.

Although Italy, France and Germany were not the only European countries where students protested, they are the ones where the protest turned into "total confrontation".

## 2. *The Utopia of the Italian Student Movement*

Compared to the French, the Italian student movement was less effective in stirring up revolutionary outbursts; compared to the German, it was less creative. It showed, however, an extraordinary capacity to grow upon a phenomenon of intense collective enthusiasm, to keep this phenomenon alive, to develop and exploit it through the elaboration of an utopian-oriented set of ideas which mobilized youth to an unprecedented degree.

The attack on authoritarianism was the starting point of the ideology of the protest. The structure of the university appeared to the students as the materialization of the most rigid and repressive authoritarianism, which was assumed to be typical of an advanced industrial society, either capitalist or even socialist. The total negation of this social system became then the long run objective. In order to do so, however, it was necessary to attain first personal liberation. *Totale Befreiung*, as a negation of the omnipresent repression exerted by the system.

Indeed, a psychological, intellectualistic emphasis on individual liberation was implicit in all the first documents issued by the student movement.<sup>5</sup>

In terms of strategy, the idea was that the revolution had to be "liberation" first; it could be put into effect eminently — or even exclusively — by intellectuals. Now, the students, who were supposed to be "uprooted" by their very nature since they are no longer integrated within the "family" institution (part of the system) and have not yet assumed the functional role which will make them a small cog of the system itself could cover the long, hard way leading to true consciousness, could refuse the fascination of the consumer society and finally lead the blind, culturally integrated working class to a society in which there would be no exploitation. However, individual liberation ended up being *the end* rather than a means or *an end*. Direct democracy, permanent assemblies, free group-work and group-

<sup>5</sup> See, in particular, the documents issued by the students of the University of Turin, in the journal "Quindici", January 15, 1968 as well as in the collections *Università: L'ipotesi rivoluzionaria*, Padova, 1968 and *Documenti della rivolta universitaria Bari*, 1968; see also G. Statera, *The short spring of the Italian student movement*; in "New Politics", VIII, 1, 1970 and *Die Utopie der Italienischen Studentenbewegung*, in "Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie", 3, 1971.

thinking became the slogans of the early protest. These "devices toward liberation" were developed up to a point in which the students remained paralyzed in exhausting, endless assemblies during which concepts and words were debated and decomposed in a subtle exercise which — as a student leader puts it — "made for an extraordinary process of intellectual, dialectical maturation of individuals most of whom barely had a gross political idea before". Sometimes this exercise "in dialectical terms" was so dialectic as to become self-disruptive. At the University of Turin, for example, the commission "Education and Society" that worked in the occupied school of Philosophy, carried a motion that forbade the use of any book, but this was not enough. A few days later, as a leader of the student movement wrote, "the commission achieved the extreme liberation from the 'book-God': the books available for the work of the commission itself were torn apart and five sheets given to each member"<sup>6</sup>. Meanwhile, in the crowded general assemblies held at the University of Rome after the serious clashes with the police on February 28, 1968, the students theorized of "the rule of the assembly" both as a "negation" of the "false" and deceiving representative democracy which hides the violence of the majority on the minority, and as a "negation" of the bureaucratized structure of power in socialist countries.

As a Roman student puts it, "we occupied anxiously, with confuse, great expectations.... The point is that we had to carry out a new kind of struggle and we *had to make the revolution inside ourselves*"<sup>7</sup>.

Spontaneity, the romantic exaltation of Mao Tse Tung and "Che" Guevara, the rejection of bureaucracy, organization, structure — anything that recalled a system — the refusal not only of institutional but also of cultural and/or ideological authority (including Marxist-Leninist ideology) and therefore the tendency to identify revolutionary theory with revolutionary practice although not always in terms of physical action; all this seemed to lead to a form of irrationalism and lowered the press, as well as some academicians and politicians, to issue a warning cry at the revival of a "left wing fascism", or "fascism" *tout court*<sup>8</sup>. The presence of neo-fascist groups among the ranks of the student movement gave more strength and credibility to this idea, which, regardless of any derogatory purpose, is correct, at least in part, if one considers the emotional coordinates of the anarcho-syndicalist outbursts that originated fascism as anti-capitalist as well as anti-bolshevik movement.

Generally speaking, it is always advisable to refrain from labelling in current political-ideological terms a social movement in a time of collective

<sup>6</sup> C. Viale, *Contro l'Università in Università: L'ipotesi rivoluzionaria*, cit. p. 113.

<sup>7</sup> M. Barone, *Libro bianco sul movimento studentesco*, Roma, 1968.

<sup>8</sup> This was already maintained by foreign observers as L. Labedz, *Students and Revolution*, in "Survey", No. 68, 1968; M. Beloff, *Emancipation of a Generation*, in "Survey", No. 69, 1968, and L. Feuer, *Patterns of Irrationality*, *ibidem*. The catholic philosopher G. DeI Noce launched first this accuse in Italy (in "Gente", No. 35, Aug. 28, 1968). The moderate press had been wavering between the label of "Nazism" and that of "Maoism", until the label "Nazi-maoism" was created. Communist leaders talked about the "irrational idolizing of infantile extremism" (P. Bufalini in "Rinascita", March 1st, 1969) and the "petty bourgeois and anarchistic leftism, which is essentially reactionary" (Natta, in "Rinascita", March 15, 1968).

behavior. It seems, however, legitimate to use for analytical purposes ideal types like those suggested by Karl Mannheim in relation to the forms of utopia which followed one after the other during the history. There is little doubt that many features of the structure of thought typical of the "chiliastic utopia" could be found in the values and ideas which shaped the Italian student movement in 1968, so that I would suggest defining it as "chiliastically oriented". Obviously on the background of the student movement's utopia the basic Marxian assumption lies according to which a classless society must replace the present capitalist system. This is not, however, a yardstick for distinguishing between what Mannheim defined as the "chiliastic utopia" and the "socialist-communist utopia". On the other hand, it is hardly possible to contrast a chiliastic utopia to a socialist-communist utopia in abstract terms. They are often mixed together as in the case of anarchism, which Mannheim himself maintained to be the best modern instance of chiliasm. The above ideal types can be useful only insofar as they allow one to single out those elements that seem to be more relevant in a given stage of the historical process.

In the case of the anabaptists and the anarchist followers of Bakunin, the revolution was not simply a means toward a precisely defined goal such as a classless social system: the present was not subdued to a definite future. Similarly during the early stage of the protest, the Italian student movement conceived revolution as an end rather than as a means. "Permanent revolution", after all, was the most popular slogan in the Italian universities in 1968 and the "struggle against the rationality of the system" was a dominant theme in the documents of the student movement. In other words, the realization of one's Self in the present, here and now, was the goal itself so that the dichotomy means ends, as determined in Marxian terms, appeared to be superseded, if not overturned.

According to Mannheim, "the only true, perhaps the only direct, identifying characteristics of chiliastic experience is absolute presentness..... For the real chiliast, the present becomes the breach through which what was previously inward bursts out suddenly, takes holds of the outer world and transforms it"<sup>9</sup>.

Moreover, "Chiliasm sees the revolution as a value in itself, not as an unavoidable means to a rationally set end, but as the only creative principle of the immediate present"<sup>10</sup>.

For the students of Rome, Turin, Pisa, Naples, Florence, committed to "desacrate" the prestige of the professors and absorbed into endless assembly discussions, there was essentially only the "here and now", a presentness to be intellectually or practically exhausted in a widespread collective excitement. Barricaded in the universities after the clashes of Valle Giulia in Rome, the mass of the students found their end in their very intellectual excitement, in the spontaneity of their action, in the freedom they experienced first in occupying buildings which were the symbols of the repressive au-

<sup>9</sup> K. Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia*, New York, Harcourt Brace, p. 215.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibidem*, cit. p. 217.

thoritarianism that frustrated them not only in the educational institution as such, but even at home, since the university was perceived as an institution *in loco parentis*.

A rigorous and complete definition of the utopia of the Italian student movement would require a much more detailed inquiry and a careful content analysis of its documents. This I began to do elsewhere.<sup>11</sup> What interests me here is to outline the main characteristics of this utopia, which made possible the relatively high level of mobilization in the mass of Italian students two years ago. As this utopia was repudiated, or at least largely superseded by the groupuscules which developed in 1969, mass support to the movement decreased constantly.

I am not suggesting that a specific kind of utopia could have been the mobilizing factor; this would be methodologically and substantially incorrect, because of the intense mass participation to the very shaping of this libertarian utopia. Moreover, when I suggest that this utopia can be defined as a form of chiliasm, I implicitly reject any approach in terms of "history of ideas". In fact, the same warning issued by Mannheim in relation with the study of Anabaptism holds true in our case. "Ideas — writes Mannheim — did not drive these men to revolutionary deeds. To see everything that occurred during this period as the work of "ideas" is an unconscious distortion produced during the liberal-humanitarian stage of utopian mentality. The history of ideas was the creation of an "idea-struck" age, which involuntarily reinterpreted the past in the light of its own central experience. It was not "ideas" that impelled men during the Peasant Wars to revolutionary action. This eruption had its roots in much deeper-lying vital and elementary levels of the psyche"<sup>12</sup>.

In relation to student protest, all this can be translated in terms of a widespread, confused feeling of dissatisfaction and frustration that suddenly exploded in an intense form of collective enthusiasm. This was kept for some time by those libertarian hints already present in the ideology of the early student movement, which, in turn, were further developed by the mobilized masses, until the end of 1968, when the Leninist upturn imposed by leftist groupuscules to the movement came along with a decline that led, if not to the death of its original utopian drive.

### 3. *The Mass Mobilization and Its Reasons*

The findings of an empirical research carried out in Rome<sup>13</sup>, as well as other data about the students in Milan<sup>14</sup> show that the majority of Italian

<sup>11</sup> G. Statera, *Die Utopie der Italienischen Studentenbewegung* in "Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie", 3, 1971.

<sup>12</sup> K. Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia*, cit., p. 213-214.

<sup>13</sup> G. Statera, *Gli studenti universitari romani: rapporto di ricerca*, in "De Homine", 23-36, 1970.

<sup>14</sup> G. Martinotti, *The Positive Marginality: Notes on Italian Students in Periods of Political Mobilization*, in S. M. Lipset — P. Altbach, *Students in Revolt*, Boston, 1969.

students shared the main aspects of the confused set of utopian ideas outlined by the student movement.

The results of the Rome research proved that the great majority of the students was highly dissatisfied: 1) with the formal relationships with professors; 2) with the content and structure of teaching; 3) with the patterns of interpersonal relations both with professors and fellow students. Altogether 61.2% of our interviewees were generally dissatisfied with the "climate" of university.

This supports the hypothesis that young people, especially those belonging to middle and upper-middle class, are deceived in their expectations when they enter university. Coming from an authoritarian and repressive family environment, they are likely to place great expectations in the university as a new, open environment. The higher these expectations the higher the frustration when they face the reality of a bureaucratized, repressive mass university.

As far as lower class students are concerned, they sharply perceive the difficulty of establishing genuine interpersonal relations with fellow students. They feel themselves to be "marginal" and the hypothesis that the university is based on class discrimination even among students seems to be reliable. The awareness of marginality, however, is unlikely, to push lower class students into the protest; on the contrary, they are more likely than other students to reject the protest, or simply to ignore it, preferring to accept the institutional channels for education as they are, or even trying to make use of them as best as possible.

Except lower classes, which are underrepresented in the Italian universities, the main themes of the protest are shared by the students. First, 90.3% of our interviewees agrees partly or completely with the reasons of the protest, although only 44.5% approve violent methods; 85.6% maintain that the Italian university system needs a "radical reform" or even a "true revolution"; most importantly 65% maintain that this radical reform is hardly possible within the present political system. This is clearly the repetition of a slogan of the Student Movement, since only 22.8% of our respondents label themselves as "leftwing oriented" and therefore explicitly aiming at overthrowing the system. These data are especially relevant as the percentage of leftwing voters in Italy is about 40%. The following conclusion can therefore be drawn: the student movement had a real grip on the mass of Italian students in so far as it outlined a strategy of protest whose libertarian grounds could be accepted even — or above all — by liberal as well as by moderate and non-political students.

#### *4. The Decline of the Movement*

Just as the student movement suddenly exploded, so it suddenly declined. Early in 1969 the sit-ins, the occupations of the universities, the assemblies continued. However, both quantitatively and qualitatively the phenomenon was changing. The "general assemblies" — the pride of the student movement in 1968 — began to be less and less general, less and less crowded; and the liberty of taking the floor to say whatever each student had in mind

was limited, the agenda was more strictly followed, the participation in the process of decision-making was restricted to a few leaders. Small groups of Trotskyites, Marxist-Leninists, Castroists, Anarchists and Maoists emerged and re-emerged from the melting-pot of the movement then trying to organize themselves and violently fighting each against the other.

While the mass of the students increasingly deserted the assemblies, the *groupuscules* turned their interest to the workers and the university became more and more a minor battlefield. This depended not only upon a strong Leninist revival among student leaders that, in a sort of *cupio dissolvi*, claimed they had to "learn" from workers, but also on tactical considerations. In fact, the imminent term of most national labour contracts, which would have produced a period of tension, was generally expected to provide an excellent opportunity to radicalize the political struggle by mobilizing the workers themselves against the unions and the "reformist" parties, including the Communist party.

"Spontaneity" became a derogatory term and the student revolt of 1968, whose main feature had been simply spontaneity, was labelled as a "magazine-like revolution".<sup>15</sup> "At present — stated a student leader — it is meaningless for us (students) to remain isolated within the universities to fight against educational selection, while Capitalism makes a much more profound and effective selection in the factories; it is here we have to start with the revolution; later, even the struggles of the students will take breath and will turn out to be more meaningful."<sup>16</sup> The students' uprising has thus been, according to this view, an exhausted experience. This is clearly a posthumous rationalisation of the death of the movement, partly due to the inability of its leaders (at first more or less hidden in the context of declared participatory democracy) to provide a consistent libertarian utopia that should have grown upon the chiliastically oriented outbursts of the protest in 1968.

Since the beginning of the academic year 1969-1970, any link between students and the student movement has been practically cut out. The relative success achieved by the groupuscules during the so-called "hot autumn", when repeated wildcat strikes, a general strike, workers rallies, factory occupations and confrontations with the police took place during a process of mobilization that partly superseded the trade unions made for their final withdrawal from the universities. A group called the "Student Movement" still exists but its present impact seems to be very low, while the former leaders of the movement are active in their groups, *but not as students*.

Two questions therefore arise: 1) What did the student movement change in the student body and in the institutions more closely involved, i. e. the universities? 2) What social and cultural changes did it produce at a higher level in Italy?

These are obviously questions which could be satisfactorily answered only on the basis of complex researches. Let us try to point to some clues.

<sup>15</sup> M. Barone, *Libro bianco sul movimento studentesco*, Roma, 1968, p. 17.

<sup>16</sup> Statement by the student leader Franco Piperno, as reported in P. Mieli and M. Scialoja, *Atlante della contestazione*, in "L'espresso Colore", Nov. 1969, 48, p. 14.

With regard to the second question, the action more than the utopia of the student movement had a relevant impact not only on the workers but also on the trade unions which seemed to be capable enough of adapting themselves to the new needs emerging in the working class under the very impact of student protest. At first sight, the same is not true of any Italian party. As far as the political system is concerned the danger of a moderate backlash is still far from being averted. It is, however, largely recognized that the effect of the "hot autumn" and therefore indirectly, of student protest, has been that of modifying the social balance of the country. The gains of the working class have been admittedly relevant and their increased consciousness is evident.

As to the institution within which and in relation to which the protest began, i. e. the university, no radical reform of this outdated structure, where 3,000 full professors have power of life and death over 500,000 students and several thousands of lower-rank professors, is to be expected in the short run. Two small changes, however, have taken place: a) the opening of the university to anybody with a high school degree, regardless of the type of school; b) the possibility of deciding upon subjects in individual study plans. These small changes could have an unexpected social and cultural impact. So far, the only remark I can make is that, unexpectedly enough, a large number of students from technical secondary schools have decided to enter schools of liberal arts, that is schools which do not provide an easy, direct opportunity to get a job after the master's degree. And it is worth stressing that the majority of these students, whom we interviewed in Rome, said their decision depended upon the need of a "critical education" such as liberal arts schools are supposed to provide. This supports the hypothesis that the main values of the betrayed utopia of the early stage of student protest are still shared by large sections of Italian youth...



## POLITICS OF THE YOUTH COUNTER-CULTURE AND DEMANDS FOR CHANGE

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USA

It is one of the ironies of the day that politicized youth of both Left and Right often seem indistinguishable in their stands on many of the issues which have emerged recently on the American political scene. The aim of this paper is to examine briefly some of the new meanings applied to Left and Right and to specify several major points of growing convergence between the two political camps. Special attention is directed to the growing "politics of convergence" among young activists of the New Left and Libertarian Right in the United States and to the potential impact of both movements for future radical change. Before proceeding, however, some critical but not necessarily obvious distinctions between the two political camps should be clarified.

### *Distinguishing Left from Right*

It is important at the outset to distinguish clearly between two distinct factions within the conventional frame of American Right-Wing politics. The first is viewed in the continuing tradition of American conservatism and for present purposes is termed the *Traditional Right*. This faction of the conservative movement, sometimes referred to as the "Old Right", draws in good part from Hoover's critique of the federal government anti-depression program of social welfare legislation — i. e., the National Recovery Act, Social Security, and other similar measures. The nature of Hoover's attack centered on what was labelled as the "welfare state". The institutional machinery developed to put into effect the broad social programs of an increasingly centralized and bureaucratized welfare state still lie at the brunt of present-day criticism from the Right. The attack has been repeated over the years by other conservative spokesmen of the Traditional Right from Robert Taft through to John Tower and Barry Goldwater, and has always been a major part of the Republican Party platform.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The traditional stream of American conservatism is also rooted in the earlier federalist debates and in the views of such men as Hamilton and Adams. Among current intel-

A second faction of the organized conservative movement is the *Libertarian Right*, sometimes referred to as the "New Right". This is a relatively recent phenomenon of the organized conservative movement, although it draws from a strong civil libertarian tradition. The libertarians trace their early intellectual roots largely from the works of Adam Smith and J. S. Mill, through Henry Thoreau, Thomas Jefferson, William Graham Sumner, Herbert Spencer, Ludwig von Mises and the "Austrian School" of economics, to some of the contemporary anti-Keynsian views of F. A. Hayek and Milton Friedman.<sup>3</sup>

A fundamental belief in the virtue, freedom, and autonomy of the individual lies at the root of the libertarian's hostile opposition to the "coercive" and "criminal" bureaucratic rule of the liberal, welfare state. Their brand of individualism is grounded essentially in an economic, self-interest form of *laissez-faire* "anarcho-capitalism" (Lubbe, 1969). It is the civil libertarian emphasis on personal freedom and autonomy that distinguishes them largely from the traditionalist faction of the conservative movement which today places its emphasis more on the statist-oriented values of authority, law and order.<sup>3</sup>

This new movement of the Right consists of relatively small, but rapidly growing, group of young and articulate libertarians who feel that their older conservative counterparts have not gone far enough in their critique of centralized government and the welfare state. Indeed, it is striking to note that the libertarians aim much of their attack against what they see as a growing fusion of the Traditional Right with the Old Left on a wide variety of issues which tends to support the very frame of a centralized and bureaucratized welfare state. The thrust of their attack takes the form of a polemic against the growing law-and-order brand of authoritarianism and statism of the older generation Establishment in the libertarian name of individual freedom and autonomy. It is at this point that young activists of the Libertarian Right often join forces with radicals of the New Left in a dual-pronged attack against the present system.<sup>4</sup>

lectual spokesmen in this general vein are Russel Kirk, William Buckley, Jr., and others who write for such publications as the *National Review*, *Human Events*, *Intercollegiate Review*, and *Modern Age*. The views of the Young Americans for Freedom (YAF), the youth-action arm of this movement, are channelled largely through their publication, the *New Guard*.

<sup>2</sup> The views of major spokesmen in this vein, like Murray Rothbard, Karl Hess and Ronald Hamowy, are voiced largely through such publications as *Left and Right*, *The New Individualist Review* and their bimonthly review, *The Libertarian Forum*. A wide variety of miscellaneous essays, pamphlets, and other small journals distributed by several newly emerging libertarian chapters throughout the country include the *Libertarian Connection*, *Rational Individualist*, *Protos*, and *Commentary on Liberty*.

<sup>3</sup> Definitive essays outlining the general scope of the new libertarian faction, as distinct from its traditionalist forebearer are found in Meyer (1964); also see Hamowy (1968), Rothbard (1969), Hess (1969), Kennell (1969), and Turner, et al. (1969).

<sup>4</sup> For libertarian positions on their recent split from the Buckley-YAF faction of the Traditional Right, see Rothbard (1969), Rothbard, et al. (1966b), and Hamowy (1968). Growing convergence with the New Left on a wide variety of current issues is well documented by the libertarians themselves (Rothbard, et al., 1966a; Kennell, 1969; Turner, et al., 1969; and the "Left-Right Festival of Liberation", 1970).

The *New Left* is of relatively recent origins, dating roughly from the early 1960's with the new, youthful resurgence of civil rights activism, the 1962 SDS Port Huron Statement, the 1964 Berkeley Free Speech Movement (FSM), the emergence of the Peace and Freedom Party (PFP) in 1968, and a variety of anti-war groups. Its program, also critical of government, is difficult to specify. Although most observers from outside assume a coherent ideology of the New Left, the radicals themselves do not so assume. Given the heterogeneity of groups making up the New Left, nothing like a party platform exists. A main difference between the New Left and both the Old Left and Traditional Right is the New Left's antipathy to conventional political forms and organizations. It does not relate well to the Democratic Party, or to the larger structure of pluralistic politics.

One way of specifying the varied and ambiguous boundaries of the New Left more distinctly is to define them as the differences between what has been called the "Third" and "Fourth" Worlds. The "First" and "Second" Worlds are the predominantly white, affluent, modernized (developed) countries, with the First World representing the countries of Western Europe and North America and the Second World including all those countries on the other side of the "Iron Curtain". The Third World includes all of those nations — for the most part non-white — striving for the levels of modernization achieved by the first two Worlds.

The Fourth World has come into existence only recently. It is composed of white radicals who have dropped out of the value framework of the first two Worlds and who have allied with the Third World against the first two Worlds. The nature of this peculiar alliance, however, must be specified. The Fourth World rejects modernization of the Third World based on the political-economic models of the first two Worlds. Special hostility is directed against that part of the Third World which seeks to upgrade itself in the manner of Western capitalism. The Third World conception is also broadened to include the essentially non-white minority populations of the First World. Fourth World support is extended particularly to those segments of the Black, Chicano, Puerto Rican, and Indian populations which are striving for new forms of community power and collective self-determination within the frame of what is referred to as "colonial" white America. Perhaps one of the clearest manifestations of the anti-First and Second World values on the part of the Fourth World is the cultural revolution of Hippies and their politicized counterpart, the Yippies, along with a variety of other newly emerging life-style groups. This aspect of the New Left Movement reflects, to a large extent, the values and political styles of a youth "counter-culture" aimed at the older generation, white middle-class, one-dimensional structure of values and authority that is a part of the military-corporate-liberal system they reject.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>5</sup> The New Left is a complex social and cultural, as well as political, phenomenon composed of a wide diversity of groups ranging from youthful McCarthy supporters to more militant Marxist-Leninist, Trotskyist, Maoist, and Socialist groups. Such groups as the Young People's Socialist League (YPSL), the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA), and the Progressive Labor Party (PLP) are included in the broad framework of the New Left only to

### *The Response to Government*

Both traditionalists and libertarians of the Right have criticized the centralization of power in the federal government, advocating instead localism and states' rights, seeking less government in the economy and more economy in government. Harking back to a pre-New Deal America, the conservative critique of government stresses limited, highly decentralized government in which hard-working local interests are encouraged by minimal governmental constraints while seeking private goals. Less centralized government means more freedom for individuals to advance their own economic interests.

It should be noted that the Right's attack is not on government *per se*. On the contrary, they favor government, provided that it is more readily controllable by relatively local interests. The traditionalists in particular affirm the assumptions of a pluralistic system and, indeed, seek an expansion of private versus public interests that would extend the pluralistic system. The Right therefore does not oppose government as an organizational form but as a problem of centralization, and as part of the welfare state. The thrust of the attack is aimed at the centralized scope of governmental bureaucracy and at the pervasive form of federal control required by the goals of social welfare legislation.

In contrast, the New Left attack on government rests on a different set of values and purposes. The thrust of its criticism is aimed at the injustice of "corporate liberalism" and the broad military-corporate-industrial power structure that it supports. Much of the anti-structure attack mirrors a basic rejection of the values, concerns, and life styles often tied to the bureaucratized, organizational life of the corporate-liberal system. Antipathy to the present governmental organization extends to all forms of social organization based on bureaucratic industrial models.

Nowhere is the radicals' anti-structure attack clearer than in their rejection of the bureaucratized university — what Clark Kerr calls the "mul-

the extent to which they unite on selected civil rights civil liberties, and peace issues. Militant ethnic minority-group movements as the Black Panther Party, Brown Berets, Third World Liberation Front, and the National Alliance for Red Power are included to the extent that their activities on similar issues converge with those of white radicals. An early definitive and influential statement on the New Left Movement is C. Wright Mills' "Letter to the New Left" (1960). Other representative works bearing on aspects of New Left history, ideology, and organization are found in Cohen and Hale (1966), Jacobs and Landau (1966), Keniston (1968), Brown (1969), Oglesby (1969), and Roszak (1969).

Special note should be made of a recent split in SDS, as it reflects a more fundamental cleavage presently surfacing in the larger New Left Movement. The newest faction of SDS — the Revolutionary Youth Movement I (RYM-I), or Weatherman faction — has shifted its energies toward a more violent brand of revolutionary vanguardism, organized street fighting and urban guerilla warfare, characterized by a harder Marxist-Leninist-Maoist line of ideology and a more organized form of tactical protest. This faction, until recently, controlled the SDS National Office and its principal organ, New Left Notes. The Weatherman group has developed into a relatively small revolutionary vanguard and now operates, for the most part, underground. It represents a very clear split in ideology, organization, and tactical procedure from the older SDS line currently represented by the Revolutionary Youth Movement-II (RYM-II). The present paper is geared to the larger segment of less violent, popular-based, and essentially reform-oriented New Left radicals as partly manifest in RYM-II.

tiversity". Radicals see such a university as a microcosm of, and a processing station for, the larger consumer society. Thus the university today receives much of the brunt of radical hostilities and serves as a major mobilization ground for radical change in the larger society.

Whereas the Right is rooted in traditional values of individual economic achievement (partly characterized by a return to, or modification of, structures and arrangements, aims and beliefs of a *laissez-faire* past), the New Left seeks to promote new values, organizational modes, and political meanings. It is part of a cultural revolution against rational "overdeveloped society" with its large administrative bureaucracies in government, corporations, trade unions, and especially the universities, as well as in other major organizational spheres of the larger society. One of the root problems for the new radicals then is bureaucracy in all forms, shapes, and sizes.

The New Left response stems from the general failure of corporate liberalism, formal government, and special-interest bureaucracy to deal effectively with the needs and demands of a new postwar, post-industrial generation. The failure is in part political, part organisational, and part psychological. Politically, the failure is in the continuation of policies with which increasingly large segments of the public disagree. For the radicals, the response is largely a matter of lost faith in liberalism as a strategy for dealing with such current and pressing problems as the war, black liberation, poverty, and the plight of the minorities. Organizationally, the failure is in the inability to implement adequately the original welfare goals for equitable distribution of public resources. Psychologically, the failure lies largely in a growing sense of political cynicism and impotency in an increasingly bureaucratic corporate state. Indeed, the very organizational structure of society as it has evolved today is seen as antithetical to the New Left conception of "participatory democracy" and human organization. Thus centralized and bureaucratized government — the heritage of liberalism — becomes for the New Left, as it traditionally has for the Right, a prime source of discontent.

### *The Politics of Convergence*

The New Left opposition to corporate liberalism and the military-industrial complex clearly echoes the New (i. e., libertarian) Right's opposition to the "oligopolistic power of major corporations" and the "authoritarian tendencies of welfare-capitalism" (Kennell, 1969, p. 20). Speaking of the New Left and the Libertarian Right, one principle libertarian spokesman suggests that: "...both share an emotional and moral commitment to the individual and believe that the dehumanization of contemporary society is, at least largely, the result of government encroachment into areas which are less and less controlled by the individual" (Hamowy, 1968, p. 1).

Another striking incidence of New Left-Libertarian Right convergence is illustrated by the following case. On August 16, 1969, Donald Meinshausen, 19, a former Goldwater supporter and member of Young Americans for Freedom (YAF), was subpoenaed as a friendly witness by the House Internal Security Committee to report on his activities as a Committee under-

cover agent in SDS. Meinshausen never testified. Instead, he denounced the Committee, the Congress, and the United States government saying, "I intended to go to the national YAF convention and try to convince them not to fight the SDS but to join it in fighting the government. The goals of the Libertarian Right and the New Left are morally and politically common. It's the only way to defeat laws you don't want. And a lot of people in YAF agree with me" (The New York Times, August 17, 1969, p. 52; also see Meinshausen, 1969, and Rothbard, 1969). Other dramatic incidences of the Libertarian split from the Buckley-Goldwater-YAF Right are marked by the newly formed Student Liberation Alliance and the Radical Libertarian Alliance, under the figure-head of Karl Hess. That position statements for the two groups were reprinted and reported in a New Left-oriented underground weekly further underlines the significance of growing convergence between Left and Right on libertarian issues (Turner, et al., 1969; Kennell, 1969; Cabbell, 1969). It is also worth noting that at the recent "Left-Right Festival of Liberation" (1970) sponsored by the Libertarian Alliance, the roster of speakers and participants included several leading representatives from a variety of New Left action groups. Thus many radicals of the New Left and libertarians of the Right appear to be converging, not only on ideological questions of centralized government and individual rights, but also through active participation at joint meetings and conferences and through a variety of publication exchanges.

Deeply ingrained in both New Left and Libertarian Right responses to these issues is an underlying and growing theme of existential concern for the "essential worth" and "dignity of man". For the New Left, the theme reflects a rather optimistic assumption about the fundamental nature of man — that he is basically a creative, self-realizing person with an ingrained capacity for developing his full human potential. The Port Huron Statement of 1962 which formulates some of the early guidelines of SDS action and ideology draws on one thread of this general theme: "We regard men as infinitely precious and possessed of unfulfilled capacities for reason, freedom, and love... We oppose the depersonalization that reduces human beings to the status of things... the goal of man and society should be human independence: a concern... with finding a meaning in life that is personally authentic; a quality of mind not compulsively driven by a sense of powerlessness... Loneliness, estrangement, isolation describe the vast distance between man and man today... we believe in generosity of a kind that imprints one's unique individual qualities in relation to other men, and to all human activity" (pp. 158-159).

For libertarians of the Right, the theme mirrors a "root belief in individual liberty" (Rothbard, 1969) and the capacity in man for "individual self-determination and autonomy" (Hamowy, 1968, p. 3). The theme for both camps reflects a fundamental "struggle for individual freedom and meaning thrust up against the 'objective' world which denies freedom and self-realization" (Calvert, 1967, p. 1).<sup>6</sup>

<sup>6</sup> It is important to underline an essential distinction between the Libertarian Right and the New Left conceptions of man. While the libertarians express a fundamental belief in

The case of the Peace and Freedom Party — an electoral vehicle for one segment of the New Left Movement — illustrates the growing existential theme in a clear and striking way. This new, radical third party evolved during a critical election year as a legitimate form of protest against the general inertia of established governmental institutions to deal radically with the problem of American commitment to the war in Vietnam. The demand for immediate peace in Vietnam extended to further demands on the domestic front, focussing particularly on the call for black liberation and the "liberation of all oppressed minorities" (see Elden Schweitzer, 1971). At the root of these demands lies a fundamental existential concern for the basic dignity of man, as clearly underlined in a statement adopted at the PFP founding convention, March 18, 1968: "The basis of human dignity is the ability of people to make the decisions that affect their lives — to order their own private lives as they choose", and "to collectively decide with their peers on matters of collective concern". The statement continues: "The Peace and Freedom Party supports the efforts of the powerless to gain dignity by exercising some real control over their own lives... [The task] is to project into the electoral arena the voices of people fighting for human dignity, to make it clear that the demand for human dignity is at root a demand for power." The appeal is to the politically estranged. The demand is for more legitimate power in political decisions that affect their lives. Underlying this demand is a basic existential concern for human dignity and individual autonomy of a more active citizenry. In effect, these are "libertarian" concerns that are as old as the civil libertarian cry for individual self-determination and autonomy.

Directly linked to the dual response to the system, and to the existential theme underlying much of the response, is a common concern between the New Left and the Libertarian Right for a more localized participatory alternative to the present structure of government and organizational society. Both point to a similar kind of solution which places more emphasis on local politics, personal action, and a more human form of social organization.

Thus to find the two camps anti-bureaucratic is not to find them necessarily anti-organizational when working for alternatives to the present system. On the contrary, an important thrust of the New Left is toward local community organizing, although community action programs and demonstrations against local power structures differ strongly from the Right's call for a return to local government or to a libertarian brand of "anarcho-capitalism". What the Left seeks is an indigenous, self-governing neighborhood community — what Eldridge Cleaver calls self-determination for "Black Colonies in the White Mother Country", or what white radicals are

the innate capacity for freedom and autonomy, the belief stems basically from an economic self-interest theory of competitive individualism. Freedom for the libertarian takes on a competitive framework, contrary to the underlying New Left notion of a cooperative, participatory democracy. Within this competitive frame emerges a libertarian conception of man and cooperation involving autonomous, independent, and fully acting individuals who cooperate voluntarily for their mutual benefit.

working toward in the poverty and minority-group communities across the country. The alternative to complex bureaucratic society is aimed toward a unique conception of direct "participatory democracy" as the standard grounds for common-sense everyday activity—as a means of living, working, being together in an autonomous, self-defining community. "As a *social system* we seek the establishment of a democracy of individual participation, governed by two central aims: that the individual share in those social decisions determining the quality and direction of his life; that society be organized to encourage independence in men and provide the media for their common participation" (Port Huron Statement, 1962, p. 160).

Participatory democracy is at once an end and means of the New Left's drive toward personal fulfillment and social autonomy. "If there is a hidden utopia [in the New Left], it is the utopia of a small group of equals, meeting together in mutual trust and respect to work out their common destiny" (Kenniston, 1968, p. 18). If men lack the skills for self-governance, they do not become subjects to be represented; they learn to participate. Those with the least political resources become to some extent politically efficacious. "I place my hope for the United States in the growth of the belief among the unqualified that they are in fact qualified: they can articulate and be responsible and hold power" (Carmichael, 1966, p. 34). Personal involvement, community organizing, and direct action are the hallmarks of New Left politics.

It is indeed striking to note that the New Left conception of participatory democracy points toward the very structure of a nineteenth-century, *laissez-faire* brand of social organization which permeates much of the Right's traditional rhetoric. The New Left, in effect, appears to echo a good part of the libertarian anti-statist call for the "liberation of every individual from the authoritarian state" and the creation of an "open, non-coercive society" in which the people may "voluntarily associate" and "participate in the decisions affecting their lives" (Kennell, 1969, p. 23; Hess, 1969, p. 2; also see Rotbard, 1969). Thus conceptions of an ideal alternative to the present system for both the New Left and the libertarian-oriented Right appear to meet along similar lines of convergence. Where they differ is largely in their attitude toward the state. The New Left rests more on the advocacy of communal egalitarianism and participatory democracy against the libertarian's competitive-framed brand of mutually benefitting cooperation and individualism or the traditionalist's call for expanded private versus public interests and an extended version of pluralistic democracy.

### Summary

While the New Left and Libertarian Right remain as distinct political entities in themselves, many of the traditional boundaries between the two camps have been obscured. Indeed, on several issues, proponents of both the New Left and the Libertarian Right often attack the system together. Much of the combined response might best be summed up in terms of a generalized anti-Establishment or *anti-structure response*. It is essentially a response to the growing structural complexity of a larger mass, post-industrial



society characterized by an increasing bureaucratization of personal lives in most organizational spheres of social life and a concomitant removal of power sources from the everyday world of the individual.

The response focuses particularly on the question of established governmental institutions and bureaucratized modes of public administration. Much of the discontent arises from the general inertia of government to deal effectively with many of the root demands for change articulated from both political camps. The standard rhetoric of Rightist criticism is aimed primarily at the centralizing scope of big welfare-state government with its imposing bureaucratic machinery, while the New Left frames its criticism more in terms of a polemic against the old liberal mode of pluralistic politics. In effect, the New Left sees the present structure of political pluralism, developed in the tradition of welfare-state liberalism, as politically immoral and intellectually bankrupt — as a limitless extension of the military-corporate-industrial power complex of white, middle-class, one-dimensional values and life styles. Part of the significance of the New Left is that it has politically “dropped out” of the liberal-elitist-pluralistic, American two-party system in working toward a community-based, non-bureaucratic, participatory alternative.

A second broad point of major convergence, linked directly to the first, is a growing *existential theme* which tends to underlie the politics of both camps. The theme expresses a deep-felt concern for the “personal worth” and “human dignity” of man confronted by an ever-increasing organizational complexity in social and political life. The root demand among radicals and libertarians alike is for a new sense of individual autonomy and self-determination and a more direct sense of control over the decisions that affect their social and political lives.

Finally, a third related area of broad convergence emerges through a shared concern for a more localized, participatory form of human organization — the righteous route to a more ideal *structural alternative* to the present system. It is a local community-oriented alternative aimed at bringing a new sense of social justice, and a new feeling of personal worth, dignity, and efficacy to the individual citizen. In the area of government, the Traditional Right tends generally to accept the pluralistic form of governmental administration, but under a sharpened doctrine of “private interests”, limited government, and “status rights”. The Libertarian Right would like to go one step further toward reducing the basis of human participation to a highly individualized, semi-anarchistic form of nineteenth-century, *laissez-faire* capitalism. The New Left, under the banner of “participatory democracy”, seeks a new basis for politics where both the ends and the means of government represent more public interest and a more involved citizenry. Ideally, the New Left would have a form of government based on the community, where everyone could draw on communal resources — both tangible and intangible — to reach higher levels of self-actualization and creative self-expression.

While both camps appear on the surface to be generally oriented toward a similar localized and personalized alternative to the present structure of government and society, their fundamental proposals are unquestion-

ably different. They differ essentially in their ultimate conception of the state. The New Left calls for a more communal form of egalitarianism and direct participatory democracy which borders on the edge of a responsible self-fulfilling brand of positive anarchy; the Libertarian Right urges a self-interest, competitive-framed brand of *laissez-faire* individualism or "anarcho-capitalism"; the Traditional Right rests more on the advocacy of expanded private versus public interests under an extended version of pluralistic democracy. *Thus parallels between Left and Right today, while joining along several broad points of convergence, ultimately are aimed in different directions and in truth never meet.*<sup>7</sup>

One of the significant contributions of the New Left today has been to redefine the problems delimiting the debate between the Old Left and the Traditional Right. The most striking aspect of the two political camps is not simply that the New Left has changed vis-a-vis the relative ideological position of the 1930's, but that issues defining the boundaries between Left and Right have themselves changed. Many liberals of the Old Left have not shifted their position with the changing values and issues of the new age. Conservatives likewise may eventually have to come to terms with fundamentally new problems and options. What is being called "libertarianism" today may be the first sign of conservatism responding in a radically new way to these challenges. If so, we may expect to see a "New Right" of increasing magnitude and political potential in the near future.

Perhaps more important is the fact that the rising thrust of dissent today stems largely from the youth action cadres of a discontented postwar, post-industrial generation. Radicals and libertarians of this generation, having grown up during a depression-free era of relative affluence, are demanding new social, cultural and political alternatives in dealing with the challenges of the new era. Older generation styles and techniques for solving yesterday's problems are themselves perceived as problems today. For many young radicals and libertarians, their movements represent the politicized arm of a larger youth-culture revolution aimed at the dominant values, institutions, and authority structures of the older generation military-corporate-liberal system. The cultural revolution is not simply a generational conflict but an assault on the social, cultural, and political system that they have inherited. Indeed, their increasing protests reflect a serious questioning of the very legitimacy of that system. The mood of cultural and political alienation which accents youthful dissent today, and the tendency among young radicals and libertarians to experiment with alternative life styles and political values, might be viewed as major cues concerning the possible character of emerging solutions to the problems of postwar, post-industrial society.

It is still too early to judge the full potential of the seemingly convergent trends between Left and Right. At the risk of overstating the political importance of the new libertarians, however, we speculate that the last third of this century will contain increasing discontent and pressure for change

<sup>7</sup> A more extensive analysis of these major political groupings, using descriptive survey data, is found in Schweitzer and Elden (1971).

from the youth action cadres of both Left and Right. The "politics of convergence" will evolve particularly around broad issues concerning the increasingly centralized and bureaucratized structure of government and society, the enduring demand for more localized and personalized solutions, and the growing need for a new sense of personal worth, dignity, and justice for man.

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## ON YOUTH AND STUDENT PROTEST

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How can sociologists explain today's youth and student protest in the western countries? My aim is to present a certain approach to answer this question. This approach is based on certain theoretical assumptions and I shall commence with an explication of these assumptions.

### *From Interdependency to Social Stratification*

My basic theoretical assumptions can be explained with the help of the definition of sociology formulated by Johan Goudsblom: 'Sociology studies the ways in which people cope with the problems of living together'.<sup>1</sup> This definition contains historical perspectives since the problems of living together are continuously being rewarded and there are no definite solutions to them. The definition also implies that in living together people need and depend on each other and are forced to take each other into account, although they are not naturally inclined to do so. In his book *Ueber den Prozess der Zivilisation* Norbert Elias uses the expression 'interdependencies network' to describe the ways in which people are connected to each other and the degree of their mutual dependencies.<sup>2</sup>

The interdependencies network which people form together limits the nature and the type of problems with which they have to cope. With changes in the interdependencies network the social definition of acute and important problems also changes. Some groups of people may have a greater capacity to solve acute problems than other groups. In a territory where there is no monopoly of violence, for instance, the problem of physical security is very acute; physical force and skill with weapons are evaluated highly and pursued more passionately than if a monopoly of violence had existed, and those who possess such qualities are able to attain a high position in the social stratification. Thus, what people compare and evaluate of each other is more or less in accordance with the way they rate problems of living together, with the degrees and types of their interdependencies.

<sup>1</sup> Goudsblom uses this definition in his lectures and has included it in his paper *High and Low in Society and in Sociology: a Semantic Approach to Social Stratification*, presented at the 7th World Congress of Sociology (Varna, Bulgaria, 1970).

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Norbert Elias, *Ueber den Prozess der Zivilisation*, 2nd ed., Berne, 1969.

Social stratification, says Goudsblom, is an indication of social inequality, expressed in terms of high and low. Social stratification implies differentiation and vertical ranking. High and low are terms used to express institutionalized forms of strong and weak, i. e. there must be consensus about what is strong and what is weak.<sup>3</sup> If the chain of interdependencies is relatively short and no monopoly of violence has yet been established, then the physical strength of people will be very important for their social strength<sup>4</sup> or their power chances. So, the hierarchy of sources of social strength of an individual or group is connected to the network of interdependencies in a society as a whole. In a society with a short chain of interdependencies, Weber's criteria of power, property and prestige are usually closely linked: They who are physically strongest are also socially strongest. When the chain of interdependencies gets longer, these criteria tend to differentiate from each other; the hierarchy of sources of social strength changes. Depending upon the way in which sources of social strength have been institutionalized, people evaluate each other and, accordingly, themselves. There is a system of social stratification to the extent that there is a clear structure in the institutionalized sources of social strength, corresponding to the weight given to certain problems of living together and a specific interdependencies network.

To sum up, in the interdependencies network the structure of the problems of living together is given. The structure of these problems determines the structure of sources of social strength for individuals and groups. These social strengths, and with them their sources, are gradually institutionalized and become a certain form of social stratification.

### *The Background to Changes in the Social Stratification*

I am convinced that youth and student protest in western countries today must be considered historically. Only then one will understand why social stratification is changing in such a way that it prompts the younger generation to certain types of protest and which social conditions have made youth protest possible. When the developments in the structure of social strengths within the interdependencies network is traced from the 14th century to the present day, it becomes clear that these changes are highly relevant to our question. In these developments a certain regularity and a specific direction can be discerned. Although my analysis here must remain too brief, the effectiveness of this approach should become clear.

In the 14th and 15th centuries the relation between the young and the older people in the western countries was not yet seen as problematic. In "*Centuries of Childhood*" Ariès states that childhood ended at the age of 5 or 7; "children" were then treated as small adults. As appears from Arjès' book, more and more children have undergone increased segregation since the 14th and 15th centuries. At that time there was a violent competition among the nobility, which ultimately ended in absolutism. Absolutism

<sup>3</sup> Goudsblom, op. cit., p. 3.

<sup>4</sup> This term has also been taken from Elias, op. cit.

implies a monopoly of violence in a relatively large area. In "*Ueber den Prozess der Zivilisation*" Elias states that the development of absolutism was mainly due to the delicate balance between the social strength of the nobility and that of the bourgeoisie, two groups that had become increasingly dependent on each other. Their degree of interdependencies implied that the destruction of either group would be disadvantageous to the other. Both groups were aware of the importance of maintaining the existing social constellation. Elias says that, whenever two groups equal each other in social strength but can neither reach a steady compromise nor gain dominance over the other by means of violence, the time has come for a strong central authority.<sup>5</sup> The sovereign was invested with this authority; the violent struggle between nobility and bourgeoisie ended and was replaced by planning, diplomacy and intrigue. Before this, children participated freely in all spheres of (adult) life, but their social position changed when the use of violence was relinquished and became the monopoly of the sovereign. Planning, diplomacy and intrigue required more self-control and insight in human beings than was ever required before; skills of an entirely different kind were now needed as sources of social strength. Children did not possess these skills sufficiently; they make mistakes, which could be disadvantageous to the adults. The adults increasingly felt that a great discrepancy existed between their children and themselves, which was expressed in an increased segregation of children and adults. Interests in children were based primarily on the strict control now considered necessary, but also on the fact that children did not possess the self-control of adults, for them an imperative of the interdependencies network. The spontaneous behaviour of children touched the adults who felt nostalgic about the time when people were allowed to be 'freer' and did not have to repress and control their passions and emotions. Children were now considered "innocent". This attitude towards children, which still exists today, is essentially contradictory: on the one hand, children are "sweet" and "innocent", on the other, they are "bad" and "dangerous" for as soon as one's attention is slackened, they are "mischievous" and are soon "corrupt".

The social position of children is thus clearly related to the interdependencies network. During the Ancien Regime institutionalized social strength was essentially defined as a person's proximity to the holder of the monopoly of violence. The not-institutionalized social strength of the bourgeoisie grew, for they were especially concerned with the solution of the societal problem that had now become important: the problem of satisfying material needs such as food, clothing, etc. This material problem had now become more important because the problem of physical safety had largely been solved by the sovereign's monopoly of violence. The social strength of the bourgeoisie became manifest at the time of the French Revolution. Occupation and capital now determined social chances to a greater extent; these assets afforded access to the monopoly of violence and the taxation monopoly. When these monopolies became gradually subject to popular con-

<sup>5</sup> N. Elias, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 236.

trol (the democratization of these monopolies), the proximity of someone to these monopolies became relatively less important as a source of social strength.

These changes also influenced the social position of children. The merchants, next to their greater capacity to solve the now relatively most acute societal problem, had sources of social strength that civil servants and noblemen did not have. They could raise their standing by means of secrecy and representation. Secrecy is required towards tradesmen and customers about the conditions of past contracts if a merchant is to get the best possible conditions for future contracts. Also, a merchant must give the impression of financial and moral solidity, which can be achieved by means of representation. Children could not be expected to participate in such strategies and, thus, the discrepancy between adults and children became even greater. As competition increased, the profession of merchant required more extensive training which was supplied by various schools. In the middle of the 18th century, the bourgeoisie came to monopolize higher education, which took place mainly in expensive boarding schools which the poor could not afford. This school development was one toward increased segregation. When boarding-schools became less popular at the end of the 19th century segregation continued at home, because segregation means essentially that the number of adults who are on intimate terms with the young is very limited. Also at home the children's world and the adults' world remained separate, they had become different worlds.

The problem of physical security had for the most part been solved by the development of a monopoly of violence and by the democratization of this monopoly. The problem of material security is going to be solved by a similar development. The production of goods which give this material security has gradually been monopolized and there is also a tendency toward democratization of this monopoly. Monopolization is demonstrated by the fact that there are about 500 multi-national companies at present.<sup>6</sup> Democratization is demonstrated by the increasing number of committees for negotiation between employers and employees, by the influence of the trade unions, but especially by the national restrictions on these monopolies: by the taxation systems and by the way the revenue is allotted to public expenses in accordance with the idea of a welfare state. So, the problems of physical security and material security have (temporarily) largely been solved within the national states. These problems can be indicated as "*quantitative*" problems of living together, because the degree of having them solved is essential for the quantity of survival chances people have. There has been a fierce struggle for the possession of the monopoly of physical violence, but it diminished in intensity once democratization had taken place. The struggle for access to the economic monopoly is likely to diminish in the same manner once the monopoly has been democratized. Thus, continued democratization of quantitative monopolies implies that access to these monopolies becomes less important as a source of social strength.

<sup>6</sup> De Volkskrant, May 23, 1970, p. 2.

The degree of democratization is limited, so the importance of the sources of social strength derived from the quantitative monopolies will not diminish unlimitedly. But they can become subordinate to sources that are not related to these two monopolies. This is demonstrated by the fact that the social values which developed in the course of the institutionalization of social strengths that were based principally on contribution to quantitative securities, are now less satisfactory and many people feel them to be threatened. The basis values of the ideology of success inherent in the "American Dream" are being undermined, as they lose their principal importance as sources of social strength. The values that are now becoming important can be called "*qualitative*" values, derived from the quality of living together. C. Wright Mills said that "when people cherish some set of values and do not feel any threat to them, they experience well-being. When they cherish values, but do feel them to be threatened, they experience a crisis, either as a personal trouble or as a public issue."<sup>7</sup> Most members of the older generations still cherish the quantitative values and feel them to be threatened. What is now called "alienation" could be a symptom of this feeling. Some delinquent subcultures can also be considered an expression of this threat towards these values.<sup>8</sup> Many young people today feel that the qualitative values are being threatened and have expressed this by way of protest. So I agree with Mills when he says that "the sociological imagination is becoming a major common determinant of our cultural life"<sup>9</sup> because sociological imagination means insight in the quality of living 'together. Kenneth Keniston describes the development as follows: "The rise of post-industrial society means that more and more young people are growing up in circumstances in which abundance, economic security, political freedom and prosperity are simply a matter of course, not a goal to strive for."<sup>10</sup> Keniston also says that young people will be concerned about the quality of living and about the answer to the question: What follows freedom and prosperity?<sup>11</sup> This all points out, that qualitative problems, qualitative sources of social strength and qualitative values have become increasingly important.

<sup>7</sup> C. Wright Mills, *The Sociological Imagination*, p. 11.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. the theory in A. K. Cohen, *Delinquent Boys: the Culture of the Gang*, New York, 1955. The emancipation of women is also inherent in the development towards the increased importance of qualitative values. As a society becomes less dominated by physical and economical force, the relationship between men and women can become more equal. Thus democratization of quantitative monopolies is a condition for the emancipation of women.

The increased importance of verbal skills as has become clear in the sociology of education, must also be considered in the light of this development. Once quantitative values such as physical strength and money play a less important role in interpersonal comparison, people will use words in order to influence comparisons to a far greater extent.

<sup>9</sup> Mills, *op. cit.* p. 14.

<sup>10</sup> Kenneth Keniston, *How Bad Things really are in Scarsdale, De Gids*, Amsterdam, Oct. 9, 1969, p. 223.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 227.



### *Changes in Social Stratification and in Position of the Young*

Why is it the younger generation that has been able to express these changes so clearly in its protest? In order to answer this question, the social position of the young and the way in which they are socialized must be considered here. Youth protest can be seen as a form of conflict between two different generations; one of the reasons why such relationships have always been a possible source of conflict is that members of the older generation occupy the "high" (key) positions in the social stratification. It follows that youth protest is related to social stratification.

### *Segregation, Adolescence and the "Sunday Sphere"*

As part of the development of the interdependencies networks, institutions such as the army, high school and university came into being. In these institutions segregation progressed and here the young lived the lives of "adolescents". Adolescence is a period in which a person is exempt from many social obligations and is highly sensitive to ideas and ideals. An adolescent has therefore the opportunity of reflecting principally detached upon social reality. Goudsblom has described this as the influence of a "Sunday sphere"<sup>12</sup>. The detachment that can be created by the "Sunday sphere" can imply that adolescents experience the change from quantitative to qualitative values more intensively than adults. An adolescent then sees before him an adult life still dominated by quantitative values. The way in which he reflects upon these values depends on his capacity for independent thinking and his expectations for the future. These conditions now apply to a large proportion of the younger generation. After the Second World War, the growth of the student population enlarged the group subject to the influence of the "Sunday sphere". The period of adolescence — and the period of segregation — has been prolonged. Keniston calls this prolonged adolescence the "Phase of Youth"<sup>13</sup>.

### *Independent Thinking: Liberal Education*

As democratization of the monopoly of violence continued, ideas about a less strict and disciplined education spread. This correlation is not coincidental. It must suffice to point out that, once violence had been banished almost entirely from society, corporal punishment such as caning at school was considered an anachronism and gradually disappeared. A liberal education implied that the child no longer had to adjust unquestioningly to the wishes of older people; now there was increasing adjustment to both sides. Since the bourgeoisie had given the impulse to decentralization of the monopoly of violence, it is understandable that liberal ideas on education were able to develop exactly in these middle class families. In practice, however,

<sup>12</sup> Johan Goudsblom, Tichelwerk interviews Herbert Wittgans, in *Propria Cures*, Amsterdam, Jan. 24, 1970, p. 17.

<sup>13</sup> Keniston, *op cit.*, p. 222.

the care of children was left to the servants: the nanny, the governess, etc. Thus, the spatial and emotional distance between parents and children was greater than would be expected from the isolated position of the family. Liberal education, a training for independence, became more intensive when the spatial and emotional distance between parents and children diminished because of the difficulty of finding servants. The parents themselves now have to educate their children and take them into account, more than they used to do. They are engrained with the ideal of a liberal education, more so than servants, but they are fairly insecure when it comes to practicing their principles. Hence the interest in books on pedagogy. The renewed attention devoted to children and their education is partly due to the qualitative value which became attached to having children (the baby boom). In this way they also expressed the rising importance of qualitative values over quantitative values. In this development more and more young people received an education focussed on independency. This liberal education is one of the factors that made youth protest possible. The inherently promoted independent thinking possibly creates a detached view and makes it less likely that youth follows traditional paths blindly. Moreover, without the liberal ideas on education, the material basis of youth protest would be swept away. The government would stop student grants if it were not well-disposed towards the protest, parents would withhold monthly allowances, employers would fire young employees, etc. Hence it becomes clear that there is a relation between liberal education and the democratization of the material monopoly: Everyone has the right to material security. This right and the relative lack of respect for quantitative values means that people in the "phase of youth" can be fairly insensitive to traditional social sanctions. Even prison punishment does not have the same different significance as it used to have.

Liberal education has not ended the segregation of the younger generation; the campus is an example of continued segregation and very few young people have some older friends. On the one hand, children are treated as adults and as equals because of liberal education, on the other, they are segregated and treated as children. This contradiction inevitably detracts from the self-evidence of parental authority and other kinds of authority and it promotes an attitude of detachment towards their quantitative values.

### *Segregation and Organization*

That the adolescents are segregated from adult society can explain the development towards the organization of youth protest. Their friends have the same age and a lot of these segregated people experience the same changes in the structure of societal problems. It is logical that solidarity with the own group should ensue. Solidarity grows when the group is mostly concerned about qualitative problems of living together while the rest of society emphasizes quantitative problems. The next step, that towards organization, is then easily taken.

### *Why was there no Significant Student Protest before the Sixties?*

To this question I have three related answers. Firstly, the change from quantitative to qualitative values has been noticeable especially for the young and has made greater progress during this decennium than during the Fifties. This generation had not experienced the last great crisis of the quantitative problems: the economic crisis of the Thirties (the last eruption of the problem of material security) and the Second World War (the last eruption of the problem of physical security). Secondly, after the last war it became increasingly difficult to leave the education of children in the hands of servants. The implications for the liberal education children received has already been pointed out. It were these children who had become adolescents in the Sixties. Thirdly, a large proportion of the student population of this decennium was not recruited from traditionally academic milieus. These students had far less concrete perspectives for their future, than traditional students had and both kinds of students formed so large a student population, that they were no longer considered to be an exceptional group. Assumedly, they are sceptical of the existing quantitative values, as they consider high social positions less accessible. This accounts less for students who come from the academic milieus, but they might consider high social positions so easily accessible and so self-evident, that these are no longer desirable. Striving for them does not bestow "honour" on them, and honour clearly is a qualitative value. The fact that an increasing number of students have chosen social sciences, demonstrates that young people are now more conscious of qualitative values, even before entering universities.

### *The United States of America*

Present-day youth protest originated in the U. S. A. This country had made considerable progress towards the solution of quantitative problems.

The values of American society are, however, still derived from quantitative problems, more so than in other western countries. One would have expected the opposite situation. The relative neglectance of qualitative values in American society can possibly explain why youth and student protest originated in this country. Here, there is a very great discrepancy between the progress made toward quantitative security and the importance in the social stratification of quantitative values.

### *Manifestations of Qualitative Societal Problems*

Two ways in which youth attempts to solve the more qualitative problems of living together can be discerned, although they are difficult to distinguish as they overlap to a great extent.

### *Equality and Solidarity*

The first way can be characterized by the words equality and solidarity. As people became increasingly interdependent, the young in the social

position mentioned above, have come to see solidarity with each other and with the socially deprived peoples as an important source of social strength, because they see lack of solidarity in the world as a very important qualitative problem of living together. They try to bring more quality in living together by demonstrating solidarity with the struggle for access to the quantitative monopolies of both negroes in the U. S. A. and of the politically and/or economically colonized nations: the Third World. They see equality with regard to access to the quantitative monopolies as necessary condition for higher quality of living together. In their shared goal of democratization of these monopolies all these protest movements can be solidary. The device of the French Revolution "Liberty Equality Fraternity" is essentially still applicable. The Third world and the Communist world are lagging behind as far as "Liberty" is concerned, as the monopolies of violence and taxation are relatively less democratized or less firmly established. In the rest of the world "Liberty" has become the common property of a large proportion of the population. This proportion and especially the younger generation wishes to extend this liberty to those who are not yet having their full share of it. One could say that they now have enough "Liberty" themselves to be able to be concerned about "Equality and Fraternity".

### *Social Regression*

The second way can be characterized by the words social regression, hedonism and expressivity.<sup>14</sup> Hippies, flower power people, etc. are part of those who are trying to solve the more qualitative problems of living together in this way. The values of equality and solidarity are made more manifest within these groups, and they have not been given political form or applied to other groups. (This is probably partly due to reaction formation.)

### *Youth as a Factor of Change*

As larger proportions of the younger generation no longer give priority to quantitative values as sources of social strength and are now able to consider qualitative problems as the problems most urgently in need of attention, youth is a factor of change. The young can contribute towards the rapid actualization of changes in the institutionalizing of qualitative social strengths and can in this way help to create a new social order.

<sup>14</sup> Cf. the last part of the paper by Paul ten Have, *Emancipation and Culture*, presented at the 7th World Congress of Sociology, Varna, Bulgaria, 1970.

## L'ENGAGEMENT POLITIQUE DES JEUNES AU QUÉBEC

FRANÇOIS-PIERRE GINGRAS

FRANCE

La participation des jeunes à la politique diffère généralement de la façon dont leurs aînés s'engagent sur ce plan. Dans les pays où plusieurs formations politiques se disputent la faveur d'un électorat, il est bien connu que certaines d'entre elles réussissent plus que d'autres, volontairement ou non, à attirer les jeunes. Ce sont généralement les partis dits de gauche, caractérisés le plus souvent par leur penchant socialiste.

La résistance au changement en général, et à un changement politique d'inspiration socialiste en particulier, apparaît comme un attribut des „vieux“. Ils ont, à les entendre, „perdu leurs illusions de jeunesse“ et l'expérience leur a montré soit „la solidité et la valeur des assises actuelles de la société“, soit „l'inutilité de tout effort visant à changer l'ordre des choses“. Les „vieux“ en viendraient donc à penser, pour stéréotyper leur comportement, que vouloir tout remettre en question, c'est désirer prendre des risques sans savoir si le résultat en vaut la peine.

Il ne faut donc pas se surprendre de trouver dans les ouvrages de sociologie politique la constatation que les préférences partisans vont en s'affermissant au fil des années.<sup>1</sup> Il en est de même, dans une certaine mesure, pour la participation proprement dite au combat politique,<sup>2</sup> encore que le sentiment d'efficacité politique ne semble pas toujours varier avec l'âge.<sup>3</sup>

Cependant, certaines études montrent que la participation politique n'est pas une fonction parfaitement linéaire de l'âge, car les citoyens âgés de 60 ans ou plus sont portés à se retirer du feu de l'action.<sup>4</sup> Si l'on exclut un instant cette fraction de l'électorat, la relation linéaire réapparaît, et avec elle un lien assez étroit entre l'âge et ce que Lazarsfeld appelle la „sophis-

<sup>1</sup> Campbell, Angus et Henry Valen, *Party Identification in Norway and the United States*, *Public Opinion Quarterly*, XXV (Winter 1961), pp. 505-525; Campbell, Angus, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller et Donald E. Stokes, *The American Voter*, Wiley, New York, 1960 (spéc. pp. 153-167, 497).

<sup>2</sup> Lane, Robert E., *Political Life*, Free Press Paperback, New York, 1965 (spéc. p. 341).

<sup>3</sup> Milbrath, Lester W., *Political Participation*, Rand McNally, Chicago, 1965 (p. 58).

<sup>4</sup> Campbell et al., op. cit., pp. 493-497; Lipset, Seymour M., *Political Man*, Anchor Books, Doubleday, New York, 1963 (p. 221).

tication" politique.<sup>5</sup> Tout ceci, à l'encontre d'une tendance inverse: les jeunes font preuve d'un niveau d'information en général plus adéquat<sup>6</sup> que leurs aînés sur la politique. Enfin, la „perte avec l'âge des illusions“ s'accompagne d'un accroissement du cynisme et de l'aliénation politique,<sup>7</sup> ainsi que d'un pessimisme plus grand à l'égard de la conjoncture économique et ses répercussions sur sa propre condition.<sup>8</sup>

Dans le cadre d'une étude plus vaste sur la configuration psycho-sociologique des membres d'une formation politique canadienne, l'auteur en est venu à se demander si les traits qui viennent d'être évoqués très rapidement ne pourraient pas se retrouver à l'intérieur d'une même formation politique, où jeunes et gens d'âge „mûr“ se partagent presque également le membership. Eldersveld a déjà fait ressortir l'éventail des orientations idéologiques (limitées) et des motivations des cadres des deux grands partis américains.<sup>9</sup> Mais on peut s'interroger sur la présence d'une telle variété d'attitudes au sein d'un parti nettement caractérisé par une idéologie claire et articulée, et orienté vers la réalisation spécifique de buts reconnus aussi bien par ses membres que par la société dans laquelle il s'insère. Le fait cependant qu'un parti idéologique soit issu d'un mouvement social plus vaste peut, dans une large mesure, contribuer à la manifestation d'un certain nombre de diversités.<sup>10</sup>

Les résultats préliminaires rapportés ici sont tirés d'une enquête menée par l'auteur de 1967 à 1969 auprès des adhérents d'un parti réclamant l'indépendance politique du Québec, une des dix provinces fédérées du Canada.<sup>11</sup> Les récriminations des indépendantistes québécois sont avant tout d'ordre économique (le Québec possède l'un des plus forts taux de chômage au Canada) et culturel (le Québec est la seule province canadienne de langue française). Né vers 1960 sur un fond de nationalisme traditionnel, le mouvement indépendantiste québécois a recueilli près de 9% des voix aux élections provinciales de 1966, et environ 23% en 1970. Lors de l'enquête, le principal parti indépendantiste met de l'avant un programme social-démocrate de saveur fortement socialiste et figure à la „gauche“ du spectre politique québécois, car la dimension nationaliste ne coïncide pas avec la dimension socio-

<sup>5</sup> Lazarsfeld, Paul F., Bernard Berelson et Hazel Gaudet, *The People's Choice*, Duell, Sloan, and Pearce, New York, 1944.

<sup>6</sup> Lane, op. cit., pp. 216—218.

<sup>7</sup> Agger, Robert E., Marshall Goldstein et Stanley Pearl, *Political Cynicism: Measurement and Meaning*, *The Journal of Politics*, XXIII (August 1961), pp. 477—506.

<sup>8</sup> Campbell et al., op. cit., p. 395.

<sup>9</sup> Eldersveld, Samuel J., *Political Parties: A Behavioral Analysis*, Rand McNally, Chicago, 1964.

<sup>10</sup> Smelser, Neil J., *Theory of Collective Behavior*, Free Press, New York, 1962 (spéc. ch. 2, 3, 4 et 10); Zald, Mayer N. et Roberta Ash, *Social Movement Organizations: Growth, Decay, and Change*, *Social Forces*, March 1966, pp. 327—341.

<sup>11</sup> La Nouvelle-France a été historiquement rattachée aux colonies britanniques d'Amérique du Nord en 1760, par suite de la défaite française aux mains de l'Angleterre. Sous le nom de Québec, elle fut l'une des quatre provinces fondatrices de la confédération canadienne en 1867. Aujourd'hui, le Québec compte environ six millions d'habitants, dont 80% de langue française.

TABLEAU 1. COMPOSITION  
 DE L'ÉCHANTILLON\*

<i>A. Travail</i>	
Salariés	52,1%
A leur compte	12,0
Étudiants à plein temps	28,1
Autres (maîtresses de maison, retraités, chômeurs, gens incapables de travailler, etc.)	7,8
$n=100\%=$	384
Sans indication	1,3%
$N$ total =	389
<i>B. Age</i>	
18 ans et moins	6,1%
19 à 23 ans	30,7
24 à 28 ans	20,4
29 à 33 ans	12,2
34 à 38 ans	10,1
39 à 43 ans	7,1
44 à 48 ans	3,2
49 à 53 ans	4,0
54 ans et plus	6,3
$n=100\%=$	378
Sans indication	2,9%
$N$ total =	389

\* Échantillon de l'enquête par questionnaire postal envoyé en 1968 à des membres du Rassemblement pour l'indépendance nationale (RIN) choisis au hasard systématique. Cette enquête a été effectuée après un bon nombre d'entretiens non directifs avec des sympathisants du mouvement indépendantiste dont plusieurs membres du RIN; ces entretiens ont donné naissance au questionnaire qui a lui-même été vérifié à l'aide de deux pré-tests.

économique dans la politique québécoise. La majorité de ses membres proviennent de la „nouvelle classe moyenne“: cadres moyens et inférieurs, fonctionnaires, professeurs, journalistes et autres professionnels et semi-professionnels salariés. En outre, les étudiants constituent un contingent appréciable, avec plus du quart des effectifs. D'ailleurs, les jeunes en général sont à l'honneur: la moitié des militants ont moins de 30 ans. Ces proportions transparaissent assez bien dans l'échantillon (tableau 1).

Il faut constater dès le premier abord que ce ne sont pas les jeunes qui manifestent la foi indépendantiste la plus aveugle, la plus fervente. D'autant plus intéressante comme caractéristique qu'elle n'est pas directement tributaire des coordonnées sociales de ceux qui la possède, la foi indépendantiste s'explique par le fait que nous sommes ici en présence d'une formation politique qui ne s'est pas totalement dégagée du caractère irrationnel que Smelser<sup>12</sup> attribue aux idéologies court-circuitées des mouvements sociaux quels qu'ils soient: toute foi en une cause implique une adhésion au moins partiellement aveugle en ceci qu'on croit, *sans savoir*, en quelque chose, ses propriétés ou ses effets. Or, ici, ce sont les membres les plus „mûrs“ qui expriment le moins de réserves sur la cause qu'ils épousent.

<sup>12</sup> Smelser, op. cit.

Ce phénomène va de pair avec une autre tendance qu'on peut observer : le vote prend de l'importance avec l'âge. C'est en plus grand nombre que les jeunes trouvent que leur vote de demain n'aura que peu d'importance ou même pas du tout. L'argument le plus souvent invoqué est celui de l'inégalité des forces électorales en présence, surtout à cause des caisses énormes dont disposent les „vieux partis“ pour leur publicité et, disent certains, „acheter les consciences“.

Une polarisation analogue se retrouve dans l'analyse du militantisme proprement dit. Puisque les membres cadets accordent assez peu de poids à leur vote, il n'est pas surprenant de voir leur participation à ce qu'on appelle communément le „travail électoral“ (39%) tomber au-dessous de la moyenne de l'échantillon (48%). Aussitôt cependant que l'on franchit l'âge de 23—24 ans, la proportion s'inverse et c'est à 61% de „travailleurs d'élection“ qu'on a affaire. De 29 à 43 ans, elle se maintient autour de la moyenne, pour s'accroître légèrement ensuite chez les membres plus âgés. Comme certains l'ont fait remarquer, il n'y a pas de doute que les étudiants disposent en principe de moins de temps à consacrer aux activités d'une campagne électorale, mais il ne s'agit pas là d'un empêchement majeur : le jeune qui le désire peut sans difficulté contribuer de sa personne au moins à temps partiel et ses études peuvent même souvent passer en second, sans qu'il n'en éprouve de crise de conscience. Sur ce point, les élections de 1970 corroborent que, même à la veille des examens, les ardeurs étudiantes peuvent se concentrer sur la politique autant sinon davantage que sur les études.

Nous constatons une *désaffection* notable à l'égard du „grand jeu“ électoral, désaffection d'abord verbale certes, mais réelle tout de même. Par ailleurs, cela ne signifie pas le rejet du mode électoral, mode qui demeure privilégié, et de très loin, par tous les membres (81%), pour parvenir à leurs fins. Les indépendantistes ne se reconnaissent en général qu'assez peu d'empressement à favoriser des modes d'action violents (5%). Cependant, le cas échéant, le recours aux armes n'est pas exclu, surtout chez les jeunes, encore que pas plus d'un pour cent de ces derniers le souhaite. Si l'on ne considère que les indépendantistes qui se disent prêts à „prendre les armes pour hâter l'avènement de l'indépendance“, aucune tendance reconnaissable ne se manifeste (moyenne : 18,5%), mais les 19—28 ans se montrent les plus disponibles (23%) et les 29—38 ans témoignent du plus de réticences (7,5%). Si l'on va jusqu'à englober ceux qui se disent prêts à „recourir aux armes pour faire face à une agression militaire“ (par ailleurs improbable), les effectifs d'un éventuel maquis passent à près de 60% de l'échantillon, avec les 24—28 ans en tête de ligne (68%) et les plus âgés en réserve (40%).

Dans les faits, cela se traduit par une plus grande propension à la manifestation chez les jeunes. Si l'on exclut les 18 ans et moins, à qui leur âge (en 1968) n'a guère permis de participer à autant de ralliements populaires dans la rue que leurs aînés, les jeunes, c'est-à-dire les 19—28 ans, ont été du plus grand nombre de manifestations. La participation décline ensuite, plus ou moins régulièrement, avec l'âge. La manifestation est un mode d'action „directe“ qui illustre une opinion fort répandue auprès des jeunes contestataires dans le monde entier, et des indépendantistes québécois notamment : dans l'esprit des participants, les canaux institutionnels d'action



sur le gouvernement ou l'administration sont „bloqués“ et ne permettent plus de véhiculer les revendications avec quelque chance d'aboutir à un changement social dans les faits. D'où la nécessité de „forcer le système“.

D'ailleurs, l'ensemble du régime subit une attaque en règle de la part des jeunes: les députés ne s'intéressent guère à leurs électeurs, sauf en période pré-électorale, les politiciens en général sont, sinon des marionnettes entre les mains de la haute finance, du moins les complices des grands intérêts capitalistes, anglo-saxons (canadiens-anglais ou américains) pour la plupart.

Les deux-tiers des militants, quel que soit l'âge, préconisent une „profonde modification du système capitaliste“, comme le met de l'avant le programme du parti. Au pôle d'une tendance assez régulière, 26% des plus de 44 ans désirent conserver intact le régime capitaliste ou tout au plus le modifier légèrement, contre seulement 13% des jeunes de 18 ans et moins. Quant à ceux qui parlent „d'abattre le capitalisme“, leur proportion s'établit à 17% chez les plus jeunes, monte à 25% chez les 19—23 ans et retombe lentement à 5% chez les plus âgés.

Ce contraste ne doit pas nous étonner outre mesure: d'une part le radicalisme des jeunes est une chose bien connue et d'autre part il n'est pas si surprenant de retrouver dans un parti politique issu d'un mouvement social une polarisation d'opinions qui reflète la réalité sociale plus vaste. Mais que proposent les jeunes contestataires québécois du capitalisme? Les mots sont, là-dessus, révélateurs. Au sein de la jeunesse indépendantiste, il n'est pour ainsi dire pas question de „communisme“, mot qui évoque Moscou et un régime d'Etat policier et l'absence de libertés individuelles. De „maoïsme“, on n'en parle pas encore en 1967—1968. Les diverses variétés de „marxisme“, de „léninisme“ et de „trotskysme“ recueillent quelques suffrages, mais la majeure partie de l'extrême-gauche du mouvement fait bande à part et se concentre au sein de deux ou trois groupuscules à l'existence éphémère. Quand les jeunes parlent „d'abattre le capitalisme“, c'est pour instaurer le socialisme. Une variété québécoise de socialisme, et un socialisme „à visage humain“, se hâte-t-on de préciser, en ajoutant que cela suppose le maintien des libertés démocratiques et l'accroissement de la justice sociale.

Si l'on se contente de prôner des „modifications profondes du régime capitaliste“, on pense tout de suite à la Suède, paradis quasi-socialiste aux yeux de l'indépendantiste moyen et du jeune en particulier, qui désire pour ses compatriotes la prospérité économique et un haut niveau de vie, des mesures sociales avancées et des syndicats puissants. En fait, l'attraction presque mythique qu'exerce la Suède auprès de la jeunesse québécoise provient beaucoup des libertés d'expression qu'on dit y trouver. Dans l'ensemble, c'est le pays qui n'est pas à la remorque du „géant américain“, et c'est l'endroit par excellence où tout est permis, où *tous les espoirs sont légitimes*. Que leurs aspirations de mieux-être collectif ne soient pas des vœux pieux et stériles ou des rêves voués à demeurer éternellement du ressort de l'imagination, voilà de quoi susciter l'admiration pour un pays, peu importe lequel, où l'on croit que tous les espoirs sont effectivement légitimes, et épeçonner le militantisme de celui qui veut faire de sa contrée un paradis semblable sous cet aspect.

Mais dans le cadre de la société actuelle, l'opinion générale de l'échantillon sur le sort de l'homme moyen n'est guère optimiste. Il est cependant étonnant de constater combien les extrêmes se rejoignent sur ce point. Dans une relation parfaitement curvilinéaire, plus jeunes comme plus vieux ont davantage tendance à trouver que „la condition de l'homme moyen empire au lieu de s'améliorer“: les premiers (à 73%) rappellent que le spectacle offert à leurs yeux par la société actuelle n'est pas des plus réjouissants, alors que les derniers (à 79%), faisant appel à leur expérience, brossent un tableau tout aussi sombre. Dans un sens comme dans l'autre, c'est à mesure qu'on se rapproche de l'âge de 30 ans que les horizons s'éclaircissent — mais le pessimisme demeure toujours prépondérant (58%).

Paradoxe de la civilisation de consommation nord-américaine, où les contestataires ont le ventre plein, les valeurs fondamentales de la société n'éclatent pas toutes. Une des préoccupations premières, avec la justice sociale, demeure le niveau de vie et la vision si sombre du monde contemporain évoquée plus haut n'entraîne pas la majorité à penser qu'il faille vivre au jour le jour et „laisser demain arriver comme il pourra“. L'incidence de la poursuite d'études et de la condition étudiante en général ne manque pas de se faire sentir. Et si les plus jeunes membres sont aussi les plus nombreux à se dire satisfaits de la *vie qu'ils mènent* en général, c'est également cette tranche qui compte le plus grand nombre de „pas satisfaits du tout“ de leurs *conditions économiques* du moment.

Que retenir de la présence des jeunes dans une formation politique de gauche issue d'un mouvement social, en l'occurrence l'indépendantisme québécois? A l'aide d'un certain nombre d'indices pondérés, il a été possible d'évaluer la relation entre l'âge et deux dimensions de l'action politique: l'engagement d'une part et le potentiel révolutionnaire de l'autre (tableau 2). L'échelle d'engagement fait appel aux deux composantes d'activité et de ferveur, ce qui donne une vision globale de l'action politique de l'individu. (Une échelle qui ne serait construite que sur la base d'indices d'activité serait handicapée d'une trop forte dépendance à l'égard de certaines coordonnées socio-géographiques, comme le lieu de résidence, la profession, le revenu.) Par potentiel révolutionnaire, nous entendons une prédisposition à recourir à des méthodes d'action („directe“) généralement désapprouvées par la société ou au moins s'écartant des normes politiques auxquelles la majorité souscrit et se conforme.

Au niveau de l'engagement, l'âge où celui-ci se manifeste avec le plus de vigueur se situe vers 36 ans, avec un peu de décalage par rapport à un plateau assez élevé allant de 29 à 38 ans et qui regroupe les éléments les plus actifs de l'échantillon sous ce premier aspect. L'engagement baisse graduellement vers les extrêmes, mais plus rapidement du côté des jeunes, où l'on trouve le plus faible nombre de militants profondément engagés dans l'action. Comme on peut s'y attendre, le potentiel révolutionnaire, lui, ne suit pas le même schéma. Indubitablement, celui-ci est le plus élevé auprès de l'élément le plus jeune de l'échantillon et le plus faible auprès de l'élément le plus âgé. Il faut cependant noter un sursaut d'ardeur chez les 39—43 ans et des réticences assez considérables dans la tranche voisine des 34—38 ans. Le potentiel révolutionnaire des jeunes n'est pas

TABLEAU 2. VISION D'ENSEMBLE DE L'ACTION POLITIQUE\*

<i>A. Engagement et âge</i>				
engagement	faible	modéré	élevé	n=100%
âge: 18 ans et moins	27,3%	54,5	18,2	22
19 à 23 ans	35,5	35,5	29,0	107
24 à 28 ans	18,6	40,0	41,4	70
29 à 33 ans	26,2	28,6	45,2	42
34 à 38 ans	21,2	33,3	45,5	33
39 à 43 ans	0,0	61,5	38,5	26
44 ans et plus	19,5	39,0	41,5	41
tous	24,3	39,0	36,7	341
<i>B. Potentiel révolutionnaire et âge</i>				
potentiel	faible	modéré	élevé	n=100%
âge: 18 ans et moins	38,1%	38,1	23,8	21
19 à 23 ans	37,6	38,6	23,8	101
24 à 28 ans	29,0	50,7	20,3	69
29 à 33 ans	37,5	40,0	22,5	40
34 à 38 ans	57,6	30,3	12,1	33
39 à 43 ans	38,5	38,5	23,1	26
44 ans et plus	60,5	26,3	13,2	38
tous	40,5	39,0	20,5	328

\* Echantillon décrit à la note<sup>®</sup> du tableau 1. L'échelle d'engagement est construite sur la base de 8 indices pondérés. L'échelle de potentiel révolutionnaire est construite sur la base de 4 indices pondérés.

méconnu des dirigeants de la formation: on y fait souvent appel à l'occasion de ralliements en faveur d'une mesure jugée d'intérêt national ou lors de manifestations contre, par exemple, l'adoption d'une loi qu'on estime rétrograde ou insatisfaisante.

C'est donc avec une telle base de jeunes (rappelons qu'ils constituent plus de la moitié du membership et une partie importante des cadres) que cette formation préconise un programme auquel les „vieux partis“ empruntent généreusement au cours des années, chaque fois qu'une idée cesse d'être contestataire pour devenir le vœu (rentable) de la population adulte et peut s'insérer dans un programme électoral „traditionnel“. Et c'est un peu là un rôle important que reconnaissent certains militants au cours d'entretiens: faire lentement passer des idées avancées dans les masses, „qui finiront bien par vouloir l'indépendance!“

Plus réceptifs de nos jours, les jeunes, sinon dépourvus d'idées reçues, du moins plus sensibles au pluralisme du monde contemporain, et spécialement dans une société québécoise „qui s'ouvre“, car le Québec connaît une formidable modernisation sociale et intellectuelle surtout depuis 1960, les jeunes donc deviennent les plus susceptibles de véhiculer cet avant-gardisme en militant pour des valeurs nouvelles, des normes sociales nouvelles, inspirées par une soif de plus grande justice pour tous, tout en assurant la liberté de chacun.

Le Rassemblement pour l'indépendance nationale (RIN), groupement sur lequel l'enquête a porté surtout, s'est dissout au cours de 1968, en invitant ses membres à rallier le Parti québécois (PQ), formation née quelques mois plus tôt, mais dont le succès s'accroît suffisamment et assez vite pour la placer au second rang, aux élections de 1970, quant aux suffrages exprimés. Il semble qu'au sein du Parti québécois, où la moyenne d'âge serait légèrement plus élevée qu'au RIN et où on n'organise ni n'appuie de manifestations de masse dans les rues, l'action électorale est menée aussi bien par les jeunes que les adultes. En effet, au cours de la campagne du printemps de 1970, les étudiants effectuent une partie considérable du travail électoral, bénévolement et en narguant les caisses des „vieux partis“. Le PQ surclasse d'ailleurs au vote populaire (23% contre 19%) le parti du gouvernement sortant. Certes déçus du petit nombre de sièges recueillis, à cause des caprices d'une carte électorale anachronique, c'est néanmoins avec une ardeur non dissimulée que les jeunes du PQ lancent alors: „On se reprendra aux prochaines élections et cette fois-là, nous formerons le gouvernement.“

Les cadres du RIN ont toujours prêché: „La souveraineté s'obtiendra par l'élection d'un parti indépendantiste.“ Pour les jeunes, ce parti, c'est devenu le PQ. En 1968, le chef du RIN déclare: „Personnellement . . . je ne crois pas que le RIN puisse aller jusqu'au bout tout seul.“ A des aspirations économiques, sociales et culturelles précises, conjuguées à une idéologie de souveraineté, la nouvelle formation apporte l'impression que la prise électorale du pouvoir est *possible*, d'utopique qu'elle était au temps du RIN. C'est la renaissance d'un espoir et le nombre des croyants décuple.

A partir de ces éléments d'analyse, on peut émettre l'opinion que dans des conditions improbables de prise électorale du pouvoir, les jeunes enrôlés dans une formation préconisant un changement social radical ont tendance

à s'éloigner de l'électoratisme au bénéfice des méthodes „directes“ d'action. En revanche, lorsque la prise du pouvoir à la suite d'élections devient une éventualité crédible et vraisemblable, les jeunes tournent leurs énergies vers cette forme d'action, afin de maximiser les chances de succès. On peut prédire que si les espoirs électoraux sont déçus lors de scrutins successifs, l'ardeur électoraliste tombe. Tant que les canaux institutionnalisés ne semblent pas irrémédiablement bloqués, la désaffection des jeunes à leur égard n'est pas sans retour. Qu'on leur donne *un peu d'espoir* de changer la société par les voies traditionnelles et ils se mettent à œuvrer dans le cadre de ces voies pour créer une société où *tous les espoirs* seront permis.

Quant aux conditions nécessaires pour donner l'impression que des changements significatifs peuvent être obtenus de la sorte, elles semblent dépendre en premier lieu, outre du contexte socio-politique du moment, de l'accumulation historique des expériences collectives de la jeunesse d'une société eu égard aux garanties de possibilité de changement données par le système politique. Après 300 ans d'existence, dont un tiers dans la confédération canadienne, les jeunes indépendantistes québécois ne croient plus en la bonne foi des fédéralistes canadiens qui leur promettent un meilleur avenir pour le Québec. Mais ils croient encore aux élections pour faire triompher leur point de vue. Après 1500 ans d'histoire, sans compter l'époque pré-mérovingienne, la jeunesse maïoste française, elle, n'y croit plus guère. Peut-être parce qu'on l'a trompée plus souvent.

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## THE RADICALISM OF MIDDLE CLASS YOUTH

GARY B. RUSH

CANADA

As Edgar Friedenberg has stated, "Every major industrial society believes it has a serious youth problem."<sup>1</sup> One of the most striking characteristics of the position of young people in advanced industrial societies is that youth is not considered a viable status in its own right. Although adults may envy "youthfulness" (as distinct from "youth"), adolescence is regarded, by both adults and the young, as a period of limbo: a time of waiting to achieve an adulthood for which there is little preparation, and often less understanding. The situation of the young person is particularly tenuous for the reason that although he is a member of a complex adolescent society of his own, he is expected to (and believes that he must) eventually become a member of an adult society. However, the opportunity for a smooth transition between these two worlds are few in advanced industrial societies. There is little opportunity for young and old to engage in mutual relationships for common ends; to find common roles that both can engage in. Thus, the young are often treated in a capriciously differential manner by their elders: as either irresponsible children or immature adults. Coming of age in modern society consists of a series of unconnected "stopovers" on the slow train to adulthood — mainly legally-defined plateaus of competence — which have little relevance to physiological, psychological, intellectual or emotional maturation. On this theme, let us again consider Friedenberg, in his observation that: "Adolescence is both a stage and a process of growth. As such it should proceed by doing what comes naturally. Instead, there is a widespread feeling that it cannot be allowed to proceed without massive intervention. The young disturb and anger their elders, and are themselves angered and disturbed, or repelled and depressed, at the thought of becoming what they see their elders to be. Adults observe and condemn the 'teen-age tyranny' of 'the adolescent society,' over which they seek to establish and maintain hegemony by techniques of infiltration and control."<sup>2</sup>

In a middle class community such as the one we have been studying — which we shall designate as "Shore City" — the techniques of infiltration,

<sup>1</sup> Edgar Z. Friedenberg, *Coming of Age in America: Growth and Acquiescence* (New York, Vintage Books, 1967), p. 3.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 4.

control and the exercise of power, although perhaps not sophisticated, are insidiously practiced by every major adult-controlled social institution: the family, the school, the church, the legal system, the political structure, the business community, and a host of public service and recreational institutions. As we have observed earlier, relationships between the members of these institutions and the young are seldom mutual, but are instead unilateral. Concerning such relationships, Donald J. McCulloch has observed: "Relationships of unilateral respect and constraint are the most common in human relationships. They come into being whenever two persons or groups come into sustained contact and potential conflict, perceive differences between themselves, define these differences as inequalities, and assume these inequalities to give one person or group rights of command over the other. . .

In the typical unilateral relationship the dominant member does not simply believe that he knows *more* than the other, he believes that he knows *better*. Typically, he also defines the one who knows less as unlikely, by reason of his nature, to come to know about what he *should* come to know about unless he is confined and coerced. And it is the critical importance attached to the notion of 'knowing better' and to the assumption about the nature of the other that supplies the justification, indeed the obligation, for the exercise of rights over the other. It is not simply in knowledge of the world of things that the dependent member is seen as deficient. He is also thought to have a deficient kind of mind — one that is impressionable, incapable of judging consequence, moved more by feeling than by reason."<sup>3</sup>

What is striking about Shore City is that the technique of control through unilateral relationships is eminently effective; for the most part, the young people we have studied have come to believe that they are deficient, inferior, and incapable of independent judgement. The majority of our student sample, for example, agree that young people often have rebellious ideas which they should get over as they grow up (67.1 per cent); that obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues that children should learn (71.0 per cent); that they waste too much time and spend it foolishly (63.0 per cent); and that they should work hard now in order to enjoy life in the future (77.6 per cent). Although young people generally hold a lower level of agreement with these kinds of ideas than do their parents, it is evident that they have pretty well accepted what the adult society has taught them about themselves. However, all adolescents in Shore City have not succumbed entirely to the pressures of socialization from the adult society. A small minority of students within school, and a larger number of those who have left school (i. e., "dropped out") manage to avoid adopting the dominant world view of their society; some, as we shall see, are constructing and communicating alternative perceptions.

As we have noted, the exercise of unilateral power over the young by adults is very pervasive in Shore City. This observation calls into question the notion of "intergenerational conflict": young people are hardly in a position to assert equivalent sanctions, coercions and controls over adults.

<sup>3</sup> Donald J. McCulloch, *The Community of the University*, in Howard Adelman and Dennis Lee (editors), *The University Game* (Toronto, Anansi Press, 1968), pp. 25-27.

Thus, the relationship between youth and adults is more of a "colonial" one, with the former being the subject population. Young people hold a common "class" position *vis-a-vis* adult society; one in which they are largely powerless and open to exploitation. Whatever class identification and characteristics young people may have are vicarious, being derived from the social class position of their parents. It is our contention, to be argued in this paper, that the technological and occupational changes now manifest in post-capitalist society, in conjunction with the converging effects of certain class and status socialization factors, are creating new class contradictions in which middle class, and not working class, youth have the greatest potential for alienation and radicalization.

Adolescent society is not homogeneous: it is highly stratified in terms of *status* relationships. During the course of several months of participant observation in Shore City we came to learn of some twelve distinct types (reflecting both age and life-style differences) by means of which young people identify themselves and one another. From these, we derived three general "types" of adolescents, distinguishable in terms of their perception of and commitment to the dominant adult norms of their society: "conformist", "nonconformist" and "uncommitted".<sup>4</sup> The latter category consists of those respondents who were unable, or unwilling, to classify themselves or others, and those who stated that they didn't believe in types. The distribution of both student and dropout samples among these categories is shown in Table 1.

Clearly (and self-evidently) very few of the dropouts see themselves as "conformists". Nearly twice as many of the dropouts as the students define themselves as "nonconformists" and the former group also has a higher proportion of "uncommitted".

When we consider the social class composition of these typological categories, some interesting findings emerge. This data for the student sample are presented in Table 2. Here we can see that the lower white and upper blue classes contribute disproportionately to the "nonconformist" category, whereas the professional and managerial classes have a slightly higher proportion of "conformists". From data not presented here, we know that the student "nonconformists" are about equally split — left and right — on issues such as civil liberties, politics, and other social attitudes and behaviours. As we shall see later, much of the conservatism of the "nonconformist" group is contributed to by the blue collar classes. Another outstanding feature of the "nonconformists" is that fewer are planning to go to university than students in the other two categories. This is shown in the data of Table 3.

What is important about the "nonconformist" student is that he maintains a relatively high friendship association with the "conformist" group, which we know has a high representation of the upper white collar classes (professional and managerial), and a correspondingly high proportion of students planning to go to university. The patterns of friendship ties for the

<sup>4</sup> It should be noted that these categories, and the more elaborate "types" from which they have been deduced, are heuristically, not theoretically, derived.



TABLE 1. DISTRIBUTION OF STUDENT AND DROPOUT SAMPLES BY TYPE (IN PERCENT)

Type	Student Sample	Dropout Sample
Conformist	45.0(175)	25.5(14)
Nonconformist	10.8(42)	20.0(11)
Uncommitted	44.2(172)	54.5(30)
Total	100.0(389)	100.0(55)

student sample are presented in Table 4. As might be expected, most of the respondents in each type reported that most of their friends were also of the same type. However, what is revealing is the direction of *out-group* friendship ties. Here, we can see that those who define themselves as either "nonconformist" or "uncommitted" have a relatively high friendship association with the "conformists" (28.5% and 22.7% respectively).

As far as the dropout in Shore City is concerned, whether a friend is in school or out of school is irrelevant: his criterion of judging friendship is sociability rather than institutional conformity.<sup>5</sup> In fact, 45.4 per cent of the dropouts' male friends, and 68.3 of their female friends, are in school. Most of the dropouts also come from the middle range socio-economic classes: the managerial and upper blue collar classes are highly represented, constituting 36.4 and 30.9 per cent of the dropouts respectively. What values, attitudes and behaviours are the dropouts transmitting back to the institutionalized student population?

For the most part, the message is one of hedonism and nihilism. Drug use, for example, is much more prevalent among dropouts (57.4 per cent use marijuana) than among students (20.0 per cent use marijuana). The incidence of sexual intercourse is also much higher for the dropouts (69.1 per cent) than for the students (17.3 per cent). In the very act of dropping out, then, those who leave school demonstrate their rejection of most of the institutional values of their society, especially those of the school, which has a major responsibility for indoctrinating youth in these values.

However, the dropouts are not without values of their own. These values reflect "equality" (e. g., class and sexual discrimination is very low among dropouts); "humanism" (e. g. dropouts are more capable of distinguishing between the oppressive nature of social institutions and the actions

<sup>5</sup> Much of the following information about dropouts has been provided by N. J. H. Mansfield in *Young Pariahs, Dropping Out of High School as an Institutional Alternative*, unpublished Master's Thesis, Simon Fraser University, 1970.

TABLE 2. TYPOLOGY BY SOCIAL CLASS, STUDENT SAMPLE  
(IN VERTICAL PERCENT)

Social Class :(a)	Typology			
	Conformist	Nonconform.	Uncommitted	Total Percent
Professional	23.4	4.7	22.1	20.8 (81)
Managerial	29.7	26.2	26.8	28.0 (109)
Lower White Collar	16.0	26.2	15.7	17.0 (66)
Upper Blue Collar	23.4	38.1	26.7	26.5 (103)
Lower Blue Collar	6.3	2.4	7.0	6.2 (24)
Missing Data	1.2	2.4	1.7	1.5 (6)
Total	100.0(175)	100.0(42)	100.0(172)	100.0 (389)

(a) The indicant of social class used was father's occupation, as follows :

Professional :	self-employed or salaried "guild" occupations (law, medicine, engineering, teaching, etc.)
Managerial :	business, proprietorial and official occupations
Lower White Collar :	clerical and sales occupations
Upper Blue Collar :	skilled craftsmen, foremen and operatives
Lower Blue Collar :	semi and unskilled service, farm and labour workers
Missing Data :	includes "don't know" and "no answer" responses

of officials within these institutions than are students in school); and "liberalism" (e.g., dropouts are more liberal on many social issues than are students). In short, the Shore City dropout espouses a value system which emphasizes the integrity of the individual over institutional imperatives. He

TABLE 3. UNIVERSITY PLAN BY TYPOLOGY, STUDENT SAMPLE (IN PERCENT)

Typology	Planning University	Not Planning University	Total
Conformist	53.3	46.7	100.0 (175)
Nonconformist	38.1	61.9	100.0 (42)
Uncommitted	48.3	51.7	100.0 (172)
Total Percent	49.4	50.6	100.0 (389)

TABLE 4. DIRECTION OF FRIENDSHIP TIES FOR STUDENT SAMPLE (IN PERCENT)

Type	Most Friends Reported As :			
	Conformist	Nonconformist	Uncommitted	Total
Conformist	88.0	2.3	9.7	100.0(175)
Nonconformist	28.5	66.7	4.8	100.0(42)
Uncommitteed	22.7	11.0	66.3	100.0(172)
Total Percent	52.7	13.1	34.2	100.0(389)

reflects, in many ways, what Edgar Friedenberg defines as "subjectivity": ". . . the capacity to attend to and respond to one's inner life and feelings, to the uniquely personal in experience, to personal relationships".<sup>6</sup>

Co-terminous with this "turned on" socialization coming from their drop-out peers, students in Shore City are receiving an intensive upward mobility and work ethic socialization from all sectors of the adult society. This is particularly true at the upper white collar class levels, where young people are constantly being admonished to get an education as a means for upward mobility. This is revealed in the data of Table 5, where we investigate university plan by social class. Not unexpectedly, we find that planning to go to university varies directly by social class. The anticipated outcome of this education, in terms of future occupational plans, also varies by social

<sup>6</sup> Friedenberg, *op. cit.*, p. 211.

TABLE 5. UNIVERSITY PLAN BY SOCIAL CLASS (IN PERCENT)

Social Class	Planning to Attend University
Professional	58.0
Managerial	69.6
Lower White Collar	56.1
Upper Blue Collar	35.0
Lower Blue Collar	20.8
Missing Data	33.3
Total Percent	49.4(389)

class, as shown in Table 6. Comparing, first of all, the "total percent" columns of Tables 2 and 6 reveals a great deal about the *actual* social class composition of our sample and their *expected* future social class: most of our students want to be upwardly mobile into the professional class, whereas they reject almost completely the managerial class of occupations, which is the most highly represented among their parents. The only point of correspondence between occupational representation in Shore City and the future occupational expectation of our students is for the lower blue collar class. Although the lower blue collar students have a disproportional expectation of "Horatio Alger" mobility (from lower blue to professional), they also contribute disproportionately to the more realistic expectation of future lower blue collar employment (see Table 6). Also from the data of Table 6, we can see that the professional and managerial class students contribute disproportionately to the expectation of future professional employment, a point which will be taken up later in this paper. Perhaps the most revealing information from Table 6 is that all students in Shore City have a highly unrealistic expectation of upward mobility, although this is slightly less for those in the lower socio-economic classes, where the incidence of planning to go to university is lowest.

At this point, it may be instructive to note what Shore City adolescents consider to be the "ideal" rewards from their future occupational careers. When we asked them to rank the satisfactions that they would most like to get from their future work, our respondents' main concern was the op-

TABLE 6. OCCUPATIONAL EXPECTATION BY SOCIAL CLASS (IN PERCENT)

Social Class	Occupational Expectation						Total
	Prof.	Manag.	Lower White	Upper Blue	Lower Blue	Missing Data	
Professional	61.8	0.0	7.4	1.2	7.4	22.2	100.0(81)
Managerial	59.6	2.8	6.4	1.8	3.7	25.7	100.0(109)
Lower White Collar	54.6	3.0	10.6	1.5	4.5	25.8	100.0(66)
Upper Blue Collar	51.4	1.0	10.7	5.8	3.9	27.2	100.0(103)
Lower Blue Collar	58.3	0.0	4.2	4.2	25.0	8.3	100.0(24)
Missing Data	66.7	—	—	—	—	33.3	100.0(6)
Total Percent	56.6	1.5	8.5	3.1	6.1	24.2	100.0(389)

portunity to put specialized talents into use (first choice of 22.6 per cent). Stability and security also ranked high (19.0 per cent). The opportunity to be helpful to others (11.6 per cent), a chance to earn a good deal of money (11.0 per cent), and the ability to work with people rather than things (10.0 per cent) were more "middle range" satisfactions. Ranking considerably lower on our respondents' scale of satisfactions were creativity and originality (6.2 per cent), adventure (5.1 per cent), freedom from supervision (2.6 per cent), and the chance to exercise leadership (1.0 per cent). In sum, it may be said that young people in Shore City want future security and the chance to use their talents rather than excitement, originality and independence. As we shall see, their chances of being disappointed in these aspirations are quite high, especially for those students who are planning to go to university to ensure them.

Turning now to political considerations, we found the party preferences of Shore City adolescents to be almost identical to those of their parents (as revealed by adult voting records), with the exception that they favour left-of-centre parties slightly over right-of-centre. For the most part, however, the young people we studied are ideologically a-political. This we suspect is largely a function of age (the ages of our respondents ranged from 12 to 19). Moreover, they show an exceptionally high degree of political alienation (nearly twice that of their parents) in terms of their perceptions of public officials and the government. However, interest in politics increases

by age: as students move through the school system they become increasingly interested in studying politics and the social sciences and decreasingly interested in studying sciences and mathematics. This trend is particularly noticeable at the grade 11 and 12 levels.

The political viewpoint of young people in Shore City is primarily "left-liberal"; they are reformist and issue-oriented. On most social issues, they are considerably more liberal than their parents. It is noteworthy that these liberal attitudes tend to vary directly by social class and university plan (which are positively correlated).<sup>7</sup> Since we shall argue later that planning to go to university is an important factor in the potential radicalization of middle class youth, let us now investigate, in Table 7, a sampling of attitudes regarding social issues by university plan ("liberal" responses are underlined). Although the percentage differences are not great, it is evident that students who are planning to go to university tend to be more liberal on social issues than those who are not planning to attend.

Let us now recapitulate the picture we have drawn of young people in a middle class community like Shore City. Here, we have found an almost colonial situation, with young people being given a highly negative perception of their present worth and status through the concerted efforts of adult-controlled social institutions. In compensation for being thus denigrated, young people (particularly those from the middle to upper social strata) are being told that if they work and study hard, and go to university, they will be successful and upwardly mobile. Consequently, a large number of middle class adolescents plan to go to university and look forward to upper level occupations which will bring them security and a chance to exercise the special talents they have acquired. At the same time, the call of a different tune is becoming more apparent: a song of hedonism and nihilism piped in by those who have more or less rejected the message of the dominant institutions of their society and have dropped out. What does the future hold for these liberal, socially conscious and slightly "turned on" middle class adolescents?

To begin with, industrial societies in the West have entered a "post-capitalist" phase. The nineteenth century class contradictions between those who owned the means of production and those who sold their labour have given way to new class contradictions based on the consumption, rather than the production, of goods and services. Power resides in the hands of those who control consumption: witness, since the 1950's, the increasingly powerful role of government, organized labour and the advertising media in the economic structure. The working classes, particularly since the advent of consumer credit, have become less proletarian in their outlook. This has been aided by the "new look" in trade unions: no longer radical, but silent partners in the military-industrial complex.

<sup>7</sup> The "conservatism" or "traditionalism" of the working classes has not gone unnoticed in the literature. See, for example, S. M. Lipset, *Democracy and Working Class Authoritarianism*, *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 24 (August 1959), pp. 482-501. The implications of working class conservatism and "trade union consciousness" will be dealt with later in this paper.

TABLE 7. ATTITUDES ON SOCIAL ISSUES BY UNIVERSITY PLAN (IN PERCENT)

Attitude Item	Planning University					Not Planning University				
	Agree	Dis-agree	Not Sure	No Answer	Total	Agree	Dis-agree	Not Sure	No Answer	Total
1. Hippies should have the right to promote their point of view.	81.8	17.7	0.5	—	100.0(192)	74.6	23.9	0.5	1.0	100.0(197)
2. It is often necessary to restrict the freedom of certain political groups	53.7	40.6	5.2	0.5	100.0(192)	59.5	29.4	10.6	0.5	100.0(197)
3. Communists and Nazis should have the same right as other politicians to make public speeches	64.1	30.2	5.7	—	100.0(192)	50.8	39.1	9.1	1.0	100.0(197)
4. If Canada were at war, the government should have the right to suppress critics of its policies	17.7	64.1	17.7	0.5	100.0(192)	24.9	50.3	22.8	2.0	100.0(197)
5. People who sell marijuana ought to be put in jail for a long time	46.4	47.4	6.2	—	100.0(192)	51.3	42.6	5.6	0.5	100.0(197)
6. It is society which is responsible for people's failures	38.7	46.6	12.6	2.1	100.0(192)	30.5	55.8	12.7	1.0	100.0(197)
7. The present system of elections does not always select the best men to govern our country	42.4	45.6	1.4	1.6	100.0(192)	36.5	44.7	17.3	1.5	100.0(197)

Few of the working class youth in Shore City plan to go to university: their career plans are more oriented (probably quite realistically) towards entering the labour market at a blue collar level. Increasingly, blue collar workers stand a good chance of being "bought off" by the post-capitalist economic system. This will most likely take the form of a guaranteed annual wage and tax reductions for lower income groups, the advent of which is imminent.

If this picture of post-capitalist society is accurate, then we can anticipate that new class contradictions are going to emerge between the "employed" (those whose economic — particularly consumption — expectations are met) and the "underemployed" (those whose expectations are not met). We cannot really expect a revolution of the "unemployed", whose consciousness centres around either a culture of poverty and despair, or the hope of becoming employed. We must look instead to that sector of the occupational structure which has a high anticipation of remunerative and satisfying employment, but a low possibility of achieving it. This is precisely the position of today's middle class, university-bound, youth.

The advent of cybernation in the early 1960's had the initial effect of increasing employment opportunities for technologists. Since then, however, the sector of the labour force most affected by shrinking employment opportunities has been the middle to upper range: engineers, technicians, scientists, managers and officials.<sup>8</sup> Although the computer has certainly had an effect on "line" occupations, its greatest application has been at the "staff" level of business, industry and government.

Most of the university-bound adolescents in Shore City are aiming for the professional and technical occupational levels: many of them (if they get employment at all) will certainly have to settle for less. The latest available age-specific unemployment rates for Canada show that unemployment is greatest for the under 20 and 20-24 age brackets (16.6 and 11.8 per cent respectively for males).<sup>9</sup> A recent study conducted by the Canada Manpower office at Simon Fraser University revealed that only 48 per cent of our graduates for the years 1966 to 1969 are currently employed.<sup>10</sup> Many university graduates, particularly those in the liberal arts, find that the only employment they can get upon graduation does not require the skills and training they spent several years and thousands of dollars to acquire.

Thus, the stage is set for the alienation of middle class youth who will find that instead of "getting ahead" through higher education, they will have a hard time to stay where they are and may even become downwardly mobile. The contradictions inherent in post-capitalist industrial society cannot long escape them, particularly when they have already acquired seeds of

<sup>8</sup> This trend is well documented by R. A. Lockhart in "The Effect of Recent Techno-Economic Changes on the Mobility Patterns and Opportunities of the American Middle Class, with Particular Emphasis on Emergent Contradictions Between Occupational and Educational Factors", unpublished Master's Thesis, Simon Fraser University, 1970.

<sup>9</sup> Dominion Bureau of Statistics, *Unemployment in Canada* (Ottawa, The Queen's Printer, 1962).

<sup>10</sup> Of the rest, 40 per cent are taking full time courses of some kind (presumably graduate work) and 12 per cent are otherwise unemployed.



doubt about the viability of adult social institutions. Added to this potential for radicalization is the fact that many young people will enter the social sciences and liberal arts in university (a well-documented trend), where the opportunity for social analysis is greatest.

There is no guarantee, of course, that the reform liberalism of middle class youth will become revolutionary. However, if it does, the potential for generational conflict is likely to increase; not because of any "rebelliousness of youth", but simply because the older middle class generation (constituting as it does a smaller age cohort than the younger) is now established in those segments of the occupational structure which it has encouraged its youth to enter. In the new class conflicts which are likely to emerge in the coming decade, middle class youth are as yet "unwitting revolutionaries".

## THE RELATION OF MORALITY AND LAW TO CONTEMPORARY YOUTH PROTEST IN THE UNITED STATES

JOHN SOMERVILLE

USA

Youth rebellion is nothing new; but what we are witnessing today has significant differences from past phenomena, both in scale and content. So far as the United States is concerned, the youth protests of the last five years have been unique in their extent, both geographically and temporally, and in the degree of moral and political consciousness involved, as well as the degree of power attained, especially among the students. In both violent and non-violent forms, civil disobedience and the politics of disruption have played central roles. All this has not come to an end, and may indeed be on the increase. While not a full-scale revolution, this might be characterized legally and politically as a sporadic and continuing rebellion, which has scored very surprising successes. There is no doubt that in important respects a new climate has been created, and a new set of social problems brought into existence. Much depends upon how they are understood and approached.

Examination of the empirical data, and analysing of the role played by values lead to the conclusion that this youth rebellion cannot be understood unless we take account of its moral content, and that this moral content is related to law in a way that has been widely misunderstood. In turn, this misunderstanding has led to much superficial sociology. Let us try to establish the actual, underlying relationships of these decisive factors.

There can be no doubt that the largest single causal factor in the American youth rebellion was the government's military involvement in Vietnam, which in part followed the pattern established by the military involvement in Korea, but which lacked the legal camouflage of a connection with the United Nations. (One must use the word "camouflage", because the widespread impression that the U. S. forces were ordered into combat in Korea as a result of a United Nations decision is false. As the record shows, the U. S. forces were first ordered into combat by President Truman unilaterally, and this act influenced the subsequent vote in the U. N. Security Council, which took place at a time when the Soviet delegate was absent from the chamber.) The fact is that American participation in both these large-scale, protracted wars, which so disrupted and threatened the lives of the youth, though contributing so greatly to the profits of industry, were direct,

*prima facie* violations of the Constitution of the United States, which provides that Congress alone, by majority vote of both Houses, has the power to order systematic, large-scale war. In each of these cases the President made the decision for large-scale war without gaining the prior authorization of Congress, then presented Congress and the country with a *fait accompli*, asking for patriotic support of the American forces already committed to systematic combat and suffering heavy casualties.

Evidence shows that the most probable reason for this *prima facie* illegal procedure was that the President and his military advisers were in each case sincerely convinced of three things: 1) the expansion of Communist power must be prevented; 2) this can be done only by large-scale military intervention, by initiating acts of war;<sup>1</sup> 3) Congress, if asked beforehand, would not vote to initiate such acts of war. This third consideration touches to the very reason, as historical documents show, that the framers of the U. S. Constitution placed the war-making power in the hands of Congress rather than the President. That is, Congress would be far less likely to plunge the country into costly wars. Thus, Thomas Jefferson wrote to James Madison in 1789: "We have already given in example one effectual check to the Dog of War by transferring the power of letting him loose from the Executive to the Legislative body, from those who are to spend to those who are to pay."<sup>2</sup>

Abraham Lincoln confronted the same problem in the context of the war against Mexico, carried on from 1846 to 1848, a context which in significant respects bears an uncanny resemblance to our situation today in relation to Vietnam. Following the annexation of Texas there were disputes with Mexico over certain stretches of territory held by the Mexicans. President Polk and his military advisers were of the opinion that the best thing to do was to go to war against Mexico, a relatively weak power militarily. Instead of presenting his case to Congress for authorization, Polk unilaterally ordered armed forces into battle against the Mexicans, and after the Americans had suffered casualties, asked Congress for support. Polk's account laid the blame on the Mexicans, and Congress was persuaded to vote for a declaration on May 13, 1846, which stated that Mexico had initiated the war. But as the struggle went on, and more facts were uncovered, suspicion grew in Congress that the Executive's account of the facts that had produced the war was distorted and exaggerated. In the credibility gap that opened up, Congress undertook its own investigations of the original circumstances, and on January 3, 1848, the House of Representatives passed a condemnatory resolution which declared that the war had been "Unnecessarily and unconstitutionally begun by the President of the United States".<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See Somerville, John: World Authority: Realities and Illusions. in Ethics, An International Journal, October 1965. U. of Chicago.

<sup>2</sup> Foner, Philip, Ed.: Basic Writings of Thomas Jefferson, p. 592. New York, Halcyon House, 1950.

<sup>3</sup> Quoted in Wormuth, Francis: The Vietnam War: The President Versus the Constitution, p. 11, Santa Barbara, California. Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, 1968.

Lincoln was then a member of the House, and voted for the resolution. His reasons, expressed in a letter to a friend who had favored Polk's action, apply completely to the situation of today, and read as if he had been thinking about Vietnam and Cambodia. Lincoln said: "Let me first state what I understand to be your position. It is that if it shall become necessary to repel invasion, the President may, without violation of the Constitution, cross the line and invade the territory of another country, and that whether such necessity exists in any given case the President is the sole judge . . ."

" . . . Allow the President to invade a neighboring nation whenever he shall deem it necessary to repel an invasion, and you allow him to do so whenever he may choose to say he deems it necessary for such a purpose, and you allow him to make war at his pleasure. Study to see if you can fix any limit to his powers in this respect, after having given him so much power as you propose . . ."

"The provision of the Constitution giving the war-making power to Congress was dictated, as I understand it, by the following reasons: Kings had always been involving and impoverishing their people in wars, pretending generally, if not always, that the good of the people was the object. This our (constitutional J. S.) convention understood to be the most oppressive of all kingly oppressions, and they resolved to so frame the Constitution that no one man should hold the power of bringing oppression upon us. But your view destroys the whole matter, and places our President where kings have always stood."<sup>4</sup>

The state legislature of Massachusetts had passed a resolution censuring the federal government for carrying on an undeclared war (the same state has passed legislation to the same effect in relation to our war action in Vietnam), and Henry David Thoreau had gone to jail rather than pay taxes that would be used to support the war against Mexico and to enforce slavery, then the law of the land. "It is not desirable," wrote Thoreau bluntly, "to cultivate a respect for the law so much as for the right."<sup>5</sup> At the same time that Lincoln in Congress was condemning President Polk for violating the Constitution Thoreau was writing his famous essay "On the Duty of Civil Disobedience", on the first page of which he made, in his own way, the same point that Lincoln made. "The government itself," said Thoreau, "which is only the mode which the people have chosen to execute their will, is equally liable to be abused and perverted before the people can act through it. Witness the present Mexican war, the work of comparatively a few individuals using the standing government as their tool; for, in the outset, the people would not have consented to this measure."<sup>6</sup> Thus Thoreau and Lincoln both condemned the President for breaking a good law which he pretended to uphold; but Thoreau went further, and openly broke a bad law which his conscience deliberately rejected.

<sup>4</sup> Quoted in Wormuth, Francis: *The Vietnam War: The President Versus the Constitution*, p. 11, Santa Barbara, California. Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, 1968.

<sup>5</sup> Thoreau, Henry David: *On the Duty of Civil Disobedience*, in Somerville and Santoni, Eds.: *Social and Political Philosophy*, p. 283. New York, Doubleday, 1963.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 282.

In these thoughts and actions of Lincoln and Thoreau in the 1840's we sense the same tensions — moral, political and legal — that we sense in the America of today, the same combination of civil disobedience and legal protest, the same unstable mixture of violence and non-violence (Thoreau defended John Brown's act, as did Emerson),<sup>7</sup> the same confrontation of conscience and authority. It was Mexico then; it is Vietnam now. It was slavery then; it is the racial ghetto now. The tensions then were not just tensions that arise and pass away, nor are they now. They were then building up to a civil war which radically changed the social institutions of a great country. What are they building up to now? This is a question of prime concern to the sociologist, especially if sociology is ever to meet the challenge of prognosis. And if it cannot meet that challenge, will it ever be significant as a science? In any case, knowledge is power only to the extent that it is predictive (*savoir, c'est prévoir; prévoir, c'est pouvoir*, as the father of sociology, Comte, put it), and this is a human need before it is a test of social science. But the two — the satisfaction of human needs and the validation of sociological theory — are, of course, connected. The link is prediction, a loop binding past, present and future, which, before its ends are joined, is a question-mark. In this case, the question suggested by the past data is: Are the tensions surrounding the youth protests in America today building up to some kind of social explosion that could be compared to the civil war? It is of course impossible as yet to give a firm answer to this question. The most one can say so far is that it is conceivable.

But what is quite certain is that important social phenomena of this kind cannot be understood at the theoretical level, nor constructively dealt with at the practical level unless full and careful account is taken of the value factors that operate in the phenomena. When the youth protest and masses revolt, there is a widespread tendency among established people — whether they are scholars, scientists, clergymen, construction workers, businessmen, government officials, or others in secure and authoritative positions — to assume that these happenings are breakdowns of law, order and morality which have their origin in unbalanced leaders and misguided people who may properly be characterized as social misfits, moral degenerates, mental cases, juvenile delinquents or contemptible bums, whose troubles can be cleared up by a strong mixture of police action and psychological therapy.

At the same time, a majority of these established people profess great admiration for such heroic figures and movements of the past as Thomas Jefferson, Abraham Lincoln, Henry Thoreau, the Abolitionists, the American Revolution and the Declaration of Independence. But they never confront the past with any serious questions about law, order and morality. They do not really take history seriously, and this prevents them from getting beneath the surface of the present. It is impossible for them to give serious consideration to the hypothesis that a living President or ex-President of the United States could be an unpunished criminal, that living federal judges

<sup>7</sup> See Thoreau's essay A Plea for Captain John Brown, in Chicago, Regnery, 1949; Emerson, Ralph Waldo: "John Brown" in The Complete Essays and Other Writings New York, Modern Library, 1940.

might know this, but fear to say it, that living disobeyers and disrupters might be as right as Thoreau and the Abolitionists, but still be called misfits and bums, that rebellion in the United States today might be as morally and politically justified as in 1776. Yet it is clear that one who is unable to give serious consideration to such hypotheses has not yet found even the problem of the present, let alone a solution of that problem.

One of the central factors of the present problem in the United States is the attitude of Congress toward what the Executive branch of the government, represented by the President, has done and is doing in regard to plunging the country into wars. Do members of Congress feel that these actions of the Executive are in violation of the Constitution? Would members of Congress have voted for a declaration of war if the question had been put to them beforehand? In the spring of 1969 the writer placed these questions before each member of Congress in the following form: "1) In view of the fact that the U. S. Constitution gives to Congress alone the power to declare war, do you feel there is a serious problem in the fact that we have recently found ourselves in two large-scale wars (Korea, Vietnam — more than 60,000 Americans dead so far) without any declaration of war by the Congress?" Three brief formulations of possible answers were supplied along with the question; amplified answers were also invited. Though less than 10% (9.3) of the members responded to the questionnaires, which required a signature, it is perhaps significant that 94% of those who did respond answered this question with the formulation, "Yes, there is a serious constitutional problem involved." The other two formulations that were provided along with the question were, "There may be a technical constitutional question, but it makes no real difference whether Congress declares war or leaves it to the Executive to decide," and "There is no constitutional problem." These two alternatives together accounted for only 6%. But no court has yet ruled on the constitutional problem.

Question 2 was worded as follows: "If, after the Tonkin Gulf incident, President Johnson had sent a message to Congress asking for a declaration of war against North Vietnam (recognizing it as a state), would you at that time have been inclined to vote for a declaration of war?" The alternatives supplied along with this question were: "Probably not," "Probably yes," and "Probably would have abstained." 76.5% said "Probably not." If this is representative of Congress there would be something like mathematical proof that a crime of enormous magnitude was committed. There were two further questions. 3) was as follows: "Do you feel that the vote for the Tonkin Gulf Resolution can properly be construed as something which handed over to President Johnson Congress' prior approval and consent for him to commit us to large-scale war at his own discretion?" 73% flatly answered, "No." Yet that is, of course, exactly what Johnson did. 4) was: "If, in relation to another country, we have signed a treaty which pledges us to go to the aid of that country militarily when it is attacked, do you feel that the Executive, without further authorization of the Congress, has the right to decide when such a country has in fact been attacked, and then commit us to large-scale war?" 91% answered with the formulation, "No, Congress must first debate and decide if war is the needed action under the given conditions." Yet this of course was never done.

These questions were submitted to the members of Congress with a covering letter on May 15, 1969, which stated: "As you well know, the college youth today are keenly concerned with the problem of war, especially the Vietnam war. I am urging them to direct their natural concern about war into channels of orderly political discussion and responsible methods of understanding the basic facts. Everyone will admit that our system is not perfect, but the youth need to be convinced that there are open channels within the system through which they can get candid answers, and thus lay a basis for orderly improvement where necessary. You can help very greatly if you, as a member of our government, will give us the benefit of your answer to the four questions listed below concerning the role and responsibility of Congress in relation to decisions to enter large-scale war."

After an interval of three weeks, when only about 5% of the members of the Congress had replied, I sent all those who had not replied a second copy of the questions with a further letter, which stated: "We are all agreed that war is our most important problem, and that our youth have most to lose when we get involved in it. I am sure you also agree that they are therefore especially entitled to know where you, as a member of the Congress, stand on the four questions. If people find they are made to bear the miseries of war, but their national government will not clarify for them who makes the decisions to involve the nation in war, would we not have to expect them to lose confidence in their government? If members of Congress did not or could not clarify the relation of what they do about war to the provisions of our most basic law — the U. S. Constitution — could we expect the youth to take seriously the solemn admonitions about the necessity of law, order and rational discussion?" The additional replies brought the total to a fraction under 10%.

What is the significance of the fact that the great majority of members of Congress would not give answers to these questions, even though this same great majority were deploring the unrest, the demonstrations and disruptions — directed mainly against the war — that were taking place on campuses all over the country, and were repeatedly saying in public that the students must turn away from such methods, must approach the problem rationally, and follow paths of law and order? The most likely interpretation is that in most cases this majority of members preferred to remain silent because they felt unable to justify rationally their action and lack of action as legislators in this matter that meant life or death to the youth. It is highly probable that many of them had come to the conclusion that the President had made a grave mistake which was also a constitutional crime, but that they, the great majority of Congress, were involved in this constitutional crime, because they had watched it taking place and had not intervened, had not asserted their rights and fulfilled their responsibilities under the Constitution. Thus they felt guilty, but only a small minority of those who felt guilty had the courage publicly to admit their guilt.

Meanwhile, what should we expect to result empirically if in these circumstances the youth are told by their parents and teachers that it is their moral duty to go on dying in increasing numbers in the name of law and order? What would we have to think of the intelligence and morality of

our youth if in these circumstances they had remained silent and obedient? "Theirs not to reason why; theirs but to do and die?" Such an attitude would be wholly inconsistent both with the predominant empirical content of American history and with the values built into American social principles. In light of these facts it should be in no way surprising that there formed in America, especially from the side of the student youth, a climate of opinion in relation to the Vietnam war radically different from the climate surrounding American participation in World War II or World War I, wherein there was no question of monstrous illegality, and there was unmistakably predominant approval morality. Add to this the fact that war itself, because of the development of thermonuclear weapons, has become a threat to the continuity of all life on the planet, and one is obviously confronted, after World War II, by moral issues of a depth utterly without precedent in all history.

Put bluntly, there is a very strong case that war with a thermonuclear potential has now become the most immoral form of behavior humanly conceivable, while the Vietnam war, on America's part, represents an enormous legal crime as well. In the American judicial system, the courts have the power and responsibility to rule on the question whether any action of any government official is or is not constitutional. But in the matter of the President ordering acts of war in Vietnam without prior authorization of Congress, the courts have incredibly but repeatedly refused to rule one way or the other. In like manner, legal petitions to Congress for a proceeding of impeachment directed against the President, also provided for in the Constitution, have elicited neither an affirmative nor negative response from the Congress, only *de facto* refusal to proceed to a judgement in the legal channels. Not even a preliminary hearing was held. The moral question, which is also a political question, thus posed itself: If a government will not obey its own rules, if it is unwilling or unable to allow channels of law and order to operate to decide questions which mean life or death to the people, what are the rights and obligations of the people in relation to such a government? A significant section of the youth, as well as representatives of other elements of the population, became convinced that in such a situation civil disobedience is morally justified, and political disruption is socially necessary.

In this connection one must not forget that modern democracy, taking its entire point of departure from the concept of the sovereignty of the people, must necessarily recognize the right, even the duty, of revolution against a tyrannical government. This was of course the whole argument of the American Declaration of Independence in justification of the violent revolution by means of which the United States of America as an independent country was brought to birth. It must further be noted that, although the classic theory of the right of revolution, expressed for example in John Locke's work,<sup>8</sup> considers this right as one that belongs to the majority as such, his American disciple, Thomas Jefferson, in addition warmly defended

<sup>8</sup> Somerville and Santoni, op. cit., pp. 169-204.



(e. g., in the case of Shays' rebellion) minority insurrections wherein the people concerned are sincerely convinced that what they are rebelling against is a tyranny. "God forbid," wrote Jefferson in 1787, shortly after the armed insurrection led by Daniel Shays in Massachusetts, "that we should ever be twenty years without such a rebellion."<sup>9</sup> Why? Jefferson answers with a question that sums up a wealth of empirical data: "What country can preserve its liberties, if its rulers are not warned, from time to time, that this people preserve the spirit of resistance?"<sup>10</sup> Jefferson says this with full awareness that the people will sometimes be misled, and will misconceive the facts, as he felt was the case in Shays' rebellion. But the most important point of all, he reasons, is that "If they remain quiet under such misconception, it is a lethargy, the forerunner of death to the public liberty."<sup>11</sup> In other words, freedom and democracy can survive misguided insurrections, but could not survive moral cowardice.

Thus, beneath the youth protests of the past five years there are moral, legal, political and historical roots that cannot be ignored. On the surface it seems easy to reach the quick conclusion one finds most frequently — that these protests are manifestations of a breakdown of law and order, of morality and democratic process on the part of misguided youth. However, the deeper one digs, the closer one is forced to the opposite conclusion — that the breakdown of law, order, morality and democratic process first took place, on a massive scale, at the upper reaches of official authority, and that the protests of the youth are, in their own way, assertions of the necessity of moral, legal and political principles which the established authority professes to recognize but fails to practice. Every movement, as William James once remarked, has its "lunatic fringe," and the present youth movement seems endowed with an unusually fertile, colorful and irritating proliferation of this kind. But if we are to judge in terms of social content and essence rather than psychological form and surface, which it is our sociological obligation to do, we must face the fact that human society will be more indebted for its future (if indeed it will have any extensive future) to those who protested, disobeyed and disrupted during these thermonuclear years than to those who remained silent, defferential, and did as they were told.

<sup>9</sup> Somerville and Santoni, *op. cit.* p., 259.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*

1. GRAND ROUND TABLES  
AND EMPIRICAL PATTERNS OF DEVELOPMENT

2. LES GRANDES TABLES RONDES  
ET LES MODELES EMPIRIQUES DE DEVELOPPEMENT

## I. GRAND THEORIES OF SOCIAL EVOLUTION AND EMPIRICAL PATTERNS OF DEVELOPMENT

### I. LES GRANDES THEORIES DE L'EVOLUTION SOCIALE ET LES MODELES EMPIRIQUES DE DEVELOPPEMENT

The subject of social evolution has been the subject of much sharp debate. Considerably more so following the Darwinian theory of evolution. The Darwinian theory of evolution has brought quite sceptical and even nihilistic treatment of the issue of social progress by Western science.

But by the middle of this century the interest in the problems of social development seems to revive. This is due to the whole set of causes: the problems of development of former colonial countries, and the necessity to find means to study processes embracing large time periods, needs in philosophy, social and economic prognostication, etc. Nevertheless, up till now evolutionism is far from being interpreted by various Western sociologists in a similar way. Thus, Teilhard de Chardin, a well-known scientist and philosopher of the XX century in his book "The Phenomenon of Man" proclaims that the evolution theory has gained an overall acknowledgment among modern scientists because for them it was the only possible way to study science.

At the same time, Becker and Sewery analyzing Western sociologists positions state the opposite — that nowadays the evolution theory has been greatly discredited and rejected.

True, the latter assumption does not reflect the factual state of affairs even in sociology. To prove this it is sufficient to mention a rather broad diffusion of the so-called neo-evolutionism in American cultural anthropology. The well-known representatives of this trend are Julian H. Steward, Doolittle Smith, Leslie White, V. Childe, as well as the authors of various theories of economic growth — W. Rostow, and others. Besides, within recently a number of adherents of the systematic approach have come up to accepting evolutionism: S. N. Eisenstadt, A. Rapoport, A. Eisen, P. L. van der Meer, and, finally, T. Parsons.

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## MODERN EVOLUTIONISM AND THE ISSUE OF SOCIAL PROGRESS

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The issue of social development, of social progress has long been the subject of most sharp debates. Considerably under the influence of Darwinism, on the one side, and, on the other side, of the most eminent representatives of philosophical thought whose works gave generalized reflection of achievements of natural sciences, and impetuous processes of social and technical progress, the second half of the XIX century has witnessed the orientation of social knowledge towards the study of social evolution, of the stages of social development. But the XX century has brought quite sceptical and even nihilistic treatment of the ideas of social progress by Western science.

But by the middle of this century the interest to the problems of social development seems to revive. This is due to the whole set of causes: the problems of development of former colonial countries, and the necessity to find means to study processes embracing large time periods, needs in philosophical, social and economic prognostication, etc. Nevertheless, up till now evolutionism is far from being interpreted by various Western sociologists in a similar way. Thus, Teillard de Chardin, a well-known scientist and philosopher of the XX century in his book "The Phenomenon of Man" proclaims that the evolution theory has gained an overall acknowledgement among modern scientists because for them it was the only possible way to study science.

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But it stands to reason to suggest that by the evolution theories Becker and Boskow have meant numerous variations of the so-called social

Darwinism characterised by mechanical transplantation of the evolution law of the biological nature into human society. This trend has long been acknowledged as groundless by overwhelming majority of contemporary scientists, and to discuss here such theoretical constructions seems needless.

Nevertheless negative estimation of evolutionism still prevails in Western sociology. The article by the English author Y. D. Peel Spencer and the Neo-Evolutionists is quite significant.<sup>1</sup> In a critical review of works of most prominent neo-evolutionists in the light of H. Spencer's conceptions, Y. D. Peel states that "social evolution was a product of the infancy of sociology,"<sup>2</sup> and proclaims the creation of the fundamental social theory impossible.

Thus, modern knowledge, including social knowledge, has exhibited in the West two distinct trends in the ways of treatment of social phenomena, two approaches to the analysis of culture, social institutions, etc. One of the trends is connected with structuralism, the second — with the revival in the West of scientific interest in the issues of social evolution, of social development, its ways and stages.

The structural-functional school, e. g. represented in anthropology and sociology<sup>3</sup> by B. Malinowski, A. Radcliffe-Brown, T. Parsons (in the works preceding the present period), and others stress the importance of the laws of integration, equilibrium, and stability of social systems, treating the laws of their functioning as absolute, and ignoring the laws of their dynamics, development, etc. These trends have suffered a number of theoretical and methodological difficulties both when treating changes in a given social system and when analyzing the global social processes leading to the changes of the structure of the society, its organization, etc.

Quite significant here are the pessimistic words of R. Nisbet, who states that it is impossible to find the sources of change in society by way of deducing them as fixed properties of social structures, and it is equally impossible to deduce them from the social structure and its processes, or the latter from the elements of human psychology.<sup>4</sup>

In opposition to structuralism now after a relatively long period of decay there forms anew in Western sociology the evolutionist trend which aims at analyzing social changes over a vast space of time, at detecting the direction of development of economic, cultural, etc., systems.

The polarization of the two trends depicts itself in the concentration of special methodological means of social knowledge, and the way social reality is perceived, and in the ideological stands of this or that scientist. This counterposition is, to a considerable degree, the cause of the absence of unified conception of social systems in present Western sociology, which would not only include the study of either functional or developmental processes, but would seek to theoretically synthesize these two indissoluble characteristics of the social whole.

<sup>1</sup> *Sociology*, vol. 3, No. 2, 1969, p. 188.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 173-191.

<sup>3</sup> Here we can ignore the differences existing among them.

<sup>4</sup> See R. Nisbet. *Social Change and History*. N. Y., 1969, p. 303.

It is necessary to say here that within recently a number of sociologists adhering to the systematic approach seek to find the possibilities for such a synthesis. Thus, T. Parsons published in 1964 an article "Evolutionary Universals in Society" which was appreciated in the "American Sociological Review"... "as a revival and extension of evolutionary thinking in social change"<sup>5</sup>.

But to my mind, in spite of the undoubtedly positive significance of this development of Parsons who seeks to overcome functional schemes without rejecting them, it is hardly possible to speak here about "extension of the evolutionary thinking". I would remind that, the "synthesis" of the systematic and evolutionist analyses was made long ago by K. Marx, this fact being admitted by many a Western scientist, including such an expert in the theory of systems, as A. Rapoport. Marx examines the society development as a natural historical process, and thoroughly analyzes it as an organized system of social relations. Structural elements of this system might as well be called "evolutionary universals". But Parsons limits the essence of social evolution to a system's growth in complexity and to the increase of its adaptive ability. Besides, Parsons' analysis is mainly oriented towards the past, practically ignoring the future prospects of the evolution of social systems. Nevertheless, this does not prevent us from agreeing with the appreciation of Parsons' present position as a neo-evolutionist one (see, e. g., "Sociology", v. 3, No. 2, 1969).

The attempt to synthesize the systematic approach with evolutionism made by S. N. Eisenstadt, is of a somewhat different nature.<sup>6</sup> Eisenstadt focusses his attention on the problem of differentiation in terms of investigation of processes themselves through attainment of new levels of integration in socio-cultural systems, rather than in terms of mechanisms of change.

In spite of the "generality" of his conception, Eisenstadt avoids the issue of the direction of social evolution at large, and, while analyzing the processes of influence of one element's changes upon the others and upon the whole system in general, he presents extremely vague definitions of the sources of these changes, and hierarchical relations of the structure of social systems.

Finally, we can mention here the article by P. L. van den Berghe "Dialectics and Functionalism: Towards Theoretical Synthesis"<sup>7</sup>. As van den Berghe himself states it, he follows the way of supplementing and clarifying the view-point of R. Dahrendorf, trying to clarify and supplement (or limit) after him both functionalism and dialectics.

It should be noted that van den Berghe presents a rather detailed analysis of difficulties encountered by structural functional theories, and of limitations of functionalism, many of his critical remarks being applicable to the above-mentioned Parsons' work on evolutionary universals as well (e. g.,

<sup>5</sup> American Sociological Review, vol. 33, 1968, No. 3, p. 343.

<sup>6</sup> See, e. g., S. N. Eisenstadt. Social Change, Differentiation and Evolution. In "American Sociological Review", vol. XXX, 1964, No. 3, pp. 375-386.

<sup>7</sup> See "American Sociological Review", vol. XXVIII, 1969, pp. 695-705.

underestimation of unevenness of the conflict and overestimation of homogeneity and graduality of changes; absolutization of adaptive and integrative processes). Let us only note that his position is not a synthesis of functionalism and dialectics, but a futile attempt to liberate functionalism from its notorious limitations with the help of dialectics terminology, whose scientific essence is emasculated from it.

As is evident from this brief review, the number of adherents of evolutionism today is not too small. Yet, it is too difficult to place Western neo-evolutionists on a single theoretical platform as they lack the unanimity in defining the essence of such crucial notions as "development", "evolution" and "progress", and their interrelation.

But it is noteworthy that even the authors who consider it justifiable to speak of evolution, development, cumulative process, etc., are quite sceptical towards the idea of progress. The latest "International Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences"<sup>8</sup>, has failed to include an article on "Progress", and the utilization of this term in the article "Evolution" is accompanied by a critical remark on "a moralistic tone" of progressivism, applying it both to "linear" conceptions of the XIX century and to Marxist dialectics. It is obviously far from reality. True, some authors seem to be ready to accept the possibility of substantiating the idea of progress. E. g., Morris Ginsberg writes: "... progress in social development is to be judged mainly by the stage reached in the growth of knowledge of nature and of insight into human needs, values and potentialities, and by the extent to which this knowledge and insight are used in the direction of human affairs"<sup>9</sup>. Alongside with this M. Ginsberg himself considers it possible, instead of deducing the notion of regularity, of law from social reality itself, to induct it into it. That is why he, as well as Bertrand Russel, J. Bury and many other Western authors seek to define progress in ethic-evaluative terms. In other words, by progress they mean such a course of change of events which is considered to be desirable and necessary in terms of certain values, or, still in other words, progress is a consideration of social processes from the view point of ethic ideal.

But the general sense of any theory of progress is interpreted in most diversified terms, because as a rule, Western social philosophical thought categorically rejects any monism and is bluntly pluralistic in its nature. This evidences itself in the proclamation of the thesis of regularity (and necessity) of independent determinants and "layers of existence", in conventionalistic principle of possibility of the multitude of isomorphous constructs, in the assertion of the necessity not "to place barriers", but "to achieve consensus" (R. Carnap), in the assertion that the absolute truth has never been and will never be given to anyone, since we all perceive history "being placed within it, and not from the view-point outside of it"<sup>10</sup> etc., etc.

<sup>8</sup> International Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences. The McMillan Co. & The Free Press, 1968.

<sup>9</sup> Morris Ginsberg. Social Evolution. In "Darwinism and the Study of Society, A Centenary Symposium". Chicago, 1961, p. 121.

<sup>10</sup> K. Jaspers. Die grossen Philosophen, B. I., München, 1957, p. 8.

This is the reason of such a diversity in the interpretation of the notion of "progress" and, moreover, the reason of rather common counterposition of it to "evolution". The "evolution" itself is interpreted either as "development", or as "transition", or, more often, just as "change". Alongside with this the notion of "evolution" suggests the analysis of the "course of history" and its basic nature.

The evaluations of social events, value judgements, are related, as a rule, to a social status or position of an evaluating individual, to his concept of a social ideal. That is why the afore mentioned speculations can be considered convincing enough neither for the refutation of the possibility and even necessity of treating social progress as a problem of the objective sociological science, nor as an argument that social progress lies in the sphere of but extremely relativistic and purely subjective evaluations. (Generally speaking, the evaluation per se is far from excluding from itself the principle possibility of the fact that it reflects an objectively true contents.)

Everything said above does not mean that we identify the notions of "social evolution", "social development" and "progress".

Evolutional development from the view-point of Marxist sociology gives rise to progress, but the former cannot be reduced to the latter, because the first has a more broad meaning and includes in itself all changes occurring in a society in both ascending and declining stages of development, as well as those periods when history, as Hegel words it, "did not march forward". The notions of "progress" and "social development" can coincide only in the direction of the social course, but the latter contains the periods of regression, even when in general society is developing in the ascending.

This is exactly what was meant by Marx when he said that "In general, the conception of progress is not to be taken in the sense of the usual abstraction."<sup>11</sup> The same was stressed by V. Lenin, who wrote that "... to picture world history as advancing smoothly and steadily without sometimes taking gigantic strides backward is undialectical, unscientific and theoretically wrong."<sup>12</sup>

The possibility of regress is intrinsic in the contradictory nature of the historic process itself. This is why the decomposition of these or those social phenomena or relations does not break, as Lenin stressed, the progressive course of history which "marches on steadfastly", "in spite of anything"<sup>13</sup>.

Scientific analysis of social development suggests explicit examination of the historical process in the complexity of interaction of various components of the social structure, of their determination and feed-back. That is why Marxist sociology investigates the society both in terms of its processes and, as a necessary component of its theory, in terms of various elements and of laws of their functioning.

<sup>11</sup> K. M a r x. A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, Chicago, 1904, p. 309.

<sup>12</sup> V. L e n i n. Collected Works. Vol. XIX, No. 4. International Publishers, 1942, p. 204.

<sup>13</sup> V. I. L e n i n. Polnoie sobranie sotchinenii (Complete Works). Moscow, 1965, vol. 35, p. 383.



Karl Marx in "The Capital", and V. I. Lenin in "Development of Capitalism in Russia" and in other works have exhibited scientific examples of study of not only the processes taking place within this or that formation and leading to radical change in economic, political, etc., structures, but of functioning of social institutions and mechanisms as well. Methodological and theoretical basis of Marxist sociology has never implied any side of social life as absolute, seeking to understand this life as an entity, as an organic system being in constant change and development. Only such an approach seems to us to be scientific and constructive. That is why the strivings of many leading Western sociologists for overcoming one-sidedness and predictions of the structural-functional method, the revival of their interest in the dynamics of social systems, and, in this sense, certain inclination of theirs towards the position of Marxist sociology cannot but satisfy us to a certain extent, even if this tendency is still not clear and consistent enough, and even if the priority of Marxism in this issues is ignored or not admitted. Let me stress here once again that it was Marxism first to examine and scientifically ground the objective criterion of social progress. It is this fact, first of all, that makes the Marxist position consistent and adequate to the historical process.

Marxist conception of progress is based on materialistic conception of history. Marx saw the objective scientific criterion of progress in material basis of society. Following Marx, Lenin considered the development of production forces and, first of all, of man, whose forces they are. "...the highest criterion of social progress"<sup>14</sup>.

From the view-point of Marxist sociology progress implies advancing development, hierarchy of factors determining it, and definite nature of the former development, though in the multitude of forms.

Improvement of means and organization of labor provides for the growth of its productivity, which, in turn, involves the improvement of human element of production forces and changes the existing social division of labor. All this results in the changing of the social structure, of social and political institutions, in the increase in the volume and structure of human demands, and means of their satisfaction, i. e., in social organization, in the way of life, and in culture. Naturally, a higher level of productive forces development is matched with a more complicated form of production relations and of social organization in general, though here, too, there cannot be any automatism or absolute interrelationship. In some cases progress can be accompanied by simplification (e. g., "refinement" of class differentiation from estate and patriarchal personalistic depositions during the transformation from feudalism to capitalism), and complications can be connected with regress.

The most general criteria of historical progress are the degree of human domination over the elemental forces of Nature (manifested in the growth of labor productivity); the degree of emancipation of society from the pressure of elemental social forces; the development of personality, emancipating from exploitation, social and political inequality, etc.

<sup>14</sup> V. I. Lenin. Op. cit., vol. 16, p. 220.

Within precommunist formations (at first due to the low level of production development, and later — due to private ownership of means of production as well) some elements of the social whole systematically progress on the account of other elements. Technical progress and development of social division of labor immensely increase its productivity. But the obverse of it is the transformation of man into a partial worker, the growth of alienation and exploitation.

So, social progress of these epochs can be compared, in a certain sense, with the progress in the animate nature, because it moves in the direction of human adaptation to elemental (natural and social) forces. Here, too, progress fixes up one direction and consequently rules out the other ones, because it is connected with the socially fixed specialization, free from subordination to conscious and planned influence of the social whole.

Here social forces operate spontaneously, practically free from human control.

But when speaking of social evolution we mean such a transformation of the social system which is oriented towards minimization of spontaneous influence of both natural and social factors. The difference between social and biological evolutions lies just in the fact that the man is not only adapting to the environment, but adapts it to his own needs and necessities as well. In the process of his activity the man changes the world and himself.

Dialectical materialistic sociology is far from ignoring the active role of man and his cognition in the historic development, as many of its opponents would incriminate to it. Vice versa, this sociology scientifically proves the efficient, reforming character of this activity. It was Marx who was the first to say that from the explanation of the world it is necessary to pass on to its reformation. He was a principle opponent to the conception of history as of fatally predetermined process and of man as of a mere function of objective historic forces.

Social environment (circumstances, conditions) does not play, as natural environment does in relation to the organic nature, an active role in historic evolution outside the human activity, because, as we have already said, this environment itself, these conditions and circumstances are the deed of man. Circumstances, writes Marx, create man in the same degree as man creates circumstances. The world surrounding man, is "a historical nature and a natural history"<sup>15</sup>. "*History*, wrote Marx, does *nothing*...It is *man*, real living man, that does all that..."<sup>16</sup>

The reforming (adapting) human activity is the reason of why social progress is of a perpetual character; why it does not lead to the increase of rigidity, but to a more and more universal freedom.

Naturally, it is impossible to conceive of the process of social development as of a clear-cut replacement of one cultural historical form by another, as if it were guard mounting. Evolutional processes are far from being

<sup>15</sup> K. Marx, F. Engels. *The German Ideology*. Moscow Progress Publishers. 1968, p. 58

<sup>16</sup> K. Marx, F. Engels. *The Holy Family or Critique of Critical Critique*. Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House. 1956, p. 125.

of a homogeneous and unilinear character, as well as their progressive character is not a constant necessity. The structure of the society is a complex one, and the interaction of its elements does not run in one and only one direction. The principle of feed-back is always present here. Rigid linear determinism, though being often attributed to Marxism, is absolutely foreign to it, because it contradicts its essence.

Social development is not a straight-forward process, it includes back movements as well; moreover, various levels of a social or cultural system are developing unevenly. Ascertaining the complexity of the social whole, Marxism has shown up various components of this complex system-economic basis, political and ideological superstructure, etc. Alongside with this Marxism was the first to expose the unevenness of development of various components, or "storeys" of the social whole; Marxism has shown that under the conditions of antagonistic socio-economic formations there can be no possibilities for even development of all the components of the social system. History evidences that economic backwardness of some countries is often followed by rapid cultural development (e. g., Russia of the sixties of the XIX century); that economic advancement of some countries is not always inevitably connected with political advancement and cultural progress.

Thus, historical monism is far from rejecting diversified interaction of various factors of social life, or the fact that under these or those given social phenomena and processes economy can fail to be a decisive factor. But Marxism does reject the counterposition of the coordination of these factors to their hierarchical subordination which reveals itself in the end. As Engels pointed out, economic necessity opens its way through the mass of fortuities, and defines the character of functioning and development of the social whole but in the long run.

Marxist sociology is far from ruling out the diversity and possibility of choice, comparison and competition among various trends of social development on condition that the decisive role is played by economic factors. Moreover, Marxism demands that any social event or process shall be treated as a concrete historical phenomenon — i. e., this implies that this diversity is inevitable. The principle of historical recapitulation by no means implies the calking of social situations within the framework of different social systems.

This seems to be the only principle basis for scientific examination and objective evaluation of the existing empirical models of social development.

First of all it is necessary to ascertain that the examination of the problem demands for the detailed and exhaustive knowledge of not only hypotheses and inferences, typical of modern sciences of society, but of those actual difficulties and problems confronting many a country following the way of intensive social development and seeking in their specific conditions the means for most effective movement towards a better future.

The degree of reliability of social development models depends on the degree of mastering, by sociological theory, this gigantic social experience of industrialized countries in the reformation of social relations, of the

whole social structure including the experience of the socialist countries and the countries of the so-called third world.

So, one thing is left to be added here: evolutionism, understood in the Marxian way, does not exclude, but, moreover, implies the necessity of breaks in gradualness, of qualitative leaps, i. e., revolutionary changes of the existing. This is a very important point, because many adversaries of evolutionism in the West seek to counterpoise evolution to revolutionary processes, instead of conceiving of the latter as of a part, of a form of progressive change and development.

## SOCIO-HISTORICAL PROGRESS FROM THE MARXIST-LENINIST POINT OF VIEW

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Social and historical life represents a panorama of the continuous changes in time and space of the social systems and their components — changes which differ in range, depth, durability, dynamics and significance. And if in social life there is anything which is absolutely lasting, intransient and incontestable, it is the fact of change.

Here, however, the question arises: is there any objective gradation, any objective link and dependence, consecution and rhythm, is there any objective law in the flow of social changes, finding expression in *specific trends in the development* of the social systems and of their components; or does social life represent a flow of absolutely discrete changes, independent of each other, a flow leading anywhere you like and nowhere in particular?

### *Types of changes. What is progress?*

The idea of social and historical progress has its starting point and its most solid basis in the conception of *social change*, the conception of the *development* of human society. In a conception of the world and of society, which excludes change and development, there is not and cannot be any place for the idea of historical progress.

*However, the notions of 'change' and 'development' are not identical with the notion of 'progress'.* Both in nature and in society, there are different types of changes and developments: quantitative and qualitative changes, emergence and disappearance, gradual and saltatory changes, changes in a straight line and changes in a zigzag one, head-on and round-about changes, changes in an upward and a downward line, progressive and regressive changes. Progressive changes and progressive development are only one of the basic types of changes and development.

*Progress, no matter whether it takes place in nature or in society, is a law-governed dialectical process of interrelated and inter-dependent quantitative and qualitative changes — a process of a progressive upward movement, leading from simpler to more complex relations, from the old and the outlived to the new and the viable, from the inferior to the superior. As a result of this the changes in the process of progress*

*lead to the emergence of new properties and qualities and each new stage of the developments contains within itself, in an aufgehoben form the history of the preceding stages, from which it has developed and opens up a greater range of possibilities for the emergence of new properties and qualities and for a further upward development.*

*Progress is the basic law of the development of human society.* "In history..." Engels wrote, "development, generally speaking, passes from simpler to more complex relations"<sup>1</sup>. Thus, for example, the utilization and the creation of the means of labour exist in an embryonic form even among some animal species. However, in the case of man the utilization and creation of the means of labour reach such a degree of development, that the specific human labour process arises which gives man immeasurable advantages over all the other animal species, radically changing the relationships between men, as well as men's relationship to the world.

Labour is becoming the basic condition for the existence and progress of man. With it begins the process of the transformation and mastering of nature by man and of the rapid transformation of man himself. The labour process brings into being a human society as a completely new reality, in which completely new human activities and relations arise and develop, a reality which develops itself.

The history of human society since its emergence reveals to us the process of an upward and progressive development of the productive forces and the relations of production, of social relations, institutions, philosophy, science, the arts, morals, communications, etc. — reveals to us man's progress in mastering nature and social reality.

### *Criticism of the non-Marxist theories of historical progress*

*Social and historical progress is an upward development in the process of which there take place quantitative and qualitative changes in society (taken as a complex system in its structure and functioning) and as a result of these changes it passes from inferior to superior states.*

The question, however, arises: what is the criterion and is there a criterion on the basis of which one can establish which of the changes are progressive and which are not? What are the motive forces of historical progress? It is precisely in regard to these questions that the speculative, metaphysical and idealistic character of the non-Marxist theories on progress is seen most clearly.

a) In 'German Ideology' Marx and Engels considered that the fundamental vice of idealistic historiography lay at that time in the fact that it ignored real history and the representatives of idealistic historiography 'were always compelled to write history according to guidelines which lay outside of it',<sup>2</sup> and which each historian chose arbitrarily. This fundamental vice has lain embedded in the principles of almost all the non-Marxist theories of historical progress up to now.

<sup>1</sup> K. Marx and F. Engels, Collected Works, vol. I, p. 420.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., Collected Works, vol. 3, p. 39.

Most of the non-Marxist theories of social and historical progress stem from the conception that the idea of progress presupposes the postulation of a supreme and final goal — the realization of a perfect, ideal state of society, in relation to which the social changes can be examined and assessed either as progressive or as non-progressive.<sup>3</sup> This is also the conception of those contemporary bourgeois sociologists who deny that there is historical progress. The only difference between those who hold non-Marxist theories of social and historical progress and those who deny that there is historical progress is that the former admit the possibility of a perfect ideal state of society whilst the others reject this possibility and, together with it, reject progress itself.

But above all, the theories which link historical progress with the realization of a perfect, ideal state of human society, are inconsistent and contradictory and they cannot be considered to be real theories on historical progress. According to them progress must inevitably be a transient, temporary phenomenon. It can only continue until the realization of the ideal state of society which puts an end to all progress and all changes, because the ideal state would not be ideal if changes — and progressive ones at that — continue to take place within it.

In the second place, all such theories are of a purely speculative nature. They can never find confirmation in actual historical reality and, for this reason, they are very vulnerable to the criticism of the opponents of progress. According to some of these theories the final end of historical progress is an ideal state which mankind must always strive for and never reach. But with this they transform historical progress into an unrealistic, utopian and chimerical goal.

The refutation of these theories is inevitable and necessary. But this does not and could not mean that the idea of historical progress itself is refuted; because the idea of historical progress, followed consistently and from beginning to end, not only does not presuppose but, on the contrary, excludes the postulation of any final goals of history, no matter whether they are considered attainable or unattainable.

b) A one-sided approach to problems of social history is typical of non-Marxist theories on historical progress. Some of them deny that there is any qualitative differences between social and biological systems, reduce the social ones to biological ones, seek the explanation of social and historical progress in the action of purely biological and other natural laws and fail to see the specific laws of social history. Other theories hold the qualitative difference between the social and natural systems as absolute. Some of them see only the progressive changes in the history of societies and proclaim the whole of history to be an uninterrupted progress in a straight upward line. Other theories see in history only the differences between the social systems, recurring in the periods of the decline and fall of the individual social systems, in order to be able to reject any continuity between them and to proclaim the whole of history to be but constantly recurring

<sup>3</sup> G. S i m m e l, *Die Probleme der Geschichtsphilosophie*, dritte Auflage, Verlag Duncker & Humboldt, Leipzig, 1907, pp. 155-156.

cycles in the development of absolutely discrete 'civilizations', unconnected with each other.

*None of these theories has arrived at the scientific conception of the real dialectics of society as a complete system and at the conception of its historical development as a contradictory zigzag process of interruptions and continuity, of gradual and saltatory changes, of states of upsurge and states of stagnation, of decline and fall, of progress and regress, of accident and necessity — but a process which, nevertheless, represents an inter-related, law-governed and upward process of development.*

c) Most of the non-Marxist theories bear an idealistic character. They seek the explanation of historical progress, either in the action of certain transcendental spiritual factors — 'the absolute spirit', the 'absolute values', etc. — or in the individual conscience of man, or in the development of scientific, moral and other ideas. According to K. Popper, for example, progress is possible but the existence of progress, the trends it follows and the results obtained from it depend *exclusively* upon our ideas, upon the goals which we have chosen and set ourselves, upon our will and our efforts.<sup>4</sup> R. G. Collingwood goes even farther. According to him historical progress is not an objective fact to be discovered by historical thinking, but it is the creation of historical thinking and exists only in our thinking, in our assessments, outside of which there is neither progress nor regress.<sup>5</sup>

### *Historical Progress is Objective and Law-Governed*

Social and historical progress can be properly understood and explained only on the basis of a scientific, dialectico-materialistic theory of the social systems, of their structure, of the real relationship and interdependence of the components of the social systems, of the laws of their functioning and development. Marxism is such a theory.

Marx shows that the explanation of the social structure and its evolution should be sought in the method of production of material life. This consists of two inter-related and inter-dependent components — the productive forces and the relations of production. The determinant role, however, is played by the productive forces. Every stage in the development of the productive forces requires specific relations of production. "The combination of these relations of production forms the economic structure of society, the real basis on which rises the legal and political superstructure and to which specific social forms of conscience correspond. The method of production of material life conditions the process of social, political and spiritual life in general. It is not the conscience of man which determines

<sup>4</sup> K. R. Popper, *The Open Society and Its Enemies*, vol. II, Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., London, 1957, p. 280.

<sup>5</sup> R. G. Collingwood, *The Idea of History*, Oxford University Press (Paperbacks), 1961, p. 333.



his life, but on the contrary, it is his social life that determines his conscience."<sup>6</sup> *Ancient* society, *feudal* society and the *bourgeois* society were such combinations of relations of production, each combination at the same time determining a specific degree of development in the history of mankind.<sup>7</sup> Generally speaking, the Asiatic, feudal and modern bourgeois methods of production can be called progressive epochs of the economic social formation.<sup>8</sup>

In coming to this conception of society and of its historical development, Marx provided, for the first time, the key to the scientific explanation of historical progress, an explanation which differed radically from the non-Marxist theories and conceptions on that problem.

The Marxist theory of historical progress is a complete refutation of the speculative approach to the problems discussed here and the only conception of progress that has consistently and unswervingly followed the idea of development, including progressive development, in social and historical developments.

*Historical progress cannot be confined in time or in space, that it is infinite. It also implies that any progress is in itself relative.*

It is a fact that whenever we speak of progress in nature or in society, what we have in mind is the *relationship* between at least two components — between two social systems, two situations of one system, etc. — of which the one is higher than the other. What in some respect is higher and progressive, however, can in another respect prove lower and regressive. The slave system stands higher than the primitive communal system, but lower than the bourgeois system. The socialist system stands higher than the capitalist system, but lower than the communist order. There was a time when the bourgeoisie as a class was revolutionary and progressive, but today it is reactionary and regressive.

Moreover, *a given change or state of things can simultaneously be progressive in some respect and regressive in another respect.* The history of all class societies based on exploitation of man by man shows us at every turn that the well-being and progress of some has been achieved and continues being achieved at the expense of hardships, oppression and restrictions of others, that progress in one sphere of social life is paid for by stagnation and regression in other spheres. Considering the development of capitalism during the past century, Marx wrote: "In our times, all things that surround us seem to contain their exact antitheses. We can see that machines which have the wonderful capacity of making human effort easier and more fruitful, cause hunger and exhaustion. The newly discovered sources of wealth become, by some fatal magic, sources of privations. The achievements in art seem to be made at the cost of some moral depravity. Humanity as a whole is gaining an ever-increasing control over nature,

<sup>6</sup> K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works*, vol. I, Publ. House of the BCP, 1950, p. 408.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 89-90.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 409.

while at the same time the individual becomes a slave to other men or to his own vile motives. It seems that the clear light of science can shine brightly only against the sombre background of ignorance. All our discoveries and all the progress we are making seem to bring us to a stage where material powers acquire intellectual life and human life is reduced to being an insensitive material force."<sup>9</sup>

Under the conditions of the imperialist stage of capitalism progress has become relative and contradictory to an unprecedented degree, entailing gigantic conflicts and disasters, involving all civilized countries and peoples. An unprecedented advance has been achieved in material culture as a whole, in science and all other spheres of social life in the metropolises, but it was paid for by harsh oppression, ruthless spoliation, misery and cultural backwardness of the colonial peoples. The gigantic, rapid progress in the development of the forces of production, science and technology stand in increasingly greater contrast to the backward production and social relations, entering in ever sharper contradictions with them, assuming the form of imperialist wars, of socialist and national-liberation revolutions. The world has now gone through two world wars, engendered by the internal contradictions of imperialism — wars that cost the lives of tens of millions of people, razing to the ground thousands of towns and villages and ruining whole countries. That was a veritable bacchanalia of destruction and retrogression, of ruining productive forces, depreciation of moral and other spiritual values, brutalizing whole nations — a bacchanalia of atrocities which have no parallel in the whole history of mankind.

Similar contradictions in progress are observed in our days, too. The colossal progress of modern science and technology is overshadowed by the sinister implications of a nuclear war.

All these developments have had a disastrous effect on the traditional non-Marxist theories of historical progress; their naïve optimism has given way to unrelieved pessimism, to all brands of anti-progressive trends, which proclaim historical progress as 'illusion', a 'deflated air balloon', and thoroughly reject it.

To all these deniers of progress we reply with the perspicacious words of Marx: "As far as we are concerned, we have no delusion about the nature of that shrewd spirit which always shows up in all these contradictions... In all these phenomena which raise panic among the bourgeoisie, the aristocracy and the unfortunate prophets of retrogression we recognize the spirit of our good friend, our Robin Goodfellow, the old mole who burrows the earth quickly, the glorious field engineer: the revolution."<sup>10</sup>

History has brilliantly borne out Marx's words of foresight. The First World War ended in the victory of the first socialist revolution in the world as a result of which the first socialist society came into being. After the Second World War, the socialist revolution triumphed in yet other countries in Europe, Asia and America, which led to the advent of the

<sup>9</sup> K. Marx and F. Engels, Coll. Works, vol. I, pp. 403-404.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 404.

world socialist system. The triumph of socialism is a victory of progress in the history of the world. But this in itself is a social and historical progress of a new type, progress, which, as Marx put it, no longer resembles that repulsive heathen idol who drinks nectar in no other way than from the skull of a dead man.<sup>11</sup>

History has not in any way refuted the idea of progress in general, but only the erroneous conception of progress — the conception of absolute progress as a forthright, uniform, non-contradictory and uninterrupted process in an ascending line, where progress in one sphere automatically leads to progress in all the remaining spheres of social life.

History has reaffirmed the Marxist conception that the various types of social formations and their specific laws determine the different forms of manifestation and realization of social progress. And since all pre-socialist formations, excepting the primitive communal system, have been formations ridden by sharp social contradictions, antagonisms and conflicts, and the present-day socialist society is developing in the circumstances of co-existence with a world of profoundest social contradictions and antagonism and in a struggle with this world — so far historical progress has always been uneven, contradictory and relative. It has been saltatory, proceeding along a zigzag path, with interruptions which have brought about spells of interim stagnation, taking at times downward regressive turns. Furthermore, the history of preceding formations has revealed that there has been a movement in circles in so far as each formation has had a period of birth, upswing, blossoming, decline and death.

All this gives us no reason, however, to regard progress as absolutely relative, or to substitute the idea of the so-called 'cyclical evolution of cultures' for the idea of progress. This is so because *the chain of historical progress is made up of the different steps and stages of progress as a common, law-governed and objective process of upward development, in which each link is coupled to the previous and to the next link and each link is relatively progressive and simultaneously absolute in so far as its progressive nature is irreversible.* The objective logic of history is such that each new generation grows and develops on the shoulders of the previous generation. Each succeeding formation grows on the material, social and cultural prerequisites provided by the preceding one. Capitalism was conceived in the womb of feudalism, on the material and moral foundations created by the feudal order. The bourgeois system in turn laid the groundwork for the advent of socialism, and socialism in its turn created the material and cultural preconditions for the triumph of communism.

Of all inherited prerequisites as a result of which every social system arises and develops and which combine the separate stages of social historical progress into an integrated interconnected and progressive process, the most important and decisive is the development of the productive forces, because 'every productive force is an acquired force, the product of a preceding activity'<sup>12</sup> and because there can be no social life and social development or any social relations without the productive forces.

<sup>11</sup> K. Marx and F. Engels, Coll. Works, vol. I, p. 402.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., Selected Letters, p. 24.

It follows from all this that socio-historical progress is an objective process and the criteria for defining it should not be sought outside but inside the objective historical process and more particularly in its material foundations. *The criterion for defining the progressive nature of a given social system in the degree of development of its productive forces and its production relations which determine all other kinds of social relations.*<sup>13</sup> *A social system is progressive when its production relations are in dynamic keeping with the development of the productive forces and, above all, with the development of the most important productive force — man — the creator of material and cultural values* because 'the development of the productive forces of mankind', as Marx points out, 'mean above all the development of the richness of human nature as an end in itself'.<sup>14</sup> And conversely, a social system is conservative and regressive when its production and social relations are in antagonistic contradiction with the development of the productive forces, giving systematically rise to all kinds of social conflicts, hindering the development of the productive forces and leading to their distortion or destruction, to the distortion and destruction of man's personality.

The degree of development of the productive forces and production relations in the social systems finds a synthesized expression in the degree of development of labour productivity. What is more, the degree of labour productivity is a synthesized expression of the degree of development of the productive forces, as well as of production relations, of science, of the living standards and culture of the masses, of the human personality and of other components of the social system and its life, which are directly linked with material production.

On account of all this, Lenin points out the development of the productive forces as 'the main criterion for the overall social development',<sup>15</sup> as 'the highest criterion for social progress'<sup>16</sup> and higher labour productivity as the most important and main condition for the victory of the new, more progressive social system.<sup>17</sup>

The degree of labour productivity reveals to us the degree to which a given society is capable of changing and mastering its natural way of life. But besides the natural way of life, there is also man's social way of life. That is why, however important the degree of development of labour productivity might be, it is not an integral criterion for defining the historical progress of society taken as a whole. *The integral criterion for defining socio-historical progress can be only the degree to which a given society is capable in a planned way to change or to create, to master and to*

<sup>13</sup> "The economic epochs differ from each other not in what they produce but in how, with what instruments of labour, they produce. The instruments of labour are not only a measure for the development of the human work force, but also an indicator of those social relations under which work is done." K. Marx and F. Engels, Works, v. 23, p. 192.

<sup>14</sup> K. Marx and F. Engels, Works, vol. 26. Article II, p. 123.

<sup>15</sup> V. I. Lenin, Works, vol. 43, p. 81.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid., vol. 16, p. 220.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid. vol. 29, p. 421-422.

*subordinate to its goals both its natural and its social way of life — its social relations, the process of its material and cultural life, the material and cultural values, which it has inherited or is creating itself. In other words, the objective and integral criterion of the socio-historical progress is the degree of development of the freedom of the social system as a whole and of the individual personalities who make it up — the degree of development of the richness of the social way of life and the personal way of life of every member of society, the degree of 'the development of the richness of human nature as an end in itself' which a given system is capable of realizing.*

The progressive or retrogressive character of the social systems and phenomena can be the object of our thoughts and assessments, but they are objective, independent of our thoughts and assessments of them, because the question of which system is progressive and which is not is in the end decided by socio-historical practice, by the objective course of history. History itself is that merciless judge who decides this question on the basis of the *viability* of the systems. But this does not mean that being objective, socio-historical progress runs on automatically as a fatally predestined process. Marx wrote that 'the judge now is history itself and the executor of the verdict is the proletariat'<sup>18</sup>. This winged phrase of the great philosopher and revolutionary reveals to us the profound nature and the mechanism of socio-historical progress. Socio-historical progress is an objective process which is accomplished through the people's actions, because the whole history of mankind is nothing else but the activity of people, organized in social classes, national communities, states etc. — in other words, in social systems. And since all the past history of mankind, with the exception of the primitive communal system, has been a history of the struggles of social classes and systems, the socio-historical process has been taking place in the process of this struggle and through it, and the champion of historical progress has always been that social class and that social system which is the champion and embodiment of a new, higher social system. In our times, the most decisive and consistent standard bearer of historical progress is the working class and the socialist system. That is why, it is natural that in our times the idea of socio-historical progress has found its most reliable support and most passionate defense in Marxist sociology, while the majority of Western sociologists not only renounce it but do not even want to hear about it at all.

<sup>18</sup> K. Marx, F. Engels, Selected Works, vol. I, p. 405.

## CLASSICAL THEORIES OF CHANGE AND THE FAMILY STRUCTURE<sup>1</sup>

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Western sociology's contribution to the understanding of structural changes in the family has been dominated by a single theme: that the emergence of modern family structure — as well as other, family-related phenomena — is determined primarily by economic forces.

In this essay I shall criticize this emphasis and suggest that greater weight be given to certain political variables which interact with economic forces in modernization. First, I shall summarize three theories which stress economic factors in the emergence of the modern family — Herbert Spencer's, Frederick Engels', and the theory of William F. Ogburn and Meyer E. Nimkoff. Second, I shall list some shortcomings of these theories. And, third, I shall argue that by analyzing modern changes in the structure of authority we may arrive at a more satisfactory understanding of the structural changes in the family.

### *A Sample of Theories of the Rise of the Modern Family*

*Herbert Spencer.* The foundation of Spencer's theory is that a definite family structure arises in a certain type of society because that structure is the best means of serving the social needs of that society.<sup>2</sup> The highest form of the family is monogamy, and as a general rule, this form arises as the industrial type of society supersedes the militant type of society.

The militant type of society is based on a predominance of structures for carrying on conflict, whereas industrial society is based on a predominance of structures for carrying on sustentation or economic activity. For the militant society, the main coordinating principle is compulsory cooperation; for the industrial it is voluntary cooperation.<sup>3</sup>

In arguing that industrial society undermines polygamy and promotes monogamy, Spencer singled out the economic factor as a crucial cause: "(1) ... as fast decreasing militancy and increasing devotion to industry

<sup>1</sup> I am indebted to Mark Traugott, who served as my research assistant during the period of preparation of this paper, for many ideas and suggestions.

<sup>2</sup> Herbert Spencer, *The Principles of Sociology*, third edition (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1895), vol. I, p. 666.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 552, 557.

cause an approximate equalization of the sexes in numbers, there results a growing resistance to polygamy; since it cannot be practiced by many of the men without leaving many of the rest wifeless, and causing an antagonism inconsistent with social stability. Monogamy is thus to a great extent compelled by that balance of the sexes which industrialism brings about. (2) ... the diminishing political coercion which naturally follows development of the industrial type, is congruous with the diminishing domestic coercion which naturally follows the accompanying development of monogamy."<sup>4</sup>

In addition to the growth of monogamy, Spencer saw a certain "disintegration of the family" in advanced societies. In particular he saw the public or the state taking responsibility for the individual's welfare from the family.<sup>5</sup> Alarmed at these trends, he stated that "we have reason to suspect that [the disintegration of the family] has already gone too far," and that "a return movement is to be looked for."<sup>6</sup>

Spencer also saw a progressive evolution in the status of women, with monogamy bringing the highest status; "[women's] position becomes good in proportion as warlike activities are replaced by industrial activities; since, when the men fight while the women work, the difference of occupation is greater than when both are engaged in productive labours, however unlike such labours may be in kind."<sup>7</sup>

Turning to the future, Spencer foresaw an extension of the principle of monogamy. He predicted that love would become the basis for the legal bond of marriage. He also predicted that divorce would become easier because "maintenance of the legal bond will come to be held improper if the natural bond [of love] ceases."<sup>8</sup> Spencer foresaw a continuing rise in women's status, though not to the point of complete sexual equality. As for the status of children, he expressed concern that parental authority had been too much eroded by the State, and hoped that in the future it would be restored.<sup>9</sup>

A paradox emerges in Spencer's position. On the one hand, he believed that industrial society fosters freedom and privacy and that it develops a decentralized State with minimal powers. On the other hand, he observed the increasing intrusion of the State into family affairs at just that time in history when, according to his own theory, it should have been diminishing. To complicate the picture even more, he saw some areas where State authority was intruding less than before, particularly in the diminishing importance of the legal aspect of marriage. This paradox suggests that to treat the structure of the State and the structure of the family as common effects of a single principle — voluntary co-operation — is oversimple.

<sup>4</sup> Herbert Spencer, *The Principles of Sociology*, third edition (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1895), pp. 678-679.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 705.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 707.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 722.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 753.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 760.

*Frederick Engels.* Engels' evolutionary theory, extending from the most primitive to the most advanced societies, is an explicitly materialistic interpretation of Lewis H. Morgan's findings in his *Ancient Society*. Adopting Morgan's phases of evolutionary development — savagery, barbarism, and civilization, each subdivided — Engels argued that the transitions between phases and sub-phases are actually transitions in the productive process. The family, a product of the material forces, runs a roughly parallel course of evolution.

For our purposes the most important transition is from the "pairing family" to monogamy. The following are the characteristics of monogamy "It is based on the supremacy of the man, the express purpose being to produce children of undisputed paternity; such parternity is demanded because these children are later to come into their father's property as his natural heirs. It is distinguished from pairing marriage by the much greater strength of the marriage tie, which can no longer be dissolved at either partner's wish. As a rule, it is now only the man who can dissolve it, and, put away his wife."<sup>10</sup>

Most important, the monogamous family is a device for consolidating and securing the continuity of private property.

Monogamy, then, is a bourgeois institution, and tends to disappear where its functions for perpetuating a property system are not necessary. Among the proletariat, for example, there is no property; and since monogamy and male domination were established to preserve property, "there is no incentive to make this male supremacy effective among the proletariat."<sup>11</sup>

Furthermore, the bourgeois form of monogamy will disappear only after a great social revolution which will abolish "capitalist production and... the property relations created by it."<sup>12</sup> The family will cease to be the economic unit of society. "Private housekeeping is transformed into a social industry. The care and education of the children becomes a public affair."<sup>13</sup> The supremacy of the male will disappear, and marriages will be freely formed on the basis of feelings of love.

Engels viewed the State, like the monogamous family, as a product of the transition to civilized society. "The central link in civilized society is the state, which in all typical periods is without exception the state of the ruling class, and in all cases continues to be essentially a machine for holding down the oppressed, exploited class."<sup>14</sup> Thus the bourgeois state — with its divorce laws, its inheritance laws, etc. — acts in the interests of property, and is directed toward the exploitation of women. With the disappearance of the bourgeois class and property system, moreover, the bourgeois state will also disappear, and the functions of the family will come under general public control, rather than the control of the ruling classes alone.

<sup>10</sup> Frederick Engels, *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State* (New York, International Publishers, 1969), p. 55.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 63.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 72.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 67.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 160-161.



*Ogburn and Nimkoff.* These authors identified eight major changes in modern family life. Three had to do with formation and dissolution of the family — an increased emphasis on love as the basis of marriage (and a correspondingly decreased emphasis on economic convenience); earlier marriage; and increased incidence of divorce. Three had to do with the relations among family members — an increased participation in the labor force by women; a decline in the authority of the husband over the wife, and an increased emphasis on the child. The final two had to do with the family as a whole — it is declining in size, and it is shrinking with respect to its economic, educational, governing, and religious functions.

To explain these changes the authors turned first to economic factors. The increased emphasis on love as the basis for marriage, for example, resulted from a decline in productive activities in the family — and a corresponding decline in emphasis upon economic criteria in the choice of a mate — which in turn resulted from a shrinking of economic functions of the family, which in its turn could be traced to the rise of institutions (factories, stores, banks, etc.); these owed their existence to technological innovations in industry and transportation. Ancillary causes of the change toward romantic love were the invention of contraceptives and preventive medicine which lessened the fear of venereal disease.<sup>15</sup>

With respect to the decline of the family's "governmental functions," Ogburn and Nimkoff relied mainly on the argument that other organizations had filled the gap left by the loss of family functions: "Probably the greatest cause of the decrease of authority of the male heads of the household lies in the decrease in the economic functions. When the household was an economic enterprise, authority to give orders and insist on obedience was natural. But with the disappearance of these enterprises, authority and government in the family were not so much needed. Also as members of the family spend more time in schools and in places of work, the government of these members was shared with other institutions."<sup>16</sup>

*Summary.* There are both similarities and differences among these three theoretical positions. There is agreement on the changes in the contemporary family — easier divorce, decline in paternal authority, greater emphasis on love as the basis of marriage, declining functions of the family, and the like. The approaches differ, however, with respect to the causes and mechanisms lying behind these changes, and with respect to the role of political factors in the changing structure. Spencer saw changes in the family resulting from the extension and consolidation of the monogamous principle — which in turn depended on the dominance of industrial society — and saw the increased intervention of the state in family functions as *antipathetic* to this general trend. Engels saw the changes resulting from the beginnings of the deterioration of monogamy and predicted that the changes would be completed with the destruction of private property. Engels saw the bourgeois state as an *ally* of the principle of private property, and its interven-

<sup>15</sup> William F. Ogburn and Meyer Nimkoff, *Technology and the Changing Family* (Boston, Houghton-Mifflin, 1955), p. iii.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 138.

tions in the family as a means of consolidating this principle. Ogburn and Nimkoff saw the changes as resulting mainly from the technological and scientific revolution of the past two centuries, which undermined many of the functions of the family directly or indirectly, and saw the increased intervention of the state as mainly *filling in the gaps* of family function.

### *Some General Lines of Criticism in These Theories*

*Empirical shortcomings.* During the past several decades much empirical evidence has thrown doubt on the validity of the connection between those kinds of economic factors just reviewed and the recent changes in the family. First, there are indications that the family has "modernized" in the absence of the technological, organizational, and demographic changes associated with industrialization. Comparative empirical evidence suggests that societies that are not now experiencing significant economic growth or industrialization are experiencing a number of the supposed effects of these processes on the family system.<sup>17</sup> Other research has revealed that the family structure of the seventeenth, eighteenth, and early nineteenth centuries in the United States had attained a far greater degree of equality, permissiveness, child-centredness, and romantic basis than the family systems of European countries that were more advanced commercially and industrially than America.<sup>18</sup>

Second, there are indications that industrialization and related changes do not always have the expected effects on the family structure. Sjöberg has challenged the view that urbanization necessarily leads to an individuation of the nuclear family.<sup>19</sup> Greenfield has assembled evidence from Japan, French Canada, Brazil, England and Barbados in an attempt to demonstrate that "urbanization and industrialization may exist without the small nuclear family and fragmented kindred, and... the small nuclear family exists without industrialization and urbanization."<sup>20</sup>

*Conceptual shortcomings.* These empirical shortcomings suggest that concepts such as "technology", "industrialization", and "urbanization" have to be broken into several sub-variables. The conception of "private property", used by Engels is more specific, but it is difficult to assess the specific impact of different private property arrangements on the family structure. Consider three possible variations of "wage labor", for example: first, a wage labor system under which men, women, and children are all hired by the plant manager; second, a wage labor system under which men

<sup>17</sup> William J. Goode, *World Revolution in Family Patterns* (New York, The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), pp. 171-174.

<sup>18</sup> F. F. Furstenburg, Jr. *Industrialization and the American Family. A Look Backward*, *American Sociological Review*, vol. 31 (1966), pp. 326-337. See also Warren G. Bennis and Philip E. Slater, *The Temporary Society* (New York, Harper & Row, 1968), pp. 30-35.

<sup>19</sup> Gideon Sjöberg, *Family Organization in the Pre-Industrial City, Marriage and Family Living*, vol. 18 (1956), pp. 30-36.

<sup>20</sup> Sidney M. Greenfield, *Industrialization and the Family in Sociological Theory*, *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 67 (1961-62), pp. 312-322.

are hired, but are allowed to choose their own wives and children as assistants; third, a wage labor system in which husbands work eight months in a city factory, then return to the countryside to join their families for four months. In all cases the laborers are "propertyless", but the differences in the impact on the authority of the laborer over his wife and children are considerable.

A second conceptual caution is necessary in analyzing the causal relations between economic and familial changes. In some cases the causal impact is definite; the ability of factories to produce goods on a mass, cheap basis clearly undercuts the family as a productive unit. To assert, however, that this decline as productive unit leads to an increase in rebelliousness of youth is to make the causal link more indeterminate, because no mechanisms (such as market mechanisms) between cause and effect are specified. It appears advisable, then, to supplement the study of the economic impact on the family by reference to other causes.

### *Broad Trends in the Organization of Social Authority*

In addition to industrialization, the contemporary world has experienced a number of political and ideological trends: the augmentation and centralization of authority in society; the differentiation and specialization of this authority; and the equalitarianization of social relationships.

One hallmark of modernization is the increasing complexity of demands made on the individual. Consider mass literacy, for example. To attain this objective, society has to demand more of its citizens — i. e., exercise more authority — than it did when literacy was not considered a necessity.

Concomitant with the augmentation of social authority in modernization are changes in the locus of that authority, and changes in the *types of agency* that exercise it. Authority is progressively more removed from its local bases — kinship, neighborhoods, communities — and transferred to agencies with more inclusive jurisdiction, especially national governments.

Typically, too, the agencies that exercise authority come to be more formal, specialized organizations. Unemployment and poverty, for example, become the responsibilities of bureaucracies specializing in insurance, welfare, job placement, and the like, whereas previously these functions were performed, if at all, by kinsmen, neighbors, voluntary associations, local patrons and local systems of charity.

What is the impact of these processes of augmentation, centralization, bureaucratization of authority on the family? Most immediately, the family experiences a relative decline in the scope of its authority. The family's relative contribution to socialization diminishes with the rise of formal education; its responsibility for the health of its members diminishes with the rise of medicine; and its responsibility for the economic security of its members has declined with the rise of insurance and welfare schemes.<sup>21</sup>

<sup>21</sup> For documentation of the extensive inroads on family authority, cf. Samuel Mencher, *Social Authority and the Family*, *Journal of Marriage and the Family*, vol. 29 (Feb. 1967), pp. 164-192

Secondly, however, the nuclear family probably enjoys more exclusive responsibility for the very early years (say from birth to three) in the lives of its children. The modern parent probably has more exclusive guardianship over children in these years than in the past, when the extended family and the neighborhood figured more prominently in infant care.<sup>22</sup>

A third trend, related to the first two, is that social authority over individuals has become more fragmented through the process of differentiation and bureaucratic specialization. From the standpoint of the individual, the individual's very early years involve concentrated relations with parents and siblings. After that time, however, he moves into an ever-widening range of specialized authorities of various sorts — the baby-sitter, the nursery school teacher, the youth leader, the policeman, the judge, and the employer, to name only a few.

In a word, the main direction of change in family patterns appears to be to effect a *greater differentiation between the social structuring of authority and the social structuring of affection*. The nuclear family has lost or is in the process of losing most of its authority, but is becoming more and more exclusively the institutionalized locus of diffuse affectional relations.

A final trend in the same direction is the equalitarianization of social relationships, whether this is incorporated into a liberal democratic ideology or a socialist ideology. As Slater has pointed out, the traditional American ideals of equality have long functioned as an ideological and political lever to diminish the authority of man over wife and parent over child. Such ideals have also found their way into the ideologies of many socialist countries and into the ideologies of many of the newly-developing nations.<sup>23</sup>

As a result of these trends a new "division of labor" has been effected between the family and other systems of authority in modernized society. The family is where the child experiences his first authority relations, and where his "affectional basis" for all subsequent authority relations is established. The basis includes the development of the ability to identify with authority, the ability to assume authority when appropriate, and so on. The family, then, is a kind of *general* training ground for subsequent social relations.

It appears, however, that even though the paring of the family's responsibilities has gone very far, there still exists the social necessity for a continuous set of social relationships with a primarily affectional emphasis. In the several instances of societies which, in revolutionary periods, attempted to strip the family more or less completely of its functions, each has experienced a partial restoration of the family system. In perhaps the most extensive experiment, the Israeli collective settlements, the nuclear family has made a partial comeback from the early days of the *kibbutzim*; interestingly, however, the restoration has laid a great premium on the af-

<sup>22</sup> However, in many countries opportunities are available for collective or communal care of even the very young, for example, in Israel, Scandinavia, and the Soviet Union.

<sup>23</sup> Bennis and Slater, *The Temporary Society*, op. cit., pp. 43-48.

fectional relations between parents and children and among children, and relatively little emphasis on the authority relations, which are still primarily communal.<sup>24</sup> In the Soviet Union and China, early efforts to effect the "withering away" of the family in keeping with the theoretical position of Marx and Engels gave way to a partial restoration of the family system — in some cases its positive endorsement — even though both regimes continued to insist that where conflicts of authority occurred the state has supremacy.<sup>25</sup>

### *Concluding Remarks*

I have asserted that several modern political trends — augmentation, centralization, bureaucratization, and equalization of social authority — have tended to push the family further in the direction of being a more nearly exclusively affectional system. These several trends, however, do not always run parallel to one another, and they are not fixed in their sequence. In fact, a central feature of modernization is its diversity, its unevenness, and its irregular patterns of leads and lags. Economic development may lead the way in one society, the consolidation of a nation-state in another, the introduction of mass education in still another. *Any one of these leading sectors, however, may have the same effect of stripping away some aspect of the family's authority.* In Great Britain, for example, the primary initial inroad on the family's authority appeared to be associated with the rise of the factory system, with the parallel effects of educational, welfare, and medical systems arising later. In many of the new nations, the authority of the family is being eroded mainly by the introduction of systems of administrative bureaucracy, mass education, and welfare, which are being institutionalized despite the lack of significant industrial development. There is, therefore, no single royal road to the development of the family as a primarily affectional institution, even though the general trend of family change is in that direction.

This perspective on family change suggests some reasons why economic-centered theories of family change run into the empirical and conceptual difficulties summarized above. To assert that industrialization, or the property system, or technology is the primary cause of the evolution of the

<sup>24</sup> Yonina Talmon, *The Family in a Revolutionary Movement — The Case of The Kibbutz in Israel*, in M. F. Nimkoff (ed.), *Comparative Family Systems* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), p. 277.

<sup>25</sup> See R. Schlesinger, *The Family in the USSR* (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1949); N. S. Timashev, *An Attempt to Abolish the Family in Russia*, in Norman W. Bell and Ezra F. Vogel (eds.), *Modern Introduction to the Family* (New York, Free Press of Glencoe, 1961), pp. 55-64; Goode, *op. cit.*, Ch. VI; and P. Chao, *The Marxist Doctrine and the Recent Development of the Chinese Family in Communist China*, *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, vol. 2 (1967), pp. 161-173. Mark Traugott has made the interesting observation that to institutionalize the Marx-Engels principle — "From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs" — is in some sense, to generalize the guiding principle of the egalitarian family to the entire society. Perhaps this is the other side of the coin of "abolishing" the family — to attempt to re-establish some of its principles at another level.

family toward its modern form is to point to a special case of a more general process of reorganization of social authority. Family changes such as the emancipation of women and children often precede economic changes, because they have been set in motion by reallocations of authority in other sectors of society. Furthermore, considerable technological change can occur without significant impact on the family if the society does not simultaneously reorganize the structure of authority surrounding the process of economic production — e. g., in the early phases of industrialization in Great Britain, when entire families worked on the factory premises. A fuller explanation of the rise of the modern family must rest on an examination of the general restructuring of authority in society.

This perspective on family change also permits us to specify the shortcomings of perspectives like those of Spencer, Engels, and Ogburn and Nimkoff. By focussing on a single type of cause or mechanism, each approach either erred in or limited the explanation for these changes. Spencer erred in that he failed to see the basic continuity between the changes in the economic sphere (the rise of industrial society) and the rise of a state that intruded more on family functions. In fact, both developments were instances of augmentation, centralization, bureaucratization, and differentiation of authority; and both were reducing the scope of authority of the family. Engels, by focussing on the variables of production and property, failed to see that the family could evolve in the directions he predicted by mechanisms other than the destruction of property relations. True, in so far as society has intruded on the family's control of property — whether through income, estate, and inheritance taxes or through nationalization of property — it has made significant inroads on the family's authority. But property is only one type of authority, and changes in other systems of authority can have the same effect on the family. And finally, Ogburn and Nimkoff, by focussing on technological changes, tended to regard the state and other systems of authority mainly as "filling the gap" created by the economy's destruction of family functions. What they also failed to realize is that other reallocations of authority supplement and even operate independently of the technological changes.

In this paper I have argued for the adoption of a new theoretical perspective for the study of the evolution of the modern family — a perspective taking the structure of authority as the basic starting-point. This perspective seems more comprehensive and less subject to empirical and conceptual difficulties than those currently employed in family sociology.

## LA THÉORIE DE LA SOCIÉTÉ „POST-INDUSTRIELLE“ (CRITIQUE)

DEIAN PAVLOV  
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Dans son essai connu sur la dite „société post-industrielle“ M. le professeur Daniel Bell désigne la prédominance de la théorie sur l'empirisme comme un trait important caractéristique de la science actuelle et surtout de la science future. Et en effet, de quelque façon que soit déterminé le paradigme de la science, il est douteux que l'on puisse contester l'affirmation du même auteur, que la codification des connaissances dans un système abstrait de symboles permettra d'intensifier le processus de „compression“ des connaissances et leur utilisation optimale à l'étape donnée. Il n'y a pas de doute que cela représente une condition préalable essentielle au progrès futur de la connaissance scientifique.

La prédominance de la théorie sur l'empirisme dans le système de „la nouvelle technologie intellectuelle“, ne doit pas, bien sûr, être interprétée comme une subordination ou une opposition mécanique à ces deux niveaux de recherche dialectique, organiquement liés. Il s'agit plutôt ici de souligner le rôle constamment grandissant de la pensée abstraite théorique dans la connaissance sociale.

C'est justement de ce point de vue que le désir de M. Bell et d'autres auteurs de formuler sur la base de l'analyse de la révolution scientifico-technique et de ses conséquences sociales une conception théorique d'ensemble sur les traits et les contours caractéristiques de la société de demain attire l'attention. L'idée même de l'élaboration de modèles structuraux futurologiques d'ensemble de la société future est exceptionnellement fructueuse et perspective. Mais toute la question consiste dans la façon dont elle se réalise dans la conception de la société „post-industrielle“.

Les auteurs de cette théorie utilisent des méthodes qui ont réellement démontré leur valeur dans la futurologie quand il s'agit des problèmes de la démographie, des recherches scientifiques et techniques, de l'urbanisation, des communications, de la régularisation économique, de l'instruction, etc. (les méthodes de l'interpolation et de l'extrapolation, de l'analogie, des scénarios, les simulations, les associations, etc.). Les succès indiscutables de la prévision et du pronostic dans les domaines mentionnés à l'aide de certaines méthodes scientifiques objectives ont encouragé certains chercheurs (futuresologues) à créer la théorie de la société „post-industrielle“. De toute évidence ils sont persuadés que cela représente justement le modèle de la

future organisation sociale mondiale, adéquat à la révolution scientifique et technique dans la fin de ce siècle et le début du siècle suivant. Quelle est la valeur scientifique objective et le rôle pratique de la théorie de la société „post-industrielle“ ? Pour éviter tous malentendus il faut souligner que dans cette théorie sont intégrées certaines positions et conclusions aussi intéressantes qu'importantes. La seule problématique, qui est l'objet de l'analyse des fondateurs de la nouvelle doctrine sociale (par exemple la scientification de la production et l'intellectualisation du travail, etc.) est extrêmement actuelle et d'une importance historique très grande.

M. Bell et ses partisans décrivent certains processus et tendances réelles dans le développement de la révolution scientifique et technique et de la vie sociale. Cela concerne surtout les points suivants de leur doctrine :

a. Reconnaître que la suppression du rôle dominateur des businessmen, de la classe capitaliste parasitaire dans la direction de la production matérielle en voie de révolutionnement. M. Bell dans l'essai mentionné écrit : „Si les figures dominantes du siècle dernier étaient les businessmen, les entrepreneurs, les administrateurs industriels, les hommes nouveaux seront les savants, les mathématiciens, les économistes et les sociologues, les praticiens de la nouvelle technologie intellectuelle...“ La révolution scientifique et technique elle-même, qui conduit à une collectivisation ultérieure de la production provoque une aggravation de la contradiction antagoniste de ce processus avec les rapports de production capitaliste privés.

b. La réservation, par M. Bell et ses partisans, d'une place toujours plus importante, dans le centre même de la vie sociale intégrale, aux instituts et aux collectifs scientifiques, aux universités, etc. M. Bell dit : „Il ne sera pas exagéré de dire que si les instituts clés aux cours des 100 ou 150 dernières années étaient des firmes, dans les 100 années étaient les firmes, dans les 100 années suivantes les universités deviendront les établissements principaux de la société grâce à leur nouveau rôle de source d'innovation et de connaissances.“

c. La mise en valeur, par Bell et ses partisans, des changements historiques déjà en cours dans la structure professionnelle et qualificative de la société et dans l'automatisation rapidement croissante de la production, le passage des hommes travaillant dans la sphère de la production, dans le vieux sens de ce mot, dans le secteur des services. M. Bell écrit : „Le développement de l'économie des services conduit à l'augmentation du nombre de ceux qui sont aujourd'hui appelés „les cols blancs“.“

d. La remarque et la désignation par les théoriciens de la société „post-industrielle“ de la tendance indiscutable à la transformation de l'instruction en facteur dont dépendra dans une grande mesure tout le progrès socio-économique ultérieur. M. Bell appelle cela „un aspect nouveau et unique de la vie sociale“ : le rythme de la croissance économique et la société „post-industrielle“ dépendra plus du capital humain que de l'argent.

Nous pourrions, bien sûr, indiquer d'autres positions, formulées par les théoriciens de la société „post-industrielle“ qui traitent des processus sociaux réels dans les conditions de la révolution scientifique et technique et des tendances objectivement existantes. Mais ces conclusions et ces prévisions, qui représentent un moment rationnel à valeur cognitive définie sont



intégrés dans une théorie d'ensemble, vers laquelle, à notre avis, doivent être dirigées un certain nombre d'objections essentielles de principe. Les points fondamentaux suivants dans la conception de la société „post-industrielle“ sont l'objet de notre désaccord :

1. M. Bell se rend compte que les businessmen, en réalité les capitalistes, en tant que parasites sont tout à fait inutiles dans le processus de la production moderne. Mais il n'accepte pas du tout la conclusion scientifique de la nécessité objective d'une substitution des rapports sociaux capitalistes périmés, dont les businessmen sont la personnification, par des rapports sociaux nouveaux, qui correspondent aux exigences de la révolution scientifique et technique, elle-même. Il est vrai que M. Bell, dans la discussion connue, organisée par la Commission pour l'an 2000, a souligné que ce ne sont pas les appareils qui sont tellement essentiels, mais plutôt les formes de la structure sociale.

Il est vrai aussi, que dans l'essai cité plus haut dans le présent exposé, le futurologue américain reconnaît que la nouvelle structure à la base des connaissances scientifiques et des rapports „doivent être politiquement formés“. Mais M. Bell ne va pas plus loin que cette rapide allusion à la nécessité réelle d'une modification radicale de l'organisation politique de la société capitaliste, de la substitution du pouvoir des travailleurs au pouvoir de la bourgeoisie. En 1967, dans son livre „Le socialisme marxiste aux USA“, a essayé de démontrer que „la société américaine, au milieu du XX s., se développe dans une direction différente de celle qui a été prévue par la sociologie marxiste“.[1] Cette déclaration n'est appuyée par aucune preuve sérieuse, parce qu'elle est en contradiction avec les faits, avec la réalité historique. Karl Marx et Friedrich Engels sur la base d'une analyse scientifique précise des lois de développement de la société capitaliste, effectuée à l'aide de la philosophie créée par eux, de la théorie économique et politique, ont abouti à la conclusion, que le régime bourgeois tombera dans une crise insurmontable. Ils ont prévu la concentration ultérieure du capital, le passage vers le capitalisme de monopole d'Etat, l'aggravation de la lutte de classe, le déclenchement et la victoire de la révolution prolétaire, l'édification de la nouvelle société, la liquidation du système colonial, la révolution scientifique et technique, etc.

Le système actuel de monopole d'Etat aux USA malgré l'élargissement de la programmation et de la régularisation de son économie est à sa base irrationnelle, et au point de vue social se trouve en profonde contradiction avec les possibilités objectives engagées dans la révolution scientifique et technique, possibilités de gouvernement rationnel de toute la société au nom de buts véritablement humanitaires. M. Bell néglige tout à fait le problème du caractère de la propriété sur les moyens de production aux USA et dans les autres pays capitalistes. Mais nous savons que si le développement des forces productrices et de la technique détermine les rapports sociaux, ces derniers à leur tour exercent une influence essentielle sur les forces productives. Le type des rapports de production est déterminé par le caractère de propriété sur les moyens de production. Bien que la révolution scientifique et technique soit un phénomène relativement indépendant, elle est aussi en fin de compte déterminée par les facteurs sociaux. D'ailleurs, M. Bell indique aussi, dans une certaine mesure, ce fait.

Le chercheur anglais S. Lilly souligne que le progrès ultérieur de la science et de la technique, ainsi que leur développement „seront plutôt déterminés par des facteurs sociaux que par des facteurs techniques“.[<sup>2</sup>]

Ainsi donc, à qui appartient la plus grande partie des richesses des USA. D'après des données officielles 0,20% de tous les consommateurs dans le pays (200 000 ménages de différents individus), possédant un revenu annuel de 500 000 dollars et plus, disposent de 22% de toutes les richesses. Tandis que 42% de tous les consommateurs aux USA, disposent seulement de 2% des richesses de tout le pays.[<sup>3</sup>] Par conséquent aux USA continue d'exister une structure sociale capitaliste, qui entre en contradiction de plus en plus profonde avec les exigences du progrès scientifique et technique, culturel, politique et social. Le capital et son pouvoir sur des millions de gens sont, aujourd'hui encore, ce qu'il y a de déterminant aux USA. Cela provient de l'essence même des rapports sociaux bourgeois, qui dominent dans ce pays. Le pouvoir anonyme de l'argent, la dictature de l'oligarchie financière et industrielle, de la bureaucratie militaire ou autre aux USA conduisent à de lourdes déformations de la personnalité, à une intensification de l'aliénation de l'individu. Pas un autre, mais M. R. K. Merton a écrit: „La conception du succès, compris comme un moyen de gagner de l'argent, traité comme une fin, est engagée dans la culture américaine.“[<sup>4</sup>] Les sociologues comme M. Learner, W. Mills, E. Fromm, H. Bridemeyer, J. Tobies ont étudié avec précision la dite orientation „monétaire“ ou „commerciale“ qui est l'expression, selon eux, de l'aliénation de l'être humain dans les conditions du capitalisme américain et des transformations de ce qui est propre à l'homme en marchandise. Le développement partiel du progrès scientifique et technique sans être accompagné d'un progrès social parallèle, pousse les USA à de nouvelles déformations toujours plus dangereuses, dans l'orientation de l'individu. L'opiomanie, l'alcoolisme, la délinquance croissante, surtout parmi la jeunesse, les suicides, l'aventurisme prennent des dimensions de plus en plus grandes dans le pays, le plus développé au point de vue technique, du monde capitaliste. L'augmentation de la criminalité et cela surtout parmi les jeunes dépasse des dizaines de fois le pourcentage de l'accroissement de la population elle-même!

Ces derniers temps un grand nombre d'auteurs occidentaux montrent ouvertement l'incapacité organique du capitalisme d'organiser une véritable communauté humaine, de s'échapper de l'hédonisme primitif, des normes limitées de consommation et de l'idéal de possession, de la vénération pour les objets. M. Maurice Duverger dans son livre connu „Introduction à la sociologie politique“ souligne avec raison „l'impossibilité de l'édification d'une véritable communauté humaine sur la base des principes capitalistes. Par sa nature le capitalisme est antisocial, il concentre l'activité de chacun des hommes sur lui-même, enferme chaque homme dans son égoïsme.“[<sup>5</sup>] Partisan de la théorie sur la société „post-industrielle“, Servan-Schreiber dans son livre populaire „Le déficit américain“ note avant tout la nécessité de „l'introduction d'une justice sociale“ comme „condition au dynamisme industriel“. L'accroissement de l'élasticité de l'économie à l'Ouest, de son dynamisme est selon lui impossible, „si les travailleurs ne se libèrent pas des angoisses et des entraves de tout genre — matérielles et intellectuel-

les — qui en gérant leur propre développement entravent aussi le développement de la production...“ Dans un rapport récent M. Herbert Marcuse a critiqué avec raison „le poids mort du modèle américain d'industrialisation et modernisation, du modèle américain d'élévation du niveau de vie“.[6]

La libération des travailleurs de toute la société, de tous ces vices ne peut se réaliser autrement sinon par la voie découverte par le marxisme — la voie de la modification radicale du caractère du pouvoir politique dans le monde capitaliste, de la suppression de la dictature du complexe militaire et industriel et de l'édification d'une économie planifiée collectivisée mise au service des individus libres. La réalité de notre époque confirme tout à fait la conclusion du fondateur de la sociologie marxiste que: „parallèlement à la révolution effectuée dans les forces productives qui se manifeste comme une révolution technique, une révolution dans les rapports de production apparaît aussi“.[7]

Il n'y a aucune raison d'espérer que la révolution scientifique et technique résoudra les problèmes radicaux de la société capitaliste hautement développée sans une révolution sociale, sans la suppression des rapports bourgeois de production et leur remplacement par les rapports socialistes. Malgré que la classe bourgeoise utilise encore le progrès scientifico-technique, pour l'affermissement de son pouvoir en perspective, ce progrès menace le capitalisme de contradictions et conflits nouveaux toujours plus aigus. Le sociologue américain R. Mayers, dans un article portant le titre significatif „L'automatisation — la véritable bombe à hydrogène“ écrit: „Aujourd'hui beaucoup de gens commencent enfin à comprendre que l'automatisation n'est pas tout simplement un genre nouveau de mécanisation, mais une force révolutionnaire qui est en état de renverser notre régime social (c.-à-d. capitaliste — D. P.).[8] L'automatisation par elle-même ne renversera pas, bien sûr, le capitalisme mais elle conduit à de telles conséquences sociales qui créent des conditions préalables objectives à l'aiguïssement des antagonismes de l'ancien régime, au révolutionnement progressif non seulement du prolétariat (classique) mais aussi de l'intelligentsia, des fonctionnaires, des masses populaires les plus larges. C'est justement eux qui effectueront, quand toutes les conditions préalables subjectives et objectives seront présentées, la substitution d'un régime social nouveau au capitalisme.

Dans la théorie de la société „post-industrielle“ on essaye au fond d'extrapoler le capitalisme américain de monopole d'Etat dans les décennies, même dans les siècles futurs. Les fondateurs de cette théorie tendent à présenter la dite voie américaine vers la société post-industrielle comme obligatoire pour toute l'humanité. En se référant à Colin Clarke, M. Bell affirme, que par la voie suivie par les USA passera chaque pays. En fin de compte, la dite société „post-industrielle“ s'avère une projection du capitalisme de monopole d'Etat d'un genre particulier vers un futur lointain, avec des atteintes encore plus graves sur la personne humaine.

Cette constatation devient encore plus convaincante quand on tient compte de la manière selon laquelle les théoriciens de la société „post-industrielle“ traitent les problèmes du travail, la situation de l'homme, etc. dans ce système. Dans le livre connu de H. Kahn et A. Wiener on prévoit que dans la société „post-industrielle“ une grande partie de la population

apte au travail ne travaillera pas pour de diverses raisons et une autre partie travaillera sans éprouver un sentiment de satisfaction. L'image de la société „post-industrielle“ n'est pas du tout attirante malgré les commodités matérielles qu'elle prévoit, malgré le revenu élevé par habitant. Elle représente un système d'aliénation aggravée, d'existence vide et dépourvue de sens, de dédoublement tragique entre la personnalité et la collectivité, etc., c.-à-d. tous ces vices qui sont inhérents au capitalisme de monopole d'Etat. La théorie de la société „post-industrielle“ essaye de suggérer la foi dans le triomphe supposé de la civilisation bourgeoise de consommation vulgaire et hédoniste qui contredit profondément la réalité et les perspectives de la révolution scientifique et technique.

La théorie de la société „post-industrielle“ dans une grande mesure repose sur la thèse de la rationalisation croissante de la vie sociale par suite de la révolution scientifico-technique. Sous ce rapport elle perpétue les traditions de tels sociologues comme Thorstein, Weblen, Max Weber, par exemple, pensait que le progrès scientifico-technique exige la suppression du rôle dirigeant des businessmen dans la société et que celui-ci soit assumé par l'Etat-major de la production — les ingénieurs et les savants. Aujourd'hui les théoriciens de la société „post-industrielle“, aussi bien que les représentants du dit néorationalisme dans la sociologie américaine (O. A. Goldner, D. March et autres) lancent une nouvelle variante du technocratisme et de l'industrialisme sociologique. Ils examinent la rationalisation, l'effectivité économique, dans une grande mesure séparément du contexte socio-humaniste. Le rationnel comme catégorie sociale théorique reflète sur la base des rapports sociaux objectifs le degré de développement et le rôle du facteur subjectif, plus particulièrement l'avancement dans la connaissance et la conquête du développement social. [9] Comme il a été souligné par l'auteur soviétique Z. Fainburg „la place de l'individu dans la société, ses rapports mutuels avec le groupe, avec les autres individus est un des moments principaux caractérisant tel ou tel système social et représente en fin de compte un critère décisif pour le progrès“.[10] Justement ce critère décisif est contourné par les théoriciens de la société „post-industrielle“. Cela n'est pas fortuit.

M. Bell examine surtout comme l'objet de la manipulation de l'action de quelques forces impersonnelles et non pas comme le sujet du processus historique. Mais l'homme est le sujet du travail comme de la connaissance, de la gestion, du pronostic, de la planification. Il n'est pas un jouet aveugle entre les mains des forces naturelles et sociales impétueuses. A l'étape actuelle les seules automatisation et rationalisation de la production dans le capitalisme obligent les patrons à encourager l'instruction plus élevée des masses travailleuses. Le niveau intellectuel croissant de la classe ouvrière dans les pays occidentaux est une des conditions préalables de sa prise de conscience sociale et de sa juste orientation politique. Peu à peu la théorie marxiste exercera une influence toujours plus grande sur les ouvriers, les ingénieurs, les techniciens, les savants, sur tous les fondateurs de valeurs spirituelles et matérielles qui sont intéressés d'une manière vitale à une harmonie optimale dans un esprit véritablement humanitaire entre la révolution scientifico-technique et la révolution sociale.

Une réponse scientifique à la question de la relation mutuelle entre le rationnel économique et l'humanisme est donnée dans la théorie marxiste-léniniste. Marx a prévu le remplacement actuel du travail humain dans le processus de production par des mécanismes et des appareils compliqués. C'est ce qui selon Marx libérera l'homme non pas du travail, mais des fonctions non créatrices dans la production. Le travail lui-même deviendra toujours plus intellectuel, plus créateur, satisfaisant les besoins grandissants des gens et en même temps l'accroissement des forces productives qui servent leur satisfaction. K. Marx écrivait: „La liberté dans ce domaine consiste seulement dans le fait que l'homme socialisé, les producteurs associés régularisent le métabolisme avec la nature, le mettent sous leur contrôle général, au lieu de le laisser comme force aveugle de dominer sur eux. Ils l'effectuent (ce métabolisme avec la nature — D. P.) avec la moindre dépense de forces et dans des conditions adéquates et convenant le mieux à leur nature humaine.“<sup>[11]</sup> Comme on voit au contraire des théoriciens de la société „post-industrielle“ K. Marx lie toujours d'une façon indestructible le principe de la production rationnelle aux conditions convenant le mieux aux travailleurs. C'est l'expression de l'unité interne et organique entre la science et l'humanisme dans le système de la théorie marxiste-léniniste et dans la société socialiste.

La société „post-industrielle“ devrait être par définition une société, qui provient du soin millénaire de satisfaire les besoins fondamentaux de nourriture, logement, vêtements, etc. et qui avance dans l'époque de rationalité et effectivité hautement économiques, d'une consommation inimaginable jusqu'alors. On prévoit aussi un accroissement du niveau intellectuel des citoyens dans cette société. Mais malgré tout M. Bell et ses souteneurs ne cachent pas qu'il ne s'agit pas du tout de surmonter l'abîme entre l'idéal du développement créateur libre et universel de la personnalité d'une part et de la psychique de consommation, l'activité intellectuelle gratuite, dépourvue d'orientation humaniste véritable, d'autre part.

La révolution scientifico-technique exige organiquement la création d'un nouveau type de travailleur non seulement hautement qualifié, mais d'une vaste culture générale, d'une riche vie spirituelle, d'une pensée créatrice, ayant de l'initiative et de la capacité croissante de découverte.

Comme le souligne le sociologue soviétique G. Volkov, le climat social adéquat à la science c'est la société communiste. <sup>[12]</sup> La science du troisième millénaire peut se développer sans contradictions et d'une manière universelle seulement dans les conditions du communisme, qui a un caractère profondément scientifique et s'édifie sur une base scientifique. Le socialisme et le communisme élèvent à une hauteur exceptionnelle l'importance du travail intellectuel de la création spirituelle entière.

La théorie de la société „post-industrielle“ par l'analyse critique des moments principaux s'avère mal fondée logiquement et empiriquement. Indépendamment des problèmes réels qu'elle traite et les résultats partiellement positifs, elle représente en fin de compte une nouvelle forme de défense du capitalisme de monopole d'Etat.

Nous pourrions nous mettre d'accord avec la juste critique de pronostiqueur ouest-allemand le prof. Robert Yungk, dirigée vers un certain nombre

de sociologues-fondateurs de la théorie de la société „post-industrielle“. Dans son célèbre interview devant „L'express“ au début de cette année, M. Young a affirmé: „L'homme est un pauvre parent, seulement, de la futurologie“. Cette insouciance à l'égard de l'homme peut nous coûter cher parce qu'au bout du compte c'est justement lui qui détruira et supprimera toutes les sociétés qui ne s'occupent pas de lui. L'homme travailleur, ouvrier, ingénieur, savant, peintre, créateur de toutes les merveilles de la terre, appuyé sur la force puissante de la révolution scientifico-technique supprimera vraiment les rapports de production bourgeoise qui le gênent et édifiera non pas quelque société „post-industrielle“ spéculative et chimérique, mais le système du travail libre — le socialisme. Ainsi seulement va se réaliser la synthèse suprême de la science, de la technique et de l'humanisme véritable.

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## PROCESSES OF STATE FORMATION AND NATION BUILDING

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One of the strangest aspects of the development of sociology during its first century and a half or so as a relatively autonomous discipline is the change from a long-term perspective to a short-term perspective, a kind of narrowing of the sociologists' interest to contemporary societies — and above all to their own societies — as they are here and now, and a withdrawal of interest from the problem how and why societies over the centuries have become what they are. The narrowing of the focus has found its most striking expression in the change in the dominant type of sociological theory. For the greater part of the 19th century the most representative sociological theories were centred on the long-term development of society, those of the second part of the 20th century — except a few, among them my own — have completely abandoned the concept of social development. For a time, it has disappeared from sociological text-books. Instead, the concept "social system" has moved into the centre of sociological theories and other concepts related to it, such as "social structure" and "social function", conceived in such a manner that they can only serve as theoretical tools for a study of a society in a given state, at a given time, whose changes are perceived as unstructured or, in other words, as *historical* changes. The shift of interest from the long-term dynamics to the short-term statics of society has many reasons which need not be discussed here, at least not explicitly (I have discussed some of them elsewhere<sup>1</sup>). But the fact that the plans of the 7th World Congress of Sociology include a Round Table discussion on the theme 'Grand Theories of Development' may perhaps be regarded as a straw in the wind. There are a number of signs that the problem of the long-term development of societies — sometimes mistakenly called evolution, for this social development is a sequential order *sui generis* and has nothing whatever to do with the biological sequence called evolution — begins to move once more into focus.

However, the restructuring of the sociological imagination that is needed in order to redress, on a new level of the spiral, the balance between

<sup>1</sup> See N. Elias, *Über den Prozess der Zivilisation*, Berne and Munich, 1969, Introduction to the second edition.

static and dynamic approaches to the theory of society once more in favour of the latter

However, the restructuring of the sociological imagination that is needed in order to redress, on a new level of the spiral, the balance between static and dynamic approaches to the theory of society once more in favour of the latter, is quite a formidable task. We have now many more facts about the long-term development of societies to go on than ever before. To build intergrating theoretical models which fit all of them closely is far from easy. Moreover, many current concepts, among them the concepts 'structure' and 'function', will come to mean something very different from what they mean today among structural-functionalists and other schools of static sociology if they are used within the context of a developmental sociological theory.

On the empirical level studies in the development of societies have been on the increase for some time, at least with regard to those societies which are called today 'developing' or 'underdeveloped'. But the interest in the development of 'developing' societies as an empirical sociological problem has as yet hardly found a response on the theoretical level. One can see why. Expressions like 'underdeveloped' or 'developing' societies themselves point to the peculiar twist in the perspective of those representatives of the wealthier, the more developed societies who habitually use these terms. For their use implies that the more highly industrialised societies themselves are not developing or, for that matter, not 'underdeveloped'. In their case the present stage of the development of society is widely perceived as a stage without future, as an end-stage. The customary restriction of the term 'developing' to the poorer countries suggests that representative sections of the wealthier countries, who thus perceive a development only in others, are satisfied with themselves. Except in a very limited sense they do not attach any value to the further development of their own society; hence interest in its development up to their own time, too, has receded. While they can perhaps see that in the case of the poorer countries their development is the structured backbone of their history, the wealthier countries, the highly industrialised nations of this world seem to have only a history, but not a development, most certainly not a development that goes on, and 'history' seems only marginally a sociologist's concern. Among the many reasons for the change from long-term developmental to short-term static theories in sociology, this is certainly one: The present conditions of 'advanced' societies are in sociological theories treated almost as if they were an unchanging final state. The short term perspective of many of the most prestigious sociological theories of our time finds its expression in law-like abstractions from selected aspects of contemporary "advanced" societies presented with the claim to be applicable to societies of all ages and regions. Sociological theories woven around concepts such as "social system" are an example. They reduce the long-term process of structured and directional changes, to which the concept of development applies and of which processes of industrialisation, bureaucratisation, scientification, urbanisation or state and nation building processes are examples, to an unchanging state as its permanent condition, while these changes themselves are perceived, at the most, as an unstructured flow, as 'history'.



A few preliminary remarks, I thought, might help to clear the decks. For in order to contribute to a Round Table discussion about 'Grand Theories of Evolution' one has to decide what it is one sets out to discuss: historical theories à la Toynbee or Spengler or sociological theories of long-term development. As one can hardly take it for granted today that the difference between an approach to changes of societies as *history* and an approach to these changes as *development* is well understood, I thought it might be useful if I state explicitly that I am concerned with the latter. It might help the discussion along, I thought, if I set out, in continuation of my theory of long-term state formation processes, some of the problems which one encounters if one studies nation building processes, the latest phase of a long line of state formation processes at least in the development of European societies.

The problem itself is not uncharacteristic of the change in one's perception implied in the change from a static to a developmental sociological paradigm. One gains access to previously neglected problems. With the exception of Reinhard Bendix few sociologists have looked into the problem of nation building and none, as far as I know, into those of long-term state formation processes and their relevance for sociologists both on the empirical and the theoretical level. The evidence for this type of processes is all around us. But in order to bring it into one's conceptual net one requires a type of theoretical paradigm which does not abstract from the flow of time and reduce, in reflection, to static chunks that which one observes as a continuous movement. Many contemporary sociological theory builders appear to take it for granted that a type of abstraction modelled on classical physics, abstractions in the form of law-like generalisations which exclude from the result of the abstraction all that happens in the sequence of time is the true badge of a scientific enterprise. Perhaps it has not been stated clearly enough that the abstractions used in different sciences can differ widely. Some of the abstractions one encounters in biological theories and concepts are very different from the law-like generalisations of classical physics. Some of them include spatial figurations and time sequences of long duration. One can already see very clearly that, in its own way, sociological theory making will have to move in a similar direction. The difficulty is that the type of theory which emerges in that case does not correspond to the ideal image of a theory which the most prominent theoretical sociologists of our time appear to take for granted and which is a kind of philosophical hangover from the time of classical physics.

Take one of the best known examples of an essentially static sociological theory of our time, the theory which tries to come to grips with the problems of society by presenting society as a "social system". I am glad to find that the leading exponent of contemporary social system theories, Talcott Parsons, is among us. I am critical of the intellectual system he has built up. A Round Table discussion at a World Congress of Sociology is, it seems to me, the right place for stating some of the reasons for my critical attitude, — only some, for my time is severely limited, and I like to combine my critical remarks with at least a few hints about the positive aspects of a developmental sociological theory which alone can justify

criticism. Moreover, my critical attitude towards Parsons' intellectual system is qualified by my respect for his person. One may disagree with him, but one cannot doubt his intellectual sincerity and integrity. Nor the width of his power of synthesis which is one of the qualifying gifts of the distinguished theory maker. However, I cannot persuade myself that this gift has been used in the right cause. Even for analytical purposes, the assumption that 'actions' form a kind of atoms of human societies appears to me one of those barren formal generalisations too remote from research tasks to be either confirmed or refuted by reference to observable data. Why put 'actions' in the center of a theory of society and not the people who act? If anything, societies are networks of human beings in the round, not a medley of disembodied actions. Nor is it easy to see how the atomism of such a sociological action theory can run in harness, as a horse from the same stable, with a decidedly not atomistic system theory according to which everything in a society is a dependent part of a highly integrated and normally smoothly functioning whole. This, too, the model of society as a 'social system' a normally well oiled social machinery where all parts are harmoniously geared to each other, is rather remote from the rough and tumble of men's social life, as one can actually observe it.

It is certainly difficult to apply to the larger societies of the past which were more integrated in terms of regions of social strata and even of immigrants, than most of our contemporary European nation states. Parson's theory of society as a normally well and highly integrated system appears to claim the status of a general sociological theory applicable to all societies of men. One cannot help wondering whether it is not in fact an over-extended and rather idealising generalisation abstracted from modern nation states and projected in all the world. Can the Parsonian model of a 'social system' with its supposedly integrating unity of values and of culture really apply to the slave states of antiquity where social distances, inequalities of social strata and differences in their culture and their values were often very much greater and regional integration often very much less great than in our contemporary industrial nation states? Does it apply for instance to the Assyrian or the Roman Empire? Or to the Confederate States of the 18th and 19th Century with their massive slave population? Or to dynastic Russia with her hierarchy of privileged landowners and state officials and the mass of her peasant serfs?

If one looks around in the sociological literature of our time, it can easily appear that nation-states as a specific type of social formation have no place at all in the sociologists field of enquiry. It takes some time before one discovers that nation states make their appearance as a topic of contemporary sociology in a characteristic disguise. The references to them are masked by a specific type of abstraction. They are hidden behind such concepts as 'the social whole' or 'total society' and above all 'the social system'. Although these concepts can be applied to other relatively highly integrated social formations, such as tribes, much that is said about society as a "whole" or as a "social system" in sociological theories, such as that of Parsons, is selected, abstracted and distilled from the most highly and closely integrated societies of our own time — from nation states. As

problems of nation states form the main topic of my contribution to this discussion, I thought it might be useful to indicate the connection between these problems and the most prominent of the contemporary system theories. The latter have a purely descriptive character often with strong teleological undertones. In Parsons' model the maintenance of an unified, equilibrated and well functioning social system often appears as the purpose and aim towards which all part-events are directed. An example — one of many — is the description of power as a 'facility for the performance of function in and on behalf of the society as a system'. Sentences such as this show very clearly the abstraction in the service of a specific ideal. As in many other cases, ideal types such as this, purely descriptive law-like abstractions serve — without doubt unintentionally in this case — as disguises for subject-centered values. Teleology serves as a substitute for explanation. If one brings the 'system'-concept down to earth, if one asks how and why long-term processes of integration of which stateformation and nation-building processes are examples, actually occurred and occur, one prepares the way for an explanatory sociological model; one directs attention to the problem why, in course of time, relatively large 'systems' *became* and *become* in these cases *more* highly intergrated and their 'parts' functionally *more* interdependent.

However, this type of question comes to life, it gains substance and relevance only if one has at one's disposal a sufficiently wide and vivid long-term knowledge which enables one to look back through the centuries and to perceive the continuity of the development of societies which led, say, from the multitude of relatively small, relatively loosely integrated dynastic states of the 11th and the 12th centuries, by way of a great number of integration and disintegration spurts, gradually to larger, more populous and more closely integrated social units in the form of the larger dynastic states and then to the — so far — most highly integrated and interdependent large societies, the industrial nation states, — unless one is able to perceive this long term process, one does not become aware of the problem. How is it to be explained that a development of societies went in this case for centuries, through all the fissions and fusions, all the disintegration and integration spurts, in the direction towards the formation of larger and more closely knit societies? How can one account for the fact that, over the centuries, this change had a specific direction although it was unplanned? For who was there to plan it, and to execute such a plan? I have given a part answer to this problem elsewhere.<sup>2</sup> It must be enough here, as a contribution to our problem of sociological theories of long-term developments, to concentrate on a few problems of the latest phase of this process, of nation bulding processes.

By neglecting long-term processes of integration and disintegration as a theoretical and empirical topic of sociological enquiry, sociologists have steered their discipline into a well known dilemma; the neglect has cemented their division into two diametrically opposed schools, one of which

<sup>2</sup> N. Elias, *Über den Prozess der Zivilisation*, *ibid.*

places collaboration, functional integration and interdependence into the center of its model of society, the other tension, fission and conflict. Whatever the more ideological reasons for this division are, any long-term enquiry into state formation and nation building processes can show that every spurt towards greater interdependence, towards closer integration of human groups which were previously independent, or less dependent, or less reciprocally dependent, on each other, runs through a series of specific integration tensions and conflicts, of balance of power struggles which are not accidental, but structural concomitants of these spurts towards greater functional interdependence of 'parts' within a 'whole'. For if two groups become more, or more reciprocally, interdependent than they were before, each of them has reason to fear that it may be dominated, or even annihilated, by the other. The struggle may result after many tests of strength in a fusion. It may result in a unit dominated by one group while still comprising both. It may result in the complete disappearance of one of them in the new unit emerging from their struggle. There are many more possibilities. The complexity of these integrations need not concern us here. It is enough to point out that every move towards greater functional interdependence between human groups engenders structural tensions, conflicts and struggles, which may or may not remain unmanageable.

Nation building processes show that very clearly. Two main types of integration processes stand out in their course, each with its specific integration struggles: processes of territorial or regional integration and processes of strata integration. Although one can distinguish them, they are structurally connected. In discussing some of their aspects, therefore, one often has to move from the one to the other. One of the first and one of the few people who have asked directly and without circumlocution: "What is a nation?" was the great French savant Ernest Renan. Some of the observations and reflections contained in his lecture, "Qu'est-ce qu'une Nation?"<sup>3</sup> are of significance here. He saw, for instance, quite clearly a fact which today is often concealed or forgotten, he recognized, that nations are something quite new.<sup>4</sup> National ideologies usually represent the nation as something very old, almost eternal and immortal. In fact, state societies assumed in Europe the character of nation states, broadly speaking, from the second part of the 18th century on. Renan pointed out that none of the great powers of antiquity had the character of nations. There were, he stated, no Chinese citizens. He could have pointed out that even much later people were treated and in general perceived themselves as subjects of Princes, not as fellow citizens of a nation. The term 'citizen' itself had for quite a time an oppositional, if not an outright revolutionary ring. States assumed the characteristics of nation states, in other words, in connection with specific changes in the distribution of power within a state society. It was, on the one hand, a change in the distribution of power between social strata as well as in the nature of social stratification itself. It was, on the other hand, a change in the distribution of power between

<sup>3</sup> Ernest Renan, *Qu'est-ce qu'une Nation?* Paris, 1882.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 2.

governments and governed. The change in the nature of stratification is usually conceptualised as a change from a stratification in terms of different estates each with legally entrenched privileges and disabilities to a stratification in the form of social classes whose members were equals before the law of the state and unequal only socially and economically. This transition, like the nation-building process as such, was far more gradual than is usually seen. Privileged groups of noble landowners with a strong monopolistic foothold on the commanding positions of their country's military forces, diplomacy, civil service departments and foreign affairs, retained in most European countries their distinguishing character as a powerful social stratum sui generis, as *the* European upper class, up to the First World War in spite of the growing power of sections of the middle classes. The power equation changed during the 19th century slowly in favour of the latter. But the former, the European aristocracy and related groups bound together and distinguished from other groups by a specific tradition, a stratum culture of their own, retained until 1918 and in some countries, above all in England, much longer not only their position as the highest status group, but also a special access to privileged position within the country's establishment which secured for them at least a modicum of their former power surplus in relation to middle and lower classes.

It is useful to keep in mind the leading part which representative sections of the traditional European upper classes continued to play in the affairs of European societies at least up to the First World War, if one wants to understand the gradualness with which dynastic states transformed themselves into nation states. Following Marx and perhaps slightly misinterpreting his model of the development of European societies, many people have today an over-simplified picture of the change in the stratification of European societies which plays so large a part in the change from dynastic to national states. According to this picture the French revolution represents an absolute caesura between an order in which what Marx called a 'feudal class' of princes, landed aristocrats and related groups, formed the 'ruling class'<sup>5</sup> of society and a social order in which the bourgeoisie broke the power of the 'feudal class' and took its place as the ruling class of society. In actual fact princes and aristocratic agrarian groups of one kind or the other continued to play a very decisive part as specific foci of power in most European societies after the French Revolution. For the greater part of the 19th century, the main axis of social tensions and conflict of European societies was not that between workers and capitalists. The 19th century was and remained a period of three-cornered struggles between landowning aristocratic and court elites, rising industrial middle class groups and, behind them, the rising industrial working classes. The expression 'middle

<sup>5</sup> Marx does not yet clearly distinguish between early medieval types of nobles with no or little income in the form of money and the dominant 18th century type, the court aristocracy, living largely on a money income. To call both 'feudal' is rather misleading. I have shown some of the differences, and some of the reasons for the transformation of a late feudal nobility into an aristocracy centered on a Court, in 'Die Höfische Gesellschaft', *Soziologische Texte*, Neuwied and Berlin, 1969.

classes' as a classifying term for the entrepreneurial classes, which is hardly any longer appropriate today, refers to their position in this three-cornered battle. As the industrial working classes were during the first part of the 19th century and often much longer, still very ineffectively organised, often hardly literate and very poor, the struggle of the urban entrepreneurial classes for stronger participation in state affairs and against the dominance of the traditional upper classes was for a time more acute on the state level than that between groups of workers and entrepreneurs which still remained often latent, which, if it came into the open, remained largely sporadic, diffuse, intermittent and which was hardly fought out above the local level with any degree of effectiveness prior to the second half of the 19th century. The slowly rising power of the organised industrial working classes greatly contributed to the rapprochement between landed and industrial interests. The decrease in the tension between them, often leading to compromise and alliance in a common struggle against working class representatives, took a different form in different societies; but it was usually the prelude to the rise of men representing the traditions of the urban industrial middle classes to the commanding positions of the state and the gradual retreat from these positions of members of the old upper classes, who preserved a modicum of their tradition and ideals. Whether the former had the face of Gladstone, Thiers or Stresemann, their advent was symptomatic of the advance of sections of the former middle classes, of the urban industrial classes, towards the position of the core group of the state. The middle classes, one might say, had become integrated into the state, or, as Parsons has put it, 'included'. But this conceptualisation is not wholly adequate. It gives the impression that a new stratum has been "included" in a 'social system' which as such remains unchanged.<sup>6</sup> In actual fact the rise to a position of greater power within the state society of representatives of the entrepreneurial classes was symptomatic of a transformation of the system' itself. It marked the point of no return at which the vestiges of the

<sup>6</sup> Parsons recognises very clearly that a 'system' can be divided into superior and inferior classes. One can see, thus, that system is a sophisticated shorthand for a country such as France, England or the USA. He explicitly mentions cases in which an upper class monopolizes the status of real membership treating a lower class second class citizenry. But he evidently shrinks from the harshness of the struggles and conflicts which form an integral part of the rise of the 'second class' citizenry, of which the struggle between the rising industrial middle classes against the aristocratic upper classes is a good example. This is how Parsons formulates his concern (in *Societies evolutionary and comparative perspectives*, Prentice Hall, 1966, p. 22): "For these reasons differentiation and upgrading processes *may require* (my italics — N. E.) the inclusion in a status of full membership in the relevant general community system of previously excluded groups which have developed legitimate capacities to "contribute" to the functioning of the system."

Once more Parsons' teleological perspective asserts itself. The 'functioning of the system' is the end. If formerly excluded groups have developed 'legitimate capacities' which enable them to contribute to the functioning system, then they should no longer be excluded. As one can see, the 'system' does not change. Newly admitted groups merely fit into it. No explanation is given as to the people who judge whether an excluded group has developed 'legitimate capacities' for fitting into the existing system. One does not know what to admire more, the patent sincerity and good will or the disarming naivety and incomprehension which one encounters here.

dynastic-aristocratic order of society slowly faded into the background and at which the state entered its first phase as a fully fledged national state — the first phase because the broadest strata of the nation still remained largely excluded and outsiders. Disraeli speaking of 'two nations' found a telling word for it. It is perhaps not uncharacteristic of the three-cornered tension figuration of societies in the second part of the 19th century that in Germany as in England the leaders of conservative groups with strong agrarian interests, Bismark and Disraeli, each in its own way tried to improve the conditions of the working classes partly in the hope of winning them over as allies in their struggle with parties more representative of urban manufacturing and liberal groups, partly in order to counter the growth of working class parties.

One can say, thus, that industrialisation and nation building are two facets of the same transformation of societies. But one cannot clearly indicate the connection unless one links both these processes to an overall change in the distribution of power chances in society. There is a simple way to demonstrate this change although it would require much greater elaboration to do it convincingly. Dynastic states are characteristic of a stage in the development of societies at which the resources of power are very unevenly distributed between ruling elites and the mass of the population. In many cases 90% or more of the population of a country have no institutional means, no regular channels of communications which enable them to influence decisions of groups with access to the commanding positions of the state which affect their lives. Even access to estate assemblies, with very few exceptions, is, in practice, open only to small elite groups. In many cases princes and governments are able to rule for long periods without allowing estate assemblies to meet. Nothing is more characteristic of the change in the distribution of power indicated by the transformation of dynastic into national states than the emergence of mass parties as a regular institution of nation states. The widespread discontent with mass parties which do not ensure a genuine participation of the groups which they nominally represent obscures the basic sociological problem with which one is faced by the great regularity with which mass parties are formed as standing institutions in all the more advanced and even in many less advanced societies of our time. One usually fails to ask which developments, which structures of societies account for the emergence of nation-wide political parties and of party governments as regular institutions in the 19th and 20th centuries? Ineffective or not, nation-wide parties and party governments are symptomatic of a stage in the development of societies, at which the integration of a state-population has become closer, at which it is no longer possible to take decisions affecting the lives of the population of a country entirely without regular channels of communication between decision makers and those affected by their decisions. The balance of power between groups with access to position which enable them to take decisions over the lives of others and groups with little or no access to these decisions is no longer quite as uneven as it was in earlier stages of social development. The reciprocity of the dependence of governments on those they govern and of the governed on governments,

though still uneven enough has become less uneven than it used to be. The nature of parties in different countries is a fairly exact indicator of this balance of power and its fluctuations.

One can see the connection between the social institution of parties and the properties of nation states. Societies assume the characteristics of nations if the functional interdependence between its regions and its social strata as well as its hierarchic levels of authority and subordination becomes sufficiently great and sufficiently reciprocal for none of them to be able to disregard completely what the others think, feel or wish. Government by party leaders and the adoption by both, governments and parties, of ideological designed to convince the mass of the population that they regard the improvement of their conditions, the advance of the welfare of the nation as their central task are symptomatic of the very pronounced change in the balance of power between governments and governed of which I have spoken. There is no doubt that even the most advanced of our contemporary industrial nation states are still in the early stages of these processes of nation building. I have not been able here to explain the reasons why they have got under way. Nor would I preempt the future and say they must and will go further in that direction. But perhaps I have clarified some of the connections between events which are academically often classified under different headings. Political parties and even nations may not appear as a sociologists' concern, social classes not as that of a political scientist, while industrialisation may be regarded as the economist's preserve, and dynastic states as that of the historian. Yet the connections are there for all to see provided one has a longtime perspective and focuses attention on the changing power relations between different social groups.

For the time being I have simply tried to put into perspective the problem of nation building. The self-images of nations, for reasons about which I have to say more, usually give the impression to the members of each of them that their nation existed, in essentials, unchanged for many centuries if not for ever. What is today taught as history of one's own country, however many changes it may show which have occurred among the inhabitants of that country over the centuries, can usually be accommodated to the requirements of a national self-image which represents one's own nation as unchanging throughout the ages in its basic characteristics. Contemporary state-societies which are still in the early stages of a state formation and nation building process, in many cases are already beginning to construct a similar image of themselves — an image of the national past with which present generations can identify themselves, which gives them a feeling of pride in their own national identity and which can serve as a catalyst in a nation building process that usually includes the integration of disparate regional groups and different social strata around certain dominant core groups.

There is much to be said for studying these processes factually. But in order to do so, one must be able to distinguish between national ideologies which make a nation appear as an unchanging and well integrated social system of great value, and the observable longterm processes of



integration and disintegration in the course of which tensions and struggles between centrifugal and centripetal tendencies and between established and outsider groups occur as a regular feature characteristic of the structure of these developments. One must be able to perceive nations as a specific type of integration which requires explanation and which cannot be explained unless one recognises state formation processes, and, as one of their phases, nation building processes, as long-term processes in the sequence of time, and considers that nation building processes, far from representing the last and ultimate spurt of a state formation process, may be followed by integrations on a higher post-national level of which one can see the beginnings, for example, in Western and Eastern Europe, among groups of Arab states and some of the African states. Sociologically speaking the scientific exploration of these contemporary integration and disintegration spurts can throw light on past spurts of this type, on earlier state formation processes and vice versa. The notion that sociological problems of our own time and those of past ages must or can be pursued, as it were, in separate compartments by different academic disciplines is greatly misleading. In fact, the study of long-term social processes and especially of processes of integration and disintegration shows very clearly the need for a unified and integrating theoretical framework for the social sciences. Their present boundaries and their incessant status struggles, together with the effects of these struggles on theories and conventions of research, have increasingly hampered their advance towards greater certainty and adequacy of the knowledge they produce of their special field, of human society. These boundaries and struggles reinforce the tendency towards short-term perspectives that prevail in most of them. Sooner or later a re-examination of their traditional relationship will become necessary.

## EMPIRICAL METHODS AND ELITE THEORIES

ELLEN H. PARSONS

1954

### II. BRIDGING BETWEEN MICRO AND MACRO SOCIOLOGY

#### II. LIAISONS ENTRE MICRO ET MACRO SOCIOLOGIE

A basic question for the analysis of social change is the extent to which social change is determined by the actions of individuals and other advanced capitalist societies there are two main schools of thought. The "pluralists" believe that these societies are united by the interplay of many interest groups, and that the political processes of multiparty democracy offer real alternatives to the mass of voters. (Leading pluralists include Dahl, Lipset, Elman, Rose, Hall, and Alinsky.) The "elite theorists" see power in capitalist societies as virtually monopolized by a unified elite, consisting of either a "power elite" or a coalition of major institutions including government, the military and big business (the Mills theory) or a "ruling class" of big capitalists (as described by Marxists like Louis Althusser, Miliband, and Korten, or quasi-Marxist like Bonhoeffer).

The argument tends to be stated in polar positions: either there is a ruling elite which runs almost everything, or there is equality of competing interest groups. To bring systematic empirical research to bear on the argument, these polar positions must be analyzed into a set of continuous dimensions (Bastion, 1955).

Logically there can be many gradations of power distribution, even though it may turn out empirically that some of these are unstable and unlikely to persist. Moreover, the argument involves several dimensions which are logically separable, although again they may be empirically inter-related so that not all combinations can occur. At a minimum there seem to be four dimensions involved in the dispute:

(1) The extent to which numbers or agents of a privileged stratum occupy the key decision-making positions in major social institutions.

(2) The degree of organization and unity of purposes of the power elite or privileged stratum.

(3) The degree to which other interest groups (workers, farmers, low-salaried employees, professional, etc.) are socially and politically organized and unified on policies.

(4) The extent to which the interests of the privileged stratum are opposed to the interests of other strata in society.

If we consider that each of these four dimensions can take on three degrees, high, medium, and low, then there are 81 or 81 logically possible

## EMPIRICAL METHODS AND ELITE THEORIES

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A basic question for the analysis of societies is the extent to which control over their major social decisions is monopolized by a ruling elite which acts in its own interests. Concerning the United States and other advanced capitalist societies there are two main schools of thought. The "pluralists" believe that these societies are ruled by the interplay of many interest groups, and that the political processes of multi-party democracy offer real alternatives to the mass of voters. (Leading pluralists include Dahl, Lipset, Riesman, Rose, Bell, and Kornhauser.) The "elite theorists" see power in capitalist societies as virtually monopolized by a unified elite, consisting of either a "power elite" of managers of major institutions including government, the military, and big business (the Mills theory) or a "ruling class" of big capitalists (as described by Marxists like Sweezy, Miliband, and Kolko, or quasi-Marxists like Domhoff).

The argument tends to be stated in polar positions: either there is a ruling elite which runs almost everything, or there is equality of competing interest groups. To bring systematic empirical research to bear on the argument, these polar positions must be analyzed into a set of continuous dimensions (Barton, 1955).

Logically there can be many gradations of power distribution, even though it may turn out empirically that some of these are unstable and unlikely to persist. Moreover the argument involves several dimensions which are logically separable, although again they may be empirically inter-related so that not all combinations can occur. At a minimum there seem to be four dimensions involved in the dispute:

- (1) The extent to which members or agents of a privileged stratum occupy the key decision-making positions in major social institutions.
- (2) The degree of organization and unity of purpose of the power elite or privileged stratum.
- (3) The degree to which other interest groups (workers, farmers, low-salaried employees, professionals, etc.) are socially and politically organized and unified on policies.
- (4) The extent to which the interests of the privileged stratum are opposed to the interests of other strata in society.

If we consider that each of these four dimensions can take on three degrees, high, medium, and low, then there are 34 or 81 logically possible

types of society. Here I will note only selected types which seem to correspond to the image of various societies held by elitists, pluralists, and other theorists.

If it is agreed that these dimensions are what the pluralism-ruling elite debate is really about, then it will be useful to turn to methodological questions. How does one go about empirically investigating where a particular society at a given time stands on these four dimensions? How can one study the laws of motion of societies from one to another type — what historical and comparative data are needed? I will use the writings of some of the participants in the debate, and particularly Domhoff, to raise issues and indicate methodological problems.

*1. The extent to which members or agents of a privileged stratum occupy key decision-making positions*

The starting point of most elite research is the examination of the social background and social connections of the people occupying leading formal positions in major social institutions. The "social background method" usually relies on available biographical information, which is quite abundant for the leadership of most societies. This is the major method employed by Domhoff in *Who Rules America?* to demonstrate a number of descriptive propositions about the United States today:

*First*, we will show the existence of a national upper class that meets generally accepted definitions of social class.

*Second*, we will show that this upper class owns a disproportionate amount of the country's wealth and receives a disproportionate amount of its yearly income, and that members of the American upper class control the major banks and corporations, which in turn are known to dominate the American economy.

*Third*, we will show that members of the American upper class and their high-level corporation executives control the foundations, the elite universities, the largest of the mass media, and such important opinion-molding institutions as the Council on Foreign Relations, the Foreign Policy Association, the Committee for Economic Development, the Business Advisory Council, and the National Advertising Council.

*Fourth*, we will show that the power elite (members of the American upper class and their high-level employees in the above institutions) control the Executive branch of the federal government.

*Fifth*, we will show that the power elite controls regulatory agencies, the federal judiciary, the military, the CIA, and the FBI through its control of the Executive branch of the federal government. It will be shown also that this control of the Executive branch is supplemented by other lines of control in the case of each of these branches or agencies of the government.

After it has been shown that the power elite does not control but merely influences (1) the Legislative branch of the federal government, (2) most state governments, and (3) most city governments, it will be argued that its control of corporations, foundations, elite universities, the Presidency, the federal judiciary, the military, and the CIA qualifies the American

FIGURE 1. TYPES OF POWER SYSTEMS

Privileged stratum control of key positions	Privileged stratum organization and unity	Masses organization and unity	Conflict of interest between strata	
High	High	Low	High	Ruling class model: privileged elite exploits weak mass
High	High	Low	Low	Benevolent elite model: elite rules weak mass for mutual benefit
High	High	High	High	Revolutionary situation: organized mass confronts privileged elite holding key positions
Medium	Medium	Medium	Medium	Pluralist model: non-unified privileged stratum competes with other strata over compromisable issues
Low	Low	High	High	Post-revolutionary situation: domination by masses over weak privileged stratum
Low or Non-existent	Low or non-existent	High	Low	Classless, conflict-free democratic society (Socialist and liberal-democratic ideal model)
Low	Low	Low	Low	Individualistic society: ideal model of free-market economics or anarchism

upper class as a "governing class", especially in the light of the wealth owned and the income received by members of that exclusive social group.

It should be added that by "control," we mean to imply dominant the exercise of "power" (ability to act) from a position of "authority" (the right to exercise power by virtue of some office or legal mandate). Synonyms for control would be rule, govern, guide, and direct. "Influence," for

us, is a weaker term, implying that a person can sometimes sway, persuade, or otherwise have an effect upon those who control from a position of authority (Domhoff, 1967, 10-11).

Propositions two, three and four concern the first variable in our typology: they assert that members of the social-economic upper class have a high degree of control (through direct occupancy or control over the indoctrination and careers of the occupants) of key positions in major institutions. Proposition one amounts to the assertion that this class has a high degree of social cohesion and interaction.

The "social background method" provides evidence for the frequency of upper-class members in high places in various institutions (government, mass media, university boards, foundation boards, lobbying or opinion-molding groups.) Domhoff provides an operational definition of the upper *social class* (as a body of high-prestige families with a high degree of social contact among them) in terms of listing in the Social Register, attendance at certain exclusive preparatory schools, and membership in exclusive clubs, or being closely related by blood or marriage to those who are. He is able on this basis to say, for example, that 53% of the directors of the top 15 banks, the top 15 insurance companies, and the top 20 industrial corporations in 1963 were members of the upper social class, and that in general there is a high degree of overlap between the top of the economic and of the social-prestige hierarchies. He is also able to show that a majority of Secretaries of State, Defense, and Treasury have been members of the upper social-economic class in recent years, that several Presidents have been, that many major publishers have been, as are leaders in political fundraising and in charitable foundations, and that upper class members and high-salaried executives of organizations which they control provide the majority of trustees of leading universities. He is also able to say that Congress is not composed of such people, nor is the military officer group, nor are state and local government officials.

## 2. *The organization and unity of the privileged stratum*

Domhoff demonstrates that the upper social class has a variety of institutions which promote informal social interaction on a national basis (the Social Registers, the exclusive private schools, the clubs, the resorts, and frequency of intermarriage). Using biographical directories and other published data he can show which people in high positions have been connected with these institutions, and thereby infer that such interaction does in fact take place. At this point he has gone as far as the social background method can. Further evidence of social cohesion must come from other sources. Domhoff makes good use of ethnographic reports of upper-class institutions from observers such as Baltzell and Amory. He also quotes sociometric surveys by Hunter and by his own students. This shows one direction which future research should take: attempts to verify the extent of social interaction within the economically privileged class and between it and the leaders of various social institutions, using detailed biographies, intensive studies of upper-class institutions, and sociometric surveys.

But beyond showing social interaction, it is vital to see whether the members of the upper class are united or divided in their values, perceptions of their interests, and activities to influence opinions and policies; whether the professionals and executives in the "power elite" of top positions who are not themselves members of the upper class have similar values and beliefs and act in the interests of the upper class; and how these attitudes and behaviors are related to interaction and membership in class institutions. Such information cannot be obtained by simple description of social background and connections.

Domhoff is not unaware of these limitations of the social-background method. He writes: "The definition of a governing class that we have given is closely related to the method we have used in our study, namely the "sociology of leadership" method. This method studies the social background of the men who control institutions and make decisions. It has two drawbacks. The first is that it does not demonstrate "consequences" from upper class control. Do upper-class leaders have "special interests"? Donald Matthews, in *The Social Background of Political Decision-Makers*, warns that even though most political leaders come from the higher social strata, they are not necessarily members of a "ruling class." Social class is not an automatic predictor of either ideology or political behavior." (Domhoff, 1967, p. 143)

Domhoff's response to this warning seems rather ambiguous. Throughout his book he talks of "control by *members* of the upper class" and "control by the *upper class*" as though they were the same, and implied control by a collectivity with common purposes. In a later paper he writes: "Pluralists might still counter that it must be shown that these men act in their own interests when in government; I will merely note that sociological and psychological studies suggest that it is very hard to transcend one's background and implicit assumptions." (Domhoff, 1969, p. 47)

Yet at many points Domhoff makes quite clear that there are major differences of opinion among members of the upper class and the power elite. "... This study has shown who controlled the New Deal — liberal elements of the American upper class, including many ex-Republicans. We have stressed that the New Deal created a split within the power elite which has not yet healed. Many members of the upper class remain unreconciled to the New Deal, believing that aristocrat Franklin Roosevelt ("Rosenfelt") was a traitor to his class who was part of an international Communist-Jewish conspiracy. However, this does not mean that other members of the upper class did not control the New Deal. As Baltzell documents, the New Deal was actually the beginning of a more ethnically representative establishment within the governing class which pushed aside the Protestant Establishment made up of heavy industrialists, fiscal conservatives, and prejudiced personalities." (Domhoff, 1967, 152)

Domhoff goes on to point out that while the "governing class" is united on *maintaining its wealth and income*, there may be severe conflict within it, not only short-run tactics but long-run strategies for maintaining that position differ.

The social background method simply cannot cope with splits within the upper social class; it does not provide information about who supported what tactics or strategies, who favored giving concessions, who were the "fiscal conservatives and prejudiced personalities" and who were the supporters of reform. Knowing how many members of a presidential cabinet were "upper class" in origins or past connections gives us little ability to predict what they will do — permit a major depression to go unchecked or fight it with New Deal policies, take an isolationist stance or intervene in world affairs, fight poverty or practice repression. What kinds of upper-class people take which positions on these issues?

To analyze these very serious divisions of opinion within the upper social-economic class, three methods are available: the use of *publicly available records* (newspaper reports, speeches, memoirs, lists of members and contributors to political parties and special campaigns); *decisional analysis* using informant interviews to find out who was involved, taking what position, in the making of particular decisions; and *elite surveys*, direct interviews or questionnaires asking samples of upper class members what attitude they have toward various policies and problems, and what they have done to further the policies they support. Each of these methods has its advantages and limitations; ideally they should be used together.

### 3. *The degree of organization and unity of other interest groups*

An adequate description of the power structure of a society has to study the possible competing interest groups, to find out what their goals are, what they are doing to achieve them, how cohesive and organized they are, and ultimately what impact these groups have on decisions of government, business, and other institutions. To what extent are the policies and activities of leaders of such competing interests influenced by various forms of "cooptation" into the system? How do their leaders communicate with one another, with their members, and the general public? To what extent are such groups *taken into account* by "ruling class" leaders in view of their political or economic power? Most writers on the subject talk as Domhoff does of "concessions" made by the ruling group to other interest groups including the working class. But are these other groups well enough organized, possessed of their own systems of research and communication, and independent enough in thought and action, to get *important* rather than merely trivial concessions?

Domhoff quotes another Donald Matthews warning on this point: "It is misleading to assume that a group must literally be represented among the political decision-makers to have influence or political power. The unrepresentative nature of America's political decision-makers no doubt has its consequences, but it does not free them from their ultimate accountability to the electorate at large. Thus the frequency with which members of certain groups are found among decision-makers should not be considered an infallible index of the distribution of power in a society. In America at least lower-status groups have political power far in excess of their number in Congress, the Cabinet, and so on." (Matthews, 1954, 463)



Domhoff finds this "farfetched," but whether such groups have power to force compromises from the upper class is obviously related to the state of their organization, ideology, and leadership, and the extent to which their leaders can influence their own group, other sectors of the public, and thereby the decision-makers. The study of possible "counterelites" or "competing elites" such as labor leaders, intellectuals, professionals, technocrats, ethnic group leaders, and protest movement organizers obviously should not be neglected.

Analysis which concentrates on the class composition of government may neglect the analysis of leadership among mass and potential mass groups. Decision-making studies and leadership surveys may provide evidence of the state of self-organization of competing interests and classes, the extent of their awareness of their own interests and the policies which would serve them, and of their impact upon the formal leaders of the system

#### *4. The degree of conflict of interests between strata*

A final and very basic dimension in the analysis of power structures is to what extent there are conflicts of interest between the strata in the system. Are the needs and demands of one group such that the elimination of another group's position in society is required to meet them? Does one group's gain require severe losses to another group? To what extent are competing desires compromiseable — or even mutually supporting so that by cooperation both groups can achieve more?

Domhoff addresses himself to this issue in discussing the question of "consequences" of ruling class control: "Another objection would run as follows. So what if the upper class controls a disproportionate amount of wealth and controls the corporations and the federal government? The important thing is whether or not their decisions are in the interests of the country as a whole. Would members of other classes make similar decisions on key issues?" (Domhoff, 1967, 150-151)

In answering this question he specifically avoids the issues of whether the interests of the upper class are generally in conflict with those of the masses: The answer to this question, above and beyond the special interests that are implied by disproportionate income and wealth, is that it is not really pertinent. This book has not tried to show that the rule of the American upper class has been a benevolent one or a malevolent one. Rather, it is concerned with the existence and the mechanics of the national upper class, not with an interpretation of the impact of its rule on American civilization for better or for worse. Whether decisions by members of the upper class are "good" for the whole country or only for themselves is difficult to answer in any case, but it is not relevant to the existence of a governing class by our definition." (Domhoff, 1967, 151)

This seems to be a major analytic weakness, arising because the social-background method provides no information on the subject. Decisional studies or surveys would be needed to tell us whether the decisions taken or supported by members of the upper class were *opposed* by members of other classes, or were perceived as being against their interests; and con-

versely whether the upper class and its representatives perceived certain concessions or reforms in the interest of other classes as disastrous, excessively expensive, or tolerable to their interests.

In his above statement Domhoff makes one exception: "above and beyond the special interests that are implied by disproportionate income and wealth." Domhoff quotes economic studies which show that the top 1% of the families (with respect to income) received in 1959 8% of the national income. These 450,000 families received an average of \$53,000 a year, which was 8 times the average income. Furthermore the top 1% of adults with respect to wealth owned 24% of all private wealth. The maintenance of this class differential in income and wealth seems to be the basic issue on which Domhoff believes the governing class to be united; and he cites the fact that relative shares of income and wealth do not change much over time in the U.S. as evidence of the continued effectiveness of upper class rule.

Mankoff, in his useful review essay on "Power in Advanced Capitalist Society," puts it this way: "Preserving capitalism has been the primary goal of the most articulate and political powerful sector of the economic elite during the 20th century because it is inextricably tied to the maintenance of class privilege (i. e., a disproportionate share of world and national wealth and its translation into power, status, and increased life chances for the members of the economic elite and their progeny)." (Mankoff, 1970, 421)

The problem with identifying "preserving capitalism" as the unifying interest of the economic elite is that this does not tell us how they respond to the issues which have most directly concerned the rest of the population of the United States in the last 40 years: whether the country would permit major depressions or would use fiscal and monetary planning to avoid them; whether there would be a social security and a medicare system; whether the trade unions would be able to organize mass production industries; whether extreme poverty is to be tolerated or abolished; whether racial oppression continues or ends. It is of the highest importance to know whether various elite groups (and various sections of the public) *believe* that reforms of this kind are compatible or incompatible with capitalism and the continued existence of a wealthy class, and act accordingly.

Marxist theory is based on the premise that the major problems experienced by the working class and the masses generally in capitalist societies are insoluble by reforms and require the abolition of capitalism. It is assumed that once efforts at reform fail, the issue of "capitalism versus socialism" will emerge as central, and the workers, their leaders, and their intellectual allies will see that socialism is in their interest. Thus they assert that the conflict of interest between the capitalists and the masses is great and noncompromisable, and that eventually the participants in the system will see it this way.

To decide whether socialism is in the interests of the masses in the U.S. and other advanced capitalist societies, and capitalism intolerably against their interests, requires historical, political, and economic analysis of the competing systems — and perhaps more historical experience with both

than is now available. But it is possible by survey methods to see what various groups and their leaders *believe* to be in their interests. Domhoff makes much of the fact that the economic upper class in the United States, comprising the top 1% of the population in income, receives 8% of the national income. However, existing attitude data suggest that it is widely believed that this allocation of incomes is not a serious loss to the working class, when the national income doubles every 20 years to produce a "bigger pie."

The survey method has been used for many years to study the behavior of the masses and the various influences on such mass behavior as voting, buying, and choice of mass communications to listen to. Special survey techniques permit the identification of "opinion leaders" who influence others; sociometric questions permit tracing the chains and networks along which communications move. Cluster sampling and sociometric ("snowball") sampling permit the identification of "interpersonal environments," "social contexts," and "reference groups" which have powerful influences on individuals.

In such types of surveys the respondents play two roles: their opinions and behavior are "dependent variables" to be explained, and at the same time when aggregated in groups or networks their opinions and behavior constitute the *contexts* for the behavior of particular individuals, and thus are independent variables in the analysis. Clustered and sociometric surveys thus permit us to examine both the inputs and the outputs of people, to measure the output of a set of people and see how it affects the individuals for whom it is an input. They are the empirical methods appropriate to a "system analysis" of mass behavior (Barton, 1968).

It should be possible to apply the same methods to the study of elite attitudes and behavior. The elites contain a much higher proportion of "opinion leaders," people who pay attention to social issues and have a high output of communications about them. The sociometric method can help to identify the system of influence and opinion formation among elites, and the extent and nature of elite efforts to influence mass opinion. It can examine the extent to which different elites (leadership groups in different institutions, classes or social categories) are socially integrated by direct contact and exposure to the same communications media, as well as exposure to common background experiences of the type documented by the social background method. It can see how different elites pull together or polarize in dealing with particular social issues, and along what lines of cohesion or cleavage.

The International Study of Opinion-Makers has developed as an effort of several research institutions in different countries to engage in such studies on a cooperative basis, exchanging methodological ideas, theoretical analyses, and substantive findings. The study of elite attitudes and behavior in the USA is now being started at the Bureau of Applied Social Research at Columbia University, under the direction of the author of this paper, along with Charles Kadushin, Bogdan Denitch and Carol Weiss of the Bureau, with financial support from the National Institute of Mental Health. A study of attitudes and behavior of national leaders in various institutional sectors

in Yugoslavia has been carried out by the Center for Public Opinion Research of the Institute of Social Sciences, Belgrade, under the direction of Dr. Firdus Dzinic and with the help of a distinguished advisory committee of social scientists (Dzinic, 1969). A study of Italian elite attitudes and behavior is being carried out by Professor Paolo Farneti and his colleagues at the Institute of Political Science of the University of Turin. French researchers at the Centre de Sociologie Européenne, under the direction of Professor Paul Bourdieu, and at the Center for the Sociology of Knowledge under Professor Serge Mallet, are working on related research in France. It is hoped that other research centers, in socialist, capitalist, and "third-world" countries will be interested in conducting similar studies and exchanging information with the American, Yugoslav, Italian and French researchers already engaged in these efforts.

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## ON THE RELATION BETWEEN MICRO- AND MACRO-SOCIOLOGY

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The logic of the development of social knowledge repeats in its most essential features that of scientific knowledge at large. Nevertheless sociology evinces considerable modification in quite a number of problems common to the history of science. This modification is caused, on the one hand, by the obvious specificity of its subject, and, on the other hand, by the influence of various ideological orientations.

The specification of micro- and macro-object of research and, accordingly, the division of science into micro- and macro-field is an event not too common within a wide range of scientific branches. It is probably only in physics that this division is terminologically, for biology as well, where micro-research has been entitled an independent existence. In sociology the relation of these two types of research is a scientific problem *per se*.

A number of reasons can explain why the discussion is now being revived with new vigour. The last three World Congresses of sociology already pointed to the fact that what may be called a "cult" of empirical research in sociology, had been outmoded. Neither methodologically, nor in terms of its social "interference" potentialities, did sociological empiricism meet the hopes connected with it. The broad social movements of the XX century emphatically demand scientific attention, reviving once again the issues of theoretical sociology.

From this view-point the theme of our Round Table seems to be quite reasonable, provided it is the problem of relation between the empirical study and theory in sociology, that is singled out as its core. The more so, as the content itself, of the notion of "micro-sociology" is not specified equivalently. Some random definitions can be put forth to see that different matters are involved.

P. Lazarsfeld in one of his works suggests a research be defined as micro-sociological, if it is "dealing with human behaviour in contemporary situations, using quantitative methods wherever possible, and trying to systematize qualitative procedures wherever they are needed". On the other hand, macro-sociology is defined as connected with "efforts to discover general laws which govern past or future trends in social developments"[1].

But these same terms are used in perfectly different context when applied to theoretical schemes based on sociometry. J. Moreno regards micro-sociology as a subdivision of sociometry (together with micro-anthropology, micro-society, micro-ecology and zoosociology)[2]. The attention is focused here on studying group micro-structures and on means of their micro-analysis.

R. Merton's approach to micro- and macro-sociology relates to the conception of middle range theories. When characterizing one of the features of these theories, he defines "Micro-sociological problems as evidenced in small group research" and "macro-sociological problems as evidenced in comparative studies of social mobility and formal organization, and the interdependence of social institutions[3].

The terms of "micro-functionalism" and "macro-functionalism" are introduced in the works of Don Martindale, who suggests that their differences should be defined by "the size of chosen system-unit considering in theory" [4].

The new approach suggested by Don Martindale is to view the difference between micro- and macro-functionalism from the viewpoint of personality research directions as well (macro-functionalism — from society to personality; micro-functionalism — from personality to society, and to its general problems)[5].

Thus, it is evident that the lack of uniformity in the terms of "micro-" and "macro-sociology" gives rise to the difference in the problems of their relation. But modern social research confronts us with such considerable generalizations that a clearer formulation of general methodological rules becomes a task of first-hand importance. Though the terms "micro-sociology" and "macro-sociology" are not traditional in Marxist sociology, this paper is an attempt to single out some aspects of the problem, most important in the light of practical sociological research as it has established itself in Soviet sociology.

In my view, there are three sets of problems which — no matter how "micro-sociology" and "macro-sociology" are interpreted—demand discussion. These are: 1) the object of sociological research; 2) the levels of data generalization; 3) analytical methods.

The examination of these problems as they exist in the Marxist sociology, is the further content of this paper.

### *1. Object of Research*

The general sociological theory which within the Marxist sociology is represented by historical materialism has a society as the object of its research. It views society not as a "society in general", but as a given integral system, as "a living organism in a state of constant development" with its corresponding laws of function and development. It is but natural, that an empirical research is not equal to the task of dealing with objects of this scale. Therefore it is important to know the relationship between the object of every special research and the sociological object in general.

Everyone seems to acknowledge theoretically that a certain "link" is necessary between these two different types of objects of social research. Still, it remains to work out some methodological norms allowing to make the "link" meaningful, and to determine the extent to which a given theoretical scheme provides for these norms effectivity.

If we assume that the empirical premises, a sociologist proceeds within his research (real individuals, their actions, behaviours in specific situations), are elements of such a macro-system as society (a given socio-economic formation), then the whole totality of links relating an element to the system at large, must be analysed. Meanwhile, one must consider the fact that every single act of behaviour is determined by the whole complex of social relations (general boundaries of every act being actively preconditioned by determinants rooting in socio-economic relation of a given society). In a given concrete social situation, these cannot be traced empirically. Moreover, in the behaviour of a given group there can evolve some determinants which seem to contradict the regularities "discending" from a given society. (As is known, R. Merton explains the phenomena functionally in terms of explicit and latent functions.) That is why an empirical analysis of every separate sociological situation cannot claim to be comprehensive, if the situation is viewed independently of the whole set of its determinants.

Structural functionalism, though considering methodologically every such object as an element of a larger social structure, fails, as a theory, to allow for an adequate conceptual foundation which would enable one to perform this task. That is why there are but few examples permitting us to see the application of structural functionalism normatives to empirical research.

It is not incidental that W. Goode, G. Sjöberg, G. Simpson and J. Milton Yinger, as well as P. Blau state in the summaries of their own works that functionalism at best has furthered the use of a set of special concepts for formulating a general conception of a study, and that is all to it.

As regards the Marxist sociology, one can find here, within the general sociological theory, a number of most important propositions which allow for genuinely organic integration of the objects of an empirical study into the general conceptual scheme. First of all, this regards the fundamental concept of the personality theory, interpreting the human essence as "the ensemble of the social relations" [6]. Secondly, let us mention the theory of social groups, whose hierarchy is determined in terms of their position in a given system of production. At last, a key conception, the one of the socio-economic formation, is introduced entailing a system approach to a society. Yet, it remains a complicated task to provide for techniques of integrating every separate object into this theoretical frame. Evidently, the main integrating instruments to this end are as following: a set of conceptions describing the object, as well as hypotheses formulating the supposed links and relations of the object within the general conceptual frame. It is natural that the whole range of problems concerning the reduction of theoretical concepts to operational definitions, remains still to be discussed.

In general [7] when examining relationships between these two types of research, description of micro- and macro-object by linguistic means is

an extremely acute problem. The "scale" of object examination depends, to a certain extent, on a particular language used, thus the relative character of contraposition of micro- and macro-object becomes all the more evident. The relativity involved here is proved by a difficult situation, arising while criteria are being sought for separating micro- and macro-objects.

When small groups or whole societies are dealt with, the use of the micro- and macro-object terms seems quite natural. But whenever a scholar is concerned with larger social groups (classes, occupations, nations) or sufficiently wide social processes, establishing the exact frontiers of micro- and macro-analysis seems to be impossible.

Everything that was said above is not a negation of an intuitive-like manner of dividing objects into micro- and macro-ones, and of dividing researches into empirical and theoretical ones. If we are to analyse the influence of certain TV viewers' attitudes on the perception of information or a workers team job attitude, we accept the specificity of the object as a fact, and as well keep it in mind, that we are not dealing with society as a whole. What we claim here is just to clearly formulate what should be a methodological precondition for every social research — theory should be included into every stage of a concrete research, so that the "isolation" of a micro-object might not prevent its adequate explanation.

## 2. Levels of Generalization

The nature of sociological explanation pertains to one of the core problems concerning the micro- and macro-sociology relationship.

In a number of scientific branches there emerges a problem of relationship between the descriptive and explanatory levels of knowledge. It is not incidental, therefore, that the nature of explanation is accorded most attention in the logic of scientific research. As regards sociology, here, side by side with the complex of problems concerning explanation there arises the problem of determining the extent to which an explanatory model can be applied to various types of social research. The scheme in which micro-research as *description* is opposed to macro-research as *explanation* has well been discredited. The opposition would rather be made along another line: micro-research corresponds to one level of explanation, while macro-research — to another one. Then the task is to find criteria to distinguish between the levels of knowledge in micro- and macro-research.

If a logical division of subjects of explanation into facts and laws is accepted, then one can evidently relate it with a conventionally admitted division of sociological objects into micro- and macro-objects.

As far as the bulk of facts that come under empirical consideration is generalized, particularly statistical facts, they have got a sort of representative property, i. e., they represent a certain *class* of social phenomena. To explain this class of facts, one must inevitably "appeal" to laws. In a research work carried out with E. P. Nikhitin [9] we defined the reasons for this. In short, these reasons are: 1) every social fact is determined by quite a number of factors and is immersed into a complex net of relationship with other facts; 2) from this follows that to explain these facts it is



necessary to take into account a large number of initial conditions, sociological laws among them; 3) therefore, to define the essence of these facts one must make use of the whole totality of qualitatively different types of explanation (not only structural and functional, but causal one as well). It is only after all preconditions mentioned above are observed, the explanation of the fact serves its main function, i. e., establishing the right place of the fact in the theoretical system.

But then these two kinds of explanation, both in micro- and theoretical research cannot possibly live separate lives. In empirical terms it means that neither group relations character, nor the norms regulating the behaviour of the group's members, can be explained, if a group level or some other empirical object level is not transcended. Student behaviour, the level of work satisfaction, TV viewers' programme orientation — all this can be explained only in a *certain* sense, if it is being explained on the basis of group relations studies, or on the basis of studies of group's relations with its immediate environment. But all these are but "steps" toward an explanation model allowing for the real knowledge of the object, i. e., for the discovery of its essence.

A certain social fact cannot be included into the system of sociological knowledge, unless it is interpreted in terms of more essential determinants which can be described only on the basis of the analysis of a series of facts. A description of series of facts per se allows but for a mere empirical generalization. The modern logic of scientific research, when analyzing the structure of social science, advocates (o. f., i. e., E. Nagel's position [10]) for the explanation or the empirical generalization itself. Therefore the transition from micro- to macro-object corresponds eventually to the transition from explanation based on empirical generalization to that within a certain theoretical scheme.

True, there still remains the problem of the "range" of the theory itself. R. Merton's idea of the possibility of applying middle range theories to sociology, is well known. However, in his definition, too, the main feature of such theories is denoted by their intermediary position between working hypotheses and "all-embracing speculations" [11]. But what are the upper and lower boundaries of this intermediate position? And more important — what are the criteria of the type of explanation at this level?

This question has become an object of intensive discussion in recent sociological literature in the USSR [12].

The problem of levels of explanation has still another aspect connected with the growing trend toward an interdisciplinary approach. Hence the need for an explanation model which would provide for the intergration of various scientific approaches. A propos, this Congress is presented with the report by three Soviet authors — E. P. Beliaiev, V. V. Vodzinskaia and V. A. Yadov.

In this case it is perfectly clear that a micro-object can only be explained if it is interpreted in terms of the general sociological theory. Only thus subjective and objective factors determining individual behaviour can be examined in unity. It is important to note that the highest explanation level is represented here by the sociological theory — interdisciplinary approach does not interfere with its dominant position here.

If it is recognized that formulation of laws regulating a given objects system should be the main aim of any system of scientific knowledge, as the modern research logic demands it, then the relativity of micro- and macro-sphere division in sociology on the basis of data explanation level becomes all the more evident.

### 3. Methods of Analysis

This relativity also reveals itself when the correlation of empirical and theoretical research methods is examined. In every day practice a dichotomy is not infrequently involved: empirical research quantitative methods, theoretical research — qualitative methods. If this classification is accepted, the frontier between micro- and macro-sociology seems explicit. But the problem is how well-grounded is the dichotomy presented.

The scope of the present report allows no detailed critical examination of the mentioned point of view — to do this we would have to analyse the general philosophical conception of neopositivism and the chain of conclusions leading to a certain approach to the methodology of social research. I intend to single out but some major points.

The first point is concerned with the specificity of empirical research in sociology as such. The relationship between exact methods and theoretical interpretation constitutes, beyond doubt, quite a problem in physics, biology and other sciences. But the acuteness it has acquired in sociology stems from the specificity of the nature of *measurement* in social sciences.

The case is not confined to a mere absence of the unit of measurement, and therefore to the fact that sociological measurement in this sense is not equivalent to that in natural sciences. Scaling, which is now a most popular measuring method in sociology, encounters difficulties of another sort, namely, the necessity to resume time and again formalizing qualitative features of the object scales. This way can easily lead astray from content analysis suggested by sociological theory, so that the results might prove to be inadequate exquisite technique if mathematics comes into contradiction with arbitrary interpretation of variables. A number of Soviet research works have shown that the solution is achieved only in those cases when mathematics is applied not so much to seeking formulas to describe quantitative relations between the observed social facts, but to a formalized definition of a feature under quantification, this feature being treated as an element of some conceptual scheme [13].

As a matter of fact, it is here that any contraposition between qualitative and quantitative analyses "falls under a ban" and a perfectly new fusion of methods is effected: on the one hand, of the methods traditional for mathematics, and, on the other — of those typical for theoretical research.

Another predicament sociology finds itself in when quantitative methods are used, is determined by organic inclusion of the objects of micro-research into a macro-system (we spoke of it in the pages above).

Can such research objects as social processes of global scale or whole socio-economic formations, etc. be formalized?

The question has not been solved yet, concerning the exact level beyond which complete formalization of a social system seems to be impossible. Therefore the whole set of methods traditionally specific for theoretical research retains, without doubt, all its force when large social systems are analyzed — broad social movements, societies as such, etc. Marx gave an excellent example of how such means of analysis ought to be applied for investigation of certain socio-economic formations, combining historical and logical analysis and synthesis, induction and deduction, ascending from the abstract to the concrete, etc. [14].

Coming back again to a relative character of differences between empirical and theoretical research in sociology (indeed, the object of one of them appears to be an element of the other, while the explanation level of, say, the first one is a stage towards explaining the second), it is necessary to recognize in turn, that a normative must be accepted to the effect that traditional-theoretical methods of analysis have to be included somehow into an empirical research as well. This way faces sociology with quite a number of difficulties. Combining statistics and intuition — these two most extreme poles of methods — is no simple matter. Moreover, such combining is, in a way, a challenge to old traditions, which counterpoise these two approaches. Nevertheless, the means of social research seem to become really sophisticated only along this way of dialectical combination of these outwardly contradicting research methods.

Thus, the means of social knowledge can hardly be classified according to the rigid dichotomy of micro- and macro-sociology. One would rather speak of a kind of "hierarchy" of social objects and, respectively, of a hierarchy (or a system) of research methods. This, in turn, leaves still less ground for any rigid contraposition of the two organically united parts of the whole, i. e., of the science of sociology.

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# L'ÉTUDE DES SYSTÈMES ORGANISATIONNELS COMME MODE D'APPROCHE EMPIRIQUE DES PROBLÈMES DE MACROSOCIOLOGIE

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## *1. Les organisations ne sont pas seulement des courroies de transmission*

Les rapports entre micro- et macrosociologie sont trop souvent vus uniquement comme un problème de logique scientifique: jusqu'à quel point et quelles conditions il est légitime d'extrapoler à tout un ensemble social les conclusions d'expériences effectuées sur de petits groupes; jusqu'à quel point et à quelles conditions on peut ignorer le contexte macrosociologique dans les analyses microsociologiques.

Nous pensons que ce problème est devenu désormais tout à fait académique et que le problème essentiel dans ce domaine est en fait un problème de méthodologie ou plutôt de *stratégie de recherche*: quelles sont, du point de vue des développements actuels de la connaissance, les démarches les plus fructueuses pour faire progresser micro- et macrosociologie.

Dans cette perspective, il nous semble que les démarches qui consistent à extrapoler et à systématiser<sup>1</sup> à partir des expériences de microsociologie et des données simples qu'elles permettent de dégager, ont perdu toute valeur stimulatrice.

Leur faiblesse essentielle c'est que les procédés d'extrapolation ou de systématisation, sur lesquels elles reposent ne sont fondés sur aucune connaissance sérieuse alors que c'est en fait dans ces opérations que s'élaborent les hypothèses les plus décisives sur les mécanismes macrosociologiques.

Développer ces connaissances en les fondant sur des études empiriques sinon expérimentales, devrait être à notre avis l'objectif premier de tous les travaux en ce domaine.

Nous voudrions présenter ici une nouvelle démarche qui se propose d'atteindre ces objectifs en développant l'analyse organisationnelle, c'est-à-dire les

<sup>1</sup> Nous faisons allusion ici aux deux modes d'utilisation de la microsociologie: l'extrapolation fondée sur une hypothèse implicite d'homologie que l'on trouve sous-jacente du mode de raisonnement de chercheurs comme Kurt Lewin et ceux de la première école de Michigan; la systématisation qui consiste, comme le fait par exemple George Homans, à utiliser une règle d'association ou d'intégration fondée sur certaines données de la microsociologie pour reconstruire tout l'ensemble social.

méthodes et le mode de raisonnement élaborés pour comprendre le fonctionnement des organisations de façon à rendre compte des modes de régulation des systèmes organisationnels plus larges où s'opèrent les intégrations éventuelles d'un système social.

On pourra s'étonner de l'importance donnée dans cette perspective au phénomène organisationnel. Les organisations en effet ont été souvent traitées comme un domaine spécialisé où on pouvait tirer parti à un niveau de sociologie appliquée des hypothèses et théories élaborées aux niveaux micro- et macrosociologiques. Au mieux les considérait-on comme les courroies de transmission de l'ensemble.

Courroies de transmission? Oui, certes, mais à condition que l'on admette que les courroies, au moins actuellement, sont en fait plus importantes que le moteur. Ce qui nous fait problème en effet pour comprendre comment une société *fonctionne* et peut se développer, ce ne sont plus les éléments premiers: l'homme social et les lois de son comportement, mais les moyens et la capacité d'intégration grâce auxquels la société peut exister et façonner ses éléments premiers.

De ce point de vue, l'organisation peut être considérée comme un modèle réduit exagérément simplifié mais au moins dans un premier temps très suggestif de société. Nous croyons donc pouvoir faire l'hypothèse en bonne stratégie de recherche que l'analyse organisationnelle, dans la mesure où, à travers l'étude des systèmes organisationnels, elle peut être centrée sur les phénomènes d'intégration constitutifs de l'„organisation“ sociale, doit pouvoir nous apporter l'élément qui nous fait le plus défaut entre micro- et macrosociologie.

## *II. La problématique organisationnelle opposée à la problématique institutionnelle*

De tout temps certes on a philosophé sur ce que nous appelons les organisations et une bonne partie de la réflexion macrosociologique a porté sur elles. Mais cette réflexion s'est exercée généralement dans une perspective institutionnelle. Elle visait à décrire armées, églises, administrations, entreprises comme des institutions, c'est-à-dire comme des formes de vie sociale développées à travers les siècles au même titre que la famille ou l'éducation. On cherchait à montrer pourquoi, historiquement ou fonctionnellement, telle activité sociale avait revêtu telle forme. On insistait sur le spécifique et on se laissait tenter par la passion taxonomique. Même à un degré de réflexion „fonctionnaliste“ plus élevé on donnait la prééminence à ce qui détermine les formes et modèle d'organisation — contraintes de l'histoire, contrainte de la fonction, interdépendances diverses — et non pas à ce qui peut être original, autonome dans le phénomène organisation.

La problématique organisationnelle est fondée sur un mode de raisonnement tout à fait opposé. Elle ne s'intéresse pas à ce qui est spécifique dans chaque possible type d'organisation mais à ce qui est général dans tous les types. Ce qu'elle veut comprendre ce n'est pas l'origine, les particularités et le développement des diverses formes d'organisation possibles mais comment des êtres humains peuvent résoudre le problème de leur coopération dans un

ensemble organisé, à quelles capacités les diverses solutions font appel et quel en est le prix. Ce sont les fondements, les mécanismes et les conditions du phénomène d'intégration qu'elle cherche à dégager à un niveau que, pour les besoins de la recherche, on décide de traiter comme autonome.

Une telle orientation implique qu'on écarte d'abord provisoirement l'histoire et les déterminants extérieurs de fonction et d'environnement. On peut et on doit naturellement revenir à l'histoire et à l'environnement. Mais quand on le fait c'est dans de tout autres termes. Il ne s'agit plus en matière d'environnement de milieu extérieur dont l'organisation dépend mais du *système* organisation — environnement qu'on s'efforce d'analyser avec le même mode de raisonnement. Et quand on reprend l'histoire, ce n'est plus pour comprendre comment le présent était déterminé mais pour réfléchir sur le comment du changement à partir d'une compréhension toute différente des mécanismes de fonctionnement dont la transformation a beaucoup plus d'importance que l'altération des formes apparentes.

Cette problématique très généralement est une problématique du comment et non du pourquoi. On ne l'utilise pas pour recenser des pratiques mais comprendre des solutions. Son apport essentiel consiste à libérer l'analyse organisationnelle du déterminisme fonctionnaliste. Elle peut très bien être comparée de ce point de vue à la problématique relationnelle de la dynamique des groupes dont l'apport essentiel aura été d'habituer à considérer les mécanismes relationnels au sein d'un groupe comme un problème et non pas comme la conséquence des propriétés particulières de l'être humain en société.

La problématique organisationnelle est enfin une problématique orientée vers l'action. Elle privilégie le conscient, le rationnel et l'organisé non pas sous l'illusion que les hommes font ce qu'ils veulent ou croient vouloir consciemment mais parce que le rationnel constitue le seul point de référence concret à partir duquel on peut réfléchir sur les activités conscientes et inconscientes, rationnelles et irrationnelles. Comme la psychanalyse, l'analyse organisationnelle doit privilégier un principe de réalité pour pouvoir comprendre ce qui est après tout un ensemble de rapports humains.

### *III. L'analyse stratégique comme mode de raisonnement et comme méthode*

L'analyse organisationnelle que nous pratiquons est fondée sur le postulat suivant, élaboré à partir de nos premières enquêtes: Aucun système d'organisation ne peut se constituer sans relations de pouvoir et toute organisation se structure autour des relations de pouvoir qui permettent d'effectuer la nécessaire médiation entre les objectifs à atteindre et les moyens humains indispensables à leur réalisation.

C'est l'organisation des relations de pouvoir, autrement dit le mode de gouvernement des moyens humains, qui conditionne la capacité de coopération et de développement de l'ensemble. C'est à travers leur étude que l'on peut le mieux comprendre le phénomène d'intégration d'un ensemble organisationnel.

Les relations de pouvoir toutefois ne peuvent pas être mesurées facilement. Pour en avoir une image indirecte mais assez claire, on peut analyser les attitudes, sentiments et comportements des membres des divers groupes qui constituent l'organisation. Ces attitudes et comportements renvoient aux différents rôles qui se sont dégagés au sein du système social que constitue l'organisation étudiée. Mais, derrière ces rôles, ils renvoient à la composante de pouvoir que comporte toute relation organisée. Les sentiments des acteurs ne manquent pas d'exprimer, en conséquence, indirectement au moins, leur situation respective de ce point de vue. On peut donc les utiliser pour découvrir ces situations. Les explications et rationalisations qu'ils donnent sont autant de signes qui attirent l'attention sur les problèmes autour desquels ces relations se sont cristallisées.

Mais l'analyse des sentiments des divers acteurs ne permet pas seulement de découvrir leur situation réelle et les problèmes qu'elle soulève, elle nous donne la possibilité de définir leur stratégie en tant que partenaires du grand jeu que constitue l'organisation et du sous-jeu que constitue l'élément d'organisation pertinent dont ils font partie.

L'analyse stratégique consiste dans ces conditions à se servir des commentaires des acteurs pour remonter à la source de leurs conflits puis à analyser à travers les décisions-clefs qui les concernent, le type de solution généralement donné à ces conflits et le jeu implicite qui y correspond. Dans cette perspective où l'organisation est considérée comme un jeu, structures et hiérarchies apparaissent alors comme les contraintes et les règles qui conditionnent ce jeu.

Un tel raisonnement, il importe de le remarquer, doit permettre à la fois de traiter des aspects de jeu rationnel que comportent les rapports entre un grand nombre de partenaires au sein d'une structure dont ils font partie et sur les problèmes psychologiques que soulèvent de tels rapports. Le jeu est toujours rationnel, ce sont les éléments qu'apportent les joueurs qui ne le sont pas; chacun d'eux n'a pas la même capacité de faire face aux problèmes psychologiques qu'impose le jeu et ses conséquences. Mais inversement les structures et les hiérarchies formelles peuvent être analysées à leur tour comme des protections nécessaires aux acteurs pour que le jeu puisse se dérouler rationnellement.

Tous les jeux ne donnent pas bien sûr les mêmes résultats. La possibilité de développer un jeu coopératif, adaptatif, donnant pour l'ensemble des joueurs le maximum de gain ou de rester bloqué dans un jeu de défense n'en donnant que le minimum se trouve déterminée par la solution qui a été trouvée aux problèmes de gouvernement que pose toute organisation. Mais cette solution n'est viable que si les joueurs ont la capacité de faire face aux situations de conflit et de dépendance qui constituent les risques d'un jeu plus ouvert. Elle est en relation de conditionnement réciproque avec ce qu'on pourrait appeler la capacité organisationnelle de ses membres.

La méthode qui correspond à ce mode de raisonnement consiste essentiellement dans les opérations suivantes:

a. On analyse tout d'abord la façon dont les différents participants vivent leur participation. On utilise à cet effet les entretiens directifs et non directifs mais ces entretiens ne sont pas utilisés comme des témoignages



véridiques sur la réalité mais comme des signes de la façon dont les participants jouent leur jeu.

b. A partir des premières analyses „libres“ un plan expérimental est élaboré qui consiste à comparer les „vérités“ opposées des différents groupes et à confronter les opinions, jugements et sentiments qu'ils expriment ou laissent entrevoir les uns à l'égard des autres.

c. On dégage à travers ces oppositions et ces confrontations la stratégie des différents partenaires.

d. On utilise la communication aux intéressés des résultats obtenus pour tester la validité des stratégies que l'on a cru ainsi dégager en faisant à l'avance des hypothèses sur les réactions des partenaires.

e. Partant du postulat — justifié par sa fécondité — que ces stratégies sont fondamentalement rationnelles — c'est aussi le postulat du psychanalyste — on cherche à découvrir les règles du jeu qui contraignent les joueurs et définissent ainsi les limites de leur rationalité.

f. Pour découvrir les règles de ce jeu, on confronte la logique des sentiments avec les contraintes techniques, juridiques, d'organisation scientifique et plus généralement avec les contraintes de l'environnement.

g. Cette confrontation permet de montrer que tous ces déterminismes ne conditionnent que partiellement des règles du jeu qui dépendent de (ou expriment) une capacité organisationnelle spécifique en même temps qu'une histoire, c'est-à-dire une succession de libertés de décisions pour les dirigeants et leurs partenaires.

Au terme de telles analyses, chaque fois très spécialisées, très cliniques, le problème des structures et des mécanismes organisationnels peut être posé dans toute sa généralité dans la mesure où on peut isoler certaines composantes autonomes de capacité organisationnelle.

#### *IV. Le passage à l'étude des systèmes organisationnels*

Entre les groupes primaires et l'ensemble social, une société n'est pas faite seulement d'organisations. Elle se régule et se gouverne à travers toute une série de systèmes plus ou moins lâches qui ne sont jamais que partiellement formels et qui couvrent en s'entrecroisant l'ensemble des activités sociales. Le système politique national n'est que l'un d'entre eux, le plus formalisé, le plus valorisé et le plus contraignant.

On peut dire qu'il y a système et non plus agrégat chaque fois qu'un ensemble, relativement stable, cohérent et multidimensionnel, a des propriétés homéostatiques. Prenons un exemple concret que nous avons étudié: le système politico-économico-administratif qui couvre l'ensemble de travaux publics en France comporte économiquement toute une série de monopoles et de marchés protégés imbriqués. Il comporte socialement une pyramide de castes indépendantes et politiquement des clientèles et des processus d'accommodation avec les divers groupes intéressés. D'autres systèmes sont plus temporaires et presque unidimensionnels comme le système qui se crée dans l'appareil politico-administratif pour élaborer une réforme; un tel système peut ne durer que quelques mois et ne couvrir que très partiellement l'activité des ses membres; il reste qu'il obéit à des formes de

régulation très contraignantes dont l'influence peut être beaucoup plus forte que l'intention qui a présidé à sa constitution. Certains systèmes sont très conscients, d'autres ne sont qu'à demi perçus par les intéressés. De toute façon, entre le gouvernement théorique des activités humaines, qu'il soit celui du marché des organes politiques ou des organes professionnels d'une part et le gouvernement inconscient par les modes, la sensibilité publique, la culture, l'ensemble des activités humaines se trouve directement déterminé par l'action de toute une série de systèmes à travers lesquels s'effectuent leur intégration, leur régulation et au sein desquels se prennent ou au moins se préparent la plupart des décisions qui les affectent.

Ces systèmes, il importe de le souligner, ne sont pas des constructions de l'esprit nées de l'imagination arbitraire du sociologue. Ils peuvent donc être analysés de façon concrète à la différence du système des normes ou du système des valeurs que postulent les théoriciens.

Dans quelle mesure peut-on appliquer à ces systèmes toutefois la même méthode d'analyse qu'à l'étude d'organisations fermées ? La différence, pensons-nous, n'est pas si forte qu'elle puisse nous en décourager. Quand nous pensons organisation, nous supposons l'existence de buts relativement clairs et définis et la disposition de procédés de contrôle contraignant permettant d'assurer la subordination de tous les moyens à ces buts. Mais n'existe-t-il pas en fait quantité d'ensembles humains qui sont en quelque manière organisés pour autant répondre aux exigences d'une définition stricte ? Si l'on admet l'existence et l'importance de tels systèmes organisés, on découvre qu'il n'est pas facile en fait de faire la distinction entre un système non organisé et un système organisé. Toute une série de degrés d'organisations peuvent exister en effet contre un système de relations réglé seulement par le besoin de stabilité commun aux divers partenaires et par le coût matériel ou émotionnel pour chacun d'eux du remplacement d'un ou plusieurs autres et une organisation structurée formalisée et reconnue comme telle par ses membres. Nous pouvons passer du système de relations possédant des éléments de régulation implicite dont les membres sont conscients, puis à un système dans lequel les éléments de régulation sont acceptés et reconnus comme tels, enfin à un système capable de prendre lui-même des décisions en matière de régulation.

Si nous prenons l'exemple d'un système possédant certains éléments de régulation dont les membres ne sont qu'à demi conscients et d'autres éléments qui sont acceptés et reconnus formellement comme par exemple le système de relations internationales ou bien le système de relations syndicats-ouvriers-employeurs-pouvoirs publics dans les pays occidentaux, nous n'avons pas affaire à un système intégré à une structure stable qui peut servir de référence : à tous les acteurs mais à un système qui n'a ni contours bien déterminés ni stabilité. Jeu et règle du jeu sont difficiles à distinguer. Les sentiments des acteurs ne semblent pas déterminés par des rapports stables et les décisions qui sont prises apparaissent d'abord comme des événements non-récurrents. Il est par conséquent difficile de maîtriser tous les éléments d'un tel système et de procéder aux inférences successives à partir des sentiments des acteurs, pour comprendre relations de pouvoir, structure, règles du jeu et valeurs.

Mais il n'est pas aussi facile de découvrir les situations à travers les sentiments et les *patterns* stables, à travers les solutions contingentes données aux conflits, les relations de pouvoir posent exactement de la même façon le problème clef d'un système en voie d'organisation. Leur existence peut être analysée comme la preuve du passage à un système organisé. La découverte des modes de correspondance entre sentiments, situations, *patterns* stables de résolution de conflits, enfin, prend une valeur différente, génétique et existentielle et non plus fonctionnelle, mais elle n'en demeure pas moins un objectif fondamental.

L'étude des sentiments de ce fait garde toute son importance. L'expérience nous a montré qu'on pouvait la mener avec les mêmes moyens que l'on utilise pour les études d'organisation. Pour remédier à l'incertitude des conclusions qu'on peut en tirer due essentiellement au manque d'engagement des partenaires ou à la possibilité de renversement de l'engagement de ces partenaires, on peut introduire une nouvelle dimension, celle du temps. En répétant les analyses de sentiments dans le temps, on peut en effet apercevoir la structure avec l'évolution.

On peut, en outre, utiliser une autre approche, l'étude des séquences décisionnelles. Cette approche n'est pas très fructueuse dans l'étude d'une organisation du fait de la stabilité du modèle de relations qui permet de faire apparaître facilement l'équilibre des forces et de dégager ainsi les éléments rationnels du jeu à partir d'une bonne connaissance des diverses zones d'incertitude pertinentes pour les uns et les autres. Dans le cas d'un système organisé encore peu intégré, on peut poser très bien le problème de l'existence de règles du jeu implicites dans une série de décisions que les partenaires analysent encore comme des événements indépendants, et chercher à apprécier ce qui dans ces décisions peut constituer une innovation dans le sens d'une prise de conscience des règles, donc du passage à un jeu plus coopératif.

#### V. Le problème du changement et de l'apprentissage

A travers ces approches nouvelles, une évolution apparaît à la fois convergente et contradictoire, entre organisations et systèmes organisés. Les organisations simples et rigides d'autrefois, fondées sur un modèle contraignant imposant un jeu de défense, font place lentement à des organisations plus souples et plus complexes, fondées sur un modèle de jeu coopératif. Tandis que les systèmes deviennent de plus en plus organisés et réglementés, les organisations deviennent de plus en plus souples et ouvertes comme des systèmes politiques.

En fait, organisations souples et systèmes organisés ne peuvent se développer que dans la mesure où les mêmes conditions sont réalisées: apparition d'éléments de jeu coopératif au plan des rapports humains, capacité d'anticiper l'avenir au plan du mode de raisonnement. Organisations rigides et systèmes à régulation inconsciente s'appuient les uns sur les autres. Ils trouvent leur efficacité maximum dans le court terme. Les systèmes organisés conscients en revanche supposent des organisations souples qui ne peuvent prouver leur efficacité que dans le long terme ou du moins le moyen terme.

Comment peut-on passer de formes moins organisées à des formes plus organisées, de systèmes à régulation inconsciente à systèmes à régulation consciente? Telle est l'interrogation historique à laquelle il est possible de revenir. Mais, on le conçoit, il s'agit d'une toute autre vision de l'histoire: contingente et prospective et non plus déterministe et rétrospective. Chercher à découvrir les raisons qui rendaient l'évolution inéluctable apparaît de plus en plus restreint. Nous devons comprendre de façon active le changement contingent. Le même problème que nous appréhendons dans le cadre d'événement et de structures peut être analysé comme connaissance et reconnaissance du jeu par les individus et les groupes ou bien en termes de capacité coopérative ou organisationnelle ou en termes de prospective. On peut à notre avis en rechercher des solutions aussi bien dans l'évolution organisationnelle de structure formelle rigide à structure formelle souple que dans l'évolution systématique de système lâche à système organisé. Dans les deux cas, l'élément essentiel apparaît la prise de conscience et le contrôle réel par les acteurs des données de leur jeu.

Un tel passage ne se fait pas de façon régulière et automatique. Il ne débouche pas non plus sur un modèle fixé à l'avance. Il constitue une sorte de découverte institutionnelle. Nous proposons d'appeler *apprentissage institutionnel* les processus par lesquels les membres d'ensembles complexes parviennent à passer d'un système de jeux à régulation fruste à un système de jeux à régulation plus élaborée, permettant une coopération plus grande.

Comment des groupes humains peuvent-ils apprendre à élaborer et à maintenir de tels systèmes plus complexes, plus souples et plus efficaces, tel est le problème d'*apprentissage* que les sociologues devraient, à notre avis, poser pour progresser sur le même modèle que les psychologues dans leur analyse expérimentale de l'apprentissage individuel.

On le voit dans cette perspective, c'est une nouvelle forme de collaboration, de convergence et de simulation qui apparaît entre micro- et macrosociologie.

#### *VI. Le problème des déterminants macrosociologiques et de l'analyse culturelle*

Ce type d'analyse laisse échapper naturellement l'ensemble des déterminants d'ordre macrosociologique qui s'exercent sur les individus et sur les groupes et influent tant sur leurs attitudes et leurs perceptions de la réalité que sur leur capacité à entreprendre et à transformer leur univers.

Ces déterminants trouvent bien évidemment tous les phénomènes que nous observons et nous nous trouvons placés de ce point de vue dans la même situation que les „microsociologues“ qui sont obligés de mettre entre parenthèses l'environnement pour pouvoir aborder sérieusement l'objet de leur recherche et qui sont ensuite tentés d'extrapoler indûment à partir de découvertes dont ils ont d'entrée restreint la portée.

Nous avons toutefois des moyens meilleurs d'échapper à ce dilemme. Tout d'abord nous pouvons nous appuyer sur l'acquis de la microsociologie et la double vue convergente qui peut se dégager d'une telle collaboration nous permet déjà grâce à un premier raisonnement systématique d'échapper

à la simplification „homologique“ de l'extrapolation.<sup>2</sup> Ensuite bien sûr en nous concentrant sur ce phénomène sociologique décisif que constitue l'intégration nous sommes en mesure de beaucoup mieux poser le problème des caractéristiques macrosociologiques d'une société. Au lieu de dire c'est une société fondée sur telles valeurs ou sur tel type d'institutions nous pouvons faire porter notre jugement sur une caractéristique beaucoup plus sociologique : le type de processus d'intégration. Certes la capacité organisationnelle que nous pouvons dégager de nos analyses des processus d'intégration au niveau des organisations n'équivaut pas à la capacité sociétale. L'étude des systèmes nous permet seulement d'ouvrir la voie. Mais nous apportons déjà quelque chose de plus substantiel que les raisonnements sur la signification des structures formelles de l'analyse institutionnelle classique ou que les spéculations culturalistes trop hasardeuses qui reposent seulement sur les données trop floues de l'étude des valeurs.

Enfin et surtout peut-être en nous servant de l'étude des systèmes, nous pouvons raisonner plus concrètement sur la genèse et les limites de la capacité organisationnelle et en précisant ainsi le degré d'autonomie du phénomène organisation et nous pouvons mettre en évidence la part du culturel propre à l'ensemble que constitue une société nationale.

Tout un travail immense est indispensable pour que nous puissions effectivement commencer à bien mesurer le comment de ces capacités organisationnelles spécifiques de chaque société et leurs relations avec les institutions formelles. Mais c'est dans cette direction que l'on pourra à notre avis rénover l'analyse culturaliste et lui donner la place centrale qu'elle mérite dans toute analyse macrosociologique.

Nous discutons, précisons-le bien, la stratégie de recherche et non pas de priorité ontologique. Il ne s'agit pas comme on le croit trop souvent, d'insister sur la prédominance de l'*organisationnel* par rapport au *micro-* ou au *macrosociologique* et par rapport au *culturel* mais de proposer un nouvel outil correspondant à une nouvelle étape de connaissance et permettant de faire progresser, en même temps qu'un domaine propre, des domaines anciens dont les développements sont désormais bloqués.

### Conclusion

La vertu de l'approche que nous préconisons ne peut naturellement se mesurer qu'aux résultats qu'on peut en tirer. Ces résultats malheureusement ne peuvent apparaître que lentement du fait de l'extrême difficulté méthodologique de l'entreprise.

Notre conviction est faite des leçons que nous avons personnellement tirées d'une série d'efforts qui ne sont encore que très partiellement fructueux mais ont pu nous permettre chaque fois, avons-nous cru, de mieux poser des problèmes macrosociologiques que nous voulions traiter. Nous vou-

<sup>2</sup> Selon laquelle les règles et mécanismes de relation que l'on a trouvés dans le groupe primaire doivent se retrouver semblables à tous les niveaux au sein de la société. Les progrès que l'on peut réaliser en combinant les deux approches sont particulièrement sensibles pour l'étude des modes de commandement au sein des groupes et des organisations.

drions, pour terminer, prendre brièvement l'exemple des quatre cas sur lesquels nous avons récemment le plus travaillé pour montrer ainsi de façon pratique les analyses et les raisonnements auxquels cette approche conduit.

Notre première tentative a été effectuée de 1965 à 1968 sur le *système politico-administratif départemental et régional en France*. Nous avons fait l'hypothèse de l'existence de ce système à l'occasion de plusieurs travaux antérieurs sur des organisations administratives. Si notre hypothèse était exacte, ce système, pensions-nous, paraissait devoir être profondément bouleversé sinon remis en cause par la création d'institutions régionales en 1964. Nous avons décidé de saisir l'occasion de ce bouleversement possible pour comprendre à la fois le fonctionnement et la logique d'un tel système en même temps que ses possibilités de changement et de renouvellement.

Nous avons procédé essentiellement par comparaison. Après une première étude préalable sur sept des vingt et une régions, nous avons effectué une analyse en profondeur sur deux régions à partir essentiellement d'entretiens semi-directifs avec sept cents notables membres des deux systèmes retenus. Nous n'avons pu malheureusement ni répéter l'analyse des sentiments dans le temps, ni procéder à une observation suffisante de séquences décisionnelles, comme nous l'avions prévu. Nous n'avons pu en conséquence mettre en évidence l'évolution du système ni comprendre à travers cette évolution sa genèse et les conditions de sa stabilité.

Mais nous avons pu, il est vrai, vérifier la pertinence de nos hypothèses de départ, d'abord sur l'existence même d'un système qui se manifeste par des relations de pouvoir stables et relativement contraignantes et par la répétition des mêmes mécanismes d'intégration, ensuite sur ses grandes caractéristiques : double dépendance contraignante des notables politiques et des responsables de l'appareil administratif, type de jeu défensif de tous les joueurs, faible capacité d'initiative et développement d'un système monolithique dont la régulation ne peut se faire qu'en restreignant considérablement le nombre de relais et en étouffant aussi les communications. On trouve ainsi la source d'un certain nombre de dysfonctions du système, de son conservatisme et de l'irresponsabilité de ses membres. L'ensemble dépend d'une structure administrative, de rapports de force politique et en même temps d'une capacité organisationnelle ou systématique relativement faible.

Nos hypothèses sur les bouleversements que devait provoquer le changement de structure, en revanche, ont été complètement infirmées. La secousse a provoqué au contraire un raidissement du système, renforçant les points durs et les relations fortes.

Nous avons effectué une deuxième tentative moins ambitieuse du point de vue méthodologique sur le *système de gestion des travaux publics en France* en nous fondant plus directement sur le milieu administratif, une analyse de l'organisation centrale — celle des Ponts et Chaussées — et de son environnement traités comme système nous a permis de mettre en évidence les mécanismes d'un jeu fondé sur le monopole et la stratification.

Le monopole est un monopole de fait non de droit qui porte sur l'expertise de tous les travaux de toutes les collectivités publiques. Son existence implique des relations contraignantes. Les collectivités sont dépendantes car elles n'ont pas d'alternative mais en même temps il y a symbiose

entre le technicien-patron et les clients-collectivités, ce qui signifie que le patron est à son tour déterminé par ses clients.

Couplée avec l'existence du monopole, la stratification hiérarchique de l'organisation administrative qui rassemble les experts, ferme complètement le système et le rend imperméable au changement. Les fonctionnaires sont groupés en corps extrêmement fermés et hiérarchiquement placés. Les passages entre corps sont extrêmement difficiles. Aucun intérêt commun sauf défensif n'existant entre eux, les membres d'un corps ont intérêt à ne pas coopérer avec les membres du corps supérieur qui ne peuvent de toute façon avoir aucune influence sur leur sort. Ils ont intérêt au contraire à s'arranger avec leurs clients extérieurs. Mais la communication se trouve ainsi bloquée. Les gens du sommet ne peuvent pas atteindre ceux de la base sauf en renforçant les règles bureaucratiques. Les microsystèmes de base restent de ce fait toujours particularistes et conservateurs tandis qu'au sommet on est beaucoup plus novateur, mais de façon bureaucratique et idéaliste. L'initiative ne peut venir que du sommet mais puisque le sommet est privé de données vraiment pertinentes, ses efforts se dépensent en pure perte.

L'ensemble de ce fait apparaît paralysé, à la merci de toutes les situations acquises entraînant toutes les injustices et tous les gaspillages à partir de l'égalitarisme le plus pointilleux, et de l'esprit d'économie le plus pingre.

Il change par à coups dans des sortes de conversions monolithiques qui lui permettent de combler les retards accumulés et dans une sorte d'expansion générale, les strates se poussant les unes et les autres et forçant la strate supérieure à coloniser, pour se maintenir, toujours de nouveaux domaines.

Les mêmes mécanismes, mais avec des caractéristiques particulières sont à l'œuvre dans un troisième cas, celui du *système des décisions publiques en matière industrielle*. A la stratification entre corps, castes et administration parmi les fonctionnaires du système administratif, répond une hiérarchie entre les clients — entreprises et groupements — dans les branches et entre les branches industrielles.

La conséquence de l'existence de cette hiérarchie c'est que l'accès au pouvoir de décision dépend du rang économique-social des clients. Les clients faibles doivent passer par leurs organisations patronales, les clients moyens vont voir les fonctionnaires moyens, les clients forts ont accès aux directeurs et clients très importants vont aux finances ou voient les ministres.

Un tel système favorise les gens établis et décourage l'initiative. Il établit une hiérarchie anti-économique entre les activités industrielles et ralentit généralement le développement en introduisant des facteurs sociaux de type traditionnel au centre même de la décision économique.

Dans une autre recherche enfin, nous essayons d'analyser un *système de décisions* qui n'est pas fondé sur des organisations permanentes mais s'est constitué à l'occasion d'un projet de réforme entre les différents partenaires possibles. Nous essayons de comprendre comment et pourquoi certains ont accès au système et d'autres s'en voient rejetés, comment le système se maintient et se régule, et comment son existence conditionne le produit possible de son activité.

Nous sommes bien persuadés naturellement du caractère limité de ces travaux. C'est seulement partiellement que nous atteignons les caractéristi-

ques de l'ensemble social. Nous sommes d'autre part encore très loin de l'expérimental et la comparaison dans le temps qui peut lui servir de substitut est extrêmement coûteuse. C'est seulement en isolant par comparaison dans l'espace plus que dans le temps et en raisonnant sur ce que l'histoire nous apporte que nous pouvons dépasser la description.

Mais nous avons l'impression toutefois de dégager déjà des mécanismes plus centraux que ceux sur lesquels on raisonnait encore. D'autre part graduellement, nous disposons d'instruments meilleurs et d'hypothèses plus précises ce qui nous permet de simplifier nos méthodes et d'entreprendre des programmes qui jusqu'alors auraient dépassé nos forces.

Déjà au niveau de la société française, il est possible d'utiliser nos premiers résultats dans des hypothèses beaucoup plus larges qui, si elles n'autorisent pas encore la vérification, permettent en revanche d'approfondir toutes les significations partielles de nos recherches.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> C'est ce que nous avons tenté dans l'ouvrage *„La société bloquée“*, Paris, Le Seuil, 1970.



# CROSS-DISCIPLINARY APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF THE RELATION BETWEEN VALUE-ORIENTATIONS AND MANIFEST BEHAVIOUR

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## *1. The formulation of the problem*

One can regard as well-grounded (historically and theoretically) the view that the social-economic conditions in which people live determine their social actions and their everyday behaviour in different spheres of social life. Such is the major premise of materialistic understanding of history developed by marxism. The statement that the immediate determinant of human actions including mass processes involves a definite belief system (of persons, of social groups and of the society) is well-grounded too. Telling beforehand about the following reasoning, we shall name the pattern of social activity a system of value orientation. The marxist materialistic idea about the historical development implies that the social-economic conditions of human life are responsible for the tendency of development of social consciousness and the systems of value orientations in particular. Hence, the proper value orientations act as an intervening variable, and the explanation of it should be found in the social-economic structure of the society.

The above mentioned approach can be used as a reliable basis for the general prognostication of social changes. At the same time, the practice of social planning for a relatively near future faces a lot of methodological problems the major of which is the following: we consider that the manifest human behaviour is determined by the existing system of value orientations, then how can we explain the considerable deviations from the tendency? Sociologists and social psychologists have pointed many times to the lack of direct conformity between the system of value orientations and the manifest behaviour.

Thus, V. Shubkin<sup>1</sup> and V. Vodzinskaya<sup>2</sup> have discovered that from 30 to 60% of school-leavers (secondary school) start their active life in occu-

<sup>1</sup> V. Shubkin, *Qualitative methods<sup>2</sup> in sociological study of problems of professional choice. In Qualitative methods in sociology.* Moscow, 1966. (V. Shubkin, *Kolitchestvennije metodi v sociologicheskom issledovaniji problem trudoustrojstva i vibora professiji, v sbornike Kolitchestvennije metodi v sociologiji*).

<sup>2</sup> V. Vodzinskaya, *Toward the question of social conditioning of the professional choice in "The man and society"*, vol. 2, Leningrad State University, 1967. (V. Vodzinskaya, *ibid.*).

pations the prestige of which is very low in their system of value orientations. R. I. La Pierre<sup>3</sup> at a school experiment and M. L. De Fleur and F. K. Westie<sup>4</sup> in laboratory experiments have discovered that the people with race prejudices at the level of attitude act at manifest behaviour as those without such a prejudice. L. I. Bozhovich<sup>5</sup> and M. Neimark<sup>6</sup> who have carried experiments with school-children have found that trying to act in conformity with the conscious principle of collectivism the school-children under experiment actually have behaved as individualists.

There are numerous facts that are exactly opposite. The practice of the supposed behaviour of customers (in market research) or the behaviour of voters (in research before elections) exclusively based on the data on the system of orientations and attitudes, has shown that it is possible to prognose the manifest behaviour by the attitudes that are available.

Thus, in some cases the manifest behaviour is in conformity with the orientations that are available, in others it does not. To have a reliable ground for a behaviour prognostication based on the data about the system of orientations that is available, we must answer the following question: what are the variables that are included in the system of "Value-orientations — manifest behaviour" as the intervening factors, determining the conformity or lack of conformity between the two poles of the system?

One must note that social prognostication at large cannot rely on the human behaviour prognostication proceeding from the knowledge about the existing system of their value-orientations. The major problem is to be able to prognose the changing of the very system of orientations under the influence of real life conditions of the people (the social-economic conditions first of all). Attempts have been made to exclude the data about the subjective state of human beings from the variables that are required for a social prognostication. Such a method can be applied provided that the sphere of conscious human activity is expressed by a latent variable (the method of black box in cybernetics). We think it more promising, however, to develop the methodology of prognostication and social planning that takes into consideration the subjective factor which determines the behaviour. The decisive argument in favour of the latter approach is the increasing role of science and the possibility of exercising active influence on the social life

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<sup>3</sup> R. I. La Pierre, Attitudes versus Action. In M. Fishbein (ed.), Attitudes Theory and Measurement, New York, 1960.

<sup>4</sup> M. L. De Fleur and F. K. Westie, Verbal Attitudes and Overt Acts, An Experiment on the Salience of Attitudes, American Sociological Review, 1958, vol. 23.

<sup>5</sup> L. Bozhovich, The Stability of personality, processes and conditions of its formation. In: Problems of psychic development and of social psychology, Theses VII World congress of Psychology, vol. I, Moscow, 1966. (L. Bozhovich, Ustojchivost lichnosti, processi i usloviya eje formirovanija v knige Problemi psichiticheskogo razvitiya v socialnoj psihologii. Theses VII Mejdunarodnij psihologiticheskij kongress, tom I). L. Bozhovich, The personality and his formation in childhood. Moscow, 1967. (L. Bozhovica Lichnost i eje formirovanije v detskom vozraste).

<sup>6</sup> M. Neimark. The experimental study of personal orientation. The questions of Psychology, 1963, No. 1 (M. Neimark. Ob eksperimentalnom izutcheniji napravlenosti lichnosti, Voprosi psihologii).

by planned, scientific and conscious changing of the reality. The present-day system of mass communications have turned into a powerful mean of extension of knowledge, norms and values effecting the way of thinking of the whole nations. In view of this the probability of selfrealizing and selfparalazing social prognostications is growing. It is evident that the possibility of social planning greatly depends upon the ability to influence the subjective world of human being and upon the provision of the conditions for practical realization of the patterns of behaviour.

## *2. Objective and subjective factors determining behaviour*

The proper formulation of the question is as follows: to what extent is the behaviour determined by external and internal factors?

The difficulty to answer the question is explained by many reasons. First of all it is explained by the complicacy of the subject of research itself, by the abundance of variables involved in the process we are interested in. Secondly, the differentiation of social sciences results in the behaviour being studied by various frames of reference, with the latter having no relation to each other. Thirdly, it is not clear how valid are the procedures of experimental (or in general empirical) research of the relationship between the patterns of behaviour and the manifest behaviour.

It seems very tempting to conduct an experimental, cross-disciplinary empirical research to try and find out the tendency of external and internal factors ratio, which determine the human behaviour. Such an attempt, however, cannot give a full answer to so extensively formulated a question, but it can become useful for clarifying the existing hypotheses and for more systematic and proper organisation of the research programme in the future.

Before we single out the groups of external and internal factors that control the individual behaviour let us explain what the main dependent variable — the behaviour — means. Let us distinguish the behaviour of a person from a single behaviour act, supposing that the behaviour means a certain sequence or wholeness of actions which express more or less permanent attitude of a person to different aspects of social reality (including other people also).

For special study we shall single out of numerous attributes of the behaviour such attributes as "independence" and "selectiveness".

Operationally we shall call an independent behaviour such a behaviour that implies a creative activity of the subject: either the products of his activity become not standard or the means to produce a standard product have not been used before. We shall call a selective behaviour such a behaviour that reveals a permanent, purposeful usage of certain means of activity out of a considerable amount of means that are available or similar and systematic following of certain ends of activity out of a considerable amount of aims. Let us distinguish inside or not manifest behaviour and outside or manifest behaviour, with manifest behaviour being the subject of research.

Thus, let us single out the group of external factors that control the behaviour, which is connected with the social structure, that is the group of superpersonal or superindividual factors: the sociological variables.

The social relations taken as a whole, based on relations of production and the relations that include also the relative mechanisms of the given culture (the system of knowledge, of norms and values of the given society). For the empiric research conducted within the frame of the socium (for example, in the Soviet Union, in a large industrial centre of Leningrad) and at a given period of time, the vast group of social factors can be taken for a relative constant. The effect of the factors will be expressed in the functioning of more specific groups of variables considered below.

The social position (the social status) of the subjects under study is considered as a definite place in the social structure (class, occupational, ethnic, etc.) from the point of view of the objective (that does not depend upon individuals) possibilities of free action. Empirically one must establish the range of free action within a certain aspect of under study (independence, selectiveness) and also within a certain limited by the program of research sphere of activity. The description of the range of the possibilities of freedom of action includes the description of the frame prescribed by the position of action in the same relation and in the same sphere of activity.

The sphere of activity or the environment within the frame of which some aims are achieved with the help of some means. In the research the sphere of activity should be limited by the program, for example, such sphere as labour (occupational) activity or the sphere of leisure.

The three groups of factors can be interpreted as the social conditions of certain activity (behaviour) including the environment, the socially prescribed aims, the means and rules of behaviour in certain relation under study. The control effect of the factors over the human behaviour is studied by sociology at the institutional, superindividual level. The inconsistency between the behaviour prescribed by the social system and the manifest behaviours is generally explained by the level of social heterogeneity of the system, and by the nature of social contradictions that cause the deviant behaviour. The explanations of the inconsistency by the existing personal peculiarities of functioners in the given frame of reference that is in the terms of sociology) look like unlawful borrowings from the explanatory prerequisites of social and general psychology.

Further, we shall isolate a group of social-psychological factors including superpersonal and personal variables.

The membership group and a referent group of people whose behaviour we are studying. One can take for granted the fact that the external factors control the behaviour of the subject in such a way that in the given groups the subject learns the patterns of attitudes to the social reality. It is clear that the effect of sociological factors is interpreted by the operation of the given factors. The experiments have proved that the inconsistency between the norm and value prescriptions for the membership groups and those for the reference groups is explained by the difference between the system of social attitudes and the manifest human behaviour.

The orientation of the person or the general social orientation is expressed in the stability of interests, aims and needs of vital activity (in our case — labour and leisure), Soviet psychologists regard the orientation as the

basis for the motivation of behaviour. The orientation can also be considered as the integrity of the cognitive system of the personality the basis of which is formed by the basic values and knowledge that are connected functionally with the system of social orientation (attitudes). According to L. Bozhovich and N. Neimark the manifest behaviour is always in correspondence with the orientation of the personality though the behaviour may be inconsistent with certain social orientations (attitudes). The theory of cognitive dissonance (by L. Festinger) says that the cognitive system and the manifest behaviour of the personality tend to be inconsistent as their contradiction is provoked by the pressure of the external circumstances while the personality is attempting to overcome the inconsistency.

The nature of relationship between concrete beliefs and the social attitudes in relation to the object or to the sphere of activity and the general orientation of the personality (or by the general system of beliefs and attitudes). M. Rekeach<sup>7</sup> says that the stronger the link the sooner the conformity between the beliefs and attitudes appears in relation to the given object and the manifest behaviour relation to the same object. D. Katz also gives theoretical reasons in favour of this opinion.<sup>8</sup>

And finally, we shall mention a group of psychological factors: the level of self-estimation of the personality, the level of conformity (as the frequency of conformity reactions to the pressure exercised by the group), the level of tolerance and the level of aspirations. These factors are supposed to form a certain syndrom of the personality. It has been proved by the experiments that the persons with a low self-estimation are more conformative have low level of aspirations and, probably, less tolerant. Unfortunately, we have no data about the way the syndrom produces increased or decreased accord between the patterns of behaviour and the manifest behaviour. By intuition we expect that the mentioned features of the personality syndrom can also be variables that control the behaviour considered as significant variables that control the behaviour of the personality in the sphere we are interested in.

Hence, we believe that owing to the fact that the behaviour of the personality is controlled at several levels (at sociological, social-psychological and general psychological) it is possible with the present-day knowledge and it is necessary to apply a cross-disciplinary approach to the study.

The major methodological difficulty that such a cross-disciplinary approach faces is to find a respective frame of reference that will meet the task. It is not only necessary to describe and explain the correlation between the patterns of behaviour and the manifest behaviour in terms of three different approaches (sociology, socio-psychology and psychology), but to find the way for expressing the solution in a single language which will integrate all the knowledge produced by the respective sciences. For example, one can believe, that the patterns of human behaviour are described in terms of value orientation or that the value-orientation patterns represent only a

<sup>7</sup> M. Rekeach, *The Open and Closed Mind*. New York, 1960; M. Rekeach, *Beliefs, Attitudes and Values: A Theory of Organization and Change*. San Francisco, 1968.

<sup>8</sup> D. Katz, *The Functional Approach to the Study of Attitudes*, *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 1960, vol. 24.

theoretical construct with empirical referents including beliefs, attitudes and sets in relation to certain social objects (objects of orientation) which form a dynamic system?

If we are able to determine the existences of such a system by means of an empiric investigation of its components then in what terms should we describe the system of various components that form the manifest behaviour? The solution of the complicated methodological problems is closely connected with the necessity of solving the problems of procedure that are as complicated as the methodological ones. We think, however, that even the very formulation of such questions and problems, without mentioning the way of their solution by means of an empiric investigation, may produce fruitful results.

A group of members of the staff of the Institute for Concrete Social Research, Soviet Academy of Sciences, is conducting an exploratory study the initial premises of which were described above. We have chosen for our studies a group of engineers — designers and technologists. We have examined the correlation between the orientation for an independent activity at work and a selective behaviour at leisure, on the one hand, and the actually observed independent and selective behaviour, on the other. The procedure provides for a record of all above mentioned variables: sociological, socio-psychological and general psychological.

The writers of the paper intend to report at the Congress in Varna the first findings of the pilot study carried out on an over a 100-strong sample. The results were analysed in relation to the whole program of the study.

## ON THE UNITY OF ALL LEVELS OF SOCIOLOGY

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1.1. Every developed science constitutes a general system of interconnected theories and methods, which occupy different levels. One of the most telling examples in the field of social sciences is the political economy, developed by Karl Marx in *The Capital*. From the methodological analysis of this work of Marx from the analysis and interpretation of history and the contemporary state of other social and natural sciences, as well as from the critical analysis of the development of sociology so far, very important inferences ensue as to the system, structure and methods of this science. One of the basic conclusions is that sociology can successfully develop as a science *only in the unity of the various levels of sociological theories and methods of research and cognition, only as a unitary system of theories*, that in its entirety corresponds to the social system and is built up with the aid of a common empirical and theoretical system of knowledge.

1.2. The vast range of questions, relating to the levels of sociological theories and investigations, can conditionally be reduced to the following groups:

- a) unity of the general sociological theory and the specific or increasingly more concrete sociological theories;
- b) unity of the sociological investigation of all levels and stages of the functioning and development of society, carried out with the aid of all suitable methods of collecting and analysing concrete information and of theoretical generalization;
- c) unity of all levels of the sociological theories and investigations with regard to social praxis.

Here only the first two groups of questions will be briefly discussed.

1.3. The basic assumptions underlying the problem of the unity of all levels of sociological theories and research and of the problem of the unity of empirical and theoretical methods of social cognition, are in principle outlined and evidenced in the dialecto-materialist philosophy and in historical materialism in particular. The most important among them is that the system of sociological theories can be built and developed upon the basis of a vast empirical material drawn both on the various traditional sources on the various forms of contemporary empirical research. Other assumptions pertain to the methods, with the aid of which empirical data are collected,

interpreted, and generalized with a view to obtaining an as much as possible adequate theoretical formulation in this process. The very selection and analysis of the empirical data as well as the development and choice of the methods of accumulation of the empirical material and of its theoretical interpretation, are in one way or another, explicitly or implicitly, connected both with the degree of development of science and with definite social class, attitudes and specific historic positions.

2. Certain aspects of the general problem of the different levels of sociological theories and investigations, are discussed in sociological literature under the form of the question of the relationship between macrosociology and microsociology. The fact of the splitting up of the various levels and components of the sociological theoretical system and of the corresponding methods of sociological research and cognition, finds an indirect avowal in the calls for bridging the gap between micro- and macrosociology.

2.1. Although the appeal for the unity of micro- and macrosociology is very widespread, one can not say that there is agreement as to the content of these terms and especially as to how to solve this problem. It seems to me that this terms pertain in the first place to the problem of the relationship between small social groups and society as a whole, and correspondingly also the problem of the relations between the theory of small groups and the sociological theory of society as a total system: secondly, these terms encode the problem of the links and interaction of the system of empirical and theoretical methods of investigation of social phenomena with the construction of sociological theory.

2.2. The bifurcation of sociology and the opposing of micro- to macrosociology does not result from a recognition of problem within the system of society, arising from the existence of individual personalities, small groups, larger social aggregates and total social formations, but rather from the attempts to put the personality of the small social group in the centre of sociological research and sociological theory. It is known that G. Moreno is among those who particularly clearly formulate the thesis that the small groups are the "social atoms", of which the entire society is built [1]. The interpretation of these atoms does not go beyond the sphere of psychology, and in the microsociology thus psychologized is sought the key to the explanation of society as a whole. Allen W. Eister notes that in the general schemes of the analysis and interpretation of social phenomena the sociologists Park and Burgess, Znaniecki, Wiese and Becker, Lundberg, Dodd and others "openly and often in details refer to the small groups". Parsons' macrosociological constructions also do not preclude the possibility for the small groups to supply the key to the understanding of society as a whole; it is assumed that the investigation of the small groups may provide information on the role formation and the series of interactions between the actors — a knowledge that would transcend the level of the small group [2].

This optimism would have sufficient logical grounds if society were an aggregate of a plurality of small groups or individual persons, and not an integral totality, a new qualitative formation, in which the small group is but one of the links.



2.3. A genuine cutting across between micro- and macrosociology is possible on the basis of the idea of society as a complex system, consisting of a multitude of sub-systems, characterized by a relative autonomy and simultaneously by mutual determination and interdependence. If the terms micro- and macrosociology imply the connection between the small social groups and society as a whole, it must be admitted that these terms do not reflect the entire complexity of the problem. As a matter of fact, the question is concerned with *the unity of all levels of the social system, from the lowest to the highest one, without bypassing the intermediate levels*. The personality or the small group can be interpreted in the light of the total social system, if all links, degrees, and levels between the personality, the small group and society as a whole. If this condition is observed, society can also be explained with the aid of the categories of personality and of small group.

2.4. It stands to reason that this requirement, expressed in such a general form, will be endorsed by all sociologists. The actual difficulty and disagreement set in when the question is raised of what the social system is, which are its sub-systems, and which are the levels of sociological theory and research. Robert Merton believes that his theory of the Middle range cuts across between the differentiation of the microsociological problems as evidenced in the investigations of small groups, and the macrosociological problems as evidenced in the comparative studies of social mobility, formal organizations, and the interrelations of social institutions [3]. It seems to me, however, that the question is not how to throw a bridge between micro- and macrosociology as already *eviaenced* problems of the small groups and correspondingly of the larger communities; the question is that the very cutting across all ranges is a prerequisite for the evidencing of the problems of the lowest and highest range.

2.5. Edward Shils utilizes the term "macrosociology" in the definition of the concept of society. The task of macrosociology, in his opinion, is to elucidate the mechanisms or processes, through which the various communities "are functioning as a society". According to Shils, a social system can be regarded as a society if it is characterized by self-sufficiency, self-regulation, self-reproduction and self-generation [4].

To these most characteristics of the system I would add one more, self-development. For the sake of brevity, all these characteristics can be synthesized in the term of *organic system*. Here this term does not allude to biologism, but rather to the concept of society as a total system, that is *functioning and developing* on the basis of its own specific laws.

Of course, the essential differences between Marxist sociology become apparent in the concrete characteristics of the maximally general concept of "system". Edward Shils, for instance, distinguishes the following characteristic features of society as a social system: marriage, territory, reproduction, government, name, history, culture [5]. Although these features are subject to discussion from the viewpoint of the question of their importance and subordination, it is beyond dispute that people can not multiply, give a name to their kin, be governed, and create spiritual values, if they do not correspondingly organize the production, exchange, distribution, and

consumption of material goods, which is something that has found no place in E. Shils' classification.

3.1. Society as an organic system differs from all other organic (biological, geological, etc.) systems in that men, the only subjects of this system, are active and creative beings, that consciously and purposefully transform natural material in accordance with their expanding need, and create also the social conditions (various institutions, organizations, culture, etc.), necessary for their life.

If work is an "eternal natural condition of human life" [6], it is logical to assume that it is also the primary and natural basis for the classification of the sub-systems of human society. However complex the division of human labour may be, and whatever historic form society may have in order that it may be considered as an organic (i. e. a self-generating, self-developing, etc.) system, people must: 1. produce material goods, i. e. *have material production*; 2. create spiritual values: customs, norms, beliefs, science, art, etc., in one word, they must have a *spiritual production, or spiritual culture*; 3. perform activities for the biological and social production and reproduction of new generations of people, through procreation and the various forms of socialization, i. e. *have reproduction of people*; 4. exchange information, i. e. *have communications*; 5. create various forms and institutions of social organization, and regulate and govern their actions, organizations, and relations, i. e. *have organization and government*.

3.2. Any human activity is not only expenditure of physical and mental energy, but also a relationship between men. Society is a system of human activities and relationships. To every type, kind and variety of human activity corresponds a definite social relationship, such as relationships of production, family relationships, communication relationships, relationships of government, etc., which form a *system of social relationships*.

3.3. The above-mentioned basic types of human activities and relationships are a general condition for the existence of society, regardless of its concrete historic form, they are the primary, most general and abstract level of sociological differentiation of society or of what could be called the *sociological structure of society*. In as much as every kind of human activity and relationship is complex in its structure and functions, we can consider them as sub-systems of total society, as the main or *basic sub-systems of the sociological structure of society*.

The question of the interrelations between the basic sub-systems of the sociological structure of human society is very important from the theoretical and methodological viewpoint. In his investigations Karl Marx demonstrated that in the system of basic social activities and relationships, the sub-system of material production plays the determining part, which in no way excludes the relative independence and the active role of the other sub-systems. From the recognition that one factor is more important and determining, it does not follow that the rest are doomed to fatal inactivity.

3.4. The most general approach to the structure of society implies also another cross-section. Men are beings, which have developed and continue to develop their consciousness in the long historic process of production activity and social relations, they are *conscious beings*. The content of

their consciousness expresses itself in views, ideas, beliefs, scientific knowledge, etc.; it leaves its imprint in a definite manner on the material and spiritual products of their labour (of their activity). Society as a whole is a unity of the material and spiritual sphere of human life (activities and relationships), or of *material and spiritual culture*. On the foundations of the economic structure of society, the basis rises the ideological part of the spiritual life of society, the religious, philosophical, legal, esthetic, and other views, and the corresponding organizations and institutions, *the superstructure*.

The basis and the superstructure form a unity, the one does not exist without the other. In this unity the determining role in the functioning, the structural changes, and the development of the system, belongs to the basis, a fact which does not preclude the reverse active role of the superstructure and does not imply fatalism, as this is ascribed to Marxism by Karl Popper [7].

3.5. What has been so far said, outlines only the most general content of human activity. This heterogeneous and varied activity develops within the framework of various social groups (national communities, state unions, etc.). All these social groups and organizations are the natural links, connecting the macro-sociological and the micro-sociological range of society. The organic link between these two ranges is expressed in the statement that: 1) society is neither a mechanical conglomerate of persons, nor an elusive unitary whole, existing independently of the individual persons; 2) the individual personality is not a psychological unit, existing in isolation from society, it is the result and simultaneously the subject of the social life, a contradictory unity of "the totality of all social relations" [8] and a unique social and psychological individuality. The sociological study of personality will be complete if across the entire series of social organizations, institutes, activities, and relationships, it is related to the most general and abstract definitions of society.

4.1. The general structure of society thus outlined does not exhaust its characterisation. Society not only has a definite structure, it not only functions, it also changes and develops, it continuously reproduces the basic conditions of its existence and simultaneously changes its concrete social forms, organizations, and relationships. The change and development of society in time is conceptualized in sociology as the *genetic aspect of the social system*. The concept of socio-economic formation, developed in Marxism, offers criteria for the characterization of the basic stages of the historic development of society, of the succession of their logical and historical links, and qualitative differentiation.

4.2. The concepts of structure and genesis of the social system express different though interrelated aspects (sections) of the same. Society does not exist but in terms of the individual stages of the social development. On the other hand, each stage of social development contains the general characteristics of all other stages, owing to which we speak of a particular stage of development of *human society*, and is characterized simultaneously by a specific structure (modification of the abstract sociological structure of society), owing to which we speak of definite *stages* in the development of society.

4.3. But the system of society is characterized also by that it exists not only as a definite structure, and not only in time, but also in space, which is expressed in the concept of *regional stream*. The development of society proceeds in the form of interrelated streams, which are continuously differentiated and integrated in a general trend of progressive convergence.

4.4. When we speak of the social system, we mean society in general, society as a system, which comprises all structural components, all stages of development, and all streams. This characterization of society is at a most abstract and most general level. But society does not exist but in some kind of structural, genetic, and regional framework, i. e. in the form of concrete societies with a definite degree of development of the productive forces and production relations, with a definite social and class structure, political system, ideology, morality, customs, family relationships, patterns and methods of organization and government, communication, etc., which are at a definite stage of historic development, and in definite geographic areas. The concrete societies do not rule out the most general and most abstract characteristics of society.

4.5. From the viewpoint of the system of human society thus understood, the relationship between macro- and microsociology appears not as a relationship only between the most general and abstract sociological structure of society and the individual human persons or their small groups, but as a series, ladder, comprising all social activities and relationships, and all ranges of movement from the general towards the particular, and from the particular towards the general of movement from the abstract towards the concrete, and from the concrete towards the abstract. Sociology must take into consideration also all levels of the structural, temporal and spatial specification of the social system.

5. From the viewpoint of the system of human society thus outlined, one can also understand the *structure of sociological theory*. The system of sociology is a dialectical unity of sociological theories and fields, differing in their ranges and degree of abstraction, in the level of study and interpretation of social phenomena.

5.1. General sociology treats the most general and abstract sociological structure of society, the basic kinds and types of human activity, relations, and organizations, the basic stages and regional modifications of the abstract sociological structure. Briefly, it treats the most general laws of the functioning and development of society.

5.2. A sequence of more specific and concrete sociological theories arise on the basis of the individual components of the sociological structure of society and encompass the sociological problems of economics, politics, culture, science, communications, urban and rural communities, the social group, the personality, the family, etc. These areas of sociology we would conditionally call *branch (or structural) theories*.

5.3. Another series of more and more specific and concrete sociological theories reflects the genetic aspect of the system of human society; these are the theories of *the sociological problems of the various historic stages* of the development of human society.

5.4. Finally the aspects of sociology come, which express the *spatial differentiation of the social system*.

In practice every such aspect of the multitude of more specific sociological theories, exists in unity with the rest. The sociology of government, for instance, is from the standpoint of general sociology a defined concretization. Yet sociology of government as such, an increasingly concrete shape within given temporal and regional boundaries (for instance, sociological problems of government in tribal or feudal society, or the government of the USA in the 20th century, or the sociological problems of government in Bulgaria during the period of socialism, etc.).

Therefore, from this standpoint too, to cut across between micro- and macrosociology means to go through the entire natural order, from the specific sociological theory to the most general one, and from the concrete, to the most abstract one, and vice versa.

6.1. The factual throwing of a bridge between micro- and macrosociology consists perhaps not in the formal recognition of a system of sociological theories of different ranges, but in the providing of these micro- and macrotheories with a strictly scientific factual basis. Therefore, another aspect of the unity of micro- and macrosociology refers to the sociological study of all ranges, parts, stages, and regional modifications of the system of human society, and correspondingly to the application of all methods of sociological research and cognition.

The sound bridge between micro- and macrosociology rests upon the sociological study of *all levels of the social system with the aid of all possible methods.*

Sociology is an *empirical and theoretical science.* This means that it is built on the basis of a vast empirical material; but this also means that it can never restrict itself to the empirical level of investigation, that it must rise successively to different levels of theoretical generalization of the empirical data. Sociology rests on all possible methods of investigation and cognition, concretely empirical and theoretical, quantitative and qualitative, historical and theoretical, inductive and deductive, comparative, etc. With the aid of these methods, sociology investigates all levels of society, the personality and the small collectives, the larger social aggregates and entire societies: the social activities and roles of men at different structural levels, temporal and regional states of the social system.

6.2. Allen Barton calls for a "macromethodology", which should focus its attention mainly on the community of persons, instead of simply investigating the *person* in the community [9]. I take this as a step forward towards overcoming the limitations of sociometric microsociology. The problem consists, however, in the interpretation of the social environment of man and the social nature of human agglomerations, in finding reliable methods of empirical investigation of the entire system of human activities and relationships, starting from the lowest and reaching the highest level, beginning from the particular and advancing towards the general, from the empirical concrete towards the theoretically abstract. Therefore, we should understand "macromethodology" to mean a system of quantitative and qualitative methods of investigation of the macrostructure, the dynamics and the development of society: such a system can not be built only of purely empirical or of purely theoretical methods, it can only be constructed out of both.

An example of a macrosociological study with aid of a "macromethodology" was the sociological investigation, carried out by the Institute of Sociology at the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences in 1968. It constituted a sociological investigation of contemporary Bulgarian society in its entirety. Under the latter term we mean all *most important social phenomena*, relating to the *components* of the social structure of contemporary socialist society in Bulgaria, in their unity and interdependence.

This was an investigation simultaneously of society through the individual personality, and of personality, through society, in the light of the basic and most important social characteristics. It was, in my opinion, a successful way of genuinely bridging the gap between micro- and macrosociology. The periodical conducting of similar macrosociological investigation would allow to establish on a concrete and empirical level the characteristics of the functioning and the trends of development of the social macrosystem.

6.3. Under "microsociological investigation" Prof. Paul Lazarsfeld understands the investigation of human behaviour in contemporary situation with the aid of qualitative methods, while macrosociology is connected with the attempt to discover general laws of "the past and future trends of social development" [10]. It is presumed at that, that the wider theories of the social change are built mainly on the basis of "qualitative support".

It has been already stressed that the throwing of a bridge between micro- and macrosociology is impossible without the utilization of qualitative and quantitative methods both on a macro- and microsocial level for both contemporary and past processes. This does not preclude the possibility for every level of sociology to be built with the aid of specific methods. General and abstract sociology resorts mainly to the system of theoretical methods, which actually are only methods of logical processing of the data, obtained with the aid of empirical methods. The possibility of applying one or another method depends both on the level of the generalization and the size and complexity of the object. The empirical methods are suitable both for the study of personality and the social groups, on the one hand, and the larger social aggregates and society as a whole, on the other. The distinction between theoretical and empirical methods of sociological research should not be observed in the division of society into corresponding spheres, in each of which only one of these types of methods would prove applicable, it should be accepted only with regard to the method and degree of knowledge, and the ways of verification of the theoretical inferences.

6.4. One of the causes for the existence of the gap between micro- and macrosociology consists in the very narrow limits, within which the theoretical inferences can be verified that these limits are imposed by neopositivist epistemology.

The difference between Marxist and neopositivist philosophical interpretation of sociological knowledge does not consist in whether the theoretical inferences, hypotheses, and even constructions, should or should not be verified. Marxists do not credit with any scientific value reasonings that are not strictly verified. The difference consists in the interpretation of verification. Everyone apparently agreed that empirical social observations, limited experiments, quantitative investigations, statistical classifica-

tions, etc., are very important for the collection of primary empirical data and for the testing of various hypotheses, for the proving of certain theoretical conclusions. It is evident that such social investigations, carried out on a large scale, systematically, and for longer periods of time, offer opportunities for theoretical generalizations at a higher level and of a wider range of action. But sociologists cannot satisfy themselves with their own limited measurements, tests and experiments; they cannot rely on valid macrosociological theories if they neglect the entire history of mankind, the actual praxis of social production and social relations.

In this sense the way towards the unity of micro- and macrosociology passes not only through the narrow bridge of, so to say, personal verification, through the empirical measurements and experiments, but also through the wider bridge of large-scale social and historical praxis.

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## THE ANALYSIS OF CONDITIONS APPLYING TO SOCIETY AS A WHOLE — A PREREQUISITE FOR THE SOCIOLOGICAL UNDERSTANDING OF SMALL SOCIAL UNITS

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The question about the possible links between understanding small social units (primary groups, small partial sections of society, as, for instance a community or a village) sociologically speaking and obtaining sure knowledge about society as a whole gave and still gives rise to quite a number of controversies and discussions among sociologists. It is closely related to the theme of this congress — "Contemporary and future societies prediction and social planning". Social planning is possible only there and then where a sure insight into contemporary conditions applying to society as a whole is linked to the understanding of the concrete activities of people. Social planning relates to society as a whole, but it is implemented only by the activity of individuals.

As in the past, the linking of "micro- and macrosociological" knowledge is often considered as a methodical and methodological problem. In this paper I would like to show that this problem can not be solved by methodical and methodological means alone. This problem is concerned with a real fact of life — the relations that exist between acting individuals and groups of individuals and the whole social system. In so far as this essential fact is not made a subject of theoretical considerations, all attempts to solve this problem by purely methodical and methodological means will fail.

According to my opinion, this one-sided methodical and methodological approach is made clear by two questions that are often linked to the problem of the relations between "micro- and macrosociological knowledge":

(1) How does the sociologist arrive from an insight into smaller groups at well-founded statements about larger units or about society as a whole?

(2) What importance, what value do statements about the whole of society have for the sociological research process in order to understand small units?

The first question is put to obtain methodological and methodical rules to make surer

(a) the way from the empirical description towards theoretical explanation, and



(b) the way from small-range or middle-range theories towards "larger theory contexts" (König, 1967, p. 309).

The second question is directed at the problem of the validity and verification of statements about society as a whole.

What is at stake, is the logical structure of these statements, the ways and means of their empirical verification, etc.

Both questions start from the fact that the starting point of empirical research is acting individuals, surveyable groups of individuals (primary groups) or other smaller social units. These social units can be described empirically. The empirical research worker takes the individual actions, attitudes and views for a start, then he tries to group them according to existing common or similar features and then proceeds to describe groups. The empiricists rarely give an account about the initial concepts they have used.

The essential feature of these groups is their empirically stated similarity or difference when compared with certain patterns of behaviour, and their views about certain social conditions or events.

In the further stages of this work, the empiricist then combines all possible groupings of the stated features. It is known that in this way it becomes by any means possible to describe real patterns of behaviour and views, their statistical distribution, and so on.

The extreme empiricism confined itself to these results. Its shortcomings, its inability to explain data are well known. But it must be mentioned that the most important reason for the failure of extreme empiricism is not a methodical incapability to obtain theoretical statements. The basic mistake of empiricism is the absolutization of the immediately given empirical point of departure. The acting individuals are considered as being isolated from society.

The failure of extreme empiricism, which was often explained by a "lack of theory", led to a "modern social research" which is as far away from a naive empiricism as from metaphysical speculation (König, 1967, p. 203). The "continuous change from theory to empiricism" is said to be a general feature of the research process (*ibid.*).

The efforts to theoretically explain empirical data led without any doubt to certain achievements in theories about social groups, in theories about small social units, or about single phenomena of society (organization, industry, and so on).

The salient feature of these theories is, however, that according to them the object of research (a particular social unit) is seen in isolation from society as a whole. The relations between the social unit under consideration and society appear as marginal conditions that are treated additionally. The society as a whole is added to the object of research proper as something supplementary. This applies for almost all theoretical approaches in bourgeois industrial sociology, organization sociology (for instance, Etzioni, 1967), group sociology, and so on.

The explanatory power of such theories is limited to a large extent. We do not speak about the domain where these theories apply. The point is rather that the isolated consideration of the explanation of empirical patterns of behaviour and social events by the interaction of the basic elements.

The basic elements are sought in the individual range — see Parsons. They are of such an abstract character that they can only provide a formal framework for the analysis of concrete patterns of behaviour and relations.

The explanatory power of these theories is characterized by the fact that the explanation follows a subsumptive scheme. The point is that the individual is again the point of departure for the different theoretical approaches. From this follows a separation of the individual and society — their theoretical representation as opposing poles, which are tried to be eliminated at a later secondary “socialization process” (Hahn, E. 1965, p. 145).

In the discussion about the relations between “micro- and macrosociological” knowledge the deeper problem is not methodical rules to unite both sides, but to make the point of departure of sociological research clear.

This point of departure are the real relations between the individual and society as a whole.

This real hard fact is the point of departure of sociological research. If it wants to be successful, sociological research cannot be based on individuals, groups, etc. on the one hand, and in isolation from conditions applying to society as a whole on the other hand (that is, without relating to the concrete actions of individuals).

The conceptual understanding of this fact in general sociological theory is the prerequisite of empirical research that analyses “the individual as a complex of social conditions” (Marx).

Marxist-Leninist sociology considers Man and Society as a unity. Our experience shows that the actions and the behaviour of people, group, for example, means that theory is reduced to the formal relations and structures inside the group.

For our investigations about socialist teams the various bourgeois theories of social groups are useless (Hofstätter, 1957). This applies above all to the explanation of the aims of team-work in socialism, of the character of social relations within the team and the enterprise, the development of the personality within the team, etc. It turned out that teams can be understood completely, if their relation to other sections of society is taken into account and if, above all, the prevailing conditions typical of our society as a whole are included into our research.

As it is not only important to merely change the sphere of application of theories to be developed, the call for “middle-range theories” does on no account solve the problem of linking the insight into the working of small social units and relations applying to society as a whole, but it rather shifts this problem to another level.

In most cases, the attempts to formulate general theories are made only under the aspect of the logical integration of small-range or middle-range theories, or they are appreciated as such. An essential aim of these attempts is to uncover basic elements of social patterns of behaviour or relations, as, for instance, action, status, role (T. Parsons, 1952), or activity, interaction, and feeling (G. C. Homans, 1960). Of course, other attempts are known, but they are hardly more successful.

In these approaches, there are the following general features:

- finding basic elements,
- indicating their general validity,
- the description of the interaction of the basic elements or theoretical synthesis,

the actions of social groups, and the relations even in larger units, such as town, enterprise, organization, etc. cannot be *completely* explained, if they are not analyzed in their unity with the essential and determining social conditions. But this means that social conditions — especially the conditions of production — are considered not as a social environment, as a marginal condition of the social unity to be analyzed, but rather as an essential part of the relations prevailing in the small units. Thus, the relations that hold in the teams of socialist society between members of these teams can only be completely explained, if they are understood as an expression of the relations of production that prevail in our society. In the sociological research work of the GDR about teams in our society it could be proved that the setting of tasks to the team, a distribution of tasks, which is determined by the needs of society as a whole, exerts an essential influence on the working and economic relations between the members of the teams (Weidig, 1969). A series of other direct relations between the development of socialist working teams and the conditions applying to society as a whole could be stated, as for instance:

- the dependence of the intensity of team work in the working teams on the level of development of the productive forces of the whole of society,
- the dependence of the development of the team on the level of development of socialist conscientiousness in the framework of the entire society,
- the relations between the State plan and the development of team work (Weidig, 1969).

Neglecting the conditions relating to society as a whole or only considering them later as an additional condition (social environment) leads to reducing sociological research to formal relations and structures within the working team.

The concrete contents, the riches of the real relations in these teams will then escape from sociological insight. The basic importance of the view about the unity of Man and Society proves indispensable for the understanding of the conditions relating to society as a whole. To the sociologist society will appear as an abstract construction only if he does not thoroughly analyze the concrete forms of its existence. Thus, the conditions of production prevailing in socialist society are not a general scheme. Their concrete existence is expressed, among others, in socialist team work, in the relations inside socialist working collectives. Without analysing the socialist working collectives and team work no complete theoretical representation of the general socialist conditions of production in our society can be given.

Therefore, to understand the unity of Man and Society in sociological terms is not a *supplementary* methodical task of bringing "micro- and macrosociological" statements and concepts together. In the first place, it is a problem of theory.

Historical materialism provides a general theory of society to the sociologist. This general theory fulfils the necessary conditions to attain a complete understanding of small social units and to bring about and enlarge the insight into the working of society as a whole as a system in the sociological research process.

Historical materialism understands the real fact of the unity of the individual and society:

(a) by considering society as the whole of the relations of people in their respective concrete historical state of development,

(b) as it has theoretically formulated the relations of production, that is the essential relations incurred in the production of material life from the total of human relations and as it has proved them empirically,

(c) as it has understood society as a whole as being in a constant state of development in concrete historical terms in the concept of the social and economic social formation,

(d) as it has understood the system character of the social and economic formation and as it has proved the existence of mediating links in the relations between the individual and society (Lenin).

This theoretical formulation of the unity of the individual and society is the point of departure for understanding small social units and conditions related to the whole of society, in the framework of the sociological research process. The methodological and methodical principles of the research process are subordinated to this basic theoretical point of departure.

The dependence of the methods on the theory explains why bourgeois and marxist sociology differ not only in theory, but in the organization of the whole research process. The small social units are understood by marxist sociology as mediating links between the individual and society as a whole. Therefore, the methodical approach for its empirical research must aim at the individual and the entire society. The analysis of the determining character of the conditions related to the entire society is of primary importance.

In any particular case the sociological research process may tend more towards one side or the other, but the proof of the concrete working of the conditions related to the entire society will always be a necessary requirement for the complete understanding of small social units.

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