TRANSACTIONS OF THE SEVENTH WORLD CONGRESS OF SOCIOLOGY

ACTES DU SEPTIEME CONGRES MONDIAL DE SOCIOLOGIE

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VOLUME IV

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
VOLUME IV

RESEARCH COMMITTEES
COMITES DE RECHERCHE

INTERNATIONAL SOCIOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION

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The Seventh World Congress of Sociology was organized by the International Sociological Association in cooperation with the Bulgarian Organizing Committee, under the sponsorship of UNESCO and under the high patronage of the President of the Council of Ministers of the People's Republic of Bulgaria Mr. Todor Zhivkov.

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PREFACE

This volume contains the papers presented at the sessions of the Research Committees during the Seventh World Congress of Sociology (Varna, September 14-19, 1970). The selection and arrangement of the papers have been done according to the recommendations of the Responsibles of the respective Research Committees.

Since Research Committees "Army and Society", "Sociology of National Development" and "Sociology of Leasure" have already publushed their reports in separate volumes, they are not included here.

The authors bear full responsibility for the texts they have presented.

The publication of this volume of the Transactions of the Seventh World Congress of Sociology, as well as that of the other volumes is effected by the Bulgarian Organizing Committee.

AVANT-PROPOS

Le présent volume contient des rapports faits aux séances des Comités de Recherche au cours du Septième Congrès Mondial de Sociologie (Varna, 14—19 Septembre 1970). Les rapports sont choisis et rangés selon les recommandations des directions des Comités correspondants.

Les Comités de Recherche «L'armée et la société», «Sociologie du développement national» et «Sociologie du loisir» ont publié dans des livres à part les rapports faits à leurs séances, c'est pourquoi ils ne sont pas represéntés dans ce volume. Les auteurs portent entièrement la responsabilité du texte qu'ils ont présenté.

L'édition de ce volume des Actes du Septième Congrès Mondial de Sociologie, ainsi que celle des autres, est organisée par le Comité d'Organisation Bulgare.

MICHEL BASSAND ET RAI WERENBERG

COMMUNITY RESEARCH
RECHERCHE SUR LA COMMUNAUTE

CHANGEMENT SOCIAL ET STRUCTURE DU POUVOIR

MICHEL BASSAND ET ULI WINDISCH
SUISSE

Toute tentative d'explication et de prévision du changement économique et social d'une collectivité locale ou régionale nécessite que la structure et les mécanismes du pouvoir soient très précisément connus. Il en va évidemment de même pour toutes les tentatives de développement ou d'animation communautaire.

C'est dans la double perspective d'une explication du changement et d'une action en développement communautaire que nous avons entrepris une recherche[1] sur la structure du pouvoir de sept communes d'une micro-région rurale de Suisse.

1. LA REGION

La collectivité que nous avons choisie d'étudier est une micro-région de moyenne montagne localisée dans la chaîne du Jura. Elle comprend environ 2400 habitants répartis en huit communes.[2] Géographiquement, le Clos-du-Doubs englobe le territoire de la vallée du Doubs, de son entrée à sa sortie de Suisse.

Cette micro-région appartient à un ensemble plus vaste: le Jura bernois qui est, de manière prédominante, de langue française et de religion catholique, mais politiquement et administrativement dépendant du canton de Berne. Contrairement au Jura, le canton de Berne est de langue allemande et de religion protestante. Ces deux facteurs ainsi qu'une certaine disparité économique sont la cause de violents conflits qui opposent non seulement une partie de la population jurassienne aux autorités bernoises, mais encore les Jurassiens entre eux.[3]

Pour mieux situer le Clos-du-Doubs dans son contexte jurassien, nous avons construit une typologie de l'ensemble des communes jurassiennes.[4]

A l'aide d'une analyse factorielle, nous avons traité une quarantaine de variables démographiques, économiques, sociales, culturelles et politiques, ce qui nous a permis de créer trois types de communes:

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[1] Cette recherche particulière s'inscrit dans une série de travaux sociologiques sur les structures familiales, la stratification et la mobilité sociale, le changement social, les aspirations, la participation politique et culturelle, etc. Ces diverses recherches s'intègrent dans un vaste programme interdisciplinaire comprenant des branches telles l'anthropologie, la médecine, l'écologie, l'économie, la sociologie, l'agronomie, etc. L'ensemble de ces travaux est financé par le Fonds national suisse de la Recherche scientifique et réalisé dans le cadre du Centre de recherche en anthropologie régionale de l'Université de Genève (cf. P. Moeschler et J. P. Schellhorn (éd.), Recherche fondamentale et analyse régionale, Université de Genève, 1967).

[2] Epauvillers, Epiquerez, Montenol, Ocourt, Saint-Ursanne, Montmelon, Seleute, Soubey.

[3] Cette situation a bien des analogies avec les conflits opposant entre autre les Canadiens français et les Canadiens anglais, les Flamands et les Wallons, etc.

[4] M. Bassand, Villes et campagnes du Jura, en *Analyse socio-démographique régionale*, CRAR, Université de Genève, 1969, p. 111—279.

Type 1. Les communes ayant un *statut de modernité*. Elles sont intensément différenciées, le contrôle social est lâche, la famille nucléaire est prédominante; d'une manière générale, ces communes sont pénétrées par des modèles, valeurs, symboles d'une grande modernité.

Type 2. Les communes ayant un *statut de semi-ruralité*. Elles se trouvent dans une situation intermédiaire entre le type 1 et le type 3.

Type 3. Les communes ayant un *statut de ruralité*. Leur structure sociale est caractérisée par une grande homogénéité, un contrôle social intense et la prédominance de la famille étendue; d'une manière générale, elles semblent réfractaires à la pénétration des normes et valeurs de la société post-industrielle.

Il apparaît que pour 1960, des huit communes du Clos-du-Doubs, aucune n'appartient au type 1, une seule appartient au type 2: St-Ursanne, les sept autres ont un statut de ruralité. Entre 1941 et 1960, les huit communes de la région n'ont pas changé de statut, ce qui ne veut évidemment pas dire que ces communes n'ont subi aucune transformation.

En bref, il ressort de ces données statistiques que:

1. Toutes ces communes enregistrent une régression démographique.
2. Epauvillers, Ocourt et Soubey sont les communes qui, proportionnellement, comptent le plus d'exploitations agricoles de moins de 10 ha.
3. Epiquerez, Montmelon, Ocourt, Soubey ont les indices globaux de changement les plus forts, de grandes minorités suisses, allemandes et protestantes, une population très dispersée.
4. Epauvillers, Montenol et Seleute sont les communes dont: la population est la plus concentrée, les indices globaux de changement sont les moins élevés, la population est la plus homogène au point de vue social, économique et culturel.

A ces quelques données, il faut en ajouter d'autres qui sont moins quantifiables. A tout observateur sur le terrain, il apparaît que ces sept communes, à des degrés divers, sont entrées depuis une quinzaine d'années dans un processus de modernisation. Si la plupart du temps ces changements se font sans discontinuité (transformation ou reconstruction de l'école communale, goudronnage des chemins, adduction d'eau, etc.) d'autres font nettement figure de mutation: réalisation d'un remaniement parcellaire à Epauvillers, introduction d'une petite industrie à Soubey, multiplication de résidences secondaires et de maisons de vacances à Soubey et Ocourt (plus de 50 environ en 10 ans).

En outre, les communes du Clos-du-Doubs sont entrées, depuis 4 à 5 ans, dans un processus de planification régionale: création d'une Association des communes du Clos-du-Doubs pour l'aménagement du territoire, mesures de protection des rives du Doubs en vue d'arrêter la construction désordonnée des résidences secondaires et la pollution du Doubs, etc.

2. QUELQUES REMARQUES TECHNIQUES ET MÉTHODOLOGIQUES

La recherche que nous avons élaborée comprend plusieurs approches du pouvoir. Nous avons en effet combiné, dans un questionnaire d'une part, les tests décisionnel et réputationnel[5] et d'autre part une série de questions classiques sur

[5] Nous nous sommes spécialement référés aux études suivantes: T. N. Clark, *Community Structure and Decision-Making: Comparative Analyses*, Chandler Publishing Co, San Francisco, 1968; R. A. Dahl, *Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1961; P. H. Rossi, Power and Community Structure, *Midwest J. of Pol. Sci.* Nov. 1960; R. Presthus, *Men at the Top*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1964.

la stratification, la mobilité, la participation sociale, etc. Cette enquête a été effectuée auprès des autorités communales (environ 70 personnes). Elle a été complétée par l'analyse d'archives communales et cantonales et par des interviews libres auprès d'autres leaders communaux. Le présent article est principalement une synthèse du test décisionnel.[6]

Il a été appliqué en vue de dégager:
— des types de processus de décision,
— l'importance relative du pouvoir des acteurs locaux, régionaux, cantonaux,
— l'influence des acteurs officieux.

Nous avons identifié des décisions portant pour les sept collectivités, d'une part, sur des problèmes semblables (élection du maire et du secrétaire communal, budget, comptes, quotité d'impôt, élection de l'instituteur), d'autre part, sur des problèmes propres à certaines communes (construction de l'école communale, remaniement parcellaire, goudronnage du village, construction de chemins forestiers, etc.). Ces décisions ont été choisies en fonction de l'importance des ressources impliquées et du degré de mobilisation de la population.

Nous nous sommes efforcés de situer les données objectives mais partielles du test décisionnel dans le cadre plus vaste des changements sociaux de la région et de l'ensemble de la société. Cette méthode est une des plus adéquates qui soit pour rendre compte de l'impact de la centralisation administrative et de la bureaucratisation sur ces communes rurales en voie de modernisation.

En résumé, par cette recherche, nous avons tenté de
1. déceler le contenu objectif de l'autonomie communale, le rôle et la position des autorités communales à l'égard de la modernité. Ces autorités sont-elles des défenseurs du statu quo et de la tradition, ou les promoteurs de la modernité, ou se divisent-elles sur la base de conflits, plus ou moins violents, en factions; certaines traditionalistes, d'autres partisanes de la modernité?
2. mettre en relief l'influence de ces changements sociétaux sur la prise de décision.

3. LES ACTEURS COMMUNAUX OFFICIELS

Selon le droit bernois, la commune est une corporation de droit public. Ces prérogatives consistent à:
— nommer toutes ses autorités,
— pourvoir à toutes les affaires qui lui sont dévolues ou abandonnées par la loi (police locale, affaires relatives au droit des personnes et de la famille, assistance publique, école, chemins communaux, etc.),
— administrer les biens communaux,
— accomplir les services qu'elle s'impose pour le bien public, etc.

D'une manière générale, ce système politique communal peut être considéré comme étant très proche du modèle de la démocratie directe. En effet, les organes ordinaires sont:
l'assemblée communale (organe législatif), le conseil municipal (organe exécutif), les commissions, les fonctionnaires communaux.

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[6] Un rapport complet est en préparation. Il sera publié en 1971.

4. SYSTEME DE DECISION ET STRUCTURE DU POUVOIR

Dans ce chapitre nous analyserons quelques-unes des décisions prises en considération dans le test décisionnel.

4.1. L'élection du maire

Au moment où le maire a donné sa démission — on le sait toujours assez longtemps à l'avance — une série de contacts informels sont pris pour désigner un candidat. Souvent ce sont les conseillers qui assurent ces démarches, quand le maire démissionnaire n'a pas lui-même trouvé un successeur. Cependant, la succession ne va pas sans peine car le nombre de personnes susceptibles de devenir maire est limité. En effet, à la petitesse de la population s'ajoutent d'autres restrictions:

— du maire, on exige en premier lieu toute une série de capacités et de qualités (honorabilité, intelligence, réussite dans ses affaires personnelles, etc.),

— la lourdeur de la tâche et le temps que celle-ci nécessite, sans grande contrepartie (matérielle tout au moins),

— les incompatibilités dues à la consanguinité et à la parenté.

En principe, avant le jour de l'élection, les citoyens s'arrangent pour qu'une personne accepte cette fonction. Notons qu'il est bon de la part des candidats de refuser, le plus longtemps possible, une telle responsabilité. Lors de l'assemblée, le candidat est présenté; il insiste sur le fait que c'est quasi contre son gré qu'il est candidat, et ensuite on passe au vote. Il se fait à main levée et à l'unanimité. S'il y a plusieurs candidats, il a lieu au scrutin secret. Le processus prend fin avec la ratification de l'election par la Préfecture. Selon le modèle traditionnel, l'élection du maire se déroule sans grands conflits. Si parfois des tensions surgissent, elles se résorbent rapidement par la suite.

Ce processus peut être qualifié de *consensuel*.

Trois communes connaissent un processus sensiblement différent et qui semble perdurer. Contrairement au modèle précédent, celui-ci est nettement *conflictuel*. La présentation d'un cas est la meilleure manière de l'illustrer. La commune en question se caractérise, depuis une assez longue période, par deux factions bien définies: d'un côté les agriculteurs des fermes isolées et de l'autre ceux du village. Cette différence écologique est accentuée par un aspect socio-culturel: les seconds sont plutôt des bourgeois[7] et les premiers plutôt des Suisses allemands, et de religion protestante (selon les bourgeois, ce sont des „étrangers"). Bien que la faction bourgeoise soit minoritaire, elle contrôle, de très longue date, la fonction de maire et la majorité du conseil. Cette domination était assurée par des mécanismes tels la contrainte, la manipulation, certaine coalition avec des non-bourgeois, etc. Une année environ avant les dernières élections, le maire en place avait donné sa démission et un candidat bourgeois avait été désigné. Le modèle traditionnel semblait se reproduire. Cependant, un acteur nouveau allait permettre le renversement de la stratégie de la faction bourgeoise.

En effet, depuis plusieurs années, un Jurassien, d'un bourg semi-urbain proche du Clos-du-Doubs, mais avec des traits suisses alémaniques, a racheté un hôtel-restaurant et une épicerie du village qu'il exploite dynamiquement et avec succès. Ses normes, attitudes et valeurs, sont empreintes d'une assez grande modernité,

Les citoyens qui sont originaires de leur commune de domicile.

Jusqu'à l'époque pré-électorale cet „étranger" était relativement bien admis dans le village, bien qu'il ne se soit jamais gêné de critiquer très ouvertement la politique de la faction bourgeoise, à ses yeux trop traditionaliste. Lorsque les agriculteurs des fermes isolées apprennent que la faction traditionnelle a désigné un candidat pour succéder au maire sortant, ils demandent au restaurateur de se présenter également. Dès lors, la commune entre en effervescence. De part et d'autre, on tient des conciliabules secrets, on contracte des alliances, d'autres se défont, des menaces sont formulées et certaines sont exécutées. Finalement, ce nouvel acteur accepte de poser sa candidature: il apparaît comme le champion de la modernité et du changement contre la faction bourgeoise qui défend la tradition et le statu quo. Il remporte les élections à quelques voies de majorité seulement. C'est un prétexte pour les bourgeois de ne pas s'avouer vaincus; ils déposent protêt à la Préfecture pour vice de forme. Déboutés par le Préfet, ils s'adressent au Conseil exécutif du canton qui finalement repousse lui aussi les opposants et confirme l'élection. Cette phase post-électorale a duré une année et pendant cette période la commune a été administrée par la faction bourgeoise... Ces conflits ont eu des répercussions sur l'ensemble de la vie communale: des familles brouillées, des amis ne se parlent plus. A titre de représailles, la faction perdante boycote le restaurant et l'épicerie du nouveau maire, parfois aussi — dit-on — sabotent certains de ses équipements, cela en espérant qu'il quitte la commune.

A quelques nuances près, des événements semblables sont apparus dans deux autres communes: factions traditionalistes et modernistes, polarisées sur les mêmes critères; deux candidats à la fonction de maire, conflits profonds et durables.[8] Ce qui est particulièrement nouveau, ce n'est pas tellement la lutte entre les deux factions au moment des élections, mais la prolongation de ces conflits qui se répercutent sur d'autres aspects de la réalité sociale et provoquent de nouvelles tensions et divisions au sein de la population.

Comment expliquer l'apparition de ce processus conflictuel? Plusieurs facteurs doivent être pris en considération. Les communes, où cette émergence s'est produite, sont celles qui:

1) sont plutôt marquées par une rupture dans leur développement économique et social: implantation d'une industrie, multiplication rapide des maisons de vacances;

2) ont une part importante de leur population qui vit hors du village. Les habitants des fermes isolées sont en outre fréquemment des Suisses allemands et protestants;

3) ont une proportion relativement élevée de petits exploitants et de bourgeois.

Bourgeois, petits paysans et habitants du village sont des catégories qui ont tendance à se superposer et à constituer la faction traditionaliste. Inversement il semble aussi que les catégories: grands agriculteurs, habitants des fermes, non-bourgeois se superposent et constituent la faction moderniste.

Il ne faudrait cependant pas négliger d'autres qui, même s'ils apparaissent comme secondaires, sont néanmoins importants si l'on veut comprendre la grande complexité des conflits que connaissent ces collectivités. Des éléments tels que la consanguinité, le voisinage, la survivance d'éléments charismatiques

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[8] Ainsi, dans une autre commune, il y avait également deux candidats en liste, tous deux paysans, mais liés par un rapport de propriétaire à fermier. C'est le fermier qui a été élu. Ne pouvant admettre un tel „affront", le propriétaire fit savoir sur le champ à son fermier qu'il ne lui renouvellerait pas son bail.

(certains individus héritent, indépendamment de leurs capacités, du prestige dont jouissaient des ancêtres de leurs familles ayant joué un rôle politique important), doivent être pris en considération. Un élément extérieur à la micro-région que nous étudions vient encore compliquer cette situation. Il s'agit de la lutte pour l'autonomie du Jura, où s'affrontent séparatistes, anti-séparatistes et partisans d'une solution intermédiaire. Cependant, ces autres facteurs ne vont pas à l'encontre de la bipolarité tradition-modernité, bien au contraire, ils l'accentuent.

En bref, il semble que l'opposition entre tradition et modernité, entre partisans du statu quo et partisans du changement, soit bien le conflit dominant de ces communes.

Par les quelques éléments que nous, venons d'articuler, il apparaît qu'il y a interaction entre, d'une part, les mutations qui s'emparent de ces communes et, d'autre part, leur grande hétérogénéité sociale, économique, culturelle et écologique. La convergence de ces deux facteurs explique le passage du processus concensuel au processus conflictuel.

En résumé l'élection du maire représente un processus de décision des plus intéressants, du moins dans les communes où il y a conflits, car il fait véritablement apparaître la réalité communale en acte et dans sa totalité. Il joue, en quelque sorte, le rôle de catalyseur. Tous les éléments de la réalité sociale apparaissent dans ce processus et se concentrent autour de celui-ci: l'interaction de ces éléments permet précisément de saisir et d'analyser la destructuration et la restructuration constantes des forces sociales.

Pour ce qui est de l'influence respective des acteurs locaux, régionaux et cantonaux, nous constatons que l'élection du maire est une décision où les acteurs extra-communaux n'interviennent pas, sauf lorsque le résultat d'une élection est controversé. Les citoyents de chaque commune choisissent donc librement et selon leur propre volonté leurs autorités politiques. Mais encore s'agira-t-il de voir si ce sont bien ces autorités locales qui prennent les décisions déterminantes pour l'évolution et l'avenir des communes.

4.2. L'élection du secrétaire communal

Les communes rencontrent autant de difficultés pour trouver une personne qui puisse et qui veuille remplir la fonction de secrétaire que celle de maire.

Le processus de décision est lui aussi, tout à fait semblable à celui qui a lieu pour l'élection du maire: il est *conflictuel* dans les communes où le changement et les clivages sociaux sons intenses, consensuel dans les autres. Cependant, comme l'enjeu est moins important, les luttes sont plus faibles.

4.3. Les affaires scolaires

Au sujet de ces affaires scolaires les sept communes que nous avons étudiées font face à de sérieux problèmes. Comme elles sont coupées des centres urbains, elle ont toutes de grandes difficultés pour engager un instituteur ou une insitutrice. De plus, l'engagement ne dure qu'une ou deux années tout au plus. C'est à dire que l'instituteur ne joue plus le rôle de leader qu'on lui connaissait autrefois.

En outre, ces communes se posent toutes la question de savoir si la régression démographique qu'elles enregistrent ne rend pas inutile la construction ou la rénovation des écoles. Ne serait-il pas préférable d'envoyer les enfants au bourg

semi-urbain le plus proche? Mais une telle solution ne condamnerait-elle pas définitivement l'autonomie communale et la commune elle-même?

Presque toutes les communes, avec beaucoup d'hésitations et de longues discussions ont opté pour le maintien de l'école primaire, en argumentant qu'avec une école neuve et moderne, elles trouveront plus facilement des instituteurs.

4.3.1. La construction d'une école

La construction d'une école fait nettement apparaître le rôle important des acteurs extra-communaux. C'est l'inspecteur scolaire, qui, constatant l'état de désaffection d'un bâtiment scolaire (parfois ces bâtiments ne répondent même plus aux conditions hygiéniques élémentaires), demande à la commission d'école de faire les démarches nécessaires en vue de la construction d'une nouvelle école. Les membres d'une commission d'école sont généralement favorables à un développement de l'éducation et, par conséquent, à la construction d'un tel bâtiment. Il n'en va, par contre, pas toujours de même pour le reste de la population. Les dépenses élevées que nécessitent ces réalisations sont généralement à la base de la réticence, voire de l'opposition de celle-ci. Par exemple, pour faire des économies, on préfère une rénovation ou une transformation de l'ancienne école à la construction d'une nouvelle, etc.

C'est à cette phase de la décision que l'inspecteur scolaire et d'autres agents cantonaux jouent un rôle décisif: le système des subventions leur permet, bien souvent, d'imposer leur point de vue. Plus le projet est conforme aux normes cantonales, plus les subventions seront élevées. C'est d'ailleurs bien souvent, cet argument financier qui convaint la partie hésitante de la population. A force de discussions, autant informelles que formelles, elle se laisse petit à petit acquérir à l'idée d'une telle réalisation. Notons encore que ce ne sont pas les experts eux-mêmes qui défendent le projet auprès de la population, mais ils le font par l'intermédiaire de quelques personnalités locales influentes, auxquelles ils démontrent le bien-fondé du projet. Les leaders locaux s'efforcent ensuite de persuader le reste de la commune.

Ainsi, dans la construction d'une école, les experts ont une influence importante voire déterminante. Quant aux acteurs locaux ce sont les autorités et la commission d'école qui représentent l'élément moteur. Il est à relever que la quasi-totalité de la population a très peu conscience de l'importance des experts car elle attribue la réalisation d'une telle construction à ses propres autorités.

4.4. *Les décisions de nature économique et sociale: le rôle des experts*

Si on ne prenait en considération que les quelques décisions décrites ci-dessus, à l'exception de la construction de l'école, on pourrait penser que les communes sont complètement autonomes et qu'elles décident à elles seules des affaires communales et de l'orientation de leur développement économique et social.

Les décisions analysées jusqu'ici étaient de nature surtout institutionnelle et administrative. Il s'agit de prendre en considération des décisions ayant un caractère plus économique et social pour démontrer que l'économie communale est très relative.

Si nous prenons l'exemple de réalisation — que nous n'avons malheureusement pas le temps de développer ici — tels que les remaniements parcellaires, l'aménagement des routes et des chemins, les plans de zone et d'aménagement du territoire, etc. on constate que dans les phases décisives des processus de décisions,

les experts, grâce au système des subventions et à leurs connaissances techniques, ont, là aussi, un pouvoir très important. Dans ce genre de réalisation dont même l'initiative appartient aux autorités cantonales, les acteurs locaux n'ont alors plus qu'un pouvoir minime. L'exemple de la décision relative à la construction de l'école est tout à fait typique, à ce sujet.

Soulignons encore, que l'influence des agents extra-communaux n'est que très partiellement perçue par les autochtones: ils mentionnent parfois l'intervention d'un expert mais croient presque toujours que l'initiative vient des autorités locales. On peut se demander si dans une telle situation, l'autonomie ne devient pas un mythe ou un simple résidu idéologique. Même si la réalité n'est pas aussi grave, l'autonomie de ces communes est en tout cas sérieusement entamée.

5. CONCLUSION

Cette communication ne relate qu'une partie des résultats d'un des aspects de la recherche que nous avons entreprise.

En effet, en plus des données fournies par le test décisionnel dont nous ne publions ici qu'une partie, nous préparons un rapport comprenant les résultats:
— d'une analyse de l'évolution (sur 30 ans) de la structure sociale des conseils communaux,
— d'une analyse de contenu d'archives communales,
— d'une test réputationnel,
— d'un questionnaire sur le statut social et les aspirations des autorités communales en place en 1969—1970.

Il n'est pas exclu que certaines de ces données modifient quelque peu les conclusions que nous allons tirer ci-dessous.

Il ressort des chapitres précédents que:

1. Deux processus de décision relativement bien typés coexistent dans la région que nous avons étudiée; l'un plutôt traditionnel et ancien que nous qualifions de consensuel; l'autre récent et incontestablement conflictuel. Ce dernier est apparu dans les communes où deux facteurs se sont superposés: la mutation et les clivages sociaux. Ils sont la cause de l'émergence de deux factions opposées: l'une partisane de la modernité, l'autre de la tradition.

2. Ces deux processus sont décentralisés, voire participationistes. Pour toutes les décisions que nous avons étudiées, il apparaît que pour ainsi dire toute la population est concernée, s'exprime et intervient soit par les canaux formels de l'assemblée communale des commissions ou du conseil, soit par des canaux officieux rendus possibles grâce à la petitesse de ces communes et au système d'interconnaissance qui les caractérise.

3. Selon les types de décisions, la structure du pouvoir varie. Dans le cas des décisions politico-administratives (élection des autorités, budget, comptes, etc.) le maire apparaît comme l'acteur central.

Dans le cas des décisions ayant un impact sur le développement économique, social et culturel de la collectivité (construction de l'école, chemins, aménagement du territoire, etc.) les agents externes, privés ou publics — les experts — détiennent effectivement le pouvoir, mais ils agissent toujours par l'intermédiaire de leaders locaux.

En bref, le système de décision et la structure du pouvoir de ces communes sont pluralistes. A la fonction de maire correspond un pouvoir considérable, mais le contrôle social est tel qu'il ne peut agir que dans le cadre très stricte des modèles, normes et valeurs de ces collectivités rurales.

THE CITY AND ITS ENVIRONMENT: PROBLEMS OF CITY CLASSIFICATION FOR THE URBAN PLANNER AND SOCIAL SCIENTIST*

ROBERT R. ALFORD

USA

Systematic comparative urban research is still in its beginning stages. Three main types can be distinguished: case studies of leadership and decision making (the "power structure" literature), aggregated quantitative studies of policy making as related to political structure and economic structure, and factor analyses of population and labor force characteristics.

Common to all these types of urban studies is a neglect of the environment within which urban communities develop historically and exist. Under the guise of merely defining a unit of analysis (a city, an urban community, a locality, a metropolitan area), a critical theoretical assumption has crept in — that cities and communities can be regarded as autonomous subsystems to be fruitfully analyzed as separate units of analysis. This assumption distorts the analyses in ways important for both the urban planner and the social scientist.

The state and national context in which an urban community exists is usually regarded as a set of exogenous factors which enter only in *ad hoc* ways into the analysis. (1) In *case studies of decision making,* an official of a state or national agency is regarded as equivalent, as a role or position of leadership, to being a mayor or a Chamber of Commerce official. Similarly, whether or not an executive is a member of a locally owned or absentee-owned firm is regarded only as a descriptive fact, a characteristic of the individual, not a property of the linkages of the city with the economy as a whole which must be taken into account as properties of the urban community. This analytic perspective stems from a concern with the role of individual actors, rather than urban community systems as they relate to the society as a whole.

(2) *Aggregate studies of policy making* similarly have regarded the state and national context as a set of exogenous variables affecting the resources available to the city. The general level of wealth, national policies such as public housing, or state legislation, are examples. The interactions between levels of policy making are typically not analyzed.

(3) *Factor analyses* of city characteristics have universally ignored the state and national environment, assuming implicitly that the city could be treated as a unit of analysis in its own right, and that all of its characteristics as measured from population and labor force data were in fact properties of the city. The atheoretical character of factor analysis allowed implicit causal theories to pass unnoticed.

Contrary to the implicit assumptions of most of these studies, cities can and should be defined as arenas within which local struggles between groups occur, as reflections of larger movements within the society as a whole. The political, economic and cultural currents within the society as a whole immediately affect its component parts — the population in urban and rural areas — and events taking place in those component parts cannot be understood except in this historical and societal context. But the opposite point is also important. To try merely to understand the events and trends in the society as a whole without attempting to understand what is going on at "lower" levels will be to analyze societal reality at a level of abstraction and generalization which may conceal some of the most important events and developments. Social movements which ultimately become national in scope and importance may often begin with events in localities — strikes, demonstrations, killings. Isolating events from each other analytically or relating them either to the national society or to a specific locality assumes that both nation and locality are autonomous systems. The contradictory pressures to stabilize or to change existing institutions will not be analyzed in their full complexity.

This point may seem obvious when put abstractly, but is difficult to translate into a research operation which recognizes in its data, indicators and statistical procedures the different levels of causal forces — local, regional, national — which are in fact producing observed behavior and outcomes. The reason for this difficulty is both theoretical and methodological. It is *theoretical* because of the unfortunate tendency in behaviorally oriented social science to assume that individuals acting in situations are the main source of causal agency, and that the social-psychological factors of influence, motivation, role and the like are the crucial factors to measure and to interpret. This reductionist approach is less likely in cross-national research, where the structural and cultural variations in institutional organization, legal powers and economic resources cannot be ignored as easily as they can in studies based only on data from one country. It is *methodological* because data tend to be gathered with respect to a single "unit of analysis" and causal theories then tend to be generated about that unit of analysis — the city, the decision, the party, the group. Causal processes thus are associated with the unit of analysis to which the data refer, partly because of our desire to stay close to the data.

As comparative cross-national research on urban areas proceeds and as data archives begin to collect comparable data on policy outputs, social and economic structures and political processes, concerns to find some systematic ways of analyzing the data will increase. Nations and states or provinces will become the context within which properties and processes within urban areas are analyzed, and

the problems of contextual analysis will arise not merely in theoretical form, but as a specific empirical problem. Few studies exist which compare urban areas in ways which take systematically into account the political and socio-economic environment of the cities.

Since time and space are both short, I can only illustrate three points with empirical data from American cities: regional heterogeneity, correlations between city and state attributes and correlations of city policy outputs with attributes of the state political system. Again, my focus is on the implications of the data for city classification, not primarily on the substantive inferences which could be drawn.

First, the regional heterogeneity of American cities is such that factor analysis as a data reduction process should not arbitrarily settle on a population of cities defined by national boundaries, nor should comparative studies of policy making. There is no reason why we cannot, and probably every reason to, expand the systematic empirical comparisons of cities past national boundaries in order to arrive at a basis for meaningful city classifications.

TABLE 1. INTERCORRELATIONS OF PRINCIPAL VARIABLES ON SIX FACTORS, CITIES WITHIN NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN REGIONS

Variable	Variable					
	Size	Income	Manufacturing	Migrant	Nonwhite	Foreign Stock
Population size	—	—16 (02)	—03 (—11)	—17 (—19)	41 (20)	05 (06)
Median income of families		—	—06 (30)	20 (25)	—25 (—49)	15 (09)
Per cent of labor force in manufacturing			—	—52 (—41)	—10 (—08)	29 (—26)
Per cent of persons five years old and over who migrated from one county to another between 1955-1960				—	—12 (—26)	—37 (13)
Per cent of population nonwhite (natural logarithm)					—	—18 (—54)
Per cent of native population of foreign or mixed parentage (foreign stock)						—

The first correlation is that for 484 northern cities, the second (in parentheses below the first) is for 191 southern cities in 16 states: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia.
These variables are selected from among those variables loading most highly on the factors found by Brian Berry, "American Urban Dimensions, 1960," in Brian Berry, editor, City Classification Handbook: Methods and Applications (New York: John Wiley, 1972).

Table 1 presents the intercorrelations of six principal variables loading on each of six primary factors in a recent factor analysis, for the nation as a whole and separately for North and South. The correlations are highly unstable for the two populations of cities. Out of the fifteen intercorrelations five are significantly altered in magnitude (by at least .21) and two of these actually have different signs in the two regions.

These results call into question the assumption that national boundaries have any significance as the basis for selecting the population of cities for factor analysis. They suggest, on the contrary, that theoretical criteria for defining populations' of cities should be developed. As a first step in devising city classifications, factor analysis is useful, but should be extended both to wider ranges of variables and to a more diverse cross-national population of cities. Data availability and comparability may be the chief hindrance, but an assumption of national homogeneity should not be implicit.

Second, the apparent properties of the city itself may be properties of the state or region in which it is located — from the point of view of the causes and consequences of those properties. Properties of the environment should be brought directly into the basic data-set which provides the raw materials for classificatory typologies and not merely analyzed in relation to a typology based solely upon socio-economic characteristics of the city itself.

In order to illustrate an alternate procedure, a number of characteristics of the state or urbanized area in which a city is located have been converted into characteristics of the city for statistical purposes. Some of these characteristics are exactly the same for both units of analysis — median income or the size of the nonwhite population, for example. But others are "global" properties of the state — the degree of centralization of the state legislature, for example — by which we mean that they are not derived from adding up characteristics of the population but rather are characteristics of institutions whose boundaries are those of the state. For the purposes of computing correlation coefficients, each state figure has been regarded as an attribute of all the cities located in that state. Such variables can be treated exactly as any others for the purposes of statistical analysis.

These characteristics of states and urbanized areas have just as much logical and theoretical reason for being included in a primary data-set describing cities and used as the basis for classifications as the population and labor force data usually selected. In fact, from the point of view of using these data for assessing the causes and consequences of various city characteristics and the range of freedom which urban planners have, they may be even more important than other data. The major forces which are influencing city population size and growth, the location of major industries (and therefore the composition of the labor force) and the migration to the city of nonwhites and various ethnic groups, may not be (and probably are not) under the control of any likely actions of leaders and officials of that city, but are statewide, regional or even national in their origins and operations. Again, this raises the question of the meaning of the "city" both as the basic unit of analysis and the location of causal forces.

In our present analysis regarding state characteristics as properties of each city within a given state has both the advantage and the disadvantage of "weighting" a given state's characteristic by the aggregate characteristics of the number of cities in that state. Our assumption is that the more cities within a state, the more impact their characteristics will have upon the state and therefore we are allowing the aggregate characteristics of the cities to influence the resulting correlations.

Table 2 shows the correlation of the six principal socio-economic characteristics already considered for both a city and the state within which it is located. In fact, the correlations tell us how well we can predict the characteristics of a city if we know only the overall totals for that same characteristic for its state.

TABLE 2. INTERCORRELATIONS OF SIX PRINCIPAL VARIABLES FOR STATE
AND CITY BY REGION, AMERICAN CITIES OVER 25,000 POPULATION IN 1960

Variable	All Cities	North	South	Variable loads on factor	Correlation of variable with the factor
Population size	01	02	09	1	97
Median income of families	57	32	42	2	88
Per cent of labor force in manufacturing	68	64	48	9	67
Per cent of persons five years old and over who migrated from one county to another between 1955-1960	58	59	48	5	57
Per cent of population nonwhite (natural logarithm)	60	34	59	4	85
Per cent of native population of foreign or mixed parentage (foreign stock)	83	72	55	7	76

Each figure in the above table represents the correlation of each city's value on a variable with the
value of its *state* on the same variable.

As Table 2 shows, the ethnicity of the city is fairly well determined by that of
its state; the correlation is .83. But we do not know anything at all about a
city's population size by knowing its state's population. Larger cities are not ne-
cessarily located in larger states.

It seems plausible to infer that the ethnic character of a city, in a causal
and explanatory sense, derives from historical processes of settlement and migration
which had little to do with features of the city itself, but rather were related to
factors attracting populations with a certain ethnic stamp which were at least state-
wide in scope, if not regional in character.

Such a correlation may help us to understand the *causal* or explanatory
forces behind the development of populations with certain characteristics, but does
not tell us anything about their *consequences*. From the point of view of the city
as an ongoing entity, its ethnicity is an established fact, regardless of its origins.
Correlations of city and state characteristics of migration, manufacturing, non-
white composition and wealth are somewhat lower than that of ethnicity, ranging
from .58 to .69. But even here, the origins of city characteristics — even the
main ones singled out by factor analysis — seem to be at least statewide and
not local in character, if we can assume that these correlations reflect the conse-
quences of historical patterns of development of the local economy, the fortunes
of the local population and subsequent migrations. These correlations raise the
whole problem of the appropriateness of different units of analysis and what
the questions of analytic and explanatory concern really are. Decisions about
the choice of data and the analytic techniques will differ, depending on whether
we are trying to explain the characteristics of cities as they are, showing the hist-
orical processes of settlement, economic growth and decline, and their role in the
regional and national economy, or trying to develop a framework of description
within which the urban planner can make decisions in the light of the best in-
formation about the consequences of his actions.

Again, our major concern is not to assess the substantive meaning of the data, but rather to consider what a given range of city characteristics tells us about principles of city classification. If a "micro" characteristic of a city — that is a property which is not that of the city as a whole, in any global sense, but rather is a property of some subgroup within it — can be regarded as legitimately included in a factor analysis, for example, why should we not consider characteristics "outside" the city, such as the level of wealth or manufacturing in the state in which it is located? The number of persons enrolled in college, for example, is intrinsically related to the "city" only in the sense that the counting unit is the territory of the political unit at the time of the census, and these boundaries are subject to frequent change, with considerable consequences for all population figures. If this is true, and if we are concerned with causes and effects, then characteristics of the political system which determine the boundaries within which data are collected should be part of the basic inquiry.

Thus, a third type of environmental property is the political environment within which cities must function. Our empirical example here is the degree of centralization or coordination of decision-making within the state legislature. If most significant decisions within American state legislatures are made by negotiations of legislative leaders with the governor, or in a policy committee representing both houses and both parties, the decision-making system of the state could be regarded as more centralized and coordinated than if most decisions were made on the floor of a house or in regular committee meetings. Such a characteristic of the state can be regarded as a meaningful property of each city within the state, and one which may have critical consequences for the range of constraints upon policy makers within any given city, or for those within the state who wish to influence urban decisions. As such, it might be the type of characteristic which should be taken into account in constructing typologies of cities, at least if factors which have *causal significance* for internal processes in a city are of prime importance for the classification.

Other things being equal, we would expect that those decisions within a city which require more state cooperation would be more affected by the type of decision-making system existing in a state than those requiring less cooperation. Whether or not greater coordination and centralization within the state legislature would alter the quantity and quality of urban policy outputs could be argued both ways, depending upon the assumptions one would want to make.

Table 3 presents the relationship of the level of centralization or coordination of decision-making in a state with the level of local policy outputs in six different areas. It shows that in the two cases requiring state cooperation — urban renewal and public housing — the more centralized and coordinated states contain cities which obtained more urban renewal dollars and built more housing units. The two federal programs which did not require as much state cooperation — the "War on Poverty" and Model Cities programs — and the two completely local activities or decisions — fluoridation and Community Chest contributions — were not related or were more weakly related to the character of the state decision-making system. What this finding may indicate is that cities with political and administrative leaders more desirous of obtaining federal money are able to create more coordination in the state legislature, or are able to exploit an existing political system for their benefit. These factors may influence a city's growth and economic character. The stronger association of state legislative centralization with urban renewal and housing outputs in the South than in the North also shows

TABLE 3.   CORRELATES OF THE DEGREE OF CENTRALIZATION OF THE STATE
LEGISLATURE WITH URBAN POLICY OUTPUTS

	Correlations with Legislative Centralization[a]		
	All cities	North	South
Urban policy outputs requiring a high degree of state cooperation			
Number of dollars per capita reserved for urban renewal projects since 1949 (natural logarithm)[b]	22	15	40
Number of low-rent housing units per 100,000 population constructed under the Housing Act of 1949[c]	21	23	41
Urban policy outputs requiring a low degree of state cooperation			
Number of dollars per capita for "War on Poverty" programs as of June 30, 1966 (natural logarithm)[d]	—02	—04	05
Presence of application for a Model Cities program in either the first or the second round (1966-1967)[e]	06	04	08
Presence of any type of adoption of fluoridation[f]	00	—06	12
Amount raised for the 1965 Community Chest as a per cent of the "effective buying income" of the city[g]	11	04	20

[a] See Wayne L. Francis, *Legislative Issues in the Fifty States* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1967), Table VI, pp. 74-75, for the measure of centralization of state legislatures.

[b] Data from Department of Housing and Urban Development, Urban Renewal Directory, June 30, 1966, Washington, D.C., 1966.

[c] Data from Report S-11A, Consolidated Development Directory, Statistics Branch, Housing Assistance Administration, Department of Housing and Urban Development, Washington, D.C., June 30, 1967.

[d] Data taken from Office of Economic Opportunity, Poverty Program Information as of June 30, 1966, Washington, D.C. 1966. The raw data are transformed to a natural logarithm because of the skewing of the data.

[e] Data from "First Model Cities Grant Recipients Names", *Journal of Housing*, 24 (November,1967), pp. 547-549, and The Model Cities Administration, Department of Housing and Urban Development.

[f] We are indebted to Robert L. Crain, Elihu Katz, and Donald Rosenthal for release of the fluoridation data, which are analyzed in their book, *The Politics of Community Conflict: The Fluoridation Decision* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1969).

[g] Data as computed from National Community Chest, 1966.

the importance of varying political environments of a city for its internal functioning. Probably these are complex interactions of city and state characteristics which a detailed study could clarify.

THE UNIT OF ANALYSIS AS THE LOCATION OF CAUSAL AGENCY

All three of the points and data-illustrations above refer to the assumption that the unit of analysis is the location of causal agency. This point deserves a bit more discussion, because of its importance and also relative neglect.

The problem arises essentially because of the ambiguity about the location of causal agencies for processes occurring within cities. Whether or not observed phenomena can best be explained by the actions of community organizations and officials, by the operations of national cultural values, by ecological and economic factors at the level of the urbanized area, or by political traditions and wealth, at a state, regional or national level, is not obvious from the data themselves.

To some extent this problem can be regarded as one solved by seeing the operation of causal forces in a way which parallels the "nesting" of units of analysis within each other: decisions, men, organizations, urban areas, states, regions, nations. Organizations shape and select the men who make the decisions; urban areas grow in ways which shape and select the organizations within them; states and regions develop in ways which shape the urban areas within them. But this way of seeing the units of analysis merely redefines the problem in a possibly clarifying way; it does not solve the problem of selecting the appropriate unit of analysis or of interpreting the resulting data.

Generally, one should not rule out *a priori* the operation of causal forces at any level of social or political organization. In my work with Michael Aiken, we suggest that many of the properties usually assigned to the community as a whole can be reduced to properties of organizations and interorganizational relationships, which might seem to opt for a smaller, more "micro" unit of analysis than the data just presented, which show the dependence of "internal" processes upon state and regional factors. But neither is a methodological principle. Rather, the analyst should not prematurely assume, just because his *data* refer to cities, for example, that the theoretical concepts appropriate for an adequate explanation must also be defined in terms of the city as the causal agency. The basic causal forces may be at a larger, more macro level (the state, region or nation as a whole), or at a more micro level (organizations, individuals), or perhaps at all three levels.[1]

I believe that this point applies both to those studies which have a specified dependent variable (such as those attempting to explain policy outputs) and to those studies which are attempting to reduce a set of variables to fewer dimensions, as in factor analysis. In both types of studies, the definition of the population of cases, the selection of variables, the mode of data reduction should not be confused with theoretical inferences about the location of the basic causal forces, which have produced the observations being analyzed. The relatively high degree of local autonomy of cities in the United States may contribute to the prevalence of this assumption, which surely will be less possible in cross-national comparisons.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE URBAN PLANNER AND THE SOCIAL SCIENTIST

The goal of both the social scentist and the urban planner is ultimately to discover the causes and consequences of observed characteristics of cities, not simply to find correlates. Generalizations about correlations contain causal theories, whether these are implicit or explicit. Correlations or clusters of associated characteristics related to some postulated underlying common "factor" are regarded by the social scientist as having some causal significance, rather than being accidentally or spuriously related to each other, even if the specific causal processes are difficult to discover. Similarly, the urban planner is not interested in aggregations of causally unrelated data, no matter how closely correlated, but wants to discover critical developmental or causal sequences of events and processes, particularly those which he has some chance to influence.

[1] See Michael Aiken and Robert R. Alford, "Community Structure and Innovation: The Case of Urban Renewal", *American Sociological Review*, 35 (August 1970), pp. 650-665, and "Community Structure and Innovation: The Case of Public Housing", *American Political Science Review*, 64 (September 1970).

Again, this point may seem obvious, and yet its implications are far from self-evident when considering principles of city classification, particularly from the urban planner's point of view. To put the point abstractly, classifications of cities based on data and comparisons drawn from "micro" characteristics of the city — the behavior of the city council or the mayor — are as legitimate as those based upon "macro" characteristics — such as the number of poor families and the rate of city growth. The purpose of the investigation must dictate the phenomena being compared and the empirical data taken into account must be determined by the theoretical criteria and expectations of the causes and consequences of the phenomena. This "subsystem" problem is important to both the social scientist and the planner. The degree of autonomous causation among the developments occurring in one geographic segment of the city (or one organization, one government agency, one social group, one neighborhood) influences whether or not the city can be regarded for purposes of classification as a single entity, to be described by a single set of characteristics, or as an aggregate of diverse parts.

The urban planner ordinarily wants to know about the causes and consequences of city characteristics about which he can or cannot *do* something, not abstract correlations which may explain much of the economic, political and social variations between cities, but about which no conceivable coalition of administrative or political leadership could do anything. This point has an important implication for the construction and use of city classifications. If the basic factors which consistently turn up in factor analyses (even accepting their present procedures) — size, metropolitan location, economic base, ethnic and religious composition, regional and state location (those characteristics which may account for most of the variations between U.S. cities at least) — are for all practical purposes unchangeable, at least by American urban planners, then they are of little use to them except insofar as they now know about important factors which they *cannot* change. Typologies which are to be useful to the planner must "hold constant" those basic characteristics which he must regard as permanent or given — "parameters" or external conditions. In other words, what will be useful to him will be studies of regular patterns of interrelationships *within* major city types (however ultimately arrived at): small or large, industrial or nonindustrial, commercial or government centers, racially and ethnically homogeneous or heterogeneous, suburbs or central cities, old and physically dilapidated versus new cities.

To the extent that the powers available to the planner differ from country to country, different variables will be manipulable and the resulting needs for data on causes and consequences will differ. My final suggestion is that some crucial features of the environment of cities may be more easily changeable than supposedly internal properties and have more long-range consequences. Unfortunately, to consider systematically this extension of the problem of causal agency is beyond my scope today.

CENTRALIZED AND NON-CENTRALIZED COMMUNITY DECISION-MAKING SYSTEMS IN ENGLAND AND THE UNITED STATES*

K. NEWTON

ENGLAND

One of the most striking and important differences between community decision-making systems in England and the United States is the relatively highly centralized nature of the former compared with the non-centralization which is generally characteristic of the latter. The English system is a unified one which combines a relatively high degree of centralized control within each city with a relatively high degree of centralization of each local political system at the national level. In comparison, the United States has a more fragmented or segmented system which exhibits a generally high degree of non-centralization at both the city level and at the state and national level. By comparison with England, each community decision-making system in the United States is composed of a large number of autonomous or semi-autonomous political bodies and, similarly, the state and national government rarely exercise the same degree of tight central control over local government as it does in England. It is not the purpose of this paper to elaborate on this typology of unified, fragmented and segmented community decision-making systems for this is done elsewhere (Newton, 1972), but rather to analyze the various factors which seem to be related to the emergence of the different types of systems in the two countries.

Several formal constitutional factors help to account for the unification of English city government systems and their fragmentation in the United States. First and foremost is the organization of English local government by a strong national government. At the beginning of the nineteenth century there were no unified local authorities with general powers in England, but a whole series of independent local boards and authorities, often with similar or overlapping functions. The result has been described as "a chaos of areas, a chaos of franchises, a chaos of authorities and a chaos of rates." (Central Office of Information 1964:3) Gradually, legislation passed by central government removed the vast majority of these independent and ad hoc bodies and gave their powers to elected councils each of which came to hold general responsibility for the administration of public services in its own area. Thus formal power of local government and

decision-making in each city was unified under the control of a single set of elected representatives.

Each council now forms part of an integrated and relatively uniform pattern of general purpose local government units, each of which controls, within its own area, the vast majority of local government services, including education, housing, roads, fire services, libraries, parks, local taxation, sanitation, town and country planning, entertainments licensing, street lighting and many other services besides. Central government plays a role of immense importance, so important that it is difficult to over-estimate it, in each of these areas of local affairs, but even so it is correct to say that insofar as decisions are made locally, they are made by the council. In the United States, on the other hand, city government does not mean one or even a small handful of local authorities but a bewildering complexity of different authorities, each dealing with its own particular area or service. As one English observer of American city government has put it, "In an American city hall one never finds the range of work to be found in an English county borough, a point to be continuously borne in mind by observers used to a more streamlined system." (Marshall, 1967:65).

The fragmentation of American city government is also a consequence of the separation of executive and legislative powers, particularly in the strong mayor-council and council-manager systems. In English city government, as in national government, there is no separation of powers. What may be loosely termed the "executive" of city government in England emerges out of the majority group on the council in much the same way that the Prime Minister and his colleagues of the inner cabinet emerge out of the majority party in the House of Commons. Unlike the strong mayor-council cities of the United States, the English Mayor or Lord Mayor is not vested with executive powers, but performs the ceremonial role of civic figure-head.

Just as central government played a critical role in creating a relatively small number of general purpose local authorities in England in the nineteenth century, so it continues to play an equally critical, though more latent role, in maintaining the concentration of centres of responsibility in twentieth century city government. It does so by means of the large amounts or money which it passes to local government. Although difficult to calculate with any precision it has been estimated (Humes and Martin, 1969:188) that approximately sixty per cent of municipal income comes not from local tax-raising efforts but from central government grants and subsidies. And, of course, central government likes to keep a close watch on how this money is spent. This means that for ease of administration and supervision it likes to deal with the smallest possible number of local government units and with only one responsible body within each individual authority. Local and central government finance would be impossibly complex if local government were divided and subdivided into tens of thousands of small parts. As long as central government continues to play an important part in city government any tendency towards atomization of this kind will be resisted by enormously strong, if latent, economic pressures. Pressures of a similar strength have not been exerted on city governments of the United States, although it is likely that they will increase with the development by the federal government of urban aid programmes, anti-poverty programmes and such like.

Another major factor which helps to concentrate decision-making power in English city politics is the party system which exists in a more or less well developed form in all large cities and in most large towns. The Conservative,

Labour and Liberal parties all have local organizations which provide the majority of active participants in local politics and the supporting structures for party groups on the council. The two main parties usually contest a very high proportion of all elections in urban areas and control a large majority of council seats. The party system which operates in most city councils is not unlike that of the House of Commons, although the stakes are obviously not as large and hence party discipline is sometimes weaker and the organizational and ideological foundations are less firm. Nevertheless, the party system of English city politics does have the important effect of aggregating interests and of mobilizing and organizing groups of people behind two or three political organizations, each of which is willing and able to take control of decision-making authority. When opinion in the council is unified in this way into two or three power blocks, the chances of outside groups effectively challenging council decisions are reduced considerably. Community groups have to try to work through and with the party groups and the administration. Community groups cannot overcome them (without very considerable and sustained effort) and they cannot afford to ignore them. As the author of one study (Peterson, 1969) concludes, "Local politicians are more isolated from group pressures in Great Britain than in the United States." It is the concentration of effective power within the majority group on the council that shields majority group members from some of the influences of the pressure group system.

In most American cities the party system is less fully developed than in England and in some of them it plays a negligible role. In such cases the community and its decision-making bodies are not organized into a small number of strong political parties, but into a large number of groups based primarily on religious, occupational, industrial, status, ethnic, colour or class differences. Each of these groups may attempt to influence issues which are of interest to them and they may well compete or co-operate with others in doing so, but there is less likely to be a relatively stable coalition of forces such as one finds organized into city politics by the party system in England. To this extent the American city is more likely to have multiple centres of power and pressure groups are more likely to play a more direct and also a more obvious role in community issues. As Williams and Adrian found, (1963:312) "Organized recruitment and campaigning for city council members leads to concentration of much decision-making in the council. Without such organization, the professional administrators and the interest groups fill the void." This is certainly not to say that parties are absent from city politics in the United States or that pressure groups are absent from city politics in England. It does mean that decision-making powers in England are centralized and concentrated by the party system, which is relatively well developed, while in the United States they are decentralized and fragmented by the pressure group system, which is given more room to flourish by virtue of the loosely organized party system.

There are other factors at work as well. Rarely is the referendum used as a decision-making mechanism in England. Invariably decisions are taken by the elected and permanent officials of the council and, no matter how controversial, the issue is only very rarely thrown back into the community arena for the whole electorate to make its will known directly. In the cities of the United States decision-making powers are not infrequently given back to the electorate when a referendum is held. Over a quarter of the cities studied by Crain, et al. (1969:92), decided to put the fluoridation issue to a vote by referendum. In addition local election primaries are not held in England, party candidates for local elections

being selected by a very small group of local party officials and activists. The primary, where it is used in America, gives the electorate a greater measure of direct influence over which is to stand in local elections, and to this extent power is distributed over a broader cross-section of the community, rather than being concentrated in the hands of a small handful of local political activists. Nor do English cities use the initiative or the recall which are other mechanisms used in America designed to transfer power from the hands of a few elected officials to those of the whole electorate.

Paradoxically the broad base of popular support necessary for election to the average American city council seems to paralyze rather than encourage political action. It has been found that some American councilmen have been unwilling to act as political leaders and innovators because this may jeopardise their future electoral success. Adrian (1958) has written that "while a councilman might concentrate upon a particular aspect of municipal policy, it was found to be dangerous for him to seek to make some specific issue a *cause celebre*. If he chose to do so, he immediately subjected himself to greater public attention and scrutiny than was the case for the typical councilman, and he risked defeat on the issue which could in turn have disastrous political consequences for him. There is danger in leadership, relative safety in conformity and anonymity. The study indicated that councilmen were aware of this." (See also Altschuler, 1967: 362-2). The situation of council members in England is quite the reverse. They are continually taking up issues and fighting political battles, because they have the security and protection of their party organizations and party label — providing, of course, that their stand is not flatly contradictory to their party's general policy. When election time comes around the council members' individual record will count for little (Morris and Newton, 1970). What really matters is his party label and his party organization. Thus while the American councilman is nervously side-stepping political controversy, and attempting to thrust it back into the community, his English equivalent has nothing to lose by making the council chamber a real political battle-ground.

Whether or not they appreciate the full extent of their freedom from electoral constraints, council members in England are sure of the fact that they and only they are the popularly elected representatives of the people and, therefore, they have the right to exclusive control of public policy. This contrasts with the system in many American cities, where not only is the council popularly elected, but also a broad range of other officials besides. The "long list" allows for the election of mayors, treasurers, clerks, assessors, auditors, attorneys, departmental heads, school boards and other special purpose boards and agencies. Each elected official or board forms a separate little centre of power, which is legitimated by the fact of popular election.

The concentration of community leaders and decision-makers within local councils in England is further facilitated by the fact that councils are large. The largest of them (Liverpool's) has one hundred and sixty members, while county boroughs (with a population of thirty three thousand or more) have, on average, fifty seven members (Committee on the Management of Local Government, Vol.5: 1967:538). The councils of most cities are certainly large enough to contain representatives of all the most important community groups and organizations. Study of council members has also shown that they have an astonishingly broad range of contacts with community groups (cf. Committee on the Management of Local Government, Vol. 2: 1967: Chapter 6; Rees and Smith, 1964:58-59), so that

in most local authorities a wide range of political views and the positions of a broad variety of community organizations can be expressed during council debates and committee meetings. This is in contrast with city councils in many American cities which, on average, have five, seven, or nine members (Bonfield and Wilson, 1963: 88). As a consequence, a majority of community organizations may be predisposed to act outside the official political forum of their community. Pressure group activity is generally a great deal more visible in America than in Britain, though it is not necessarily any more important for that reason.

Groups which are represented among the elected members of the council can gain representation as co-opted members of council committees. The practice of co-opting a small number of representatives of leading community organizations onto a few local government committees is widespread in England and Wales. An American observer (Smallwood, 1965:105) has noted that "the British have been considerably more open than is generally the case in the United States in incorporating many of their groups directly into the very heart of the executive process." One survey (Committee on the Management of Local Government, Vol. 5, 1967:559) found that seventy eight of the larger cities in England and Wales co-opted members onto their local authority committees, and that the total number of co-optations was only a little short of three thousand. As the report points out, "Co-option to committees aims at broadening the basis of council decisions and in some cases at associating relative outside interests in their work. It acknowledges a need to bring into deliberation members of the public who have a special contribution to make, either because of their expert knowledge or as spokesmen of groups in the community which are closely affected by council decisions and which might otherwise be inadequately represented." It must be emphasized that co-option is not of great importance in community decision-making in England, but nevertheless, it is a factor, however small, which helps to concentrate, rather than disperse, influences on the decision-making process.

No account of the factors which contribute towards the concentration of decision-making power in English city politics could be complete without a discussion of the committee system. As all the textbooks state, English city government is government by and through committees. Moreover, the deliberations of the vast majority of committees are not accissible to either the press or the general public, which gives committee members more independence to bargain, compromise and take up unpopular positions than if their every word was exposed to public scrutiny and criticism. Decisions made by committees in private must be ratified by the whole council, which meets in public, but, as one source (Humes and Martin, 1969:103) puts it, "Many English local committees act in an apparently independent fashion, with council approval of their action appearing to be an almost foregone conclusion." It is indeed true that most committee decisions are accepted by the council with little or no discussion, but this is only half the story. Control of the committee system is at the heart of majority group control of the council. In most cases the policies to be pursued by the party group on the council are discussed in each group's caucus meeting by all members of the group plus a few other members of the borough party. These meetings are secret because political parties are private organizations. Once they have made up their minds about an issue, each party will pursue its policy in council and committee according to agreed tactics. The majority party can get its own way because it holds a majority of committee places including the committee chairmen, as well as a majority on the whole council. And since it holds a majority on the whole council, the minority

party or parties will rarely find it tactically fruitful to force a vote. The council therefore leads back to the committees which, in turn, leads back to the party system, and the end result is the centralization of all policy and decision-making through the internal organization of the majority party. Since the majority party can only retain control of the council and its committees by ensuring that it presents a solid front to the opposition on most important issues, it must have either a strong, natural cohesion, or else a well developed set of formal and informal rules designed to maintain party discipline. In either case, effective power is concentrated within a single organization and is centralized to the extent that the party organization is centralized. On central political issues the party groups on some councils maintain a centralized system of party discipline and policy-making which is the envy of all but the most die-hard Stalinists.

Another factor is worth mentioning here. In the United States the mass media are predominantly localized with each area having its own radio and television stations and its own newspapers. The local press seems to be a particularly important centre of influence in American cities and in many of them ranks second in importance to the mayor (Clark, 1969). In England the mass media are mostly centralized on London, although very recently a number of local radio stations have been established. At the moment they are too new to have become much of a force in the community. The press is also centralized and the majority of city dwellers read not a local morning paper but one of the national dailies. It is true that a small handful of the larger cities like Birmingham, Glasgow, Sheffield and Leeds have their own morning newspapers which offer editorial comment and leadership on important community issues, but the vast majority of local newspapers appear in the evening or the week-end, dealing with local social gossip and devoting little space to systematic coverage of serious community issues. Thus another important centre of power outside the council is absent in English city politics but present in America.

Lastly, one could point to cultural differences between England and the United States which have helped to shape different types of political structures in the cities. A strong tradition of local self-government has always expressed itself in forceable ways in the United States and is more deeply embedded in the political 'ethos' of city government than in England. It could be argued that England is altogether too small and too continuously urbanised to sustain much of a preference for local autonomy or to make this the most practical form of governing cities. Centralized planning and regulation was accepted as a necessary evil or as a blessing long before the Labour Party encouraged ideas about socialist planning and central control of local government. At the same time, feelings of deference towards the independent authority of the government was probably a great deal more widespread during the formative years of modern English city politics and helped shape a political structure which concentrated power and authority in relatively few hands. The participant political culture of the United States combined with a tradition of local autonomy resulted in a different type of system with a multiplicity of access points for popular intervention at all its levels.

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SOCIOLINGUISTICS
SOCIOLINGUISTIQUE

A MULTIFACTOR AND MULTILEVEL APPROACH TO APPLIED RESEARCH ON THE SOCIOLOGY OF LANGUAGE

JOSHUA A. FISHMAN*

USA

The applied sociology of language is concerned with societal differentials touching upon the major fields of applied linguistics (Fishman, 1971):

(i) language policy and planning
(ii) language teaching
(iii) creation and revision of writing systems
(iv) literacy programs and
(v) translation programs

MACRO-STUDIES

In each of the above fields macro-studies (or more generally macro-discussions) have proceeded along the lines of inter-polity or inter-language differentials in connection with selected independent variables. Thus, given methods X and Y with respect to second language instruction at the elementary level, macro-analysis is likely to ask:

(a) whether one method is generally superior to the other, each country (or region) or language being considered an "instance" or "case" in point, or,

(b) given that no clear "yes" or "no" reply is forthcoming with respect to (a) above, whether one method is superior to the other in particualr *types* of polities, or in connection with particular types of first language-second language co-occurrences.

MICRO-STUDIES

In contrast with macro-studies (of which there have really been far fewer than would appear to be the case from the frequency with which questions or discussions at this level are encountered, e. g. "Is Romanization of the writing system generally more likely to increase literacy rates than the maintenance of indigenous non-Roman writing systems?") micro-studies attempt to pursue small-network inquiries in connection with differentials pertaining to selected independent

variables. Thus, given methods X and Y with respect to second language instruc-
tion at the elementary level micro-analysis is likely to ask:

(a) whether one method is generally superior to the other, each class, school
or school district being considered an "instance" or "case" in point, or

(b) given that no clear "yes" or "no" reply is forthcoming with respect to
(a) above, whether one method is superior to the other in particular *types* of classes,
schools or school districts in the context of particular types of first language-second
language co-occurrences.

A COMBINED APPROACH

Very few micro-studies have been undertaken within the bounds of the appli
ed sociology of language, perhaps, in part, because the entire discipline is so young
but, perhaps, also in part, because the answers forthcoming from such studies
would not provide sufficient guidance for large scale policy decisions in other
macro-contexts (countries, languages, etc.). Superficially viewed there would seem
to be a contradiction between the fact that, on the one hand, initial policy de-
cisions with respect to curricula, methodologies and materials of instruction are
generally made and implemented on the *macro-level*, whereas the careful evalu-
ation of outcomes requires analysis, feedback and subsequent policy revision (or
adjustment) at the most micro-level consonant with available resources. However,
this seeming contradiction can be overcome by *combining both macro- and micro-
analysis* within one and the same study design. The following discussion of such a
design deals with the field of language planning but might be of interest to those
concerned with planning research and evaluation in various other educationally
relevant fields of applied sociology of language.

LANGUAGE PLANNING

The term *language planning* refers to the organized pursuit of solutions to
language problems, typically at the national level (Jernudd and Das Gupta 1971,
Fishman, ms.). Several investigators have enumerated rather similar types or kinds
of language planning. Thus Neustupny (1970) has suggested (see Table 1), that
when the *problem* to be faced is that of *code selection, planning* is concerned with
official policy formation by authorities in control of power. When the problem is
that of *stabiliznig the selected code* (in view of its variability over space, time and
experiential networks), *planning* is concerned with *codification* via dictionaries,
grammars, spellers, punctuation and pronunciation guides, etc. When the *problem*
is that of rapidly *expanding* the number of available options (as a result of the
addition of new functions for the selected code), *planning* is concerned with *ela-
boration* via nomenclatures, thesauruses, etc. When the *problem* is that of *dif-
ferentiation* of one variety from another within any particular code, *planning* is
concerned with *cultivation* via the preparation of style manuals, the subsudization
of literary creativity in a variety of genres for various purposes and audiences.
Neustupny clearly sees the above four *problem-planning correspondences* as norm-
ally standing at least in a rough sequential relationship to each other, such
that the least developed or least advanced speech-and-writing communities may
need to be disproportionately concerned with *policy formation planning*, whereas
the most developed or most advanced communities are able to devote proportion-
ately more attention to *cultivation planning*.

TABLE 1. PROBLEM/PROCESS CORRESPONDENCES IN LANGUAGE PLANNING
(per Neustupny 1970)

	1	2	3	4
Problem	Selection	Stability	Expansion	Differentiation
Process	Policy Decisions	Codification	Elaboration	Cultivation

For the sociology of language the processes and consequences of language planning (vis a vis change in language usage) should ultimately be as central as are the processes and consequences of social planning more generally (vis a vis change in social usage) in general sociology. In both realms we are concerned with the circumstances which account for the differential outcomes of organized deployment of time, resources and effort toward goals desired by the authorities in power. In both realms — the narrower as well as the wider — we are eager to compare planned change with unplanned, rapid fad-and-fashion behavior, on the other hand.

PREVIOUS STUDIES

Although journal references to language planning are not inconsiderable (see e. g. the hundreds of references in Fishman, Ferguson and Das Gupta 1968 and in Rubin and Jernudd 1971) the number of full fledged studies of monographic length or longer are few indeed. Of the small number in the latter category a large proportion deals primarily with language policy *decisions* and their implementation (e. g., Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturism 1965, 1967, 1968; Commission on the Restoration of the Irish Language 1965, 1966, 1968) or with the historical and/or linguistic facts of the cases described (Gastil 1959, Le Page 1964, Minn Latt 1966, Whitely 1966). Very few studies indeed give any attention to the *actual processes of language planning per se*, that is on *who* does it, *how* it is done, *who* implements it, how *that* is done, who *accepts* it and to what *degree*.

The few major studies available to us that deal (at least to some extent) with language planning per se (Alisjahbana 1960, De Francis 1950, Haugen 1966, Heyd 1954, Kurman 1968) are all qualitatively sound and well written. Unfortunately, these studies were conducted at widely different times, by scholars trained in very different data collection biases and with far different theoretical interests. As a results, it is very difficult to extract from them any general principals accounting for the differential successes which each of these studies cites. Finally, each of these studies — although dealing with a particular country and language at a particular time — is actually a macro-study in that it purports to account for a single *countrywide outcome* in each instance.

A CROSS-NATIONAL STUDY

For all of the above reasons a group of social scientists interested in language behavior have recently launched a cross-national study of language planning processes. Because of their own limitation (in funds, in time and in understanding)

they have restricted themselves to four countries (Indonesia: Indonesian, India:
Hindi, Israel: Hebrew and Pakistan: Bengali) and to language planning at the
lexical level.* Admittedly, both of these restrictions pertain to variables which
must themselves be studied and evaluated in future research. In the study in ques-
tion two of the countries involved (Indonesia and Israel) currently style themselves
as being mono-modal and two as being multi-modal in terms of national moderni-
zation and integration goals in the cultural sphere (Fishman 1969).

VARIABLES TO BE EXAMINED

1. Planning Variables. Although each of the countries selected has an offici-
ally recognized language planning agency, these agencies differ in the extent to
which they are governmentally controlled or supported, in the extent to which
they are open to influence by various clientelle groups, in the extent to which
they attempt to involve ultimate or intermediate consumers in the planning process
and in the extent to which they are exposed to competition from unofficial language
planning organizations (of political parties, religious groupings, occupational
groups, etc.) as well as to competition from unplanned language innovation in the
same country.

Additional language planning variables to be examined deal with the resources,
qualifications and methods of the planners, their familiarity with language planning
efforts in other countries, the internal organization of the language planning agen-
cies and their links (formal and informal) to the mass-media, on the one hand,
and to the educational world (hierarchy and rank-and-file), on the other hand.

2. Implementation Variables. The countries selected vary in the degree to which
governmental controls and sanctions are exercised on behalf of language planning
products. Not only do these controls and sanctions vary in *intensity*, but they
also vary in the extent to which they *blanket the entire sphere* of the mass media
and the educational institutions. A considerable amount of publication activity
in the languages of interest to us also occurs outside of several of the countries or
jurisdictions under consideration. As a result, both planning and implementation
variation may exist in this connection, since some may attempt joint planning,
while others may attempt restrictive implementation with respect to publications
or broadcasts from outside.

3. Population Variables. Three different *user-populations* have been selected
for attention via sampling methods in connection with three different *semantic
fields*. The populations are students at the secondary, university and teacher train-
ing levels, teachers at the secondary, university and teacher training levels and
parents of students at the above mentioned levels. The semantic fields selected for
study are chemistry (a natural science field in which one rarely acquires any sub-
stantial vocabulary without specialized study), local language and literature (a
humanistic field in which all educated persons receive at least a modicum of spe-
cialized training) and local and national government (a social sceience field in
which all literate citizens acquire some specialized vocabulary as a result of mass-
media exposure and personal endurance). The study will seek to determine to what
extent differentials exist between the above mentioned populations in the above
three semantic fields, particularly insofar as terminologies approved by the of-
ficial language planning agencies are concerned.

* In addition to the four countries and languages specified a smaller subset of topics will
also be studied in Sweden and in the Republic of Ireland.

In addition, the above populations (as well as a general adult population and the textbook writer population) will also be studied with respect to their personal language histories and current usage practices, their language attitudes, their language planning attitudes and information, their modernization and nationalism attitudes and a variety of personal background variables (education, reading habits, media-listening or media-watching habits, visits abroad etc.).

STUDY DESIGN

In general terms, the study focuses upon three classes of variables:

Independent variables: Planning variables per se, particularly in reference to semantic fields under study.

Intervening variables: (a) Implementation variables, particularly in reference to the semantic fields under study.

(b) Population variables

(i) attitudinal re language planning: general and specific

(ii) informational re language planning: general and specific.

(c) Inter-polity variables: differences between the countries involved, the languages involved and the resources and models available for planning and implementation.

Dependent variables: Lexical knowledge, lexical usage and lexical evaluation.

The above variables lend themselves to study via two-way analyses of variance in which between-country differences and between-semantic field differences are systematically examined. In addition, factor analyses may be attempted of the hundreds of items included within the independent and the intervening measures. Finally, multiple regression analyses, using the independent and intervening variables as predictors and the dependent variables as criteria, will almost certainly be attempted.

Conclusions: A study of this type cannot hope to answer all possible questions concerning "the differential success of various language planning processes and implementation procedures with respect to various target population", if only because of the restricted number of countries, of user populations and of planning products included. However, for the middle range of developing countries (countries with quasi-planned economics and quasi-democratic institutions and traditions, at least in the cultural sphere) the findings may prove to be of substantial interest, particularly because of the attention given to distinguishing between-country (macro-)variation from within-country (micro-)variation. Thus, given differential knowledge of planned terminologies in the three semantic fields examined, it will be possible to determine whether such differentials are more parsimoniously attributable to between-country or to within-country factors. If within-country factors are salient it will be possible to determine whether the differentials encountered are more parsimoniously attributable to population variables, planning variables, implementation variables, etc.

If significant interactions are encountered, as expected, then it will become clear at least for the countries and products studied, that planning is differentially effective for particular populations depending on the type of implementation employed within the given cultural-economic context. Finally, the research problems encountered and the solutions attempted to them may be of general interest to applied sociology of language research on a cross-national basis. Hopefully, future applied research on methods and material of second language instruction, or on the acceptability of new writing systems and literacy or literary materials will benefit from the combined macro-plus-micro approach here set forth.

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COMMONPLACES IN THE ROOTS OF LANGUAGE

EDWARD ROSE

USA

How an array of language roots points to a massive body of sense has been the directing concern of this inquiry. Roots can be linked through the senses they are taken to express and senses are correspondingly linked through roots. A single great body of sense happens to be formed out of coincidences in the assignment of meanings to the Indo-European roots. That body, though intricately and confoundingly patterned, lends itself to a fairly plain description that will be undertaken here. And sociology will be fitted to that great mass of sense by locating within the mass a few sociological conceptions.

It is convenient to refer to the declarative senses of roots, to the senses that etymologists simply have declared to be the core meanings of roots. Almost all of these declaratives standing as the senses of roots are recognized as commonplaces of sense that are everywhere brought out, usually as the simplest, most familiar, utterly comprehended notions in the most ordinary expressions in all natural languages. Examples are notions of a man, of a woman, of you or me, of numbers up to ten, of in or out, of common things to do like eating or sleeping. Such commonplaces generally can be expressed by what is called Basic English or Basic German or by whatever is taken as the basics of any language. Say that the commonplaces are those notions that may be clearly grasped by any four-year old child and by his father. It is simply such commonplace senses as these that make up most of the declaratives of roots. The commonplaces of sense appear always to have represented the commonplaces of experience and of imagined experience. It is not strange then for etymologists to have enfolded them among the roots of language.

Now it is through the exercise of what are really outrageous presumptions of agreement, understanding and interpretation on the part of humanity speaking languages that the commonplaces of sense, especially as ordinarily declared, are allowed to carry the rather amazing qualities of 1) universality of recognition in all languages, 2) pervasive persistence of usage over vast reaches of time, however translated into the terms of many languages, 3) unquestioned openness to comprehension assumed by all persons as they encounter in their native languages expressions of these commonplaces and 4) especially when connected with roots, the historically displayed and yet mysterious seminal power of expansion of meaning. These handy endowments of universality and persistence of use and recognition, of ready comprehendedness and of seminal power not only attach importance to the commonplaces of sense expressed by roots, but render the root commonplaces accessible to inquiry: though few of us may comprehend roots

directly, all of us may recognize and deal meaningfully with the senses of roots translated for us into native tongues or into other mastered languages.

Well then, assume deliberately two ethnographical attitudes: 1) roots are so distant, so strange that not one of us can understand them; 2) the senses of roots are so close, so familiar when expressed for us in English or in some other managed language, that not one of us can fail to understand them. Etymologists know both the mysterious roots and the comprehended language into which senses can be translated. Etymologists can serve then as trustworthy informants helping us to fit sense well comprehended by us to roots that can remain absolutely mysterious. This fitting of the known with the unknown, of sense with nonsense, is indeed a fundamental, though often unnoticed, procedure of hermeneutical inquiry. We can simply follow that procedure deliberately.

Take it that all of us here understand English perfectly. Then our subject-matter can speak for itself as roots may inform etymologists and they in turn may inform us in English about the senses of roots. I shall direct your attention then to how senses are brought closely together or are separated through linkages with roots. The etymologist serving, as my informant is Calvert Watkins who with his associates in the Department of Linguistics at Harvard has recently prepared a list of Indo-European roots, glossed especially for the etymology of English.[1]

English is here made to serve as a meta-language with great resources for making sense out of such things as roots. Only a small portion of English was actually used by Calvert Watkins for explicating the roots. That would seem to be the radical portion of English sense and expression. We may then describe as a radical any comprehended English term or sense of a term that glosses and seems to clarify any uncomprehended language feature, particularly a root or a lemma out of which a root may have been reconstructed. A simple example: the fully comprehended notion of 'sitting' is a radical, indeed the declarative radical, of the uncomprehended root, *sed-*. Don't let your knowledge of the Latin, 'sedere', help you to seem to understand *sed-*.

There are critical radicals. A critical radical is any comprehended term, set of terms or sense of a term that glosses and clarifies two or more roots or lemmas. These radicals are called critical exactly because it is through them that roots are linked to roots and consequently that senses are linked to senses by connections with roots. The great body of sense alluded to here is made possible by and compounded largely out of critical radicals.

Be prepared for strange linkages. Seemingly disparate senses may be closely linked simply by the most trifling twists of language history. For instance 'to bend down' and 'animal' are fairly closely linked senses, not because we can think of some animals, such as elephants, bending down, but because 'bending down' and 'animal' are each directly connected with the notion of 'small'. 'Small' in English comes from the Old English, 'small,' 'that' traces back to a reconstructed Germanic root, *smal-* that stands for the notion of 'small animal' and that in turn leads back to the Indo-European root, *smēlo-* or *mēlo-*, also meaning 'small animal'. 'Small' and 'animal' and 'small animal' are directly-connected declarative radicals of *smēlo-* or *mēlo-*. And 'small' is further the declarative radical of still another root, *leud-*, that is glossed by the idea of 'to bend down' by way of explicating the sense of 'small.' To make something small, bend it down. And say that it is as small as

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[1] Presented as an appendix to *The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language*, William Morris, editor (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1969), pp. 1505-1550.

a *smélo* or small animal. The notion of small links at least two roots, *leud-* and *smēlo-*. It thus is a critical radical that in odd ways fits into the great body of sense delineated by the Indo-European roots. We are now ready to discuss that body of sense and those roots.

I offer the briefest possible descriptions. The lists of Indo-European roots may range from about 1200 to 1500 terms, depending upon whether certain questioned terms are admitted into a list and upon whether certain extensions of roots are listed separately from parental forms. With the elimination of a number of obscure or foreign roots from Watkins' list, I investigated 1296 roots. Of these 1296 roots 1241 were through Watkins' glosses linked together into a single network by critical radicals, where a critical radical was taken to be any spoken English term and its clearly comprehended sense introduced by Watkins into the gloss of two or more roots. I thus found in Watkins' glosses 524 critical radicals serving to bring the 1241 or 95% of the roots into this massive single network of primal Indo-European terms.[2] The 524 critical radicals in turn were drawn together by the roots into a great intricately knotted ball of sense, made up largely of commonplace notions.

The most common declarative and explanatory notion offered in the English glosses of Indo-European roots is the sense of 'to cut'. 'To cut' is the primal declarative of twenty-nine roots and further is involved in extended glosses of eleven other roots or their lemmas. Then 'to cut' is the principal critical radical for Indo-European roots, it is in other words the most common, most accessible link between roots and can serve as a principal link between senses. Simply for purposes of exposition here, I shall describe the great congeries or ball of Indo-European sense as though the idea of 'to cut' lay at the heart of it. I do not thereby imply that 'to cut' is the most important, most relevant, best characterizing sense among the Indo-European roots and languages. It is simply the notion most easily reached and therefore the most effective radical to place at the center of the network of senses joined through roots. 'To cut' is like the most talkative gossip in the neighborhood: you can expect to find her involved in much of the talk and, thus, closely in touch with many of her neighbors.

1. Picture now a great ordered universe of sense with the most accessible radical, 'to cut,' placed in the center.

2. Surround 'to cut' with the forty roots to which it is directly linked (*tem-, sek-, sneit-, bherdh-* and 36 others).

3. Surround the forty core roots with 169 senses that link the core roots with 485 other roots. These 169 senses through their function of linking roots are critical radicals, constituting a second order of commonalities through which roots are joined by senses. These include such notions as the following frequently standing as the declarative senses of roots: strike, protect, break, head, push, thick and sharp.

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[2] A more intensive review of Watkins' glosses of roots is now being undertaken by myself and P. W. Stadheuwer, Jr. In that review notions such as 'bent', 'to bend' and 'bending' are listed under a single sense, 'to bend'; 'to die', 'dying' and 'death' are listed under the single sense of 'death'. Similarly all other patently related entries in the glosses are converted to a single form, usually by grammatical changes, to allow for wider comparisons and for more and larger listings of radicals. This newer procedure of working with converted forms and expressions extends the number of critical radicals in Watkin's glosses beyond 2000. The 524 critical radicals discussed here are senses of roots that have not been converted to common grammatical forms for comparison. It is noteworthy that, even without form conversions, most of the roots are linked through radicals into a single great network.

4. The 485 roots form a second circle of roots surrounding 'to cut' and sur-rounding the forty core roots with which 'to cut' is directly connected.

5. These 485 second-circle or second-order roots in turn are linked with a tertiary circle of critical radicals that comprise a collection of 275 notions.

6. And the 275 tertiary radicals in turn lead to 586 tertiary roots.

7. Quaternary critical radicals or connecting senses number 79.

8. Quaternary roots number 130.

Thus out of all the 1296 roots and their critical radical senses, 1241 roots and 524 critical radicals lie at the farthest within the range of four circles of roots and three circles of senses surrounding the most readily reached sense, 'to cut'. The display of concentric circles of roots and senses, of course, simplifies the actual networks of roots and sense, but it does delineate without distortion maximum separations between senses or between roots. In this display reaching from any sense to any other sense expressed in the gloss of the roots requires at the most passing through seven intermediate senses and eight roots.

Any notion that contributes to the gloss of two or more roots could have been put at the center of a universe of sense linked by roots, just as any man may stand as "I" in the center of his social universe. Indeed, the universe of sense is much like a sociometric network of friends where some friendships may happen to violate expected social and bureaucratic orders. 'To cut' and other busy critical radicals, such as 'to swell', 'to strike' and 'to bend', whether placed at the center or at the edge of a network of senses, would still be turned too frequently for easy passage between roots or senses.

With 'to cut' placed at the center, whatever you might take to be strong social notions are likely to lie remotely away from 'cutting'. 'To decide' of course is directly connected with 'to cut'. And 'reason', 'to know' and 'to judge' as well as social 'caste' and 'fortified place' lie close at hand. The outright social notions are poorly represented among the radical senses of Indo-European roots and those that might be recognized are likely to appear at tertiary and quaternary locations away from 'to cut' and from the senses closely linked with 'to cut'. At tertiary locations such notions appear as 'name', 'race', 'reward', 'sacred' and 'sign'. In terms such as these you might locate the subject-matter of sociology. It is an es-sential argument here that in any of the terms and senses, even in 'to cut', you might recognize the theory of that subject-matter, perhaps some theory not much put to use by the profession.

Proceed now as though we have said enough about the size and general features of the radical network of sense. We can locate sociological topics within it. Consider as rather standard curiosities these two pairs: community and so-ciety and self and society.

Trace community, and incidentally communism, common and commonplace back through the Latin, 'communis', to two roots, kom- (with, near, by: together) and mei- (to change, go, move: exchange) or to the general primal sense of 'to go together'. The radical study of community would appear to be of what goes together, particularly of persons moving and even changing together. Society traces back through the Latin, 'societas' and 'socius', to the root, sekw- with the declarative, 'to follow'. The study of society in radical respects would be of all that is involved in 'following'. Say, as Toennies may be read, that a master enter-prise in sociology is exactly that of relating society to community. Then a radical expression of that enterprise is exactly this: fitting 'following' to 'going together'.

I make at this moment no brief for or against the study of 'going together' and of 'following'. We may note simply that very few really get around to investigating community or society, for all the talk and good intentions, whereas almost anyone can get started immediately with the simplest of ethnographic techniques of watching and listening in the direct approach to persons 'going or moving together' and of persons 'following' — actually following rules, directions, conversations, customs, signs, leaders, one another and whatever else there is to follow. The radicals have impressive ways of cutting through to basic accessible topics for sociological inquiry. 'To go together' and 'to follow' are rather widely separated from one another in the great scheme of roots and radicals. Wide separations within that scheme represent profound qualitative disparities of sense and point to what a change it must be if the life, indeed, has been transformed from community to society.

Now, here by contrast is an ironic circumstance: the self and society, now distinguished, not as 'following', but as 'we ourselves', both trace back to a single root, *seu-*. Society in the sense of 'we ourselves' and the self may be called equants, notions that are equally informed by the gloss of *seu-* and are furthermore fitted into the same location in the net of roots and radicals. Radical insights on self and society draw upon the coincidence of location and gloss of these two concepts in the great network of sense. That coincidence of location and gloss is a strong point of departure for wonder and perhaps for inquiry: the gloss of *seu-* embraces not only 'self' and 'we ourselves', but such radicals as 'same', 'without', 'apart', 'alone', 'custom', 'nation', 'servant' and 'master' and such other powerful derivatives as sedition, seduce, segregate, sib, gossip, ethic, ethos, swami, suicide and solitude. These are penetrating notions that can inform the sense of the self and that of the society of ourselves. The self and its equants under *seu-* stand at quite a distance from 'to cut', just as 'to follow' does. Something further is to be gained then by noting the considerable qualitative disparity between the self and a follower.

That is enough said about standard sociological topics even at a radical level of discourse. I am not much interested in locating traditional sociological concerns within a realm of primitive thought. I should rather want to explore all of that realm for whatever it offers through any root or set of roots as primordial imagery and as elementary formal expression. I listen to the radicals as fundamental reductions of human experience, achieved by our subject-matter, by persons in communities and societies, talking to one another and occasionally to ethnographers and etymologists. All of language is vast. It is then fortunate to find here and there natural reductions of the vast natural theory of human experience and involvement expressed through language. Roots and radicals stand there in the life, in the records of the life, as the primal gist of the whole natural theory of experience put into words by our subject-matter. Roots and radicals must be therefore fundamentally interesting.

It is exciting to find moreover how that gist of theory, constituted by roots and radicals, is for the most part brought into one great mass of connected sense, where the gloss of any root can, either directly or remotely, be informed by and be informative about almost every other root. The sociological subject-matter accordingly not only reveals its own understanding and theory of things as a mass, but also instructs us on how, with a little etymological guidance, we may move through that mass of sense in the strong empirical endeavor to hear from fully generalized others, speaking sometimes strangely, what it has seemed to those

others that the life has been essentially and fundamentally about. From the record
of roots and radicals it does seem that the life, viewed within the life, has been
fundamentally about commonplaces that are fairly well delineated by a rather
small number of radical concepts entwined within the roots. Well, here I simply
recommend them for your consideration if you are concerned as I am in find-
ing how the subject-matter of sociology may have itself proceeded to make its
own sense out of its involvements and situations.

SUGGESTIONS ON THE DIRECTION OF SOCIOLOGICAL
RESEARCH ON LANGUAGE*

THOMAS LUCKMANN

GFR

I. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

In order to be able to plan a "rational" strategy one presumably first agrees on the goal to be reached and then calculates the cost of alternative ways leading to that goal. The tactics are subordinated to strategy, although the strategy cannot be devised without taking tactical problems into account. Evidently all this is beyond our reach — and perhaps I should add, fortunately. I dare say that we can agree on a common goal in the abstract, i. e., to gain more — and more systematic — knowledge about language as a social phenomenon. We can also agree on the way to reach that goal in an abstract manner; we are committed to the elementary canons of the scientific method. But a goal on that level of abstraction is just about as useful as being against sin and the ways to reach that goal are practically unlimited and their respective cost cannot be determined. It should be salutary to recognize the limitations of a discussion such as ours at the outset. We should beware of the intellectualist *hybris* of bodies of experts and avoid the notion that we could design something like a Five Year Plan for research in the sociology of language.

On the other hand, we can do better than indulge in quite illusory blueprints. Our discipline is relatively new and relatively small. We can learn from the mistake of other, older and bigger branches of specialized study in the social sciences. It is not unreasonable to expect that discussions of this kind could lead to a reasonably concrete articulation of the kind of knowledge we need to have about language in sociology. Perhaps we can reach some provisional agreement on the theoretical relevance of the work that has already been accomplished, review the aproaches that promise successful accumulation of data and then strike a tentative balance between the various criteria that should determine — in some arguable combination — the priorities for future work — insofar as intrinsically scientific criteria can at all determine the development of an academic discipline.

This may not be quite as far as some of us, disdainful or ignorant of the contingencies of the academic prestige game, intellectual fashion, funding bureaucracies and the strength of habit might like. Nonetheless, the sociology of language is in a comparatively fortunate position, for a number of reasons.

III. LEVELS AND PERSPECTIVES OF INVESTIGATION

With these considerations in mind I turn to the thankless task of starting our discussion by presenting a synoptic view of empirical work in the discipline, evaluating its theoretical relevance, assessing its "tactical" possibilities, calculating the relative degree of "development" and estimating social needs for certain kinds of knowledge. I expect argument and hope for revision. But start should be made and no purpose is served by extreme caution and a welter of qualifications and reservations.

I have categorized the work by two major dimensions, i. e., the analytic level of investigation and the (temporal) perspective of analysis. I distinguish between two main levels (macro-structures and micro-structures) and two perspectives (the synchronic and the diachronic). This yields four main categories. The scheme has the advantage of simplicity but, of course, few studies neatly fit one particular slot and that slot alone.

By *macro-structure* I refer to the global systems (or quasi-systems): *social structure, culture* and *language* (or more generally, sign-systems). I also include here social realities (or if you prefer a nominalist formulation, heuristic constructs) immediately below the highest level of analytic abstraction, realities which may be understood as constituent elements of the global structures: *institutional domains* and segmentary institutions (economy, political organization, family), the system of social *stratification* as components of the social structure; *subcultures; language styles* and linguistic repertoires as constituents of language.

By *micro-structure* I refer to *social roles* and social interaction, to cognitive and affective *personality* organization and to *speech acts* — or, correlatively, to ndividual systems of cognition, motivation and linguistic competence.

In the *synchronic perspective* analysis and interpretation try to establish the ifunctional and structural interdependence of the constituent elements of macro-structures as well as micro-structures.

In the *diachronical perspective* the goal is to explain the historical concatenation of the various components of macro-structures or to show the biographical development of the elements of micro-structures.

I hardly need to stress that theoretical explanations often shift from one level to another — as they ultimately must — and they — as well as diachronic and synchronic modes of analysis — frequently appear in the same study. Nevertheless, I find that most empirical research in the field can be classified without an irresponsibly high degree of arbitrariness in this scheme. There are indeed studies that exemplify an "ideographic" historical interest in language and society, just as there are "functionalist" studies of institutions and their linguistic repertoires, etc.

Level: Macrostructures

Perspective : Synchronic	1	2	3	4	5	Perspective : Diachronic	1	2	3	4	5
1) "Ecology" of Communication (e.g. K. W. Deutsch 1953)	+	0	++	+	?	1) "Evolutionary" and Historical Ecology of Communication (e.g. Grootaers 1959)	+	0	+	?	?
2) Language /Culture/ Social Structure: Global Typologies (e.g. Sommerfelt 1938; Whorf 1956; Gastil 1959; Hymes 1961 b)	++	0	—	—	?	2) Language /Culture/ Social Structure: General Histories (e.g. Meillet 1905/6; Hoijer 1948)	++	0	—	—	?
3) Language Styles and Repertoires /Subcultures/ Institutional Domains						3) Language Styles and Reportoires /Subcultures/ Institutional Domains					
a) General (e.g. Fischer 1966)	++	?	—	—	+	a) General	+	0	—	?	+
b) Kinship (e.g. Fischer 1964; Friedrich 1964)	+	0	+	+	+	b) Kinship (e.g. Hockett 1950)	+	0	0	—	?
c) Economic (e.g. Goodenough 1964)	+	0	+	—	+	c) Economic (e.g. Reinicke 1938)	+	0	0	—	?
d) Political (e.g. Sereno 1949)	+	+	+	—	+	d) Political (e.g. Jakobson 1945)	+	0	0	—	?
e) Religious (e.g. Newman 1955)	+	0	+	—	+	e) Religious (e.g. Linqguist 1955)	+	0	0		?
4) Language /Subcultures/ Occupations (e.g. Maurer 1955)	+	0	+	—	+	4) Language /Subcultures/ Occupations (e.g. Epstein 1959)	+	0	0	—	0
5) Language /Subcultures/ Stratification (e.g. Gumperz 1958)	+	+	+	+	0	5) Language /Subcultures/ Stratification (e.g. Labov 1966; Bright & Ramanujan 1964; McDavid 1948; Bright 1960b)	+	0	+	+	0
6. Language /Marginal Subcultures (e.g. Barker 1950)	+	0	+	+	0	6) Language /Marginal Subcultures	+	0	0	+	0
7. Social Functions of Language (e.g. Barker 1947; Marshal 1961; Conclin 1959)	++	+	—	—	++						

Legend : 1=Theoretical Relevance ; 2=Practical Need ; 3=Tactical Possibilities ; 4=Present Concentration ; 5=Future Direction

Level : Microstructures

Perspective : Synchronic	1	2	3	4	5	Perspective : Diachronic	1	2	3	4	5
1) Social Roles /Motivation and Cognitive Systems/ Linguistic Repertoire						1) Primary Socialization					
a) General, e.g. bilingualism (e.g. Fishman 1956)	+	++	+	++	+	a) General (e.g. Wygotski 1934)	++	0	−	+	+
b) Kinship (e. g. Fischer 1964)	+	−	+	+	0	b) in relation to kinship (e.g. Diebold 1961 and Bossard 1945)	+	0	−	−	+
c) Economic (e. g. Trier 1955)	+	−	+	−	0	c) in relation to class (e.g. Bernstein)	+	+	+	++	0
d) Political (e. g. Brown and Gilman 1960)	+	+	+	−	0						
e) Religious (e. g. White 1944)	+	0	+	+	0						
2) Social Status /Motivation and Cognitive Systems/ Linguistic Repertoires (e. g. Labov 1964 ; Schatzmann & Strauss 1955)	+	+	+	++	0	2) Occupational Socialization	+	−	0	−	+
3) Subjective Functions of Language e. g. linguistic influences on perception (e.g. Brown & Lenneberg 1954); or language and personal identity (e. g. Hymes 1961a ; Lambert 1956 ; Luria 1959 ; Westcott 1960)	+	+	−	++	+	3) Acculturation (e.g. Dozier 1956)	+	+	+	+	0
						4) Social and Linguistic Interaction-Ethnography of Speaking;	++	−	0	+	+

Legend : 1=Theoretical Relevance ; 2=Practical Needs ; 3=Tactical Possibilites ; 4=Present Concentration ; 5=Future Direction

SOCIOLOGY OF MASS COMMUNICATION
SOCIOLOGIE DES COMMUNICATIONS DE MASSE

YOUNG PEOPLE AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS
IN A TRANSITIONAL SOCIETY

DAVID CHANEY
HONG KONG

It is commonly held that the mass media possess a tremendous potential for change, and yet confusion as to how, why and in which direction change will occur has not promoted caution. As social change can refer to any variation in a society which is observable through time, a researcher must specify the limits of his attempted explanation in terms of dependant variables. These variables can be divided into those which are quantifiable and those which are qualitative. This distinction contrasts: first, changes in the social structure which derive from innovations resulting in changes in aggregate attributes or aggregate rates of behaviour; and secondly, changes in cultural patterns which supply meaning and legitimation for social interaction. The distinction is important because our understanding of the consequences of expanding technical information will depend upon our degree of insight into the meaning for any given society of new types of knowledge.

The basis for this argument is an informational view of society. A society, inasmuch as it possesses a discrete culture, can be seen as a unique store-house of information. Unique, not because it possesses a complete stock of knowledge that other societies are not aware of, but because each culture will pattern or organise its stock of knowledge in terms of culturally-specific norms, values, attitudes and beliefs. Not every element in this stock of knowledge need be true in terms of some universal criteria, indeed the structure of social knowledge may need to be bolstered by patently false beliefs. This view does not hold that such a stock of knowledge should be available to every member of a society, or even that any single set of shared beliefs will necessarily constitute a conventional reality for that society. Around the conventional norms of everyday reality more or less sophisticated versions will form the personal realities of identifiable groups. These variations will not be randomly distributed but will form a structure such that knowledge will form a cultural hierarchy closely paralleling the socio-economic hierarchy[1].

From this perspective social change, development, modernization and westernization can be seen as more or less radical changes in a societal stock of knowledge. Change has to be accepted as part of the conventional reality of a society, and this involves processes of diffusion and acceptance. Given that knowledge is structurally distributed, innovations will probably be taken up by groups who

[1] This approach to the role of mass communications is developed more fully in the author's "Processes of Mass Communication", London, MacMillan, 1972.

occupy a marginal or ambiguous role in the social structure, since there will be fewer structural constraints on them to preserve conventional norms and accepted beliefs. Thus a relevant question for the researcher to ask is, under what conditions was innovation X diffused and accepted? Mass communications may determine the process of change by speeding the diffusion of new ideas within the social structure, and/or by facilitating the adjustment of norms of conventional reality.

The literature on the role of mass communications in social change can be integrated into the perspective set out here.[2] Lerner summarises the two levels at which mass communications have been seen to be relevant to development, societal access to new information and individual receptiveness: "The modernization process begins with public communications — the diffusion of new ideas and new information which stimulate people to want to behave in new ways."[3] In other words, media stimulate change in the personal realities of individuals so that new ideas have both meaning and legitimation. Schramm distinguishes three functional roles for communication in national development: the diffusion of information, the spread of participation and the teaching of new skills.[4] To these, Eisenstadt adds several social control functions such as providing support and instruction as to what constitutes appropriate behaviour, resolution of roles conflict and institutional conflict through emphasis on a common value hierarchy, and in developing cosmopolitan rather than local role orientations.[5] At the individual level, mass communications are generally felt to be important because of the way in which they extend the range of available information. They also provide a climate sympathetic to innovation and thus nurture and support individual empathy and flexibility.[6]

The concept of individual flexibility or empathy seems extremely useful as a means of describing an individual predisposition to change. It is distinct from both observable changes in attitudes and behaviour and from social variables that stimulate such changes. However, such a concept treats the individual in psychological isolation. Hagen has pointed to the importance of group locations of creativity,[7] and the idea of "innovation-climate" which has become quite well accepted in diffusion studies suggests that the innovative individual has to be supported in his environment.[8] This suggests that if the study of mass communications as a

[2] All the relevant literature cannot be summarized here but four books useful in themselves and for further references are: — L. W. Doob, Communications in Africa: A Search for Boundaries, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1961; D. Lerner and W. Schramm (eds.), Communication and Change in the Developing Countries, Honolulu, East-West Center Press, 1967; L. W. Pye (ed.), Communications and Political Development, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1963; and W. Schramm, Mass Media and National Development, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1964.

[3] D. Lerner, Toward a Communication Theory of Modernization, in L. W. Pye (ed.); op. cit., p. 348.

[4] W. Schramm, op. cit., pp. 125-6.

[5] S. N. Eisenstadt, Communication Systems and Social Structure, Public Opinion Quarterly, Summer 1955.

[6] Several writers have pointed to the need for a concept of individual predisposition to change, although they have not agreed on a suitable name, e. g. 'creativity' in E. Hagen. On the Theory of Social Change, London, Tavistock Publications, 1964; 'empathy' in D. Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society, Glencoe, The Free Press, 1958; and 'breadth of perspective' in L. H. Warshay, Breadth of Perspective and Social Change, in G. K. Zollschan and W. Hirsch (eds.), Explorations in Social Change, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1964.

[7] E. Hagen, op. cit.

[8] Cf. E. Rogers, The Diffusion of Innovations, New York, MacMillan, 1962.

modernizing agent is to have any utility, the distinction between the role of the media as an impetus to change and its integrative role in a culturally fluid situation should be maintained, and that research should concentrate upon identifying groups in society who use the available media in different ways. With the further consequence that the researcher is also faced with a set of questions about the types of situations in which one role predominates over the other.

The inherent conflict between stability and change suggests that groups which are least committed to the established culture will be most receptive to innovatory communications, adolescent groups sharing an identifiable youth culture can be taken as an example. Processes of urbanization and industrialization have tended through education, high industrial wages and employment mobility to encourage a generation conscious of their identity as adolescents. In this sense adolescence is a structural consequence of the types of social change often called modernization.[9] Many of the values of such youth cultures run counter to those embodied in institutional authorities, and they are typically more dependent upon the provision of media facilities than other groups in the society. However, it has sometimes been argued in relation to the youth cultures of Western societies that such cultures are sub-cultural adaptations of traditional themes, rather than contra-cultural rejections of important values.[10] If this is so, adolescent cultures may be seen as institutionalized adaptations to structural strains, a way of bridging the divergent realities of childhood and adulthood, not necessarily a forcing-house for innovations. In the terms of earlier paragraphs the introduction of youth cultures in urban/industrial societies may be regarded as adaptive, not innovatory.

This brief discussion indicates that: (1) members of a commercial youth culture are likely to be heavier consumers of the media than average members of their society;[11] (2) within a youth culture there is a potential conflict between adaptive and innovatory values; (3) this distinction between types of youth values parallels the distinction that has been drawn between the stabilizing and innovatory roles of mass communications; (4) thus it should be possible to justify descriptions of groups of young people as innovatory and adaptive on the basis of their consumption of mass communications.

A HONG KONG CASE-STUDY

Hong Kong is an interesting society in which to investigate questions concerning mass communications and social change. It can only be described as a transitional society. Over the last twenty-five years it has grown from a small entreport

[9] Cf. S. N. Eisenstadt. From Generation to Generation, Glencoe, The Free Press 1956.

[10] F. Elkin and W. A. Westley. Myth of Adolescent Culture, American Sociologica Review, Vol. 20 (6), 1955; see also D. Gottlieb and J. Reeves; Adolescent Behaviour in Urban Areas, New York, MacMillan, 1963 esp. Chap. 2.

[11] The results of a survey of heads of households asking the same questions can be compared with the results of the young adults survey reported in this paper.

	Read HK Press	Read English Press	Often Listens to Radio	Often Watches Television
Household Heads	77.4	22.0	38.9	37.7
Young Adults	95.3	54.3	38.4	44.6

All figures in percentages.
N.B. Literacy is an important factor here.

colonial port to a position, after Japan, as the second richest economy in South-East Asia.[12] Although many aspects of the economy suggest that it should be termed "modern" in Asian terms, the extraordinary growth of Hong Kong has been based upon a vast influx of refugees who largely came from rural peasant backgrounds. Many of the social strains in contemporary Hong Kong can be said to derive from a lag in social adjustment by comparison with the leap into economic modernization.[13] It is in this context that one has to place the gap between the economic infra-structure, of roads, factories, ports and export arrangements, and the social infra-structure, of schools, housing, industrial relations and political participation.[14]

Mass communications are more readily available in Hong Kong than would be the case in many other transitional societies.[15] One reason for this is, of course, the concentration of Hong Kong's urban population, a population of 3 million living in an area of 20 square miles. A combination of political instability and the brashness of laissez-faire capitalism has led to a style of conspicuous consumption, a climate in which the commercial mass media flourish.[16] Hong Kong, lacking a rural hinterland of its own, has become an urban communications centre for much of South-East Asia. Local communications have flourished partly as a by-product of the growth of international communications in the area.

A third reason why Hong Kong provides an interesting case-study overlays the reasons already mentioned. Hong Kong's colonial status means that the contrast between the modern and the traditional is immediately, forcibly and continuously demonstrated. To the extent that modernization is often used synonymously with westernization, western societies act as a lode-star in social change. But when the western model also provides the governing elite, the conflicts and ruptures inherent in development become immediately dramatized. The overt juxtaposition between economic benefits of change and the derogation of traditional values suggests both why Hong Kong is reluctantly modernizing in some aspects and the potential importance of mass communications in providing a stabilizing rationale. The colonial status also underlies the competition between Hong Kong material using the Cantonese dialect, English language media and communist publications that are either locally produced or imported from China.

The data reported in this paper were obtained from a survey of young adults resident in the metropolitan area of Hong Kong and aged between 15-29.[17] Despite the lack of an adequate sampling framework there are good reasons for believing that this sample is not wildly unrepresentative.[18] The survey was designed

[12] The most recent data are those quoted by Lee Kuan Yew, Prime Minister of Singapore, in an address to the 75th Congregation of the University of Hong Kong, 18/2/70 — see University of Hong Kong Gazette, vol. 17 (4), 19/2/70. In his speech Mr. Lee estimated that Hong Kong overtook Singapore in per capita Gross Domestic Product in 1969.

[13] Cf. the essays in K. Hopkins (ed.), Hong Kong: The Industrial Colony, Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press, 1971.

[14] The lack of opportunities for effective political participation is relevant to the view that mass communications spread a de facto democracy of spirit which is in itself modernizing.

[15] Cf. footnote 11; see also Lee Wing Yee, Youth and the Media, Lutheran World Federation Broadcasting Service, Hong Kong Office, 1969.

[16] The only non-commerical media are two Government broadcasting stations, English and Chinese, whose main function is to act as channels of official communication.

[17] The survey was carried out during the summer months of 1969; a full report of the survey is now being prepared for publication by the author and his co-researchers D. B. L. Podmore and A. Lu.

[18] Comparison of this sample with the characteristics of the equivalent age-group reported in the Hong Kong 1966 By-Census does not show gross sampling errors.

with two main purposes: first, to collect socio-economic information on the family, education, occupation and income, of this group. Secondly, using a large number of attitude items culled from many different sources, to try and distinguish patterns of attitudes towards social and economic changes in Hong Kong and to deduce a shorter list of attitude items to correlate with major socio-economic variables. A sub-section of the questionnaire comprised questions on respondents' consumption of and preferences within available mass communications. The data reported here result from the analysis of differences in media patterns of groups distinguished by attitudinal differences.

Each respondent was read a total of 47 statements and asked to indicate whether he agreed or disagreed with each statement. Correlation analysis was then used to identify clusters of positively associated items. One item was selected from each cluster to represent that group, the selection being based upon strength of association between the chosen item and other members of the cluster and the distribution of responses to this item. Intermingled with the attitude statements were attitudinal questions such as: "How many children do you hope to have altogether?" These questions were included to provide some validation for each attitude statement.[19] Attitudinal statements that failed to do this were discarded from further analysis. It should be made clear that neither any particular cluster nor the list of cluster of representatives has at any time been treated as a scale: methods of data-collection and analysis would not have justified such a step.

These procedures produced eleven attitudinal items, each representative of a cluster of other items. These items fall into two groups distinguished by subject-matter. The first group of five items concerns attitudes towards family relationships, the second concerns attitudes towards socio-economic relationships.[20] The five family items are:

a: "Newly-married couples should not live with their parents." (M)

b: "A child should not be allowed to talk back to his parents." (T)

c: "The unmarried mother is morally a greater failure than the unmarried father." (T)

d: "A young man has been offered a job which he wants to take but his parents disapprove of this job. Should he take it?" (No — Yes) (T)

e: "After their son has married, parents should in no circumstances interfere in his affairs." (M)

The letters in the brackets after each statement, M = modern, T = traditional, indicate our assumption of the meaning of a response in agreement with the statement. As they have very different subject-matter, it was decided to label the responses to the second group of six items either Conservative (C) of Radical (R).

f: "The city would be better off if there were more policemen." (C)

g: "Policemen are pretty stupid." (R)

h: "Trade unions should only concern themselves with the social lives of their members." (C)

i: "If I could do as I pleased, I would change the kind of work I do every few months." (R)

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[19] To illustrate the procedure — it was hypothesized that respondents who gave a traditional response would be significantly more likely to say they wanted a large rather than a small family.

[20] Although similar direction items are positively correlated, the correlations are never sufficiently strong to suggest duplication.

j: "One can never feel at ease on a job where the ways of doing things are always being changed." (C)

k: "Hong Kong is truly a land of opportunity where people get pretty much what they deserve." (C)

In the following discussion these items will only be referred to by their preceding letters.

The items have been grouped by content to produce four orientations — Traditionals, Conservatives, Moderns and Radicals. The following analysis is based on the assumption that although both Moderns and Radicals are modern or westernized in the conventionally loose usage of those terms, they represent different aspects of reactions to social change. Moderns are concerned with family relationships, primarily they challenge relations of authority and difference between generations, a characteristic of youth culture values. In contrast, Radicals are receptive to change and are distrustful of institutionalized authority.[21]

Using available data patterns of consumption can be looked at in four ways:

1. overall consumption of all types of media;

2. consumption of "foreign" media, for example English language and communist media;

3. preferences for particular channels;

4. preferences for certain types of performance, for example informational presentations as opposed to entertainment or dramatic performances.

Using these distinctions the following hypotheses were tested:

1. Moderns and Radicals will consistently consume more of all types of media than Traditionals and Conservatives.

2. Moderns and Radicals will also consume more of both types of foreign media than Traditionals and Conservatives.

3. That there will be differences between Moderns and Radicals in terms of consumption of particular channels.

4. There will also be differences between Moderns' and Radicals' preferences between performances; with Moderns preferring entertainment as opposed to information.

These hypotheses can be summarized by saying that although mass communications are more important to both Moderns and Radicals than they are to Traditionals and Conservatives, for the Moderns this importance derives from a role of expressing a style, while for the Radicals the importance is based upon the functional benefits mass communications offer.

RESULTS

The data reported in Table 1 provide very little support for the first hypothesis.[22] Modern and Radical respondents do not claim to read the local Chinese-language press or listen to local radio stations any more frequently than their counterparts. Moderns, however, do claim to watch television consistently, in two cases

[21] There are strong differences between Moderns (Radicals and Traditionals) Conservatives in terms of socio-economic factors such as age, sex, education, income and occupation. There are, however, no consistent differences between Moderns and Radicals by these variables, except that Moderns are more likely to be female while Radicals are more likely to be male. This means that the media are not more accessible, through income or education, to Moderns than Radicals, socio-economic variables are therefore not included in the tables on p. 67.

[22] In reporting results it has been found clearer to ignore the direction of the item and always place the "progressive" response first.

TABLE 1. MEDIA CONSUMPTION BY ATTITUDE GROUPS

Items		Reads Hong Kong Press	Often Listens to Radio	Often Watches Television
a	M	93.9	35.4	46.8
	T	96.6	39.4	42.5
b	M	95.1	41.7	46.0
	T	95.3	37.2	43.7
c	M	95.8	38.2	46.5
	T	95.6	39.0	43.2
d	M	94.6	39.0	[47.2]
	T	95.1	38.9	[40.9] **
e	M	94.7	[32.9]	[49.5]
	T	95.7	[41.6] ***	[39.2] ***
f	R	96.1	36.4	45.8
	C	95.0	39.2	43.2
g	R	93.8	37.6	45.8
	C	95.9	39.0	43.6
h	R	95.4	41.3	40.6
	C	96.0	36.4	45.2
i	R	96.5	34.5	50.0
	C	95.3	39.3	44.0
j	R	95.6	40.7	47.6
	C	95.6	37.2	44.7
k	R	95.7	[42.3]	46.7
	C	95.6	[35.6] **	43.8

All figures are percentages of relevant cell total
Probability of results measured by x^2

significantly, more often than Traditionals. In investigating the second hypothesis, inter-media differences become much clearer. Apart from the readership of the mainland press, where the numbers are too small to have much confidence in the results, Moderns and Radicals consume considerably more English-language material than their counterparts — Table 2. For Moderns this pattern is most clear in the case of radio, favoured by television and then the press. Among Radicals the differences in consumption of foreign media are most marked in the press, followed by radio and then by television.

The inter-media differences in consumption do support the argument that mass communications are serving different roles for these groups. Television and radio seem, *a priori,* more entertainment oriented than the press which is primarily concerned with news, however entertainingly news is presented.[23] But the data on channel preferences proves disappointing. There are four English-language daily newspapers produced in the colony. A serious, conservative-style morning newspaper proves to be more popular with both Moderns and Radicals than with Traditionals and Conservatives. In no case is this greater popularity statistically significant and it is no more popular with Radicals than Moderns. Readership of other

[23] Studies of political opinion leadership have found that the press is more important as a source of information, e. g. J. Blumler and D. McQuail, Television and Politics: Its Uses and Influence, London, Faber, 1968, esp. Chap. 8.

TABLE 2. "FOREIGN" MEDIA CONSUMPTION BY ATTITUDE GROUPS

Items		Reads Mainland Press	Reads English-Language Press	Often Listens English-Language Radio	Often Watches English-Language Television
a	M	3.1	53.8	[27.2	14.4
	T	4.2	52.5	19.3] ***	11.1
b	M	[5.0	[62.1	[30.2	[16.2
	T	2.7] *	51.1] ***	19.8] ***	11.7] *
c	M	3.4	52.6	[29.1	[15.1
	T	3.4	47.9	17.3] ***	11.1] *
d	M	[5.0	54.6	22.9	12.9
	T	2.4] **	46.2	22.5	12.8
e	M	3.6	55.3	25.7	[15.8
	T	2.9	54.9	21.2	10.7] **
f	R	[5.5	[68.0	[32.2	[16.7
	C	2.2] ***	47.1] ***	18.4] ***	11.1] **
g	R	3.2	[63.8	[30.5	14.9
	C	3.1	53.7] ***	21.8] **	12.4
h	R	4.2	[63.9	23.8	12.9
	C	3.5	54.0] ***	23.3	13.8
i	R	4.7	[62.4	[36.1	[17.5
	C	3.0	53.3] **	21.4] ***	12.2] *
j	R	3.8	[61.6	27.0	13.4
	C	3.2	52.3] ***	22.0	13.3
k	R	4.9	[63.4	[26.9	[16.6
	C	2.9	51.1] ***	21.2] *	11.7] **

   * indicates difference between results has $p < 0.1$
  ** indicates difference between results has $p < 0.05$
 *** indicates difference between results has $p < 0.01$

newspapers is unaffected by attitudes. There are four main radio services in Hong Kong, two English and two Chinese speaking, similarly there are four television channels. Reported attitudes make no differences to preferences between same-language stations.[24] There is no obvious explanation for the failure to find differences in channel preferences. The most reasonable explanation lies in the fact that with the exception of the press, media channels are fairly uniform in content.

The data available support the fourth hypothesis although the pattern of results is not very clear-cut. Respondents who indicated that they sometimes or often listened to the radio were asked an open-ended question about the types of radio programmes they preferred. There were no restrictions on the number of choices allowed and the responses were coded after interview. Few differences exist between the groups the way they rank preferences, pop music is the universal favourite, followed by news, classical music and comedy programmes. However, if the relative popularity of these preferences is studied then a pattern emerges. First, there are no differences between Traditionals and Conservatives, their preferences are remarkably uniform. In companion with Moderns and Radicals they prefer family programmes, thrillers, plays and the miscellaneous category of indiscriminate

[24] One factor affecting results concerning television preferences may be that most English-language television broadcasts carry Chinese sub-titles thus broadening the potential audience.

TABLE 3. RADIO PREFERENCES BY ATTITUDE GROUPS

Items		Traditionals Preferences		Pop Music		Radicals Preferences
a	M	20.2	*	33.2		54.5
	T	21.2		26.0		51.4
b	M	13.3	***	33.9	***	58.6
	T	22.6		28.2		51.2
c	M	15.9	***	31.0	***	55.1
	T	24.3		28.0		51.7
d	M	20.2	***	34.2		54.0
	T	19.7		27.9		52.9
e	M	18.8		31.3		54.9
	T	20.7		28.7		52.2
f	R	12.2	***	33.8	***	60.8
	C	24.5		27.9		44.5
g	R	18.8		35.7		59.4
	C	19.7		28.3		51.9
h	R	18.2	*	30.2	**	55.0
	C	20.7		29.9		53.2
i	R	14.9	***	38.3	***	59.1
	C	20.8		28.5		52.4
j	R	14.9	**	30.9	***	55.4
	C	21.4		30.1		53.6
k	R	14.0	***	31.6	***	57.7
	C	22.3		29.9		52.0

All figures are percentages of relevant row total
Probability of results measured by x^2

choices. In contrast Moderns compensate for their underchoosing of these categories by overchoosing pop music. Radicals compensate by choosing news and sports programmes as well as pop music — Table 3. It appears that while a strong preference for pop music as opposed to general dramatic entertainment discriminates between Radicals and Moderns and their more traditional counterparts, a preference for news and sport is also likely to distinguish Radicals from Conservatives. This basis for distinction does not occur with any consistency between Moderns and Traditionals.

Turning to preferences within types of television programmes, some similarities occur. There are few differences in ranking of programmes; news, comedy, sports and films are the most popular categories, but the relative popularity of categories between groups does vary. Radicals and Moderns consistently prefer news and music programmes while their counterparts more frequently mention films. Other categories discriminate between Radicals and Conservatives but do not discriminate so consistently between Moderns and Traditionals. In Table 4, the percentages choosing two clusters of programme types are shown by item. The first cluster consists of news, sports, music and quizzes, while the second cluster consists of films and an indiscriminate choice-category which accommodates the frequently made "I like every programme" type of response. It can be seen that in every case Radicals and Conservatives tend to polarize between the clusters, in two cases the differences are statistically significant. However, the same clusters are not associated with responses to the traditional-modern attitude items. In this analysis, the differences are in two cases in the same direction, in one case there is no difference and in the remaining cases the differences are reversed.

TABLE 4. TELEVISION PREFERENCES BY ATTITUDE GROUPS

Items		Traditionals Preferences	Progressives Preferences
a	M	⎡23.4 *	34.4⎤
	T	⎣20.8	40.3⎦
b	M	⎡20.3 ***	43.1⎤
	T	⎣23.3	34.7⎦
c	M	⎡20.1 **	40.9⎤
	T	⎣25.2	34.9⎦
d	M	23.1	34.7
	T	22.3	39.6
e	M	21.3	38.7
	T	23.4	36.1
f	R	⎡17.9 ***	43.5⎤
	C	⎣25.4	33.0⎦
g	R	18.8	38.7
	C	23.9	37.0
h	R	20.8	40.1
	C	22.6	36.4
i	R	19.3	40.0
	C	21.0	37.2
j	R	⎡15.4 ***	41.8⎤
	C	⎣26.0	34.5⎦
k	R	19.3	38.6
	C	22.9	36.9

* indicates difference between results has $p < 0.1$
** indicates difference between results has $p < 0.05$
*** indicates difference between results has $p < 0.01$

CONCLUSION

In this paper two related issues have been explored. First, some of the senses in which mass communications can be said to be important in contemporary processes of social change. Secondly, whether the modernness of adolescent values provides an appropriate climate for the extension of developmental change. The common theme in the approach to these issues is that although it is feasible to distinguish between 'modern' as opposed to 'traditional' in social change, it is considerably more difficult to describe those characteristics of modernization that facilitate adaptation to and development of further change. Processes of mass communication are inextricably involved in contemporary change, but with different groups in a society and at different stages of development their role may alternate between stabilizing an expanding universe and providing an impetus to further expansion. Because adolescence and early adulthood bridges the ascribed knowledge of childhood and the achieved skills of maturity it is likely to provide a social climate receptive to change.

It was therefore hypothesized that a study of consumption of mass communications amongst urban adolescents in a transitional society would reveal differences related to different types of modern attitudes. It seems that a distinction must

be drawn between conventional media which are widely available and less access-
ible material, in this case because it requires knowledge of a foreign language.
Within the less accessible media distinctions must also be drawn between different
types of media, and between the performances these media offer. Although there
are no discernible differences between groups labelled Traditionals and Conserv-
atives, there are certain consistent differences between two types of progressive —
Moderns and Radicals. Differences which support a distinction between adaptive
and innovatory conceptions of mass communications amongst Hong Kong youth.

A final point to stress is that discussion of both mass communications and
their audiences must be brought back to the enveloping social structures. Social
change is never merely a re-interpretation of the world, because our understand-
ing of social knowledge is so closely related to the structures and forms of con-
ventional social relationships, therefore elements in change are themselves always
elements in a broader social conflict. It is in this sense that the implications
of the values of a youth culture are central to social development. Both mass
media and the commercial values they often espouse are symbolically modern,
but if they are political soporifics the modernness of their world may seem an end
to their young audiences rather than a potential re-shaping of knowledge as a means
to further change.

EMANCIPATION AND CULTURE[1]

PAUL TEN HAVE

THE NETHERLANDS

This paper presents some comparative data and theoretical fragments concerning the cultural activities of groups involved in a process of emancipation. Aspects of contemporary youth cultures are compared with data on emancipating groups in three other socio-historical contexts, namely bourgeois groups in 18th century Germany; French-speaking intellectuals from Africa in the years immediately preceding and following World War II; and negroes in the United States in the last two decades.

It appears that in their efforts to better their positions vis à vis established elites rising groups show typical changes in their strategies. In the beginning, *assimilation* prevails: people try to rise by imitating the attributes of the better placed persons. When assimilation fails, an *emancipation* is bound to follow. In this phase the groups considered show heightened cultural activity, stressing and expressing their inner meaning, common background and general humanity. The ideological catchwords for this movement among the groups I consider are "Kultur", "Négritude" and "Soul", respectively. This period is sometimes followed by one of open conflict, but some sort of integration of the parties will be the end of the total process.

The second phase, emancipation, seems to be especially important if a stagnation occurs, if assimilation is sharply frustrated and (political) combat is for the moment impossible. In that case cultural activities, the playing of expressive roles and the construction of new or renewed identities draw most energy and attention. Some sections of contemporary youth seem to be in this situation. The symbolism of their youthfulness, their spontaneity, energy and "regressiveness", provides much of the material for mass-communication and commercial exploitation. This reinforces the ever present danger of "fixation" to this phase.

"KULTUR"

The first case to be discussed is that of the rising bourgeois groups in eighteenth-century Germany. The ideological catchword that best conveys the self-justification and solidarity within these groups is "Kultur". In his great study of the civilizing process Norbert Elias places "Kultur" in opposition to "Zivilisation". He points out that — at the time when he wrote his book, the 1930s — the term "Zivilisation" indicated in Germany something somewhat inferior to "Kultur".

[1] Because of space limitations many paragraphs and all footnotes had to be omitted. A full version was published in Mens en Maatschappij, 45 (1970), pp. 246-257.

Civilization stands for the public aspects of behaviour in the political, economical or "social" spheres: it indicates the increasing stylization and refinement of patterns of behaviour, or "civil manners". "Kultur", however, denotes "matters of the mind", the "inner life", and the products in which the labours of the human mind find expression: works of art, books, religious, philosophical, and scientific systems. Civilization indicates the way in which things are done, "Kultur" signifies the "content", or the product of action.

The contrast between "Kultur" and "Zivilisation" was at first social and got its "national" feeling only later. It reflected the tension between bourgeoisie and aristocracy in the second half of the eighteenth century in Germany. As Elias' study in its entirety demonstrates, civilization is closely linked to life at court, to the characteristic interpersonal restraint which was necessary there and which eventually came to symbolize the high court status. The court nobility did not "do" much and "produced" nothing. It was a leisure class which used its civilization as a legitimation of its power and status position. The "Bürger" countered this with their own productivity. "Kultur" and civilization are the central terms in a large-scale social debate between bourgeoisie and nobility.

In this debate the bourgeoisie emphasized morality, sincerity and rich inner life as characteristic for themselves. In particular deep emotionality and personality development were brought forward by them as ideals. They criticized life at court for its superficiality, cold rationality, depravity, empty ostentation and artificial refinement of convention and conversation. During the 18th century there have been important changes in style in the pictorial arts, architecture, music and literature. Ballet, who made an extensive study of these changes which got real momentum towards the middle of the century, speaks of "bourgeoisification".

He regards these developments as a reflection of the relative social strength of the aristocratic and bourgeois groups. The relative weakening of the nobility and strengthening of the bourgeoisie initially began in the economic field, while politic in the eighteenth century still remained almost entirely in the hands of the first. The "social" sphere, the sphere of relative evaluation, was at that time particularly the field of competition. Matters of culture, life-style and value-orientation constituted the material, the weapons, the criteria.

In the first half of the century the bourgeoisie still oriented itself towards life at court and accepted courtly standards to a high degree as being decisive. The arts were dominated by "absolutism". Architecture, the pictorial arts and music contain suggestions of space, limitlessness and continuity. In literature and the theatrical arts the stereotyped characters and the attention for stylization and presentation strike us. In the middle of the century a change set in. The bourgeoisie turned away from life at court to orientate itself more inwardly. In the arts we now see more intimacy, more attention for the human element and less adherence to hard-and-fast rules. Subjectivity, fluctuations in emotional life, personality development and intimate friendship are themes of the literature of the second half of the eighteenth century which mirror the way of life and the aims of the bourgeoisie. The bourgeoisie, which was strengthening its position, placed its deeply felt humanity in opposition to the empty formality of the court nobility. This humanity warranted, in their eyes, equal adjudication at the very least, but the development of it could even lead to bourgeois feelings of superiority.

The German intellectuals constituted a small class whose members lived in small provincial towns scattered over a large area. This dispersion rendered indirect, "spiritual" communication more important; books and letters were more

important than conversation. Politically powerless, they tried, on the one hand, to become the equals of the nobility, and on the other, to distinguish themselves from the common people. They did this, on their own steam as it were, by cultivating their humanity, their minds and, their emotions, by their "Kultur" and "Bildung". Later on this "social" internal contrast in Germany developed into an opposition on an international scale. While in countries such as France and England aristocratic and bourgeois values mingled, culture and civilization in Germany remained separate, with the former carrying the more weight.

ASSIMILATION AND EMANCIPATION

Later on in his study Elias reverts to the antithesis between civilization and culture. He points out that within the general development of a steadily growing of interdependencies, of the spread of forms of civilization and of a certain levelling of the contrasts between the behaviour of social groups, smaller cyclic developments in the social rising of certain groups occur. He distinguishes here two phases, a phase of "colonization" and "*assimilation*" and a phase of "refutation", "differentiation" and "*emancipation*". In the former the elite spread their models of behaviour and individual members of the still relatively weak, rising groups try to secure a place among the elite by adjusting their behaviour to the standards prevailing there. This often results in somewhat artificial behaviour, because they wish to appear what they are not yet (entirely) capable of being. If the rising group as a whole gains social strength, the rivalry between it and the elite increases. At this point the second phase commences. The elite start to isolate themselves and stress the distinctions in order to stabilize the status quo. The selfawareness of both groups increases. Instead of orienting themselves on the standards of the elite, the members of the rising group start looking for their own values. Thus in their polemic with the aristocracy the bourgeois groups countered the latter's idleness with work, their artificial etiquette with authenticity, their attention for manners with the search for knowledge, their frivolity with virtue. When the social force of rising groups has increased to such an extent that they themselves function as the top stratum, the life styles of the old and new top strata intermingle. A contributing factor here is that both tendencies — the search for equality and the search for distinctions — are present throughout. The phases are characterized by varying accentuation. The strategies of both groups are constantly ambivalent, and these ambivalences give them a certain tension.

Thus we see that certain aspects of culture can be related to the changes in the balance of power of social groups within a system of interdependencies. Both an old and a new elite have, in such situations, various strategic possibilities open to them, so that the tensions of ambivalences, of the repression of alternatives, are always discernible. These are ambivalences of equality and inequality, of correspondence and difference — inherent in every human situation — but here they are given a specific form. In the first stage, that of colonization/assimilation, inequality and equality are determined and symbolized "externally". Once equality is more within reach, the fear of the elite and the frustration of the climbers increase both. The latter then concentrate more on their inner self, on the externalization of it, directed towards "fundamental" equality which results in a new distinction: equal dignity becomes unique dignity.

"NEGRITUDE"

The term "Négritude" denotes an ideological view of being a "nègre" which was developed in the 1930's by French-speaking Africans who belonged to the small elite of colonized men who were permitted to continue their studies in Paris. After a period in which they tried to "assimilate" into French civilization they got frustrated because they became aware of the strong barriers to real acceptance. One of the ways out of this impasse was to re-accept "black culture", to idealize it, as in the poems and essays of Senghor and Cécaire, among others.

Thus the term "Négritude" is used to indicate characteristics of the soul and culture of black people which are considered to be more or less distinctive as compared to Europeans and the European culture. These characteristics include "emotionality", "rhythm", "participation" and "solidarity", as opposed to the European reason, technology, lack of feeling and individualism. Senghor states that "la raison negro-africaine est intuitive par participation" as opposed to "la raison européenne classique", which is "analytique par utilisation". And "le Nègre est l'homme de la Nature". Or, in the words of Fanon: "Dans l'ensemble les chantres de la négritude opposeront la vieille Europe à la jeune Afrique, la raison ennuyeuse à la poésie, la logique oppressive à la piaffante nature, d'un côté raideur, cérémonie, protocole, scepticisme, de l'autre ingénuité, pétulance, liberté, pourquoi pas luxuriance. Mais aussi irresponsabilité."

EMANCIPATION AND CONFLICT

Thus it appears that a number of cultural phenomena and ideological value-accents centering on the concept of "Négritude" are similar to those of the "Kultur" of the German bourgeoisie. Here again there is a striking shift in the strategy of the rising "elite of the masses" after their unsuccessful attempt at assimilation. Instead of expecting everything from "external" imitation of elite characteristics, they start looking for self-respect in themselves: they become more introverted, they turn to the past and thus try to find an identity of their own which is valid in itself. While assimilation is often an individualistic attempt to improve one's position, the building up of an identity of one's own (emancipation) requires a more collective response.

Yet this shift to within, this collective and symbolic seeking for the self lacks potency. Although necessary and useful when seen from a perspective of "dignity", a fixation to this phase is not very fruitful politically. Franz Fanon expresses this point of view in an essay "Sur la culture nationale". He distinguishes three stages in the development of the orientations of colonized intellectuals, the first two of which are similar to those of Elias. First there is a "période assimilationniste intégrale", in which they imitate European culture. Then follows a period of confusion and fear in which they try to find a foothold in the cultural products and mystical past of their own people. This, however, has the danger of immobility, "folklore" and exoticism. The third stage should be a "période de combat" in which the intellectual places himself at the service of the people, in which he appeals to his people to take part in the struggle, and makes himself the spokesman of a new reality of action. This should make an end to the elitism which often emerges in the preceding stages, and the struggle should bring unity to the people. Emancipation has therefore a function in this perspective, but it is temporary — it is a preparatory step to the open conflict by strengthening self-confidence.

Whether a process in which phases of assimilation and emancipation are discern-
ible is always followed by a stage of conflict depends on all sorts of circumstances.
Often the elements of "civilization" and "culture" will eventually intermingle after
an alliance between the old elite and old avantgarde has come about, even with-
out open political struggle. This mixture can then function as a criterion of civil-
ization for a new elite.

"SOUL"

The cultural history as reflected in music of the blacks in the USA is cha-
racterized by many shifts. Tendencies of "assimilation" and of an emancipatory
forming or renewing of culture alternate again and again. There were frequent changes
in style based on aspects of the preceding civilization and harking back to pri-
mordial inspiration, in which the spontaneous, "sound", "drive", "swing" and
improvisational inspiration predominated, and each they were followed sooner or
later by an encapsulation into commercial, massive, arranged, civilized forms,
whereby the personal, the emotional, as well as the "black" elements were ousted
by slick salability, an easy appeal and/or a polished performance. One of these
shifts and developments with a back-to-the-roots/back-to-blackness image was
"soul music" which developed in the 1960's.

It was for the most part vocal, expressive, primarily emotional, compelling
music. The lyrics contain many references to matters associated with the life of
black people in the rural Deep South. The atmosphere is often one of joy and
inspiration: "Feelin' good!" There is much emphasis on communication, on "com-
plete communion": "Can you hear me? Yeah!" There is a strong interplay be-
tween the singer (usually) and the audience, which is often represented symbol-
ically by a small back-up chorus. This is a direct derivation from "gospel" traditions
in a secularized context. It is remarkable that it was precisely those forms that
were least "civilized" and the most expressive of solidarity, that were taken over,
thus imparting a ritual character to the whole.

Also outside the world of music an extensive "soul" vocabulary has spread
among American blacks. What does "soul" really mean? The "concept" is rather
vague, but the associations which it appears to evoke are fairly clear: inspired
bodily existence; strong, shared emotions; supple, forceful movement; "timing",
drive, traditional food; sex; paradoxical, "in-group" communication; purity; and
a sharing of experience, understanding, and ways of thinking and expression.

"Soul" would therefore seem to convey what those who use the term — for
the most part "lower class urban Negroes" — are, or at any rate those elements
of their "nature" that they wish to stress. It is precisely the relative vagueness,
the reference to shared backgrounds and values, the emphasis on the general
above the personal, that makes the "soul strategy" so effective for the strengthen-
ing of feelings of solidarity. The emergence of this vocabulary towards the end
of the fifties has been interpreted in relation to the expansion of social possibili-
ties which took place — in principle at least — at that time and the resulting
feelings of insecurity.

However, some authors doubt the "authenticity" of the "soul movement",
especially in relation to soul music; they point to the strongly commercialized
use of soul vocabulary and see soul music as little more than commercial enter-
tainment. There are definitely indications for such a point of view, but commerc-
ialization seems to have taken over at a later stage, and can therefore not be held

responsible for the emergence of "soul". And besides, the successful use of symbols points to a felt need for the messages suggested by those symbols. Keil: "The situation that gives rise to the soul strategy really needs no elaboration . . . the problem of self-hatred, the lack of self-esteem — the lack of self, for that matter; these form the pervasive and frightening theme, and the variation on it is a deep-seated mistrust of others — black as well as white." "The soul ideology ministers to the needs of identity and solidarity."

EMANCIPATION AND IDENTITY

The emancipatory activities discussed above display striking similarities in spite of certain differences. Each time we see a rejection of assimilation and that people are not yet ready for conflict. In each case there is a consideration of the values of the group itself, a search for shared backgrounds and joy at this new or re-found dignity. This joy sometimes strikes us as somewhat exaggerated. It seems that doubts and ambivalences, remnants of assimilatory internalizations, are suppressed. "Cultural" activities and the playing of expressive roles have the function of exorcising these doubts, of convincing the self, others in the same circumstances, and society.

Cultural activities and expressive roles may be linked to one of the aspects of society as distinguished by Parsons: "Latency" (pattern maintenance and tension management, socialization and recreation, motivation). The other three aspects are "adaptation" (economy and technology), "goal attainment" (polity) and "integration" (social control, stratification). In cultural activities patterns of life are, as it were, developed, symbolized and ritualized, without actually putting them into operation in the "reality" of economy, politics and "society". People in this case use symbols to gain their ends, instead of money, power or "social" sanctions, which are means appropriate for the other spheres. Cultural activities would seem typical of those situations in which an action-potential is available, that cannot be used in an economic, political or "social" way. Expressive roles function as models for the organization of energy with an eye to more extensive action in the future.

The opportunities that are open to people in society depend on the availability of such things as wealth, power or prestige, but also on something like "self-confidence", organized motivation or identity. This is a symbolic construction, which points the direction for action potentialities, which gives sense and meaning to existence and action. It also functions as a defence, against the feeling of being a mere object or of belonging to the chaos, against doubts and despair. This construction comes into being with varying degrees of success in the course of people's development, depending on many circumstances including both the attainment of institutionalized prestige and interpersonal esteem.

The transitions from assimilation to emancipation described above appear to be connected with the impossibility of finding a worthwhile identity in certain situations. Because one lacks an unattainable attribute, one is excluded from a centre of symbolic value. One belongs definitively to another "pseudo species." By accepting this collectively an attempt is made to arrive at an alternative, but equally valuable centre as opposed to the unattainable official one. By this active acceptance of one's kind the old differences are rendered invalid. This struggle, fought with symbols, also takes place "within" the people concerned. The divers stages leave their internalized traces. The struggle between these elements of po-

sitive and negative identities forms the background of the tensions we spoke of. This "double struggle", personal and social, for an alternative basis of self-confidence and identity, for a new start based on the self, constitutes the core of the process of emancipation. Cultural activities, expressive self-ascertainment and ritual communion are strategic means for this.

Emancipation is a protest against established stratification as well as an attempt to escape from it. The "external elements" of the existing order, which are accepted in the assimilatory phase, are now countered by the "inner" feelings of self-esteem and humanity. But this is done by symbolizing, by "externalizing". This in turn leads to new institutionalization, standardization and routinization. Even in the language of spontaneity, a grammar, a syntax, and idiom or even a way of spelling evolve. Every spontaneous urge is expressed in rhetoric and clichés. Cultural activities yield cultural products, by means of participation in culture new methods of distinction are obtained and expressive roles become institutional. By this inevitable routinization of the emancipatory, cultural acceleration is doomed to stagnation: emancipation is a phase.

YOUTH AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS

Among the younger generations — at any rate in Western Europe and North America — a number of phenomena are discernible which display a certain similarity to what we have pointed out earlier as being typical for emancipation (in a stricter sense), such as the emphasis on spontaneity and resistance against rationalism. Today's youth are as it were passing through two mutually reinforcing emancipations. Firstly there is the individual emancipation, which is described in the literature of developmental psychology with the aid of such a term as adolescence crisis; and secondly there is a collective emancipation, whereby the young rebel against their elders as a generation.

Apart from being stages in a process, assimilation, emancipation and open conflict can also be seen as strategic alternatives in the situation of those who stand outside a centre and who wish to improve their position in relation to it. Successive generations of young people do not always opt for the same alternatives. In the past decade the preference seems to have shifted from assimilation to emancipation or conflict. Ten years ago most youth could be described as "new adults", who were oriented towards the society of adults in anticipatory socialization. A considerable proportion of today's youth turn away from this and oppose the life-style of the "gerontocracy" with alternative forms. This tendency appears, to my mind, to be an expression of a changing balance of power between the generations.

Other contributing factors here are: the disappointment about the failure to realize generally proclaimed values and ideals, the taking for granted of divers attainments and an improved distribution of education and information. Many young people now explicitly and very emphatically place values of youthfulness in opposition to the central standards of their elders such as experience, knowledge, specialized expertise, restraint, deferred gratification, authority, law and order. This protest is in turn often condemned by older generations as proof of irresponsible self-indulgence and immature irrealism. Older people often define their responsibility in terms of an existing order, whereas young people do so with an eye to general values and ideals.

The counter-movement of the young takes a variety of forms. Where the emphasis lies chiefly on personal liberation, as among the hippies, the parallel with the emancipation reactions is the strongest. Other groups tend to move in the direction of open conflict. Participants in the former variants are concerned with the development of the self and expansion of consciousness, while outsiders may tend to wield terms such as social regression or collective narcism. These motives are also to be found in the bourgeois "Kultur" in the second half of the eighteenth century. Now too its translation into symbols, works of art or ritualized enactments of expressive roles, appears to be very exploitable commercially. Many cannot afford to indulge in an unrestricted regression of an ego-maniacal narcism, even though they do feel a certain need to do so. These needs can be satisfied to a certain degree by a symbolic identification with poets, soul men or pop idols. This symbolic gratification is open to exploitation via mass media. This often is accompanied by a change, however, a polishing or coarsening, whereby both regressive and revolutionary temptations are diverted and channelled into "latency" and "leisure".

Mass exploitation of emancipation-culture can obstruct the transition to a stage of conflict. By the amused, slightly derogatory tolerance of regressive and aggressive youthfulness the political aspect is kept latent: "repressive tolerance" is applied. By partial satisfaction of narcistic impulses and emancipatory needs — but now in a context of weekend activities and with a touch of "civilization" — assimilation is reverted to, and intermingling is undertaken without conflict: an expressively, youthfully adorned "beat" or "soul" band is often accompanied — audibly but invisibly — by middle-aged violin players.

FAMILY COMMUNICATION PATTERNS, FAMILY AUTONOMY
AND PEER AUTONOMY: A THEORETICAL MODEL
OF SOCIALIZATION*

F. GERALD KLINE,[1] NIELS CHRISTIANSEN,[2] DENNIS K. DAVIS,[3]
RON OSTMAN,[3] LEA VUORI[4] AND SHELTON GUNARATNE[3] **

USA, FINLAND

INTRODUCTION

In a recent paper Kline, Davis, Ostman, Vuori, Christiansen, Gu-
naratne and Kivens (1970) explored the socialization nexus of family commun-
ication patterns, peer autonomy and family autonomy as it related to such contem-
porary characteristics of youth as radical political activism, evaluation of mass
institutions and mass media use. This basically descriptive study examined each
of the independent variables of socialization separately. It is the intent of this
paper to develop a socialization model that interrelates these three major social-
ization influences to explain their effects on five measures that are in turn import-
ant for interpretation of contemporary youth events.

The previous paper examined the relevant family studies literature and found
two major threads running through it: family authority patterns and a concern
with intellectual interaction among family members. This literature examination
supported recent work by Chaffee et al. (1966) and McLeod et al. (1967) in
the development of a family typology that rests on family communication patterns.
This work conceives of family communication patterns developing out of the inter-
action of two major dimensions. The first of these is a socio-oriented com-
munication dimension in which the parent stresses avoidance of disharmonious
interpersonal relations by the child. The second is a concept-oriented dimension
in which parents expose the child to a wide range of controversial issues, emphas-
izing that youth should express his views on issues. Conceptually, McLeod and
Chaffee maintain, the dimensions are independent.

The theory assumes that the two kinds of communication practices have differing consequences for the individual's behavior. Socio-oriented communication teaches the youth to be cautious and defer to adults, while concept-oriented communication provides a milieu in which the child can express himself, and to seek, and be tolerant of divergent viewpoints. By dichotomizing the two dimensions four family types emerge:

DIAGRAM 1

		Concept-oriented low	Communication high
Socio-oriented	low	Laissez-faire	Pluralistic
Communication	high	Protective	Consensual

Laissez-faire families are not discouraged from challenging parental viewpoints, but neither are they exposed to information relevant to the expression of independent ideas. *Protective* families stress socio-relations at the expense of concept-oriented relations. The child is encouraged to get along with others by avoiding controversy and is given little opportunity to encounter information for developing his own views. *Pluralistic* families emphasize the development of varied concept relations in an environment relatively free of social restraints. And *consensual* families stress both kinds of communication. While the child is exposed to ideas he is discouraged from expressing dissenting opinions.

The socialization literature also pointed to the role peer groups play in the socialization of adolescents. Value differences between family and youth played an important role in developing the differential effect family and peers have on adolescent development. Newcomb (1961), Duncan (1968), Sewell, Haller, Portes (1969), Maccoby (1962), Fishman and Solomon (1964), all pointed to the importance of the peer group in the development of political attitudes, political activism and occupational and educational attainment. Kandel and Lesser (1969) found both peer and family effects in educational planning and disagreed with the notion of a separate adolescent peer sub-culture which has main importance in socialization.

Another area of interest examined by Kline et al. (1970) is family autonomy. This notion deals with physical separation as well as the extent of self determination even though the child still lives at home. Lipset (1968), Smith, Haan and Block (1970) found that the active and critical youth is relatively autonomous from parental influence. And Costello (1969) found that the kind of family communication patterns that exist in families is related to the self-confidence a young person has when leaving the family for the larger social system.

PREVIOUS FINDINGS

Kline et al. (1970) compared survey research findings on two samples of young people with the findings in the original Chaffee et al. paper (1966) for family communication patterns, as well as for family and peer autonomy. The two groups examined were a random sample of young people between 13 and 20 years of age in the Twin City metropolitan area of Minneapolis and St. Paul, Minnesota, and a non-random sample of university students in an introductory sociology class at a large university. In general the findings were consistent with Chaffee

et al. although problems of interpretation arose because of differences in non-equivalent questionnaire items.

Two new measures were developed in the Kline et al. (1970) study: mass institution evaluation and radical political activism. It was thought that these were better measures of youthful perceptions and political activity than the more traditional measures. Upon examination it was found that pluralists in both samples were the highest in mass institution distrust, but as in the Chaffee study there was little to choose between the four family types. In the area of radical political activism the pluralists were the most active among the university students with few differences among the other three types. In the TC Youth group the pluralists and laissez-faire types were most active. It was found, however, that the kind of activism in the TC Youth group was of a less radical nature than that found in the university sample. This would support the impression one gets of the recent events at American universities.

A similar analysis was carried out for high and low peer and family autonomy measures. Youth low in family autonomy were lower in newspaper reading, radical political activism and public affairs knowledge. They were also higher on mass institution trust and higher on reading of editorial page material.

In examining peer autonomy it was found that those low in autonomy read less editorial page matter and did not use the media for seeking other opinions. Also they were lower in public affairs knowledge and were more trustful of the mass institutions.

With these findings in mind we conceive of this paper as an effort to develop a socialization model that takes into account the interrelated effects of the family communication patterns, family autonomy and peer autonomy. The next section is devoted to this task.

MODEL DEVELOPMENT

An examination of the studies done in the area of family communication patterns point to the importance of these phenomena for how autonomous an adolescent will be with regard to the family as well as the peer groups with which he is involved. Based on the conceptual characteristics of the two major socialization dimensions being discussed here, we would expect higher socio-orientation to have a differential impact on our measures of family and peer autonomy. *The more authority exerted within the family the greater the autonomy from the family and the greater reliance on the peers.* The second dimension of concept-orientation, however, would work toward greater freedom of inquiry and probably less dependence either on the family or the peers. Therefore, we would expect that *the higher the concept-orientation the greater the peer and family autonomy.* And in the original conceptualization the two orientation dimensions were independent.

For this paper we will be using path analysis as the method for the construction and testing of our theoretical view. A great deal of work has been done in this area recently by Blalock (1964) (1969), Duncan (1966), Borgatta and Bohrnstedt (1969) in sociological inquiry. We will argue that we can set up a temporal sequence, although not absolutely non-reciprocal in a causal sense, that will allow us to combine our heretofore unrelated socialization components. Diagram 2 will indicate the sign and direction of cause that we will be testing in the first part of this paper.

DIAGRAM 2

Socio-orientation $(-)$ ⟶ Peer Autonomy

$(+)$

$(+)$

$(+)$

Concept-orientation ⟶ Family Autonomy

If it were possible to obtain data that were collected over time we would be able to develop a better test of the causality we are postulating and we would also be able to gauge the effect that time has on the relationships being examined. To simulate this we will take the age variable into account implicitly (that is as a non-causal theoretical mechanism) by using dummy variable cohort analysis. Thus our path estimates for testing the model in Diagram 2 will have been controlled for age.

DATA ANALYSIS — PART I

Table 1 shows the standardized partial regression coefficients (path coefficients) for the sample. We can see that with regard to our hypothesized model we have very little explanation of variance and only one significant path.

TABLE 1. PATH COEFFICIENTS ESTIMATED FOR THE SOCIALIZATION MODEL

	Hypotheses		Coeff.	% Var.
Socio-orientation	$(+)$ ⟶	Family Autonomy	+.11	9
Concept-orientation	$(+)$ ⟶	Family Autonomy	—.26**	
Socio-orientation	$(-)$ ⟶	Peer Autonomy	—.11	4
Concept-orientation	$(+)$ ⟶	Peer Autonomy	+.09	
Peer Autonomy/Family Autonomy*			.00	
Socio-/Concept-orientation*			—.13	

* These are the zero-order correlation coefficients for these pairs of variables.
** Significant at the .01 level.

In the sample there is a reversal of prediction for the causal relationship between concept-orientation and family autonomy. Perhaps the intellectual interchange that is allowed in families high on this dimension causes the adolescent to see his family as a group he does not want to be autonomous from. The lack of significant paths would indicate that this socialization nexus is not causally linked as we conceived. It should be pointed out also that the lack of correlation between family communication dimensions was sustained as was the sign between family and peer autonomy. Also age was not a significant factor in predicting either peer or family autonomy.

The next step is to examine how these socialization measures, although not tightly knit as the above analysis shows, operate as a predictive model for a num-

ber of dependent variables. First we will postulate the predicted relationships that seem to grow out of our examination of the literature and the previous Kline et al. (1970) paper.

DATA ANALYSIS — PART II

Table 2 indicates the path relationships that would be expected for each of the chosen dependent variables. We will examine them in order of the sequential relationship they might be expected to have: mass media time budgeting, evaluation of mass institutions, and radical political activism.

TABLE 2. HYPOTHESIZED RELATIONSHIPS FOR SOCIALIZATION MODEL AND DEPENDENT VARIABLES

Independent Variables	Dependent Variables				
	TV	Nsps	Radio	Mass Inst. Eval.	Radical Pol. Act.
Socio-orientation	+	+	+	+	—
Concept-orientation	—	+	—	—	+
Peer Autonomy	+	+	+	—	+
Family Autonomy	—	—	—	—	—

In testing our notions we examined the path coefficients for media use and public affairs knowledge to determine whether there was any predictive capability in this area. A quick glance at Table 3 indicates that there are only three links that are statistically significant. Only TV viewing time seems related to our socialization set (then only to the concept development that takes place as part of the family communication patterns) and to peer relationships. As expected the younger more concept-oriented adolescent uses TV less. And the more autonomous one is from his peers the less TV viewing. Similarly the more autonomous one is of his peers the less he listens to radio. Not shown in Table 3 is the statistical significance of age to both TV and newspaper usage. The older an adolescent is the more reading and less viewing he does.

TABLE 3. ESTIMATED PATH COEFFICIENTS FOR SOCIALIZATION MODEL AND MASS MEDIA VARIABLES

Independent Variables	Dependent Variables		
	TV	Newspapers	Radio
Socio-orientation	—.08	—.10	—.08
Concept-orientation	—.19**	+.12	+.02
Peer Autonomy	—.22**	—.02	+.04
Family Autonomy	—.05	—.09	+.18*
% Variance	14	6	5

* Significant at the .05 level
** Significant at the .01 level

It appears that our model is of little use as it relates to the socialization of adolescents to the media. Let us now turn our attention to mass institution evaluation and radical political activism.

One would expect that the use of the media would be a necessary, if not sufficient, condition for evaluating mass institutions and acting for or against them. We will now see if the socialization set we thought would relate to media use will be as ineffective for our last two dependent variables.

TABLE 4. ESTIMATED PATH COEFFICIENTS FOR
SOCIALIZATION MODEL AND POLITICAL VARIABLES

Independent Variables	Dependent Variables	
	Mass Inst. Eval.	Rad. Pol. Activism
Socio-orientation	+.07	+.06
Concept-orientation	—.04	+.09
Peer Autonomy	—.17*	—.03
Family Autonomy	—.42**	+.38**
% Variance	30	09

* Significant at .05 level
** Significant at .01 level

Table 4 displays the path coefficients generated by our data. As one can see the explanation of variance is up considerably and the coefficients are interpretable in light of the literature.

It is obvious that the greater the adolescent autonomy from peer and, particularly, family influences, the greater the distrust of the mass institutions around him. The temporal immediacy of these two groups for our sample is obvious in the lack of significance of the family communication variables. It should also be pointed out that there was a large age factor entering into this analysis. An implicit (theoretically) path coefficient of — .20 was found for age on mass institution evaluation. This is significant at the .05 level.

Moving now to the radical political activism dimensions we find that there is a similarity of effect on activism as there was on mass institution evaluation. This time the family autonomy effect is accentuated. Given the massive influence the family has on those who have not left home yet we can see that independence is a key measure of how radical one will be.

In reviewing this analysis it appears that the socialization nexus postulated at the outset of this paper is much more appropriate to these areas of adolescent activity than to media use habits.

DISCUSSION

It was our hypothesis that the family communication patterns had an effect on the autonomy an adolescent had from his parents and peers. And in turn this relationship would be a reasonable model for prediction of media time budgeting, mass institution evaluation and radical political activism. As it turned out the best predictive capability was for the political measures rather than for the media measures. For example, family communication measures had no combina-

torial effect on either peer or family autonomy. Only concept-orientation communication related to family autonomy. And when it came to predicting TV viewing this same concept-orientation by-passed the family autonomy effect to join peer autonomy as the best predictors. Thus the higher the concept-orientation and the higher the peer autonomy the less TV viewing.

For radio listening the concept-orientation worked through family autonomy to predict the time budgeted for this activity. The higher the concept-orientation the lower the family autonomy, and the lower the family autonomy, the higher the radio time budget. Interestingly enough the peer group, which is supposed to be very important in this media activity, had little impact. Apparently, as shown in other family media use studies (Kline, 1969), radio is a family use medium. Newspapers were not related in any way to our socialization measures.

Concept-orientation was also very important when it came to predicting mass institution evaluation and radical political activity.

From Diagram 3 we can see that there is a causal chain operating for both measures with the addition of the peer group autonomy when it comes to evaluating the institutions around the youth.

DIAGRAM 3

$$
\begin{array}{ccc}
& & \text{Peer Autonomy} \xrightarrow{\;(-)\;} \\
& (-) & (-) \\
\text{Concept-orientation} \xrightarrow{\hspace{2cm}} & \text{Family Autonomy} \xrightarrow{\hspace{1.5cm}} & \text{Mass Inst. Eval.} \\
& (-) & (+) \\
\text{Concept-orientation} \xrightarrow{\hspace{2cm}} & \text{Family Autonomy} \xrightarrow{\hspace{1.5cm}} & \text{Radical Pol. Activism}
\end{array}
$$

Thus the higher the concept-orientation the lower the family autonomy, and the lower the family autonomy, the lower the trust in the institutions and the higher the radical political activism. And the greater the peer autonomy the lower the trust in the system. One can see that the family and peers are important components when it comes to youthful distrust and activity generated from that distrust.

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SOCIOLOGY OF LAW
SOCIOLOGIE DU DROIT

L'évolution de la justice pénale se caractérise dans la plupart des pays par une transformation des peines-châtiments, fondées sur une logique abstraite d'ordre moral et individualiste, en des sanctions-traitements dictées par une approche criminologique des délinquants et une conception sociale des droits-devoirs de l'autorité.

Cette «socialisation» de la justice pénale a été marquée, en Belgique, par la nette étape que constitue la loi du 29 juin 1964 concernant la suspension, le sursis et la probation. La loi autorise en effet les juges à suspendre le prononcé de la condamnation, ou à faire surseoir à l'exécution des peines prononcées, tout en assortissant ces décisions de conditions particulières. Le délinquant s'engage à respecter ces conditions qui sont déterminées en vue de favoriser sa rééducation ou sa stabilisation sociales.

La loi assure aux délinquants ainsi mis à l'épreuve une vigilance qu'exercent les assistants de probation. Ceux-ci accomplissent leur mission sous le contrôle de commissions de probation composées d'un magistrat, d'un avocat et d'un membre non juriste, choisi en raison de sa compétence ou de son expérience en matière de service social.

Ce nouveau régime rompt de manière très nette avec la tradition punitive comme avec les critères intentionnalistes du droit pénal classique. Il semblait dès lors justifié de vérifier dans quelle mesure le monde judiciaire intègre cette modification profonde du sens de la justice pénale. Pareille vérification permet de juger dans quelle mesure les agents de justice peuvent contribuer aux transformations de la vie sociale.

Trois ans après l'entrée en vigueur de la loi de 1964, le *Centre de sociologie du droit et de la justice* s'est adressé par questionnaire aux juristes et non juristes qui appliquaient la loi — soit les juges, procureurs et avocats intervenant au stade judiciaire — les membres des commissions de probation intervenant au stade de l'exécution des sanctions probatoires — et les assistants de probation chargés des enquêtes sociales préalables au jugement, comme des guidances résultant des décisions judiciaires de mise à l'épreuve.

Le questionnaire comportait 14 items fréquemment subdivisés et structurés de manière à permettre des vérifications par regroupement. Les destinataires furent invités à commenter leurs réponses par des observations libres dont l'analyse qualitative a permis de valider ou de nuancer quelques indications quantitatives.

Les 424 réponses obtenues représentent 39,3% du nombre total des destinataires, soit 36,2% pour les juges et procureurs, 30,3% pour les avocats, 59,8% pour

L'ACCEPTATION RÉELLE OU FORMELLE D'UNE INSTITUTION PÉNALE NOUVELLE

SÉVÉRIN-CARLOS VERSELE

BELGIQUE

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Les 424 réponses obtenues représentent 29,5% du nombre total des destinataires, soit 34,2% pour les juges et procureurs, 20,5% pour les avocats, 39,8% pour

les membres des commissions de probation et 60% pour les assistants de probation. Les tendances très opposées qu'expriment les observations libres suggèrent que les réponses proviennent principalement tant des personnes les plus favorables à la probation, que des personnes les plus réticentes à l'égard de l'institution nouvelle.

1º L'ACCEPTATION DE LA PROBATION

Une question fermée, mais à 5 possibilités de réponse, visait directement une approbation du principe même de la probation. D'autres items portaient sur des problèmes qui impliquent plus ou moins nécessairement l'acceptation authentique de ce principe. On se limite ici aux réponses relatives à la suspension du prononcé de la condamnation, parce que cette modalité consititue l'innovation la plus hardie de la loi.

Le principe même de la suspension probatoire est approuvé sans réserve par 82,8% des juges, 65,5% des procureurs et 75,4% des avocats, la différence entre la magistrature et le barreau n'étant point statistiquement significative (.13414). Toutefois, la manière dont le monde judiciaire conçoit la suspension indique la relativité de cette acceptation. La mesure de suspension est en effet envisagée comme un avertissement-menace par 84,5% des juges, 78,0% des procureurs et 77,7% des avocats, comme d'ailleurs aussi par 71,9% des membres non juristes des commissions de probation et 50,0% des assistants de probation.

Le fait que la suspension du prononcé de la condamnation est encore entrevue dans la perspective d'intimidation qui caractérisait le droit pénal classique, est confirmé notamment par la fréquence du recours à la suspension que souhaite le monde judiciaire. En effet, il n'est que 14,2% des juges, 10,7% des procureurs et même 25,4% des avocats pour estimer que la suspension doit être fréquemment appliquée par les tribunaux, alors que ces pourcentages passent à 28,4%, 21,3% et 36,5% en ce qui concerne le sursis à l'exécution des peines, où le principe kantien de la condamnation est respecté.

Des aspirations dogmatiques se manifestent encore dans les avis relatifs à la durée des épreuves probatoires. On incline à prolonger la mesure aussi longtemps que possible, soit par souci d'aider le délinquant, soit par souci de protéger la société. Mais une indication est plus nette encore: la non-concordance entre l'opinion exprimée à travers les réponses à l'enquête et l'opinion manifestée dans les jugements. En ne tenant compte que des réponses émanant des juges — puisqu'eux seuls décident finalement du délai d'une probation entre les limites légales de 1 à 5 ans — on observe une discordance entre l'option théorique et le fait jurisprudentiel:

Durée de l'épreuve	Durée optimale Enquête 1967	Durée de fait Jurisprudence 1969
1 an	4%	2,0%
2 ans	24%	2,5%
3 ans	47%	42,5%
4 ans	3%	6,0%
5 ans	10%	47,0%
Sans réponse	12%	

On note cependant que la jurisprudence évolue vers un raccourcissement des délais d'épreuves, la fréquence des délais de 5 ans ayant été de 70% en 1965.

La perspective punitive traditionnelle apparaît également dans l'opinion qu'un manquement aux engagements pris par le probationnaire doit être sanctionné par une révocation de la probation. Pareille opinion se manifeste chez 25,3% des juges, 26,5% des procureurs et 16,9% des avocats, alors qu'elle ne rallie que 10,8% des membres non juristes des commissions de probation et seulement 5,6% des assistants de probation.

* * *

Les constatations suggèrent donc que l'acceptation de la probation par les juristes, serait plus formelle que réelle, en ce sens que les attitudes et les décisions restent fortement déterminées par la tradition répressive.

On croit cependant pouvoir observer, à travers les commentaires entourant les réponses des juristes, que les déterminations répressives sont plutôt subconscientes et que l'habit de logique moralo-juridique sous lequel elles se déguisent habituellement laisse déjà percer quelques trous.

Les différences de rôles s'atténuent entre l'accusation, la défense et le siège. Le monde judiciaire évolue incontestablement; il semble dépasser le point de non-retour dans sa renonciation à une justice de pur châtiment.

2° L'ACCEPTATION DES COLLABORATEURS NON-JURISTES

En organisant le régime nouveau de la probation, le législateur y attribuait un rôle important à des non-juristes. C'est ainsi que, outre les experts médicaux auxquels la procédure criminelle courante permet de faire appel, des travailleurs sociaux sont appelés à informer les autorités judiciaires — à la demande de celles-ci et de l'accord du prévenu — sur le comportement et le milieu de ce dernier. Le législateur y voyait un moyen d'apprécier plus judicieusement l'opportunité d'une sanction probatoire et la nature des conditions particulières dont cette sanction serait plus utilement assortie. C'est ainsi encore que l'exécution d'une mise à l'épreuve déclenche la guidance du probationnaire, cet «assist, advice, befriend» confié aux assistants de probation et contrôlé par l'organe non judiciaire qu'est la commission de probation.

On observe que les juristes sont encore bien réticents à l'égard des travailleurs sociaux et des commissions de probation, apparemment par crainte de certains empiètements de la criminologie sur le droit, ou du pouvoir exécutif sur le pouvoir judiciaire.

L'obligation de procéder en tous cas à une enquête sociale préalable — d'y procéder avant de pouvoir statuer une suspension — n'est prônée que par 29,7% des juges, 40,5% des procureurs et 27,8% des avocats. Une délégation de pouvoirs accordée par le tribunal à la commission de probation, en vue de préciser les conditions particulières d'une mise à l'épreuve, n'est acceptée sans réserves qu'à 39,1% par les juges, 28,6% par les procureurs et 37,3% par les avocats. La décision par laquelle une commission de probation met anticipativement fin à une épreuve, avant l'échéance du délai fixé par le tribunal, suscite le désaccord de 21,9% des juges, 29,8% des procureurs et même 17,4% des avocats.

* * *

On constate dès lors que les juristes approuveraient formellement une institution, sans assez admettre le rôle que la loi y assigne aux non-juristes. Encore qu'il soit peu justifié de vouloir la fin sans en vouloir les moyens.

Une appétence profonde vers l'apparente sécurité des normes fixées par le droit s'oppose à accepter les incertitudes et les mouvances des faits anthropologiques et des nécessités sociales. De plus, les juristes semblent ne pas assez savoir de quelle manière les spécialistes du comportement déviant peuvent enrichir l'application du droit. Un goût subconscient de la «sévérité» semble parfois faire négliger les moyens de découvrir la «vérité».

3° JURISTES ET NON-JURISTES

Un rapprochement entre les réponses données par les juristes (juges, procureurs, avocats) et par les non-juristes (membres-fonctionnaires des commissions de probation et assistants de probation) indique que ces deux groupes d'agents de justice réagissent de manière différente. Nous ne retenons ici que certains exemples, après avoir relevé que la participation à l'enquête n'atteint que 25,7% chez les juristes contre 46,3% chez les non-juristes, la différence étant nette entre l'ensemble des avocats (20,5%) et le groupe des avocats-membres des commissions de probation (38,3%).

Alors qu'il n'est aucun non-juriste pour désapprouver le principe de la suspension, il est 1,5% des juges pour le faire, 10,5% des procureurs et même 3,2% des avocats. Et pour considérer la suspension comme un pardon judiciaire symbolisant le pardon social, nous trouvons 21,9% des membres non-juristes des commissions de probation, alors qu'il n'est que 9,5% des juges, 17% des procureurs et 8,3% des avocats pour le faire. Par ailleurs, les non-juristes se prononcent à 34,7% en faveur d'un recours fréquent à la suspension, contre seulement 17,8% chez les juristes.

En ce qui concerne le souhait de rendre l'enquête sociale obligatoire avant toute décision de suspension, 65,6% des membres non-juristes des commissions de probation l'expriment, alors que les juges ne le font qu'à 29,7%, les procureurs à 40,5% et les avocats à 27,8%.

A la question de savoir si le tribunal peut déléguer à la commission de probation ses pouvoirs de préciser les conditions particulières d'une mise à l'épreuve, les non-juristes des commissions répondent affirmativement par 65,6% alors que les juges, procureurs et avocats ne le font qu'à 39,1%, 28,6% et 37,3%.

Enfin, lorsqu'il s'agit des décisions par lesquelles les commissions de probation mettent fin aux épreuves probatoires avant l'échéance du délai fixé par les tribunaux, 56,3% des membres-fonctionnaires des commissions approuvent cette pratique, alors que cette approbation n'est obtenue que pour 39,8% des juges, 30,9% des procureurs et 41,3% des avocats.

* * *

Des différences existent donc entre les perceptions ou réactions des juristes et celles des non-juristes. On s'étonne même de la forte cohésion entre les juristes: les différences de réponse entre les membres du siège, du parquet et du barreau sont très minces et elles s'expriment parfois dans un sens inattendu, puisque les procureurs sont parfois plus proches des délinquants que les avocats.

Ne faut-il pas souhaiter une participation plus directe des non-juristes dans l'administration de la justice pénale? La collaboration de non-juristes et de juristes au sein d'un même organisme aboutit à un rapprochement des points de vue. L'hypothèse mérite des recherches plus approfondies, qui élimineraient la

variable formée par l'engagement social plus exigeant qui conduit certains avocats à siéger avec des non-juristes au sein des commissions de probation.

Sous cette réserve et en vue d'objectiver une hypothèse de départ, les rapprochements suivants ont été effectués entre le barreau pris en bloc, le groupe des avocats-membres des commissions de probation et celui des fonctionnaires-membres des dites commissions.

Questions envisagées	Barreau	C. P. avocats	C. P. fonctionnaires
Approbation de la suspension	75,4	80,6	75,9
Suspension comme pardon	11,1	8,3	21,9
Finalité sociale de la justice	38,1	50,0	43,8
Recours fréquent à la suspension	25,4	27,8	37,5
Enquête sociale obligatoire	27,8	33,3	65,6
Guidance d'assistance	20,2	31,4	22,2
Durée maximum de 3 ans	38,9	41,6	37,5
Délégation de pouvoirs aux commissions de probation	37,3	77,8	65,6
Levée anticipée des épreuves par les commissions de probation	41,3	72,2	56,2

Les confrontations que permet ce tableau purement provisoire suscitent de nombreuses interrogations qui incitent tant à multiplier les investigations qu'à en comparer les résultats aux travaux qui, dans les pays socialistes, ont porté sur l'influence des assesseurs populaires dans les juridictions pénales, ou des accusateurs et défenseurs sociaux intervenant dans les organismes de conciliation ou dans les tribunaux de camarades.

4° LES ILLUSIONS DE LA SPECIALISATION CRIMINOLOGIQUE

On a cru, durant des décennies, qu'une spécialisation des juristes dans le domaine des sciences criminelles ou de la criminologie synthétique, obtiendrait que les pénalistes comprennent plus exactement les faits et les hommes, par une meilleure prise de conscience des déterminations anthropologiques et sociales de la personnalité criminelle et du comportement délictueux ou socialement déviant.

Parmi les 424 réponses analysées, 292 émanaient de juges, procureurs ou avocats qui pratiquaient couramment la justice pénale. Seuls 53 de ces pénalistes avaient obtenu une licence en sciences criminelles complémentaire de leur diplôme de droit. Une comparaison entre les réponses de ces 53 pénalistes-criminologues et des 239 pénalistes-juristes n'a point confirmé l'hypothèse que les premiers réagiraient autrement que les seconds en matière de probation.

Il est deux questions a propos desquelles les criminologues se distinguent des juristes au-delà d'une probabilité statistique. D'une part, un recours plus fréquent à l'avis des psychiatres avant d'arrêter la décision judiciaire ($< .001$). D'autre part, un plus vif souci de la délinquance de droit commun au regard des délits routiers, économiques ou sociaux ($< .001$). Mais cette dernière différence trouve une signification négative dans l'hypothèse que la spécialisation criminologique actuelle ne s'étendrait point aux aspects les plus neufs et socialement inquiétants de la délinquance.

Toutes les autres différences restent sans signification statistiquement validée. Il en est ainsi notamment pour la préférence donnée à l'assistance du délinquant

par rapport au souci de protéger la collectivité contre les délinquants (. 93479), ou à une conception de la guidance qui met l'accent sur l'assistance plus que sur la surveillance (. 01328).

Il en est encore ainsi pour l'approbation sans réserves du principe de la suspension (. 00478), pour l'acceptation de la suspension simple (. 02661) et pour le souci de recourir plus souvent à la suspension probatoire (. 08918).

Contrairement à l'hypothèse de départ, les criminologues ne sont statistiquement pas mieux disposés à faire contribuer les assistants de probation à la préparation des dossiers, par des enquêtes sociales préalables au jugement (. 91628 pour la suspension et . 00151 pour le sursis). Ils ne sont pas plus disposés à étendre les pouvoirs des commissions de probation par la délégation de pouvoirs que les juridictions peuvent leur accorder (. 54981), ni à réagir aux manquements d'un probationnaire par la seule adaptation des conditions (. 00752), ni à confier aux commissions le soin de mettre fin aux guidances devenant inutiles, avant l'échéance du délai judiciairement fixé (1 . 90299).

5° LA SOCIALISATION DE LA JUSTICE PÉNALE

La recherche consacrée par le Centre de sociologie du droit et de la justice à l'intégration de la probation dans le monde judiciaire belge, confirme qu'*une modification de la loi ne suffit point pour socialiser son application.* Il en est ainsi même si le législateur a conçu cette modification comme une partie de la programmation sociale générale. Les juristes qui appliquent l'institution nouvelle restent déterminés par les optiques répressives traditionnelles, qui se verbalisent en des cadres de logique formelle.

On constate — contre toute attente — que la *spécialisation criminologique des pénalistes est peu efficace.* Elle ne transforme certainement pas ce manière accélérée notre ancienne justice pénale abstraite, en un rouage social qui tiendrait compte, avant tout, des faits et qui viserait des objectifs concrets de pacification sociale et de réinsertion des délinquants dans la communauté.

L'intervention des non-juristes atténue le dogmatisme rigoriste de la justice pénale. Les conceptions, aspirations et critères plus authentiquement sociaux des assistants de probation et des membres non-juristes des commissions de probation assouplissent le régime de la probation, tant au niveau du choix de la sanction et des conditions particulières dont celle-ci s'assortit, qu'au niveau de l'exécution des mesures probatoires.

L'analyse des observations libres qui entourent les réponses à l'enquête indique que la *socialisation du droit de fond est tributaire d'une adaptation des modes procéduraux.* Bien des réticences s'expliquent par une distorsion entre des objectifs rénovés et des itinéraires demeurés. Si la forme n'est point adaptée au fond, les finalités nouvelles de la justice pénale resteront des résolutions de congrès.

* * *

Pour que les agents de la justice pénale puissent mieux contribuer au bien-être des collectivités, il semble souhaitable:

— que des non-juristes soient plus étroitement et plus fréquemment associés à la préparation, à la détermination et à l'exécution des sanctions judiciaires;

— que la sélection des juristes intervenant dans les procès pénaux se fonde sur une vérification des attitudes profondes, des motivations et de l'authenticité des engagements sociaux.

INSTRUMENTAL LAW AS A MEANS OF SOCIAL CHANGE

BRITT-MARI PERSSON BLEGVAD

SWEDEN

I

The aim of this paper[1] is to point out some aspects of the problem of law as a means of social change which are often overlooked, but which emerge when one considers cases of another kind than those usually discussed. As an example of such a case the conversion in Sweden from left-hand to right-hand traffic in 1967 is analyzed.[2]

II

Social change is with Moore here defined as "significant alterations of social structures."[3] The question then is whether such changes can be brought about by law or, in other words, whether law can induce rather than simply reflect changes.

In this context law can both be regarded as an object and as a means of communication. In the latter sense law is one type of mass media and/or individual means of influence. In this paper both aspects will be discussed. Communication presupposes a sender, a receiver and a message. It is impossible to tell who e. g. is the sender of new traffic-rules, but the legislative assembly plays an important role. As the legal system is based on the assumption that the legal rules are familiar to the public, disobedience is generally sanctioned. This element is also part of the communication process.

Very little is known about the circumstances most favourable to giving out information about a law, how such a message reaches its destination and further-

more how this knowledge influences the receiver. In Scandinavia so far, only one study has been carried out in this field by Aubert, Eckhoff and Sveri.[4]

In accordance with this study, it is here presumed that at least three variables are involved, namely attitudes, knowledge and behavior. The problem is then how closely those elements are related and further whether those relations differ according to different types of laws. A certain degree of compliance with certain types of laws may be obtained without the complete change of attitudes which an internalization involves.

To sociologists of the evolutionary school, such as Sumner, mores always precede and take precedence over mere laws. Mores are facts and they are furthermore, according to Sumner, unchangeable.[5] Myrdal, in an appendix to his thirty-year-old analysis of the American Negro, discusses whether this relation between mores and laws will hold and reaches the following conclusion: "The theory is, however, crude and misleading when applied to a modern Western society in process of rapid industrialization."[6] It is interesting, however, that the sociologist Vilhelm Aubert in an article summing up the results of the previously mentioned study which concerns the effects of the Norwegian Housemaid Law issued in 1948, refers to Sumner. Aubert indicates that those rules in the law in question which corresponded to existing customs penetrated individual perceptions while the other, less familiar rules, did not come across because they lacked sanction in prevailing customs.[7]

Myrdal and Aubert obviously differ in their view of the relations between folkways or customs and laws; a diversity which might be explained by the fact that Aubert is dealing with a more specific area. Myrdal's analysis, as well as other theoretical discussions of law and social change by e. g. Dror,[8] Evans [9] and Podgorecki in collaboration with Schulze[10] are rather broad in the sense that no distinctions have been made between different types of legislation. Many of the legislative efforts aimed at changing the economic and more *instrumental* aspects of life have been fairly successful, while other attempts, focused on social and more *expressive* relationships such as e. g. interracial sexual and marital relations have had only limited effects.[11]

It is here assumed that both instrumental activities and norms are relatively easy to change because they consist merely of agreements on how to do things in a certain way while behavior and norms in the field of expression are related to the deep layers of an individual's personality and therefore more resistant to change. Examples of expressive behavior would be interaction in family-groups nd other small, informal groups. It is in trying to change these types of behavior

[4] Vilhelm Aubert, Torstein Eckhoff and Knut Sveri, En lov i sökelyset (A Law in Searchlight), Oslo, 1952. A discussion of some of the results was carried out by Aubert, Some Social Functions of Legislation, in Britt-Mari Persson Blegvad (ed.) Contributions to the Sociology of Law, Acta Sociologica, Vol. 10, Fasc. 1-2, Copenhagen, 1966.

[5] William Graham Sumner, Folkways, Ginn and Company, 1906.

[6] Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma, Harper and Row, New York and Evanstone, 1944 and 1962, pp. 1031-1032.

[7] Vilhelm Aubert, Op. cit., 1966 (See note 4).

[8] Yehezkel Dror, Law as an Instrument of Social Change, 33 Tulane Law Review, 1959.

[9] William M. Evan, Law as an Instrument of Social Change, in Alvin W. Gouldner and S. M. Miller (ed.) Applied Sociology, Free Press, 1965.

[10] Adam Podgorecki and Rolf Schulze, Sociotechnique, Social Science Information, 7 (4).

[11] The distinction between instrumental and expressive social relations is taken from Talcott Parsons, The Social System, Free Press, Glencoe, Ill., 1951.

that compliance with a law must interact with internalization to break down traditional behavior and values. One could propose a hypothetical continuum of behavior from the most trivial instrumental to the most deeply expressive. Different means must then be used in order to change different types of behavior. Law may here be regarded as a necessary but insufficient means when obtaining change in instrumental behavior on the societal level, while law in the expressive area on the other hand is neither a necessary nor a sufficient means.

III

Coordination of the driver's activity with that of other road-users was unnecessary as long as driving a car was a rare activity. Today, for obvious reasons, such a coordination is crucial. As the driver is isolated and sheltered from direct contact with other drivers by the body of the car, this coordination is partly obtained through traffic-laws and regulations. In most industrialized countries drivers have to pass both knowledge — and ability — tests before they are allowed to drive on their own. Through those tests the authorities try to ensure, that drivers will behave in a uniform way on the road and thereby make their own activity predictable to other drivers and road-users.

A driver is thus taught to behave according to a complicated pattern of legal rules, to coordinate his activity with that of other road-users and furthermore to adapt his own ability and that of his car to other agents and vehicles. His own safety is dependent on those factors.

When carrying out a changeover in traffic by traffic-laws, a general knowledge of the content of the rules, as will later be discussed, is of crucial importance. Even if the change is not accepted by the road-users, disobedience may be sanctioned not only by fines, imprisonment and other legal sanctions but by damages to the user's own body. Other road-users may be endangered as well. Society must therefore, in one way or another, bring about a synchronized and instant change in behavior.

The political authorities in Sweden consequently decided not only to employ legal means to bring about this change but to combine these with other measures. Law was regarded as a necessary but insufficient means of communication. The content, the new traffic-rules, were not only communicated as legal rules but by adapting them to traffic-situations communicated in various ways to the public, they were demonstrated to all road-users.

Traffic-laws and regulations in general must be simple, clear and distinctly formulated in a language understandable to anyone. In a crucial situation the driver must be able to interpret a rule instantly. Lawyers cannot function as intermediary agents as they do in many other situations where an interpretation of legal rules is questioned. The problem of the Swedish authorities was how to change an established way of behavior by using norms and other means of communication. The population, as it were, had to unlearn a certain mode of behavior as well as learn a new one.

Contrary to the other Scandinavian countries Sweden had had lefthand-driving since the year of 1734 when the first regulations were passed. Svalastoga claims, that both Sweden and Norway belong to a low risk category and Denmark to a middle risk group when one measures accident rate versus car density. This should be explained by the geographic situation of the countries as Sweden and Norway

contrary to Denmark are situated on the periphery of the European continent.[12] A Swedish government publication, however, reports an increasing traffic over the Swedish borders during the sixties. This increase was also regarded as the main factor in the discussions pro et contra a conversion.[13]

In 1955 a referendum was carried out. Only half of the voters participated and of those as many as 82.9 per cent voted against. In spite of this result the issue was brought up again in the beginning of the sixties when a royal commission was established, which in 1961 strongly recommended a conversion. These domestic efforts were strongly supported by the European as well as by the Nordic Council, which in 1961 resolved that different traffic-laws in the Nordic Countries presented a grave danger to road-safety. By the end of 1962 the four big parties in the Swedish legislative assembly reached a decision in principle for a conversion. The next step was the proposition of a bill in the assembly. This bill was passed with 294 votes in favour of and 50 votes against the propositon.

It was on this occasion resolved that the conversion should take place in 1967 and certain funds were allocated. The costs of the conversion were estimated to about 1,000 million Swedish kr. during the period 1965-1967. Out of this amount about 26 million Swedish kr. were reserved for information about the changeover. The practical handling of the conversion from left-hand to right-hand driving was else delegated to the administration. The date of the 3rd of September 1967 was chosen. A special commission was set up in 1963 — "Högertrafikkommissionen", which was to prepare the actual changeover. This commission set up three special expert groups responsible for the more scientific aspects of the planned alteration.

The necessary changes in statutes were carried out in two stages: by alterations in the Swedish traffic-law — "Vägtrafikförordningen", dated October 28th, 1966 and by a circular dated January 13th, 1967.[14]

IV

A change of behavior through legal means requires a general accept of the change in the society in question. The 1963 commission carried out in all seventeen public opinion polls covering the period from 1963 till the so-called H-day in 1967 — the day of conversion — as well as the period after.

By the end of 1964 about 35 per cent of the population was positive while between 40 and 50 per cent was still negative and 20 per cent indifferent. The number of persons with a positive attitude grew as the date of the changeover came closer. Three days before — August 31st, 1967 — a poll showed, that 46 per cent of the population was for and 35 per cent was against the change. The number of indifferents remained more or less unchanged both before and after the conversion. Some days after the change, the number of negatively inclined dramatically reduced from 35 to 20 per cent while that of persons positively inclined had grown to 55 per cent. By December 1967 — about four months after the change — the positively inclined numbered 76 per cent of the population.

[12] Kaare Svalastoga, Differential Rates of Change and Road Accidents in Western Europe and North America, In Acta Sociologica, Vol. 13, No. 2.

[13] Kungl. Maj: ts proposition nr. 58 år 1963.

[14] This part of the paper is based on the report mentioned in note 13 as well as on Krister Spolander, Op. cit., 1968 (See note 2).

The means used to spread information about the conversion were television programs with entertainment by popular artists, factual information in all news media, a pamphlet distributed to the whole Swedish population and even door-

Fig. 1. Attitudes to the right-hand traffic changeover prior to and after the change. The latest survey was carried out in January-February 1968[15]

1 — positive; *2* — indifferent; *3* — negative

to-door actions focused on particularly vulnerable groups such as school-children and old people.

In the analysis of the polls the material was split according to sex and to type of activity in traffic. As a whole, men were more positive towards the conversion than women, as were people with driving-license compared to those without any license. Age has already been mentioned as an important factor. With increasing age people seemed to become more negative towards the conversion.[16]

TABLE 1. A POLL, MADE IN 1966, GIVES THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION ABOUT
THE GENERAL ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE CONVERSION IN PERCENT

Attitude	Men			Women			Total	
	Drivers license	No license	Total	Drivers license	No license	Total	Drivers license	No license
For conversion	52	42	49	40	40	40	49	41
Indifferent	11	25	16	24	21	22	14	22
Against conversion	38	33	36	37	39	38	37	37
N.	239	115	354	88	229	317	327	344

[15] Krister Spolander, Op. cit., 1968. Fig. 2 (See note 2 and 14).
[16] Svante Thorslund, Målpopulation och målgrupper (Testpopulation and Testgroups), 1968? Mimeographed.

One of the special expert-groups within the commission specially focused on the communication problems. The group used a theoretical model originally developed in the commercial sector. As may be seen from the design, the model

Fig. 2

is based on the general assumptions of a sender-receiver situation with a special focus on the decision-making process.

A sender has a piece of information with a certain content which he wants to transmit to the receiver. The content, e. g. the new traffic-rules, is called the object of information — on Fig. 2 — 0_1. This content may under especially good conditions be received undisturbed by the receiver — 0_2.[17]

By a certain degree of selectivity, varying with all individuals, the individual "decides" if he is to accept a certain information, what part of the information is interesting or meaningful to him and, finally, to what extent the information received is to be retained. The communication group therefore regarded it as essential first to change people's attitudes and then, after such a change had taken place, to present the necessary information, e. g. about the changeover.

V

Although the referendum of 1955 indicated that the Swedish population rejected the conversion, the results of the poll in December 1967 showed that about 75 per cent of the population by this time was for the conversion. Obviously the population regarded the authorities as legitimized and all in all reacted positively in relation to authority. Different societies react in different ways to authority. Opposing views of the function of law suggest a hypothetical continuum of the amount of potential resistance. As Evans puts it: "When there is likely to be zero per cent resistance to a law, one would obviously question the need for it, since complete agreement between the behavior required by the law and the existing customs and morals apparently exists. In this situation there would be no need to codify the mores into law. At the other extreme, when there is likely to be 100 per cent resistance to a law one would expect the law to be totally ineffective, because nobody would enforce it and the authority of the lawmaker would be undermined."[18]

It is here questioned if this is true of all types of law. A differential reaction carries with it implications for the efficacy of law as an instrument of change. One of the most well-known examples is the general — today we call it un-

[17] Karl-Erik Wärneryd, Utnyttjande av massmedia i trafiksäkerhetsarbetet. Människan trafiken (Man and Traffic), Stockholm, 1966.
[18] William M. Evan, Op. cit., 1965 (See note 9).

critical — acceptance of law as an instrument of change in Nazi Cermany. Resistance to law was severely punished and obedience became one of the great virtues. It has been suggested, that one of the essential characteristics of a totalitarian dictatorship is a transition from a state based on the rule of law, in which the presumptions are in favor of the rights of the citizen, to a police state, in which the presumptions favor the coercive right of the state.[19]

Most of the laws involved in this change were to some extent expressive or at least related to the moral fabric of society. Compliance to e. g. race-discriminational laws touches other elements of personality than compliance to new traffic laws, although non-compliance may be fatal in both situations. The conversion in Sweden from left-hand to right-hand traffic was based on a decision in the legislative assembly. One may add, that in Sweden the legislature is elected democratically and that different groups of citizens concerned as reported by the commission[20] were able to express their view-points to the commission. Further there is no tradition in Sweden for mass action against a correctly passed law.

It is here hypothesized, that drastic changes in the expressive areas of social life would rather cause mass resistance towards the legal order than would cause changes in the instrumental fields. Massel's study of how law was employed as an instrument of revolutionary change in a traditional milieu might be used as another example. In 1926 an attempt was made through legislation to b: æk habits such as marriage by purchase, polygamy etc. in a central Asian repub!.c characterized by a highly traditional Mohammedan culture. The interesting point, however, is that this break came so suddenly that the woman's position socially changed for the worse. A woman who could obtain a legal divorce had neither the means or skills nor the requisite attitudes and opportunities to support herself. Moslem men responded with an explosion of hostility and violence hitherto unequaled in scope and intensity on any other grounds, as Massel puts it.[21] These incidents were unpredicted social effects, which contributed to a reversal of the policy after only two and a half years. Hirsch reports a similar, though less violent, reaction in Turkey, when Western European matrimonial laws were introduced in Turkey by Kemal Atatürk in the twenties. There the change was only accepted after World War Two.[22]

VI

As mentioned the Swedish population changed its attitude towards the conversion from left-hand to right-hand traffic rather drastically during the first six months after the so-called H-day in September 1967. The experts in the committee were not only interested in changes in the general attitude but also in changes of level and knowledge, as well as in actual behavior. The data relevant to such an analysis was collected by means of identical questionnaires at four dates in August and September 1967. It was further supplemented by group-tests and by documentary material regarding accident frequencies and actual behavior in crucial situ-

[19] Frank Neuman, The Democratic and the Authoritarian State, New York, Free Press, 1957.

[20] See note 13.

[21] Gregory J. Massel, Law as an Instrument of Revolutionary Change in a Traditional Milieu, Law and Society Review, vol. II, No. 2, 1968.

[22] Ernst E. Hirsch, Socialer Sachverhalt und rechtliche Regulierung als Interdependenz problem, Guestlecture in Copenhagen, 1969, mimeographed.

ations. The material therefore makes it possibe — to a certain extent — to correlate the changes in the attitudes, on the one hand, with the changes in knowledge and actual behavior demonstrated, on the other hand. It is here hypothesized, that if the population all in all complied to the new rules although its attitude was more or less negative to the conversion, this would mean that an internalization of instrumental rules is not necessarily linked to compliance.

A negative or indifferent attitude is here regarded as a symptom of non-internalization. To recapitulate: The polls drawn some days after the conversion showed that the part of the population negatively inclined to the change droppea from 35 per cent before the conversion to 20 per cent after the manipulation and further to about 10 per cent three months later. The number of people indifferent was on the whole unchanged during the period in question: about 20 per cent.

Questionnaires were used to check the level of general knowledge. One of the most important new rules was a give-way-rule for all traffic coming from the right. One of the questions is therefore: If you are driving at a crossroad and another car comes towards you on your right, who has the right of way. (Correct answer: You are obliged to give way to all traffic coming from your right side.) The number of correct answers rose from 82 per cent shortly before the conversion to 88 per cent two weeks after. Another question, which deals with the situation of the pedestrian, was: On which side of the road must a pedestrian walk after the conversion. (Correct answer: On the left side of the road.) Here the number of correct answers rose only slightly, namely from 85 to 88 per cent during the same period.

The material also indicates, that a great part of the populatilon still behaved as if in left-hand traffic about a month after the conversion. At a group-test e. g., carried out about two weeks after the change, 58 per cent of the tested individuals claimed, that they had looked to the left instead of the right side of the road when crossing and 11 per cent, that they had looked for road signals on the left instead of on the right side of the road.

If we turn to the material regarding hehavior and first look at the situation of the pedestrians, a study of their behavior when crossing streets showed an increase rather than decrease in incorrect behavior. Especially crucial situations were studied at five different dates during the first six months after the conversion. The average frequency of incorrect behavior increased from 8.5 per cent immediately after H-day to 15.1 per cent six months later.[23]

The frequency of accidents also reflects the compliance to the new traffic rules. This goes e. g. for head-on collisions caused by relapse to left-hand traffic behavior. The number of fatal injuries went down during the first six months, if frequency is compared to that of the previous year. The frequency then started

[23] Krister Spolander, Op. cit., 1968 (See note 2, 14 and 15).

to rise, especially outside built-up areas. This can partly be explained by the rigorous speed-limits used during the first period after the conversion.[24]

All the data covering the level of knowledge and the actual behavior show the same trend. Although there is a rather drastic change in attitude towards the conversion shortly after it has occurred, neither the level of knowledge nor the actual behavior seem to alter if one considers the period from a week before the conversion to six months after the change. The hypothesis put forward by the communication group of the Swedish commission, namely that one must first alter the attitudes and then present the information necessary to the change in order to alter behavior, seems therefore not to be supported by the material.

The data seem rather to support the conclusion, that authorities planning a social change in an instrumental area, such as the conversion in Sweden, can concentrate on spreading the information and regard a change in the attitudes of the population as a secondary factor. As mentioned the Swedish expert group dealing with the problems of communication, had taken over their theoretic assumptions from commercial life. It is possible that this group had underestimated the crucial need for compliance in a traffic situation and furthermore the element of constraint, which traditionally plays a great role in the legal, but not in the economic system.

[24] Fig. 3 is taken from Krister Spolander, op. cit., 1968 (see note 2, 14, 15 and 23).

Fig. 3. Single Accidents (MOT)
1 — 1966-67 (left-hand traffic); *2* — 1967-68
(right-hand traffic)

ELISE BOULDING

FAMILY SOCIOLOGY
SOCIOLOGIE DE LA FAMILLE

The socialization of children presents special problems in countries in the early stages of industrialization. In this paper we will focus on women as role models for girl children in rapidly changing times. UN demographic data on education and occupation and Human Relations Area Files data on traditional institutions and women's roles will be examined for 58 societies in Africa and Asia to isolate macro-system variables predictive of successful participation of girls in the contemporary society.

The focus is on socialization for general social competence, and education and employment variables are being treated as indicators of such a generalized social competence in the adult female population. All societies regard the family as an instrument for the training of children in a variety of skills of social management relevant to the routine operations of that society. Development theory postulates that industrialization opens up new opportunities to acquire social competencies. Rural families moving to the city do consciously seek these opportunities for their children and expectations for their children play a part in their decision to move, as shown in studies of recent migrants to urban areas (Bartell and Walter, 1969).

Visions of industrialization-generated opportunities are fading, however, before the mounting evidence that the rural poor leave a subsistence economy in the countryside only to enter a poverty trap in the city (Solee-Sala, 1969).

As early as the 1600's Adam Smith (1937:734-735) foresaw a large-scale decline in civic competence with industrialization, unless strenuous efforts were made to avoid this through intensive education programs. Contemporary studies of the effects of modernization on women's roles in the third world conclude that industrialization is either irrelevant or results in decreasing employment opportunities for women (Ward, 1963; Sadie, 1967:121; Weller, 1968:60-69).

Previous generalizations about preindustrial societies have underestimated the extent of participation of women in domestic craft production, traditional service occupations, and marketing roles. My own study of the effects of modernization on women's roles also points to a narrowing of the range of economic opportunities for women with increasing industrialization (Boulding, 1969a). The poverty-trap catches the poor rural in-migrant and impedes the working of the urban-based communications network model of development. Women, far more than men, appear to be subject to this "ghetto effect" when they move into the city (Carr-Saunders, 1959; Wheeler, 1967:227; McSwain, 1965).

WOMEN AS ROLE MODELS IN INDUSTRIALIZING SOCIETIES:
A MACRO-SYSTEM MODEL OF SOCIALIZATION
FOR CIVIC COMPETENCE

ELISE BOULDING

USA

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THE PROBLEM

The third world "urban-immigrant" mother's store of folk knowledge acquir-
ed in a rural setting is not relevant in the city (Boulding, 1969b). Nevertheless,
it is the mother's job in every society to build up a map inside the minds of her
children about the social world outside the four walls of the home. She must also
be a role model especially for her daughters. What determines the mother's suc-
cess in these jobs, and her children's success with the new skills?

Using UN data and Human Relations Area Files materials, I have constructed
a macro-system model of the socialization process for developing countries which
includes variables relating to traditional structures and roles, modernization and
contemporary measures of women's participation in employment and education,
with the proportion of girl children of the total school-age population enrolled in
primary school as the dependent variable, measuring the success of the socializa-
tion process for the child.

THE MODEL

Earlier findings (Boulding, 1969a) indicate two minimally related sets of
factors at work in developing countries which influence women's participation in
the modern sector: 1) the traditional religious institutionalization of society and
2) the degree of industrializing infrastructure present in a society. Previous data
further indicated that incipiently industrializing countries have a very wide range
of degreee of participation by women in non-agricultural employment and
other extra-familial activities, and that industrialization narrows the range of that
variation.

Five major inputs to the level of participatory competence of the next gene-
ration can be categorized as follows:

1. Traditional

a. Institutionalization of Traditional Religion

b. Individuation of Women's Roles in Traditional Society (I Scale Rating —
measure of the individuation of women's roles in the traditional society)

2. Modernizing

a. GNP Per Capita (As an indicator of modernizing infrastructure, communi-
cations network, etc.)

b. Role Status, Modernizing Sector (R-S Scale rating — measure of women's
role status in the modernizing sector)

3. Current Participation

a. Role Status Modernized Sector

The model can be drawn as follows:

Historic Traditional Religion	→	Individuation of Women's Roles in Traditional Society		
		↓		
		→ Women's Current Educational and → Occupational Roles		Per Cent of Girls Enrolled in Primary Education
Modernizing Infrastructure	→	Women's Role Status, Modernized Sector		

Since the range of enrollment figures for girls in the group of 58 countries under study is from 11 percent to 48 percent, these figures may be a reasonable measure of success for girls in "working the system."

THE VARIABLES

Traditional Variables

The institutional matrix in which women's roles are embedded in the traditional society will be a significant determinant of the roles themselves, so we use Degree of Institutionalization of the Majority Traditional (pre-1900) Religion here, measured very roughly on a simple three-point localism scale, as follows (Boulding, 1969a:145):

Code		Localism of Religious Organization*
1	Moslem, Catholic, Orthodox	Low
2	Protestant, Jewish, Moslem with strong minority religions	Medium
3	Animist, or Hindu, or Buddhist	High

Each of our 58 countries was coded high, medium or low on religious localism on this scale.

A measure of the individuation of women's roles in traditional society (the I Scale) was conceptualized and developed after a search of the Human Relations Area Files, using the following nine variables:

Age at Marriage
Freedom of Marriage Choice
Property Rights
Inheritance Rights
Divorce Rights (Bilaterality of)
Range of Movement from Hearth
Handler of Money and/or
Food Provider
Freedom to be Traders
and/or Business Women
Tribal Positions of
Authority**

The year 1900 was chosen as the baseline period for traditional social behavior patterns, since this was the earliest time period for which enough ethnographic data on which to base judgements was available for all the countries of the study.

Using the Guttman scaling technique, eight of the nine variables scaled for the 58 countries of the sample, with 92 percent reproducibility (see Table 1). Each country was then coded high, medium or low on Individuation according to its position on the Individuation Scale, which will henceforth be referred to as the I Scale. The variable which did not scale was Positions of Authority in the Traditional Society. This variable will be treated separately.

* Localism in the sense of local autonomy, not in the sense of "local spirit of place."
** Refers to positions of authority with power over men and women as tribal chiefs, queens, priestesses, etc.

TABLE 1.   GUTTMAN SCALE OF WOMEN'S INDIVIDUATION: DISTRIBUTION
ON THE SCALE OF 58 COUNTRIES OF AFRICA AND ASIA

Scale Type	% Countries		Scale Items Reported	Scale Errors
1	12	31%	No Scale Items	3
2	19		Age at Marriage	7
3	12		All of the Above Plus Divorce Rights	3
4	5	44%	All of the Above Plus Freedom to be Traders, etc.	4
5	12		All of the Above Plus Range of Movement from Hearth	3
6	15		All of the Above Plus Money Handler or Food Provider	12
7	7		All of the Above Plus Marriage Choice	1
8	7	24%	All of the Above Plus Property Rights	5
9	10		All of the Above Plus Inheritance Rights	2

Coefficient = $1 - 40/464 = 92\%$

Transition Variables

A set of transition variables such as Participation of Women in the Bid for Independence, and Number of Decades a Country has had Women Suffrage (United Nations, 1964), were originally included in the socialization model, but dropped when correlations between these variables and other contemporary participation variables turned out to be very low.

Modernizing Variables

Extent of modernizing infrastructure is represented by the figure, GNP Per Capita (United Nations, 1966).

Another kind of modernization variable, relating particularly to women, is the Woman's Role Status in the Modernized Sector (the R-S Scale). This scale was developed from data on women's civic participation collected by the UN (United Nations, 1968a, 1968b). The following items were widely enough reported for the 58 countries under study to be considered for inclusion in the Role Status Scale:

1) *Candidacy Rights:* the right to vote and run for office on an equal basis with men; 2) *Political Rights:* the State is party to the UN Convention on the Political Rights of Women; 3) *Members of Parliament:* women have been elected to the national parliament; 4) *High Governmental Posts:* women have held high governmental posts; 5) *High Judicial Posts:* women have held high judicial posts; 6) *High Diplomatic Posts:* women have held high diplomatic posts; 7) *Slavery:* the State is party to the UN Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, 1956; 8) *Employment Discrimination:* the State is party to the ILO Convention on Discrimination, 1958; 9) *Equal Pay:* the State is party to the ILO Convention on Equal Remuneration for Men and Women Workers, 1951; 10) *Equal Education:* the State is party to the UNESCO Convention Against Discrimination in Education, 1960; 11) *Women's International Organizations* per 100,000 female population age 25 and over (United Nations, 1967; Tew, 1969).

A procedure similar to that followed for developing the I Scale was used with appropriate modifications for the R-S Scale. Using the Guttman scaling technique, only six of the eleven variables scaled satisfactorily (93 percent reproducability) for the 58 countries (Table 2). All UN Conventions pertaining to the rights

TABLE 2 GUTTMAN SCALE OF WOMEN'S ROLE STATUS: DISTRIBUTION
ON THE SCALE OF 58 COUNTRIES OF AFRICA AND ASIA

Scale Type	% Countries		Scale Items Reported	Scale Errors
1	7	41%	No Scale Items	3
2	34		Right to Vote and to Run for Office	
3	5		All of the Above Plus Women Having Been Elected to the National Parliament	7
4	20	37%	All of the Above Plus Women Having Held High Governmental Posts	1
5	12		All of the Above Plus Women Having Held High Diplomatic Posts	3
6	14	21%	All of the Above plus Women Having Held High Judicial Posts	4
7	7		All of the Above Plus States Parties to Convention on Discrimination on Education	6
			Coefficient $= 1 - 24/348 = 93\%$	

of women except the one pertaining to equal rights in education had to be removed from the scale because the error count was too high. The information on women's organizations failed completely to scale. High and low incidence of women's organizations were randomly distributed across the countries in relation to the other scale items.

Women's Current Educational and Occupational Roles

The only women's education and employment variables reported adequately for this study are Percent of Persons in Non-Agricultural Employment Who Are Women, Percent of Literates Who are Women, Percent of Primary Teachers Who Are Women. Percent of Female Primary Enrollment, 1960, was used as the dependent variable.

Lumping Africa and Asia together unfortunately blurs some important differences in historical residues between the two regions.

FINDINGS

Figures 1, 2 and 3 show the correlations* between each pair of variables in the model, using the different women's role variables. It is readily seen that the traditional and modernization variables do not correlate with each other at all, these inputs to current women's and girl's roles are indeed independent.

* Since the figures refer to a "universe" of countries and not a random sample, the correlations are purely descriptive and levels of significance do not apply.

Fig. 1. Correlations between traditional and modernizing variables,
women's employment and primary edication for girls

Fig. 2. Correlations between traditional, modernizing and women's
education variables and primary education for girls

Fig. 3. Correlations between traditional and modernizing variables,
woman primary teachers and primary education for girls

Traditional Religion and Traditional and Modern Women's Roles

Tracing the sequence* in the upper half of the model, we note a fairly strong relationship between the extent of localist type religious institutionalization and the individuation of women's roles in the traditional society, supporting the notion of the role-shaping features of traditional religious structures. Most of the high I Scale countries are predominantly rural and animist and the life-styles associated with these minimally institutionalized societies provide great freedom of movement for woman as compared to her more home-bound counterpart (rural or urban). The three versions of our socialization model in Figs. 1, 2 and 3 show the degree of association of the I Scale rating with each of three types of women's contemporary participation.

The I Scale is most predictive of women in non-agricultural employment with r. 52 (Fig. 1), somewhat less predictive of women's literacy, r. 33 (Fig. 2) and not at all predictive of women teachers (Fig. 3). Also when paired directly with enrollment of girls in primary school, the I Scale is very weakly predictive of this enrollment. However, when we look at the intervening employment and education, we see that these variables considerably increase prediction concerning girls' schooling. Women's literacy, r. 83, has the highest predictive power of all variables relating to girls' schooling, substantially higher even than the variable women primary teachers (r. 71). Non-agricultural employment comes in a respectable third, with r. 46. The role-model effect inherent in the sequence, traditional roles → contemporary participation → girls' enrollment, makes sense then except in the case of women teachers, where the input of traditional role models is evidently irrelevant.

Looking at the modernization-related sequences in the lower half of the model, we see that GNP is not a good predictor of women in the labor force as we suspected. GNP is, however, a better predictor of women's literacy (r. 47, Fig. 2) and an excellent predictor of women primary school teachers (r. 71, Fig. 3). Also, paired directly with enrollment of girls in primary school, it sustains its predictive capacity with regard to education (r. 62). Educational "coverage" of the female sector, and teaching opportunities for women, are clearly much more modernization-dependent than general employment opportunities for women.

The R-S Scale as constructed for the purposes of this study does not "belong" in the model. The low relationship between high government, judicial and diplomatic posts and women's employment and education *may* be due to inadequate reporting, but is more likely a reflection of an elitist phenomenon so common in poorer countries, involving the creation of special opportunities for high-status women with no counterpart for middle- and low-status women.

The evidence we have been able to present in the testing of the socialization model is as interesting for what it refutes as for what it supports. The fact of independent inputs of traditional roles and modernized infrastructure, in contributing to the educational opportunities for girls, is confirmed. The presence of the intervening variable of the educated and employed contemporary woman as a role model increasing the chances of girls to find their way into primary school is also supported. The absence of any noteworthy correlations between the R-S Scale and either the intervening variables or the dependent variable probably in-

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* The model is designed to show historical sequence, but the statistical technique of path analysis is not used since two separate sequences are treated independently; therefore the figures in the diagrams represent only correlations between pairs of variables.

dicates, with all due allowance for the weaknesses of the scale, that the statuses represented by these variables are on the whole token statuses available to the elite only.

It is worthy of note that one historical and two transitional participation variables — i. e. Women's Traditional Authority Roles, Participation in a Country's Struggle for Independence and Decades of Suffrage, have so little effect either on women's current activities, or on the opportunities of girls. Traditional authority roles for women appear to be a somewhat isolated phenomenon in traditional societies, at least in terms of the kinds of variables we are using in this study.

The lack of impact of suffrage experience on contemporary women's participation is a reflection of the fact that giving voting rights is primarily a political decision, not necessarily related to existing or intended activity levels of women. I found that participation in the independence struggle, another variable which apparently has no impact on women's contemporary participation, emerged in an unusual way when the impact of urbanization was investigated. The 58 countries were grouped by the Percent of Population Living in Urban Centers of 20,000 or more (United Nations, 1966), divided into low (under 5 percent), medium (6-19 percent) and high (over 20 percent) cross classified by I Scale ratings. This process uncovered a group of low I-Scale countries — Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Singapore, Syria and U.A.R. which (except Singapore) are all part of an area that has been more or less continuously urban for 3,000 years (Sjoberg, 1960:53).

Recency of urbanization obviously affects the impact of the city on women's roles. Centuries-long urbanization persisting through the turbulent rise and fall of many empires, accompanied by the development of highly institutionalized religious bureaucracies, have generated rigid confinement practices for women. It is precisely in these anciently urbanized countries with low traditional individuation for women that the women remained uninvolved in the independence struggle. At the same time, these non-politicized women (as seen in data for the individual countries which space precludes presenting here) are present in the modernized sector of the labor force (white-collar employment) and as teachers in the schools, to a greater extent than their more politicized sisters in less urban countries in a way that it does not elsewhere.

SUMMARY AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

The socialization model postulating independent contrubutions from women's traditional role behaviors and from modernization features to women's current education and employment role patterns and an association between these current role patterns and the achievement of pupil status by girls in primary school, finds general confirmation in our data. The specifically modernization-generated women's status roles represented by the R-S Scale do not appear relevant to women's participation or girls' enrollment. Their function may be primarily symbolic at the present time.

What are the implications for the policy-makers in newly industrializing countries? First, public rhetoric about the status of women, the signing of UN Conventions, and the occasional use of a member of the women's elite in high-status public positions, while perhaps valuable in the long run in creating new attitudes towards women's roles, have very little impact on the contemporary opportunity structure for women in a society.

National investment in primary education for women, which is often stated as the top priority, is important but may be less crucial than giving attention to traditional local activities of women and building appropriately on these in local education and employment programs, and through women's organizations and a mass media geared to communication with the "grass-roots". It is what the young girl growing up in her local community perceives as possible based on her own experience in and outside her home, that determines the contributions she will make to society as an adult.

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STUDY OF THE IMPACT OF A FAMILY PROTECTION
MEASURE: THE SELECTIVE ROLE PLAYED BY SOCIAL
FACTORS IN UTILIZING THE ALLOWANCE
FOR CHILD CARE IN HUNGARY

EGON SZABADY

HUNGARY

In the past fifteen years Hungarian demographers have paid great attention to the investigation of fertility trends. This particular interest was due to the peculiar tendencies in fertility which were manifesting themselves in Hungary in the years following World War II, when the decrease in fertility — a tendency characteristic of all European countries in the interwar period — essentially continued. In the early 1950's in the wake of the war, a transitory increase could be witnessed in Hungary, but this was followed by a decrease in birth numbers until 1962, when fertility reached its lowest point. For some years the birth rate was stagnating at a level around 13 per thousand then, in 1966, it began to rise and this upward tendency continued into the late 1960's.

Ever since the early beginnings, Hungarian demographical research has undertaken also the investigation of the role of economic, social and socio-psychological factors in fertility trends. In the wake of World War II, profound economic and social changes have taken place in Hungary, changes which have also affected the trend in fertility. Suffice it to mention but a few of these factors. Social mobility saw an enormous increase as compared with the preceding decades, and this brought about changes not only in the situation of those attaining a new stratum but — due to the dimensions of the movement — transformed also the individual strata themselves, setting new ideals and norms of behaviour to those in the stratum concerned; the number of economically active married women increased suddenly; the educational level of the women of productive age rose as compared with the former situation; as a result of internal migration, the number of rural population was decreasing at an accelerated rate and urbanization was proceeding with rapid strides, etc. These changes are, of course, characteristic not only of Hungary; however, here the transformation outlined above was condensed into a comparatively short period of time.

Hungarian demographers did not content themselves with the traditional methods of fertility study, namely the analysis of fertility data of censuses and vital statistics, but undertook the study, based on questionnaire enquiries, of the population's conceptions and practices of family planning as well as of the social and political factors affecting these conceptions. The first special fertility and fa-

mily-planning survey took place in 1958-1960,[1] then in 1965-1966 another fertility and family-planning survey was carried out by the Hungarian Demographic Research Institute. In the period between the two surveys, in 1960 and 1964 the Institute and the Central Statistical Office collected data among women treated in hospital in connection with induced abortion and childbirth — this survey was repeated in 1968 — and Hungarian demographers were also carrying out a careful analysis of the fertility data of the 1960 census and the 1963 micro-census. The 1970 population census gives much more information on the development of fertility as compared to the previous censuses. For the 14 years old and older female population — for 25 per cent of the enumerated population — data are available on the number of children born, of children living together with the mother, of children living separately from the mother and of the children deceased. Main data on total children born as well as the history of marriage(s) of the mother are known. These data will be analyzed shortly.

From the demographical point of view, the most important conclusion of the 1965-1966 fertility, family-planning and birth-control survey[2] was that at the time of the survey young married people in Hungary were planning such a low number of children that this already endangered the reproduction of the population. From the sociological point of view, on the other hand, the results of the investigation are important which explain this attitude. The young married couples interviewed gave mainly the following three factors as the reason for their resorting to contraception: 1) recently born child, 2) housing problems and 3) material difficulties in the early stage of married life, arising partly in connection with setting up a home for the new family. Of the young married couples applying contraception these reasons were given by 63 per cent in the year of marriage and in the next one, and by 54 per cent in the second to fourth year of marriage. In the course of married life the importance of the three factors gradually diminishes.

[1] A termékenységi, családtervezési és születésszabályozási vizsgálat fontosabb adatai (Majo data of the fertility, family-planning and birth-control survey). Central Statistical Office, Buda pest, 1963.
[2] The 1965-1966 Hungarian survey formed part of an international comparative survey series initiated by the IPPF's Commission for Europe. The plans of the survey were worked out by Hungarian demographers commissioned by IPPF, and it was in Hungary that the program was, after coordination with the countries concerned, carried out first, poviding thus a basis for surveys in other countries.

Several publications have been dealing with the program, the methodological and organizational problems as well as the major results of this survey; the present study is intended to deal only with the findings relevant from the point of view of the selective role of social factors.

The publications on the 1965-1966 fertility, family planning and birth-control survey are the following:

Dr. E. Szabady: Tervezet a nemzetközi összehasonlító születésszabályozási és családtervezési vizsgálatra (A program for the international comparative birth-control and family-planning survey), Statisztikai Szemle, 1965, No. 8-9, p. 898-901.
Dr. E. Szabady — Dr. A. Klinger: Az 1965—66, évi termékenységi, családtervezési és születésszabályozási vizsgálat (The 1965-66 Hungarian study on fertility, family-planning and birth-control). Demográfia, 1966, No. 2, p. 135-161.
Dr. E. Szabady: A csáladtervezési vizsgálatok egyes kérdései (Some problems of family-planning surveys). Demográfia, 1967, No. 2, p. 219-237.
Dr. E. Szabady: Családtervezési trendek: a magyar vizsgálat (Family-planning trends: The Hungarian study). Demográfia, 1968, No. 3—4, p. 333-346.
Dr. E. Szabady: Hungarian fertility and family, planning studies. Social Demography and Medical Responsibility. Proceedings of the Sixth Conference of the International Planned Parenthood Federation Europe and Near East Region held in Budapest, September 1969, pp. 12-23.

There were comparatively few who when inquired about their reason of contraception indicated the following response category: the mother is restrained from undertaking to give birth to more children by the difficulties of bringing up the child. Even of the economically active women there were only 2 per cent who gave this reason for the application of contraceptive measures; of the inactive ones there were less than 0.5 per cent. In the case of economically active women this low percentage is surprising, since here caring and providing for and raising the child inevitably increases the burden laid on the women.[3] An earning activity obviously strains a woman to an extent which must find its expression as one of the main factors in family planning, even if the fact does not appear from the subjective replies of the economically active women.

The data of the 1965-1966 survey relating to total desired live-births clearly indicate the role of economic activity in family planning by women.[4] According to these data, desired live-births by 100 economically active women interviewed totalled 201, whereas for 100 economically inactive women the total was 245; planned fertility of the inactive women was thus some 20 per cent higher than that of the active ones. The difference between active and inactive women showed itself also by socio-economic groups: it was the highest in the case of those performing non-agricultural manual work compared to the inactive wives of non-agricultural manual workers and the lowest in the case of those engaged in manual work in agriculture and the inactive wives in this group.

DESIRED LIVE-BIRTHS PER 100 WOMEN

Socio-economic group	Economically active	Economically inactive
Agricultural manual workers	255	275
Non-agricultural manual workers	200	243
Non-manual workers	175	206

Not only did the economically active women plan a smaller family, they also gave birth to less children at the time of the survey and in previous years. For example, in 1949 in the case of the non-agricultural stratum the fertility of economically active women was only one third of that of the inactive ones, and although the difference diminished in subsequent years, in 1960 still the frequency of child-births in the case of economically inactive women exceeded that of active women by 68 per cent. Even in 1965-1966 the fertility of dependent women was still higher. Then in 1967 a significant change came about with the introduction of the allowance for child care.

The system of allowance for child care was instituted by the Hungarian government at the beginning of 1967. Under the government decree introducing the system, after a maternity leave of 20 weeks economically active mothers are free to choose whether they continue to work or ask for leave without pay, in the course of which they are granted an allowance of Ft 600 monthly until their child reaches the age of 3 years.

[3] For the problems of economically active mothers in Hungary, see Dr. E. Szabady: Gainful Occupation and Motherhood — The Position of Women in Hungary — The New Hungarian Quarterly, 1963, No. 34. p. 51-63.

[4] Desired live-birth — occurred live-birth + planned further birth.

The introduction of this measure, novel in character even by international standards, was prompted by considerations of demographic and public health policy. The aim of demographic policy is to increase the number of births. The public-health aspect of the measure consisted in the realization of the fact that in the case of the infants of economically active mothers placed in nurseries the morbidity rate was much higher than in that of infants nursed at home. Moreover, the majority of economically active mothers could not even avail themselves of the nursery, since the nurseries were unable to admit more than 10 per cent even of the children born in low birth-rate years. The need for nursery places was several times higher. Most working women were thus obliged to leave the child to somebody's care over the day, to a person who usually just minded the child and fed it the food prepared in advance; the majority of tasks connected with child care was left to the working mother to carry out after working hours. Obviously this double burden had a negative effect on the working standard of many mothers and this fact as well as the inevitable freguent absence from work of mothers with a small child was detrimental also to production. In addition, while many a mother with small child made great efforts both to carry out her gainful work and to care for her child, a latent supply of female labour was manifesting itself in various settlements. All these phenomena motivated the temporary interruption of the employment of economically active young mothers from the point of view of labour policy, too.

The effects of this measure — primarily one of family policy — were followed up by the Demographic Research Institute right from the start of the child care allowance system with the aid of data collection of a complete coverage and now on the basis of two years' experiences it is already possible to evaluate the results. The data enable to draw an inference on demographical efficiency of the allowance system and to examine the social factors influencing the young mother in her decision whether to avail herself of the allowance and to give up temporarily her economic activity.

The experiences of the first two years show that the allowance system has become more popular than expected. In both years, about two thirds of the economically active young mothers availed themselves of this possibility. At the time when the Demographic Research Institute closed the collection of data for the second year, more than 100,000 mothers with small children were already staying at home, making use of the allowance, their number amounted to 144,000 at the beginning of 1970 and to 167, 000 at the beginning of 1971. According to the latest available data in September 1971 already 175,000 women were on child care leave, that means that about 10 per cent of economically active women became temporarily inactive.

The utilization of the allowance for child care varied by social strata. It was primarily the employed women engaged in manual work who availed themselves of the allowance. Nearly two thirds of female manual workers made use of the allowance, whereas in the case of non-manual workers the rate was significantly lower in the first year already (58 per cent) and decreased further in the course of the next year (to 54 per cent). In the case of farmers' cooperative members the rate of utilization was between those of the two other strata, and here utilization increased in the second year as against the first year (from 60.5 per cent to 65 per cent).

The differences in the rate of utilization reflect the degree varying by social stratum of the dilemma facing the economically active young mother when she has

to decide whether to consider the nursing of her child her principal task over three years and to accept the drawbacks of interrupting her economic activity to her career, social connections and, last but not least, financial situation, or to continue her occupation and to carry out the work of childcare as an additional burden. The majority of women engaged in manual work choose to stay at home; in their case, a two or three years' interruption does not mean a major break in their career and the nursing allowance of Ft 600 monthly compensates for at least half of their former monthly earnings. As regards non-manual workers, with those engaged in clerical work the situation is similar; those, on the other hand, whose occupation requires higher qualification, a sense of vocation, and higher compensation, will be more reluctant to interrupt their career and, therefore, in their case the rate of utilization of the allowance is lower. The particular behaviour of the non-manual stratum with higher qualification can be clearly demonstrated on hand of the data broken down according to level of schooling; whereas in the case of those with only elementary, i. e, general school education the rate of utilization was 72 to 73 per cent in both years, in that of those with secondary school education 60 to 61 per cent, and of university graduates only 30 per cent gave up temporarily their job.

The role of occupation and educational attainment manifests itself also in the proportion of women renouncing the allowance before its expiry (i. e. before the child has reached the age of three years) and returning to their former job. According to data collected in the first two years, 18 per cent of those drawing an allowance renounced the latter before its expiry; in the case of non-manual occupations their proportion was nearly double that of the manual workers (27 per cent as against 14 per cent). The rate of discontinuance was lowest in the case of farmers' cooperative workers where it did not reach even 10 per cent. The analysis of the data according to educational attainment shows that there is a direct relationship between the rate of discontinuance and the mother's educational level: in the case of those with general school education the rate was 15 per cent, in that of those with secondary schooling 25 per cent, and in that of university graduates 46 per cent. It can be seen that those having a higher qualification are not only reluctant to make use of the allowance but also renounce it at an earlier date to return to their career as soon as possible.

The Demographic Research Institute has analyzed the rate of utilization and its changes according to a number of other characteristics, such as the husband's occupation, income, educational attainment, the age of the non-manual mother, the duration of the marriage, the number of the mother's live-births and live-born children, the type of settlement in which she resides and in which she works, or the economic branch of her employer. None of these factors did, however, cause differences of such extent as educational attainment and occupation of the non-manual women. The other factors at most completed and coloured the overall picture on the basis of which it may be stated that it is primarily the young newly married, and especially the manual workers, who are interested in the allowance for child care.

In 1967, the year of introduction of the allowance for child care, the birth rate rose by 8 per cent, followed by a further 4 per cent rise in 1968, whereas in 1969 it stagnated essentially on the 1968 level. From the middle of 1970 to the middle of 1971 a slight decrease occurred. By the second halfyear of 1971 the number of births practically became stable on the 1969 level. The circumstance that after an invariably low level for years, a comparatively significant rise occurred simul-

taneously with the introduction of the allowance for child care obviously raises the idea of a causal relationship.

The detailed analysis of the data reveals the fact that the increase in birth-rate varied by social stratum. The greatest difference, however, shows itself between economically active and dependent women: whereas the fertility of the former increased, that of the latter continued to decline.

As mentioned above, up till 1966 the fertility of dependent women did in spite of its declining tendency exceed that of the economically active ones. The change came about in 1967, when the fertility of economically active women rose significantly, while that of dependent women declined, and this tendency continued also in 1968. In 1969-1970 fertility of economically active women is still higher than that of dependents, but as compared to 1968 it shows a certain decrease in the last two years. The declining trend in the fertility of dependent women continues.

TENDENCY OF FERTILITY OF ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE AND DEPENDENT WOMEN
BY SOCIAL STRATUM

Socio-economic stratum and economic activity	Number of live-births per 1000 women of 15-49 years						
	1960	1963	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970
Agricultural (economically active and dependent together)	53	50	53	54	51	48	47
Non-agricultural (economically active and dependent together) of which	63	56	55	59	61	61	59
economically active	48	50	51	60	67	66	64
of which manual worker	45	48	49	60	66	65	64
non-manual worker	54	53	55	60	68	68	66
dependent	78	64	62	57	50	49	44
of which dependent of manual worker	87	73	73	68	60	59	53
dependent of non-manual worker	42	31	25	21	17	17	19

On detailed analysis of the data it appears that the 1967 and 1968 increase came about with the women working in non-agricultural branches and also here a slight decrease can be observed in 1969-1970. Within the group of economically active women a significant rise or in the last two years a fall manifested itself primarily in the stratum, where the rate of utilization of the child care allowance was highest, i. e. that of women performing manual work whose fertility largely reached the level of the women engaged in non-manual work.

It should be pointed out that the difference in fertility between economically active and dependent women can be attributed mainly to the different age distribution of the two female populations. As a matter of fact, the age pattern of the dependents is older. However, the fact can be established that in the age bracket most important from the point of view of fertility — that of women below 30 years — also in the case of those belonging to the same age-group there is an excess in favour of the economically active women.

The average fertility of female agricultural population has again decreased in the second year of the allowance for child care. However, the low fertility of agricultural population must be attributed exclusively to the ageing of the female agricultural population, to the increase in the share of the age groups above 30 and 40 years. Even in present-day Hungary, fertility is highest in the case of agricul-

tural women below 24 years of age and also within certain higher age-groups the
fertility of women engaged in agriculture is higher than that of e. g. women of
the corresponding age engaged in non-manual work.

Likewise related to differences in the age-pattern is the higher fertility of non-
manual workers as compared to manual   workers; with a standardized age-distri-
bution, the fertility rate of manual workers becomes higher. Particularly significant
increase in fertility can be found in the case of women below 30 years engaged in
manual work; besides, it is also in the age-groups below 30 years that the ferti-
lity of women engaged in non-manual work shows the greatest increase.

AGE-STANDARDIZED FERTILITY RATES BY SOCIAL STRATUM

Social stratum	Live-births by 1000 women of 15-49 years		
	1960	1968	1970
Agricultural	59	64	63
Non-agricultural	59	58	56
of which manual	66	64	61
non-manual worker	44	47	48

The data thus clearly indicate the fact that the introduction of the allowance
for child care played a significant role in the movement of the birth rate in 1967
and 1968. As a matter of fact the increase in fertility occurred exactly in the strata
where the rate of utilization of the allowance was highest. The change or invari-
ability of the trends up to 1966 in the various groups of the population reflects
primarily the degree to which they made use of the allowance and the extent to
which the latter affected their demographical behaviour. For example, the fact that
in the case of agricultural population the trend of fertility did not change is certainly
due to the conditions of the allowance which exclude from the beneficiaries part
of the women engaged in agricultural work. Actually the granting of the allowance
depends on the condition of either one year of continuous employment, which is
not the case with part of the seasonal agricultural workers or in the case of farmers'
cooperative workers — 120 days of participation in the collective work. Part of
the farmers' cooperative workers engaged also in work on the private plot and
already pregnant over the major part of the period in question does not meet
this condition.

Thus under the effect of the introduction of the allowance for child care a com-
paratively sudden change came about in the birth-rates characteristic of the dif-
ferent social strata. It is too early at present to determine whether these changes
are not only due to the fact that women undertake the birth of their first and se-
cond children at an earlier age, but even if this were the case for the moment,
the phenomenon is still favourable from the point of view of the actual increase
in fertility. The postponing and deferring of the birth of the first child does as a mat-
ter of fact involve the danger that the birth of the first child and especially of
further children does not come about; conversely, it may be assumed that the birth
of the first and second child increases the chance of further children being born.

Under the effect of the allowance for child care, the fertility levels of the so-
cial strata have come essentially nearer to one another. Actually this constitutes

a continuation of earlier trends. This trend of development can be observed in the results of the mobility investigations carried out by the Demographic Research Institute. This research project, which described the intergeneration and intra-generation mobility of men between 1938 and 1962—1964 on the basis of nation-wide representation offers also data for the analysis of the interrelations between social strata, mobility and fertility.[5]

The data on the number of children of the men show that the average number of children of the men interviewed in the first half of the 1960's varied by social stratum; however, in the younger age-groups the differences were considerably smaller than in the older ones. Whereas in Hungarian towns (with the expception of Budapest), in the case of men of 60 years and over, to professionals there had been born only 1.5 children, to other non-manual workers 2.0, to non-agricultural manual workers 2.7 and to agricultural workers 3.3, in the case of men of 20 to 29 years the corresponding indicators were respectively 0.7, 0.7, 0.9 and 0.9.

AVERAGE NUMBER OF CHILDREN IN THE MAJOR SOCIAL STRATA
BY AGE-GROUP

Age-group (years)	Professionals	Other non-manual	Non-agricultural manual	Agricultural manual
		Urban		
		Workers		
20—29 years	0.7	0.7	0.9	0.9
30—39 years	1.4	1.5	1.8	1.8
40—49 years	1.8	1.8	2.1	2.2
50—59 years	2.3	1.7	2.2	3.1
60 years and over	1.5	2.0	2.7	3.3

Age-group (years)	Professionals	Other non-manual	Non-agricultural manual	Agricultural manual
		Rural		
		Workers		
20—29 years	1.0	0.9	1.2	1.4
30—39 years	1.6	1.7	2.0	2.2
40—49 years	2.0	2.2	2.6	2.5
50—59 years	2.0	2.4	2.9	2.9
60 years and over	2.6	3.5	3.3	3,4

In the case of the Budapest men interviewed this tendency is less marked. Thus professionals in the higher age-groups have more, and in the lower ones less children than the other non-manual workers. This phenomenon may in part reflect the general tendency which has been observed in economically advanced countries in recent years, namely that in contrast with earlier periods it is not the stratum with the highest income and level of schooling but the lower income group composed mainly of medium-level employees and clerical workers with 8 to 12 years of schooling that the number of children is lowest.[6] The situation brought

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[5] Társadalmi átrétegződés Magyarországon (Social re-stratification in Hungary), Publications of the Demographic Research Institute, Budapest, 1970.

[6] Johnson G. Z.: Differential Fertility in European Countries. Demographic and Economic Change in Developed Countries, Princeton, 1960, 36-72 pp.

about by the introduction of the allowance for child care acts against this tendency since, as pointed out above, the allowance has become popular mainly with those of secondary level of schooling whereas it has affected but little the behaviour of those of higher qualification.

One of the most important final conclusions of the mobility investigation was that mobility — the main direction of which was from peasantry to working class and to non-manual workers, from working class to non-manual workers and within the latter group from the employee group to professionals — has decreased fertility in the sense that the mobile persons and families have in most cases adopted the new environment's conception of the family and adapted themselves in forming their family plans to the new stratum's ideal of a lower number of children. Those of working-class and peasant background, or former manual workers and peasants, who have passed into the group of professionals or other non-manual stratum as well as those of peasant background and the former peasants who have passed into the working class in provincial towns and in villages have fully adopted the lower fertility corresponding to the new social environment.[7] With the decrease of the differences in fertility between the social strata the mobility to be expected in the future is not likely to cause further essential changes in fertility trends. As a matter of fact from the mobility investigations of the Demographic Research Institute it has become clear that the fact of movement itself does — apart from the difference in fertility between the initial and the recipient stratum — not lead to a decrease in fertility. The mobiles will, therefore, not have to bring increased sacrifices in respect of reducing the number of their children in order to pass into another social stratum. The introduction of the allowance for child care marks an important phase in Hungarian demographic policy, and further developed it may, together with other measures of family policy, contribute to the settling of the Hungarian demographic situation. Moreover, it may claim also international interest among the sociologists and demographers engaged in the problems of fertility, since in fertility investigations its effects may be observed under almost exceptional "laboratory" conditions on the basis of the extensive survey of the Demographic Research Institute.[8] The results achieved up to the present still fail to provide an answer to a great number of questions, but it can be assumed that the data of surveys to be carried out in the next years will contribute to the solution of further problems.

[7] The only exception was found in the case of the Budapest working class where those with peasant background had a somewhat higher number of children than those of working-class background.

[8] Gyermekgondozási segély (Allowance for Child Care), Periodical Statistical Publications, Vol. 147, Central Statistical Office, 1969/3.

Gyermekgondozási segély (Allowance for Child Care) Publications of the Demographic Research Institute, Budapest, 1970.

For an evaluation of the significance of the allowance see Dr. E. Szabady: A gyermekgondozási segély társadalmi és demográfiai jelentösége (The social and demographic significance of the allowance for child care.), Társadalmi Szemle, 1969, Vol. XXIV, No. 7-8, p. 99-105.

CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS AND THEORY CONSTRUCTION IN CROSS-CULTURAL FAMILY RESEARCH

VERONICA STOLTE-HEISKANEN

FINLAND

The last decade has witnessed the "rediscovery" of the comparative approach in the social sciences, which in family sociology is reflected in the rising interest in cross-cultural studies. There are, however, still many unsolved theoretical and methodological problems originating from the systematic application of the comparative approach, and it is the purpose of this paper to suggest some possible (a) strategies of empirical research and (b) strategies for causal explanations and theory construction. By way of illustration the outlines of a potential model for studying families cross-culturally is presented.

I. EMPIRICAL COMPARATIVE RESEARCH: A CASE FOR CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS

It seems that in discussions of the problems of carrying out cross-cultural family research our efforts have too narrowly focused on the technical problems of organization and execution of projects, on the one hand, and the semantic and operational comparability of our instruments, on the other. At the same time the very nature of our traditional theoretical and methodological approaches and their utility for comparative research are unquestionably taken for granted. Yet, some of our most cherished and fundamental traditions of research may at least be partly responsible for some of the unhealthy biases and create serious impediments to meaningful systematic comparative analyses. This can be briefly illustrated by what may be called the universality and micro-level biases in family sociology.

1. The universality bias. Partly because of the possible carryover of some latent "cultural homogenization" commitments of American social sciences, partly because of the earlier strong emphasis on descriptive studies and preoccupations with functional imperatives of social systems in theoretical conceptualizations, family research has been overemphasizing the search for universals at the expence of considering the significance of variations (Easton and Dennis, 1969; Heiskanen, 1971). Obviously our ultimate aim is to establish invariances in the phenomena observed, but we can only hope to pass from the stage of description to explanation in family sociology by systematically observing also the departures from universal statistical relationships and by specifying the general conditions where they take place. The study of variations is necessary in empirical research in general for understanding not only that variables X and Y are related to each other. In cross-cultural research the relative appropriateness of regarding comparative family analysis as a search for universals or a study of variations becomes an even

more pressing question. Yet in reading the majority of comparative works on the family one gets the impression that industrialization, urbanization, or what has been more recently called "modernization" has been the greatest levelling force since the flood after which societies emerge from Noah's Ark — with the exception of insignificant variations — with almost identical "conjugal families", "democratic child rearing practices", "rational family planning orientations", all joined together by "romantic love". This general approach may be at least partly responsible for the frequent disregard for not only inter-country but also intra-country variations and their significance for the validity of cross-cultural empirical generalizations, on the one hand, and for the development of theory, on the other.

2. *Implications of intra-country variations.* Obviously inter-country comparisons are insufficient and incomplete if intra-country variations are not taken into account, yet the general assumption is that in cross-cultural comparisons it is sufficient to demonstrate the existence or absence of similarities or differences among the countries under consideration and in most research reports or comparative analyses only averages or measures of central tendency are reported. Even on a simple descriptive level one can hardly reach any meaningful conclusions about inter-societal differences without any information on whether the *within*-country variations in the countries compared may not in fact be greater than the magnitude of the similarities or differences observed *between* the countries.

Intra-country variations become even more important when our aims are not only to observe but also explain cross-cultural phenomena. Here we are immediately faced with several problems:

First, the observed similarity in the phenomena studied may be explained by different factors, e. g. in different regions of the country compared. A case in point is the "universality" of the conjugal family in Italy. On the societal level as a whole the country may be characterized by the "modern" independent nuclear family as the predominant family structure. Yet as it has been noted by Banfield, in the more prosperous, industrialized northern parts of the country this family structure evolved and is related to the factors traditionally associated with Western modernizing middle class conjugal families, while in the south it is a consequence of the former feudalist economy, low level of modernization and extreme present-day poverty (Banfield, 1958). Obviously these differences in the sources of two identical structures have implications not only for the general hypothesis concerning modernization and the conjugal family, but also can be expected to have differential ralationships when family structure is used as the independent variable in comparisons.

Secondly, *the phenomena under comparison may be positively related to some structural characteristics in some region, social class, ethnic group, etc., and negatveily correlated in another region, etc., making the total, national relationships come close to zero.* One example may be the differential expectations concerning residential homogamy in ethnically mixed versus ethnically homogeneous regions.

Finaly, intra-country variations have implications for the validity of the measurements themselves in comparative research, since *variables that exhibit great intra-country variability are likely to have relatively low comparative validity,* as they will thend to contain errors that are non-random with respect to individuals (Allardt, 1966). For example, failure to practice birth control (or family size) in agrarian, under-developed regions of a country may be an indicator of "traditionalism" while in urban, developed regions it may measure "non-conformity".

3. The micro-level bias. The vast majority of our propositions concerning the family, and consequently the bulk of cross-cultural research focuses on the micro-level of individuals or individual units (e. g. the household). As Hill's review of cross-cultural family research indicates, the focus is "disproportionately on the assessment of the amount of co-variance of two or more variables in family structure and functioning within differing social and cultural contexts". (Hill, 1962). With a few exceptions of cross-cultural studies utilizing statistical, usually demographic data, substantive problems that may range from the degree of modernization of families through role differentiation in the nuclear family in different occupational settings, to the relationship between motivation and information and effectiveness of family planning, are investigated and analyzed in terms of associations between measurements on individual units.

In cross-cultural research this apporach implies that at best our methodological efforts go into the selection of comparable samples of individual units, but hardly any attention is being paid to the very rationale for cross-cultural research, the effects of the societies themselves wherein the individuals are located on the phenomena studied. Yet, if we fail to take the societies themselves systematically into consideration in empirical comparison we cannot infer anything about the causes of the observed similarities or differences and must necessarily remain on the descriptive level. Since the ultimate aim of family research — cross-cultural or otherwise — is explanation, it seems all the more surprising then that we have paid hardly any serious attention to the problems of indicators of societal differences and similarities. One reason for this may be our apparent lack of interest in aggregate data and macro-level analyses in general.

4. Implications of macro-level analyses. Although undoubtedly macro-level analysis is not the exclusive answer, it seems that studies of the interrelationships of structural elements of total systems and the testing of hypotheses about the structural influences on the behavior of component units such as families, individuals, etc., would take us a long way toward a more systematic comparative perspective in family research in a number of specific ways.

The utilization of aggregate data and macro-level analyses and its implications for family research can be considered from two different, though not entirely unrelated approaches:

A. Analyses of aggregate data utilizing internal quantitative measures of family structures (systems). This is the approach characteristically used in demographic analyses of, e. g., birth, marriage, divorce, etc. statistics. Obviously a great many more of this type of indicators of family structure and behavior that are already available for secondary analysis can be listed such as, e. g., size and composition of the household, proportion of married females in labor force, data on household expenditures, etc. Nor need we be limited only to national statistics: legal documents provide us with information on family social policies, family laws on age at marriage, permissible marriage partners, inheritance rules, etc. Time budgets, indicators developed by content analysis, etc. can all be used as macro-level measurements.

Macro-level analyses of this type of aggregate data could be useful in many ways:

Identification and analysis of the interrelationship between different family variables in different countries, e. g., by means of factor analysis or other multivariate techniques. *This identification of intra-country relationships among variables would enable us to use intra-country standards in the selection of "societal" indicators*

and thus considerably enhance the validity and reliability of inter-country comparisons. Let us assume that we are interested in comparing the position of women in different societies. The observed variations and similarities in the interrelationships of, e, g., proportion of females with higher education, the proportion of employed females in different occupational strata and the distribution of the female population by marital status in the different countries compared can provide us with information whether to accept or reject any of these variables as valid indicators in intercountry comparisons (T e u n e, 1968).

Determination of the magnitude and type of intra-country variations in family variables and the location of significant dimensions along which intra-country variations take place. One need only mention wives' employment, birth rates, divorce rates, etc., as the most obvious examples along which significant intra-country variations could be expected along dimensions of region, urbanization, social class, religion, etc. Since evidently many important variables are not equally or randomly distributed in any given population, a variety of indexes already available to us such as, e. g., the Gini index, Pareto's coefficient, the Lorenz curve, etc., that measure "inequality", could be constructed that could serve both in pointing to intra-country variations and in constructing more meaningful indicators for inter-country comparisons (Alker and Russett, 1966).

Preliminary exploration of hypotheses concerning the interrelationship between structural characteristics of families and other structural-cultural aspects of societies such as, e. g., the relationship between level of economic development, articulation of non-associational groups in society and size and composition of households.

Construction of structural indicators and contextual specifiers for testing hypotheses concerning selected aspects of family behavior on the micro-level. For example do certain propositions concerning the relationship between father-absent families and child development hold in societies that have high proportions of father-absent families and marital instability as well as in societies that have low proportions of such families?

B. Analyses of aggregate data on external (non-family) quantitative measures of structural characteristics of societies. During the last decades a number of efforts have been made to codify a vast body of quantitative data from all over the world (Banks and Textor, 1963; Russett et al., 1964). These works can provide a vast variety of quantitative multidimensional indices for structural characteristics of nations that range from level of economic development through urbanization, linguistic, religious and ethnic homogeneity. Yet cross-cultural family researchers seem to have been so far conspicuously unaware of its existence much less the potentialities of this type of existing aggregate data archives.

Such indicators of structural characteristics of societies can be useful to comparative family researchers in a number of ways in addition to the testing of relationships of aggregate family indicators and other aspects of the social structure, as already mentioned above.

The most obvious of these is the utility for *selecting samples of societies that* are relatively homogeneous and similar to each other, on the one hand, and differ from other sets of societies, on the other, in the case of broad, general analyses of family systems.

Secondly, *societies can be sampled along selected theoretically relevant dimensions* that would permit us to more clearly isolate and test hypotheses, e. g., between specific aspects of the family and the social structure such as, e. g., the relation-

ship between family socialization patterns and the political system, mass communications system and planned changes in family (i. e., birth control), and family structures and the economy.

A third possibility presents itself in the direction of much needed *systematic codification and secondary analyses of already existing studies in the* field of the family carried out in different substantive contexts and in a number of countries. These types of data would lend themselves to further codification and comparisons along some selected relevant societal dimensions and may in the long run encourage systematic regional codification and ultimate distinction of the relative contributions of cultural vs. structural factors in inter-country comparisons.

Finally, a more general use of aggregate data and macro-level specifiers both in comparative family research in general, and as contextual specifiers of the conditions under which micro-level relationships hold would *reduce the possibilities of committing errors of inference of the type that has been caled the "individualistic fallacy",* Although the debate over the "ecological fallacy" has attracted widespread attention, the problem of making inferences from micro-level observations — of particular relevance to family sociology, where micro-level analyses predominate — has been far less seriously considered. Briefly stated, the dangers of committing the individualistic fallacy are "present when the units of observation or counting are smaller than the units to which inferences are made". (Scheuch, 1966.) These dangers are particularly great in cross-cultural research, where the gap between individual measurements and inferences to "cultural" phenomena are far wider. A simple example will illustrate the problem: let us assume that in testing a proposition concerning the relationship between types of child-rearing practices and attitudes toward democratic political systems we find that the hypothesized relationship holds in a number of countries when education is used as a control variable. The inference of absence of *cross-cultural* differences in attitudes toward democratic systems would then be a case of the individualistic fallacy. Although in all countries *individuals* with, e. g., higher levels of education may hold the same, say, "favorable attitudes toward democratic systems", the proportions of individuals with higher education may vary from one country to another. Therefore, the *societies* may be quite dissimilar in their "democratic values". These differences between countries, moreover, may mean that "democratic attitudes" in one country equals "conformity to societal norms" and "deviance" in another, and as such similarities in content in fact indicate differences on another level of abstraction.

II. CAUSAL EXPLANATIONS AND THEORY CONSTRUCTION IN COMPARATIVE RESEARCH: A CASE FOR OPEN SYSTEM ANALYSIS

Current theoretical approaches to the family may range from structural functionalism to symbolic interactionalism and from the application of "grand" theories to theories of the middle-range. Despite this variety the common characteristic of strategies of theory construction as they are applied to the family is that they are generally oriented toward explanations in terms of limited, hierarchical (recursive) and unilinear causality and as such may be defined as "closed system" or "limited open system" orientations.

1. The closed system approach. On the one hand, we have a number of theoretical frameworks that can be said to represent "closed system" approaches to the family. This means that even theoretically oriented research often focuses on problems of how certain structural or functional characteristics of the family are re-

lated to another set of phenomena in the family such as, e. g., the relationship between husband-wife communication patterns and family planning behavior. or the relationship between wife's employment and "egalitarian" husband-wife role relations. Most often, when exogeneous (i. e., extra-familial) variables are introduced, e. g., social class, they are generally treated on the same level of analysis rather than contextually, and they are introduced not as explanatory but as control variables for testing for spurious associations. Analyses of this type can be illustrated by, e. g., testing the relationship between wife's employment (X) and egalitarian spouse roles (Y); where the evidence and possibilities of explanation can be summarized as follows:

1) *Observation* of a relationship between, e. g., correlation between wife's employment (X) and egalitarian spouse roles (Y); and 2) *elaboration,* when done, is carried out in terms of decomposition of the data into subgroups according to categories of a control variable, e. g., social class (C) (E. g. Alker, 1965).

If class differences are observed, e. g., in the above sample, they are not *explained* and seldom are explainable because there is no way to assess the causal priorities of any of the variables in the analysis. Thus such an approach provides positive evidence of certain relationships but does not contribute to causal explanation regarding how and why the variables are related. Consequently, although closed system approaches may provide us with reliable information, they seldom bring forth anything positively new and as such have low informative value.

2. The "*limited open system*" *approach.* There is another, more "open" system approach that treats the family as an open system, although it tends to do so unidirectionally. In this category we find propositions derived from loose conceptual frameworks that consider the family in relationship to some broader frameworks of society, wherein the family is viewed as a dependent variable. This is illustrated by some of our focal concerns today that deal with the consequences of industrialization, urbanization, etc., on the family such as, e. g., the relationship between level of industrialization and interaction with relatives.

Research of this type differs from the closed system approach in that it contributes not only to a greater cumulation of evidence, but also opens up more possibilities for inference and causal explanations. The substantive ordering of the variables rests on firmer grounds, since such "objective" criteria as time sequence, complexity, or degree of generality are more readily available in case of multilevel (i. e., societal and familial) than one-level (only familial) variables. By returning to our previous example, propositions could be tested concerning, e. g., level of industrialization of society (C), wife's employment (X) and egalitarian spouse roles (Y). Typically the causal model here is that of one-arrow causal relations where the whole chain is one of a developmental sequence: $C \rightarrow X \rightarrow Y$.

It is obvious that even this kind of "limited" open system orientation could be much further developed with proper methodological and theoretical considerations. This would simply demand giving up our ideas of unicausality in the chain of assumed relationships. Thus — as was indicated in the discussion on contextual analysis — one could systematically introduce some other theoretically important societal variables that would be relevant from the point of view of intra-country variations (e. g., type of political ideology) and reconsider the consequences of their separate or combined effects. Thus in case of the previous example we could consider the case of double causality and developmental sequence:

$$
\begin{array}{ccc}
C & & C \\
\mid & & \mid \\
\rightarrow & X & \leftarrow \\
& \downarrow & \\
& Y &
\end{array}
$$

Alternatively, there may be combined developmental sequence and double effect:

$$
\begin{array}{ccc}
 & C & \\
 & \downarrow & \\
 & C & \\
 & | & \\
X & & Y
\end{array}
$$

A third possibility is the mutual interaction of the variables of higher hierarchical order and subsequent developmental sequence:

$$
\begin{array}{ccc}
C & \longrightarrow & C \\
| & \leftarrow & | \\
| & \rightarrow X \leftarrow & | \\
 & \downarrow & \\
 & Y &
\end{array}
$$

These few simple examples show that even by progressing to hierarchical, unidirectional multicausality one can already test a whole variety of different explanations. One can of course say that the ideal would be to use such theoretical concepts and models that would allow us to predict in advance the type of causal chain. At the present stage of development of the field, however, we hardly have recourse to such a theoretical system, and the testing of such hypotheses would in any case usually require the investigation of other potential causal chains.

3. The analysis of circular causality. Since at the present stage of theoretical development we cannot yet take even full advantage of the limited, hierarchical, multicausal approach, it may seem premature to even take up the next step in opening up the system so to speak at the other end of the chain, and consider the family as an independent and/or intervening variable.

In theoretical conceptualizations of the family there is no lack of discussion of how in the interrelationships between family and society the family is affected by and in turn affects some aspects or processes in society. However, the consequences of certain characteristics of the family on some processes of society seldom receive systematic attention in empirical research. Oddly enough, although a substantial part of our efforts in empirical research focus on the question of the consequences of social change on the family, the analysis and investigation of the *influence of the family itself* on the processes of change is usually left to other than family sociologists (e. g. Levine, La Palombara, Barghoorn and Pye, 1965).

The idea of the family as both dependent and independent variable raises the problem of circular or reciprocal causality. Again we can consider two societal (exogeneous) variables, economic development (C) and societal ideology (C), and two familial (endogamous) variables, employment of the wives (X), and egalitarian spouse roles (Y). The next step then in opening up the system would be to allow feedback from the endogamous variables to the exogamous, hierarchically higher order variables, as is illustrated by the example

$$
\begin{array}{ccc}
C & \leftarrow \quad \longrightarrow & C \\
\downarrow & & \downarrow \\
X & \longrightarrow & Y
\end{array}
$$

Substantively this would imply a kind of explanation, e. g., along the following lines: economic development in interaction with certain ideology creates conditions for the employment of wives outside the home, which in turn influences her power position in the home to become more egalitarian; this spread of egalitarianism has a feedback on the value system to create, e. g., further decrease in

traditional ideologies in society, which in turn has consequences on economic development, etc.

The suggested "opening" discussed here is in terms of test variables that are cross-sectional without considerations of time, since from the point of view of our immediate concerns in empirical cross-cultural research this may be more relevant. On the other hand, longitudinal data with information about change rates of variables in time would be a natural, final opening of theory formation into more dynamic directions. However, at our present stage of methodological tools and techniques of data collection we can hardly begin even to consider these problems.

The present discussion has focused on causal explanations and causal chains that are assumedly derivable from present loose conceptual frameworks. This one-sided examination probably makes the problems appear more complex than they actually are. If we begin to think in terms of the "opening up" possibilities above and improve our empirical research, substantive theory will also benefit and its development consequently will simplify the complexities of empirical research itself.

III. TOWARD UNIFIED SUBSTANTIVE THEORIES: UTILIZATION OF GENERAL SYSTEMS THEORY AND SIMPLE ORGANIZING PRINCIPLES IN COMPARATIVE RESEARCH

Two final comments on some more substantive aspects of theory construction may be still in order. The first concerns the relationship between our discussion of contextual analysis and causal explanations. The second concerns the concepts (theoretical dimensions) and models and their utilization in multi-level cross-cultural analyses.

As it has been implied above, contextual analysis and the suggested opening up of causal analysis are reversed sides of the same coin. They are both common aspects of a more general type of analysis, i. e., that of general system theory. It is obvious that contextual analysis advocates the delineation of systems of differing size and complexity on different aggregate levels (individual, family, regional, societal, inter-societal). The discussion on alternatives of causal analysis, in turn, speaks for the systematic and varied investigation of the interaction of systems of various levels with special attention to circular affects (feedbacks).

General systems theory is already sufficiently well-known to make detailed elaboration here unnecessary (von Bertalanffy, 1968, Buckley, 1967). It is worthwhile, however, to point out that our discussion of inter- and intra-country variations, application of macro-level dimensions, and opening up the system of explanations in testing causality have their counterparts in the problems of system delineation and feedback in general systems theory. Consequently, comparative family sociology may gain considerably by greater familiarity with these problems. It is also worthwhile to point out the difference between strictly cybernetic general systems theory and the open general systems approach. It is undoubtedly the latter that will be beneficial in developing cross-cultural family research and theoretically oriented family sociology in general. After all, as it has been observed in another context, "the cleavage between intranational theories and hoped for comparative theory is transparently untenable. All science is of necessity comparative; there can be little basis for circumscribing a theory by virtue of its national or comparative referents." (Easton, 1966). The second comment concerns actual substantive theory construction. In family research the most important problems

in theory development are still what kind of theoretical concepts to use and what kind of models to adopt. The preceding discussion has at least two implications. Our present theoretical concepts are on very low level of abstraction and generality, perhaps the most sophisticated being those of societal and familial development. Also models used in deriving hypotheses are so loose that for any suggested causal relationships one can as well easily suggest several others that should also be tested.

The foregoing considerations do not presume to provide a clue as to what substantive concepts and models should be utilized in cross-national family research. They will no doubt have to be determined separately for each problem area and will depend on the researchers' own predilections for perceiving relevant problem areas in intra- and inter-societal contexts. One can, however, suggest some general organizing principles that seem relevant in the selection of concepts and their operationalization on different aggregate levels. These principles can also serve as primitive, embryonic models for theory construction. Such possible principles are, e. g., those of analogous development, cumulation, substitution and compensation. Thus one could suggest, e. g., that division of labor and decrease in norm pressure in societies or some functional or regional intra-societal sector has its parallel development in division of labor and norm pressure within the family system. This parallel development, however, need not be of the same tempo or direction as that on the societal level. It can be, e. g., cumulative, i. e., proceed with higher rate than on the societal level; it can be substitutive, i. e., development in family goes to another direction than in society; or it can be compensatory, i. e., increased norm pressure in family may compensate for increased differentiation in society and functional role differentiation in family may replace earlier societally defined roles.

This kind of suggestion may seem rather naive, but in fact they can be used to derive rather large numbers of testable hypotheses (Heiskanen, 1967). Furthermore, if principles of this type govern research in different sub-fields of cross-cultural family research, the possibilities of combining these hypotheses, e. g., via a hypothetico-deductive approach, or subsuming them under a more general model may become considerably enhanced.

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SOCIOLOGY OF MEDICINE
SOCIOLOGIE DE LA MEDECINE

Organized medicine exerts a monopoly control in structuring decisions under which the profession will work and to whom the benefits of modern medical science will be extended. A power elite as conceived by C. Wright Mills refers to "the circles and individuals who in a collaboratory share decisions having national consequences. Insofar as events are determined, the power they as a collectively makes the decisions." That a medical power elite does exist although its organization may not even possess conscious conspiracy or may be a rigid "collaboratory", is suggested by certain manifest trends which characterize medical organization in most countries which extend beyond the activities of professional behaviour. The medical power elite consists of individuals drawn from such groups as officers of heads of medical associations, members of specialty review boards, research granting agencies, leading medical educators, key medical civil servants, editors of medical journals, highly respected clinicians and others who may, through their collective decisions or attitudes determine the well being of the profession, and who are often well aware when their decisions conform to or deviate from the expectations generally held by their confreres.

Consensus is reached on decisions concerning the profession by an informal "gentleman's agreement" not to rock the boat. Power is seldom openly used as in the case of the British Medical Association's defeat of the Friendly Societies from 1911/1920, the successful fight by the American Medical Association of the application of Dr. John Knowles as Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare in the United States or the doctors' strike in Saskatchewan in 1962. Members of the medical power elite may, while typically scattered in many different cities in a nation, usually have ample opportunities to share frequently their positions concerning vital organizational issues at innumerable professional meetings, scientific review panels and through professional media.

THE MEDICAL POWER ELITE[1]

ROBIN F. BADGLEY,[2] SAMUEL WOLFE,[3] RICHARD V. KASIUS,[4]
JOHN Z. GARSON[5] AND JOHN D. BURY[6]

CANADA

Organized medicine exerts great influence in shaping those decisions under which the professional will work and to whom the benefits of modern medical science will be extended. A power elite as conceived by C. Wright Mills refers to "the circles and individuals who as a collectivity share dicisions having national consequences. Insofar as events are determined, the power elite as a collectivity makes the dicisions."[7] That a medical power elite does exist although its organization may not stem from a conscious conspiracy or may be a rigid "collectivity", is suggested by certain consistent trends which charactirize medical practice in western countries which extend beyond the attributes of professional behaviour. The medical power elite consists of individuals drawn from such groups as elected officials of medical associations, members of specialty review boards, research granting agencies, leading medical educators, key medical civil servants, editors of medical journals, highly respected clinicians and others who seek through their collective decisions to preserve the well-being of the profession, and who are often well aware when their decisions conform to or deviate from the expectations generally held by many doctors.

Concensus is reached on decisions concerning the profession by an informal "gentleman's agreement" not to rock the boat. Power is seldom publicly used as in the case of the British Medical Association's defeat of the Friendly Societies from 1911-1920, the successful fight by the American Medical Association of the appointment of Dr. John Knowles as Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare in the United States or the doctors' strike in Saskatchewan in 1962. Members of the medical power elite, while typically scattered in many different cities in a nation, usually have ample opportunity to check frequently their positions concerning vital organizational issues at innumerable professional meetings, scientific review panels and through professional media.

Because medicine is in fact composed of many, often competing components, devisive and sensitive issues (such as the functional realignment of work, fee schedules and the differing quality of work by practitioners), which might split the profession and diminish the power of the group as a whole, are scrupulously avoided. Rather it is those issues which the profession can potentially endorse which receive priority. The profession in most western countries for instance has set medical standards for the public which have invariably been accepted by legislative bodies; in most nations it has successfully downgraded or been instrumental in outlawing other types of health practitioners such as chiropractors, osteopaths and a variety of medical quacks.

An imbalance in the distribution of health facilities and personnel between rural and urban areas, and between the rich and poor nations is probably almost an invariate fact of life with profound social consequences. The poor and those in rural areas of many "western" countries will continue to receive less medical care and care of a poorer quality than the well-to-do and urban dwellers. Physicians will continue to emigrate like other skilled personnel from the poor to the rich nations and from economically depressed areas within countries to those where industry and its concomitants, better technical facilities, better educational systems and a higher standard of living thrive.

One of the attributes of power and authority is that certain rights and duties are entrusted to those in influential positions. Great power of any type, whether that of a parent over a child, a key services industry relative to the public, or between professionals and their clients, may lead to corrosive, if not corruptive, effects on those who wield it. Most individual medical leaders have niether been corrupt nor unidealistic, but their collective actions and decisions have been profession-centred, resulting in professional nepotism and actions which can only be most charitably described as socially and ethically irresponsible. Too often, the profession has acted to fulfil its own needs and objectives, not those of the public. While there are no laws governing medical behaviour which are quite comparable to those in industry concerning the restraint of trade or the operation of a monopoly, were such laws operative, medicine in many instances would be harshly judged. That it has not happened results from the extraordinary privileges everywhere which are granted to the doctor.

The medical power elite in many countries in the western world has seldom sought to promote legislation which would improve or extend various medical benefits for the public. To the contrary, in most countries the profession has consistently opposed, stymied or delayed when possible, the introduction of such legislative acts. In the United States, for example, the American Medical Association has opposed the recent passage of bills on Medicare an Medicaid, fought the introduction of Blue Cross and Social Security in 1930's initially opposed scholarships or loans to medical students, effectively outlawed the operation of consumer-sponsored group medical practices and for years denied that there was a shortage of physicians. Such opposition is to be expected for the man of medicine like his counterpart the businessman is motivated in part by similar work ethics, and both have consistently opposed state intervention.

SELECTION AND RECRUITMENT

The cohesiveness of the profession, the effective influence of the power elite and the structure of medical education and the practice conditions, all contribute to the paradox that while medical technology is daily yielding new important

technical discoveries, the organization of medicine has evolved slowly through the years. Few significant changes, for example, have taken place during the past few decades in the types of medical students who are recruited, in the general format of their medical education which still give priority to mastery of an overwhelming body of scientific knowledge, or in the conditions under which the doctor practices in the community. Similarly, the basis for the selection or recruitment of medical teachers, of appointing members to key medical committees or health commissions and the policies of granting agencies have all remained relatively consistent through the years, making the medical profession a tight professional island, which if not making it immutable to change, at least precludes its rapid transformation. The structure of the profession (excluding external factors) has established a strong self-perpetuating momentum which is difficult to break by rational choice, and if it were altered in one sphere, would probably be compensated for in another. Change, then, proceeds only within carefully set limits and most of the reforms which have been experimented with in medical education or practice settings have been either unsuccessful or limited to a small fraction of the profession because the tolerable boundaries for change have been exceeded.

Through the years in most countries, even those where socialist or communist governments prevail, medical students have typically been drawn from a relatively small pool of students. The cost and structure of medical education in most western countries effectively screens out applicants on a basis of social class, and inadvertently, on the basis of their general attitudes toward free enterprise. Motivation or opportunity for higher education are still largely a function of economic opportunity in many countries, and of exposure to values of scholarly diligence and the pursuit of long-terms objectives which typify the values of the upper classes. The cost of prolonged training is high (through lost earning potential) even when the state defrays part or all of the cost of medical education. For these reasons a disproportionate number of medical students come from professional, managerial and other upper class backgrounds where they have been exposed and probably implicitly accept the propriety of the principles of free enterprise. In Canada, for example, 56.2 per cent of medical students come from families classified as proprietors and managers or professionals in comparison to 58 per cent of American medical students who come from similar backgrounds.

The pattern of recruitment which stresses academic ability and a solid background in the general physical and biological sciences with the typical related social characteristics of class and attitudinal backgrounds means that only a narrow spectrum of personal and academic interests and talents are drawn into the medical schools. It has long been recognized by many leading medical educators that because of the length of the curriculum and the pre-requisites required of pre-medical students, that most students in medical schools are deficient in their understanding of the humanities and social sciences. Limited attempts have been made to rectify this deficiency by the introduction of the social sciences in an increasing number of faculties, often on a basis which precludes any real impact on the student.

THE MEDICAL FACULTY

Once in a medical school the values of the student about professional independence, a concern with individualism and a general antipathy toward state involvement, are reinforced by many medical educators. In the lecture halls, on ward rounds and in the operating theatre, the student is awed by medical virtuosos using

their hard to come by specialized skills and knowledge. Beside such brilliance, which is often unique and the very epitome of individualism, the concept of a team or group approach seems mundane and of secondary importance. It is not surprising that surveys in the United States and United Kingdom have found that most students prefer non-salaried posts or independent practice.

Within the medical school faculty, appointments are typically made on the basis of a man's clinical or scholarly reputation and for most major clinical posts and departmental heads, on the assumption that he will be able to "get along" with practitioners in the field or with other medical faculty members. This latter consideration has less importance for appointments made in the basic medical sciences or in the more esoteric clinical subspecialties, but places limitations on the types of appointments which can be made to the key medical departments and consequently on the extent to which innovation within the organization of medicine can be genuinely affected. Since, for example, 67.0 per cent of practicing Canadian doctors in the early 1960's were solo practitioners, 71 per cent in private practice and 88 per cent of the teachers in the country's medical schools were part-time appointments, these patterns of practice and of appointment reinforce in medical faculties the model of private, entrepreneural solo practice to which students are exposed, and serve as a block to innovation in establishing effective alternate types of work settings from which students may choose. Appointments made on this basis can hardly be expected to provide the creative and catalytic momentum required to provide the needed critical leadership in these areas.

MEDICAL PRACTICE

This philosophical outlook — of being independent and in business for oneself — is deeply entrenched in the structure of medical practice. Many students enter their training with these values, have them reinforced in medical school and find the fulfillment in the actual conditions under which they practice. The porttrait of the British family doctor painted by several researchers suggests that not only is he frequently isolated professionally from other practising physicians and thus may well resent even the imposition of professional control on the quality of his work, but as expected, also rejects comparable measures which might be introduced by the British Ministry of Health.

Although medicine is the grist for T. V. programs and novels, too often it is only the glamour and mystique of the doctor's role which is portrayed, not the inner dimensions of the profession. For this reason it is often assumed to be unethical for doctors or others to discuss openly the basis of the fee schedule, the issue of self-labelled or profession defined specialists or the quality of medical care. These are jealously guarded issues which are purportedly outside of the domain or concern of the medically untrained public, and yet, as various studies on the quality of medical practice have shown, many doctors are producing such a poor quality of medicine that many of their patients are treated "at risk". The public indeed has genuine need to be informed and concerned about such issues.

MEDICAL SOCIETIES AND FUNDING AGENCIES

These values of entrepreneural practice are perhaps most visible in the decisions reached by medical societies, the composition of key committees or commissions and in the policies of research finding agencies. The pages devoted to asso-

ciation business of professional juornals such as the British Medical Association Journal, the Canadian Medical Association Journal and the Journal of the American Medical Association are replete with references to new legislation, and position papers outlining the stand of the profession on these issues. The granting policies of many foundations supporting health projects are also subtly influenced by the fact that most have been established by large industrial magnates or their heirs, and their granting policies, while seeking innovation are limited to a narrow range of acceptable alternatives which implicitly bulwark the general status quo of society. Typically, "safe bets" are made in the awarding of fellowships and few research proposals are supported in which real risks are taken. These policies stem not only from the guiding philosophy of most foundations but also through a fear of antagonizing a powerful conservative profession. Significantly, when such innovative studies have been undertaken, they have resulted either in the quiet release or firing, the putting out to pasture or a convenient transfer to another post of the responsible executives, or, as in the case of the well-known Flexner Report, or more recent Carnegie Commission, actually conform to movements already incipient within the profession itself. Most foundations, in their policies toward the health field, tend to support members of the medical power elite or their candidates and those whom they deem will subsequently wield great authority. Consequently, assistance is commonly given in the form of institutional grants or support of outstanding clinical and biological scientists but seldom to the slippery marshes of medical organization or the quality of medical care.

The consequences of these staffing patterns and granting policies of private foundations and government granting agencies results in a disproportionate emphasis on support for a narrow range of projects primarily in the biological and physiological areas. A self-fulfilling prophecy operates here for since relatively so little support proportionately has in the past actually been given to the analyses of the social and economic aspects of medicine, or to studies dealing with the job realignment, the quality of medical care, or similar themes, there are indeed few competent researchers in these fields, and many of the projects which are submitted for support can legitimately be rejected as methodologically inadequate or conceptually irrelevant. Despite the fact that personal health services and hospital costs now account for the majority of total health expenditures in most nations, these are only a handful of soundly conceived and executed studies in these areas. In Canada, for example, while hospital costs consume 57 per cent of the national health dollar, there is not a single prominent, baseline Canadian study on the organization and structure of the hospital, of hospital personnel relations, or of the role of the hospital in the community. Similarly, Canadian studies relating to the quality of medical care are limited in number to the fingers of one hand.

CONCLUSION

There are sufficient similarities in industry and medicine to suggets that both are now being influenced in certain areas by broad social forces over which neither has much control — a growing bureaucratiziation of work in all spheres, an increasing dependence upon and an evaluation in prestige of technology, an overriding concern for what is good for institutional interests rather than those of their clients and in predetermining what they will offer to the public. In both industry

and medicine certain universal standards have developed which are operating to the detriment of the economically impoverished nations of the world which have resulted in a migration of tragic proportions of skilled talent for many nations. Because of their adherence to the ethic of individualism and free enterprise, both spheres have othen opposed internal checks on their performance or the imposition of legal controls established by the state. In each instance the rewards to be gained of income and prestige are high. Each system tends to promote those who have become effective "organization men" and each in turn selects and molds its recruits by highly traditional means. Dramatic innovation either in the design of cars in the automobile industry or within the organization of medicine is curtailed by the structure of these systems as well as by the decisions of strong and influential power elites.

These power elites have a tight interlocking structure at the top levels of decision making, which is evident in the large representation of business magnates on the boards of foundations, of prestigious physicians on the technical advisory boards of industry, and of both within politics. That few changes in the organization of medicine have occurred is not because the voice of the profession has not been heard in the political corridors of power. The converse is the case, for medicine has a well established lobby in Washington and, for example, in the 17th Parliament of Canada, 14.7 per cent of the seats in the House of Commons were held by doctors or dentists who then represented only 0.4 per cent of the labour force.

All of these factors in a sense constitute structural invariates, or values and ways of working which will probably not readily be changed. There is no reason why this should be so, but unless extraordinary leadership and concern is stimulated (as in the case of the Project Apollo which within a decade was able to land man on the moon), which is unlikely in this instance, these trends will largely influence the structure and practice of medicine for the remainder of the century. Changes in how family doctors work will occur slowly, almost imperceptibly, and will result more from broad social forces which are recasting the fabric of society as a whole than any specific or deliberate innovation which may be introduced within medicine.

COORDINATION AMONG HOSPITALS: AN INSTANCE
OF INTERORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES
IN URBAN COMMUNITIES*

HERMAN TURK
USA

URBAN SOCIETY IN MULTI-ORGANIZATIONAL TERMS

Large cities and the relationships which they form among one another have been and very likely should be conceived as multi- and interorganizational phenomena (Turk, 1969, 1970). Under this view, formal organizations are the primary actors within large-scale social structures; and persons affect the social setting — either singly or collectively — in terms of the organizations which they obey, patronize, petition, support, enact or join. If this view is correct, urban phenomena should be capable of description at an independent level of analysis — one in which organizational phenomena are predicted in the light of other organizational phenomena without recourse to rates among populations of individuals, except for purposes of investigative control. And such familiar urban variables as integration, conflict, differentiation and fragmentation may be stated in terms of relations among organizations.

Hospitals are formal organizations and coordination among them within any given city is seen only as one instance of the city's interorganizational characteristics. We find the writings of Hunter and his associates (1956) and that of Wilson (1968, 83-98) instructive in this light. Although neither one restricts itself to the level of analysis adopted here, both works suggest that the given community's organization in the area of health is closely related to its organization in other areas — to its organization in general. Thus, the level of coordination among hospitals should be capable of prediction on the basis of levels of coordination in other walks of urban life. Our earlier work on relations among anti-poverty organizations has provided encouragement along these lines (Turk, 1970). Although our data pertain only to large cities in the United States, the conceptual framework to be described is sufficiently general to stimulate attempts at cross-national replication, given suitable variants of the empirical indicators used here.

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THE LOCAL AND EXTRALOCAL INTEGRATION OF CITIES

Theories that emphasize social stability as well as those concerned with dialectic process remark upon the problematic relationship between the internal integration of social units and their joint integration into some larger whole which they comprise. Reviewing the growing literature on communities which suggests these twin structures — including his own major contributions along such lines — Roland Warren has distinguished between vertical and horizontal patterns (1956, 1966). A community's vertical pattern consists of relationships between various of its units and *social systems which lie outside it*. The community's horizontal pattern describes *the relationships of its own units to one another*. We have endeavored to measure the respective strengths of these two patterns by means of a pair of dimensions, which are called *extralocal integration* and *local integration* (Turk, 1970). The research to be described sought to predict the coordination among a city's hospitals — one instance of its local integration — on the basis of broad measures of that city's local and extralocal integration.

The research hypothesis to follow is based directly upon our assumption about the tendency toward unidimensionality in community social organization from one walk of life to the next: *The degree of coordination among hospitals within a community is a positive function of its local integration.*

The second research problem is to seek the *covariation between coordination among the hospitals within a community and its extralocal integration.* Here our attempts must be exploratory for they elude prediction. On the one hand, the inverse association which has been claimed between the integration of a social system and that of its subsystems has been applied to the question of societal integration *versus* community integration (by Warren, for example, in 1966). Accordingly, the extralocal integration of a community may be seen as having a fragmenting effect upon integration among its local units, including hospitals. On the other hand, organizational centralization at the societal level has been considered a means by which material technology and other cultural resources required for certain special kinds of local coordination can flow into the community (see Morris and Rein, 1963, 165-76). Thus, the fragmenting potential of extralocal integration must be weighed against its adaptive potential.

All this means that the effect of general local integration upon its special instance of coordination between hospitals was predicted; while that of extralocal integration, if any, was only sought.

RESEARCH DESIGN

The 130 United States cities with 1960 populations of more than 100,000 inhabitants constituted the units of study. The degree of coordination among hospitals was measured by the presence or absence in 1969 of a local association to which at least some of the hospitals belonged. Fifty-two cities were served by such hospital associations; the remainder were not. This dichotomous measure is the dependent variable of the investigation to be described.

Extralocal integration was measured by the number of national headquarters of voluntary associations (professional, technical, patriotic, religious, industrial, and the like) located within each of the study cities in 1960. In addition to the face validity such a measure has in terms of the breadth of sociocultural content included, it was also found to be closely associated with such other indicators of

a city's external ties as diversity among its economic organizations which have export products, banking activity, its size and its age (Turk, 1970).

Local integration was measured in 1961 by the unsolicited mention-nonmention of community-wide civic organizations in letters written by officials and other knowledgeable informants from these cities in response to broad, uniform questions about "community cohesion". Including fraternal organizations, fund-raising groups, a labor council, a taxpayers' association and various business-professional clubs, this category was limited to organizations which exceeded their manifest purposes and special interests by displaying certain over-all community orientations. No hospital associations were mentioned in this light; thus, empirical redundancy with the hospital coordination measure is not at issue. Respondents tended to agree upon the existence of community-wide associations and 76 cities were classified as having them. This dichotomous measure of local integration proved to be associated with such other indicators of the absence of fragmentation as nonpartisan and at-large election of municipal representatives, reported centralization in the city's power structure, the city manager form of government and ethnic homogeneity.

In addition to these, validity claims for the index of local integration (Turk, 1970), an *inverse association* has also been found between the broad measures of local and extralocal integration we have discussed, once the effects of intruding sources of variation were controlled. Since this finding was in keeping with observations made by Warren (1956, 1966) and other community theorists, it provides further support of the validity claimed for both measures.

Although not of current theoretical concern, certain content-specific factors also had to be included in the design as eventual independent variables. The city's commitment to health affairs, as well as the magnitude and complexity of its provision of health services, could determine its need or capacity for coordination between hospitals. The following variables were available for introduction as approximations of factors such as these: the per capita number of medical and other health workers in the city and its surroundings, per capita municipal expenditure for health and hospitals, number of general hospitals and the per capita number of hospital beds.

Other variables which have the potential of affecting the influence of local and extralocal integration are population size, stability, density and socioeconomic status; city and county governments; industrialization, banking activity and diversification among economic establishments; political preferences in national elections; and region, taken as a sociocultural entity. Measures of these variables were included for purposes of control.

The research strategy was to use multiple regression analysis to assess the effects of the extralocal measure of national headquarters and the local measure of community-wide civic associations upon the presence or absence of hospital associations some nine years later. The effect of each was considered independently of the influence of the other as well as of the influences of the health-related and other variables we have included for purposes of control.

RESULTS

The organizational indicators of both local and extralocal integration proved to be positively and significantly associated with the occurrence of hospital associations. In the first instance, the standardized partial regression coefficient was

24 per cent of its maximum possible value; in the second case, the value was 48 per cent of its own maximum. Only one of the health related measures was significantly related to the dependent variable; the greater the number of general hospitals, the more likely was a hospital association to have occurred — a relationship which was 29 per cent of maximum. A significant *negative* contribution (19 per cent of maximum) made by per capita county government revenue is taken to signify the effect of external control in reducing the city's capacity for local integration. The only remaining variable to contribute significantly (21 per cent of maximum) was location in the East North Central United States. These five indicators accounted for 42 per cent of the variation in occurrence of hospital associations. Together with the remaining variables which entered the regression equation, they explained 59 per cent of such variation.

CONCLUSIONS

Clearly, prediction has proven possible at a multi- and interorganizational level of analysis. Four of the five predictors were obviously organizational. Perhaps the fifth also reflected little more than variations in organizational structure. Support has been lent to the hypothesis that the general level of local integration manifests itself in specific content areas — here in coordination among hospitals. An instance has also been observed in which extralocal integration appears to have had a positive effect upon a specific aspect of local integration, perhaps because of the dissemination of a model for local organization via media of such nonlocal social systems as the American Hospital Association. But the negative effect of external *control* upon such organization was also suggested by the data.

Analysis of the local and extralocal aspects of cities as interorganizational systems should prove fruitful in further investigations of the provision of health services as well as of other areas of social life. Using different measures, replication can be and should be attempted in other national settings, especially along a broad range of degrees of central planning. I would expect the direction of correlation to remain the same from country to country, first, between the general levels of local integration and integration within specific local content areas and, second, between general levels of local and extralocal integration.

TECHNICAL APPENDIX

The continuous variables were rank-scored along a 0-129 scale. All coefficients — including the multiple correlation coefficient upon whose square the explained variance is based — were described as proportions of their respective maxima, given the skewed dichotomy used to measure the dependent variable. The national headquarters measure yielded significance at the .01 level, the county revenue measure at the .10 level and the remaining three predictors at the .05 level. The details of regression analysis and relevant tables may be obtained from the author.

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POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY
SOCIOLOGIE DE LA POLITIQUE

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CULTURAL DIFFERENCES IN KENYA AND DIVERGENT ATTITUDES TOWARDS COMMUNIST CHINA

ALI A. MAZRUI

UGANDA

One of the least explored areas of politics in the new states is the impact of anthropological factors on foreign policy preferences. It seems quite clear that popular images in Africa of other countries abroad are conditioned, not only by news media and political speeches, but also by cultural predispositions and traditional attitudes among the different tribal communities. This paper seeks, in part, to address itself to an example of this kind of interaction. The area of study is one which should bring together students of social anthropology and students of international relations. The quest in this case is for areas of interaction between tribal norms and perspectives on international affairs.

It will be seen that this is a special area of the politics of linkages between domestic and external factors. There have been studies and commentaries on foreign policies as extensions of domestic politics, and even of "national" values as determinants of international behaviour by each of the states concerned. But an adequate examination of the impact of ethnic patterns and tribal predispositions on the foreign policy preferences of a particular African state has yet to be undertaken.

Our case in this paper is Kenya, and our focus will be on the Kikuyu, the most dominant tribe politically in Kenya, and the Luo, the second largest tribe and the major rival to the Kikuyu tribe in the national arena. The specific foreign policy issue we have in mind concerns Kenya's relations with Communist China.

The Government of Kenya under Mzee Jomo Kenyatta, an Mkikuyu, has had a long-standing distrust of Communist China from around 1965. Kenya's last opposition party, the Kenya People's Union under Mr. Oginga Odinga, a Luo, had established links with Communist China from an early stage. The question which arises is to what extent were these respective attitudes of the Government and the Opposition in Kenya towards the issue of relations with Communist China conditioned by ethnic factors and traditional predispositions.

The evidence since independence would seem to suggests that, on balance, the Kikuyu are politically conservative but economically innovative. The conservatism of the Kikuyu has, in part, lain in their rural nationalism. During the colonial period Kikuyu rural nationalism, combined with economic dynamism, helped to give the Mau Mau movement the image of a revolution. The Kikuyu uprising in the Mau Mau insurrection seemed inspired by radical fervour, as well as by a rebellion against racial humiliation and foreign control.

At that stage it almost appeared that the Kikuyu might have been animated by the same kind of peasant radicalism as the Chinese under Mao's leadership just a few years earlier. The Mau Mau insurrection, like the Chinese Communist Revolution, has been interpreted in historical perspective as basically a peasant revolt. The argument has been to the effect that land hunger in Kenya created a situation of peasant grievance, and this initiated a transformative self-assertion.

Sometimes the term "peasant" is used to denote a person who already owns a modest piece of land. But much of the agitation behind the Mau Mau insurrection was by people who were landless, living as squatters on European estates, and observing hungrily large tracts of land, sometimes uncultivated and unused, or sometimes richly cultivated and foreign owned, all beyond their capacity to acquire. As Donald L. Barnett put it in his introduction to Karai Njama's *Mau Mau From Within,* "It is not only the brute fact of landlessness, land hunger and insecurity of tenure which conditioned Kikuyu involvement in the nationalist movement and peasant revolt; it is also the fact that for a people who attach such sacred meaning to the land, the areas alienated remain within their field of experience, unattainable yet in considerable measure unused by its new (white) owners."[1]

The final outcome was the revolt of the rural dispossessed — and the long years of Kenya's state of emergency in the 1950s.

Could the Chinese model of peasant assertion in the 1940s have been a contributory factor to some characteristics of the Mau Mau insurrection? Carl Rosberg and John Nottingham traced the very name "Mau Mau" to the year 1948. That was the period of maturation for the Chinese Communist Revolution. One of the leaders of the Mau Mau insurrection later came to be called "General China". This was the fighter Waruhiu Itote. When the outbreak of violence in Kenya finally came it coincided with the lingering Korean War. Harold C. Hinton, in his book on *Communist China in World Politics,* suggestibly refers to a "General Korea" within the Mau Mau movement. The British were also involved at the time in fighting Communist "terrorism" in Malaya, and Rosberg and Nottingham refer to the British application in Kenya of "rehabilitation methods" based in part on experience in fighting ethnic Chinese in Malaya. And now analysts like Donald Barnett insist on seeing the Kenay insurrection as basically "a peasant revolt" — very much as the Chinese Revolution is interpreted to have been.

Is it conceivable that the more sophisticated of the Kenyan rebels had vaguely come to admire what the Chinese, both in Mainland China and in Malaya, had been doing? Was that why Waruhiu Itote called himself "General China"? Did this sinophilia influence the name of the very movement "Mau Mau" itself? Was, in other words, the designation of Kenya's peasant revolt a corruption of "Mao Mao" in honour of Mao Tse-Tung?

The actual meaning of the name "Mau Mau" still remains a mystery and several theories have been advanced as to its origins. The theory that it is a corruption of "Mao Mao" is one more hypothesis for political etymologists to consider.

But what matters more fundamentally in a consideration of the Chinese and the Kikuyu rebellions is the nature of motivating ideals. The rural assertion in Kenya had the garb of traditionalism which was at times almost primeval. The nature of Mau Mau oaths administered as a way of commanding loyalties was

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[1] Barnett and Njama, "Mau Mau From Within: Analysis of Kenya's Peasant Revolt" (New York and London: Monthly Review Press, 1967), p. 34.

an indication of a profound traditionality in Kikuyu nationalism, which was, in turn, to remain the basis of Kikuyu political conservatism after independence. But, for as long as the battle at the time was directed against the elimination of colonial rule and the British settler presence, the Kikuyu uprising did manage to acquire the reputation of a radical and even revolutionary movement.

It is true that even at that time many could not quite reconcile Kikuyu radical assertiveness with the strange ritualism which consolidated it. Western observers at the time could understand killings and torture, having tried that sort of thing themselves on many occasions, including on the occasion of fighting Mau Mau. Even Elspeth Huxley — hardly a friend of African nationalism, let alone of Mau Mau — concedes that atrocities during the Kenya Emergencies were perpetrated by *both sides*. Anyone who expected different standards from Government had, forces had, according to Mrs. Huxley, "read no history". Rebellions could not be put down "without brutalizing."[2]

What western commentators and observers could not stomach were not the brutalities of the war but the bad taste of the Mau Mau rituals. There did not seem to be enough precedents in history books for these oaths — to enlighten those who, like Mrs. Huxley, had indeed "read their history".

The range of rituals invoked was from drinking menstrual blood to taking the Mau Mau Batuni oath, standing naked, with one's male organ inserted through a hole in the thorax of a goat.

The Chinese peasant assertion had culminated in a Marxist revolution. But the Kikuyu peasant assertion came to assume a more conservative orientation on attainment of independence. The nature of those oaths during the insurrection might have been an indication of the innate ruralism of Kikuyu political behaviour.

The tendency to invoke oath-taking and sacred ritualism manifested itself again after independence. In 1969 the Kikuyu began to feel once again insecure, partly in the face of a growing challenge from the second of the major ethnic groups. Oath-taking erupted once again. There was a tendency to seek reassurance in the solidarity of shared rituals. There was a determination not to permit the Kikuyu to be in the political wilderness ever again. The Luo challenge had taken the place of settler intransigence as an igniting factor behind the re-emergence of traditionalist assertiveness among the Kikuyu.

The traditionality of Kikuyu political behaviour in this respect has led to other problems associated with such an orientation. In recruitment to the civil service and the parastatal bodies, to the awarding of licences for trading, in the allocation of land rights in areas other than those reserved for individual communities — in all these instances of the distribution of benefits and privileges Kikuyu traditionalism has, at times, come into conflict with modern criteria of merit and rational eligibility. Ethnic nepotism in Kenya has sometimes been more frank and less disguised than elsewhere in Africa partly because the universe of values of the dominant tribe still puts a premium on solidarity rather than on rationality as a principle of distribution. There has been widespread concern in Kenya that powerful positions and fruitful opportunities are disproportionately, though not exclusively, allocated to fellow Kikuyu.

There is, then, in much of Kikuyu political behaviour a kind of traditionalism which distrusts both an excessively rationalistic approach to political arrangements and an excessively egalitarian tendency. The relative anti-rationalism, as well as

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[2] Elspeth Huxley, Review of Mau Mau Detainee, Sunday Times (London), August 4, 1963.

the relative anti-egalitarianism, of Kikuyu traditionalist behaviour in a modern context have been important conditioning factors behind the attitude to Communism and, less directly, to Communist China.

But in the case of the Kikuyu the other side of their political conservatism is their economic innovativeness. There seems to be little doubt that the Kikuyu are among the most economically dynamic of all tribal communities in East Africa. They are rapidly responding to the policy of Africanizing commercial activity in Kenya, and thrusting themselves out into different parts of the country in a bid to establish themselves economically. In many ways the Kikuyu have become once again reminiscent of the Ibo in Nigeria. The readiness to go out into the wider world for economic opportunities, the greater acceptance of the need for risk-taking, the mystique of self-improvement as a traditional imperative, have all contributed to an economic resurgence among the Kikuyu. Perhaps it goes back to the colonial days, and the extent to which the Kikuyu responded more positively than some of their neighbours to the impact of modernity and western educational chalenges. They built their own schools during the colonial period in a bid to acquire the necessary skills for modern success.

Even land, in some ways a profoundly sacred entity among the Kikuyu, was also in other respects more a commodity to the Kikuyu than it is among other tribes in Africa as a whole. The idea of parting with land as an exercise in exchange was by no means an alien doctrine among the Kikuyu.[3]

Even in the midst of the Mau Mau Emergency Kikuyu entrepreneurship was seeking new outlets among those not directly involved in the war. In 1955 L. S. B. Leakey had occasion to observe: "The Kikuyu have over the past ten years developed an absolute craze for "company" formation. There are hundreds, possibly thousands, of unregistered "Companies", as they call them, comprising anything from three to ten shareholders, who invest their money with the hope, often a forlorn one, that it will multiply much more quickly than it would in the Post Office Savings Bank or in any other organized concern.[4]"

The range of companies and types of enterprise attempted were quite wide. The mere fact that they preferred to invest in such companies rather than put away their money in a Post Office Savings Bank augured well for the spirit of risk-taking which later seemed to characterize Kikuyu economic behaviour after independence. The small companies in the colonial period which they organized ranged from commercial transport to small grocery shops in the villages. There was no doubt that something in Kikuyu culture and its response to new economic innovations made the tribe potential commercial masters of the country as a whole should the political climate one day become more congenial to their full economic maturation.

And then independence came. The principle of personal success as a measure of social achievement began to find legitimacy in a Kenya under African rule. In the first two years of Kenya's independence the term "African socialism" still featured as part of the official vocabulary of politics. But meanwhile changes were taking place in the direction of greater African involvement in the economic organization of the country. The policies of giving Africans more of a share in the former White Highlands of Kenya; the policies of encouraging more efficient

[3] See Greet Sluiter, "Kikuyu Concepts of Land and Land Kin" (M. A. thesis, University of Chicago, 1960 — manuscript); J. F. M. Middleton, "The Kikuyu and Kamba of Kenya" (Ethnographic survey of Africa, East Central Africa, part 5 — 1953), pp. 20-40.
[4] L. S. B. Leakey, "The Economics of Kikuyu Life", East African Economic Review, vol. 3, 1956, pp. 177-179.

froms of land settlement among Africans; the policies of bringing under cultivation land which was before underutilized; and finally the policy that led the Kenya Government to push harder than ever the idea of creating an African commercial class to replace, at least in part, the cadre of businessmen which had previously consisted of Asians and Europeans. All these aspects of a vigorous move to Africanize more substantially the central parts of Kenya's economy. A question which remained was whether the Africanization of the economy had to be in the direction of creating African capitalism. Again Kikuyu traditional predispositions, activated in part by Jomo Kenyatta's style of leadership, helped to determine an affirmative answer to that question. Kenya took the highroad towards an African private-enterprise system partly because within Kikuyu traditional predispositions was an ethic which accepted personal success as a measure of social achievement. President Kenyatta himself once tried to "disgrace" a prominent Kenya leftist at a public meeting by pointing out that the leftist did not own a big house or a private business. The leftist, Mr. Bildad Kaggia, was himself present at the meeting. President Kenyatta compared Kaggia with other old colleagues of his who had since become prosperous. Addressing Kaggia directly, Mzee Kenyatta said: "We were together with Paul Ngei in jail. If you go to Ngei's home, he has planted a lot of coffee and other crops. What have you done for yourself? If you go to Kubai's home, he has a big house and has a nice shamba. Kaggia, what have you done for yourself? We were together with Kungu Karumba in jail, now he is running his own buses. What have you done for yourself?"[5]

What is significant here is the conviction that failure to prosper is an argument *against* a leader. As a socialist radical, Kaggia was, at the time, urging a distribution of land in Kenya to the poor. Kenyatta was suggesting that a person who had failed to prosper through his own exertions should not be "advocating free things."[6]

From this kind of reasoning it was an easy transition to the feeling that enforced economic equality was an insult to the dignity of labour. The principle of "to each according to his work" made sense — but it did not make sense to strive for a principle of "to each according to his needs". The official distrust of Communism in Kenya's ideological orientation is, therefore, to be traced, not so much to western influence in Kenya, as to the influence on political behaviour of traditional *mores* among the dominant ethnic groups in Kenya politics. The Kikuyu distrust of economic egalitarianism was sometimes shared by other groups, or by specific individuals from other groups converted to a similar orientation. From all this emerged the official conviction in Kenya crystalized in Minister Ronald Ngala's assertion that "Communism teaches people laziness."[7]

Reaction to the Communist China is to be traced, in part, to this deeper attitude to Communism itself. But the distrust of the Chinese in Kenya politics

[5] See East African Standard (Nairobi), April 12, 1965.

[6] Ibid. This point is discussed more fully in my article "The Monarchical Tendency in African Political Culture", The British Journal of Sociology, Vol. XVIII, No 3, September 1967. The article occurs as Chapter 10 in Mazrui, "Violence and Thought: Essays on Social Tensions in Africa" (London: Longmans, 1969).

[7] See B. B. C. Monitoring Service Records of African Broadcasts, Nairobi in English, ME/1892/B/2, June 22, 1965. In Lenin's terms, the principle of "from each according to his ability, to each according to his work" is a transitional principle characteristic of the lower phase of Communism. But the ultimate aim of justice in Communist terms was, according to Lenin "from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs". See Lenin, "State and Revolution", 1917.

did not cristallize immediately following independence. On the contrary, much of the ethos of independence had included a passionate desire to be non-aligned. Kenya seemed quite willing to pursue the possibility of having relations with both Chinas, the Nationalist and the Communist. In August 1963, on the eve of independence, a Kenya delegation signed an agreement on economic and technical cooperation in Taipeh, Formosa. Under the agreement Nationalist China was to despatch a survey team to Kenya, to be followed by a farming demonstration team consisting of ten to twelve experienced Chinese farmers to help grow paddy rice, vegetables and upland crops.

But the Communist Chinese soon established an edge over their rivals. Almost immediately following Kenya's independence the Communists had sent a chargé d'affaires and an ambassador was on the way.

Meanwhile the intrigue of competitions within competitions between Kenya and prospective donors began to gather momentum. The Russians extended aid to Kenya announcing it within months of independence. Three days after the announcement of Russian aid an agreement between Kenya and Communist China was disclosed by the two Governments. The Chinese were offering a twofold plan, first a loan of three million pounds free of interest to cover the cost of equipment and technical assistance during the five years beginning in July 1964, and escondly, as grant of rather more than a million pounds towards the relief of immediate financial stress. Jaramogi Oginga Odinga had a lot to do with the success of the negotiations.

On balance, the Russians have lived up to their promises much better than have the Communist Chinese. The very hospital which Kenyatta opened at Kisumu on Saturday, October 24, 1969, and which led to demonstrations and several deaths culminating in the banning of the Opposition Party, was part of the package of aid which the Russians promised to give Kenya in 1964. In fairness, however, it should also be pointed out that China's failure to live up to the promises made was part due to the changing attitudes of Kenya Government itself towards Communist China.

But this, in turn, was also connected with changing alignments domestically in Kenya. Oginga Odinga, who had been Vice-President of the country, as well as Vice-President of the ruling party, began to drift away from the leadership of Mr. Kenyatta and the right wing of the party which backed him. Tom Mboya, a co-tribesman of Mr. Oginga Odinga, remained part of Mr. Kenyatta's team, though evidence since his assassination in July 1969 would seem to suggest that Mboya was also getting ideologically and ethnically isolated within the ruling party, the Kenya African National Union (KANU).

Oginga Odinga began to lose one after another the positions he had held within the ruling alliance. He lost the Vice-Presidency of the country, the Vice-Presidency of KANU, and finally broke away to form a separate party, the Kenya People's Union, in 1966. The Kenya Peoples's Union began to be identified as the radical, socialistically-oriented party, in opposition to KANU with its defense of private enterprise. In foreign policy orientation KPU emerged as a party with a brand of non-alignment which inclined towards a preference for the Eastern bloc; while KANU pronounced a non-alignment with a leaning towards friendship with the West. We have so far indicated that Kikuyu partially for a free-enterprise system was partly derived from traditional cultural predispositions. A shared doctrine with the West might have provided congeniality for friendship with the West. The militancy of the Communist Chinese in supporting

those who were opposed to capitalistic tendencies in Africa might, in turn, have alienated even further those in effective control of Kenya's economy.

There is, therefore, a link of some kind between Kikuyu culture and the Kenya Government's growing alienation from the Communist Chinese.

But were there also cultural factors behind the pro-eastern orientation of the Kenya People's Union under Luo leadership? It is to this that we must now briefly turn.

When President Kenyatta visited Luoland in October 1969 to open the Soviet-financed hospital in Kisumu, he gave a speech which provoked a political reaction from the supporters of the Opposition Party, the Kenya People's Union. Mzee Kenyatta accused the people of Nyanza, the Luo, of some deficiencies in their commitment to nation-building. His taunts included the charge of "laziness". It was quite clear that the Luo had been commercially and even agriculturally less innovative and less dynamic than the Kikuyu. The President suggested that the relative slowness of economic development in that region was, in part, due to inadequate exertion by the local people.

The President's analysis of Nyanza behaviour was exaggerated, but he was pointing to an important element in what appeared to be aspects of Luo social behaviour and cultural orientation. The history of the Luo in Kenya did seem to indicate that their cultural genius in the modern period might lie more in prole-tarian organization and intellectual excellence, and less in entrepreneurial vigour. While the Kikuyu soon displayed a readiness to move out of their tribal areas and establish businesses in Luoland and other regions, the Luo had an even longer history of mobility with longer distances traversed in search of opportunities. But the opportunities which the Luo sought were not in business or commerce. The Luo were great proletarians and great intellectuals without being great businessmen.

On the intellectual side, the Luo soon established a presence at the Univer-sity of Nairobi disproportionate to their numbers. Tensions in university politics were sometimes created by the simple fact that many of the academic leaders seem-ed to be disproportionately drawn from Nyanza. Recruitment had not been distorted to produce such a result. It just so happened that the Luo tribe in the first few years of Kenya's independence has produced more academics than any other single community in the country or indeed in the East African region as a whole.

On the proletarian side, the Luo of Kenya have been exceptionally mobile as a labour force, crossing boundaries and establishing their presence in important fields of employment outside their homes. Of course the Luo, like the Kikuyu, are in some important respects basically a rural people. And yet the role of the Luo in Kenya's nationalism has been basically the role of an urban class. The impact of the Luo on trade unionism in Kenya and Uganda has been impressive. The mobility of the tribe across national frontiers has helped to give them a cos-mopolitan dimension rooted in relative urbanism. Tom Mboya, a Luo, emerged as a founding father of African trade unionism in Kenya and a great fighter for fair wages in the towns.

The fact that the socialist party of Kenya, the Kenya People's Union had its base in Luoland was due to a variety of factors, some of which might have had nothing to do with the cultural predispositions of the Luo as a people. And yet it seems almost certain that these cultural predispositions were not entirely ir-relevant in sharpening the confrontation between the Kikuyu and the Luo in Kenya. Kikuyu conviction that the Luos were lazy and needed advantages dis-proportionate to their exertion were based on Kikuyu values in relation to agri-

cultural innovation and entrepreneurial vigour. In these fields the Luo had not proved especially outstanding. They were neither great farmers nor great busines- smen like the Kikuyu.

And yet it is these same Luo who have a history of mobility in search of bet- ter opportunities, and who establish their presence in university institutions as well as in trade unionism. The conclusion to be drawn was that some of their cultural predispositions oriented them towards these alternative fields of endeavour. The question which arises is whether the proletarian orientation of the Luo was a contributory factor towards their ideological radicalization under Oginga Odinga. As for the attitude of Luo intelectuals to radicalism in Kenya politics, it is not quite clear whether this is either prevalent as an ideological position or culturally determined. But the nagging question remains that Luo intellectualist leanings might also turn out to be especially congenial to ideological radicalisation in the years ahead.

Meanwhile Mr. Oginga Odinga's special relationship with Communist China continued until his own detention in November 1969. The Kenya Government retained its profound distrust of Mao Tse-Tung and even banned the works of Chairman Mao as produced by the Foreign Languages Press. The anti-Commun- ist leanings of the Kikuyu path and the radical orientation of the Luo-backed party put Kenya on the road towards evolving parties with genuine ideological differences.

But what the experience of Kenya illustrates is that modern ideologies in Af- rica should not be viewed as phenomena which came to replace traditional cultural predispositions. The politics of ethnicity and the politics of ideology are capable not only of co-existing, but also of interacting. And perspectives on both national and international affairs could be profoundly conditioned by primordial values and inclinations.

LINGUISTIC PLURALISM AS SOURCE OF CLEAVAGE
AND CONFLICTS

WALTER B. SIMON
CANADA

We are here concerned with the relations between language groups that live within the same communities or within the same political systems. The relations between groups of people who speak different languages are becoming more problematic as the written and spoken word becomes more important while distances between people of diverse tongues become ever smaller.

Multilingualism only becomes a source of serious conflict where urbanization and industrialization is advanced by and advances a public school system that prepares for entry into government and other forms of public service. Pre-industrial, rural and predominantly illiterate societies can peacefully accomodate any number of language groups as long as the members of its educated elite share a *lingua franca*. Thus language was not an issue in a predominantly rural and mostly illiterate Europe ruled by an elite that communicated in Latin and later, in French. Similarly, language conflicts do not appear among the post-colonial new nations as long as predominantly illiterate tribal groups follow their elites who have been educated in the language of their one-time colonial powers.

Progress that enhances the importance of spoken and written language may lead to conflict over the use of languages in schools, courts and offices. These conflicts are apt to become quite bitter because the stakes are extremely high. These stakes involve career contingencies and questions of personal identification and group identities at their most sensitive points. Men are thoroughly identified with their mother tongue at many levels and they do not forsake their language and causes affiliated with it readily.

Concern with language conflicts is in order because such conflicts impede and disrupt the functioning of democratic institutions, and they endanger civic and world peace. Language conflicts have contributed decisively to the outbreak of the First World War and have figures prominently among the causes of the Second. Numerous states, foremost among them Austria-Hungary and its successor states have been unable to cope with language conflicts. At present Belgium [1], Canada [2], India [3] and Ceylon are confronted by language conflicts that have already occasioned serious disturbances and threaten the very existence of these countries. Many signs indicate that numerous other countries, especially developing countries in Africa [4], are likewise about to experience internal strife over language differences.

It is extremely difficult to resolve language conflicts equitably, that is, with a solution acceptable to the conflicting parties. Until now, most language conflicts

have been resolved by "final solutions" that took the form of forced assimilation, expulsion or mass murder.

Neither liberal-minded statesmen like President Woodrew Wilson nor revolutionary theoreticians like Lenin have yet succeeded in their efforts to conceive of theories or programs that contributed in any way to resolving language conflicts. Peacemaking efforts of men of good will have heretofore been swept aside ruthlessly by the ardent partisans dedicated to fight till the bitter end that enabled victors to impose their will unilaterally upon the vanquished.

Sociologists who have studied language conflicts in the context of sociolinguistics have brought together a great deal of useful material that may serve as a source of understanding and insights. Their approach has however been too broad and too unsystematic because they tried to encompass too many diverse aspects of the various problems of interhuman communication. They also tend to underrate the seriousness and complexity of language conflicts and give them comparatively little space in their work [5]. They also try their hand at formulating guidelines for resolving language conflicts that fail to take into account the needs, perceptions and sentiments of the conflicting parties[6].

The author of this paper considers it the primary task of social scientists to provide conceptual schemes that facilitate the formulation of testable theories which, in turn, provide a basis for diagnosing the state of problematic situations such as language conflicts. Ideally, such sociological diagnosis should encompass the essential features and aspects of the conflicting positions and their crucial implications. If accomplished in good time such diagnosis might assist in anticipating undue exacerbation of impending conflicts in its latent stage.

Social scientists are, of course, free to enter conflicts as mediators or as partisans and they may well enhance their effectiveness in such roles through their insights and knowledge gained as social scientists. The roles of inquiring social scientists, impartial mediators and participating partisans should be kept apart. *Under no circumstances should social scientists advance in any way partisan solutions of conflicts while they strike a pose of peacemaking mediators guided by scientific insights!* This kind of offence is committed by more than one social scientist who endorse what they see as sensible solutions of language (or, for that matter, other) problems at the cost of people whom they discount or ignore[7]. Therefore, this presentation is limited to a study of the political aspects of multilingualism, that is, these aspects of the language problems that occasion conflicts and cleavages. The author hopes that his presentation will contribute to the understanding of the political aspects of multilingualism which, in turn, should serve the peaceful solution of conflicts. He does not intend to lay down any norms or guidelines.

Language differences are a source of serious conflicts only since a comparatively short period of time. In the days before literacy was widespread identification with language groups was of secondary importance. This is indicated by the fact that today Poles and Germans both claim the great astronomer Copernicus as one of their own. He was equally at home in German and Polish, and he served Polish as well as German sponsors. Since he wrote in Latin he did not have to identify himself with either language group.

It is similarly significant that the protests against the Quebec Act were directed only against the concessions made to the Catholic Church, while no offence was taken regarding the concessions to the French language. In the last third of the 18th century the Protestant English-speaking settlers of North-America were concerned primarily with religion and not with language. The educated urban elite

knew French, and the interests of the farmers and craftsmen were not affected by language policies.

Language conflict is related to proximity. As long as language groups are territorially separated they may be served by their own monolingual institutions. This is not the case with religion. Men have gone crusades to spread their religious faith but not their language. Consequently we find serious strife over language only between neighbors. Technological progress advances urbanization and industrialization which bring diverse people into close contact with one another and compel them to adjust to one another at work and in their neighborhood. The resulting tensions will be compounded greatly if the people who work and live together cannot speak to one another. These tensions will be compounded further yet where diverse language groups advance conflicting claims for official recognition. Today technological progress brings diverse language groups closer and closer together, in part by shortening distances between different parts of the world, and in part by bringing them together in growing cities and expanding industries. One may consider all of mankind as one big multilingual society. It is for that reason of the essence that the social and political aspects of multilingualism be understood in all the various ways in which they might become sources of tensions and conflicts.

It should be inserted that tensions between language groups will be attenuated in the absence of claims for official recognition. For this reason multilingualism did not become a source of serious conflict where numerous immigrant groups have been absorbed by countries with but one official language. In North America, Latin America and Australia we find evidence for tensions between the various immigrant groups and between them and the native-born citizens, but these tensions did not lead to conflicts because the immigrants accepted the language situation as they found it. Such acceptance involved however a great deal of cultural stress and strains for the immigrants themselves.

Multilingualism does not become a source of conflicts when the educated members of the various language groups know the language of their fellow citizens. This is most readily achieved when the languages in question are languages of worldwide importance. The Swiss case readily comes to mind. It should however be pointed out that the Swiss case is *sui generis* and for this reason hardly serves as a model for other multilingual societies, since its traditions cannot possibly be transplanted or generated by acts of will.

Language conflict is also likely to remain comparatively benign where the more important language at home is of lesser importance abroad, while the lesser language at home is of great importance abroad. This is, for instance, the case in the Danish province of North-Slesvig [8] and among the whites of South Africa. In both cases the languages of the minorities, German in one case and English in the other, are important world languages which are studied readily by the members of the majority. Further inquiry will be necessary to check the extent of the validity of the foregoing observation but it seems likely that conflict is held at a minimum when the members of the various language groups are under comparable pressures to learn one another's languages.

Pressures that impel the study of languages are especially unequally distributed when the more important language at home is, at the same time, also the more important language abroad. Then the members of the less important language groups stand under unilateral pressures to learn the language of the dominant group. Thus, language conflicts in Canada and in Belgium are exacerbated by the

fact that the French in Canada and the Flemish in Belgium are under unilateral pressures to learn the languages of the dominant group, because English is more important than French as a world language (especially in North America) and the French language is more important on the world scene than Flemish. Similarly unbalanced pressures were, incidentally, experienced by the non-German subjects of Imperial Austria.

Multilingualism does not cause tensions or conflicts as long as the subordinate group does not claim official recognition for its language. The ambitious members of such groups simply learn the language of the dominant group along with their own. In case the members of the dominant group do not learn the language of the dominated group we find that all concessions regarding language use cost the members of the majority group a great deal in the form of career chances because all positions that are declared bilingual will then go to the members of the previously dominated group. This explains why members of a dominant group offer such bitter resistence to concessions at the expense of the privileged position of their language. Where the members of the dominant group are monolingual and the members of the dominated group know the language of the dominated group as well as their own, any equalization in position of the language favors the previously dominated group to such an extent that one may say that wherever language conflicts are resolved by equalization of the status of languages, the last will indeed become the first.

Unilingual members of a group whose language loses the privileged status of being the only recognized public language find the study of a second language difficult for two reasons: They not only have to undergo the intellectual rigors involved in the study of a foreign language, but they also have to cope with emotional blocks. (This role of emotional blocks and psychological resistence against the learning of certain foreign languages is, incidentally, a matter that seems to have been neglected till now by the pedagogues.) The fusion of economic interests with emotional aspects occasion in the case of language conflicts irrational claims that are based upon unrealistic perspectives. This contributes further to the escalation of language conflicts. Irrational claims that are based upon unrealistic perspectives have frequently embittered language conflicts to such an extent that the outcomes have been extremely costly for all involved. The outcome of the language conflict between Czechs and Germans is certainly a case in point.

Not only the German-Czech language conflict but the whole history of language strife in Central Europe serves to advance our understanding of what is involved in this matter. Especially the course of the Czech-German dispute illustrates what George Orwell had in mind when he despaired of man's capacity to cope with his own history.

In the lands that constituted Imperial Austria and that have been represented from 1867 until 1918 in the *Reichsrath* in Vienna eleven languages enjoyed official recognition. Among these German was by far the most important at home and abroad. The ruling dynasty, the capital city of Vienna and one third of the population were German. Since German was also paramount abroad it was a matter of course that the educated subjects of the Habsburg Crown all learned German. A good command of German was, of course, a condition for a career in Government service and in the upper echelons of industry and commerce.

Among the non-German subjects of the Habsburg monarchy many knew only their own language, and requested local recognition of their languages in offices and courts. They also demanded and received the right to have schools in their

respective languages. This led to serious tensions in mixed-language areas. The government in Vienna tried hard to resolve language issues wherever they appeared through compromise solutions designed to satisfy moderate claims. Since the claims of the extremists on both sides of language conflicts were unlimited in their scope it was, of course, not possible to satisfy them.

The German Austrians were the dominant group but they were at a great disadvantage wherever another language received public recognition. The educated members of other language groups invariably knew German too, so that all positions declared bi-lingual fell in nearly all cases to non-German subjects of the Habsburg Monarchy.

Among all of the language groups of Imperial Austria the moderates who were willing to accept compromises in language questions outnumbered the unyielding and intransigeant extremists. This is established beyond doubt by the results of elections. The extremist chauvinistic groups predominated however where they were in a position to sabotage compromise solutions effectively and disturb public peace: in the mixed-language areas and in the colleges and universities.

Compromise solutions require for their effectiveness those who are closest to the conflicts to be resolved by compromise. In the case of language conflicts these are the inhabitants of mixed-language areas and the academicians, because these are the people most affected by language regulations. We find the world over that intransigeance in language questions predominates time and again among these people in the mixed-language areas and among students. Rioting students on both sides of language conflicts are usually not able to overthrow political systems whose established governments favor compromise in language questions but they are able to impede compromise solutions by causing intermittent unrest. In the course of such unrest we find rational pragmatic bread-and-butter issues often overshadowed by emotional considerations of prestige and by utopian aspirations.

Irrational emotional claims to prestige appear most clearly on occasions of minor importance. Thus, it occurs in mixed-language areas that public buildings remain without signs because the conflicting parties are unable to agree whose language should appear first or on top. Thus, the railway station of G. in Imperial Austria remained for long periods without signs because no agreements could be reached upon the sequence of the German "Goerz", the Italian "Gorizia" and the Slovenian "Gorice". (Problems of greater complexity and consequence, such as the use of languages in schools and courts, were of course even more difficult to resolve.)

The efforts of the Habsburg regime to resolve language conflicts failed where none of its successor states succeeded. Of special interest among the successor states was the Czechoslovakian Republic as the only parliamentary democracy among them. The government in Prague after the 1st World War as the government in Vienna before tried to resolve language conflicts by compromise but the extremists had the last word. It is especially noteworthy that the political movements committed to a policy of moderation failed in Imperial Austria as well as in the Czechoslovakian Republic because of their inability to commit their followers in the mixed-language areas to their policies of compromise. The international socialist party and the proclerical conservative party of the supernational Roman Catholic Church both favored compromise solutions in the language question. Yet we find that the socialist party as well as the proclerical party split into sections according to language. On both sides the parties had difficulties with their followers in the mixed-language areas whenever specific issues regarding language recognition arose.

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Time and again the socialists and the proclerical parties found themselves hard-pressed to maintain their followers in mixed-language areas where these were inclined to defect to the extremists.

The inability of the international socialists and the proclerical party to commit their followers in mixed-language areas successfully to their own conciliatory positions regarding language conflicts indicates that language conflicts are indeed potent sources of conflict in their own right. This observation casts doubt upon the position of sociolinguists to the effect that ". . .Divisiveness (in languages) is an ideologized position and it can magnify minor differences; indeed it can manufacture differences in languages as in other matters almost as easily as it can capitalize on more obvious differences. Similarly, unification is also an ideologized position and it can minimize seemingly major differences or ignore them entirely, whether they be in the realm of religion, culture, race or any other basis of differentiation" [9].

The record of language conflict does not bear out the contention that the divisive effect of language differences is a function of ideology. Historical analysis leaves no doubt that language conflicts generate ideologies rather than result from them. Thus the conflict between Czechs and Germans did not result from divisive ideologies but generated them.

On the Czech side, extremist chauvinism contributed considerably to the appeal of pan-Slavism that enjoyed greater popularity among the Czechs than among any other Slavic nation.

The case on the German side of the German-Czech dispute is even clearer. The German-speaking Bohemians and Moravians, now known as Sudeten-Germans, did not take an uncompromising position in the language question because of a chauvinistic ideology. Instead, their position in the language question motivated them to defect from the international socialist party and from the proclerical party to the extreme German-nationalist camp which spawned the name as well as the ideology of Hitler's party long before Hitler himself had ever been heard from. As early as in 1907 we find here a "German National-Socialist Workers' Party" that accepted ideological positions that were to become characteristic of Hitler's party and that was to guide the policies of his regime. Hitlerite anti-capitalism, anti-clericalism, condemnation of international socialism and racial antisemitism all assume a logical consistency against the background of language conflict, for all of these followed from a condemnation of positions in favor of compromise on the language issue (Among Germans outside the so-called Sudetenland racial antisemitism only appealed to a marginal fringe. Only in the Sudetenland and in some other mixed-language areas of Austria-Hungary — and at the universities — racial antisemitism found a ready response. This appears to have been due entirely to the tendency of assimilated Jews, including Jews who had turned Christians, to take a conciliatory position in the language question.) It is also noteworthy that Hitler's party enjoyed greater following in the Sudetenland than in any other German-speaking part of Germany or Austria.

Scrutiny of language conflicts elsewhere confirms that ideologies are generated by conflicts rather than the other way round. Thus Jacques Brazeau says about the language conflict between the Walloons and the Flemish in Belgium: "Movements that plan on changing social arrangements and those that work for their maintenance have recourse to ideologies and political philosophies. . ." [10]. It is hardly ever sound sociology to explain the motives underlying social conflicts as generated by ideological commitments. In the case of class conflicts as in the case

of language conflicts the nature of the underlying interests inspire ideologies appropriate to the positions of the parties involved.

The study of language conflicts also provide insights regarding other aspects of conflict situations in general. Thus, they tend to confirm findings to the effect that group conflicts are usually provoked and escalated by the marginal group members or by leaders about to lose their positions because conflict gives them a chance to confirm themselves in the group.

Language conflict also reflects upon the complex relations between pacifist-minded moderates and militant extremists. We see that the pacifism of the moderates leaves the initiative often to the extremists so that moderates are often compelled to participate in conflicts on the side of their extremists in spite of themselves, because at crucial junctures they are exposed primarily to the extremist pressures on their own side. Especially in language conflicts we often find peaceloving majorities reduced to puppets of developments they might have stopped by a firm stand against the extremists in their own camp. It is however very easy to propagate extremist demands and much more difficult to argue against them within the fold of an interest group — especially when language policies are involved. Consequently, small numbers of fanatic extremists suffice to thwart compromise desired by silent majorities and even commit the moderates to battle in spite of their desire for peace. Thus the pacifism of moderate majorities may facilitate paradoxically the designs of extremists bent upon staking all in battles for the imposition of final solutions.

Lack of space inhibits extensive comparisons between the current language conflicts in Belgium and in Canada with past language conflicts in Central Europe, but an extensive comparative study should be most rewarding. In all cases do we find the resistence of the dominant language group to concessions that would exclude its members from access to bilingual positions, and in all cases do we find that students are prominent among those who espouse extremist positions in opposition to compromise. A systematic comparative study would, of course, have to go into a great many additional aspects [11].

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4. Piere L. van den Berghe, "Africa's Language Problems — Too Many, Too Late!" *Transaction*, St. Louis.

5. For an illustration see the collection of essays in Joshua A. Fishman, editor, *Readings in the Sociology of Language*, The Hague-Paris, Mouton, 1968.

Among the seven sections with forty four conrtibutions we find only two sections that contain contributions on problems of multilingualism, Section V under the title of "Multilingualism", and Section VI under the title "Language Maintenance and Language Shift".

In each of the two sections we find one chapter which mentions the possibility of conflict over language in passing.

We find no reference to language conflict in the extensive subject-matter index, Joyce O. Hertzler, *A Sociology of Language*, New York: Random House, 1965, likewise contains no reference to "language conflict" or "conflict in its subject-matter index".

The whole problem area of conflict between language groups is dealt by a reference to "linguistic intolerance" on pp. 257-258.

6. See below.

7. See below.

8. See Kaare Svalastoga and Preben Wolf, "A Town in Danish Borderland", *International Review of Community Development*, Rome, No. 13-14, 1963.

9. Joshua A. Fishman, "Nationality-Nationalism and Nation-Nationalism", in *Language Problems of Developins Nations*, Joshua Fishman et al., editors, New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1968, p. 45.

10. Jacques Brazeau, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, II-B, p. 18.

11. Walter B. Simon, "Multilingualism, a Comparative Study", in *Studies in Multilingualism*, edited by Nels Anderson, *op. cit.*, pp. 11-25.

PSYCHIATRIC SOCIOLOGY
SOCIOLOGIE PSYCHIATRIQUE

A multitude of studies carried out in several countries consistently suggest that schizophrenia occurs most frequently at the lowest social class levels of urban society. Reviews and assessments of this research literature by Mishler and Scotch (1963), Roman and Trice (1967), Kohn (1968) and the Dohrenwends (1969) all come to the same conclusion: despite serious shortcomings in the research, the weight of evidence clearly points to an especially high rate of schizophrenia at the bottom of the social class hierarchy. What is not clear is why class is related to schizophrenia.

Many discussions of the class-schizophrenia relationship have focused on interpretations that, in fact, explain away its theoretical significance. This is obviously true of most interpretations that consider the relationship to be artifactual, the result of methodological error. It is equally true of interpretations that assert that schizophrenics are found disproportionately in lower social classes because of the impairment they have suffered or because of some characterological defect of non-social origin. The social statuses of schizophrenics, from this point of view, tell us something about how schizophrenics fare in society but little or nothing about what produces schizophrenia.

Others argue that class matters for schizophrenia, not because lower-class conditions of life are conducive to the development of the disorder, but because a person's social class position affects other people's perceptions of and reactions to his behavior. One such interpretation asserts that psychiatric and other authorities are especially prone to stigmatize and hospitalize lower-class people; they victimize the powerless. Similar, though more subtle, explanations focus on the processes by which families, employers, police and others come to label some deviant behaviors as mentally disordered, thereby setting in motion complex changes in social expectation and self-conception that sometimes eventuate in hospitalization,

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Limitations of space preclude anything more than the most sketchy documentation. A more thoroughly documented version of this paper will appear in *Social Forces*, Vol. 50, No. 3, March 1972.

In common with most American investigators, I use the term schizophrenia broadly, to refer to those severe functional disorders marked by disturbances in reality relationships and thought formation. Unfortunately, available research evidence does not enable me to differentiate clinical subtypes of schizophrenia nor to make such important distinctions as that between "process" and "reactive" forms of disturbance.

The evidence comes from research conducted in Canada, Denmark, Finland, Great Britain, Norway, Sweden, Taiwan and the United States — an unusually large number of countries and cultures for establishing the generality of any relationship in social science.

CLASS, FAMILY AND SCHIZOPHRENIA:
A REFORMULATION[1]

MELVIN L. KOHN

USA

A multitude of studies carried out in several countries consistently suggest that schizophrenia[2] occurs most frequently at the lowest social class levels of urban society. Reviews and assessments of this research literature by Mishler and Scotch (1963), Roman and Trice (1967), Kohn (1968) and the Dohrenwends (1969) all come to the same conclusion: despite serious shortcomings in the research, the weight of evidence clearly points to an especially high rate of schizophrenia at the bottom of the social class hierarchy.[3] What is not clear is *why* class is related to schizophrenia.

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[3] The evidence comes from research conducted in Canada, Denmark, Finland, Great Britain, Norway, Sweden, Taiwan and the United States — an unusually large number of countries and cultures for establishing the generality of any relationship in social science.

From this point of view, the class-schizophrenia relationship documents the discriminatory readiness of many people to see signs of mental disorder in lower-class behavior.

Even those interpretations that accord a primary causal significance to social structural conditions have de-emphasized the importance of class, per se, emphasizing instead such related processes as social isolation, social integration, discrepancies between aspirations and achievements, and minority position in the community — to name but a few of the most prominently suggested. These interpretations are, for the most part, consistent with existing data and must be acknowledged to be plausible. But they largely neglect the most straightforward possibility of all — that social class is related to schizophrenia primarily because the conditions of life built into lower social class position are conducive to that disorder.

I think it is time to devote a larger portion of our efforts to devising and testing formulations about how and why lower-class conditions of life might contribute to schizophrenia. The purpose of this paper is to offer one such formulation. It is necessarily tentative, for it is based on seriously incomplete information; at critical places, there is no directly pertinent evidence and I can only speculate.

GENETICS AND STRESS

To try to explain the relationship of class to schizophrenia without bringing other variables into play would be extremely difficult. One would be hard pressed to resolve the apparent contradiction that, although lower-class conditions of life appear to be conducive to schizophrenia, the vast majority of lower-class people never become schizophrenic. When, however, one brings genetics and stress into consideration, the task becomes more manageable. It is no longer necessary to find in class itself an explanation of schizophrenia. Instead, the interpretive task is to explain how social class fits into an equation that includes genetics, probably stress, and undoubtedly other, as yet unrecognized, factors.

Genetics. Recent studies of monozygotic twins and of adopted children demonstrate that although genetics alone cannot provide a sufficient explanation of schizophrenia, some genetic mechanism is almost undoubtedly involved (cf. Rosenthal, 1970). Geneticists do not agree on what is inherited — whether it be a vulnerability specifically to schizophrenia, a vulnerability to mental disorder more generally, or even a type of personality structure. Nor is it certain whether the mode of genetic transmission is monogenic or polygenic. Important as these questions may be, they can for my immediate purposes be passed over; all that needs to be accepted is that genetics plays some substantial part in schizophrenia.

One could argue, in fact, that genetics explains why *class* is related to schizophrenia. If there is a heritable component in schizophrenia, there must have been higher than usual rates of the disorder among the parents and grandparents of schizophrenics. Moreover, since schizophrenia is debilitating, there would have been downward social mobility in earlier generations. Thus, schizophrenics could come disproportionately from lower-class families because of a concentration of genetically susceptible people in the lower social classes. But has there been *enough* downward mobility attributable to the genetically induced disabilities of earlier generations to account for the heightened incidence of schizophrenia found today in the lower social classes?

Since there are no data about the mobility rates of parents and grandparents of schizophrenics, one can only come to a tentative appraisal based on data about

schizophrenics themselves. Turner and Wagenfeld (1967:110) show that although schizophrenics have not actually declined from their fathers' occupational levels, they have lagged behind the general population in not rising above those levels.[4] But it would take a large amount of downward mobility, not just a moderate lag in upward mobility, to have a pronounced effect on the total amount of genetic susceptibility in the lower social classes. Moreover, it can reasonably be assumed that the parents and grandparents were, on the average, less disturbed and therefore less likely to lag in mobility than were the schizophrenics themselves. Finally, we need not assume that all deficits in occupational attainment are genetically induced or have genetic consequences. In all probability, genetically induced, intergenerational social mobility has contributed to, but falls far short of explaining, the higher incidence of schizophrenia in the lower social classes.

Stress. Investigators of the role of stress in schizophrenia face a perplexing problem in defining and indexing stress (cf. Lazarus, 1966; Dohrenwend and Dohrenwend, 1969). A narrow conception would have that term apply only to externally induced events that can be assumed to be psychically painful to virtually everyone who experiences them. Such a conception achieves rigor at the price of excluding from its purview those traumas that may have been self-induced, as well as all those traumas that are painful for some people but not for everyone. It also excludes such real if self-d_fined misfortunes as failure to attain a longed-for goal. In fact, the only experiences that can be assumed to be externally induced and to be painful for everyone are such crises as serious illness, death of close relatives, hunger, and loss of one's job; and even these misfortunes may not be equally painful to all who experience them. But broader conceptions of stress are also problematic. At the extreme, if any event that produces subjectively experienced pain in some individual is considered to be stressful, formulation that attribute to stress a causal role in schizophrenia become tautological.

Research workers have for the most part dealt with this dilemma by (explicitly or implicitly) defining as stressful those events that usually are externally induced and that can be expected to be painful to most people who experience them. Such events occur with greater frequency at lower social class levels: people at the bottom of the class hierarchy experience great economic insecurity and far more than their share of seriously ill health, degradation, and the afflictions attendant on inadequate, overcrowded housing, often in over-populated, under-serviced areas.

Is stress conducive to schizophrenia? A definitive study would require direct, rather than inferential, measurement of stress; a research design that takes social class explicitly into account; and, of course, an adequate index of schizophrenia. Not surprisingly, no study meets all these criteria. Therefore, one can make only a tentative overall appraisal, recognizing that some pertinent studies do not index stress as well as we should like, others do not explicitly control social class and some are addressed to mental disorder in general rather than specifically to schizophrenia.

My appraisal of the research evidence is based primarily on the studies by Rogler and Hollingshead (1965), Brown and Birley (1968), Langner and Michael (1963) and Eitinger (1964). These studies do indicate that stress is associated with the occurrence of schizophrenia. Moroever, Rogler and Hollingshead

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[4] Thirty-six percent of the schizophrenics have fallen and 35% have risen from their fathers' occupational levels, for a net decline of less than one-tenth of a step on a 7-point occupational scale. In the general population, though, there has been a net rise of nearly one-half step on the same 7-point scale.

(1965 : 409-411) show that the relationship between stress and schizophrenia does not simply reflect the high levels of stress prevalent in the lower social classes. From their investigation of schizophrenics and matched controls in the lowest social class of San Juan, Puerto Rico, they report that during the year before onset of symptoms, the schizophrenics experienced notably greater stress than did the controls. Even when judged by the harsh standards of life of the San Juan slums, the stresses that preceded the onset of schizophrenia were unusually severe.

As with genetics, one must reverse the question and ask whether stress can explain the relationship of class to schizophrenia. The Rogler-Hollingshead study cannot help us here, for it is limited to one social class. Unfortunately for our purposes, the only study that does provide data for all levels of social class, that by Langner and Michael, is addressed to mental disorder in general rather than specifically to schizophrenia. This study is, nevertheless, germane, for it indicates that at any given level of stress, people of lower social class position are more likely to become mentally disturbed than are people of higher social class position. In fact, the more sources of stress, the greater the class difference in the proportion of people who manifest psychotic symptoms. The implication is that the relationship of class to mental disorder (hence, if we may extrapolate, to schizophrenia) is not attributable to the amount of stress that people endure. There must also be important class differences in how effectively people deal with stress.

Part of the explanation for lower-class people dealing less effectively with stress may be that the stress-producing situations they face are less alterable by individual action than are those encountered by people of higher social class position. Many of the stresses they encounter arise from economic circumstances- over which few individuals have much control, lower-class individuals least of all. Moreover, lower-class people have little money or power to employ in coping with the consequences of stress. It also appears (cf. Dohrenwend and Dohrenwend, 1969 : 137-139) that fewer institutional resources are available to them, either for escaping stressful situations or for mitigating the consequences of stress. Finally there is reason to believe that lower-class conditions of life limit people's *internal* resources for dealing with stress (cf. Dohrenwend and Dohrenwend, 1969 : 140-143).

While recognizing that all these factors may make it difficult for lower-class people to deal effectively with stress, my formulation emphasizes only one; lower-class conditions of life may impair people's internal resources. I shall argue, more generally, that these life conditions may adversely affect people's ability to deal not only with situations, that by my limited definition are stressful, but also with many other dilemmas and uncertainties in a rapidly changing, complex society.

A critic might contend that an adequate explanation of the class-schizophrenia relationship can be formulated without taking internal resources into account. I think this formulation too narrow, it ignores too much of what we know about the social psychology of class. And so I shall devote much of the remainder of this essay to laying out the reasons for believing that lower-class conditions of life may adversely affect people's internal resources for dealing with stressful, problematic or complex situations, and for believing that such impairment may be important in the schizophrenic process.

CLASS, FAMILY AND SCHIZOPHRENIA

If internal resources for dealing with complex and stressful situations are at issue, then that primary socializing institution, the family, is probably somehow involved. Many studies of the role of the family in the development of schizophrenia are pertinent here, even though most of them have been addressed to a question quite different from ours. The purpose of these investigations has generally been to find some pattern of interpersonal relationship unique to the families of schizophrenics. To the best of my knowledge, though, no well-controlled study has shown a substantial difference between the patterns of parent-child relationship characteristic of families that produce schizophrenic offspring and those characteristic of ordinary lower- and working-class families. From a traditional, single factor perspective, two interpretations of this negative finding are possible.

One would be, that the family plays no important part in the genesis of schizophrenia. This interpretation holds that the patterns of parent-child relationship typical of schizophrenia-producing families merely reflect those of the lower social classes from which schizophrenics disproportionately come, without having been instrumental in the disorder.

The alternative interpretation would assert that the family does play a critically differentiating role in schizophrenia, but that the statistical evidence is not yet in. From this point of view, most well-controlled studies have been too limited in focus. They have dealt with such relatively concrete aspects of family life as the overall pattern of role-allocation, parental bestowal of warmth and affection and disciplinary practices, but have missed more subtle interpersonal processes that recent clinical investigations have emphasized. Future studies may show clear and convincing evidence of important differences between schizophrenia-producing families and ordinary families of lower social class position.

There is, however, a third possible interpretation. Instead of looking to the family for a total explanation of schizophrenia, this interpretation attempts only to explain how lower-class families may contribute to the disorder in genetically vulnerable people who are subject to great stress. From this perspective, the family is important for schizophrenia, not because the family experiences of schizophrenics have differed in some presently undisclosed manner from those of other people of lower social class background, but precisely because they have been similar. If this be the case, there is no reason to restrict our interest to processes that are unique to the family, such as its particular patterns of role allocation. We should expand our focus to include, even to emphasize, processes that the family shares with other institutions — notably, those processes that affect people's ability to perceive, to assess and to deal with complexity and stress.

The family, I suggest, is important principally because of its strategic role in transmitting to its offspring conceptions of social reality that parents have learned from their own experience. In particular, many lower-class families transmit to their offspring an orientational system too limited and too rigid for dealing effectively with complex, changing or stressful situations. This point of view is, I believe, consonant with recent psychiatric thinking about the family and schizophrenia, which emphasizes those communicational and cognitive processes in schizophrenia-producing families that contribute to the schizophrenic's difficulties in interpreting social reality. What is new is the assertion that these conceptions of reality, far from being unique to families whose offspring become schizophrenic, are widely held in the lower social classes, in fact arise out of the very conditions of life experienced by people in these segments of society.

SOCIAL CLASS AND CONCEPTIONS OF REALITY

The heart of my formulation is the hypothesis that the constricted conditions of life experienced by people of lower social class position foster conceptions of social reality so limited and so rigid as to impair people's ability to deal resourcefully with the problematic and the stressful. Although speculative, this hypothesis is a direct extrapolation from what is known about the relationship between social class and conceptions of reality (cf. the review by Rossi and Blum, 1968). My own research (Kohn, 1969 : Chapters 4 and 5) indicates that the lower a man's social class position, the more likely he is to value conformity to external authority and to believe that such conformity is all that his own capacities and the exigencies of the world allow; in particular, the lower a man's social class position, the more likely is his orientational system to be marked by a rigidly conservative view of man and his social institutions, fearfulness and distrust and a fatalistic belief that one is at the mercy of forces and people beyond one's control, often, beyond one's understanding.

One need not argue that this orientational system is held by all lower-class people, or that lower-class people hold these beliefs and values to the exclusion of others, more characteristic of higher social classes. It does seem to be well established, though, that these conceptions of social reality are most prevalent at the bottom of the social hierarchy.

The existence of class differences in beliefs and values is hardly accidental, nor even cultural in the sense employed by "culture of poverty" theorists who see lower-class orientations as something handed down from generation to generation independently of current social conditions. On the contrary, social class embodies such basic differences in conditions of life that subjective reality is necessarily different for people differentially situated in the social hierarchy. Lower-class conditions of life allow little freedom of action, give little reason to feel in control of fate. To be lower-class is to be insufficiently educated, to work at a job of little substantive complexity, under conditions of close supervision and with little leeway to vary a routine flow of work. These are precisely the conditions that narrow one's conception of social reality and reduce one's sense of personal efficacy (cf. Kohn, 1969: Chapters 9 and 10).

There is, then, ample evidence that class differences in conditions of life are productive of differences in conceptions of social reality. But do these differences in orientation contribute to class differences in schizophrenia? There are three reasons for thinking that they might.

The first is a consideration of theoretical strategy. Instead of searching aimlessly among the innumerable correlates of social class for one or another that might help to explain its relationship to schizophrenia, I think it strategic to look to what underlies the social psychology of class: members of different social classes, by virtue of enjoying (or suffering) different conditions of life, come to see the world differently — to develop different conceptions of social reality, different aspirations, and hopes and fears, different conceptions of the desirable. Class differences in orientation are an important bridge between social conditions and psychological functioning.

The second reason for thinking orientations pertinent is that our analysis of the inter-relationship of class, genetics and stress points the desirability of taking into account any factor that might have an important bearing on class differences in how effectively people are able to deal with stressful or problematic situations.

It seems to me that the conformist orientational system characteristic of the lower social classes is less adequate for dealing with such situations than is the self-directed orientational system more prevalent at higher social class levels.

Admittedly, the characteristically lower-class orientational system, molded as it is by actual conditions, may often be useful. It is, for example, attuned to the occupational demands that lower-class people must meet; a self-directed stance would probably bring few rewards and might easily lead to trouble. Moreover, participant-observation studies of lower-class life make it vividly apparent that, in an environment where one may be subject to diverse and often unpredictable risks of exploitation and victimization, this perspective may serve other protective functions as well. It is a way of keeping one's guard up. It provides a defensive strategy for people who really are vulnerable to forces they cannot control.

But there are times when a defensive posture invites attack, and there are times when the assumption that one is at the mercy of forces beyond one's control — even though justified — leaves one all the more at their mercy. An orientational system predicated on conforming to the dictates of authority sees social reality too simply and too fearfully to permit taking advantage of options that might otherwise be open. It is too inflexible for precisely those problematic and stressful circumstances that most require subtlety, flexibility and a perceptive understanding of larger social complexities.

The third reason for thinking class differences in orientations pertinent is that orientations — conceptions of reality — are fundamental to schizophrenia. Fearful, inflexible reactions to threat are integral to the schizophrenic experience. One reason for the disproportionately high incidence of schizophrenia at lower social class levels may be that schizophrenic disorders build on conceptions of reality firmly grounded on the experiences of these social classes.

CONCLUSION

My proposed formulation attempts to bring genetics, stress and the conditions of life attendant on social class position into one coherent interpretation of schizophrenia. The thrust of the argument is that the conditions of life experienced by people of lower social class position tend to impair their ability to deal resourcefully with the problematic and the stressful. Such impairment would be unfortunate for all who suffer it, but would not in itself result in schizophrenia. In conjunction with a genetic vulnerability to schizophrenia and the experience of great stress, though, such impairment could well be disabling. Since both genetic vulnerability and stress appear to occur disproportionately at lower social class levels, people in these segments of society may be at triple jeopardy.

How would one test such a formulation? Since the formulation posits that schizophrenia is produced by the interaction of genetic vulnerability, stress and the disabilities attendant on a conformist orientation, a rigorous test clearly requires that all three elements be considered together. I speak of interaction in its precise statistical sense: the relevance of any of the three factors depends on the strength of the other two. It may also be that the critical threshold for each of the factors depends on the strength of the other two. If, for example, the genetic predisposition is exceptionally strong, less stress may be required; if there is exceedingly great stress, perhaps only minimal genetic vulnerability will be sufficient; if a person's orientation is strongly conformist, even moderately stressful situations may overwhelm him. These possibilities, and the numerous variations

they imply, suggest that my model may be only a simple prototype of a family of models. Fortunately, research designed to test any one of them can assess the others as well, for they are all based on the interplay of the same three factors.

If the effects of genetics, stress and orientation were assumed to be additive, we could test any of them by comparing schizophrenics to nonschizophrenics of the same social class on that factor alone. But with an interactive model of the type I have proposed, a single-factor comparison is inadequate. Since no one factor could produce schizophrenia except in combination with the others, it would be possible for *all* members of a given social class to surpass the threshold for any factor, provided they did not exceed the thresholds for the others. Thus, an absence of difference between schizophrenics and nonschizophrenics of the same class level on any of the factors in the model is no disproof of the pertinence of that factor. Correspondingly, finding a difference provides *prima facie* evidence that the factor is pertinent to schizophrenia, but no proof that its place in the model has been correctly established. An important corollary is that different factors may distinguish schizophrenics from non-schizophrenics in different social classes.

To be concrete: the correlations between class and the pertinent facets of orientation range from 0.13 to 0.38 (Kohn, 1969: 81, 83). If one took the moderate size of these correlations to imply that many lower-class people do not hold a conformist orientation, he would predict substantial differences in orientation between those lower-class people who do and those who do not become schizophrenic. But I interpret the moderate correlations between class and orientation to mean that a conformist orientation is widely held at lower social class levels and is far from absent, though less widely held, at higher social class levels. I would therefore predict little or no difference in orientation between lower-class schizophrenics and nonschizophrenics. From either perspective, we should expect lower-class schizophrenics and nonschizophrenics to differ most decidedly in genetic vulnerability, perhaps also in exposure to stress and least of all in orientation. Since present evidence suggests that the correlation between class and orientation is greater than that between class and genetics, or than that between class and stress, differences between schizophrenics and nonschizophrenics should center more and more on orientation at increasingly higher social class levels.

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THE INFLUENCE OF SOCIAL CHANGE ON THE FREQUENCY
OF CERTAIN FORMS OF DEVIANT BEHAVIOUR

RUDOLF ANDORKA, BÉLA BUDA, IMRE HEGEDÜS, JUDITH G. KISS

HUNGARY

1. SURVEYS ON DEVIANCE CARRIED OUT BY THE CENTRAL
STATISTICAL OFFICE

The surveys of the Central Statistical Office of Hungary had theoretical and practical aims. These surveys, on which this paper is based, can be characterized in the following way:

1. A series of surveys carried out by the Demographic Research Institute of the Central Statistical Office consisting of the analysis of the case sheets of 6867 *alcoholics* in Budapest, who were patients in the institutions for the ambulatory care of alcoholics, as well as of interview survey of 200 male alcoholics. In the latter survey there were multiple choice and open-ended questions, an unstructured life story and in addition three psychological tests (4 pictures of the Thematic Apperception Test, the Lüscher test and the Picture Frustration Test) were administrated. In addition to the authors of this paper László Cseh-Szombathy and Györgyi Simon took part in this survey, which is the main basis of the conclusions of this paper.

2. A series of surveys carried out by the Section of Social Statistics on *suicide*, consisting of the regular analysis of yearly official statistical data, as well as an interview survey with the relatives, neighbours, etc. of 110 suicides, analysed by László Cseh-Szombathy.

3. Surveys on *criminals* carried out by the Section of Social Statistics, analysed by Károly Miltényi, Jozsef Csonka and István Vavró.

4. A survey on *patients in mental hospitals* carried out by the Section of Health Statistics, analysed by Zoltán Marton and Mrs. E. Szabó.

In addition to these surveys carried out by the Central Statistical Office we utilized the results of other Hungarian researchers too.

2. THEORIES ON THE INFLUENCE OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT ON DEVIANCE

The theories concerning the relation of socio-economic development and the frequency of deviance may be grouped in two broad categories, namely "optimistic" and "pessimistic" theories.

The "*optimistic theories*" postulate that the conditions causing deviance shall either be automatically eradicated by development or can be eliminated by planned social reforms.

One branch of these theories which may be called the ecological stream, supposes that crime and delinquency, mental disorders, alcoholism, etc. are in connection with poverty, low cultural level, slum conditions in cities, inadequate care upon certain population groups or areas, association with deviant people. It follows from this assumption that the growth of per capita income, a higher school level, slum clearance, social care, etc. may diminish the frequency of deviance.

Another branch of the optimistic theories was constituted by some social scientists and philosophers in the socialist countries who in the period just after the socialist transformation of these countries thought that the change of the economic and institutional system will bring about almost automatically the diminishing and gradual disappearance of deviance.

The *pessimistic theories* emphasize on the contrary the corollaries of modern socio-economic development which presumably increase the incidence of deviance.

Some authors blamed the tendency of technological innovations, others urbanization. Anomie theories too may be considered a more sophisticated type of the pessimistic theories.

Another branch of theories uses rather socio-psychological concepts to prove the negative effects of modern development. Erich Fromm, a distinguished representative of this school of thought, considers that modern Western society is characterized by alienation, a pathological state of mind and cites the rates of suicide, homicide and alcoholism as evidences and manifestations of social pathology.

3. ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL DEVELOPMENT VERSUS RELATIVE CONSTANCY OF DEVIANCE IN HUNGARY SINCE 1945

1. Hungary underwent since 1945 truly radical changes. Per capita income increased by 150% (since 1938), the proportion of agricultural population decreased from nearly 60% to 30% (in 1968), the proportion of persons with at least 12 school education (among those 18 and more years old) increased from 4% in 1941 to 15% in 1968. At the same time the whole economic system and social structure changed. Productive asserts are today almost exclusively in the possession of state and cooperative enterprises. The class of capitalists and landlords disappeared. 66% of the intellectuals and economic and administrative leaders, as well as 75% of the non-manual workers originate from the manual strata, more than 50% of the manuals outside agriculture originate from the agricultural stratum.

It may be expected that these radical developments and changes caused similarly a radical change in the frequency of deviance. If optimistic theories were true, deviance should have diminished. If the pessimistic ones were true, it should have increased strongly. Neither alternative, however, seems to be realized. Being well aware of the difficulties of obtaining time series of the real frequency of different forms of deviant behaviour, the following statements can be made: the rate of suicide per 100,000 population averaged 32.9 in 1931-35, 30.5 in 1935-38 and 31.5 in 1966-68; the number of alcoholics (as determined by the Jellinek formula) seems to have moderately risen (number of persons died because of cirrhosis of the liver in 1938: 675, in 1966-68: on the average 1098); the number of persons convicted of homicide and attempted homicide slightly decreased (1938: 392, 1968: 352). It can be stated that *the rates of different forms of deviance are relatively constant.*

Two further research results cast doubts on the simplified theories according to which suicide, alcoholism, homicide, etc. change simply and in the same di-

rection in function of socio-economic development and change. First, the regional distribution or "map" of suicide in Hungary did not change since the First World War. The rate of suicide is always highest in the South-East of the country (a rather underdeveloped region) and the more far away a country or town is from this South-Eastern part, the lower is its suicide rate [1].

Secondary, there is no significant correlation between the territorial distribution of suicide, homicide and alcoholism, though it might be accepted that their rates are all high where anomie, alienation, etc. are prevalent, and in spite of the fact that in the individual cases alcoholism and suicide, on the one hand, and drunkenness and homicide, on the other hand, are very often connected: alcoholics commit suicide, drunken men commit homicide [2].

4. FACTORS IN THE CAUSATIVE MECHANISM OF DEVIANCE. RESULTS OF THE SURVEYS ON ALCOHOLISM

On the basis of the surveys of the Demographic Research Institute we could verify the following hypothesis on the causative mechanism of alcoholism in individual cases [3-9]. Those persons become alcoholics: 1. whose socialization (or personality development) in childhood was disturbed; 2. who are exposed in adult life to stresses which they cannot bear in a normal way; 3. who saw in their childhood behaviour patterns favourable for heavy drinking; 4. who see in adult life behaviour patterns favourable for drinking.

In order to give a more life-like idea of this hypothesis we insert here the abbreviated life history of an alcoholic in the 200-person survey: a 38 years old unskilled worker in a brick-factory. Born in a small town. His father was seaman, heavy drinker. He saw him for the last time when he was 7 years old. Brought up by mother, grandmother, other relatives. Spent some years in an asylum. Mother lived in consensual union with a skilled worker who did not like our subject. When he came periodically to his mother, the stepfather often thrashed him. Stepfather was an excessive drinker too.

When he was sixteen years old, he tried to find his father in Roumania where he was said to live. He did not succeed, was arrested, later came home to Hungary.

He had several jobs, always unskilled ones, some in agriculture, some in industry. For some time he lived in Budapest with his mother, but quarrelled with her and returned to village.

He married a young peasant girl. They had three children who died in their house which burned down while the parents were not at home.

They migrated several times, at last returned to Budapest. He had several unskilled jobs, presently both work in the brick-factory. Their dwelling is in the factory. Their financial conditions are good, they work and earn well. Their marriage, however, is not without problems, though they have further four children. Our subject is very jealous. He asserts that his first heavy drinking was associated with the supposed infidelity of his wife. Drinking is customary in the brick-factory because of the dust. Our subject, however, has periodical drinking bouts mostly as a consequence of or connected with marriage problems. In these bout periods he thrashes wife, sells consumer durables in their home.

More exactly we found the following factors contributing to the development of alcoholism:

1. Events and conditions which may have contributed to defects of socialization: 16% of the alcoholics lost their fathers, 6.5% their mothers and 4.5% both

parents before being 18 years old (parents died or disappeared completely); 4% spent some years in an asylum for destitute children; 14.5% were brutally thrashed or completely neglected by parents, another 16% suffered from the emotional instability of parents (e. g. periodical thrashing).

Though thrashing and neglecting were more frequent on the side of the father of alcoholics, the stories told in connection with the Thematic Apperception Test indicate that the problematical relation with the mother had more important influence on the defective development of personality, than the faults of the father. Namely 90% of the alcoholics recognized the mother on card 6 BM of the T.A.T. test, while only 51% identified the old man on card 7 BM with the father of the younger man. Also mentioning of conflict is more frequent in connection with the mother than with the father.

The fact that alcoholics more often live with an older wife or woman partner than average male population (the proportion of marriages where the woman is older being 20-25% in the case of alcoholics and about 13% in average population) may be interpreted as a manifestation of the desire of alcoholics to find a mother-substitute, an important part of alcoholics being strongly "mother-dependent".

2. Stresses in adulthood: the most frequent factors precipitating the personality, whose socialization was disturbed, were marriage problems (59.5% of the alcoholics). Career frustrations, e. g. downward mobility (26%), problems in job (16%), events connected with war, etc. (15%) played an important role too. It is remarkable that death of a member of family (8%) and poverty, resp. bad living and dwelling conditions (7%) were less important in precipitating alcoholism. The importance of open and hidden family conflicts seem to be even greater on the basis of the stories told in connection with card 4 of the Thematic Apperception Test, as part of those alcoholics, who asserted to be living in good marriage, related ambivalent emotions, disinterest, an intention to break with the woman.

The stress situation of alcoholics is displayed also by the stories told in connection with card 14 of the T.A.T. The very vague picture (man or woman are standing at the window, or outside before the window) can be interpreted as a scene of love affair, breaking into a house and among others also as suicide. 38% of the alcoholics (much more than in a control group) considered it a suicidal scene, another 10% emphatically (spontaneously) declared that "it is surely not suicide" (that may be interpreted as a sign of serious concern with suicide), a further 12% said it is an escape from prison, etc. In our opinion these stories prove the existence of very heavy stresses from which the alcoholic tries to escape, may be suicide.

3. Behaviour patterns favourable for drinking in childhood: 23.5% of the alcoholics had a father who was a regular drinker, 27.5% a father who was excessive drinker or alcoholic. 17.0% of the mothers drank regularly and 2.0% were excessive drinkers. It is rather the behaviour of parents, not the permission or prohibition of drinking of their children which influences the children.

4. Behaviour patterns favourable for drinking in adulthood appear first of all in the reference group of alcoholics; among friends (64%), colleagues (56.5%), etc. Generally our hypothesis seems to be verified. The most striking and unexpected result is the prevalence of the factors connected with parental family and marriage. Microculture of the parental family, on the one side, problems in parental family causing defective socialization, as well as stresses in marriage, on the other side, are in most cases connected with the development of alcoholism.

These defects of socialization and stresses, however, are not specific or typical for alcoholism, as similar factors were demonstrated in studies on suicide [1], problem

children and juvenile delinquency [10], crime [11] and mental disorders [12]. Not excluding the possibility that there are, nevertheless, socialization defects and stresses which (or the level of the damage caused by them) are specific for different kinds of deviance, we hypothesize that the different forms of deviant behaviour are more or less alternative results of similar disturbances of socialization and personality development, as well as similar stress situations, and it is in the first place culture (more exactly microculture of family and other primary groups) which influences the outcome, i. e. the form of deviance "chosen" by the individual. The influence of microculture may explain the constancy in regional differences of deviance. The fact that alcoholism and suicide, homicide (aggression) and suicide (auto-aggression), etc. are more or less alternatives, on the one hand, but intensify each other, on the other hand (prolonged alcoholism leads to such desperate situations where suicide seems a plausible solution, drunkenness weakens the controls over aggression, etc.) may explain the lack of correlation between the regional rates of different forms of deviance. It follows from the above described results that if we consider the effect of economic and social development on deviance, we must study their influence on culture, on the one side, and on socialization and stress situations, on the other side.

5. THE INFLUENCE OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ON CULTURE

In spite of socio-economic change and development, culture (beliefs, valuations, norms, etc.) remained relatively unchanged in Hungary. Neglecting other aspects of culture we concentrate here our analysis on valuations and norms concerning deviant behaviour.

As to excessive drinking, large groups of the population hold the opinion today as since centuries that drinking is a natural, even necessary concomitant of true entertainment, the drunken man is a nice, likeable and amusing fellow, drinking is a part of the role of man, a concomitant of courage, and when a man is in a difficult, sad or tragic situation, the proper thing to do is to drink.

According to the interview survey of 200 alcoholics these valuations and norms are more or less equally widespread in each social group, the differences being only in the habits of drinking. E. g. manual workers drink more often in inns and less often at home than non-manuals, etc.

6. THE INFLUENCE OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ON SOCIALIZATION

There are certain conditions associated with modern development which are not favourable for the socialization of children, e. g. the commuting (travelling long hours from home to work every day or once a week) of the father of the family. Apart from this kind of direct influences, however, we consider even more important the indirect effect of modern development through its influence on family. Modern life, on the one hand, increased the demands upon the family as the chief agent of socialization, school and other institutions have a rather secondary role even today in socialization, but, on the other hand, made socialization more difficult because of the changes in role conceptions causing conflict between the generation of parents and children. Therefore families often fail in their socialization function, school or other similar institution cannot substitute family and, thus, a certain kind of asocial socialization occurs by gangs.

THE INFLUENCE OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
AND STRESS SITUATIONS

We analyse here only the influence of three socio-demographic phenomena on stresses which may have contributed to alcoholism, namely commuting, migration and social mobility.

a) Almost 20% of the economically active population commute, i. e. have their working place in another community than their dwelling. Nearly half of them commute from one county to another county. The average distance of commuting amounts to 144 kilometres in the case of these later-mentioned commuters. It is not necessary to prove that these commuters have very few leisure time and are bacause of that under constant strain. Even worse is the situation of those who return only once a week to their home (generally far away) and live in bunk-houses. The living conditions in these bunk-houses generally do not allow recreation, their inhabitants, mostly originating from country folk, seek company and pastime in the inns. 8% of the alcoholics in the 200-person survey were inhabitants of bunk-houses.

b) The situation of some recent immigrants in Budapest is not much better. They have to adapt themselves to new conditions in work and community, to an urban and industrial culture which is quite different from the village and peasant culture in which they were brought up. Under the influence of the stresses arising from their isolation, as well as adaptation difficulties they seek the traditional way of escape learned in childhood in the villages and accepted in urban communities too, namely drinking, 60.5% of the alcoholics in the 200-person survey were immigrants in Budapest. (It must be mentioned that the proportion of immigrants is not lower in the total population of Budapest). Their problems of adaptation are manifested by frequent change of working place (35.5% often change place of work), problems in connection with workshop discipline (56%), criminal acts (21% were convicted).

On the basis of the comparison of social mobility of the alcoholics in our survey and of the male population of Budapest (on the basis of a representative survey on social mobility of the Demographic Research Institute) it is possible to verify a hypothesis according to which alcoholism is connected with lower mobility performance, i. e. alcoholics attain lower position in society than the average population.

Social mobility in Hungary in the past decades was characterized first of all by the mass movement of peasantry into the class of non-agricultural non-manuals. The alcoholics among those coming from the peasantry are today mostly in unskilled and semi-skilled jobs, while the average son of peasant in Budapest is rather a skilled worker (Table 1).

1. PRESENT OCCUPATIONAL GROUP OF THE SONS
OF PEASANTS IN BUDAPEST, %

	Population of Budapest	Alcoholics in Budapest
Intellectuals and other non-manuals	18	12
Craftsmen, skilled workers	41	30
Semi-skilled	22	12
Unskilled	16	46
Others	3	—
Total	100	100

Similarly the sons of manual workers entered the social group of intellectuals and that of other non-manuals more frequently in average population than in the case of alcoholics.

On the other hand, the downward mobility of sons of intellectuals and persons in leading positions was much more pronounced in the case of alcoholics than in the average population (Table 2).

2. PRESENT OCCUPATIONAL GROUP OF THE SONS OF INTELLECTUALS AND LEADERS IN BUDAPEST, %

	Population of Budapest	Alcoholics in Budapest
Intellectuals, leaders	55	30
Other non-manuals	25	30
Manuals	20	40
Total	100	100

These results, naturally, can be interpreted in two ways: either social mobility causes stresses leading to alcoholism, or alcoholism causes low performance at job and in consequence downward mobility.

Modern life conditions have an indirect effect on stresses leading to alcoholism too, and this indirect effect may be even more powerful. Namely the "individual sustaining" function of family, its role in the emotional protection of family members seems to be increasing, as in modern society the similar role of other institutions is declining. The changes of the institution of family, the diminishing importance of the family as a production unit, the growing economic activity outside the home of mothers and wives, generally the emancipation of women, the growing emotional demands of wife and husband connected with the tendency toward "companionship", etc., however, may cause conflicts between wife and husband and such conflicts are the major cause of stresses in the life of alcoholics.

8. CONCLUSIONS

In our opinion the results of our studies verify neither the optimistic, nor the pessimistic theories of the influence of socio-economic development on deviance. It seems that development is associated with factors which may contribute to the intensification of deviance, but it is probable that at the same time some factors causing deviance disappear in function of development.

We consider that all theories of deviance ought to be reformulated in terms of family sociology, as the role of socialization in family, marriage problems and the microculture of family seems to be predominant in the causative mechanism of deviance. Macrosociological facts and phenomena (e. g. norm conflicts) have an effect first of all through family, therefore the macrosociological theories of deviance, the anomie theory, the socio-psychological theories like the theory of alienation, the ecological theories, might be interpreted taking into consideration that it is mostly through the family that anomie, alienation and objective conditions exert their influence on the individual.

Though in our opinion neither the optimistic, nor the pessimistic theories are verified, the practical recommendations derived from them are generally not

only sympathetic to us, but surely in some degree efficient too. Slum clearance, the fight against poverty, educational improvement, etc., on the one side, a general humanization of economic and social life, on the other side, will contribute to the mitigation of deviance. Our opinion concerning practical combatting of deviance differs from theirs only in that respect that we emphasize very strongly the family programs, i. e. the education and psychological treatment of families where a member is deviant, the aid of families in financial or moral crisis.

The other way to combat deviance is the slow change of cultural norms and valuations. That can be effective only if the microculture of primary groups, first of all families, changes, too.

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REJECTION OF THE MENTALLY ILL IN A SOUTH AMERICAN CITY:
VARIATIONS BY AGE, SEX AND SOCIAL POSITION*

MICHAEL MICKLIN   CARLOS A. LEÓN
USA   COLOMBIA

Though in recent years a number of studies have been conducted regarding public views of mental illness and its treatment, we still lack adequate data concerning the cross-cultural variation of these phenomena.[1] The present study deals with a specific aspect of the broader problem: the public rejection of the mentally ill. Our goals are (1) to describe varying patterns of public reactions toward the mentally ill in a South American city, and (2) to compare our findings with those available from previous studies.

REJECTION OF THE MENTALLY ILL: SELECTED FINDINGS

Studies regarding public attitudes toward the mentally ill reveal a wide range of attitudes," . . .extending from failure to realize that they are ill at all and full acceptance of them as members of the community, to complete rejection of those not conforming to the norm".[2] Typically, though, persons labelled as mentally ill ". . . are not merely regarded as sick; they are regarded as a special class of beings, to be feared or scorned, sometimes to be pitied, but nearly always to be degraded"[3].

Rejection of the mentally ill is manifested in many aspects of social life. For example, the former mental patient is often barred from employment or re-employment, thus making it extremely difficult for him to re-establish his identity as a productive, and by implication, normal, member of the community[4]. More gene-

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[1] See H. P. Halpert, Surveys of Public Opinions and Attitudes about Mental Illness, Public Health Reports, 80 (1965): 589-597; W. J. Johannsen, Attitudes Toward Mental Patients, Mental Hygiene 53 (1969): 218-228; S. King, Perceptions of Illness and Medical Practice, New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1962; and WHO, Expert Committee on Mental Health Social Psychiatry and Community Attitudes, Technical Report Series No. 177:1-40.
[2] WHO, Ibid., p. 11.
[3] T. R. Sarbin, On the Futility of the Proposition that Some People are Labelled as Mentally Ill, Journal of Consulting Psychology 31 (1967):447—453.
[4] D. Miller and W. H. Dawson, Effects of Stigma on Re-Employment of Ex-Mental Patients, Mental Hygiene, 49 (1965):281-287; S. Olshansky, S. Grob and I. T. Malamud, Employer's Attitudes and Practices in the Hiring of Ex-Mental Patients, Mental Hygiene, 42 (1958): 391-401; and C. G. Schwartz, The Stigma of Mental Illness, Journal of Rehabilitation, 22 (1956):7-8, 20-22, 28.

rally, a number of studies clearly indicate that public tolerance of the currently mentally ill, as well as the ex-mental patient, is limited to situations characterized by impersonal social contact; as the degree of intimacy in social interaction increases, so does the degree of rejection.[5] Thus we find the public increasingly hesitant to accept the mentally ill in situations which would relate them as neighbors, fellow workers, and kin. Furthermore, these attitudes appear to be fairly resistant to change,[6] even when there is evidence to suggest that the "labelled" individual's behavior is relatively normal.[7] Even the relatives of mental patients appear to reject them upon their return to the community.[8]

Patterns of rejection do not appear to vary randomly. Among the characteristics of respondents which have been shown to be associated with higher rates of rejection are lower social status (less education, less prestigious occupations), greater age, self-reliant attitudes, less experience with the mentally ill and lack of psychiatric sophistication. It is still problematic, though, how and why relationships between these variables and rejection of the mentally ill vary according to socio-cultural context. Though of course no single study is definitive, it is hoped that our data will contribute to an understanding of the socio-cultural bases of rejecting attitudes toward the mentally ill.

METHODS AND MEASURES

These data were collected during the summer of 1968 in Cali, Colombia, a rapidly growing city of approximately 850,000 inhabitants. Four "barrios" (neighborhoods), stratified by social class level, were selected as primary sampling units, and within these a quota sample of households was systematically selected. In all 800 interviews were obtained, 332 with males and 468 females, 200 from each of the four barrios sampled.

In the following analysis three analytic variables are utilized: age, sex and social status. Each of these has been shown, at one time or another, to be related to tendencies to reject the mentally ill. The measure of social status is a modified

[5] G. Adis-Castro and F. Waisanen, Lugar de Residencia y Actitudes Hacia el Enfermo Mental, Acta Psiquiatrica y Psicologica de América Latina 11(1965):356—363; M. Carstairs, The Social Limits of Eccentricity: An English Study, pp. 373-389 of Culture and Mental Health, ed. M. K. Opler. New York; The MacMillan Co., 1959; G. Crocetti, H. R. Spiro and I. Siassi, Are the Ranks Closed: Attitudinal Social Distance and Mental Illness, American Journal of Psychiatry 127(1971):1121-1127; B. P. Dohrenwend and E. Chin-Shong, Social Status and Attitudes Toward Psychological Disorder: The Problem of Tolerance of Deviance, American Sociological Review, 32(1967):417-433; P. Lemkau and G. M. Crocetti, An Urban Population's Opinion and Knowledge about Mental Illness, American Journal of Psychiatry, 118(1962):692-699; D. L. Phillips, Rejection: A Possible Consequence of Seeking Help for Mental Disorders, American Sociological Review, 28 (1963): 963-972, and Public Identification and Acceptance of the Mentally Ill, American Journal of Public Health 56(1966):755-763; and S. Terashima, The Structure of Rejecting Attitudes Toward the Mentally Ill in Japan, pp. 195-215 of Mental Health Research in Asia and the Pacific, ed. W. Caudill and T. Lin. Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1969.

[6] E. Cumming and J. Cumming, Closed Ranks: An Experiment in Mental Health Education. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1957; c. f. Crocetti, Spiro and Siassi, 1971 and Lemkau and Crocetti, 1962, Ibid.

[7] A. Farina and K. Ring, The Influence of Perceived Mental Illness on Interpersonal Relations, Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 70(1965):47-51.

[8] Schwartz, op. cit.; and H. E. Freeman and O. G. Simmons, The Mental Patient Comes Home. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1963.

version of Hollingshead's Index of Social Position.[9] Three factors were included: the head of the household's occupation and level of education, and the prestige level of the family's place of residence.[10]

In order to maximize the opportunity for comparing our results with the other major survey of this kind conducted in Latin America[11] we selected measures of rejection utilized in that study, namely, a scale for evaluating the concepts "mentally ill" and "psychiatric hospital," and one for measuring perceived social distance between respondents and the mentally ill. Specifically the evaluation question is as follows: "Here we have a ladder. Let us suppose that the top step of the ladder represents things that are very good and the bottom step things that are very bad. At which step would you locate (1) a person who is mentally ill ("loco") and (2) the psychiatric hospital?" The social distance question is worded in the following manner: "If a person suffers from a mental illness and is successfully treated at the psychiatric hospital, would you (1) accept him as a next door neighbor, (2) accept him as a colleague in your place of work and (3) accept him as your spouse or as an intimate member of your family (e.g., through marriage)?" It is important to note that the social distance questions are worded in personal terms, i. e., they refer to potential inter-action with the respondent rather than some anonymous "other" and they also specify that the mentally ill person has been successfully treated at a psychiatric hospital. Thus our results should represent conservative estimates of the level of rejection within this population. Two additional variables are utilized which may serve to specify the relationships between respondent characteristics and the indicators of rejection of the mentally ill: "experience with the mentally ill", and "opinion regarding psychiatrists". The first of these is based upon the following question: "Among your close friends or family, have you had someone who has received psychiatric treatment, been hospitalized, an outpatient, or consulted with a doctor about mental illness or emotional problems?" Schroder and Ehrlich have suggested the psychiatric nursing experience and education tends to "neutralize" the typical normative orientation toward psychiatric disorder held by the public.[12] Experience with the mentally ill may well serve the same function.

The second variable is derived from this question: "Some people think that psychiatrists can help the mentally ill, others do not think so. What do you think?" It seems reasonable to assume that persons who express confidence in the ability of psychiatrists to treat the mentally ill would, at the very least, be more accepting of former mental patients who have been pronounced well and, perhaps, might even have higher evaluations of the more abstract concepts of "mentally ill" and "psychiatric hospital," though they may be more evident with respect to the latter concept.

[9] See A. B. Hollingshead and F. C. Redlich, Social Class and Mental Illness. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1958, pp. 387-97.

[10] None of the components were weighted since criteria for assigning weights are lacking at this time. Five status levels were identified, I being the highest and V the lowest. For purposes of analysis we have combined levels I and II since the former contains only 37 respondents.

[11] Adis-Castro and Waisanen, 1965, po. cit., and Modernidad y Tolerancia: El Caso de las Actitudes Hacia la Enfermedad Mental, Acta Psiquiatrica y Psicologica de América Latina, 13 (1967):149-157.

[12] D. Schroder and D. Ehrlich, Rejection by Mental Health Professionals: A Possible Consequence of Not Seeking Appropriate Help for Emotional Disorders, Journal of Health and Social Behavior, 9(1968):222-232.

RESULTS

The two groups of analytic variables are relatively independent of one another, the highest relationships being between sex and opinion that psychiatrists can help ($\gamma = .51$, females higher)[13] social position and opinion that psychiatrists can help ($\gamma = -.23$), close experience with the mentally ill and opinion that psychiatrists can help ($\gamma = .13$), and social position and close experience with the mentally ill ($\gamma = -.12$). Thus, interaction effects should be minimal. The indicators of rejection, however, are fairly highly intercorrelated. This is particularly evident in the relationships among the social distance items; for rejection as neighbor and as fellow worker $\gamma = .97$, for rejection as fellow worker and as spouse $\gamma = .91$, and for rejection as neighbor and as spouse $\gamma = .82$. The evaluations of "mentally ill" and "phychiatric hospital", though, are only slightly related ($\gamma = .08$). An overall indication of the interrelationships among these measures is seen in Table 1.

TABLE 1. SELECTED INDICATORS OF REJECTION OF THE MENTALLY ILL BY EVALUATION OF "MENTALLY ILL" AND "PSYCHIATRIC HOSPITAL"

| | Evaluation of : | | | |
| | Mentally Ill | | Psychiatric Hospital | |
Per Cent Rejecting Mentally Ill as :	(1—4) Low	(5—10) High	(1—4) Low	(5—10) High
Neighbor	4.4	4.8	7.5	4.3
Fellow Worker	11.9	10.8	13.2	11.2
Spouse	54.3	46.6	64.2	50.6
Percentages based upon N of[a]	(523)	(249)	(53)	(721)

[a] "No Answers" and "Don't Knows" excluded

It is clear that generally the higher the evaluation of the concepts "mentally ill" and "psychiatric hospital," the lower the rejection of ex-mental patients. Furthermore, the increasing tendency to reject as social distance decreases is readily apparent at all levels of evaluation and for both concepts. These data strongly suggest the internal consistency of these measures of orientations toward the mentally ill.

Tables 2 and 3 summarize the relationships between our measures of rejection variables. The concepts "mentally ill" and "psychiatric hospital" are, as expected, evaluated quite differently. While 65% of our respondents evaluate the former concept negatively, only seven per cent do so for the latter. From Table 2 it is evident that variations in the evaluation of "mentally ill" are slight when age, sex and social position of respondents are considered. For evaluations of psychiatric hospital, however, significant variations are seen according to age ($\gamma = -.14$, younger respondents higher) and sex ($\gamma = -.19$, females higher). Turning to the social distance items, we find a clear pattern of rejection which varies according to the degree of social interaction implied. Considering the entire sample, we find that while only five per cent of these respondents would reject a successfully tre-

[13] One problem in interpreting the effects of opinions regarding the utility of psychiatrists is that 92% of our sample responded to this question in the affirmative and thus it does not differentiate well.

TABLE 2. RELATIONSHIPS AMONG SELECTED INDICATORS OF REJECTION OF THE
MENTALLY ILL AND RESPONDENT'S AGE, SEX AND SOCIAL POSITION[a]

	Age[b]	Sex[c]	Social Position[d]	N[e]
Evaluation of "Mentally Ill"	—.06	—.03	—.07	772
Evaluation of "Psychiatric Hospital"	—.14	—.19	—.04	774
Rejection as Neighbor	—.05	.04	—.19	794
Rejection as Fellow Worker	—.05	.05	—.30	790
Rejection as Spouse	.05	.10	.13	735

[a]The measure of association used is Gamma (γ). See T. R. Anderson and M. R. Zelditch, A Basic Course in Statistics, 2nd ed. New York a. Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1968. All gammas above ± .10 are statistically significant at p < .05.

[b]A positive association indicates that older respondents have more positive evaluations and are more rejecting. Information regarding age is not available for four respondents.

[c]A positive association indicates that females have more positive evaluations and are more rejecting.

[d]A positive association indicates that respondents of higher social position have more positive evaluations and are more rejecting.

[e]Deviations from 800 are accounted for by "no response".

TABLE 3. RELATIONSHIPS AMONG SELECTED INDICATORS OF REJECTION OF THE MENTALLY ILL, OPINION AS TO WHETHER PSYCHIATRISTS CAN HELP, AND RESPONDENTS' EXPERIENCE WITH THE MENTALLY ILL[a]

	Psychiatrists Can Help the Mentally Ill[b]	Close Experience w/Mentally Ill[c]	N[d]
Evaluation of "Mentally Ill"	.64	.09	772
Evaluation of "Psychiatric Hospital"	.47	.41	774
Rejection as Neighbor	—.72	—.02	794
Rejection as Fellow Worker	—.55	.13	790
Rejection as Spouse	—.22	—.09	735

[a]The measure of association used is Gamma (γ). See T. R. Anderson and M. R. Zelditch, A Basic Course in Statistics, 2nd ed. New York : Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1968. All Gammas above ± .10 are statistically significant at p < .05.

[b]A positive association indicates that those with positive opinions have higher evaluations and are more rejecting. Data as to whether Psychiatrists can help are not available for 40 respondents.

[c]A positive association indicates that those with close experience have higher evaluations and are more rejecting. Data as to whether respondents have had close experience with the mentally ill are not available for 23 respondents.

[d]Deviations from 800 are accounted for by "no response".

ated ex-mental patient as a neighbor, 12% would reject him as a fellow worker, and 52% would reject him as a potential spouse or intimate member of the family.[14] Again considering Table 2, it is apparent that variations by age and sex

[14] It is perhaps important to note that the question dealing with rejection of the ex-mental patients as a potential spouse or intimate member of the family has a much higher rate of refusals to answer (8% overall). This may be due to reluctance to deal with intimate personal matters or to the salience of matters related to family and kinship in this culture, an issue which will receive further comment below.

are minimal, though there is a tendency ($\gamma = .10$) for females to be more reject-ing than males when considering the former patient as a potential spouse. Signi-ficant differences in the pattern of rejection are encountered when respondents' social position is taken into consideration. Those of lower status are more reject-ing when viewing the ex-patient as neighbor and fellow worker ($\gamma = -.19$ and $-.20$, respectively), but less rejecting when he is considered as a potential spouse or intimate member of the family ($\gamma = .13$).

Table 3 shows relationships between rejection, opinion regarding psychiat-rists, and experience with the mentally ill. It is readily apparent that those who feel that psychiatrists can help the mentally ill have a much higher evaluation of the concepts "mentally ill" and "psychiatric hospital" ($\gamma = .64$ and $.47$, respectively). Considering "close experience with the mentally ill", the only significant variation is in relation to the evaluation of "psychiatric hospital" ($\gamma = .41$, those with close experience higher). Regarding the social distance measures, we find that a high opinion of psychiatrists is associated with increasingly less rejection as contact with the ex-patient as neighbor ($\gamma = -.72$), fellow worker ($\gamma = -.55$) and spouse or intimate member of the family ($\gamma = -.22$) are considered, respectively. Dif-ferences in perceived social distance are much less evident when "close experience" is taken into consideration.

DISCUSSION

First, let us consider the absolute levels of rejection evident from these data. We may compare our results regarding the evaluation of the concepts "mentally ill" and "psychiatric hospital" with those obtained in Costa Rica by Adis-Castro and Waisanen.[15] While 64% of their respondents gave a negative evaluation to the concept "mentally ill", 65% of ours did so, and while 8% of the Costa Rican sample evaluated the concept "phsychiatric hospital" negatively, 7% of our Colombians did so. The general tendencies evident from these two studies then suggest relat-ively negative evaluations of the psychatric hospital.

We have a larger number of studies available from which to evaluate our re-sults on the measures of perceived social distance between the public and the men-tally ill. These data are summarized in Table 4. The pattern of increasing rejec-tion with decreasing social distance is apparent in each of these studies. However, the Colombian data suggest a somewhat lesser degree of rejection, at all levels of social interaction, when compared with most of these other studies. One possible interpretation is that the mentally ill are simply tolerated more in Colombia, and perhaps in Latin America, or developing countries, in general. Another possibility is that differences in the degree of rejection manifested are due to variations in the wording of the questions posed to respondents. Note, for example, that with the exception of the two North American studies[16] the Colombian and Costa Rican respondents show the lowest levels of rejection. In both these studies it was stipu-lated that the ex-mental patient had been *successfully treated* at a mental hospital. Given the generally high evaluation accorded the concept "psychiatric hospital" by these two sets of respondents and the fact that at least among the Colombians some 92% of the respondents felt that psychiatrists can help the mentally ill, it is not surprising that there is relatively little fear expressed toward the ex-mental patient.

[15] Adis-Castro and Waisanen, 1965, 1967, op. cit.
[16] Crocetti, Spiro and Siassi, 1971, and Lemkau and Crocetti, 1962, op. cit.

TABLE 4. A COMPARISON OF RESULTS FROM SELECTED STUDIES
OF REJECTION OF THE MENTALLY ILL[a]

Country and Approximate Date	Per Cent Rejecting the Mentally Ill as :		
	Neighbor	Fellow Worker	Spouse or Intimate Family Member
Canada, 1951[b]	29	29	68—73
Costa Rica, 1964[c]	17	22	62
England, 1959[d]	10—20	*	80
Japan, 1968[e]	*	*	81—87
Puerto Rico, 1960[f]	*	*	96
USA, 1960[g]	*	19	50
USA, 1960[h]	18	38	63
USA, 1963[i]	18—30	12—26	52—74
USA, 1966[j]	3	13	83
USA, 1969[k]	*	5	27
Colombia, 1968[l]	5	19—23	52—60
Overall Range	(3—29)	(5—38)	(27—96)

[a] It must be remembered that the percentages reported here represent responses to somewhat variable questions and thus must be interpreted with caution. They also represent the responses of populations with widely varying characteristics. For some studies ranges rather than absolute percentages are reported due to the inclusion of qualified responses not readily classified as clearly rejecting or not.

[b] Cumming and Cumming, 1957, op. cit.

[c] Adis-Castro and Waisanen, 1965, op. cit.

[d] Carstairs, 1959, op. cit.

[e] Terashima, 1969, op. cit.

[f] L. Rogler and A. B. Hollingshead, Trapped: Families and Schizophrenia, New York : John Wiley and Sons, 1965.

[g] Lemkan and Crocetti, 1962, op. cit.

[h] Dohrenwend and Chin-Shong, 1967, op. cit.

[i] J. Elinson, E. Paqilla, and M. E. Perkins, Public Image of Mental Health Service. New York : Mental Health Materials Center, 1967.

[j] Phillips, 1966, op. cit.

[k] Crocetti, Spiro and Siassi, 1971, op. cit.

[l] Data from the present study
* Specific data not available

Our data regarding variations by age and sex are, like many other studies, inconclusive. We do find, however, a general tendency for respondents in lower social statuses to hold more stigmatizing and negative attitudes toward the mentally ill, i. e., to evaluate the concepts "mentally ill" and "psychiatric hospital" more negatively and to reject the ex-mental patient more strongly, with a few exceptions. Most importantly, there is a consistent tendency for upper status respondents to be *more rather than less rejecting* of ex-mental patients when they are considered as potential spouses or intimate members of the family. Apparently there is something qualitatively different about the familial level of social interaction which

causes this reversal in the generally observed pattern of increasing acceptance of the mentally ill among the higher social statuses. It is well known that family and kinship is still the most important social institution in Latin America. Our data would suggest, though, that in the present context perhaps the salience of this institution is strongest for persons with higher social statuses. One possible explanation is in terms of the tendency for upper status Colombians to place more emphasis on physical or genetic explanations of the etiology of mental illness;[17] they may well believe that to allow ex-mental patients to marry into the family would be to invite the intrusion of hereditary defects which may result in mental illness in future generations.

Our respondents tend to agree overwhelmingly that psychiatrists can help the mentally ill and this view is strongly related to a positive evaluation of the concepts "mentally ill" and "psychiatric hospital", and to an attitude of acceptance of the mentally ill at all levels of social interaction, though the degree of acceptance is diminished as the intimacy of interaction increases. Stated otherwise, it appears that our respondents' willingness to be influenced in their relative acceptance of the mentally ill by their opinion of the utility of psychiatric treatment is clearly contingent upon the social situations in which interaction is to take place.

In conclusion, our data generally support the findings of previous investigators. We find a pattern of increasing rejection of the mentally ill as social distance is decreased, but also conclude that particular cultural arrangements may result in variations in the pattern. This simply points up the need for a greater number of systematic cross-cultural comparisons of orientations toward the mentally ill.

[17] C. A. Leon and M. Micklin, Opiniones Comunitarias sobre la Enfermedad Mental y Su Tratamiento en Cali, Colombia, Acta Psiquiatrica y Psicologica de América Latina, 17 (1971):385—395.

SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION
SOCIOLOGIE DE LA RELIGION

THE INFLUENCE OF ISLAM ON THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE
OF THE BALKAN SOCIETIES

A. LOPASIC
England

When talking about Islam in the Balkans, we must connect its presence with those who brought it to the Balkans, namely the Turks.

The presence and spreading of Islam is the result of the Turkish invasion and military conquest.

In spite of the fact that Islam came as the result of conquest, as the religion of the conquering Turkish Army, the actual spreading of Islam is a peaceful process.

Before we start to talk about the spreading and influence of Islam on the Balkan population, something has to be said about the attempts of Moslem colonization in those areas which took place in the 15th and 16th centuries.

The idea of settling Moslems from Anatolia and other regions of Asia Minor was primarily the result of political and military reasoning, and much less of religion.

Following the Timur's invasion of Anatolia at the beginning of the 15th century, a number of Turkmen nomads, Kurds and Arabs colonized the regions of Thrace and Maritza valley.

Among the groups forcibly removed to the Balkans, Yuruk nomads from Anatolia are certainly the most important. They represent the largest group of Moslem immigrants which, at the end of the 15th and the beginning of the 16th centuries, enjoyed special privileges and autonomy.

Another Moslem group forcibly removed to the Balkans were the remnants of the Safawid Shiites who settled down in Bulgaria where they were better known as Kizilbashi.

The last group are the commanders of the Turkish Army who, with their entourage, settled in newly established towns and centres of the Turkish frontier marches. These were people like Ishaq-bey, Timurtash-bey, Turhan or Evrenos-bey, about whom we are well informed from the Turkish chronicles of the period.

In spite of those colonization attempts, the ethnographic picture of the Balkans did not change much. This is an important factor as large shifts of population or migrations would considerably disrupt the social structure of these societies, already weakened by the disappearance of their state organisation and the loss of political independence.

The islamization of the Balkans is, therefore, related to the original inhabitants who, for one reason or another, embraced Islam and in this way considerably enlarged the small number of Moslem immigrants from Asia Minor.

The conversion to Islam was, with few exceptions, a voluntary and a peaceful process. What really mattered to the Turks was the loyalty of non-Moslems towards the Sultan, the ultimate source of power of the Ottoman state irrespective of religion. Besides this, there were economic advantages for the Ottoman state as non-Moslems had to pay a poll-tax.

The Quran states explicitly that Christians (people of the book) are allowed to practise their religion, provided they remain loyal to the Sultan and pay their taxes.

On the other hand, the Christians were deprived of the right to serve in the army and often even of the right to carry weapons.

In some cases, however, Christians served under the Sultan as auxiliary troops known as Martolozi or Vojnuci and for which services they received different privileges and were exempted of certain taxes.

In the 15th century we have even a number of Christian Sipahis (fief cavalry) in Northern Serbia, Bosnia, Albania and Bulgaria. In 1469 they represented 70% of all Sipahis in Bosnia and in 1431/2 17% in Albania. In the frontier march of Ishaq bey (present Macedonia) in 1455 $1/4$ of all Sipahis were Christians.

We have definite attempts of forcible conversion to Islam by Selim I and Murad III in the 16th century, but the religious advisers persuaded them to change their minds, because of direct opposition to the Moslem ideology of tolerance and the prospect of loosing a considerable income coming from the taxation of Christians.

People who got converted belonged to a particular population strata such as landed aristocracy, small nobility and soldiers or peasants.

The first group by accepting Islam could have achieved high posts in the permanently growing Ottoman Army and bureaucracy as well as in the court. Good examples of this group are Hersek Oglu (Ahmed Pasha Herzegowich), son of the Herzeg Stjepan Vukchich, ruler of Herzegovina, who became four times Grand Vizier and a son-in-law of Bajazid II or Ahmed Pasha Dukagjin, son of a well known Albanian tribal leader, also a Grand Vizier and commander of the Sipahi cavalry.

Islamization of the small nobility was also connected with new opportunities in the administration, largely centred in the cities. Their inherited rights and possessions were recognized by the Sultan, in Bosnia even increased. These new opportunities were considerably larger than those given by the previous feudal system. The same applied even more to the former soldiers who when converted, could achieve even the highest posts in the army. Ultimately, there were peasants who in the previous feudal system were tied to the land which they could not sell and had to pay considerable tributes and taxes to their masters. After becoming Moslems they were freed of their bondage, secured their hereditary land rights and had to pay a smaller tax. Some of them even moved to the towns where they could become craftsmen of minor officials. This development led to an ethnic and religious pseudomorphosis, as the newly islamized population tried to identify itself with their new masters whose status they wanted to achieve by imitation and of whom they were otherwise afraid.

In spite of these obvious advantages, large-scale conversion to Islam only took place in Bosnia, Central Albania, Western Bulgaria and the island of Crete. This is certainly the result of a relative security enjoyed by the Christians in the first period of the Ottoman rule. The Ottoman state divided all subjects according to their religion, Christians forming a separate "Millet" under the Orthodox Pat-

riarch in Istanbul. This gave the Patriarch considerable rights, making him the religious and temporal leader as well. Such attitude of the Ottoman state was the result of political and religious considerations, giving the Turks, at the beginning, certain advantages but in the end separating the Christians from the Ottoman state and making them only a tolerated minority.

The submission of all Christians to an Orthodox Patriarch resulted in conflicts, open and subdued, between Orthodox priests and Catholics, cleverly exploited by the Ottoman administration.

However, due to its recognized position, the church became the centre of the country's national and religious identity and a protector of a rich national folklore. This helped the main aspects of the social structure to survive the 400 years of Ottoman rule largely untouched.

Another factor for the preservation of the traditional social structure was the respect shown by the Ottoman state towards common law and customs of the Balkan societies under their control. A number of areas preserved their local autonomy, e. g., in NW Greece, Timok-region in Serbia or Herzegovina with their local leaders or council of elders who had judicial powers over their fellow villagers and into which neither the Ottoman administration nor law did interfere.

The old "Zadruga" system (extended family) was also preserved. In short the pre-conquest tribal organization survived the destruction of the Balkan medieval state not completely established at the eve of the Turkish conquest.

A definite Christian hierarchy and class structure emerged with the Patriarch and senior church officials on the top, followed by the Phanariotes or Greek patricians with great influence, followed by tribal leaders and village and "Zadruga" elders.

Parallel with the preservation of the old social structure, spread the new Islamic culture which, in the Balkans, was primarily concentrated in towns, which followed the Moslem pattern of Moslem and non-Moslem quarters, a market, a mosque and trades divided into guilds. Towns like Sarajevo, Uskub, Belgrade, Plovdiv, Saloniki or Banja Luka became political and religious centres as well. Even smaller towns like Mostar, Yeni Pazar, Prusac or Foca became genuine centres of Islamic culture. Literature and poetry in Oriental languages as well as religious mysticism, represented by different religious orders, became the expression of that growing Islamic culture.

However, it was concentrated in Muslim towns and did not affect the prevailing Slavonic or Greek peasantry. On the other hand, the parallel existence of Christian, pre-Christian and Moslem culture was responsible for a number of synchretistic elements like the Bektashi order, not surprisingly strong in Albania where pre-Christian elements intermixed with popular Islam and Christianity. Albania is one of the areas where, at the beginning of the Turkish conquest, Christianity was thinly spread.

We can also distinguish between traditional Islam, concentrated in Bosnia, or the synchretistic one in Albania.

In many places converted Christians still celebrated patron saints, kept icons in their houses or respected pre-Christian customs.

The medieval Christian state was replaced by the Ottoman state in which a converted Christian could achieve through the Devshirme system even the highest posts in the empire. 40 Grand Viziers and a large number of pashas and high officials were recruited from that enormous Balkan reservoir. It was incomparable

to anything they could have achieved in their own national state where high posts were reserved for few.

However, the presence of the Ottoman state influenced the remaining part of the Balkan peninsula not under their rule and was responsible for the creation of "military frontiers", the Austrian and Ottoman. Both of these frontiers had separate administrations and laws directly resulting from special circumstances. In the Austrian frontier march, religious tolerance towards a number of Orthodox refugees, who served in the frontiers army units and enjoyed other privileges, was one of the examples and unusual for a Catholic state of those days.

Separate administration and military organization enabled a number of young men to receive education and gain posts, denied to them in other parts of the Austrian empire.

The servitude, very much in existence, was forbidden on the frontier and saved many a peasant from feudal dependency. The "Zadruga" system, like in the Ottoman parts, was also preserved.

The Ottoman frontier, on the other hand, created a special class of frontier aristocracy and a number of privileged groups, often hereditary.

In spite of the tensions, existing on the two frontiers, the connection between the two sides never ceased and the relationship between officials and traders was often very friendly. This can be supported by a considerable correspondence and trade which existed between the two sides.

The tolerance on the frontiers preserved the connection between the national living on both sides in spite of the different religion on the political system.

The kinship structure of the patriarchal family, tribal democracy of the Montenegrin mountains, traditional law of the Dukagjins or worship of a patron saint in a Serb village, all of these have outlived the spread of Islam and the Ottoman state.

RECHERCHES SOCIOLOGIQUES DU PROCESSUS
DE SECULARISATION SOUS LE SOCIALISME

(sur les résultats de la recherche empirique dans
le district de Penza de RSFSR)

R. LOPATKINE
URSS

La méthode sociologique permet de rechercher le processus de sécularisation à quatre niveaux; a) la société entière; b) les diverses sphères de la vie sociale et les institutions sociales; c) les groupes sociaux; d) la personnalité.

Les recherches sociologiques réalisées par l'Institut de l'athéisme scientifique dans le district de Penza se basait sur l'expérience de recherches théoriques et empiriques de ce problème en URSS et dans les autres pays socialistes. L'idée suivante de K. Marx fut l'une des thèses de départ de notre recherche: "La religion disparaîtra au fur et à mesure que s'effectuera le développement du socialisme.

Sa disparition doit se réaliser par suite du développement social dans lequel l'éducation joue un grand rôle." Cela signifie que le processus de sécularisation est un composant du progrès social et, en même temps, un facteur qui influe rétroactivement sur le progrès de la société.

Nos recherches ont pour but de révéler les particularités du processus de sécularisation sous le socialisme et les paramètres quantitatifs au niveau de groupes sociaux. C'est la population adulte de la région rurale, des localités et microrégions, les collectifs des entreprises et des kolkhozes, les communautés religieuses qui furent l'objet de cette analyse.

Voici les résultats préalables de nos recherches: 1. Les athées représentent 69,7% des habitants adultes enquêtés; les hésitants entre la croyance et l'incroyance — 8,9%, les croyants — 19,5%.

Mais la religiosité des hésitants et de la plus grande partie des croyants s'est brusquement affaiblie, elle a un caractère restant et s'exprime surtout par l'attachement à des traditions anciennes. La conscience et les liens sociaux de ces derniers, la motivation de leur conduite ont, par préférence, un caractère laïque.

24,5% des croyants et 64,0% des hésitants n'admettent que l'existence de Dieu ou croient en des forces surnaturelles indéterminées. Le dépérissement de la croyance en la vie d'au-delà va encore plus intensivement. 39,3% des croyants et 53,3% des hésitants soumettent à un doute ce dogme chrétien, 11,1% des croyants et 27,0% des hésitants le rejettent.

8,6% des enquêtés seulement expriment activement leur religiosité.

Sous l'influence du processus de sécularisation le caractère de la religiosité des croyants contemporains subit de grands changements. Ce processus s'effectue dans deux directions fondamentales: a) une perte de certains composants du com-

plexe religieux, qui est fixée empiriquement comme une réduction de la quantité d'indices religieux dans la conscience et dans la conduite des gens religieux; b) l'intensité de manifestations des indices religieux qui restent encore, diminue.

Par suite de ce processus les liens des croyants et des hésitants avec l'église s'affaiblissent peu à peu. Dans notre pays les croyants continuent à s'écarter de la religion.

2. Une autre manifestation du processus de sécularisation, et qui est, en même temps, le résultat de ce dernier, consiste en une diminution de la reproduction de la religiosité dans les nouvelles générations soviétiques. Chaque génération suivante est moins religieuse.

3. La comparaison des caractéristiques correspondantes aux groupes tipologiques des athées, des hésitants et des croyants montre que plus le degré de sécularisation est élevé, plus forte est l'activité sociale des représentants des groupes comparés.

Cela témoigne de la fonction sociale bienfaisante du processus de sécularisation.

TYPOLOGIE DE LA RELIGION ET DE LA RELIGIOSITE

TODOR T. STOITCHEV
BULGARIE

Le problème de la religion et de la religiosité est organiquement lié au pro-
blème général de la structure de la religion et avant tout à l'analyse du rapport entre
ses deux parties: la conscience et la conduite religieuses. C'est pourquoi l'édifi-
cation d'une typologie scientifique de la religion est possible en satisfaisant les
deux exigences d'une analyse théorique concrète dans le cas: premièrement, en se
basant sur la définition de la *religion en tant qu'une unité de la conscience et de
la conduite religieuses; deuxièmement, en plaçant à la base de la typologie un objet
général, et non pas unique et concret, de la foi dans le surnaturel, ainsi qu'une
forme de conduite religieuse spécifique, mais des plus générales elle aussi*. En
résultat précisément de cette manière d'aborder la question que nous estimons comme
étant la plus judicieuse et la plus fructueuse, de nombreux phénomènes religieux,
qualifiés jusqu'à maintenant par certains auteurs marxistes de types de religion,
seront éliminés, étant donné qu'ils se révèlent des *genres* de religion compris dans
le *type* général ou la *classe* de la religion.

La typologie de la religion se manifeste sous deux formes fondamentales: *la
typologie de la religion* (les doctrines, les systèmes religieux) et *la typologie de la
religiosité*. La première typologie est toujours — par le sujet de la foi religieuse —
la plus générale, se rapportant à tous les adeptes d'une confession donnée ou d'une
de ses variétés; elle s'édifie *uniquement* sur les caractéristiques qualitatives et les
particularités des composantes correspondantes de la structure religieuse. La se-
conde typologie, à la différence de la première, est une typologie non pas générale,
mais concrète; elle ne concerne que des groupes déterminés de croyants et carac-
térise les composantes de la structure de la religion, leurs transformations quanti-
tatives et leur degré de développement.

D'autre part, la typologie de la religion constitue toujours une expression
spécifique de leur structure, sa concrétisation sous deux aspects: *statique et dyna-
mique*. Dans la typologie de la religion, nous ne nous intéressons pas aux transfor-
mations et aux modifications dans une forme apparue historiquement et s'étant
confirmée. Là nous avons affaire à la forme dans sa statique. Au contraire, dans
la typologie de la religiosité, nous opérons avec ces formes dans le processus de
leur dynamisme. C'est donc précisément cet élément de développement du dyna-
misme de la forme qui conditionne également l'apparition de la notion „religio-
sité", qui n'est rien d'autre que le reflet de la religion se développant, du dynamisme,
de la dialectique propre aux composantes de sa structure. C'est pourquoi nous
qualifions la typologie de la religion de *typologie statique,* et la typologie de la
religiosité — de *typologie dynamique*. En même temps, la typologie de la religion
possède un *caractère historique,* alors que la typologie de la religiosité a un carac-

tère *concret actuel*. Par conséquent, dans un des cas est *présentée une typologie statique, historique, de la religion,* et dans l'autre, *une typologie dynamique, concrète et actuelle de la religion.*

La typologie historique de la religion peut se manifester sous trois formes fondamentales; une typologie historique de la religion primitive, une typologie de la religion dans la société de classes et une typologie historique générale de la religion.

Typologie statique (historique) de la religion

typologie historique de la religion primitive	typologie historique de la religion dans la société de classes	typologie historique générale de la religion

Chacune de ces trois formes fondamentales de la typologie historique de la religion possède le contenu suivant:

Typologie historique de la religion primitive	*Typologie historique de la religion dans la société de classes*
1. Fétichisme	1. Culte d'un dieu tribal
2. Magie	2. Polythéisme
3. Totémisme	3. Monothéisme
4. Animisme	

Typologie historique générale de la religion

1. Fétichisme
2. Magie
3. Totémisme
4. Animisme
5. Culte d'un dieu tribal
6. Polythéisme
7. Monothéisme

Ce qui veut dire que la typologie historique générale de la religion unit les types de religion dans les typologies des sociétés primitives et de classes. Cette typologie, bien qu'également statique par son essence, nous offre la possibilité de suivre les principales particularités de l'évolution de la religion depuis sa naissance jusqu'à nos jours.

La *première* particularité caractéristique se compose de l'évolution conforme aux lois naturelles des formes concrètes vers des formes abstraites.

La seconde particularité caractéristique est constituée par une continuité extrêmement large entre les divers types de religion. Dans les formes religieuses les plus inférieures, elle est si grande que de nombreux ethnographes jusqu'aujourd'hui encore ne peuvent délimiter le fétichisme primitif de la magie et de l'animisme. Il suffit qu'aient pénétré, par exemple, dans les croyances fétichistes et les activités du culte, des éléments d'animisme, pour tirer la conclusion du caractère (type) animiste de la

religion. Alors qu'en fait, en se basant sur la particularité que nous avons remarquée, le spécialiste en matière de religion peut trouver dans ce cas un critère sûr de la forme religieuse *prédominante*. Quelles que différentes que soient les influences réciproques, ce qui détermine le type de religion, bien que dans les limites d'une particularité relativement indépendante, sont l'idéologie et les pratiques religieuses prédominantes. Pour la même raison, nous parlons de religions monothéistes, indépendamment du fait qu'elles constituent un complexe compliqué de composantes fétichistes, magiques, totémiques, animistes et polythéistes. Ainsi que le souligne Max Müller "aucune religion, même s'appuyant sur la révélation, n'a pu se séparer entièrement de la religion naturelle"[1].

La troisième particularité caractéristique se compose du fait que le culte de la magie, apparu dans la société primitive, s'est transformé, enrichi et toujours concrétisé par son caractère quel qu'il soit, en principale composante du culte des types de religion supérieurs, y compris de types monothéistes.

Mais, en plus de ces types de religion formés historiquement, nous pouvons édifier également *des structures de genres* et de *sous-genres* pour chaque type et genre de religion. En relation avec cela, le schéma du prof. J. Ochavkov sur la structure régionale du christianisme, de l'islam et d'autres religions, présente un grand intérêt.[2] Par ce moyen, nous sommes en état de préciser, par exemple, la structure de genre d'un type de religion — le monothéisme. Cette structure peut revêtir l'aspect suivant:

Monothéisme

1. Bouddhisme	6. Shintoïsme
2. Christianisme	7. Djainisme
3. Islam	8. Hindouisme
4. Confucianisme	9. Mazdéisme (zoroastrisme)
5. Taocisme	10. Judaïsme

Si la typologie de la religion découvre des formes de croyance au surnaturel relativement indépendantes et spécifiques par la façon de refléter la réalité et d'influer sur elle, la typologie de la religiosité a pour tâche d'établir concrètement, pour des groupes (types) déterminés de croyants, le rapport entre la conscience et la conduite religieuses, ainsi que les degrés de la manifestation et du développement de la structure intérieure qui leur est propre. C'est pourquoi, la première typologie est *historique,* elle embrasse tous les phénomènes religieux dans le processus de leur apparition chronologique et de leur continuité, et la seconde établissant *concrètement* la situation actuelle de la religion sur la base d'une analyse différenciée de ses composantes. *Alors que la religion représente l'unité de la conscience et de la conduite religieuses sous leur forme la plus générale, la religiosité signifie toujours une certaine catégorisation du contenu structural des diverses composantes de la religion. Ou, en d'autres termes, chaque religion est un complexe déterminé d'éléments idéologiques, émotionnels, d'action pratique (du mode de vie), tandis que la religiosité constitue leur manifestation concrète selon leur volume et leur degré de développement.*

La typologie de la religiosité est basée invariablement sur la caractéristique quantitative et qualitative de la structure de la religion. C'est ainsi, par exemple,

[1] Max Müller, Religia kak predmet sravnitelnogo izoutchénia, Kharkov, 1887, str. 52.
[2] Voir J. Ochavkov, L'objet de la sociologie et la programmation des recherches sociologiques concrètes, revue "Sozologuitchesk problemi", No. 1, 1969, pp. 39—41.

que la conscience religieuse se compose d'un complexe déterminé d'idées (l'idée du surnaturel, l'idée de l'âme, l'idée de l'immortalité, l'idée de l'expiation, etc.), tandis que la conduite religieuse peut être non-rituelle ou rituelle, chacun de ces deux genres de conduite étant constitué respectivement d'éléments déterminés: a) aide aux pauvres et à ceux qui souffrent, au nom de la fraternité chrétienne ou du salut "céleste", legs de sommes à destination religieuse, propagation d'idées religieuses parmi des milieux sociaux déterminés, adhésion en qualité de membres à des associations, fraternités, organisations chrétiennes, etc.; b) prières à domicile, entretien d'un oratoire à la maison, célébration des fêtes religieuses, fréquentation des services religieux et des sacrements, observation des rites religieux, etc. Ici, la recherche des croyants d'après des indices déterminés permet de former des groupes (types) de personnes religieuses, c'est-à-dire de les étudier d'après les représentations concrètes de Dieu (Dieu-esprit, Dieu-homme, Dieu-nature, etc.), de l'immortalité, etc., ainsi que d'après les pratiques religieuses concrètes, et en même temps, d'établir certains indices quantitatifs des éléments structuraux correspondants et leurs composantes. C'est pourquoi, la religiosité représente toujours une religion *concrète*, se manifestant par les caractéristiques qualitatives et quantitative des éléments structuraux de la conscience et de la conduite religieuses. Pour cette raison, les connaissances concernant la religiosité d'un groupe déterminé de personnes sont des connaissances qui découvrent tant *la statique* de la religion que *le dynamisme, la dialectique* de son évolution ascendante et descendante.

La typologie de la religiosité exige avant tout un classement des éléments essentiels de la conscience et de la conduite religieuses, dont certains degrés adoptent inévitablement parfois la forme d'une généralisation plus large et plus totale. Ainsi, par exemple, si un degré inférieur fixe l'idée concrète du surnaturel, un autre, supérieur, peut donner une réponse à la question: quelle est en fait la croyance religieuse — consciente ou fanatique? Tels jalons ont une grande importance dans le cas, étant donné qu'ils jouent le rôle de critères fondamentaux, décisifs, pour la formation de groupes déterminés de croyants, c'est-à-dire la typologie de la religiosité.

Voici une variante d'un tel classement de la religiosité (R), établi séparément pour chacune de ses composantes — la conscience religieuse (C) et la conduite religieuse (Cd).

ECHELLE DE LA CONSCIENCE RELIGIEUSE (C)

C^{10} — foi aveugle, fanatique en les dogmes religieux

C^9 — le croyant connaît et partage les moments fondamentaux de l'idéologie religieuse

C^8 — foi en le caractère divin, sacré des livres religieux

C^7 — présence d'une conception religieuse dans la conduite morale du croyant, l'estimant comme représentant une voie réelle pour accomplir la volonté de Dieu et comme un moyen de surmonter les contradictions sociales

C^6 — foi en la résurrection et l'immortalité de l'âme

C^5 — idée du péché, de la souffrance et de l'expiation

C^4 — foi en la prédestination divine de l'evolution naturelle et sociale

C^3 — foi en la nature contradictoire de Dieu — créateur du bien et du mal

C^2 — idée du surnaturel en tant que Dieu-homme

C^1 — idée du surnaturel en tant que nature, force immatérielle, esprit

ECHELLE DE LA CONDUITE RELIGIEUSE (CD)

Cd^{10} — le croyant mène une propagande de ses opinions religieuses parmi les gens et se montre irréductiblement hostile envers l'athéisme

Cd^9 — démonstration ouverte des rites religieux dans le but de consolider leur rôle social

Cd^8 — célébration régulière des principales fêtes religieuses et des rites, fréquentation des sacrements

Cd^7 — observation des rites religieux principalement par suite des traditions familiales

Cd^6 — le croyant observe les rites religieux pour la raison qu'ils constituent pour lui une source de sentiments émotionnels (consolation, joie, espoir, etc.)

Cd^5 — fréquentation partielle et irrégulière des sacrements religieux fondamentaux: la communion et la confession

Cd^4 — participation irrégulière aux services et aux rites religieux

Cd^3 — célébration partielle et irrégulière des principales fêtes religieuses

Cd^2 — fréquentation irrégulière des services religieux dominicaux

Cd^1 — le croyant conserve un oratoire à son domicile et prie irrégulièrement à la maison

Cette variante de classement (échelle à intervalles) les composantes structurales de la religiosité permet de former, par exemple, une typologie de six catégories, qui, sur la base des indices quantitatifs et qualitatifs de la conscience et de la conduite religieuse, découvre les traits spécifiques et les particularités de chaque type de religiosité, ainsi que les passages spécifiques d'un type à l'autre. Selon leur ces types sont les suivants:

R du VIe degré ($R\text{-}C^{10}$ — Cd^{9-10}) — type de religiosité *fanatique*

R du Ve degré ($R\text{-}C^{8-9}$ — Cd^{8-9}) — type de religiosité *dynamique*

R du IVe degré ($R\text{-}C^{5-9}$ — $Cd^{n(p)}$) — type de religiosité *moral*

R du IIIe degré ($R=C^{1-6}$ — Cd^{6-7}) — type de religiosité *émotionnel*

R du IIe degré ($R=C^{2-6}$ — Cd^{3-5}) — type de religiosité *indifférent*

R du Ier degré ($R=C^{1-3}$ — Cd^{1-2}) — type de religiosité *ébranlé*

n = conduite religieuse non rituelle
(p) = conduite religieuse partielle

Le type de religiosité *ébranlé* (C^{1-3} — Cd^{1-2}) caractérise la catégorie de croyants, dans la conscience religieuse desquels a pénétré largement et profondément, sous l'influence de facteurs idéologiques et sociaux, le doute en la véracité des dogmes religieux fondamentaux. Ils se sont détachés de la religion et de l'Eglise à tel point qu'ils limitent leur vie religieuse principalement à l'ambiance familiale et ne prennent part parfois que tout à fait formellement à certaines formes publiques des rites religieux. Ce sont des croyants se trouvant sur le seuil de l'athéisme.

Le type de religiosité *indifférent* (C^{2-6} — Cd^{3-5}) démontre nettement l'indifférence qui se manifeste envers l'observation stricte et systématique des devoirs de la vie religieuse — l'assimilation de la doctrine religieuse et l'exécution des rites réglementés par l'Eglise. Là le croyant ne doute pas de la véracité des dogmes religieux, bien qu'il perçoive certaines contradictions dans la description du principe du surnaturel, mais est enclin à simplifier le cérémonial rituel, à réduire le temps destiné à communiquer avec Dieu, à conserver un minimum de conscience et de conduite religieuses. Le principal pour lui est une conception générale de

Dieu, qui renaît principalement lors des moments difficiles et des épreuves. La personne appartenant à ce type de religiosité demeure un strict individualiste dans sa pratique religieuse — elle ne s'intéresse presque pas à la situation de la religion dans son milieu et n'est pas encline à s'opposer à son affaiblissement et à sa décomposition.

Le type de religiosité *émotionnel* (C^{1-6} — Cd^{6-7}) se caractérise par une activité religieuse élémentaire ou d'un degré moyen et par un degré élevé des sentiments religieux, se manifestant avec une force particulière lors du processus de la pratique rituelle. La célébration du culte représente ici le moment culminant d'un complexe religieux et c'est pourquoi le croyant le recherche sans hésitations, ni doutes. Pour ce type de personnes le culte constitue un moyen perceptible de communiquer avec le surnaturel et la source profonde de la paix de l'âme, du bonheur et de l'espoir.

Le type de religiosité *moral* (C^{5-9} — $Cd^{d(p)}$) possède la particularité principale d'être animé d'une idéologie relativement élevée, tout en observant une conduite religieuse non rituelle (n) totale ou dominante. Chez lui, l'idée de Dieu possède un contenu plus large, principalement moral et oriente l'homme loin hors des limites de sa propre individualité. Le croyant cherche son bonheur personnel dans celui du milieu social, non pas par les moyens d'un rite empreint de superstitions et de magie, auquel il est parfois obligé de recourir, mais par l'entremise de la conduite morale, de l'activité sociale pratique, dictée par ses conceptions religieuses concernant l'amour entre les humains, le royaume de Dieu sur terre, etc.

Le type de religiosité *dynamique* (C^{8-9} — Cd^{8-9}) possède un degré élevé de développement de la conscience et de la conduite religieuses. Chez lui, les questions de la foi constituent l'expression d'une profonde conviction intérieure qui conditionne l'activité de la vie religieuse entière des croyants, y compris la lutte pour implanter et consolider les idées religieuses parmi les diverses catégories sociales et avant tout parmi la jeunesse. Les représentants de ce type de religiosité condamnent par principe l'athéisme, mais font preuve de tolérence envers lui.

Le type de religiosité *fanatique* (C^{10} — Cd^{9-10}) se distingue non seulement par l'activité du type dynamique, mais aussi par une foi aveugle en la doctrine religieuse respective, par un attachement passionné envers ses dogmes et ses rites, aboutissant à une intolérence extrême à l'égard des autres opinions et activités religieuses, à une hostilité ouverte envers l'athéisme et ses partisans.

Par ce moyen peuvent être également édifiées de nombreuses autres typologies de la religiosité. Elles seront toujours plus générales ou plus différenciées, aussi bien selon l'envergure de la recherche que de la compréhension judicieuse des données concrètes d'après des indices suffisamment uniques et généralisés. *Mais quelles que soient les différences et les nuances, la condition invariable de l'objectivité de chaque typologie est constituée par l'englobement relativement le plus complet des composantes essentielles et générales de la conscience et de la conduite religieuses.*

Avec celà, il convient de souligner que la typologie de la religion à six degrés que nous avons indiquée, possède le caractère le plus général. Cette typologie, ainsi que les typologies qui lui sont semblables, peuvent être utilisées lors des recherches sur les croyants dans un cadre social relativement large, ou bien dans les limites de la population entière d'un pays donné. Mais lorsque sont effectuées des recherches spécialisées (par exemple sur les membres de sectes — adventistes, baptistes et autres), alors est indispensable une typologie plus précisée aux degrés élevés, découvrant d'une manière suffisamment complète et dans tous les domaines les particularités et les nuances, principalement dans le type de religiosité fanatique, dy-

namique et émotionnel. Ainsi, on parvient inévitablement à découvrir les différents *genres* de religiosité dans les divers types de cette dernière: un type de religiosité fanatique ou émotionnel du premier, du second genre, etc. Tout cela signifie que la typologie doit être *concrète,* répondre à la spécificité d'un système religieux déterminé dans les conditions données de la vie nationale, historiques et autres. Elle en sera une pour le pays entier où existent différentes confessions, une autre pour les chrétiens orthodoxes, une troisième pour les catholiques, une quatrième pour les protestants.

Mais cette typologie de la religiosité, réalisée dans le cadre de l'athéisme scientifique ne représente pas la dernière, l'extrême limite de la généralisation et de la caractéristique de la religiosité. Cette typologie peut se concrétiser et se développer ultérieurement en un aspect *sociologique,* c'est-à-dire se modifier de façon à nous fournir des renseignements sur les mêmes formes et degrés de religiosité par diverses composantes de la structure sociologique. Ainsi, on aboutit à des structures concrètes des types de religiosité sur la base de l'origine et de la situation sociales, de l'instruction, du revenu mensuel, de la nationalité, etc. Et par exemple, les types de la religiosité en Bulgarie, établis en 1962, possèdent (dans les limites de la religiosité générale pour le pays — 35,51%) la caractéristique quantitative suivante: actifs — 5,76%, passifs — 14,39%, ébranlés — 15,03%, non désignés—0,33%, sous l'aspect sociologique, chaque structure de la religiosité (selon l'âge, le sexe, l'origine sociale, l'instruction, etc.) doit découvrir non seulement la répartition des croyants dans des groupes d'âge, d'instruction et autres, mais aussi établir quels types de religiosité existent dans chaque groupe et lequel d'entre eux prédomine. Ainsi, on aboutit à une forme supérieure du reflet de la religiosité — *à la typologie structurale de cette dernière.* Sous ce rapport selon nous un rôle important peut être joué par les calculs des coefficients à intervalles d'une corrélation partielle, exécutés à l'aide d'ordinateurs qui permettent „d'établir directement une comparaison quantitative, ainsi que le rôle direct et indirect de chacune des composantes étudiées de la structure sociologique de la société soit dans la lutte contre la superstition religieuse, soit pour sa reproduction et son maintien"[3].

Tout cela montre que l'élaboration d'une typologie de la religiosité relativement précise et embrassant tous ses domaines, constitue une tâche *théorique* difficile, qui peut être resolue judicieusement sur la base du principe méthodologique concernant l'unité organique de la conscience et de la conduite, de la motivation idéologique, de l'action et de sa réalisation pratique. Se consacre à ce problème *l'athéisme scientifique,* une science non sociologique particulière, qui, ainsi que toute science sociale, effectue des recherches sociales sur un objet spécifique. Ces recherches se limitent dans le cadre des phénomènes religieux *eux-mêmes* et ont pour but de fournir au théoricien des données strictement déterminées concernant uniquement la propagation quantitative de la religion et sa caractéristique qualitative *personnelle.* Certains auteurs confondent encore cette recherche spécifiquement sociale avec les recherches sociologiques sur la religiosité. Mais ces dernières ont un autre caractère, étant donné qu'elles portent sur l'objet de la sociologie, exigeant la découverte *des actions réciproques,* conformément aux lois naturelles entre les principaux domaines les plus essentiels de la vie sociale, ou d'un domaine principal (tel que la religion) avec d'autres domaines principaux.

[3] "Le processus de la lutte contre la superstition religieuse en Bulgarie", ouvrage collectif sous la rédaction du prof. J. Ochavkov, Ed. de l'Académie Bulgare des Sciences, Sofia, 1968, p. 322.

C'est pourquoi, la typologie de la religiosité est toujours créée dans les limites de la science théorique de l'athéisme scientifique. C'est seulement lorsque cette typologie est déjà mise au point sur la base des recherches sociales correspondantes, qu'il devient possible de l'enrichir et de la développer par l'entremise de la sociologie de la religion, qui ne crée pas une nouvelle typologie, mais met à jour seulement sa structure sociologique spécifique. Cette typologie de la religiosité adopte une forme supérieure — une structure sociologique de la typologie de la religiosité.

Aujourd'hui, la typologie de la religiosité et sa structure sociologique se trouvent encore à l'étape de début de leur formation et de leur développement. Mais les marxistes déploient également de sérieux efforts,[4] surmontant l'empirisme et le subjectivisme de la sociologie bourgeoise, afin de créer une théorie claire et entière de ces phénomènes, dans le cadre des sciences correspondantes: l'athéisme scientifique et la sociologie de la religion.[5] Ces conditions, bien entendu, sont d'autant plus rapidement couronnées de succès que plus étroite est la coopération entre les deux sciences, que plus efficace est leur développement indépendant sur la base de la méthodologie marxiste-léniniste, que d'autant plus est créée la possibilité permettant à la sociologie de la religion de bénéficier des résultats théoriques de la principale science particulière concernant la religion — l'athéisme scientifique.

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[4] Religion und Atheismus heute, Ergebnisse und Aufgaben marxistischer Religionssoziologie, hrsgb, von Olof Klohr, Berlin, 1966, S. 90—92, 150—151; Voprosy naoutchnogo athéisma, vypousk No. 3, Izd. „Mysl", Moskva, 1967, str. 133—135; Le processus de la lutte contre la superstition religieuse en Bulgarie, ouvrage collectif sous la rédaction, du prof. J. Ochavkov, Ed. de l'Académie Bulgare des Sciences, 1968, pp. 34—38, 137—140, 182—185.

[5] Voir T. Stoïtchev. Otnositelno predméta naoutchnogo athéisma, „Voprosy naoutchnogo athéisma", vypousk No. 5, Izd. „Mysl", Moskva, 1968, str. 306—322.

SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE
SOCIOLOGIE DE LA SCIENCE

SOCIOLOGY AND THE PERSONAL SERVICE PROFESSIONS

PAUL HALMOS

ENGLAND

In my recently published work, *The Personal Service Society* (Halmos, 1970) I offered a definition of a group of professions which has acquired a significantly shared mentality in contemporary culture. "Professions", so runs the definition on this group, "whose principal function is to bring about changes in the body or personality of the client are the *personal service professions,* whilst all other professions which are not charged with responsibilities of this sort or, at any rate, which do not set themselves such tasks as these, are the *impersonal service professions.*" (Halmos, 1970) The book, to which I have referred, presents documented evidence to the effect that the dramatic growth in the numbers and social influence of these professions in modern industrial societies not only prompts a moral renewal of leadership but also affects the general quality of social change in our time. Even whilst engaged in selfishly advancing their interests as professional groups or individuals their culture of personal service connotes ideals, which do not very well go with a *laissez faire* licence, an unbridled system of free economy, the rapacity of penal justice, the harshness of educational discipline and the mercenariness of marketable doctoring. At the same time, their culture inspires certain commitments to humanistic ideologies: it generally advocates the positive virtues of equity, tolerance, understanding, generosity and sympathy. And, as a rule, the personal service professional selfconsciously pretends that he sustains these values not because of an open and inspired allegiance to some creed, but because of their clinical utility. These values have proved to be instrumental in the achievement of certain moral objectives and this is why they are cherished. A nurse's kindness to a patient, a teacher's patience with a pupil and a social worker's sympathetic understanding of a client are not only morally sanctioned *virtues,* but also professionally approved *techniques.*

Those for whom these "techniques" are occupational requisites, the "personal service professions", are largely a product of this age. Though in medicine and in the priesthood there have been forerunners it is only in our time that the diversification and sheer numerical growth of entirely secular personal services have spread themselves over the whole of populous industrial societies and have affected almost every manifestation of their cultural life. The yearly accretion of wealth and income in modern industrial societies has made the constant growth of these personal services not only possible but also inevitable. With their increasing number and market-value the moral and intellectual influence of the personnel of these services has grown and is likely to continue to grow. I have shown in my last book how the very leadership of society is penetrated and in some cases taken over by personal

service professionals and how, as a consequence of this, the ideology of this personnel permeates the quality and sets the direction of social change in our time.

I also sought to identify certain moral outcomes which not surprisingly issue from the cultivation of personal services and pointed out that these outcomes constituted "betterment" in terms of the principal moral values of modern industrial societies whether these societies were collectivistic-irreligious or capitalistic-religious (by no means the only possible combinations). Clearly the sociological importance of these assumptions is very great indeed and one cannot help wondering why a systematic sociological criticism of these assumptions has not yet been forthcoming. Indeed, it is also of some sociological interest why sociology neglects even to reflect on processes of this kind at some length. So long as sociology ignores or underrates the progressive process of "personalisation" in professional work to which I have referred and concerns itself, well-nigh exclusively, with problems of power, stratification and conflict, as the major, decisive and even exclusive change-agents, sociology will continue to be deficient in objectivity and scientific accuracy. There ought to be two kinds of issues looked at separately, but characteristically they do get mixed up: the first issue is a strict factual one. Does the expansion of the personal service professions, in fact, increasingly influence the moral-cultural quality of society? The second question is whether we approve of any hypothesis, no matter how well founded, so long as it flavours of a theory of progress. It goes without saying that the answer to the first should be given without preference to our answer to the second. Yet strangely enough, in the most unexpected circle, among sociologists of all people, we come across some idiosyncratic objections against conceptions of progressive improvements for thoughts and imaginings of this kind convey to the sociologist a reprehensible complacency, which he feels he must combat with all his might. Unless the sociologist does his daily toilet of scepticism he feels he is unlikely to advance his discipline. It does not sufficiently often occur to him that there is a hidden spring of bias in his very phobia of an optimistic bias. He is like the man, who does not realize that "the bottle is $^7/_8$ empty" is the same proposition as "the bottle is $^1/_8$ full", and that he will be wrong if he rejects one of these propositions while affirming the other. Those who decline to follow up the implications of my hypotheses on the ground that they were "too optimistic" and subscribed to pessimistic implications only were precisely in this kind of position.

So it would seem that there *are* a small number of encouraging propositions about a "Personal Service Society" which we may put forward without much hazard of error. One of these is that the material enrichment of humanity in the technological revolution of our time constantly widens the margin of intelligent and highly educated manpower which society can now spare for work in the personal social services. As society grows richer, more and more people can be recruited to teach, to heal and to care for others. That this growth process is going on in industrial societies is now well established. Whereas throughout the history of man labouring society has been overwhelmingly taken up with the task of producing goods, material services and reflective society — to a lesser degree — with the task of producing the symbolic reasons, rationalizations and distractions, we are now moving in the direction of affording wider and wider margins of human time and intelligence for institutionalizing the personal services of healing, caring and teaching.

I am identifying this process and underscoring it not because I am tempted to distract from catastrophic dangers, grievous wrongs and blatant failure: but

to make possible a sociological estimate of the consequences of a process which we must take into account if we are to understand social change. This is not a matter of indulging in a misguided optimistic day-dream but one of engaging in a hard-headed calculation. This calculation is made so much the more timely and necessary as contemporary sociology has consistently recoiled from contemplating anything which may prejudge its alert attention to threatening catastrophes, manifest wrongs and blatant failures.

The sociological premises I have in mind are simple, even naive, certainly not new, yet they are strangely neglected in the contemporary sociological theories of social change. These are that (1) continued scientific-technological growth is inevitable, that (2) if we do not fatally cripple ourselves in global conflict the growth will inevitably result in making available more and more human time and intelligence to serve the personal needs of man for the healing of his vulnerable and mortal body, for the instructing and consoling of his lonely soul, and for the training of his capabilities and skills. I am pointing to no utopia, only to a continuous process of change in the division of labour in an ever expanding industrial society. The thesis is that the process will go on and that it is a legitimate sociological exercise to try to estimate its consequences. Whether this thesis will survive testing by the events of the coming decades, we cannot know, and here I shall not consider its prospects. *I presented the thesis in this paper because it is an essential background to the theme of this paper.*

My present pre-occupation is this: the personal service professional is usually trained in one of the social sciences, indeed in sociology or social psychology, and even in the absence of a formal training he is exposed to the mode of thought evolved under the influence of the social sciences of to-day. On the one hand, we have a social science indoctrination of the professional; on the other hand, and conversely, the personal service professional is an operative in the context of human relations and is a worker who, more often than not, works on human relations. His sociologically effected conceptions, his theoretical formulations will be tested in the context of practice, will be reported and interpreted in his professional papers and will act back on the sociological conceptualizers and theory-makers who erstwhile took a hand in his training.

My present attention is focussed on this interaction: the influence sociology exerts on the ideology of the personal service professions and the influence of the ideology of the personal service professions on sociology.

The subject-matter to which sociological concepts and theories ultimately refer is human conduct. The concepts and theories of sociology can be shown always to be based on some conception of human nature which is deemed to be responsible for human conduct. Take the concepts of social class and social status, for example. Here the notions could not even have come into view without a belief in the dominative and exploitive egotism as well as self-advancing competitiveness of man. On the other hand, take, for example, the concept of the socialization of the child. This idea could not have come into being without a belief in the child's native need for the love of those on whose succour he depends and whose succour he will, therefore, love. The sociological concepts presupposed an axiomatic affirmation of a native need for two things simultaneously: the experience of being loved and the experience of loving. Clearly, sociological thinking implicitly or explicitly postulates psychological categories, qualities and potentials in man and all sociological theory-making is preceded by some psychological postulation. I am sure you will not think me rash if I suggest that, on the whole, these postulations tend to em-

phasize either an egotistic-dominative-exploitive-manipulative-hostile-aggressive orientation in man or an altruistic-cooperative-compliant-serving-helping-loving orientation. I wonder whether you would regard it as unwarranted if I put it to you that most sociology to-date has stressed postulations about the first orientations, the negative, pessimistic and combative orientations and neglected the positive, optimistic and pacific orientations. There are certain firmly entrenched facts in the situation which have fostered this outcome.

The more the culture of the age of science imposes standards of rigour on our methods of enquiry and the more social science strives to comply with these standards, the more the sociologists will strive to be trenchant, perspicuous and ruthlessly critical.

To get at the truth, the sociologist will inevitably take up the stance of the enquirer into truth who anticipates and expects that people will try to deceive him: he will be in constant readiness to sweep aside misrepresentation, to tear off camouflage, to penetrate smoke-screens. The result of this is — as it has been said in a recent book — that, ". . .the sociologist as a social critic is habitually engaged in exposing the seamy side of society." (Lazarsfels, Sewell & Wilensky) There is an almost invariable tendency to link analysis with devaluation and to take discovery as if it was always disclosure. This negativism was cogently challenged by Nathan Glazer in the same volume: "Thus when we say the sociology of religion, we mean the part that is not religion. When we say the sociology of industry, we mean the part that shows how people gum up productivity in the factory. When we say the sociology of health, we mean the part that shows that doctors and nurses are moved by prestige and status, rather than simply the needs of patients. The sociology of politics deals with the nonpolitical reasons why people act the way they do in political life. And the sociology of social science will emphasize all the less pleasant reasons why people become scientists" (Lazarsfeld, Sewell & Wilensky).

The grey mood and the unflattering anticipations are occupational afflictions of the searching sociological mind. Sociology is certainly not a *Fröhliches Wissenschaft*. Of course, one ought to repeat that the very scepticism of this mood thus engendered is a product of a considerable intellectual scrupulousness. This is clearly a moral asset of an inspiring nature which contradicts the very scepticism it encourages. The positive moral qualities of this intellectual conscientiousness are rare if ever given any credit in the *critical* sociological appraisal of man's conduct. This is an interesting anomaly which has always been characteristic of philosophical scepticism and which now makes contemporary sociology ideological in an unexpected yet strikingly obvious manner.

Terrified of failure in scholarly rigour or of the charge of sentimentalism and of complacent credulity sociologists are found to be departing from the very objective standards which they have always considered as the corner-stone of their functioning. It is this interpretation of methodological rigour as philosophical scepticism and pessimism, which cannot but affect the training and practice of the personal service professional. In my earlier book *The Faith of the Counsellors* (Halmos, 1966) I showed at some length how some social casework and psychotherapy theorists reacted to the positivism of social science by leaning on phenomenological, existentialist and subjectivist notions about the nature of man and conceding in their own published work that some of the time they relied on faith and not on science, that is to say, in their professional practice they depended on certain beliefs about the nature of man, beliefs which were not derived from a scientific study of human conduct.

It is my belief that the social science thinking of the personal service professional will, of necessity, be always qualified by the personal and subjectivist interpretations of social reality, for this kind of interpretation is a *sine qua non* of sustained and dedicated personal service. This is not a moral prophecy but an assessment of the technical requisites of these professions. I also further infer from this belief that sociology will continue to be tainted by this source, for to imagine the methodological rigours of sociology triumphing over the subjectivist concepts of the personal service professions is to imagine that the advancement of social science can, will and should liquidate the personal contents and forms of this service. Here we are face to face with an intriguing paradox of our cultural history: more science leads to more technology, to more affluence, a wider margin of resources to be spread for personal services, more and more personal service professionals and, presumably, these will encounter a more and more sophisticated, critical and analytical sociology which the ideas and images of their actual practice will have to oppose. It would seem to me that the continued sharpening of this philosophical conflict has implications for those who are responsible for the training of the personal service professionals as well as those sociologists who are interested in the problems of social change.

The opposition of methodological stringencies to flights of imagination and gusts of aspirations to an unbound spiritual state of some kind, is one source of discrepancy between sociology and the ideology of personal service. Another one is that sociologists apply themselves to problems, breakdowns and failures in society and are preoccupied with what's wrong with it. It may be that their preoccupation is an outcome of their motives for becoming sociologists; to make things better in society (the optimistitc account) or to sell their services to society in order to enhance their status and income (the pessimistic account). Whichever explanation is favoured, some sociologists — like book-reviewers and theatre-critics — fear that they are not earning their keep unless they can spot the blemishes, unless they are *critical*. The outcome is that in viewing their own societies they tend to confuse the aspiration to be courageously self-critical with an indulgence to be masochistically self-deprecatory. I am not putting forward an unqualified view that sociology is everywhere jaundiced or that its pessimism is always provocative but that one cannot maintain a problem-oriented discipline and allow space for optimistic prognoses without an anxiety that they may cast a veil over the sharpness of one's vivid diagnoses of ills and problems.

There are some other, less publicized reasons for preoccupations with what is wrong. The major increments of sociological knowledge were secured in the past mainly on those occasions when there were idols to be toppled or when there were prevaricators to be discredited. If revenge is sweet, sociological truth is gratifying if it can be hurled against the lying heads of oppressors, of the unjust or of the deceivers. The truth of Marxism, for example, is dramatically enhanced by the discomfiture and shame of those who will have to let go of ill-gotten advantages because of a wider acceptance of this truth. Or, to cite another example, the intellectual triumph of those who defined the misrepresentations of a so-called "authoritarian personality" or a "closed mind", is dramatically enhanced by the relegation of these culprits to a clinical kind of existence instead of the politico-ideological rostrum which afforded them a certain amount of legitimacy and respectability. That "insight-giving" in psychotherapy, social casework and education, can be aggressive and even sadistic has been known widely. But now a so-called "critical sociology" seems to assume social purposes other than the institutionalized

purposes of science: one could even say that sociology is refashioned into being an instrument of selfrighteousness for intellectuals who have come to distrust all except the legitimacy, status and income of their own position. One might even say that sociology has become *functional* in the sense of the theory of functionalism, that it makes possible the perpetuation and legitimation of a social class of increasing influence which can subsist in spite of its total disbelief in ideological rationalizations of the kind of advantages which it has and enjoys.

The history of sociology bears this out.

In picking our way amidst the relics of Hobbesian and Spencerian ideas about social change most sociologists seem to prefer the aggressive disillusionment of a Hobbes to the romantic complacency of a Spencer. Spencer's prophetic dictum, that "progress is not an accident, not a thing within human control, but a beneficent necessity" (Spencer, 1891) is a badly phrased statement which doesn't do full justice to the truth that is in it. But the truth, that in spite of disasters and errors, human life is longer and freer of physical constraints to-day for a much larger number of individuals than even before is manifestly true, and that it will be more so in the future is, to say the least, probable. Why should we not take this into prime account in our formulation of sociological theory about professionalization? Instead of which, as Robert Nisbet remarks about this Spencerian statement, "so many times has this passage been laughed at, treated with contempt, marked as the utterance of someone wholly blind to the miseries and mishaps around him" (Nisbet, 1970). Lewis A. Coser says about Max Weber in the Preface to Arthur Mitzman's book, *The Iron Cage*, that "His pessimistic and despairing vision of the future as an "iron cage" increasingly has come to replace images of the coming Golden Age of the perfectibility of man to which most social thought tended to cling ever since the enlightenment." And Coser significantly adds, "The shadow of Weber's work lies over most serious attempts to come to terms with the fundamental issues of our day" (Coser, 1970). Indeed, the so-called Frankfurt School of sociology has had leading members whose writings have been described as being in the "depth of despair", such as those of Walter Benjamin and Theodor W. Adorno, and Juergen Habermas calls upon sociologists to proclaim their disgust with social development altogether (Burisch, 1969). One is reminded of Galbraith's view that politics is a choice between the disastrous and the unpalatable, except that for "politics" one would have to read "sociology."

During the half century between Weber and the Frankfurt School, if anything, the mood has become more sceptical and the attitude to the future more nihilistic.

To understand another strain of influence exerted by the two belief-systems — by the personal service ideology and by sociology — in opposition to each other's bias, we must remember that one of the cardinal characteristics of a personal service practitioner is that he aspires and strives to be personal, global and synthesizing rather than analytical, manipulative and fragmenting. The stress on the "use of one's person" is prominent in every area of training for the personal service professions. It is generally recognised that a neglect of this aspiration leads to professional failure or, at least, to inadequacy and an impoverishment of service. It is, therefore, not some pious hankering after a respectable moral stance which makes the professional subscribe to these standards but the empirical test of their functional value. Naturally, this defence on the grounds of utility conceals some self-boosting increments of moral worth which may well be secured from this kind of explanation. The doctrine stated in its simplest form is that technique, skill and knowledge are essential in practice but without the rightly attuned use of the

total personality of the practitioner there may still be failure or, at least, poor performance.

The sociological and social psychological account of interpersonal relationships makes little or no provision for this kind of doctrine. Clearly the usual sociological analysis of the personal functioning of the professional worker will not only be analytical and fragmenting but it will not allow for the importation of mystical notions about the total and global personal entity.

The interaction of the two belief-systems, sociology and the personal service ideology is that whilst sociology weakens the inspirational elements of professional experience and interpretation, professional ideology of personal service weakens the positivistic authority of social science.

The most blatant variance between the two belief systems arises from the professional workers' pretence that they do not manipulate other persons. It is little realized that this implies an attempt at suspending the operation of the causal law. The personal service professional protests that what he does for a client, patient, pupil or student is done to assist the other person to evolve in his own self-chosen direction and mode, and that his course of professional actions do not make, direct, determine, that is to say cause, changes in the life of the other which the other would not have chosen himself. Those who administer personal help maintain the fiction of moral neutrality, the fiction that they merely lend themselves to be the means whereby the other will enable himself to follow an independently and freely chosen path. These beliefs are mostly in evidence in social casework and psychotherapy but they have also spilled over into education and some aspects of health administration as well. The logical fallacy is quickly pointed out by the positivistic sociological mind: if the helping intervention does not effect a change then it is useless, if it does, then it causes a result which would not otherwise have come to pass. In so far as this is foreseen and is predictable, the helping agent must be taken to proceed with the intention to effect a result and cause a result to be brought about.

Sometimes even doctors invoke the self-healing and homeostatic qualities of the organism and teachers, of course, diligently stress the "educing" and "drawing-out" function of the educator who, at his best, merely "brings out" what is best in the pupil: the non-directiveness of the social worker and of the psychotherapist rounds up the picture of this element, the notion of a moratorium from causality. The effect of this notion on sociology is that it weakens its positivistic hold on social study; the impact of sociology on the personal service ideology is that it weakens fantasies of unsullied integrity in dealing with other inviolate persons and inviolate privacies.

Yet another and perhaps equally universal characteristic of the personal service practitioners in health, welfare and education is that they could not function without a belief in the possibility that the condition of man can be bettered. One might advance the view that a totally stoical, let alone sceptical or even cynical, doctor, nurse, teacher or social worker could not be conceived as a model of professional excellence. Of course, the surgeon who does not meet his patient except when the latter is unconscious, may be cited as an exception. Or the behaviour therapist may be quoted, for it is claimed that he manipulates and does not address his patients personally. But, clearly, no surgeon could maintain his true professional efficiency without replenishing and reinforcing his global-sympathetic attitudes to patients by periodically returning to personal contact with them. Nor does the behaviour therapist tell us the whole truth: in his impersonal technology he takes

his personal presence for granted and then he discounts it altogether. Indeed, a personal and intimate humanism can be observed to prevail in professional practice of this kind when that practice is working satisfactorily, that is when it does achieve its stated objectives.

But how does sociology view this component of the interpersonal process in the personal service professions? After all, "betterment" is extraneous to a sociology which is committed to the doctrine of being *wertfrei*! A *wertfrei* ideology of personal service is a contradiction in terms and a positivistic sociological discipline can hardly be instrumental in maintaining a belief system which makes personal professional practice possible. Yet it is also a conclusion of the positivistic sociological discipline that the continued functioning of society, especially under conditions of expanding technology and material affluence, makes the diversification and radical extension of personal service institutions of society indispensable. And even so, the categorical and logical premises of this positivistic discipline militate against the emergence and survival of a body of ideas which would make some of the vital images and assumptions of a personal service viable and credible.

The highlighting of the anomaly which concerns me here is so much the more important that it does not appear to be any less in evidence in communist countries than it is in capitalist ones. No matter what sort of economic-political-social institutions are created to incorporate the sefvices in health, education and welfare, at the end of the day the professional services will have to be rendered by persons to persons and these services require the cultivation of certain preconceptions about them which social science is not equipped to furnish but rather attuned to undermine with scepticism.

In focussing on this divergence in our cultural history it will be said that I have introduced a note of overoptimism about the nature of man and that I am postulating certain extravagantly favourable attributes both in the practising professionals and in people in general. Surely, the enlightened egoism of man will suffice to regulate the ramifications of personal service. There is no need to invoke implausibly selfless principles, such as, for example, some sort of a "total personal service" to others. In pointing to the aspirations of the personal service professionals I am told, above all, that I ignore their ambitions, their striving for status and income. A *critical* sociology has no time for considering my rosy alternatives. One important effect of this etiquette is that sociologists will be reluctant to go back to the so-called "progress-theories" of social change or to the theories which establish the progressive realization in social change of some explicitly stated system of desired values. My "personal service society" is a case in point and its reception by some sociologists illustrates what I am trying to say here. One example of this reception will suffice to make my point. The reviewer in this case objects against my optimism and then goes on to say that "He (Halmos) does nothing to allay the suspicions of people like me (the reviewer) who wonder (in Barbara Wootton's words) whether the counselling ideology (which is the core of my personal service ideology) inadvertantly or not, is not "a collection of arrogant and pretentious assumptions" that "distract attention from the financial, economic and social realities of human problems." "Of course, I accept individual compassion from whatever quarter," this reviewer says, "but I will dissent if it is to be elevated into an institutionalized moral force, a church, founded on largely spurious justifications. This is because it must inevitably blind people to realities of money and power and thus divert them from politics" (Hawthorn, 1970). The objection to

optimism is not on the grounds that it is unjustified by the facts but that it may make righteous political indignation less readily forthcoming. That the personal service professions, the practitioners of the counselling ideology, may exert the kind of influence I attribute to them is first caricatured into a "church" and then demolished as an extravagant and unproven claim. It's the "bottle is $1/_8$ full" proposition all over again: never mind whether the proposition is valid, it is unscientific to allow an optimistic claim: it is true that the bottle is $7/_8$ empty but not true that it is $1/_8$ full! To conceal his ideological negativism the reviewer declares that he accepts individual compassion from whatever quarter, but what does this "acceptance" mean? Surely he must have meant that he accepts it as one of the operative principles of social change, otherwise, the "acceptance" is meaningless. But having paid lip-service to the o. k. moral principle he sees no reason why as a scientist of social change he should consider the implications of this acceptance. Of course, it would cramp his political-revolutionary style which needs its daily ration of discontent and pessimistic rebelliousness to survive. But would it not be only logical to maintain that even if the financial and economic realities do not, the social realities do *include* the reality of compassion? For if they do then it would be no less than reasonable to object to the sociology which obstinately encourages the financial, the economic and power factors of social life to distract attention from the role of compassion in social change!

At any rate, to insist that the matter be considered and included in our theory-making about professionalization and social change is not the same thing as to insist that compassion is a sufficient explanatory principle in these.

I have sought to draw your attention to the kind of influence on sociology which issues from the rather narrower group of those who practise in the fields of health, education and welfare, in modern industrial societies, the personal service professionals. I am interested in what influence these groups can and will exert on our thinking about human relationships and perforce on sociology. As you will have gathered by now I hypothesize that this influence is not insignificant and that it is inevitably in the direction of a prelogical kind of thinking. We already have empirical evidence to support the claim that the personal service professions cannot function effectively without an aspirational imagery, which is personal. This imagery imaginatively sees the transcendence of the reality in which it operates by affirming ideals and by ennobling the hard realities of life. It seems to me that so long as personal service must transcend the positivistic philosophy which forms a basis of sociology we must, as sociologists, face this paradoxical condition and appraise the paradox itself sociologically.

Sociology's reaction to this has been, at least so far, an over-reaction. For its anxiety to ward-off mystification which may come from the aspiring professional practitioners, the sociologist discounts all that may appear to him a flattering impression of civilized man. It seems axiomatic to him that the truth cannot be flattering and, therefore, what is flattering cannot be true. The sociologist has not as yet realized that this is a doctrinaire position and not a scientific one. It arises in the face of professionalization but professionalization is not to be blamed for it: Sociology is. In this area Sociology has confused scepticism with objectivity and thus fallen short of objectivity. And so, for the time being at least, the interaction between a Personal Service Ideology, on the one hand, and Sociology, on the other, could be described as mutually inhibiting.

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DIFFERENCES BETWEEN SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL AND NON-SCIENTIFIC SCHOLARLY COMMUNITIES

DEREK J. DE SOLLA PRICE

USA

I take as my problem here the elucidation of what it is, apart from substantive content, that distinguishes scientific information from other information. It must be noted that such research is only possible because quite new and important unobtrusive measures of scientific literature (Cf. Parker *et al.* ref. 11) have become available as a sort of waste-product of the large-scale commercial operation of the *Science Citation Index* as a radically new tool for practical needs of scientists. Such computerized bibliographies give immediately counts that surpass in accuracy and scope all previous data, sometimes by orders of magnitude. The problem has been to develop counts of such things that might be a diagnostic of whether a piece of scholarship or a field of knowledge acted as "science" or as "non-science".

A now classical paper by Deutsch [5] worked out in some detail the implications of a suggestion by Conant that the essential difference between the two modes of scholarship was that of "cumulation" versus "non-cumulation". It was seen that cumulation in this sense implies not merely growth, nor indeed growth at compound interest, but rather the existence of a tightly integrated structure for the sciences. Evidently the prototypes of the other side, identified as "the humanities" grew (perhaps almost as fast), contained specialties and fashions just as science, but had something different from the integrated structure of cumulation.

Some empirical evidence was fed into this qualitative analysis by Storer who broke new ground also in setting up an analysis of "Hard Science" versus "Soft

Science" and by implication of "Non-Science". Perhaps the most useful thing is that he got us over the barrier that nobody likes to be "soft". Storer pointed out that it was not a distinction of "hard" in the sense of "difficult" as against subjects that were soft and easy. The words were being used in such ways as brittle, unyielding, impersonal and hard; and gentle and adapting for the soft. Perhaps the usage in "hard and soft sell" in advertising is nearer to that we want to agree with our intuitive senses. At all events, it was shown that the intuition could be related quite simply to scales provided by the amount of tabular presentation and the amount of usage of full given names or "initials only" in the references in the literature of these fields.

The first of these is obviously a valid though rough measure of the use of quantitative methods in the substantive content, which is fair enough for those subjects where one might not otherwise know in advance if it were wordy or mathematical. The other measure is a horse of a different color. It is a measure of impersonality in the relations between authors and leads to quite new speculations. A high degree of given name personality would indicate an invisible college structure of authors known to each other as warm bodies rather than as labels on literature. Though one might suppose that this latter measure was largely a matter of fashion and unthinking tradition, the index it generates seems rather consistent and accurate enough to show a clear time variation towards impersonality in the social sciences.

Another measure that might be used, but has not, to distinguish science from non-science, and to sort the soft from the hard would be something that reflected on the social place of each branch of learning in society. The whole life of a discipline within a university is determined by whether it is used for education or for training. In some fields, such as history and philosophy, most of the embryonic researchers get their Ph. D's and then proceed towards some sort of career as a teacher. In that case society is paying for students to become teachers to beget students; research becomes an epiphenomenon. In the most "scientific" departments at our universities only about 20% of the Ph. D. output is fed back into education, and society gets for its investment not only the education of the undergraduate young and a by-product of research, but also the training of Ph. D.'s who become employed in the non-university world. If we take this measure of feedback, it provides a functional spectrum showing the range from the hard sciences to the soft sciences and thence to the humanities. Further work here showed that universities in the US had an overall feedback rate of about 50% and that it took about 100 teachers with Doctorate qualification for every 15 new Doctorates produced per year [1]. This input-output model of undergraduate and graduate education surely deserves further elaboration on a field-by-field basis (see the table on p. 227).

Another series of such social parameters have been demonstrated by Warren Hagstrom in his classical study of the scientific community [7] (and in the present volume). In these he shows, for example, that the scale from hardest sciences to softest humanities coincides in hierarchy with the decreasing scale of agreement with the proposition that "major professors often exploit doctoral candidates" — a clear measure of collaboration through economic subservience. Perhaps less emotionally loaded are his findings that there are different spectrums governing the amounts of publication in research articles, in review articles and in books. The characteristic differences from field to field seem to form a very clear pattern, depending only on one or two independent social parameters.

TABLE 1. ADAPTED FROM WILSON. PERCENT OF PH.D.GRADUATES EMPLOYED IN COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY

Chemistry	23.7
Engineering	25.1
Psychology	27.3
Physics	38.7
Microbiology	56.5
Botany	63.4
Mathematics	68.7
Zoology	70.2
Other Bioscience	73.5
Economics	75.4
Sociology	83.2
History	88.8
English	91.2
Foreign Langs.	91.9
Pol. Science	93.9

At this point it becomes evident that we cannot and should not artificially separate the matter of substantive content from that of social behavior. In order to deal with quantitative, highly orderly, rather certain findings, a special sort of social relation between participants is called for. This relationship changes with time; we note, for example, that in Galileo's day it was an embarrassment to find books which were not old classics but authored by scholars that were still alive; by the scientific revolution of the mid-seventeenth century, the pace increased to the point where scholars met as a learned academy and where consequently the scientific paper and journal could be invented. The time span is ever decreasing and changing our behavior. It does this because essentially scholarship is a conspiracy to pool the capabilities of many men, and science is an even more radical conspiracy that structures this pooling so that the totality of this sort of knowledge can grow more rapidly than any individual can move by himself. The humanities, by resting with the capability of the individual, eschew this growth rate and certainty. As we find ways of being certain through impersonality and mathematics, so the humanities are left with less of the problems. It is this way that natural philosophy was transformed into science, and, in general, it is this way that the different substantive contents have erected different social apparatuses of information pooling and exchange.

I turn immediately from the humanistic philosophy of this process to a more certain, or at least a more quantitative formulation of the matter in hand. A scholarly publication is not a piece of information but an expression of the state of a scholar or group of scholars at a particular time. We do not, contrary to superstition, publish a fact, a theory, a finding, but some complex of these. A scientific paper is at the same time more and less than a concept or a datum, or a hypothesis. If the paper is an expression of a person or several persons working at the research front, we can tell something about the relations amongst the people from the papers themselves.

It is in this sense that several of us have used bibliographical references[*] and collaborative authorships as indications of social links. Though collaborative

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[*] It seems to me a great pity to waste a good technical term by using the words *citation* and *reference* interchangeably. I, therefore, propose and adopt the convention that if

authorship has proved useful as a means of analysing invisible colleges and in-groups, it is perhaps not so useful as a means of differentiating between one sort of scholarly field and another. Hirsch and Singleton [8], in a paper that has lain unpublished for too long, demonstrated quite effectively that the amount of collaborative authorship in a field was directly proportional to the amount of economic support received by the workers. My own sociological analyses indicate also that collaboration arises more from economic than from intellectual depend-ence and that the effect is often that of squeezing full papers out of people who only have fractional papers in them at that particular time. At all events, amount of collaborative authorship measures no more than the economic value accorded to each field by society. A soft subject highly subsidized would become as colla-borative as high energy physics; it would be interesting to see what happens to ur-banology.

The sheer amount of bibliographical references provides a handy measure of social linkage. The etymology of "scholarship" indicates that it derives from the "scholia", the added explanatory footnotes put into school texts, so perhaps it is reasonable to identify the amount of such footnotage and referencing with our intuitive idea of "scholarliness". I would not like to push this point too hard by claiming, for example, that all papers with a dozen bibliographical references were more scholarly than all those with only ten. Nor would I dream of maintaining that all papers with ten references were of similar scholarliness. I would, however, direct your attention to three relevant questions:

1. Why is the norm of scholarship a paper with ca. 10-22 references?
2. What sort of paper lies far above this norm?
3. What sort of paper lies far below it?

I cannot answer the first question except to remark that for a literature grow-ing as our does at about 7% per annum, the number of references back is then of the same order of magnitude as the corpus of past literature. Thus, each old paper gives rise roughly and on the average to about one citation per year. This seems a sort of natural rate of procreation and one might have a very different world if it were a f ctor of ten more or less. There seems to be a slow but steady in-crease in referencing in all fields. Even *Physical Review* contained few explicit re-ferences before World War I. Parker *et al.* find for the social sciences that re-ferences per article jumped from 8.4 and 9.4 in 1950 and 1955 to 15.2 and 15.5 in 1960 and 1965.

As to the second question of very scholarly papers, we must find it a little disappointing for quite clearly the papers with large numbers of references are not creative scholarship at all, but rather they are review papers condensing and giving access to a pile of recent literature in some particular specialty. It seems from a first inspection that this is just as likely to happen in Art, History or Comparative Literature as in International Law, or even in the more familiarly hard sciences areas of Physics and Biochemistry. The only new finding I have to offer is that there seems much less distinction than I had expected between these review papers and the research papers; they merge into each other insensibly.

Paper R contains a bibliographical footnote using and describing Paper C, then R contains a *reference* to C, and C has a *citation* from R. The number of references a paper has is measured by the number of items in its bibliography as endnotes and footnotes, etc., while the number of citations a paper has is found by looking it up in some sort of citation index and seeing how many other papers mention it.

The third question is a bit more productive; unscholarly papers with hardly any explicit references certainly exist in profusion, even in decent academic subjects like economics and mathematics. Trivially and quite typically such unreferenced papers occur when an experienced scientist or librarian makes an *ex cathedra* pronouncement out of his innate knowledge of what should be or what is. The same is true in all fields of knowledge; there is perhaps a place for pronouncements, but it must be firmly stated that there is an implication that the culminating scholarship does not exist, exists but is irrelevant, or exists relevantly but is unknown. Scholarliness, as I have defined it, may be taken not just as a diagnostic but also as prescriptive for a cumulating knowledge system. Not so trivially it is found that a very large class of technical news magazines is largely unreferenced in this way. I suggest that science may be *papyrocentric* but that a large part of technology is *papyrophobic*. If you want to make capital out of technological discovery the last thing you want is that open publication that determines intellectual private property for the sciences. Why then do we have technical magazines of this sort? I must suggest that they function as a news medium outside the knowledge system. Perhaps, more likely, it is not the text, but rather the advertisements that are the most prized part of the package in this literature. We know that when an engineer moves, it is his catalogues rather than his journals that go with him.

If indeed some parts of technology are low in scholarliness, it makes one wonder if direct economic value is an inhibitor of information flow. Is it prescriptive in the sense that technologists do not use references and, therefore, do not need to be fed any papers which might be embodied in their own contribution. I doubt this. The technologists seem to want papers all the more and the resultant conflict or paradox is probably at the heart of any so-called literature crisis or information-problem. It is perhaps worth noting that citation amongst patents is also amazingly light so that there are no "highly-cited" patents, and the system has only fragmented short chains of self-citation rather than the diversified branching network found in papers and scientists. Also worth noting is the fact that this all seems little different in the Soviet literature in spite of the different economic basis of technology. It seems that technologists differ markedly from both scientific and non-scientific scholars. They have a quite different scheme of social relationship, are differently motivated and display different personality traits.

The amount of referencing by itself is certainly not enough to give us the distinctions we have been looking for between science and non-science, hard and soft. What is needed is some measure of the texture of this system of referencing and citation whether it be applied heavily or lightly. We need not only the rate and density of the procreative system but some knowledge of its metabolism or its eugenics.

In my first (and, I am afraid, grossly over-condensed) paper on scientific networks, I was able to use the *Science Citation Index* data for millions of papers to show conclusively that there was not a single population of references, but rather two overlapping populations. On the one hand, there was a fairly uniform raiding of the archive of all the available literature, past and present, with only a slow secular decrease in the usefulness of literature as a function of its age. Secondly, there was something which I called an "Immediacy Effect", a special hyper-activity of the rather recent literature which was still, so to speak, at the research front. I want to stress that this immediacy is something quite different from the normal aging of the literature, for this has been misunderstood by, at least, one commentator [9].

The normal aging is not so simple either. For literature more than about 15 or 20 years old, the time-spread of references matches rather well the known growth of the literature. A modern work will refer to almost twice as many papers from 1913 as from 1900, because there were twice as many papers published in 1913 than there were in 1900. The number of citations per paper published does fall off with time, but probably only with a halving in value every 20 or 30 years as the knowledge gets packed down and outmoded. The near constancy of every paper ever published, producing about one citation per year on the average, is a bit misleading. One must not forget that the number of citing papers is growing exponentially, too, and doubling every ten years or so. Thus, the number of citations per *citing* paper is actually halving every ten years, and it is only the near equality between the growth rate of literature and the half-life of obsolescence that gives one a near constant balance just noted, of one citation per archival paper per year.

The phenomenon I invoke as an immediacy is a much increased use of the last few years over an above the natural growth of the literature and its normal slow aging. The present and the last year accrued literature does not show up so strongly because it takes a while for the information to become well known and available, and there is a time lapse, now well documented, between the communication and its publication in the journals embodied as a reference. Papers from about two years ago may be cited six times as much as the normal archival rate, from three years ago five times, nine years ago three times. These rates represent averages over the whole field of science and may be faster or slower field to field. The effect of this extra immediacy of interest in recent work is that the references fall off with date very much more rapidly than the normal 13.5 year halving time given by the *Science Citation Index* statistics. Over the S.C.I. literature the rate for recent references is a halving in number with every five years of age of reference. MacRae [9] finds this figure for sociology and the soft sciences, but an even steeper immediacy effect of a halving in three years for physics and the biomedical sciences. Stoddart found the half life of citations in geography decreased from an archival 16 years in 1954 to a steep research front of four years in 1967, the change being quite regular and marked.

I think it is, however, of relatively little value to determine the exact rates of decline in recent references as has often been done in the determination of the half-life of references [3]. What is more important than the exact profile of the fall-off in immediacy effect is the proportion between this research front immediacy, on the one hand, and the normal archival use of the literature, on the other hand. Meadows [10] has suggested an immediacy index which is the ratio between the numbers of references to the last six years compared with those to work more than 20 years old, but I find little pay-off in the additional complexity. It seems to me quite reasonable to take as a valid measure the proportion of the references that are to the last five years of literature. The reason I choose five years is that ten is too much and three too few. Ten would give 50% increase from exponential growth even without any immediacy effect. Three years does not give long enough for consistent figures since the first two years contribute little (the paper is not well disseminated) and there is a fluctuation caused by the cycle of the calendar year and periodic annual publication. Several previous workers have used this instinctively, and the choice seems felicitous.

To get an estimate of the range of values of this parameter, which provides a sort of "Brinnell scale" of scholarly hardness, we may note that a literature growing at a rate of 5% per annum doubles in size in 13.9 years and contains

about 22% of all that has been published in its last five years of publication. A field growing at the most rapid rate experienced of 10% per annum, with a doubling time of 6.9 years has within the last five years about 39% of all its archive. Price's Index (as I might call it) will vary from 22% for normal growth to 39% for most rapid growth for a field that is purely archival, raiding all the literature that has gone before equally with only a gradual secular decline with aging and without this special immediacy of an active research front.

It is difficult to estimate exactly what Price's Index would be for a subject that was all research front and no general archive, but I hazard a guess that 75% to 80% is the range to look for, again depending on rate of growth. Any mixture of the two types of referencing will result in an intermediate value of the index and we, therefore, derive a useful indication of the balance as it varies from subject to subject. Parenthetically, I would remark that there is nothing here to restrict this Price's Index or the number of references per paper to being used over a whole field. It can be given micro- as well as macro-use, as a means of evaluating (with what uncertainty we know not) a journal, an institution, the idiosyncrasies of even a single person, or just a single paper. It goes without saying that this paper in its published form will have to have about the norm of 16 references at least and I would suppose that whatever I do in a field like this, all but two or three will be to work published here after 1963 (see Tables 2 and 3).

My study of the *Science Citation Index* statistics showed that the average of all fields covered was a Price's Index of just over 50% and from this I deduce that about half of the references go to an even spread over the entire archive while the other half go to the research front. For the archive this means that for every hundred papers in the archive we have about seven new papers each year with their 100 references back of which about 50 are to the archive. It follows that the chance of an archival paper being cited in any particular year is about one-half so that, roughly, half of the citable papers lie uncited in any year (actually

T A B L E 2. SUMMARY OF DATA COLLECTED BY D. J. DE S. P. FOR 162 JOURNALS OF VARIOUS SUBJECTS AND DATES

	Lower Quartile	Median	Upper Quartile
Number of References/article	10	16	22
Percent Refs in last 5 years	21	32	42

Data from *Science Citation Index* statistics

	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968
Citation from Source Journal Items/Source J. Item	11.77	12.39	11.26	11.14	12.00
Percent total Citations in last 5 years	55.13	55.30	52.56	52.49	52.11

TABLE 3. ADAPTED FROM PARKER *et al.* pp. 22-24

Percent of Citations dated in previous 5 years

American Behavioral Scientist	1965	43.6
American Documentation	1955	44.2
	1960	47.0
	1965	59.8
American Educational Resch J.	1965	36.0
American Psychologist	1950	55.8
	1955	51.0
	1960	51.4
	1965	47.6
American Sociological Review	1950	38.8
	1955	47.4
	1960	43.2
	1965	35.2
Audio Visual Communic. Review	1960	45.6
	1965	44.2
Behavioral Science	1960	48.8
	1965	49.4
J. Abnormal and Social Psychol.	1950	44.6
	1955	48.0
	1960	40.0
	1965	39.2
J. of Advertising Research	1965	41.6
Journal of Broadcasting	1960	31.4
	1965	38.0
Journal of Communication	1965	36.0
J. of Educational Psychology	1950	31.0
	1955	35.4
	1960	37.8
	1965	51.8
J. of Verbal Learning and V. Behav.	1965	47.4
Journalism Quarterly	1950	38.4
	1955	47.0
	1960	39.2
	1965	42.4
Psychological Bulletin	1950	35.0
	1955	44.8
	1960	34.0
	1965	37.8
Public Opinion Quarterly	1950	42.4
	1955	37.8
	1960	47.0
	1965	38.2
Sociometry	1950	46.8
	1955	44.2
	1960	32.4
	1965	37.4

it seems to be about 40% uncited, 60% cited). For the research front, which contains about 30 papers within the last five years, we have another 50 citations available and this results in an average of about 1.67 citations per paper cited — again in agreement with S.C.I. statistics.

Perhaps the most important finding I have to offer is that the hierarchy of Price's Index seems to correspond very well with what we intuit as hard science, soft science, and non-science as we descend the scale. At the top, with indexes of 60-70% we have journals of physics and biochemistry; a little lower there are publications [6] like *Radiology* (58%) and *American Journal of Roentgenology* (54%). *American Sociological Review* stands at 46.5% and a study by Parker *et al.* shows most of the other social sciences clustering around 41.9% ± 1.2% while a pilot project investigation of my own covering 154 journals of various brands of scholarship (See Table 4) showed that the median over all fields of science and non-science was 32% with quartiles at 21% and 42%. I find some slight indication of a slow increase of the index with time for any particular field, but the average over the whole *Science Citation Index* has fallen with time as more of the softer sciences have been included.

The journals with an index higher than the upper quartile (i. e. above ca. 43%) are unquestionably of the hard science variety and those with an index higher than 60% are just the ones where competition, fashion, Invisible Colleges and all direct social action symptoms are evident. At the other end of the scale, I was most surprised to find that there are a considerable number of journals where the index is less than one would find with pure archive and no research front at all. *German Review, American Literature, Studies in English Literature, Isis,* are all samples of a very low index value, less than 10%. In a sense, these fields find special reasons for citing older material which is indeed their universe of discourse. Amongst the sciences, I think one would find similarly that the taxonomic sciences, giving special place as they do to the first and earliest case examples, would also display an anomalous appearance of a negative amount of research front.

Such pathological cases apart, it would seem that this index provides a good diagnostic for the extent to which a subject is attempting, so to speak, to grow from the skin rather than from the body. With a low index one has a humanistic type of metabolism in which the scholar has to digest all that has gone before, let it mature gently in the cellar of his wisdom and then distill forth new words of wisdom about the same sorts of questions. In hard science the positiveness of the knowledge and its short-term permanence enable one to move through the packed-down past while still a student and then to emerge at the research front where interaction with one's peers is as important as the storehouse of conventional wisdom. The thinner the skin of science, the more orderly and crystalline the growth and the more rapid the process. In a previous study I guessed that the skin thickness of the research front might be put at something like 50 papers. After that number of contributions have been laid down, some sort of packing-down or production of a review paper, or summary seems to be necessary, but perhaps that, too, varies from field to field.

It is also worth pointing out that the data for the population of journals studied shows a scatter over the entire range of values of scholarliness and Price's Index. The two measures are, therefore, uncorrelated and quite independent parameters characterizing the journal in question.

I have already said that I regard the value of this work as being not only diagnostic, but also prescriptive, so let us look in closing at what suggestions it makes for the technology of scientific information. At the personal level of the scientific

TABLE 4

	Title	No.	Articles	Average No. of Refs/ article	% of all Refs dated within last 5 years
1	Acta Physiologica	12	1954	17	40
2	Acta Physiologica	11	current	19	34
3	Advances in the Physical Sciences (Uspekhi)	3	current	100	50
4	American Antiquity	8	recent	25	21
5	American Historical Review	15	1925	14	10
6	American Historical Review	6	1950	41	22
7	American Historical Review	3	curent	73	30
8	American Journal of Archaeology	9	recent	22	17
9	American Journal of Botany	11	recent	18	21
10	American Journal of Economics & Sociology	8	recent	18	17
11	American Journal of International Law	3	recent	83	48
12	American Journal of Mathematics	12	recent	9	29
13	American Journal of Philology	16	recent	8	30
14	American Journal of Physical Anthropology	8	recent	25	45
15	American Journal of Sociology	12	recent	17	60
16	American Literature	11	recent	11	4
17	American Mathematical Monthly	52	recent	3	30
18	American Naturalist	11	recent	19	26
19	American Philosophical Quarterly	10	recent	10	18
20	American Quarterly	8	recent	22	12
21	American Sociological Review	18	1936	11	49
22	American Sociological Review	15	1951	15	45
23	American Sociological Review	8	recent	25	35
24	American Zoologist	6	recent	37	47
25	Anatomischer Anzeiger	30	1928	7	26
26	Anatomischer Anzeiger	6	1950	42	12
27	Anatomischer Anzeiger	13	current	15	12
28	Anesthesie Analgesie Reanimation	15	1957	13	71
29	Anesthesie Analgesie Reanimation	13	current	16	36
30	Anglican Theological Review	5	recent	24	20
31	Annales Medico Psychologiques	18	1930	11	31
32	Annales Medico Psychologiques	4	current	66	17
33	Annals & Magazine of Natural History	16	recent	12	9
34	Annals of the Association American Geographers	3	recent	64	11
35	Annals of Botany	10	recent	20	27
36	Antiquity	19	recent	12	27
37	Architectural Science Review	15	recent	8	39
38	Archiv für Physikalische Therapie	19	1949/50	10	31
39	Archiv für Physikalische Therapie	24	current	8	27
40	Art Bulletin	3	recent	76	8
41	Art Journal	13	recent	4	38
42	Astrophysical Jou nal	10	recent	20	66
43	British Journal of Aesthetics	28	recent	4	27
44	British Journal of Experimental Pathology	13	recent	23	43
45	British Journal of Psychology	13	Batch I	16	21

1	2	3	4	5	6
46	British Journal of Psychology	7	Batch II	30	33
47	British Journal of Psychology	12	Batch III	20	35
48	British Journal of Psychology	17	Batch IV	12	27
49	British Journal of Psychology	26	recent Batch V	12	34
50	British Journal of Sociology	9	recent	22	29
51	Bulletin of the Geological Soc. of America	5	Batch I	44	14
52	Bulletin of the Geological Soc. of America	6	Batch II	38	15
53	Bulletin of the Geological Soc. of America	8	Batch III	27	22
54	Bulletin of the Geological Soc. of America	9	Batch IV	23	26
55	Bulletin of the Geological Soc. of America	13	Batch V	18	41
56	Bulletin of the Geological Soc. of America	5	Batch VI	39	32
57	Civil War History	15	1955	13	9
58	Civil War History	5	current	38	27
59	Communications of the ACM	27	Batch I	7	69
60	Communications of the ACM	27	Batch II	8	72
61	Communications of the ACM	30	Batch III	7	77
62	Communications of the ACM	35	Batch IV	6	70
63	Communications of the ACM	18	recent Batch V	11	70
64	Comprehensive Psychiatry	14	Batch I	15	39
65	Comprehensive Psychiatry	12	Batch II	16	42
66	Comprehensive Psychiatry	13	Batch III	16	37
67	Comprehensive Psychiatry	11	Batch IV	18	15
68	Comprehensive Psychiatry	15	Batch V	14	37
69	Comprehensive Psychiatry	8	recent Batch VI	16	18
70	Computer Journal	19	recent	5	52
71	Comptes Rendus des Seances	51	current	4	57
72	Criticism	10	recent	15	13
73	Czechoslovak Journal of Physics	18	recent	11	39
74	Ecological Monographs	3	recent	70	26
75	Ecology	8	recent	24	26
76	Economic Botany	11	recent	18	21
77	Economic Journal	21	1907	2	51
78	Economic Journal	28	1925	3	66
79	Economic Journal	7	current	13	36
80	Electronic Computers	25	recent	8	42
81	E.L.H.	9	recent	23	8
82	French Review	19	recent	7	13
83	Geographical Journal	21	recent	8	23
84	Geological Society of America Bulletin	8	recent	34	48
85	Geophysical Journal	17	recent	11	43
86	Geophysics	19	recent	12	24
87	German Review	12	recent	13	6
88	Isis	12	recent	18	8
89	Islamic Studies	8	recent	10	9
90	Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism	19	recent	11	14
91	Journal of American Academy of Religion	6	recent	25	38
92	Journal of the American Chemical Society	24	1920	8	32
93	Journal of the American Chemical Society	21	1950	10	36
94	Journal of the American Chemical Society	52	recent	17	50
95	Journal of American Statistical Association	20	recent	10	39
96	Journal of Analytical Chemistry	60	recent	9	45
97	Journal of Anatomy	16	recent	24	28
98	Journal of the Association for Computing Mach'ry	14	recent	8	31
99	Journal of the Atmospheric Sciences	15	recent	12	43

1	2	3	4	5	6
100	Journal of Biological Chemistry	7	recent	30	52
101	Journal of Cuneiform Studies	5	recent	7	24
102	Journal of Economic Entomology	22	recent	9	46
103	Journal of Economic History	8	recent	29	30
104	Journal of Experimental Botany	11	1950	19	36
105	Journal of Experimental Botany	8	current	24	25
106	Journal of the Geochemical Society	6	recent	37	33
107	Journal Inorganic Chemistry	50	recent	16	54
108	Journal of the Institute of Wood Science	12	recent	11	26
109	Journal of Math. Analysis & Applications	27	recent	8	37
110	Journal Nuclear Physics	14	recent	17	54
111	Journal of Physical Chemistry	10	recent	21	40
112	Journal of Plasma and Thermonuclear Fusion	16	recent	17	26
113	Journal of Political Economy	11	Batch I	19	28
114	Journal of Political Economy	13	Batch II	17	38
115	Journal of Political Economy	13	Batch III	15	24
116	Journal of Political Economy	11	Batch IV	20	42
117	Journal of Political Economy	14	recent Batch V	14	52
118	Journal of Political Economy	14	Batch VI	15	50
119	Journal of Politics	12	1939	16	62
120	Journal of Politics	22	1950	10	39
121	Journal of Politics	8	recent	29	34
122	Journal Quantitative Spectroscopy & Rad. Transfer	11	recent	19	38
123	Journal of Symbolic Logic	28	recent	7	22
124	Journal of Zoology	10	1949/50	21	8
125	Journal of Zoology	9	recent	24	19
126	Language	11	recent	19	15
127	Linguistics	11	recent	14	18
128	Mind	14	recent	4	24
129	Musical Quarterly	6	recent	8	22
130	Philological Quarterly	6	recent	36	7
131	Philosophy of Science	15	recent	13	21
132	Physical Review	47	1900	5	56
133	Physical Review	28	1925	8	67
134	Physical Review	13	1950	17	73
135	Physical Review	18	current	11	72
136	Physical Review Letters	15	recent	10	71
137	Physiological Reports	70	recent	7	38
138	Planetary and Space Science	11	recent	19	38
139	Plant Physiology	12	recent	17	40
140	Proceedings of the Geologists' Association	5	recent	41	12
141	Reviews of Modern Physics	7	Batch I	33	45
142	Reviews of Modern Physics	2	Batch II	101	68
143	Reviews of Modern Physics	7	recent Batch III	43	58
144	Reviews of Modern Physics	3	Batch IV	81	34
145	Reviews of Modern Physics	5	Batch V	47	22
146	Reviews of Modern Physics	4	Batch VI	50	32
147	Revue d'Assyriologie	6	recent	8	32
148	Semaine des Hopitaux	22	1950	9	45
149	Semaine des Hopitaux	19	current	13	41
150	Slavic and East European Journal	15	recent	13	10
151	Soviet Atomic Energy	13	current	15	47
152	Soviet Journal of Nuclear Physics	15	current	14	43
153	Soviet Physics Crystallography	18	current	12	32
154	Studies in English Literature	27	recent	6	8

Price's index = % Refs dated in last five years

writer and the editor and publisher of journals it tells that one might well be as careful about references as we are about titles, authorships and proper presentation of data.* For a research paper it should be exceptional to allow an author to eschew interaction with colleagues by citing too few references, and if he cited too many, perhaps he is writing a review paper rather than a research contribution. Similarly, if you want to make the field firm and tight, and hard, and crystalline you have to play with your peers and keep on the ball by citing their recent work.

At the systems level, perhaps, these measures give prescriptions for the properties needed in an information service. If the people using the service use very few references, may be they do not want scientific papers at all. If they give very many, they are striving for good old-fashioned scholarly completeness. If they write papers with a low Price's Index you just have to maintain an archival library as libraries have always been maintained and try all new tricks with indexes and computers. If, however, they write with a high Price's Index, it is some indication that the information system is most active at the research front and what we have is a current awareness system of interaction with peers, not with subjects or methodologies. For such people it seems obvious that citation indexing and the social engineering of Invisible Colleges produce results vastly superior to any possibilities of normal library or information organization.

In short, hard science, soft science, technology and non-science may be all different social systems and each system must have its own special machinery for handling the processes of publication and communication amongst people at the research fronts and behind those fronts, too. I believe that the elucidation of problems like this provide the most exciting fundamental material for social science research and that a proper understanding of science as a social system will wipe away a lot of naive misunderstanding which shrouds the business of science information and makes us hope for the wrong sort of expensive solutions to what seem to be the problems.

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* One must hope the effect is something more than a self-fulfilling prophecy!

INTERACTIONS DANS LES RAPPORTS SCIENTIFIQUES INTERNES ET LES RAPPORTS "SCIENTIFIQUES EXTERNES" ET OPTIMISATION DE LA GESTION DE L'ACTIVITE SCIENTIFIQUE

NIKO IAKHIEL

BULGARIE

Ayant un rapport direct avec la sociologie, l'optimisation de la gestion de l'activité scientifique est actuellement l'un des problèmes cardinaux de la science et de la pratique.

De nos jours la science se développe avec une vitesse vertigineuse. La société, et surtout la société socialiste, en tant que scientifiquement dirigée et dans laquelle la science fait partie organique du système social intégral, ainsi qu'une base pour son fonctionnement et développement, est vitalement intéressée à stimuler la perfection de la gestion de l'activité scientifique, afin d'augmenter son efficacité. Voilà pourquoi, l'étude multilatérale de la science en tant que phénomène social, la découverte de son mécanisme interne et ses rapports avec les autres structures sociales, ainsi qu'avec la société, en tant qu'entité deviennent une nécessité vitale. L'analyse des rapports scientifiques internes et externes présente à ce propos un intérêt particulier et, notamment, leur rapport dans le processus de la gestion de l'activité scientifique.

L'activité scientifique en tant que manifestation d'un genre particulier, dans laquelle est synthétisée tant la spécificité dans la science comme un système de connaissances et base pour recueillir une information scientifique nouvelle que la spécificité de la "production" elle-même de cette information, représente une unité de deux sous-systèmes: rapports scientifiques internes et rapports "scientifiques externes" qui ont une indépendance relative et se trouvent en interaction étroite.

Les rapports scientifiques internes sont des rapports typiques pour le système et pour le mécanisme de l'interaction dans le système même de la science, de la logique et du mécanisme des recherches scientifiques. Ils englobent les processus de la "production" de connaissances nouvelles, de la différentiation et de l'intégration des sciences, l'action réciproque entre les diverses branches de la connaissance scientifique, etc. Les rapports scientifiques internes caractérisent la science comme un système de connaissances et dépendent, en général, de l'architectonique et de la structure de la science, ainsi que de l'effet de ses lois internes. Dans cette optique la science dispose d'un mécanisme interne propre d'autogestion et d'autoréglage qui dépend non pas des organes de gestion sociale, mais des lois de fonctionnement et de développement.

Les rapports "scientifiques externes" caractérisent à leur tour la science comme un système d'organisation, un système qui comprend comme ses propres compo-

sants la base matérielle, les cadres, les institutions scientifiques, etc. Dans ce sens le système des rapports "sceintifiques externes" englobe les rapports du domaine de l'ainsi-dit, potentiel scientifique.

En fin de compte, le fonctionnement normal et efficace ainsi que le développement de l'activité scientifique, en tant que système achevé, dépendent de l'état de ces deux sous-systèmes et de leur fonctionnement harmonieux et efficace.

A son tour la science, en tant que système dynamique, est une partie intégrante du système général de la vie sociale. La vie sociale où ses différents composants reflètent "le milieu", "le climat" dans lequel focnctionne et se développe l'activité scientifique. Se développe-t-elle, par exemple, dans les conditions du capitalisme ou dans le socialisme est un fait qui, évidemment, revêt une importance capitale pour le développement général de la science. En même temps, la science n'est point un système qui puisse s'adapter à titre passif aux conditions extérieures en changement perpétuel. D'une part, elle est un facteur actif pour le changement du milieu extérieur. D'autre part, scus l'influence du facteur subjectif et avec la participation active des organes sociaux de gestion de l'activité scientifique, la science peut accélérer le processus de son propre fonctionnement et développement.

En ce qui concerne l'activité scientifique elle-même il est évident, que des rapports "scientifiques externes" et, en particulier du potentiel scientifique qui forme la base matérielle du processus même de la recherche scientifique, de la "liaison" correcte et l'interaction des ses constituants, dépendent dans un large degré tant le niveau que les résultats de cette activité. Quelle est la structure organisationnelle dans laquelle évolue l'activité scientifique, comment fonctionnent les collectivités scientifiques, quel est l'état actuel de la base expérimentale, combien de genre des cadres sont occupés dans le domaine de la science, etc. — ce sont là les problèmes primordiaux capables d'assurer une recherche scientifique fructueuse et de la plus efficace. Et c'est de là qu'est déterminé, également, le rôle important que les recherches sociologiques sur ces problèmes jouent dans l'optimisation de la gestion de l'activité scientifique.

Mais, d'autre part, la science n'aurait pas été une science, c'est-à-dire un système capable de „produire" des connaissances nouvelles, si son propre mécanisme se révélait défectueux sous quelque rapport. Dans des cas pareils, la base matérielle la plus perfectionnée n'est pas à même d'assurer le résultat recherché. L'organisation de la recherche scientifique, la topoligie des travailleurs scientifiques, etc., sont dictés en fin de compte par la structure même de la science, par les processus de la différentiation et de 'l'intégration, par les rapports scientifiques internes.

On découvre ici une particularité importante des rapports scientifiques internes et des rapports „scientifiques externes": leur lien indestructible et leur action réciproque étroite. Cette particularité provient du fait que ces deux types de rapports caractérisent deux aspects d'un même objet, d'un fond unique. Les manifestations et le développement des rapports scientifiques internes se produisent dans une suite logique, et une interaction étroite avec les rapports "scientifiques externes". Et vice-versa: les rapports "scientifiques externes", et de façon plus concrète, le potentiel scientifique, son développement et fonctionnement, sont en fonction directe du développement et des manifestations des rapports scientifiques internes et, plus spécialement, du processus de la différentiation et de l'intégration des sciences. De son côté, le potentiel scientifique exerce une influence directe sur les rapports scientifiques internes. La naissance, par exemple, de la cybernétique en tant que résultat de l'action des lois internes de la science et du

mécanisme des rapports scientifiques internes, ainsi que son développement ultérieur, auraient été impensables sans un niveau élevé du potentiel scientifique. Mais, une fois née, la cybernétique elle-même apporte des changements qualitatifs profonds dans ce potentiel scientifique, dans les rapports "scientifiques externes". L'interaction entre les rapports scientifiques internes et les rapports "scientifiques externes" est un des catalyseurs puissants du développement de la science dans la société contemporaine.

Les deux genres de rapports agissent réciproquement tout en conservant leur spécificité, leur indépendance relative, leur propre logique, leurs lois intérieures et leur mécanisme de fonctionnement et de développement. Voilà pourquoi ils sont loin de jouer le même rôle dans le développement de l'activité scientifique et dans la gestion de la science. L'expérience acquise prouve que l'attention, accordée par les organes sociaux à la gestion de la science, est dirigée avant tout vers le développement du potentiel scientifique.

Le perfectionnement des rapports "scientifiques externes", le développement du potentiel scientifique sont, en effet, l'un des aspects principaux du problème de l'optimisation de la gestion de la science. Ainsi, en rapport avec cela, une grande attention mérite l'élaboration des simulateurs optimaux pour l'organisation de la collectivité scientifique, pour les conditions de leur fonctionnement le plus efficace. Le perfectionnement de la base matérielle, de l'activité scientifique, l'implantation de l'appareillage scientifique plus perfectionné dans le domaine de la recherche et des machines à calculer électroniques doivent être l'un des facteurs principaux pour l'intensification de la "production" de connaissances. Il y a lieu de signaler que, dernièrement, dans République la Populaire de Bulgarie, par exemple, ont été entreprises une série de mesures pour l'amélioration décisive de la formation des cadres. Une réforme de l'enseignement a été tracée, visant à ce que les cadres puissent répondre aux exigences de la révolution technique et scientifique. Une Académie pour la formation de cadres nécessaires aux besoins de la gestion sociale a été également créée.

Dans leur ensemble, les orientations de la gestion des rapports "scientifiques externes" se ramènent:

a) au développement optimal des différents composants du potentiel scientifique, et

b) à la corrélation et à l'interactionoptimales entre les composants du potentiel scientifique, afin que celui-ci en tant que tout, puisse fonctionner d'une manière optimale.

Les organes de gestion de la science doivent également à l'avenir faire de leur mieux dans cette voie, afin de rehausser la productivité du travail scientifique et l'efficacité de l'activité scientifique. Sous-estimer le potentiel scientifique, ne fût-ce qu'un de ses composants qui peut nuire considérablement au développement de la science en général.

Mais le développement régulier du potentiel scientifique, l'établissement de rapports optimaux entre ses propres composants, la découverte des dimensions optimales de la collectivité scientifique, etc., ne peuvent en aucun cas épuiser la tâche de l'optimisation de la gestion de la science. Une importance décisive en l'occurence revêt le fait que dans l'action réciproque des rapports „scientifiques externes" et des rapports scientifiques internes, ces derniers ont la priorité. C'est de ces derniers, de leur développement et de leur fonctionnement, ainsi que de leur structure et comportement que dépend au plus haut degré l'état des rapports "scientifiques externes".

Le passage d'une méthode presque exclusivement individuelle vers une méthode d'activité scientifique avant tout collective, constitue aujourd'hui l'un des traits les plus caractéristiques du processus de la recherche. Ce passage est défini surtout par la complexité des méthodes de recherche et d'interaction des connaissances scientifiques, par l'augmentation gigantesque du volume de l'information scientifique. Le développement des sciences mène irréductiblement vers une spécialisation toujours plus concrète des savants, vers la concentration de leurs intérêts techniques et scientifiques sur une partie déterminée de la connaissance, qui, très souvent, selon la force de la différentiation de la science en voie de se réaliser, paraît toujours plus détachée et éloignée des autres domaines scientifiques. La recherche scientifique contemporaine, aspirant vers une pénétration toujours plus approfondie dans la nature des phénomènes et de la découverte des secrets les plus sublimes de la nature, exige de manière toujours plus pressante l'union des efforts des savants de différents domaines et spécialisations.

"La crise" survenue dans la science, dont parlent avec anxiété certains savants, en tenant compte de la différentiation des sciences et de la spécialisation toujours plus approfondie, des difficultés croissantes lors de l'établissement d'un rapport entre les diverses disciplines, etc., engendre des processus contraires d'intégration des sciences toujours plus forts, la naissance et le développement d'une série de sciences synthétiques. Il s'agit actuellement de consacrer non seulement des branches dites hybrides comme la chimie, la physique, la biophysique, la biochimie, l'astrophysique, etc., ou bien du genre de la psychologie sociale. Actuellement pour les rapports scientifiques internes se révèle caractéristique le développement des recherches multilatérales et la consécration d'un grand nombre de théories et de sciences interdisciplinaires, telles la cybernétique, la théorie de l'informatique, la théorie des jeux, la théorie des décisions, la topologie, la théorie générale des systèmes, etc. "Le mouvement interbranches" et la coopération interbranches dans le processus de la recherche scientifique comme résultat du développement des rapports interscientifiques exige de nouvelles structures organisationnelles, pose de nouvelles exigences devant les cadres de chercheurs, devant l'édification de la base matérielle scientifique, etc.

Le processus de l'"industrialisation" du travail de recherche et la complexité et l'amplification y afférentes de la base matérielle et technique de la science, l'augmentation des dépenses financières réservées à l'activité scientifique, l'accroissement à des cadences étonnamment rapides du volume de l'information scientifique et sa mise en profit de plus en plus difficile — tout cela est le résultat, avant tout, du développement des rapports scientifiques internes, de l'action des lois internes dans le fonctionnement et dans le développement de la science. La typologie contemporaine des travailleurs scientifiques prouve d'une manière spécifique le rôle décisif des rapports scientifiques internes pour le développement de l'activité scientifique.

Bref, le fonctionnement et le développement optimum de l'activité scientifique ne sauraient être atteints si l'on ne tient pas compte de la priorité des rapports scientifiques internes et de leur interaction avec les rapports "scientifiques externes". Cet état des choses joue un rôle important dans les pronostics et la planification de la science, ainsi que dans son organisation et gestion.

Il est vrai que la gestion des rapports scientifiques internes, et, plus spécialement, celle des processus liés à la différentiation et à l'intégration de la connaissance scientifique, ainsi qu'à l'application d'une méthodologie spécifique dans la recherche, ne saurait être fonction des organes de la gestion sociale de la science.

Ces organes ne peuvent pas éliminer les lois internes du fonctionnement et du développement de la science, ses mécanismes internes de gestion. Ce n'est point en cela que réside leur rôle. En l'occurrence, la tâche des organes de la gestion sociale est de créer toutes les conditions objectives et subjectives nécessaires à leur fonctionnement et manifestations les plus effectifs, à l'action optimale des mécanismes intérieurs de gestion et d'ajustement de l'action scientifique, pour donner la liberté au développement des rapports scientifiques internes. Dans ce sens-là, le système de gestion dépend dans un degré des plus élevés à créer dans le domaine de la science des conditions plus favorables pour l'accélération du processus d'interaction des connaissances scientifiques pour la naissance de sciences nouvelles, de la différentiation et de l'intégration des sciences, pour la création d'une corrélation optimale entre la structure intérieure du système de la science et les rapports "scientifiques externes", de l'orientation correcte de l'activité de la recherche scienifique compte tenu des besoins du développement économique et sociopolitique du pays en question.

Par conséquent, une position active de la part des organes de la gestion sociale s'avère nécessaire dans leurs efforts pour le perfectionnement de cette gestion et l'ajustement des rapports scientifiques internes.

Le problème même de la gestion des rapports scientifiques internes se présente sous deux aspects. Le premier concerne les mécanismes intérieurs propres de gestion et d'ajustement de la science et des rapports scientifiques internes. Le second se rapporte à l'influence active des organes de gestion sociale et de la science sur le fonctionnement et sur le développement de ces mécanismes et leur coordination avec les autres facteurs dont dépend la gestion effective de la science. C'est précisément le second aspect qui est pris en considération lorsqu'on fait ressortir la nécessité d'un perfectionnement de la gestion des rapports scientifiques internes. C'est ici notamment que nous voyons aussi le rôle actif que peut jouer la sociologie de la science lors de l'optimisation de la gestion de l'activité scientifique, en ce qui concerne les mécanismes intérieurs du fonctionnement et du développement de la science.

Il est nécessaire de souligner, à ce propos, que la politique scientifique dans un pays donné, y compris les pronostics et la planification du développement scientifique, la détermination de l'organisation et du développement du potentiel scientifique ne saurait assurer en fin de compte, des conditions optimales de gestion et d'ajustement de l'activité scientifique si une série de problèmes du domaine des rapports scientifiques internes n'étaient pas élucidés, notamment:

a) — le critère pour le choix des sciences qu'un pays donné devrait développer pour une période déterminée;

b) — dans quels domaines doivent se concentrer les recherches scientifiques, à quels disciplines et problèmes scientifiques doit être accordée la priorité;

c) — quelle est la corrélation optimale pour le pays donné (compte tenu de ses nécessités et possibilités) entre les recherches fondamentales et appliquées, etc.

A ce propos la tâche de pronostiquer le développement de la science devient de plus en plus importante, afin de permettre un coup d'oeil sur le développement futur des rapports scientifiques internes, pour prévoir dans quel domaine de la science sont imminents des changements révolutionnaires et qui auront une influence profonde sur d'autres domaines de la science et de la pratique. Cela mettra à l'abri les organes de la gestion sociale d'éventuelles surprises, souvent à incidences négatives, ce qui permettra la réorganisation opportune de la base scientifique

et d'orienter de façon correcte les efforts des travailleurs scientifiques et du potentiel scientifique, en harmonie avec les modifications attendues.

D'autre part, dans le fait que les rapports scientifiques internes et les rapports "scientifiques externes" représentent deux systèmes relativement indépendants avec des manifestations spécifiques, réside la possibilité de pouvoir dévier l'action scientifique de son régime normal, de son homéostasis. Le système des rapports scientifiques internes est d'origine plus mobile, "aspect" de l'activité scientifique, se développant plus rapidement. Le potentiel scientifique et plus spécialement l'organisation de la science sont relativement plus inertes, plus conserveurs, accusent plus lentement les changements survenus dans les tendances du développement scientifique, dans la différentiation et l'intégration des sciences. Grâce à ce phénomène, dans des cas déterminés entre les rapports scientifiques internes et les rapports "scientifiques externes" surgissent des différences, des non-conformités qui pourraient s'aggraver et devenir des contradictions. Ainsi, des conditions sont-elles créées qui nuisent au fonctionnement normal du système de l'action scientifique. D'ailleurs, ce fait est lié avec la necéssité pressante d'effectuer de profonds changements dans l'organisation de l'activité scientifique et dans le système d'éducation au niveau contemporain du développement de la science.

Tout cela nous autorise à estimer, que l'étude de la nature des rapports scientifiques internes et des rapports „scientifiques externes", ainsi que leurs interactions, la découverte et l'élimination des différences et des contradictions entre eux, la possibilité d'assurer leur développement planifié et harmonique, représentent à l'étape actuelle l'un des problèmes fondamentaux du pronostic, de la planification de l'activité scientifique, de l'optimisation et de l'organisation de sa gestion.

SOCIOLOGY OF SPORT
SOCIOLOGIE DU SPORT

SOCIAL ORIGINS AND OCCUPATIONAL MOBILITY PATTERNS
OF A SELECTED SAMPLE OF AMERICAN ATHLETES[1]

JOHN W. LOY

USA

The American Creed advocates an "open" class system, emphasizing that "the positions at the top are open to those who have the talents, aptitudes and whatever else it takes to reach them" (Reissman, 1959: 293). Faith in the creed is maintained by the hundreds of heroic success stories about individuals in American society who have gone from rags to riches. The world of sport in past perspective has provided its share of heroes who have given substance to the creed. Moreover, it continues to provide exemplary examples. Thus we have the rags to riches stories of such contemporary sport figures as Willie Mays, Mickey Mantle, Bill Russel, Bob Cousey, Johnny Unitas, O. J. Simpson, Pancho Gonzalez and Althea Gibson. Their stories and others like them have played a major role in sustaining the American Dream.

Special emphasis has been placed by social observers on the role of sport in educational settings upon the success patterns of youth from lower socio-economic backgrounds. Even social scientists who have been critical of the rags to riches myth in the society at large have acknowledged the importance of athletics for furthering the social mobility of young men of low social origin. Havinghurst and Neugarten assert that "athletic prowess combined with education often provides a very good base for mobility in a lower class boy" (1957:45). Riesman and Denny on the basis of their analysis of early All-American football teams note that, "There is an element of class identification running through American football since its earliest days and the ethnic origins of players contain ample invitations to the making of theory about the class dimensions of football" (1951:310). More explicitly, Hodges states in his text on social stratification that, "College football has functioned as a highly effective status elevator for thousands of boys from blue-collar ethnic backgrounds" (1964:167). However, not withstanding such observations by sociologists, the fact is that there exists little evidence concerning the social origins of collegiate athletes, still less information regarding their social mobility and virtually no knowledge concerning the effects of their sport participation upon their post-college career success. This paper presents the preliminary findings of an exploratory effort to collect some "empirical data" bearing upon these slightly studied topics.

PURPOSE

The purpose of the investigation was to discover and examine the social origins and social mobility patterns of a selected sample of former university athletes. More specifically, the main objectives of the study were to determine whether varsity athletes competing in different intercollegiate sports: (1) have similar social origins; (2) experience similar patterns of social mobility and whether (3) their post-college career patterns are differentially influenced by certain ascribed and achieved social attributes.

DESIGN AND ANALYSIS

The population of the study consists of recipients of Life Passes from 1924 through 1968 from the University of California at Los Angeles (UCLA). In order to obtain a Life Pass an athlete must have participated in an intercollegiate sport for four years and have earned at least three varsity letters.

Sample

According to records of the UCLA Athletic Department, 1.386 men had received a Life Pass as of the spring of 1968. Addresses were obtained for 1,097 of these men and each was mailed a six-page questionnaire containing questions relevant to this study. Thirty-three questionnaires were returned because of wrong addresses, fifteen Life Pass recipients were discovered to be deceased, and twenty-eight respondents were found to hold honorary rather than earned Life Passes. Thus 1,021 Life Pass recipients were eligible for response; and of this sample 865 (85%) returned completed questionnaires.

Variables

Social backgrounds and post college career patterns of athletes were determined by the assessment of the following factors:

Social Origins. The social background of each subject was determined from information concerning: (1) father's national origin, (2) paternal grandfather's national origin, (3) family size, (4) mother's religious faith, (5) father's educational attainment and (6) father's socio-economic status. As regards this last variable: father's occupation at the time the respondent entered college was assigned an occupational prestige score based upon the Duncan Socio-economic Status Index (Reiss, 1961).

Social Mobility. Post-college career patterns of former athletes were assessed in terms of: (1) post-graduate education, (2) annual income and (3) occupational status. Crude comparisons of intergenerational occupational mobility were made by comparing the status of respondents' first and present occupations with those of their fathers.

Ascribed vs. Achieved Attributes. An exploratory effort was made to measure the relative influence of certain ascribed and achieved attributes in determining respondents present occupational statuses. Specifically, variables reflecting: (1) father's educational attainment, (2) father's occupational status, (3) son's educational attainment and (4) son's first job were employed in multiple regression analysis to ascertain the relative effects of social origin and personal achievement upon

respondent's present occupational status. Fathers' and sons' occupational statuses were scaled by the Duncan Socio-economic Status Index and their respective degrees of educational attainment were assessed by the following arbitrary scale: (1) no high school study, (2) some high school study, (3) high school graduate, (4) some college study, (5) college graduate, (6) professional and/or graduate study.

FINDINGS

Social Origins

Subjects in the sample were classified into one of twenty sport categories for purposes of comparison (see Table 1). However, as several sport groups were found to have few subjects most analyses were confined to ten sport categories having a minimum of twenty-seven subjects each.

Socio-economic Status. In Table 1 sport groups are arranged in rank order from high to low on the basis of the mean occupational prestige score of fathers of athletes found in each sport category. For purposes of illustration sports are arbitrarily grouped into six categories. On the one hand, it is evident from the range of status scores shown in the table that athletes were recruited from a variety of social backgrounds. On the other hand, the positive skewness of status scores suggests that the majority of athletes come from what might be best described as the "American middle-class".

Educational Status. Results reveal that about a quarter of the fathers of soccer players (23%), rowers (24%), tennis players (26%) and swimmers (27%) had not completed high school. Roughly two-fifths of the fathers of basketball players (37%), gymnasts (38%) and trackmen (44%) failed to finish high school and half of the fathers of baseball players (50%), wrestlers (50%) and football players (52%) did not earn a high school diploma. In sum, educational status when considered in combination with socio-economic status indicates that athletes competing in contact or combative sports tended to come from "lower" social origins than athletes in non-combative sports.

National Origin. Although the majority of athletes in the total sample were American born, a substantial number were only second or third generation Americans. For example, approximately half of the athletes participating in basketball, track, football, baseball, crew, tennis and swimming had foreign born paternal grandparents. The percentage of foreign born grandparents was more marked for wrestlers (61%) and gymnasts (62%) and most predominant in the case of soccer players (80%). The continuing influence of parents' national origin is reflected in the number of athletes coming from homes where a second language is spoken: soccer (43%), wrestling (32%), gymnastics (26%), football (21%), swimming (20%), baseball (19%), basketball (19%), tennis (17%), track (13%) and crew (9%).

Religion and Family Size. Other social background factors which tend to characterize sport groups are religion and family size. Athletes from Catholic homes were most often found in soccer, football and baseball. Whereas athletes of Jewish background were predominant in gymnastics, wrestling and swimming. Basketball players constituted the most Protestant group of athletes.

A relatively high percentage of only born children were found among tennis players; a predominant number of wrestlers were drawn from two children families and there was a tendency for many baseball players, trackmen, football players and wrestlers to come from very large families.

TABLE 1. MEAN OCCUPATIONAL STATUS SCORES OF FATHERS OF FORMER ATHLETES IN TWENTY COLLEGIATE SPORTS

Sport	N	Status score	Category
Golf	(19)	74	Upper-Upper
Tennis	(50)	64	
Swimming	(78)	64	
Cricket	(17)	63	Lower-Upper
Ice Hockey	(9)	62	
Crew	(64)	62	
Fencing	(5)	60	
Gymnastics	(33)	58	
Basketball	(91)	57	Upper-Middle
Volleyball	(3)	55	
Team Managers	(34)	55	
Track	(119)	53	
Handball	(6)	53	
Rugby	(16)	52	Lower-Middle
Rifle Team	(12)	51	
Soccer	(32)	51	
Baseball	(89)	49	
Football	(192)	48	Upper-Lower
Boxing	(12)	47	
Wrestling	(27)	43	Lower-Lower

Social Mobility

Post-college career patterns of the sample of former athletes are discussed in terms of educational attainment, annual income and occupational status.

Educational Attainment. Since an athlete must have competed in a varsity sport for four years in order to be eligible for a Life Pass, it is not surprising

TABLE 2. A COMPARISON OF FATHERS' OCCUPATIONAL STATUS SCORES WITH THOSE OF SONS' FIRST JOB AND SONS' PRESENT JOB

Sport	N[a]	Fathers' Occupation[b]	N[a]	Sons' First Job[b]	N[a]	Sons' Present Job[b]
Wrestling	(27)	43	(24)	70	(27)	77
Football	(192)	48	(192)	63	(206)	74
Baseball	(89)	49	(90)	64	(91)	75
Soccer	(32)	51	(33)	74	(36)	79
Track	(119)	53	(120)	67	(121)	77
Basketball	(91)	57	(92)	69	(100)	77
Gymnastics	(33)	58	(33)	67	(33)	80
Crew	(64)	62	(52)	69	(65)	78
Swimming	(78)	63	(80)	67	(81)	78
Tennis	(50)	64	(51)	70	(55)	75

[a] Total N on which mean scores are based
    ores are rounded to nearest whole number

that all but a small percentage of the athletes in the sample received a college degree. However, it is notable that approximately 44 per cent of all athletes in the sample earned an advanced degree. Academic achievement was especially characteristic of gymnasts, soccer players and wrestlers. For example 62% of former gymnasts hold a professional or graduate degree, including 15% with a Ph. D.

Annual Income. If one grants that money is the "sign of success" in American society, then one must conclude that the athletes sampled are highly successful individuals. For from 31 to 47 per cent of the subjects in each sport category were found to be earning over $ 20,000 a year.

Occupational Status and Mobility. Table 2 shows the differences for each sport group between the mean occupational status scores for fathers' occupations

TABLE 3. A COMPARISON OF SONS' PRESENT OCCUPATIONAL STATUSES WITH FATHERS' PAST OCCUPATIONAL STATUSES (TOTAL SAMPLE, N=865)

Status Groups	Low				Middle			High		
Status Scores	0—9	10—19	20—29	30—39	40—49	50—59	60 - 69	70—79	80—89	90—99
Fathers (N)	20	92	24	103	95	99	154	136	93	49
Sons (N)	0	5	1	6	21	38	99	318	262	115
Fathers (%)	2.3	10.6	2.8	11.9	11.0	11.4	17.8	15.7	10.8	5.7
Sons (%)	.0	0.6	0.1	0.7	2.4	4.4	11.4	36.8	30.3	13.3

TABLE 4. PARTIAL REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS IN STANDARD FORM (BETA COEFFICIENTS), MULTIPLE CORRELATIONS, AND COEFFICIENTS OF DETERMINATION, FOR SPECIFIED COMBINATION OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES AND SUBSAMPLES IN PREDICTING RESPONDENTS PRESENT OCCUPATIONAL PRESTIGE (DEPENDENT VARIABLES)

Category	N	Sons' 1st Job	Sons' Education	Fathers' Occupation	Fathers' Education	R	R^2
Total Sample	865	.2985	.2604	.0550	.0106	.4505	.2030
Pre-World War II Sample	386	.2142	.3369	.0848	.0273	.4615	.2130
Post-World War II Sample	474	.4040	.2065	.0296	.0000	.4847	.2350
Track	111	.2758	.0655	.0825	—.2270	.3474	.1207
Gymnastics	31	.1514	.0052	.0181	.3150	.3622	.1312
Baseball	76	.2419	.3010	—.1671	.1830	.4224	.1784
Tennis	49	.3876	.2149	—.0141	.0280	.4736	.2243
Basketball	86	.3016	.2035	.0448	.0479	.4909	.2409
Football	188	.1884	.4175	.0905	—.0766	.4920	.2420
Soccer	31	.1647	.3142	—.5329	.4449	.5370	.2883
Crew	62	.3924	.1803	.0479	.2497	.5435	.2954
Swimming	73	.3917	.3091	.2217	.0247	.6327	.4003
Wrestling	24	.5016	.2810	—.2246	—.0515	.6410	.4109

sons' first job and sons' present job. It is clear from the table that the majority of former athletes are presently employed in occupations of high socio-economic status. Although there are no marked differences in the status scores of sons' present occupations among sport categories, the degree of career mobility achieved by subjects from lower socio-economic backgrounds is quite striking.

The status differences between fathers and sons irrespective of sport group are compared in greater detail in Table 3. Table 3 shows, for example, that while less than a third of the fathers held high status jobs, over four-fifths of their sons were employed in high status occupations.

From Table 4 one can see that social origin as assessed by fathers' education and occupation has virtually no influence on sons' occupational success. On the other hand, even though the respondents' own training and early career experience exerts much greater influence than social background, it is evident that these personal achievements only account for a very small percent of the variance in occupational status. In fact, for the total sample the cumulative effects of social origin, education and career beginning account for only a fifth of the variance in occupational achievement. Although the independent variables explain a greater degree of variance for certain sport groups, in no case do they explain more than 41 percent of the variance and they typically account for less than 25 percent.

DUSCUSSION

For the purpose of this paper we thought it more appropriate to present a variety of findings in a cursory manner rather than to give an in-depth analysis of specific results. Refined analysis aside, however, there are several major limitations to the investigation. A most obvious limitation is that the athletes sampled represent only one educational institution in America and a rather select one at that. Moreover, they represent a select group of athletes within the institution, in that, they were enrolled in college for at least four years and earned at least three varsity letters. Notwithstanding these rather severe limitations, the major weakness of the study is that no control groups were employed for comparative purposes. Thus while we have some indications of the social origins and mobility patterns of former athletes, we do not know if our findings are especially characteristic of athletic alumni *per se* or more generally apply to all graduates of the particular university from which athletes were sampled.

In counter response to the stated limitations we note that exploratory comparative analyses are not entirely precluded. For example, Perrucci and Perrucci (1970) report findings concerning the social origins, educational attainment, and career mobility of a sample of engineers who received bachelor degrees, in engineering, from 1947 through 1961, from the same university as our sample of former athletes. Since they assessed similar variables with similar measures to our own, selected comparisons are possible. Moreover, data from both studies can be contrasted with that reported by Blau and Duncan (1968) in their recent analysis of occupational mobility among a national representative sample of 20,000 American men. In addition to such possible comparative analyses we suggest that consideration of our sample of former athletes as a sample of university graduates should provide some small insight regarding the relative effects of ascriptive and achieved statuses on post-college careers. As Kinloch (1969:350) states the case: "Growth patterns of higher education in the United States are striking both in extent and diversity. With such expansion has come greater variety in levels of as-

piration, motivation, economic and social levels of students, as well as the emergence of class-based colleges and universities and class-based career choices. Such developments make crucial the examination of changing pattern of social mobility among college graduates, particularly the possible emergence of variables which may hinder or promote mobility".

Finally, we argue that the study of social origins of athletes in educational settings is important in its own right. Although numerous studies have been conducted to determine the influence of social background and pre-university education upon university academic achievement, little attention has been given to the effects of social background and previous personal achievements upon non-academic successes such as athletic achievement in higher education. As Eggleston (1965:232) has observed: "This is urious in view of the widely held beliefs in the social and other non-academic adcantages to be gained from university life."

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AN APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF SPORT SOCIALIZATION*

GERALD S. KENYON AND BARRY D. McPHERSON

CANADA

For well over fifty years, psychologists, anthropologists and sociologists have been addressing themselves to the social process whereby persons learn to become participants in their society — the process of *socialization*. Most of their efforts have focussed upon the socialization of the child and as a result, the consequences of the process which have interested most investigators have been relatively broad behavioral traits or behavioral dispositions. Recently, however, there has been a trend toward the study of socialization as it occurs not only during childhood but throughout the life cycle (Brim and Wheeler, 1966). Moreover, attention is being directed to more limited aspects of the phenomenon, such as occupational socialization and political socialization, and, consequently, researchers are able to concentrate upon a narrower set of behaviors and dispositions, i. e., those associated with more definitive roles. Not only have these newer approaches made research on socialization more manageable, they have also facilitated a more efficacious study of the consequences of socialization.

The basic problem which underlies this paper is the better understanding of the process through which sport roles are learned. Eventually it is hoped that through a number of theoretical and empirical efforts, a definitive set of propositions will emerge which will explain socialization phenomena associated with sport.

Although the learning of sport roles is likely to occur in about the same way as the learning of non-sport roles, the complexity of the process in sport contexts is often greater, since sport is engaged in throughout the life cycle, and in a wide variety of interrelated forms (Kenyon, 1969). Such complexity becomes obvious when the various dimensions of the sport socialization process are enumerated:

1. Socialization of the elite performer
2. Socialization of the sub-elite performer
3. Socialization of the sport consumer
4. Socialization of the sport producer
5. Socialization of the sport leader
6. Sport re-socialization
   — sport to sport
   — sport to non-sport
   — role to role, within sport
7. Sport socialization and social change
8. Socialization via sport

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Moreover, once sport roles are learned, they are usually enacted, thus leading to many further dimensions of sport involvement. However, explaining sport role-enactment, including the accounting for persistence and patterns of persistence, although related to socialization, opens up another complete set of problems and as such will not be considered here.

Fig. 1. The three elements of the socialization process

Fig. 2. A non-system approach to modelling
the learning of Consumer roles

Among the several theoretical orientations used to study socialization, including psychoanalysis, psychoanalytically-oriented social anthropology, the normative-maturational approach, the developmental-cognitive approach, the genetic and constitutional approach and the various learning theory approaches, the latter, and particularly the social learning orientations, have become the most popular and most productive in both theory and empirical findings (Bandura and Walters, 1963; Brim and Wheeler, 1966; Clausen, 1968). Thus, given the nature of sport and given that the major characteristics associated with sport roles are probably acquired after early childhood, a social learning approach, utilizing both psychological and sociological variables, would seem to be most fruitful for the study of sport socialization. However, there are variations within this approach. For example, sport role learning can be studied using as a frame of reference the three main elements of the socialization process, namely *significant others* (socializing

agents) who exert influence within *social situations* (socializing agencies) upon role learners (actors or role aspirants) who are characterized by a wide variety of *relevant personal attributes* (see Fig. 1).

Some preliminary studies using this aproach have already been carried out (Kenyon, 1970)[1]. By way of illustration, a causal model is presented in Fig. 2 purporting to account for the learning of consumer roles.

There is an inherent weakness in such a general approach, however, namely the difficulty of specifying a manageable number of variables from a great many plausible ones, i. e. the "specification problem" (Heise, 1968).

A SOCIAL ROLE — SOCIAL SYSTEM APPROACH: A GENERAL MODEL

A more definitive rationale than the foregoing for the selection of variables is the "social role—social system" approach (Sewell, 1963). Role learning is accounted for by exposure of the role aspirant — who is already characterized by a set of physical and psychological traits — to a variety of stimuli and reinforcements provided by significant others, but, who act within one or more norm-encumbered social systems. Thus a careful analysis is needed of the nature of both *social roles* and *social systems*.

The nature of sport roles is treated below under the heading "The Dependent Variable Problem." However, with respect to social systems, it is argued that: given the nature, complexity and pervasiveness of sport roles, each relevant social system should be treated separately as a potential role learning situation. This takes advantage of considerable knowledge already available concerning the structure and function of institutionalized social systems. Moreover, such a procedure recognizes that factors accounting for socialization are likely to be more salient within, rather than between, systems (Sewell et al., 1969).

If the social system is made central in characterizing the socialization process, it is suggested that a general model of this process can be constructed consisting of a simple causal chain. Thus, in the proposed model: given a degree of role aptitude (cognitive and motoric) the role aspirant is variously influenced within each of the social situations in which he inevitably finds himself, with the net effect being the acquisition of a *propensity* for learning the role in question. Furthermore, this motivates him to rehearse the role, which in turn leads to the learning of the role. In propositional form:

1. The greater the role aptitude, the greater the system-induced propensity for role learning

2. The greater the system-induced propensity for role learning, the greater the role rehearsal, and *vice versa*

3. The greater the propensity for role learning, the greater the role learning, i. e., degree of socialization

These propositions are illustrated in Figure 3. Note that the model specifies four institutionalized social systems, and that temporally, it includes only two stages in the life cycle — late childhood (e. g. age 12) and adolescence (e. g. age 16). As later stages in the life cycle are taken into account, the relevant systems would, of course, change. For example, young adults become a part of vocational or economic situations and withdraw from educational situations.

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[1] Considerable data have been acquired in efforts to account for socialization and enactment of both the performer and the consumer. Summaries are available on request from the authors at the University of Waterloo.

Ultimately it may be possible to strip away the institutional barriers and utilize only those few variables that reflect the sum total of influence within a system. For example, the Blau and Duncan (1967) model of the occupational attainment process relies on only two status variables (father's education and occupational

Fig. 3. Postulated social role — social system two-stage block-recursive model for sport socialization

attainment) and two behavior variables (individual's education level and prestige of first job). Sewell *et al.* (1969, 1970), in explaining occupational attainment, have shown that it is possible, and indeed useful, to characterize significant others' influence as a single variable. At the moment, however, it is suggested that the best strategy for identifying the influential variables is through a careful analysis of each relevant social system. However one might worship parsimony, the selection of a small number of variables is premature in sport socialization since too little is known at this time.

Given the present state of knowledge, then, it would seem that the best research strategy would be somewhat akin to McPhee's "modular" concept of model building (1963), or to Blalock's "block-recursive system" (1969).

RELEVANT FACTORS IN RELEVANT SOCIAL SYSTEMS

The general model proposed above would likely account for the socialization into most social roles and not just those associated with sport. What is needed, then, is a careful consideration of the sport-relevant factors in those social systems likely to be important in inducing a propensity for sport involvement.[2] An alternative would be to begin with a highly theoretical analysis of the nature of social systems, e. g. Parsons (1961), and try to show how sport may be functional or dysfunctional for a particular system and the consequent implications for

[2] It is proposed that the construct "propensity for sport involvement" (PSI) be considered as an intervening variable in the basic model. Each institutionalized social system considered would be assumed to contribute to, or detract from, the development of PSI.

the socialization process.[3] However, insofar as the central objective is not to explain the nature of social systems per se, but rather to account for the processes precipitating sport socialization, it is suggested that only those factors likely to be useful in explaining the socialization process be considered. Therefore, it is proposed that the following elements, drawn largely from Smelser (1962), serve as a frame of reference when considering system-level factors:

Values
Norms
Sanctions
Situational Facilities

Thus, for a given social system, both in general and with regard to sport, the social learning that occurs, whether in the form of imitation, identification or various forms of reinforcement (Bandura and Walters, 1963), will be governed by each of the foregoing elements.

EXPLANATION AT THE SYSTEM LEVEL

If explanation is taken as theory and if theory is considered as a set of logically interrelated propositions (Zetterberg, 1966), then explanation of socialization should be in propositional form. By way of illustrating this point, a small number of propositions will be presented that reflect the explanation of sport socialization as a consequence of a social role — social system approach. In each case the dependent variable will be propensity for sport involvement.

Consider the *family* as an institutionalized social system. Although Reiss (1966) suggests that the transmission of behavioral patterns through the family may not be as great as in other institutions, in sport socialization it appears that the family is of some importance (Kenyon, 1970) and therefore should not be excluded from the general model. For example, in the context of *values* as a social system element, *achievement* is often associated with both family socialization and sport role enactment. Thus, an analysis of achievement training may lead to a better understanding of the family's contribution to sport socialization, particularly for those sport roles where achievement and role enactment are closely related. Considering only a few variables (Rehberg et al., 1970; Turner, 1970; Zigler and Child, 1969), we might have, in propositional form, something as follows:

1. The greater the independence training, the greater the achievement motivation[4]

2. The more democratic the parents, the greater the achievement motivation

3. The greater the father's entrepreneurial role behavior associated with his occupational status, the higher the son's achievement motivation

4. The greater the achievement motivation, the greater the propensity for sport involvement

5. Therefore, the greater the independence training, the more democratic the parents, and the greater the father's entrepreneurial behavior, the greater the propensity for sport involvement

[3] For an example of this approach and a discussion of its strengths and weaknesses, see Lüschen (1969).

[4] This proposition should not be taken as axiomatic in view of the recent work of Rehberg et al. (1970).

Again, using an element common to all social systems, namely *situational facilities,* but again within the context of the family, the following propositions are a few of the several that might help to explain sport socialization (Spady, 1970; unpublished pilot work, University of Wisconsin, 1969):

1. The higher the family socio-economic status, the greater the social participation

2. The higher the family socio-economic status, the greater the sport involvement

3. The greater the social participation, the greater the sport involvement

4. Therefore, the greater the social participation, the greater the propensity for sport involvement

Still in the context of *situational facilities,* but more particularly with regard to *role models* (Brim, 1958; Stone, 1969) we have:

1. Sport involvement reflects masculinity (at least in the US)

2. Siblings frequently serve as powerful role models

3. Children take on the personality traits of siblings of the opposite sex

4. Therefore, as the number of male siblings increases, and the number of female siblings decreases, the propensity for sport involvement increases

Shifting to the system elements, *norms* and sanctions, the following propositions are presented, again in the context of the family (Campbell, 1969; McCandless, 1969) and again with achievement motivation considered a factor:

1. The less autocratic, the less authoritarian (particularly the father) and the more permissive the parents, the greater the likelihood of their being used as role models

2. The greater the warmth and nurture provided by the parents, the greater the likelihood of their being used as role models

3. The less autocratic, the less authoritarian, the more permissive, and the greater the warmth and nurture provided by the parents, the higher the offspring's need to achieve

4. The higher the need to achieve, the greater the propensity for sport involvement

5. Thus, given the capability of modelling sport roles, as parents become less autocratic and authoritarian and more permissive, nurturant and warm, the propensity for sport involvement increases

Although the foregoing propositions do not exhaust the factors accounting for family-induced propensity for sport involvement, they do suggest that it is possible to consider sport socialization at the social system level. Moreover, from the point of manageability, they also illustrate the desirability of a social system approach.

Other institutionalized social systems could be analyzed in a similar way, including those reflecting various educational, potilical, economic and religious institutions. Moreover, if the *adolescent peer group* is taken as a social system, drawing upon the work of Helanko (1957), Homans (1950) and Spady (1970), it might be possible to partially account for peer influence with the following propositions:

1. The greater the aggregation, the greater the interaction

2. The greater the interaction, the greater the mutual liking

3. The greater the mutual liking, the more effective the peer influence (sport provides the means for achieving peer group goals — e. g., "status definition" — Helanko, 1957)

4. The greater the involvement in youth aggregates (groups and clubs), the greater the propensity for sport involvement

When the contribution to sport socialization by each of several institutions is more completely analyzed, it is likely that some propositions would be system specific, while others would emerge as applicable in all systems. For example, from existing knowledge (LeVine, 1969; unpublished studies, University of Wisconsin, 1969; Webb, 1969), the following propositions, although somewhat general, would likely apply to all or most social systems having any bearing on sport socialization:

1. The greater the similarity between the values associated with sport and those associated with the institution, the greater the system-induced propensity for sport involvement

2. The more deliberate the socialization effort, the greater the effect

3. The more the role learner is aware of the socialization process, the greater the socialization

4. The greater the number of positive sanctions (and the earlier they are applied) and the fewer the negative sanctions, the greater the system-induced propensity for sport involvement

5a. The earlier success is experienced, the greater the propensity for sport involvement

5b. The greater the situational facilities (number and kind), the greater the chances for success

5c. As the degree of success increases, propensity for sport involvement increases

THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE PROBLEM

The discussion thus far has centered upon the system portion of the social system — social role approach to socialization. Before propositions akin to the above can be tested, the concept of "sport role" will need careful attention. A sport role, like any role, implies that the role incumbent possesses knowledges, skills and dispositions characterizing the role in question. With regard to each of these dimensions then, the role recruit may be placed on a continuum from fully socialized to fully alienated, with "unsocialized" being in the neutral position. Thus, a clear definition of each dimension is required for each sport role. More difficult, however, is the identification and classification of the many sport roles. After only a brief analysis, the complexity of this situation becomes very clear (Kenyon, 1969). While some role players actually participate in the contest, others "consume" sport (secondary involvement) either directly (as spectators) or indirectly (as consumers of the mass media). Still others produce sport through the enactment of leadership, organizational and entrepreneurial roles. Moreover, sports themselves differ greatly in *kind* (exercise-oriented activity, game-like activity, expressive activity), *social environment* (from involvement in the presence of many others to involvement in the absence of all others; or, involvement oriented to varying combinations of reference groups, such as Kemper's (1968) "normative", "role model" and "audience" groups) and *complexity* (from unstructured to highly structured).

Taking into account the several combinations of *kind, social environment* and *organizational complexity* precipitates many possible sport roles. To provide a rational enumeration of these goes beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless,

to be able to specify the characteristics of a particular role is clearly a prerequisite to the study of the learning of that role, and thus deserves far greater attention than heretofore received.

There is another aspect to the dependent variable problem. Often sociologists are concerned with the *consequences* of role enactment. In such a situation the learning and enactment of sport roles become independent variables for such dependent variables as community identification, social integration, social mobility and social control. Again, the objective here is not to focus upon socialization *via* sport, but, rather socialization *into* sport.

NATIONAL DIFFERENCES IN THE SOCIALIZATION PROCESS

In assuming a social role—social system orientation to socialization, it is obvious that national differences exist in the nature of both sport roles (kind, milieu and complexity) and relevant social system elements (values, norms, sanctions and situational facilities). Consequently, cross-national research would provide a medium for testing the generality of any model of the sport role learning process. By way of example, consider the following propositions (University of Wisconsin unpublished studies, 1969):

1. The earlier the success, the greater the propensity for sport involvement

2. The more diverse the opportunity structure, the greater the chance of early success

3. The more diverse the opportunity structure, the greater the propensity for sport involvement

With wide between-nation differences in opportunity structure and public policy (e. g. achievement-oriented vs. participation-oriented, or, as in Moore and Andersons's terms (1969), "performance" societies vs. "learning" societies) it can be expected that national variations will exist. Again, however, the significance of these for explaining sport socialization can only be ascertained through careful cross-national investigations.

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PROGNOSTIC MODELS OF SPORT IN SOCIALIST COUNTRIES ON THE BACKGROUND OF CHANGES IN SPORTS IN PEOPLE'S POLAND

ANDRZEJ WOHL
POLAND

1. PROBLEMS AND THEIR SCOPE

At the turn of our century sport was still and above all considered an attractive form of entertainment, providing all-round possibilities for young people to find an outlet for their energy in motor activity. There certainly was not a lack of people who saw in sport a phenomenon threatening culture, that should therefore be ruthlessly condemned.

It was only the exceptional expansion of sports organizations during the past 25 years and the development of many branches of science, connected with physical education that accompanied it, which brought about a fundamental change in the attitude towards sport. People became aware of the fact that the stereotypes regarding sport had lost their significance and in no case could they prevail in confrontation with the many-sided aspects of the sports movement.

Today there is no longer any doubt that irrespective of the limited aims the participants in the sports movement set themselves in the successive stages of its development, this movement should be approached as a demonstration of the new significance of physical culture and as an expression of the new values ascribed to the body in our contemporary culture. Today one can no longer approach sports only as a domain, serving to satisfy the needs of youth. It should be understood as a universal property which contemporary man cannot give up without being threatened with the loss of some part and parcel of his own human nature.

Therefore we have to look at sport from a much broader perspective than was the case so far, from a perspective embracing not only the present day, but also the future.

These are questions related to the possibility of anticipating the further development of sport and at the same time a possibility to clear the road to a conscious direction of this development and the shaping of sport in accordance with rationally understood requirements.

Thanks to experience gained so far in many countries and continents, there are today already known certain fundamental factors promoting the development of sport, factors that retained their significance, irrespective of the activity of various mechanisms delaying and suppressing this development. That is why there exists a possibility to base prognostic research on them, at least in some countries.

This regards mainly socialist countries where the spontaneity of social processes has to a considerable extent been limited and where such prognoses are required by the system of economic planning itself.

2. METHODOLOGICAL REMARKS

Anticipation of social phenomena is possible only if based on knowledge of their development until now, and of the laws discovered and defined on this basis. It is above all a matter of knowledge of the conditions, in which the given development process proceeded, knowledge of the rate, typical of this development, of the mechanisms stimulating or inhibiting its course and the entire complex of data, defining the quantitative indices of this process. Borne in mind here should be the influence of environmental factors as well as the influence of internal forces, cooperating or opposing the former, that have to be taken into consideration, if we are to be able to make the proper diagnosis of a given phenomenon.

Only if we are in possession of these types of initial data, will it be possible to set apart those factors which can be considered lasting factors, i. e., those which define the basic trend and rate of development of the phenomenon that is under investigation, irrespective of deviations that may occur.

The extrapolation of a development trend, found in such a way, i. e., the prolongation of it for the coming years, gives some picture of probability of the future state of the phenomenon under investigation for a certain prognostic period.

But in social life, that which follows, is most frequently not the simple prolongation or repetition of what has been before. What usually shocks us, takes us by surprise, is not so much development and the steady quantitative growth of phenomena, but above all the sudden turns and twists, the source of which may be either the appearance, within the examined phenomenon, of new qualities, due to the fact that certain quantitative thresholds have been crossed or due to a change, caused by the activity of some external factor, which so far had been of no special significance for the given development process or simply had not yet existed.

There undoubtedly exists a chance to anticipate sudden turns, caused by the passage of certain quantitative features into new qualitative features.

Social research, conducted so far in the field of sports, permits the distinction of at least the following seven factors which exerted a lasting influence on sport.

1) *Urbanization processes.*
2) *The development of education.*
3) *Industrialization.*
4) The role and meaning of leisure for the popularization of sport.
5) The general living standard of the population.
6) The democratization of social relations and the drive towards egalitarianism.
7) Organizational model of sport.

The influence of these above-mentioned facts can actually differ very much, depending on the interaction of their influence and the proportions in which they make their appearance. There still remain existing traditions, that have taken shape already and which the research worker has difficulty to catch hold of, there remains the enormous creative force of human thought, either in the form of established scientific statements or generally accepted ideas. There still remains human initiative and creative energy, that do not lend themselves to measurement, human aspirations to shape new models of life, a new model of the human personality.

3. THE PAST TWENTY-FIVE YEARS

Dynamics and Development Trends. Physical education and sport achieved in People's Poland indices, close to the prewar period, not earlier than after 1949. Thus, one may speak about a true development of physical culture during the past 25 years, only beginning with 1950. Nevertheless, already before that time certain fundamental changes had taken place, which defined the further course o the development of physical culture. In accordance with the entire system of centralization and state planning, a state-sponsored Committee was set up, attached to the Council of Ministers, to direct physical culture, having the proper authority and budget to carry out the planned tasks. The superiority of this model of central control of sport could be noticed at once, above all as regards the financing and shaping of material conditions for the sports movement.

The system of central steering thus means the setting up of a permanent material foundation for the development of physical culture, the financing of direct sports activity as well as the setting apart of funds for the construction of sports buildings.

The next consequence of this steering was the change of the sports model, regarding its fundamental lower links. The sports clubs were now based on trade union centres and especially on the trade union organizations in the work establishments and institutions. Provisions were made for the development of a sports movement of a mass character in the countryside. This meant that the centre of gravity in the development of sport was shifted from middle class youth circles to the working population of town and villages.

Thus, already in 1950 Polish sport not only had new organizational foundations but also an outlined new development trend.

The following years brought the further development of the organizational model of sport and threw into relief the characteristic features of this new development trend. Side by side with trade union sport developed school and academic sport, there grew up a powerful organization of rural sport and a mass organization of recreational sport in towns was set up, the Society for the Popularization of Physical Culture (Polish abbreviation: TKKF).

Favourable factors in this regard were the deep social transformations, taking place in Poland during that period, above all the rapid growth of the working class and the professional and office workers as well as the intensive industrialization and urbanization processes, embracing even those rural areas, which so far had been economically most neglected.

At the same time there could be noticed an exceptionally intensive development of the school system at all levels and since schools and studies are free of charge people from towns and the countryside had now broad access to education. This is shown by Table No. 1.[1]

Thus, it was a genuine educational revolution which was actually accompanied by a substantial turning point in the dissemination of a broadly conceived humanistic culture. All these processes lead to deep transformations in the social and vocational structure of the broad strata of the population of towns and villages. A large section of skilled workers came into existence, of engineers and technicians in the towns and a new type of rural intelligentsia. Poland was lifted out of the group of poor countries, backward countries, with an industry lacking the pro-

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[1] Statistical Yearbook on Education 1968-69. Central Statistical Office.

TABLE 1. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SCHOOL SYSTEM
IN THE YEARS 1950-1968 (NUMBER OF PUPILS
AND STUDENTS, IN THOUSANDS)

Years	Pupils of primary schools	Pupils of secondary schools	Pupils of vocational schools	Students of higher schools
1950	3281.8	194.4	634.7	125.1
1968	5604.0	311.2	1523.7	305.6

per investment funds. New attitudes toward life and behavioral patterns have taken shape, new creative forces and new needs have come to the fore. Changes in habits and customs have taken place. There are now more people with a normalized work time, the right to paid vacations and access to the workers' holiday scheme.

It may be expected that the above-mentioned transformations have created the proper conditions for the development of the sports movement. These new potential possibilities for the development of physical culture, upheld by the new structure of the sports movement, all-round organizational efforts, the enlargement of the material foundation of sport and the initiative of people yielded good results, shown by Table 2 and 3.

T A B L E 2. MEMBERS OF SPORTS CLUBS AND ORGANIZATIONS, IN THOUSANDS

Year	Total	Of these women	T.U. clubs and clubs of work cooperatives		Peasant sports clubs		Society for popul. of phys. culture		Academic and school sports clubs	
			total	of these women	total	of these women	total	of these women	total	of these women
1950	898.5	—	370.8	—	277.2	—	—	—	214.9	—
1955	1,574.1	—	472.5	—	549.1	—	—	—	424.3	—
1960	1,556.1	371.4	367.7	18.5	359.5	56.7	106.5	23.0	571.9	261.6
1965	2,614.1	635.0	568.6	28.6	634.3	173.8	495.1	99.0	688.6	322.6
1968	3,429.1	809.6	791.1	35.6	775.5	220.5	780.3	169.6	888.7	377.7

This table reveals a quite obvious acceleration in the past years of the rapid development rate of all sports organizations. While in 1950 the sports movement embraced 3.6 per cent of the total population of the country, this percentage increased in 1960 already to 5.2 per cent and in 1968 to 9.2 per cent. Most probably this was due to an accumulation of factors, permitting the crossing of certain thresholds, as a result of which certain difficulties could be overcome which had bothered the sports movement so far. One probably is entitled to reach the conclusion that the most decisive factor was the discarding of a sports model, based on autonomic sports clubs and organizations, not connected with the production process and the definite passing over to clubs and organizations, backed by large numbers of people and enjoying the material support of production establishments, i. e., a model best adapted to the socialist structure of People's Poland.

TABLE 3. MEMBERS OF SPORTS CLUBS AND ORGANIZATIONS, IN THOUSANDS, IN 1985 (HYPOTHETICAL)

Year	Total	Including women	Clubs in work enterprises and cooperatives		Rural sports clubs		The Society for the Propagation of Physical Culture		Academic and school sports clubs	
			total	including women	total	including women	total	including women	total	including women
1968	3429.1	809.6	791.1	35.6	775.5	220.5	780.3	196.6	888.7	377.7
1985 W₁	18000.0	2400.0	1400.0	200.0	1600.0	650.0	2500.0	800.0	1500.0	650.0
W₂	9000.0	2700.0	1800.0	250.0	2000.0	750.0	3000.0	1000.0	1800.0	700.0

Most probably these figures also point to the distinct change that has taken place during the past few years in the consciousness of people as regards their attitude towards physical culture.

In spite of this general dynamic development, there are many irregularities and disproportions which are awaiting a solution. Mention is due here to: 1) The considerable disproportion in the participation of men and women in sports. 2) The poor participation in sport activities by middle-aged and older people. 3) The shortage of sports facilities in residential areas and a lack of funds and staffs for the development of such facilities.

4. SOME BASIC ELEMENTS OF FORECASTING

An attempt to present a continuation of the above trend of development in the next 15 years, taking into account demographic, economic and educational forecasting, would give us an over-simplified picture. But, nonetheless, it is worthwhile to get a closer look at this picture, bearing in mind that it is hypothetical to a degree, even though many forecasts have a large degree of probability because of the planned and direction-setting character of the socialist economy.

Thus, as some demographic forecasts claim, by 1968 the population in Poland will increase by 6 5 million bringing the total to close on 39 million. Taking into account the high rate of urbanization in that period, it is expected that the increase will raise the number of town inhabitants by some 40%.[2]

It is generally expected that employment in Poland will increase to 15.5 million in 1985, in that in industry to about 5.5 million respectively. This high level of employment is justified by the fact that Poland of 1985 will be a highly industrialized country. Under the already existing initial provisions of the 15-year future plan, industry is expected to increase to four times the 1965 figure, thanks to the intensification of technical progress and the scientific-technical revolution. This will bring industrial production in Poland to the level of the countries which are now in the world's lead.

[2] See Jerzy Holzer, Demographic Trends up to 1985. Warsaw, 1968.

The national income and consumption per inhabitant are to increase 2.5 times each. Poland will then move from the group of countries with medium living standards to that of high living standards.

Forecasts for education foresee an increase in the obligatory school age up to 18 or its equivalent of general secondary education. The number of university-level day-students will increase to 370,000 in 1985 and that of students attending extramural courses to 268,000 respectively.

Finally, it should be added that the great increase of people in the production age in 1970-1975 will allow a shortening of the working time from 46 to 40 hours a week, thus giving more leisure time to working people.

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If, against this background, we attempted to set indices for the development of physical culture and took as a point of departure the pace of development of the sports movement in 1955-1968 we could estimate that the number of people actively participating in the sports movement will have increased by 1985 to some 8 to 9 million, or 20 to 23% of the whole population, an index attained now by the countries most advanced in this field.

It must be said that there are many factors which substantiate this assumption.

In the first place, we must bear in mind the fact that population in towns will increase by 40%, largely at the cost of migration of the rural population in the productive age. Secondly, we must remember that already in 1975 people between 15 and 29 will constitute, according to demographic forecasts, 45% of the population in the productive age and nearly 30% of the whole population. Thirdly, the youth now in the age group that forms the core of the population engaging in sports, will have moved into the middle-aged group and there replace those who are mostly little interested in sports.

Besides, the planned intensive development of industry is another factor which speaks for the continuation of the present dynamic development of sport. Erection of hundreds of new plants is usually followed, as past experience has proved, by the emergence of hundreds of new big multi-section sports clubs, new TKKF branches and PTTK circles. Finally, the notable increase of people with higher education in the next fifteen years and the near-approach to the ideal of secondary education for all is another weighty argument supporting the above assumption.

But the working week shortened to 40 hours will probably be the most important factor. An extra free day will allow the majority of working people better to arrange household work and family duties and save some spare time for sports and tourism. It is expected, therefore, that women will go in more for sports and that their participation in the sports movement will gradually increase. The assumption is justified that their participation will go up from 23.7% in 1968 to about 30% in 1985. The same applies to greater participation in sports by people of middle age who for the first time will have some experience in sporting life and a larger margin of leisure time that will permit them to continue their exercises in spite of family duties.

Better living conditions and higher real earnings should also do much to stimulate larger participation in sports.

Moreover, larger investments on sports building should allow us to double the number of permanent sports facilities and to spread them more evenly over the whole country. To meet Polish norms at least 420 indoor swimming pools,

1,200 outdoor swimming pools, as well as 1,200 sports halls and rooms should be built by 1985.

Will the present model of physical culture remain unchanged in these new conditions, so basically different from the present ones? We must bear in mind that these conditions will be particularly favourable to the promotion of the whole culture and thus, to physical culture as well, not only from the point of view of objective but also of subjective factors.

The accumulation of all these subjective and objective reasons should bring about a number of qualitative changes, a breakthrough in many spheres of life, including also physical culture.

It seems that in sports the changes will amount mainly to a broad development of the sports movement in residential estates, of a recreation-type sport in which whole families, whole estates will take part. It will be possible to attain this goal when the people's councils have larger funds for investment in sports in residential estates.

Thus, alongside the sports movement organized by factories and offices, being one of the basic elements of the socialist model of physical culture, a new element will be added in the near future to that model — sports in residential estates, organized and handled by people's councils. A nucleus of that model already exists in the form of town, district and district-council committees for physical culture, but they do not yet have the necessary power and funds.

When this happens, the SPPC branches in residential areas will develop as dynamically as those in plants and offices. New-type sport facilities will be required then, adapted to the needs of a given residential estate and being in harmony with its architecture. There will also be a demand for instructors and activists of the residential-estate type of sport, connected in some way with the municipal economy and the work of the people's councils.

5. A MODEL OF SPORT AND HUMAN PERSONALITY

We speak of a model of sport but we have in mind a model of human personality, a model of the society. Therefore, when we try to perceive the emerging outlines of this new model and state what factors are contributing to its creation and implementation we want, of course, to know what type of man will act under that model and how the latter will affect his personality.

We strongly believe that under these new conditions, Man will be able more fully to satisfy his human needs, more efficiently to develop his mental and physical skills. This is the meaning lying behind all efforts to foresee the future. We strive to penetrate it in order to rationally shape it.

We have departed far from the model of sports which existed in inter-war Poland. That model, giving preference to middle class youth not involved in productive work, ceased to correspond to the new socialist structure of the country. Middle class sports clubs admitted only small numbers of people, mostly non-working students, free from the cares of life, youth that entered the productive age relatively late and for whom it meant the end of their youthful years.

The superiority of that new model lies in the fact that it allows whole crews of individual enterprises to be involved in sports activities and compels the management of the latter to think not only of how a man should work and produce best, but also how he should rest, enjoy life, enrich its contents.

In this model, work, rest and enjoyment reforge the link broken ages ago through the formation of market relations which split the personality of man into that of a man of affairs and a man of enjoyment, an official and a private man. Consequently, this is a more human model, closer to Man and his needs, a model which also provides favourable conditions for an increase in the number of participants in the sports movement.

SOCIOLOGY OF WORK AND ORGANIZATION
SOCIOLOGIE DU TRAVAIL ET DE L'ORGANISATION

EMPLOYEE PARTICIPATION IN JAPANESE INDUSTRIES

KUNIO ODAKA
JAPAN

I

The purpose of this paper is to review briefly recent trends in employee participation in management in Japanese industries, with special reference to its forms, the obstacles to its future development, and the ways and means to overcome them. Before entering into the subject in question, however, it seems appropriate to define the term "employee participation" as it is used in this paper.

"Workers' participation in management" in a broad sense comprises the following four types, irrespective of whether or not they are instituted by legislation: (1) co-determination by union and management, in which both parties decide jointly on major managerial policies and share the responsibility of carrying out their decisions; (2) joint consultation between union and management, where both parties hold conferences to reach formal agreements on the matters in which their interests are common; (3) employee representatives' participation in management, in which a limited number of employee and management representatives decide jointly on major managerial policies and co-operate with each other in their execution; and (4) total employee participation in management, where all the employees in an enterprise are entrusted with the power to make decisions regarding the administration of their respective work groups at shop, middle and top levels of the enterprise.

Of the four types mentioned above, it is only the last that may be called "employee participation" in its proper sense. In the present writer's opinion, the first type deprives a labor union of its inique social function of being an "opponent" of management. A union's decisions ought to be independent of those of management. Should a union be directly involved in the planning and execution of managerial policies and, in consequence, be held responsible even partly for their outcome, it would no longer be entitled to the name of "union". The German system of co-determination (*Mitbestimmung*) is an example which corresponds to the third type above, rather than the first.

While the second form, joint consultation, does not contradict the essential qualities of unionism, the role of a union in this case will be inevitably limited to that of a passive consultation through modification or alteration of original plans submitted by management. There are actually cases, at least in postwar Japan, in which joint consultation takes a form very close to that of either co-determination or collective bargaining. Neither of these cases may be considered properly joint consultation practices. As a matter of convenience, however, one may refer to the second type as "union's participation in management". It is to be

noted that this type can be coexistent with the fourth, namely, employee particicipation in its proper sense.

The third form, employee representatives' participation, can in theory be a form of participation by all the employees engaged in an enterprise. Actually, however, this form seldom functions so that the opinions and desires of all are reflected in managerial decisions because of the aloofness of employee representatives. As a result, it often happens that the employees are either indifferent to or kept uninformed of the progress and results of their representatives' participation in management. However ideally the representatives may be elected, such deficiencies are likely to remain. In order to arouse a genuine feeling of participation among employees and to heighten their motivation for work, it is vital to invite direct participation by all employees of an enterprise in managerial decisions. One may add, however, that the defects of the third form may be relatively insignificant so long as it is applied to small-scale enterprises with fewer than a couple of hundred employees.

II

With the rapid economic growth beginning in the second half of the 1950s, various systems of employee participation are gradually gaining support in Japanese industries.

Three factors seem to account for this trend. First, the centralized, authoritarian methods of traditional management have proved no longer effective. Prior to World War II, this type of managerial attitude predominated in Japanese industry. At the same time, however, the traditional managerial policy was strongly marked by a tendency to paternalism. In other words, Japanese executives tended not merely to treat their employees as a means of production but to look after all aspects of their private lives. Combined with paternalism, the authoriatarian methods of Japanese management were fairly successful until the end of World War II in securing employees' allegiance to the company while providing them with a high degree of satisfaction. In postwar years, however, industrial democracy has come to be a basic social value. In addition, an increasing proportion of young employees has been brought up under new methods of education with advocate individualism and resistance to authority. Even if a firm, following the traditional paternalistic approach, attempts to improve the welfare of its employees, it is unlikely that their response will live up to management's expectations. It has therefore become necessary for management to replace the old methods by new approaches designed to democratize undustrial relations. A sector of Japanese industry has considered employee participation the appropriate means for achieving this end.

Second, the relative shortage of labor has forced business executives to restrict employment while encouraging employees to display their talents and abilities as much as possible. The shortage of labor, which has become intensified during the sixties, makes itself felt with particular seriousness in a lack of young, newly-graduated labor force and lately there have been four to five times as many job openings as persons available for them[1]. Under these circumstances, Japanese business executives are compelled to utilize the limited number of workers as effectively as possible by making them fully exert their abilities. One of the prere-

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[1] Ministry of Labor, Division of Labor Statistics and Research *Labor White Paper*, 1969 edition (in Japanese), Tokyo, 1969, pp. 2-10.

quisites for inducing employees to do so is, without doubt, to delegate to them the power to make decisions as to the process of their own daily work. The recognition of this need has prompted management to give serious attention to employee participation.

Third, there are symptoms of employees' alienation and of a decline in their work morale, due to the spread of automation and to the increasing size and bureaucratization of business organizations. These symptoms are particularly noticeable among blue-collar workers engaged in assembly-line operations which are characterized by belt conveyers and transfer machines, and white-collar workers engaged in automated office work, such as key punchers, teletypists and computer operators[2]. One of the basic prescriptions to "disalienate" such workers and to restore their work morale is to entrust them with autonomy in their work and in the administration of their respective work places. Being aware of this, Japanese business executives have begun to give serious thoughts to the introduction of employee participation.

Support for employee participation comes not only from the management side, however. The proportion of workers who are favorable to its introduction is increasing even among those engaged in shop-floor operations[3].

It may be useful to note in this connection that no legislation has been enacted in Japan with regard to employee participation, and that there is no sign of enactment in the near future.

III

There are a variety of forms in employee participation currently practised in Japanese industries. One may cite as a noteworthy example the *ringi* system, which has been practised as a unique method of decision-making in Japanese business organizations since the early Meiji era. This system adopts a form of group decision-making, where written proposals (*ringisho*) are circulated from middle to top echelons of managemet, so that it has the appearance of a democratic and participative form of management.

The *ringi* system is still commonly found among large-scale enterprises in Japan, as a result largely of the mere force of habit. The majority of business executives, however, are well aware that the system is already obsolete and hinders

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[2] The Japanese Ministry of Labor recently conducted a Survey of Monotonous Work in the Tokyo-Yokohama industrial area drawing a sample of 1.113 employees from 14 plants representing seven different industries. According to the results of the survey a significantly larger number of complaints were reported by those engaged in the two types of jobs mentioned above, as compared with a third type of employee whose jobs were performed in small work teams, such as those working in the control rooms of electric power plants, oil refineries and automated steel mills. The most common complaints by the former types of workers consisted of a feeling of weariness dislike of the job itself and difficulty in displaying one's abilities through the job. Ministry of Labor, Committee for the Study of Monotonous Work, *Report of the 1967 Survey of Monotonous Work* (in Japanese), Tokyo, 1968 (mimeographed).

[3] According to the 1968 Survey of Monotonous Work undertaken at 53 plants representing 11 industries selected from the whole country as many as 80.3 per cent of the total number (2,451) of workers engaged in automated jobs held favorable views regard to employee participation. on the ground that it will help strengthen their right to speak in the enterprise and will help develop their abilities. By contrast only 18.1 per cent of the respondents were of a negative opinion and for the reason that such a practice will place a heavier responsibility on themselves and make their jobs harder. Ministry of Labor. Committee for the Study of Monotonous Work, *Report of the 1968 Survey of Monotonous Work* (in Japanese), Tokyo, 1969 (mimeographed).

the rational planning and quick action which are prerequisites to modern management. For one thing, the system is obviously inefficient, in that it requires too many steps of authorization before a proposal is approved and brought into operation. Furthermore, one should bear in mind that the responsibility for the decisions thus made lies neither with the person who drafts the original proposal nor with those who perfunctorily authorize it. One may even characterize the system as a skilful device for obscuring the locus of responsibility in managerial decision-making. Despite its democratic appearance, the *ringi* system actually has very little in common with a participative method of management. It is with good reason, therefore, that many progressive business executives are now attempting to abolish or at least to revise it.

With the exception of the *ringi* system, recent practices of employee participation in Japanese industries may be classified under the following five heads: (a) the human relations approach; (b) delegation of power; (c) profit-sharing schemes; (d) partnership management; and (e) the autonomous small-group system.

(*a*) *The human relations approach:* Immediately after World War II, a movement for the improvement of human relations in industry was introduced from the United States, and it soon came into fashion among Japanese enterprises during the fifties. While this movement has by now lost its popularity, several firms have adopted more sophisticated schemes of this approach while employing such devices as the suggestion system, the self-reporting system, the "open-door" policy, the "speak-up" program, etc. (E. g., Tokyo Shibaura Electric and IBM Japan).

This approach basically aims at better understanding by management of the opinions and desires of those who are in the lower strata of an organization, so that the decisions of management may approximate to the consensus of the employees as a whole. It has a disadvantage, however, that under these arrangements lower-level employees are offered only very limited chances of direct participation in decision-making with regard to the administration of their own work places.

(*b*) *Delegation of power:* Almost concurrent with the spread of the human relations movement, many Japanese firms began to experiment with the democratization of management through a system of delegation of power. The result was in most cases superficial, however, partly because of the authoritarian climate within enterprises still dominant at that time, and partly due to the lack of proficiency on the part of lower-level managers who were still unfamiliar with the working of the system. In consequence, there are only a small number of firms which have maintained this system with a fair degree of success. (E. g. Matsushita Electric and Honda Motor).

Among these successful cases, one may distinguish the following two categories: Those where individual employees are customarily subject to authoritarian, group-centered values, and are content to work at the beck and call of the section or department head who is now entrusted with full power to make decisions; and those where employees have a more individualistic, job-centered inclination, and their autonomy in their work places is more or less recognized by their boss. Only the second category should be called "employee participation".

(*c*) *Profit-sharing schemes* have a longer history in Japanese industries, and are designed to intensify employees' company allegiance as well as to arouse a feeling of participation among employees through the sharing of profits or ownership of stocks. In recent years, such schemes have been frequently utilized as de-

vices for minimizing the separation rate of employees. (E. g., Teijin Limited and Asahi Chemical).

These schemes, however, fail to offer any real opportunity for employee participation in managerial decisions, usually giving employees only the illusion thereof. Such an imaginary participation will have little effect beyond that of providing employees with a degree of temporary work incentive.

(*d*) *Partnership management:* This system, in which a limited number of employee representatives and company executives jointly — under the name of "partners" — make decisions on major managerial policies is often called "partner *keiei*" (partnership management) in postwar Japan[4]. It has proved to be fairly successful among small-sized manufacturing firms with fewer than 300 employees. (E. g., Koritsu Industrial and Jujo Paper Board.) Since only a limited number of employee representatives participate in managerial decisions under this system, however, it does not deserve to be called "employee participation in the proper sense". Furthermore, it can be effective only in small-scale enterprises where the social and psychological distance between employee representatives and employees is slight.

(*e*) *Autonomous small-group system:* An increasing number of enterprises has lately introduced a system of small groups which calls for a reorganization of the existing hierarchical structure of enterprises on the basis of autonomous work teams. (E. g., Sony and Kawasaki Steel).

Although details vary from case to case, the essence of this system invariably is self-government of face-to-face groups consisting of fewer than 20 employees each, at shop levels. The basic unit of the reorganized structure is such an autonomous work team with a leader who, in turn, becomes a constituent of an upper-level small group. The leaders of such upper-level groups again form another group at a still higher level and so on. These leaders are formally appointed by management after they are informally suggested by members of their respective work groups, and they function not only as connecting links between the lower- and upper-level groups but also as coordinators between various groups on the same level. In this manner, the organizational structure of a plant or firm is made up of an network of vertically and horizontally interconnected small work groups. Under this system, each employee is expected to participate in setting up the target of his team and in decision-making about the process of its daily work. Needless to say, these teams are assigned specific tasks and responsibilities in relation to the goals of a larger group, namely, the plant or the company to which they belong. Each employee, therefore, is required to contribute as much as possible to the achievements of his work team and, at the same time, is expected to be loyal to the plant or the company as a whole.

Whichever approach to employee participation may be chosen by an enterprise, success is guaranteed only when top management realizes that employees should be treated as partners and that they have the right to take part in managerial decisions. If, on the other hand, top management lacks this understanding and regards the approach merely as a better means to gain larger profits, the chances are that the results will be disappointing.

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[4] This term is derived from the idea of *Partnerschaftsbetrieb* which was originally suggested by Guido Fischer of the University of Munich. Guido Fischer, *Partnerschaft im Betrieb,* Heidelberg, Quelle & Meyer, 1955.

IV

There are two major obstacles to the future development of employee participation in Japanese industries, namely: (1) the resistance of labor unions and (2) the prevalence of the *nenko* system, or Japanese system of seniority, which is based on the traditional methods of group-centered employee evaluation.

(a) *The union's resistance:* Japanese labor unions are mostly organized on an enterprise basis, embracing the majority of non-managerial employees of a firm[5]. In consequence, union officials in Japan are prone to regard a system of employee participation as a threat to the union, since they fear that it would induce union members to identify themselves more closely with the company. Some officials show indecisive attitudes, on the other hand, thinking that employee participation might become a hindrance to the development of joint consultation between union and management.

Knowing of these fears, Japanese management has taken precaution not to provoke union officials. This is probably one of the reasons why Japanese management hesitates to use the term "employee participation" even where its practice has grown up in recent years.

Union resistance appears to be waning, however, as officials come to understand better the actual aims and functions of employee participation. In fact, the introduction of a system of participation does not in the least interfere with the proper functions of a labor union, which are primarily concerned with the betterment of workers' welfare, and are in the domain of distribution, rather than production.

One should note, however, that this understanding has been achieved by few of the officials of the unions affiliated with *Sohyo* (General Council of Japanese Labor Unions), which comprises two-thirds of public employees, that is, those employed directly by the government or in government-owned corporations. One of the reasons for this conservative attitude of the *Sohyo* affiliates may be the overwhelmingly authoritarian climate of government offices and public corporations. In such an environment, union officials tend to learn little about employee participation.

(b) *The nenko system,* the second obstacle to the development of employee participation, is so deeply rooted in Japanese managerial practice that it will take more than a decade before it can be successfully overcome. Originating at the turn of the century, this was a method of employment and promotion whereby a large number of young, unskilled workers were recruited from agricultural districts, hired first at relatively low wages and given on-the-job training, and moved up gradually to higher income statuses as time went on. This practice was not only an indispensable, but a rational, means of personnel management in a nation like Japan, at that time industrially backward, and keenly aware of the need for rapid industrialization and the development of large-scale industries through the introduction of modern technology from the West. The same practice was extended to office workers who were graduates of either high schools or universities. Under this system, the hierarchy of skills coincided with that of *nenko* (length of service), and both income and status levels were raised concurrently.

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[5] For this reason Japanese labor unions are often called "enterprise unions". For the structure and functions of enterprise unions see Solomon B. Levine, *Industrial Relations in Postwar Japan,* Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1958, pp. 90-91, 101-107.

Furthermore, the *nenko* system was in full accord with the traditional entrepreneurial ideology of Japan, which regarded enterprise as a large family, and also with the Confucian philosophy of "elders first", a fundamental principle of social order within the family. In the old days, a business firm was generally conceived of as a closed, organismic group after the example of a patriarchal family or a feudal clan. The major codes of behavior to which members of the group were expected to conform were unquestioning loyalty to the group; co-operation and harmony among the group members; and priority given to the continuance and prosperity of the group as a whole over the welfare of its individual members. *Nenko* was used as the basic index for measuring the extent to which each member conformed to these group norms.

The group-centered patterns of value orientation, which have been prevalent in all aspects of social life in Japan, may be called "groupism" to contrast them with as against Western individualism[6]. This "groupism" has of course undergone a considerable transformation since the end of World War II and the extent of its influence has also shrunk. Even today, however, not a few business executives and employees unconsciously accept the group-centered values.

So long as the *nenko* system and the underlying group-centered orientations are predominant, it is only natural that a rigid but elaborate hierarchical order is at home within enterprises, and that the "escalator" system of promotion is deeply rooted. In such a hierarchical order it is hardly to be expected that the power of decision-making would be entrusted to lower-level employees. Even if a system of employee participation is introduced, it will not function effectively unless the traditional *nenko* system is radically reformed.

V

At present one observes three different types of managerial policy aiming a a reform of the *nenko* system: (A) the conventional type, which keeps the existing system almost unchanged, while supplementing it by human relations techniques, delegation of power, etc.; (B) the individualistic type, which adopts the method of evaluating employees primarily by their skill and job achievements; and (C) the combined type, which attempts to reshape the company's organizational structure in terms of a network of autonomous small work units.

(A) A number of variants of the *conventional* type can be distinguished, depending on the devices used to modify the *nenko* system. One method of modification, adopted by several firms, is to substitute for the current practice of wage payment through seniority some kind of job-rating wage system. Solutions may vary, but there is a common factor among all: that is, the conventional type of policy invariably adheres to the group-centered value system and leaves the substance of the *nenko* system virtually intact. In fact, the majority of recent reform plans in Japanese personnel management are of this nature. This suggests the

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[6] This is not the place to go into the details of various hypotheses concerning the origins of the group-centered patterns of value orientation. It will suffice here to list a few key items which are considered essential in the analysis of this problem: (i) that Japan is a small country geographically separated from the outer world; (ii) that the Japanese are racially and culturally highly homogeneous: (iii) that the units of Japanese social life were traditionally patriarchal families; (iv) that the physical structure of Japanese houses is suitable for facilitating collective rather than individual ways of living; and (v) that there existed in Japan little tradition of monotheistic religion like Christianity.

strength of the tradition of "groupism" supporting the *nenko* system. Small wonder if some business executives even try to stress the merits of this system. They would argue that the exceptionally rapid progress of Japanese industrialization has been made possible by the use of various traditional practices of management, including that of *nenko,* and that there is no need to modify them.

(B) The *individualistic* approach aims at eliminating the defects and abuses of the *nenko* system by introducing methods of job- and skill-centered evaluation, such as those commonly found in the United States. This type of policy may be characterized as follows: More consideration is given to individuals' abilities and skill than to their educational background and seniority in determining recruitment and job assignment; the "one-job-by-one-person" system of operations in which individual employees are held responsible for their own work performance; and employee evaluation and promotion are made primarily on the basis again of skill levels and job achievements rather than seniority. If this type of policy is carried through successfully, the *nenko* system — merits and demerits together — will be totally wiped out and entirely replaced by a very different mode of operation. This policy, however, has had only a handful of successes in Japan, though there are many theorists who favor it.

(C) The *combined* type, which attempts to co-ordinate job-centered and group-centered approaches, makes use of autonomous work teams, as described earlier. Under such a policy, both the working of the system of organization and the method of employee evaluation are determined by integrating these two patterns of value orientation.

The working of the organization varies slightly as between intra-team or inter-team activities. In the former, each employee is entitled to autonomy in determining the method by which he will carry out the assignment, and which will employ his talents and abilities as much as possible. Although mutual cooperation among the team members is encouraged, the basic principle in running the work team is highly individualistic and job-centered. In inter-team activities, on the other hand, higher-level group-centered control applies a set of adjustment procedures that ensure the harmonious functioning of the entire plant or enterprise. It follows that individual team members are required to be loyal to the larger group as well.

Similarly, employee evaluation proceeds through a dual approach. On the one hand, each employee is evaluated within his own work team in terms of his job achievements, in accordance with which he is given a functional position, such as team leader, section subchief, etc. On the other hand, the same person is rated by the use of an integrated scale based on length of service, educational background, abilities, achievements, etc. The resulting evaluation thus provides a grading by which each employee is offered a certain status position with a corresponding pay rate, such as second-grade engineering, third-grade administrative, etc.

In view of the prevalence of group-centered patterns of value orientation in Japan, the combined type of policy seems the ideal one for the future development of employee participation. At the present moment, only a fraction of enterprises are actually practising this type of managerial policy. One anticipates, however, that as more business executives come to appreciate the merits of employee participation, an increasing number of enterprises will adopt this type of approach in the future.

MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL
PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS AS MECHANISMS
FOR INTEGRATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

WILLIAM M. EVAN

USA

The sociology of organizations has for some years been preoccupied with problems of intraorganizational dynamics, principally in the context of industrial organizations. Only recently has a shift occurred in the angle of vision, with some researchers focusing on problems of interorganizational dynamics (Turk, 1970; Evan, 1966; Litwak and Hylton, 1962; Levine and White, 1961). Under the circumstances, it is not surprising that scant research attention has been paid to organizations operating in what political scientists and others call the international system (Brams, 1969; Miles, 1968; Galtung, 1967). I refer to two categories of international organizations: one, a private, profit organization which in recent years has come to be designated as the "multinational corporation", and the other, an international professional association, a non-profit voluntary association often characterized as one type of international non-governmental organization and abbreviated as INGO. Since World War II both types of organizations have grown markedly. Both organizations also involve participation of occupational elites — executives of corporations and members of various professions — whose collective efforts could have far-reaching consequences, particularly for the state of the international system.

The purpose of this paper is to explore some features of multinational corporations and international professional associations as they bear on the degree of integration of the international system.

ALTERNATIVE MODELS OF INTEGRATION
OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

A widespread assumption underlying the use of the term "international organization" among political scientists and other scholars is that the international system is composed of various relationships among sovereign actors. In order to improve the prospects for peace between nations, it is necessary to generate normative integration — i. e., a commitment to a set of values and norms — through the mechanism of a universal intergovernmental organization. With the aid of multilateral agreements, a complex of intergovernmental organizations is created which builds commitment among nation-states to a body of international law designed to increase the forces for international order. With an increase in the level of normative integration, the international system evolves in the direction of a

world community of peaceful sovereign states. In effect, the model implicit in this conception of the international system is that of a *direct, linear process* of normative integration increasing as a function of interaction of nation-states within the framework of intergovernmental organizations.

This model guided the formation of the League of Nations and, to some extent, that of the United Nations as well. Without abridging national sovereignty, membership in an intergovernmental organization is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the development of normative integration. Nor is normative integration a sufficient condition for significantly transforming the international system. Other modes of integration — notably ecomomic, organizational and occupational — which create new patterns of interdependence, are essential if the international system is to undergo a major transformation.

The failure of the League of Nations was not lost on some of its former members in Western Europe. After World War II they began to explore problems of economic integration via regional organizations which would impose limitations on national sovereignty. The Economic and Steel Community, founded in 1952, was conceived as a supranational organization which paved the way for the more inclusive European Economic Community in 1958 (Haas, 1958; Schokking and Anderson, 1960). Among the Comminist countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union a similar movement toward economic integration was initiated, which gave rise in 1949 to the Council on Mutual Economic Aid (CEMA or COMECON) (Grzybowski, 1964). Similar regional organizations have since emerged in Latin America (the Latin American Free Trade Area and the Central American Common Market), Africa and elsewhere.

The model underlying various experiments in regionalism may be conceptualized as involving an *indirect, linear process* of integration: Nation-states form regional organizations and the participation of both nation-states and regional organizations within the framework of intergovernmental organizations, such as the U.N., stimulate economic as well as normative integration of the international system. Although it is probably premature to assess the predictive power of this model, it is doubtful whether in the absence of an infrastructure of international, non-governmental organizations of a profit and non-profit variety, adequate system linkages can be formed among nation-states, regional organizations and intergovernmental organizations. This conjecture about the potential role of international, non-governmental organizations suggests a complex, non-linear model with a variety of feedback loops diagrammed in Figure 1.

According to this model, nation-states, particularly those that are highly industrialized, give rise to multinational corporations, that is, enterprises that develop production, research and distribution facilities in various countries of the world.

Nation-states also spawn a multitude of non-governmental organizations — a high proportion of which consist of professional associations — which become federated at the international level. Some of these international non-governmental, non-profit organizations are accorded official consultative status under the U.N. Charter (Article 71).

Each type of organization has mutual interactions with regional organizations; and although there are as yet few linkages between the multinational corporation and the international professional association, they are likely to develop in the future as these organizations discover their intersecting interests in common third parties such as nation-states, regional organizations and various intergovernmental organizations. Collectively and cumulatively, the international non-governmental

organizations, the multinational corporations and the regional organizations interact with one another and with nation-states and intergovernmental organizations in such a manner as to increase the degree of integration of the international system along four dimensions: normative, economic, organizational and occupational.

Fig. 1. Nonlinear Model of Integration of the International System

With the aid of our nonlinear model of integration of the international system, we shall now consider in turn the growth and interaction patterns of multinational corporations and international professional associations.

GROWTH AND INTERACTION PATTERNS

Multinational Corporations

Although the term "multinational corporation" has become current only in the past two decades, the phenomenon of international business operation is, of course, not new. "The first wave of foreign investment by manufacturing companies began in the closing decades of the nineteenth century, and continued, gathering strength, up to 1914. . . ." (Miles, 1969: 259). One of the factors that stimulated the exponential growth of multinational corporations in the past decade is the emergence of the European Economic Community (Rolfe, 1969: 11; Kaufmann, 1970: 103). It is now recognized that American corporations have taken more advantage of the economic opportunities created by this regional organization than European corporations themselves, so much so that it has prompted Servan-Schreiber to deplore this trend and exhort his fellow Europeans to ward off the invasion of American enterprise (Servan-Schreiber, 1968).

Notwithstanding the rate of growth of multinational corporations, data on this type of firm, particularly of an organizational nature, are hard to come by. For the first time in its history, the Union of International Associations included a section on multinational corporations in the 12th edition of its *Yearbook on*

W. M. EVAN (USA)

International Organizations (Union of International Associations, 1969: 1189-1214). In a preliminary survey, the *Yearbook* reports 7,045 parent companies in fourteen European countries and the U.S.A. with affiliates in one or more countries. Omitted from this survey are data on Japan, Canada, Communist countries and others, presumably because they were unobtainable. A subset of these corporations with affiliates in ten or more countries, totalling 590, is listed by name which suggested an analysis, presented in Table 1, of the nationality of the corporate headquarters of these organizations. Of these relatively large multinational corporations, 46 per cent are American, 26 per cent are British, 7 per cent are German and 7 per cent are French, with the remainder distributed among eight European countries. Underlying this uneven distribution of parent companies among countries is a differential in economic development. This is borne out by a statistically significant rank-order correlation coefficient of .39 (Kendall tau) between the number of multinational firms in a country and its GNP per capita, shown in Table 2.

TABLE 1. COUNTRY OF CORPORATE HEADQUARTERS OF MULTINATIONAL FIRMS BY NUMBER OF COUNTRIES IN WHICH AFFILIATES ARE LOCATED*

	No. of Countries in Which Affiliates Are Located								
Country of HO	10-12	13-15	16-20	21-25	26-30	31-40	41+	Total	%
Denmark	3	—	—	—	—	—	1	4	1
Netherlands	8	2	4	2	2	—	1	19	3
U.K.	47	31	43	14	10	5	3	153	26
U.S.A.	92	59	40	37	18	14	9	269	46
Germany (FR)	18	10	9	1	2	2	—	42	7
Italy	—	2	2	4	1	1	—	10	2
Sweden	10	4	3	2	5	2	—	26	4
Switzerland	8	3	3	2	—	2	—	18	3
France	19	6	8	5	2	—	—	40	7
Belgium	3	2	1	—	—	—	—	6	1
Norway	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	1	**
Austria	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	2	**

* Source : Union of International Associations, *Yearbook of International Organizations*, 12 th edition Brussels, Belgium, 1969, Table 3, p. 1203.
** Less than .5 per cent

To undertake research, engineering design, manufacturing and marketing in a multitude of differing environments, a multinational corporation must transfer products, capital, managers and other technical personnel, as well as technology. The extensive transfer of the factors of production points to some of the effects the multinational corporations are having on various components of the international system.

The most proximate effect is on the host countries in which affiliates are located. By employing its nationals in various capacities, from unskilled laborers to professional and managerial personnel, the parent company creates many new employment and career opportunities. Invariably, employees in host countries are the recipients of new bodies of knowledge and skills essential to man, the technology transferred by the parent company (Rolfe, 1969: 48-60). Apart from such beneficial effects on a segment of the host country's labor force and, in turn, on the standard of living of employees, the inflow of foreign capital potentially stimulates economic development.

TABLE 2. RANK ORDER CORRELATION OF NUMBER OF MULTI-
NATIONAL FIRMS OF A COUNTRY AND ITS GNP PER CAPITA*

Country of HO	Number of Multi-national Firms	Rank Order	GNP/Capita (000 U.S.Dollars)	Rank Order
U.S.A.	2816	1	8.8	1
United Kingdom	1651	2	1.9	8.5
Germany (FR)	801	3	2.0	6.5
France	471	4	2.1	5
Switzerland	349	5	2.5	3
Netherlands	222	6	1.7	10
Sweden	219	7	2.7	2
Belgium	197	8	1.9	8.5
Italy	101	9	1.2	12
Denmark	82	10	2.3	4
Norway	78	11	2.0	6.5
Austria	38	12	1.4	11
Spain	9	13	0.8	13

$\tau = .39$, significant at .03.
* Union of International Associations, *Yearbook of International Organizations*, 12th ed., Brussels, Belgium, 1969, p. 1189.

As for reciprocal effects, i. e., from the host country on the parent company, several are noteworthy. First, it grants the company legal protection of incorporation. Secondly, it subjects the company to taxation which may be of economic as well as political importance to the host government. And thirdly, as a condition for admission in the first place, particularly in a developing country, the parent company may be required to enter into a joint venture with the host government as a partner.

Less proximate effects of the multinational firm may be discerned in the changing relations between nation-states. By virtue of the fact that these firms operate production facilities in various countries, they stimulate trade among nation-states. And to the extent that they have recourse to vertical integration, international trade includes the transfer of products among affiliates of multinational firms. Moreover, because such firms often have similar operations in more than one country, there is a tendency, over time, to standardize technology (Behrman, 1969, 74-75; Kindleberger, 1969, 84-86). There is also a tendency to standardize various policies, including wage scales. At least one international economist has suggested that such companies are exerting an influence in the direction of wage equalization, thus, in the long run contributing to a reduction of one source of income inequality between nations (Kindleberger, 1969: 34-35, 188).

Yet another impact of these firms on the relationships between nation-states, which is indeed dramatic, is the recent emergence of what Perlmutter has called the "trans-ideological venture" (Perlmutter, 1969). To modernize their industrial plant, Communist countries have encouraged their state-owned enterprises to enter into co-production contracts with Western firms. Such contracts usually provide for the cooperative manufacture of finished industrial products. Whether such co-production contracts will become institutionalized, whether they will diffuse to such regional organizations as the European Common Market and the Council on Mutual Economic Aid, only time will tell.

Operating within and between sovereign states exposes the multinational firm to various hazards, chief of which, of course, is nationalization by a host country.

Another restriction on the operations of multinational firms occurs when a home government, in exercising its rights of extra-territoriality, intervenes in the operations of a subsidiary in a host country. A case in point is when the U.S., committed to a policy of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, prohibits IBM's subsidiary in France from selling the French Government a particular type of a computer needed for the production of nuclear bombs (Kindleberger, 1969: 43).

Such risks and restrictions, stemming from the fact that the multinational company is a citizen of several sovereign states, have prompted some scholars to speculate about a new legal status for this type of organization. Instead of being subject to various sovereignties, they advocate that it be chartered, taxed and controlled by an international organization, perhaps some agency of the U.N. (Robinson, 1964: 224; 1967: 154). If such a transformation in legal status were ever wrought, the U.N. and the international system obviously would be its beneficiaries. The U.N. would have a greatly expanded source of income from many thousands of companies to finance adequately its own activities as well as the urgent development programs of many poor member states, thus substantially strengthening the economic, organizational and normative levels of integration of the international system.

International Professional Associations

Although it antedates the multinational corporation, the international professional association is also essentially a twentieth century phenomenon. What is more, like the multinational corporation, its growth rate in the past two decades has been impressive. It is by far the most numerous and probably the most influential type of organization in the class usually referred to as international, non-governmental organizations or INGOs. In a study of INGOs, Smoker found that the rate of formation between 1870 and 1960 has increased exponentially, except for two slumps associated with World Wars I and II (Smoker, 1965: 640-641). This finding very likely applies to international professional associations as well.

For an assessment of the growth of different types of international professional associations, we turn again to the invaluable *Yearbook* of the Union of International Associations. Over the years this organization has struggled with the problem of classifying INGOs. In its 12th edition, nineteen categories of organizations are presented from which I have selected the following six that appear to include a great variety of professional associations: Social Sciences, Law, Administration; Professions, Employers; Economics, Finance; Technology, Science; Health, Medicine (Union of International Associations, 1969: 13). Examining various editions of the *Yearbook* yielded data, shown in Table 3, on the number of associations reported in each of these six categories for a sixty-year period, from 1909-1969.

The first noteworthy finding is that as of 1969 there were 757 international professional associations which constitute 50% of the population of 1,515 active INGOs for that year. In all likelihood, this percentage underestimates the total number of INGOs that are in fact engaged in professional activities. A reclassification of the population of associations in the *Yearbook* would probably yield a higher percentage. Secondly, over a sixty-year period these associations have increased about tenfold; and during the last twenty years they have increased about 169%. The average annual percentage increase in the past two decades is about 9%, a striking growth rate which approximates that of the multinational corporation.

TABLE 3. GROWTH OF INTERNATIONAL PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS*

Category	1909—1910	1951—1952	1956—1957	1966—1967	1968—1969	% Increase 1951—1969	% Increase 1951—1969	Average Annual % Increase Since	
								1909	1951
Social Science	10	35	57	80	90	800	157	13.33	8.26
Law, Administration	13	30	28	48	54	315	80	5.25	4.21
Professions, Employers	2	34	67	93	105	5150	208	85.83	10.99
Economics, Finance	3	14	15	35	40	1238	185	20.55	9.77
Technology	8	35	36	83	102	1175	191	19.58	10.07
Science	21	56	69	137	152	623	171	10.38	9.02
Health, Medicine	16	77	100	173	214	1237	178	20.62	9.36
Total	73	281	372	649	757	936	169	15.61	8.91

* Source: Union of International Associations, *Yearbook of International Organizations*, Brussels, Belgium; 1st, 4th, 6th, 11th and 12th editions

Given the number and growth rate of international professional associations, what effect are they having on the process of integration of the international system? In the absence of relevant systematic research, I shall approximate an answer to this question with the aid of the nonlinear model of integration of the international system, presented in Figure 1. This entails mapping the interaction patterns of these organizations with other components of the international system. To do this, we shall first consider some of the activities of these organizations.

The principal functions of these associations are to convene congresses and other special meetings, publish conference proceedings and research reports, facilitate an exchange of visits, stimulate collaborative research, etc. In organizing a congress, the international professional association depends upon the cooperation and assistance of its member organizations in various countries. Of the estimated 3,000-4,000 international congresses of INGOs held annually (Judge, 1969; 144), involving at least one million people, probably one-half are convened by international professional associations. It is, therefore, no wonder that the problems of planning and managing congresses have themselves become the subject of international congresses (Union of International Associations, 1961).

On the occasion of the Fifth World Congress of Sociology in 1962, Lazarsfeld and Leeds pointed out that congresses perform three important interrelated functions: they afford an opportunity for personal contacts, stimulate joint research projects and sensitize participants to theoretical perspectives of members from different countries (Lazarsfeld and Leeds, 1962). That personal contacts, in turn, increase sensitivity to foreign perspectives was recently noted by Marshall, a former president of the International Sociological Association (UNESCO, 1966:11).

The various functions performed by international professional associations tend to increase the bonds between the parent organization, as it were, and the affiliated organizations, i. e., the national professional associations in the various nation-states. And by eliciting participation of national professional associations from various nation-states, the international professional association unintentionally creates a network of relationships between nation-states. This is especially true for those associations that are relatively free of ideology. Thus, for example, Kriesberg found that in health and science INGOs, in which consensus is

presumably high, participation of professional associations from the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. is higher than in INGOs in which consensus is low, such as those dealing with international relations, art and religion (Kriesberg, 1968: 471).

There are also other links with nation-states, one of which is of considerable moment to the international professional association. The nation-state is the source of incorporation of this type of association; and depending on how liberal its incorporation law is, it affects the legal status of the association and, more specifically, such rights as owning property, holding funds, entering into contracts, transferring funds from one country to another and the freedom of its representatives to travel over the world (Rodgers, 1960).

Another link with the nation-state, which is quite different, involves rendering expert professional guidance, as in the case of the International Statistical Institute which has helped nations with their censuses to insure high professional standards and comparable classifications (Keyfitz, 1968: 235); and a variety of medical associations, such as the International Union Against Tuberculosis, have aided nation-states in the combating of diseases (White, 1951: 171).

Compared with the links between the international professional association and the nation-state, those with regional organizations are probably fewer. The European Economic Community has accorded consultative status to various INGOs, some of which would fall into the category of professional associations (Schokking and Anderson, 1960: 392-395). In all likelihood, *regional* professional associations, such as the European Federation of National Associations of Engineers, develop closer ties with the European Economic Community than do *international* professional associations. This may also be true in other regional communities, e. g., the Central American Common Market and their corresponding professional as-sociations, e. g., the Pan-American Federation of Engineering Societies.

As regards the bonds between the international professional association and the multinational firm, they seem rather tenuous, judging from the virtual absence of any discussion of this relationship in the literature. This is indeed surprising, in view of the fact that there is a high overlap in membership of engineers and scientists in these two types of organizations and that both organizations struggle with the ambiguities of operating across national boundaries. Apart from encouraging employees to attend international congresses, some multinational corporations probably make grants available to international professional associations in order to assist them with their dissemination of professional information. It can be safely predicted that when each type of organization becomes fully cognizant of the other's existence — and the Union of International Associations already is, witness the addition of a section of multinational corporations in its *Yearbook* — new patterns of interactions will emerge which will significantly increase the level of integration of the international system.

By far the most highly developed interaction patterns are observable between international professional associations and intergovernmental organizations or IGOs, as they are customarily abbreviated. This is to be expected since some INGOs have for a long time sought to influence the decisions of IGOs. The fact that INGOs are accorded consultative status to the Economic and Social Council of the U.N. and to its many specialized agencies, such as the International Labor Organization, the World Health Organization and UNESCO, has encouraged the growth of INGOs — so much so that it has been asserted that "Every IGO ... has at least one

counterpart in the INGO world" (Rodgers, 1960: 8). The reciprocal effects between these two types of organizations have been extensive. Some international professional associations have been instrumental in the formation of some IGOs and, in turn, some IGOs have created some international professional associations.

The unique role of UNESCO in creating and reorganizing various international associations in the social sciences and in establishing two super-INGOs, viz., the International Social Science Council and the International Committee for Social Science Documentation, is well known (UNESCO, 1966). Less well known, and of considerable importance, is the fact that UNESCO provides subventions to various international professional associations to supplement their meager budgets.

In short, there is already in being an elaborate network of relationships between international professional associations and various components of the international system. How to strengthen these relationships in order to increase the level of normative and organizational integration of the international system is a challenging problem for the sociology of organizations.

CONCLUSION

Two types of international organizations — the multinational corporation and the international professional association — have thus far largely eluded the ken of awareness of researchers in the sociology of organizations. This oversight need not continue because these types of organizations provide strategic sites for coming to grips with two frontier problems in the field: a) the analysis of interorganizational dynamics; and b) the cross-cultural comparison of organizations.

Broadly conceived, the multinational corporation and the international professional association may be collectively performing the solidary functions at the international level which Durkheim envisioned for "occupational groups" within the nation (Durkheim, 1960: 27-28). By studying the interaction patterns of these organizations to ascertain whether they are in fact creating networks of people transcending the nation-state and generating new levels of normative, economic, organizational and occupational integration, social scientists can discover whether Durkheim's anticipations are valid for the international system.

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URBAN SOCIOLOGY
SOCIOLOGIE URBAINE

LATIN AMERICAN INTERNAL MIGRATIONS IN THIRD WORLD PERSPECTIVE

RICHARD M. MORSE

USA

In this vein, the Veblen-Mills tradition of United States sociology offers more for the study of Latin American societies than the Merton-Lazarsfeld tradition.

The question at issue is antecedent to both theorizing and policy making, for it has to do with perception of reality. This being the case, it might not be extravagant to suggest that we turn for a while from sociological categories to literary sources. Moffatt gives a cue by extracting elements of the *cultura del cabecita* from *Martin Fierro*. To review at this point the gallery of human types from *La Celestina, Lazarillo de Tormes, Quijote, El Perriquillo Sarniento* down through recent novelists (lingering over the four volitional positions defined by Unamuno in the prologue to his *Tres novelas ejemplares* — surely this would sharpen our perception and understanding of stances and strategies in contemporary urban society. The skilled literary eye can do even more. It can reconstruct the logic of a whole society, as Antônio Cândido (1970) does for early-nineteenth-century Rio by his reading of the *Memórias de um Sargento de Milicias.*

THIRD-WORLD MIGRATIONS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

Various researchers have suggested that urbanization in Latin America can usefully be compared with the process in other parts of the Third World, particularly Sub-Saharan Africa and India. Friedmann (1970: 23-30) notes differences in migration patterns in these three areas but subordinates them to a global paradigm for the urbanization process. Little (1964) compares migrants' regional associations in West African cities and Lima, Peru, to conclude that in both cases they mediate between primary groups and "units of the urban industrial structure" to help "the rural migrant to assume an urban role". For Chile Herrick (1965: 55) emphasizes the nature of the migratory movement; because it follows the fill-in pattern, the urbanization of migrants is gradual and "does not provide strain for the society in the same way that African and Indian migrations have". Kahl (1959: 68) claims that family structure facilitates the transition. "The Mexican rural family system is better adapted to urban needs than is the African, and thus less change is produced when people move cityward". Lewis (1965b: 503) endorses and generalizes this hypothesis: "On purely theoretical grounds I would expect that culture shock would be greater for tribal peoples" than for peasants who move

into cities.[1] Southall (1964: 21) agrees: "The peasant value system in a class-stratified society is less incompatible with urban living than that of a classless tribal society: there is more that is transferable and therefore has higher survival value".

These formulations suggest two distinct hypotheses: (1) Migrants are advantaged for urban life when they carry with them "pre-urban" tribal, caste, kin or locality-group associations which can be reworked for protective and supportive purposes in the city. (2) Migrants are advantaged for city life when they come from "urbanized" rural areas where castes or primary associations have disintegrated and persons are psychologically prepared to participate in an individualistic, class-based society. Rare is the scholar who can bring comparative research to bear on the issue, such as Lewis conducted in Mexico and North India. Confronted with these specific cases, Lewis cautions against premature typologies (1965a: 303-37). In some respects the caste-based North Indian village "has somewhat the quality of our urban communities with their variety of ethnic and minority groups and a high degree of division of labor". In Tepoztlán, Mexico, the population and its traditions are "more homogeneous, and there is nothing comparable to the divisive effects of the caste system". Yet Rampur, India, also has more "primitive" features, such as an extended family system which plays a vigorous integrating role in village life. In Tepoztlán the extended family is weak, despite elaborate *compadrazgo;* religious and political life is organized on non-kinship bases, and social relations are "atomistic". Similar ambiguity characterizes the two villages' regional involvements. Rampur with its haphazard alleys and lack of plaza and government buildings seems more rural and "village-like"; yet its affinal and lineage ties link it to multiple networks of over four hundred other villages, "making for a kind of rural cosmopolitanism". Tepoztlán has a plaza, church, market and centrally organized religious and political institutions; yet this centripetal, self-contained settlement pattern, heir of the Spanish colonial model, keeps the villages of highland Mexico in relative isolation each from another.

Since Lewis did not follow his North Indian villagers to the city as he did the Tepoztecans, we fail to learn whether what helps them adapt to urban life is the experience derived from the urban-like or heterogeneous quality of their home community or whether it is the organizational support afforded by a more "primitive" extended family system (or perhaps, a combination of the two). Such theorizing as emerges from his Latin American research alternately enlightens and perplexes. His article "Urbanization without Breakdown" (1952) was a valuable corrective to generalizations about the disorganization of urban societies. His insight, however, threatened to collapse into the truism that migrants not yet absorbed by the city are not yet fully urbanized. Lewis (1965b) valiantly resists this reduction to the obvious. He has also sharpened his attack on the folk-urban construct that is alleged to idealize village life and to derogate the big city. He even comes close to implying that Tepoztecans in their village habitat are withdrawn, distrustful, envious, violent, sorcery-ridden and atomistic but that once they relocate in Mexico City their *Vecindades* blossom with social interaction, mutual aid, shared experience and revitalized family and religious life.

[1] With possible inconsistency Lewis (1968: XIV) elsewhere notes a "striking contrast" between tribal African and rural Latin American migrants because the village ties and "well-organized traditional culture" of the former inhibit formation of "a full-blown culture of poverty in many of the African towns and cities". Since Lewis defines the culture of poverty both as a form of marginalization in capitalist societies and as a protective response to marginalization, one scarcely knows whether this statement meshes with the one quoted in the text.

Lewis confronts us with two intriguing paradoxes: (1) He challenges Redfield's folk-urban continuum, asking that we redirect ourselves to "controlled, narrow-focus comparison of subunits" (1965b: 502); he then smuggles in his own continuum theory (tribal-peasant-urban) by suggesting that peasant migrants to cities experience less culture shock than tribal migrants. (2) He criticizes Louis Wirth's description of urban social disorganization for its assumption that "all people who live in cities are affected by this experience in profound and similar ways" (1965b: 496); he then offers his own "culture of poverty" (1966; 1968: xlii-lii) as a generalized ethos to be encountered in such dissimilar settings as London, Glasgow, Paris, Harlem, San Juan, Mexico City and in one version (1964: 151) the "courtyard cultures" of African cities.

Some deft casuistry could undoubtedly save the appearances of this private system. But Mangin (1968a; 1968b) seems justified in making the criticism that Lewis sweeps national cultures under the rug too easily and that the "culture of poverty" might more appropriately be called "a cognitive orientation" than a culture.[2]

Global comparisons of urbanization are treacherous for many reasons, the most obvious being intracontinental diversity. For Epstein (1969), the heterogeneity of urban Africa requires that its cities be classified along scales registering differences of civic,[3] industrial and demographic structure; these factors in turn affect ecology, administrative attitudes, welfare policies, employment possibilities, forms of voluntary association and other elements of the migrant-absorption process. Balán (1969) makes a comparable proposal for Latin American cities. Not only, he feels, should migrants be classified by provenience but also cities themselves should be ranked by two variables: degree of "credentialism" (or, entry requirements of the occupational structure) and rate of increase of jobs in high-productivity sectors. Cross-tabulation produces four ideal-types of Latin American city.[4]

Generalization is even more difficult when we turn from the assimilation to the acculturation and adjustment of migrants.[5] For however we may wish to characterize the *tendencies* of urban value schemes (organic solidarity, universal-achievement traits, Southall's "density of role texture"), the cultural amalgam of any given city is embedded in a larger regional or national culture. While one can devise crude comparative indices for assimilation (e.g., housing, income, employment), cultural and psychological indices are more relative, as indicated above in the discussion of deviance. It would be misleading, for example, to use rates of prostitution, thievery or mendicancy as a cross-cultural index of maladjustment or cultural breakdown.

The best hope for comparisons of continental scope seems to lie not in evaluating the relative success with which cities accommodate migrants — which is a little like trying to establish a yardstick for "happiness" — but in identifying broad ecological and migratory patterns. In the literature on Indian and African

[1] In fairness one should add that Lewis has been pommeled a bit immoderately of late for his lack of conceptual rigor (Opler, 1968; Valentine, 1968; Silberstein, 1969; González, 1969). After all, the immediacies he so voluminously reports scarcely require elaborate theoretical validation.

[3] "Civic" structure refers to administrative policies governing location and housing of migrants. Rogler (1967) contrasts three Latin American cities in this respect.

[4] Critical comments by other scholars are appended to both the Epstein and Balan articles.

[5] Trout (1968) distinguishes among "structural assimilation" (integration to functional institutional roles), "acculturation" (acquisition of attitudes and knowledge of urban society) and "adjustment" (degree of psychological stress experienced).

migrations one is struck by the recurrence of the term "network". Epstein (1969: 256) reports that African urban-dwellers are involved in a complex network of relations with neighbors, workmates and friends centering on persons defined as kinsmen and fellow tribesmen. These ties make for stability in a fluid situation. "[They] link together large numbers of individuals not only within the one town, but between one town and another, and between town and country. More than this they provide the basis for a more elaborate scheme of organizing social relationships in the new environment."

In the Copperbelt towns, where kinship and affinity are no longer a viable basis for social action, tribalism continues to offer beliefs and reference points that are drawn upon by the principle of "situational selection". "In this way the network of tribal relationships operating within the town provides a framework by means of which any African is able to fix his relationship with any other. Here therefore "trubalism" is a category of interaction in day-to-day social intercourse." (Epstein 1958: 224-40)

In rural India, villages may be interlinked by common descent and village exogamy, caste assemblies, work obligation and participation in religious or political movements. Urban contacts are only one form of external relationship for the village. Supralocal networks may link as many as 100,000 people directly or indirectly. "Traditional routes of contact outside of the village are mostly with other villages, and travel is in the time-honored pathways or 'networks'" which lessen the urban impact on rural areas. (Lambert, 1962: 120-23)[6]

An obvious reflection to make is that Latin America is more urbanized than Sub-Saharan Africa and India and that its cities exert stronger disruptive or polarizing force on rural areas. Ellefsen (1962: 96) notes the limited reach of metropolitan hinterlands in India: "Much of the area fairly close to the city, . . . which would be an active hinterland for a comparable Western city, remains as isolated and tied to agriculture and a bartertype economy as many points lying at great-distances from any major city". In much of Sub-Saharan Africa urban communities developed in modern times under European colonial auspices. Hamdan (1069) reports that sixteen African states have "pygmy" capitals of fewer than 50,000 inhabitants; some he even calls "capital-less". Younger, peripherally located capitals have a regional rather than national character and recruit migrants mostly from their close environs, while certain traditional cities, such as the Yoruba mud cities of 100,000 or more inhabitants, are scarcely urban by usual definitions.

Beyond quantitative indices of urbanization, however, lies the question of configuration. Just as Latin American development does not replicate the stages of the Rest of the West, neither do India and Africa accompany the Latin American. Hoselitz (1962: 180-81) points out that India's resource endowment and structure of investment is very different from Latin America's and will dictate different urban solutions. Cities are considered an unnecessary evil in India; industrial policy has favored dispersal over concentration and, to an uneconomic degree perhaps, handicrafts over factories. (Peach, 1968: 302) The historic continuities of rural social organization have no parallel in Latin America. In southern South America, Brazil and the Caribbean, Amerindian settlement patterns disintegrated under the impact of European economic institutions. In Meso and Andean America this was less true, but even here the trauma of conquest was so severe, the Ame-

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[6] Piddington (1965) gathers several studies of kinship and spatial mobility in India and Africa. Bailey (1961) offers a distinction between tribe and caste.

rindian population decline so precipitous and the reconcentration of rural workers so widespread the extended indigenous social systems such as one finds in India and Africa had no chance for survival. Although Tax (1953: 10) describes active regional trade among Amerindian communities of modern Guatemala, he also concludes that: "The only effective social segment is the individual household whatever its constitution".

Given the pattern of European colonization in Latin America, the usual rural-agricultural settlement is, according to Wolfe (1966: 16-17), "a small and loosely organized cluster of families, constituting a primary neighborhood and usually found in combination with still more dispersed settlement by single families. Large agricultural villages deserving the name of 'community' can be found but are not typical". Present trends are toward "even greater dispersal and impermanence of rural settlement", exemplified by irregular "line settlements" along roads and nuclei of flimsy shelters at the sites of temporary jobs. Such rural leadership as is developing for migrants and urban squatters may come from displaced small cultivators representing a "mobile, adaptable and aggressive new cultural type, detached from rural localism and traditionalism", who mediate between rural groups and the larger society as traders, truck owner-drivers, and leaders of peasant unions and local political movements.[7]

In this ecological setting migration flows vertically from smaller to larger centers (Arriaga, 1968: 242), as though respecting the memory of the colonial urban hierarchy. It receives virtually no lateral pull from the gravitational fields of regional inter-village or extended-kinship systems. Although urban migrants frequently visit their communities of origin, little permanent return migration is reported.[8]

In North India Rowe (1964: 16-17) reports that entire village families do not often migrate because the village tie generally provides more security than the city can be expected to offer. Migration becomes a "way of life", and in contradiction to the claim that the city will destroy the village, Rowe finds that "in economic terms at least, the city makes the continuance of the North Indian village possible". The typical African who leaves his tribal area to seek work in town returns after a varying period "whether he has realized his goals or not". (Eames-Schwab, 1964) Elkan (1960: 134-38) observed "perpetual flow between town and country" in Uganda, where the worker views his life "as a whole and is well aware that his income consists not solely, or even necessarily mainly, of wages and other benefits of employment, but also of the income which his family draws from farming in the countryside". If it was the "most economic choice" for the nineteenth-century English agricultural migrant to stay put in the towns, in "most parts of tropical Africa it clearly is not". In Northern Rhodesia, where tribal lands symbolize national freedom, the African keeps a foot in the rural camp however long he may have lived in town. "This state of affairs not only militates against the growth of a stabilized urban population; it also serves to maintain the Africans' interest in the land and consequently in the tribe from which their claims to land derive." (Epstein, 1958: 238-39).

[7] Gonzalez (1970) advances the term "neoteric" to describe "nontraditional" societies conspicuous in modern Latin America, whether rural (plantation workers) or urban (squatters), characterized by varied ethnic origins, relative poverty, "openness", secularity, technicways in lieu of folkways, face-to-face relations and organizational inventiveness.

[8] The biography of Juan Pérez Jolote (Pozas, 1962) documents one case of a return migrant and his problems of readjustment to a Mexican Indian village.

Generalization, to repeat, is tricky. Kuper (1965: 120-22) points out the multiplicity and sociological subtleties of urban tribalism in comparing research on the Copperbelt, West Africa and South Africa. The innovative, even protean possibilities of urban tribalism enthusiastically described for West Africa by Little (1965) must be set against the situation of migrants in Southern Rhodesia who are residentially segregated in towns and primarily confined to unskilled labor. (Eames-Schwab, 1964)

Despite the caveats, a few broad contrasts between Latin America and Africa-India still seem viable: (1) Not only is urbanization in Africa-India less advanced than in Latin America, but regional village systems are more elaborate, have more adaptive resiliency vis-à-vis the urban impact, retain a stronger hold on the out-migrant. (2) Tribal, village-caste and rural kin or associational networks are making important and lasting contributions to the structure of urban society in Africa-India, however, extensively they may become reworked. Because the creolized Ibero-Catholic societies of Latin American countries are more homogeneous (save for tribal communities of forest Indians),[9] rural areas make fewer distinctive contributions to the urban environment. Sociologically speaking, less rural-urban dialectic occurs within the large cities — a point Roberts (1970b: 9) makes even for Guatemala, where one might have assumed considerable cleavage in this regard. (3) The fact that migrants in Africa-India are more likely than in Latin America to maintain a rural economic base accentuates circulatory migration and keeps rural economic alternatives open to lower-class urban workers.[10] The very fact that rural Latin America is more "urbanized", that its settlement patterns tend toward "dispersal and impermanence", reduces possibilities for urban-rural symbiosis.

One need not discount the importance of city-village ties in Latin America in the form of kinship bonds, visiting habits, urban regional associations or transplanted saints' cults. (Lewis, 1952; Mangin, 1965; Butterworth, 1970; Browning-Feindt, 1970a) They may selectively mitigate problems of culture shock, temporary indigence and job placement. Durable economic relationships, however, are not widely reported. Roberts (1970b: 11) does find that 25% of his city-born and migrant family heads in Guatemala City go to the provinces for periods of a year or less to harvest coffee or maintain small farms, and Doughty (1970: 42) states that remittances from a regional association in Lima are sometimes the sole source of external assistance for a rural community. Yet there is little evidence that city-village ties in Latin America are generally supported by economic symbiosis between town and country; and if such ties yield more psychological than structural support, one can easily exaggerate their therapeutic potential. Mangin (1965: 314), Montoya (1967: 96) and Doughty (1970: 35) report factional splitting in the regional clubs of Lima, while migrant case histories for the city (Turner, 1970: 6; Mangin, 1970b; Dietz, 1969) assign no role at all to regional associations at the critical moment of squatters' invasions. In Brasilia, Pastore (1969: 119) finds that the migrants' home visits may increase their dissatisfactions and hinder their urban adjustment. For Sao Paulo Berlinck (1969) reports that kinship systems are no less important for upper than for lower classes in adapting to

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[9] For the urbanization of tribal Amerindians see Oliveira (1968) and Watson (1968).

[10] Gutkind (1969: 391) however observes that should an agrarian revolution in Africa cause a wholesale shift from subsistence to surplus cropping and an exodus from agricultural activities, then for many urban Africans "the break with the land and rural traditions is likely to be complete and final".

social change and that for lower classes the resources of the extended family are largely consumed in mere "tension management." Sayres (1965) suggests that *compadrazgo* is in part "a program of psychologically constricting and socially enervating restraints and controls" which engenders negative affect, then inhibits its release.

If primary-group ties, patron-client arrangements and particularism are prominent in Latin American urban societies, it is not because these features are imported from the countryside but because they permeate entire national societies. Doughty's analysis (1970) of the Lima regional associations makes clear that they are not exclusively or perhaps even primarily oriented to the priority needs of the lower-class migrant.[11] Club headquarters are regularly located in the inner city, not the *barriadas*, and the prestige rankings of the clubs or of members within a club, suggest that while they may help "integrate" poor migrants to city life, they also insert him into a control system whose more formal mechanisms are not fully articulated. Where, as in Buenos Aires, one finds regional groups specific to lower-class migrants, they serve the function of *insulation*. (Margulis, 1968: 165-75). And in Guatemala Roberts (1970a: 372, 379) discovers that while common village origin may inspire a clientage relationship, it cannot serve even for group insulation in the absence of a "situational basis for group solidarity among low-income families". Where one does encounter effective organizations for non-patronal integration of the urban poor (squatters' invasions, *juntas de vecinos*, cult groups), they are by and large unrelated to regional and ethnic backgrounds. The cumulative effect of urban pressures on lower-class locality groups is not to preserve or reorganize but to atomize them with the promise, however illusory, of external sources of succor or support. (Medina, 1969; Roberts, 1970a)[12]

Some years ago Beals (1953: 172) posed this query with respect to cityward migrations: "Is it, by chance, easier to induce the radical culture changes of industrialization or urbanization if there is a wider gulf between the cultures rather than a narrower one?" Subsequent research in Latin America has tended to supply a commonsensical negative answer. Leeds-Leeds (1967) stress the importance of prior urban exposure in the adaptation of migrants, while Balán (1968) stresses educational and occupational status — whether or not the migrant is an urbanite — in assisting the transition. As Testa (1970: 96) intimates, such conclusions seem suspiciously in debt to Redfield's folk-urban continuum, for Monterrey, in fact, Browning-Feindt (1968) go so far as to establish a socioeconomic migrant-native "continuum", stepped in three plateaus.

From Africa, however, comes an affirmative reply to Beals' question. In Nigeria Henderson (1966) compared the adaptation to town life of persons from urban based tribal communities and those from rural ones. Although urbanites are accustomed to greater diversification of roles, innovators among them may be forced into "situations which are particularistically defined in terms of these roles and prerogatives". Innovation, or adaptation, may come more easily: ". . . when

[11] Doughty loosely compares the regional clubs to immigrants' associations in the United States, neglecting a central finding of the classic Thomas-Znaniecki study of Polish immigrants — namely, that membership in influential voluntary associations was largely restricted to immigrants who had already "made it".

[12] Family control of mobility made for "smoother" urbanization in Japan precisely because younger sons who were not to inherit property were judiciously exported to *make their own way* in cities. "The younger son came to the city at a time of life when he was able to learn new urban patterns, and there was no strong kinship or provincial association in the city which interfered with his rapid adaptation." (Vogel, 1963: 257)

the urbanites, tribal community is rural, remote and lacking in educational advantages, for in this situation a "simplification" of the frame of reference occurs for the urban immigrants which makes possible a more universalistic approach to the organizational problems of city life". (1966: 388-89)

What Henderson alludes to is not the protective or buffer function of rural folkways — which Lewis describes for Tepoztecans in Mexico City — but the rural tribesman's potential for "radical" psychological response to urban conditions. In some African cities the spectrum of migrant backgrounds may be broader and the shape of future urban societies more innovative than is predictable for Latin America. The fact, however, that the Latin American rural exodus is becoming more cross-sectional — that is, less selective for status and education (Quijano, 1967: 11), Browning-Feindt, 1970b) — may inject new catalysts, as well as "problems", into the urban setting.

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CLASS, RACE AND THE OCCUPATIONAL STRUCTURE
IN SOUTH AFRICA

HAROLD WOLPE

ENGLAND

1. INTRODUCTION

This paper attempts to examine certain changes,which are occurring in the South African occupational structure, and to suggest an approach to the explanation of these changes.

The analysis presented here is somewhat tentative, due, in part, to the fact that the statistical data available for the period after 1960 (during which the major changes have taken place) is fragmentary[1] and, in part, to the virtual absence of mobility and other specifically relevant studies of South Africa to which reference could be made.

The paucity of empirical material is, however, a less important contributing factor to the tentative nature of the analysis than the fact that no coherent satisfactory framework for the analysis of South African society is available. Indeed, a major purpose of the present paper is to contribute to the development of such a framework, through the examination of an empirical "problem".

It is to be noted that very little assistance can be gained from any of the more general work on South Africa, since almost all of it is written from an underlying perspective which tends to obscure important changes in the social relationships within the society. All this work, although different in some respects, shares a basic common feature — only racial categories, in the form of racial ideologies and racial groups, are considered to be salient. (See, for example, Hepple, 1969; Horwitz, 1967; Hutt, 1964; Kuper and Smith, 1969; van den Berghe, 1967 (a) and (b)).

There are two important related consequences of this type of approach. Firstly, since the ideologies of specific groups are not related to their position in the social structure, except insofar as the social structure is defined in terms of racial values, ideologies become treated as detached, autonomous determinants of action. Secondly, the failure to examine the changing non-ideological conditions in which specific groups apply and, therefore, interpret and modify their ideologies, results in the treatment of the latter as unchanging entities. By simply ascribing all action to generalized racial beliefs, prejudices or ideologies, the specific content of changing social relations *and* the conditions of change become excluded from the analysis.[2]

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[1] The latest census for which reports are available was held in 1960. Very little data are as yet available from the census taken in May 1970.

[2] For a critique of this thesis, particularly in its application to the notion of industrialism, see H. Wolpe (1970).

In the analysis of the South African occupational structure specifically, the application of the perspectives under discussion leads, on the one hand, to a description of the racial status of different occupations (that is, for example, whether an occupation is "white" and skilled, unskilled but "civilized", "black" and unskilled, etc.) and, on the other hand, to the assertion that the entrance of Non-Whites into "white" occupations is blocked by racial ideologies or prejudices.

This appears more concretely from the analysis which is generally made of the cause of the acute shortages of skilled and semi-skilled manual and various categories of non-manual workers which have accompanied the rapid expansion of the South African economy over the last decade. These shortages are ascribed to the conventional as well as the statutory colour bars[3], which exclude Non-Whites from the relevant categories of work, and this is represented simply as the actualization of racial beliefs, prejudices or ideologies stemming from outside the economy and inhibiting the rationality of the latter.

The crucial question, however, is: Which specific groups support which particular type of racial exclusions/inclusions and why? Once the question is posed in this way, it is no longer possible to treat whites or non-whites as undifferentiated populations, nor apartheid as an undifferentiated ideology or system of relationships (compare Johnstone, 1970). It becomes necessary to locate groups in the socio-economic structure and to view their ideology and practice in the context of this position. This argument is clearly illustrated by the different stances adopted in relation to the labour shortage "problem". Thus, white miners' trade unions oppose any changes in the racial distribution of occupations in the mines; the Trade Union Congress of South Africa, on the other hand, supports the entry of non-whites into "white" jobs but demands equal pay for equal work. The problem is to account for such differences.

There is implied in the above argument the more general proposition that any theoretical approach, which assumes a separation of the polity from the economy and treats these as if they constitute autonomous systems or sub-systems, will be unable to provide an adequate analysis. Now, for example, would such an approach deal with the political control in the economy through nationalization of transport, SASOL, FSLOR, etc., or the utilization of the State funds to build up agriculture, or the utilization of political power to accumulate capital?

It is only by making the assumption mentioned above and by ignoring the structural position of groups that it is possible to contend that the "economy" tends to act out some kind of formal, abstracted rationality. Indeed, the very notion of "the economy" masks the fact that it is a historically specific form of "the economy" constituted by classes having specific (contradictory) interests and relationships.

The first task of analysis, it is suggested, is precisely to establish the nature of the class relationships. This involves, initially, an abstract characterization of the relationships in economic terms which simultaneously characterizes the "model" of the society. But this is certainly not to argue that that is all that is required. On the contrary, an analysis of a particular society demands an analysis of the concrete legal, social and political content of the class relationships which give

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[3] Statutory colour bars refer to legislative provisions, such as the Mines and Workers Act 1911, as amended. Bantu Building Workers Act 1951, etc., which specifically exclude Africans etc., from certain work. Conventional colour bars refer to those which have developed in various industries through agreement between white workers and employers or otherwise and have become 'traditional'.

the latter their historical specificity. That is to say, while class relationships are "ultimately" economic they are also always political, social and legal as well.

Applying this to South Africa, an analysis of the abstract class categories and relationships leads to its characterization as a capitalist society. At the concrete level, the specific form of these relationships is defined by the content of Apartheid. The "colour bar" in the economy may be the result of political decisions (as is frequently argued), but it, nevertheless, defines the relationships between classes (and sectors of classes). Apartheid is "economic" no less than it is "political".

It follows from this that the simple assertion, which is frequently made of South Africa, that there is a contradiction between Apartheid (conceived of as a political force external to the economy) and the economy, is inadequate. Obviously Apartheid and class relationships are not co-terminus and it is possible that racially structured political relationships and institutions may develop which will come into contradiction with racially structured class relationships in the economy. This in no way affects the contention, which is implicit in the above discussion, that contradictions inhere in the class relationships themselves. Indeed, the position advanced here is that Apartheid can be viewed predominantly as an attempt to order the non-white working-class in terms of the specific demands of different classes and sectors of class. From this point of view, the main contradiction in South Africa is in the relations of production between the white capitalist class and the non-white working-class.

This of course does not preclude (has not precluded) the possibility that the non-white sectors of other classes, operating within a different set of class relationships from the non-white working-class, may have their situation ordered in terms of Apartheid. The fact that this occurs, creates within certain limits an identity of interests between the non-white sectors of different classes and gives rise to the appearance that race is *the* salient factor.

Similar processes occur between the white sectors of different classes. What is of equal, if not greater, significance, however, is that the interests of these different classes, within particular racial groups, tend to become contradictory and the outcome at any time in terms of policies, turns on the changing power situation.

The specification and analysis of the dominant and subordinate contradictions and their relationships is a requirement of an adequate analysis of South Africa.

In the remainder of this paper, an attempt is made, through an examination of changes in the occupational structure, to analyse in a sketchy way some of these contradictory relationships and their consequences.

Specifically, the contention is that the configuration of conditions, which previously brought into existence and which operated within the structure of South African society to maintain in existence a cheap, *unskilled*, non-white industrial labour force, are giving way to conditions within the same basic capitalist structure, in which a substantial section of this labour force will provide *cheap*, semi-skilled and skilled labour.

What I am suggesting is that the conditions, which developed in South Africa during the 1960's, will result in a vast increase in the number and proportion of Non-Whites (particularly Africans) in the clerical and semi-skilled categories of work, and that this will occur at the expense of the very large unskilled sector of the Non-White labour force. This will be accompanied, I suggest, by on increasing proportion of the white population finding employment in non-manual white collar and professional occupations as well as in technological jobs.

Although the data showing the changes, which have already occurred in the 1960's, cannot be presented systematically, it seems clear that the "penetration" of Non-Whites into semi-skilled, skilled and lower white-collar jobs is already well under way. The fact of "penetration" is not new; what is new is the extent to which this is now taking place, and the degree of legitimacy which is accorded to the shifts in the occupational structure.

Within different occupational or economic sectors (including the state owned steel enterprises, postal and transport services as well as privately owned distributive concerns, engineering industry, garment, mining and building industries) the employment of Africans and other non-whites in occupations or at levels, which were previously the preserve of Whites, appears to take place under one or other or both of two different sets of conditions. Firstly, in some sectors, the demand for labour to fill jobs, hitherto defined as white, has exceeded the supply of white workers and in that event non-white workers have been, and are being, employed. Secondly, in other cases, the dilution and fragmentation of skilled white jobs has led to the introduction of new, semi-skilled jobs which are filled largely by African labour.

It is not possible, for reasons of space, to set out in detail the data which show both the extent of the changes resulting and the fact that the new emerging employment pattern leave unaltered the relative differential in wages and status between black and white workers. Suffice it to say that the developments, which are occurring, contradict the contention that Apartheid is consistent only with the employment of Africans and other non-whites exclusively, or almost exclusively, in unskilled work.

How are these changes in the pattern of employment to be accounted for?

II. THE BASIS OF THE CHANGING PATTERN OF NON-WHITE EMPLOYMENT

The explanation lies in a combination of changes in the class structure and in the structure of occupational roles. These have, in turn, led both to a redistribution of power as between different sectors of the capitalist class and as between different segments or strata of the working class. Racial ideologies have begun to transform themselves to fit this new situation.

The Situation Prior to the 1960's

The single most significant fact about South Africa prior to the 1960's is the dominance of two sectors of the economy — mining and capitalist agriculture. For present purposes the importance of these two industries can be indicated by their contribution to the national income (see Table 1).

The table shows that the primary sectors of the economy contributed nearly 12 times more than manufacturing in 1912, and as late as 1960, 25% more than the latter to the gross domestic product. Similarly, the number employed in the primary sectors exceeded employment in manufacturing by approximately 8 times in 1921 and by $2^1/_2$ times in 1960.

Two features of these important sectors of the economy, which were themselves the outcome of the conditions in which they developed, affected the nature of South African society in general and the pattern of non-white employment in particular. Firstly, both were (and are) dependent upon, or insistent upon, a continuous supply of cheap, unskilled African labour. The creation or maintenance of the conditions,

TABLE 1.[4] PERCENTAGE CONTRIBUTION
OF AGRICULTURE, MINING AND MANUFACTURING
TO THE GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT

	Agriculture (a) %	Mining (b) %	Total (a) (b) %	Manufacturing %
1912	21.6	26.3	47.9	4.3
1920	22.4	17.4	39.8	7.4
1930	14.4	15.1	29.5	9.4
1940	12.3	18.9	30.9	12.5
1950	17.3	13.1	30.4	16.8
1955	15.2	11.7	26.9	18.8
1960	12.2	13.6	25.8	19.0
1966	10.3	12.2	22.5	21.7

which ensured this supply, had consequences for the society as a whole. Secondly, the nature of the gold mining industry was such that it had little or no interest in the industrialization of South Africa; agriculture, on the other hand, whatever its interests, was unable to invest in the development of manufacturing.

The dependence of these industries on African labour and the cheapness of this labour has been fully documented (De Kiewiet, 1942; Hepple, 1969, 1966; Horwitz, 1967), and it is, therefore, unnecessary to deal with the statistical aspects of this.

The interest of the Chamber of Mines in obtaining cheap African labour and its capacity to secure it was a function of two conditions. The Chamber's interest in cheap labour was not merely a question of the realization of profit but, more specifically, the realization of profit in conditions of a fixed market price for gold and continuously increasing price of capital equipment, stores and white wages. The question of power was central to all these conditions. Thus, the Chamber had no control over the international market which fixed the price of gold, nor did it have power over the price of stores and capital equipment. The political power of white workers and the organizational power of their trade union presented a formidable obstacle in the way of the Chamber's attempt to substitute African workers (as the 1922 strike showed), or to any thought of lowering their wages.

The capacity of the gold mines to secure cheap African labour was a product of the political and economic powerlessness of the unorganized African "reservoir" of labour, both inside South Africa and in the external territories. This situation of the African population in the industrializing economy within South Africa was the outcome of military conquest, the introduction of a capitalist economy on a people, no section of whom had wealth capable of being converted into capital, and the restriction of the predominantly rural African population engaged in subsistence farming to 13% of the land.

The confinement of subsistence farming, which involved extensive rotation of land, to a relatively small land area, rendered it incapable of producing the subsistence needs of the population. In these circumstances, the intrusion of a money economy in the form of manufactured consumer goods and the imposition of compulsory taxes provided the "push" required to ensure the flow of rural Africans

[4] The full table appears in *State of South Africa Year Book 1969*, p. 250.
The net national income table shows a rather earlier shift in favour of manufacturing, but this does not affect my argument. See Hobart — Houghton, 1964, p. 228.

into the labour market. It only needed the recruiting organizations of the Chamber to channel this labour in the form of migrant, contract labour into the mines.

Thus, the underdevelopment and impoverishment of the African reserves was a condition of the development of the mining industry — a fact reflected in the almost total unavailability of any resources to develop the reserves. The continuation of this relationship required the maintenance of the political and economic powerlessness of Africans and this, in turn, was effected by and reflected in the entire economic, political and legal structure of the society and the racial character of this structure.

An important element of the economy relates to the position of manufacturing and this raises the second feature of the mining industry to which I referred above — that is, its interest or lack of interest in the industrial development of South Africa.

The rate of development of the manufacturing sector in South Africa up to the second World War was relatively slow. This is, in part, reflected in Table 1 above. The main reason for this was the lack of investment capital, and this, in turn, leads to an examination of the mining industry which was by far the main possible source of capital. The mining industry, however, invested very little in manufacturing, and there would appear to be two reasons for this. Firstly, not only was the major portion of investment in mining obtained from foreign sources (£120 million out of £200 million by 1932) but also gold was, of course, not produced for the home market and consequently the development of a consumer market through the growth of employment in manufacturing was of no particular concern to the industry. Frankel (1938, p. 110) noted that "During the last quarter of a century no outside observer of the Union's development could have at any time failed to notice the unanimity with which the legislature and electorate alike declared it to be their policy to develop the resources of the country in such that its dependence on what it would have been usual to call 'wasting' mineral assets could be lessened, and provision be made for the distant future when the mineral industries might no longer prove a source of income. Yet, notwithstanding continuous legislation designed to foster other activities, the country appears to be more independent on mining than ever before."

Secondly, the growth of manufacturing itself presented a double threat to the mining industry. On the one hand, it could lead to competition for labour and challenge the mines' virtual control over the labour market. On the other hand, the nature of manufacturing labour requirements — relatively stable and at least partly trained labour — posed a potential threat to the whole system of cheap, unskilled African labour.

In the case of the white rural bourgeoisie, their inability to foster industrial development, which would have created a larger home market for their products, was at the same time the basis for their support for a system which ensured the supply of cheap labour and made impossible the rapid growth of the home market. The low level of mechanization, the relative infertility of the land and inefficient methods of farming were among the factors which made cheap labour a condition of survival of this class and prevented the accumulation of capital for investment in industry.

The common interest of the two major sectors of the economy in maintaining the system of cheap, unskilled non-white labour was unambiguously supported by the white working class — it was precisely this which guaranteed their monopoly over higher paid, skilled and white-collar work and also over higher paid,

unskilled work under the Civilized Labour Policy. There were two significant features of the situation of the white working class. Firstly, one consequence of the slow rate of industrial growth was that the number of jobs also increased at a slow rate. Given the rapid migration of "Poor Whites" from rural to the urban areas (particularly in the 1920's) and the fact that there were some 200,000 unemployed whites out of a population of $1\frac{1}{2}$ million, the competition for "white" or "civilized" jobs was extremely strong. Secondly, and related to the above, the flow of Africans into the town and their availability as cheap labour presented a threat, which was met by a racial ideology which defined what work was suitable for which race, and a successful struggle to maintain monopoly control over "white" jobs in the absence of job opportunities at other, higher levels. This competition over work is one of the crucial factors which divided the working class and which led to white working class support for a system which maintained black workers in a weak position.

The Situation in the 1960's

A number of the ralationships discussed above and the conditions, in which they occurred, have undergone significant changes in the 1960's.

The continuous growth of the manufacturing sector, which took place before the 1960's (see Table 3), occurred not only largely without the participation of capital from gold mining or from farming but, in fact, in opposition to those industries. Not that cheap labour was unattractive to the manufacturing industry. In this sector, too, the differentials between African unskilled and white skilled wages is roughly in the ratio of 1 :6. However, as I suggested above, the greater capitalization of production and the greater specialization of labour involved made stability of labour also important. This potentially brought manufacturing into contradiction with the gold mining industry since the development of conditions of labour stability tended to undermine the conditions necessary for the migrant labour system. In addition, the expansion of the home market, which was one condition of the growth of manufacturing, was also in contradiction to the interests of the gold mines, since this threatened to push African wages up beyond the extremely low level of the mine wages.

Two developments have served to change this relationship between mining and manufacturing so that it is no longer as true as it once was that ". . . The Chamber of Mines, which represents the gold industry and constitutes the most powerful economic group in the country, has a strong vested interest in the migratory system." (Van Den Berghe, 1967, p. 192)

The first of these developments relates to the increasing interpenetration of mining and industrial capital. The second relates to the increasing utilization of foreign African migrant labour in the mining industry.

The interpenetration of mining and industrial (and, to a lesser extent, agricultural) capital is taking place in two directions. That is to say, mining capital is being invested directly or indirectly through finance corporations in manufacturing industry and industrial and finance capital (particularly, it would seem of Afrikaner origin) is being invested in mining.

It has been estimated that at least £ 300 million have been invested by mining companies in industrial and commercial undertakings.[5] The reports of some of the larger mining houses are revealing.

[5] *Sunday Times*. 15.3. 1970.

The estimated value of the industrial and commercial member companies of the gigantic Anglo-American Corporation increased in 1969 by £ 35 million to £ 175 million. The investment portfolio of the group shows that while investment in gold mining declined from 26% in 1968 to 21% in 1969, industrial investment rose by 2% to 22% of the total.

Johannesburg Consolidated Investments has £ 32 million invested in industrial takings. This represents 32% of its total investments. The company's investments in mining declined from 41% of its total portfolio in 1968 to 39% in 1969, while the share of its industrial investment increased from 28% in 1968 to the 31% mentioned in 1969.[6]

The Anglo-Vaal Corporation's investments in 1969 totalled nearly £ 17 million, of which 35% was invested in Industry and 38% in finance.[7]

Although it has not been possible to obtain figures at the date of writing, the reverse trend is exemplified by the large Federale Volksbelegging Beperk's investments from finance, industry and agriculture into mining.

While quite clearly far more research needs to be done, it is undoubtedly no longer possible to regard mining and manufacturing as two totally separate contradictory sectors of the economy. (The same cannot be said of agriculture because its position does not seem to have changed to the same extent). The stake of mining in manufacturing industry brings its interests into alignment with the latter.

This is underlined by the second factor referred to above, namely the increasing dependence of the mining industry on *foreign African unskilled labour*. Foreign African labour has always been important in the mines — the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association was formed in about 1901 to recruit labour from territories outside South Africa. However, what is important is the ever increasing proportion of African labour which is recruited externally. Thus, whereas in the earlier period approximately 50% of African gold mine workers were foreign, in 1967 over 65% came from the former British protectorates, Portuguese, East Africa and Malawi, etc., and by 1970 this figure had reached 69.5%.

It is probable that the economic underdevelopment of these other countries and the powerful competition for African labour, resulting from the massive growth of manufacturing (see Tables 2 & 3 below), account for the changing proportions of African labour recruited externally. Only approximately 160,000 black South Africans now work in the gold mines. Whatever the reason, the mines no longer have the same interest in the continuation of the conditions which ensure the system of migratory labour inside South Africa.

The changed relationship between mining and industry has been accompanied by changes within manufacturing which affect the position of the white working class.

The trends indicated in Table 1 appear to have continued at an accelerated rate in the 1960's. It is estimated that the share of mining and agriculture has declined to 20% in 1969, while that of manufacturing has continued to rise[8]. There are other indications of the growing importance of manufacturing — the mounting

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[6] *Sunday Times*. 15. 3. 1970.

[7] *Sunday Tribune*. 16. 11. 1969.

[8] Dr. P. E. R o u s s e a u in an address to the 25th Congress of the Handelsinstituut in April 1970.

volume of production and increased investment [9]. Of greater relevance for the argument in this paper, however, are the dramatic changes in the structure of employment in the 1960's.

TABLE 2[10]. INDUSTRIAL CLASSIFICATION OF THE POPULATION
No AND PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATION EMPLOYED IN MINING, MANUFACTURING AND COMMERCE AND FINANCF (ALL RACES)

	1951		1960		1969	
	No. (000's)	%	No. (000's)	%	No. (000's)	%
Mining	511	11.1	614	10.7	632	9.1
Manufacturing	503	10.9	643	11.2	1,104	15.8
Commerce & finance	327	7.1	518	9.1	?	?

TABLE 3. PERCENTAGE INCREASE OVER PREVIOUS YEAR OF EMPLOYMENT (ALL RACES) IN MINING, MANUFACTURING AND COMMERCE AND FINANCE AS A PERCENTAGE OF PREVIOUS YEARS

	1951	1960		1969	
	No. (000's)	No. (000's)	% increase over 1951	No. (000's)	% increase over 1960
Mining	511	614	20.2	632	2.9
Manufacturing	503	643	27.8	1,104	71.7
Commerce & finance	327	518	58.4	?	?

The shift towards manufacturing and commerce and finance is revealed even more clearly, however, if the percentage increase over the earlier years is calculated for each sector.

It has not been possible to obtain statistical data for employment in commerce and finance during the 1960's, but impressionistic reports suggest that the trend revealed in 1960 was continued into the 1960's.

[9] Figures prepared by the Northern Transvaal Chamber of Industries in June 1970, although showing a fall off, indicate the high rate of investment.

Year	%age increase over previous year of private investment in manufacturing
1963	33
1964	56
1965	22
1966	10
1967	1

[10] This table is adapted from the Population Census of 1960. The figures for 1969 are from Tables B-7, B-3 of the *Bulletin of Statistics* of March 1970. The 1969 percentage figures, however, are calculated on the basis of the Bureau of Statistics' estimate of the total economically active population for the end of 1968 as reported in Hansard 7. 2. 1969.

These developments have given rise to acute labour shortages in the skilled, semi-skilled and non-manual categories. Various estimates put the shortage of skilled and semi-skilled workers in 1969 at 47,700. Shortages have also been claimed among scientists, nurses, managers, teachers and in the professions generally.

There are no mobility studies which would enable firm conclusions to be drawn above the movement of white labour, but there is data which suggest that the white population is moving from manual work into non-manual work and from skilled manual into technological positions. The evidence on the latter aspect is clearest.

Overall, the statistics show a declining trend in the percentage of the employment of white workers in manufacturing.

TABLE 4.[11] PERCENTAGE OF WHITES
AND AFRICANS OF TOTAL WORKERS
IN MANUFACTURING

	Africans	Whites
1960	47.9	32.7
1962	52.8	26.5
1967	52.7	25.3

TABLE 5.[12] WHITES AND AFRICANS IN VARIOUS OCCUPATIONS, EXPRESSED AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATION OF EACH GROUP (EXCLUDING FARMING)

	1921		1936		1946		1951		1960	
	white %	Afr. %	white %	Afr. %	white %	Afr. %	white %	Afr. %	white %	Afr. %
1—4	31.3	.8	33.1	.9	38.4	1.9	44.4	1.9	49.4	2.4
6—8	6.2	28.3	6.5	24.6	14.0	28.0	19.3	35.9	29.0	43.9
9	7.3	33.1	8.8	33.2	18.0	36.0	14.6	27.1	16.5	25.0

1—4 Professional, Technical, Managerial, Administrative, Executive, Clerical, Sales
6—8 Miners, Transport Workers, Unskilled and Skilled Industrial Workers
9   Service, Sports, Entertainment, etc.

This trend is corroborated by the fall off in registration of white apprenticeships in a number of industries from 8,569 in 1966 to 7,263 in 1968.

Furthermore, whereas in 1960 whites constituted 16.3% of the manual labour force, excluding farming (a decline of 4.3% compared with 1951), they constituted 77.7% of the professional, technical, administrative, clerical and sales occupations (a decline of 0.3% as compared to 1951). The proportion of the white economically active population in different occupations, excluding farming, from 1921 to 1960 as compared to the African population is shown in Table 5.

Further support for the contention that whites are moving into higher level occupations is to be found in the increased enrolment in the Universities. Thus,

[11] From TUCSA (1969).
[12] Adopted from 1960 Census report.

whereas 37,934 white students (compared with 4,381 non-white students) were registered in 1960, by 1968 there were 66,659 white students (and 8,605 non-white). (Horrell, 1962, 1968).

That a shift of white workers out of skilled manual work is occurring is also suggested by the comments of various trade unionists. Both the Trades Union Council of South Africa and the President of the Railway Artisans Staff Association have pointed to this trend. The latter stated[13]: "The drain of trained artisans not only in the railways but in other industries, to work outside of their particular trades had become serious. This was a feature of the acute manpower shortage and represented an almost total loss of skilled workers."

It is contended, then, that there is evidence of changes in the occupational structure which have opened up avenues of employment and mobility not previously available, at least not in the present number, to white employees. This, I would suggest, is an important factor in accounting for a diminution in the opposition by white workers to the employment of non-whites in semi-skilled jobs.

It is neither necessary to suggest, nor is it suggested, that the emergence of opportunities of upward mobility have entered fully into the organized consciousness of the white working class. What seems clear, however, is that the degree of opposition (even within the gold mining industry) to the utilization of non-white (particularly African) labour in more skilled occupations, is by no means as monolithic as it was. Indeed, one of the most interesting phenomena is that in conditions of acute shortages of skilled and semi-skilled manpower white organized workers have, despite their strong market and organizational position, agreed in important industries (steel engineering, construction and railways, for example) to both job dilution and African employment in semi-skilled occupations.

It is important, however, to bear in mind that the analysis of the white working class and, indeed, of the other classes in the economy, requires to be refined. The changes to which I have referred do not take place evenly or uniformly throughout the economy. For example, in a sector where rapid upward mobility of whites is occurring, there is likely to be less opposition to the introduction of Africans into semi-skilled occupations than in a declining industry. Thus, it is necessary to examine in detail the position of different groups in order to understand the support they give to different policies.

Finally, it is to be noted that the situation in the agricultural sector has also undergone changes, although the nature of these is somewhat obscure. It seems likely that capital, derived from non-agricultural sources, has been utilized by various companies to secure agricultural land on a large scale. One consequence of this would be to diminish the extent of the holdings and the economic power of individual farmers. It is possible that the conflict between the 'verligtes' and the 'verkramptes' reflects the continued interest of the latter in the maintenance of a system which perpetuates the position of the Africans as a source of unskilled labour.

III. CONCLUSION

I have tried to show in this paper that an analysis of the position of different racial groups in the occupation structure can be understood only as part of an analysis of the whole society in terms of a configuration of contradictory relationships.

It is obvious that in a systematic analysis it would be necessary to incorporate more fully the social and ideological structures of the society.

[13] *Rand Daily Mail*. 21. 4. 1970.

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STRATIFICATION
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Les travaux français sur la mobilité sociale sont rares, et malgré quelques
exceptions,[1] ils ont été effectués moins ou par des démographes; on pourrait d'ailleurs faire la même remarque à propos des recherches sur la "stratification".

Inversement, il existe en France plusieurs courants théoriques, notamment
marxistes et structuralistes, qui en ayant protégé les études sociales contre la vague
mondiale de l'empirisme abstrait d'après-guerre, permettraient aujourd'hui des
contributions originales.

Dans cet article, j'essaierai de m'appuyer sur ces courants pour commencer
la construction d'une problématique permettant de penser les phénomènes de "mobilité sociale" (en fait, d'anthropo-distribution) et ci-dessous.

J'aborderai cette tâche centrale à partir de plusieurs approches: celle de l'empiriste, celle du méthodologue, celle du théoricien, voire celle de l'historien. Il
me faudra être très bref sur chacune de ces approches; l'article ressemblera donc
inévitablement à un chantier de construction (et de démolition ...). C'est à une
rapide visite de ce chantier que je convie maintenant le lecteur.[1]

L'APPROCHE EMPIRIQUE ET MÉTHODOLOGIQUE

Une rectification empirique

Jusqu'ici, l'aire nommée "mobilité sociale" en France était surtout connue
à l'étranger à travers les résultats d'une enquête effectuée par Marcel Brésard en
1948, résultats réinterprétés et diffusés par N. Rogoff en langue anglaise.[2]

Or, ces résultats sont faux. L'erreur semble provenir d'un biais sur l'échantillon; en effet, son pourcentage d'ouvriers, 24%, est très inférieur à la part de cette
catégorie dans la structure socio-professionnelle française, soit 40%. Il en est sur
résulté de grosses erreurs sur l'estimation de la mobilité "ascendante" (III. d'une

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[1] Le présent texte est une reprise, complétée et enrichie, de ma communication à Varna.
Une autre version de cette communication est à paraître sous le même titre dans "Quality and
Quantity" (1971); plus développée, elle reprend essentiel des certains passages que figurent
ici et que je crois importants (histoire naturelle de la structure sociale, naissance du dans "écrite"),
la renaissance de la pensée sociale concrète. L'enjeu est si rapide que alorqu'il deux notions des
contributions pertinentes à la connaissance scientifique de la réalité sociale.

[2] M. BRésard, "Mobilité sociale et dimension de la famille", in Population, 5-11, juin-sept. 1950,
p. 533-566; N. Rogoff, "Social stratification in France and the United States", in American
Journal of Sociology, 58, 1953, p. ...

NOUVELLES PERSPECTIVES SUR LA MOBILITE SOCIALE EN FRANCE

DANIEL BERTAUX

FRANCE

Les travaux français sur la mobilité sociale sont rares, et malgré quelques exceptions, ils ont été effectués jusqu'ici par des démographes; on pourrait d'ailleurs faire la même remarque à propos des recherches sur la „stratification".

Inversement, il existe en France plusieurs courants théoriques, notamment marxistes et structuralistes, qui en ayant protégé les études sociales contre la vague mondiale de l'empirisme abstrait d'après-guerre, permettraient aujourd'hui des contributions originales.

Dans cet article, j'essaierai de m'appuyer sur ces courants pour commencer la construction d'une problématique permettant de penser les phénomènes de „mobilité sociale" (en fait, d'anthropo-distribution: cf. ci-dessous).

J'aborderai cette tâche centrale à partir de plusieurs approches: celle de l'empiriste, celle du méthodologue, celle du théoricien, voire celle de l'historien. Il me faudra être très bref sur chacune de ces approches; l'article ressemblera donc inévitablement à un chantier de construction (et de démolition. . .). C'est à une rapide visite de ce chantier que je convie maintenant le lecteur.[1]

I. APPROCHE EMPIRIQUE ET METHODOLOGIQUE

Une rectification empirique

Jusqu'ici, l'ainsi nommée „mobilité sociale" en France était surtout connue à l'étranger à travers les résultats d'une enquête effectuée par Marcel Brésard en 1948, résultats réinterprétés et diffusés par N. Rogoff en langue anglaise.[2]

Or, ces résultats sont faux. L'erreur semble provenir d'un biais sur l'échantillon; en effet, son pourcentage d'ouvriers, 24%, est très inférieur à la part de cette catégorie dans la structure socio-professionnelle française, soit 40%. Il en est résulté de grosses erreurs sur l'estimation de la mobilité „ascendante" (fils d'ouv-

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[1] Le présent texte est une reprise, condensée et enrichie, de ma communication à Varna. Une autre version de cette communication est à paraître sous le même titre dans "Quality and Quantity" (1971); plus développée, elle ne contient cependant pas certains passages qui figurent ici, et que je crois importants (théorie marxiste de la structure sociale; existence de deux "écoles"): la renaissance de la pensée sociale critique en France est si rapide que chaque mois apporte des contributions pertinentes à la compréhension scientifique de la réalité sociale.

[2] M. Brésard. "Mobilité sociale et taille de la famille", in *Population*. 5 (3), juin-sept. 1950, p. 533—566; N. Rogoff, "Social stratification in France and the United States", in *American Journal of Sociology*, 58, 1953, p. 347—357.

riers devenus „non-manuels“. . .: 34% estimés, contre moins de 28% réels) et sur celle de la „mobilité descendante“ (mouvements inverses: 20%, contre plus de 25% réels).

Au demeurant, ces chiffres n'ont guère de signification sociologique; ils sont en effet le résultat d'une problématique extrêmement douteuse. On ne s'y attardera donc pas.

Nouvelles sources de données

Une excellente enquête de „mobilité“ (et de „stratification“) a été effectuée en 1964 par l'Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques (INSEE); l'échantillon en est de 27 000 personnes dont la représentativité a été minutieusement établie et vérifiée, et le questionnaire très détaillé en fait l'une des enquêtes de ce type les plus intéressantes; seul le remarquable travail effectué par P. Machonin et son équipe en Tchécoslovaquie nous paraît de facture meilleure (par contre, l'enquête de Blau et Duncan souffre de graves défauts auxquels l'enquête française, et à plus forte raison l'enquête tchécoslovaque, ont échappé: définitions mystifiantes de certaines catégories, — „Proprietors“[3] notamment — nombreuses non-réponses, et surtout absence de résultats détaillés.)[3].

L'étude de la relation entre la profession du père et celle du fils a été effectuée notamment en isolant les hommes nés après 1918 et travaillant depuis cinq ans au moins en 1964 (pour éliminer les jeunes travailleurs). J'en ai reproduit ici les données (tableau 1); elles ont été commentées ailleurs.[4] Il est clair en tous cas que le trait principal de la „mobilité sociale“ en France, c'est. . . l'immobilité. Trois fils d'ouvriers sur quatre sont eux-mêmes ouvriers; quatre fils d'ouvriers agricoles sur cinq sont ouvriers (agricoles ou industriels); pratiquement aucun n'est devenu agriculteur exploitant. . .; par contre pratiquement aucun enfant de cadre supérieur, de „profession libérale“, d'industriel, d'ingénieur, de professeur, n'est devenu ouvrier. Enfin, tous les paysans sont des fils de paysans.

Telle est la reponse des chiffres, et même si, établie sans l'aide d'une théorie explicite, elle n'a pour nous aucune signification sociologique, du moins a-t-elle le mérite de projeter sur les considérations idéologiques du discours quotidien la lumière crue de la réalité.

Ce qui fait cruellement défaut, c'est un cadre conceptuel permettant de conférer à ces resultats leur véritable sens; et l'objet du présent travail est de contribuer à son élaboration.[5] Pour cela je procèderai de deux manières: d'une part en partant des données empiriques et en cherchant à en percevoir la „structure cachée“

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[3] Enquête INSEE 1964: Michel Praderie et al. "La mobilité professionnelle en France", *Etudes et Conjoncture*, oct, 1966; "La mobilité sociale en France", id., fév. 1967, p. 3—109. P. Blau and O. D. Duncan: *American Occupational Structure*, John Wiley and Sons, 1967; 520 p.; Pavel Machonin et al. "Československa společnost" (La société tchécoslovaque), Epocha, Bratislava, 1970.

[4] Daniel Bertaux "Sur l'analyse des tables de mobilité sociale", *Revue Française de Sociologie*, X-4, oct/déc. 1969, p. 448—490. Voir aussi D. Bertaux "L'hérédité sociale en France", *Economie et Statistique*, Fevrier 1970.

[5] Pour un exposé critique sur l'état des recherches dans le domaine, voir Vittorio Cappechi: "Problèmes méthodologiques dans la mesure de la mobilité sociale", *Archives Européennes de Sociologie*, 8—2, 1967, p. 285—318. V. Cappechi déplore notamment l'indigence théorique de cette branche de la sociologie. Voir aussi: K. U. Mayer and W. Müller: "Roles, Status and Careers: Some Comments about Mobility Analysis and New Data on Intergenerational Mobility in West Germany", communication présentée dans la session sur la mobilité du VII Congrès mondial de sociologie (Varna).

TABLEAU 1

Origine \ Position	Cadres supérieurs. Professions libérales	Cadres moyens	Employés. Services — Autres	Ouvriers qualifiés. Contremaîtres	Ouvriers spécialisés. Mineurs	Manoeuvres	Salariés agricoles	Industriels. Gros commerçants	Artisans. Petits commerçants	Agriculteurs	
Cadres supérieurs. Proffessions libérales	135	75	55	(22)	(8)	—	(2)	5	18	(9)	330
Cadres moyens	65	140	70	45	(35)	(4)	(8)	5	12	(8)	390
Employés. Serv.ces — Autres	75	160	245	300	130	(25)	(4)	12	56	(12)	1015
Ouvriers qualifiés. Contremaîtres	55	190	220	795	315	112	(8)	15	97	(20)	1830
Ouvriers spécialisés. Mineurs	10	82	140	355	450	80	(10)	5	47	(14)	1195
Manoeuvres	4	23	62	200	95	75	(4)	5	9	(17)	475
Salariés agricoles	4	12	45	95	135	90	115	(1)	22	—	540
Industriels. Gros commerçants	44	43	26	(25)	(6)	—	—	48	20	(18)	210
Artisans. Petits commerçants	93	118	173	295	135	42	(15)	40	305	—	1235
Agriculteurs	40	80	270	300	410	210	200	6	133	1130	2780
	525	925	1305	2435	1720	640	365	110	715	1225	10 000 (5 309 000)

N. B. — Pour les modalités de l'enquête „Formation-Qualification Professionnelle" (F. Q. P.) 1964 de l'I.N.S.E.E., se rapporter à M. P. Praderie et M. Passagez, op. cit., p. 4-6. On a ramené le chiffre réel de la population considérée, soit 5 309 000 hommes, a 10 000. La précision des effectifs dépend des taux de sondages qui varient de 1/200 à 1/2000 selon les catégories : compte tenu de cela, on a arrondi certains effectifs aux multiples de 5 et maintenu un écart entre les sommes des effectifs et les marginaux pour mettre en évidence le degré réel de précision des effectifs. Certains d'entre eux ont été calculés sur des nombres d'individus statistiquement trop faibles ; ils sont mis entre parenthèses.

— Mobilité sociale en France : hommes nés après 1918, actifs en 1959 et 1964 ; d'après Praderie et al., op. cit.

Tableaux reproduits d'après D. Bertaux analyse des tables de mobilité sociale, Revue Française de Sociologie X-4 ; p-480 et 487.-Avec l'aimable autorisation des éditions du C. N. R. S.

(demarche utile mais limitée „par construction", car les données sont elles-mêmes le produit de prénotions fausses sur le réel et ne peuvent donc en donner qu'une image déformée); d'autre part, en refléchissant.

Deux méthodes intéressantes

Parmi les nombreuses méthodes proposées pour traiter ces tables,[6] j'en retiens deux: celle de la „comparaison à la mobilité parfaite"; et celle basée sur la distinction entre mobilité structurale et circulation.

La „comparaison à la mobilité parfaite" est utile à condition qu'on lui restitue son véritable sens: non pas, comparaison à un modèle idéal de société utopique, mais tout simplement, comparaison des différents flux réels *entre eux*, comparaison qui ne peut s'effectuer directement puisque ces flux relient des catégories d'arrivée et de départ de tailles très différentes, et qui doit donc être précédée d'une „normalisation" de ces flux; il faut rapporter leurs intensités observées aux tailles des deux catégories qu'ils relient, et la „comparaison à la mobilité parfaite" ne fait pas autre chose. Conférer un autre sens à cette opération technique est s'aventurer dans les eaux troubles de la philosophie sociale.

Effectuée sur les données de l'enquête INSEE, à partir des dix catégories statistiques disponibles (catégories non sociologiques, et cependant bien meilleures que celles de certains sociologues: voir l'hétérogénéité de la catégorie „Proprietors" chez Blau et Duncan, par exemple), cette opération donne un résultat fort intéressant. On retrouve la configuration observée dans toutes les autres enquêtes: les flux les plus forts (en valeur relative, donc) sont ceux qui relient une catégorie à elle-même, puis aux catégories voisines, avec une préférence pour la catégorie située „juste au-dessus"; et plus deux catégories sont „distantes", plus le flux qui les relie est faible, voire totalement nul (Tableau 2).

Peut-on donner une interprétation théorique de ce „fait"? Absolument pas. Il s'agit en effet d'un „fait" préconstruit, c'est-à-dire, tiré d'un mode d'observation purement empirique, ne comportant d'hypothèses explicites ni sur la structure sociale, ni sur les déterminations de la mobilité. Si on prend un tant soit peu au sérieux l'épistémologie, on ne peut se permettre de tirer des „conclusions théoriques" d'un tel „fait."

Qu'en faire alors? Le ranger dans la catégorie des „faits inexpliqués"; sources d'intuitions théoriques, ils montent aussi la garde contre toute théorie qui ne les expliquerait pas. Ainsi la structure des flux de mobilité en France, si proche de l'immobilité, empêche de soutenir la „théorie" d'une „société égalitaire"; d'autre part, le biais des flux vers „le haut" nous suggérera plus loin une hypothèse (i. e., il existe, derrière la structure des catégories socio-professionnelles, qui se déforme lentement vers „le haut", une structure plus profonde, qui est invariable: c'est la „structure sociale". Voir ci-dessous). Mais en aucun cas nous n'avons le droit de nous appuyer sur ce „fait" pour élaborer tout un discours descriptivo-explicativo-idéologique sur la „mobilité sociale", en France ou ailleurs.

L'autre idée intéressante est celle de la distinction entre *mobilité structurelle et circulation*. Dans un précédent article[7] j'ai essayé de pousser cette distinction

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[6] Ces méthodes ont été passées en revue par V. Cappechi dans l'article cité plus haut. La plupart sont du type "statistique". Or, pour moi les "modèles statistiques" n'offrent aucun intérêt, tant qu'ils se bornent du moins à décrire les phénomènes: car ils se condamnent ainsi à rester à la surface des choses. Au contraire, un scientifique doit chercher à pénétrer plus avant, à saisir *les déterminations* des phénomènes de surface.

[7] „Sur l'analyse. . .", op. cit.

TABLEAU 2

Origine \ Position	Cadres supérieurs. Professions libérales	Cadres moyens	Employés. Services — Autres	Ouvriers qualifiés. Contremaîtres	Ouvriers spécialisés. Mineurs	Manoeuvres	Salariés agricoles	Industriels. Gros commerçants	Artisans, Petits commerçants	Agriculteurs	Proportions
Cadres supérieurs. Professions libérales	7,6	2,5	1,2	0,3	(0,1)	—	(0,2)	1,0	0,7	(0,2)	3,3
Cadres moyens	3,2	3,9	1,4	0,5	0,5	(0,2)	(0,5)	0,8	(0,4)	(0,1)	3,9
Employés. Services — Autres	1,3	1,7	1,9	1,2	0,7	(0,4)	(0,1)	0,8	0,8	(0,1)	10,2
Ouvriers qualifiés. Contremaîtres	0,6	1,1	0,9	1,8	1,0	1,0	(0,1)	0,6	0,7	(0,1)	18,3
Ouvriers spécialisés. Mineurs	0,2	0,7	0,9	1,2	2,2	1,1	(0,2)	(0,3)	0,6	(0,1)	12,0
Manoeuvres	0,2	0,5	1,0	1,7	1,2	2,5	(0,2)	0,7	(0,3)	—	4,7
Salariés agricoles	0,1	0,2	0,6	0,8	1,2	2,6	5,8	(0,1)	0,5	—	5,4
Industriels. Gros commerçants	3,7	2,0	1,0	(0,4)	(0,2)	—	—	17,0	0,2	—	2,1
Artisans. Petits commerçants	1,4	1,0	1,1	1,0	0,6	0,5	(0,3)	2,2	3,4	(0,1)	12,3
Agriculteurs	0,3	0,3	0,7	(0,4)	0,9	1,2	2,0	(0,2)	0,7	3,4	27,8
Proportions	5,3	9,2	13,0	24,4	17,2	6,4	3,7	1,4	7,2	12,2	100,0

N. B — En cas de rigoureuse égalité de chances, tous les coefficients auraient été égaux à 1,0 — voire à 1,2 si les catégories de l'agriculture avaient été exclues des catégories de destination. Les coefficients égaux ou supérieurs à 1,2 ont été soulignés — *Coefficients rapportant les intensités des mouvements observés aux tailles relatives des catégories d'origine et de destination.*

jusqu'au bout de sa propre logique. Il m'a semblé qu'on n'avait pas suffisamment accordé d'attention au fait que le phénomènes de mobilité forment un *ensemble*: les étudier catégorie par catégorie, c'est se rendre aveugle aux *relations entre flux de mobilité*. Or ces relations sont importantes.

TABLEAU III. MOBILITE STRUCTURELLE
(CONFIGURATION CONFORME AUX RESULTATS
EMPIRIQUES)

Echelle: la population visée par l'enquête est de 5 300 000 hommes. On a pris 5 300 000 = 100 chaque flux de 1 représente donc un flux de 50 000 environ.

* Ind., Gr. c. = Industriels, Gros commerçants
** C. sup., Pr. Lib. = Cadres supérieurs, Professions libérales (fig. 5 et 6)

Prenons le cas des fils d'agriculteurs exploitants (paysans propriétaires de leurs terres, fermiers et métayers, mais non ouvriers agricoles). Aujourd'hui en France il y a environ 12% d'agriculteurs; et ce nombre diminue rapidement.

L'enquête montre que dans la génération considérée, un fils d'agriculteur sur deux est resté agriculteur; l'autre a quitté la terre. Or cette sortie massive correspond à une contraction très forte de la catégorie: il y avait deux fois plus d'agriculteurs en France dans la génération précédente.[8] La „mobilité" des fils d'agriculteurs est donc typiquement de la mobilité *structurelle*.

Mais où sont-ils allés? Deux sur trois sont devenues ouvriers. Or *c'est autant de places d'ouvriers que les fils d'ouvriers n'ont pas „eues" à remplir*, donc c'est une possibilité (virtuelle jusqu'ici) de mobilité (structurelle) pour autant de fils d'ouvriers. En fait cette possibilité n'a pu être saisie car il y a eu, parallèlement,

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[8] Les phénomènes de fécondité différentielle, etc. viennent compliquer le tableau dans les détails.

expansion de la catégorie des ouvriers, et cette expansion a absorbé les fils d'ouvriers virtuellement excédentaires. Pourtant il est possible de retrouver des signes d'un tel processus de „mobilité en chaîne" *à l'intérieur* de la catégorie des ouvriers: les fils de paysans (et aujourd'hui, les fils de paysans algériens, portugais, espagnols,

TABLEAU IV. CIRCULATION (CALCULEE D'APRÈS
LA CONFIGURATION DE MOBILITE STRUCTURELLE)
PRÉSENTÉE SUR LE TABLEAU III

etc.) y ont pris les places de manoeuvres, et les fils d'ouvriers ont pu de ce fait „monter" quelque peu (montée très largement illusoire bien entendu).[9]

Il y a beaucoup d'autres exemples de ce type, et ils sont d'autant plus observables que l'on descend dans le détail des catégories. Autrement dit, la mobilité structurelle peut être vue (il y a d'autres possibilités, cf. article cité) comme une mobilité „en escalier": la contraction d'une catégorie expulsant les fils vers une catégorie voisine, et l'arrivée de ces fils dans la catégorie voisine expulsant à son tour des fils de cette catégorie (si elle n'est pas en expansion) vers une autre catégorie, etc. Cette idée n'est d'ailleurs pas nouvelle; c'est peut-être l'essai d'application à des données empiriques qui est nouveau. J'ai trouvé ainsi que plus de la moitié de la mobilité en France était de la mobilité structurelle, et qu'une bonne part de ce que d'autres auteurs comptent comme de la circulation est, en fait, bel et bien de la mobilité structurelle *selon leur propre définition* (à condition d'en pousser la logique jusqu'au bout): cas de Jackson et Crockett, Broom et Jones,[10] etc.

[9] Les flux totaux de "mobilité" tels qu'indiqués sur le tableau I, peuvent être décomposés en flux "structurels" et flux de circulation, selon la méthode de l'article cité; voir le résultat sur les tableaux III et IV.

[10] E. F. Jackson et H. J. Crockett Jr., "Occupational Mobility in the United States", *American Sociological Review,* 29, (1), 1964, p. 5—15; L. Broom et F. L. Jones., "Father-to-son Mobility: Australia in comparative perspective", *American Journal of Sociology,* 74, (4), Janvier 1969.

Une pincée d'histoire sociale

L'idée même de mobilité structurelle est à analyser, si on veut en faire un concept scientifique; et cette analyse reste à faire. En deux mots, voyons les premières difficultés.

Parler de mobilité structurelle, c'est faire le postulat qu'il existe une dynamique sociale qui produit notamment des déformations de la „structure socioprofessionnelle", selon des déterminations agissant à un niveau sociétal, c'est-à-dire à un tout autre niveau que les déterminations agissant au niveau des „individus".

A part quelques statisticiens psychosociologisants, quelques inoffensifs faiseurs de modèles, et quelques idéologues humanistes attardés, plus personne ne croit aujourd'hui qu'il n'existe pas de déterminations au niveau sociétal; en fait, notre travail de sociologues consiste précisément à les percevoir et à les étudier. Les désaccords commencent quand on se demande de quelle nature sont ces déterminations: sont-elles d'ordre „culturel", comme voudraient nous le faire croire les sociologues des „values"? Ou bien, d'ordre „technologique", comme le soutiennent d'autres sociologues, souvent proches d'ailleurs des premiers, qui compensent leur idéalisme par un matérialisme technologique très réducteur? Sont-elles d'ordre économique, ou c'est déjà mieux — à trouver au niveau de la production matérielle, qui est un tout plus riche en déterminations que la seule économie? Où sont-elles, en dernier ressort, politiques, sociales, voire militaires (luttes de classes et guerres)?

Prenons le seul phénomène de l'exode rural: comment peut-on l'expliquer?

L'explication la plus souvent entendue et lue est d'ordre technologico-économique. Les progrès de l'industrie auraient permis une augmentation rapide de la productivité agricole, grâce aux engrais chimiques, à la mécanisation, à la sélection d'espèces plus rentables, etc. Comme la productivité croissait beaucoup plus vite que la „consommativité" de la population, les fils de paysans ont pu, ou ont dû, aller chercher du travail à la ville. Explication qui se complète par une bonne dose de „culturel": la pénétration des „valeurs urbains" à la campagne, la destruction des valeurs rurales qui s'en suivit, auraient attiré les jeunes vers les villes.

Or, il y a bien eu exode rural dans tous les pays s'industrialisant; mais ce phénomène s'est produit de façon différente en Angleterre et en France, aux Etats-Unis et en URSS. Une explication théorique du phénomène devrait expliquer aussi ces différences; et c'est ici, je crois, que l'explication technologico-économico-culturelle devient insuffisante; la prise en considération des luttes sociales, politiques et militaires devient nécessaire, non seulement pour „combler les lacunes" de l'autre type d'explication, mais en fait, pour s'y substituer.

Car si l'on essaye de dessiner les grands traits de l'histoire de la France depuis deux cents ans en partant de la „lutte des classes", cela donne à peu près ceci. Pour s'emparer du pouvoir politique que détenaient le roi et la noblesse (s'appuyant sur le clergé et les hauteurs de l'armée), la bourgeoisie financière et marchande dut s'appuyer sur d'autres catégories (petite bourgeoisie des villes, et au moment de la Révolution française, paysannerie); une fois le pouvoir pris, pour le consolider et saper celui des nobles, elle créa une petite bourgeoisie rurale fort nombreuse en distribuant les terres de l'Eglise et (en partie) des nobles aux paysans les moins pauvres. Cette masse de petits paysans propriétaires allait donner à la France son visage particulier dans les deux siècles à venir: exode rural beaucoup plus lent qu'ailleurs, industrialisation lente, partis politiques du centre forts, idéologie nationale fortement empreinte d'„égalitarisme petit-bourgeois", etc. Quand la grande bourgeoisie voulut liquider la petite paysannerie qui freinait l'industrialisation (vers 1860 et

seq.) parce qu'elle n'avait plus besoin d'elle contre la noblesse enfin désarmée, elle s'aperçut qu'un nouvel ennemi se dressait en face d'elle: le prolétariat industriel des villes. Dans la Commune de 1870, artisans et ouvriers s'opposèrent violemment à la classe dominante. Quelques années plus tard, la grande bourgeoisie devait concéder le suffrage universel. Dès lors, elle dut partager le pouvoir politique avec des catégories urbaines „moyennes", et conserver une masse paysanne électoralement nombreuse et politiquement conservatrice: c'est là le sens des „tarifs Méline" qui ont protégé l'agriculture française depuis 1880 contre les importations.

Je ne garantis pas la qualité scientifique de cette esquisse terriblement schématique de l'histoire sociale de la France.[11] Ce que je veux montrer en donnant ce schéma, c'est que cette façon de voir la mobilité structurelle lui donne un sens complètement différent que celui conféré par une perspective purement technologico-économique à la Colin Clark. Elle fait apparaître l'évolution de la structure socio-professionnelle comme un processus qui, à l'intérieur de contraintes provenant effectivement de déterminismes technologiques et économiques, évolue selon sa dynamique propre qui est celle de la lutte de classes et des relations internationales (économiques, politiques, militaires, phénomènes de migrations).[12]

J'ai essayé de reconstituer l'évolution de la structure socio-professionnelle depuis cent ans d'après les recensements, pour donner un visage concret à la mobilité structurelle. Les nomenclatures et les définitions ont varié d'un recensement à l'autre. Les courbes que je donne ici pour information (et qu'on aura intérêt à comparer avec celles d'autres pays) sont donc approximatives. Pour les construire je me suis inspiré de deux études et des recensements récents.[13]

On trouvera ces résultats (provisoires) en Annexe. J'éviterai de les commenter longuement: ils n'ont guère de signification par eux-mêmes. Ce n'est que par *comparaison* avec les courbes retraçant l'évolution des structures socio-professionnelles d'autres pays, notamment celles de la Grande-Bretagne et des Etats-Unis, qu'on verrait apparaître les différences saisissantes de rythme dans l'industrialisation et l'„exode rural". Je donne ici ces courbes pour information: il semble que les publications sur ce sujet soient pour la France, fort rares.

II. ESSAI D'APPROCHE THEORIQUE

Le processus d'anthropo-distribution

Première constatation: il est impossible de distinguer scientifiquement mobilité et immobilité sociales. Il ne s'agit en effet que de deux aspects du même processus, le processus de distribution des êtres humains dans la structure sociale ou „processus d'anthropo-distribution". Par ailleurs, faire la théorie de ce processus ce n'est pas seulement en faire la description: c'est en expliciter les *déterminations* profondes.

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[11] Elle se base notamment sur des ouvrages tels que: Nikos Poulantzas, "Pouvoir politique et clases sociales'', Maspéro, 1968; Barrington Moore, "Les origines sociales de la dictature et de la démocratie'', tr. fr. Maspéro, 1969.

[12] Cette dynamique prenant notamment — mais pas seulement — la forme "culturelle ''de changements de „valeurs"; il ne s'agit donc pas de refuser aux "valeurs'' le statut de "causes'' ou plutôt de forces ayant une action réelle, mais de montrer qu'elles ne sont que desmédiations, qu'une des multiples formes sous lesquelles s'actualise une dynamique plus générale.

[13] Il s'agit de: J. C. Toutain, "La population de la France de 1700 à 1959", *Cahiers de l'I.S.E.A.,* suppl. n° 133, jan. 1963, 247 p.; et de Cahen, "Evolution de la population active française depuis cent ans", Etudes et Conjoncture, mai — juin, 1953.

Ces déterminations sont sans doute à chercher, non dans les „valeurs des individus" ni même dans la technique, qui ne sont que des *effets* — mais dans la *structure sociale* elle-même dont le processus d'anthropo-distribution constitue en quelque sorte le métabolisme. Vu au niveau sociétal, les groupes sociaux apparaissent en effet comme recrutant leurs supports, d'une génération sur l'autre, au moyen des „institutions distributrices", principalement la *famille* comme agent de la classe sociale (famille „de classe"), l'école, voire le marché du travail; et à cette altitude, le „choix du métier" apparaît comme le choix *par* le métier, et les „aspirations" des jeunes comme l'effet du fait qu'ils sont *aspirés* objectivement par la structure sociale.

Pour ce qui est de nos chers tableaux de „mobilité" (ou plutôt d'immobilité), cette perspective conduit à interpréter la présence d'un être humain dans une de leurs cases comme le simple *signe matériel,* l'effet de l'existence d'un rapport déterminant entre une catégorie sociale de la structure des pères et une catégorie de la structure des fils. Mais examinons de plus près ce rapport père/fils, trop évident pour n'être pas suspect.

Parenté biologique et parenté sociologique

La relation père/fils semble avoir une existence biologique extrêmement concrète: la parenté génétique. Or, il faut la sociologiser; et ce faisant, on s'aperçoit qu'il n'y a pas correspondance directe entre relations biologiques et relations sociologiquement significatives.

En effet, la relation père/fils est une relation à réinsérer dans le système des relations *de parenté,* définie sociologiquement. Ce système se développe concrètement à partir du système des relations de parenté biologique mais ne lui est pas réductible. L'ethnographie l'a montré de mille façons. Pour nous en tenir aux sociétés dites „développées", citons les exemples concrets des rapports créés par l'adoption ou le parrainage, rapports sociologiques mais non biologiques; ou à l'inverse, des rapports de conception adultérine ou „de père inconnu", rapports (entre le père biologique et l'enfant) biologiques mais non „sociologiques". Finalement on voit que la seule relation biologique ayant une signification directement sociologique est la relation mère/enfant; tandis que le rôle biologique de père apparaît ridiculement insignifiant face au rôle de „père sociologique", c'est-à-dire le chef de *famille*: c'est dans cette dernière institution que se trouve la clé de l'interprétation sociologique de la relation père/fils, et plus généralement de *l'ensemble* des relations de parenté qu'elle définit socialement entre ses différrents rôles. Encore une remarque: tandis que la relation biologique est „éternelle", la relation de parenté définie par l'institution famille est historique; et pour bien le comprendre il faut replacer la famille dans le „système social" à chaque époque.

Théories du „système social" et de la „stratification"

Les différentes théories de la „stratification" sont très controversées. Par exemple, à la théorie de Davis-Moore et autres, qui voit en la *qualification* (professionelle) le fondement de la stratification (sociale), s'oppose la théorie „conflictuelle" (Wesolowoski, Dahrendorf, etc.) qui voit ce fondement dans la relation de pouvoir/non pouvoir. Les approches „multidimensionnelles" du type „class-status-power" sont insatisfaisantes en ce qu'elles se refusent à chercher *l'unité* pro-

fonde des phénomènes de stratification, unité que Weber voyait sans doute, contrairement à ses récupérateurs, dans le pouvoir. Quant aux soi-disants „théories" qui se fondent sur „l'échelle de prestige des professions", et qui de ce fait transforment un phénomène empirique intéressant (la stabilité de cette échelle) mais d'ordre culturel ou „idéologique" en „explication", je n'en parlerai même pas.

La stabilité de l'échelle de prestige des professions, et le fait qu'elle ressemble fort à une échelle de qualifications, est parfois utilisée pour justifier la théorie de Davis-Moore. A ce sujet on peut faire remarquer que la „qualification" pourrait bien être l'inoffensive peau de mouton sous laquelle se dissimulent les rapports de pouvoir, dont les oreilles de loup se montrent pourtant aux points essentiels (que l'échelle de prestige des professions se garde bien d'éclairer); en effet, un examen objectif révèle que les postes ou les „rôles", chargés de pouvoir ne nécessitent aucune qualification (professionnelle) particulière: quelle qualification est requise pour occuper les postes de chef de l'Etat ou de ministre, de représentant de pouvoir executif ou de „représentant du peuple"? et exige-t-on aucune qualification pour devenir le support d'une immense fortune, voire même pour faire partie de son Conseil d'administration? Et cependant, ces places occupent sans conteste le haut des „hiérarchies", qu'elles soient de pouvoir, de prestige, ou de revenu; elles sont donc les plus significatives pour comprendre la structure sociale. Que dire alors d'une „théorie" qui les laisserait en dehors de son champ?

Vers une théorie scientifique des rapports sociaux

Y-a-t-il une théorie marxiste de la structure sociale? Je crois que oui, et que ses principes généraux pourraient se formuler ainsi:

I — le processus de production est le processus social par excellence, celui dont dépend la survie de l'espèce et des sociétés, celui qui détermine tous les autres (même s'ils le déterminent parfois en retour);

II — la seule chose d'utile pour lui-même qu'un groupe puisse prendre à un autre groupe, c'est son *travail* (et non son repos, sa liberté, sa vie, etc., qui peuvent se prendre mais non se donner);

III — aussi le *but* de la „domination" d'un groupe sur un autre est-il toujours *l'exploitation de surtravail*. Mais les *moyens* pour y parvenir sont différents selon les époques: oppression politique, domination idéologique, appropriation des moyens de production sont trois moyens fondamentaux que l'on retrouve à toutes les époques avec des importances et dans des combinaisons variables;

IV — la forme historique actuelle de l'exploitation, à savoir le mode de production capitaliste (MPC), possède sa logique propre, la dynamique du profit, qui échappe de plus en plus à tout contrôle, même à celui des classes dominantes des différents pays. Après avoir permis le développement des „forces productives", elle mènera l'humanité à la barbarie et à la destruction si l'humanité ne la détruit pas auparavant.

Pour tout dire, cette perspective (telle que je la comprends: il peut y avoir d'autres interprétations, et la mienne peut évoluer) me paraît beaucoup plus féconde, et donc possède une valeur scientifique beaucoup plus grande, que toutes les „théories de la stratification" réunies. Il me semble qu'elle découle d'une attitude qui serait universelle si la sociologie était vraiment une discpline scientifique, à savoir: „il y a des phénomènes sociaux; il s'agit de les expliquer; et tant pis pour nos présupposés".

Fig. 1. France: Population totale, rurale, urbaine d'après
les recensements et Toutain, op. cit.

1 — population totale; *2* — population rurale; *3* — population urbaine;
4 — population vivant de l'agriculture

Quant aux critiques qui lui ont été faites, elles ont souvent procédé d'un ma-
lentendu. En effet, si „Le Capital" ne contient pas de théorie des classes sociales,
c'est parce que son objet d'étude n'est pas une formation économico-sociale réelle
(par exemple l'Angleterre du XIXe siècle), mais bien le „mode de production capi-
taliste pur", qui est un objet théorique dont Marx cherche à expliciter complète-
ment la logique; et comme il n'étudie que la production, il ne prend en considéra-
tion que les déterminations économiques, et ne s'occupe des autres (politiques,
idéologiques, sociales) que lorsqu'elles interviennent dans la production[14]. Au

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[14] Rappelons que le critère central de son analyse de classes dans le MPC est la propriété
non propriété des moyens de production; c'est déjà, notons-le, un critère politico-économique et
pas seulement économique.

Fig. 2. Population active totale*

1 — population active totale (avant 1906);   *2* — population active agricole;   *3* — popualation active
non-agricole; *4* — industrie + manutention et transports; *5* — services

contraire, les formations sociales réelles sont le produit de *tous* les ordres de déter-
minations, et de conditions spécifiques; d'autre part, plusieurs stades d'un même
mode de production coexistent en leur sein. Au demeurant, lorsque Marx entre-
prend d'analyser le mouvement de sociétés réelles — dans ses ouvrages historiques —
il est bien obligé de tenir compte de tous ces rapports déterminants, dont l'image en
son cerveau n'est pas encore explicitée.

Certes, la théorie „marxiste" des classes sociales reste à faire. Mais de récent
progrès, notamment dans la compréhension de l'Etat et des fameuses „classes moy-
ennes salariées", montrent la voie.[15]

[15] Voir notamment les deux ouvrages de N. Poulantzas, *Pouvoir politique et classes so-
siales,* Maspéro, 1968; et surtout *Fascisme et dictature,* Maspéro, 1970.
    * Les statistiques officielles indiquées par 1 et 2 sous-estiment la population agricole.

Fig. 3. Population active agricole*

1 — population active agricole totale (chiffres officiels): *2* — population active agricole totale (nos estimations); *3*— exploitants agricoles (chiffres offciels); *4* — exploitants agricoles (nos estimations); *5* — population active: ouvriers agricoles (chiffres officiels); *6* — population active: ouvriers agricoles (nos estimations); *i* — population active: isolés; *H* — population active: hommes; *F* — population active: femmes

Une difficulté supplémentaire vient de ce qu'il existe de multiples systèmes se-condaires de „relations de stratification" ou plutôt de rapports de domination, tels que ceux dérivant du sexe, de l'âge, de la race, de la nationalité, etc.: naturel-lement, ces systèmes fondés sur des caractères biologiques ou pseudo-biologiques sont réinterprétés différemment dans chaque formation sociale particulière, con-formément à sa logique profonde, et c'est la réinterprétation sociale que compte en tant que détermination sociologique (par exemple, être une femme ou un ado-lescent ou un être de race blanche, prend des significations très différentes au Bré-

* N. B. Utilisée de 1896 à 1936, la catégorie des "isolés" regroupe les exploitants indivi-duels et les ouvriers saisonniers.

Fig. 4. Ouvriers et employers (urbains) des deux sexes

1 — ouvriers (industrie + services); *2* — employés (tous salariée urbains non-ouvriers sauf cadres superieurs)

sil, aux Etats-Unis et en France, à la campagne et à la ville, en milieu ouvrier et en milieu fonctionnaire, etc.).

Le problème est complexe. Cela veut dire qu'il faut redoubler d'efforts: en effet, le chemin vers une théorie de l'anthropo-distribution passe *obligatoirement* par une théorie de la structure sociale. Il n'y a pas de raccourci.

Logique des institutions distributrices

L'existence de différentes catégories sociales est un *fait* empiriquement observable. Les divergences portent sur l'interprétation théorique de ce fait — c'est-à-dire, en dernier ressort, sur la nature des *rapports entre catégories*. Selon les orientations théorico-idéologiques, les „sociologues" pensent en effet ces rapports comme rapports d'opposition, d'inégalités ou de simples différences, ou même ne les pensent pas du tout. Il en découle des points de vue différents sur l'anthropo-distribution; on parlera de „chances opposées", ou seulement de chances „inégales", de „valeurs (de classes) différentes", ou de „goûts individuels" (?) et de processus stochastiques: ce dernier mot signifiant la renonciation complète des ainsi-nommés „sociologues" à comprendre la réalité sociale.

Il semble que la „dominante" du processus d'A-distribution, ce soit la transmission de la position *sociale* (à ne pas confondre avec la catégorie professionnelle[16]

[16] Ainsi lorsque les artisans et surtout les petits commerçants, actuellement en pleine déroute économique, orientent leurs enfants vers des postes de petits fonctionnaires, ils leur trans-

des parents aux enfants; la „famille" jouant le rôle d'agent de la classe sociale. Autrefois transmission du patrimoine au fils aîné, ce mécanisme prend de plus en plus la forme de la transmission d'un certain „niveau" social dans le monde diversifié des salariés; le niveau d'instruction constituant le moyen privilégié, mais non le seul, par lequel cette transmission est médiatisée.

Une hypothèse me paraît féconde: ce qui mobiliserait les parents, ce ne serait pas tant le désir de „promouvoir" leurs enfants que celui de les empêcher de tomber. Il semble en effet que les moyens employés pour éviter la „chute" soient plus nombreux, plus inventifs et finalement plus efficaces que ceux utilisés pour promouvoir les enfants. A noter que ce mécanisme suffirait à lui seul à assurer la transmission directe: si les catégories relativement „élevées" protègent leurs enfants contre toute „descente", elles empêchent par là-même les enfants des autres catégories de „monter".

Deuxième institution A-distributrice, *l'école* est de création récente (XIXe siècle). En fait il y a toujours eu, en France du moins, *deux* écoles: l'école des notables et l'école du peuple, comme les appelle A. Prost.[17] L'apparition de l'„école du peuple" (1840—1880) ne correspond d'ailleurs pas à des idéaux égalitaristes mais aux nouveaux besoins du capitalisme, non pas tant en alphabétisation qu'en encasernement des enfants de prolétaires, réputés „dangereux": les débats législatifs de l'époque sont très clairs là-dessus.

L'école a-t-elle, comme elle le proclame, sa propre logique A-distributrice dont le „mérite scolaire" serait le critère? Ou se contente-t-elle de décerner des diplômes en fonction exclusive de l'origine sociale, le „mérite scolaire" n'étant que le déguisement honorable de l'immérite social? Question controversée, mais question de *fait*. En fait, les études les plus sérieuses, celles qui étudient l'école primaire, montrent que loin d'égaliser les chances, l'école *différencie selon leur milieu social des enfants qui avaient à l'origine des moyens intellectuels comparables.*[18] C'est qu'il faut bien retrouver, à chaque génération, de quoi fournir en travailleurs non-qualifiés les champs, les usines et les comptoirs de vente: 3 enfants sur 4 y sont „destinés".

Au demeurant, il est possible d'imaginer une école réellement égalitaire dans une société de classes; car ce que (re)-produit l'école, ce n'est pas, fondamentalement, les classes à partir d'elles-mêmes, mais les *rapports de classes* („dirigeants" vs. dirigés, „intellectuels" vs. „manuels", en fait: exploiteurs et leurs agents vs. travailleurs productifs de richesses). Cependant, le maintien de cette situation supposerait la dissolution totale de la famille, qui, elle, reproduit les classes *à partir d'elles-mêmes*. Dans le cas contraire, la classe dominante s'efforcerait constamment de détourner l'école au profit de ses enfants — ou d'en réduire l'importance comme institution distributrice.

Il y a sans doute d'autres institutions distributrices; ainsi les divers réseaux de „solidarité" (constitués à partir d'un village, d'une communauté ethnique ou religieuse, combattante ou sportive) peuvent-ils fonctionner comme agences de placement. Quant au „marché du travail", instance très mal connue où les „re-

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mettent, à travers un changement de catégorie professionnelle, l'équivalent de leur position sociale. Voir sur ce sujet Pierre Bourdieu, "Condition de classe et position de classe", *Archives Européennes de Sociologie*, VII, 1966, p. 1—23.

[17] Antoine Prost, "Histoire de l'enseignement en France, 1800—1967", Armand Colin, 1969.

[18] Voir notamment les enquêtes d'Alain Girard et al., revue *Population*; de Collette Chilland (thèse 3e cycle Sorbonne, juillet 1970, non publiée); et surtout, l'ouvrage de Christian Baudelot et Roger Establet L'école capitaliste en France, Maspéro, 1971.

lations" semblent jouer un très grand rôle on y notera l'apparition de la psycho-technique (tests) comme discipline de sélection à l'entrée des firmes: le critère en étant le *caractère*, cela signifierait-il que les grands oligopoles mondiaux ont désormais besoin de docilité plus que d'intelligence?

Les phénomènes d'A-distribution sont donc nombreux et divers, et doivent être étudiés dans leur diversité concrète (c'est-à-dire avec des techniques ethnographiques telles que biographies ou monographies, et non avec des questionnaires); mais cette phase „descriptive" n'est qu'un premier pas vers la théorie de ces phénomènes, c'est-à-dire la théorie de leurs *déterminations*. Ici on rejoint la totalité sociale, et sans vouloir anticiper sur les études empiriques, on peut donner quelques grandes lignes à partir d'un domaine de la théorie sociale qui est plus développé: la théorie de l'économie politique.

Distribution «économique» et anthropo-distribution

Dans un texte célèbre, Marx a montré que pour la sphère des marchandises, on ne pouvait dissocier production, distribution et consommation. Les *rapports* qui unissent ces trois moments d'un même processus d'ensemble sont nombreux et forment un tout complexe et cohérent, où chaque moment est à son tour déterminé et déterminant, voire à la fois négation et reproduction des autres moments de l'ensemble.[19]

Au cours de ce manuscrit remarquable, Marx touche plusieurs fois à la question de la distribution des êtres humains, sans toutefois la traiter de manière spécifique.[20] Or, il est très fécond, à titre d'analogie, de reprendre la démonstration que Marx a faite pour la sphère de la production-distribution-consommation des marchandises, en l'appliquant à la *production-distribution-consomation des êtres humains*.

Soit quelques brèves remarques. Qui produit les êtres humains? Concrètement, ce sont les femmes. Mais pas les femmes en tant qu'*individus:* les femmes en tant qu'agents et supports d'*une institution particulière, la famille*. Et la famille à son tour n'est qu'un agent d'un ordre social particulier; ses pratiques reproductrices sont soumises au contrôle permanent (et plus ou moins efficace) des puissances sociales (Eglise, gouvernements, partis, etc.). La fécondité (i. e., la production matérielle d'êtres humains) est un phénomène *social* et non un phénomène exclusivement biologique ou le résultat du libre arbitre des individus et des ménages. Comment expliquer autrement, d'ailleurs, les variations *générales* de fécondité selon les époques, ainsi que les phénomènes de fécondité différente selon les catégories sociales?

Mais la production des êtres humains ne se réduit pas à leur mise au monde: l'*éducation* au sens large, en tant qu'elle façonne les êtres, est évidemment produc-

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[19] "Nous ne concluerons pas pour autant que la production, la distribution, l'échange et la consommation sont identiques, mais que chacun d'eux est l'élément d'un tout et représente la diversité au sein de l'unité." *Introduction à la critique de l'Economie politique* (1857).

[20] Par exemple, "Dans l'acception la plus banale, la distribution est répartition des produits; définie de la sorte, elle est la plus éloignée de la production et en est pour ainsi dire indépendante. Mais, avant d'être distribution des produits, elle est: 1) distribution des instruments de la production, et 2) ce qui est le prolongenemt du rapport précédent, distribution des membres de la société entre les diverses branches de la production, autrememt dit soumission des individus à des rapports de production déterminés."

Voir aussi "L'individu n'a ni capital, ni propriété foncière de par sa naissance: en venant au monde, il est voué au travail salarié par la distribution sociale."

tion (travail de transformation du matériau brut: le bébé, en produit consommable par „la société"); et elle est d'autant plus prégnante qu'elle se mêle intimement à l'assouvissement des besoins biologiques. Les institutions qui s'occupent d'éducation au sens large (famille de classe, école, Eglise, armée, mass media, etc.) peuvent donc être considérées comme des *unités de production d'êtres humains.* On remarquera qu'en même temps qu'elles produisent l'idéologie des êtres humains, les principales de ces institutions (famille de classe, école) les *distribuent matériellement* dans la structure sociale: il semble que ce soit là deux aspects dialectiquement liés de la même chose.

A l'inverse, comment comprendre le terme de „consommation des êtres humains"? Un premier sens évident est celui qui désigne la consommation de leur *force de travail* (travailleurs, ménagères). Mais ce n'est pas seulement dans la dépense de leur force de travail, mais aussi dans celle de leur énergie hors travail, de leur temps, de leur vie même, que les êtres humains sont soumis à la logique sociale. En effet, tout développement autonome de la personne qui pourrait constituer une menace pour l'„ordre social" existant est systématiquement plié, réprimé ou canalisé, tout au moins tant que l'être humain est seul à lutter contre les „structures sociales". Au bout de ce processus de „conformation continue", on trouve l'adulte-adapté, celui qui a cessé de lutter, c'est-à-dire le *zombie:* pièce interchangeable, mort-vivant qui ne sort de son rôle passif que lorsque l'ordre social dont il est devenu la chose est menacé, somnambule mais aussi, en tant qu'il a une parcelle d'autorité (comme parent ou petit chef), agent reproducteur des rapports sociaux qui l'ont à la fois formé et déformé, qui sont en même temps la cause de sa disparition en tant qu'homme et la condition de son existence en tant que rouage social.

Les deux bouts de la chaîne se répondent: à l'anthropo-production répond l'anthropo-consommation. Dans cette perspective, l'anthropo-distribution apparaît comme un moment non isolable d'un processus d'ensemble qui, fonctionnant selon une logique sociétale tout à fait extérieure aux „individus" (située au-dessus d'eux et hors de leur vie), les produit, les élève, les transforme en produits consommables et en agents reproducteurs des rapports sociaux, les utilise et les rejette. Ce processus est en quelque sorte l'indispensable inverse du processus de production des marchandises (dont la logique capitaliste a été analysée par Marx): en effet, les êtres humains sont utilisés (consommés) dans la production de marchandises, d'êtres humains et de rapports sociaux, tandis que les marchandises sont utilisées (consommées) dans la production d'êtres humains, de marchandises et de rapports sociaux.

Sans doute, derrière les multiples formes historiques qu'ont revêtues ces processus, faut-il rechercher un mécanisme constant qui donnerait un sens à leur mouvement; pourra-t-on trouver une hypothèse plus féconde que celle de Marx et de Machiavel, à savoir le maintien et la reproduction sous des formes nouvelles d'un rapport fondamental d'exploitation dans la production, flanqué — comme le donjon est flanqué du sabre et du goupillon — d'un rapport d'oppression dans le domaine du politique, et d'un rapport de domination dans la sphère de l'idéologique? L'analyse reste à faire; mais la direction dans laquelle on fait le premier pas est celle dont dépend toute la suite.

ROLES, STATUS AND CAREERS: SOME
COMMENTS ON MOBILITY ANALYSIS AND NEW DATA
ON INTERGENERATIONAL MOBILITY
IN WEST GERMANY*

KARL U. MAYER, WALTER MÜLLER

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The major interests in studies of social mobility have been a) to describe the degree of inequality in the attainment of status and thus to show the openness or rigidity of class to be decreasing or increasing as a result of other transformations of societal structure, b) to demonstrate the effects of status mobility on personal identity, social integration and political stability, c) to prove the dependence of the factual amount of fluctuation within class structure on specific cultural belief systems.

We do now have a large and continually increasing amount of data, a great number of monographs on specific studies in the problem area and an impressive array of sophisticated methods of data analysis. Yet despite the mass of data we do not know much more than ten years ago as far as the accumulation of conformed hypotheses and the resolution of theoretical issues are concerned. In fact, views once firmly held on the development of the overall mobility rate, its relation to the degree of industrialization or the impact of education on the distribution of opportunities are now being questioned. Many instances could be cited to support this view: Goldhamer's article in the *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, Bolte's summary in the *Handbuch für empirische Sozialforschung* or Smelser and Lipset's imaginative analysis in *Social Structure and Mobility in Economic Development*[1].

[1] H. Goldhamer, Social Mobility, International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, vol. 14, New York, Free press, 1968, pp. 429-438; K. M. Bolte, Vertikale Mobilität, Handbuch für Empirische Sozialforschung. II, Stuttgart, Encke Verlag, 1969, pp. 1-42; N. J. Smelser and S. M. Lipset, Social Structure, Mobility and Development, in N. J. Smelser/S. M. Lipset (eds.), Social Structure and Mobility in Economic Development, Chicago, Aldine, 1966, pp. 1-50.

The political and ideological interest in social mobility, however, persists as well as the inclination of sociologists to attribute far-reaching societal and individual effects to it and to use mobility data as major means for the description of social structure. This divergence between interest, invested efforts and number of publications, on the one hand, and reliable, theoretically enlightening results, on the other, encouraged us to examine the basic assumptions of traditional mobility studies and to review the criticisms directed against them. We shall further indicate which modified and different approaches might be taken to advance in this area. As a telling example of the problems and subtleties of the current mode of mobility investigations we shall present in the second part of the paper data from our own survey in Konstanz and a 1968 quota sample of West Germany and compare it to the data of Janowitz using a method proposed by Leo A. Goodman.

I

1. CRITICISM OF MOBILITY STUDIES — THE MAIN ARGUMENTS

Predominantly, social mobility has been understood as vertical mobility and in most cases was operationalized in terms of movements between broad occupational groupings. The occupational hierarchy was usually ordered according to the prestige dimension, presupposing high correlations with other factors of social rank such as education, income, deference or autonomy. Social mobility was measured as intergenerational mobility: turnover between social origin — occupational groups of fathers — and social destination — occupational groups of sons.

An essential part for providing continuity and comparability has been played by the strong emphasis on standardization by means of consturucting mobility tables and their descriptive analysis by summarizing statistical measures.

Pointing now to the shortcomings of this approach we wish in no way to denigrate the outstanding scholarship which has gone into building up this tradition of mobility research.

Scope of Social Mobility

The scope of the study of individual movements in social structure has been narrowed due to theoretical predilections and technical problems of investigations ever since Sorokin introduced the onesided dichotomy between vertical and horizontal mobility[2]. Although recent studies by Wilensky, Westoff et al. and Blau/Duncan clearly show the interrelations between vertical occupational mobility in terms of prestige and various other movements, the theoretical implications of that evidence have not yet been worked out[3].

[2] P. A. Sorokin, Social Mobility, New York, Harper & Brothers, 1927. Chs. 1/7.

[3] H. Wilensky, Measures and Effects of Social Mobility, in Smelser/Lipset, op. cit., pp. 98-140; Ch. F. Westoff, et al., The Concept of Social Mobility. An Empirical Inquiry, "American Sociological Review" (1960), pp. 375-385; P. Blau and O. D. Duncan, American Occupational Structure, New York, Wiley & Sons, 1967, Chs. 7/10. Independently, the same point has been raised by R. Ryvkina. To the Study of Relations between Different Kinds of Mobility, Novosibirsk 1970 (Paper presented at the 7th World Congress of Sociology, Varna, Bulgaria).

Mobility and Stratification

The advancement of the study of social mobility as an instrument for the study of the rigidity of class structures has suffered from the premature empirical treatment of vertical mobility before prior analysis of the stratification system itself. Unsolved problems of stratification theory and research have become chronic diseases of the analysis and interpretation of mobility studies and have limited the theoretical relevance of their results. These problems, e. g. the issues of classes vs. strata, discontinuous strata vs. continuous status-systems, objective vs. subjective measurement, unidimensionality vs. multidimensionality of status, the role of occupation in the stratification system and the relation between local and national status systems have largerly been subject to pragmatical and ad hoc empirical research decisions.[4] Critical arguments have been advanced especially against the use of prestige ranking of occupations as the sole indicator of stratification and the non-homogeneous occupational categories applied.[5]

Social Mobility and Social Structure

The occupational classification schemes adopted for the measurement of mo bility give rise to a biased conception of compound social structure. One bias con sists in the reduction of social structure to an unidimensional system of occupati onal status, the categories of which do not correspond to observable social strata (reduction to one dimension).

The other bias results from measuring social mobility as turnover in a static classification scheme between two fixed points. The processes involved in the transition from father's to son's occupational group or from first to last job, i. e. continuous or discontinuous career types, mobility channels and movements within occupational categories have therefore received less attention than warranted (static-comparative instead of process analysis).

For the most part changes of structure which could be inferred directly from changes of the marginal distributions in standard mobility tables, i. e. demographic- and technological changes, have come to be regarded as 'structural' causes of social mobility. Other transformations, as for instance transformations in t he distri bution of political power, property or income, changes of legal requirements or the standards of social justice, have not been seriously considered — the major exception being changes in the educational system.[6]

[4] Concerning these controversies and their bearing on mobility research cf.: V. Capecchi, Problèmes méthodologiques dans la mesure de la mobilité sociale, "Archives Européennes de Sociologie", VIII (1967), pp. 285—318; G. Carlsson, Social Mobility and Class Structure, Lund. Gleerup, 1958; R. Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1959, Ch. 2/3; M. B. Haug and M. B. Sussman, Social Class Measurement II — The Case of the Duncan SEI, American Sociological Association, Boston, 1968; S. M. Lipset, H. Zetterberg, A Theory of Social Mobility, in R. Bendix, S. M. Lipset (eds.), Class, Status and Power, New York, Free Press, 1966; K. Svalastoga, Class, Prestige and Mobility, Copenhagen, Gyldendal, 1959; J. H. Goldthorpe, Social Stratification in Industrial Society, in Bendix/Lipset, op. cit., pp. 648-659; E. P. Jackson, R. F. Curtis, Conceptualization and Measurement in the Study of Social Stratification, in H. Blalock, A. Blalock, Methodology in Social Research, New York, McGraw Hill, 1968, pp. 112-149.

[5] A critical summary has been presented by J. H. Goldthorpe in a lecture on mobility research given at the University of Konstanz in January 1970.

[6] Cf. Goldhamer, op. cit., p. 437. D. Bertaux, Nouvelles perspectives de la Mobilité Sociale en France, Paper presented at the 7th World Congress of Sociology, Varna, Bulgaria 1970, also this issue.

Another consequence of occupational classification schemes as a representation of social structure seems to be the implicit bias which identifies the criterion of classification — prestige or occupational status in general — with the motivating force propelling individuals. Correspondingly, the occupational inheritance from father to son appeared to be the almost only moment inhibiting mobility. By this procedure questionable assumptions about human nature or the dominant social character were incorporated but not tested.[7]

Mobility Rates

A central concern of mobility studies has been the establishment of mobility rates, indices of the overall frequency of social mobility and its incidence in a society. They have been well summarized by Miller's trend report of 1960.[8]

Even disregarding the difficulties in constructing and interpreting global rates[9] of mobility, e. g., outflow and inflow coefficients, measures based on the concept of perfect mobility or on that of mathematical freedom and correlation coefficients, the utility of such summary measurements of the mobility of whole nations, cities or strata remains doubtful. These measures could only be useful if they permitted comparisons between societies of different periods of a single society. But the prevalence of ambiguous indices, non-comparable classifications, non-comparable samples, lack of correspondence between generations and cohorts, and variations in the efficiency of field procedures make it extremely difficult to meet this condition.[10] No available measure has been shown to be adequate in testing the relationships between the extent of social mobility and other indicators of states and processes of social systems, e. g., national income, investment rate, population growth, degree of urbanization, level of achievement motivation, elite fluctuation, etc.[11].

[7] Cf. the critique of A. M. R o s e, Social Mobility and Social Values, Archives Européennes de Sociologie, V, (1964), pp. 324-330; J. P o r t e r, The Future of Upward Mobility, American Sociological Review, XXXIII (1968), pp. 5-19.

[8] S. M. M i l l e r, Comparative Social Mobility: A Trend Report, Current Sociology, IX, (1960), pp. 1-89.

[9] Cf. O. D. D u n c a n, Methodological Issues in the Analysis of Social Mobility, in Smelser/Lipset, op. cit., pp. 51-97; Capecchi, op. cit.; Carlsson, op. cit., Ch. 5/8; P. Duncan-Jones, Social Mobility, Canonical Scoring and Occupational Classification, Paper presented at the 7th World Congress of Sociology, Varna, Bulgaria, 1970.

[10] Cf. D u n c a n, op. cit.; W i l e n s k y, op. cit.

[11] For attempts of international comparisons and the use of mobility rates in macrosociological analysis, cf. Lipset/Zetterberg, A Theory of Social Mobility, op. cit.; Th. Fox, S. M. Miller, Occupational Stratification and Mobility: Intercountry Variation, Studies in Comparative International Development, I (1965), St. Louis; Th. Fox, S. M. Miller, Economic, Political and Social Determinants of Mobility: An International Cross-Sectional Analysis, Acta Sociologica, IX (1965), 1-2, 76-93; S. M. Miller, Comparative Social Mobility, op. cit.; S. M. Miller, H. Brice, Soziale Mobilität, wirtschaftliches Wachstum und Struktur, in D. Glass/R. König (eds.), Soziale Schichtung und soziale Mobilität, pp. 303-315; Ph. Cutright, Occupational Inheritance: A Cross-National Analysis, American Journal of Sociology, LXXIII (1968), pp. 400-416; For a critique cf. K. M. Bolte, R. Kreckel, Internationale Mobilitätsvergleiche im Bereich der Soziologie — Versuch einer kritischen Bilanz, in U. Gruber u. a., Soziale Mobilität heute, Herford, Maximilian Verlag, 1968, pp. 38-63; Ph. Cutright, Studying Cross National Mobility Rates, Acta Sociologica, XI 3, pp. 170-176; F. Lancaster Jones, Social Mobility and Industrial Society: A Thesis Re-examined, Sociological Quarterly (1969), pp. 292-306; Smelser/Lipset, op. cit., p. 20; K. Svalastoga, Gedanken zu Internationalen Vergleichen sozialer Mobilität, in Glass/König, op. cit., pp. 284-302.

Subjective Aspects of Social Mobility

Mobility studies have neglected almost totally what may be termed subjective aspects of individuals' movements: perceptions of structure, status satisfaction, mobility norms and values and aspirations.[12] It is not known to what extent the movements, which are counted and categorized statistically, correspond, if at all, to individual mobility experiences such as improvement, immobility, ups and downs or skidding. Nor is known whether the occupation or overall status of the father is the most salient subjective point of comparison.

2. APPROACHES TO MOBILITY RESEARCH

If there has been relatively small progress in mobility research and more question marks than substantial results have accumulated, this is not only so because more emphasis has been placed on description than on explanation, more on mobility as an academic topic than as a political and social problem, but also because one has attempted to resolve the issues of mobility theory by only one avenue: intergenerational occupational mobility rates. In the following, several other approaches to mobility research are being shortly discussed which together promise to yield more satisfactory answers.

Determinants of Occupational Status

The major recent study of a whole society, Blau and Duncan's *American Occupational Structure,* is the best example to date for the research strategy to estimate the variance explained by factors influencing occupational status, instead of attempting to determine societal parameters of mobility incidence and intensity. This straight-forward solution to the problem of theoretical scope and measurement turns the deficiencies of traditional mobility studies into virtues. The answers searched for are being restricted to the occupational hierarchy and the traditional father-son comparisons are being extended into a path model including educational and career variables. It follows, however, that all questions concerning social mobility in a compound stratification system and its causes remain outside the focus of this research strategy. Moreover, which structural conditions determine the relative weights within the path model of the occupational status-attainment process cannot be answered within this approach. In regard to causes and effects it is restricted to attributes which can be measured as properties of individuals.

Determinants of Occupational Changes and Career Developments

A methodological route quite similar to Blau and Duncan is being taken by Coleman, Rossi and associates in their extensive study of individual changes between jobs and occupations. They collected detailed informations on the occupational history of white and black respondents and now analyze aspects of it as a causal chain. Here, again, the stratification system is being measured only in two as-

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[12] For a critique of that point, cf. R. Dahrendorf, Warum gibt es in den Vereinigten Staaten keinen Sozialismus? in Die Angewandte Aufklärung, Piper Verlag, 1963, pp. 84-87; S. M. Miller, The Concept of Mobility, Social Problems (1955), p. 71 f.; H. Wilensky, op. cit., p. 131.

pects — occupational prestige and ethnicity — and the status-attainment process is considered per se via the attributes of individuals and some contextual variables like branches.[13]

Career Mobility

The studies of the Johns Hopkins group of Coleman/Rossi are, however, only one example for a wider tendency to shift from studies of intergenerational mobility to career mobility in a comprehensive sense, referring to the whole life history of individuals. Both the methodological problems involved in the estimation of societal parameters of intergenerational mobility and the decreasing relevance of father's social status on son's social identity in the later steps of the life cycle support this trend. Since no samples representative of whole nations are needed, but rather samples of various kinds of careers and mobility patterns, data collection can be extended to more than one role sphere of the individual. Career studies may lead to more knowledge on the impact of social and cultural discontinuity than intergenerational mobility studies, if they bring several elements together: a stratification frame of reference, a life-cycle perspective, an inclusion of institutional spheres outside work (family, leisure, community, participation). The goal would be to build up a dynamic picture of social structure made up not alone by status groups, occupational groups or strata, but also by career groups which comprise similar life chances and life histories.

Social Mobilization

One major aspect of mobility theory, which since the sweeping ideas of Sorokin and Schumpeter could have been expected to be tested by traditional intergenerational mobility studies, concerns relationships between the extent and intensity of social mobility and other properties of societies as a whole, such as the intensity of social and political conflict, economic growth and level of intellectual activity and the degree of inequality.[14] It is on this level of intersociety comparisons where such studies were aimed and where they have obviously failed.

Since the restricted perspective of occupational mobility rates and possible correlates has been unsuccessful and not very enlightening theoretically, issues of mobility theory on the societal level might be better attacked within the broader framework of cross-national studies of the components and conditions of modernization. Modernization implies an increasing flexibility and interchangeability of the variable units in a social system — individuals, sanctions, resources and positions. This already rather developed research area provides theoretical concepts like Deutsch's and Etzioni's concept of 'social mobilization', cross-sectional and time-series data on many social, economic and political indicators and an elaborate methodology to describe and explain stability and change, causes and effects of

[13] P. H. Rossi, M. Ornstein, Quantitative Studies in Intra-Generational Mobility. The Johns Hopkins Social Accounts Project Illustrated by an Analysis of the Impact of Labor Market Entry Factors. Paper presented to the International Workshop on career Mobility, Konstanz (Germany), April 1971.

[14] Sorokin, op. cit.; J. A. Schumpeter, Die sozialen Klassen im ethnisch homogenen Milieu, in Aufsätze zur Soziologie, Tübingen, Mohr-Siebeck, 1953, pp. 147-213.

various types of social mobility.[15] Moving to the macroscopic level in the study of social mobility does not remove the difficulties of assembling data. But asking for the significance of the mobility of personnel in social structure in the course of modernization instead of merely looking for societal factors explaining occupational mobility rates, one may become aware that various indicators of mobility could be employed and even crude indices could serve the purpose of testing relevant hypotheses.

Mobility Theory

Concept-and-theory-building on social mobility has for a long time been neglected. Definitions and theoretical formulations have seldom surpassed the crude stage of Sorokin's classical work and have not taken much notice of the theoretical developments in related fields of sociology. On the individual level, concepts of social mobility could be clarified by conceiving the structural settings in which individuals move in the analytic terms of an extended role theory. Then it appears immediately that to deal with social mobility exclusively as changes between positions of different status leaves many other aspects of social positions which may influence mobility unconsidered, e. g. functional role requirements such as occupational skills, properties of work organizations, types of relations to role-others, regional and local ties, interconnectedness between roles etc. Below the level of status differences we find differences between positions without status implications and differences in the composition of interaction partners. An empirically applicable mobility theory which deals only with status aspects of individual moves would be very much like the attempt of designing cars to transport only heads and not whole bodies. These very abridged considerations point to the unfortunate and highly misleading consequences of Sorokin's dichotomy between vertical and horizontal mobility and calls for a mobility theory which incorporates all social aspects which are implied in making a change between positions of different status.[16]

Another point to be raised in regard to mobility theory on the societal level is that statements on frequency, intensity and effects of social mobility have once been elements of comprehensive dynamic theories of societal change, like in Schumpeter's and Toqueville's works. Also due to Sorokin, however, in most standard texts social mobility is simply conceived of as dependent or independent variable in two-element correlational hypotheses or even merely indicator of a morphological attribute in the description of social structure. This is quite in contrast to its inherent processual character.

Thus, a reorientation toward theory building seems to be called for which ties social mobility to role behavior and status passages on the individual level and to political and social change on the societal level.

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[15] Cf. Smelser/Lipset, op. cit.; K. W. Deutsch, Social Mobilization and Politica l De velopment, American Political Science Review, LV (1961), pp. 493-514; A. Etzioni, M obi lization as a Macro-Sociological Conception, British Journal of Sociology, XIX, 3.

[16] The need for a perspective of mobility research focusing on individuals has been stressed by Th. Geiger (who is calling that perspective "Anaskopie") and S. Miller. Cf. Th. Geiger, Typologie und Mechanik der gesellschaftlichen Fluktuation, in Geiger, Arbeiten zur Soziologie, Neuwied, Luchterhand, 1962, pp. 114-151; S. M. Miller, op. cit., 1955, passim; S. M. Miller, op. cit. 1960, pp. 16-17.

II

Up to this point we have not much said about the statistical methods used in social mobility research and about the adequacy of these tools in solving the theoretical problems. We shall not try to summarize the many critical arguments raised in this field. We rather should like to examine in detail to what extent a method newly proposed by Leo A. Goodman[17] enables the researcher to affirm conclusions drawn from mobility data more safely than in the past. This method has been used by Goodman for comparisons of mobility rates across nations and should also be suitable for comparing mobility rates over time, a problem to which much attention has been payed under the heading of "social mobility and economic development".

The last available data about intergenerational mobility in West Germany has been collected in the end of 1950.[18] After a successful re-assimilation of refugees and a long period of economic growth it should be worth-while seeing whether remarkable changes in the mobility pattern of West German society have occurred.

1) GOODMAN'S METHOD OF RANSACKING SOCIAL MOBILITY TABLES

1. The underlying reasoning of the method proposed by Goodman is a model of perfect mobility, in which basically one computes a measure of exchange between two status categories of origin and two status categories of destination. The measure is called "interaction" and in a given 2×2 table (or a 2×2 subtable of a larger table) it is defined as

$$G = g_{11} + g_{22} - g_{12} - g_{21} \tag{1}$$

where g_{ij} is the logarithm of the observed frequency in the i-th row and the j-th column of the table (or subtable) under study.

2. It is important to note that the interactions are 'not influenced by either the absolute or relative sizes of the row marginal totals or by either the absolute or relative sizes of the column marginal totals.'[19] Therefore the G-value is a more adequate measure of association than the traditional coefficent of association (c-value) if one has to compare any transition rates in mobility tables of which the marginal distributions vary either by sampling differences or because of differences in the occupational structure of the populations studied.

3. Goodman's method is not limited to the study of 2x2 tables (or subtables) only. To obtain more comprehensive measures Goodman computes average interactions of different subtables of a larger table. Such a measure is the G-value of *status inheritance* (SI). SI of U-status, for instance, is defined as the average interaction in all 2×2 subtables which include the (U,U)-cell. More simply, in a mobility table of n rows and n columns the G-value of SI for any status category k is given by

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[17] When referring in the following pages to "Goodman's method" we deliberately limit the discussion to the techniques of analysis proposed in pages 1-23 of L. A. Goodman, How to Ransack Social Mobility Tables and Other Kinds of Cross-Classification Tables, American Journal of Sociology, LXXV (1969), pp. 1-40.

[18] M. Janowitz, Social Stratification and Mobility in West Germany, American Journal of Sociology, LXIV (1958), pp. 6-24; H. Daheim, Berufliche Intergenerationen-Mobilität in der komplexen Gesellschaft, Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, pp. 92-124.

[19] L. A. Goodman, op. cit., p. 6.

$$G = \sum_{i}^{n} \sum_{j}^{n} a_{ij} g_{ij}, \quad \text{where } a_{ij} = \begin{cases} 1 & i=j=k & (2a) \\ -1/(n-1) & i=k \text{ and } j \neq k; \ j=k \text{ and } i \neq k & (2b) \\ 1(n-1)^2 & i \neq j \neq k & (2c) \end{cases}$$

This formula of status inheritance of e. g. U-status takes account of all information available in a RxC table about the mobility chances of people with a specific origin different from U as compared with the corresponding chances of people whose origin is U.[20]

In many studies of social mobility high self-recruitment, respectively "status inheritance", in all status groups can be observed. Goodman's G-value of SI also yields generally significant effects of "status inheritance" for the diagonal cells. Goodman argues, however, that the measure of SI overestimates "status inheritance".

In fact, formula (2) includes n-1 diagonal cells beside the diagonal cell corresponding to the status category k. Therefore SI of e. g. U-status is influenced by "status inheritance" in other status categories.

The suggestion made by Goodman is to exclude the subtables containing two diagonal cells and to calculate an average measure of "status inheritance" from the remaining subtables. The formula of this measure, which he calls "intrinsic status inheritance" (ISI) is

$$G = \sum_{i}^{n} \sum_{j}^{n} a_{ij} g_{ij}, \quad \text{where } a_{ij} = \begin{cases} 1 & i=j=k & (3a) \\ 0 & i=j \neq k & (3b) \\ -1/(n-1) & j=k \text{ and } i \neq k; \ i=k \text{ and } j \neq k & (3c) \\ 1/[(n-1)^2-(n-1)] & i \neq j \neq k & (3d) \end{cases}$$

4. Goodman relates the concept of intrinsic status inheritance to the models of quasi-perfect mobility.[21] In these models one examines which cells of a given mobility-table must be excluded from consideration in order to find perfect mobility in the remaining cells of the table. Following this idea one should similarly exclude these cells in the definition of ISI, since ISI intends to measure "status inheritance" in a manner that is not influenced by deviations from statistical independence in other cells of the table. Let us take as an example a mobility matrix, where we find quasi-perfect mobility if we blank out the cells labeled "0" in table 1. For computing ISI of A-status in this table we have to compute the average interaction in all possible 2 × 2 subtables, which include the (A,A)-cell, but do not include any of the blanked out cells.

TABLE 1

Father's status	Subject's status			
	A	B	C	D
A	0	0	—	—
B	0	0		
C	—		0	+
D	—		+	0

SUBTABLE 1.1

Father's status	Subject's status	
	A	D
A	+	—
C	—	+

SUBTABLE 1.2

Father's status	Subject's status	
	A	C
A	+	—
D	—	+

[20] With respect to utilizing information, it is superior to the c-values of diagonal cells, which take into account only the absolute size of the cell under study, the total size of the sample and the relative size of corresponding marginals.

[21] See Goodman, op. cit., Footnote 25, p. 16.

The only subtables, which in this case can be taken into account, are the subtables 1.1 and 1.2 ISI of A-status, therefore, is the average of the interactions in these subtables (the sign "+" herein indicates positive, the sign "—" negative components).

Thus, of the 16 cells of table 1 beside the (A,A)-cell only the 6 cells labeled either "+" or "—" are included in the formula predicting ISI of A-status. It shall not be discussed here, whether this is a statistically correct predictor, but — useless to say — it is rather arbitrary from the point of view of mobility theory. Therefore, we shall exclude only diagonal cells, when we later apply the ISI-measure to our data.

2) WEST GERMAN MOBILITY DATA: GOODMAN'S METHOD APPLIED

For further demonstration of advantages and disadvantages of Goodman's method we shall analyse with these statistical tools the intergenerational mobility tables of the following three samples:[22]

1) the DIVO-sample (1955) used by Janowitz,[23] see table 2,

2) a quota sample of the West German Population (1969), made available by the Institut für Demoskopie (IfD), Allensbach, see table 3,

3) the sample of the Konstanz mobility project (1969), which includes all accessible 33 year-old male inhabitants of Konstanz[24], see table 4.

TABLE 2. MOBILITY FROM FATHER'S OCCUPATION TO
SUBJECT'S OCCUPATION FOR HEADS OF HOUSEHOLDS
IN WESTERN GERMANY (JANOWITZ 1955)

Father's status	Subject's status			
	U	M	L	LL
U	43	23	8	4
M	70	470	101	149
L	15	138	132	90
LL	7	154	132	656

[22] In all three tables farm occupations are excluded. The status categories include the following occupational groups.

U — upper-middle: Professionals, managers and proprietors of larger establishments, upper civil servants

M — lower-middle: Minor officials, clerical and sales persons, small businessmen and independent artisans

L — upper-lower: Skilled workers and employed artisans

LL — lower-lower: Semi- and unskilled workers.

[23] M. Janowitz, op. cit., p. 10.

[24] The town of Konstanz has c. 60,000 inhabitants. The occupational structure of Konstanz can be characterized as follows: i) an above average percentage of employed and small proprietors in the service sector: ii) above average people employed in public administration; iii) an electronics industry, which has grown rapidly in the last 10 years, employing highly qualified technical, administrative and research personnel: iv) a relatively high proportion of young university staff.

TABLE 3. MOBILITY FROM FATHER'S OCCUPATION
TO SUBJECT'S OCCUPATION FOR MALES IN WESTERN
GERMANY (INSTITUT FÜR DEMOSKOPIE, ALLENSBACH
1968)

Father's status	Subject's status			
	U	M	L	LL
U	65	68	51	5
M	63	164	117	49
L	28	82	252	68
LL	11	27	137	141

TABLE 4. MOBILITY FROM FATHER'S OCCUPATION
TO SUBJECT'S OCCUPATION FOR 33 YEARS OLD MALE
RESIDENTS OF KONSTANZ (1969)

Father's status	Subject's status			
	U	M	L	LL
U	64	23	8	1
M	44	67	28	12
L	16	20	28	7
LL	5	12	20	13

We shall mainly be concerned with two topics:

1: the amount of "status inheritance" revealed by the data and a discussion of different measures of "status inheritance";

2: the differences of the mobility patterns found in the three samples.

1. The figures in table 5 show the measures of "status inheritance" proposed by Goodman. For all status categories *the G-values of SI* differ significantly from zero-interaction.[25] The measure of SI yields a significant effect of "status inheritance" for all status categories in all samples.

Another picture of "status inheritance", however, appears if we examine the *G-values of ISI*. All ISI-values are smaller than the corresponding SI-values. This difference is due to the exclusion of the subtables containing two diagonal cells in the ISI-measure. The M- and L-status categories are more affected by this manipulation than the U- and LL-status categories. While the G-values of ISI for the highest and lowest status category remain significant, this is not the case for the ISI-values of the M- and L-status categories.

This result of no "status inheritance" in the middle status categories is rather surprising and one should ensure that it is not due to some kind of statistical artefact. For this purpose it may be useful to examine the interaction in the subtable which contains the transitions from M- or L-origin to M- or L-destination (see table 6)

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[25] In the analysis of the data we have computed a total of 48 interactions for each sample. The critical constant at the 5% level of significance is 3.28. (For the computing formula of this constant see Goodman, op. cit., p. 10.)

TABLE 5. STANDARDIZED VALUES OF SI- AND
ISI-INTERACTIONS BETWEEN SUBJECT'S STATUS
AND FATHER'S STATUS IN THE SAMPLE
OF JANOWITZ, IfD AND KONSTANZ

	Sample of Janowitz	Sample of IfD	Sample of Konstanz
SI of U-status	12.17	9.05	6.12
SI of M-status	5.62	4.98	1.93
SI of L-status	5.61	5.38	2.06
SI of LL-status	12.92	11.51	4.03
ISI of U-status	11.04	7.67	5.53
ISI of M-status	0.48	1.55	0.11
ISI of L-status	2.05	1.66	0.58
ISI of LL-status	10.64	10.18	3.42

TABLE 6. INTERACTION IN THE SUBTABLE   SUBTABLE UNDERLIYING
INCLUDING THE (M, M)- AND (L, L)-CELL FOR   THE G-VALUES OF
THE SAMPLES OF JANOWITZ, IfD AND KONSTANZ   TABLE 6

	G-value	Standardized G-value	Father's status	Subject's status	
				M	L
Janowitz sample	1.49	9.11			
IfD sample	1.46	8.32	M	+	—
Konstanz sample	1.21	3.27	L	—	+

The G-value for this subtable is able to indicate whether there is no "status inheritance" in fact in the M- and L-status categories as it is suggested by the ISI-measure[26]. On the contrary, we find in table 8 that the G-values are significantly different from zero-interaction in all three samples.

Having argued above that the SI-measure overestimates "status inheritance", one is now inclined to admit that the ISI measure underestimates "status inheritance".[27]

Goodman's method allows to test differences between interactions of two samples. With respect to the interactions studied in table 5, the standardized values of the differences between the three samples are given in table 7. A positive value indicates that the corresponding interaction is higher in the sample named first in the heading of the respective column. A negative value indicates higher interaction in the sample named second. The data of Janowitz yield significantly higher values of SI and ISI pertaining to U-status than the IfD data, i. e., status inheritance of the highest category is lower in the IfD data than in the sample of Janowitz

[26] The G-value of this subtable is not included in the ISI-measure of M- and L-status. Since that measure does not prove to be significant neither for M- nor for L-status one should examine the interaction between these status categories in more detail. Only if this interaction does not significantly deviate from zero one could legitimately speak of no "status inheritance" in the M- and L-status category.

[27] The same interaction value can be obtained by different figures of frequencies in the 4 cells under consideration. In our subtables a lower interaction can be obtained by any distribution of frequencies that leads either to a lower product of the number of cases in the diagonal cells and/or to a higher product of the number of cases in the other two cells.

T A B L E 7. STANDARDIZED VALUES OF DIFFERENCES
BETWEEN THE SAMPLES OF JANOWITZ, IfD AND
KONSTANZ WITH RESPECT TO THE SI- AND
ISI-INTERACTIONS BETWEEN SUBJECT'S STATUS
AND FATHER'S STATUS

	Standardized difference Jano-witz-IfD	Standardized difference Jano-witz-Konstanz	Standardized difference IfD-Konstanz
SI of U-status	3.99	2.14	—0.87
SI of M-status	0.16	0.90	0.78
SI of L-status	1.44	1.14	0.24
SI of LL-status	1.21	1.66	0.97
ISI of U-status	3.90	1.90	—1.05
ISI of M-status	—0.76	0.14	0.65
ISI of L-status	0.65	0.55	0.15
ISI of LL-status	0.66	1.39	1.01

T A B L E 8. INTERACTIONS BETWEEN SUBJECT'S STATUS
AND FATHER'S STATUS PERTAINING TO THE
SUBTABLES INCLUDING THE (U, U)-CELL AND
ANOTHER DIAGONAL CELL

	G-value sample Janowitz	G-value sample IfD	Standardized G-value of dif-ference : sample Janowitz-sam-ple IfD
(1) U or M father's and U or M subject's	2.53	0.91	4.40
(2) U or L father's and U or L subject's	3.86	2.44	2.60
(3) U or LL father's and U or LL subject's	6.92	5.12	2.10

What does this mean? Does it imply more upward mobility to U-status of subjects from father's status below U or more downward mobility of subjects with U-status-fathers? Is the upward or downward mobility of the short or long distance type?

Perhaps we are able to clarify these issues by looking more thoroughly at some of the basic interactions in the two samples. Table 8 presents the interections pertaining to the 2×2 tables within the 4×4 table, each of which includes the (U,U)-cell and another diagonal cell.

In row 1 we find the interactions of the subtables which contain the (U,U)-and the (M,M)-cell. This interaction yields significant difference between Jano-witz and IfD. There is a significantly higher exchange rate between origin and des-tination of the two highest status categories in the IfD sample than in the Janowitz sample. The exchange rates between the highest and the two lower status categories (L and LL), as can be seen in rows 2 and 3, are higher in the IfD sample also, but not in a statistically significant way. We might then conclude as follows: with re-gard to the U-status group, the IfD data yield significantly more short-distance but not significantly more long-distance mobility than the data of Janowitz.

But does this demonstrate more upward or more downward mobility? This kind of question cannot be clarified by the statistical tools proposed by Goodman. Comparing mobility tables or parts of them with the help of this method, the only thing to be said is whether a table deviates from the assumed model of independence either to the same extent or to a higher or lower extent than another table.

The substantial results of the preceding paragraphs can now be briefly *summarized* as follows:

In the West German samples studied, the immobility is high in the group of professionals, managers, proprietors and upper civil servants (the U-status category) as well as in the group of un- and semiskilled workers (the LL-status category), i. e., at the extremes of the stratification system. The immobility in the groups of skilled manuals and lower white collar occupations is less pronounced. Using the measure of intrinsic status inheritance, one even would have to conclude that no more sons are in the same occupational category as their fathers than statistically expected. The latter result, however, is doubtful because of the tendency of the ISI-measure to underestimate the amount of immobility.

The IfD sample (1969) indicates less status inheritance in the upper stratum than the sample of Janowitz, mainly due to more mobility between the two white collar strata. This leads us to conclude that the stratification system of the West German society is less rigid than it appeared in the national mobility profile of Miller, which was based on the sample of Janowitz.[28] For the study of our data the method we have worked with has mainly been chosen because the interaction values are not affected by the marginal distributions. This is an important precondition if one wants to compare data of different samples. But as a consequence of abstracting from marginal distributions, the same interaction values for two samples with different occupational structures or incongruent transformations of the occupational system between father's and son's generation can hide quite diverse processes in the distribution of available opportunities.

Disregarding the advantages of Goodman's method for comparisons, everyone who has followed the discussion so far will agree that a great extent of methodological sophistication and computational efforts is required to obtain a few substantial results.

Innovations and improvements in the methods of data analysis, for which Goodman's measures are but one example, further unequivocal and reliable inferences. Yet the main obstacle to satisfactory answers on the social mobility of societies is not the often tedious application of elaborate techniques, but the largely unresolved problems of the validity of the indicators of social status, status hierarchies and status changes. It is in this latter area where advances in mobility theory and research are most called for.

[28] S. M. Miller, Comparative Social Mobility, op. cit., p. 56.

SOCIAL CLASS AND SIBLING MOBILITY IN FINLAND*

DORRIAN APPLE SWEETSER

USA

"Sibling group differentiation" is a dimension of intergenerational occupation-al mobility: an influence on the occupations of groups of siblings whose fathers are at the same occupational level which bears equally on the occupations of members of sibling groups and differentially on different groups. Intergenerational occupational mobility is usually studied by comparing the occupations of sons, one per family, with their fathers' occupations and sometimes also with father-in-laws' occupations.

If the occupation of all sons in each family are ascertained, it becomes possible to learn whether the sons in family groups at the same level of father's occupation disperse individually over a range of occupations, or whether they tend to move together, so that one family group clusters around one occupational level while other groups cluster at other levels. The same facet of mobility can be studied in relation to father-in-law's occupation, by ascertaining the occupation of husbands of all married daughters in the families. Once sibling group differentiation has been found to be present, it is also possible to measure how much variance in the occupations of the second generation it accounts for. That such a factor has been found to exist is not surprising. What is of greater interest is the detection of the circumstances under which it occurs and the measurement of how much it affects occupations.

A previous paper (Sweetser, 1970) reported the detection and measurement of this phenomenon in a Finnish sample and interpreted it as due to factors internal to the family. The present paper compares the magnitude of the effect of sibling group differentiation with the effect of father's occupation and discusses the implications for social mobility.

SAMPLE AND MEASUREMENTS

In March 1966 both husband and wife were interviewed in a probability sample of 200 married couples in Helsinki, Finland. Included were questions about the occupations of the father, all brothers, husbands of married sisters and non-married sisters. Information on 400 families was thus obtained. The questions about occupation asked for that which the person had held for most of his life. Details on the sampling and interviewing are to be found in Sweetser (1968).

Brothers' occupations were studied separately, as were sisters' husbands' occupations. As the analysis of variance was used to detect sibling group differentiation, men without any brothers and married women without at least one married sister were necessarily excluded. Non-married women were excluded because of an insufficient number of groups of cases. In addition 92 farmer siblings were omitted, because the occupational scale used requires that the amount of land cultivated by farmers be known, and this information was not obtained for siblings.

Remaining were 182 groups of two or more brothers containing 528 men and 147 groups of two or more married sisters with 395 members. A group of brothers might include the respondent husband or it might consist only of brothers of a respondent wife. A group of married sisters might include the respondent wife or it might consist only of sisters of a respondent husband.

Occupations were scored using Rauhala's occupational prestige scale which is suitable for being treated as an interval scale (Rauhala, 1966). Nearly 1300 occupations have been scored on this 9-point scale, so that the usual difficulty with occupational prestige scales, namely the small number of occupations for which scores are available, was not encountered.

Analysis of variance provides the operational definition of the variable, sibling group differentiation. In general, a significant F ratio in an analysis of variance is grounds for regarding each individual's score as consisting of an "error" or "unexplained" component plus an additional part which is a constant factor for all members of a group and which differs from group to group. "Sibling group differentiation" is such a group component.

PREVIOUS RESEARCH

The mobility of groups of siblings has been little studied which is surprising in view of the refinements of analysis which such data make possible. Tumin and Feldman (1961) ascertained the occupations of all brothers of respondents in their study of social class in Puerto Rico, but they treated these as additional cases of individual sons and did not study family groups as such. Blau and Duncan's extensive study of a 1962 sample of U. S. men included information on education of the respondent's oldest brother, which was then used as an indicator of the degree to which the family valued education and achievement of children (1967). Hammel (1969) measured "fraternal differences" in total mobility in a sample of Belgrade industrial workers as the difference between a respondent's total mobility score and the mean score of the respondent plus his brothers. He concluded that in his sample, younger sons from low status families were more mobile than their brothers, and that number of siblings was unrelated to this measure of dispersion.

Aside from these, previous research which has dealt in any way with siblings includes studies of the relation of family size and of birth order to mobility. Large families hamper upward mobility (Lipset and Bendix, 1960, p. 240; Blau and Duncan, 1967, pp. 298-299; Svalastoga, 1965a, p. 134). Total number of siblings was one of the variables included in the present research. Birth order is not relevant.

The first analysis of sibling group differentiation was chiefly concerned with establishing its presence and ascertaining the proportion of variance at each level of father's occupation explained by it (Sweetser, 1970; a preliminary report was included in Sweetser, 1969). In the first report, after testing that the data met the

requirements for use of the analysis of variance, separate one way analyses of variance were made for groups of brothers, and for groups of married sisters' husbands, at each level of father's occupation. It was found that: "Sibling group differentiation is a group component, or group influence, in the occupational prestige scores of groups of siblings whose fathers' occupations are the same in prestige. This variable was found to be present in brothers' occupations at four out of five levels of father's occupation, the exception being the lowest level. The occupations of sisters' husbands were affected by this variable at two of these same four levels of father's occupation and possibly at a third. The less consistent presence of the factor among sisters' husbands is attributed to the additional variability introduced by the differing backgrounds of the husbands of sisters. These findings were not due to differences in city versus non-city origin of the family, whether or not the father was a farmer, age or total size of the family. About one fourth of the variance in occupations of brothers and of sister's husbands, which remained after father's occupation is controlled, was explained by this variable. What causes sibling group differentiation? The fact that, in the statistical analysis, groups were groups of siblings does not by itself establish that causal factors pertaining to families as such account for the existence of this factor. External forces which differentially influence families with the same origins could produce, or could contribute to, this phenomenon. . . The causal interpretation offered here for sibling group differentiation is that a force internal to the family is a major cause and that a certain minimum level of mobility opportunities in the society is a necessary condition. The force internal to the family is conceived to be the effect of the family environment on aspirations. . . This causal interpretation gains plausibility from the consistent absence of sibling group differentiation in families at the lowest level of father's occupation. If these families fail to instil ambition in their children, or if the opportunities for children from such families are very limited regardless of ambition, the result would be such a uniformity as was observed in the occupations of sons, and of daughters' husbands, and little chance for one family to differ from another."

VARIANCE EXPLAINED BY SIBLING
GROUP DIFFERENTIATION

In order to measure the contribution of sibling group differentiation to the total variance of occupations in the second generation in the sample as a whole, analysis of variance was applied to a nested or hierarchical classification (Snedecor and Cochran, 1967, p. 285 ff). First the component of variance due to this variable was estimated, and then the proportion explained was calculated.

In the nested classification, two F ratios were computed. Where both are significant, as was the case for groups of brothers and also for groups of married sisters' husbands, the deviation of an individual score from the sample mean can be regarded as the sum of three independent components: (1) a part due to father's occupation, which is the same for all individuals at that level of father's occupation and different between levels of father's occupation, (2) an additional part due to the sibling group, which is the same for all members of one family but which differs between families, and (3) an error or unexplained component which differs from one individual to the next. The first and second of these components do not overlap, because the group component is measured after the variability due to father's occupation has been removed.

The components of variance can be extracted from the mean squares in the analysis of variance by the following formulas, which show the contributions of components to mean squares. The various n's represent averaged numbers of cases per sibling group or per level of father's occupation. (For how these n's are calculated when there are, as in this study, unequal numbers in groups or categories, see Snedecor and Cochran, 1967, p. 291 ff.). The v's stand for components of variance in the population and the subscripts are identified in the column headed "Source of variation".

Source of variation	Population parameters estimated by mean squares
level of father's occupation (f)	$V_w + n_w V_g + n_g n_w V_f$
sibling groups within levels of father's occupation (g)	$V_w + n_w V_g$
individuals within groups (w)	V_w

It should be kept in mind that the components are estimates only. The analysis of variance produces only estimates of population variance. This means that there is the chance that sampling variablility has affected the values obtained for the components and only replication of the analysis with different samples can decrease the uncertainty about the precise magnitude of the components.

The mean squares and degrees of freedom for groups of brothers and for groups of married sisters' husbands together with the estimated components of variance are shown in the following:

Source of variation	Brothers	Sisters' husbands
father's occupation (f)	25.547,4 d.f.	18.425,4 d.f.
groups within father's occupation (g)	2.009,177 d.f.	2.019,142 d.f.
individuals within groups (w)	1.037,346 d.f.	1.034,248 d.f.
Components of variance		
Vf	.232	.218
Vg	.336	.367
Vw	1.037	1.034

The next question is, how much does sibling group differentiation contribute to the total variance? The proportion contributed by v_g to the total of the components is .21 for groups of brothers and .23 for groups of sisters' husbands. If one asks how much sibling group differentiation contributes to the variance remaining after father's occupation has been allowed for, the answer is .24 for groups of brothers and .26 for sisters' husbands.

It seems safe to say, therefore, that the contribution of sibling group differentiation to the total variance of occupations in the second generation is, although moderate in size, not trivial. In other words, a fair amount of variability in occupations is due to a factor whose effect is independent of father's occupation and which differentiates families.

FATHER'S OCCUPATION AND MOBILITY

Considering the well-known linear relationship of father's occupation to son's (or to the occupation of daughter's husband), it is of interest to compare this relationship in the sample with the effect attributable to sibling group differentiation. The correlation of father's occupation with those of all individual sons was .29. Since r^2 gives the proportion of variance in one variable which is attributable to variance in the other, the proportion of variance of occupations of all sons which is explained by a linear relationship with father's occupation is .08. It has already been shown that sibling group differentiation contributes .21 to this total variance or over twice as much as father's occupation.

Similar results were obtained when father's occupation was correlated with occupations of all sisters' husbands. The value of r was .28, r^2 is .08 and the proportion of total variance attributable to sibling group differentiation has been shown to be .23 or over twice as much as the contribution of father's occupation.

Thus, sibling groups differ as groups to a moderate extent independent of their regression on father's occupation and this differentiation is greater than that introduced by father's occupation. Consideration of these findings raises the question of how to explain them conceptually. That is, what forces, with what origins, have produced these results? Before answering this question, one further aspect of the data will be considered, namely the effect of sibling group differentiation on the correlation of father's occupation and that of one son (or daughter's husband) per family, which is the usual way in which intergenerational mobility is studied.

FATHER — INDIVIDUAL CHILD CORRELATIONS

Although sibling group differentiation can be detected only in a sample containing groups of siblings, there is no logical reason for assuming that the phenomenon is present only in larger families. Operationally, this variable pertains to groups and produces significant differences in group means. Both logically and statistically, it is possible for it to be present whether the groups contain one case or more than one, though it can be measured only in the latter instance.

Given that sibling group differentiation can be present regardless of size of the sibling group, are measurements of it biased since they can be made only with larger families? Certain comparisons of data from the sample indicated that such bias, although undoubtedly present, did not have a marked effect.

If the occupations of respondent husbands in the sample are correlated with those of their father or their father-in-law, we have the usual kind of mobility correlation. Such correlation should be approximately the same as the correlation of father's occupation and the mean occupation of sibling groups, if the various differences in the subsamples introduce little bias. If the correlations are about the same, then information about sibling group differentiation can be applied to father-one child correlations. Furthermore, if these correlations are similar to results from other studies of mobility, the way is opened for tentative generalizations about the effect of sibling group differentiation on mobility.

The father-respondent husband correlation and the father-mean occupation of sons correlation were quite similar, being respectively .40 and .38. The father-in-law-respondent husband correlation and the father-mean occupation of sisters' husbands correlation were also quite similar, being .36 and .39.

In addition the father-respondent husband correlation in this probability sample of Helsinki married couples was identical with the estimate given by Svalastoga (1965b, p. 9) as probably typical of father-son mobility in any industrialized European country and is almost the same as that obtained by Blau and Duncan (r = .41) in their recent nation-wide American sample (1967, p. 169). The father-in-law-respondent husband correlation was very similar to the values obtained in other studies (Svalastoga, 1965a, p. 116).

Thus, we can apply information about sibling group differentiation to the father-husband correlation and to the father-in-law-husband correlation, even though the statistics come from different subsamples. Since the father-one child correlations are like those obtained in other studies of intergenerational mobility in urban industrial samples, we can make tentative generalizations to this wider realm.

The question which will be asked about the father-child correlations is how much they are depressed by sibling group differentiation. This variable can have only a depressing effect on the correlation, since it increases the variability of child's occupation. To say how much the correlation is depressed, we will show what it would be without the effect of sibling group differentiation on child's occupation.

For any r,

r^2 = explained variance/total variance

$1 - r^2$ = unexplained variance/total variance

In father-child correlations sibling group differentiation increases the unexplained variance of the mean occupations of children and also, of course, the total variance of these means. The proportional effect on the means was calculated and was found to be .39 for sons and .40 for daughters' husbands. Call this proportion p.

If this proportion were not present, $1 - r^2$ would be less and necessarily r^2 would be greater, since their sum is 1. For sons, $1 - r^2 = .86 = \dfrac{.86}{1.00}$. Subtracting p from both the top and bottom of this fraction produces an estimate of what $1 - r^2$ would be without the influence of sibling group differentiation and from this a value for r can be found.

This correlation of father's occupation and the mean occupations of sons with the effect of sibling group differentiation removed is .49. For daughter's husbands, r would be .51. The father-mean children's occupation correlation should be approximately equivalent to a father-individual child correlation. Applying to the latter what is true of the former, it can be said that the father-individual child correlation would be noticeably higher if it were not for the countervailing influence of sibling group differentiation. In other words, father's occupation would determine child's occupation to a greater degree.

These adjusted correlations are entirely hypothetical, in fact they are at present merely curiosities. They do, however, state a kind of upper limit of what intergenerational mobility would be, all other things remaining the same and one identified influence, the phenomenon under investigation, removed.

TOTAL EFFECT OF THE FAMILY ON OCCUPATIONS

Several comparisons of sources of variability in occupations of members of sibling groups have been made. A summary of all sources is needed at this point. The deviation of an individual score from the sample mean consists of the following parts:

1) a linear effect of father's occupation, that is, a regression on father's occupation

2) a remaining effect of father's occupation which is nonlinear

3) sibling group differentiation, that is, a group influence operating within levels of father's occupation

4) an error or unexplained component

The total proportion of variance due to father's occupation, both linear and nonlinear, as measured by the intraclass correlation coefficient, is .14 for both sons and daughter's husbands. If we put this together with the estimates previously given for the proportion of total variance of individual occupations attributable to sibling group differentiation, we arrive at totals for each sex which are slightly over one-third. In other words, about one third of the occupational variance in the second generation is due to variables which act the same on members of a sibling group. Both of these variables are non-linear and so we are not speaking here of mobility in the sense of vertical difference of children's occupations and fathers'. Rather, this proportion of occupational variance is variance in the second generation without regard to direction of difference from father's occupation.

Wherever the causes may lie, father's occupation and sibling group differentiation both operate through the family. (More exactly, they have been measured through the family). Their effects on occupations of each member of a sibling group are the same for each member, viewed statistically. We have seen that these effects amount to a third of the variance of occupations. Impressionistically, therefore, one can say that the second generation moves into the occupational structure in family groups and that this is so to a greater extent than one might guess if he knew only the correlation of occupations of fathers and single descendants.

DISCUSSION

What causes the aspect of social mobility whose measurable effect has been called sibling group differentiation? It is certainly not due to a single influence but is rather the observable end result of a number of influences. Whether most of these lie in or out of the internal environment of the family is not known at this time.

The relation of four variables to occupational variability in the sample have been examined and found negligible (Sweetser, 1970). These were age, total size of the family, city or noncity origin and whether or not the father was a farmer. These are variables external to the family as a social-psychological, interacting unit. Where there are a number of possible external causes and a number of possible internal causes, and four of the former have been eliminated, this slightly improves the likelihood that the explanation is to be found in the latter category. As previously proposed (Sweetser, 1970), the effect of family environment on aspirations is a likely explanation and a certain minimum level of mobility opportunities is a necessary condition for this familial influence to operate.

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S. M. MILLER, PAMELA ROBY

POVERTY, SOCIAL WELFARE AND SOCIAL POLICY
POUVRETE, ACTION SOCIALE ET POLITIQUE SOCIALE

Since World War II the discussion of social mobility has moved on three levels from presentation of the *facts* and patterns of mobility to *explanations* of these patterns to an analysis of *policies* that might induce changes in the patterns of stratification and mobility of a society. Social mobility can no longer be considered a residual or a derivative of inscrutable structural forces. It is a variable that is affected by public policy, whether through acts of commission or omission.

Social *policy* is the impetus of the current study of mobility. Although all three levels of discussion — facts, explanations and policies — are intertwined, policy is now the dominant concern. The facts of social mobility show to what extent policy is effective; success or failure of policy should affect explanation; and, of course, explanation should guide policy. Unfortunately, such consistency is not crucial, for explanations of mobility patterns are not very secure. Policy is a guide to explanation more frequently than the reverse, as we assess and change policy, we begin to understand some of the difficulties in, hopefully, possibilities in the stratification and mobility picture. We can then generate hypotheses to explain the outcomes which can be tested by new policies.

In the mid-fifties, led principally by Seymour Martin Lipset and his associates (1954, 1959, 1966), there was an emphasis upon structural elements in explaining mobility. Given a certain level of technology, certain mobility rates and patterns would emerge. The emphasis was more on the explanation of the apparent facts of contemporary mobility rates and patterns than on forecasting the variables that could produce change in these rates and patterns. Today we are beginning to introduce other structural and normative explanations that do not leave us entirely unresponsive to policy changes. In both low-income nations and high-income nations, planners and politicians have to know to attain higher rates of mobility and are therefore searching for the *fulcrums of change* rather than for the mere *outlines of structure*.

Parallel the work of Lipset on structural analysis was the work of David Glass (1954) who emphasized the impact of education on mobility. Indeed, in many countries rehousing and off-the-job training or retraining programs have become the principal ways of attempting to effect social mobility.

In the last few years, we have had disturbing reports about the effectiveness of education as a promoter of social mobility. The Robbins report (United Kingdom Commission on Higher Education, 1963) in Great Britain has shown, to the

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Unless showing of other variables, see Part I and the notes to that.

STRATEGIES FOR SOCIAL MOBILITY, A POLICY FRAMEWORK

S. M. MILLER, PAMELA ROBY

USA

Since World War II, the discussion of social mobility has moved on three levels: from presentation of the *facts* and patterns of mobility to *explanations* of these patterns to an analysis of *policies* that might induce changes in the profiles of stratification and mobility of a society. Social mobility can no longer be considered a residual or a derivative of immutable structural trends. It is a variable that is affected by public policy, whether through acts of commission or ommission.

Social policy is the impetus of the current study of mobility. Although all three levels of discussion — facts, explanations and policies — are interwined, policy is now the dominant concern. The facts of social mobility show to what extent policy is effective; success or failure of policy should affect explanation; and, of course, explanation should guide policy. Unfortunately, such smoothness is untypical, for explanations of mobility patterns are not very secure. Policy is a guide to explanation more frequently than the reverse; as we assess and change policy, we begin to understand some of the difficulties or, hopefully, possibilities in the stratification and mobility picture. We can then generate hypotheses to explain the outcomes, which can be tested by new policies.

In the mid-fifties, led principally by Seymour Martin Lipset and his associates (1954, 1959, 1966), there was an emphasis upon structural elements in producing mobility.[1] Given a certain level of technology, certain mobility rates and patterns would emerge. The emphasis was more on the explanation of the apparent facts of contemporary mobility rates and patterns than on explicating the variables that could produce change in these rates and patterns. Today we are beginning to question these structural and normative explanations that do not focus on variables susceptible to policy change. In both low-income nations and high-income nations, planners and politicians have to move to attain higher rates of mobility and are therefore searching for the fulcrums of change rather than for the inevitabilities of structure.

Prior to the work of Lipset on structural analysis was the work of David Glass (1954) who emphasized the impact of education on mobility. Indeed, in many countries schooling and off-the-job manpower-training programs have become the primary ways of attempting to effect social mobility.

In the last few years, we have had dismaying reports about the effectiveness of education as a promoter of social mobility. The Robbins report (United Kingdom Commission on Higher Education, 1963) in Great Britain has shown, to the

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[1] For an analysis of other variables, see Fox and Miller (1966).

surprise of many, that the relative proportion of working-class students in universities has not changed over several decades despite the expansion of university places. In the United States, an outpouring of literature has shown that while more education is available to all, the distribution of educational resources is still closely linked to social class factors (Gampbell et al., 1966; Hobson, 1970; Sexton, 1961; The Southern Center for Studies in Public Policy and the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, 1969; Weisbrod and Hansen, 1969). In addition, the report of Coleman et al. (1966) is interpreted to show that school-related factors are less important than family-related factors in educational outcomes.

Obviously, to expand educational programs without redistributing or equalizing educational opportunities does not drastically change social mobility rates, particularly for those at the bottom of the social structure. Perhaps there is equally little impact on social mobility rates where educational opportunities are equalized but out-of-school environmental conditions of students are not.

PROMOTION OF SOCIAL MOBILITY: NEW DIRECTIONS

Disappointment in educational programs is leading to three levels of further policy work: educational reform, income and education and stratum mobility.

Educational Reform. This first level is in direct continuity with the educational emphasis of the past. It seeks further educational reform in several directions. In the United States, there has been pressure toward more education in very early childhood; the major program of this effort is Operation Head Start. The assumption is that if children with cultural and language limitations are given aid in these areas before they come to school, the school will have less difficulty in working with them. Results have been disappointing. The initial gains of children who have attended Head Start programs erode after they enter schools that do not continue to respond to their needs (Wolff and Stein, 1965 a, b). Nevertheless, the programs have important payoffs in that they identify remedial health defects and advance general awareness of the need for preparing children for school. Efforts are being made to improve schools by insisting on accountability in schools' performance with their students and by offering incentives to good performance. Through pressure, public censure and reward for meritorious work, the hope is to induce schools to perform more adequately than they have before.

Another major educational reform aims at anticredentialism and the expansion of continuing of recurrent education (Illich, 1970; Miller, 1968, 1970; Miller and Kroll, 1970; Miller and Riessman, 1969). The first assumption of this perspective is that the educational prerequisites for many, if not most, jobs are inappropriately high (Berg, 1970). A second assumption is that education and training, rather than under-age-thirty experiences, should be regarded as lifetime necessities or interests. The third assumption is that people can be better developed on the job than they now are, and, indeed, that on-the-job training and experience may prove better than formal education for teaching many people. While the primary discussion has been in terms of high-income, high-education countries, the anticredentialism/continuing education approach is probably even more applicable to low-income, low-education nations (Illich, 1970).

Three policy lines follow from this perspective. One is to reduce inappropriate educational requirements for jobs so that talented or developable persons with limited formal schooling can obtain good jobs. The second is to develop routes to higher-level jobs for those who have relatively little schooling. The third, connect-

ed with the second, is to build and expand a system of recurrent education, connecting formal schooling with the education and development that take place on the job. Many European countries with long experience in the apprenticeship mode are now looking to this way of developing competence, a way that does not rely exclusively (in form at least) on early or formal schooling. In the United States, man-power programs are moving in this direction, even though it is not fully recognized that these programs are in effect a third-tier, continuing-education system.

Another approach to educational reform is a program that provides cash payments to induce or allow individuals to go further in school. Many countries throughout the world provide stipends (cash subsidies) to university students. To some extent, family allowance programs serve the same function; they make it possible for individuals to stay in school without reducing family income through lost earnings from work or without adding extra expenses. In the United States, the Neighborhood Youth Corps (NYC) provides cash to high school students under the guise of helping them to secure training. Since many in-school NYC programs offer little training, in effect they mainly function as a way of augmenting a family's resources so as to make it easier for the children of the family to remain in school.

Income and Education. This second new level in policy work is the "cash (income) strategy", most sharply articulated by Lee Rainwater (1970) who argues that it will not be possible to improve the educational outcomes for children from poor families without improving the incomes of their families. In a sense, higher income is a necessary take-off stage for advancement in education. Children whose family's income has increased are more likely to do well in school even though the school has not changed. Thus, educational performance is seen as a function of family income.

There is much that is very attractive in this policy proposal. Its one drawback is that the relationship between education and income is not simple. As shown elsewhere (Miller and Roby, 1970) the education of the parents rather than family income is highly associated with the educational performance of children. Despite this limitation, it is important not only to improve schools *but to increase the income of families in order to improve children's educational prospects.*

There are, of course, political obstacles to overcome in providing cash payments to families instead of spending public funds for education. In many countries, however, expenditures on education are undergoing critical assessment. The result may be that both cash and educational programs lose, rather than that cash strategies benefit. This is an occurrence we would obviously wish to avoid.

Stratum Mobility or Lessened Inequality. The third level toward promoting social mobility enlarges on the second one. In doing so, it more sharply connects social policy with social mobility concerns. The emphasis is openly upon stratum, group or collective mobility rather than upon individual mobility, aiming at promoting a particular type of stratum mobility rather than at increasing individual mobility. The type of stratum mobility to which we refer is that in which the economic, social and/or political level of the bottom group in society is improved relative to groups above it. At the same time no other group — not immigrants from outside the society and not a marginal group from within — is drawn into a new bottommost position. The objective is to redistribute income and other resources to groups at the bottom of the society so that the difference between them and higher-income groups is reduced (Miller, 1968). Furthermore, lessening income

differences between groups reduces the (income) significance of individual social mobility.

Unlike the second-level approach, the concern here is not with educational take-off but with drastically changing the conditions of individuals. This may be done largely but not solely by directly increasing the income of families, a strategy that involves a variety of economic policies. The most important, perhaps, is the provision of transfer payments such as social security, family allowances, unemployment insurance and the like to lower income groups.

Direct cash payments could be accompanied by indirect benefits of services. For example, as Elizabeth Durbin (1969) has pointed out, employers feequently pay white-collar workers when they are ill. This is a form of sickness benefit that is not generally extended to blue-collar workers, who are paid on an hourly basis. Thus a government program of sickness benefits reduces some of the differentials in well-being between white-collar workers and blue-collar workers. As Gorz (1965) and Wedderburn (1970) have shown, there is a wide range of other so-called fringe benefits that accentuates the inequalities of blue-collar workers.

Another tool for lessening inequality or improving statum mobility is the tax system. A progressive tax system reduces the income of those at the top more than those at the bottom. Through evasion, complicated tax laws and reliance on indirect taxes, the tax structure in many nations is much less progressive than is frequently believed. For example, despite the steeply rising tax rates for higher incomes, the distribution of incomes after taxes in the United States differs little from the distribution of income before taxes (Bishop, 1967). If statistics on tax avoidance and evasion were taken into consideration, the picture of apparent progressive effects of taxation would look even bleaker. This situation is not unique to the United States (Titmuss, 1962). Our guess is that major reforms in tax systems will be an important item in many countries in the next decade.

Economic policy specifically designed to aid low-income groups is another instrument to be used to promote stratum mobility. In the United States, for example, a policy aimed at continuously high employment would significantly aid low-income groups by drawing them into the labor force and encouraging their upgrading. Wooten (1963) has contended that in post-World War II Great Britain full employment improved the situation of the workers much more than the social welfare state improved it.[2]

Selective economic programs rather than aggregative economic programs will be important for groups that are lagging behind the rest of society. This is particularly so for isolated regional groups that do not benefit from general economic expansion. One such selective policy is enactment of a minimum-wage law, which tends to push up the wages of those at the bottom. On the other hand, Marris and

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[2] Wooten (1936) notes, "The origins of this progress (of the British working class since World War II) are not far to seek. Overwhelmingly, the most important factor is the immense reduction in the rate of unemployment". In an analysis of the Michigan Employment Security Commission's 1962 data on 2,114 of Detroit's hard-core unemployed ("hard-core unemployment" was defined as twenty-six weeks or more of joblessness at the time of the survey), Howard Wachtel (1970) found that 40 percent of the hard-core unemployed had been employed in their last job for more than five years. Following his study, Wachtel recommended that "rather than defining hard-core unemployment in terms of an individual's unemployment experiences as of a given point in time, an individual's unemployment experiences over the business cycle should be measured. In this way a more accurate focus on the size and character of hard-core unemployment would be obtained, permitting more meaningful research and policy concerning the problem of hard-core unemployment in the United States" (see also Reubens, 1970; Sinfield, 1970).

Rein (forthcoming) contend on the basis of British experience that the pressure toward equity (fairness) rather than equality means that, over time, wage differentials and wage rates tend to be maintained even though there may be temporary compression or expansion. The conflict they detect between equity and equality deserves close attention.

Many countries are now pursuing — or attempting or contemplating pursuit of — an "incomes policy". Because of the pressures of inflation, such policies aim at restricting wages and prices. One tactic is for income policy boards to decide which occupations will be allowed to receive wage or salary increases. On a large scale, the question is a fundamental one (at least in market-oriented economies), for wages then are no longer regarded as an exclusively market-determined product. Incomes policy can be a way of increasing the stratum mobility of low-level groups without increasing the incomes of other groups. It also can be used to widen differentials between groups and improve the relative position of upper-income groups in society. The economic reform in Hungary, for example, has been criticized by Hegedus and Marcovitch (1969) because it widens differentials in order to increase, presumably, the motivation of managers to work more effectively. In the United States, Bluestone (1970) points out that there has never been explicit recognition of public manipulation of wage differentials and yet, he notes, neither the federal corporate tax policy nor the government's expenditure policy has been neutral. Both policies have highly favored what are now core, high-wage industries.

The possibility of alternatives to individual occupational mobility as a way of improving one's situation does not mean that individual mobility has no significance. What may happen is that horizontal rather than vertical mobility becomes important. The desirable situation is certainly not zero mobility. Obviously, some jobs are more attractive to different people for various reasons at various points in their lives. Rather than concentrating on a simple upward trajectory of occupations and careers, we might encourage individuals at different points in their lives to take on various kinds of jobs. This might mean more horizontal than vertical mobility. "Higher" and "lower" positions would be less important than having satisfying work at particular moments. (This is what happens to many women who discontinue working in a factory of office while their children are very young and then return; if their household and child-rearing roles were classified as "work", they would be involved in horizontal mobility.) The diminution of inequalities does not necessarily mean the end of mobility. Rather, occupational mobility may be the means of job satisfaction rather than the route to economic improvement.

MOBILITY AS TARGET

In the perspective that has been developing over the last decade and longer, social mobility seems affected not only by structural development but by economic and social policy forces that deliberately change its patterns. In this perspective, a structural pressure is not regarded as having only one possible kind of response. Increased skills may be achievable in ways other than through increased formal schooling; enlarging the supply of workers in a field may not require that income inequalities be expanded. When social mobility is an important objective of public policy, the structural requirements to achieve it may be blunted. Policy may address itself not only to structural goals, such as economic growth, but to the objective of expanding stratum or individual mobility.

An important example is the matter of wage differentials. Generally, increasing the relative gain of a group is seen as stimulating the incentive to work. As Goldthorpe (1969) and Halsey (1970) have stated in important articles on inequality, any argument for increasing inequalities in order to promote motivation must be concretely and carefully scrutinized rather than taken for granted. Goldthorpe then points out that there are social and economic costs in increasing inequalities; he attributes much of worker discontent and work disruption to an anomic response because the norms of society are not acceptable due to the maintenance or aggrevation of inequality.[3]

BROAD IMPLICATIONS

We conclude by pushing toward some of the wider implications of this paper. If mobility is to be analyzed as a policy question, that is, as a question of what a society wants, the study of it must drive torward the broader issues of economic and social policy and not rest with educational policy alone.

Social mobility and social equality should not be kept as separate discussions. Just as policy, data and explanations need to be interwoven, social mobility and social equality need to be in part supplementary and interpenetrating perspective and goals.

Mobility and equality concern more than income. They concern power, dignity and respect. As we have pointed out, it is misleading to focus solely on the income component of well-being (Miller and Roby, 1970: 120-121). One reason is that income does not completely define economic well-being. The second and more important reason is that there are social, psychological and political characteristics of well-being that are not automatically produced by changes in income. In the United States among blacks, goals have become broader than economic security; they have become focused on political well-being around slogan "black power". Sometimes, as Frances Piven (1970) contends, national policy fools people by substituting pseudo power for economic gain. But a genuine concern for mobility and equality requires more than narrow attention to economic events.

Finally, we believe that it is essential for sociologists to turn to (and to be equipped to deal with) questions of economic policy. Until recently, the limited interest of sociologists in economics has focused principally on organizations, structures and norms. But public economic policies are playing increasingly important roles in determining the operation of the economy and the effects of the economy upon social structure. Economists concentrate on a truncated but powerful theater of action; sociologists are largely unprepared to understand this theater and, therefore, do not understand its larger (social) import. This intellectual void harms both the development of effective and humane policy and the development and utilization of sociology.

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[3] As Wooten (1964) argues, moral considerations underlie the claims to higher wages even when these claims are couched in economic terms (see also Goldthorpe, 1969).

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THE POSITIVE FUNCTIONS OF POVERTY*

HERBERT J. GANS**

USA

I

Some twenty years ago, Robert K. Merton, analyzing the persistence of the urban political machine, wrote that because "we should ordinarily. . .expect persistent social patterns. . . to perform positive functions which are at the time not adequately fulfilled by other existing patterns. . . perhaps this publicly maligned (social phenomenon) is, under present conditions, satisfying. . .(positive) functions.[1]" He pointed out how the machine provided central authority to get things done when a decentralized local government could not act, humanized the services of the impersonal bureaucracy for fearful citizens, offered concrete help (rather than law or justice) to the poor and otherwise performed services needed or demanded by many people but considered unconventional or even illegal by formal public agencies.

Today poverty is more maligned than the political machine ever was, yet it too is a persistent social phenomenon.Consequently, there may be some merit in applying Merton's functional analysis to poverty, to ask whether it too has positive functions that explain its persistence.

One of the prime contributions of functional analysis has been to identify the latent — or unintended and unrecognized — functions of maligned phenomena and to show why they persist despite efforts to eliminatet hem. As a result, functional analysis has been condemned in some quarters as a politically conservative approach which seemingly justifies what ought to be condemned, but as Merton suggested, "the functional approach. . . like other forms of sociological analysis. . . can be infused with any one a wide range of ideological values".[2]

Merton defined functions as "those observed consequences (of a phenomenon) which make for the adaptation or adjustment of a given system"[3], suggesting also that the determination of the system would have to consider a *range* of units. . . individuals in diverse statuses, subgroups, the larger social system and culture systems".[4] I will not be concerned here with identifying functions for an entire so-

[1] "Manifest and Latent Functions", *Social Theory and Social Structure*, Free Press of Glencoe, 1949, p. 71.

[2] Ibid., p. 40.

[3] Ibid., p. 50.

[4] Ibid., p. 51.

ciety or social system, but will identify them for the interest groups, socio-econo-
mic classes and other population aggregates with shared values and similar sta-
tuses that "inhabit" a society or a social system.

This approach is based on the fact that almost every social system is composed
of several groups, often with different interests and values, so that a phenomenon,
which has positive functions for one group in the system, may have negative fun-
ctions for others. Indeed, frequently one group's positive functions are another
group's negative functions. For example, the political machine analyzed by Merton
was functional for the working class and business interests of the city but dysfunc-
tional for many middle class and reform interests. Consequently, positive functions
(which I shall hereafter also abbreviate as functions) are defined as those observ-
ed consequences which are positive *as judged by the values of the group
under analysis;* negative functions (or dysfunctions), those which are negative by
these values. (I shall also describe functions and dysfunctions, in the planner's
terminology, as benefits and costs).

Limiting the determination of functions to groups rather than social systems
precludes reaching *a priori* conclusions about two important empirical questions,
whether any phenomenon is positively or negatively functional for an entire so-
ciety, or whether it is even indispensable to that society. I suspect that in a modern
heterogeneous society few phenomena are functional or dysfunctional for the so-
ciety as a whole and that most result in benefits to some groups and costs
to others. Nor are any phenomena indispensable; in most instances, one can suggest
what Merton calls "functional alternatives" or equivalents for them, i. e., other
social patterns or policies which achieve the same positive functions but avoid
the dysfunctions.

II

The conventional view of poverty is so dedicated to indentifying the dysfunc-
tions of poverty, both for the poor and the larger society, that associating poverty
with positive functions seems at first glance to be unimaginable. Of course, the slum-
lord and the loan shark are commonly known to profit from the existence of po-
verty, but they are viewed as evil men so that their activities are classified among
the dysfunctions of poverty. However, what is less often recognized, at least by the
conventional wisdom, is that poverty also makes possible the existence or expan-
sion of respectable professions and occupations, for example, penology, crimino-
logy, social work and public health. More recently, the poor have provided jobs
for professional and para-professional "poverty warriors", as well as journalists
and social scientists who have supplied the information demanded by the revival
of public interest in poverty.

Clearly, then, poverty and the poor may well satisfy a number of positive func-
tions for many non-poor groups in American society and I shall describe thirteen
such functions — economic, social and political— that seem to me most signi-
ficant.

First, the existence of poverty makes sure that society's "dirty work" is done.
Every society has such work: physically dirty or dangerous, temporary, dead-end
and underpaid, undignified and menial jobs. Society can fill these jobs by paying
higher wages for "clean" work, or it can force people who have no other choice to
do the dirty work at low wages. In America, poverty functions to provide a low-
wage labor pool that is willing — or rather, unable to be unwilling — to perform

dirty work at low cost. Indeed, this function of the poor is so important that in some Southern states welfare payments have been cut off during the summer months when the poor are needed to work in the fields. Moreover, much of the debate about the Negative Income Tax has concerned its impact on the work incentive, by which is actually meant the incentive of the poor to do the needed dirty work if the wages therefrom are no larger than the negative income tax grant. Many economic activities which involve dirty work depend on the poor for their existence; restaurants, hospitals, parts of the garment industry, fruit and vegetable farming, among others, could not persist in their present form without the poor.

Second, because the poor are required to work at low wages, they subsidize a variety of economic activities that benefit the affluent. For example, domestics subsidize the upper middle and upper classes, making life easier for their employers and freeing affluent women for a variety of professional, cultural, civic and partying activities. Similarly, because the poor pay a higher proportion of their income in property and sales taxes, among others, they subsidize many state and local governmental services that benefit more affluent groups. In addition, the poor support innovation in medical practice as patients in teaching and research hospitals and as subjects in medical experiments.

Third, poverty creates jobs for a number of occupations and professions who serve or "service" the poor, or protect the rest of society from them. As already noted, penology would be miniscule without the poor, as would the police. Other activities, which flourish because of the existence of poverty, are the numbers game, the sale of heroin and cheap wines and liquors, pentecostal ministers, faith healers, prostitutes, pawn shops and the peace-time army which recruits its enlisted men mainly from among the poor.

Fourth, the poor buy goods which others do not want and, thus, prolong their economic usefulness, such as old bread, fruit and vegetables which would otherwise have to be thrown out, second-hand clothes and deteriorating automobiles and buildings. They also provide incomes for doctors, lawyers, teachers and others who are too old, poorly trained or incompetent to attract more affluent clients.

In addition to economic functions, the poor also perform a number of social functions.

Fifth, the poor can be identified and punished as alleged or real deviants in order to uphold the legitimacy of conventional norms. To justify the desirability of hard work, thrift, honesty and monogamy, for example, the defenders of these norms must be able to find people who can be accused of being lazy, spendthrift, dishonest and promiscuous. Although there is some evidence that the poor are about as moral and law-abiding as everyone else, they are more likely to be caught and punished when they participate in deviant acts than middle class transgressors. Moreover, they lack the political and cultural power to correct the stereotypes that other people hold of them and, thus, continue to be thought of as lazy, spendthrift, etc. by those who need living proof that moral deviance does not pay.

Sixth, and conversely, the poor offer vicarious participation to the rest of the population in the uninhibited sexual, alcoholic and narcotic behavior in which they are alleged to participate and which, being freed from the constraints of affluence, are often thought to enjoy more than middle classes. Thus, many people, some social scientists included, believe that the poor are not only more given to uninhibited behavior (which may be true, although it is often motivated by despair more than by lack of inhibition) but that they derive more pleasure from it than affluent people (which research by Lee Rainwater, Walter Miller and others shows

to be patently untrue). However, whether the poor actually have more sex and enjoy it more is irrelevant; as long as middle class people believe it is so, they can participate in it vicariously when instances are reported in factual or fictional form.

Seventh, the poor also serve a direct cultural function, when culture created by or for them is adopted by the more affluent. The rich often collect artifacts from extinct folk cultures of poor people and almost all Americans listen to "the blues", jazz, Negro spirituals and country music which originated among the Southern poor. During the 1960's they have enjoyed the rock styles that were born, like the Beatles, in the slums and in 1970 poetry written by ghetto children has suddenly become popular in literary circles. The poor also serve as culture heroes, particularly, of course, to the Left, but the hobo, cowboy, hipster and the mythical prostitute with a heart of gold have performed this function for a variety of groups.

Eighth, poverty helps to guarantee the status of those who are not poor. In every hierarchical society someone has to be at the bottom, but in American society, where social mobility is an important goal for many and people need to know where they stand, the poor function as a reliable and relatively permanent measuring rod for status comparisons. This is particularly so for the working class, whose politics is influenced by this need to maintain status distinctions between themselves and the poor, much as the aristocracy must find ways of distinguishing itself from the nouveau riche.

Ninth, the poor also aid the upward mobility of groups just above them in the class hierarchy. Thus, a goodly number of Americans have entered the middle class through the profits earned from the provision of goods and services in the slums, including illegal or non-respectable ones which more affluent businessmen shun because of their low prestige. As a result, members of almost every immigrant group have financed their upward mobility by providing slum housing, entertainment, gambling and narcotics to later arrivals — and most recently to blacks and Puerto Ricans.

Tenth, the poor help to keep the aristocracy busy, thus justifying its continued existence. "Society" uses the poor as clients of settlement houses and beneficiaries of charity affairs; indeed, it must have the poor to demonstrate its superiority over other elites who devote themselves to earning money.

Eleventh, the poor, being powerless, can be made to absorb the costs of change and growth in American society. During the 19th century they did the back-breaking work that built the cities; today they are pushed out of their neighborhoods to make room for "progress". Urban renewal projects to hold middle class taxpayers in the city and expressways to enable suburbanites to commute downtown have typically been located in poor neighborhoods, since no other group will allow itself to be displaced. For the same reason, universities, hospitals and civic centers also expand into land occupied by the poor. The major costs of the industrialization of agriculture have been borne by the poor, who are pushed off the land without recompense, and they have paid a large share of the human cost of the growth of American power overseas, for they have provided many of the foot soldiers for Viet Nam and other wars.

Twelfth, the poor facilitate and stabilize the American political process because they vote and participate in politics less than other groups, the political system is often free to ignore them. Moreover, since they can rarely support Republicans, they often provide the Democrats with a captive constituency which has no other place to go. As a result, the Democrats can count on their votes and can be more

responsive to voters who might otherwise switch to the Republicans, for example, the white working class.

Thirteenth, the role of the poor in upholding conventional norms (see 5 above) also has a significant political function. An economy based on the ideology of laissez-faire requires a deprived population which is allegedly unwilling to work or which can be considered as inferior because it must accept charity or welfare in order to survive. Not only does the alleged moral deviancy of the poor reduce the moral pressure on the present political economy to eliminate poverty, but socialist alternatives can be made to look quite unattractive if those who will benefit most from them can be described as lazy, spendthrift, dishonest and promiscuous.

III

I have described thirteen of the more important functions which poverty and the poor satisfy in American society, enough to support the functionalist thesis that poverty, like any other social phenomenon, survives in part because it is useful to society or some of its parts. This analysis is not intended to suggest that because it is often functional, poverty *should* exist, or that it *must* exist. For one thing, poverty has many more dysfunctions than functions; for another, it is possible to suggest functional alternatives.

Thus, society's dirty work could be done without poverty, either by automation or by paying "dirty workers" decent wages. Nor is it necessary for the poor to subsidize the many activities they support through their low wage jobs. This would, however, drive up the costs of these activities, resulting in higher prices to their customers and clients. Similarly, many of the professionals, who flourish because of the poor, could be given other roles. Social workers could provide counseling to the affluent, as they prefer to do anyway, and the police could devote themselves to traffic and organized crime. Fewer penologists would be employable, however, and pentecostal religion could probably not survive without the poor. Nor would parts of the second-and-third-hand goods market, and in many cities, "used" housing that no one else wants, then have to be torn down at public expense. Other roles would have to be found for badly trained or incompetent professionals, now relegated to serving the poor, and someone else would have to pay their salaries.

Alternatives for the cultural functions of the poor could be found more easily and cheaply. Indeed, entertainers, hippies and adolescents are already serving as the deviants needed to uphold traditional morality and as orgiasts to staff fantasies of vicarious participation.

The status functions of the poor are another matter. In a hierarchical society some people must be defined as inferior to everyone else with respect to a variety of attributes, but they need not be poor in the absolute sense. One can conceive of a stratification system in which the people below the government's "poverty line" receive 75 percent of the median income rather than 40 percent or less, as is now the case — even though they would still be lowest in the pecking order. Needless to say, such a reduction of economic inequality would require considerable income redistribution.

The contribution which the poor make to the upward mobility of the groups that provide them with goods and services could also be maintained without their being so low in income. However, it is true that if the poor were more affluent, they would have access to enough capital to take over this role, thus competing

with and perhaps rejecting the "outsiders." (Indeed, due in part to antipoverty programs, this is already happening in a number of ghettoes where white store-owners are being replaced by blacks.) Similarly, if the poor were more affluent, they would make less willing clients for upper class philanthropy, although some would still use settlement houses to achieve upward mobility, as they do now. Thus, "Society" could continue to run its philanthropic activities.

The political functions of the poor would be more difficult to substitute. With increased affluence, the poor would probably obtain more political power and would be more active politically as well. Thus, they would be less likely to serve as a passive constituency of the Democratic party and might in fact become more radical when they can afford to raise their political expectations. This would add new dimensions and complexities to the American political process and, perhaps, even lead to the development of a viable Left in American politics. With higher income and more political power, the poor would be likely to resist paying the costs of growth and change as well. Of course, it is possible to imagine urban renewal and highway projects which properly reimbursed the displaced people, but such projects would then become considerably more expensive, and many might never be built. This, in turn, would reduce the comfort and convenience of those who now benefit from urban renewal and expressways. Finally, hippies could also serve as moral deviants to justify the existing political economy — as they already do, but presumably, if poverty were eliminated, there would also be fewer attacks on that economy.

IV

In sum, then, many of the functions played by the poor could be replaced if poverty were eliminated, but almost always at higher costs to others, particularly more affluent others. Consequently, a functional analysis must conclude that poverty persits not only because it satisfies a number of positive functions, but also because many of the functional alternatives for poverty would be quite dysfunctional for the affluent members of society. Thus, a functional analysis ultimately arrives at much the same conclusion as radical sociology: that social phenomena which are functional for affluent or powerful groups and dysfunctional for poor or powerless ones persist; that when the elimination of such phenomena through functional alternatives would generate dysfunctions for the affluent or powerful, they will continue to persist; and that phenomena like poverty can only be eliminated either when they become dysfunctional for the affluent or powerful, or when the powerless can obtain enough power to change society.[5]

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[5] One of the differences between this analysis and that of radical sociology is that most of the functions I have described are latent, but radical thinkers treat them as manifest, intended by an evil economic system to oppress the poor. However, even if unintended functions became recognized, it is unlikely that greater anti-poverty efforts would result and it is possible that many affluent people would now decide that these functions ought to be intended.

SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE
SOCIOLOGIE DE LA CONNAISSANCE

DYNAMICS OF CONSCIOUSNESS WITHIN THAT OF SOCIETIES[1]

NORBERT ELIAS
ENGLAND

The title of my paper, involved as it may seem, has a sharp edge. It is direct-
ed against a tradition according to which the concepts "society" and "consciou-
ness" are used as if they referred to two separate objects which can exist indepen-
dently and can stand in a cause and effect relationship with each other so that one
can discuss whether "changes of society" are the cause of which "changes or con-
sciousness" are the effect or vice versa. The events to which we summarily refer
to as "human consciousness" do not occur outside human society, that is, outside
a plurality of communicating human beings; it is surely absurd to think of human
society without consciousness (which is implied if one argues that society or "so-
cial being" in any of its aspects such as "material conditions" or "relations of pro-
duction" are the cause and "being conscious" the effect). Moreover, the use often
made of concepts such as these gives the impression that "society" or "being" and
"consciousness" or "ideas" are static entities which can be in a condition of com-
plete rest, though they may from time to time move so that the question is which
is the active mover and which is being moved passively by the other. Thus, the
title of my paper implies firstly that "society" and "consciousness" are not two dif-
ferent objects existing separately, but quite the contrary, that "consciousness" is
an integral dimension of everything social; it implies secondly that society is a
process and, as one of its dimensions, so is "consciousness", "knowledge" or how-
ever one may call it.

The tendency to conceptualize "society" and "consciousness" as if they were
two different objects external to each other still plays a very prominent part in
contemporary sociological theories of knowledge. In that respect they remain the
heirs of the theoretical teaching of Marx. The immediate problem which occasioned
Marx's sharp and exclusive distinction between "being" and "consciousness"
is well known enough. He used this distinction as a weapon in his battle with one
of the central doctrines of his teacher Hegel. According to it, mankind's history
appeared as the unfolding of consciousness. Moreover, aspects of consciousness
under names such as reason, perception, soul, mind or idea had formed long be-
fore Hegel, the traditional centre-piece of philosophical reflections about man. In
these reflections, consciousness in one or the other of its various guises was usu-
ally conceived in a highly abstract manner as if it were an autonomous entity

a reflection of the philosopher's self-image existing independently of the relations of men with each other, of their social life. Not only Hegel's "world spirit'' had been thus conceived as an abstraction that somehow existed, endowed by the philosopher's grace with the breath of life, but also Kant's "consciousness in general", Locke's "reason" and numerous other symbolic representations of men's consciousness which, like Plato's "ideas", seemed to exist quite independently of the rest of men and outside their social life. This philosophical treatment of consciousness as something independent of men's relations with each other, of society, became for Marx the target of his attack. But by attacking it, Marx, one might say, "overshot the marks". In his justified attempt to show the weakness of a philosophical tradition which made it appear that consciousness could exist without society, he arrived at an equally one-sided formulation which made it appear that society could exist without consciousness. He recognized that the picture of the world, and especially of the social world, presented in the books of learned men, such as Hegel, often fails to correspond with the objects to which it appears to refer. It fails to do so, he saw, not, as philosophers had sometimes assumed, because of an eternal gulf between "subject" and "object" or because of some eternal forms of consciousness given to men prior to any experience, but because specific ideals, values and interests of groups, with which those who reflect on these matters identify themselves, distort and obscure their perceptions. As a point of departure for further investigations this hypothesis was eminently promising. Distortions and blockages of this type can be studied empirically. The hypothesis is open to systematic examination. It was in fact the root from which most of the contemporary sociological theories of knowledge have sprung. But in the heat of the battle, Marx conceptualized this particular relationship between "consciousness" and "social reality" as an existential, an eternal and general relationship. In fighting philosophical idealism and especially Hegel he became fixated on the modes of thinking and the types of conceptualization characteristic of his opponents. He contrasted "being" and "being conscious", "Sein" and "Bewusstsein" in a manner which makes it appear that all forms and levels of men's consciousness stand in contrast to all forms of "social reality" at all times and in all ages. One need not look far in order to recognize that this is an ideological over-extension. It is this over-extension of a very specific aspect of "consciousness", this presentation of men's consciousness as an eternal froth with no structure of its own, as a mere "superstructure" of the structured "social basis" reflected by it, which makes it appear that men's "social reality," that for instance men's "means of production", could be produced and developed by men without consciousness and that men could enter without consciousness into "relations of production". In opposing "consciousness" to "being'', "Bewusstsein" to "Sein", Marx took over into his own theory only the highly reflective levels of consciousness, the same levels which served as point of departure for philosophical theories. He took insufficient note of the fact that consciousness is a universal dimension of society, that it is present in the feeding of a child by a mother, the ploughing of his field by the farmer, in the spinning of cotton by the workers of a 19th century mill. Can one really say that all "consciousness", that everything people think or experience while they form with each other the "economic basis" of society, is only "ideology" and can be adequately conceptualized as "superstructure"? Is not the "material basis" itself *consciously,* if not deliberately, produced and reproduced by men? It is useful to keep in mind both the sociological gain and the philosophical exaggeration represented by Marx's dualistic paradigm. One can see better how uneasily antitheses such as that between "society" and "conscious-

ness'' hover between a sociological meaning with reference to a very specific and limited type of problem and a philosophical meaning which appears to embrace for all time the whole world of men. In this ambiguous form Marx's dualistic model, a genuine scientific advance cast in a speculative philosophical mould, has initiated a tradition of thinking which ever since has made itself felt in all camps, non-Marxist as well as Marxist.

It has dominated with particular force enquiries into the sociology of knowledge. The basic approach of most of its dominant representatives still embodies a dualism akin to Marx's conceptual antitheses "infrastructure-superstructure". But contemporary sociological theories of knowledge do not preserve the Marxian heritage without some fundamental differences of approach. The most crucial of these differences concerns the underlying concept of social change. Marx worked within the framework of a simple developmental model according to which any particular social structure presupposed an antecedent structure as its necessary condition and was in turn the necessary condition for a further stage of development which followed from it. Hence, the possibility of gaining insight into the "true" conditions of society, according to him, was masked and distorted by group interests *only* in the case of social groups which monopolize social positions as economic exploiters and oppressors of other groups and of their intellectual spokesmen. In the case of societies without class conflicts and even in the case of social scientists who identify themselves with those social strata who are exploited and who are, as Marx believed, destined through their struggles and their final victory to bring about this society, it is — according to the Marxian hypothesis — quite possible to produce non-ideological or scientific knowledge about societies. That, indeed, was the justification for Marx's claim to a scientific status for his own work. Marx was no relativist.

By contrast, contemporary sociological theories of knowledge are largely relativistic. They have abandoned as speculative the Marxist assumptions about the development of societies with their implications for the coming of an ideal unoppressive state of society as the social basis of a non-ideological scientific type of knowledge about society. They went further and rejected not only Marx's specific model of social development; they abandoned the concept of a development of society altogether. Instead, they fell back upon the historian's concept of social change according to which this change has neither a structure nor a direction. In their conception, the development of society, like that of "ideas", "knowledge" or "consciousness", simply appears as a necklace of here-and-now situations strung together on an unknown and invisible thread. Their approach, as one can see, bears some kinship to that of the ancient eleatic philosophers who conceptually reduced the movement of physical bodies in a specific direction to a series of discontinuous moments: the movement of a flying arrow, as they apparently saw it, is not actually a movement: the arrow is at any given moment in a given place. They were unable to develop their conceptual model more closely in accordance with the observable momentum of the flying arrow. The procedure of sociological theories of knowledge, at present, is similar. Their representatives are not concerned with the types of knowledge which men acquire cumulatively over long periods of time. They are not concerned, for instance, with the sociological problems of the growing knowledge about plants and animals (which in thousands of years has led to increasing control of both) in the form of pastoralism and agriculture or with the sociological problems of the growth of knowledge about the movement of the stars from its more subject-orientated, non-scientific stage as astrology to its more object-

orientated scientific stage as astronomy. They are not concerned with the sociological problems of the steady expansion of the physical and biological sciences up to our own time. They have almost completely abandoned the quest for models of the long-term development of society and, as part of it, of knowledge. Instead, they take their cue from sociological problems of knowledge concerned with small-scale and short-range details — a little bit here and a little bit there. The result is that sociological theories of knowledge constructed with that vision in mind are trapped in a relativistic position from which no escape seems possible. As their central task seems to be that of explaining specific types of knowledge in terms of social situations conceived atomistically as discontinuous here-and-now situations, all knowledge appears equally reducible to social circumstances which change, as it seems, unaccountably, like clouds in the sky.

This is not to say that this type of enquiry is wholly unproductive. It has a limited fruitfulness. There are cases in which the subject-orientation of knowledge predominates and its object-relevance is tenuous. Social ideologies, social ideals and beliefs are knowledge of this type. In fact, a vast and fruitful field of ideology-studies is available to specialists in the sociology of knowledge who want to devote their labour to empirical enquiries. However, the vision of sociologists, with respect to "values", "ideologies" and in other respects, has become increasingly foreshortened by their involvement in short-range problems of their own time. Not only representatives of the sociology of knowledge, but sociologists generally have become the victim of a movement of retreatism into the present, narrowly conceived, of a withdrawal of interest, both professional and emotional, from the sociological problems presented by the long social development of which present societies are the direct outcome and continuation. One still pays lip service to the great pioneers of sociology, to men like Marx or Weber who, much as they were concerned with the immediate problems of their own time, never ceased to perceive them with a long-term perspective and whose penetration of their contemporary scene, however distorted it may have been by their involvement, went deeper than that of the great majority of contemporary sociologists precisely because it was enriched by a vast knowledge of the sociological problems of other ages.

In connection with this foreshortening of their perspective, representatives of the contemporary sociology of knowledge exclude from their purview all the knowledge about nature, non-scientific as well as scientific; they exclude from it most of the knowledge of the social sciences; they exclude from it the knowledge about the growth of knowledge. Their eyes are fixated alone on a highly subject-centred type of knowledge about society, on social ideologies mostly of our own time. On the basis of this limited evidence, they come to the conclusion that all knowledge is "relative", that it is nothing more than a kind of mirror reflecting the short-term situations and interests of the knowers. Contemporary sociological theories of knowledge, in other words, are vitiated by an over-generalization of a limited type of evidence similar to that observed before with regard to some theoretical formulations of Marx. It is thus that they are caught unawares in a self-made trap. Their professional expertise in reducing human knowledge to preconceived interests, values, norms of specific groups to particular social structures or "existential situations" leads them into a blind alley. They cannot persuade themselves that any knowledge about society or, for that matter, any knowledge at all, is more than a projection into the universe of human groups that come and go and of their transient interests. They, and those they teach, therefore, are plunged into a trough of uncertainty. The relativistic fallacy is self-defeating. It has much

the same structure as the ancient conundrum of a Cretan Philosopher who said that all Cretans are liars: he himself was a Cretan, hence his statement was a lie; in that case it may *not* have been true to say that all Cretans are liars; his own statement that all Cretans are liars may *not* have been a lie; but if it was not a lie, then it may have been correct that all Cretans are liars. So it was perhaps a lie that all Cretans are liars?

Sociological relativism leads into a similar trap. If a sociologist — or anybody else — states that all knowledge is ideology, this statement, which is a piece of knowledge, is, therefore, itself an ideology with no claim to be more than an epiphenomenon of the structure and interests of groups where such a belief is held. Like the statement of the Cretan Philosopher it leads into an endless vicious circle. Adherents to a relativistic and reductionist ideology deceive themselves as well as others if they put forward their views with an air of certainty. Relativistic ideologies are wide-spread in our time; they appear in many guises. There are those — philosophers no less than sociologists — who gleefully announce that all theories are based on values and norms, implying that one set of values and norms, as a guide to the making of scientific theories, is as good as any other. It simply means: "you can have your bias so I can have mine". Some have the appearance of a dogmatic absolutism so that the underlying relativism is concealed, as for instance in the case of those who say: "all knowledge is ideology but our ideology is true while all the others are false", — which is much the same as if the Cretan Philosopher had said: "my lie is the truth, all the others are untruthful lies". There is no need here to go into the problem of the social developments which account for this wave of relativistic ideologies. But whatever its reasons, so far as the social sciences are concerned, it saps the basic effort of their scientific enterprise, — the effort to make their conceptual net fit better than before the connections of observed data and, if possible, a wider expanse of these connections. To make this effort requires a particular type of intellectual discipline; it requires the subordination of all subject-orientated impulses to a consistent object-orientation; it is based on the awareness that the aim of every scientific enterprise is the discovery of connections which have a degree of autonomy in relation to all short-term interests, values, norms or aims of one's own group or of oneself — apart from the very aim to discover more of these object-connections and thus to extend the realm of men's certainty and control.

The difficulty encountered by sociologists in this context is due to their awareness that even scientific knowledge itself is possible only in a specific social context. They have not yet developed their theoretical framework far enough in order to account for the fact that although the development of all kinds of knowledge forms part and parcel of that of societies, not all kinds of knowledge are bound up with the groups where they are acquired and handed on in the same way. It is not difficult to point out that astrology as well as astronomy, alchemy as well as chemistry, party-creeds such as conservatism and communism as well as sociological enquiries into these creeds, are "socially conditioned". What is now required, is a sociological theory which can account for the fact that, and can help to explain why, non-scientific or ideological types of knowledge and scientific types of knowledge are not embedded in their societies in quite the same way. Marx's discovery of the ideological character of *some* knowledge is not to be thrown aside; it is merely revealed as a partial discovery. The next step is to discover the distinguishing characteristics of non-ideological, of scientific types of knowledge as well as the characteristics of the social developments and structures which make this type of

knowledge possible. Up to this date, a testable sociological theory of scientific knowledge does not exist. Moreover, although sociological enquiries into sciences may provide information about scientific institutions or groups of scientists, they hardly ever supply any substantive information about that which gives these groups their distinctive character as groups of scientists, about the specific problems with which they wrestle and which they try to solve, in short, about sciences themselves. To do that would require sociologists who, at least with regard to specific problem areas, are trained for the exploration of the substantive problems of the developing scientific knowledge as well as for that of other aspects of the development of societies and of their structure at a given stage. If one is able to conceptualize scientific knowledge or, for that matter, knowledge generally, as a continuous long-term process, it soon becomes apparent how inadequate are the conventional sociological and philosophical ways of thinking in that field; for they force one's intellectual effort into the Procrustean bed of static and totally exclusive conceptual antitheses which might be appropriate if total immobility and, with it, absolute finality were the normal conditions of knowledge, and movements, especially structured and directional movements, such as growth, decline or stagnation, marginal, exceptional and accidental. If the long-range growth without end-state is placed squarely into the centre of the sociological exploration of knowledge, the focus of attention shifts from the seemingly static antipodes to that which lies between them. Polar concepts, such as "non-scientific" and "scientific", "ideological" and "non-ideological", "absolute error" and "absolute truth" become marginal; they become, at the most, indicators of the direction of movements of knowledge without beginning or end. The task of conceptualization with which one is confronted, therefore, is that of developing sets of process concepts for the exploration of knowledge, as for that of other social processes, which do not compel those who use them to abstract from the developmental character of knowledge and to reduce its long-range diachronic problems to short-range synchronic problems (instead of lifting the latter into the context of the former). Whether one explores the early scientific fragments of antiquity, the theological and philosophical writings of medieval Aristotelians or the rising tide of scientific writings up to our own time, the effort will be in vain, as long as one does not work on a testable and improvable model of the overall process of knowledge as a diagnostic framework for determining the stage and the problems of the knowledge stream at a given time. The effort will be in vain, in other words, if one brings to bear upon the exploration of any specific contribution to men's scientific knowledge either relativistic concepts explaining these contributions, for example, *alone* as a result of the stage in the development of the "class structure" of their time, or absolutistic concepts, such as the concepts of "logic", "rationality" or that of "truth", of a total and final solution to scientific problems presented to a generation of knowers by the social stream of knowledge at their specific stage of its development.

The effort can be fruitful only if one reorientates one's problems firmly in accordance with the character of knowledge as a directional process with its specific sequential order, but without any absolute beginning or any anticipated absolute end, and embedded into the wider social process as one of its dimensions with a relative autonomy of many shades and degrees. If one is able to reorientate one's perception in that sense, one will find that the problem of the *advance* of knowledge moves into the centre of the exploration of human knowledge, non-scientific as well as scientific, as its key-problem.

The notion that Newton's laws are absolutely "true" or "valid" in the sense that they are an end-state of scientific discovery in their field has as little meaning as the other that they are merely a reflection of the incipient capitalism of Newton's age, a transient ideology of a transient structure of society. What can be demonstrated is that Newton's laws represent an advance of knowledge in relation to the pre-Newtonian stage of knowledge. Statements about the advance which a specific solution consititutes compared with previous proposals for a solution of a problem or with a stage where no solution of this problem was in sight, can attain a very high degree of certainty. However, one should not expect that a theory and criteria of the advance of knowledge can be worked out in the philosophical manner, that is, without systematic cross-fertilization with empirical investigations into the recurrent characteristics which gain specific scientific problem-solutions social recognition as advances of knowledge. To determine criteria of scientific advance, thus, is a fairly long-term sociological task. But one can make a few preliminary suggestions. They require, however, a more explicit statement about the nature and function of knowledge itself which up to now is still lacking in contemporary theories of knowledge, sociological as well as philosophical. It must be enough here to sum up some of the essentials briefly.

By knowledge I understand the fund of symbolic representations, which every society develops over the generations and which is availabe to its members at a given time, in some of its aspects. This fund can serve a number of closely interdependent social functions. It has the character of knowledge in so far as it serves as a means of orientation for the members of a society, — of orientation with regard to the world in which they find themselves and, with it, to themselves. It can be learned, stored and handed on from one generation to another; without acquiring a store of knowledge inherited from previous generations an individual human being has no means of orientation. Knowledge can advance, decline or stagnate, (as the case may be), in connection with the changing fortunes of the group of knowers for whom the social fund of knowledge, grown, used and stored by them, is itself one of the integral conditions of their lives. The changes in the fund of communicable and orientating symbolic representations as well as their part and function within the all-embracing changes which the groups of knowers themselves undergo are open to systematic explorations. If one keeps in mind that all human knowledge consists of symbolic representations which serve men's orientation, which can be stored in a variety of ways and can be acquired through learning, it is easier to see what is meant by an advance of knowledge. It can take the form of new symbolic representations being evolved from the previous fund with regard to segments of the universe which were previously unrepresented or perhaps less clearly and succinctly represented by social symbols. Advance can take the form of a change towards greater adequacy or of sets of symbolic representations to that which they are intended to represent. It can also mean advance of certainty about the greater adequacy of sets of symbols as representations of object-connections. While the knowledge process is never independent of the process of the group of knowers, it possesses, as a stream of collective and communicable symbolic representations, a relative independence of each individual knower and of each generation of knowers, which may increase or decrease. It increases in connection with a specific change in the structure of knowledge, namely, with a change in the balance between its subject-orientation and its object-orientation in favour of the latter. Examples are the change from astrology to astronomy, from a theological to a scientific approach to nature, from explanatory symbolic representations of a highly personalized, magic-mythical charac-

ter to explanatory symbolic representations of a more impersonal character such as that of a mechanical cause and effect connection. All these changes in the structure of knowledge form part of specific changes in the structure of the group of knowers. Changes towards greater object-adequacy and greater relative autonomy vis à vis the knowers are other criteria of the advance of knowledge.

Many people are aware that non-scientific types of knowledge everywhere preceded the scientific types. However, the question why human knowledge changed in that specific sequential order is at present hardly perceived as a problem whose solution is relevant to a theory of knowledge. It is still, as one might say, a non-articulated problem. The non-articulation of a problem itself presents a problem. The long-term sequential order in which human knowledge develops and of which scientific knowledge is a relatively late stage can serve as an example: it is not only, for the greater part, unexplored, but not even articulated as a sociological problem. It is still largely perceived as "history", i. e. as a haphazard and unstructured coming and going of people and their views. The long-term advance of knowledge is vaguely known, but it has not yet been firmly conceptualized as a development, as a dimension of the long-term development of specific groups of knowers.

The characteristics of a situation, where bits of unfocused knowledge have not yet become sufficiently focused even for the formulation of a problem, can help to illustrate yet another aspect of the problem of the *advance* of knowledge. That the process of knowledge, especially of scientific knowledge, is at present still largely perceived as "history" and not as a development, finds its expression, among others, in its frequent presentation as a string of individual problem-*solutions*. What is lacking is a systematic reconstruction of the sequential order in which problems themselves, the condition of any attempt at solution, present themselves to groups of knowers. The intergenerational development of problems is far less dependent on the differentiating ingenuity of outstanding individuals than the solutions. A given set of unsolved problems in the vanguard of a knowledge development is usually the common inheritance of a generation of knowers. For it is one of the characteristics of the advance of knowledge that a problem of generation C emerges from the solution, or more often than not, from the confluence of solutions of a number of problems of generation B and these in turn from the confluence of solutions of an A generation of problems. Without a testable and improvable model of the sequential order of problems as well as problem-solutions and systematic empirical enquiries supported by it and supporting it, one cannot determine one of the crucial aspects of the advance of knowledge. One cannot determine why a problem which at one time perhaps had not even been clearly articulated or perhaps not articulated in a manner that admitted of a more object-adequate solution, advanced to a stage where it was already perceived as a fairly object-adequate problem whose solution still escaped men and then to a stage where a solution was found. A solution of formerly unsolved, and at an early stage of social development insoluble, problems is one of the most decisive stepping stones of the advance of human knowledge. The trap into which philosophical absolutists fall is that of treating solutions of isolated problems as absolutely final or at least of treating an ultimate end of a specific road of discovery as ideally possible — which is illusory for the simple reason that no single problem can be solved with absolute finality in isolation; as far as our present knowledge goes, the universe is continuous and all its problems interdependent. Unless one assumes that all problems and problem-solutions are symbolic representations of a finite and discontinuous universe, no single problem-solution can be regarded as absolutely final. But one ca

state with very great assurance and certainty that a specific problem formerly un-
solved has later found a solution and perhaps later still a more comprehensive and
more object-adequate solution. The hypothesis of a final state as basis of a theo-
retical construct, in the physical as in the social sciences, is a treacherous tool which-
ever way one turns it. The trap into which sociological relativists fall is due to their
oversight of the possibility of an advance of knowledge. Having discovered that
knowledge can be highly subject-orientated, contemporary makers of sociological
theories of knowledge tend to construct seemingly general theoretical models from
the limited evidence provided by this one type of knowledge, by subject-centred
myths or ideologies. The structure of the social development in the course of which
more object-adequate solutions of formerly insoluble, formerly unsolved or in-
adequately solved problems became possible, is excluded from their purview and
from their theoretical paradigm; and so they must remain in a condition of re-
lativistic uncertainty and despair.

MEANINGS OF POVERTY IN HISTORIES AND CULTURES[1]

E. V. WALTER

USA

The sociology of knowledge is a sometimes puzzling but always friendly domain of inquiry with paths that lead in many directions. It offers hospitality to all kinds of explorers who investigate the relations between thought and action. One path leads the inquirer to the border between the history of ideas and the history of social action, where he may discover how intellectual changes are causes or effects of changes in interactive systems. On this path, one discovers that the history of ideas is not invariably an intellectual gymnasium set apart from the rest of social science, for some ideas are policies and social rationales that define, justify and direct the scenarios of daily routines.

Still, there ought to be a subdivison in the sociology of knowledge which might be called "the sociology of ignorance", which should be more than the study of ideology or the science of false consciousness. It should investigate the social causes of no consciousness, of not knowing, and things associated with selective inattention, failures to recognize the obvious, illusions that conceal what is there and countless devices to ignore the realities of meaning as well as the meanings of reality. Perhaps this new approach would help us to learn why the idea of poverty has been treated poorly by historical sociologists as well as by sociological historians. Despite centuries, even millennia, of solemn fascination with the condition of the poor, we are not well informed about how the meaning of poverty changes and how those changes are linked to transformations in the pattern of interactions with the poor and among the poor. We also do not know how different social definitions of poverty affect structure and solidarity in communities of the poor.

The French word for poverty, *la misère*, has always suggested that poverty has a subjective or spiritual dimension, as well as objective, material characteristics. Recent literature dwells on the subjective dimension, especially in statements that affirm or deny the reality of a so-called "culture of poverty". Oscar Lewis formulates that concept "as a subculture with its own structure and rationale, as a way of life that is passed down from generation to generation along family lines."[2]

[2] Oscar Lewis. A *Study of Slum Culture,* New York, 1968, p. 4.

As Michael Harrington develops the idea in a very popular book, poverty "is a culture, an institution, a way of life. . . . a way of looking at reality, a series of attitudes, a special type of life. . . .There is, in short, a language of the poor, a psychology of the poor, a world view of the poor."[3] A number or critics have attacked the concept because it is biased by a middle-class point of view, and because the notion and ideas associated with it "distort the reality of life among the poor, prejudice our understanding of that life, and encourage policies which perpetuate the disadvantages associated with poverty".[4] The critics tend to see the life style of the poor as an adaptation of a reaction to material circumstances and deny that it can be explained as a self-perpetuating "culture". Yet, disagreeing about the causes, many of them would agree with their opponents about the characteristics of that life-style — low aspiration, low status, low self-esteem, emotional depression, isolation, absence of community and so on.

Poverty watchers today, then, tend to agree that whatever the reason, poverty implies a certain kind of life-style and spiritual condition, which they identify with misery. Oscar Lewis writes, "*The* culture of poverty can come into being in a variety of historical contexts" (my italics). His understanding suffers from an ahistorical bias shared by many other contemporary social scientists. The truth of the matter is that *many* cultures of poverty have come into being in a variety of historical contexts. Being poor has not always implied emotional depression and low aspiration — for the early Christians, the highest optimism and spiritual aspirations were reserved for the poor. Being poor has not always meant low status and low self-esteem — for the post-exilic Hebrews and the early Christians, the poor were the faithful remnant, beloved by God, and "the saints". Being poor has not always implied isolation and absence of community — the medieval poverty movement was marked by great solidarity in communities of the poor. To think that material deprivation inevitably demands our familiar culture of misery and culture of pauperism disregards many creative episodes in the culture history of the poor. It aslo tells the poor that the only cultural options availabe to them are the subjective experiences that have been fashioned by the pauper system.

The "pauper system" is a name I have given to the complex of ideas and practices developed over centuries by the effects of the Anglo-American Poor Laws and now by the welfare system in the United States. Pauperism is a vested dishonor, and the pauper is endowed with public funds and social disabilities. The culture of pauperism — which is not restricted to the recipients of public funds — designates the poor as the legitimate consumers of illth. The sociology of knowledge, which brackets the familiar, cannot take for granted the commonplace knowledge that the poor are treated badly. It must find ways to account for the legitimacy of this everyday experience. Historically, moreover, the poor have not always been in this position. One problem for the historical sociology of knowledge, then, is to trace conditions and events that help to explain how the culture of charity in early Christianity gave rise to what seems to be the very opposite — the culture of pauperism. How can we account for the origins of the Poor Laws within Christendom and how explain the cultural foundations of social institutions, that were marked by suspicion, low esteem for poverty, deterrent policies, dreadful sanctions, and punitive measures against the "unworthy" poor? As we explore other cultural patterns in which the poor have lived, we find that what is called today "*the*" culture of poverty is one historical product, caused by a changing series of needs and events.

[3] Michael Harrington. *The Other America,* Baltimore, 1963, pp. 22-23.
[4] C. A. Valentine. *Culture and Poverty,* Chicago, 1968, p. 17.

THE CONCEPT OF POVERTY

The conventional outlook today defines poverty as a "social problem", subject to management by policies and by techniques, a condition to be stabilized or ameliorated, depending on political attitude. From this pragmatic point of view and from the contemporary literature on the subject, one can scarcely imagine that one of the major themes of Western Civilization has alwasy been and still remains the controversy over the meaning of poverty, especially the issues of how it should be defined and what it implies for personal and collective action.[5]

Poverty has inspired varieties of symbolic interpretation. In this paper, I intend only to sketch some historical changes in the idea of poverty and to show how those changes were associated with changes in social institutions.

Although the social identities of the poor and their origins in the class structure have varied with historical circumstance, "poverty" is older than industrialism, capitalism and feudalism. The social forces that produce the poor do change and the symbolic interpretation of the experience of poverty also changes, but "the poor" as a social category have such durable presence, that Simmel defined poverty analytically as a feature of stratification. He implied that it is a universal structural characteristic inherent in any system of ordered inequality. He also considered it as any inevitable companion of social change, writing, "No change, development, polarization, or breakdown of social life occurs without leaving its residuum in the stratum of poverty."[6]

Simmel defined poverty by the need for assistance, which includes persons in any social class who are relatively deprived. I would modify that definition to emphasize relative lack of resources and relative incapacity to control events[7] which cause a person's serious inability to satisfy regularly his socially defined needs. Lack of resources and lack of power go together, for power implies control over resources. The poor, then, are excluded — not absolutely, but relatively and extremely — from resources and from power.

This condition must be understood as extreme but nonetheless limited exclusion. It is still partial exclusion, even if the part is as large as 99 percent. Persons totally excluded would not be present at all, even as shadows in the corners. Anyone totally excluded from resources does not survive. Furthermore, even the poorest are not totally powerless, for a beggar by his petitions and entreaties does manage to influence someone to give him alms. To some degree, every person in a social system is excluded from resources and from power, but some are less excluded than others, and poverty may be understood as the highest degree of exclusion in a given society. Conversely, the most powerful and wealthy persons may be understood as the ones least excluded from resources. The study of poverty, therefore, can turn into an investigation of the system of power and wealth from the underside, asking the question: Who gets denied what, how and why?

The proximate cause of poverty, then, is a system of differential exclusion. Marx associated it with private property, with its exclusive controls over men and resources. Yet, a collective, in which private property were absent, could also exclude from resources a segment of the population, which would then live in poverty.

This analysis implies that even though humane measures may go far toward relieving the poor and to making their lives less painful, poverty may be *eliminated* only in two ways. One is to make the partial exclusion total and to remove the poor. This alternative has been taken seriously from time to time in plans to deport them. Both Booths in the 19th century — Charles Booth, the author of the great social survey, *Life and Labour of the People in London,* and General William Booth of the Salvation Army, the author of *In Darkest England and the Way Out* — had programs for labor colonies beyond the shores of England designed to receive people shipped out of the slums. The other alternative, simply put, is to remove the exclusions — that is, to make resources available to all and to give everyone an equal capacity to control events.

THE DISTRIBUTION OF ILLTH

There is more to poverty, however, than the lack of resources. Of course, it is true that poor people lack resources, but it does not explain everything about their lives. Their exclusions make them vulnerable to bad experiences, and they are targets for destructive actions, ill treatment, bad services and malevolent neglect. To use a theological metaphor, the nature of their suffering is not a passive absence of good, but an active presence of evil. In other words, the absence of resources is a necessary condition, but not a sufficient condition for the misery of the poor. Actually, that misery is caused not only by the absence of wealth, but even more by the presence of illth.

In a dictionary of economic terms, one may find the entry,"illth:Consumer goods and services that are injurious to the individuals who consume them and to society as a whole".[8] The term was invented by John Ruskin in 1860 and it was used later on by George Bernard Shaw. Originally, Ruskin suggested, "We ought to have a correspondent term [to wealth] — 'illth', causing various devastation and trouble. . . in all directions".[9] The concept is virtually unknown because conventional opinion has preferred to describe illth as an epiphenomenon in the industrual system. We are beginning to understand that destructive products and services are not accidental phenomena (in the philosophical sense) with negligible consequence, but primary outputs, and that the industrial system produces both wealth and illth. The relative quantity of each does depend on priorities.

In our understanding of the social system, we have been deceived by an illusion as extensive as the one that has obscured the working of the industrial system. We are inclined to think of our institutions as engines of utility and means to satisfy needs. Our institutions, we think, are instruments of the good life. The military and penal systems, to mention two exceptions, are regarded as epiphenomenal because the illth they distribute is restricted to people officially designated as "enemies" and "criminals", who "deserve" what they get. A more accurate understanding would notice that all institutions distribute differentially to distinct categories of persons both wealth and illth, both good services and ill treatment. They are instruments of the bad life as well as the good. A clear view of society, then, would regard the class structure not only as a system of unequal claims to privileges and values, but also as a hierarchy of ordered disadvantages.

[8] H. S. Sloan and A. J. Zurcher. *A Dictionary of Economics,* New York, 1961, p. 162.
[9] John Ruskin, *Unto this Last,* New York, 1876, p. 105; G. B. Shaw, *Fabian Essays* (first published 1889), 6th ed., London, 1962, p. 54.

In my own field work, I observe people who believe and say in different ways that they get special, painful treatment because they are poor. As I heard one woman put it, "When you are on welfare, everyone treats you like shit". A typical middle-class reaction might find the cause of her offensive treatment in the very attitude expressed, regarding the statement itself as a paranoid symptom or as a self-ful-filling prophecy. Her suspicion and low self-esteem, one might argue, cause her to interact in a way that provokes bad treatment and results in what is regarded as her social failure. But she has a different understanding of cause and effect. She believes: *Because I* am poor, I am treated badly, and *that* is why I feel so low.

The illth the poor endure is often experienced as punishment without a crime. As another woman, who is a tenant in a public housing project, told one of my research assistants, "I feel like I am in a prison. I really used to say, Gee I wish I was in jail, because if I was in jail I know that I would have done something wrong, and I would know how long I had to be there. But I know that I did not do anything wrong, and I am being punished for nothing. . ."

The life space of the poor is not an empty vessel simply deprived of the good things that fill the lives of everyone else — on the contrary, it is filled with bad ex-periences. The familiar distinction "between the haves" and "the have-nots" is a bit of fancy perpetrated by an ideology of scarcity. The idea of scarcity is frequently used to mask the presence of active evil. The poor have plenty, but it is plenty of what nobody wants. The facts have been visible for a long time, but they have been veiled by myths about scarcity. A great deal of what passes for the culture of po-verty — or, alternatively, the adaptive mechanisms of the poor — is not just a passive adjustment to emptiness, but rather an active defence against an organized onslaught of bad experiences and an abundance of illth. And frequently, the agents of destruction and executors of bad experience are the poor themselves. That does not mean that the conservative interpreters of "the culture of poverty" are correct, and that the poor create and transmit a life-style that does them in. They fill the roles and act the parts, and even get caught up in the play, but they did not write the script.

Poverty is a vocation. In an earlier time, men chose to be poor for reli-gious reasons; today a few make that choice for political reasons; but most live poor against their will. Those who are called to poverty must learn how to act, look, think and experience life as a poor person. As in every other kind of socia-lization, these things are taught largely by informal processes: countless interactions that replicate experiences, which convey ideals, norms, expectations and valuations. For every time and place there is indeed a cultural system that directs the poor to be sad or merry, contemptible or proud, isolated or gregarious, segregated or integrated, passive or active, hopeless or sanguine. Often this cultural system is cre-ated by the rest of society *for* the poor. It tells them what they are worth, what they should do, how they should feel and how they should expect to be treated. Per-haps it would be more accurate to call it a culture *for* poverty.

In contrast, there are also cultures *of* poverty, created by those who identify themselves with the poor and by those who live poor either by choice or from ne-cessity. A culture *of* poverty is made within the consciousness of the poor.

NOTION D'APTITUDE ET SOCIETE DE CLASSE
EN FRANCE[1]

(Contribution à l'étude de la dominance sociale)

NOELLE BISSERET
FRANCE

L'analyse historique de la diffusion et des discontinuités de sens d'un mot fortement valorisé peut permettre de déceler certaines correspondances entre la structure d'une société à un moment donné et les modes de connaissance et d'interprétation du réel qu'elle secrète. Le concept d'aptitude fait partie du système d'interprétation que la société française actuelle se donne des inégalités scolaires et plus généralement des inégalités sociales qu'elle constate en son sein. Il est employé aussi bien dans le langage usuel que dans le langage scientifique, la psychologie différentielle s'efforçant de donner une définition scientifique à cette notion reprise du sens commun. Mais jusqu'à présent cette discipline n'a pu opérer une décentration de ce concept en égard à certaines formes de pensée irrationnelles: il reste en effet lourd des présupposés métaphysique dont l'histoire l'a chargé.

En mettant historiquement en parallèle les changements de sens et d'utilisation de la notion d'aptitude avec les faits majeurs révélateurs des transformations globales d'ordre économique, politique, social, on peut en effet constater qu'à partir de la Révolution française ce mot est progressivement devenu un des éléments d'un système d'interprétation que la société française s'est donné de son ordonnancement et de ses propres conflits. Il perd au cours du XIXᵉ siècle son sens originel de caractère aléatoire et réversible pour celui d'une réalité biologiquement déterminée, héréditaire et irréversible. C'est donc au moment où la bourgeoisie s'assure le pouvoir politique et économique qu'il entre en usage et devient un élément d'une idéologie propre à légitimer la position de cette nouvelle classe dominante. Cette idéologie se renforcera peu à peu, en s'appuyant sur des découvertes scientifiques qu'elle prétend toujours réinterpréter dans sa logique et dont elle guide parfois la problématique comme pour la psychologie différentielle. Posant l'aptitude comme une réalité en soi, cette branche de la psychologie n'a pu en conséquence passer d'une pratique empirique de sélection et d'orientation à une pratique théorique, faute d'avoir renoncé aux évidences du sens commun, masque d'emprunt de toute idéologie. Mais ce faisant, elle a apporté dans son aveuglement une caution scientifique à une idéologie de classe qu'elle a ainsi contribué à renforcer; car s'il est un effet de certains phénomènes sociaux concrets, le recours à la notion d'aptitude

joue en retour le rôle d'un médiateur efficace dans la genèse des conduites collectives qui orientent les transformations du système scolaire et du système social.

I — Avant le XIXᵉ siècle, jusqu'à ce que le pouvoir politique passe définivement de la noblesse à la bourgeoisie, le mot «aptitude» désigne une réalité contingente.

Jusqu'à la seconde moitié du XVIIIᵉ siècle, tant que la noblesse détient le pouvoir politique et en grande partie le pouvoir économique, le mot est peu usité, considéré comme «pédant», «barbare»[2]. Au XVᵉ siècle, terme juridique, il implique l'idee d'institution: pluis il passe dans le langage philosophique et se définit comme «sisposition naturelle à quelque chose». Or, l'idée de nature dans l'Ancien Régime renvoie à l'idée de volonté divine.[3] Les caractéristiques physiques ou mentales sont aléatoires et dépendent de la grâce de Dieu à qui le miracle est toujours possible. L'aptitude n'a rien à voir avec le rang social: un roi dément ou idiot ne saurait être déchu de son droit d'essence divine. On nait puissant ou misérable et on demeure dans son «état» de naissance.

Dans la seconde moitié du XVIII , la noblesse détient toujours le pouvoir politique mais la bourgeoisie a acquis un pouvoir économique grandissant. Son emprise progressive sur la nature (découvertes scientifiques et realisations techniques) l'amène à rompre avec la conception théocentriste de la société: ce n'est plus Dieu mais l'homme qui devient le centre de référence. Le monde physique et humain obéit à des lois propres que la science doit dévouvrir; les naturalistes n'attachent à réintégrer l'homme dans le continium de l'univers physique et des éspèces vivantes. L'homme étant devenu le centre de référence, on s'interroge donc sur ses particularit.s physiques ou mentales (Gall) qui sont perçues comme contingentes, relatives au milieu physique et social. C'est que, classe sociale qui prend conscience d'elle-même, la bourgeoisie remet en cause l'ordre social existant, rapporte l'inégalité des destins aux institutions sociales, et revendique le pouvoir politique au nom du mérite individuel. Il apparaît alors une spécification du sens du mot aptitude, en référence aux activités pratiques des hommes: on parle de «disposition naturelle à la poésie, les mathématique, etc. . .». Mais les différences entre groupes humains étant considérées comme relatives au milieu, on estime que "l'éducation a plus de force sur nous que la nature même". L'aptitude est donc toujours pensée comme une réalité contingente, mais sa contingence relève non plus de Dieu mais des hommes.

Au moment du renversement de l'Ancien Régime, les faits apportent une confirmation à cette nouvelle croyance selon laquelle les hommes sont les maîtres d'oeuvre de leur destin. La bourgeoisie qui a bouleversé l'ordre ancien à son profit fonce ses espoirs les plus vifs d'égalisation des chances sur un système d'enseignement qu'elle veut ouvert à tous sans distinction. Les mots de «peuple» et «ouvrier», perdent leurs connotations péjoratives. Que l'on naisse ouvrier n'implique plus que l'on demeure nécessairement dans cet «état»: l'aptitude est devenue une valeur au nom de laquelle tout homme peut acquérir un certain rang social quelle que soit sa naissance. Certes, tout en voulant faire passer dans les faits l'idéologie égalitaire qu'elle a forgée pour arracher à la noblesse ses privilèges, la bourgeoisie recreée à son profit de nouvelles inégalités 'politique, économiques et sociales; mais les notions d'égalité, de mérite, d'aptitude, de responsabilité individuelle, sont devenues

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[2] Ouvrages consultés: F. Brunot. *Histoire de la langue française des origines*, Paris, A. Colin, 1913. Dictionnaires e J. Nicot, 1606; Vaugelas, 1647; P. Bouhourà 1675; Richelet, 1680; Furetière, 1690; Ab. Prevost, 1750; Trevoux, 1771; Ab Feraud, 1787.

[3] Cf. B. Groethuysen. *Origines de l'esprit bourgeois en France*. Paris, Gallimard, 1927.

des éléments d'une idéologie partagée par tous les groupes sociaux qu'ils aient ou non tiré profit du bouleversement des structures sociales.

II — Première moitié du XIXᵉ siècle: au moment ou la bourgeoisie conquiert le pouvoir politique, l'aptitude devient un élément d'une nouvelle idéologie justificatrice des inégalités sociales. Elle prend alors le sens d'une caractéristique essentielle et héréditaire.

Une nouvelle hiérarchie sociale se constitue: la noblesse comme classe a disparu; le tiers-état a éclaté en deux fractions opposées, la bourgeoisie qui détient le pouvoir politique, et le prolétariat auquel elle refuse pratiquement le droit de vote. La nouvelle classe au pouvoir ne pense plus l'égalité qu'en référence aux membres de sa propre classe. Les projets relatifs à l'enseignement primaire (qui avait été proclamé condition primordiale d'une égalité des chances effectives) restent lettre morte; l'intérêt des réformateurs se porte sur l'enseignement secondaire réservé aux enfants de la bourgeoisie. Confrontée aux inégalités qu'elle a recréées, alors que l'égalité est devenue une valeur de la société globale, la bourgeoisie va secréter une nouvelle idéologie propre à justifier ces inégalités et à réduire une opposition menaçant ses nouveaux privilèges: tous étant libres et égaux en droit, le destin d'un être humain ne dépend plus que de ses aptitudes individuelles, lesquelles sont naturelles et héréditaires. Cette idéologie lui sert à se consolider comme classe en déniant à ceux qu'elle soumet à son pouvoir politique et économique les qualités essentielles qu'elle s'attribue à elle-même et en particulier l'intelligence. Le mot «ouvrier» reprend alors son sens péjoratif d'avant la Révolution. Les recherches anthropométriques, en plein essor, servent alors de caution à cette idéologie: les différences physiques, dûment établies, sont considerées comme causales des différences mentales et des différences sociales censées en être la consequence directe. A l'époque où la bourgeoisie conquiert définitivement le pouvoir, le mot «aptitude» perd donc le sens de caractère aléatoire que lui conférait au XVIIIᵉ siècle l'idée de liberté humaine, idée au nom de laquelle elle revendiquait ses droits face à la noblesse. Les connotations du terme deviennent celles d'un donné immuable, permanent, héréditaire, qui détermine dès la naissance le destin d'un individu.

III — Deuxième moitié du XIXᵉ siècle: au triomphe de la bourgeoisie correspond une systématisation de l'idéologie des aptitudes. L'aptitude relève alors d'un ordre de causalité strictement biologique.

L'écrasement de la révolte du prolétariat en 1848 marque le début d'une ère nouvelle, celle de l'expansion de l'industrie et du commerce. Le travail social se divise en tâches multiples et hiérarchisées qui nécessitent une formation plus ou moins poussée. En 1881, l'enseignement devient gratuit, laïque et obligatoire pour des deux sexes, mais il n'est pas question que le peuple ait accés à l'enseignement secondaire, réservé aux enfants de la bourgeoisie.

Le système de croyance, au nom duquel cette classe cherche à maintenir sa domination, va trouver un support dans les découvertes de Darwin, l'idée d'une concurrence vitale aboutissant à une sélection naturelle étant en affinité avec l'idéologie de la classe au pouvoir. Les inégalités sociales ne sont plus considérées comme relatives à un ordre social, dont les hommes seraient les créateurs mais comme dépendantes d'un ordre transcental, celui d'une donné biologique absolument déterminant. En 1852, Gobineau[1] systématise cette idéologie diffuse: la hiérarchie des peuples et des classes fondées sur des différences biologiques irréduc-

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[1] A. de G o b i n e a u. *Essai sur l'inégalité des races humaines*, Paris, P. Belfond, 1967 (I-ère édition, 1852).

tibles rend inévitable et nécessaire la domination des uns sur les autres. Galton[5] fondateur de la psychologie différentielle part du même présupposé ideologique pour tenter de démontrer que les facultés mentales sont héréditaires. Son postulat constitutionaliste pésera sur l'avenir de cette branche de la psychologie. Le parallélisme psycho-biologique du XVIIIᵉ siècle s'est donc transformé au XIXᵉ siècle en un determinisme du psychique et du social par le biologique.

Cependant l'idée d'une distribution naturelle d'aptitudes inégales ordonnant les individus dans l'échelle sociale rencontre une résistance dans la classe ouvrière qui lui oppose une idéologie contradictoire. La seconde moitié du XIXᵉ siècle voit surgir de graves conflits sociaux: les idées de Marx, en rupture radicale avec celles de son époque, inspire le mouvement ouvrier. En 1871, l'ordre social est momentanément renversé par la Commune. Ces conflits ne sont pas sans susciter des réflexions chez les théoriciens et les chercheurs en sciences humaines: ainsi Durkheim déclaret-il qu'à son époque «la contrainte seule plus ou moins violente et plus ou moins directe lie (les hommes) à leurs fonctions»[6]. Mais si attentif soit-il aux rapports entre structures sociales et systèmes d'interprétation du réel, Durkheim oriente sa réflexion en fonction des schémas de pensée prévalents à son époque: les «facultés générales'' étant, dit-il, héréditaires, ce son telles qu'il faut découvrir pour attribuer à chacun sa juste place dans la socité et supprimer ainsi les conflits préjudiciables à l'ordre social. Cette idée guidera les recherches de Binet[7] également, psychologue occupant une position analogue dans le système de classes. A la fin du XIXᵉ siècle, la génétique qui prend un essor considérable vient alimenter des schèmes de pensée déjà bien établis et servir de support à l'idée de la transmission heréditaire des aptitudes. Le mot, «pleinement passé dans l'usage», a hérité definitivement d'un sens biologisant dont font foi les définitions des dictionnaires de l'époque, comme le Litté et le Larousse, qui demeurent les sources fondamentales auxquelles s'alimentent les définitions actuelles.

IV — Début du XXᵉ siècle: l'époque des tests. L'aptitude étant devenue une réalité mesurable, la science des aptitudes apparait comme la garantie d'un ordre social qu'elle legitime.

Confronté aux problèmes pratiques que pose à l'aube du XXᵉ siècle la mise en application de la loi sur la scolarité primaire obligatoire, le Ministère de l'Instruction Publique charge le psychologue Binet de mettre au point un instrument susceptible de permettre la sélection des enfants, considérés comme inaptes, à cette scolarité. Les travaux de Binet sur les processus de raisonnement, où il relativisait la notion d'intelligence, cèdent alors le pas à la construction d'une échelle métrique de l'intelligence qui vise à l'établissement de normes, fondées sur des critères d'utilisation sociale des individus. L'âge devient le critère majeur en fonction, on jauge les performances scolaires et leur degré de normalité. Les normes scolaires et sociales, selon lesquelles est valorisée la «precocité» et déprécié de «retard» deviennent la référence centrale autour de laquelle s'organisent les recherches sur les notions d'âge mental, de quotient intellectuel, de développment. On dispose enfin d'un nstrument permettant de mesurer l'intelligence, donc d'assigner à chacun sa place dans la hiérarchie sociale par une sélection et une orientation «scientifiques.»

[5] F. Galton. *Hereditary Genius. Its laws and consequences,* London, Macmillan and C, 1869.
[6] E. Durkehim. *De la division du travail social,* Paris, P.U.F., 1893.
[7] A. Binet: "Nouvelles recherches sur la mesure du niveau intellectuel chez les enfants d'école", en *l'Année psychologique,* 1911.

Tous les efforts sont alors consciencieusement dirigés sur un travail de dissection de l'intelligence. Il faut en atteindre l'essence, délimiter et mesurer les aptitudes sui generis qui en constituent les multiples facettes. La liste des aptitudes devient vite impressionnante. Méconnaissant la relativité de leur propre système culturel, ces psychologues sont en géneral frappés de cécité quant au système de valeurs qui oriente le découpage du réel qu'ils opèrent pour mener à bien leur entreprise de différenciation des individus. La hiérarchie des aptitudes qu'ils élaborent est curieusement constituée à l'image de la hiérarchie sociale: plus on occupe une position élevée dans la hiérarchie, plus on possède le «facteur G» (intelligence génerale); au bas de l'échelle socaiale les aptitudes sont géneralement spécifiques, limitées. Les uns possédent des aptitudes organisées selon une bonne structure, les autres se définissent d'abord par un manque: ils ne possédent pas les aptitudes valorisées. Il semble que l'ethnocentrisme culturel, qui se marque dans la croyance en l'existence d'apptitudes «humaines» en général, se double chez ces chercheurs d'un ethnocentrisme relatif à leur position dans le système de classes de leur propre sociéte. En fait la classe «intelligente» ne découvre des aptitudes «naturelles» specifiques (dextérité manuelle, etc...) chez la classe «inapte aux tâches intellectuelles» qu'en fonction des exigences sociales du marché de l'emploi. Après avoir emprunté ses présupposes de nature idéologique à un ordre social qu'elle prend pour l'ordre naturel des choses, la «science» des aptitudes a contribué en retour à le légitimer en lui fournissant une caution scientifique.

V — Les tentatives de définition scientifique du concept d'aptitude. Mise en question de la pertinence de son utilisation en sciences humaines, après la deuxième guerre mondiale.

La psychologie différentielle ayant emprunté au langage courant un concept lourd des présupposés métaphysiques dont l'histoire l'a chargée, elle s'est efforcée d'en purifier le sens dans la mesure où elle l'utilisait comme outil conceptuel dans sa pratique théorique. Certaines définitions, entre autres celle de Claparède[8], font autorité. Or, la tentative de clarification du concept par cet auteur aboutit finalement à un retour à la définition du sens commun: «nous réservons le terme d'aptitude ... à une disposition naturelle». En définitive si l'ambiguïté marque sa définition de l'aptitude c'est que Claparède comme bien des chercheurs utilise ce concept comme un être et non comme une fonction, un outil.

Par la suite une querelle terminologique opposera Christiaens, pour qui l'aptitude est le résultat du développement dû à l'exercice d'une «disposition native», à Piéron qui lui reproche de «désigner les capacités sous le nom d'aptitudes» et entend réserver ce dernier terme au «substrat congénital» préexistant à la capacité.[9] Mais l'idée d'une différence biologique causale des différences psychiques est présente chez l'un comme chez l'autre. Certes les théories qui transforment le champ du savoir relatif à la nature du psychisme: théorie psychanalytique, gestalthéorie, béhaviorisme, culturalisme, phénoménologie, théories où le concept d'aptitudes n'a aucune place, ne sont pas sans modifier les conceptions relatives à la genèse des différences individuelles. La référence à un schéma bipolaire prenant en compte les influences respectives de l'«hérédité» et du «milieu» a remplacé la référence à un schéma causal selon lequel on opérait une réduction du psychologique au biologique.

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[8] E. Claparède. *Comment diagnostiquer les aptitudes des écoliers*, Paris Flammarion, 1924. Cf. ch. III., p. 29: les aptitudes et leur structure.
[9] H. Pieron. *Traité de psychologie appliquée* Paris, P.U.F, 1949.

Cependant l'un des pôles est encore privilégié, comme le prouve la simplification et en définitive la scotomisation de ce que l'on désigne sous le nom de «facteurs de milieu» en général. Le «milieu», éternel gêneur sans lequel le constat des aptitudes naturelles serait bien simplifié, est conçu comme une réalité d'ordre physique exerçant des influences quasi mécaniques. On pose a priori que des jumeaux plongés dans un «même» milieu familial et social ont nécessairement subi des influences identiques. La méconnaissance de la dynamique des relations où chaque être humain se trouve impliqué de façon singulière dès sa naissance, l'imperméabilité à l'apport freudien, s'originent en une foi aveugle en la transmission d'une intelligence dont certains gènes seraient porteurs. Pourtant, la réflexion de certains chercheurs sur les postulats orientant les procédés d'étalonnage des tests les a conduit à mettre en cause la pertinence de l'utilisation de ce concept peu scientifique. C'est le cas de P. Naville en 1945 et de M. Reuchlin en 1954[10], l'un et l'autre praticiens en orientation professionnelle au moment de cette emise en question.

VI — Permanence dans la pratique de la recherche des schémas de pensée, nés au XIXe siècle.

Renonçant à utiliser le concept d'aptitude ou pensant rompre avec ses connotations métaphysiques, un certain nombre de chercheurs vont alors s'attacher à décrire les différences entre individus ou entre groupes sociaux en s'interdisant dans l'immédiat la recherche des causes. Leur démarche se veut purement descriptive. Leur but est d'établir des constats, de voir entre autres s'il existe une répartition inègale des aptitudes selon la race, le sexe, la classe sociale, les uns cherchant à confirmer les autres à infirmer cette hypothèse. Mais ce faisant, on part d'un découpage préétable du réel, celui du sens commun. Or depuis le XIXe siècle, pour l'ensemblie de la culture globale, les catégories ainsi découpées sont définies en référence à des différences de «nature». Les noirs, les femmes, les ouvriers sont perçus comme essentiellement différents des blancs, des hommes, des bourgeois. Le postulat sous-jacent est qu'aux caractéristiques corporelles qui marquent l'appartenance à une catégorie désignée par un manque (manque de peau blanche, de phallus, ou d'aisance dans la gestuelle et dans l'élocution) correspondent nécessairement des caractéristiques mentales et psychiques, privées des dimensions qui sont le signe d'une précellence et le gage d'une appartenance à l'«élite» dirigeante[11].

Faute d'analyser les conditions sociales d'émergence des conduites spécifiques aux individus et aux groupes, on en arrive à poser de manière inconsciente le postulat fixiste que l'on voulait évacuer. Aussi quelles que soient les visées éthiques des auteurs, le fait qu'ils se bornent à constater la répartition inégale des aptitudes selon la race, le sexe, la condition sociale, en s'interdisant d'étudier les processus en jeu dans la genèse des conduites spécifiques à chaque catégorie, aboutit à renforcer l'idéologie selon laquelle le groupe dominant ne doit son pouvoir qu'à une supériorité naturelle.

Que l'on rapporte les inégalités scolaires et sociales à des différences culturelles n'implique pas qu'il y ait nécessairement rupture avec le schéma de pensée

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[10] P. Naville. *Théorie de l'orientation professionnelle,* Paris, Gallimard, 1945; M. Reuchlin: "Le problème théorique de la commaissance des aptitudes", in *Traité. de psychologie appliquée,* ch. III, op. cit., Cf. également L. S. Hearnshaw: "The concepts of aptitude and capacity". Textes des rapports du XII-e Congrès International d'Histoire Sciences. Ed. A. Michel, 1968.
[11] Cf. C. Guillaumin. *L'idéologie raciste: Genèse et langage actuel.* A paraître chez Mouton, 1971.

fixiste. Si les uns substantialisent les aptitudes, les autres risquent de substantialiser les différences culturelles. Ainsi certains sociologues, cherchant à expliquer les inégalités devant l'école, les rapportent à des différences de langage entre les classes sociales; mais au cours de leur analyse ils prennent comme référence centrale un seul langage, celui de la classe bourgeoise, défini par ses qualités de complexité, d'abstraction, etc. . . Le langage des autres classes n'est défini que par un manque: il n'est ni riche, ni complexe, ni abstrait[12]. Or, le langage «pauvre» et le «manque» de culture des uns ne sont-ils pas la condition du langage «riche» et de la «culture» des autres? On peut se demander si ces différents langages ne sont pas en fait la traduction du degré d'autonomie qu'autorisent les conditions concrètes d'existence et de la conscience de soi qui en découle. Or, la plupart du temps la démarche consiste à abstraire du réel des éléments (langage ou culture) qui sont, sinon dans la théorie de tous les auteurs du moins dans la pratique de leurs analyses, maniés comme des en soi. On peut regretter qu'une telle démarche évite d'insister sur la nécessité de démontrer comment ces langages *se constituent* comme différents au sein d'une même culture globale, et sur la nécessité de reconnaître le rapport qui les fonde et les spécifient comme différents, rapport de dominance et non de réciprocité reflétant ce qui dans les rapports concrets eux-mêmes relève de la répartition inégale d'un pouvoir de fait, économique, politique et juridique.

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Pour conclure, on peut souligner la force actuelle du schéma de pensée qui, né au XIXe siècle, cherche à rendre compte des inégalités sociales en recourant à l'idée de l'existence d'inégalités naturelles entre les individus ou les groupes. L'école est un des lieux privilégiés qui permet de saisir comment cette idéologie de classe s'est progressivement incarnée dans des pratiques qui la montrent à l'oeuvre et révèlent son impact au niveau du système de pensée globale. Les processus de selection en jeu jusqu'au niveau des études supérieures contribuent à maintenir une hiérarchie sociale fondée particulièrement sur des distinctions de classe et de sexe. Dans des processus, la référence plus ou moins consciente à l'idéologie des aptitudes n'est pas sans opérer une médiation nécessaire et efficiente.[13]

L'idéologie des inégalités naturelles, secrétée par une classe sociale au moment où elle accaparaît le pouvoir économique puis politique, est devenue vérité scientifique en empruntant successivement à la craniométie, l'anthropométrie, la biologie, la génétique, la psychologie et la sociologie, dont elle guidait parfois la pratique scientifique, les éléments lui permettant de justifier le bien-fondé de ses assertions. Par là même elle se donnait le moyen de s'imposer à l'ensemble des groupes sociaux qui croient unanimement au Progrès et la Science, valeurs qui ont présidé à la naissance de l'idéologie des aptitudes. Il semble qu'au-delà des divergences qui opposent les différents groupes socio-politiques reconnus, cette idéologie globale guide l'ensemble des conceptions relatives à la sélection et à l'orientation scolarire: le système scolaire a pour fin la sélection d'une «élite» que sa compétence, son mérite, ses aptitudes, destinent aux hautes fonctions dont la responsabilité implique certains avantages sociaux et économiques.

[12] P. Bourdieu: "L'école conservatrice", *Revue Française de Sociologie*, VI, 3, 1966. Egalement A. Sauvy et A. Girard: "Les diverses classes sociales devant l'enseignement", *Population*, mars, 1965.
[13] N. Bisseret: "La sélection à l'Université et sa signification pour l'étude des rapports de dominance", *Revue Française de Sociologie*, IX, 1968.

Les schèmes de pensée, nés au XIXe siècle s'imposent toujours également à la recherche en sciences humaines. Les acquisitions en ce domaine revêtent de par la division du travail scientifique un caractère parcellaire peu susceptible de lever la méconnaissance relative au processus dynamique global, où sont impliquées instances psychiques et instances sociales. Dans le seul domaine de la psychologie le fossé entre la recherche psychanalytique et la recherche expérimentale ne facilite pas l'intégration des acquisitions respectives de ces branches du savoir dans une théorie plus générale de la genèse des conduites. Si par sa pratique scientifique Freud a été amené à remettre en question la dichotomie classique entre l'affectif et le cognitif, la recherche dont il a ainsi posé les bases est encore dans les limbes. Il est possible qu'elle conduise à un bouleversement de l'idée d'irréversibilité qu' imposent actuellement les limites d'un savoir théorique mis à l'épreuve de certaines applications (thérapeutiques, pédagogiques...).

Les affirmations les plus triviales sur les exigences d'une démarche qui se veut scientifique sont souvent ignorées dans la pratique de la recherche. Aussi faut-il rappeler un principe qui n'est constamment posé que pour être aussitôt oublié, à savoir: la nécessité de se dégager de l'emprise des schèmes de la culture globale et de forger de nouveaux outils conceptuels, sans perdre de vue que les concepts ne sont pas des êtres mais des fonctions et que, relatifs à l'état des connaissances dans un système social, ils naissent, changent de sens (comme le prouvent les avatars de la notion d'aptitude), et sont parfois amenés à disparaître du champ de la connaissance scientifique.