

TRANSACTIONS OF THE SIXTH
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ACTES DU SIXIÈME
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Erla, 4-11 September 1968

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CONGRÈS MONDIAL DE SOCIOLOGIE

VOLUME II

UNITY AND DIVERSITY IN SOCIOLOGY
UNITE ET DIVERSITE EN SOCIOLOGIE

SOCIOLOGY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
SOCIOLOGIE DES RELATIONS INTERNATIONALES

PROBLEMS OF SOCIOLOGICAL DOCUMENTATION
PROBLÈMES DE LA DOCUMENTATION EN SOCIOLOGIE

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EDITORIAL NOTE

The Sixth World Congress of Sociology of Evian involved meetings during which Working Groups dealt with two themes chosen for the occasion: «Unity and Diversity in Sociology», «Sociology of International Relations». It gave the opportunity, besides, to have Round Tables concerning chosen problems, meetings of the permanent Research Committees under the patronage of the International Sociological Association, and varied special meetings.

The present volume first of all, assembles the papers of the presidents of the above mentioned Working Groups. Two of them, Messrs. P. de Bie, Université Catholique de Louvain, President of the Working Group entrusted to examine the incidences of ethnical tensions in international relations, and P. Lazarsfeld, Columbia University, President of the Working Group dealing with Objectivity of Research Methods», have been compelled to postpone the sending of their manuscript.

One will find also in the following pages the reports of the President of the Round Table dealing with documentation (M. J. Meyriat, and that of the Round Table which examined the role of educational sociology in the domain of development (M. A. Pearse).

The text of Mr. R. König, President of the Round Table, dedicated to «Teaching of Sociology» will be remitted subsequently to the Association.

Works of the Round Table on comparative research of international order (S. Rokkan) have occupied one of the Plenary Sessions of the Congress and are reproduced in another volume (Transactions of the Sixth World Congress of Sociology - Volume 1).

Another Round Table figured on the programme (International Researches on Time-Budgets, A. Szalai). His works will be reproduced subsequently.

AVANT-PROPOS

Table des Matières

Le Sixième Congrès mondial de sociologie d'Evian a comporté des séances au cours desquelles des groupes de travail ont traité deux thèmes choisis pour l'occasion: «Unité et diversité en sociologie», «Sociologie des relations internationales». En outre, il a donné lieu à des tables rondes relatives à des problèmes choisis, à des séances des comités permanents de recherches que patronne l'Association internationale de sociologie, et à des réunions spéciales très diverses.

Le présent volume rassemble d'abord les communications des présidents des groupes de travail mentionnés ci-dessus. Deux d'entre eux, MM. P. de Bie, Université catholique de Louvain, président du groupe de travail chargé d'examiner les incidences des tensions ethniques sur les relations internationales, et P. Lazarsfeld, Université Columbia, président du groupe de travail ayant pour objet «Objectivité des méthodes de recherches» ont dû différer la remise de leur manuscrit.

On trouvera également dans les pages qui suivent les rapports du président de la table ronde consacrés à la documentation (M. J. Meyriat), et de celui de la table ronde qui a examiné le rôle de la sociologie de l'éducation dans le domaine du développement (M. A. Pearse).

Le texte de M. R. König, président de la table ronde, consacré à «L'enseignement de la sociologie» doit être remis ultérieurement à l'Association.

Les travaux de la table ronde sur les recherches comparatives d'ordre international (S. Rokkan) ont occupé l'une des séances plénières du Congrès et sont reproduits dans un autre volume (Actes du Sixième Congrès mondial de sociologie - Volume 1).

Une autre table ronde figurait au programme (Recherches internationales sur les budgets-temps, A. Szalai). Ses travaux seront reproduits ultérieurement.

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MATHEMATICAL MODELS IN SOCIOLOGY

LEON S. COLLINGS

The Johns Hopkins University

UNITY AND DIVERSITY IN SOCIOLOGY

Introduction:

UNITÉ ET DIVERSITÉ EN SOCIOLOGIE

I have chosen in this paper not to present a general overview of typology of mathematical models in sociology, but rather to present a specific model. My choice in doing so has been governed by the belief that sociologists, whether mathematically inclined or not, can more easily gain a sense of the potential contributions of mathematical models to sociology through specific examples than through general surveys. The reader should keep in mind, however, that this represents but one approach to mathematical treatment of sociological problems. The papers of the work group members will illustrate a variety of other approaches, again through the development of specific models. Among these approaches, it has become quite clear that certain ones will offer direct and rather immediate aid to empirical research and theory. Probable foremost among these is the use of stochastic processes to mirror certain sociological processes — including those ranging from population dynamics to career patterns in a bureaucracy. The contribution contained in this paper does not offer such direct value to research, for it deals with a problem that has been most often treated in speculation and verbal theory. As such, it shows the way in which such a problem can be treated by mathematical methods, and attempts to make a contribution to the solution of this particularly difficult problem.

A Framework for the Theory of Collective Decisions

One of the major problems in the functioning of society is the problem of collective decisions. When control over a decision is divided among different persons (as it tends to be when the decision has consequences for different persons), then the resolution of differences cannot take place within an individual, but must take place through social processes.

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INTRODUCTION

I have chosen in this paper not to present a general overview or typology of mathematical models in sociology, but rather to present a specific model. My choice in doing so has been governed by the belief that sociologists, whether mathematically inclined or not, can more easily gain a sense of the potential contributions of mathematical models to sociology through specific examples than through general surveys. The reader should keep in mind, however, that this represents but one approach to mathematical treatment of sociological problems. The papers of the work group members will illustrate a variety of other approaches, again through the development of specific models. Among these approaches, it has become quite clear that certain ones will offer direct and rather immediate aid to empirical research and theory. Probably foremost among these is the use of stochastic processes to mirror certain sociological processes — including those ranging from population dynamics to career patterns in a bureaucracy. The contribution contained in this paper does not offer such direct value to research, for it deals with a problem that has been most often treated in speculation and verbal theory. As such, it shows the way in which such a problem can be treated by mathematical methods, and attempts to make a contribution to the solution of this particularly difficult problem.

A Framework for the Theory of Collective Decisions

One of the major problems in the functioning of society is the problem of collective decisions. When control over a decision is divided among different persons (as it tends to be when the decision has consequences for different persons), then the resolution of differences cannot take place within an individual, but must take place through social processes.

Recognition of the fundamental problem this poses for society occurred among the founders of political science: John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Thomas Hobbes and others of their period. Sociologists, however, have seldom taken this problem as a starting point in the development of sociological theory.

The fundamental character of this problem for societies and groups is evident in the continual flux that occurs in the government of societies and groups. Constitutions and governmental forms are continually being modified, as they show one or another weakness; and conflicts and revolutions attest to man's frequent inability to establish viable systems for collective decisions. The relative absence of social theory in this area is attested by the paucity of guidelines for government that sociological theory provides.

An especially fruitful starting point for social theory that addresses itself to this problem is one which begins with the individuals who constitute a society, organization, or group, and attempts to relate the decision to their interests. For a theory which does not reach down to this level may suffer from the blindness to discontent from which oligarchic or dictatorial regimes often suffer, and thus contain the seeds of failure.

Of the various conceptual approaches to action, the one which lays a foundation for such an approach is classical utilitarian theory, with its conception of man as a rational being, maximizing his self-interests. The principle of maximization of utility requires the conception of an individual actor who orders the alternative outcomes of a decision or an action according to the "utility" each has for him. If we label the actor i , the outcomes j, k, l , and the utility of outcome k for actor i u_{ik} , then his choice among alternatives is governed by an order relation: If $u_{ik} > u_{ij} > u_{il}$, then he will choose k over j , and j over l . This in fact is the definition of utility, and the relation between the underlying utility and the manifest choice is the fundamental tautology on which utilitarian theory rests.

Through this definition, the theory is able to account for, or describe, the action of an individual actor when the outcome of his choice, and its resulting consequences for him, are certain. When the outcome does not follow with certainty from his choice, then a more complex theory of choice under uncertainty is necessary to account for his choice. We will have occasion to return to this expanded theory of choice for reasons that will become evident; but for the present it is useful to focus attention upon a related but different complication. When the decision is a collective one, what does the

theory of choice say? Consider a case of two alternative outcomes, A and B, and a collectivity of two individuals, X and Y. There are four situations:

- X prefers A and Y prefers A
- X prefers A and Y prefers B
- X prefers B and Y prefers A
- X prefers B and Y prefers B

These can be expressed as in table 1.

Table 1

		Y's preference	
		A	B
X's preference	A	1	2
	B	3	4

Simple utilitarian theory can account for the outcome only in two of these four conditions, the first and the fourth. These are conditions of complete consensus, in which both prefer either A or B. Thus the theory of rational man maximizing his utility is not sufficient to account for the choice in half the possible conditions.

When the number of alternatives increases, then rational theory is even less sufficient; in the case of three alternatives, as shown in Table 2, it can predict only in three of nine possible conditions, those along the main diagonal of Table 2. More generally, if there are m alternative outcomes, then there are m^2 total patterns of first preference for the pair of individuals, and for only m of them does rational theory make a prediction. This means that only m/m^2 or $1/m$ of the possible conditions are predicted by rational theory.

Some attempts to expand the theory have been made by economists and political scientists, to encompass the remaining cases. These approaches generally assume that numbers can be attached to the utilities of each individual, so that in cases of disagreement, the outcome with the higher number is chosen¹. Some authors would derive these

¹ See Jerome ROTHENBERG, *The Measurement of Social Welfare*, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey. Prentice Hall, 1961 (Chapters 7, 8, 9).

Table 2

		Y's preference		
		A	B	C
X's preference	A	1	2	3
	B	4	5	6
	C	7	8	9

numbers from the rank of the alternative for the actor, while others would obtain the numbers in a different way. But this solution does not appear to describe reality, for in cases of disagreement it can hardly be said that two individuals peacefully resolve disagreements merely by comparing the amounts of utility that the outcomes have for them.

In collective decisions, the more usual case is that the number of individuals is larger than two, though the number of alternative outcomes may remain two. In this case, the patterns of preference can be described as in Table 3 for three actors. In the case of three individuals, rational theory predicts for only two patterns out of eight, 1 and 8 in the table: complete consensus on A or B. More generally, with two alternative outcomes and n individuals, the theory will predict for two patterns, while there are 2^n patterns altogether. Thus the theory predicts in only $2/2^n$ cases, or $1/2^{n-1}$. This is even a smaller fraction of cases than in the case of multiple alternative outcomes.

Table 3

		Z's preference			
		$\begin{bmatrix} A \\ A \end{bmatrix}$	[B]	[A]	$\begin{bmatrix} B \\ B \end{bmatrix}$
Y's preference :	A	1	2	3	4
	X's preference B	5	6	7	8

In the general case of m outcomes and n individuals, the number of choices predicted is m , and the number of total patterns is m^n , so that the fraction of choices predicted is $1/m^{n-1}$. When either m or n is large, and especially n , this gives an exceedingly small fraction of possible patterns that are predicted by the theory.

This is the state of affairs, and indicates the problem that societies face in making collective decisions, as well as the problem that social theorists face in adequately describing how they do so or fail to do so.

The problem, then, is to devise a theory that builds upon the theory of rational action as a base, and yet is adequately descriptive of the way collective decisions actually occur. The best place to look in such a circumstance is at the social systems themselves, to see how collective decisions do take place.

In doing this, the first thing one notes is that nearly all collective decisions in formally organized groups, and many of those in informal groups, proceed according to a decision rule. The decision rule specifies which members of the collectivity have a voice in the decision, and what rule is to be followed when these participants disagree. For example, a decision rule for taxation may specify that it is to be made by a body of elected representatives, with each representative having a single vote.

The decision at which the decision rule itself is determined may be described as the constitutional decision, and the set of decision rules concerning the collective decisions of the body as the *constitution*². This terminology is useful even in informal collectivities, where the «constitution» only exists by custom or an informal norm.

The determination of a constitution we will take as given here, for it is a more difficult theoretical problem, and will examine only the decisions that occur under a given constitution.

Decision rules ordinarily divide all patterns of preference (or vote) among the participants into two classes: those in which a proposed action is accepted, and those in which it is defeated. The classes are ordinarily determined by a counting of votes. The most common rule is a majority vote, but for some actions a proportion greater than half, such as $2/3$ or $3/4$ or even unanimity, is required for acceptance. In cases of several alternatives (such as an election among more than two candidates), one class of patterns rejects all actions,

² I am indebted to James BUCHANAN and Gordon TULLOCK, in *The Calculus of Consent* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962) for making me aware of the importance of the distinction between the constitutional decision and the decisions made under a given constitution.

and another procedure is specified for resolving the decision. (For example, in many cases, the failure of any candidate to reach a majority leads to a run-off election with the leading candidates, requiring a majority to win.)

The second point to note about actual collective decisions is that the decision rule is not always successful, in the sense that all individuals accept the collective choice. If it were, the problem of collective decisions would reduce to a question of how individuals come to cast their vote on a given decision. One widespread current example in American communities is the example of decisions to fluoridate the water. These are often made by majority vote of the city council, but in many communities this has been followed by a popular reaction and a petition for referendum. In some states this has led to a decision which is effectively a constitutional change: that no municipality shall initiate fluoridation without a popular referendum.

A given decision rule establishes a structure of control over the decision. It was the absence of such explicit structure of control that made the case of two individuals described earlier wholly indeterminate. Thus the first necessary addition to the rational theory of action if it is to be relevant to collective decisions is the explicit introduction of the idea of *control* over a decision. By definition of a collective decision, in contrast to an individual decision, this control resides in more than one person.

Having introduced this, does the rational theory of action correctly describe the behavior of individuals in collective decisions? A number of social scientists have assumed that it does, in the sense that individuals vote their preferences, and the decision rule determines the outcome. But if this assumption is accepted, then several problems arise:

1. How can we account for acceptance of the decision by those whose favored outcome loses?
2. How can we account for refusal to accept the decision, and the resort to conflict or other modes of refusal when it does occur?
3. How can we allow for those cases in which a minority favors one alternative very intensely, and defeats a majority who favors the opposing alternative with less intensity?
4. Under the given assumptions, a familiar paradox in voting occurs, given at least three outcomes and three actors. Certain patterns of preference show the Condorcet paradox, that the outcome will be determined by the order of voting, if alternatives are voted on two

at a time. This paradox was further developed by Arrow, whose impossibility theorem states that no decision rule can escape such apparently unreasonable results³.

If, however, one does not assume that the rational theory of action, that is, simply voting one's preference, in conjunction with a rule of control describes behavior in collective decisions, then some progress may be made toward solving these problems. The first point of progress is to recognize that when an individual no longer has complete control over the outcome, the theory of rational behavior under certainty no longer applies. In its place is the theory of rational choice under uncertainty, in which the individual must not only assess the relative utilities of the outcomes, but also the probability of their occurrence under different possible actions he might take. This means that he may *not* vote his preference, for he may see that it will give an outcome for him less good than another choice. For example, in Table 4 is shown a preference pattern for three individuals (X, Y, and Z) and three outcomes (A, B, and C) which would show the Condorcet paradox. If a majority rule held, and A and B were voted on first, then C would be the final winner. If A and C were voted on first, B would be the winner; and if B and C were voted on first, A would be the winner. But all these results hold only if each votes his preference, which is only rational if he knows this will give him his desired outcome. For example, suppose that for X, the utility difference between A and B were small, and that between B and C were large. Suppose also he knew the preference ordering of Y and Z, and that the difference between their first and second choice was about the same as the difference between their second and third. Then if A and B are voted on first, it is clearly more rational for X to vote for B. This will mean that the second vote will be between B and C rather than A and C, and consequently B will be the final winner, rather than C. Individual X will have prevented his least preferred alternative from winning, obtaining instead his second choice. This change itself will not affect Condorcet's paradox in this case, for depending on the order of pairing the alternatives, one of the individuals could prevent his least preferred outcome from winning by voting his second choice in the first round, rather than his first. Thus X can have no greater influence in preventing C from occurring than Y and Z can in preventing A and B respectively.

³ See Kenneth ARROW, *Social Choice and Individual Values*, New York, John Wiley & Sons, 1952.

Table 4

Rank of preference	X	Y	Z
1	A	B	C
2	B	C	A
3	C	A	B

This suggests the addition of two elements, both of which bring the theory somewhat closer to sociological treatment of collective decisions. The first is the importance of a decision to an individual, or the *interest* he has in the outcome. What makes a decision of greater or lesser interest to him is the *difference* its outcome will mean for him, that is, the difference in the utility of its best and worst outcome for him. (For simplicity in what follows, we will restrict the discussion to two-outcome decisions. In this case, his interest is the absolute value of the utility difference between the two outcomes.) In this decision let us suppose that X's interest was greater than Y's or Z's, relative to other interests of each.

But because X, Y, and Z each had a single vote in this single decision, X could realize his greater interests no more fully than could Y or Z realize their lesser interests. However, if X, Y, and Z had some additional *resources*, they could implement their interests, and obviously X would be willing to use more resources than either Y or Z and thus control the outcome, since his interest is greater. To be sure, it would cost him additional resources to do so, but the gain would be worth it to him.

Thus, by the introduction of two additional elements, an individual's interest in the outcome, and his additional resources by which he can implement these interests, we can come closer to a solution of the problem of collective decisions. These two additions resolve Condorcet's paradox, and by introducing the notion of amount or intensity of interest they provide a basis for the way in which a minority can, if it favors its outcome with enough intensity and has enough resources, gain the outcome it favors. The introduction of these two elements also brings the theory much closer to what we observe qualitatively in social systems. Different persons engaged in a collective decision *do* act as if they have different amounts of interest in the decision, and the actions that show this are differential

willingness to employ external resources toward control of the decision. These resources include the investment of time or money, the promises of votes by interest groups to legislators, and the promise by one legislator of reciprocal support on another decision in return for support on this one. Some political observers would say, in fact, that the essence of politics is the exchange of political resources so that those who have most interest in a decision have most power to affect its outcome.

This is not to say, of course, that Condorcet's paradox is always resolved in practice, nor that an intense minority can always realize its interests — for the addition indicated above as necessary to the theory, that is, additional resources held by all individuals, may not always exist.

Multiple decisions and an ongoing system

One case, however, that is of particular interest, occurs in an ongoing social system, in which a sequence of collective decisions is made by the same individuals. The existence of such a sequence gives each individual a set of resources external to any one decision, which he can use in that decision if his interest in it is great enough. In general, the rational individual will attempt to concentrate his resources in those decisions that interest him most. He will use his control over those issues that interest him least as resources to exchange for control over decisions that interest him most. Though I will not do so here, it is possible to show precisely, for a situation in which we know his interest in each decision and the probability he attaches to the direction will vote, the conditions under which he will want to exchange his partial control over one decision for increased control over another. The criterion is the expected utility that each state brings, and according to this expanded theory of rational action he will attempt to realize the state that will maximize his expected utility, subject to his initial resources.

This model can be made more explicit by conceiving of two matrices, one a matrix of «constitutional control» that shows the degree of control that each individual has over each decision. In a set of m collective decisions with n individuals each having a single vote on each decision, each entry in the matrix, c_{ij} , showing the control of individual i over decision j , would be $1/n$.

The second matrix is a matrix of interest, showing the relative in-

terest of each individual in each decision. The sizes of one man's interests relative to those of another are not determined (that is, no interpersonal comparison of utility is assumed), but only the sizes relative to other interests of the same individual. If we label the elements of this matrix as x_{ij} , then individual i 's realizable interests

are given by $\sum_{i=1}^m x_{ji} c_{ij}$. In attempting to maximize this sum of products,

he will want to adjust the values of c_{ij} so as to maximize this sum. How he will do so is a complex question, because control over different decisions may cost him different amounts of resources, depending on how many others are interested in control of that decision. However, something can be said for a kind of ideal case which is analogous to a perfect market. This will be carried out below.

A perfect system of collective decisions

In the concept of a perfect market for the exchange of private goods, economists have developed a valuable tool, despite the fact that a perfect market is never met in practice. It is useful to attempt a similar conception in the case of collective decisions. To do so requires the following assumptions in addition to those assumed earlier:

1. The number of decisions is so great and the relative interest in any one is so small that fine gradations of value can be made in adjusting the ratio of exchange.

2. The number of individuals is so large that no one individual's exchanges can effect the ratio of exchanges.

3. There is complete information about all the exchanges that each individual is willing to make. In a scheme similar to Walras's for a private market, individuals can carry on endless tentative negotiations until all agreements are firm, and then all exchanges are made at once.

4. The decisions are determined by a particular decision rule, a rule in which the outcome 1 occurs with a probability which is the proportion of votes cast in its favor.

Under these special conditions, we can conceive of the *value* in exchange of each decision. This is the *value* (relative to the value of others) which control over it is worth in the market of vote exchange. Similarly, we can think of the *power* of each individual in the system.

This power consists of his constitutional control of valuable decisions. Stated formally,

$$p_i = \sum_{j=1}^m c_{ij} v_j \quad (1)$$

(where v_j is the value of decision j)

The definition of v_j in turn, is in terms of the interests that individuals have in it, times the power of each of these individuals.

$$v_j = \sum_{k=1}^n x_{kj} p_k \quad (2)$$

With value and power defined in terms of one another, the definitions can be used to find the power in terms of interest and control, or the value in terms of interest and control.

$$p_i = \sum_{j=1}^m c_{ij} v_j \quad (3)$$

$$= \sum_j c_{ij} \sum_k x_{kj} p_k \quad (4)$$

The set of n equations like (4) above can be solved for the n values of p_i (there are only $n-1$ independent equations, since $\sum_i c_{ij} = 1$ and $\sum_j x_{kj} = 1$), giving the power of each individual in the system.

This power is the power he has to realize his interests, and depends both upon his and others' constitutional control of decisions and upon the distribution of interests in decisions. The situation is analogous to that of the trader entering a perfect market. If he brings a lot of goods to the market, and others who have resources have high interest in these goods, he can realize his own interests through exchange. But if he brings few resources to the market, or if no one is interested in what he brings, or if those who are interested have few resources, then he has little power to realize his own interests through exchange.

Similarly, the value of a decision is analogous to the value of a good in a market. The value of a good is high if it has high utility for those with many resources, but low if it has low utility for all, or high utility only for those with few resources.

Perhaps the most useful derivation of this model is the concept of power in a system as deriving from control of events and others' interest in those events. The resulting concept of power is not a relation between two individuals (individual Y having power over

X), but a concept associated with the individual alone. Thus in such a perfect system, the relative amounts of power of X and Y would determine the ability of each to get his way in a given decision that had equal relative interest for them. If Y had more power than X, he could use it to gain control of the decision, for X would forego the control of this decision to maintain control over another decision that Y could afford to buy control over, but X could not afford to give up.

It is clearly the case in reality that power is not this fully diffuse, and that there is a great deal of friction in systems of exchange relative to collective decisions. However, it may be that certain systems of homogeneous types of collective decisions, such as legislation may be usefully studied through the notion of an ideal system of collective decisions. It is clear that in social life as a whole, there are numerous arenas within which exchanges may occur but between which exchanges are illegitimate or are not possible. For example, it is legitimate for a pressure group to exchange the promise of vote support to a legislator in return for his pursuit of their interests; but it is not legitimate for the pressure group to use money or promise of economic gain for the same purpose.

Altogether, it is evident that this framework provides only a beginning to the theory of collective decisions. Yet this expanded rational theory of action does appear to provide a promising framework, one which may bridge the gap between theory of individual rational action and our observations of the ways in which collective decisions are made.

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS ON IDEOLOGY AND SOCIOLOGY

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1. The relationship between ideology and sociology constitutes a complicated, interesting and, at times, disturbing picture¹. Interwoven as they are, they seem to have been fighting each other continuously since the very beginning (in Comte even before Marx): ideology as an act of impatience, the desire to have certainty beyond evidence, and sociology as a careful retrieving of motives and actualities. And yet, they emerge as necessary to each other as the over-all meaningful reaching towards a set of goals and the analysis of how to get there and whether the effort is worth while, as total assertion of values and the permanent casting of a doubt. A first, cursory examination can probably detect three traditional sociological ways of looking at ideology: (a) as a cultural system, or system of notions concerning various aspects of social life, whose main function appears to be twofold — of building and perpetuating internal group-cohesion as regards its members, and of insuring a sufficient degree of group-integration with respect to the global structure of society; these notions do not necessarily have to be lies or distorted views, but usually they do not resist scientific analysis; their value as social tools, that is in terms of their effectiveness in orienting the group, does not, however, depend on their empirical verification; (b) as a pure and simple conjecture which is difficult to refute because of its intrinsic vagueness or complexity and which usually expresses an individual or group preference which would not normally be shaken by the demonstration that it is empirically groundless or logically untenable; and (c) finally, as the expression in general universal terms of standpoints which are historically determined in such a way as to regard as «eternal values» and invariable principles historical specific traits and intellectual positions which are in fact quite variable, at least in the sense that they are *relative* to a given historical period and society².

¹ For a panoramic view, see Kurt LENK, editor, *Ideologie*, Neuwied, 1961.

² For an excellent account, see G. LICHTHEIM, «The Concept of Ideology.» *History and Theory*, IV, 2, 1965, pp. 164-195.

Closer scrutiny of the notion of ideology is likely to show that in the social science literature there are many contrasting and overlapping definitions of it, ranging from the concept of ideology as the «original vision» and pre-scientific insight³ to the concept of ideology as «pure error» and «psychological deformation⁴». In between these two polar concepts there is a variety of more or less elaborate conceptions and opinions which could perhaps be summarized as follows: (a) ideology as a relatively coherent body of beliefs about the various aspects of society, that is, as a cultural system and a guide for policy; (b) as lore, or pre-scientific knowledge, imbued with ethical common sense implications for behavior; (c) as an activist aspiration offering a sense of direction for group-behavior; (d) as a «false» or «mystified» consciousness related to practical economic interests; (e) as a non-scientific theory; (f) as a rationalization of the *status quo*; (g) as a doctrinaire dogmatic design to change the existing social and political situation.

2. Disregarding for the time being these conflicting and overlapping definitions, there can be little doubt that the sociological study of ideology indicates an important and baffling area of social research⁵. The relationship between ideology and sociology is not an easy one. The fact that ideology is in itself an elusive term which has become thoroughly ideologized, as Clifford Geertz has pointed out⁶, is not the only reason. The matter seems to go somewhat deeper and it involves sociology as a specific discipline and its orientation. While, on the one hand, ideology has been seen by some sociologists as exhausted, or «come to an end⁷», sociology on the

³ Cfr. Joseph A. SCHUMPETER, «Science and Ideology», *The American Economic Review*, XXXIX, 2, March 1949, pp. 345-359. Schumpeter applies his notion of ideology to the explanation of the economic thought of Adam Smith, Marx and Keynes. But the relation between their thinking and their personal and ancestral class affiliation is emphasized by him rather mechanically.

⁴ Werner STARK, *The Sociology of Knowledge*, London, 1958, esp. Part One, Ch. II. Stark excludes the study of ideology from the sociology of knowledge because, according to him, whereas socially determined knowledge shares in the truth, ideologies are pure and simple lies.

⁵ For a comprehensive critical survey, see N. BIRNBAUM, «The Sociological Study of Ideology (1940-1960)», *Current Sociology*, 1960, n. 2.

⁶ C. GEERTZ, «Ideology as a Cultural System», in David E. APTER, ed., *Ideology and Discontent*, London, 1964, p. 47.

⁷ For the most elaborate and articulate treatment of this point of view, see Daniel BELL, *The End of Ideology*, Glencoe, 1960; among the first writers to deal with this subject, see L.S. FEUER, «Beyond Ideology», in *Psycho-*

other hand is being regarded in some quarters as, first, an essentially manipulative device whereby the ideological tension towards changing the existing social and economic conditions is wisely diluted and finally eliminated, and, secondly, as nothing more than the substitute, at best the compensation, for the unfulfilled ideological promise. In other words, the sociologist would only be a disappointed ideologist, and social science itself, that is the quest for reliable information about and understanding of social structures (institutions) and behavior, nothing but a carefully planned flight from personal anxiety or commitment. This kind of criticism was quite familiar, in a strongly polemical vein, with G. Lukàcs with respect to Max Weber and other bourgeois sociologists. The attempt by Weber to go beyond the typical one sidedness of Marxian and Engelsian analysis was here presented as a revealing example of division of labour as reflected in the specialistic separation of the social sciences, in particular in the separation of sociology from economics. It is true however, that Lukàcs saw Marxism itself as historically conditioned and implied the necessity of transforming it in concomitance with the evolution of capitalist society. From this point of view, the relevance of Weber's work becomes apparent. As has been aptly remarked by G. Lichtheim, «Weber did not really 'turn Marx upside down'... but rather developed a bourgeois counterpart to the Marxian theory of history.» But Lichtheim recognizes that, in one important respect, Weber went beyond Marx, namely «...in that his sociology concerned «industrial society» as such; it thus became relevant, for capitalism and socialism alike⁸.» We shall see later that things are in this connection not so obvious as they appear to be and that further research is needed.

3. It seems that a curious fact must be taken into consideration: we live in an age of personal, evaluative commitments and judgments which, by every count, appear to be ashamed of themselves and would rather be regarded as statements of fact, if not scientific propositions altogether. The fear of ideological contamination is widespread. Recent writings concerning democracy and its problems,

analysis and Ethics, Springfield, 1955, pp. 126-130. For a stress on the intrinsic limitations of individuals to act rationally, see George H. SABINE, «Beyond Ideology», *The Philosophical Review*, LVII, 1948, pp. 1-25; MAX HORCKHEIMER, *Eclipse of Reason*, New York, 1947.

⁸ Cfr. G. LICHTHEIM, *op. cit.*, p. 186.; see also my *Max Weber e il destino della ragione*, Bari, 1965, esp. pp. 34-35.

for example, go to great pains to avoid any ideological overtones and to establish a claim to scientific status although their ideological nature becomes apparent when they finally hold up the Western democratic form of government as an historical *nec plus ultra*⁹. There is a good reason for all this. Gustav Bergmann has observed that «as we survey man's history, we cannot, I believe, escape the following conclusion: the motive power of a value judgment is often greatly increased when it appears within the rationale of those who held it not under its proper logical flag as a value judgment but in the disguise of a statement of fact¹⁰». The instrumental nature of ideologies seems to be out of the question. A characteristic distortion is also present in them. In the history of Western culture, the idea that certain ways of thinking are capable of falsifying whatever they come into contact with is undoubtedly of a religious nature; it evokes the idea of the «false prophet.» But what is most important to note is that the thesis of the end of ideology can easily be presented as a new ideology, that is as another ideological «trick» pretending to smuggle a personal or group-belief as «a factual version of the world¹¹».

Together with other catch phrases such as the «affluent society» and «neo-capitalism,» the end of ideology has been subjected to a lengthy and, at times, ungenerous examination¹². According to Meynaud, the phenomenon, which has been brilliantly and profusely described especially by Raymond Aron and Daniel Bell, is probably

⁹ Cfr. especially, among others, Gabriel A. ALMOND and Sidney VERBA, *The Civic Culture*, Princeton, 1963; Bertrand DE JOUVENEL, *The Pure Theory of Politics*, Cambridge, 1963; William KORNHAUSER, *The Politics of Mass Society*, Glencoe, 1959; Seymour M. LIPSET, *Political Man*, New York, 1960. According to William G. RUNCIMAN, «the point is not that such propositions about political behaviour cannot be made, but that no properly explanatory or interpretative propositions about it can be 'scientific' in the *naturwissenschaftlich* sense distinction. Explanations, or interpretations, of political behaviour must be unscientific not because they are prescriptive statements in disguise (although this is sometimes so) but because they are in some other sense evaluative statements, as all historical explanations and interpretations must be»; *Archives Européennes de Sociologie*, VI, 1, 1965, p. 175.

¹⁰ Cfr. G. BERGMANN, «Ideology,» *Ethics*, LXI, April 1951, 3, p. 210.

¹¹ Cfr. N. BIRNBAUM, *op. cit.*, p. 92.

¹² Jean MEYNAUD, *Destin des idéologies*, Lausanne, 1961; cfr. also, Stephen W. ROUSSEAU and James FARGANIS, «American Politics and the End of Ideology,» *The British Journal of Sociology*, XIV, 4, December 1963, pp. 347-362; James PETRAS, «Ideology and United States Political Scientists,» *Science and Society*, XXIX, 2, Spring 1965, pp. 192-216.

a real one, at least for the technically advanced and economically mature societies, but its significance and implications have been grossly exaggerated. With a kind of vitriolic light touch he reviews most of the points made in this connection by Raymond Aron, Maurice Duverger, John K. Galbraith, Daniel Bell, Seymour M. Lipset, not to mention Arthur Koestler¹³, and sums up his thinking by saying that the phenomenon, if real, seems also typical of a stage of transition. The interpretation of it should be cautious, especially when it comes to prediction for future developments. As a basis for generalizations what we know about it is too little and ambiguous. For instance, lack of citizens' participation in political affairs, far from indicating a decline in ideological passion, could simply mean a passionate, total, «ideological» refusal of the institutional instruments and of the prevailing conditions under which political life develops itself. Moreover, it is undoubtedly true that both right and left nowadays accept (but only in Western democratic societies, and this should not be forgotten, lest the charge of «provincialism» made by C. Wright Mills should appear correct) a certain measure of public intervention in economic affairs and, in general, what could be regarded as a «mixed» economic system, but it is equally true that the right wing keeps thundering against «dirigisme» and that the left wing advocates «socialism» without adjectives, here and now, in the best maximalistic tradition.

To talk and to write about a post-ideological society in which social conflicts appear to be «aseptic» as it were, and only factually or technically motivated, is at least premature. There is no doubt that in the long run important qualitative changes and transformations take place, but this is a matter of research, not of speculation. At any rate, it does not necessarily imply the pure and simple liquidation of ideologies conceived as ideal projections in universal terms of interests and standpoints which are of a sectional character. It might simply mean the emergence of new ideologies.

4. In fact, even the writers mentioned above, in their effective treatment of the decline and of the end of «ideological enthusiasms,»

¹³ See R. ARON, *L'opium des intellectuels*, Paris, 1955; JOHN K. GALBRAITH, *The Affluent Society*, New York, 1958; MAURICE DUVERGER, *De la dictature*, Paris, 1961; A. KOESTLER, *L'ombre du dinosaure*, Paris, 1956, see also in S.M. LIPSET, *Political Man*, cit., Ch. XIII, «The End of Ideology?», pp. 403-417; E.A. SHILS, «The End of Ideology?», *Encounter*, Nov. 1955, pp. 52-58, and *The Torment of Secrecy*, Glencoe, 1956, ch. 12, «Ideological Politics», pp. 231-238.

as Shils put it, seem to slide at times and *sensim sine sensu* back from the standpoint of sociological analysis into an attempt at persuasion. This becomes disturbingly apparent in the selective underlining of the positive aspects of specific economic, political and social situations and the relative neglect of other aspects which are equally real, in the nearly obsessive denunciation of dogmatism and lack of moderation, and in offering a compromise solution for any kind of problem. These compromise solutions, however, are not offered as such, but rather as if they were the only rational answer, something quite objectively imposed, as it were, by a substantial rationality which would have nothing to do with personal (ideological) principles of preference.

Meynaud takes as an outstanding example of this selective technique *The Affluent Society* by John K. Galbraith to show how only the rosy passages and the felicitous descriptions of American opulence are recalled and commented upon while the bitter pages in which, in a somewhat Veblenian mood, Galbraith writes about the conspicuous waste *vis-à-vis* the chronic deficiencies of elementary community services (housing, schools, hospitals) are usually subjected to a freudian evasion and neglected, if not altogether forgotten. According to its main contention — that the concentration on production will finally result in the pre-dominance of the productive sphere over and against capacity to consume to such an extent that the «affluent society» would have to invent imaginary needs to survive — the book is clearly mistitled unless it is meant to convey an idea of sinister irony. On the other hand, Galbraith is himself quite optimistic about the future and seems to enjoy his extraordinary gift for phrase-making, already apparent in his early work on *American Capitalism* and his quasi-proudhonian concept of «countervailing power», without feeling any urgency to go much beyond the paradox to find the possible structural causes at work behind the disconcerting and even amusing contradictions of an industrially advanced society. Simple, factual questions are left open: is it true that economic inequality is no longer a problem in an industrially advanced society and that, as a consequence, ideological passions have lost one of their important motives? Is it true that economic insecurity is no longer there, not even when a society is faced by rapid technological change making for radical and at times psychologically unacceptable retraining of vast sectors of the labor force? A broad and many-sided field for social research is here open to sociologists. The study of the specifically ideological components of the process of

social and cultural change would certainly help in the elaboration of an integrated theory of culture and its development¹⁴.

It could be, Meynaud goes on to suggest, that the thesis of the end of ideology is merely a tactical (ideological) move to discourage, as no longer necessary or practical, any attempt towards a structural change in society. It is only natural to expect that a suspicion of this kind would arouse the biblical anger of a social critic such as C. Wright Mills, who not only denies scientific dignity to the end-of-ideology point of view but sees it quite conspiratorially as a «weary know-it-all justification — by tone of voice rather than by explicit argument — of the cultural and political default of the NATO intellectuals¹⁵». Yet, what has happened to ideology in industrially developed societies should not be impossible to identify on a factual basis, both with regard to the ruling groups or «catégories dirigeantes» and to the employees or working classes. But the difficulty here begins with the very concept, and term, of industrial society. Can one speak of industrial society per se without making explicit reference to its «capitalistic» or «socialistic» or «mixed» nature? Is the term *industrial* by itself sufficient to differentiate it qualitatively from other historical types of society¹⁶?

5. Some sociologists, in Europe, in the United States, and in the Soviet Union, ask themselves somewhat melodramatically whether one can speak of «industrial society» or whether one should, more appropriately, speak of a «capitalist» society. In their opinion, the adjective «industrial» is not revealing, or sanguine enough. It necessarily implies a dilution of the ideological tension, making for a situation socially neutral and ideologically indifferent. It is an escape. According to this view, the term «industrial society» is adopted

¹⁴ There is a growing body of literature on change, social and cultural. Economists have in general recognized the impossibility of an exhaustive explanation of economic development in purely economic terms, but Everett E. Hagen is right when he laments that these are purely verbal admissions with no detectable consequences on research; cfr. E.E. HAGEN, *On the Theory of Social Change*, Homewood, 1962, p. 37. The fact is that, once the inadequacy of the economic explanation is recognized, the very autonomy of economics as a specific, self-sufficient discipline is in danger.

¹⁵ C. Wright Mills, «The New Left», *New Left Review*, 5, Sept.-Oct. 1960, now in *Power, Politics and People*, New York, 1964, p. 249; see also «The Conservative Mood», *op. cit.*, pp. 208-220.

¹⁶ Cfr. R. ARON, ed., *Colloques de Rheinfelden*, Paris, 1960, esp. Part II; and the remarks by Jeanne HERSCH on ARON's Report; cfr. also J. HERSCH, *Ideologies et réalité*, Paris, 1956.

more willingly by social scientists than such terms as «capitalist society» or «socialist society» simply to avoid the embarrassment of a clear-cut position and commitment¹⁷. The generic connotation of «industrial» would in particular blur the principal characteristics of a technically advanced society while neglecting its structural economic features in favor of the supposedly secondary, or purely concomitant aspects of its evolutionary process. Undoubtedly, the term «capitalist society» indicates more directly a social and economic situation in which private property is accepted and formally codified and power relationships among social groups and classes currently develop and are recognized and eventually disciplined as such.

There are other interesting or even crucial structural differences. In a capitalist society, surplus in the form of private profit is ultimately controlled and allocated by the owners of the means of production according to their principles of preference. In a socialist society, this function is performed by a central power which takes care of the social goals of production through a general plan in such a way that no specific, or partial, plan reflecting the needs of a given region or industrial sector should contradict the priority list determined at the national level. Under modern conditions, planning is no exclusive prerogative of the socialist society. Capitalist societies, Western democratic countries also are currently planning for economic development, especially for their underdeveloped areas. State intervention in the economic sphere is no longer a rare occurrence or an emergency measure. But it would be hasty and essentially incorrect, and it would probably amount to an «ideological lie,» to infer a basic convergence between «capitalist society» and «socialist society» in the name of the logic of industrial development. More research is needed along lines which can be only approximately indicated. Every country wants development and is ready to accept planning as a technique to achieve it. But Western democratic planning is largely indicative and sectional; it concerns those sectors which private enterprise does not seem to be able or willing to develop, usually because of scarce profit prospects; socialist planning is essentially nationwide; that is, global and rigid

¹⁷ For a balanced comment on the ideological bias of present-day social scientists in this regard, see T.B. BOTTOMORE, *Classes in Modern Society*, London, 1955; H.P. BAHRDT, *Industrie-bürokratie*, Stuttgart, 1958, *passim*. There is a host of criticism on the part of Soviet commentators about the so-called theory of a universal industrial society, post-capitalist and post-ideological; for a recent comment, see ZAMOSKI in *Kommunist*.

between the two systems, and they cannot be dismissed simply by saying that they are sectional in character¹⁹. Any social system tends to achieve a high degree of internal coherence whereby the reciprocal congruity of its component parts is assured. On the other hand, the rejection of the oversimplified theory of convergence as an end-product of an isomorphic tendency which is supposed to be mechanically at work independently of systematic and ideological differences does not mean that one should be blind to problems and situations which seem to be common to any developing society and which can reasonably be taken as the outcome of what is being sometimes romantically referred to as the logic of industrialism²⁰. Obviously, there is no abstract, timeless and placeless logic of industrialism. Industrial development is an historical phenomenon, the changing product of the concurrence of varying social forces in a given environment which in each specific case should be identified, analyzed and possibly explained. Hasty attempts toward building a formal analytical model usually end up with a more or less sophisticated rationalization of ideological preference²¹. It is interesting to observe in this connection that in their effort to construct deductively an analytical model of the logic of industrialism a group of distinguished American authors have simply forgotten to account for the existence of a politically organized and ideologically oriented labor movement in several countries which are in a stage of transition from a predominantly agrarian economy to an industrial way of life. Such a conspicuous absence reduces sharply the usefulness of the model. Stressing the importance of consensus in society and the cult of efficiency per se, and regarding management as some sort of *deus ex machina*, they have mirrored the historical situation of the United States and they have unconsciously offered it as the necessary path or the inevitable blueprint for the newly developing countries²².

¹⁹ See in this connection the structures by Raymond ARON, on Maurice DUVERGER in R. ARON, «Société industrielle, idéologies, philosophie,» *Preuves*; n. 167, Jan. 1965, esp. pp. 9-13.

²⁰ See, for instance, Clark KERR, John T. DUNLOP, Frederick HARBISON, Ch. A. MYERS, *Industrialism and Industrial Man*, Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, Ch. 2, «The Logic of Industrialism.»

²¹ For a redefinition of the belief that industrialization operates predominantly to undermine traditional societies, see H. BLUMER, «Industrialization and the Traditional Order», *Sociology of Social Research*, 48, 2, Jan. 1964, pp. 129-138.

²² Clark KERR, John T. DUNLOP, Frederick HARBISON, Ch. A. MYERS, *op. cit.*, pp. 42-44.

This is not to discount the validity of such attempts. They can be important and useful provided they do not «jump to conclusions,» as it were, through the one-sided idealization of a given determinant or of an isolated factor which would supply, *ex capite Jovis*, a passe-partout explanation for everything. No matter how naive, convergence theory has merit as a psychological symptom, as a testimony of the *Zeitgeist*²³. It reflects a common, if disturbing, experience. Societies with a different historical background, endowed with contrasting legal and economic systems, institutional machinery and value-orientation, appear to show increasingly analogous behavioral patterns as they adopt similar technological processes.

In order to distinguish one society from another, in particular a «socialist» society from a «capitalist» society, structural differences, concerning the formal codification of individual and group behavior as sanctioned by the legal system of a given country or bloc of countries, are necessary but not sufficient. Their insufficiency in this respect emerges with full evidence when we take into consideration, beyond the letter of laws and regulations and of ideological platforms, the actual day-to-day routine of social life, the specific daily instances of power allocation and the practical exercise of it, the concrete possibility of social equality and of individual and group mobility, the quality of the average relationship between citizen and institution. In other words, contrary to the passionate expectations of one century of ideological struggle, socialization of the means of production and exchange does not automatically produce socialization of power: it does not automatically lead to a social situation in which rational administration of things replaces domination over human beings and eliminates the inevitable consequences of such domination — preferential monetary rewards, a higher prestige, a higher ability to spend and to indulge into honorific consumption, a privileged position with regard to career pattern and social status for some restricted social groups. Under present-day conditions, terms such as «capitalist» or «socialist» society appear to be essentially inadequate unless one clings to the «vulgar» conception of Marxism whereby to a given structure, or *Unterbau*, of society would axiomatically correspond a given ideology and a personality structure, the famous «new man,» endowed with special values and incentives, who is, however, nowhere to be seen. These

²³ Interesting in this connection is Cyril A. ZEBOT, *The Economics of Competitive Coexistence - Convergence Through Growth*, New York, 1964.

formulas belong to the nineteenth century world of the *Weltanschauungen* and they are not likely to contribute substantially to the advance of our knowledge of present-day society. It is difficult on their basis to assess how, and how far, the impact of the technological frame affects culturally and structurally different societies which share the fact of having chosen the technical process and the machine discipline as an important instrument of their self-development.

Technical process, once adopted and applied to industrial production on a large scale, appears to be capable of social and human consequences which are far-reaching in scope and relevant in nature as they concern the prevailing type of personality, its main value orientations and its expectations, the structure and function of the family and of the small work group and the basis for legitimation of the relevant economic and political decisions. Any industrial manager, no matter in which society he is active, or whether he is a fully professional manager or a manager owner or co-owner of the business enterprise, or finally a public functionary with managerial prerogatives, acts in his managerial capacity according to a pattern in which four major steps are perfectly visible: information, decision, action, control. In a broader perspective, one may point to certain common features which seem to belong to any industrially advanced and technically developed society, be it socialist or capitalist, democratic or totalitarian, pluralistic or highly centripetal. There are general characteristics which seem to bind together modern societies, and which are perhaps responsible for an uncritical use of the notion of modernization. Without forgetting or blurring structural differences, ideological cleavages and historical background, the process of industrialization seems to provide a meeting ground for quite different countries, as for years Raymond Aron has tried most eloquently to show²⁴. But Wilbert Moore and Arnold Feldman have correctly criticized the simplifications which are now current in this respect²⁵. Certainly the notion of the decline of ideological enthusiasms does not seem to be applicable to the developing countries, as Shils had noted since 1955, and Bell himself recognizes the existence of nationalistic ideologies typical of African and Asian

²⁴ See, for some more nuancé restatements, R. ARON, *Dix-huit Leçons sur la société industrielle*, Paris, 1962.

²⁵ Cfr. «The Sociology of Development» in *Transactions of the Fifth World Congress of Sociology*, ed. ISA, Louvain, 1962.

countries today, but he quite readily points out that they do not entertain the universalistic and cosmopolitan character of their European XIX century counterparts²⁶.

6. There is no dearth of general studies of the «cultural foundations» of modern or industrial societies, both East and West, but we are far from having anything approaching a plausible well-rounded analysis of the ideology of industrialism in the tradition of the classical legacy of Smith, Saint-Simon, Marx and Weber. The gap concerning the place and role of ideology in the process of industrialization and the ideological attitude of the actors of that process is certainly a serious one. Despite different historical heritages and institutional setups, interesting convergences could probably be established as regards such major functions as entrepreneurship, labor commitment to industrial employment, and so on. A few attempts made to relate systematically a certain personality type to a given set of structural traits of the social system through the mediation of the prevailing habits of thought and value-orientations have ended in the lamentable confusion between analytical framework and specific historical content. (See notably Neil J. Smelser, *Social Change in the Industrial Revolution — An Application of Theory to the British Cotton Industry, 1770-1840*, Chicago, 1959). Notable contributions in this respect are the work of Reinhard Bendix (*Work and Authority in Industry — Ideologies of Management in the Course of Industrialization*, New York, 1956), and, with a widely different approach, of Francis X. Sutton, Seymour E. Harris, Carl Kaysen, James Tobin (*The American Business Creed*, Cambridge, 1956), David McClelland (*The Achieving Society*, New York, 1961), not to mention the breezy impressionistic portraits, stimulating, however, from a comparative point of view, by David Granick (*The European Executive*, New York, 1962; *The Red Executive*, New York, 1960)²⁷. Employees have been studied from various standpoints, usually in terms of their society image (like in Popitz and associates) or value orientation (as in Ely Chinoy with regard to the USA automobile work-

²⁶ With regard to contemporary nationalistic ideology, see the interesting article by R. GIRARDET, «Autour de l'idéologie nationaliste: perspective de recherches», *Revue Française de Science Politique*, XV, 3, Juin 1965, pp. 423-445.

²⁷ See the critical comment to D. GRANICK, *The Red Executive - A Study of the Organization Man in Russian Industry*, by V. DROBIZHEV, «On the Role of USSR Working Class in supplying Executive Personnel to socialist Industry», *Istoriia SSSR*, 4, april 1961.

ers)²⁸ and in terms of the personal and professional repercussions if the evolution of industrial machinery (A. Touraine; A. Pizzorno; S. Mallet). The structure of authority at the plant level has been explored from the ideology point of view by Polish sociologists (A. Matejko; A. Sarapata; H. Kowaleski, and others). The very concept of class still entertains the attention of French sociologists (see their meeting in Quebec, 1964, with R. Aron, «class as representation and will» (*la classe comme représentation et comme volonté*). One should also mention M. Kaplan, editor, *The Revolution in World Politics*, New York, 1962, and a number of European contributions related, rather scholastically, to the debate on Marxism, such as J. Habermas, *Theorie und Praxis*, and L. Sebag, *Marxisme et structuralisme*. Perhaps more rewarding are some studies of an historical nature: Rudé, *The Crowd in History*, New York, 1964, a study of political demonstrations and aggressive mob behavior in France and England during the years 1730-1848; Hill, *The Intellectual Origins of the English Revolution*; MacPherson, *The Political Philosophy of Possessive Individualism*; and Thompson, *The Making of the English Working Class*.

With regard to the specific problem of modernization and of the function of ideology in the developing countries, an outstanding contribution is the already mentioned *Ideology and Discontent* edited by David E. Apter and including studies by Leonard Binder (Egyptian and Islamic nationalism), Robert Scalapino (modern Japanese political thinking), Philip Converse (American public and politics) and others. Here it seems that the category «modernization» is used monodically to cover widely different historical contexts and ideological meanings. This is particularly evident in the essay by Scalapino. Clifford Geertz, dealing with ideology as a cultural system, appears to be much more articulate and actually takes into consideration also what could prove to be the most important aspect of ideology, that is its meaning as a particular linguistic structure. No mention is made in this connection of the work of Claude Lévy-Strauss, but Geertz refers to Kenneth Burke without, however trying to test the heuristic validity of Burke's notion of terms as having «entelechial» implications because language contains within itself a «principle of perfection»²⁹.

²⁸ E. CHINOY, *Automobile Workers and the American Dream*, New York, 1955.

²⁹ See esp. K. BURKE, *Rhetoric of Religion*.

Whereas Apter develops, in a lively and quite interesting manner, his main idea that ideology is somehow related to the ability or inability of a given society to satisfy the emulative ambition and its drive which, according to him, is present in every human being (If not a reedition of Thomas' four wishes theory, revised and perhaps simplified, this notion could appear as nothing more than a projection of American values on other societies and on different cultural settings), the concluding chapter of R. Bendix is, on the contrary, quite sensitive to the historical perspective and gives a useful account of the evolution of the concept of ideology. In connection with the problem of modernization, together with the reedition of *The Passing of Traditional Society*, by Daniel Lerner, a mention should be made of *The Urban Process* (New York, 1964) by Leonard Reissman, in which the author sees among the main components of modernization and urbanization the rise of nationalism as the dominating and unifying ideology, but the problem of the indicators for such components cannot be said to have been adequately solved, mainly because of lack of cross-cultural studies and in general because of missing data.

7. Meynaud, Mills, and the other critics of the end-of-ideology thesis react quite vivaciously to the derogatory connotation of the term «ideology» which is at least implicit in any attempt to theorize a post-ideological age. This is, however, a thoroughly familiar problem. One could contend that the whole history of the sociological analysis of ideology can be seen as an attempt to answer the question of how and on the basis of what criterion any given form of thought can evade the charge of being ideological. This question looms large and appears closely connected with the fact that the elusive problematic nature of ideology involves the sociological study of ideology itself. In other words, sociological conceptual frameworks and techniques are themselves relative to their own specific social and cultural contexts and have no basis for claiming a status of invariance or absolute objectivity in the sense of the natural sciences. In this perspective, the work of Marx is the obvious starting point for the sociological study of ideology. And even before Marx, Comte sets for himself the task of criticizing the competing ideologies of his time as radically inadequate to effect the necessary «social reorganization» and actually responsible for the intellectual confusion and anarchy of the day. Comte's attack is aimed simultaneously at three targets: the revolutionary ideology which aims at progress, but still on the basis of metaphysical preconceptions; the reactionary ideology which wants

at all costs to maintain the status quo and is therefore intimately contradictory; and, finally, the constitutionalist ideology because of its formal character which makes it incapable of satisfying the two basic needs of society — those of order and progress³⁰.

Comte's critique cannot, however, be regarded as an anticipation of Marx's demystification of the «German ideology». Marx's position is much more problematic and does not justify any interpretation in mechanistic terms. For Marx history is man-made and men are moved by ideas, to be sure not *in vacuo* but within specific contexts. In other words, the theory of the material conditioning of ideas does not exclude their importance, their *Umwälzende Praxis* (see in this connection Barth, *Wahrheit und Ideologie*). For Marx and Engels ideologies correspond to the need of man to understand nature and his social environment; this need is satisfied by different social groups in a different way. Thus ideologies are, on the one hand, super-structural productions and, on the other, distorted points of view, that is ideas which pretend to be of universal value while reflecting a sectional interest or class positions. In this sense, it is possible to regard Marx as the founder of the sociology of knowledge³¹.

But Marx's conception of ideology is hardly understandable, as Birnbaum aptly points out, without explicit reference to the inter-related concepts of alienation, mystification and reification. A mechanistic notion of marxism, for all its naiveté, can be politically expedient, as Antonio Gramsci has shown, to the extent in which it reinforces in the political activists the belief in the final victory. It is in the nature of a religion of the oppressed, a chiliastic promise. As regards the private, ideological myths fabricated by intellectuals without any reference to the social context or the political struggle, it is obvious for Gramsci that they are only idle *vues de l'esprit*, «lorianesimo», that is, an expression of intellectual irresponsibility.

There has been recently a revival of interest in the concept of «alienation» which has become a popular term to indicate any kind of subjective or objective maladjustment, but one can easily detect in most studies an uncritical reduction of the term to its existential, that is vaguely psychological, meaning which appears to be by definition beyond verification. The term should be first of all clarified in all its current meanings, and the use of it for social research

³⁰ A. COMTE, *Cours de philosophie positive*, ed. J. B. Baillièrre et Fils, Paris, 1864, vol. IV, p. 87.

³¹ Cfr. T.B. BOTTOMORE, ed., *Marx - Selected writings in Sociology and Social Philosophy*, London, 1961, *Introduction*, p. 24.

should be critically tested. Certainly one cannot dispute a priori the value of speculative considerations of alienation; the sociological determination and research of the phenomenon, however, are something different. Works such as the ones by J. Habermas (*Theorie und Praxis*) or H. Marcuse (*One-dimensional Man*) are certainly guided by a genuine concern with grasping the problem globally as a totality; the danger remains that dialectical impatience with empirical data and analytical research might simply lead to a merely verbal totality, that is, to a totality which is empty and which only in the case of J.P. Sartre, despite his typically nineteenth century equivocal terminology (see for instance *Le Patron..., l'Ouvrier...*, in *La Critique de la Raison dialectique*), could probably be saved on account of its literary suggestiveness.

In this respect, the effort made by Melvin Seeman is important at least so far as the distinction between the concept of alienation and other related concepts, such as self-estrangement, rather loosely used by Fromm and others, is concerned³². Basically, alienation means a loss and an exclusion — but of what and from what, and with respect to whom and whose aspirations? This determination in terms which should be more specific than the broad, philosophical category of alienation is essential to sociological analysis. Unfortunately this preliminary determination is usually not made explicit in most research dealing with alienation of individuals and groups. Usually both environmental conditions and culture, that is objective situations, and individual or group interests and values, that is subjective data, are inadequately defined and a restrictive concept of alienation as «individual feeling of uneasiness» emerges as almost inevitable³³. In general one could conclude that the use of the term

³² Cfr. M. SEEMAN, «On the Meaning of Alienation», *The American Sociological Review*, XIV, 1959, pp. 783-791; attention to the «rediscovery» of alienation not only in the United States was called, with his extraordinarily sensitive ear for intellectual fad, by Daniel Bell. Vittorio Rieser has pointed out that during the years 1936-1955 not one article on alienation was published in *The American Sociological Review*; since 1956 there seems to be a growing interest in this subject on the part of all the social science journals; see V. RIESER, «Il concetto di alienazione in sociologia», *Quaderni di Sociologia*, XIV, 2, aprile-giugno 1965, p. 156; cfr. also, Joseph GABEL, *La Fausse Conscience*, Paris, 1962. For «alienation» as meaninglessness of social culture, paving the way to totalitarian experiments, the classic work is Th. W. ADORNØ and associates, *The Authoritarian Personality*, New York, 1950.

³³ Cfr. for instance Jan HAJDA, «Alienation and Integration of Student Intellectuals», *The American Sociological Review*, XXVI, 1961, pp. 758-777;

alienation should be discouraged as regards sociological analysis.

8. It would certainly be of interest to follow through the evolution of Marx's concept of ideology with its correlates (alienation, reification, and mystification) centering the attention on the work of Lukàcs seen, as Lichtheim suggests, as a mediating link between Weber and Mannheim. But we must content ourselves with sketchy indications. Marxian categories can be very useful, as generally enriching factor as well as a source of heuristic insights, provided they are no longer taken and dealt with as philosophical concepts. They must be translated, as it were, into specific research tools, that is to say into operational concepts. We have seen that Melvin Seeman, for instance, has broken down the concept of alienation which has in Marx a characteristically philosophic usage, into five sociologically relevant categories (powerlessness, meaninglessness, normlessness, isolation, self-estrangement). These categories constitute a step forward and are necessary, but not sufficient. The structure of sociological explanation requires not only general categories but in the first place definite sets of terms and propositions specifically related to the phenomena to be explained or understood. This seems to be an essential prerequisite if one is to avoid the curious and all too frequent confusion between the construction of social theory and a purely mechanical model-building ability.

Berger and Pullberg have successfully subjected to an analogous treatment the Marxian category of reification which they conceive as the moment in the process of alienation in which the characteristic of thing-hood becomes the standard of objective reality³⁴. In fact they argue that, if socialization has been only to an extent successful, then the individual acts within the socially prescribed channels with a minimum of reflectiveness. That is, he is integrated. But such integration is never complete and *für ewig*, as utopian social systems, which pay for their perfection the high price of immobility, would have it³⁵. Alienation and sociation are in reality linked processes.

also D.G. DEAN, «Meaning and Measurement of Alienation», *The American Sociological Review*, XXVI, 1961, pp. 753-757; for an exception, although methodologically inadequate in some respects, see G. BONAZZI, *Alienazione e anomia nella grande industria*, Milan, 1963.

³⁴ Cfr. Peter BERGER and Stanley PULLBERG, «Reification and the Sociological Critique of Consciousness», *History and Theory*, IV, 2, 1965, pp. 196-211.

³⁵ On the concept of system, for a strong and well-taken emphasis on its character of «social myth... (giving) the individuals a sense of being integrated into something stable and supportive», see Alfred McCLUNG LEE,

Human beings are both historical and meta-historical. At the very moment in which they perceive themselves and their destiny as purely historical, their ideologies, that is to say the meaning-systems supporting their day-to-day behavior and giving sense of direction and purpose to their daily experience, are likely to go to extremes, to become «mad virtues» which have lost everything except the ability to abstract reasoning³⁶.

In this sense, sociology itself is involved and its relationship with ideology forces it to clarify its own position and orientation. Berger and Pullberg point out that «sociology has the tendency either to be a narrow empiricism oblivious of its own theoretical foundations or to build highly abstract theoretical systems emptied of empirical content. Both these directions take sociology away from that everyday life which is supposed to be the subject of the discipline. Sociology too is super-structure, ... That is, sociology is grounded in the pulsating intersubjectivity of the real world of men. The de-humanization of sociology in either of the above-mentioned directions not only results in a pomposity as abstruse as anything the philosophers might conceivably produce, but marks the point at which sociology has lost its own subject»³⁷. These points, which have been made by several scholars and have become almost popular, should not be understood as a plea against the diversity of themes and of approaches to the study of human problems and social situations. Especially in the case of C. Wright Mills, it seems that his distinction between «individuals and private milieux», as being unworthy of the study of «intellectual workers», and «structures» or «larger issues», as a proper study object for the sociologist, is too sweeping and fundamentally biased³⁸. It betrays the nearly total absence of that enlargement of vision which comes with a sense of the manifold ways in which intelligence can be exercised, the sense

«The Concept of System», *Social Research*, 32, 3, Autumn 1965, pp. 229-238.

³⁶ See in this respect the remarks by Albert CAMUS, *L'homme révolté*, Paris, 1951; Camus denies that man's nature is totally historical, but on the other hand he admits that whatever man does is bound to be historical; there is no evasion from history; Camus' critique of modern ideologies as ignoring the Greek ideal of «measure» (μεδὲν ἄγαν) is suggestive, but his reduction of Aeschylus to some sort of disciple of Edmund Burke is less convincing. See also Richard H. COX, «Ideology, History and Political Philosophy Camus' *L'Homme Révolté*», *Social Research*, 32, 1, Spring 1965, pp. 71-97.

³⁷ P. BERGER and S. PULLBERG, *cit.*, p. 211.

³⁸ See especially C. WRIGHT MILLS, *The Sociological Imagination*, New York, 1959; *passim*; in this respects, at least, Mills shows a lack of imagination.

of the variety of forms both morality and intelligence can take in the life of the mind. This is not said to convey the idea that everything goes provided it delivers results. There are profound qualitative differences both in method and in substance which make for a contrast between a dialectically oriented sociology and sociological studies empirically and analytically inclined³⁹. But the necessity for a critical determination of the concepts to be used in sociological research is certainly common, especially as regards the concept of ideology and its correlates. As the efforts by Melvin Seeman and Berger seem to demonstrate, this is a fruitful approach and one which could perhaps be used in a critical reinterpretation of such authors as Karl Mannheim and Vilfredo Pareto who could be seen essentially and, in my opinion, correctly, as critics of ideological thinking and attitude.

In the case of Mannheim, his distinction between ideology and utopia would probably reveal its purely formal character and some of the major shortcomings of his position would become apparent, in particular that peculiar *petitio principii* of his consisting in positing as a general postulate the existential determination of knowledge, *quod erat demonstrandum*. The postulate that every rationale is of necessity an ideology puts him in a difficult position and the strictures of Gustav Bergmann are well taken: «If this proposition that every rationale is an ideology is itself objectively true, how can he know it? If it is not, why should we pay attention to it? And what in particular is the value of a social science thus construed?⁴⁰». The answer of Mannheim is known: in a stratified society intellectuals enjoy some sort of extraterritorial immunity, as it were; they do not belong to any social class in particular: actually they circulate rather freely among the various social groups, they tend to be more broad-minded than the average, and by this very fact they are in a position to see the distorted ways of thinking of other people and explain them away. It would be difficult to prove this point having resort to specific research. Studying Veblen's career, thinking and attitude, Walter P. Metzger has demonstrated, or has at least argued plausibly,

³⁹ For a clear restatement of such differences, see Jürgen HABERMAS, «Gegen einen positivistisch halbierten Rationalismus - Erwiderung eines Pamphlets», *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie*, XVI, 4, 1964, pp. 635-659; it is a rebuttal to the article by H. ALBERT, «Der Mythos der totalen Vernunft», which had appeared in the n.2 issue of the same Journal.

⁴⁰ Cfr. G. BERGMANN, *cit.*, p. 213.

that «however he(Veblen) may have seen himself, Veblen's social goal was to weave the latent evolving attitudes of his group into an ideology that would attract adherents and compel attention»⁴¹. In fact, «as a disabused intellectual he lashed out at the tenets of the dominant ideology: at the nationalistic pretensions that fettered the free flow of ideas, at the invidious aping of leisure class manners that puts a premium on material display and useless information. As an isolated intellectual, he rejected farmer, small businessman and worker as not possessing the *qualities of mind* necessary to effect beneficial changes. It is probable that Veblen in his own mind was not aware of the ideological function he performed. ... The transformation of the group's need into the individual's thought is a subtle process not always known to the thinker»⁴².

This kind of analysis would probably yield more copious results than the speculative elaborations about the «particular» conception and the «total» conception of ideology which Mannheim develops at length and which does not seem to amount to anything different from the opposition between ideology and the sociology of knowledge, that is to say between the distorted view of a specific content and the distortion of methodological framework and concepts. It would be, at any rate, difficult to deny any ground to the disappointment voiced by K. Danziger: «Since the publication of Mannheim's major contributions to the sociology of knowledge the discrepancy between their epistemological promise and their actual fruit in terms of empirical research has become more and more striking»⁴³.

The importance of Mannheim's contribution exceeds, however, the scope of methodological considerations, as Kurt H. Wolff has amply demonstrated in his excellent introduction to the selected writings on

⁴¹ Cfr. Walter P. METZGER, «Ideology and the Intellectual: a Study of Thorstein Veblen», *Philosophy of Science*, 16, 1949, p. 133.

⁴² *Ibidem*. The problem of the intellectual in an industrial society as of a man threatened by technological unemployment due to the growing specialization of the social functions has attracted considerable attention with highly uneven results. Cfr. William MACDONALD, *The Intellectual Worker and his Work*, New York, 1924; R. WILLIAMS, *Culture and Society*, London, 1958; Jean TOUCHARD, editor, «Les intellectuels dans la société contemporaine», *Revue Française de Science Politique*, déc. 1959; N. BOBBIO, *Politica e cultura*, Turin, 1955; G.B. DE HUSZAR, ed., *The Intellectuals - a Controversial Portrait*, Glencoe, 1960; R. WILLIAMS, *The Long Revolution*, London, 1961; Lewis A. COSER, *Men of Ideas*, New York, 1965.

⁴³ K. DANZIGER, «Ideology and Utopia in South Africa: a Methodological Contribution to the Sociology of Knowledge», *The British Journal of Sociology*, XIV, 1, March, 1963, p. 59.

«sociology of knowledge»⁴⁴. His seminal ideas on scientific politics and democratic planning and on the role of the social sciences as potential «policy sciences» are well known and go a long way beyond Lukacs standpoint that the knowledge that a being has of himself is not science but consciousness, contrary to the opinion put forth by L. Goldmann⁴⁵.

It is in Pareto that we have the pure opposition between science and ideology. In this sense, that is as a critic of ideological thinking, it seems correct to place Pareto side by side with Marx; they both try to «unmask», to see what lies behind the «ideological superstructures», that is behind the «derivations» with which people rationalize their instinctual drives and their special interests⁴⁶. But the ideological preferences underlying the «scientific» thinking of Pareto himself have been keenly examined and made explicit, especially with regard to the elaboration of the concept of «élite» and «élite circulation», by Thomas B. Bottomore⁴⁷. The methodological weaknesses of Pareto, on the other hand, have been quite effectively handled by Werner Stark⁴⁸. It would be interesting to see how much of Pareto's thinking about «ideologies» — a term which never appears in the *Trattato di Sociologia generale*, but which could be properly used for all those forms of non-scientific theories presenting in a highly theoretical or abstract jargon moral and political programs — has been taken over by Talcott Parsons. It seems that the parsonian distinction between ideas, or belief-systems, of an empirical character and of a non-

⁴⁴ See K. MANNHEIM, *Wissenssoziologie*, Berlin and Neuwied, 1964; Introduction by Kurt H. WOLFF, Karl Mannheim in seinen Abhandlungen bis 1933», pp. 11-65.

⁴⁵ L. GOLDMANN, *Sciences humaines et philosophie*, Paris, 1953, p. 29; see also, F. LEONARDI, «Sociologia della conoscenza e pianificazione sociale», *Rassegna Italiana di Sociologia*, I, 2, April-June 1960, pp. 25-44; R. TREVES, «Interpretazioni sociologiche del fascismo», *Occidente*, 6, 1953, pp. 371-391; E.S. BOGARDUS, «Mental Processes and Democracy», *Sociology and Social Research*, 41, Nov.-Dec., 1956, pp. 125-132.

⁴⁶ See esp. N. BOBBIO, «V. Pareto e la critica delle ideologie», *Rivista di Filosofia*, 1957, pp. 355 ff.; for a recent reappraisal, James H. MEISEL, editor, *Pareto and Mosca*, Englewood Cliffs, 1965, G. EISERMANN, *Vilfredo Pareto's System der allgemeinen Soziologie*, Stuttgart, 1962; for a descriptive examination, see Morris GINSBERG, «The Sociology of Pareto», *The Sociological Review*, XXVIII, 3 July 1936, pp. 221-245.

⁴⁷ See T.B. BOTTOMORE, *Elites and Society*, London, 1964, esp. ch. I, «The Elite: Concept and Ideology», pp. 1-17.

⁴⁸ Cfr. W. STARK, «In Search of the True Pareto», *The British Journal of Sociology*, XIV, June 1963, pp. 103-112.

empirical character reflects the distinction which Pareto draws between theories which transcend and theories which do not transcend experience. For Pareto the experience-transcending theories are by definition pseudo-theories, that is theories non-scientific and devoid of any cognitive value; they are programs of action, not tools of knowledge. Parsons, on the contrary, does not exclude the cognitive value of meta-empirical or non-empirical theories. Thus, ideology becomes in Parsons an important instrument of «justification» and «legitimation» of change in the institutional structures to insure a norm-directed integration of the community. The connection between value and ideology is therefore of fundamental importance⁴⁹.

But the problem with the social theory of Parsons is well known: there is no place in it for conflict and change, the emphasis and the attention of the writer being absorbed by the classical issues of *order* and *integration* in society (consensus; social contract).

9. Specific studies of ideological thinking and acting are growing in number and the areas of empirical study of ideology (such as the special outlook and orientation of class positions within the social structure and occupational groups, political activities and organizations in the developing countries and in the advanced industrial societies, intellectuals and student culture, mass communication, personality motivation) seem to be practically limitless⁵⁰. But there is a price for this varied landscape. The term «ideology» is used in a shifting and imprecise way. As such it points to something sociologically amorphous and, from a research point of view, it becomes useless if not misleading. *Omnis determinatio nulla definitio*. At times ideology seems to be simply equated with ideas and ideals, as a moving historical force. At times it amounts to nothing more than a manipulative device to win and structure the loyalty and to mobilize the energy of masses of human beings. It is quite natural that

⁴⁹ For the ideological implications of the parsonian position, see Andrew HACKER, «Sociology and Ideology», in Max Black, editor, *The Social Theories of Talcott Parsons*, Englewood Cliffs, 1961, pp. 289-310.

⁵⁰ See, for instance, H. McCLOSKEY, «Consensus and Ideology in American Politics», *The American Political Science Review*, LVIII, 2, 1964, pp. 361-382; J.P. HUNTINGTON, «Conservatism as an Ideology», *The Am. Pol. Sci. Review*, LI, June 1957, pp. 454-473; R.E. LANE, *Political Ideology*, New York, 1962; V.K. DIBBLE, «Occupations and Ideologies», *The Am. Journal of Sociol.*, LXVIII, 2, Sept. 1962, pp. 229-241; F.W. HOWTON, B. ROSENBERG, «The Salesman: Ideology and Self-imagery in a Prototypic Occupation», *Social Research*, Autumn 1965, 3, pp. 277-298; S.M. LIPSET, «University Students and Politics in Underdeveloped Countries», *Minerva*, III, 1, 1964, pp. 15-56.

for the sociologists, to indulge in a *bon mot*, it all depends whether they have their revolution in front or in back of them. Correspondingly, ideology can be regarded either as a merely mystifying mask or as an official doctrine which reveals the true direction of historical development. A suggestive field of study for sociologists who are not a priori either pro-Soviet or pro-American could be the attempt to detect the factual propositions in the ideological systems or doctrines, to identify the relatively permanent characteristics of ideological groups and organizations, to understand and to spell out the conditions making for the development of ideological thinking and conduct, and finally to outline the eventual functions of sociology with respect to ideology.

Not much has been done along these lines. Frederick M. Watkins has pointed out three characteristic features of modern ideology, namely optimism, oversimplification, and belief in progress. In general he sees ideology as essentially connected with the breaking down of the traditional political and social order as a means to face the unprecedented problems and opportunities posed by an age of growing mass participation in politics⁵¹. The mobilizing and militancy aspect of ideologies is also stressed by Carl J. Friedrich as essential. According to Friedrich, ideologies are action-related systems of ideas. From this point of view, ideologies are not only setting goals; they imply also the necessity of an organizational structure to reach them and the elaboration of a strategy and a tactics for practical action to implement them. Friedrich criticizes the indiscriminate use of the term ideology in its broad connotation: «it is confusing and fails to provide the opportunity for political analysis to call any system of ideas an ideology, such as the philosophy of Aristotle or the theology of the Old Testament. Such systems *may* provide the *basis* for an ideology, but only after being related to action in a specific sense and for a specific situation»⁵².

But how does ideology finally emerge? And what are the characteristics of specifically ideological groups? Can they be subsumed under the traditional label of primary, face-to-face groups, characterized by a high degree of internal cohesion and close personal

⁵¹ Frederick M. WATKINS, *The Age of Ideology*, Englewood Cliffs, 1964, *passim*.

⁵² Carl J. FRIEDRICH, *Man and his Government - An Empirical Theory of Politics*, New York, p. 89, italics in the text. See also Carl J. FRIEDRICH, and Zbigniew K. BRZEZINSKI, *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy*, Cambridge, 1956, esp. Ch. III, «The Nature and Role of Ideology».

feelings of the *Gemeinschaft* variety, or should they be dealt with in their own terms?

Accounts of the rise and subsequent development of ideological movements show the tendency to personalize the issues through the emphasis on the charismatic qualities of the leaders⁵³. As regards the specific characteristics of ideological groups, sociological analysis seems in the main still confined to the usual and mostly mechanistic dichotomies *Gemeinschaft* versus *Gesellschaft*, structure versus motivation, personal versus functional, and so on, as if social process would develop and move like a train on its railways tracks from one station to the next one. In this connection, the pioneering effort by Vladimir C. Nahirny has a special relevance⁵⁴. Refusing to throw everything into the logically exclusive categories mentioned above, Nahirny tries in fact to identify the basic components of ideological orientation and to show how they differ from personal and functional ones. In the first place, ideological orientation is *total*; secondly, it is *dichotomous*; thirdly, it precludes seeing an individual as a composite of personal ascribed qualities and performances, and finally, in the fourth place, ideological orientation precludes a direct affective disposition toward human beings. The translation of these components into empirically relevant propositions, difficult as it is, would indubitably result in a set of more refined tools for social analysis.

10. It would be interesting at this point to study an ideological system in action through a detailed analysis of the relationship between ideology and sociology in the Soviet Union. In fact, here perhaps more directly than anywhere else ideology faces its *experimentum crucis*, and the limitations of ideological dogmatism, when confronted with the problems of day-to-day administration and the realities of power, become apparent. Not to mention the intrinsic difficulty, the introductory nature of these remarks makes us content with some very general indications.

The slow, uneven and generally difficult development of sociology in the Soviet Union and in other Eastern European countries is a well-known fact which goes back to the government decree of 1922 on the basis of which sociology, hardly accepted into the academic world with the February Revolution, was again excluded from the universities, with the exception of the chair of sociology at the University

⁵³ Cfr. Barrington MOORE, JR., *Soviet Politics - the Dilemma of Power*, Cambridge, 1950, esp. Part One, Ch. I, «How an Ideology emerged».

⁵⁴ Vladimir C. NAHIRNY, «Some Observations on Ideological Groups», *The American Journal of Sociology*, LXVII, 4, January 1962, pp. 397-405.

of Moscow which lasted until 1924⁵⁵. The process of transformation of traditional sociology into the Marxist-Leninist «scientific» sociology has been recently described by Henri Lefebvre who does not, however, take into consideration pre-Revolution sociology and sees the beginning of the involution with Stalin's advent to power⁵⁶. Stalin's political apparatus, which successfully replaced the old-time militants with State bureaucrats, certainly played a decisive role, especially crucial in the days of the personality cult, but the transition and the final conversion of sociological analysis into the *Diamat* were made possible, much earlier, by the work of Plekhanov and by Lenin's concept of the revolutionary party with its typical priority of action theory over and against theory-reality⁵⁷.

The thesis put forward by H. Lefebvre does not contradict the official position taken at the present time by Soviet sociologists. According to G. Osipov and M. Yovchuk, it is true that the personality cult of Joseph Stalin slowed down the progressive advancement of concrete social research in some measure in the Soviet Union. The program of social research outlined by these authors is quite impressive and touches on the following problems: 1) The alternation of the social, structure of society in the process of building Communism; 2) Modifications in the character of work; 3) The transfer of Socialist State functions to public self-governing organizations; 4) Soviet family life and functions in relation to living space and material and

⁵⁵ For accounts about pre-Soviet sociology, see H. BECKER, and H. BARNES, *Social Thought from Lore to Science*, New York, ed. 1961, vol. III, pp. 1029-1059; also, for «Soviet Sociology», see the chapters on «Russian Sociology» in G. Gurvitch, and W.E. MOORE, eds, *Twentieth Century Sociology*, New York, 1945, J. Roucek, ed., *Contemporary Sociology*, New York, 1958; for the populist background of Russian traditional sociology, see J. HECKER, *Russian Sociology A Contribution to the History of Sociological Thought and Theory*, New York, 1934.

⁵⁶ Cfr. H. LEFEBVRE, «Les cadres sociaux de la sociologie marxiste», *Cahiers Internationaux de sociologie*, XXVI, Jan. 1959.

⁵⁷ About the *Diamat*, for a western comment see G. WETTER, *Der Dialektische Materialismus*, Freiburg, 1952; J. BOCHENSKI, *Der Sowjetrussische Dialektische Materialismus*, Berne, 1950; *Die Dogmatischen Grundlagen der Sowjetischen Philosophie*, Dordrecht, 1959; for a recent contribution on Lenin, see A. MEYER, *Leninism*, New York, 1962; see also the review of this book by S. VISHIEVSKY, in *Pravda*, May 23, 1963, p. 3. For general recent contributions, see Zbigniew K. BRZEZINSKI, *Ideology and Power in Soviet Politics*, New York, 1962, esp. Ch. 3, «The Nature of the Soviet System», and Ch. 4, «Communist Ideology and International Affairs»; John A. ARMSTRONG, *Ideology, Politics and Government in the Soviet Union*, New York, 1962.

social conditions; 5) The spiritual life of the people and the maximum development of personality⁵⁸.

There is no doubt that on some of these topics a broad convergence of research interests could materialize as regards both Soviet and Western sociology. Equally definite is the fact Soviet sociologists tend to view Western non-marxist sociology through the coloured glass of ideological dogma, but the very progress of Soviet society makes it compulsory to adopt non-ideological research techniques and to go to the empirical facts of life if for no other reason than to satisfy, through timely, circumscribed and reliable information and data, the need to control the occurring social and cultural changes⁵⁹. In this connection, especially as regards the autonomy of sociological analysis, which should not be definition subordinate to ideological dogma, some interesting dissenting opinion has been voiced among Soviet social scientists⁶⁰. But the evolution from ideology as a mobilizing instrument to ideals as a shared conscious heritage indicates a long and difficult process whose final success rests on the ability and willingness, East and West, to face each issue and situation with intellectual clarity and free from artificial pessimism or optimism⁶¹.

⁵⁸ See G. OSIPOV, M. YOVCHUK, «Some Principles of Theory, Problems and Methods of Research in Sociology in the U.S.S.R.», *American Sociological Review*, 28, 4, August 1963, pp. 620-623.

⁵⁹ For an admission, see L. LABEDZ, «Sociology as a Vocation», *Survey*, 49, July 1963, for the usual presentation of Western, especially American, sociology, see G. ANDREEVA, «The Efforts of the Bourgeois Empirical Sociology to find a Way out of Its Crisis», *Filosofskie Nauki*, 5, 1962; N. NOVIKOV, «Contemporary American Capitalism and the Action Theory of T. Parsons», *Voprosy Filosofii*, XVII, March 3, 1963; editorial in *Kommunist*, Jan. 2, 1963, «In Search of a Sociological Theory».

⁶⁰ Cfr. G. KARAVAEV, «Historical Materialism and Concrete Sociological Research», *Vestnik Leningradskogo Universiteta, Seria Ekonomiki, Filosofii i Prava*, XVII, 11, Nov. 1962, in which the author criticizes Rutkevich and Kogan, and indirectly oldtime party leaders who seem to advocate and accept concrete social research only in terms of «an application of historical materialism to the investigation of concrete phenomena».

⁶¹ For some recent impressions concerning topics of common interest, see T. PARSONS, «An American Impression of Sociology in the Soviet Union», *American Sociological Review*, 30, 1, February 1965, pp. 121-125.

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SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL ANTHROPOLOGY

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The distinction between sociology and social anthropology is itself a social rather than a logical one. In other words, the distinction can best be understood not by looking at some neat dividing line in the subject matter of the disciplines or in their method, but in the concrete, and hence untidy, factors which operated in various times and places to cause people to class themselves as 'sociologists' and as 'social anthropologists'. This is highlighted by the fact that this distinction, and similar distinctions, are drawn differently in different countries. If the facts or logic of the case imposed the distinction, one should expect it to be drawn similarly in most places. To say this is not to claim that there is no logical content at all to the distinction: merely that, as so often, logical, pragmatic, opportunist and accidental factors all contribute to the drawing of a distinction between two groups of people.

What are the logical or substantive elements in the differentiation? What are the various watersheds along which the frontier is or has been located? I shall list a few obvious ones.

The first distinction which springs to mind is the contrast Advanced/Primitive. This is certainly the first rule of thumb by means of which one distinguishes the concerns of sociologists from those of anthropologists. Nevertheless, it gives rise to formidable difficulties, both theoretical and practical, if it were to be treated as an internationally recognised frontier. The practical difficulty is this: anthropologists do not cease to be anthropologists, in their own estimation or that of others, when they study, for instance, middle-class kinship in London and Chicago. At a pinch, villages in Western Ireland, Wales or Italy, or even the working classes of industrial cities, could be classed as a kind of honorary savage. But middle-class professional families?

The theoretical objection can be formulated, in simplest terms, as follows: the classification of societies into advanced and primitive, or more elaborate versions of such a classification, presuppose at the very least a tacit acceptance of an evolutionist view of human

societies. What happens if such a schema is rejected? Any workable definition of the subject must surely refrain from prejudging the truth or falsity of theories *within* the subject. Are not anthropologists (or, for that matter, sociologists) entitled to reject evolutionism?

Of course, one might attempt to make the delimitation concrete and specific, and consequently free from attachment to any evolutionist doctrine of 'stages' of unilineal development. One might draw the line between large and small societies, or between complex and simple. But the small societies which concern the anthropologists are sometimes disconcertingly complex, and at least one reasonably interesting theory of modern society («Mass Society») makes it out to be simple, at least to the extent of being composed of similar elements. Moreover, anthropologists do not lose interest in a community when it is incorporated, politically or otherwise, in a worldwide social network.

Could it be claimed that anthropologists are concerned with societies as totalities, whereas sociological researchers isolate various *aspects* of society? There are various factors which point in this way. Anthropologists are able to concern themselves with a whole society when that society is small, and they are *obliged* to do so when that society is previously relatively unknown, so that the characterisation of any one aspect of it requires at least the sketching in of the rest of that society. Sociological researchers *cannot* do this in large complex societies, and *need not* do so in as far as some general knowledge of society can be taken for granted. Moreover, anthropologists have recently been less inclined to do comparative work, and hence had less need to isolate 'aspects' for comparison, whereas sociologists, when theorising at all, have had to do this. Despite all this, one could nevertheless not draw a definitive boundary here. A typical anthropological thesis is also concerned with specific aspects of a society; and sociologists sometimes attempt to see a society globally, and the most all-embracing and global of theorists have counted as 'sociologists'.

Perhaps one should attempt to differentiate the two disciplines in terms of their attitude to time? For many people outside sociology and for a few within it, the paradigm of a sociological theory is still an account of 'stages'; whereas what characterises many anthropologists is the preference for the synchronic method. But although I shall have a good deal more to say about this crucial question of time, clearly no such simple frontier can be drawn here either. It would

condemn sociologists who are evolutionists, or anti-evolutionists, to the wrong side of the frontier, and it would ignore the quite effective efforts of anthropologists to deal with change over time.

One might at times be tempted to see the distinction not in the kind of theory employed, but in the attitude to theory as such or in terms of its very presence or absence: one might be led to this by the manner of speaking adopted by some anthropologists, who distinguish between ethnography and sociology and mean by the latter the general, theoretical conclusions drawn from field observation. But again, this will not do. Heaven knows, there are untheoretical sociologists too.

Or, again, one might be tempted to seek the distinction in the type of method employed. Anthropology suggests above all field work, participation, intensive pursuit of the social reality under the social appearance and a careful mapping of both, a pursuit of latent functions. Sociology suggests extensive rather than intensive research, general observation, comparison. But it is hardly necessary to repeat that, once again, this cannot give us an acceptable boundary.

One might say that a different contrast underlies the two disciplines. Sociology is born above all from preoccupation with social change within Europe, from an attempt to understand how the European present and future arose from the European past. Anthropology, on the other hand, was born of the contact between Europeans and others, and the question is not «how did we emerge from our ancestors», but rather «how did they get left behind or diverge from our path?»

Anthropology was born of the interest in the contrast between western and savage man. Sociology was born of the contrast between the present and the past of western man. This highlights the somewhat paradoxical fact that anthropology began by being *more*, not less, past-oriented than sociology. Present academic social structure bears witness to this: in university curricula, anthropologists are still often linked with archaeologists. Anthropologists were differentiable from sociologists even before the days in which this differentiation was conceived in terms of the cult of field work: but in the early days, the differentiation was in terms of a concern with the distant past as opposed to a closer past (in both a literal and a geographical sense). Of course, when the concern with primitive societies as surrogate time-machines was replaced by concern with them as exemplars of social structure as such, officially this preoccupation disappeared: but it is still there, somewhere in the back-

ground. Since the Second World War, of course, both these two contrasted contrasts were replaced by one all-embracing one, that between modern industrial society on the one hand, and *both* 'feudal' and 'pre-industrial' and 'oriental' civilization, *and* tribal societies, on the other. This strikingly illustrates one of my main points — perhaps an obvious one — that the contrast with which we are concerned is not merely not a neat one, but also a highly unstable one: it fluctuates in time and place, according to background intellectual doctrine, and according to general social preoccupations.

There used to be a joke to the effect that whereas in Oxford, dons were preoccupied only with what past thinkers had taught, in Cambridge they were preoccupied with the teaching of Cambridge dons in the recent three decades. The truth actually is that whereas in Cambridge they are preoccupied with the teaching of Cambridge thinkers in the past three decades, in Oxford they are preoccupied with the teaching of Oxford dons in the past two years. Some similar dialectic exists perhaps between sociology and anthropology. The distance of the horizons, the range of concern, the centre of intellectual gravity has shifted, expanded, shrunk and varied, and though this question of the temporal horizon is crucial, no simple characteristic of it will do justice to the facts. Nor is there anything regrettable in the changes which have occurred.

It is not, then, in some neat distinction of subject or method, or even in a less than neat conjunction of such distinctions, that we must seek the boundary, but in the actual social structure, ethos and history of the two disciplines, and this moreover will vary from country to country. From actual observation, I can only speak concerning Britain or a part of it. In Britain, it is or was relatively easy to distinguish an anthropologist from a sociologist, though possibly the differences between one kind of a sociologist and another are even greater than those which separate both of them from anthropologists. But just *this* is the crucial distinction: the valid joke in Britain is that the two disciplines mirror the type of society with which, in the popular imagination, they are associated. Anthropologists study tribal societies and they are a tribe; sociologists study anomic modern societies, and they are notoriously and excessively anomic. Anthropologists have a coherent and cohesive tradition and a great deal of similarity in training and outlook. Sociologists come in all shapes and sizes, and some are so far removed from each other that they do not even engage in any sustained dialogue, or sometimes any dialogue at all.

If, then, no neat boundary separates the two subjects, one should nevertheless be able to distinguish and characterise the two cultures, the sociological and anthropological: but the characterisation will have no universal validity, either in time or in space. The only characterisation I can offer is based on observation of the two disciplines in Britain in the recent past. Sociologists are still in a heroic age: no consensus, no central authority, and the populace affiliates itself to heroic figures who, each of them, can carve their own intellectual principality. By contrast, anthropologists enjoy a consensus and a moral community which knows how to impose its norms on its members. They have a fairly stable internal segmentation.

What are those norms? The 'structural-functional' method, and a certain shared attitude to time. I shall say more of these, and I shall not dwell on the familiar matter of homogeneous recruitments, initiation by field work and so forth, with which one would have to be concerned if one wished to explain the precise social mechanism by which those norms are imposed and maintained, by means of which they are internalised, by means of which each individual anthropologist acquires a deep inner investment in the traditional approach which ensures that he is sufficiently like his fellows to communicate with them easily and to produce comparable and hence reasonably cumulative work.

First of all: *time*.

Modern anthropology springs from Malinowski and is characterised by a synchronic attitude towards the interpretation of society. Simplifying: earlier anthropology was distinguished by a greater concern with the past, and a preoccupation with a more distant past, whereas modern anthropology is characterised by a disregard of the past.

Now I happen to be fully aware that this is a gross simplification, and moreover one which is by now vehemently repudiated by many anthropologists, including some who have earned the right to speak with authority about their own subject. Nevertheless, the simplification contains an important truth, and it seems to me that the qualifications and repudiations which have been made are the *wrong kind* of qualification and repudiation. I know that one distinguished anthropologist has defined his subject as a kind of history¹, and that another one has carefully demonstrated how patiently and attentively

¹ Cf. Evans-Pritchard, *Essays in Social Anthropology*, 1962, Essays 2 and 3.

anthropologists do look at the past of the societies which they interpret². Notwithstanding all this, and for reasons which will be stated, I think that the synchronic approach is the correct starting point for understanding what is really happening in the discipline.

The first point which it is necessary to make is that the manifest and latent reasons given for the synchronic approach are not identical. By manifest reasons I mean those which were actually given in so many words; by latent reasons I mean those underlying reasons which are, first of all, valid (in my view), and which also through their cogency and validity had the effective consequence of making anthropological research so very fruitful, effective and cumulative, and which consequently sustained the application of the method. I trust that it is as legitimate to apply distinction between latent and manifest function to anthropologists, as it is legitimate for them to apply it to the peoples they investigate. But it is worth stressing that my notion of the 'latent', in this context, is doubly loaded: it suggests both logical validity, *and* social effectiveness. The two of course do not necessarily or generally go together, but in this case, providentially, they did³.

To begin with, a brief sketch of the manifest reasoning underlying the synchronic approach. First, there was the inaccessibility of the past in an illiterate society without records. The consequence of this state of affairs, it was asserted, was that reconstructions of tribal history were mere speculative reconstructions, which it was impossible to check and which consequently had little or no scientific validity. The trouble with this is that, whilst partially true, it is only partially true, and no one really knows just how big the two parts are, and in any case there is no reason to assume that the past is equally accessible or inaccessible in all places. Can one really say that there is no element of validity at all in the attempts by archaeologists to reconstruct past social structure by the method of their craft, or in the attempts to reconstruct history from systematically collected oral traditions? And if there is at least some validity, some possibility of valid results, who is to say that in some places, at least with greater ingenuity or greater luck, or with respect to some particular problems, the results should not be very fruitful? It

² Cf. I. Schapera, «Should Anthropologists be Historians?» in *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, Vol. 92, July 1962.

³ Latent functions were not discovered by anthropological functionalists. Long before, they were familiar to philosophers as the Cunning of Reason.

is always dangerous to claim that something cannot be done. Especially if it is manifest that *some* of it *can* be done.

Coupled with the rejection of the past on the grounds of lack of records and the undesirability of uncheckable speculation, there was also a more interesting reason. This is a theory of social causation, and is perhaps best expressed in the slogan associated with Malinowski — «there are no survivals». One can easily grasp the underlying idea. When people do things, they have motives for doing them — *now*. The motives as well as the action are in the present. Human actions are not inert objects, which can be left behind by the past like artefacts (though the magpie anthropologists who had assimilated customs to artefacts might have thought so); they have to be caused or willed anew each time they occur. Hence their explanation must be sought in the circumstances, inclinations and so forth which brought them into being at the time they were done, and not somewhere in the past. Is that not obvious?

One is at this point reminded of the metaphysical doctrine that the world is recreated anew each instance (say by the Deity), because manifestly the past has not the power to create the present. For one thing, the past is now quite inert: for another it no longer exists. How could it contain a hidden mystic power to generate and control the present? We cannot maintain ourselves in being, it is fortunate accident that we persist: the miraculous gift of existence is granted us anew every instant that passes. And so it is. The metaphysical intuition which generates this doctrine can also be applied specifically to human societies and institutions, and I do believe that it is one of the factors underlying the synchronic predilection.

But the trouble here again is that we are dealing with something which is only partially true. But in the case of the «lack of evidence» argument, we are dealing with something which was «partially true», and indeed also «partially untrue», in a very straightforward sense. The inertness and ineffectiveness of the past, on the other hand, is true and untrue in a much more complicated manner, being true in some senses and not true at others. We are here not in a situation where we can say «It is true to such and such a degree, because there is evidence at this point but no evidence at another, and evidence concerning this problem but not that». The sorting out of the true and the untrue elements requires some more complicated distinctions. Here again, we see that the thesis — in this case, the thesis of the impotence of the past — cannot be wholly true. Any social process consists of a series of events in which people react one day to what

somebody else may have done the previous day, and so on. Of course, in one sense the past may be claimed to be wholly dead: I can only react today to something someone else did or said yesterday, if that action or utterance of his of yesterday had left some kind of mark in the present, literally present, situation. But it *has* left a mark: that literally present situation would be different if what had happened yesterday had been other than it was. Deny this and you end up with a quite absurd position, a series of wholly discrete and discontinuous incidents, quite independent in their content and structure of each other.

But if this extreme position is not intended, what is meant? Is there a kind of sociological 'specious present', within which interaction is permitted? If so, how long is it? A few days, a season, a year, a generation? From the viewpoint of the metaphysical intuition which underlies the argument, the intuition that only the present can operate in the present, a miss is as good as a mile: if the events of yesterday are relevant, then the invocation of events of any past period, however distant, are in principle permissible...

There is another way of highlighting the fact that the idea underlying the slogan «there are no survivors» cannot be pushed to the limit, that it must be allowed to have some exceptions — and, of course, once this is allowed, the question arises concerning how many exceptions are to be allowed and how important they are. Take an example which, it is said, was discussed in Malinowski's seminar: those peculiarly pointless buttons which are found at the end of the sleeve on male coats in our society. *Prima facie*, these are of course splendid candidates for the status of being a 'survival': one assumes that, in the sartorial past, they performed some function, but they really do nothing whatsoever now. Yet, at the same time, it is not at all difficult to find some kind of synchronic, functionalist, Malinowskian explanation of their presence. They are, for instance, part of that sartorial elaboration which, through its very pointlessness, manages to sift out in our society those who have the resources and leisure for attending to their clothes from those whose poverty or occupation prevents them from doing this. In a society in which low status accrues to those who can not attend to pointless sartorial niceties, the buttons on one's sleeve do make a contribution, albeit a humble one, to the maintenance and expression of social stratification.

So far so good: an explanation of this kind is plausible, and some explanation along those lines may well be true. But the 'functionalist' explanation really only applies to a certain aspect of the pheno-

menon: to its formal aspect, so to speak, the fact *some* pointless sartorial elaboration is necessary, an elaboration which requires time and/or money and which thus helps to segregate the possessors of either from those who are deprived of them. Such an explanation might be quite powerful in the sense of being pretty specific, in narrowing down the 'functional requirement' very specifically: the explanation might for instance deduce from independent evidence about our society just the precise amount of pointlessness that is required. It might show that our society is just sufficiently egalitarian, mobile and utilitarian not to permit great excesses in pointlessness, whilst at the same time requiring a kind of minimal modicum of it. It might then be shown that things rather like buttons on sleeves fit the requirement precisely.

But this kind of explanation, useful though it may be in the hands of a skilled practitioner, does not explain why it is *just buttons* and not something else, containing exactly the same amount of pointlessness, which is employed. Why *ausgerechnet* buttons on sleeves? Obviously there is an infinity of possible adornments, which would satisfy the requirements. Why just buttons? Why just at the bottom of the sleeve?

Here surely the functionalist anthropologist will be driven to say something like this: the structure of society or a social situation is explained synchronically, but the culture, the precise symbols that happen to be employed and so on, can be determined historically, by the past. A certain degree of elaborate sartorial pointlessness is required by this social situation, but the symbols or tools employed for it are determined by the accident of the past.

But this concession, which I think is inevitable, again operates as the thin end of a wedge. If some cultural content is allowed to be determined by the past, where is one to draw the line? If some cultural content is determined in that way, why not a lot of it, as indeed is likely to be the case? And if a lot of it is so determined, is it really plausible to say that at no time do the accidents of cultural *content* have a crucial influence on the structural *form* of the society? The distinction between structure and culture is an enormously important one, and highly valuable in field work and in analysis: but it is not a sharp one, and it would be a daring anthropologist who would maintain that 'culture' is always causally powerless.

So once again, for different reasons, one finds that the powerlessness of the past in the strong and exceptionless sense cannot be maintained, and if qualifications and modifications are introduced, it is not clear how much is left of the original thesis.

There is another consideration, curiously seldom noticed: there is a certain contradiction between the synchronic method and functionalism — notwithstanding the fact that so many anthropologists embraced both, and indeed considered them to be mutually reinforcing. In some ways, no doubt they are. But in one way, they are in contradiction. Functionalism in a way amounts to this: when interpreting an institution, look for the ways in which it contributes to social stability. Functionalism as a *method* consists of the requirement that one should seek these contributions to stability; functionalism as a *doctrine* consists of the view that all existing institutions do make such a contribution.

But all this presupposes that we know the society in question to be *stable*. This means, of course, that we suppose it to have been the same in the past as it is in the present and, indeed, that we expect it to continue in the same condition in the future. But how on earth can one say, almost in the same breath, that one does not know anything about the past of an illiterate tribal society (there being no records), *and* that one knows it to have been the *same* in the past as it is in the present? How indeed. One can say it in the same breath, provided one does not say it in the same words. The presumptuous doctrine claiming knowledge of past stability was not put in these words, but was tacitly incapsulated in the very notion of 'function', meaning, roughly, contribution to *stability*, whereas the more modest principle of disclaimer of speculative reconstructions of the past was asserted, bravely, in so many words. This deception was not, of course, deliberate: it just happened.

What I am saying is that the reasons for the timeless approach, in as far as overtly formulated, were inadequate, imprecisely formulated (and then false on a strong interpretation and inadequate on a weak one), and in some respects downright self-contradictory. Yet underneath, there were other, cogent, valid and important reasons. What were these? They are connected with what seems to me a very valid perception concerning social causation: a kind of sociological rejection of action at a distance.

The trouble with traditional evolutionism was that it had an in-built tendency towards a vicious kind of abstraction. I am not saying that this vicious tendency always and necessarily had to manifest itself: but it was a strong tendency, strong enough to vitiate much if not most of the work of evolutionists. It amounted to a tendency to seek causal connections at too high a level.

Evolutionism was concerned with the Great Path. Consequently,

and this is an important point, it tended to take stability for granted. It was the great *change* which had to be explained, and hence stability seemed a kind of inertia, requiring no special explanation. Consequently, it is mainly interested in seeing and explaining how one Big Stage causes the next one. But does causation really occur at this level of abstraction?

The answer is — Yes, it does; but before we look at the causation at *this* high level of social abstraction, we must first of all look at the more atomic level of social interaction. Consider an imaginary and very, very stable society, leaving aside the question whether really stable societies exist. An evolutionist with a grand vision might pass this society by, for it is of no interest to him since the time it was generated by the preceding 'stage' or until the time when it begins to generate the next 'stage'. But can such a neglect be justified? This stable society is not, after all, in any kind of social rigor mortis. Bend over the ant-heap, look at it carefully and in detail, and obviously its members must be quite active — perhaps even very, very active. A persisting society, even or especially a stable one, consists of people doing the many things required to keep themselves alive, to reproduce themselves, to maintain order amongst themselves, to ward off the various shocks which an external social or political environment invariably gives to any society — all these things have to be *done*. Is there not a problem here of how this is managed?

Malinowskian anthropologists set about answering precisely this kind of question. They found themselves small-scale, technologically primitive societies, assumed them to be stable (on the somewhat self-contradictory grounds that they did not know their past and consequently could not assert them to be *unstable*), and proceeded to do immensely valuable work in so doing. The explanations they put forward had to be in 'structural-functional' terms, for their terms of reference precluded (rightly) the invocation of something external to the present society altogether, such as its past condition. The explanations then must be 'structural', in as far as they must be about the relationship of the parts of the society to each other. (There is nothing else in terms of which it could be.) They must also be 'functional', for the problem is «how does the society maintain itself in a condition of stability», and the answer must be in terms of how each individual institution or custom etc. contributes to this effect, and how it in turn is kept in place by the other institutions, etc. Not only are explanations in terms of the past excluded, but the method itself also automatically excludes explanations in terms of unique events,

such as the occurrence of an idea or of an outstanding personality, for such a *deus ex machina* explanation would not be a real explanation of stability unless a mechanism was specified which caused its reproduction regularly, and of course if such a mechanism is specified, the crucial event ceases to be unique. (It is then acceptable to the method, of course.)

The point towards which I am working is that the 'structural' method, which I am not defining very precisely, but which implies a good look at the self-maintenance properties of organisations (and ignoring supposedly unique events, treating everything anonymously instead), is profoundly implied by the 'timeless' approach, but — and this is enormously important — it does not imply it in turn. In other words, the historic service performed by the shock of timelessness introduced by Malinowski was to make people into structuralists: when they became structuralists, they could then cease to be timeless⁴.

Once the habit of looking at molecular causal connections, so to speak, within a society has become second nature for the social investigator, it can easily be reapplied to *unstable* situations as much as to stable ones, to situations obtaining in *the past* as much as in the present. It in no way requires a rejection either of change and development, or of concern with the past. It had been injected, forcefully, into anthropology as part of a timeless attitude: once it is securely present, it has no need whatever of that timelessness.

Causation does of course occur at both molecular and molar levels (or perhaps one should say *many* levels). Institutions, customs, activities interact and produce the stability, or change, of the society, as the case may be, and also in another sense total states of a society produce the subsequent states: but the nexus existing between total states cannot be fully explained without the prior specification of the molecular interactions of which it consists, and whose existence it presupposes⁵.

⁴ This shows how mistaken it is to attack «functionalism» along the lines adopted by Kingsley Davis, who argues (*American Sociological Review*, December 1959, pp. 752-772) that «functional» explanations do not differ from any other kind of explanation of sociology and that consequently functionalism is a myth. Functional explanations may indeed not differ from other causal explanations: but the whole point is that the doctrine and method against which functionalists were reacting was, in a very important way, vacuous in its supposedly causal explanations. Functionalism thus differed from *inadequately* causal explanations.

⁵ This point in no way prejudices the order in which various connections

This shows that those anthropologists who want to save anthropology from the charge of timelessness are somewhat misguided. No doubt they are quite right in their facts, and anthropologists have never neglected the past where evidence was relevant. But this throws out the baby with the bath water. Timelessness was most valuable in throwing out evolutionist pseudo-history: and it is all to the good that it never threw out genuine history as well. But the elimination of evolutionism was a great achievement, and the defence against a minor and not very important charge obscures that achievement. Since the shock of the timeless approach, and thanks to it, concern with molecular causation, and an unwillingness to take stability (*or* change) for granted, have become second nature with anthropological thinking; and this too is an enormous achievement. Why obscure it by being worried with a minor and inaccurate charge?

To sum up the argument: anthropologists are most interestingly distinguishable by their attitude to time. The extreme formulation of that attitude is invalid and yet was, through its very extremity, valuable: for though mistaken in itself, it brought with it the habituation, indeed the profound internalisation, of the 'structural-functional' method.

If one believes this method to be most valuable, as I do, it is perhaps desirable to define it, and the crucial notion of 'structure', in greater detail than has been done so far — for, so far, it has really been made equivalent in this argument with something like «attention to molecular causation». Hence such a more detailed account must be the next step in the argument.

What is a functional system, or at any rate a stable functional system, «in equilibrium»? It is a system of interacting parts such that a stable order is maintained, this in turn being defined so that any change going beyond specified limits will be prevented by mechanisms within the system. This definition already highlights the fact that the notion of a functional system is rather elliptical, and becomes determinate only if the limits which must not be transgressed are clearly specified. The limits cannot be *too* narrow, for some change characterises any system made up of living beings — if only the change consisting of a turnover in personnel due to

are noted or established. One may perceive a molar connection without having fully worked out or understood a molecular one, and of course vice versa.

the passage of generations. The limits cannot be too broad, of course, without making the attribution of functionality tautological.

As indicated, such a system may but need not be teleological. Indeed, whether or not it is may sometimes be just a matter of phraseology. For example, many children believe the world itself to be a functional system, in which cats were created to keep down mice, and dock leaves were created to keep in check the pain caused by stinging nettles. Now this belief can be formulated in a causal manner, by simply saying that the whole system is kept within certain limits through the effect of the behaviour of cats on mice, and of dock leaves on the pain generated by stinging nettles. Alternatively, it can of course be formulated (and generally is) in a purposive manner, in terms of what cats or dock leaves «are for». The content of the two assertions need not differ, though of course it can differ in as far as the attribution of purpose also contains the idea that there is some mind responsible for the creation of the whole system, a mind for which the purpose in question was a decisive consideration ⁶.

Now the idea of a self-maintaining order is an interesting one and deserves some further elaboration. An order is 'self-maintaining' not only relatively to the permitted limits of change, as indicated, but also, and in somewhat different sense, it is relative to the amount of permitted external impact, i.e., the amount of external impact which it can, as it were, assimilate or digest or react against. A snail, for instance, is presumably reasonably self-maintaining organism, but when crossing a road it cannot resist the external impact of a steam-roller. Most systems, excluding the universe as a whole, must count with some external impact, and the attribution of self-maintenance must, once again, contain the specification of just how much external impact can be accommodated. A good deal follows from this point. For instance, it might be argued in defence of the applicability of the 'functional method' in modern circumstances, that the functional interpretations developed concerning traditional society must be tested by the adaptability of traditional institutions in modern circumstances ⁷.

I doubt whether this particular defence is generally acceptable. The

⁶ It is interesting to note that primitive societies tend to have their own evolutionism and their own functionalism. They interpret the world purposively, but they also explain its causal arrangements in terms of antecedent events, whose effects somehow continue to pervade the world.

⁷ This was argued to me in conversation by Dr. Ioan Lewis.

kind of steam-roller effect which the modern world has must be well beyond the range with which traditional institutions can, in general, cope, or can indeed be expected to.

Another consideration is of course — how much external impact can it tolerate, and how much internal potential for disruption does it possess? A perfect example of a functional equilibrium is a *vacuum*. One may reflect that the most elegant solution for the Creator would have been to create *absolutely nothing*, thus saving Leibniz his question as to why there was anything rather than nothing. Why indeed? There is something inelegant about creating something, and then needing other things to balance it, with the corollary that creating this rather than that opens the Creator to the inescapable charge of arbitrariness and partiality. It really would have been much more elegant to leave the whole thing entirely vacant, for ever and ever, no nettles and no mice.

This is something which does of course occur to the child if it becomes sceptical. Had not the Deity created mice, it need not have troubled itself with the creation of cats. If only the Deity had not created stinging nettles, it need not have bothered with dock leaves. The world may be functional, but it is clumsily so. It contains one thing to counteract another, when it would have been much simpler to have neither one nor the other.

The functionalist anthropologist may not be tempted to play the part of a Leibnizian philosopher and ask why there is anything at all: he may well be content to find out how one thing sustains another and so on in a circle, and leave unasked the questions of why the society exists at all. This only highlights the no doubt trite observation that institutions and activities are not functional in themselves, but only in relation to each other. Perhaps we do not need to justify the circle as a whole, but we do need to establish that there is a circle. And to give an account of the method, we must specify the general nature of the relationship by means of which one institution sustains another. The activities of the one 'cause' the activities of another, or keep them within the appropriate limits. But just *how*?

The very best model for a functional system in equilibrium is an absolute vacuum, which after all has no potential disturbances either inside or outside. The next best approximation is some rigid immobile homogeneous body which, excluding inner corrosion, is strong enough to resist external impact up to a certain level of vehemence. But neither of these resembles a social system, which after all con-

sists of disjointed moving parts. A good model for a social system in equilibrium is perhaps one of those situations in chess in which neither player has any choice and the whole situation is repetitive. *This* is a social system 'in equilibrium': it is not at the mercy of the will of the participants, but perpetuates itself *whatever* they do, within the limits which are open to them.

One might say this of extreme functionalism: it takes the stalemate in chess as the paradigm of a society.

But the chess situation differs from a social equilibrium in one very important respect: and the highlighting of this particular feature is the main merit of using the chess situation. In chess, the rules which limit the movements of the players are supplied and given *from the outside*. What corresponds to this given element in the social situation?

A social system is like the game of chess in which the activities of the players generate and sustain not merely the situation in which they find themselves, *but also the rules of the game itself*. Nothing in the very nature and constitution of things prescribes the playing of this or that game, the rules of which would then lead to stalemate situations (in the case of stable societies) or progressive situations (in the case of developing ones). Or rather: very nearly nothing. *Nature* does impose certain limits. This provides part of the answer: compatibility, rules by which some things are required, are *in part* stated by nature. No complex of institutions which precludes the nourishment and physical reproduction, for instance, of a given population, can be self-maintaining. Certain rules of compatibility and incompatibility are thus supplied by the physical basis of human existence. But only some: for if one thing is obvious, it is that the natural environment plus the need or desire to survive do not uniquely determine social structure. It is simply not the case that given the same physical environment, and the same size of population, only one social structure is possible. What else, then, narrows down the range of possibilities?

In the case of the vacuum or a homogeneous inert mass, the question of 'compatibility' hardly arises. But is a complex made up of parts, what is it that makes one part compatible with another, or what makes one part 'sustain' another? In this context, we think too much in a spatial metaphor: we think of a jigsaw puzzle, where compatibility is easily understood. But institutions are not shapes occupying space, whose compatibility or mutual support are easily understood. They are activities, and above all, repeated activities. It

is important to stress here that for these things, the notion of compatibility is far from self-evident.

We tend to take social causation for granted. But it is in fact a rather puzzling phenomenon. There is here no push or pull. Somebody does something in one place, and *in consequence* somebody else does something else in another place. A man fires a shot and six runners set off on a track. A man raises a signal and an engine driver starts a train. What is the link?

When a man passes food to another and thus enables him to survive, or pushes him to this death, or even when he impels him to do something by a threat, there is a kind of intelligible physical causation present. But nothing of this kind is present in the examples cited. The physical world is perfectly conceivable in which the man fires the starting gun and the runners choose not to run. The connection has at any rate no immediate physical basis. If, then, nature did not supply the connecting rules, who or what did?

One is tempted to say, as the first attempt at a reply, that the *concepts* of the social order in question dictate the connection, or its conventions, or something of that kind. But that won't quite do: what dictates and sustains those concepts or conventions? Anyway, they are not always effective. We are, when facing a social system, facing something very odd indeed: a system whose parts interact by means of connections which *it itself generates*. (I am not here concerned with the question of how we discover social causal connections. I believe we discover them in the same way in which we discover any others, though we may be guided in our search by insight, by *verstehen*. I am concerned with what a social or cultural connection *is*, as opposed to a natural one, rather than how we discover or establish it.) How is the connection maintained?

The first and less puzzling sense in which institutions can be connected with each other, or the society of which they are a part, and have effects which contribute towards the 'explanation' of that society (be it stable or not), is the one arising when a given institution has, for instance, the consequence of safeguarding the food supply in a simple physical sense. Here a «rule of the game» is supplied by nature, to the effect that a society does not persist unless its members are fed, and a 'move' is made, in the form of the working of an institution or complex of institutions which helps satisfy the need in question. But, as indicated, the rules are not always so supplied by nature. What happens in the other cases?

First, consider what may be called the Idealist solution. It would

run something as follows: the concepts of the society themselves acquire a force as great as the rules supplied by nature herself: as great, or almost as great, as the rules demanding the supply of food, the conditions of procreation and so forth. It is the concepts of the society itself which supply some of the «rules of the game», analogous to the rules of chess in our previous example. When we say that a society is a stable functional system in which the various institutions sustain each other and check each other (or, for that matter, if we say that it is an unstable system leading through the interaction of its parts to a changing end result), the *nexus* between one institution, activity, etc and its social effect, is provided by the *ideas* of the society itself. Just as nature, a set of data supplied from the outside, decrees that the consequence of the availability of food is the possibility or reality of survival, so culture, the set of ideas of the society itself, decrees for instance that the consequence of one situation (e.g., a certain transgression has been committed) is a certain consequence (e.g., a certain punishment is applied according to certain rules to certain people connected directly or indirectly with the transgression). It is a set of connections like these, dependent on the *ideas* or *concepts* of the society, which leads to the additional interplay of cause and effect (over and above that supplied by nature), and the play of all the complementary chains produced in this effect leads to a stable end result (or an unstable one, as the case may be).

There is an obvious and immediate problem here: the concepts which, as it were, provide the glue between one activity and its social consequences, which determine that *this* should cause *that*, socially speaking, are themselves in a very important and real sense institutions of the society in question. They in turn must be sustained and, for the matter, checked, protected from developing cancerous growth. This makes the system complex, but that is not necessarily an objection: societies *are* complex. There is one well-known shortcut available here, which happily and rightly has, on the whole, dropped out of anthropology: to claim that one sustaining mechanism is sufficient to explain all the concepts which abound in a given society, namely the mechanism of education. The argument is that, particularly in the case of primitive societies, men are so flawlessly indoctrinated, 'conditioned' into the concepts of that society that no one can conceivably think or act outside them. In fact, primitive societies are not such perfect specimens of a retrojected 'Brave New World'.

Eliminating this shortcut, we are left with a picture of causal con-

nections in a society, either based on a nexus supplied by nature, or supplied by culture in the form of a concept of the society, these concepts then being in turn sustained in various ways, so that the social system as a whole is a by-product of natural *and* cultural connections, where the reliability of the cultural connections themselves is a by-product of the system.

But, in this unqualified form, this picture is part of what I've called the Idealist approach and, when left unqualified, incorrect. Basically, it exaggerates two things: first, the power of concepts to guide the behaviour of men and, secondly, the length to which societies can indulge their free fantasy in living by this or that concept. The whole picture, as sketched in so far, would suggest that there is no limit to the kind of connections between activities which a society can impose in virtue of having, or creating, the appropriate concept. For instance, to take a relatively extreme example, a society such as Erewhon could exist, in which people were punished for illness but treated medically for criminal acts, and other societies could exist in which connections were not merely inverted versions, of what we are familiar with, but, in our eyes, totally arbitrary. There would, on this version of the theory, be no restrictive rules on what kind of concepts can exist.

I do not believe that the conceptual and social worlds are so limitlessly flexible. But what then is the alternative to the rejected, idealist picture? The alternative can, appropriately, be called the Materialist account. It would run something as follows: social causation remains very close to physical causation. Examples of physical causation are the nourishing effects of food, or the debilitating effects of undernourishment. When one social event is causally connected with another, what is happening is in principle similar to these examples. There are also things which cannot be physically defined, being conceptual artefacts, so to speak, of the society in question: some of these things might be called 'ideology' or 'culture' or something like that. These things are effected by physical causes but do not significantly react back. The real linkages in a social system, whose sustained interaction leads to stability or change in a society, are between things susceptible to causal connections, such as those summed up as hunger, fear, etc.

The materialist approach amounts to saying this: that which corresponds in sociology to the externally given rules of chess in the stalemate situation, are rules supplied by the physical environment of

man (including, of course, those governing his own physiology, etc.) The most important and influential version of sociological materialism is somewhat less extreme than this, in as far as it seems to be saying something like this: the by-product of the interaction of man and environment, and man and man, is the production of certain tools. These, then, form part of the system and have effects of their own, and it is indeed the effects of type of tools which are the crucial factor in understanding and determining the shape of social systems.

How does the so-called structural-functional method stand with respect to the two extremes on the spectrum, from the idealist to the materialist answer, concerning the stuff and nature of social connections? It is, I believe, much closer to the materialist end than to the idealist one, without for all that being in the very least identical with it.

How could one characterise this method? I would like to sum up once again the formal framework within which, on my account, it must be fitted: a social system is an aggregate of parts; its 'parts' are human activities etc., which interact with each other to produce a certain result; and the *manner* of their connection, the nexus by which they interact, is itself either one further institution of the society in question, or something supplied by the natural environment. We have here a structure in which *some* of the bricks are supplied by nature, but many are, as it were, themselves supplied by the structure and help to hold other parts of it in place.

It is worth noting that the (in my view rightly) fashionable concept of *structure* combines the valid aspects of the underlying intuitions of both materialism and idealism. The sensible aspect of the intuition of materialism I take to be this: our explanatory models should be built up in an orderly and systematic and economical way, in such a way that the properties of the model as a whole should as much as possible follow from the properties of its parts and their arrangement, and that these more primary properties, as it were, should be limited in number, clearly defined and, as far as possible, 'intelligible'. (Rigid materialism, of course, may well have been wrong in trying to work with a very restricted set of such properties, reducing them in as far as possible to the impenetrability of extended matter.)

Idealism, on the other hand, sets out from the perception that in social, semantic, psychological and other systems the *context* provided by the system as a whole is essential: the essence of the

part is its role in the system. To take the simplest example, from the theory of meaning: a name is not just a relationship between a sound and a thing. The 'meaning' of a sound, which makes it a name, derives from the fact that it is part of a system in which other names exist, or at least are possible, and have a given role, and that this (not necessarily delimited) system of names relates to a whole set of things, isolated from the continuum in which they occur in accordance with certain principles, and so forth. In other words, one cannot even perceive that something has a name without first of all understanding the system within which it exists and is named.

The notion of 'structure' as used by anthropologists incorporates both these insights. The models are built up with care and with a minimum of invocation of explanatory notions or alleged connections which are not deducible from fairly elementary and manifestly powerful human tendencies. At the same time, the whole orientation of 'structural explanations' drives the investigator towards 'placing' any given activity in the context of the system of which it is a part, which gives it its 'meaning', and towards trying to make that large system explicit.

The same point can probably also be made concerning the ideas underlying Information Theory, cybernetics, etc. The 'Idealist' insight is powerfully present: the models invoked presuppose, fundamentally, that the meaning of a message is its place within a system of alternatives and the rules or pattern of that system. There is no 'echo' theory of meaning here. On the other hand, of course, the fact that this approach leads to the building of concrete physical models highlights its 'materialist' connections — the systems are material and its properties depend on the properties of its parts, and there is no suggestion that the system is itself somehow outside the world. In as far as these systems are 'idealistic', they could be described as a kind of mechanised idealism.

Under the impact of explicit and implicit procedural rules, modern anthropologists have developed a distinctive and easily recognisable style of reconstructing the social systems of the societies with which they are concerned. There are certain things an anthropologist will tend *not* to do. He will not rely on allegations of strange motives, a strange concept, or on inertia. Finding a strange custom, he will not invoke the alleged fact that the locals believe something or other (from which belief the custom is meant to follow): he has far too strong a sense of the fragility of belief, and also of the fact that the

belief itself needs to be sustained, notably by the very custom which is justified in its name, and cannot constitute an independent and adequate explanation. Similarly, he will not suppose that the locals have been fashioned into possessing some strange and specific motives from which the set custom follows: the same kind of tacit reasoning excludes explanations of this kind. Least of all would he suppose that the custom can be explained by the supposition that it was once established in a specific situation and has since persisted by sheer inertia. (This kind of account, which of course is often built into the local legends themselves, he will contemptuously dismiss as 'just-so' stories when used by old-fashioned anthropologists.)

These things he will refrain from doing. But there are also certain things he positively will do. One is what I would like to call Power Accounting, or a Power Balance-Sheet. I believe that a Power Balance-Sheet is implicitly present in every good anthropological account of a given society. This consists of showing how the persistence of a given political or economic etc. system is the result of the interplay of given forces in the given environment, observing the negative rules mentioned above — i.e., without placing too much explanatory strain on the assumption of an automatic persistence of strange beliefs, etc. The assumption is that people are very roughly similar all over the place, and are not perfectly socialised, i.e., are not total slaves of either the overt or the tacit norms of their society. Men will go off any kind of social rails. A Power Balance-Sheet shows how the system maintains itself even on the assumption of a reasonable amount of deviance (and, incidentally, a reasonable amount of external disturbance as well).

The negative rules cited above do indeed contain an assumption which can be summed up as the very rough generalisation that people are much the same everywhere. Of course, in fact they are not: but it is a sound methodological rule, built into this method, to minimise the invocation of individual differences. To minimise is not necessarily to exclude altogether: but the requirement to try to find an explanation within the Balance Sheet first of all is an *excellent* requirement.

The requirement that eccentric beliefs or aims should not too easily be invoked by way of explanation is not the same as their exclusion altogether. The method consists really of placing the onus of proof heavily on the side of the demonstration that strange beliefs, etc., are really present, operative, and sustained by other social

factors. If this is indeed established, as it sometimes may be, *then* the further invocation of the eccentricity is permissible⁸.

The structural-functional method, as I am describing it, was not really internalised in the soul of the anthropologist by means of the official summaries of it which exist, but by the real education of the anthropologist: field work, and the subsequent systematic discussion of field work results in seminars by his peers and seniors. It is in these two crucial anthropological activities that the set of rules which I am trying to make explicit was forged and sustained. The method, and its deep internalisation and persistent effectiveness, was the causal, rather than the logical, consequence of the cult of field work.

The ideas of Malinowski, taken in isolation and coldly, may not be particularly original and hence, in that sense, not particularly important. But his position in the history of the social sciences is perhaps, in one respect, rather like that of Lenin in the history of political thought: it is impossible, or at any rate pointless, to investigate his ideas without at the same time being concerned with the institutions which were engendered by them. The importance of Malinowski lies perhaps in his fusion of a certain set of ideas into a kind of whole *and*, above all, in setting up the institutions, the traditions and the ethos which perpetuated the *application* of those ideas in cumulative and profitable research.

Two interesting theories of knowledge were associated with the cult of field work: knowledge by total immersion, and cognition by trauma. I have some sympathy for the former, the Baptist theory of knowledge, so to speak, but am rather sceptical about the second, at any rate when it is generalised. Many people have experienced the trauma of alien mores, without thereby gaining social understanding. Does the trauma work only if it is anticipated? And, in that case, is it genuinely traumatic?

⁸ It is sometimes claimed that the anthropologist, as such, has no opinion about the validity of e.g., witchcraft beliefs. (This claim is to be distinguished from the stronger, and even more mistaken, view that local concepts are never mistaken.) This seems to me incorrect. In fact, the anthropologist knows full well that witches do not exist, and that *consequently* he is obliged to explain how witchcraft beliefs are sustained. *True* beliefs do not require to be explained nearly as much - though they too need a social explanation. There are social explanations of true beliefs just as there are of false beliefs, but when beliefs fly in the face of evidence the social mechanism presumably needs to be that much stronger. But it is precisely the anthropologist's awareness of the false elements in local belief, that helps him select the areas requiring special explanation.

The situation here is parallel to what I claim holds concerning the modern anthropologists' attitude to time: a mistaken doctrine of the self-sufficiency of the social instant served as premise, and overt stimulus, for a perfectly valid attitude towards social explanation. Similarly, an attitude to field work, justified by arguments which were not always cogent, an attitude which itself may be exaggerated, led to the internalisation of what seems to me a valid type of social explanation. Of course, field work is an excellent thing, partly because it is interesting and enjoyable and partly because it brings in material which otherwise would not be available and which is generally of a far higher quality than that supplied by non-anthropologists. But the analytic method which is internalised by means of the cult of field work and its subsequent discussion by peers has merit quite independently of whether it was indeed preceded by, and internalised by means of, field work; and it can in fact also be applied to non-field-work material.

An additional note about the Power Accounting: the field work habit not only forces the anthropologist to account for the persisting situation (or the situation believed to persist) in terms of the operating forces, but it also forces him to make a kind of survey of all the forces operating in the society and show how they spend themselves. He must ask: why does *this* sub-group not break out, what constrains an individual in this position, etc. etc. This is implicit in the habit of spending a lengthy time in a fairly small community, taking a sociological census, and so on. This imposes a further check of facile and excessively abstract, context-less explanations. What is there must be included in the Power Balance Sheet, just as the final result at the end of the Balance Sheet must follow from what is documented in a recognised field work manner.

We can now see how this method differs from what I've called the Materialist and the Idealist accounts of how a social system is built up, and how it is rather closer to the materialist approach than the other. It might be called a 'multiform materialism', to differentiate it from the materialism which carried the doctrine, or the suggestion, that one material base implies one type of 'superstructure' — in other words, a doctrine of a one-one relation. The 'structural-functional method' certainly is not materialist in the sense of carrying any suggestion of such a one-one correlation. It differs from the materialist approach in being quite willing, if the evidence warrants it, to allow explanation in terms of institutions which are social, cultural artefacts, which are not simply dictated by the interplay

between nature and an imaginary pre-social man. But it is close to the Materialist approach in placing a heavy onus of proof on any such claim, and thereby placing a healthy restraint on sociological fantasy. All this is, of course, closely connected with the cult of field work, which itself curbs fantasy⁹. One might object at this point: is this, then, all that the 'structural-functional' method amounts to? — an abstention from various kinds of facile explanations, a requirement that the accounting of social forces be thorough, and that the resultant situation be worked out, and effectively be compatible with the forces which are operating, and documented as such; and a cautious but not rigid approach in allowing cultural artefacts to play a part similar to the forces and requirements of nature? Is this really *all* there is to it?

This is indeed, I suspect, a good deal of what it does amount to: but I reject the implication that that isn't a great deal. It may not seem a great deal when cozily and briefly summed up in this manner. But its systematic implementation and application in the study and account of societies *is* a great achievement: indeed, the achievements of social anthropologists bear witness to this. The great achievement of Malinowskian social anthropology was perhaps the establishment and perpetuation of those social institutions *within* the anthropological community which led to the persistent, compulsive, thorough, cumulative applications of these relatively simple rules. Anthropologists were of course also aided by the general characteristics of the societies with which they were concerned: the communities in question were often small, and hence the kind of 'accounting' des-

⁹ There is a puzzle about the Materialist approach which I do not quite know how materialists themselves face. Their position treats the social, cultural, conceptual artefacts as a kind of epiphenomenon. But if some class of human activities is mainly or largely epiphenomenal, why should it exist at all? What need is there to have an excrescence which echoes, but does not in turn have significant effects? Is it just a kind of causal accident it just so happens that society generates it, without it being in any way essential to the system? I suspect Materialism is ambivalent and inconsistent at this point: it both treats the «superstructure» as epiphenomenal, and yet also as pretty essential to the maintenance of the system - which suggests that it does have crucial effects after all. Anyway, if it is epiphenomenal, is its *specific* content irrelevant? Could a society of one kind have *any* kind of cultural superstructure? And, if not, can the superstructure be epiphenomenal? And there are distinctions to be drawn: what is epiphenomenal - the fact that there is superstructure at all, or the specific cultural content it has? And, if the latter, to what degree of specificity is it determined by the substructure?

cribed could indeed be attempted on the basis of, say, two years of field work. The communities were indeed 'simple' in the sense that, relatively speaking, they wore their social hearts on their sleeves: not in the sense that what their members said corresponded to the reality of the situation, but that the reality of the situation itself could not be hidden in quite so many clouds of ambiguity as it is in complex 'developed' societies. All these advantages are often denied to the sociologist. But, given that the anthropologist did frequently have these advantages, nevertheless modern anthropology must be credited with having found the tools for exploiting them brilliantly.

The merits of the method have not changed or diminished (though there is no further need to tie them either to an attitude of timelessness or to a cult of field work). On the contrary, it seems to me that progress in sociology is conditional to a large extent on applying a similar attitude to large, complex and rapidly changing societies.

What has changed is not the merit of the method, but the external environment which once so greatly favoured the implementation of the method. Roughly speaking, tribes are getting rarer, and the colonial system has (almost wholly) disappeared.

What are the implications of this? In the beginning, I stressed that the differentiation between sociology and anthropology, and hence the relationship between them, was itself as much a social as a logical matter. It follows that the future fate of the method I have attempted to analyse must itself be seen in social terms, i.e. in terms of its fate as operating in effective contemporary conditions, as much as in abstract logical terms.

The connection modern social anthropology and the colonial system is obvious and has been commented on¹⁰. In the first instance, and most obviously, the colonial system made field-work-based anthropology possible by making residence in tribal societies safe, by making the tribal societies relatively accessible (but not so accessible as to destroy them rapidly) and, often, by providing a certain protection for tribal institutions. Colonial administrations were not the same in all places, but in sufficiently numerous colonies they were willing to maintain traditional structures, from one motive or another, provided practices too deeply repugnant to the European moral sense were not indulged and sometimes even without such a proviso. Colonial administrations sometimes had their own version of functionalism, unaided by anthropologists. Some

¹⁰ Cf., for instance, Peter Worsley: *The Trumpet shall Sound*, 1957, p. 260.

anthropologists are liable to overrate the originality of the functionalist doctrine of the meaningfulness and usefulness of even surprising tribal institutions in their particular social contexts¹¹. It would have been surprising if this idea had been novel, for after all it had been the stock-in-trade of conservative political theory for quite some time. The ideas of Burke could be applied to tribal societies as much as to European ones — indeed, in view of the fact that tribal societies were assumed not to have been disrupted by a few centuries of rapid change, they might be supposed to be *more* applicable. What was true of England might, after all, apply equally well to Northern Nigeria. Far from it being the case that anthropologists obligingly supplied the colonial administration with an ideology for using the tribes against the newly emergent, disrupted and hence revolutionary classes, it might well be that the anthropologist had brought back his functionalism in part *from* the district officer, who had picked it up from a conservative political background. Be that as it may: the anthropologist's employment of functionalism was considerably superior to the use made of it by conservatives, for conservatives had invoked it as an omnibus *carte blanche* justification of any and unspecified archaisms in their own society, whereas anthropologists had used it in a concrete and specific manner to work out what I've called the Power Balance Sheet of the communities they were studying.

The colonial system aided the field anthropologist not merely by providing him with security and transport. The anthropologist may not have been the intellectual lackey of colonialism, but he was in various very important ways ideologically inoffensive and hence there was no reason not to tolerate him. The anthropologist's aim was to find out how a tribal society worked, to draw the Power Balance Sheet of the community he was studying, to describe how it *really* worked. For at least two reasons, whatever he found or claimed to have found out was unlikely to be ideologically offensive to the new ultimate power holders, the colonial administration. For one thing, he was naturally, at any rate in the earlier years, concerned with finding out how the tribal society had worked prior to the colonial interference, and hence he tended to abstract from the goings on of the administration, imagining things in their state of sociological purity. If, in all good faith, you abstract from the ad-

¹¹ Cf. Dr. Ian Hogbin in *Man and Culture*, edited by Professor Raymond Firth, 1957, p. 248.

ministrator, you naturally are not likely to say things about the administrator which will annoy him. Secondly, the administration had no ideology of its own about how the tribe 'really functioned', and hence could hardly be upset by any findings on this topic (especially if, as indicated, the findings were liable to abstract from the activities of the administration itself).

There were other factors still. A colonial administration tended to be a genuine bureaucracy: that is to say, its functioning tended to follow set rules, and a member of it, however junior, who observed these rules was reasonably safe. Even if he was not safe, the possession of his post was not something so enormously superior to the professional openings available to him at home as to make him desperately keen at all costs to maintain it. This is not to say that intrigues or conflicts were absent in its ranks (though, on the other hand, the opportunities for intrigue amongst territorially dispersed district officers must be less than amongst bureaucrats in a ministry, with adjoining offices); but, nevertheless, the individual member of the bureaucracy was not involved in a crucial struggle to maintain his position, he was not precarious in the face of those he administered, and he did not need to involve them one way or the other in his intrigues, such as they were.

The situation is different in the post-colonial period. Take an independent ex-colonial country with a multi-party system (they do exist, contrary to popular belief): though the country probably subscribes in a nominal manner to the doctrine of civil service impartiality, in fact the civil servant, or the local administrator, is almost certainly involved in a very serious political struggle, in which the career stakes from his own viewpoint are very great indeed. He is unlikely to welcome an independent observer and busebody who amongst other things provides locals opposed to himself with the possibility, or the illusion, of a new channel of information and communication with the capital.

Or consider one of the more typical one-party states. The same facts operate, in as far as there may be conflict within the one political system, and the anthropologist, being outside the local system of sanctions and authority, provides a disturbing break in the authority structure. Moreover, both his existence, his views and, finally, the report he publishes may be in conflict with what is ideologically required to be true.

It is not so much that under the colonial system the anthropologist had on his side the prestige of belonging to the dominant race.

whereas now he does not: he still often does, by virtue of his contacts and his familiarity with the modern world, possess a privileged position amongst the local population. It is rather that the privileged position he now occupies tends, in the political setting, to act against him, whereas in the past it acted on his behalf. It is for this reason that the post-colonial world is not particularly favourable to anthropological research.

But these practical difficulties might be overcome by a skilful and determined field worker. Or, at least, they might be overcome in favourable circumstances. It is not the practical difficulties which constitute the biggest and most significant change in the working conditions of the anthropologist. The really important change is taking place in the nature of his subject matter, in the societies he is studying.

To begin with, a point by way of introduction: it is generally assumed that the forces of the modern world destroy small intimate communities, and substitute large structures. In one sense, this is not true. A colonial occupation, or a modernisation drive by a newly independent country, does not always rapidly destroy, for instance, the kinship structure or family organisation of a given people. An anthropologist can arrive, decades after the effective incorporation of the local community in a wider political system, and find these molecular social patterns, so to speak, relatively undisturbed. It is the *larger* units, the political achievements on a grander scale, which tend to disappear most rapidly, be it because they are rivals of the new institutions or because their functional prerequisites are more precarious. There are of course exceptions to this: the emirates of northern Nigeria, or the kingdom of Buganda spring to mind. But by and large, it is the large-scale groupings and institutions of the traditional world which disappear most easily (and where they do not, to what extent is there a real social continuity, as opposed to a merely nominal one, in the institution surviving from the traditional world into modern one?).

Perhaps this generalisation will not survive careful scrutiny. But suppose it does; what follows? Are the modern political and other large-scale institutions which replace 'tribal states', where these existed, as amenable to anthropological enquiry as were those traditional ones which they replaced? In other words: is the district officer, or the secretary of the local branch of the political party, as amenable to anthropological interpretation as the chief or the cult priest?

The answer must be: *ultimately*, yes. 'Ultimately', it *must* be so if I am right in my contention that socio-anthropological method, 'structural-functional' interpretation is simply the paradigm of correct sociological method in any context. If this is so, then in the long run it must of course be applicable. It simply embodies the recognition that social life has at its base the repetition of certain activities, and that these cycles of activity, as well as changes in the pattern of the cycles, must be causally explained, and that the system of sanctions or incentives which canalise the concrete doings of individuals into grooves compatible with these cycles must themselves be explained without facile invocation either of nature or of conscious intention and belief, and so forth.

But, in the short run, the world of the district officer and of the secretary of the political party does differ very significantly from that of the chief and of the cult priest. The point is this: the technological limitations of 'primitive' society were a considerable help in narrowing the range within which one could seek the causal mechanisms which maintained the social structure. What are the sanctions, the multiple swords of Damocles, hanging over any society? Above all, starvation, anarchy, external aggression. A sociological account must explain how, outside the Garden of Eden, both life and order are maintained by a society in an indifferent or hostile environment. The means of production and of coercion available to primitive society are, by definition, very limited. This considerably simplifies the search for explanations. This also, in my view, gives a very special interest to those larger groupings and institutions and political structures which are sometimes evolved in primitive society: the achievement is so much greater, its mechanisms so much more interesting. A skyscraper built of mud is more interesting than one built of concrete.

Modern society differs from this in that it can allow itself a kind of sociological fantasy. Where productive and administrative techniques are so very powerful, the society can, form accident or ideological predilection, build up structures which are not the simplest or optimal means of attaining certain effects. There is here a clear analogy with the notion of 'functionalism' in architecture. Were technology is limited, one can see how the materials 'dictate' a given style of building. Where technology is as powerful as it now is, it is only the architect's preference for simplicity, in other words a particular aesthetic doctrine, which keeps him within 'functional' solutions. He can easily allow himself non-functional solutions, if

his taste or that of this clients happens to require it. It is in this sense, amongst others, that functional interpretations are not immediately and easily applicable to modern societies. They have far too much technological and administrative leeway.

It is significant that anthropologists think of 'functionalism' as essentially a descriptive doctrine, whereas architects think of it as a normative or prescriptive one. 'Functionalism' seems descriptive in sociology and prescriptive in architectural aesthetics. The reason is of course that modern building materials allow architects ample scope *not* to be functional, so that if they proceed 'functionally' it is from preference and not from necessity. The same may yet happen to societies. Not quite yet, perhaps: one still hears, for instance, that industrial society has certain kinds of functional preconditions which are not compatible, for instance, with strict Muslim religious observances, or that the functioning of secular Israel is not easily squared with strict religious Jewish observance. But the time may come when the progress of automation will make the strictest industrial discipline compatible with the greatest Muslim religious rigorism, and when a massive electronic automated *shabes-goi* will make an industrial theocracy feasible. In other words, it is possible that fully industrial society will exceed in ritual and doctrinal fantasy anything achieved by 'primitive' society.

The present relevance of this point may very well be challenged, and I would not wish to be dogmatic about the extent to which it is now significant. It might be challenged as follows: the administrative power of modern societies should not be overrated. Consider those numerous and striking failures to mobilise populations in accordance with the wishes of the administration. Just because the central power possesses means of coercion, bribery, propaganda, information and communication, etc., that does not mean that these provide it with effective and adequate levers for organising the society according to its wishes. The actual life of societies is outlined within limits set not by deliberate plan, by what I called sociological fantasy, but by social reality. Is it not just for this reason that sociologists are now so fashionable, so very much in demand as advisers on the implementation of social reform and development?

There is clearly a good deal of truth in this counterassertion. The reply to it in turn consists of two points. First, and not very interesting, is that this is a matter of degree. The fact that the power of deliberate manipulation is not limitless, and in certain cases totally absent, despite the presence of modern administrative and tech-

nological means, does not mean that it is non-existent, and that it can be ignored in those many cases and areas where it has radically transformed the situation. Secondly, and more interestingly, there is this consideration: there is now a rather different relationship between the nominal and the real social structure of any given society. There is a sense in which, in traditional societies, the nominal political or religious structures were also parts of the real structure: however distinct from the real structures and however illusory or divergent from them in content, nevertheless the nominal structure usually had an important part to play. Its illusions or ambiguities were 'functional', in contributing something to the real functioning of the society which they are in and described. The society could not allow itself the luxury of what I called sociological fantasy.

This is not so in modern societies. The real functioning may still be subject to very real limitations (though less so than in the past), and these are inadequately explored. But it is too easy to build up nominal hierarchies of authority on ideological precepts, social theories and so forth. It is very easy, the limits are so wide as to be hardly discernible, and there is very little presumption of 'functionality'. It is for these reasons that modern nominal structures are so very much less interesting than the old ones: it is not just romanticism which makes some anthropologists more interested in the old structures of a tribe than in a ministry or a district office. The former may be sociologically more significant: it may reveal the limits of what can be done, organisationally, with certain limited means. If assumed to persist over time, there is a strong presumption of functionality.

This brings one to the problem of typicality. The following objection is sometimes raised against anthropological method: an anthropologist will pick his village and investigate it intensively, and then present his findings as the structure of *the* Ruritanian village, without having any real basis for his explicit or implicit contention that the village he chose is typical of Ruritanian villages in general. There is a twofold answer to this: first, typicality is not at issue. Of course, an anthropologist should not make claims of typicality where he has no evidence to support such a claim, but a single Ruritanian village is of interest irrespective of whether it is typical or not. Given the limited resources available to Ruritanian villages, any one village constitutes important evidence of what can be done, given those resources. Secondly, the limitation of resources itself constitutes some evidence of typicality, even where there is no survey of the traits

of Ruritanian villages in general. If one knows the general ecological conditions obtaining in Ruritania, and the institutional and conceptual devices available in Ruritanian culture and language generally, one automatically has *some* evidence of the limits of possible structures to be found in Ruritanian villages. (This evidence may be misinterpreted, and should of course, whenever possible, be supplemented by a genuine survey: but all the same, it does constitute some evidence.)

But these arguments are of course very much weakened for a modern context. Where the presumption of functionality is weaker, good evidence of typicality matters more. There is much less of a presumption of a kind of limiting achievement within given means, and there is also much less of a presumption that one can know the limits of the cultural tools available: there is too much instability, change and heterogeneity in the modern world. For these reasons, knowledge of typicality becomes very much more important, and investigation of community in isolation correspondingly less valuable.

Typicality in space brings one back to the question of typicality in time, and the question of the presumption of stability as a tacit premise of 'functional' interpretations. In my earlier account of what underlay this assumption, I concentrated on the *logical* considerations: on the assumption of stability as a camouflaged form of the insistence on a realistic assessment of causal connections, which, once appreciated as such, can indeed be dissociated from that assumption of stability which had introduced it, and equally applied to unstable situations. (The latent function of a—historism, I claimed, was a realistic, structural approach to social condition. Once this latent function becomes manifest, the old manifest rationale can be dropped.) But this (to my mind) admirable premise was not the only consideration present. There was also an empirical matter. Primitive societies were assumed to be stable in as far as they lacked the technical means for being *unstable*. They were assumed to lack the means to get anywhere from their present conditions, and a similar argument could be extended backwards: no special means were available in the recent generation to make the present condition an exceptional and temporary one but, on the contrary, it could be assumed to be somehow 'normal' for the society in question. Now this argument is something of a *non sequitur*: for although technological power generates rapid change, not all rapid change is generated by technological power. As no one put forward this argument *explicitly*

(as far as I know), no one can be specifically charged with it, though I believe it was tacitly operative in helping to make the stability assumption acceptable. But there is, once again, an element of truth in it, despite its unacceptability as a generalisation. The element is this: stability can be assumed as a first approximation where there is no evidence to the contrary in primitive societies, whereas the strongest possible presumption against it exists in modern contexts. In modern contexts, positive evidence for stability would be required before one could really assume that recent generations were in a condition similar to the present one.

When this is true, the realistic assessment of causal connections, which on my argument is at the heart of sound anthropological and sociological method, cannot begin by simply looking for the way in which current practices contribute to their own perpetuation, because this perpetuation cannot be presumed to hold, and the method cannot proceed without positively trying to ascertain what the past situation was. To resume the earlier formulation, typicality cannot be assumed either over time or over space. Take this in conjunction with the fact that social structures are not the limiting exploitations of given means, for the means of the modern world are as yet unexploited, together with the fact that the divorce between nominal and real structures is sharper and different in kind from that which obtained in traditional societies, and you can see that the anthropologist working in modern conditions lives in a world very different from that which formed his method and traditions a decade or so ago.

Summary of argument

One of the crucial things about social anthropology is its method.

This method, when reduced to its bare bones, may sound obvious. Nevertheless, obvious though it may be, few men who investigate societies or theories about them have succeeded in not sinning against it. The distinctive and important thing about social anthropology is the creation of a tradition which sustains the effective application of this (theoretically obvious) method, and which minimises the danger of sinning against it. It is a tradition which itself contains institutional checks enforcing the 'right approach'.

The method consists in the first place of seeking causal connections between various institutions and activities. (Only in appearance is it teleological.) Obvious though this may seem, the effective im-

plementation of this requirement distinguishes social anthropology from many styles of enquiry which only seek causal connections in an ineffectual and unrealistic manner. Furthermore, the method requires that the causal connections themselves should be explained: leaving aside those connections which are imposed by nature, there is nothing inherent in the nature of things which requires that one activity should have the modification of another one as its effect. If it does have such an effect, this is itself a social fact. It in turn requires support from other activities or institutions. Anthropological method requires that this circle be, as far as possible, closed. *This* is the essence of functionalism. Functionalism is not really a doctrine about what societies are like: it is rather an obligation placed upon anthropological enquiry. It contains excellent recipes for avoiding facile ways of achieving this end.

This method and its application was engendered and sustained by various factors within the anthropological tradition and in the wider world in which it operated. Some of these factors were doctrinal and, it so happens, mistaken, but the abandonment of these mistaken ideological props does not require the abandonment of the method itself. (Examples: the doctrine of social stability, built into 'functionalism', or the doctrine of the irrelevance of the past.) Others were customs of the anthropological community itself, such as the institutionalisation of field work. This is a good but not a necessary thing, and can again if necessary be abandoned without the abandonment of the method itself. Others still were social conditions of the wider world, notably those prevailing under the 'colonial system', and these are in any case disappearing. Thus many of both the doctrinal and socio-environmental props of the method are disappearing. These are general features of the modern world which make the application of the method more difficult.

Thus the application of the method to new situations and in new conditions is more difficult than it was in the past. It is, however, eminently desirable.

A PROPOS DE L'INTÉGRATION DES SCIENCES DE L'HOMME

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Il n'y a certes rien de nouveau à soulever le problème de l'homme en tant qu'objet de réflexions philosophiques et de recherches scientifiques. Nos lamentations à propos des lacunes dans ce domaine et des imperfections de notre science de l'homme, ne sont pas non plus originales ni nouvelles. Malebranche, qui lui non plus n'était ni le premier ni le seul à le remarquer — écrivait déjà :

«La plus belle, la plus agréable et la plus nécessaire de nos connaissances, est sans doute la connaissance de nous-mêmes. De toutes les sciences humaines, la science de l'homme est la plus digne de l'homme: cependant cette science n'est pas la plus cultivée ni la plus achevée que nous ayons: le commun des hommes la néglige entièrement. Entre ceux mêmes qui se piquent de science, il y en a très peu qui s'y appliquent, et il y a encore beaucoup moins qui s'y appliquent avec succès»¹.

Et lorsqu'à l'heure actuelle nous soulevons à nouveau ce problème en posant la question de l'intégration nécessaire de la science de l'homme comme étant entre autres un moyen capable d'accélérer le développement de cette science, nous ne faisons certainement pas non plus œuvre de découverte.

Cependant, l'état actuel de la science en général et de la science de l'homme en particulier permet sans doute de poser le problème de l'intégration de la science de l'homme non seulement sous un jour nouveau mais aussi en espérant pouvoir, plus que par le passé, nous rapprocher du but, en pratique.

Cette situation est nouvelle du fait de deux éléments principaux:

1) les sciences, y compris la science de l'homme, connaissent par rapport au passé des développements non seulement quantitatifs mais aussi qualitatifs;

2) les conditions sociales nouvelles qui — comme à chaque époque

¹ N. MALEBRANCHE, *De la recherche de la vérité*, Tome I, Paris, 1762, p. 28.

de transformations révolutionnaires des systèmes sociaux et des systèmes de valeurs qui s'y rattachent — incitent non seulement à la réflexion sur l'homme mais aussi à un développement de la science de l'homme.

Je ne m'arrêterai pas aux considérations relatives au premier élément. Il s'agit uniquement pour moi d'ouvrir un débat au cours duquel les éminents spécialistes de différentes disciplines / traitant de l'homme du point de vue des sciences naturelles, humaines et sociales / se prononceront. Je me bornerai à répéter ici la thèse générale, incontestablement vraie bien que banale, à savoir que jamais nos connaissances concrètes sur l'homme n'ont été si profondes et si poussées qu'aujourd'hui. Bien des problèmes, qui appartenaient autrefois au domaine des mythes et des spéculations des utopistes, deviennent aujourd'hui potentiellement réalisables grâce aux procédés scientifiques, ou le deviendront très prochainement. La science est déjà sur leur piste, elle a franchi le seuil de bien de ces «ignorabimus» qui semblaient impénétrables à la fin du siècle dernier encore. Nous avons appris à poser des questions à la nature, et ceci est plus important que les connaissances dès à présent acquises et les réponses concrètes obtenues. Nous avons à transférer les multiples problèmes concernant l'homme du domaine de la mystique religieuse à la sphère de la recherche scientifique, compliquée mais exacte.

Ceci concerne tous les domaines de la science — aussi bien traditionnels que nouvellement créés et séparés du tronc jadis commun — qui s'occupent de l'homme en tant qu'élément de la nature animée et en tant qu'*être naturel*. Je pense ici à la biologie et, en particulier, à la génétique et à la biochimie qui lui sont étroitement liées, et dont les progrès extraordinaires annoncent non seulement des changements révolutionnaires de notre connaissance de l'homme mais aussi des possibilités radicalement neuves d'influence pratique sur la formation et le développement de l'homme. Deux problèmes me semblent ici particulièrement importants: la synthèse de l'albumine qui permettrait de franchir le seuil du mystère de la formation de la vie organique / qui appartenait jusque là au domaine absolu de la mystique religieuse / et le déchiffrement de la structure biochimique de la cellule organique qui nous permettrait de comprendre la formation et le développement physique et psychique de l'être humain.

Un autre domaine dans lequel nos connaissances ont considérablement augmenté est celui de la physiologie et en particulier de la physiologie du cerveau et de la partie de la psychologie qui est étroitement liée à cette dernière. Le développement de la physiologie du

cerveau est un grand succès du XX^e siècle bien que ses fondements remontent au XIX^e siècle. Grâce à lui, notre connaissance de plusieurs fonctions de la vie psychique de l'homme a été approfondie, ce qui a permis de faire progresser la psychologie. Celle-ci — à l'encontre des traditions du passé — devient de plus en plus une science naturelle, ce qui ne diminue en rien son contenu humain.

Les sciences dénommées traditionnellement humaines ou sociales se trouvent nettement en retard par rapport aux secteurs des sciences naturelles qui nous intéressent ici parce qu'ils font partie de la science de l'homme. Je pense non seulement à leur rythme d'évolution relativement plus lent ou aux nuances plus ou moins subjectives de ce que l'on appelle dans ce domaine la vérité scientifique / ne serait-ce qu'à cause de l'influence du facteur social sur la position prise par le chercheur /; je pense aussi à l'état d'arriération, au sens strict de ce mot, qui est liée à leur incapacité d'absorber les nouveaux éléments de nos connaissances de l'homme apportés par les sciences naturelles. De ce fait, la forme traditionnelle des sciences humaines devient de plus en plus anachronique et exposée aux critiques. La réalisation du postulat d'intégration est, pour ce domaine de la science de l'homme, une question de vie et de mort et, en tout cas, la condition du franchissement de l'obstacle à une véritable innovation.

Cela ne signifie pas pour autant que dans ce domaine également un net progrès n'ait été accompli. Au contraire, de nouvelles disciplines se sont développées, preuve de nouveaux intérêts et de nouvelles perspectives scientifiques / anthropologie culturelle et sociale /. Les disciplines traditionnelles ont connu un grand essor / p. ex. la sociologie, l'économie et la psychologie /. On a pu remarquer — au moins dans une certaine mesure — l'absorption impétueuse du matériel apporté par les sciences naturelles. Cela a eu pour effet une transformation de la forme traditionnelle des disciplines anciennes / p. ex. la psychologie et, au moins en partie, la linguistique dans sa forme structuraliste /. Le développement des méthodes mathématiques et de la cybernétique a conduit à des expériences plus ou moins réussies dans les sciences sociales / avec des résultats probants en économétrie et quelque peu plus contestables en sociologie /. Seule la philosophie s'en tient dignement, dans sa réflexion anthropologique, aux positions des siècles passés. Sauf certains changements de vocabulaire, sorte de camouflage terminologique, elle répète obstinément des idées anciennes en général formulées de manière plus claire et plus simple dans le passé.

En somme, dans ce grand et important domaine des sciences de l'homme, il s'est produit aussi quelque chose au cours de ces dernières décennies. Mais j'hésiterais à déclarer qu'il s'agit de changements qualitatifs. Les changements qui m'apparaissent essentiels en ce qui concerne la réflexion sur l'homme / abstraction faite du changement quantitatif de nos connaissances *de fait* qui se sont considérablement enrichies, surtout s'il s'agit de l'histoire et des sciences comparées /, sont les changements méthodologiques et gnoséologiques. Ils sont tous deux importants pour le développement ultérieur de ce type de réflexion et d'études, et ils sont tous deux liés à l'inspiration marxiste, du fait que la méthode marxiste a été incorporée d'une façon naturelle à l'ensemble des sciences humaines et sociales.

Pour ce qui est des méthodes, l'approche systématiquement historique des phénomènes sociaux s'est vue complétée ces derniers temps d'une manière harmonieuse par l'application des méthodes structuralistes. En ce qui concerne l'aspect gnoséologique — lequel possède également des implications méthodologiques — il s'agit, à mes yeux, de la prise en considération sérieuse de la théorie de la vérité: ce que nous appelons vérité est conditionné par des facteurs individuels et sociaux qui influent sur la position du chercheur; donc — sauf dans certains cas seulement et seulement s'ils sont interprétés d'une certaine façon — il n'est possible d'aboutir à la vérité absolue de façon scientifique qu'au cours d'un processus infini. Cette thèse est propre à la forme modérée de la sociologie de la connaissance et à l'heure actuelle elle a presque généralement droit de cité dans le monde de la science.

Les considérations qui précèdent paraissent conduire à la conclusion que dans le développement des sciences de l'homme — développement révolutionnaire dans certains domaines, moins impétueux mais toujours important dans les autres — nous sommes parvenus à un point où l'intégration de ces sciences s'impose. Elle est nécessaire non seulement pour faciliter ce développement lui-même et vaincre les traditions conservatrices, mais pour prendre une position active tendant à ce qu'une action réfléchie soit entreprise par les différentes sciences de l'homme.

Comme je l'ai déjà dit, le dernier mot en ce qui concerne l'état de fait, l'appréciation de la situation et les propositions de solution, incombe aux spécialistes représentant les différentes disciplines intéressées. Je me suis borné ici à signaler un problème général.

Je voudrais maintenant m'arrêter sur le second des éléments signa-

lés et apporter quelques réflexions historiques, à la limite de la philosophie et de la sociologie. Elles pourront peut-être nous aider à apprécier la situation et à tirer des conclusions pour l'activité pratique dans ce domaine de la science.

La thèse est la suivante: le développement de la science de l'homme, conditionné à l'heure actuelle par l'intégration de cette science, répond non seulement à un besoin propre de celle-ci mais encore à un besoin *social*, résultant de certaines lois du développement de la société. S'il est vrai que les conditions sociales peuvent soit freiner soit accélérer le développement de la science / ce qu'on pourrait, dans les deux cas, illustrer par des exemples historiques/, il semble que notre époque est particulièrement propice à l'intensification de la réflexion sur l'homme.

Je voudrais présenter ces considérations non seulement pour ouvrir la discussion, mais aussi en tant que spécialiste d'un domaine particulier, bien que très général, de la réflexion sur l'homme, l'anthropologie philosophique. Mes considérations seront celles d'un philosophe, et d'un philosophe appartenant à une école philosophique déterminée, l'école marxiste. Je ne crois pas, quant à moi, à la possibilité de philosopher «en général», en dehors de toute école; car même celui qui déclare ne se rattacher à aucune des écoles existantes vise lui-même — avec plus ou moins de succès — à créer sa propre école. Je crois donc qu'il est plus sage de poser les problèmes ouvertement car, les choses étant claires, la discussion est plus facile.

Si donc ces remarques sont elles d'un philosophe appartenant à une école philosophique déterminée, je pense que leurs implications pour le problème qui nous intéresse plus largement n'en seront pas moins nettes.

Les problèmes de la philosophie de l'homme et surtout les problèmes des rapports de l'individu et de la société prennent de l'importance, au cours de l'histoire, dans les périodes où le système social établi chancelle et qu'avec lui s'ébranle le système de valeurs jusque-là socialement admis. Aussi longtemps que le mécanisme social fonctionne sans accrocs, aussi longtemps que — pour user du langage marxiste — règne l'harmonie entre les forces productives et les rapports de production, l'individu formé sur la base de ces rapports sociaux est enclin à les considérer comme naturels. Il considère également comme naturelles les normes de coexistence sociale établies régissant ses propres rapports avec la société. Ceci s'accomplit tout naturellement, généralement sans même que l'individu en ait con-

science, puisqu'il a été formé dans cette société donnée et dans ce groupe social. La société le dote d'un langage, d'une certaine manière de voir le monde et de penser, d'un système de valeurs déterminé ainsi que d'habitudes, de coutumes et d'une certaine moralité qui s'y rattachent. Il faut l'ébranlement des rapports sociaux, l'accumulation des conflits objectifs dans la base et, par suite, dans la superstructure de la société, l'ébranlement et la désintégration du système de valeurs traditionnellement admis, pour que l'individu commence à prendre brusquement conscience de sa particularité et aussi à poser nettement le problème de ses rapports avec les autres individus, avec la société. Comment vivre dignement ? — est la question qui, sous des formes diverses, se pose toujours à l'homme. Mais dans les périodes révolutionnaires, dans les périodes de transition d'une formation socio-économique à une autre, dans les périodes de désintégration des rapports existants, traditionnels, entre l'individu et la société, et l'élaboration difficile de rapports nouveaux, ce problème se pose avec une acuité particulière. On sait déjà que l'on ne peut plus et l'on ne veut plus désormais vivre comme par le passé, mais l'on ne sait pas encore comment il convient de vivre. Ce sont là des périodes qui incitent à l'auto-réflexion de l'individu sur son propre statut et sur son propre sort, des périodes qui favorisent l'essor de la philosophie de l'homme. L'histoire a connu des périodes d'« explosion » des problèmes relatifs à la philosophie de l'homme, par exemple lorsque le courant socratique, qui donnait comme objet propre à la philosophie les problèmes de l'homme même, prit le dessus sur le courant de la philosophie naturaliste de Démocrite, qui étudiait avant tout les lois générales régissant la réalité.

Ce rôle des conflits de l'époque dans les conflits de la conscience humaine et, partant, de l'auto-réflexion de l'individu, a été perçu, dans le passé comme à l'heure actuelle, par ceux qui ont fait des problèmes de l'homme l'objet principal de leurs recherches.

Hegel a été l'auteur de la théorie de la conscience malheureuse, déchirée. Aujourd'hui, dans des circonstances nouvelles, ses idées sont reprises par Jean Hyppolite :

« Mais les périodes critiques dans l'histoire sont celles où l'ordre ancien ne subsiste plus qu'en apparence et où l'ordre nouveau n'a pas encore fait son apparition. Ces périodes de transition qui précèdent les révolutions sont des périodes de déchirement intérieur pour l'esprit. La dialectique ne parvient à la conscience que comme dialectique négative. On n'aperçoit pas encore en elle la positivité qui est l'envers de sa négativité. On a bien souvent insisté depuis Hegel sur ces crises qui pré-

cèdent les grands changements des valeurs établies. Cependant, l'analyse de Hegel nous paraît particulièrement originale à cette date»².

En 1845, donc à l'époque où Marx écrivait ses œuvres de jeunesse, Soeren Kierkegaard notait dans son journal que dans les périodes qui précèdent les grands évènements on voit apparaître des hommes qui, à l'instar de certains oiseaux annonciateurs de pluie, sont capables de prévoir l'approche de l'orage social³.

Comme le fait remarquer Hans Schoeps, c'est là une réflexion qui pourrait se rapporter à de nombreux penseurs de cette époque /selon nous, elle se rapporte très certainement aussi à Marx/ qui — avant leurs contemporains — ont su prévoir la crise de l'époque, ainsi que la désintégration du système de valeurs établi.

Ces sentiments ont été exprimés avec une force et une netteté particulièrement remarquables par Tocqueville, à propos d'évènements dont il fut contemporain :

«...Ce qui est clair pour moi, c'est qu'on s'est trompé depuis soixante ans en croyant voir le *bout* de la révolution... Il est évident aujourd'hui que le flot continue à marcher, que la mer monte; que non seulement nous n'avons pas vu la fin de l'immense révolution qui a commencé avant nous, mais que l'enfant qui naît aujourd'hui ne la verra vraisemblablement pas. Ce n'est pas d'une modification, mais d'une transformation du corps social qu'il s'agit. Pour arriver à quoi? En vérité, je l'ignore, et je crois que cela dépasse l'intelligence de tous.

On sent que l'ancien monde finit: mais quel sera le nouveau? Les plus grands esprits de ce temps ne sont pas plus en état de le dire que ne l'ont été ceux de l'antiquité de prévoir l'abolition de l'esclavage, la société chrétienne, l'invasion des barbares, toutes ces grandes choses qui ont renouvelé la face de la terre...»⁴.

Ces remarques de Tocqueville qui datent de 1849 reflètent fidèlement l'état d'esprit de ceux qui, à l'époque, s'interrogeaient sur les problèmes de l'individu et de ses rapports avec la société en transformation impétueuse. Et ils étaient légion.

Si l'on considère le milieu dans lequel vivait Karl Marx et qui avait dans un certain sens formé son esprit, ce problème — sous le nom significatif d'humanisme — en était la dominante. Feuerbach et

² Jean HYPOLITE, *Etudes sur Marx et Hegel*, Libr. Marcel Rivière, Paris, 1955, p. 60-61.

³ Soeren KIERKEGAARD, *Tagebücher*, éd. Th. Haecker I, p. 326. Cité d'après Hans SCHOEPS, *Was ist der Mensch?*, Musterschmidt Verlag, Göttingen, 1960, p. 20.

⁴ A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, *Oeuvres*, Tome V: *Correspondance et oeuvres posthumes*, Paris, 1866, in 8°, pp. 461-462 «Lettre du 28 avril 1850 à Eugène Stoffels».

Moïse Hess, Bruno Bauer et Stirner, de nombreux autres, tout comme d'ailleurs le jeune Marx, sont préoccupés principalement par cette question: comment faire de l'homme, devenu l'esclave de ce qu'il a créé, un être qui soit maître de son sort? Comment assurer à l'homme le plein et libre essor de sa personnalité? Comment créer les conditions les meilleures au bonheur humain afin de rendre l'existence de l'homme conforme à son idéal, à son «être» /pour employer le langage de l'époque/, transformant ainsi l'homme réel en homme véritable?

Lorsqu'on envisage les problèmes auxquels s'attaquaient les représentants des tendances humanistes de l'époque, on se rend compte de combien leur sens est d'actualité. Voilà l'homme en face d'un monde étranger, aliéné, dans lequel ce qu'il crée — que ce soit dans le domaine économique, politique, idéologique /en particulier religieux/ ou social/ en particulier familial/ — devient indépendant, se dérobe au pouvoir et à la volonté de l'individu et, plus encore, commence à réduire celui-ci à sa merci, à le subjuguier. L'homme se retrouve dans la situation de l'apprenti sorcier. Il a déclenché des forces qu'il n'est plus en mesure de conjurer. La tâche qui s'impose est donc la suivante: transformer ce monde inhumain, dominé par des choses, en un monde d'hommes libres, maîtres de leur destin et pour qui le bien suprême est l'homme. Ainsi compris, l'humanisme est en quelque sorte une théorie du bonheur. L'objectif principal, c'est que les hommes soient heureux, qu'ils *puissent* être heureux.

En abordant ce problème Marx n'était pas original, et il n'était pas isolé dans ses méditations. Au contraire — comme l'a fort bien dit Lénine — ils est retrouvé sur la grande route des problèmes et des réflexions de son époque. C'est, entre autres, en cela que consiste sa grandeur. C'est, entre autres, ce qui fait son actualité à notre époque, ce qui fait que sa manière de poser le problème nous est si proche.

Car si les problèmes qui ont préoccupé le jeune Marx et ses contemporains ont existé bien plus tôt au cours de l'histoire, ils ont pris une importance particulière au XIX^e siècle. Manifestement — le souvenir de la Révolution Française en était le symbole sanglant — le vieux monde allait à son déclin. Le monde nouveau commençait seulement à s'installer, aggravant les contradictions fondamentales de la société et les mettant à nu. L'ancien système de valeurs tombait en ruines. Le nouveau était encore en gestation, provoquant des oppositions et des conflits. Le problème de l'individu, désemparé et avide de stabilisation, opprimé et avide de liberté, exploité et avide de

vivre véritablement, déchiré et avide de bonheur, se posait plus violemment que jamais. Il devenait le problème de l'époque, car c'était une époque de transformations et de révolution.

C'est là précisément ce qui fait l'actualité de ces problèmes dans une situation autre mais semblable, dans une époque aux contradictions et aux conflits incomparablement plus aigus, mais néanmoins analogues à ceux de l'autre époque.

Marx et ses contemporains — dont Kierkegaard — posaient les problèmes de l'existence humaine, ils formulaient des programmes d'humanismes de diverses sortes, parce que cette existence était nettement menacée, parce qu'il y avait un net besoin social de réponses à des questions précises. Hegel a dit un jour qu'aucune philosophie ne dépassait son époque. Il est possible de donner une forme positive à cette même pensée — chaque philosophie, et à coup sûr chaque philosophie trouvant un écho, constitue une réponse à des questions et des problèmes actuels. C'est précisément pourquoi nous aussi, aujourd'hui, sous des aspects philosophiques différents, nous abordons les problèmes de l'existence humaine: c'est précisément pourquoi les problèmes du jeune Marx nous semblent aussi proches.

Si les problèmes anthropologiques dominent dans la philosophie contemporaine, c'est qu'il faut trouver des réponses relatives à l'existence, à une époque où cette existence est menacée et où, dans la période de transition entre deux formations, les systèmes de valeurs traditionnellement admis ont été ébranlés. Des chercheurs ayant, par ailleurs, des positions philosophiques très éloignées voire même opposées, s'accordent sur ce diagnostic.

C'est ainsi que voit ce problème un communiste — Roger Garaudy:

«Les deux guerres mondiales ont exercé une influence déterminante sur la formation et le développement des philosophies de l'existence. D'abord, elles ont largement contribué à contraindre toutes les philosophies, existentialisme athée, philosophies chrétiennes, marxisme, à être des philosophies de l'existence, parce que les fondements de l'existence humaine étaient remis en cause et que la réponse ne pouvait être différée. Il n'est pas de philosophie contemporaine vivante qui ne traduise cette situation de l'homme, de tous les hommes, jetés dans des conflits universels, dans des destins inconnus, et devant la menace permanente de la mort, dans une angoisse généralisée à l'échelle des événements qui la suscitent»⁵.

⁵ Roger GARAUDY, *Perspectives de l'homme*, Presses Univ. de France, Paris, 1959, p. 8.

A l'autre bord du royaume de la philosophie, on trouve Martin Buber, qui a effectué l'une des analyses — selon moi — les plus intéressantes du problème qui nous préoccupe, d'autant plus intéressante d'ailleurs qu'elle est antérieure à la Seconde Guerre Mondiale. Elle a donc été élaborée par un auteur qui n'avait pas encore connu les conséquences que celle-ci entraînerait pour l'homme dans le monde actuel.

Dans son livre *Le problème de l'homme*⁶, Buber distingue les périodes de flux et de reflux de la vague des idées anthropologiques, qu'il fait dépendre du sentiment de solitude de l'homme. Si l'on y ajoutait simplement une explication sur l'origine de ce sentiment de solitude, à savoir que l'homme se sent «sans feu ni lieu» dans un monde en transformation violente, dans lequel les rapports humains et les systèmes de valeurs sur lesquels ils reposent subissent des bouleversements révolutionnaires, nous pourrions pleinement souscrire à ce diagnostic.

Pendant, selon Buber, le problème anthropologique n'est arrivé à sa maturation qu'à notre époque. Buber voit la raison de ce phénomène dans deux facteurs, outre l'essor et le mûrissement de la pensée philosophique elle-même.

Le premier est le facteur sociologique, à savoir la désintégration des formes traditionnelles de la coexistence humaine, telles que la famille, la communauté rurale, urbaine etc., conséquence de la révolution bourgeoise.

Le second facteur /et c'est là que nous parvenons à la partie, selon moi, la plus intéressante du raisonnement de Buber/, c'est le fait que l'homme perd le contrôle du monde qu'il a créé; il s'agit donc du phénomène que Marx, à la suite de Hegel, avait jadis appelé l'aliénation.

«Ce point concerne le rapport entre l'homme et les nouvelles choses et relations nées de son action ou avec son concours. L'homme se laisse distancer par ses oeuvres: c'est ainsi que je nommerais volontiers cette singularité de la crise moderne. L'homme n'est plus capable de venir à bout du monde né sous sa propre action: ce monde devient plus fort que lui, il se libère de lui, il lui fait face dans une élémentaire indépendance, et l'homme ne connaît plus le mot qui conjurerait le Golem qu'il a créé et qui l'empêcherait de nuire»⁷.

Ainsi donc Buber parle, en d'autres termes, des mêmes phénomènes autour desquels se concentrait l'attention du jeune Marx et de ses

⁶ Martin BUBER, *Le problème de l'homme*, Aubier, Paris, 1962, p. 19.

⁷ M. BUBER, *op. cit.*, p. 60.

contemporains lorsqu'ils analysaient le *statut* de l'individu sur le fond des bouleversements de l'époque. Il parle des mêmes phénomènes lorsqu'il mentionne plus loin la technique, l'économie et la politique, comme étant les domaines où l'on ressent le plus la domination de l'homme par les choses et les relations nées avec son concours.

Ce problème prend une acuité particulière chez Buber dans le domaine de la politique, sur le fond des événements de la première guerre mondiale. Souvenons-nous que ce qu'il dit, dans ce contexte, ne tient compte ni des terribles expériences de la seconde guerre et de ses conséquences, ni de l'épée de Damoclès de la destruction atomique, suspendue au-dessus de l'humanité.

«Ainsi l'homme se trouve devant l'épouvantable fait qu'il engendrait des démons dont il ne pouvait pas se rendre maître. Quel sens avait donc cette puissance qui était en même temps impuissance? La question aboutissait à celle de la nature de l'homme, laquelle recevait une nouvelle signification, immensément pratique»⁸.

C'est sans doute là que réside l'essentiel du problème: à notre époque les questions de l'anthropologie philosophique ont pris pour les hommes une signification pratique. C'est ce qui explique le «flux» de ces problèmes après la première et surtout après la seconde guerre mondiale /tant Buber que Garaudy sont d'accord pour voir dans ce «flux» un phénomène socio-psychologique intéressant/.

Martin Heidegger a fait dans les années vingt une remarque qui constitue une généralisation:

«A aucune époque la connaissance de l'homme n'a été aussi vaste et diverse qu'aujourd'hui... Mais jamais non plus, cette connaissance n'a été aussi minime qu'aujourd'hui. A aucun moment l'homme n'a fait l'objet d'autant de questions qu' à l'heure actuelle»⁹.

Certes, les phénomènes d'aliénation sont apparus dans la société il y a longtemps — durant toute la vie sociale des hommes sans doute — mais jamais ils n'ont pris une forme aussi violente et puissante qu'aujourd'hui. Et cela sous tous les aspects: économique, politique, social et idéologique.

A toutes les époques de l'histoire de l'humanité il y a eu des moments où l'existence humaine était menacée, mais jamais cette me-

⁸ *op. cit.*, p. 61.

⁹ Martin HEIDEGGER, *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*, Verlag Fr. Cohen, Bonn, 1929, p. 200.

nace n'a revêtu un caractère aussi total qu'à présent, aussi horrible dans ses conséquences pour l'existence humaine.

Il y a eu bien entendu, par le passé, des moments où le système de valeurs était mis en question. Mais jamais ces phénomènes n'ont été aussi généralisés, ni aussi profonds que maintenant, quand dans une partie du monde la conviction s'impose que l'ancien système de valeurs — bien que publiquement on le vante — est dépassé, qu'il n'est plus valable, alors que dans l'autre, le système de valeurs n'est pas encore suffisamment formé et enraciné, et partant, ne sert pas encore convenablement.

Quoi d'étonnant, dès lors, si l'individu se sent menacé, incertain, effrayé, s'il ne se sent pas lié organiquement avec la société, et si, par conséquent, il a un sentiment de solitude et d'isolement ? C'est là un phénomène normal dans les périodes de bouleversements et de désintégration des rapports humains. Mais il est tout aussi naturel que ces époques soient propices à la réflexion de l'homme sur lui-même, sur les problèmes passant généralement inaperçus, que ces époques voient s'accroître l'importance et le rôle de l'anthropologie philosophique. Comme l'a si bien exprimé Buber :

«Je distingue dans l'histoire de l'esprit humain entre des époques où l'homme possède sa demeure et des époques où il est sans demeure. Dans les unes, il habite le monde comme on habite une maison: dans les autres, il y vit comme en plein champ, et il ne possède même pas, parfois, les quatre piquets qu'il faut pour dresser une tente. Dans les premières, la pensée anthropologique n'existe qu'en tant que partie de la pensée cosmologique: dans les deuxièmes, la pensée anthropologique gagne sa profondeur et, avec elle, son indépendance»¹⁰.

Maintenant, notre monde vit justement une époque où l'homme n'habite pas la société comme on habite une maison, mais il y vit comme en plein champ, pour reprendre la métaphore de Buber. Surtout depuis la seconde guerre mondiale et le début de l'ère atomique.

Pour revenir au problème général de l'intégration des sciences de l'homme, il faut souligner que ce problème est stimulant, avant tout, par son caractère actif. Si l'on peut considérer comme acquis que les représentants des différentes disciplines de la science de l'homme reconnaîtront nécessaire l'intégration de nos connaissances de l'homme, il ne s'agit donc pas de savoir *si* cette intégration est utile et juste mais *comment* la réaliser. Et cela sans perdre aucun

¹⁰ Martin BUBER, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

des profits qui découlent de la spécialisation. Autrement dit: comment peut-on aboutir à l'intégration de la science de l'homme sans porter atteinte à la spécialisation de ses diverses disciplines ?

La spécialisation est, historiquement, un phénomène nécessaire et un facteur de progrès. Il ne s'agit point de la rejeter mais de surmonter la désintégration qui y est liée.

Mais que faut-il entendre concrètement par là ?

Il me semble qu'avant tout il convient de trouver les points de contact entre les disciplines particulières qui étudient les différents aspects d'un même sujet, les points de contact dans le double sens de ce mot.

Il s'agit d'abord de trouver une problématique commune, traitée dans les diverses disciplines sous des jours différents et, en principe, à partir d'un matériel de fait différent. Par exemple: le problème de la personnalité intéresse traditionnellement le psychologue et le pédagogue, mais /ce qui est relativement nouveau/ il intéresse aussi les représentants de l'anthropologie culturelle et se trouve maintenant au centre de l'intérêt du biochimiste. Il découle de là une nécessité fondamentale et simple: il faut que tous ces spécialistes n'abordent pas le problème de la personnalité sans connaître l'approche de ce problème par les disciplines voisines et les résultats atteints par elles dans ce domaine.

Il faut d'abord souligner la double restriction que contient cette idée. Il n'est évidemment pas question que les spécialistes d'une discipline connaissent à fond aussi les disciplines connexes. Cela signifierait la fin de la spécialisation et à l'heure actuelle c'est physiquement irréalisable /il est vrai que la mémoire électronique auxiliaire est déjà du domaine des possibilités techniques, mais elle n'est pas encore un fait réel dans la vie scientifique courante/. Il s'agit seulement que les spécialistes d'une discipline connaissent le mode d'approche d'autres disciplines par rapport à un problème *concret* qu'ils étudient et les résultats obtenus par ces disciplines dans ce domaine. Cette exigence, en apparence élémentaire, est encore loin d'être réalisée dans la pratique scientifique. En somme, il s'agit uniquement de ce but *informatif et didactique*, ce qui est la seconde restriction de l'idée avancée ci-dessus. Son importance est pourtant grande pour le progrès de la science, car cela remédierait à l'ignorance interdisciplinaire toujours fréquente.

Par ailleurs, la mise en évidence des points de contact peut avoir aussi un effet *heuristique*, en raison de l'influence stimulante de la problématique des disciplines connexes et des résultats obtenus par

elles. Sur cette base peuvent apparaître des synthèses partielles qui, à leur tour, peuvent revêtir une importance heuristique.

Quand nous parlons de l'intégration de la science de l'homme, nous voulons «trouver les points de contact» dans les deux sens de ce mot. Cette tâche, apparemment modeste, est aussi difficile à réaliser que féconde en conséquences potentielles.

Car, nous l'avons dit, il ne s'agit pas seulement d'avancer un postulat, mais de trouver les voies de sa réalisation.

Commençons par la chose la plus élémentaire: par l'aspect informatif et didactique. Une tâche relativement simple serait d'établir un répertoire des problèmes «avoisinants» à partir de la présentation, aussi détaillée que possible, de l'état des recherches dans des disciplines particulières, et des réflexions de leurs représentants sur le besoin de coopération avec les spécialistes voisins. Méthode primitive mais, pour commencer, assez prometteuse, ne serait-ce que parce que jusqu'à présent on ne l'a pas essayée. C'est d'autant plus facile que sa réalisation /au moins au début/ est relativement simple. On pourrait songer notamment à des colloques bien préparés de spécialistes de diverses disciplines à l'échelle nationale et internationale.

Le travail relatif au second but — heuristique — exige, en revanche, une organisation assez complexe. Il s'agirait d'abord de susciter et d'organiser des recherches appropriées en transplantant les problèmes et sans doute aussi, plus d'une fois, les résultats obtenus, d'une discipline à une autre, après leur avoir fait subir les modifications nécessaires. L'étude en commun des mêmes problèmes par des disciplines différentes, à l'aide de méthodes différentes et en partant de points de vue différents, devrait être considérée comme un degré encore supérieur. Ceci ne pourrait donner des résultats que si tout était soigneusement réfléchi, planifié et coordonné.

Il faudrait pour cela des Instituts de la Science de l'Homme avec des plans de recherche précis, disposant de cadres scientifiques et de moyens matériels appropriés. Les Instituts de ce type pourraient avoir un caractère national. Mais il nous faudrait aussi un Institut analogue de caractère international. Une initiative à ce propos devrait être — à mon avis — un des buts de notre rencontre.

L'avantage d'un Institut international consisterait en la meilleure utilisation, à l'échelon mondial, des cadres assez modestes dont disposent les disciplines particulières. Ensuite, et peut-être avant tout, un Institut international permettrait de prendre en considération les diverses écoles scientifiques qui, bien souvent, correspondent à une répartition géographique et, partant, présentent des tendances à l'iso-

lement. Notre expérience au Centre européen des Sciences sociales témoigne du fait que, du point de vue de l'organisation, un Institut international pose à certains égards moins de problèmes que la création d'un Institut national.

Cette idée est d'autant plus digne d'attention que, selon toute vraisemblance, on pourrait compter sur un appui actif de l'UNESCO qui, lors de sa conférence générale de 1964, a décidé de concentrer ses activités dans le domaine des sciences sociales et humaines autour des problèmes de la *science de l'homme*, ce qui devait se traduire par la création d'un seul Département des Sciences de l'homme. Conformément à la conception de Monsieur René Maheu, Directeur Général de l'UNESCO, conception que je partage entièrement, il s'agit de transformer l'UNESCO qui, dans le domaine des sciences sociales, était jusqu'à présent l'administrateur encyclopédique de toutes les disciplines possibles, en un centre de stimulation et d'organisation du progrès scientifique sur les points les plus névralgiques. *L'intégration de la science de l'homme* est, assurément, l'un de ces points. Le projet que je me permets de soumettre comme un des éléments de notre discussion, dépasse le cadre des sciences sociales car, sans les sciences naturelles, l'intégration de la science de l'homme est, à l'heure actuelle, impossible. J'ai le sentiment que ce projet est conforme à l'esprit des tendances de l'UNESCO et qu'il pourra donc trouver l'appui de cette organisation, si nous réussissons à esquisser les voies de sa réalisation concrète.

NOTES ON THE METHODOLOGY OF COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY

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The objective of this essay is to throw light on a number of difficult and unresolved methodological issues that have plagued the comparative analysis of economic institutions and behavior — as well as other types of comparative analysis — for many decades. I shall first outline the issues, then mention a few efforts that scholars have made to solve them, and finally outline my own views on a methodological perspective and some research strategies that may improve on these suggested solutions.

THE ISSUES

The issues to which I shall address myself take the following forms:

(1) In what ways is it appropriate to regard comparative economic analysis as the search for features of economic life that are universal in their incidence and in what ways as a study of variations? For example: Is the psychological propensity to economize to be considered universal? Is it profitable to search for similar institutional forms (e.g., the market) from society to society? Is it appropriate to ascertain the degree to which industrialization is correlated with the isolated nuclear family? In one respect the answers to these questions are empirical; however, I am posing them in terms of their methodological appropriateness.

(2) How is it possible to compare economic institutions and activities in diverse sociocultural contexts? This issue, which might be termed «the problem of comparability,» arises at three distinct levels: a) How can we be certain that the *events* and *situations* we wish to explain are comparable from one sociocultural context to another? How, for example, can we compare production rates a century ago with production rates now? Were not recording procedures different then from now? Was not the social meaning of a product

different then from now? More generally, are not «the [economic] activity and the income... inseparable and...both embedded together in the customs and ways of thought which mould the social life of the community as a whole?»¹. b) How can we be certain that the general *dimensions* used to compare societies cross-culturally do not do violence to the events and situations we wish to study? In what sense is it appropriate to apply the concept «economic» to both the role of an African subsistence farmer and to that of a member of the board of directors of a large American corporation? In what sense are both roles economic? Certainly it appears that *some* general dimensions are necessary to engage in comparative analysis; otherwise the investigator would seem to be committed to a radical relativism that prohibits him from moving beyond the confines of a single social unit. But the truth of this general point does not solve the problem of what particular comparative dimensions do least violence to the distinctive sociocultural meaning of events and situations, yet at the same time provide a genuinely general basis for comparison. c) How is it possible to compare very different *social units* (or social systems) with one another? Does it make any sense to compare a highly complex economy like those of the modern West or the Soviet Union with hunting-and-gathering tribes in Australia, when it is obvious that these economies differ from one another in almost every conceivable respect?

(3) Should economic activity in different societies be described in terms of its meanings to the members of the societies themselves, or should it be measured by some objective index? Should we, at one extreme, be prepared to regard as economic any kind of activity that any culture happens to regard as economic? Or should we, at the other extreme, search for indices such as dollar equivalents to describe all economic activity everywhere, no matter what its socio-cultural context²?

(4) If, indeed, we wish to investigate economic life in different

¹ S. Herbert FRANKEL, *The Economic Impact on Under-developed Societies*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959, pp. 41-42.

² Claude LEVI-STRAUSS has presented this distinction in terms of its relation to consciousness. «[The anthropologist] may have to construct a model from phenomena the systematic character of which has evoked no awareness on the part of the culture; ...Or else anthropologist will be dealing, on the one hand, with raw phenomena and, on the other, with the models already constructed by the culture to interpret the former.» See «Social Structure,» reprinted in Sol Tax (ed.), *Anthropology Today: Selections* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), p. 324.

contexts how are we to define the various concepts to be used — concepts such as «economic» and «noneconomic» themselves, «capital,» «savings,» «production,» and so on ?

These several issues are closely interrelated. The degree of universality of a phenomenon depends in part on the way this phenomenon is defined. «Marketplace», which refers to a physical location at which exchange takes place, for example, is more nearly universal than «market,» which in the economist's definition would involve not only exchange but also some generalized medium of exchange such as money, equilibrating mechanisms such as supply and demand, and perhaps some notion of economic rationality attributed to buyers and sellers³. Moreover, the degree of comparability of different units also depends on the choice and definition of concepts. To choose a non-economic example, the concept of civil service is so intimately linked with a bureaucratic form that it is literally useless in connection with societies without a formal state or governmental apparatus. The concept of administration is somewhat superior, since it is not so closely tied to particular forms of bureaucracy, but even this term is quite culture-bound. Weber's concept of staff is even more helpful, since it can encompass, without embarrassment, various political arrangements based on kinship and other forms of particularistic loyalties⁴. Staff is more satisfactory than administration, then, and administration more satisfactory than civil service, because the former allow for a wider range of instantiation in principle. The questions of definition of concepts, adequacy of comparability, and universality of occurrence, then, appear to rest in large part on a single master question : how adequately does the investigator choose and use his comparative categories ? To this question this essay is devoted.

APPROACHES TO THE ISSUE OF COMPARABILITY

In the area of comparative economics existing solutions to the master question I have posed tend to fall between two extremes —

³ For a discussion of the distinction between marketplace and market, and the empirical occurrence of both, see Paul BOHANNAN and George DALTON, «Introduction,» in *Markets in Africa* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1962), pp. 1-12.

⁴ Max WEBER, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, translated by A.M. HENDERSON and Talcott PARSONS (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947), pp. 329 ff.

phenomenological subjectivism (and relativism) on the one hand, and positivistic objectivism on the other. With respect to the former, the investigator, conscious of the vast ranges of variability in economic activity and in meanings assigned to it in different socio-cultural contexts, is pulled toward the position of representing the «economic» differently for each culture. This position is well stated by Marcel Mauss, who characterized his own comparative methodology as follows:

...since we are concerned with words and their meanings, we choose only areas where we have access to the minds of the societies through documentation and philological research. This further limits our field of comparison. Each particular study has a bearing on the systems we set out to describe and is presented in its logical place. In this way we avoid that method of haphazard comparison in which institutions lose their local colour and documents their value.⁵

Presumably the research method most appropriate to this kind of definition is ethnographic work in the field, on the basis of which the investigator records the values, beliefs, and other cultural items as faithfully and accurately as possible. If pressed to its extreme, however, this position leaves the investigator in a state of paralysis. He soon ends in a position of radical relativism, at which he must treat everything as «economic» that any group happens to define thus; and, respecting «local colour» in this way, he loses his grasp on any general concept of the economic whatsoever, and hence loses any ability to engage in comparative analysis.

The first rule of thumb in comparative analysis, then, is to avoid concepts that are so particularly tied to single cultures or groups of cultures that no instance of the concepts, as defined, can be found in other cultures. Some more general definition of economic is required — for example, a definition based on the fact that all societies face the problem of scarcity of natural resources and human resources and skills, and that they must come to terms in some institutionalized way with this problem. Such a definition would appear to have comparative potential, since all societies can be said to have a scarcity problem and display economic behavior; moreover, the definition would appear to avoid the conceptual paralysis associated with the extreme of phenomenological subjectivism. But it is

⁵ *The Gift: Forms and Functions of Exchange in Archaic Societies*, translated by Ian CUNNISON (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1954), pp. 2-3. Emphasis added.

necessary to proceed further and ask how economic behavior, defined thus, is identified empirically in different sociocultural contexts.

One convenient and widely used way of identifying the economic is to limit the empirical referents of the term, as did Alfred Marshall, to those aspects of men's attitudes and activities which are subject to measurement in terms of money⁶. From the standpoint of empirical precision, this monetary index has clear advantages. From the standpoint of encompassing economic behavior on a uniform and universal basis, however, it is severely limited. Even in our own society, many activities that are economically significant — housewives, labor, lending a hand to a friend, etc. — are seldom expressed in monetary terms. In the case of economies based on subsistence farming and domestically consumed household manufacture, the limitations of the monetary index are even more marked, since the most fundamentally economic kinds of behavior — such as the production, distribution, and consumption of foodstuffs — never become monetized. In addition, the monetary index is limited from the standpoint of comparing a growing economic system with its own past, since one of the concomitants of economic growth is the entry of an increasing proportion of goods and services into the market context — and hence their increasing monetization; this means that if the monetary definition of economic is used, the rate of growth will be artificially inflated by the fact of the transformation of nonmonetized economic activity into monetized economic activity⁷. When used for international comparisons of wealth, such indices suffer not only from the fact of differential levels of monetization, but also from the frequent practice of translation of various currencies into dollar or other equivalencies, usually on the basis of current international exchange ratios. Since many of these ratios are pegged artificially and do not represent true economic exchange ratios, additional bias creeps into the comparative estimates.

Another objective definition has been suggested in the work of

⁶ Alfred MARSHALL, *Principles of Economics*, eighth edition (London and New York: Macmillan, 1920), Book I, chapter II.

⁷ It should be added that some definitions of economics do not limit economic activity to monetized activity. Thus Samuelson's textbook definition is "...the study of how men and society choose, *with or without the use of money*, to employ scarce productive resources to produce various commodities over time and distribute them for consumption, now and in the future, among people and groups in society." Paul A. SAMUELSON, *Economics: An Introductory Analysis*, 5th edition (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1961).

Polanyi, Arensberg, and Pearson⁸. Reacting negatively to the tradition of formal economics — which distorts comparisons by imposing a market bias on nonmarket economies — they suggest that economic activity be defined as that instituted process which results in a «continuous supply of want-satisfying *material* means». This materialistic definition introduces a bias precisely opposite to that of the monetary definition of economic activity — a bias in favor of the primitive and peasant societies. In such societies, it appears (but is not necessarily the case) that economic activity is devoted to a sort of material subsistence based on food, clothing, and shelter. In advanced market societies, however, in which expressive behavior, ideas, personalities, and other nonmaterial items have economic value, the formula of the economic as the «supply of want-satisfying material means» collapses as an adequate comparative tool. It is as illegitimate to try to force a physical or material bias on all economic activity as it is to impose a fully developed model of the market on all economic activity⁹.

How, then, is the comparative analyst to steer a course between the Scylla of paralysis associated with culture-specific definitions and the Charybdis of distortion associated with more general definitions¹⁰. No ready solution exists in the literature, from my reading,

⁸ Karl POLANYI, Conrad M. ARENSBERG, and Harry W. PEARSON, *Trade and Market in the Early Empires* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press and The Falcon's Wing Press), 1957.

⁹ For further development of this point, and further criticism of the formulation developed by POLANYI, *et al.*, cf. Neil J. SMELSER, «A Comparative View of Exchange Systems,» *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, Vol. 7 (1959), pp. 173-182.

¹⁰ This tension between culture-specific and general measures has made its appearance in the general theoretical discussions of structural-functional analysis, in particular in the discussion of the «postulate of indispensability.» In general terms, this postulate holds that there are certain universal functional exigencies (such as the socialization of the young, the integration of diverse groups in society) which society faces, and that there are *specific* social-structural forms which *alone* serve these functions (structural forms such as the nuclear family for socialization and organized religion for integration, for instance). Thus the postulate of indispensability links specific institutional or behavioral indices with general social functions, just as the monetary definition of economic activity links «measurement in terms of money» to the general concept of «economic.» The formulations are parallel. Objecting to the postulate of indispensability, Merton has asserted that «just as the same item may have multiple functions, so the same function may be diversely fulfilled by alternative items. Functional needs are... taken to be permissive, rather than determinant, of specific social structures.» Robert K. MERTON, *Social Theory and Social Struc-*

and the approach I now propose is put forth as an indication of the general direction to be taken rather than as a final solution to this difficult dilemma.

Any encompassing definition and measure of economic activity must involve more than some convenient index of monetized activity, physical production, or some other objective phenomenon. It must involve a definition of the production, distribution, and consumption of scarce goods and services *in relation to individual and social goals*. Economists have long recognized this relational quality of economic activity in their preoccupation with the notion of utility as the basis of value. Yet their preoccupation has been predominantly with the wants of individuals, despite the tradition of welfare economics that has pursued questions of inter-individual comparability and community welfare¹¹. Furthermore, economists have generally tended to treat wants as given and stable, and therefore subject to no further analysis. But in comparative analysis the question of wants as the ultimate defining basis for economic activity and measurement cannot be taken as a parametric given¹²; it must be treated in relation to variable societal values and goals.

To arrive at an appropriate comparative definition of economic activity, therefore, we first recognize that a society possesses a value-system that defines certain goals as desirable for members and groups of the society at various levels. By a process of institutionalization, the appropriate channels for realizing these goals are specified. It

ture, revised and enlarged edition (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1957), pp. 33-34. In line with this position, Merton goes on to insist on the importance of concepts like «functional alternatives», «functional substitutes», and «functional equivalents.» Here Merton is opting for general comparative concepts (functions) that encompass a wide variety of empirical manifestations (items).

¹¹ See, for example, I.M.D. LITTLE, *A Critique of Welfare Economics* (Oxford: at the Clarendon Press, 1950); Jerome ROTHENBERG, *The Measurement of Social Welfare* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1961).

¹² Joseph S. BERLINER, an economist, commenting on the anthropological method, states: «Economists do not as a rule search for regularities between the economic system and the kinship system or religious or political systems; the latter are assumed to be 'given'... The application of the cultural anthropological method... would involve the replacement of the shift parameter by a series of variables... The economist's assumption of the stability of consumer preferences, at least with respect to cultural variables in the short run, is probably valid. For long-run prediction, however, the use of cultural variables may significantly improve the results.» «The Feet of the Natives are Large: An Essay on Anthropology by an Economist,» *Current Anthropology*, Vol. 3, N° 1 (Feb., 1962), pp. 53-54.

is apparent, however, that all societies exist in an environment that does not guarantee automatically the complete and instantaneous realization of these goals. Hence an important part of the societal situation is that certain institutionalized attention be given to the supply of various facilities to attain the valued goals. Part of this attention is economic activity. The goals — and the institutionalized means for attaining them — may vary considerably; they may concern perpetuation of kinship lines, attainment of a state of religious bliss, territorial expansion, or maximization of wealth. Economic activity in any society is defined as a *relation* between these goals and the degree of scarcity of goods and services. Indeed, the definition of the economic in any given society — and the structure of its economy — will be in large part a function of both the institutionalized values and goals and the availability (or scarcity) of human and nonhuman resources.

The investigator of comparative economic activity, then, must allow cultural values and meanings to intervene between his most general concept («the economic») and its specific measurements. He must begin by comparing systematically the value-systems of different societies, then identify and measure — using a different set of operational rules in each society — what classes of activity are economic (scarce) in relation to these values. This difficult and prolonged research operation is certainly more plagued with problems of operationalizability than the simple comparison of market transactions. The difficulties of the comparative analysis of cultural values are only too well appreciated by anthropologists and comparative sociologists. But I am convinced that comparative analysis — both of economic activity in particular and social behavior in general — cannot proceed far without striving to introduce social values and meanings into the comparative identification and measurement of general constructs; if it does not undertake this task, it will be bedeviled by uncorrectable distortions from the very outset of study.

From a methodological point of view, I am suggesting that some of the sources of cultural variability (values and goals) that obscure a neat correspondence between a universal concept (the economic) and its specific manifestations (items of behavior) *be themselves systematically classified and brought to bear on the measurement process*. As I have indicated, past solutions to this methodological issue have tended either to ignore these sources of variability by treating them as given and non-variable or to be discouraged from com-

parative analysis and driven into isolated case studies by them. The type of solution suggested here would incorporate the sources of cultural variability into the very process of comparative analysis. I see this solution as in keeping with the general method of scientific analysis, *viz.*, to make determinate those sources of variation that have hitherto been assumed to be so simple as to be nondeterminate or so complex as to be indeterminate.

SOME RESEARCH STRATEGIES FOR COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

Thus far the discussion has concerned primarily general and conceptual means of coming to terms with the problems of sociocultural variability and complexity. In addition, there are a number of more concrete and specific strategies to be observed in posing research questions and conducting research — strategies also directed toward the problems of variability and complexity. In the remainder of this essay I shall outline these strategies, again using mainly the comparative study of economic activity for illustration.

Let us begin with a specific comparative problem: why does the gross national product of some societies grow at a faster rate than that of others? (Assume for the moment that adequate comparative measures for GNP have been devised.) The factors contributing to the answer to such a question are, at first sight, discouragingly numerous. In the first instance, of course, the several factors of production — land, labor, capital, and organization — and the characteristics of demand determine the level of production. Each of these determinants is, however, itself conditioned by a vast array of sociocultural factors — the kinship system, the educational framework, the stratification system, the political structure, and so on. The initial picture in comparative analysis, then — indeed, in social analysis in general — is one of a *multiplicity* of operating conditions, a *confounding* of their influences on the dependent variable, and an *indeterminacy* regarding the effect of any one condition or several conditions in combination. The corresponding problems facing the investigator at this stage are to *reduce* the number of operating conditions, to *isolate* one condition from another, and thereby to *make precise* the role of each condition, both singly and in combination with other conditions. How does the investigator face these problems?

The general answer to the question is that he imposes some sort of

organization on the conditions, for example, by distinguishing among independent, intervening, and dependent variables. One of the most fundamental ways of organizing conditions is found in the distinction between conditions treated as *parameters* and conditions treated as *operative variables*. Parameters are conditions that are known or suspected to influence the dependent variable, but which, in the investigation at hand, are made or assumed not to vary. Operative variables are conditions that are known or suspected to influence the dependent variable and which, in the investigation, are made or allowed to vary in order to assess this influence. By making variables into parameters for purposes of analysis, most of the potentially operative conditions are made not to vary, so that the operation of one or a few conditions may be isolated and examined.

The distinction between parameters and operative variables is a relative one. What may be treated as a parameter in one investigation may become a variable condition in another. Suppose, for example, it is known that foreign trade is important in the determination of the national income of a society, but that calculation of the impact of foreign trade on the domestic economy is impossible unless certain internal relations — say, between private investment, government investment and consumption — are already known. The economist may proceed by assuming that foreign trade is a parameter — i.e., that it does not exist, or that it occurs at a constant rate throughout the time period in question — and, by thus simplifying the picture of the determinants of income, may proceed to establish national income as some function of private investment, government investment and current consumption. Having established these relations, he may then «relax» the restricting assumption about foreign trade, and «allow» it to vary, thus tracing its impact on the known relations internal to the economy. In the same operation he may very well have transformed domestic investment into a parameter — i.e., assumed it not to vary — in order to pinpoint the impact of foreign trade more precisely.

The several methods of inquiry in the social sciences may be characterized in terms of the ways in which parameters and operative variables are controlled, manipulated, combined and re-combined into explanatory accounts. The *experimental* method, for example, involves the direct human manipulation of situations to create parameters and operative variables. Control variables are those variables whose influence is nullified by manipulation of experimental conditions; these variables can be treated as parameters or constants

so that the influence of experimentally varied conditions can be isolated and investigated systematically. The *statistical* method, which applies mathematical techniques to populations and samples of events containing large numbers, attempts to achieve the same transformation of potentially operative conditions into parameters. The main difference between it and experimentation is that the latter does so by situational manipulation whereas the former does so by conceptual (mathematical) manipulation, which holds constant or cancels out sources of variation, or shows them to be actually inoperative. Even the method of *heuristic assumption* I have mentioned — the method of simply assuming large sources of variation to be given or stable — attempts to make parameters of known or suspected sources of variation so that the influence of other, operative variables may be assessed.

The *comparative* method is frequently employed for the scientific analysis of historical data which cannot be controlled experimentally and the number of cases of which is too small to permit statistical analysis. (This method is most evidently required in comparing societies, which are few in number, but may also be used in comparing regions, cities, communities, and other sub-societal social units.) Because of the difficulties of experimental and statistical manipulation, the investigator is forced to rely on systematic comparative illustration. Despite these restrictions, however, the logic of the comparative method is identical to the methods just listed in that it attempts to yield scientific explanation by the systematic manipulation of parameters and operative variables. Two classic examples will show this identity.

One of Durkheim's central findings in his study of suicide was that Protestants persistently display higher rates of suicide than Catholics¹⁸. The variable which he employed to explain this finding was differential integration of the two religious groupings: Protestants, with their anti-authoritarian, individualistic traditions are less integrated than Catholics and hence less protected against self-destruction. On examining the countries on which his religious data were available, however, Durkheim noticed that the Catholics were in the minority in every case. Could it not be, he asked, that minority status rather than religious tradition is the operative variable in the genesis of the lower suicide rates among Catholics? To throw

¹⁸ Emile DURKHEIM, *Suicide*, translated by John A. SPAULDING and George SIMPSON (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1951), pp. 152-156.

light on this question, he examined regions such as Austria and Bavaria, where Catholics are in the majority; in these regions he discovered some diminution of the differences in suicide rates between Protestants and Catholics, but Protestant rates were still higher. On the basis of this examination, he concluded that «Catholicism does not owe [its protective influence] solely to its minority status¹⁴.» In this operation Durkheim used no statistical techniques; yet he was approximating their use through systematic comparative illustration. He was making minority status into a parameter in order to isolate the distinctive influence of the religious variable.

Max Weber's studies on religion and rational bourgeois capitalism illustrate the difference between the positive and negative variants of the comparative method. Given that certain societies (mainly in North-West Europe and North America) had developed rational bourgeois capitalism, Weber asked what characteristics these societies had in common. In doing so he was using the *positive* comparative method — identifying similarities in conditions associated with a common outcome. Then, turning to societies that had not developed this kind of economic organization (e.g., classical India, classical China), he asked in what respects they differed from the former societies. In so doing he was using the *negative* comparative method — identifying conditions associated with divergent outcomes. By thus manipulating the conditions and the outcomes, Weber built his case that differences in religious systems were crucial in accounting for the different economic histories of the various societies¹⁵. Translating Weber's comparative method into the language of scientific inquiry, Weber was making parameters of those general features shared by both the West and his Oriental examples (for instance, he ruled out the influence of merchant classes by pointing out that both China and the West had these classes prior to the development of capitalism in the West); and he was making operative variables of those religious features in which they differed.

The comparative method as just outlined is a systematic attempt to come to grips with the methodological issues raised at the beginning of this essay. It takes cognizance of the variability in socio-

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 157.

¹⁵ Relevant works include *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, translated by Talcott PARSONS (London: Allen & Unwin, 1948); *The Religion of China*, translated by Hans H. GERTH, (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1951); *The Religion of India*, translated by Hans H. GERTH and DON MARTINDALE (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1958).

cultural context but attempts to control it by the method of systematic illustration, and by continuous transformation of parameters into operative variables and vice-versa. Viewing the comparative problem in this way, it is possible to suggest a number of specific research strategies that are advisable at the present state of the art of comparative analysis.

First, while — given the appropriate comparative categories — it is in principle possible to compare economies so different as the American urban-industrial complex and hunting-and-gathering tribes, it is more fruitful to compare economic variations in societies that are much closer to one another in many respects. For example, it would be a fruitful exercise to compare the different paths of development of socialist economic policies in Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland and Iceland, which are similar but not identical in cultural traditions and social structure. It would be less fruitful to compare the socialism of Denmark with the socialism of emerging African countries, whose cultural traditions and social structures are vastly different. The reason for adopting this research strategy can be stated in terms of the distinction between parameters and operative variables. If two societies share some important conditions in common, it is relatively more permissible to treat these common conditions as parameters, and proceed to examine the operation of other variables as if these common conditions were not operative, because their operation is presumably similar in both cases. By contrast, if two social units that differ in almost every respect are chosen for comparison, the investigator is in the disadvantaged position of having to consider all sources of difference as operative variables, because he is unable to «control» them by considering them to be similar. The more similar two or more societies are with respect to crucial variables, in short, the better able is the investigator to isolate and analyze the influence of other variables that might account for the differences he wishes to explain¹⁶.

Second — and related to the first — it is fruitful to replicate comparisons *between* social units by means of comparisons *within* social units. Let me illustrate this method first by reference to a non-

¹⁶ For an example of a comparative study of «close» cases, see Lipset's comparisons of differences in political structure among the four English-speaking democracies of Australia, Canada, Great Britain, and the United States. Seymour M. LIPSET, «The Value Patterns of Democracy: A Case Study in Comparative Analysis», *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 28 (1963), pp. 515-532.

economic example. Durkheim's best-analyzed case of altruistic suicide was the military case. His general interpretation was that military personnel, in comparison with civilians, are more involved in a collective code of honor, and therefore are more likely to sacrifice themselves through self-destruction in the name of this code. On this basis he predicted higher rates of suicide among military personnel than among civilians. The available suicide statistics tended to support his hypothesis. Even after he corrected for marital status, the differences between military and civilian personnel stood. Still, it might be argued, it is not clear that Durkheim had isolated the salient differences between military and civilian personnel; after all, they differ in many other circumstances than in degree of commitment to a code of honor, and on the basis of the gross comparison between military and civilian personnel alone it is impossible to know that the differential value-commitment is the operative variable. By way of attempting to support his own interpretation, Durkheim turned to the analysis of *intra*-military differences in suicide rates. First he compared those with limited terms of service with those of longer duration, finding that the latter — presumably more imbued with the military spirit than the former — showed higher suicide rates; next he compared officers and noncommissioned officers with private soldiers, finding that the former — again more involved in the military life — showed higher rates; finally, he found a greater tendency for suicide among volunteers and re-enlisted men, i.e., those who chose the military life freely. Summarizing these *intra*-military findings, Durkheim concluded that «the members of the army most stricken by suicide are also those most inclined to this career...¹⁷». By this replication at the *intra*-unit level Durkheim rendered more plausible the *inter*-unit relation (between military and civilian)¹⁸.

The main advantage of replication at different analytic levels is to increase or decrease the investigator's confidence in a suspected association between conditions and the phenomenon to be explained. In some cases *intra*-unit comparisons may prove more fruitful than *inter*-unit comparisons. The logic behind this assertion is the same

¹⁷ *Suicide*, p. 233.

¹⁸ For a discussion of Durkheim's study, with special reference to the problems of replication and statistical significance, cf. Hanan C. SELVIN, «Durkheim's *Suicide* and Problems of Empirical Research,» *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 63 (1958), pp. 607-619.

that lies behind the assertion that it is more fruitful to compare social units that are similar to one another in important respects. Suppose we wish to carry out certain investigations on societies that differ from one another in terms of level of industrialization. Suppose further that Germany, a highly industrialized country, and Italy, a less industrialized country, are the two societies chosen for comparisons. For many purposes it would be more fruitful to compare northern Italy with southern Italy, and the Ruhr with Bavaria, than it would be to compare Germany as a whole with Italy as a whole. These two countries differ not only in level of industrialization but also in cultural traditions, type of governmental structure, and so on. From the standpoint of inter-unit comparison, these differences are not controllable as parameters. If the investigator were instead to pursue intra-unit comparisons between those parts of Italy and Germany that are industrialized and those parts that are not, it is more nearly possible to hold these inter-unit differences constant, and thus pinpoint the factors lying behind differential industrialization more precisely. Then, having located what appear to be operative factors in the intra-unit comparisons, it is possible to move to the inter-unit comparisons to see if the same differences hold in the large.

Important and advantageous as are the method of comparing similar cases and the method of replication at different levels for the establishment of comparative findings, the investigator must proceed judiciously in their use. He must attempt to establish empirically — not merely assume — that those conditions he treats as parameters are indeed based on similarities and continuities between and within social units. Otherwise his study will suffer from the methodological weaknesses that arise when noncomparable units are analyzed.

I shall conclude with a few comments — ventured in the light of the methodological approach I have outlined — on the first issue I introduced: the appropriateness of asking to what degree empirical phenomena and associations are universal and to what degree variable. So long as this question is posed with the understanding that the extent of empirical occurrence of a phenomenon and its associations is a necessary preliminary to comparative explanation, it is a legitimate question. In so far as the search for empirical universals becomes an end in itself, however, it can lead to relatively unproductive research and unnecessary controversy. I shall illustrate this point by referring to the familiar issue of the relations

between the urban-industrial complex and the isolated nuclear family.

The argument for the universal association between these two social phenomena — an argument presented by the Chicago school of the inter-war period¹⁹ — runs roughly as follows: The traditional farm or peasant family is given a shock by the development of a commercial market structure, by the development of industry, or by the development of cities — usually, in fact, by some great social force involving an undifferentiated combination of all three. The immediate effects of this shock are to draw one or more family members into wage labor (separated from the household), thereby destroying the traditional division of labor, making the family more mobile socially and geographically, placing the family in a generally anonymous social environment, and perhaps destroying its economic base further by flooding the market with cheap, mass-produced commodities that compete with those previously produced in the domestic setting. The result is the small nuclear family that is mobile, neolocal and isolated from many of its previous social connections and functions. Once this assertion of the universality of the connection between the urban-industrial complex and the isolated nuclear family is made, the research problem quite appropriately becomes one of establishing the empirical strength of the relation by examining different societies at different stages of economic and urban development.

If the research question remains at this level, it is likely to lead to two unhelpful preoccupations. First, research on the degree of universality of some occurrence or association may degenerate into controversy over the precise degree of «universality» that exists. With respect to the association between the urban-industrial complex and the family, «negative findings» have begun to accrue and attacks have been launched on the formulation just outlined²⁰. These

¹⁹ Relevant works are Ernest W. BURGESS and Harvey J. LOCKE, *The Family: From Institution to Companionship*, second edition (New York: American Book Company, 1953); W.F. OGBURN and M.F. NIMKOFF, *Technology and the Changing Family* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1955); and Ernest R. Mowrer, *Family Disorganization: An Introduction to a Sociological Analysis* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1927).

²⁰ For example, Gideon SJOBERG, «Family Organization in the Pre-industrial City», *Marriage and Family Living*, Vol. 18 (1956), pp. 30-36; John MOGEY, «Introduction» to «Changes in the Family», *International Social Science Journal*, Vol. 14 (1962), p. 417; Eugene LITWAK, «Occupational Mobility and Family Cohesion», and «Geographic Mobility and Extended Fa-

findings tend to show that the isolated nuclear family sometimes antedates urbanization and industrialization and that various kinds of extended family structures persist into urban-industrial development. While such findings are valuable, the research does little to specify, in a systematic way, any new conditions by which we can account for differences in the relations between urban-industrial variables and family structure. This limitation stems, I submit, from an exaggerated preoccupation with the empirical universality — or lack of it — of the association.

Second, if a sociocultural occurrence or association is to be described as genuinely universal, its characterization may have to be so general as to compress many important sources of variation into very global concepts. Certainly the variables of industrialization and urbanization should be separated from one another at the very outset for purposes of assessing their impact on the family. Furthermore, neither urbanization nor industrialization constitutes an irreducible whole; several subtypes of each should be identified before any adequate statement of the relations between each and the family can be formulated. In addition, the «isolation of the nuclear family» is not a single entity; it also displays a variation that demands classification and separate description of subtypes. If we introduce these kinds of complexity in relating the variables — though limiting the subclassifications on both sides to avoid falling into mere historical description — we are in a more advantageous position for establishing the specific conditions under which urban and industrial variables will influence family variables than if we remain at the level of highly nonspecific universals. Of course, to refine variables in this way means to sacrifice some «universals» and «invariants» in the meantime, but in this case I consider the sacrifice to be an advantage for the program of comparative analysis.

family Cohesion," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 25 (1960), pp. 9-21 and 385-394; Sidney M. GREENFIELD, «Industrialization and the Family in Sociological Theory," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 67 (1961-62), pp. 312-322. See also the brief but informative discussion by William J. GOODE, in *The Family* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964), pp. 108-116.

UNITÉ ET DIVERSITÉ DE LA SOCIOLOGIE

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I.- LES CONDITIONS SOCIALES DE LA PRODUCTION SOCIOLOGIQUE

Une expérience historique nouvelle suscite de nouvelles orientations des conduites, un nouveau sens de la situation vécue : ce sens apparaît, est reconnu, codifié en institutions, en normes sociales et transmis aux nouveaux membres de la société; le sens devient ordre.

Dans l'union de ces deux mouvements, celui qui oriente l'action et celui qui règle les conduites, celui qui crée les institutions et celui qui les maintient, réside l'unité de l'analyse sociologique. Mais leur décalage, le malentendu qui sépare toujours l'action historique et le système social, la novation et le fonctionnement, permettent seuls l'apparition de la sociologie. Celle-ci n'a pour objet que le sens caché, non reconnu, du neuf.

Point de sociologie où manquent l'action nouvelle, la création historique, l'invention de groupes, d'idées, de sentiments nouveaux; point davantage où l'évolution est entièrement contrôlée, dès le départ interprétée, canalisée et dirigée dans des formes sociales qui sont supposées lui être parfaitement adaptées.

C'est pourquoi les sociologies sont inquiètes et inquiétantes, toujours menacées par les tenants de l'ordre établi, du passé intangible et tout autant, de l'avenir scientifique. Elles ne vivent qu'entre le bois de l'histoire et l'écorce des institutions.

Si le regard des sociologues se porte à la limite du présent et de l'avenir, ce n'est pas seulement pour des raisons pratiques, à cause des matériaux qu'offre le vivant à l'observation, à l'enquête et à l'expérimentation, c'est d'abord parce qu'il est plus aisé de ne pas comprendre le présent, parce que l'illusion du tout social, alimenté de sa propre substance, ne perdant rien dans le mouvement qui monte des racines aux branches, est plus difficile à accepter dans le présent, où la nécessité est moins visible, les révoltes plus nombreuses, les contraintes plus quotidiennement ressenties.

L'idée hégélienne de l'histoire, rappelle L. Althusser, est «que tous

les éléments du tout coexistent toujours dans le même temps, dans le même présent et sont donc contemporains les uns aux autres dans le même présent. Cela veut dire que la structure de l'existence historique de la totalité sociale hégélienne permet ce que je propose d'appeler une «*coupe d'essence*», c'est-à-dire cette opération intellectuelle par laquelle on opère à n'importe quel moment du temps historique une *coupure* verticale, une coupure du présent, telle que tous les éléments du tout révélés par cette coupe soient entre eux dans un rapport immédiat, qui exprime immédiatement leur essence interne» (Esquisse du concept d'histoire in *La Pensée*, Juin 1965, page 5).

Pour le sociologue au contraire, la société n'est jamais contemporaine à elle-même, elle est à la fois son avenir et son passé, une expérience vécue, encore informulée ou décrite de manière à la fois incohérente et non responsable, et des cadres sociaux et mentaux, expression qui marque assez clairement que *les règles s'appuient* les unes sur les autres, maintiennent une certaine rigidité et ne sont pas la mise en forme parfaite d'une inspiration ou d'une expérience.

Tout l'effort du sociologue vise donc à réduire l'espace vide sans lequel pourtant il ne peut exister. Il rêve d'intégration sociale, il la découvre où d'autres ne voient que désordre ou pure initiative, mais si sa société proclame elle-même sa propre intégration, il se rejette aussitôt vers la description du nouveau, du scandaleux, du marginal, de tout ce qui témoigne du mouvement incessant de la vie sociale et donc de la nécessité de la libre analyse.

Sa fonction est de chercher l'ordre dans les phénomènes; sa raison d'être est que cet ordre s'invente et se transforme à chaque instant. Imaginons une organisation purement bureaucratique. Le sociologue en énonce les règles, mais doit aussitôt se retirer devant le naturaliste qui, beaucoup mieux que lui, en calcule le fonctionnement. Rappelez-lui au contraire que toute organisation est soumise à une politique, doit plus simplement s'adapter à un environnement, il reprend son travail, en considérant d'abord les rapports et les tensions de la politique et de l'administration, de l'invention des fins et de la résistance des moyens.

Disons, en empruntant au vocabulaire politique de la France du XIX^e siècle, qu'il n'y a pas plus de sociologie de l'ordre que de sociologie du mouvement, car toute sociologie naît de la distance entre l'un et l'autre et travaille à les réunir.

La situation la plus défavorable à la sociologie est donc l'existence

d'une société stagnante, ou en faible transformation ou dont les changements sont limités à une aire très particulière et qui, en même temps, s'impose ou se voit imposer un mode d'interprétation de la réalité sociale fortement intégré. Plus précisément, le risque est grand que dans une telle situation l'institution universitaire au sein de laquelle doit naturellement se développer la connaissance de la société comme toute autre forme de connaissance scientifique, soit surtout une agence de transmission de valeurs culturelles héritées, plutôt qu'un organe d'interprétation de nouvelles pratiques sociales.

Moins défavorable est la situation où l'absence de créativité sociale s'accompagne d'une crise de la pensée sociale. La sociologie tend alors à s'interroger sur le fonctionnement même de la société. Elle accorde un certain privilège à l'étude des conduites sociales concrètes et des structures sociales figées qu'elles font apparaître. Peut-être son thème central est-il alors l'inégalité sociale et ses manifestations les plus visibles, les barrières, la séparation des classes dans l'espace urbain ou dans le système d'enseignement. Parallèlement, l'attention se porte sur les formes et les conséquences de la non-participation ou de l'exclusion sociale, sur le chômage, sur la criminalité, sur la désorganisation sociale. Sociologie proche de l'observation ethnographique et soucieuse de servir à l'étude, voire à la solution des problèmes sociaux.

A cette situation s'oppose directement celle d'une société moderniste, mais animée ou dirigée par une pensée sociale fortement constituée, largement acceptée et enseignée. Le risque principal est alors d'identifier une réalité historique concrète à une notion sociale particulière, ce qui ouvre la porte à tous les dangers de la philosophie de l'histoire, et surtout à l'affirmation dogmatique que tous les éléments d'une situation sociale dénotent un mécanisme central. Le plus souvent, une société choisit un système d'analyse qui lui assure une situation privilégiée dans l'évolution. Si elle est économiquement très développée, elle tend à montrer que le niveau de modernité commande la plupart des attributs de la société; si elle est née d'un puissant mouvement social, elle tend à définir les autres sociétés comme dominées par les contraintes dont, seule, elle a su se libérer, ce qui peut aboutir à un extrême ethnocentrisme et à l'incapacité d'analyser utilement les sociétés étrangères.

Il est peu douteux que *la sociologie se développe avec le plus de vigueur* dans les situations où de grandes transformations sociales s'accompagnent d'une faible organisation de la pensée sociale. Cette situation recouvre des cas très divers, nous le verrons dans un ins-

tant, en recherchant les raisons sociales des diverses orientations de l'analyse sociologique. Pour l'instant, nous nous contentons d'indiquer la situation la plus favorable en général au développement de la sociologie, celle où existe une faible liaison entre l'expérience sociale et le système de valeurs codifié, institutionnalisé, défendu par la loi.

Il convient d'ajouter, à ces diverses situations, celle, plus élémentaire, où toute tension entre l'expérience et la pensée sociales disparaît officiellement, car l'ensemble des conduites est soumis à des règles impératives édictées par les états totalitaires, ne se définissant plus par un rôle de progrès ou de transformation sociale, mais par la volonté de puissance, le règne de l'appareil, ou la défense agressive d'une essence nationale ou « raciale ». La sociologie ne peut survivre dans une société totalitaire : le monument aux morts de la sociologie en porte le tragique témoignage.

Mais il ne suffit pas qu'existe une frange de clair-obscur entre l'expérience et la doctrine sociales pour que se développe la sociologie. Encore faut-il que s'y installent des institutions particulières universités ou institutions de recherche, qui se chargent d'établir scientifiquement une liaison qui n'existe pas pratiquement. Les universités doivent être indépendantes des forces de contrôle social; elles doivent aussi être tournées vers l'analyse des expériences sociales nouvelles.

Cette ouverture et cette indépendance ne se rencontrent pas partout. Même là où ne pèse aucun despotisme sur la vie universitaire, il est fréquent que l'esprit corporatif, la rigidité administrative ou la simple pauvreté empêchent les universités de jouer leur rôle de transformateurs de l'expérience sociale.

Cette observation conduit à considérer l'inégalité de développement de la sociologie dans le continent américain et dans le continent européen, au cours des dernières décennies.

Non seulement la production n'a pas crû en Europe au cours du demi-siècle écoulé d'une manière comparable à la croissance américaine, mais l'ensemble des sociétés européennes possède une sensibilité bien moindre aux travaux sociologiques que les sociétés américaines, qu'elles soient de langue anglaise, espagnole, portugaise ou française.

Le fait peut s'expliquer historiquement : les sociétés européennes ont joué un rôle d'avant-garde avant les autres et leur pensée sociale comme le travail de leurs sciences sociales s'est organisé autour de l'opposition et de la complémentarité de l'évolution historique et

de la résistance d'ensembles géographiques régionaux. Aujourd'hui encore, en France par exemple, l'histoire sociale et économique d'un côté, la géographie régionale de l'autre, représentent les éléments les plus solides de la formation scolaire et universitaire en matière de sciences sociales.

L'importance de l'analyse économique d'un côté, de l'étude des communautés locales, surtout urbaines de l'autre, en Grande-Bretagne, est du même ordre. Ce qui explique peut-être l'accueil assez favorable reçu dans plusieurs pays européens par les domaines de la recherche sociologique très proches de l'étude historique et géographique, comme la sociologie industrielle, la sociologie rurale et la sociologie urbaine. Est-ce absolument un hasard si le plus important centre de recherches français, le Centre d'Etudes Sociologiques, a compté parmi ses directeurs un géographe et un sociologue qui a toujours proclamé son attachement au groupe des «Annales», c'est-à-dire à l'école historique née de l'œuvre de Marc Bloch et de Lucien Febvre ? La situation n'apparaît pas profondément différente en Italie, en Angleterre, en Allemagne, en Belgique et aux Pays-Bas.

D'autre part, il est indiscutable que la sociologie a longtemps rencontré des obstacles, s'est même heurtée à des condamnations en Union Soviétique et dans les pays se réclamant de la même orientation politique qu'elle. Le fort développement de la sociologie en Pologne après 1956 ne fait que renforcer cette observation générale. Les pays scandinaves font dans une certaine mesure exception à ce schéma, sans pour autant conduire à l'abandonner.

Mais cette résistance européenne à la sociologie n'est pas un phénomène simple. Si on résume les observations précédentes en disant que la sociologie se développe dans des sociétés modernistes, où la pensée sociale est faiblement intégrée et peu contraignante et où existent de fortes institutions universitaires à la fois ouvertes aux problèmes de la société et politiquement indépendantes, on peut reconnaître trois facteurs de résistance à la sociologie en Europe. En premier lieu, l'absence de modernisme de certaines sociétés qui, malgré de profondes transformations économiques, n'ont pas profondément transformé leur orientation sociale et culturelle. On ne doit pas oublier l'importance de ce décalage qui permet de dire que beaucoup de sociétés européennes ont été au cours des deux dernières décennies, des économies en croissance plus que des sociétés en développement. On peut cependant estimer que les résistances du traditionalisme s'affaiblissent. En second lieu, beaucoup de sociétés européennes ou certains de leurs secteurs ont été attachées à des idéolo-

gies globales, en principe favorables au développement des sciences sociales, mais qui l'ont gênée en fait par un incessant rappel à la «totalité» conduisant au rejet de presque toute recherche concrète et limitée. Ici encore, on peut penser que des progrès ont été accomplis récemment et qu'une attitude plus favorable aux recherches positives se développe.

Enfin les universités européennes ont considérablement souffert du décalage entre le changement économique et les orientations sociales et culturelles, au moins en Europe Occidentale, dans les pays du Marché Commun et en Grande-Bretagne. Car si la sociologie est rejetée par le dogmatisme idéologique et politique, elle ne prospère pas lorsque la modernisation ne se diffuse pas dans l'ensemble de la vie sociale et culturelle, en particulier lorsqu'elle n'aboutit pas à créer des nouveaux modèles d'éducation.

Les universités des vieux pays industriels européens, libres mais faiblement pressées et soutenues par des modifications culturelles, ou moins partiellement institutionnalisées, se sont trouvées relativement isolées et peu inventives. L'importance de ce point, le fait que la sociologie ait dû, dans beaucoup de cas, se développer en marge des institutions universitaires traditionnelles, précise les raisonnements précédents.

La sociologie ne se développe que quand se produisent des «faits sociaux» nouveaux. Or, un changement technique, démographique ou économique ne devient un fait social nouveau que s'il est reconnu, si de nouvelles normes se créent, si elles sont au moins partiellement institutionnalisées. Le rôle de la sociologie est de transformer une expérience sociale en science sociale. C'est impossible si d'abord la réalité sociale n'a pas été transformé en expérience sociale.

II.- LES TYPES DE PENSÉE SOCIOLOGIQUE

L'énoncé des conditions favorables au développement de la sociologie ne permet donc pas d'établir une liaison directe entre ce développement et tel ou tel caractère particulier d'une société, son niveau économique ou son type de système politique.

La sociologie profite de toute forme de décalage entre l'expérience et la conscience collectives. Mais divers types de sociétés ou plutôt diverses formes de ce décalage comportent à la fois des dangers et des incitations particuliers pour la sociologie.

On peut schématiquement distinguer trois situations principales :

— *l'optimisme libéral* est le propre de sociétés ou de groupes sociaux qui connaissent des expériences sociales nouvelles et qui rencontrent sur leur chemin assez peu d'obstacles pour ne pas développer une conscience militante de la modernité, qui se mobiliserait pour détruire ou surmonter de tels obstacles. Le risque est donc assez grand de placer au centre de l'analyse une idée de l'évolution conduisant des sociétés closes aux sociétés ouvertes, de la communauté à la société, du transmis à l'acquis, du particularisme à l'universalisme, ou, plus simplement, de la rareté à l'abondance. Le devenir de la société apparaîtrait davantage comme une évolution que comme une action, l'objet propre de la sociologie est présenté comme l'étude des conduites sociales, des résistances ou de la participation à la modernité, de l'intégration ou de la marginalité sociales.

La sociologie, fortement associée à la psychologie sociale est alors surtout sensible aux conditions de fonctionnement des relations sociales. Les valeurs apparaissent comme un donné, comme un contexte, et toute l'attention se porte sur l'organisation du système d'interaction.

L'avantage principal d'une telle orientation est d'insister sur la spécificité de l'analyse sociologique, de rompre nettement avec la confusion de l'histoire sociale et de la sociologie et de permettre ainsi un progrès décisif de la théorie sociologique, en approfondissant les notions de statut et de rôle, de système social et d'organisation, de changement et de tension.

Le danger qui peut apparaître provient d'une réintroduction de la philosophie de l'histoire et surtout d'une retombée de l'étude de l'action sociale à celle de la société, souvent présentée comme un être quasi biologique.

— *l'optimisme progressiste* lie plus fortement l'expérience de modernité et la volonté de modernisation. Il s'intéresse à la formation de l'action sociale et surtout des mouvements sociaux, c'est-à-dire qu'il lie très fortement la création historique des valeurs et l'organisation des rapports sociaux. C'est une sociologie du développement, plus que du changement. Le risque couru est de souder à nouveau l'analyse sociologique à l'analyse historique et de retomber dans la philosophie de l'histoire, ou plus précisément, de confondre l'intention de la sociologie et l'idéologie des mouvements sociaux qu'elle étudie, comme on a pu le voir pendant la période d'essor de l'Amérique Latine, entre 1945 et 1960 — en particulier au Brésil.

— *le pessimisme progressiste* est d'abord sensible aux contradictions de la société et cherche les moyens de les dépasser. Il réagit

utilement contre l'étréitesse d'une analyse de la société en termes de système social et contre la confusion de l'intention et de l'action qui menace l'optimisme progressiste. En réalité, du point de vue de l'analyse sociologique, il n'existe pas de différence fondamentale entre ce pessimisme progressiste et ce qu'on pourrait nommer le pessimisme libéral. L'un et l'autre sont avant tout sensibles au conflit, à la violence, c'est-à-dire à l'opposé du lien social ou du mouvement social : la violence indique la relation de deux unités distinctes, en rapport certes l'une avec l'autre, mais d'abord distinctes, indépendantes, comme le sont deux Etats, deux négociateurs, deux groupes qui s'affrontent. Que ce type de pensée en appelle à Marx ou à Machiavel, ce qui ne veut pas dire qu'il soit celui de tous les marxistes ou de tous les machiavéliens, il rappelle la distance infranchissable qui sépare les constructions analytiques de la sociologie de la description de la pratique sociale. Ce qui fait sa force et aussi sa faiblesse, car il est souvent tenté de rester en marge de l'analyse sociologique.

On doit exclure tout effort de classement direct des œuvres de la sociologie moderne dans ces catégories. Telle n'est pas leur fonction. Elles ne proposent pas une analyse interne du mouvement de la sociologie, mais une description des conditions sociales dans lesquelles se développe l'analyse sociologique, dont on a d'abord tenté de définir la situation générale. C'est parce qu'on l'a située dans le clair-obscur qui partage l'expérience de la pensée sociale qu'on peut rechercher comment divers rapports entre ces deux réalités orientent de manières différentes le travail de la sociologie.

Les meilleurs sociologues intègrent plus ou moins ces divers courants de pensée, non pas abstraitement mais pour dégager l'existence de processus sociaux particuliers et aux connotations multiples.

III.- TYPES DE SOCIÉTÉS ET ÉCOLES SOCIOLOGIQUES

Il serait néanmoins insuffisant de dire qu'il existe divers courants de l'analyse sociologique, correspondant à des situations sociales différentes et entre lesquels les grands hommes de la sociologie jetteraient des ponts. Il n'existe d'analyse sociologique que dans la mesure où existe une certaine intégration entre les éléments ou les tendances qu'on vient de distinguer, où se trouve maintenue l'unité de la problématique sociologique.

C'est en ce sens qu'on peut parler d'écoles sociologiques. Isolé l'op-

timisme libéral ou tel autre courant tend à perdre sa qualité sociologique, se naturalise.

Une école n'est donc pas l'expression d'une tendance de l'expérience ou de la pensée sociale, mais un type de combinaison entre les éléments constitutifs de l'analyse sociologique, répondant à un certain état des relations entre l'expérience et la pensée sociales. C'est pourquoi cette notion ne peut jamais avoir qu'une importance secondaire. Elle est même dangereuse si elle dépèce l'analyse sociologique et constitue des ensembles étrangers les uns aux autres et qui ne communiqueraient que par l'anathème, le malentendu ou le compromis.

Les écoles sociologiques ne sont définies que par la diversité des situations dans lesquelles se développe le travail sociologique dont l'unité doit avoir été définie au moment où l'on s'efforce de distinguer ces écoles.

Après avoir défini cette unité dans la première partie, après avoir distingué les éléments constitutifs de l'analyse sociologique, l'étude du lien social, celle des orientations de l'action, celle des conflits inter-sociaux, dans la deuxième on peut donc distinguer sans risque de démanteler l'unité de la sociologie, diverses écoles sociologiques. On le fera d'abord à l'intérieur de la civilisation industrielle, c'est-à-dire des sociétés qui se définissent par leur rapport à leurs œuvres et non par leur dépendance à l'égard de leur passé ou de sociétés étrangères.

Les trois types de sociétés industrielles qu'on va distinguer représentent diverses combinaisons de modernité et de modernisme, d'innovation au niveau de l'expérience sociale et de volonté de transformation sociale volontaire.

Ces types ne correspondent donc pas directement aux tendances de la pensée sociologique que nous venons d'évoquer. Chacun d'eux représente une configuration historique particulière et donc une certaine combinaison des diverses tendances de la pensée sociologique. On doit seulement ajouter que dans chaque type de société les risques principaux que court la sociologie sont ceux qui accompagnent la tendance de la pensée sociale qui lui est la plus proche.

Les sociétés *libérales* se situent dans l'histoire, dans l'évolution plus qu'elles ne se saisissent comme des acteurs historiques volontaires. Elles sont donc très favorables à l'analyse fonctionnaliste des systèmes de relations sociales dans des cadres particuliers, organisations ou communautés, tandis qu'au niveau de la société globale elles sont plus sensibles à une analyse du changement menée en ter-

mes d'adaptation à une situation nouvelle donc de stratégies ou de recherche utilitariste du maximum d'avantages. Et c'est plutôt au niveau de l'individu que la sociologie, souvent grâce à des liens étroits avec la psychanalyse, se soucie de la formation des valeurs.

A l'inverse, les sociétés *volontaristes* sont celles qui se heurtent à de fortes résistances de la société traditionnelle et qui, pour les surmonter, développent des mouvements et des doctrines de transformation sociale. C'est donc au niveau de la société globale que se situe, dans ce cas, le souci de la création historique. Cette force des institutions sociétales entraîne un appauvrissement des systèmes sociaux particuliers et de leur analyse, souvent menée en termes stratégiques, le problème principal étant celui de l'accès à l'influence politique des «corps intermédiaires» villes, entreprises, ou organisations volontaires.

L'individu est considéré dans ses rapports avec un système général de décision et d'organisation, donc analysé en termes surtout fonctionnalistes, de rôles et de conflits de rôles, d'adaptation au changement, de carrière, etc..

Enfin, on nommera sociétés *contractuelles* celles qui, suivant le modèle anglais de la démocratie industrielle, ne séparent pas la modernisation économique et la transformation sociale, les unissent au contraire dans le thème de la participation croissante et de l'élargissement du «citizenship».

C'est alors au niveau intermédiaire des organisations et des communautés que les sociétés cherchent à comprendre leur dynamique, leur historicité. La société globale est analysée dans une perspective plus fonctionnaliste, le thème central étant celui du développement des relations contractuelles et de l'institutionnalisation des conflits. L'individu est considéré dans une perspective utilitariste, dans sa recherche de son intérêt ou de son bonheur.

Ainsi les divers types de sociétés industrielles poursuivent tous le même ensemble de problèmes, mais elles répartissent différemment, entre les trois principaux niveaux d'observation, celui de la société globale, celui des systèmes sociaux particuliers et celui de l'individu, leur triple souci commun de l'historicité, du lien social et de l'autonomie de l'acteur.

On ne peut pas dire qu'il existe des écoles nationales de sociologie, surtout si on considère les principaux producteurs de sociologie, mais on doit s'efforcer de reconnaître les liens, non pas d'une œuvre individuelle, mais d'un ensemble d'analyses avec une situation dé-

finie non historiquement et géographiquement, mais comme un certain rapport entre l'expérience et la pensée sociale.

On peut surtout s'interroger sur les problèmes principaux que rencontre chaque école sociologique. Dans la société libérale, c'est l'analyse de la société globale qui suscite les débats les plus vifs, comme en témoigne par exemple l'affrontement de Lipset et de Mills. Dans la société volontariste rien n'est plus chargé de conflits que l'analyse des organisations, puisque naturellement celles-ci sont considérées comme de simples instruments d'une volonté sociale supposée unifiée et transparente à elle-même. Enfin, dans les sociétés contractuelles, par nature participationnistes, c'est l'individu qui est au centre des débats. La sociologie n'est donc jamais la transcription directe de la situation qu'elle analyse; elle est d'autant plus vivante qu'elle s'efforce de maintenir son unité en luttant contre les limitations ou les distortions qu'impose la pratique sociale.

Ce rôle d'opposition est plus marqué encore dans les sociétés en voie de développement. Au Japon, c'est l'influence américaine qui a permis le développement de la sociologie dans une société dominée par un code fortement constitué de valeurs; au Brésil au contraire, ou en Argentine, la sociologie s'est élevée contre un développement surtout libéral; dans le Québec, elle se forme contre un modèle de société contractuelle.

Là où existe une forte intégration des forces modernisatrices et des mouvements de transformation sociale, la sociologie se développe difficilement. Elle rencontre plus de difficultés au Chili qu'en Argentine, au Mexique qu'au Brésil, en Egypte qu'en Turquie, en Yougoslavie qu'en Pologne, et on pourrait ajouter en Angleterre qu'en France et à fortiori en Union Soviétique qu'aux Etats-Unis. La sociologie est toujours un instrument de critique sociale, en appelant non pas à l'idéal contre toute réalité particulière, mais à l'unité d'une problématique scientifique contre les limitations de la pratique.

IV.- LES RÔLES NON PROFESSIONNELS DES SOCIOLOGUES

Etudier la situation sociale de la sociologie, conduit à s'interroger sur le rôle social des sociologues. Parce qu'ils sont à mi-chemin de l'expérience et de la pensée sociales, ils contribuent à former l'une et l'autre. Ils ont d'un côté un rôle d'innovation culturelle, de l'autre une fonction politique et idéologique. Parce qu'ils constituent une profession attachée au progrès de la connaissance, donc de la pré-

vision des conduites sociales; ils peuvent aussi jouer un rôle dans l'application de leurs recherches. Ici encore, on dira que si les sociologues ne possédaient qu'un seul de ces trois rôles, leur situation dans la société serait si particulière qu'elle mettrait en danger leur vie proprement scientifique. Le sociologue ne peut être seulement un intellectuel, un idéologue, ou un travailleur social; il ne serait plus alors un sociologue.

Mais divers types de sociétés favorisent divers types de rôles extra-professionnels, de la même manière qu'ils renforcent ou affaiblissent certains aspects de l'analyse sociologique. Dans les sociétés *volontaristes*, les sociologues ont peu de moyens d'appliquer leurs résultats, les changements sociaux étant en principe commandés par une intention générale, politique, de transformation sociale. Leur rôle politique et idéologique n'est pas inexistant, mais reste limité; employés comme experts, ils sont toujours soumis aux dirigeants économiques et politiques. En revanche, leur rôle est ou peut être considérable dans la formulation et l'analyse de l'expérience sociale; presque nécessairement ils sont amenés à décrire la résistance de faits aux intentions politiques, à exprimer l'opinion publique. Il suffit ici d'évoquer l'exemple polonais et l'importance sociale dans ce pays des enquêtes de l'Institut d'opinion publique.

Dans les sociétés *contractuelles*, soucieuses de «welfare», de liaison entre la croissance économique et la participation sociale, également institutionnalisées, le rôle politique des sociologues peut être considérable, car leurs enquêtes portent sur les problèmes jugés centraux de la société. Ceci s'observe dans l'Europe du Nord et en France même, où les planificateurs, qui, suivant l'exemple de P. Massé et de C. Gruson, voulant établir leur pays dans la catégorie des sociétés contractuelles, ont été les premiers à proclamer l'importance sociale de la sociologie. Ce rôle d'expert diminue les possibilités d'application, sans les annuler, puisque le sociologue est amené à intervenir davantage au niveau de la conception que de l'application. Dans cette situation, le rôle d'innovation culturelle risque d'être faible, puisque c'est davantage vers la modernisation des systèmes de décision que vers celle de l'expérience sociale que s'oriente la sociologie. En France, les deux situations qui viennent d'être évoquées coexistent, comme dans tous les pays où le mouvement socialiste a exercé une grande influence sur les milieux intellectuels, et on pourrait dire que le sociologue français d'aujourd'hui s'efforce de garder le contact à la fois avec le Commissariat au Plan et avec les «*Temps Modernes*».

Dans les sociétés *libérales* enfin la participation politique et idéologique est faible, puisque le système politique évite de recourir à une vision systématique et se définit mieux comme un champ de forces très diverses possédant un plus ou moins grand accès au pouvoir. A l'inverse, les possibilités d'application dans des domaines particuliers sont grandes : des programmes scolaires ou universitaires sont transformés, des médiations apportées dans des conflits du travail, un plan d'organisation des régions rurales ou urbaines élaboré. Le rôle d'innovation culturelle est moyen, car les sociologues, dans leur majorité universitaires, vivent relativement isolés, mais aussi parce que les sociétés ont des moyens très nombreux de modernisation de l'opinion publique et enfin, parce que, l'innovation culturelle dans ces sociétés se produit surtout au niveau de l'individu et de sa vie privée, domaine où le psychologue intervient avec beaucoup plus de force que le sociologue.

Il est fréquent que les sociologues placés dans une certaine situation dénoncent les rôles extra-scientifiques acceptés par leurs confrères vivant dans un autre type de société. Les accusations de politisation ou d'idéologie répondent aux critiques contre le conservatisme des travailleurs sociaux. Ces critiques sont parfois exactes, mais leurs dangers sont beaucoup plus grands que leurs avantages. Il n'existe aucune contradiction entre la nature scientifique de l'analyse sociologique, reconnue par tous comme nécessaire, et les rôles extra-professionnels assurés par des sociologues. C'est seulement si la recherche sociologique n'avait d'autre prolongement qu'un savoir technique que les exigences les plus générales du travail sociologique seraient mises en danger, que le sociologue perdrait de vue son objet même, qui est l'étude de l'organisation de la société par elle-même.

Inversement, il est probablement utopique de souhaiter qu'une même école sociologique puisse à la fois appliquer largement ses connaissances, participer à l'élaboration des modèles d'action sociale qui orientent la société et jouer un rôle d'innovation culturelle. Il est plus réaliste d'espérer que des communautés sociologiques nationales parviennent à être assez diversifiées pour permettre la coexistence d'écoles différentes et donc pour ouvrir à la sociologie des champs très divers, et toujours relativement séparés d'intervention.

V.- UNITÉ ET DIVERSITÉ DE LA SOCIOLOGIE

La diversité des sociologies nationales ou régionales ne peut être acceptée comme un fait central. En Europe, en particulier l'appel à la tradition, allemande, anglaise, française ou italienne n'est bien souvent qu'une forme à peine voilée de résistance à l'analyse proprement sociologique, un effort pour maintenir l'emprise de la pensée philosophique, historique ou économique sur la sociologie. Les communications entre sociologues européens sont d'autant plus difficiles que l'insistance sur ces différentes traditions est plus grande. La facilité des voyages, la reconnaissance des qualités intellectuelles des meilleurs représentants de diverses traditions ne doit pas masquer la faiblesse des échanges intellectuels entre pays européens, dont témoigne le faible nombre des traductions.

Il convient donc d'abord d'insister sur l'unité et sur la spécificité de l'analyse sociologique. Celle-ci s'est le mieux dégagée aux Etats-Unis, c'est-à-dire dans une société moderne, où la distance entre l'expérience sociale et la conception de la société, elle-même peu explicite, est considérable, où enfin se sont développées des universités à la fois indépendantes et très sensibles aux problèmes posés par la politique sociale. Même ceux qui s'efforcent de suivre des lignes de réflexion peu suivies aux Etats-Unis doivent reconnaître qu'ils ont reçu de ce pays, comme ils avaient reçu autrefois de l'école durkheimienne, et sans qu'il y ait de rupture entre les deux influences, la conscience de la nature propre de l'analyse sociologique.

Mais il serait aussi dangereux d'affirmer la suffisance d'une école sociologique que de défendre la pluralité irréductible des traditions intellectuelles nationales.

Très concrètement, au lieu d'opposer par exemple une conception américaine et une conception européenne de la sociologie, on peut considérer que le progrès de la sociologie doit se traduire en particulier par sa pénétration dans des sociétés où la distance entre l'expérience et la doctrine est moins grande qu'aux Etats-Unis. A mesure que l'aire d'autonomie de la sociologie diminue, elle rencontre évidemment des difficultés plus grandes, mais elle devient aussi plus sensible à des problèmes que la situation américaine incite peu à étudier, avant tout, pour reprendre notre remarque initiale, aux problèmes de la création des valeurs, de l'action des mouvements sociaux, des conflits autour de l'appropriation de la modernisation.

Ce travail d'extension de la sociologie conduit à remettre en cause certains des points de vue de la sociologie américaine, mais ceci

ne doit jamais être fait en rupture avec elle, faute de quoi on retomberait dans un pluralisme en soi destructeur et surtout recouvrant mal la résistance de traditions pré-sociologiques, mère des chauvinismes nationaux. Un exemple de ce processus peut s'observer en Amérique Latine où la connaissance de la sociologie nord-américaine a été un élément important de rupture avec la pensée pré-sociologique et, dans certains cas au moins, un facteur de développement d'un travail original assez éloigné du modèle nord-américain.

Il ne peut y avoir d'universalité de la sociologie que si son travail se développe dans tous les types de situations sociales. Il ne serait pas suffisant que l'aire d'application d'une école s'étendît à la planète entière. Un tel succès serait même catastrophique, car il rendrait inintelligibles la plupart des expériences sociales observables.

Une sociologie ne peut assimiler une expérience qui n'est pas la sienne. Elle peut en revanche communiquer avec la sociologie de cette expérience différente. Ce n'est pas recourir à un relativisme élémentaire de l'analyse sociologique mais affirmer que le monde du présent ne peut être compris qu'à travers toute la conscience qu'il a de lui. L'ethnologue ou l'historien interrogent des sociétés différentes de la leur; ils rencontrent donc l'autre, non une part d'eux-mêmes. Ils sont en position d'observateurs, non de participants. Le sociologue n'est jamais étranger à l'objet de son étude. Il ne pourra donc se délivrer de sa double nature d'acteur et d'observateur, que lorsque toutes les parties de l'univers auquel il appartient se réfléchiront elles-mêmes dans une pensée scientifique.

La véritable unité de la sociologie est dans son universalité, c'est à dire aussi dans la diversité, dans l'enracinement social des sociologies. Car toute la réalité sociale peut être interprétée à partir de la conscience que possède une de ses parties, mais l'ensemble de l'expérience sociale ne peut être comprise qu'en recomposant le miroir brisé de la conscience sociale.

Aujourd'hui, la distribution des ressources est trop inégale, la liberté d'observation et d'analyse est trop limitée pour que la lente remontée de l'expérience à son sens soit partout possible. Bien plus, on peut soutenir que l'influence des centres mondiaux du pouvoir et de la richesse est si grande qu'un nombre croissant des sociétés qui participent à la civilisation industrielle est privée non seulement de la connaissance de soi, mais même de son expérience vécue.

Ce qu'on nomme l'effet de démonstration est aussi l'imitation, la fausse expérience et la fausse conscience, de telle sorte que les sociologues des pays les mieux équipés en instruments de recherche,

s'ils peuvent étendre plus qu'avant le champ de leurs observations, le voient aussi devenir de plus en plus monotone, entendant partout l'écho de leur voix, marchant sur leur ombre au lieu de découvrir dans le miroir que leur tendrait autrui une image inconnue d'eux-mêmes, et donc un moyen de se libérer de leurs propres déterminations sociales.

C'est en ce sens qu'il faut souhaiter la multiplication des écoles sociologiques, non pour dissoudre l'unité de l'analyse scientifique dans le flot divers des traditions ou des idéologies, mais pour la créer au contraire, puisque chaque approche de la théorie sociologique ne peut se définir elle-même que par sa rencontre avec d'autres qui organisent différemment les mêmes éléments.

SOCIOLOGIE DES NATIONS NOUVELLES

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SOCIOLOGY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

SOCIOLOGIE DES RELATIONS INTERNATIONALES

Quelle est la portée de ce titre ? Il suggère des questions sur lesquelles la sociologie internationale a beaucoup travaillé. Elle n'est pas une discipline autonome, mais elle est responsable de son développement. Elle se définit par ses problèmes, ses sujets et ses méthodes, et la sociologie ne doit pas être seulement un étiquette appliquée à l'égard de cette discipline qui doit entretenir l'interrogation permanente de ses méthodes, qui doit se renouveler constamment à partir des faits nouveaux que l'évolution humaine fait surgir. Sans ces deux conditions, la sociologie risquerait de dériver vers le relatif à l'égard d'un schéma étroitement défini.

Cette remarque n'est pas sans portée. Elle suggère une tâche urgente, à un moment où la sociologie internationale, à l'étude de la vie humaine et du mouvement des sociétés, une analyse logique à l'égard sociologique, et un intérêt en cette même mesure accrue plus d'importance à la forme des relations sociales qu'aux individus et aux groupes qu'elles lient et qu'elles opposent. Le rigueur de la sociologie ne peut être le produit d'une simplification ou d'une simplification possible des faits. Elle doit être ouverte sur le terrain de la complexité, de la diversité et du mouvement des sociétés humaines. La véritable tâche est là. Et les pays en voie de développement le posent et l'impulsent d'une manière toute nouvelle. Dès le départ, nous pouvons ainsi mesurer les difficultés et l'importance de l'étude.

Le thème même est donc doublement actualisé par les problèmes réels qu'il constitue et par la tension d'épreuve où il situe la sociologie. Il met en présence de philosophes d'une complexité telle que l'étude ne saurait se limiter des modes d'investigation à petite échelle, des micro-analyses et des démarches dérivées de l'ambition de synthèse. Nous sommes dans les domaines qui manifestent une obligation et qui exposent le cœur des grands enjeux.

L'acte d'investigation sur le point de départ initial. Elle est un phénomène global, est la connaissance d'un état d'esprit. Cette étude

SOCIOLOGIE DES «NATIONS NOUVELLES»

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Derrière un tel intitulé se profilent la majorité des sociétés humaines: le nombre et la diversité. Si la tâche peut paraître démesurée, elle n'en est pas moins nécessaire. Elle engage doublement notre responsabilité de sociologues. A l'égard de notre époque et de ses problèmes majeurs, si nous admettons que la sociologie ne doit pas être seulement un exercice spéculatif. A l'égard de cette dernière qui doit entretenir l'interrogation permanente de *toutes* les sociétés, qui doit se renouveler constamment à partir des faits nouveaux que l'histoire humaine fait surgir. Sans ces deux conditions, la sociologie risquerait de déperir et de se réduire à l'état d'un «folklore scientifique».

Cette remarque n'est pas hors de propos. Elle suggère une tâche urgente; à un moment où la mode scientifique substitue, à l'étude de la vie interne et du mouvement des sociétés, une *analyse logique* à thèmes sociologiques; à un moment où cette même mode accorde plus d'importance à la *forme* des relations sociales qu'aux individus et aux groupes qu'elles lient et qu'elles opposent. La rigueur de la sociologie ne peut être le produit d'une mutilation ou d'une simplification préalable des faits. Elle doit être acquise sur le terrain de la complexité, de la diversité et du continuel devenir des sociétés humaines. Le véritable défi est là. Et les pays en voie de développement le posent et l'imposent d'une manière toute concrète. Dès le départ, nous pouvons ainsi mesurer les difficultés et l'importance de l'enjeu.

Le thème retenu est donc doublement actuel: par les problèmes *réels* qu'il considère et par le *terrain d'épreuve* où il situe la sociologie. Il met en présence de phénomènes d'une ampleur telle que l'étude ne saurait se satisfaire des seules investigations à petite échelle, des micro-analyses et des démarches dépourvues de l'ambition de synthèse. Voyons donc les données qui manifestent cette obligation et qui imposent le choix des thèmes majeurs.

1° La *décolonisation* est le point de référence initial. Elle est un phénomène global, car la colonisation l'était elle-même. Cette der-

nière a instauré une domination politique, économique, sociale et culturelle. Elle a «gelé» l'histoire des pays colonisés. Elle a placé les sociétés dominées dans une situation essentiellement ambiguë: celle de la soumission de façade et de la résistance de fait, mais cachée. L'indépendance ne retourne pas d'un coup cette situation; certaines modifications sont irréversibles et certaines dépendances subsistent. Mais elle impose néanmoins un remaniement général de la société. La nation est souvent à construire et une économie nationale, également à bâtir, doit lui servir d'assise. L'Etat moderne prend place; il fonctionne en contradiction avec les principes de fonctionnement des Etats traditionnels annulés ou «bousculés» par la colonisation. La structure globale de la société *nationale* s'organise au-delà des sociétés particulières et des rapports sociaux prescrits par la tradition. Ce façonnage total — et parfois totalitaire — ne s'effectue pas sans heurts et sans ambiguïtés. Le mouvement de décolonisation débouche sur une «expérience sociologique complète», et non seulement sur la reprise en charge d'une histoire et d'une authenticité niées par les colonisateurs.

2° Décolonisation, édification de la nation, promotion d'une société nouvelle, ce sont là autant de processus, autant de dynamismes globaux étroitement associés. Leur examen requiert la recherche des forces sociales qui sont à l'œuvre, et des agents qui les contrôlent. A diverses reprises, le problème des *classes sociales en devenir* dans les pays du Tiers Monde s'est imposé. Il doit être au centre des confrontations organisées dans le cadre du groupe de travail. Peut-être plus sur le mode interrogatif que sur le mode affirmatif; car la formation des classes diffère, en ce cas, de celle que les sociétés européennes et nord-américaines ont connues. Souvent, l'accès au pouvoir donne l'emprise sur l'économie beaucoup plus que l'inverse. Et la seule classe bien constituée devient alors celle des dirigeants et des gestionnaires — comme le montrent nombre de sociétés africaines. Mais la difficulté tient aussi aux options des responsables: celle de faire prévaloir l'unité nationale sur l'affrontement des classes naissantes; celle d'élaborer des formes nouvelles (ou inédites) de la société et de l'économie.

3° Cette dernière exigence conduit à envisager la question des *idéologies* et des *initiatives* culturelles associées à la construction de la nation. Les nations nouvelles ne peuvent être les simples importatrices d'une civilisation industrielle élaborée au dehors et de philosophies politiques issues d'une histoire étrangère. Elles ne sauraient consentir à devenir les simples répliques des sociétés aujour-

d'hui «développées». Elles veulent remodeler leur *personnalité* tout en adoptant les instruments du progrès matériel. La décolonisation idéologique et culturelle leur paraît tout aussi nécessaire que la décolonisation politique et économique. Pour cette raison, les problèmes qu'elle pose doivent être considérés au cours de tout débat portant sur les «nations en voie de se faire».

4° Telles sont les tendances dominantes. Les thèmes qu'elles suggèrent s'imposent solidairement. La confrontation des expériences et des points de vue ne pourra que le montrer. Elle révélera aussi que cet ordre de préoccupations est bien du domaine de la sociologie; dans la mesure où cette dernière est d'*abord* une science de la liberté humaine et des entreprises qui l'expriment.

Sous une forme plus abstraite, et plus systématique aussi, il semble possible de considérer les quatre points suivants:

Sociologie des Nations Nouvelles *Thématique*

- I. Processus de formation des nouvelles nations.
 1. Interprétation sociologique de la décolonisation.
 2. Force et formes nouvelles de l'idée de nation.
 3. Etat moderne et construction nationale.
- II. Nouvelles classes sociales et dynamique politique moderne.
 1. Interprétation sociologique des classes en formation dans les pays en voie de développement.
 2. Rôle des nouvelles classes dans la construction nationale.
 3. Lutte nationale et antagonismes de classes.
- III. Aspects culturels de la construction nationale.
 1. Problèmes socio-culturels des nouvelles nations.
 - 2. Culture nationale et conscience nationale.
 3. Dialectique de la tradition et de la modernité.
- IV. Problèmes idéologiques des nations nouvelles.
 1. Analyse sociologique d'idéologies spécifiques des pays en voie de développement.
 2. Formes syncrétiques de l'idéologie.
 3. Adaptation des idéologies importées (par exemple: socialismes spécifiques).

Une semblable thématique peut paraître ambitieuse; elle définit plus le programme d'un colloque que les tâches d'un groupe de tra-

vail. Il convient, en fait, de la considérer comme ayant une valeur d'orientation. Elle suggère les thèmes *possibles* — et nécessaires si l'on entendait procéder à un large examen. Elle permet d'exprimer le souhait qu'une communication, au moins, donne la possibilité de considérer chacun des quatre points cardinaux.

SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON STRATEGY

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Strategy sets forth principles for the selection and employment of resources and power in the pursuit of given goals, and also specifies priorities among these goals. However, it does not formulate the goals themselves.

In contrast with terms such as orientation and perspective, it is *self-conscious* and *articulated*. It is similar to policy; in fact these terms are often used interchangeably, but policy deals more with the setting of goals and is less articulated than strategy. Typically, one talks of foreign *policy* but of military *strategy* because the former is less subject to explicit and specific criteria of operation than the latter. With the increased mobilization of society and the increased sophistication of policy making, it is becoming more common to talk about strategies of foreign affairs (and even of corporations, advertising, and major scientific research undertakings such as the lunar exploration).

STRATEGY FORMATION AS A SOCIOLOGICAL PROCESS

One sociological perspective on strategy sees it as a social process, as a study of the actors who formulate it in interaction with each other. Strategy is often viewed as a mode of thinking, and thinking, it has often been stressed, inevitably occurs in individual minds. Hence, it might be argued that strategy is free from, or will escape, sociological imperialism. But this viewpoint is based on an optical illusion: it sees individuals as biological units, and therefore tends to view what they think and say as «individual». Actually, their thought is governed by sociological forces as much as their behavior. Due to language and culture-bound assumptions, thought does not take place in a vacuum. The formulation of strategy is no exception.

Nor is the formulation of strategy a pure thought process. Suggestions concerning strategies are manifold, but, like other «free-floating» ideas, they become subject for sociological study chiefly when they gain some degree of following. Only a small fraction of

all strategies initiated gains such a following. Sociologists might explore the generic ways in which strategies that gain a following differ from those that do not.

Here the relationships among those who formulate a strategy, those who approve it and those who implement it is of interest. Unlike most systems of thought, strategies tend to be produced for a specific client, often a military, political, or corporate decision-maker. Very few strategies are advanced without considerable interaction between the «producers» and their prospective clients. Usually there is a deep sharing of assumptions and concepts between the strategist and his organizational client. On the basis of this common orientation, the strategist formulates a new strategy or sub-strategy, as when a politician's «brain-trust» works out a «line» for the next election, or the U.S. Air Force requests the Rand Corporation to work out a new strategy in which missiles will replace bombers. For a different client, with different assumptions, the same strategist and strategy would be of little use. Thus, the relations between producers and consumers of strategic thought are very particularistic.

Far from being a rational process that responds only to empirical evidence and follows clear rules of derivation or logic, the formation of strategy — and its initiation — involves a bargaining process which take place among the various interests that are concerned with its implementation (or the prevention of its implementation). Few, if any, intellectual processes are freed from such divisive forces, especially if they concern applied matters and include normative considerations as do strategies. Since they also deal with the future and are, as a rule, on a fairly general level, it is not surprising that strategies are highly extra-empirical. This means that, with few exceptions, no decisive «reality test» is applicable. The advocates of a strategy that relies heavily on air power rather than counter-insurgency, on advertising rather than product quality, etc., can often do as well by using persuasive arguments as by collecting compelling evidence. Nor can the two be as easily separated as is sometimes assumed.

There are several studies which follow this general line of analysis and provide a basis for the study of strategy as a social process. They try to determine the direction and relative influence of the interaction which occurs during the formulation of various elements of a strategy. What interests came into play and to what degree were they able to slant the strategy in their direction? Who endorsed the strategy and to what degree was it implemented? Typically, few of

these studies go one step further, to determine the results obtained by using one particular strategy. Particularly lacking are studies of the forces which prevent the revision or substitution of a strategy once it has been institutionalized.

SOCIOLOGICAL MODELS AS BASES OF STRATEGIC THOUGHT

A not unrelated, but in many ways quite different, sociological approach to the study of strategy seeks theoretical elements which could serve as a basis of strategic thought, disregarding both the actors who formulate it and the relations between strategists and their clients. Since most strategies deal with social factors and systems, whether the electorate, the consumer market, or an alien society, one might ask: What kinds of sociological theory can serve strategies best? This is not a test of the empirical validity of a theory, but of its practical utility; i.e., which strategy in terms of whatever theory lies behind it, works best? Moreover, the applied test is of a special nature, because it is comparatively generalized. Unlike tactics, strategies deal with general approaches to the pursuit of one or more goals over relatively long periods of time. Thus, the test is not the success of a weapons system, but the winning of a campaign, or a war; it is not gaining the votes of some group within the electorate, but winning the election, etc.

These two characteristics of strategy, its applied and general nature, make its testing difficult. The applied quality puts strong demands on most theories that are analytical rather than synthesizing because application requires synthesis. And, since empirical tests tend to be limited in scope and the transition from limited to general tests is at best risky, the generic conditions of a test are hard to satisfy.

Among the main dimensions along which sociological theories can be ordered according to their utility in the formulation of strategies, the following are especially valuable: (a) They can be either normative or descriptive. While all strategies contain both evaluative and factual statements, they differ in the degree to which they stress one rather than the other. Theories based on mathematical models are often highly normative, in the sense that they advise the actor on how he ought to act if he seeks to maximize one or more goals (e.g., profit), under a carefully delineated set of circumstances (e.g., a perfect dice game, with two players). Other theories tend to draw more on information about past experiences, present allocation of

resources, etc. (e.g., «One ought not change one's course in mid-stream.»). (b) The degree of separation of normative and empirical elements is another relevant issue. (c) The scope of the unit of action may vary. A theory can, for example, stress macro-units or micro-units (e.g. classes or voters). (d) Theories use varying substantive labels to describe the elements or origins of change (e.g. economic, or psychological). (e) Strategies also differ in their degree of self-confidence, that is, the degree to which they guard against their own failure. It seems that those which view man more rationally (e.g. mathematical and related economic theories) tend also to be more self-confident.

Both structural and phenomenological approaches need to be pursued further if the study of strategy is to be integrated into sociology.

ARMED FORCES AND SOCIETY IN A WORLD PERSPECTIVE

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I. THE PROFESSIONAL MILITARY AS AN OBJECT OF SOCIOLOGICAL INVESTIGATION

In the last few years, there has been a marked increase in scholarly work on the sociology of military institutions and militarism. Despite the intrinsic intellectual interest of the field and its overriding substantive and policy importance, this aspect of sociology has lagged far behind other subjects in the discipline. During the first four World Congresses of Sociology, the topic was not directly discussed. At the Fifth Congress of Sociology in Washington, D.C., in 1962, a single paper was presented in the section on Political Sociology on the topic of «The Role of the Military in the Political Development of New Nations». However, the Sixth World Congress marks an important departure in that a complete working group is devoted to the topic «The Professional Military and Militarism».

The communications presented to this working group include papers by sociologists and other scholars from a large number of countries and deal with issues such as the internal structure of the military, trends in the professionalization of the military, the relationships of armed forces to social structure, the socio-political institutions for controlling the military establishment and the role of the military as a peace-keeping agency in the world community. These papers represent the proliferation of research efforts on the military in both industrialized countries and in the developing nations.

The sociological analysis of the military cannot be contained or restrained by arbitrary institutional categories. In a period of rapid social and political change the focus of attention must of necessity include the full range of institutions which deal with force and violence.

First, the impact of technology and new mass destructive weapons has changed the pattern of international relations and altered the threat of general war. The major nuclear powers, while pursuing a policy of mutual deterrence, have had to face the severe limitation

which mass destruction instruments place on the conduct of traditional diplomacy and international relations. For the military profession, the implication has been not merely that new weapons have had to be incorporated but that there has been a fundamental crisis in the military profession. The military profession as it emerged in the nineteenth century had the overriding orientation that the outbreak of general war was inevitable. This inevitability, the profession assumed, was rooted in the nature of man, in the conduct of international relations and in the consequences of each new arms race. In the contemporary scene, the military profession must face the political imperative that the outbreak of general war is no longer seen inevitably nor in the national interest. General war continues to be a contingency and an undesirable one at that. It is recognized as such by a significant proportion of the military profession. Therefore, the study of the military profession involves its reaction to the actual and proposed international schemes of arms control and disarmament. The sociology of the military must also encompass the consequences of multilateral arrangements and United Nations peace-keeping activities which are designed to contain or reduce limited wars, especially those limited wars which might increase the possibility of general war.

Second, limited war is no longer «traditional». Since 1945, it has less often been a struggle between two legitimate governments, and more often a violent contest within a nation by some group against the existing regime. These wars are conflicts into which external national powers are drawn. These struggles involve use of non-professional forces and, therefore, the study of militarism and violence involves the analysis of various forms of armed revolts, police systems, insurrections, paramilitary formations and the other agencies of internal warfare.

Despite the rapid development of sociological interest in the changing nature of military institutions, it is necessary to note the resistances to such research in order that these topics might be approached with the greatest amount of objectivity and thereby transcend national and personal prejudices. It would be a mistake to assume that current and contemporary literature has achieved the necessary level of objectivity. However, there is a growing body of literature which, while based in existing national systems of sociological inquiry, seeks to apply the canons of sociological scholarship.

First, sociologists have avoided the study of war — internal and external — because of political pressures and personal values. The

management of violence involves the most fundamental values and most significant considerations in a society. Only under the conditions of the widest intellectual freedom is it possible to pursue sociological research on these topics. The field is still not pursued in a great many countries. Even where adequate political conditions exist, personal and academic considerations continue to define the study of the military as outside the central core of sociological endeavors.

Second, the secrecy of military institutions, both official and professional, has been offered as a barrier to sociological analysis. There can be no doubt that this is an important reason with significant implications for the research sociologist. But it can hardly be offered as a fundamental explanation, if only because the sheer amount of available material which is yet to be analyzed. This is particularly the case for historical materials and for the use of ex and retired military professionals as sources of more contemporary materials. It has also been the experience of numerous research workers that a direct contact with military professionals have produced more favorable conditions for research than they had anticipated. However, the central issue is that the recent growth in interest and fruitful work has not been the result of a fundamental change in military practices concerning secrecy but rather in the orientation, diligence and persistence of sociological investigators.

Third, and more important as a barrier than secrecy, has been the intellectual posture of sociology. The discipline has failed to develop a realistic understanding of social structure which would include the military establishment and the role of force. Classical writers on sociology such as Herbert Spencer, for example, could not be accused of such a failing. The growth of sociology as a specialized and technical discipline and as a diffuse form of social criticism seems to have been connected with this decline in such realism.

Fourth, resistance to the growth of a sociology of the military can be stated in ideological terms. While there are many ideological sources at work in sociological thought, it appears that sociology has flourished in societies in which there is a strong liberal tradition. But the liberal tradition has served as a barrier to a sociology of the military, for the liberal tradition has in general sought to handle the problem of military institutions by denial. In fact, in the liberal tradition some sociologists have even believed that to study and analyze military institutions would have the consequences of strengthening the role of military leaders and militaristic forces.

Ideological opposition to the sociological study of military insti-

tutions has receded, but the field is still confronted by complex questions of «values», in particular the values of the sociologist. To the extent that progress has been made, it is because the study of military institutions has become a legitimate object of scientific analysis. The scholar worthy of any contribution must be judged by the same standards of intellectual progress as any other aspect of sociology. This assertion does not imply that sociologists in this field are not concerned with the responsible application of knowledge to social problems. The very importance of the issues of war and peace guarantee that the findings of sociologist will be subject to the closest scrutiny by political leaders, policy makers and the mass media. To the contrary, the field of the sociology of international relations has suffered from naive exaggeration of the potential policy consequences of sociological research and a willingness to lower academic standards because of the importance of the topic.

There is every reason to assert that the barriers to research into the sociology of the military profession and militarism are giving way to new pressures for sponsored scholarship by both public and private agencies. These pressures will in turn produce new problems and new distortions. In the past the liberal tradition, which was indifferent to the study of military institutions, introduced a strong bias. When such social scientists approached the study of armed forces, they did so with an expression of a civilian ideology which tended to distort the differences between military and civilian organization. They tended to overlook what is common to large-scale organization in general, both civilian and military. In the current intellectual climate, the reverse distortion is the danger. The social scientist runs the risk of overemphasizing the special characteristics of the military establishment.

The field of the sociology of war and peace has been and is likely to remain strikingly different from other fields in sociology. First, the rapid increase in interest and work still means that only a handful of specialists are at work. Even if the number were to double or even triple, we would still be dealing with a very small group. Second, it is a field in which there is more theoretical ideal type analysis and suggestive propositions than empirical substance. Nevertheless, even the limited available results have transformed the study of comparative sociology and societal change. It is no longer possible to deal with those problems — in either industrialized societies or in developing nations — without due emphasis on the sociology of military institutions in a world perspective.

From a worldwide perspective, two fundamental questions require investigation:

One. To what extent have the military in industrialized and developing nations modified their professional perspectives to take into account the consequences of new weapons of mass destruction and the emerging socio-political context of limited warfare? What factors condition or inhibit the transformation of professional military perspectives and forms of military organization?

Two. Why are military officers of the developing nations, as compared with those in industrialized societies, more influential in domestic politics? The answer must be found both in the internal structure of the military profession in different societies and in differences in social structure of nation-states.

II. MILITARY ESTABLISHMENTS: A WORLD PROFILE

The study of military institutions requires more adequate data and statistics on the forms, size and structure of military establishments throughout the world. It is not possible to point to a body of fundamental data organized on a world basis which would in particular include comprehensive trend data on costs and manpower allocations.

Despite the problem of secrecy, and of reliable information, it is possible to develop a summary chart of available information. Chart No. 1 presents, for the nation-states of the world with over one million population, the size of the armed forces, total population size and the ratio of military manpower to the total population. Nations with less than one million are excluded since they present special cases and are often so small as not to have articulated military institutions. (Nevertheless, even the 200-man army of Togo was capable of political intervention by the use of force).

This chart is designed as a preliminary statement in order to generate more careful attention to the problem of collecting basic data on the military profession. It should be pointed out that there are numerous countries which publish accurate data, and there are a variety of private sources which seek to produce relevant estimates. This chart is based on the author's evaluation and synthesis of all of the various types of available sources. An alternate array of data on military manpower has been presented by Bruce Russett et al.¹

¹ Bruce M. RUSSETT, *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators*. Yale University Press, New Haven, 1964, pp. 72-80.

Aside from the basic question of the reliability of data, the definition of the term «armed forces» needs to be standardized. The figures presented are limited to the central government's formations of the army, the navy and the air force of the respective country. It includes only those personnel who are designated as being on full-time active duty. These figures do not include the different types of reserve units, auxiliary reserves, civilian defense forces or special frontier guards and national police units, which are very large in some countries and may in selected cases be as large as, or larger than, the central military establishment.

In examining these data, it should be pointed out that, among the leaders of the new nations which have attained political independence since 1945, only Prime Minister Julius Nyerere of Tanganyika has discussed the possibility of relying on an armed police force instead of a conventional army. Among the rest of the nations of the world, only in Costa Rica and Panama are there no central armed forces; but these countries have, respectively, a full-time civil guard and national police force. National armed forces appear to be «universal» institutions and, in fact, in the present world are defined as essential marks of national sovereignty.

The array of data presented in Chart No. 1 underlines (a) the wide variation in the mobilization of personnel in the armed forces as between nations, and (b) the markedly different overall patterns in specific regions of the world. These typical force levels can best be seen if the conspicuous exceptions are eliminated. Typically, African nations have the lowest concentration of military personnel. The force levels are very small, including the exceptions, which are relatively small. Typically, the range is from 0.01 percent to 0.03 percent of the total population. In Asia, the typical level is distinctly higher, varying from 0.2 percent to 0.5 percent, and includes more nations with relatively and absolutely large forces. On the average, North and South America reveal somewhat still higher percentages than Asia, with the national level often centering around 0.5 percent. In Europe, the typical armed force is much larger proportionally, being usually somewhat less than one percent of the total population. New nations, therefore, are in this dimension less «developed» than old nations. While there are specific nations with proportionately higher levels of mobilization than the United States and the Soviet Union, these two nations have their own relatively equal and distinctively high percentage — a level higher than that typical of the highest region — Europe.

These data make possible gross analysis based on aggregate statistics. An analysis based on a world-wide array of data must be extremely crude because of the difficulties of developing an adequate set of concepts to handle the wide heterogeneity of the nations and of military establishments. For example, in the case of new nations, the Libyan army of 4,500 composed exclusively of infantry troops is hardly the same type of administrative organization as the Indian defense forces of over 500,000 with first-line jet planes and naval units. Again, in Western Europe, despite the similarities in societal setting and technology, there are important differences between the military profession in Switzerland and Sweden, which were able to be neutral during the last two wars, and the military formations of Holland and Belgium, which have been deeply influenced by their wartime experience.

One effort at gross statistical analysis has been presented by Bruce Russett et al., which deals with a comparison of military expenditures and the size of the military manpower in a selection of heterogeneous countries. Military expenditures are standardized in the terms of the expenditures on defense as a percentage of G.N.P., while military personnel is treated as a percentage of working-age population. The conclusion of the analysis seems hardly profound, in that the authors report «that the two ratios generally vary together (they correlated with a fairly high $r = 0.68$ around the regression line)». Deviations from the regression line are not errors in reporting, since some countries have large but poorly equipped military establishments.

A somewhat more rewarding approach is developed when a narrower and more homogeneous group of military establishments are examined in terms of a specific issue. Janowitz explored whether there is any relationship between economic development or absence thereof and the political role of the military in a sample of 51 developing nations². The results are mainly negative. Students of comparative politics have offered the proposition that there is a positive association between economic development and democratic political competitiveness. By inference, the more economically developed a new nation is, the less likely it is that the military could hinder the competitive process in domestic politics.

S. M. Lipset made use of selected indices of economic development to compare Western European and Latin American democracies as a

² MORRIS JANOWITZ, *The Military in the Political Development of New Nations*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1964, pp. 18-23.

basis for testing this hypothesis concerning the positive association between economic development and political competitiveness. Statistical support for this proposition is hardly impressive, and this type of analysis appears to have limited relevance for understanding, on a comparative basis, the dynamic relationship between economic development and political forms. Since there are only a limited number of cases in the analysis, even a minor re-definition of the universe markedly alters the statistical conclusions. More important: in order to avoid a mechanical test of the proposition, one would expect that the changes in political competitiveness since the original analysis should at least be congruent with the basic proposition. This means that those nations high on the economic development index should have moved toward more competitiveness. For Latin America, the trend has been toward less competitiveness, and this trend cannot directly be related to the level of economic development; in some cases, it is inversely related. The same lack of support of this hypothesis is presented by an examination of the countries of Africa and Asia.

Some of the difficulties of this type of analysis rest in the crude nature of the political categories. Even when more refined categories of military involvement in politics are employed among the 51 new nations studied, there is no basis for asserting that, with higher levels of economic development, there is a movement toward restriction of the military's involvement with the domestic political system. In fact, among those new nations with the highest levels of economic development, the absence of democratic competitive systems is more noteworthy than their presence, since competitive systems are concentrated in the middle level of economic development. On the other hand, there is an apparent but not profoundly explanatory relation between the length of time that a new nation has been independent and the increased political role of the military. The change of political involvement increases year by year after independence, while contraction of the military's political role remains a highly problematic issue.

At this point, aggregate statistical analysis supplies at best a limited point of entrance for understanding differences in the political role of the military. Instead, a more systematic analysis of the military profession and social structure is required which rests on precise conceptual categories, and which could throw light on similarities and differences among relatively homogeneous groups of nations.

III. MILITARISM AND THE MILITARY PROFESSION

The distinction offered by Alfred Vagts, the historian, between «militarism» and «the military way» is a useful approach for the study of the military profession undergoing change³. «The military way is marked by a primary concentration of men and materials on winning specific objectives of power with the utmost efficiency, that is, with the least expenditure of blood and treasure». «Militarism, on the other hand, presents a vast array of customs, interests, prestige, actions, and thought associated with armies and wars and yet transcending true military purposes. Indeed militarism is so constituted that it may hamper and defeat the purposes of the military way».

This distinction, which requires refinement, is a specific application to military organization of the classic problem of nationality in large-scale organization, that is, the conditions promoting or hampering the effective adjustment of means to ends. Internally, militarism implies the development and persistence of practices which block scientific and administrative procedures designed to produce greater «professionalism». Externally, militarism encompasses the social, economic and political power that the military generate and its consequences on domestic social structure and international politics. Militarism as it affects the external social structure can be either designed or unanticipated. Designed militarism flows from the strength and conscious effort of military officers to influence and modify certain aspects of social structure. Unanticipated militarism develops from a lack of effective traditions and practices for controlling the military establishment, as well as from a failure of civilian political leaders to act relevantly and consistently. Under such circumstances a vacuum is created which not only encourage an extension of the tasks and power of the military but actually forces such trends.

Both the internal and external aspects of militarism flow from the special characteristics of military organization. The similarities that exist between civilian and military bureaucracy are counterbalanced by the overriding consideration that its members are specialists in the «management» of violence and mass destruction. Of course, military organizations have multiple goals and perform many non-military functions. Moreover, it is essential not to overlook the fundamental and repeated observation of both historians and sociologists that mi-

³ Alfred VAGTS, *A History of Militarism*. Meridian Books, 1959, p. 13.

lity institutions in peacetime can quickly dissipate their special military character.

But to the extent that the military officer is a professional, to that extent he must relate himself to the profound uncertainties in planning for and conducting military hostilities. Therefore, the ideal model of the military professional is not that of the scientist or the engineer or the business administrator. There is an irreducible component of an heroic posture in his professional self-image, for he must be prepared to face danger.

The development of the military profession has been a continuous struggle to be rational and scientific in the context of military requirements. Thus, it is possible to describe the history of the modern military establishment as a struggle between heroic leaders who embody traditionalism and glory, and military managers who are concerned with the scientific and rational conduct of war. Internal militarism in the sense that the military blocks technical progress has waned in most military establishments. As the military establishment becomes progressively dependent on more complex technology, the importance of the military manager increases. He does not displace the heroic leader, but he undermines the long-standing traditionalism of the military establishment. As a result, there is a crisis in the strain between the military managers and heroic leader. However, this is a professional crisis that can be controlled by organizational resources, by compromise and because the military manager acknowledges the worth and instrumental value of the heroic leader in the military profession.

The crisis in the professional self-image of the military man derives not primarily from this role differentiation, but from the crisis in military goals. At the upper end of the violence continuum, the development of nuclear weapons and strategic conceptions of deterrence means that the military officer — both the military manager and the heroic leader — is transformed into a teacher, that is, an instructor of men who will man and maintain a machine designed not to be employed. The past supplies little basis for organizing and maintaining a professional self-image under such conditions. At the lower end of the violence continuum, the scope of conventional warfare narrows. The tactics and techniques of limited war and internal warfare limit the authority of the military professional at the expense of civilian experts and civilian political leadership. It is almost possible to speak of civilian militarism as each aspect of military operations comes of the elaborate control of civilian leaders — de-

mocratic and authoritarian — and as the mechanics of warfare must be integrated into political strategy in the absence of an opportunity for traditional type military «victory». The common elements which the military profession and military men display because of technology, organizational format and professional training have always been modified by the impact of the social and political structure in which they operate. In the contemporary period the linkages between armed forces and social structure are even more overriding and direct.

IV. MILITARISM AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE

A world-wide perspective toward the sociology of military institutions requires a careful reexamination of the limitation of the model presented by historians concerning the development of the military profession from feudal forms of social structure. The aristocratic feudal model is a relevant base only if it is seen as describing the conditions of Western Europe, and not fully applicable to the historical emergence of the military in other parts of the world.

The aristocratic-feudal model is a composite estimate of the armed forces among Western European powers before industrialism had its full impact. Under the feudal aristocratic model, civilian and military elites were socially and functionally integrated. A narrow base of recruitment for both elites and a relatively monolithic power structure provided the civilian elite with a comprehensive basis for political control of the military. There was a rigid hierarchy in the aristocratic model which delineated both the source of authority and the prestige of any member of the military elite. The low specialization of the military profession made it possible for the political elite to supply the bulk of the necessary leadership for the armed forces. Birth, family connections and common values insured that the military embodied the ideology of the dominant groups in society. Political control was civilian control because there was a unity of interest between aristocratic and military groups. The system was rooted in concepts of authority and land tenure which produced a relatively stable ruling stratum.

In Western Europe the concept of armed forces and society began to have fuller meaning as the military developed a separate bureaucratic organization. Feudal military institutions had to be transformed — either by reformers from within or by the incorporation of new middle-class elements — so that complex technology could be made

part of the apparatus of war-making. In this long-term development, which became intensified in the first half of the nineteenth century, the various national armed forces became precursors of modern large-scale organizations and active elements of social change. However, the relatively common forms of military professions had a diverse political impact and produced varying forms of socio-political balance in the nation-states of Western Europe. Thus, for example, the emergence of a differentiated professional establishment in the nineteenth century was compatible with civil-military relations of parliamentary institutions in Great Britain and with a nationalistic oligarchy in Prussia.

But in a world perspective the origins of the military in Western Europe and the United States derivatively represent one particular pattern of emergence and historical continuity. It was a pattern which generally linked the military to feudal institutions and to conservative traditions. The military emerged as a modern institution, in fact as one of the first modern institutions in Western Europe, but it was a modern institution in a Western context. In the evolution of professional military forms throughout the world, Western concepts and practices had a profound effect. But because of different historical settings and because often the military experienced sharp discontinuities or were grafted on by external forces, there emerged different patterns of civil-military relations in other parts of the world.

Frequently, the pattern of development was one that produced a more independent type of establishment, with fewer and weaker linkages to the landed interest groups. Often the military evolved as one governmental bureaucratic service among others, but the most crucial one. In many parts of the world this was the result of the colonial practices of the European powers, which destroyed traditional military forces linked to feudal-type ruling groups and which in turn created civil-service type establishments under their control. Under the Ottoman Empire, the practices of recruitment and administration pushed early to "separate" the military establishment and place it under centralized control. In this case also, the land tenure system served not to strengthen relations between the military and traditionally landed groups. Elements of European feudalism were transplanted to South America, but in a manner which gave the military a much more independent political base than under classical European forms.

Because of the experiences of Western Europe, when scholars analyze the development of modern military institutions it has been conventional to focus on the social origins of the officer corps. The dif-

ferentiation of the military establishment in Western Europe can be carefully documented by a decline in the concentration of officers from aristocratic and landed gentry background and in the infusion of middle-class patterns of recruitment. But even in the nineteenth century the difference, for example, between the socio-political balance in Great Britain and in Germany cannot be accounted for to any great extent by differences in social stratification, particularly social recruitment. The Prussian military was predominantly recruited from landed higher and lower aristocratic groups, while the personnel of the British armed forces was only slightly more differentiated from its aristocratic counterparts. By contrast, the German system of education for its officer recruits served to differentiate them more from civilian institutions than military education in Great Britain. What was important was that a political system emerged under the Prussian model in which the civilian political elites did not exercise control over the military through a set of formal rules. Instead, the polity was ruled by an oligarchy in which the military were active and key elements.

In the contemporary period, social recruitment supplies only a partial index to patterns of armed forces and society in industrialized societies. Thus, for a variety of nations in Western Europe for which data are available — Great Britain, Germany, France, Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands — there has been a basic social transformation in the pattern of officer recruitment which started in the nineteenth century and is even more marked since the turn of the century. The officer corps and its elite members as well have been shifting their recruitment from a narrow, relatively high social status to a broader base more presentative of the population as a whole. The end of the feudal character of the armed forces is well documented, and with the elimination of colonial armies these vestiges are further displaced.

But this is not to say that the broadening of the base has taken place at a uniform rate in the countries under investigation. Nor is it to infer that the consequences of this transformation has been similar in all of these countries. Thus, for example, there is reason to believe that the long-term shift towards a «middle class» profession has taken place at a slower rate in England than in other countries. The top elite in the military has a greater concentration of upper-middle-class sons than in some other industrialized nations, as a result of the system of education and formal requirements for entrance. But this pattern of recruitment has not weakened civilian parliamentary controls.

In the current period, one sociological issue in Western Europe is the extent to which the military profession, that is the officer class, is accessible to the sons of the working class. On this measure the findings support the observation of S. N. Miller that there are marked national differences in social mobility from the lower classes into other key professions⁴. In England and the Netherlands, the amount of such mobility from the lower classes into the officer corps is negligible, while in France it is more pronounced. In Norway the figure reached 18.7 percent of the cadets for the period 1950-1960, while for the United States in 1960 the percentage was over 30. The opening of the military to the working class represents general patterns of «democratization» and reflects the low prestige of the profession in industrial society. But the national differences derive in part from specific variations. In France this is the result of self-recruitment, especially recruitment of the sons of enlisted personnel into the officer ranks, and expresses a self-segregation trend in the military. To the contrary, in Norway it represents the desire for social mobility among working-class sons who are unable to enter upon a university career, and thereby serves to integrate the military with the civilian population.

In Western Europe or elsewhere there is, of course, no guarantee that «democratization» of social origins produces «democratization» of professional attitudes and a strengthening of the willingness to submit to civilian controls. In fact, there are clear-cut cases where the reverse may occur. What is significant is the process and content of professional socialization and the nature of the socio-political institutions for administering and controlling the military establishment, and the organizational tasks of the military. In industrialized societies, because the military has become a bureaucratized and professionalized institution in a complex division of labor, the significance of social origins in fashioning military orientation declines.

In a comparison of the military establishments of Western Europe with those of the new nations of Africa and Asia, social recruitment can supply a more important index of social attitudes. In the new nations the military establishment is recruited from the middle and lower middle classes, drawn mainly from rural areas or hinterlands. In comparison with Western European professional armies, there is a marked absence of a history of feudal domination. As a result, the

⁴ S. N. MILLER, « Comparative Social Mobility : A Trend Report and Bibliography », *Current Sociology*, vol. IX, No. 1, 1960.

military profession does not have strong allegiance to an integrated upper class which it accepts as its political leader, nor does it have a pervasive conservative outlook.

Militarism in the new nations of Africa and Asia is often reactive or unanticipated because of the weakness of civilian institutions and the breakdown of parliamentary forms of government. Military officers in these countries develop a sense of public service and national guardianship as a result of their military training and experience. Their politics are «suprapolitical» because they are suspicious of professional politicians and the bargaining process. It is easier for them to seize power than to exercise power. Again, these forms of militarism must be distinguished from the intervention by the military in many South American countries. In the past, in many South American countries military intervention was much more designed and premeditated. Despite the extensive amount of political disruption, often these military groups supplied political regimes because they were not primarily concerned with economic and social development. In South America, the tasks of military leadership became complicated and their political limitations emerge in the face of popular demands for such progress.

On a world perspective, the comparative analysis of armed forces and society leads to the identification of a range of typologies of civil-military relations which help explain the process of social change and political development. These typologies are designed to clarify the conditions under which militarism is restrained or developed.

The power of the military in domestic politics and, derivatively, in international relations can be limited by an authoritarian regime based on personal and traditional power or it may be based on a newly developed personal autocracy. This is the (1) *authoritarian-personal* system of civil-military control and it is likely to be found in nations just beginning the process of modernization. The military can be excluded from domestic political influence by the power of a civilian single mass political party. When political power is lodged in a one-party state, under strong personal leadership, without parliamentary institutions, it is possible to reduce old-fashioned militarism. This form of civil-military relations can be labeled (2) a *civilian mass party* system. In these states, both the civilian police and paramilitary institutions under the control of the mass party operate as counterweights to the military.

Militarism can be contained on the basis of (3) a *democratic competitive* system or a *semi-democratic* system. Competitive democratic systems have emerged mainly in industrialized societies where politi-

cal power is exercised through a multiple-party and election system. Civilian political elites exercise control over the military through a formal set of rules which specify the functions of the military and the conditions under which the military may exercise its power. In particular, these rules exclude the military from involvement in domestic partisan politics. Professional ethics, as well as democratic parliamentary institutions guarantee civilian political supremacy. Semi-competitive democratic patterns can be found in a few of the new nations because of powerful personal leadership of the chief executive and in part because colonial traditions have implanted a strong sense of self-restraint on the military. In these countries, there are competing civilian institutions and power groups, as well as a mass political party which dominates politics but permits a measure of political competition.

When the military expands its political activity and becomes a political bloc, the civilian leadership remains in power only because of the military passive assent or active assistance. The extent of political competition decreases, and it is appropriate to describe such a system as a (4) *civil-military* coalition, because of the crucial role of the armed forces. Here the military serves as an active political bloc in its support of civilian parties and other bureaucratic power groups. The civilian group is in power because of the assistance of the military. The military may act as an informal, or even an explicit umpire between competing political parties and political groups. The military may, at this level, be forced to establish a caretaker government with a view to returning power to civilian political groups. Such alliances and caretaker governments can be unstable; they frequently lead to a wider level of involvement where the military sets itself up as the political ruling group. The result is a (5) *military oligarchy*, because, for a limited time at least, the political initiative passes to the military. When an actual takeover occurs and the military becomes the ruling group, civilian political activity is transformed, constricted and repressed.

But it is a basic observation that in the contemporary world the military operates at each level of political intervention, including the takeover of political power, as incomplete agents of political change. Thus, an additional type of civil-military relations, in part hypothetical, and to some degree actually emerging, must be postulated. After «takeover», the military regime can begin to recognize the task of supplying national political leaders. At this level, the military recognizes the needs for a mass political base in order to

achieve objective national development. It seeks to develop a broader political apparatus, either with its own personnel, under their direct supervision, or through a system of alliances with civilians.

V. MILITARISM AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Militarism — internal and external, designed or unanticipated — complicates the tasks of international relations and the development of a world community. The opposite, the «military way» — the efficient use of military resources — seems too limited a concept for analyzing the contemporary problems of the sociology of war and peace.

To create a world community which is able to cope with the problems of nuclear confrontation and to contain limited warfare, a redefinition of the military profession is required. Two different models are possible in the intellectual and scientific tasks of conceptual reformulation. One model excludes the military from participation in the construction of a world community and from the specific tasks of United Nations peacekeeping, regional security arrangements, the international relations of arms control and disarmament. This model focuses on the explicit negotiation of civilian political leaders who must search for the terms of reference to initiate treaties or agreements as the prime mechanisms for reducing international tensions. From this «tensions» approach, the organizational and institutions aspects of the world community and of arms control are secondary and present few special problems beyond the technical features of inspection and the like. The basic issues are the tensions between nations which need to be reduced in order to insure the success of the diplomatic and negotiating process. In this view, the threat of military professionals is seen in traditional terms as a pressure group and a coalition element in the political process likely to frustrate the development of a world community because of professional interests.

This point of view has the advantage that it focuses on presumed basic issues of economic development and international communications and political arrangements which must be dealt with in order to contribute to the development of the world community. However, it is only a partial model for the students of the sociology of war and military institutions. It fails to incorporate a realistic understanding of the potentials and limitations of the military professional in constructive international relations. It fails to formulate an institutional

role for the specialist in violence in creating the stable conditions required for a world community. The military must move in the direction of becoming a police-type operation, in the sense that «victory» against a specific enemy is no longer its major goal, but rather that of creating stable conditions for social and political change.

The second model, the «institutional» approach, does not exclude the military from a positive role in peacekeeping, arms control and disarmament. Movement toward a world community involves more than creating the political and social psychological preconditions for bargaining and negotiating at the diplomatic level. There is an organizational and institutional aspect. It is not enough to speak of policies without a concern for the organizations that must implement policy, since policy is not self-enforcing. The reduction and elimination of the threat of war involves adaptation and changes in all of the institutions of foreign policy — political, economic and military.

In the long run, successful systems of accommodation and arms control would reduce the size of the military; but in the very short run, such schemes are likely to require a shift in the pattern of military activity. From this point of view, each step and each type of international accommodation requires new involvements and adaptations by the military if the accommodations of arms control are to be stable, relatively enduring and expanding in scope.

Thus it becomes highly relevant to examine the actual and potential capacity of the armed forces to adjust and adapt to the problems of managing the instruments of violence so as to avoid general war and contain limited war. Obviously, this is a multi-faceted problem — political, strategic and organizational. The sociological analysis of the military must also deal with this problem. But for this purpose the sociologist must have a policy-oriented conceptual standpoint if his research is to bear on these policy problems.

The notion of the constabulary force is a sociological contribution to understanding the organizational problem. In *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait*, the constabulary concept is defined in the following way: «The military establishment becomes a constabulary force when it is continuously prepared to act, committed to the minimum use of force, and seeks viable international relations rather than victory because it has incorporated a protective military posture»⁵. The constabulary force concept encompasses the

⁵ MORRIS JANOWITZ, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait*, The Free Press of Glencoe, 1960, p. 418.

entire range of military power and organization, including the military contribution to arms control and disarmament.

The constabulary concept is not tied to a specific strategic outlook, but rather is an expression of enlightened self-interest. It is designed to facilitate creative innovations in military organization and doctrine so as to permit modification in national policy where necessary in order to reduce the risk of war.

The peacekeeping operations of the United Nations can be viewed as an application of the constabulary concept at the level of the world community. In the early evolution of the United Nations, there was considerable discussion of the possibility of a world military force to enforce the political and legal decisions of the United Nations. This would be a force recruited and staffed directly under its jurisdiction, as a step toward «world government». The pressure of the international relations plus the organizational defects of this approach rendered this concept inoperative from the very beginning.

The actual pattern of military operations of the United Nations has in effect conformed to a constabulary pattern. Peacekeeping operations by the United Nations have been undertaken by conventional national forces which have been welded into ad hoc organization, and given political and administrative direction by United Nations organs. It is striking to note that, while there have been factual and operational reports of the United Nations peacekeeping operations, they have not been studied in depth from a sociological perspective. Such studies would be of considerable importance. However, there are still no resources or plans to study the impact and consequences of contemporary operations, for example United Nations forces in Cyprus and on the Israeli-Arab border. Clearly, international social science research units under the sponsorships of the International Sociological Association and UNESCO to carry out such research and to be prepared on a standby basis to accompany future United Nations peacekeeping operations are required.

Equally significant is the analysis of the impact of United Nations military experiences on member nations and their constituent forces. A large number of nations have sent forces to participate in United Nations operations with discernible impact on the participants and, in turn, on the internal processes of the particular member nation involved. Only one such study is available on the Irish army, where the impact of United Nations peacekeeping activity has been of considerable importance for political integration of the country and for broadening and deepening its international commitments. Participation

in United Nations peacekeeping activities is not certain to have such consequences, since all experience has not been successful in this respect. In part, the outcome of the particular operations and the conduct of the troops are of some significance. Victory in the traditional military sense is not relevant, but success in the constabulary sense of making a contribution to the world community. (This was precisely the case for the Irish troops, which were hardly «victorious» in the field operations but succeeded in their organizational mission.)

In recent years planning for United Nations military operations has as a result of experience, undergone a radical change and the notion of a permanent United Nations force has receded. Obviously, this is a result of international politics and the burdens of existing United Nations military operations. It is also the result of creative thinking which is seeking to develop professional military forms appropriate to the political and administrative tasks of the United Nations. As a result, thinking and planning have progressed in the constabulary direction; namely, to create that kind of force which would satisfy the needs of the United Nations and which in its organizational format would contribute to the reduction of tensions *per se* rather than create new imbalances. The evolving format is that of national standby forces which are designated in advance as potential United Nations units. These units are housed in member nations and are part of their national defense forces but are available on a constabulary basis for United Nations emergencies. It is noteworthy that some small nations, namely Norway, Sweden and Denmark, have designated specific units for such activities. It is, of course, such small nations that will be called on for United Nations constabulary duty. Canada has taken the lead and organized an international conference on these problems. As a result, the United Nations has the rudiments of a military force at its disposal without the political instabilities and administrative difficulties that would be generated if it had a force in being. But it remains for sociologists to study and appraise these rudimentary efforts in order to help stimulate creative thinking on the development of appropriate military forms.

Beyond peacekeeping operations is the arena of arms control and disarmament. It is possible to develop models of the world community under conditions of radical disarmament. Walter Millis and James Real in *The Abolition of War* are concerned with eliminating war as an instrument of national policy. Yet they conclude with an organi-

zational concept which they label as national police forces. National police forces — and not a world police — are argued as elements required to enforce the domestic conditions required for a world community. The idea of the national police force converges with the concept of the constabulary force. Not only are specialists in violence seen as operating in a protective military posture, but, by whatever name, they are seen as having a positive role in arms control and disarmament.

On the level more specifically related to the mechanics of arms control, is the formulation of Thomas C. Schelling of a special surveillance force⁶. The special surveillance force is seen as an instrument for implementing an arms control arrangement. It is an organizational device for making treaties and formal arrangements enforceable, effective and expanding. The special surveillance force is an example of institution-building which would function «to observe the enemy's behavior, at the enemy's invitation, and to report home instantly through authentic channels. The purpose is to help tranquilize crises that threaten to erupt into general war, particularly crises aggravated by the instability of strategic deterrence...». Thus, it is striking to note that Schelling sees arms control in part as a crash program in which new arrangements — formal and informal, unilateral and bilateral — can emerge in response to a sudden crisis. It is even more striking to note that the organizational characteristics he describes for his special surveillance force are military characteristics in part, and more specifically converge with the constabulary concept; namely, «the attributes of the forces should be readiness, speed and reliability, self-sufficiency, versatility and ability to improvise».

It is, of course, not sufficient for sociologists to speculate and develop alternative models of the institutional arrangements required for arms control and disarmament. It is essential to investigate in organizational and institutional terms the relevant national and international agencies in order better to understand the processes of their adaptation and decision-making. In projecting the research agenda for the sociology of military institutions, it is necessary to examine the full range of their non-military activities. At a minimum, national disasters are likely to persist whose consequences can be coped with in part by military forces. In addition to these national

⁶ Thomas C. SCHELLING, «A Special Surveillance Force,» in Irving Wright, Williams M. Evan, and Deutsch Morton, editors, *Preventing World War III*, Simon and Schuster, Inc., New York, 1962, pp. 87-105.

disasters, there are the continuous rescue missions and responses to the failure and breakdown of man-made systems of transportation, power, navigation and the like. In the process of economic and social development the military have roles to play in education and training that are compatible with the development of a world community. There is every reason to believe that such multiple goals, including cooperative exploration of the limits of man's environment supply important elements in containing and reducing professional militarism.

Chart N° 1

World Profile of Armed Forces Personnel

	Population Mid-1963 Est. (1000 s)	Military Manpower	Military Manpower Ratio*
<i>Africa</i>			
1. Nigeria	55,620	8,000	.014
2. UAR	27,963	80,000-130,000	.464
3. Ethiopia	21,800	30,000	.137
4. S. Africa	17,057	26,500	.155
5. Congo	15,007	31,600	.210
6. Sudan	12,831	12,000	.093
7. Morocco	12,665	35,000	.276
8. Algeria	11,600	65,000	.560
9. United Rep. of Tanzania	10,123	1,500	.014
10. Kenya	8,847	3,000	.033
11. Ghana	7,340	9,000	.122
12. Uganda	7,190	2,000	.027
13. Madagascar	5,940	2,700-9,000	.151
14. Cameroon	5,008	2,800	.055
15. Upper Volta	4,650	1,000	.021
16. Tunisia	4,494	20,000	.445
17. Mali	4,394	3,000	.068
18. S. Rhodesia	4,010	10,000	.249
19. Malawi	3,753	1,500	.039
20. Ivory Coast	3,665	1,500-4,000	.109
21. Zambia	3,496	2,500	.071
22. Guinea	3,360	2,000-5,500	.163
23. Senegal	3,326	2,700-7,000	.210
24. Niger	3,117	1,200-2,000	.064
25. Rwanda	2,850	1,000	.035
26. Chad	2,800	400	.014
27. Burundi	2,650	1,000	.037
28. Somalia	2,300	6,000	.260
29. Dahomey	2,250	1,000	.044
30. Sierra Leone	2,190	1,300	.059
31. Togo	1,565	1,000	.063
32. Libya	1,504	5,500	.365
33. Cent. Af. Rep.	1,300	1,200	.092
34. Liberia	1,030	3,800	.368

* Ratio of Military Manpower over Total Population in Percents.

Chart N° 2

World Profile of Armed Forces Personnel as of 1965

	Population Mid-1963 Est. (1000 s)	Military Manpower	Manpower Ratio* Military
<i>Asia</i>			
1. China (Mainland)	750,000	2,614,000	.348
2. India	460,490	550,000	.119
3. Indonesia	100,045	350,000	.349
4. Pakistan	98,612	103,000-260,000	.263
5. Japan	95,899	221,000	.230
6. Turkey	30,256	428,000	1.414
7. Philippines	30,241	28,500	.094
8. Thailand	28,835	81,000-134,000	.464
9. Rep. Korea	26,969	575,000	2.140
10. Burma	23,735	149,000	.627
11. Iran	22,182	150,000	.676
12. N. Vietnam	17,800	250,000	1.404
13. Rep. Vietnam	15,317	225,000	1.468
14. Afghanistan	14,900	90,000	.604
15. Taiwan	11,696	542,000	4.634
16. N. Korea	10,700	309,000	2.887
17. Ceylon	10,625	8,800	.082
18. Nepal	9,700	20,000	.206
19. Malaya	7,607	8,000	.105
20. Iraq	6,855	60,000-70,000	1.021
21. Saudi Arabia	6,600	30,000	.454
22. Cambodia	5,900	32,000	.542
23. Syria	5,251	45,000	.856
24. Yeman	5,000	10,000	.200
25. Israel	2,376	75,000	3.156
26. Lebanon	2,200	10,800	.490
27. Laos	1,925	60,000 Right 9,000 Neutral 25,000 Left	3.116 .467 1.298
28. Jordan	1,827	35,000	1.915

* Ratio of Military Manpower over Total Population in Percents.

Chart N° 3

World Profile of Armed Forces Personnel

	Population Mid-1963 Est. (1000 s)	Military Manpower	Military Manpower Ratio*
<i>Europe</i>			
1. Ger. Fed. Rep.	55,430	430,000	.750
2. UK	53,812	435,000	.808
3. Italy	50,498	388,000	.768
4. France	47,853	880,400	1.839
5. Spain	31,077	400,000	1.287
6. Poland	30,691	285,000	.928
7. Yugoslavia	19,065	347,000	1.820
8. Rumania	18,813	218,000	1.158
9. E. Ger. (GDR)	16,095	154,000	.956
10. Czechoslovakia	13,951	185,000	1.326
11. Netherlands	11,967	130,000	1.086
12. Hungary	10,088	90,000	.892
13. Belgium	9,290	110,000	1.184
14. Portugal	9,037	120,000	1.327
15. Greece	8,480	161,000	1.898
16. Bulgaria	8,078	149,500	1.850
17. Sweden	7,604	23,000	.302
18. Austria	7,712	14,000	.195
19. Switzerland	5,770	12,000	.207
20. Denmark	4,684	42,500	.907
21. Finland	4,543	41,900	.922
22. Norway	3,667	35,000	.954
23. Ireland	2,841	13,000	.457
24. Albania	1,762	28,000	1.589

* Ratio of Military Manpower over Total Population in Percents.

Chart N° 4

World Profile of Armed Forces Personnel as of 1965

	Population Mid-1963 Est. (1000 s)	Manpower Military	Ratio* Manpower Military
<i>North America</i>			
1. U.S.A.	189,417	2,702,000	1.426
2. Mexico	38,416	62,200	.161
3. Canada	18,928	119,700	.632
4. Cuba	7,203	43,000	.596
5. Haiti	4,448	5,000	.112
6. Guatamala	4,144	8,000	.193
7. Dom. Rep.	3,334	19,000	.569
8. El Salvador	2,721	4,000	.147
9. Honduras	2,024	2,500	.123
10. Nicaragua	1,541	5,000	.324
11. Costa Rica	1,344	None	
12. Panama	1,177	None	

* Ratio of Military Manpower over Total Population in Percents.

Chart N° 5

World Profile of Armed Forces Personnel as of 1965

	Population Mid-1963 Est. (1000 s)	Military Manpower	Military Manpower Ratio*
<i>Oceania</i>			
1. Australia	10,916	52,000	.476
2. New Zealand	2,538	12,500	.492

* Ratio of Military Manpower over Total Population in Percents.

Chart N° 6

World Profile of Armed Forces Personnel as of 1965

	Population Mid-1963 Est. (1000 s)	Military Manpower	Military Manpower Ratio*
<i>South America</i>			
1. Brazil	76,409	272,700	.356
2. Argentina	21,719	116,000	.534
3. Colombia	15,098	19,000-22,000	.145
4. Peru	11,045	37,000	.334
5. Chile	8,217	42,300	.514
6. Venezuela	8,144	19,700	.241
7. Ecuador	4,726	15,800	.334
8. Bolivia	3,596	8,000-15,000	.417
9. Uruguay	2,649	NI	---
10. Paraguay	1,903	9,600	.504

* Ratio of Military Manpower over Total Population in Percents.

Chart N° 7

World Profile of Armed Forces Personnel as of 1965

	Population Mid-1963 Est. (1000 s)	Military Manpower	Military Manpower Ratio*
U.S.S.R.	224,764	3,850,000	1.713

* Ratio of Military Manpower over Total Population in Percents.

POVERTY

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The exceptional rather than the modal frequently dominates thought. The formation of the poverty program in the United States was spurred by the «discovery» of poverty among a minority of citizens in our most affluent society rather than by its chronicity and preponderance in most of the nations of the world. Similarly, it has been the policy-oriented social scientists of the first industrialized society who have in recent years awakened our interests in social mobility and in poverty and inequality. In their work and that of their colleagues, David Glass and Richard Titmuss of the London School of Economics have focused attention on the barriers to opportunity and to well-being and have forced us to reassess not only the roles of education and social welfare but also the meanings that we wish to assign to societal well-being.

As such, poverty has not been analyzed in the poor nations. The concern rather has been with issues of economic development. The assumption has been that the first task (at least in chronology) of economic development will adequately handle the second task, improving the well-being of people over time.

The disparities between the rich and poor societies make it rather embarrassing at times to discuss in the same breath the poverty of the affluent economy and the poverty of the low-income society. The poor are so much poorer in poor societies that some writers believed that poverty had been ended in the richer societies. Since our conceptualizations and policy orientations may be inadequate even for dealing with poverty in the rich nations, we shall have to exercise great caution in our discussions to insure that the ways of thinking about poverty and its eradication are not mechanically applied to situations where they may prove inappropriate. Also, the situations in societies with differing social systems may be significantly contrasting. We must search for the discontinuities of poverty analysis as well as for the continuities.

In the richer societies poverty is essentially a minority phenomenon in that the majority of citizens are believed to be living above a

poverty line. For most societies, however, the struggle is to move a dominant poverty into a minority poverty. How different is poverty when it is in the majority or in the minority position? ¹

We can categorize different patterns of poverty:

A. Dominant Poverty

1. Most people are poor except for a small but very rich section; the distribution is perhaps 90-10.
2. The poor are in the majority, but there is a sizable number of non-poor in the nation; the distribution of poor to non-poor may be 70-30 or 60-40. That is, a sizable middle-income group has developed.

B. Minority Poverty

3. Although the majority of the population is not poor, a sizable slice is; the distribution of poor to non-poor may be 30-70.

The poor may be made up (to a substantial extent at least) of a low-income class group (a regional peasantry) or a caste group (e.g., Negroes in the United States).

4. Most of the population is not poor, except for special groups dependent on special sources (e.g., the aged) or suffering from economic decay (e.g., chronically depressed regional areas).

The distribution of poor to non-poor is perhaps 15-85.

These may not be the best categories to denote different poverty situations, but some classification is needed. As with much of the analysis of this paper, the effort is to open doors to discussion rather than to provide a narrow structure to frame discussions.

¹ "...poverty becomes visible and measurable as an increasing proportion of the population attains a higher standard of living, and the poverty of the minority then stands out as a glaring disgrace to a progressive society. Poverty becomes a policy problem when it has been reduced to a manageable proportion at a certain stage of socio-economic development." Koji TAIRA, *Country Reports: 6, Japan*, International Trade Union Seminar on Low Income Groups and Methods of Dealing with Their Problems, Manpower and Social Affairs Directorate, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1965, mimeographed, p.1. While this striking statement has much merit, I do not think that it is entirely accurate. It will probably become less so, as I argue later.

The analysis of poverty is complicated by the varied meanings and shades attached to the term. To some it is the poverty of mind, of spirit, that is most important, and they are willing to declare, with varying degrees of specificity, what qualities of mind and spirit are the standards. By such standards an affluent society could be poor. Those enamored of the now fashionable term of alienation would characterize many who are materially well-situated as suffering from a poverty of spirit. For others, poverty is essentially a question of income, of the capacity to buy a particular basket of goods which is defined as essential to life in that society. For still others, poverty is an insufficiency in the command over important economic, social or political ingredients of a level of living. Our concern is largely with "poverty" as indicated in the last two sentences, but we have to be aware of the shifting focuses and goals of poverty analysis.

I suggest below the broad value of looking at poverty in relative terms — the poor are those who are falling behind the advances of the rest of society. In that sense, the concept of poverty applies to rich and poor, socialist and capitalist, industrial and non-industrial societies.

THE ABSOLUTE APPROACH

It is deceptively easy to believe that when we deal with poverty in the low-income countries we are dealing with a basic subsistence problem. The implication is that we are identifying those who fall — and these should be easily identifiable — below the subsistence level. We tend to assume that when we refer to the poverty of the low-income nations we are referring to situations where all or most of the population is barely able to survive. In some countries and in some regions of even well-to-do nations, this is undoubtedly an accurate statement. But in all countries we find that cultural factors affect the definition of poverty. Peter Townsend has alerted us to the possibility that even the basic sustaining caloric intake is probably not determined by sheer biological necessity but by the particular cultural phenomena defining an adequate diet.

Further, in all societies, no matter how low the economic level, there is probably a considerable amount of internal differentiation. Even among the poor we find many who are much poorer than others. We always have to be concerned with the public policy question: to which poor do we wish to direct attention?

THE RELATIVE APPROACH

Richard Titmuss, Peter Townsend and Brian Abel-Smith have made an enormous contribution in forcing us to look at poverty in welfare societies in new ways. Much of their analysis probably applies to low-income societies; how much is one of the problematics of these sessions.

Their argument is that poverty is always relative to time, place, and circumstance. Poverty, then, is defined by some standard which changes as society changes. In the higher-income societies, we are not dealing with a subsistence level today in most poverty situations. Rather, poverty refers to those who have *fallen behind the rest of society* in important respects. In Parodi's conceptualization, «lagging income» rather than low income is the issue. He argues:

Certain social groups are in fact particularly vulnerable to the combined effects of an increase in the cost of living, a stationary or inadequately increasing income in nominal terms and the specific factors which are normally responsible for poverty. The persistence and even the extension of geographical and vocational areas of poverty and frustration in a country with a rapidly expanding economy are a serious threat to a country's social cohesion.²

Poverty, then, has to be analyzed in terms of the over-all conditions of a changing society.

Another great conceptual contribution of the Titmuss group has been to emphasize the varied dimensions of well-being today. The Titmuss group has seen that in the contemporary complex society a conventional and limited interpretation of income is inadequate for assessing the well-being of a population. Titmuss has argued that income has to be considered broadly; in particular, wage-connected benefits (e.g., pensions) and fiscal benefits (e.g., tax deductions for children which benefit the better-off more than the low-income tax payer) as well as welfare (transfer) benefits have to be included in any discussion of the *command over resources*. Poverty, then, is an insufficiency in the *command over resources*.³

² Maurice PARODI, *Country Reports: 1, France, Ibid.*, p. 1.

³ Richard TITMUSS, *Essays on «The Welfare State»*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1958; *Income Distribution and Social Change*, London: Allen and Unwin, 1962; Brian ABEL-SMITH, «Whose Welfare State?» in Norman MAC-KENZIE, ed., *Conviction*, London: MacGibbon and Kee, 1959; Peter TOWNSEND, «The Meaning Of Poverty», *British Journal of Sociology*, 13, 3, September, 1962.

This theme has been developed recently by Miller, Gross and Rein. The concept of income has been widened beyond current monetary income to the accumulation of and access to assets (e.g., pensions and housing) and the availability and utilization of services (public and private, as in wage-related medical programs).⁴ Poverty lines could be drawn in each of these areas.

In the high-industrial society it may become increasingly important to recognize «the new income» — the evolving forms of social and political inclusions and exclusions, of social and psychological participation, of social distance. T.H. Marshall's «citizenship rights» concept is being applied in the United States, with considerable public furor and varying degrees of achievement, to include the «maximum feasible participation» of the poor in making decisions in the poverty programs. Not only voting rights but political and personal autonomy become new forms of resources which place individuals in a society.⁵

As the average per capita income of a society increases, the various dimensions of income probably become less coincident. Marginal increments in income do not guarantee better housing, better medical services, better education, more neighborhood amenities or more political effectiveness. The fragmentation and segmentalization of activities in high-industrial societies — contrasting with the functionalist's emphasis on integration and interaction — means that efforts have to be expanded in each institutional area. Across-the-board expenditures cannot solve all the problems of the poor. If we extend the range of amenities that the poor should have (e.g., decent housing), we may have to operate in many of the institutional areas affecting amenities as well as in aggregative economic areas. Organi-

⁴ Bertram GROSS and S.M. MILLER, «The War on Poverty: Programs Without Objectives,» *ditto*, 1965. S.M. MILLER and Martin REIN, «Poverty, Inequality and Policy,» in Howard S. BECKER ed., *Social Problems*, New York: John Wiley and Sons; 1966.

⁵ S.M. MILLER, «The New Income,» Syracuse University Youth Development Center, 1965, *ditto*. In this paper, a case is made for treating education as a consumers' good and not only, in the now-fashionable lexicon of economists, as an investment in human resources. Education «adds enjoyment values to individuals who possess it, apart from the economic gains that they may receive because of education.» «In the affluent society, those ... with limited education ... are not fully included in the society. They are not able to enjoy a variety of benefits of the society. They are differentiated in terms of their treatment by various kinds of agencies and the like.» (p. 12).

zational resistance to change will become increasingly important. (The sociology of organization has failed to provide an adequate perspective for those attempting to engineer change in educational and welfare bureaucracies.)

The relative approach to poverty — emphasizing the changing components and standards of a level of living — forces recognition of cultural and *ideological* issues. Scientific rigor cannot be applied in most poverty analyses.⁶ If poverty is defined by society's standards, exactly where should the poverty lines be placed? And which defining publics are credible?

A more disturbing aspect of poverty analysis is that it can become a lever to raise questions about the character and direction of society. The concern with inequality is frequently presented in the form of statements about poverty. At times, efforts to reduce poverty require reductions in inequalities; this is probably the case of educational differentials in societies with rising educational requirements. But not every statement about inequality is a statement about poverty. It may be a useful political device to link the two — and to some extent they are inextricably linked — but for some purposes of analysis, it has been argued, the differences should be separated. A central issue raised by the Titmuss group and requiring further analysis is the degree of convergence between reducing poverty and reducing inequalities.

SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND POVERTY

The relative and new income approaches require understanding poverty in terms of the changing stratifications and structure of society. We lack adequate accounts of social stratification and structure in low-income societies which are industrializing, in high income societies which are in a «welfare-state» phase, and in socialist societies. Attention to poverty analysis forces reexamination of the transformations in stratification and social structure

At one level, the question is: are the poor «pockets of poverty,» statistical groups, or forms of classes? At another level, what are the new forms of income, authority and personal relationships, and

⁶ The uncertain empirical procedures in counting the poor leads Parodi to speak of «detection» rather than «assessment» of the number of poor persons.

how do various groupings in society appear on these indications of social structure? Obviously, the new income approach is defining a poverty level in terms of the classic dimensions of class, status and power. How should these categories be filled in contemporary societies with different social systems and economic production levels?

The question «what are the causes of poverty?» leads to an analysis of the interaction of social and economic forces and, some would argue, of psychological and physiological circumstances. A statement about the factors producing the poor — the people who fall behind — is a statement about *leads and lags in the social structure*.

For this reason as well as others, I suspect that the relative approach will be important in all forms of societies. This approach delineates a society in motion; industries, occupations, regions, special groups cannot share equally in the changes. In all societies, there is uneven advance. (We call the situation of those worst-off «poverty.» Of course, we can disagree about the appropriateness or usefulness of such a designation.)

Statements about policy are implicitly statements about social structure. Such statements etch out not only assumptions about the character of society but, more importantly, the ways in which the society is to be shaped.

Perhaps the greatest lack in discussions of poverty — of the uneven advance of individuals and groups — is the inadequate depiction of contemporary and evolving social structures.

POVERTY STRATEGIES

While economic development and growth are the basic factors in poverty reduction, one cannot offhandedly say that they will solve the problems of poverty. For the issue is *who benefits at what rate* from the development or growth. A poor society may be industrializing at a rapid rate with a sharply rising gross national product. But the number of poor persons may be very slowly (if at all) reduced if the increased product is going into augmenting productive capacity and not consumption. An economic answer to a social issue never resolves the question of choice.

We can look at efforts to reduce poverty in terms of programs of

improving social conditions and programs of improving social mobility. («Social» is used in the widest sense to include all the dimensions of the new income.) Although these two approaches overlap, the distinctions are important. The social conditions approach attempts to change the distribution of benefits; the social mobility approach attempts to change the distribution of individuals.

Social Conditions Approach: The aim there is to improve immediately, directly or indirectly, the *conditions* of those who are poor. It differs from the social mobility approach in that the concern is not with moving some of the now poor into other social niches in society. We can delineate five variants of the efforts to improve social conditions:

- (1) Bringing the poor, or a substantial category of the poor, directly above the poverty levels; for example, increasing the incomes of low-income employed categories (e.g., unskilled laborers) through a measure like a minimum wage. Alternatively, the effort is to increase benefit levels of transfer payments to a specific group like the aged or female-headed households on public-welfare assistance. The effort is *not* to change the group in some way but to enhance the conditions of the group as a category of social humanity.⁷
- (2) Insuring against economic stress and old age. A variety of social insurances (old-age pensions, unemployment insurance, medical benefits) attempt to maintain the income of individuals and families so that they do not fall into poverty or are not at the lowest levels of poverty. The eligibility for and the adequacy of benefits as society changes are recurring issues.
- (3) Aiding those who are left behind in the general advance of society. The concern is to pinpoint aid to particular groups who are sharply falling behind the general advances of society. Supplementary and assistance schemes, aimed at helping a fairly specific population, are characteristic of this approach.
- (4) Providing amenities to a larger number of people. Since certain kinds of amenities — decent health, housing, recreation, social services, etc. — are important elements in the new level

⁷ This effort is aimed at increasing stratum mobility, the position of one category relative to others. (See S.M. MILLER, «Comparative Social Mobility,» *Current Sociology*, IX, 1, 1960.) I have not included it under social mobility because it is of a different character than other social mobility measures.

of living, programs are aimed at directly improving the quantity and quality of these amenities available to and used by the poor. Non-market policies offset the impact of market forces.

- (5) Enhancing social conditions to promote social mobility. The effort here is to provide improved family social conditions in order to accentuate or encourage some of the people in a category (especially the young) to become socially mobile. Occasionally, improving income levels is seen as a way to stimulate mobility aspirations and efforts. More frequently, as in the United States, social services (cast in the chastizing setting of «rehabilitation») are regarded as the fulcrum to prepare and motivate youth for seizing opportunity to be mobile.⁸ To some extent, then, there is a dual function in the effort to better social conditions: improving the conditions of some and encouraging their offspring to be mobile.

Social Mobility Approach: The aim here is to improve the chances of individuals and groups to move into occupational niches which provide higher levels of income and amenities. If there is a great increase in mobility opportunities for a particular category (e.g., if 35 per cent rather than 5 per cent, of the sons of unskilled, low-income men move into considerably higher-paid and higher-valued occupations) we are dealing with a structural change in the distribution of life-chances. The social mobility approach is highly valued because it emphasizes the normal operation of market forces and the desirability of participation in the labor market. Economic development means to a large extent social mobility, for it requires and results in changes in the occupational distribution. But those most poor in a society may have less opportunity than other groups to change their oc-

⁸ The descriptions of and attitudes towards the poor are important elements in the formation of policy. In the United States, the metaphor «the culture of poverty» has unfortunately affected much of policy thinking. See MILLER and REIN, *op. cit.*; MILLER and REIN, «Poverty, Policy and Purpose: The Dilemma of Choice,» *Social Welfare Assembly*, 1966; S.M. MILLER and Frank RIESSMAN, «The Working-Class Subculture: A New View,» *Social Problems*, 1961; S.M. MILLER, Frank RIESSMAN and Arthur SEAGULL, «Poverty and Indulgence: A Critique of the Deferred Gratification Pattern,» in Louis FERMAN, Joyce KORNBLUH, and Alan HABER, eds., *Poverty in America*, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1965; S.M. MILLER, «The American Lower Classes: A Typological Approach,» in Arthur SHOSTAK and William GOMBERG, eds., *Blue Collar World*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1964.

cupations despite the growth of industry and new forms of economic activity.

When social mobility is looked at from the viewpoint of policy, education becomes the focus. The improvement of social mobility chances for the poor (and for many other sectors) requires an expansion and democratization of education. In less industrialized societies, education may be at first of less importance. But as a society advances along the industrialization continuum, educational credentials assume increased importance, undoubtedly much beyond their reflection of real skill needs.

The distribution of educational opportunity, then, becomes a cardinal issue in the social mobility approach to poverty reduction. Expanding educational opportunities across the board may be less important than expanding opportunities for low-income youth.

The social mobility approach is oriented to *opening doors* into the larger society for the poor; the social conditions approach, to *providing floors* so that no one can fall below a particular level. The two approaches obviously overlap. But they are aimed at different visions and values of society and different concerns about the poor. To a large extent, the low-industrial society implicitly emphasizes improving the conditions of the poor by increasing social mobility through opening up new kinds of occupational statuses. In high-industrial societies, there is likely to be a more conscious debate about the two approaches.

To what extent do these approaches necessarily conflict, to what extent do they converge, and which one has precedence in what kinds of situations, are questions of extraordinary importance that social science has not dealt with adequately at present.

Some measures can promote both the improvement of social conditions and social mobility. Other measures can do only one and would be harmful or irrelevant perhaps to the other. We need more and more delineation of measures and assessments of their effectiveness under varying conditions in low-income and high-income societies. Although much has been written on social policies, we still lack a theory which provides a basis for the allocation of resources and the improvement of the operations of welfare and educational bureaucracies.

Are there different kinds of strategies for poor and rich societies? To what extent has Western society been emphasizing the improvement of social mobility opportunities and neglecting the improvement of social conditions? How to divide expenditures in a society between

improving social conditions and improving social mobility is an extraordinarily complicated point which will need much more analysis of the economic costs and benefits as well as the social costs and benefits of each kind of program. We are concerned, in dealing with the poor, with tracing out the kinds of responsibilities and burdens we wish our society to have. For example, to what extent do we wish to improve the conditions of the aged or the conditions of youth?

These are value issues to a large extent, not narrow technical issues. It is the hallmark of a 'beneficent society' that it recognizes principles and does not submerge social values into technical issues. To some extent technicism has led to underestimating the significance of the moral choice involved in the way we wish to allocate production and to shape the kind of society in which we wish to live.

RICH AND POOR NATIONS

Increasingly, rich and poor nations are part of the same international system. With the spread of communication and information, the relevant comparisons of economic standing will not be within a nation but with an international standard of well-being. The richer nations will be yardsticks to provide measurements of well-being in poorer nations. «The revolution of rising expectations» is the development of new standards of well-being, based on images of what is possible. These images, even in poor societies, reflect conditions in the richer societies. The lines which will demarcate poverty will be increasingly determined by *international* rather than *intranational* situations. Poverty, then, could be considered a great problem in nations where it has not been «reduced to a manageable proportion.»

Gunnar Myrdal has been one of the few who have consistently addressed themselves to the interaction of poor and rich economies. His conclusions are that the disparities between the rich and poor nations have deepened: the rich nations are richer today relative to the poor than in previous decades. Moreover, in many low-income economies the absolute level of living may actually be going down. Thus, many of the poor nations in the world are not only falling behind the rich nations relatively, but they are also suffering a real decline in their conditions of life.

Frequently, one hears attacks upon the new nations as being un-

willing to assume the kinds of burdens necessary to promote industrialization. Here, it is important to remember that a number of pieces of evidence now show that the level of living in these countries may be below the level which was achieved in Western Europe at the time of its rapid industrialization. Productivity in agriculture in these areas — frequently after hundreds of years of Western influence and control — is at a lower productivity level than was the productivity of agricultural lands in Western Europe in its time of «takeoff.»

The political difficulties in these nations also parallel the political difficulties of many high-industrial nations in their early stages. The revolutionary wars, the wars for national independence, the long battles among various countries, the internal constraints and conflicts which took place in the industrialized societies at an earlier point are very similar to the kinds of strains and difficulties of the now industrializing societies.

We have had, perhaps, a lack of humility, respect and understanding for the difficulties of industrializing societies. We have rather assumed that the benefits which have been attained in Western society are unique manifestations of the good will and dedication of Westerners, rather than related to specific historical experiences and luck, particularly in terms of raw materials and geography.

How can the rich nations help the poor nations? Here we have had inadequate analysis. We need many more basic ideas (and their implementation!) than have been developed. Myrdal has analyzed the important kinds of changes that must take place in relationships among rich and poor nations. He emphasizes the need for changes in the terms of trade so that the poorer agricultural nations can benefit more from international commerce. The rich nations should be more willing to accept the trade restrictions devised by the poor nations to promote development. Sizable investments of capital will probably be needed if internal strain is to be reduced in industrializing societies.

There has been an enormous amount of activity in the general area labelled technical aid and «investment in institution-building.» To what extent have we learned how to borrow most effectively from the experiences and expertise of advanced societies in helping poor societies to move ahead economically?

There are grave difficulties involved here, apart from the level of systematizing what is known or might become known. The great problem is that of colonialism in the intellectual realm. Many people

in industrializing societies are concerned that a colonial situation may continue despite the formation of a national state. They see the development of various forms of technical aid as intellectual bases for colonialism. Is it possible to provide expert help without encouraging intellectual dependence of and disrespect for the society?

A serious issue which obviously deserves much more attention is the analysis of the *resistance* to aiding the poor of other nations. In many societies, of course, there is even resistance to aiding the poor of one's own society. In the rich societies there is general reluctance to think seriously about aiding the poor of other societies. True, some nations have provided aid on a sizable level to other societies. But as a continuous, deep responsibility, this kind of consciousness does not seem to be pervasive. In the United States aid has been primarily related to the need to limit the attractiveness of Communism. In other societies, the counter-emphasis has provided the push towards aid. Is there a perspective which goes beyond the peculiar and limited national interest in attempting to provide aid to other nations? To what extent is it possible to develop new ways of viewing national output so that it is considered in terms of international as well as national benefit?

A new stage has probably been reached in international relations. While it is undoubtedly true that the rich societies are benefiting mightily from many of their activities in less rich societies, it seems that internal markets have developed to such an extent in the large industrial societies that the heavy rewards from colonial possessions and trade are no longer as significant as they once were. If this is true, then, it presages new possibilities on the international scene. Why have we not moved as rapidly in making these kinds of changes as is now possible? To what extent has there been reluctance of particular kinds of elites to image new possibilities? What have been the obstacles to popular support for measures of aid to other societies? These are important issues which deserve much more attention from social scientists than they have received.

The issues of poverty open up questions about the direction of a nation internally and externally. To ask what we wish to do about poverty is a question about the goals and character of a society.

SOCIAL CLASSES AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

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Like many other issues of sociology of international relations, the problem of interaction of the social classes and international relations has not yet been thoroughly worked out in the sociological literature. However, we cannot but acknowledge that at the present time there are a lot of publications written by the sociologists and other specialists of many countries which contain rather interesting, diverse and sometimes contradictory statements, ideas and conceptions relating to this problem.

The methodological difficulty of research in this field consists in the fact that the very conception of «social class» is variously treated by different authors. Social classes are treated as decisive, basic social groups of people in a society — working class, ruling class, etc. — or as rather small social groups of people — governmental staff, groups which make the decisions, military groups etc. International relations are affected both by the main classes and by many other social groups. Hence we shall use the term «social classes» to denote the decisive groups and the term «social groups» to denote all other groups of people in the society. The term «social groups» is used also to denote the aggregate of the classes and other groups of people which form the social structure of the society.

Based on the analysis of the events making the development of international life, analysis of historical practice, and generalization of the various sociologists' statements on the subject, we shall try to outline the basic problems of relations between the social classes and international life. It is not our purpose to find solutions for all the problems that have arisen. At the present stage of research it is more important to define the scope of the problems that we are interested in and to outline the ways, means and methods which may be employed for finding solutions to them.

1. *Interconnection and Interdependence between Development of Social Classes and International Life*

The first fact to be stated refers to the mutual connection and mutual effect of two sides of this problem: the development of social classes and class relations exerts its effect on the state of international relations, while the development of international life, in its turn, exerts an effect on the social classes and class relations, drawing new social groups of the population in various countries into the orbit of international relations.

Of the two interacting sides, the development of the social classes is predominant. It is only due to lack of development of the social classes and groups of people that these classes and groups have led a secluded life and have been isolated from international affairs. Under such conditions, international life could not actively influence class relations inside separate countries. With the development of the social classes, ever-growing groups and masses of the population become involved in the international relations and actively influence their development.

In the pre-industrial societies, where most of the population was suppressed and deprived of elementary freedoms, foreign policy and international relations were controlled by a small rich upper layer of the society and were the prerogative of the rich classes. In this situation, the effect of large social classes and masses of population on international life was not constantly felt. It was felt only from time to time, in certain periods — especially periods of war, when the position and behaviour of the social classes and of the masses of the population greatly influenced the fighting ability of the army, the strength of the rear, and often determined the outcome of the armed conflicts between states. These were also the periods of greatest social progress, particularly the periods of revolution, when the activity of large social classes not only altered the existing pattern within individual countries but also affected relations between many countries, and international life as a whole.

The industrialization and social revolutions accomplished in many countries in the 18th and 19th centuries led to rapid development and activation of the social classes, especially the working class. As distinguished from the peasantry which was at that time disorganized and, as a rule, passive, the working class became more class-conscious, organized and solid. The working class made its appearance

in the international arena and came to participate actively in international relations.

By way of example, let us consider one historical fact. During the Civil War in the United States, the British workers displaying their solidarity with the workers of the USA heroically resisted the attempts of the ruling classes of the Old World to take part in this war on the side of the Southern states. K. Marx wrote that it «saved Western Europe from the adventure of a shameful crusade intended to perpetuate and spread slavery on the other side of the Atlantic»¹.

In the Twentieth Century changes in the internal social structure of countries and states led to changes in the social structure of the world family of nations — the social structure of international relations. Earlier international relations were determined by, and boiled down mainly to, relations between narrow closed social groups — ruling classes. These ruling classes represented mostly the owners of industry and agriculture. It was supposed that these ruling classes were representing the rest of the social groups of the nation. But actually this was not the case. In the Twentieth Century, in many countries of the world, changes took place within the ruling classes themselves and in the groups most actively participating in international relations and influencing international life. In the Socialist countries no more were there narrow social classes monopolizing the economic resources of their countries. The largest classes — the workers and the peasants — got to be the ruling classes. These classes not only had a decisive effect on the destinies of the countries themselves but also materially affected the development of international relations.

The sociologist V. Willi (B.R.D.) has characterized the changes in Russia in the following way: «The proletariat has come to power. Former workers and peasants are now *setting the fashion* in the Kremlin»². International relations came to be controlled by the workers and peasants who established their power in the Socialist countries.

But the international relations are not restricted to relations between ruling classes of various countries. The Twentieth Century is characterized by an active drawing into international life of the social classes which are not directly ruling.

¹ K. MARX, F. ENGELS, *Works*, 2nd edition, v.16, p. 11.

² I.V. WILLI, *Weltpolitik und Wertsoziologie*. *Schweizer Rundschau*, 1963, p. 42.

In some cases such social classes exert their influence on the government in their countries and, though they are not ruling, are to some extent represented by the authorities. In other cases these social classes are in opposition to the ruling classes and are not represented by the state authorities.

Irrespective of their specific relations with the national authorities and governments, these classes, in the course of their development, have come to participate in international life, not only through the channels peculiar to the ruling classes but apart from them or side by side with them.

The working class, social groups of intelligentsia and employees, even if they were not ruling classes, managed to find various ways and methods of influencing international relations. This influence was exerted by the combined efforts of the workers of various countries, the international activity of the workers' parties and trade unions, and the combined action of intelligentsia groups in various countries.

The development of international relations, in its turn, led to drawing into international life social classes and groups which had been earlier apart from it. Such a process took place during the Second World War, when in many countries there could be found no social classes and groups apathetic or indifferent to international events. The activity of the social classes and the great role played by the large masses of the population were responsible for the anti-fascist nature of the Second World War.

Domestic and international events in the post-war years also contributed to involving new social classes and large groups of the world's population into the sphere of international relations. I would like to mention four aspects of this process.

First aspect — *formation of new Socialist countries.*

New Socialist states have arisen in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe and Asia, which represent the broadest social groups — workers, peasants and the intelligentsia. These classes and groups, being the owners of their countries, have thereby become the participants and the subjects of international relations.

This is particularly true for the countries of Asia. Before the Second World War the broad masses of the multi-million population there did not participate in international relations, as they were only the object of policy of the international forces. Now in these states the social classes of workers and peasants have become active subjects of policy in international life.

Second aspect — *rise of more than 60 independent liberated states in Asia and Africa*. Before the Second World War all these peoples were only the objects of policy of international forces, not participating as active subjects in international life. Having won their independence, the peoples of these countries have gained the possibility of participating actively in international relations. This refers mainly to the social classes of small owners, peasants and workers, social groups of the intelligentsia, and military and civilian employees. The social classes and groups of new nations have become involved in international relations either as ruling groups or as powers affecting the foreign policy of the independent states, or as direct participants in international life acting through the party, trade unions and other organizations, through their leaders and representatives.

Third aspect — *the scientific-technical and industrial revolution* which ensures the activation of social classes and groups in international life. In an ever-growing number of countries, industry has become a universal form of material production. The role of science has increased to the extent where it has taken the lead in the industrial revolution. Industrialization penetrates agriculture, house building, trade and services. This considerably raises the status of employees, their educational and technical level, and enhances the importance of mental work. All this helps to increase the consciousness, unity and activity of social classes and groups. From the technical point of view (we are not considering the social aspect of the industrial revolution) the industrial revolution has many common features in various countries. This makes for the necessity of international contacts, communications, and relations between the social groups and classes participating in the industrial revolution. The industrial revolution has resulted in more active participation in international relations of scientists, technical specialists and highly skilled workers in various branches of the economy.

Fourth aspect — *the problems of peace and war*, which make it necessary to involve the social classes and groups even more actively in international life. The danger of a new war, especially of a world war, is causing a threat to the very physical existence of entire countries and continents. Any armed clash in any part of the world may develop into «large war» and is fraught with the danger of a general thermo nuclear disaster. The life of peoples, of social classes and of every man depends on the reasonable settlement of basic international issues. These conditions will inevitably lead to an

increase of the interest of the broad masses of the population, and of social classes small and large, in international problems; it will intensify the activity of the social groups in the sphere of the foreign policy and international relations. Broad masses of the population and social groups in all countries are displaying a lively interest in the problems of Viet-nam, the Congo, the Dominican Republic, Germany and Southern Rhodesia. In most countries of the world the representatives of each social group have clearly shown their attitude towards these most acute international issues of the years 1965-66.

Thus, we see that the mutual relations and mutual influence between the development of social classes and international life lead, on the one hand, to social classes and social relations exerting an ever-growing effect on international relations and, on the other hand, to the development of international life exerting its influence on the social classes and class relations.

According to S. Huddleston, our time is distinguished from previous periods by the influence exerted by the masses on the social life³. The sociologist G.A. Almond, in some of his works, writes about great influence exerted by the broad masses of the population and by social groups on the foreign policy of the USA⁴. The members of the teaching staff of Harvard University and officials of the Center of International Problems headed by R. Bouye, who were entrusted by the Foreign Affairs Committee of the U.S. Senate to compile a report «Ideology and Foreign Affairs», have come to the conclusion that in modern conditions foreign problems are no more the prerogative of a small group of people free to adopt, approve and change foreign policy. Today, as never before, foreign policy must take into account the aspirations and hesitations of the broad masses of the population⁵.

The tendencies of social development lead to such an increase of the influence of the masses of the population — of social classes and groups — on international relations that it is now rather difficult to take important decisions on foreign problems without due regard to

³ S. HUDDLESTON, *Popular Diplomacy and War*, Ringe, New Hampshire, 1954, p. 86.

⁴ G.A. ALMOND, *The American People and Foreign Policy*, New York, 1950; G. A. ALMOND, Public Opinion and National Security Policy, *Public Opinion Quarterly*, v. 20, Summer 1956.

⁵ *United States Foreign Policy. Ideology and Foreign Affairs*, Washington, 1960.

the opinion of the social classes and masses of the population. This pointed out by the Austrian sociologist R. Blühdorn: «When taking decisions on the most important problems such as going to war or concluding peace, the most difficult task is to secure the consent of the population»⁶.

And this is good. The social classes and groups — and first of all the broadest of them — being the main components of the population, should have the opportunities and means for not only expressing their opinion on the most important international issues but also for determining actively *the pattern of international relations* in the modern world.

2. *Social Classes, the Nation, the State and International Relations*

Many publications devoted to the sociology of international relations stress the fact that, generally speaking, social classes affect international relations and participate in international life not directly but indirectly — through the nation, the State, and the power which they wield. Hence the relationship between social classes and international life is connected with a number of concepts and categories which should be at least briefly discussed.

The first concept is that of the *nation*. In the international arena certain aggregates of social classes and groups act as large, stable, historically developed communities of people, i.e. nations. J. Morgenthau remarks that world politics «deals with relations between the international society and its components, national states»⁷. This is stressed by other sociologists also. «The national state is the main actor in the international system»⁸.

«The models of the international system commonly deal with large units, with national states as the main actors»⁹. Therefore the sociology of international relations deals with «two most widely used levels of analysis: international system and national subsystem»¹⁰.

⁶ R. BLÜHDORN, *Internationale Beziehungen*, Vienna, 1956, p. 220.

⁷ Hans J. MORGENTHAU, *Dilemmas of Politics*, Chicago, 1958, p. 47.

⁸ Morton A. KAPLAN, Is International Relations a Discipline?, *The Journal of Politics*, 1961, vol. 23, N° 3, p. 471.

⁹ Sidney VERBA, Assumptions of Rationality and Non-Rationality in Models of the International System, *World Politics*, New Haven, 1961, vol.14, N° 1, p. 93.

¹⁰ J. David SINGER, The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations, *World Politics*, 1961, vol.14, N° 1, p. 80.

The second concept is that of *the State, and state authority*. The nation, as an aggregate of social classes and groups, is represented in the international arena by the authority, or the State (state authority). It is not always that one nation is represented by one state, and one authority. The nation may be divided into two states with various types of authority. In society, says Felix Grosse, the highest institution, which unites the variety of institutions and establishes its leadership, is the State¹¹. Hans Morgenthau and many other sociologists consider «authority» as the central concept in political theory, including the theory of international relations.

The third concept is that of *interest*. In any nation the authority and the State express certain interests and are guided by these interests in their activity in the international sphere. The interest expressed by the authority and State may be either the interest of the whole nation (i.e. of the social classes and groups forming the national state concerned) or the interests of some (but not all) social classes and groups, or the interests of one class only and of separate portions of the remaining social groups, etc.

The interests of separate classes are commonly expressed by the political parties. These parties represent also the interests of these classes in the state authority. As Paul Nitse points out, before speaking of the aims pursued by the authority it is necessary to determine whose aims and whose interests are pursued — and this depends on an analysis of the political structure¹².

Thus those who participate in international relations are nations, or national states. Each national state is an aggregate of social classes and groups (its social structure). The nation is represented internationally by the state authority, which expresses (through the parties) the interests of separate classes or combinations of social classes and groups.

The actual relationship between the various social-political elements — viz. social classes and groups; their interests; political parties; the authority, or the State — determines which of the social classes and groups take an actual and active part in international relations through the State, and in what degree. In actual historical practice there arise many different combinations and modifications of these social-political elements, reflecting specific problems

¹¹ *International Social Science Journal*, UNESCO, 1960, vol. XII, N° 2, p. 273.

¹² *Theoretical Aspects of International Relations*, Ed. by W.T.R. Fox, Notre Dame, 1959, p. 3.

as regards the participation of social classes in international life.

The present problems can, of course, be easily «settled» by denying complex nature of the social-political relationships inside the nation and declaring each nation to be a «united», «integral» society, «a united nation» in which the interests of all the social classes and groups merge into a «united», or «higher» interest, and this higher interest is expressed by the authority, i.e. by the State which is the «highest authority», pursuing the aim of the «common welfare». Under this simplified approach the authority, or the State, in each nation is assumed to represent in the international arena all social classes and groups of the nation to an equal extent.

But a good deal of sociological research has shown that in fact matters are much more complicated and that not all social classes and groups are equally represented through the State authority in the international arena.

In society, writes H. Morgenthau, the interests with which the authority is connected and which it pursues are variable as much as are the social aims pursued by the members of the society concerned¹³. It is quite possible (and it is proved by historical practice) for the state authority actually to express the interests of the aggregate of the social classes and groups which form the present national or multi-national state. But, first, the state authority in this case expresses the variety of interests in their main features only, as it is impossible for all practical purposes to express all the specific features of the interests of various groups. Secondly, the very possibility of the state authority expressing the interest of various social groups follows from the fact (without which it cannot exist) that the interests of the social classes and groups are in the main united and not different that they are of one type and not of differing types.

Commonly the state authority acts in the name of the whole nation, claims its opinion to be the opinion of the nation and of all its social classes and groups, and presents its interest as the interest of all classes of the population. But that does not necessarily correspond to reality. It is necessary to study the forces, interests and opinions which are expressed by the state authority, and the classes, portions of classes and social groups whose interests are not represented by the state authority, including their representation at the international level.

In his «Research on International Relations» (New York, 1947)

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 26.

Kirk writes of the need for analysing the forces which influence the foreign policy of separate states, particularly great powers.

The ideas expressed in the name of the nation may actually be only the opinion of the ruling minority. The sociologist R. Behrendt characterizes ideological unity in a nation in the following way: «Ideological unity — whenever and wherever it exists — is evidently always the result of monopolization of the symbols of legitimation and channels of communication by monocracies and oligarchies. The ruling minority should impress upon the majority that its privileges were blessed by God and Fate and that any kind of resistance, and even any kind of hesitation, is not only useless but also sinful»¹⁴.

That which is claimed to represent the interests, opinion, and features of the nation, or of the national character, often happens to be typical only of the ruling classes. The American sociologist H.G. Gallis writes that the honest scientist «cannot run the risk of equally widespread and dangerous simplification, namely of taking into account only the prevailing opinions, or the opinion of the majority, or predominant ideologies which may be inherent only in the ruling class. Karl Manheim clearly expressed the essence of this problem by saying that 'the people try to imitate the actions and opinions of the ruling classes' and that 'the national character in this sense is actually the behaviour characteristic of the ruling classes and gradually adopted by the subordinates'.

«However, the sociologist who studies living societies in their integrity and who is interested in the dynamics of these societies should not miss the underground ideological streams and growth or separation of the social groups irrespective of whether these groups represent the minority or majority, are leading or suppressed»¹⁵.

Since social and political relations inside the nation are very complicated, let us consider only the most specific practical situations characterized by the presence or absence of connections (full or partial) between social classes and groups through the parties and the state authority and international life.

Situation 1. The state authority represents only the ruling class exercising complete sway in the country.

¹⁴ R.F. BEHRENDT, *Dynamische Gesellschaft*, Bern-Stuttgart, 1963, S. 106.

¹⁵ Helmut G. CALLIS, *Sociology and International Politics*. In the book *Roots of Political Behaviour. Introduction to Government and Politics*, New York, 1949, p. 211-212.

In this event only a small group of people participate in international relations through the state authority while the overwhelming majority of the nation (the broadest social classes) do not participate in international life through this medium.

Let us consider Russia before the revolution. In 1913, 16,3% of its social structure was represented by the ruling classes (bourgeoisie, landowners, merchants, kulaks), 66,7% by the peasants and handicraftsmen, and 17,0% by the workers and employees. The state authority of Russia expressed at the international level only the interests of the ruling classes. The interests of the people — peasants, the working class and most the intelligentsia — were not represented by the state authority in the international arena.

Situation 2. The state authority expresses the interests of a small ruling class (which exercises its sway for a long period of time) as well as of the richest groups, high-ranking military officers and members of the government and ideological staff connected in one way or another with the ruling class. The ruling class has gained the support of the top leadership of the broadest social classes and groups. The representation of the ruling class in the state authority thus exhibiting the signs of a democratic or semi-democratic system.

In this case the fact that not all social classes and groups are fully represented in the state authority and through this authority in international relations is to a certain degree camouflaged. Actually, the bulk of the classes and groups which make up the people (workers, peasants and farmers, intelligentsia, employees) does not participate through the state authority in international relations.

«Situation 2» admits of variants, depending on the specific conditions. For instance, the government may be headed not by the leadership of the ruling class but by the leadership of some other social class, which will nevertheless implement the policies of the ruling class.

Situation 3. The state authority in a country which has gained independence acts as a coalition of forces representing the basic masses and groups of people. The former ruling classes are kept away from power but have not lost hope of getting it back. The difficulty is that the broad masses of the population have not yet formed social classes with certain interest or with necessary degree of consciousness; there is no organization, and there are no parties.

Here the state authority expresses in the international arena the interests of the overwhelming majority of the population and social groups. But as the process of social class formation is under way, and

various social groups are still struggling for power, the problem of how the various social classes will participate through the state authority in international relations can only be settled later.

Situation 4. The state authority represents the interests of all social classes and groups due to the fact that these social classes and groups have come to be, in the social-economic, political and ideological pattern, fused with the basic ruling social class of the society (the working class).

In this event it becomes quite possible for the interests of the whole national or multi-national state, and of all its social classes and groups, to be represented through the state authority in international relations.

The consideration of some specific patterns of social-political relations inside national states makes it possible to draw certain conclusions.

Social classes and groups, as components of national states, participate in international relations through the state authority. The state authority always reflects the social structure of the nation. But, first, different nations are characterized by different types of social structures based, for instance, on private or social property. Secondly, the state authority represents in one case the interests of all social classes and groups (situation 4), in another case the interests of the bulk of the population (situation 3), in a third case the interests of a small ruling class (situation 1), and in a fourth case the interests of the ruling class together with certain portions of other social groups (situation 2).

Hence in some countries where the working class is in power, it participates through the state authority in international relations and exerts an active influence on these relations. In other states, where the working class has no representation in the state authority, it is unable to take part in international relations through state channels.

In one case the state authority provides an opportunity for all the social classes and masses of the population to take an active part in international relations, while in the other case the bulk of the population and of the social classes are deprived of such an opportunity.

The opportunity for a social class to participate through the state authority in international relations depends on whether the state authority expresses the interests of that social class or group.

The facts show that at the present time the working class and the peasants are deprived in many countries of this opportunity or have

very limited, restricted opportunities to take part through the national government in international life since that government represents the interests of the other classes, i.e. of the privileged groups. The interest of the majority of the intelligentsia and of white-collar workers is also insufficiently represented by the governments of many countries.

Thus, the problem of participation of social classes in international relations is closely connected with the type of the domestic social structure of the national states, i.e. the problem of which interests are expressed by the state authority of the nation in question. The international aspect of the activity of each social class is a function of the position, place and role of that class in the national state and in the state authority.

3. Non-Governmental Forms of Participation of Social Classes in International Relations

The social classes and groups participate in international relations not only through the state authority but also in other ways. This is true both in cases where the social class is represented in the state authority and in cases where it is not so represented. This is due to the fact that the state authority, irrespective of how it represents the interests of the class, cannot embrace all forms of activity of social classes and groups. Thus the state cannot replace the class itself in its activities in the international arena.

The social classes which are only slightly represented or are not represented at all by the state authority are particularly eager to find their own path to the international arena. «There are some countries where solidarity is so weak that the relations established between the social and political groups resemble international relations»¹⁶. Under such conditions the classes select the nongovernmental channels for participation in international relations.

Various forms of participation of the social classes in international life were marked by a number of sociologists. Felix Grosse proposed the following approach to this problem:

«International relations may be divided into political and ethnic relations. Political relations take place between governments and, more broadly, between nation-states. Ethnic relations refer to the relations between the national cultures and between the cultural (in

¹⁶ Stanley HOFFMAN, *Theorie et Relations Internationales. Revue française de science politique*, Paris, vol.XI, N°2, juin 1961, p. 424.

the cultural-anthropological sense) or linguistic groups possessing common cultural or historical traditions»¹⁷.

Since we are dealing with social classes, we shall not consider ethnic relations. But it is a fact that international relations exhibit many forms. They include both relations between governments and states and many other forms of relations between the social classes with which we are concerned here.

Such non-governmental relations between classes in the international arena also commonly have a political nature, as they express the position, interests, opinions and activity of social classes. But these relations have other aspects as well, e.g. professional, ideological, cultural, etc.

Social classes play a part in international relations as organized groups. In terms of organizational structure, international relations between social classes and groups assume the form of relations between parties, trade unions and other public organizations set up by the members of the classes (women's, youth, cultural, sport and other organizations).

International relations between the social classes of various countries conducted through parties are the most important and most widespread.

Irrespective of whether the social class is in power or is suppressed, this class, represented by its party, considers it its duty to establish and strengthen international relations with similar classes and parties in other countries. Often the social class is represented by several parties which express the interests of various groups within the class, pursue different aims and use different methods for achieving these aims. The parties whose programs, ideologies and aims are identical sometimes set up international organizations (for instance, the International).

The international economic, political, military and ideological union of ruling groups of the same type, established by these groups through the state authority, is opposed by the union of predominantly non-ruling classes. This union acts as the union of their parties, and it may or may not have the form of an international organization.

International trade union relations are a widely developed form of international social class relations. National trade union organizations establish communication with the trade union organizations in other

¹⁷ *International Social Science Journal*, UNESCO, 1960, vol. XII, No. 2, p. 270.

countries which are close to them in aims and spirit. The trade unions establish international organizations which defend throughout the world the trade union interests of huge masses of people belonging to various social classes.

Similar international unions are organized by youth, women, or for sports and other activities. But these organizations and unions are not directly concerned with international social class relations, since they group representatives of different social groups.

What is the nature of international social class relations, as embodied in relations between parties, trade unions and the like?

It is international exchange of opinions between social classes, their parties and trade unions, and the organization of international conferences, discussions and debates.

It is international exchange between social classes of experience, knowledge and information concerning their struggles.

It is mutual assistance between the social classes, parties and trade unions of different countries. This assistance may be material, political or ideological.

It is international support for the struggle of the social classes, parties and trade unions, support of their activity and actions.

In the first years of the Revolution in Russia, during the Civil War and the foreign intervention, the workers of Britain, France, the United States, Italy and many other countries of the world took the side of the young republic of workers and peasants. «Hands off Soviet Russia» — that was their slogan. This was a case of international support — from the working class of America and Europe to the working class of Russia. The solid international support rendered by the social class of one country to the social class of another country may take the form of political actions, strikes, demonstrations, appeals and material help, — in other words, of declarations and combined actions.

The development of international relations in the last decade testifies to the fact that, along with national governments, state authorities and ruling classes which play a decisive role in the development of the international relations, the mankind, the masses of the population also intensify and extend their role in international relations through direct contacts at the international level between social classes and groups, parties and trade unions, and public organizations. Ever-growing masses of population are brought into the orbit of international relations through intensive activity of the social classes in the international arena.

This process was rather originally characterized by K. Weizsäcker, a well-known German scientist and public official (B.R.D.): «The former foreign policy is being gradually transformed into a world domestic policy»¹⁸.

4. *Nature and Assessment of the Influence of Social Classes on International Life*

One of the most complicated problems is to determine the nature of the influence exerted by the social classes on international life. How can this influence be assessed — as positive or negative, progressive or reactionary, contributing to peace or increasing the threat of war? It is impossible to give any one answer to these questions, which would be applicable to any situation that might arise.

Under specific conditions, certain actions by social classes in the international arena can lead to positive results, while under other conditions the same actions can lead to opposite, i.e. negative results. Certain actions in the international arena may proceed from the best of intentions and nevertheless have whatever most unfavourable results.

The difficulty lies in the fact that the results of action taken in the international arena are seen not immediately but only after a certain time has elapsed. To foresee all the results exactly is rather difficult and sometimes impossible.

Does this mean that in assessing the influence of classes on international relations one should rely only on divination, instinct or psychology? Certainly not; for the sociology of international relations may have a tool for assessing the role of social classes in international life.

In general, the criterion for such an assessment is whether the activity of social classes contributes to, or hinders, public progress.

But in this case new questions arise: what is public progress, and how to determine it.

Mankind in its development, its ideals and its dreams has always set for itself quite definite tasks. These tasks boil down to the following aspirations:

1. Social equality, well-being, justice and brotherhood of peoples, and freedom of human beings.

¹⁸ Karl FRIEDRICH, Freiherr von Weizsäcker, *Bedingungen des Friedens*, Berlin, 1964, p. 12.

2. Equality of nations and races.

3. Peace.

It is from the point of view of these eternal aims of humanity that we should judge in the long run the actions of nations, countries, ruling classes, state authorities, governments, politicians, and historical persons. These criteria may help also in evaluating the manner in which social classes influence international life.

These are, so to speak, *purpose criteria* for estimating the role played by social classes in international relations.

Of no less importance are criteria based on the *nature* of social classes and groups when estimating their role in international life.

It is evident that social classes are at certain stages of their development ascending or descending, growing or decreasing, progressive or reactionary, looking forward or backward. Of course, the question of how a particular class is developing is a matter for debate. But it is a fact, for instance, that in the industrial countries the development of the economy inevitably leads to the growth of a «new middle class» (intelligentsia and employees) and to a shrinking of the «old middle class» (peasants and farmers, and handicraftsmen). Economic trends determine the direction in which all social classes and groups develop.

In the economic sphere humanity progresses normally from the stage of agricultural societies to that of the first industrial revolution and further to the second industrial revolution, which is under way at the present time. These developments in the economic sphere are accompanied by changes in the social sphere, as a result of which the position, role and significance of the social classes in the society are altered. While in agricultural societies the main position was occupied by the peasants, in the form of society which emerged from the first industrial revolution the active role was played by the working class. In the society which is resulting from the second industrial revolution the leading role and significance attaches to the working class, the technical and scientific intelligentsia, and specialists in the field of education and culture.

Hence the activity of the working class and groups of the intelligentsia within national communities as well as at the international level is conditioned by the progressive tendency of public development (provided that it emanates from the tendency in question) and is not performed to please other classes, for instance ruling classes, and is not dependent on them.

Sometimes it happens that the actions and activities of social clas-

ses and groups in international relations are not a reflection of the intrinsic nature of these social classes, but are the result of the influence of other social classes (due to low maturity, and to political and ideological hardening of the former classes). Nor can we ignore the fact that members of the various classes and groups — the masses of the population — are subjected to foreign propaganda which inspires them with false ideas and creates a state of mind favourable to the ruling class.

R. Behrendt writes, for instance, that «the bourgeois way of thinking is extending beyond the limits of the old bourgeoisie and has deeply penetrated into the circles of what used to be called the proletariat»¹⁹. This process (which, in our opinion, has been greatly exaggerated by R. Behrendt) means only that in some countries the definite part of the proletariat has taken up bourgeois thinking habits and, at both the national and international levels, acts not in its own interests but in those of the bourgeoisie, thereby expressing the nature of the bourgeoisie.

The combined use of «purpose criteria» and «nature criteria» for the evaluation and assessment of the role played by social classes in the international arena yields a criterion for comparing the behaviour of various social groups in international life.

Sociologist Paul Nitse uses the criterion of purpose for assessing the role played in international politics by such an «organized group» as the United States of America. He writes: «Today the United States are sure to consider a first-class air force as their long-wished goal. Therefore the treaties with Spain and Saudi Arabia are the long-wished means. The air forces in their turn are a means for attaining the higher goal — general military power, which serves as a means of establishing international supremacy...»²⁰.

The limited participation of many social groups in the life of the State, the absence of any check on the part of society over foreign policy and over the actions of the leading groups enables the ruling class to do what it pleases on both the home and the international fronts, i.e. to express frankly its nature and its purposes. «From this — writes R. Behrendt, — it follows that a dynamic society is ruled by an irresponsible oligarchy which leads it towards destruction»²¹.

¹⁹ R.F. BEHRENDT, *Dynamische Gesellschaft*, Bern-Stuttgart, 1963, p. 75.

²⁰ *Theoretical Aspects of International Relations*, Ed. by W.T.R. Fox, Notre Dame, 1959, p.6.

²¹ R.F. BEHRENDT, *op. cit.*, p. 76.

The social classes which are naturally backward-looking conduct a 'backward-looking international policy. According to R. Behrendt, «today the lack of a sense of proportion among statesmen finds expression both at the so-called 'high level' and in the masses of the population. The statesmen are 'the prisoners of the past' and try to conduct a nineteenth century policy in a twentieth century society.

For instance, they stubbornly refuse to recognize the changes resulting from the dynamism and explosive demographic growth of China, with its 700 million people, and from the existence of more than 2,000 millions of people in the so-called developing countries... These combinations of the most modern technology with atavistic social rule have characterized our time since the days of Wilhelm II and Hitler»²².

Thus, while new technology has developed on the economic side, old social classes with old conceptions have continued to characterize the social picture. Thus the actions of these social classes in international life are directed against the progress of our time; they are backward-looking.

«Belief in the inevitability violent social clashes has often led its exponents to argue that they are the only 'realistic' means of action. Actually, such means have proved in practice to be the opposite of, since they are incompatible realistic with the survival of the parties to the struggle. Our past experience gives us both the right and the duty to try to settle conflicts by non-violent methods...»²³.

As a result, some of the ruling groups cling to «violence» in the international relations, whether in Viet Nam or in other parts of the world, while other social groups, demonstrating in international affairs the «spirit of Tashkent», offer their cooperation in settling the conflict between India and Pakistan.

The activity of social classes in the international sphere characterizes their goals and their nature. We would venture to quote R. Behrendt once more: «Our own one-sided indination against slavery in the Communist block, which is accompanied by indifference to lack of freedom in such countries as Spain, Portuga', South Africa, Algiers, Cuba during the rule of Batista, and most Asiatic countries which are under the guardianship of the United States, is considered

²² *Ibid.*, p. 78.

²³ *Ibidem.*

as hypocrisy by the «younger generation» in the developing countries...

«Believing in the necessity of supporting dictators or dying-off ruling classes because of their anti-communist policy, we renounce the help of the most valuable active circles and pave the way for a violent upheaval, which has tendency to develop from the extreme 'right' to the extreme 'left'»²⁴.

The cited statements of R. Behrendt confirm our idea that in assessing the participation of social groups in the international relations *the criterion of action* should be used on a par with the criterion of purpose and criterion of nature. This criterion makes it possible to judge the manner in which a given social class, in keeping with its own nature and objectives, behaves in the international sphere — whether it goes along with the dynamics of the century and struggles for the future or whether it places obstacles in the way of the new and clings to the past.

We have discussed here the problems posed by relations between large groups of people of the international level. These relations are versatile, have many forms, and may be of a differing nature. They give rise to many problems which have not yet been studied, and it was not our goal to settle all of them. Thorough study of all these questions and issues requires intensive effort on the part of a large number of sociologists in the various countries.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 148-149.

SOCIOLOGIE DES ORGANISATIONS INTERNATIONALES

DOCUMENT DE TRAVAIL PRÉLIMINAIRE

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L'organisation des discussions, je l'espère fructueuses, du groupe de travail sur la sociologie des organisations internationales exigeait une première vue d'ensemble sur les problèmes à aborder. La matière étant neuve, il n'était pas aisé de dresser un tel tableau général. Le présent memorandum doit être considéré comme un réflexion tout à fait exploratoire. L'auteur tient à insister fortement sur ce point et demande au lecteur de ne pas l'oublier. Il est très conscient des imperfections de ce texte. Pour sa défense, il a de bons arguments à présenter:

1. S'il a une certaine expérience des organisations internationales, qu'il étudie depuis de longues années, il n'est pas sociologue;
2. Il n'a disposé que de quelques jours pour rédiger ce document, dont la diffusion était urgente;
3. Il n'a voulu que mettre le ballon en jeu: la beauté du match dépend, désormais, de la science et de l'ardeur des joueurs.

LES DIFFICULTÉS D'UNE ÉTUDE SOCIOLOGIQUE DES ORGANISATIONS INTERNATIONALES

Les organisations internationales ont fait l'objet, surtout depuis 1945, de très nombreuses études, formant aujourd'hui une littérature abondante, ainsi que d'un enseignement considéré, de plus en plus, comme celui d'une discipline indépendante. Au début, et en Europe surtout, ces études et cet enseignement ont été conçus d'un point de vue principalement juridique. Aujourd'hui, ils sont plutôt considérés comme un secteur particulier des relations internationales, relevant des méthodes de la science politique.

Face à ce mouvement considérable, l'analyse proprement sociologique des organisations internationales n'a presque pas été abordée, si ce n'est de façon incidente dans des travaux de science politique.

Il n'est pas inutile, au moment où un premier effort est fait par l'Association internationale de Sociologie pour étudier ce problème, de s'interroger sur les raisons de ce silence persistant.

LA NATURE DES DIFFICULTÉS

Elles tiennent, probablement, à l'attitude des sociologues eux-mêmes, longtemps tournés, de façon presque exclusive, vers les groupes sociaux les plus proches de l'individu, et qui n'ont abordé que tardivement l'analyse des relations internationales. Mais, même dans ce cadre nouveau, les organisations internationales présentent une complexité probablement supérieure à celle des autres secteurs des relations internationales. Elles sont, en outre, d'un accès malaisé à qui n'est pas familier des problèmes internationaux. Ce sont donc plutôt les caractères spécifiques du sujet qui expliquent, pensons-nous, que les sociologues aient négligé un champ de recherches qui pouvait leur paraître mieux approprié à des analyses de science politique.

La première difficulté vient probablement de ce que les organisations internationales, qui réunissent des hommes de façon permanente — ce qui ne se retrouve pas dans d'autres secteurs des relations internationales — constituent néanmoins un milieu social très artificiel. En effet, les individus ainsi groupés sont des représentants de gouvernements. Cela signifie qu'ils ne prennent pas leurs décisions en fonction de leurs propres sentiments et représentations personnelles et des influences qu'ils reçoivent du milieu, mais d'après des instructions reçues du dehors et émanant d'hommes soustraits à ces influences. Cet aspect des choses ne gêne pas l'analyse du processus de décision des organes, lorsqu'elle est entreprise du point de vue de la science politique, qui s'intéresse essentiellement aux mécanismes institutionnels et aux motivations politiques. Il rend décevante, au contraire, l'analyse sociologique du même processus, ainsi que celle des mécanismes sociaux et du groupe lui-même.

En second lieu, les fins de l'organisation internationale sont étrangères à celles du groupe humain qu'elles constituent. Elles concernent, en effet, les relations entre les groupes politiques que forment les Etats, les comportements de leurs gouvernements respectifs et, dans une plus faible mesure, l'évolution des rapports sociaux à l'intérieur de ces groupes politiques. On est donc d'un point de vue sociologique, en présence d'un système de systèmes au 3^e degré, dans la mesure où l'appareil étatique constitue lui-même déjà un système de

systèmes. La distance entre les décisions prises et les groupes sociaux concernés est considérable et la complexité du phénomène défie l'analyse.

Enfin, peut-être faut-il signaler aussi une difficulté pratique, à laquelle risquent de se heurter les enquêtes, surtout si elles comportent des interrogatoires des acteurs. Le secret diplomatique entraînera, probablement, beaucoup d'entre eux à dissimuler la véritable motivation de leurs comportements et de leurs décisions, voire à les déguiser, sans qu'on dispose de beaucoup de moyens de rétablir la vérité.

LA PORTÉE LIMITÉE DE CES DIFFICULTÉS

Ces difficultés sont réelles et il est bon de les conserver présentes à l'esprit. Elles ne doivent pourtant pas être exagérées.

Tout d'abord, chacune des organisations internationales ou presque a provoqué la formation d'un milieu social vrai, bien que fonctionnel, composé des fonctionnaires permanents qui composent son secrétariat, auxquels il faut ajouter, dans certains cas, des experts internationaux, rattachés à l'organisation pour une période plus ou moins longue, ainsi que, parfois, les membres de formations militaires. Les remarques présentées plus haut ne sont pas valables pour les membres de ces groupes particuliers ou, tout au moins, perdent beaucoup de leur portée. Or, les secrétariats et les corps d'experts prennent une importance grandissante dans la vie de la plupart des organisations internationales.

L'étude des administrations nationales, publiques ou privées, et du phénomène bureaucratique, aussi bien que des milieux de fonctionnaires, compose déjà un secteur important de la sociologie contemporaine. A première vue, il semble que les méthodes mises au point à cette occasion pourraient facilement être utilisées pour l'analyse des phénomènes et des milieux correspondants au niveau des organisations internationales. Elles devraient seulement être adaptées, pour tenir compte de la diversité nationale et culturelle des fonctionnaires et experts internationaux. Il y a là un très vaste champ de recherches.

D'autre part, l'organisation internationale forme un cadre institutionnel à l'intérieur duquel se développe un jeu social comportant un certain nombre de rôles. Or, même si on considère les délégués et représentants gouvernementaux, on ne doit pas exagérer leur hétérodétermination. Beaucoup d'entre eux n'ont que des instructions

vagues, laissant une très large place à la manœuvre et aux choix personnels. Cela est vrai non seulement des représentants d'Etats ne disposant pas d'une administration des Affaires étrangères très structurée, mais aussi de nombreux délégués, compétents dans des domaines techniques où n'existe pas une politique gouvernementale ou administrative très définie.

Les représentants munis d'instructions eux-mêmes, disposent toujours d'une certaine marge de manœuvre, à l'intérieur de laquelle ils pourront donner un style personnel à l'exécution de leur mission (et seront soumis à l'influence du milieu). On peut, en outre, observer très souvent une distance remarquable entre les positions officielles qu'ils expriment dans des votes et des déclarations publiques, et leur comportement personnel dans les conversations privées et les négociations officieuses, dont l'importance et la signification n'ont pas besoin d'être soulignées. Enfin, les représentants peuvent aussi, dans beaucoup de cas, prendre une part importante dans l'élaboration de leurs instructions, soit par les informations qu'ils sélectionnent dans leurs rapports, par la méthode de présentation de ces informations et les commentaires ou suggestions qui les accompagnent, soit par une véritable négociation avec les administrations centrales et les autorités gouvernementales. Il convient de se souvenir, à ce propos, que certains représentants ont rang ministériel. En aucun cas, le représentant n'est un simple robot téléguidé, dont les réactions seraient totalement imperméables aux influences du milieu.

Cela n'apparaît peut-être à aucun moment avec autant d'évidence que dans la prise de décision, qui constitue la fonction essentielle d'un organe international. Sauf l'hypothèse, assez exceptionnelle, d'un sabotage délibéré — ou d'un boycottage — des travaux d'un organe, le processus de prise de décision joue le rôle d'un aimant qui soude l'ensemble de ceux qui forment cet organe et polarise leurs énergies vers un même objectif, en un seul jeu social où tous sont pleinement intégrés, des délégués et de leurs aides jusqu'aux interprètes et aux secrétaires.

Enfin, une analyse sociologique des organisations internationales doit comprendre encore l'étude de l'influence que peuvent avoir ces organisations sur le milieu et les groupes et sous-groupes nationaux, ce qui ramène aux problèmes les plus familiers de la sociologie. Cette influence résulte de l'existence même de l'organisation, qui modifie le champ diplomatique et peut aussi ouvrir de nouvelles possibilités d'action à des groupes de pression à l'intérieur de la com-

munauté nationale. C'est aussi l'effet des décisions prises par les organes internationaux, qui peuvent peser sur les déterminations nationales et même modifier les règles du jeu diplomatique.

En définitive, l'obstacle le plus sérieux à surmonter pour l'analyse sociologique des organisations internationales — en dehors de la complexité du système qu'elles constituent — vient peut-être de ce que les comportements manifestes des acteurs sont très souvent trompeurs, notamment en ce qui concerne les représentants gouvernementaux. Pour des raisons de tactique politique, ils sont décalés par rapport aux sentiments et aux représentations internes et même parfois aux comportements réels, observés hors de la vue du public et des réunions officielles. Ce décalage risque de se produire à la fois dans le jeu social lui-même et dans les relations avec l'enquêteur. C'est là, toutefois, une difficulté très fréquemment rencontrée dans les enquêtes sociologiques, qui n'est absolument pas propre à ce domaine de recherches par conséquent, et ne saurait donc être considérée comme insurmontable.

ÉLÉMENTS D'UNE PROBLÉMATIQUE

Quelles sont les directions de recherches dans lesquelles on pourrait s'orienter ? Elles sont, évidemment, fort nombreuses et il ne peut être question de les reconnaître toutes. Les recherches poursuivies dans d'autres secteurs de la sociologie viendront, d'ailleurs, en suggérer sans cesse de nouvelles. Il n'est pas inutile, cependant, de procéder à un premier défrichage, à partir duquel des allées pourront être progressivement tracées.

La première direction qui s'offre à un apport original de la sociologie, est celle des études de milieu. Celles-ci peuvent être conçues d'abord comme des analyses de morphologie sociale, isolant les divers groupes et catégories de groupes constituant le milieu, avec toutes leurs composantes, ainsi que les structures formelles et informelles par lesquelles ils se trouvent associés, opposés ou isolés les uns des autres.

Parallèlement à cet effort d'identification du spectre social, envisagé d'un point de vue statique, il y a place également pour une étude de dynamique sociale, faisant pendant à la dynamique institutionnelle, déjà bien explorée par des travaux de science politique. Les deux points de vue se complètent et s'interpénètrent, d'ailleurs, beaucoup plus qu'ils ne s'opposent.

Quelques indications suffiront pour donner un aperçu de l'étendue de ce champ encore presque inexploré.

On songe d'abord, tout naturellement, aux recherches sur la bureaucratie, que nous avons déjà évoquées, inséparables de l'analyse de la multitude des groupes sociaux, formels et informels, qui se forment en rapport avec les structures administratives et entretiennent des relations souvent compliquées avec la hiérarchie officielle.

L'étude sociologique des Secrétariats internationaux, inévitablement, prendra une grande place dans la sociologie des organisations internationales. Il serait dommage que ce soit au détriment d'autres recherches, peut-être plus délicates, mais non moins dignes d'intérêt. Citons, à titre d'exemple seulement:

- L'étude des rôles sociaux au sein des organes délibérants, ou de l'organisation dans son ensemble, d'autant plus remarquables qu'on assiste souvent, dans ce cadre, à un phénomène de personnalisation comparable à celui qu'on a pu constater à d'autres niveaux de l'organisation politico-administrative.
- L'influence du milieu sur les motivations individuelles, en particulier l'action de l'atmosphère sociale et des idéaux communs au groupe des «internationaux», qu'ils soient représentants gouvernementaux, experts ou fonctionnaires internationaux, ainsi que le processus de formation de ces idéaux.
- L'influence, également sur les motivations individuelles, du jeu social dont les exemples sont multiples, indépendamment de celui que nous avons déjà évoqué, c'est-à-dire l'élaboration d'un projet de résolution et son adoption.

Les influences s'exerçant sur le milieu méritent aussi considération. On peut envisager, par exemple, celles des idéologies et, tout spécialement, de l'idéologie internationale, c'est-à-dire des idées-forces que représentent la coopération internationale, la paix internationale et la mission propre à chaque organisation. Le milieu social auquel l'organisation donne naissance participe activement à l'élaboration de cette idéologie, mais la reçoit aussi partiellement de l'extérieur, en particulier par l'intermédiaire des réactions de l'opinion publique et de ses organes.

D'autres facteurs extérieurs sont aussi importants. Au premier rang, se place l'action de l'environnement social, notamment la pression exercée par les pays et les grandes villes où les organisations internationales ont leur siège. Le cas de New-York pour le siège de l'ONU est typique à cet égard. On pourrait citer d'autres exemples encore de tels facteurs, comme le climat créé par certaines décisions gouver-

nementales (lorsqu'elles émanent de grandes puissances ou de groupes influents) ou par certaines crises internationales.

A côté des études de milieu, où la sociologie prend quelque peu ses distances par rapport à la science politique, il serait intéressant de se tourner vers un domaine où les deux disciplines pourraient, au contraire, se rencontrer et confronter leurs points de vue: celui des problèmes de décisions.

Il n'est sans doute pas nécessaire d'élaborer beaucoup ce thème, dont tous les aspects sont bien connus des sociologues autant que des politologues. Le processus de décision proprement dit, l'analyse des motivations, les modes de réalisation d'accords, les conflits, les échecs et impasses, les stratégies, etc. figurent parmi les directions d'enquêtes possibles.

Enfin, un dernier thème conduirait à replacer les organisations internationales dans l'ensemble des relations internationales, ainsi que dans les cadres nationaux. Ce serait l'étude de l'influence des organisations sur les politiques gouvernementales ainsi que sur les groupes et sous-groupes nationaux. Nous y avons déjà fait allusion précédemment et il n'est pas nécessaire d'y revenir. Des recherches plus ambitieuses, prétendant mesurer l'influence des organisations internationales sur les résolutions des conflits et sur le système des relations internationales en général relèvent aussi, théoriquement, de la sociologie. En l'état actuel de nos informations et de nos connaissances en matière de sociologie internationale, il est peut-être plus prudent de les abandonner provisoirement aux politologues et aux historiens.

PROGRAMME PROPOSÉ POUR LE GROUPE DE TRAVAIL

Même avec cette réserve — qui sera probablement discutée d'ailleurs — les directions de recherches indiquées ci-dessus sont certainement trop nombreuses et trop vastes pour être toutes abordées au cours des trois matinées de travail dont pourra disposer le groupe de travail sur la sociologie des organisations internationales pendant le Congrès d'Evian. Il est donc impératif de se limiter, ce qui ne peut aller sans beaucoup d'arbitraire. L'essentiel est, cependant, de commencer. Après beaucoup d'hésitation, je me suis arrêté à trois thèmes généraux, qui m'ont paru particulièrement propres à un premier échange de vues. J'ai tenu compte, également, dans leur choix, du fait que le groupe de travail réunira probablement des sociologues

n'ayant, jusqu'à présent, accordé qu'une attention limitée aux organisations internationales, et des spécialistes de ces organisations, qui les ont étudiées plutôt d'un point de vue de science politique, même s'ils ont fait appel à des concepts et à des méthodes sociologiques.

1. La méthode de la sociologie des organisations internationales

Puisque les travaux proprement sociologiques sont encore rares, les problèmes de méthode méritent d'être posés avant de s'y engager plus avant. Il s'agit de savoir quels sont les procédés habituels de l'analyse sociologique qui peuvent être utilisés dans ce nouveau champ de recherches, si leur transposition pure et simple se heurte à des difficultés ou présente des dangers, si une adaptation est requise et laquelle, etc.

2. Le milieu social constitué par les organisations internationales

L'étude du milieu social que composent les organisations internationales constitue un domaine presque vierge, où il paraît utile de lancer dès maintenant quelques opérations de reconnaissance. Le champ, nous l'avons vu, est très vaste et on aurait pu penser à le limiter, par exemple à la morphologie sociale ou, au contraire, à la dynamique sociale. Cette division risquait, cependant, d'apparaître artificielle, lorsqu'on aborde un phénomène tel que le Secrétariat international, par exemple. Au surplus, puisqu'il s'agit d'un travail exploratoire, il n'est pas convenable de le limiter trop étroitement *a priori*.

3. Le processus de décision des organisations internationales

Enfin, l'étude du processus de décision au sein des organisations internationales a paru devoir constituer, pour les raisons déjà exposées précédemment, un terrain particulièrement propice à une confrontation entre sociologues et politologues.

LA SOCIOLOGIE ET SES PROBLÈMES D'INFORMATION
SCIENTIFIQUE

JEAN MÉRILL

PROBLEMS OF SOCIOLOGICAL
DOCUMENTATION

PROBLÈMES DE LA DOCUMENTATION EN
SOCIOLOGIE

Il est des disciplines où la documentation est devenue un problème de plus en plus urgent. Les publications et les documents diffusés de façon excessive et déraisonnablement trop vite contemporains, ainsi que leur accès dans laquelle ils sont engagés. Il concerne plus particulièrement les activités scientifiques.

Qu'il se réalise ou non, le sociologue doit porter grande attention à ses problèmes, qui tend à modifier les conditions mêmes de son travail. Comme ses collègues engagés dans l'étude de la société présente, il éprouve la difficulté d'accéder à sa documentation un trop grand nombre de documents trop grand pour qu'il puisse effectivement les maîtriser. Sa situation est à cet égard la même de celle des savants qui travaillent dans des disciplines voisines, comme l'archéologie ou l'épigraphie, ou même la plupart des branches traditionnelles de l'histoire, qui manquent de documents, et pour qui la recherche documentaire des documents est une des activités essentielles.

Il convient donc que les sociologues se mettent au travail de résoudre le problème qui se présente à eux. Sans identifier les données et sans mesurer exactement les difficultés.

Ce problème a jusqu'ici été relativement peu étudié en ce qui concerne la sociologie. Il l'a été par des sociologues, mais surtout il est à peu près toujours resté dans le domaine scientifique même que le leur propre. Nous proposons de considérer que nous sommes en fait dans une situation qui nécessite une recherche spécifique de la recherche sociologique, celle que les sociologues peuvent légitimement considérer un de ses objets. Et nous voudrions indiquer les quelques-uns des points sur lesquels elle pourrait porter.

Précisons d'abord à titre préliminaire la documentation, à laquelle

¹ William L. Flagg, *The Flow of Information: Science Advancement, A Review of the Research Conducted at Oxford University, Institute for Contemporary Research, November 1962 (January), p. 11.*

LA SOCIOLOGIE ET SES PROBLÈMES D'INFORMATION SCIENTIFIQUE

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Ce qu'on appelle «explosion documentaire» est reconnu comme un des phénomènes notables de notre époque. Il s'agit de la multiplication de plus en plus rapide des publications et des documents diffusés de façons diverses. Ce phénomène intéresse tous nos contemporains, quelle que soit l'activité dans laquelle ils sont engagés. Il concerne tout particulièrement les activités scientifiques.

Qu'il le veuille ou non, le sociologue doit prêter grande attention à ce phénomène, qui tend à modifier les conditions mêmes de son travail. Comme ses collègues engagés dans l'étude de la société présente, il éprouve la difficulté d'avoir à sa disposition un trop grand nombre de documents (trop grand pour qu'il puisse effectivement les maîtriser). Sa situation est à cet égard inverse de celle des savants qui travaillent dans des disciplines «classiques», comme l'archéologie ou l'épigraphie, ou même la plupart des branches traditionnelles de l'histoire, qui manquent de documents, et pour qui la recherche, l'«invention» des documents est une des nécessités essentielles.

Il convient donc que les sociologues se mettent en mesure de reconnaître le problème qui se présente à eux, d'en identifier les données et d'en mesurer exactement les difficultés.

Ce problème a jusqu'ici été relativement peu étudié en ce qui concerne la sociologie. Il l'a été par des sociologues, mais ceux-ci se sont à peu près toujours intéressés à des domaines scientifiques autres que le leur propre¹. Nous proposons de considérer que non seulement cette étude peut constituer une branche spécialisée de la recherche sociologique, mais que les sociologues peuvent légitimement constituer un de ses objets. Et nous voudrions indiquer ici quelques-uns des points sur lesquels elle pourrait porter.

Précisons comment nous entendons la «documentation», à laquelle

¹ William J. PAISLEY, *The Flow of (Behavioral) Science Information. A Review of the Research Literature*, Stanford University, Institute for Communication Research, November 1965 (mimeo), p. I-1.

conviendrait peut-être mieux l'expression d'«information scientifique». La documentation ne se définit que par rapport aux documents qu'elle traite et rend utilisables. Ces documents sont toutes les sources existantes d'informations scientifiques. Le chercheur, dans une discipline quelconque, peut en effet utiliser deux sortes d'informations: celles qui existent déjà, et qu'il n'a qu'à recueillir; et celles qu'il dégage lui-même de son objet d'étude, par les techniques propres à sa spécialité (expériences, interviews, enquêtes, etc...). Toutes les informations de la première espèce sont inscrites sur un support; celui-ci est généralement écrit, mais pas nécessairement: ce peut être une collection de cartes perforées, un film ou une bande magnétique. Tous ces supports d'informations existantes sont des documents. L'ensemble des documents disponibles à un moment donné constitue le stock documentaire, que celui-ci soit ou non effectivement utilisé. Le problème de la documentation est celui de la confrontation entre le savant, ici le sociologue, et ce stock documentaire.

Plusieurs aspects de ce problème vont être discutés dans une Table-Ronde. Et il n'est question ici que d'en indiquer quelques données générales, et de poser des questions auxquelles les participants à la Table-Ronde apporteront des réponses. Aussi ce rapport introductif est-il présenté selon un plan plus logique, alors que l'organisation de la Table-Ronde elle-même est davantage soumise à des nécessités pratiques. Nous examinerons successivement le rôle que joue le sociologue dans la constitution du stock documentaire, la façon dont il utilise le stock documentaire existant, et la fonction des techniques qui lui sont proposées pour accéder plus facilement à ce stock documentaire.

I. LE SOCIOLOGUE ET LA CONSTITUTION DU STOCK DOCUMENTAIRE

1.— Parmi les conséquences entraînées par le développement contemporain des recherches sociologiques, il en est au moins deux qui contribuent à la croissance du stock documentaire utilisé par les sociologues.

D'une part, les chercheurs veulent fonder sur des informations originales leur connaissance des sociétés humaines, de leur comportement, de leurs mécanismes. Ils ne se contentent pas de soumettre à une élaboration nouvelle des données déjà acquises par d'autres, mais ils veulent recueillir de nouvelles données par l'examen direct

de leur objet d'étude; à cet effet ils mettent en œuvre toute la série des techniques dont dispose maintenant la recherche empirique: enquêtes, interviews, observation, etc... La masse de données ainsi recueillies est partie intégrante de leur propre recherche. Mais en même temps elle est mise à la disposition des autres chercheurs, qui peuvent y trouver des cas pertinents à leur propre sujet de travail, ou en faire la matière d'analyses secondaires.

D'autre part, les publications de travaux sociologiques se multiplient, et chacune constitue par elle-même un document nouveau. Ce document est naturellement susceptible d'être utilisé par les chercheurs à venir, et en tout cas ne peut plus être ignoré par eux. Or, cette multiplication s'opère à un rythme de plus en plus rapide, actuellement considéré comme exponentiel. A nous en tenir aux seules publications proprement sociologiques, un signe très clair en est donné par le rythme auquel apparaissent chaque année de nouvelles revues spécialisées².

Par conséquent, indépendamment des informations que le sociologue recueille ou engendre par lui-même, le nombre des sources dans lesquelles lui sont offertes des informations pré-existantes va en croissant, et il est lui-même, par son activité, le principal responsable de cette croissance.

2.— Il convient d'examiner de plus près les problèmes que pose la publication des travaux scientifiques relevant de la sociologie.

Il apparaît en premier lieu que la publication ne répond pas toujours aux mêmes fins, et les auteurs peuvent avoir des motivations différentes.

La raison la plus normale que peut avoir un auteur de publier un travail est la volonté de faire connaître les résultats de sa recherche, de les soumettre au jugement du public en même temps que des autres chercheurs engagés dans la même direction, d'en recevoir des commentaires qui l'aideront lui-même à aller plus loin. Cette raison est certainement celle qui entre le plus fréquemment en ligne de compte, et en tant que telle elle n'appelle aucun commentaire particulier. Toutefois, on doit remarquer qu'elle n'est pas nécessairement la seule.

² D'après la troisième édition de la *Liste mondiale des périodiques spécialisés dans les sciences sociales* (Paris, Unesco, sous presse, pour paraître en 1966), sur 12 revues spécialisées en sociologie publiées actuellement en France, 9 ont été créées depuis 1956; en Italie, 7 sur 9.

L'auteur peut également désirer exercer une action sur les lecteurs, les pousser à adopter certaines idées ou à utiliser certaines méthodes, finalement orienter l'activité scientifique dans une direction qui lui semble plus convenable que d'autres. Cette raison est déjà moins désintéressée, dans la mesure où celui qui lui obéit tend plus ou moins à gagner à ses propres vues une partie du public, et en quelque sorte à se constituer une clientèle.

On peut même aller plus loin dans la recherche de motivations intéressées. Selon une étude récente³, le désir de se faire « reconnaître » par la communauté scientifique, d'y acquérir un « statut », serait une des motivations fondamentales de tout travailleur en ce domaine. Dans ce sens, la publication par un sociologue d'ouvrages et d'articles portant sa signature serait un des moyens les plus indiqués pour y parvenir. Peut-être même certains auteurs sont-ils mus par le souci d'affirmer leur priorité, de ne pas laisser un collègue les devancer en attachant son nom à une découverte qu'ils ont conscience d'avoir faite, à une idée qu'ils pensent avoir formulée de façon originale. Ainsi s'expliqueraient certaines publications objectivement prématurées, et qui viennent grossir la masse des documents imparfaits. Ainsi s'expliquerait également le soin jaloux avec lequel quelques chercheurs veillent sur la masse d'informations qu'ils ont rassemblées, et qu'ils considèrent comme leur propriété exclusive aussi longtemps qu'ils n'en ont pas eux-mêmes donné connaissance dans leurs écrits, comme si la notion de propriété intellectuelle ne s'appliquait pas seulement à ce qui est la création d'un esprit, mais également aux informations qu'il a eu le seul mérite de rassembler avant qu'elles ne servent de base à cette création.

N'omettons pas enfin une autre explication parfois acceptable, selon laquelle des auteurs seraient sensibles à l'attrait des récompenses que le monde universitaire réserve à ceux de ses membres qui l'honorent par une quantité suffisante de publications, ces récompenses pouvant prendre la forme de postes honorifiques, de promotions professionnelles, de distinctions diverses, d'améliorations de salaires, etc...

Même si ces stimulations à publier ne jouent pas en même temps dans chaque cas, elles suffisent à expliquer que paraissent beaucoup de publications non indispensables. Il n'en faut pas moins men-

³ Warren O. HAGSTROM, *The Scientific Community*, New York, London, Basic Books, 1965, XVI-304 p.

tionner un certain nombre de forces qui, agissant en sens contraire, tendent à limiter cette croissance.

Certains sociologues en effet peuvent ne pas trouver le temps de donner à leurs idées une forme écrite qui permette la publication. Ce peut être le cas des professeurs qui se laissent absorber par leur tâche d'enseignement; et l'on observe en effet que dans des pays où l'entrée dans l'enseignement supérieur est obligatoirement précédée par la publication d'une œuvre volumineuse, elle est plusieurs fois suivie par une diminution notable de la productivité littéraire. Ce peut être également le cas de ceux qui sont chargés de fonctions administratives, et qui ont par exemple à assurer la direction et la gestion d'unités de recherche. Il faut ajouter que pour certains l'intérêt de la découverte est beaucoup plus grand que celui qu'ils trouvent ensuite à la décrire. C'est du moins assez souvent le cas dans les sciences exactes. Il peut en aller autrement dans les sciences humaines, où la formulation et la rédaction sont davantage liées au travail même de recherche. Il serait intéressant d'éclaircir ce point par une enquête auprès d'un échantillon de sociologues.

La production écrite de quelques auteurs peut être ralentie ou réduite par leur souci de perfection, ou par leurs scrupules scientifiques; le cas des sociologues n'est pas particulier à cet égard. Ils partagent également le sort commun des auteurs lorsqu'ils voient se dresser devant eux le barrage des comités de lecture ou de rédaction. Les décisions de ces derniers, quelle que soit leur honnêteté, ne sont pas toujours exemptes de quelque esprit d'école ou de système. Ils peuvent être plus enclins à accepter le dernier texte d'une gloire consacrée que le premier essai d'un jeune sociologue inconnu. Ils peuvent être effarouchés par le non-conformisme d'une méthode ou la nouveauté d'un thème entrant mal dans les classifications traditionnelles. En un mot, leur nature même suscite un risque que l'innovation soit pénalisée par rapport au conformisme. Ajoutons que l'auteur débutant est davantage exposé que son collègue jouissant déjà d'une situation acquise à voir son désir de publier mis en échec par des limitations purement matérielles ou financières. C'est ainsi que bon nombre de thèses, dissertations, etc... restent inédites. On dira que tous les travaux écrits qui le méritent vraiment trouvent un moyen d'être publiés sous une forme ou sous l'autre. Nous ne contredirons pas cette affirmation optimiste mais nous remarquons qu'elle attend encore d'être prouvée.

En définitive, il apparaît que la décision de publier un écrit quelconque est comme la résultante de toute une série de forces, dont les

unes tendent à cette publication et les autres y font obstacle. Ces forces, évaluées en fonction de critères scientifiques ont des contenus bien différents les unes des autres. Par conséquent, on ne peut s'attendre à ce que les écrits publiés soient le plus généralement ceux qui ont le plus de valeur scientifique, ni à fortiori ceux qui ont le contenu informatif le plus riche.

3.— Une autre série de questions est posée par la différence entre les formes de publication, et par le choix qui doit intervenir entre elles. Dans certains cas, il n'y a pas de choix véritable entre la publication sous forme de livre ou d'article. Mais il se peut que la question reste ouverte, au moins pendant un certain temps, et ne soit tranchée qu'en deuxième analyse. Il existe aussi d'autres formes de publication moins clairement distinguées, comme souvent les rapports à diffusion limitée. D'autres encore apparaissent comme des substituts des précédentes: ainsi parfois le microfilm ou la microfiche. L'utilisation d'un tel substitut peut alors être imposée par des circonstances extérieures, mais elle peut aussi résulter d'un choix.

Dans tous les cas par conséquent où un choix intervient, il faut se demander comment il est fait, et à quelles raisons obéit son auteur. Cet auteur lui-même est à identifier: ce peut être celui qui a écrit le document, mais ce peut également être le responsable de l'unité de recherche à laquelle il appartient, ou un éditeur commercial, un directeur de revue, etc... Toutes les motivations des uns et des autres ne sont pas nécessairement les mêmes.

Certaines peuvent être plus financières, et faire intervenir surtout la rentabilité présumée de la publication. D'autres peuvent tenir à diverses contraintes matérielles. D'autres encore peuvent être considérées comme plus «scientifiques», dans la mesure où elles attachent plus d'importance à la convenance d'une forme de publication pour les lecteurs intéressés, à la facilité qu'elles donneront d'établir la meilleure communication entre l'auteur et ceux qui auront profit à connaître ce qu'il a écrit. Des considérations de prestige se font sans doute également jour, et il doit exister, dans l'esprit de nombreux auteurs (et lecteurs), des hiérarchies implicites entre les formes de publication, que l'analyse pourrait sans doute expliciter.

Il est aussi intéressant de savoir à quel moment la décision est prise. Ce peut être avant la rédaction, et dans ce cas-là celle-ci est orientée par la connaissance de la forme que revêtira le texte écrit. Ce peut être en revanche lorsque la rédaction est achevée, et il existe des auteurs pour écrire ce qu'ils croient nécessaire de faire con-

naître, sans se préoccuper à l'avance de la façon dont les lecteurs potentiels en prendront connaissance. Dans de tels cas (et si l'on exclut l'hypothèse d'une révision ou d'une transformation du texte écrit) les caractéristiques du document rédigé, et notamment sa dimension, peuvent limiter sensiblement le choix entre les formes théoriquement possibles de la publication. Un autre cas extrême est celui du texte écrit «sur commande». Des rédacteurs en chef de revues, des directeurs de collections, des éditeurs, demandent à des auteurs qu'ils connaissent d'écrire sur un sujet donné un texte de telle dimension, de telle forme. Le problème principal est alors celui des servitudes que cette demande fait peser sur l'auteur. En fait, des servitudes au moins implicites existent le plus souvent, ne serait-ce qu'en fonction de l'idée que l'auteur se fait à l'avance du texte qu'il se propose d'écrire, même s'il le détermine librement.

Ces servitudes sont d'ordre divers. Elles peuvent porter sur la dimension du texte, mais aussi sur la possibilité plus ou moins grande de le munir de notes et d'un appareil critique. Elles concernent aussi le délai plus ou moins grand qui s'écoule entre l'achèvement de la rédaction, et le moment où le texte écrit parvient sous les yeux du public: ce délai est toujours trop long aux yeux des auteurs, et les mesures objectives qui en sont faites semblent indiquer qu'il n'est jamais bref⁴. De la même façon, le mode de publication choisi entraîne des conséquences quant au type de public qui sera atteint, à son extension.

Par conséquent, ces diverses décisions sont de nature à affecter considérablement la valeur du texte publié en tant que support d'informations. Dans quelle mesure le souci de faciliter et d'accélérer la circulation de l'information entre-t-il en ligne de compte dans ces décisions ?

Une autre décision appelle des questions semblables: celle qui concerne le lieu de publication. Les auteurs qui ont la chance de travailler dans un pays suffisamment équipé n'ont pas à se poser de question: ils ont sous la main tous les moyens nécessaires pour se faire publier. Dans d'autres pays au contraire, pour des raisons linguistiques, ou financières, ou autres, la publication à l'étranger

⁴ Par exemple, dans le domaine de la psychologie, deux ans et demi à trois ans en moyenne s'écouleraient entre le début de la préparation d'un article et la publication de ce dernier: voir *Reports of the American Psychological Association's Project on Scientific Information Exchange in Psychology*, Washington, D.C., American Psychological Association, Vol. 1, December 1963, Report n° 7, p. 160.

est souvent indispensable. Dans ce cas, comment sont choisis le pays et la langue de publication ? Un problème connexe est posé par le fait que des documents jugés utiles par certains de leurs lecteurs sont ensuite traduits et publiés dans d'autres langues, et donc normalement dans d'autres pays: quels facteurs interviennent à ce moment dans le choix de ces langues et de ces pays: dans quelle mesure ce choix appartient-il à l'auteur ? Mentionnons enfin le fait que parfois des traductions (ou même des reproductions dans la même langue du texte original) sont publiées à l'étranger sans que l'auteur soit consulté ou informé.

Toutes ces circonstances conduisent à une grande dispersion des publications d'un même document, voire d'un même auteur. La comparaison de listes de toutes les publications faites des travaux d'un certain nombre de sociologues contemporains permettrait de prendre une mesure de cette dispersion. Il faudrait alors se demander jusqu'à quel point cette dispersion est utile (en permettant à un plus grand nombre de lecteurs d'avoir accès aux œuvres de cet auteur), ou nuisible (en empêchant les lecteurs d'avoir accès à la totalité des œuvres de cet auteur). Ce problème doit être étudié à la fois du point de vue des usagers directs, et du point de vue des documentalistes qui se proposent de faciliter l'accès aux documents, mais voient souvent leur travail rendu plus difficile par cette dispersion même⁵.

4.— Dans ce qui précède, nous avons plusieurs fois rencontré des personnages autres que l'auteur d'une publication, qui interviennent concurremment avec lui dans le processus de la publication et dans les décisions qui l'intéressent.

Il convient de signaler l'intérêt que présenterait une étude systématique du rôle de ces interlocuteurs: le directeur du laboratoire ou de l'unité de recherche, l'éditeur, le rédacteur en chef d'une revue et les membres de son Comité de rédaction, etc... Dans la mesure où il s'agit ici de la transmission d'informations par un auteur à ses lecteurs, ces divers interlocuteurs ne sont en droit que des auxiliaires de l'auteur. Toutefois, il est naturel qu'ils représentent des intérêts et des points de vue différents de ceux de l'auteur, et qu'ils engagent un dialogue avec lui. Dans certains cas, ces intérêts et points de vue peuvent être plus orientés vers l'utilité générale que ceux de l'auteur, exposé au risque d'obéir à des motivations égoïstes.

⁵ Voir notamment P.F. COLE, «A new look at reference scattering», *Journal of Documentation* 18, 1962: 58-64.

Mais il peut se faire aussi que les motivations de ces interlocuteurs soient aussi égoïstes (bien qu'en un sens différent) que celles de l'auteur, et qu'ils soient en mesure de les imposer à l'auteur. Elles méritent donc une analyse spéciale, à conduire également du point de vue de l'utilisateur et de ses besoins, que nous considérons par principe comme prioritaires. C'est là encore au sociologue de dire dans quelle mesure il estime être servi ou desservi.

II. LE SOCIOLOGUE DEVANT LE STOCK DOCUMENTAIRE

Tout sociologue a à sa disposition un stock documentaire, dont la composition est d'ailleurs constamment variable. Il lui appartient d'y faire appel ou non, et d'y faire appel de telle ou telle façon.

Pour certains, cette utilisation ne pose pas de problème. Nous pensons qu'il s'agit alors plutôt de situations où l'utilisateur ne prend pas conscience des problèmes qui se posent à lui. Laissons de côté quelques cas tout à fait marginaux. Le moins intéressant est celui de l'homme qui «sait», une fois pour toutes, et qui n'a donc pas besoin de s'informer de ce que font ou pensent les autres. Il semble difficile que cette attitude soit celle du véritable sociologue. Un autre cas marginal est celui du «patron», disposant de l'assistance d'une équipe de collaborateurs, qui lui donnent à mesure les informations dont il a besoin. Ce sont eux qui les cherchent, et le problème se trouve sensiblement déplacé, même si l'utilisateur final a l'impression d'avoir directement à sa disposition ce dont il a besoin.

Un cas méritant plus d'attention est celui du spécialiste confirmé, qui est en relation directe et quasi permanente avec tous les autres sociologues travaillant précisément dans la même spécialité. Entre les membres de ce groupe, qui n'a pas besoin d'être formel, existe tout un réseau de communications personnelles qui assurent à chacun la possession rapide des informations relatives à la spécialité couverte. Cette situation typique n'est celle que d'un petit nombre de sociologues, les plus éminents ou travaillant dans la spécialité la plus étroite. Mais des éléments s'en retrouvent dans la plupart des situations concrètes, qui sont en ce sens de nature mixte.

Venons-en au cas «normal», celui du sociologue qui doit compter d'abord sur lui-même, et qui se trouve en face de ce stock documentaire.

1.— Pour lui comme pour tout chercheur en quelque discipline que ce soit se pose un dilemme que l'on peut à peu près formuler en ces

termes: comment trouver tous les documents contenant les informations dont on a besoin? et comment d'autre part ne pas être submergé par toute la masse des documents qui se présentent de toutes parts?

Dans la mesure où ce dilemme se pose à chaque chercheur, il appartient bien sûr à chacun de définir son attitude; c'est une partie essentielle de sa responsabilité vis-à-vis de son travail scientifique. Mais en même temps, l'ensemble de tous ces choix individuels faits par les sociologues est un objet de connaissance sociologique. Cette connaissance des diverses solutions adoptées, de leur fréquence relative, de leur succès, est nécessaire pour savoir dans quelles conditions travaillent effectivement les sociologues, et en particulier pour servir de base à toute recherche sur les moyens d'améliorer ces conditions de travail.

2.— Une masse importante de documents est reçue par le sociologue sans qu'il ait besoin de la rechercher. Cette partie du stock documentaire lui est offerte spontanément, ou automatiquement, que ce soit de façon désintéressée ou non, et il se trouve exposé à son influence.

Il s'agit notamment des revues qu'il reçoit régulièrement, soit parce qu'il y est abonné, soit parce qu'on lui en fait gratuitement le service, soit parce que ce service est lié à l'appartenance à une société ou association. Il serait intéressant de savoir comment se répartissent les revues reçues par des populations données de sociologues: combien de revues au total sont régulièrement reçues par x sociologues de tel pays ou de telle branche, combien de titres différents représentent ces revues, quels titres sont les plus fréquemment reçus? Quelles différences peut-on relever suivant les pays, suivant les spécialités? Pendant combien de temps les mêmes revues sont-elles reçues par les mêmes sociologues? Quelle proportion de leur budget professionnel les sociologues consacrent-ils à des abonnements à des revues?

Il faudrait aussi savoir quelle utilisation est faite des revues ainsi reçues: quelle proportion en est lue, ou seulement feuilletée? Quelle proportion est simplement conservée pour des utilisations ultérieures, sans être examinée sur le moment? Dans combien de cas le lecteur établit-il un fichier ou un autre instrument de référence, pour retrouver dans sa propre collection de revues des informations dont il a reconnu l'existence à mesure qu'il en recevait les livraisons? D'autre part, quelles corrélations peuvent être établies entre les réponses fournies à ces questions, et celles fournies en réponse aux

questions posées dans le paragraphe précédent ? Au total, il s'agit ici de savoir quelle est actuellement l'importance et l'utilité réelle pour le sociologue de la revue, moyen traditionnel de communication scientifique.

Parallèlement à elle, d'autres moyens de communication semblent prendre une importance croissante. Parmi ceux-ci, se détache l'envoi par les auteurs de tirés à part ou de «preprints». Il faudrait s'attacher à savoir quel rôle ceux-ci jouent dans la vie professionnelle du sociologue, et les comparer avec les périodiques, tant du point de vue de la quantité reçue que de l'utilisation faite. Des distinctions doivent pouvoir être établies suivant la nationalité des sociologues, suivant leur ancienneté et leur statut professionnel...

Des problèmes de même genre sont posés par les «rapports de recherche», c'est-à-dire des documents non mis dans le commerce, reproduits par des moyens relativement sommaires (multigraphie, par exemple), en un nombre limité d'exemplaires, et destinés à présenter surtout à des collègues les résultats (provisoire) de recherches. Le plus souvent de tels rapports sont établis lorsqu'il s'agit de recherches effectuées dans le cadre d'équipes ou de laboratoires. Dans d'autres sciences, ils tendent à devenir un des instruments principaux de communication scientifique. Il serait important de savoir ce qu'il en est pour les sociologues.

Ceux-ci reçoivent d'autre part des livres, qui leur sont envoyés en hommage ou en service de presse, de la part des auteurs ou des éditeurs. Là encore il y a lieu de se poser deux séries de questions, relatives d'une part à l'origine de ces envois (nombre, provenance, etc...), d'autre part à l'utilisation qui en est faite: par exemple, le sociologue lit-il plus facilement un ouvrage qui lui a été ainsi envoyé, a-t-il davantage tendance à le conserver ?

La documentation offerte au sociologue couvre encore une catégorie au moins: celle des informations bibliographiques sur des livres récemment parus. Ces informations proviennent par trois voies principales. La voie «commerciale» est empruntée par les prospectus et catalogues d'éditeurs et de libraires. La voie «professionnelle» est suivie par les revues spécialisées que reçoit le sociologue, et qui lui apportent à la fois des compte-rendus et des analyses de récentes publications. Enfin, un certain nombre de bibliothèques utilisent une voie «technique» en établissant des listes de leurs récentes acquisitions qu'elles envoient à un certain nombre d'usagers, qui peuvent être des sociologues aussi bien que des bibliothèques ou autres institutions. L'usage effectivement fait de cet ensemble d'informations

est assez peu connu. Quel pourcentage en est utilisé, soit immédiatement, soit à terme ? Dans combien de cas l'arrivée de ces informations est-elle suivie de la décision de lire, ou d'acheter, une publication ainsi signalée ?

Au total, il s'agit donc de savoir dans quelle mesure le sociologue est exposé à une influence de cette documentation qui lui est offerte, quel profit il en tire, et quelles conséquences en résultent pour sa méthode de travail, et pour sa productivité scientifique.

3.— Parmi les démarches documentaires actives du sociologue, une des plus faciles à identifier est celle qui consiste à se rendre dans une «bibliothèque» (le mot étant pris ici dans son sens le plus général, et désignant tout lieu où des documents écrits sont conservés pour être mis à la disposition de lecteurs).

La fréquence et les modalités de cette démarche dépendent dans une très large mesure du cadre matériel dans lequel travaille chaque sociologue. Suivant que celui-ci est isolé, ou passe la plus grande part de sa vie professionnelle dans une institution d'enseignement ou de recherche, suivant que cette institution possède une bibliothèque plus ou moins importante, plus ou moins spécialisée, plus ou moins accessible et accueillante, il accomplira cette démarche avec plus ou moins de facilité, de fréquence, ou au contraire de répugnance.

Compte dûment tenu de cette variable institutionnelle, il est possible de rechercher les différents types d'usages qui sont faits des bibliothèques par les sociologues, et de classer ceux-ci selon ces usages, en établissant des corrélations avec les variables déjà mentionnées (nationalité, spécialité, ancienneté, statut professionnel, etc.). Il est possible de la même façon de rechercher quel usage est fait respectivement d'une bibliothèque pouvant être qualifiée pour chaque sociologue de «principale», et des diverses autres bibliothèques pouvant être qualifiées de «secondaires», ces usages se distinguant les uns des autres en termes quantitatifs comme en termes qualitatifs.

4.— Une démarche relativement facile à identifier est celle de la «recherche documentaire», c'est-à-dire la recherche par le sociologue d'une information déterminée dans les documents qui peuvent la contenir. Cette façon d'utiliser le stock documentaire est nettement caractérisée et se distingue bien par exemple de celle qui consiste à se tenir au courant de ce qui paraît au fur et à mesure. L'effort principal des techniciens du domaine de la documentation tend précisément à faciliter cette recherche documentaire.

Le problème, du point de vue du sociologue, est de savoir où il doit faire cette recherche, avec quelles chances de succès, en surmontant quelles difficultés. On ne saurait exclure au départ l'hypothèse que les documentalistes se donnent beaucoup de peine pour mettre sur pied des machines compliquées dont les sociologues ne se servent pas ou se servent guère. Une autre hypothèse à considérer est celle selon laquelle cette machinerie, malgré sa complexité, serait relativement inefficace. La vérification de ces hypothèses, ou de l'hypothèse optimiste selon laquelle les conditions de travail du sociologue seraient améliorées de façon appréciable par les facilités qu'on lui offre pour la recherche documentaire, demande l'étude objective d'un grand nombre de situations. Il est vraisemblable que les constatations fournies par une telle étude ne seront pas identiques suivant la nationalité ou le lieu de travail du sociologue, sa spécialité, son ancienneté, son statut professionnel, etc..

Il est possible que certains sociologues trouvent les informations qu'ils cherchent, ou une partie importante de ces informations, dans un stock documentaire personnel qu'ils se sont constitué (sous forme d'un fichier ou de dossiers, ou encore simplement dans leur mémoire). Sinon, ils doivent conduire leurs recherches à l'extérieur.

Dans ce deuxième cas, ils ont d'abord la ressource d'exploiter un réseau de communications personnelles. Celui-ci inclut les collègues de l'institution à laquelle ils sont attachés (et peut presque se limiter à ceux-ci dans le cas d'institutions importantes). Il inclut normalement aussi d'autres personnes avec qui sont maintenus des contacts et échangées des informations, soit oralement, soit par correspondance. Des études faites dans d'autres disciplines ont montré que ce moyen de recherche documentaire est le plus volontiers et le plus fréquemment utilisé⁶. Qu'en est-il chez les sociologues ?

Reste enfin l'interrogation des documents eux-mêmes, par le moyen des techniques inventées à cet effet. Le sociologue cherchant une information peut aller dans une bibliothèque: quel type de bibliothèque choisit-il alors, la choisit-il en fonction de la nature de sa recherche, ou pour des raisons extérieures, en fonction de ses habitudes ou de ses commodités ? Dans cette bibliothèque, comment conduit-il sa recherche, quel usage fait-il des catalogues, des bibliothécaires, etc... ? Recourt-il, ou cherche-t-il à recourir, à des services plus élaborés, tels que ceux que peut fournir un centre de documen-

⁶ Chez les psychologues notamment: voir *Reports of the A.P.A.'s P.S.I.E.P.* (cités *supra* n° 4), Report n° 1, p. 11 sqq.

tation ou de recherche d'informations scientifiques (utilisant éventuellement des procédures automatiques) ?

Il peut également consulter (soit chez lui, soit dans une institution ou dans une bibliothèque) des instruments bibliographiques, dont la fonction est en principe de le guider vers les documents susceptibles de contenir des informations dont il a besoin. Quels instruments de travail utilise-t-il alors: des bibliographies courantes? des rapports critiques sur la bibliographie de sujets particuliers? des recueils de compte-rendus analytiques? d'autres ouvrages de référence? Et comment les utilise-t-il, avec quel pourcentage de succès, quel temps leur consacre-t-il?

Les tactiques de recherche utilisées par le sociologue dépendent peut-être d'un certain nombre de variables. Il est possible qu'elles soient différentes suivant que la recherche porte sur un point relevant de la spécialité du sociologue, ou bien sur un problème latéral, ou même sur un domaine de la connaissance extérieur au sien. On peut penser que, si le sociologue recourt à des instruments bibliographiques, il emploie de façon différente ceux qui sont proprement sociologiques, et ceux qui lui sont éventuellement fournis par d'autres sciences ou professions.

Il est possible également que ces tactiques diffèrent suivant que les éléments de réponse cherchés ont des chances d'être plus ou moins contemporains, ou au contraire éloignés dans le temps.

5.— Une variable est assez importante pour être considérée particulièrement: c'est celle qu'introduit la division du monde en plusieurs zones linguistiques et culturelles, la dispersion des sociologues entre ces diverses zones, les difficultés de communication entre ces zones et l'inégalité des conditions de travail que les sociologues trouvent dans chacune d'entre elles.

Il est clair en effet que ces conditions diffèrent d'un pays à l'autre suivant son niveau de développement, suivant la façon dont le travail scientifique et universitaire y est organisé, suivant la place que la sociologie y occupe dans l'ensemble des disciplines. Un reflet de ces différences est fourni par le nombre des revues spécialisées en sociologie qui paraissent dans les différents pays⁷.

Dans certains pays, la sociologie constitue une profession, prati-

⁷ D'après la troisième édition de la *Liste mondiale* (citée *supra*, n° 2), les revues consacrées exclusivement ou partiellement à la sociologie étaient en 1964 au nombre de 9 en Allemagne, 7 en Belgique, 4 en Espagne, 2 au Mexique, 8 en Inde, 3 au Royaume-Uni, 6 aux Pays-Bas, 4 dans l'ensemble

que par de nombreux spécialistes et disposant de raisonnables facilités. C'est le cas notamment aux Etats-Unis. Peut-être est-ce là une des raisons pour lesquelles les sociologues américains ne portent en général qu'un intérêt relativement modéré aux publications et aux recherches sociologiques des pays étrangers, et surtout en langues étrangères. Une mesure de ce phénomène pourrait être prise en comparant des recensements de citations faites dans des articles, d'une part de revues sociologiques américaines, d'autre part de revues sociologiques européennes, pour voir s'il y a une différence significative dans la proportion de citations respectivement faites à des publications nationales et à des publications étrangères.

Peut-être aussi trouverait-on là un élément d'explication à une constatation qui a été faite à diverses reprises⁸: comparés aux chercheurs anglais, les chercheurs américains semblent accorder relativement plus de place aux relations inter-personnelles dans leurs démarches liées à la recherche d'information, et moins de place à l'utilisation des sources écrites.

En revanche, un nombre élevé de pays sont beaucoup moins bien pourvus. Dans certains les sociologues se trouvent même dans une situation de relatif isolement, non par leur volonté, mais à cause des obstacles linguistiques et autres qui limitent la diffusion de leurs propres travaux, et leur rend difficile l'information rapide et complète sur le travail sociologique dans le reste du monde. Il est donc indiqué d'étudier systématiquement les problèmes particuliers de ce type qui se posent aux sociologues dans un certain nombre de pays considérés comme typiques ou de régions culturelles: comment publient-ils leurs travaux, dans quels pays, dans quelles langues? Comment est assurée la diffusion de leurs publications quand elles paraissent dans leur propre pays? Comment d'autre part se procurent-ils les documents dont ils ont besoin, avec quelle efficacité, dans quel délai? Par quels moyens obtiennent-ils l'information courante sur le travail scientifique? Quelle partie de leur travail est consacrée à améliorer les communications avec leurs collègues étrangers? Quels efforts font de leur côté ces collègues étrangers pour améliorer les communications avec eux? Quel est à cet égard le rôle effectivement joué par les organisations internationales (notamment les associations), et quel rôle pourraient-elles jouer?

des pays d'Afrique au Sud du Sahara, 4 en Pologne, 4 au Pakistan, 1 en Finlande, 1 en Israël, 1 en Turquie, 1 pour l'ensemble des pays arabes du Moyen-Orient, etc..

⁸ Voir notamment PAISLEY, *op. cit.* (*supra* n° 1), p. II-25, et surtout p. II-54.

III. LES TECHNIQUES INTERMÉDIAIRES

Dans les deux rôles complémentaires qui viennent d'être analysés, le sociologue est d'une part producteur, d'autre part utilisateur de documents. Dans la plupart des cas, c'est le même sociologue qui remplit ces deux fonctions différentes, à deux moments de son activité. Il est donc à la fois au point de départ et au point d'arrivée d'un circuit qui le relie aux autres membres de la communauté scientifique, et que parcourt l'information scientifique. Sur ce circuit se placent un certain nombre d'intermédiaires, de relais techniques, qui ont été institués précisément pour faciliter la circulation de l'information.

Il y a lieu de se demander quel rôle est en fait joué par ces relais techniques. Quelle est leur efficacité ? et d'abord, comment mesurer ou évaluer cette efficacité ?

La réponse à cette question n'est pas connue d'avance. Elle ne pourra être trouvée que par un effort commun des techniciens (documentalistes) et des sociologues (producteurs et utilisateurs de documents) pour lesquels travaillent les techniciens. Il est possible qu'entre ces deux groupes existe parfois une certaine ignorance réciproque, qui risque de stériliser une partie des efforts accomplis. Un but important d'une Table-Ronde sur les problèmes de la documentation en sociologie aurait été atteint si elle permettait à chacun des deux groupes de mieux connaître les méthodes de travail et les problèmes propres de l'autre.

Pour faciliter ce dialogue, nous voudrions maintenant mentionner quelques-unes des questions que pose l'application de ces techniques intermédiaires: quels services les techniciens se proposent-ils de rendre aux sociologues ? Sont-ils en mesure d'en donner une définition assurée ? Quel usage les sociologues font-ils de ces services ? Quelle insuffisance y trouvent-ils ? Quelles conséquences est-il légitime de tirer du jugement qu'ils portent sur ces techniciens et sur les techniques mises en œuvre ? Certains (parmi les techniciens) pensent que les usagers ne sont pas de bons juges, et que la valeur d'une technique médicale ne s'évalue pas d'après l'opinion des malades: ce raisonnement ne recouvre-t-il pas une tendance dangereuse à se complaire dans le bon fonctionnement d'une machine, et à perdre de vue l'utilité réelle, ou le prix de revient, du produit qu'elle fabrique ?

Ces questions peuvent être posées de façon plus précise et un peu plus concrète à propos de chacune des techniques documentaires qui viennent d'être globalement évoquées.

1. *Bibliographies courantes*

Des services bibliographiques périodiques sont offerts aux spécialistes de sciences sociales comme à leurs collègues des autres branches du savoir. Pour sa part, la Sociologie possède une *Bibliographie internationale* paraissant annuellement depuis quinze ans. En outre, il existe d'autres bibliographies courantes plus spécialisées, ou limitées à un champ national.

Il s'agit là d'un type de service très traditionnel, et dont l'universalité même semble indiquer qu'il est généralement reçu. Toutefois, il faut reconnaître que l'on possède peu d'informations sur l'usage qui est effectivement fait de ces bibliographies. Les responsables mêmes de ces publications, lorsqu'ils veulent en évaluer l'utilité réelle, et par exemple la comparer avec leur coût, manquent de bases objectives d'appréciation.

Ils ne s'en posent pas moins diverses questions, auxquelles ils espèrent trouver des éléments de réponse dans un dialogue plus suivi avec les usagers.

Comment définir le champ optimum que doit couvrir une bibliographie ? c'est-à-dire vaut-il mieux que sa spécialisation soit définie en termes très stricts, ou en termes plus larges ? Est-il plus utile de disposer d'une bibliographie strictement consacrée à une science déterminée (différentes bibliographies pouvant se compléter ainsi l'une l'autre), ou de trouver dans une bibliographie l'indication des principaux documents relevant de disciplines voisines ?

Comment doit être pratiquement défini le mot « international » dans une bibliographie qui porte ce nom ? Doit-elle consacrer ses efforts à atteindre toutes les publications de la spécialité provenant de tous les pays et de toutes les langues, et représenter les publications en chaque langue de façon strictement proportionnelle à leur nombre ? Doit-elle au contraire tenir davantage compte de la répartition de ses usagers, et accorder davantage de place aux publications écrites en des langues que peuvent utiliser la majorité de ces usagers ?

A quelles fins la bibliographie est-elle surtout utilisée : pour se tenir au courant de ce qui paraît dans un domaine déterminé de la science, ou pour permettre des recherches documentaires dans les publications d'une période donnée ? Suivant la réponse que l'on croit pouvoir donner à cette question, l'organisation et la conception même de la bibliographie sont sensiblement différentes. Cette différence affecte notamment le rythme optimum de la bibliographie. Aux fins de la recherche rétrospective, il est à peu près suffisant qu'elle paraî-

se chaque année, ce qui implique inévitablement un certain retard par rapport aux publications qu'elle cite. Aux fins de l'information courante, il importe en revanche qu'elle parvienne aux usagers le plus fréquemment et le plus rapidement possible (on pourrait presque dire continuellement et immédiatement).

A quel niveau doivent se situer les informations qu'elle contient ? Suffit-il d'une description bibliographique des documents (leur référence bibliographique), ou convient-il d'y ajouter des indications sur leur contenu sous forme d'une annotation ou d'une analyse ? Dans ce dernier cas, jusqu'où faut-il aller, et doit-on finalement considérer la bibliographie seulement comme une forme imparfaite d'un recueil de compte-rendus analytiques ?

Quels index désirent trouver les usagers ? On peut dire en principe qu'ils les veulent précis et fouillés : mais jusqu'où faut-il aller dans ce sens ? Les bibliographies traditionnelles consacrent aux index une partie limitée de l'espace imprimé dont elles disposent (de l'ordre de 20 à 30 %). A l'inverse, une expérience est actuellement en cours pour fournir aux lecteurs d'une bibliographie des index « en profondeur », qui occupent au moins les trois quarts des pages de chaque volume⁹.

Quelle est l'opinion des usagers sur cette innovation ? Quelles dépenses supplémentaires acceptent-ils de supporter pour en bénéficier ?

2. Recueils de compte-rendus analytiques («abstracts»)

Les sciences sociales sont moins systématiquement pourvues de ce type d'instruments bibliographiques que la plupart des sciences dites « exactes ou naturelles ». Toutefois, des *Sociological Abstracts* paraissent aux Etats-Unis depuis 14 ans, et rendent des services même dans d'autres pays.

Quel est le rôle exact de ce genre de recueils ? Ont-ils pour fonction essentielle de faire connaître le contenu des documents qu'ils analysent, de façon à conduire les usagers à les lire en connaissance de cause, ou à l'inverse se proposent-ils d'éviter la lecture des documents originaux en fournissant l'essentiel de l'information que ceux-ci contiennent ?

⁹ Alfred DE GRAZIA, «The Universal Reference System», *American Behavioral Scientist* 8(8), April 1965: 3-14. L'auteur présente son entreprise comme «the largest indexed bibliography of human sciences materials to have been assembled».

Suivant le rôle qui leur est attribué, quels doivent être de préférence leur rythme de publication et leur rapidité ? Les caractéristiques considérées à cet égard comme les meilleures sont-elles possibles à respecter avec les moyens disponibles, compte tenu du temps nécessaire pour faire établir des compte-rendus analytiques par des analystes qualifiés, pour les contrôler, les classer...?

De même, quel style est désirable pour ces compte-rendus ? Dans quelle mesure doivent-ils être rédigés de façon quasi littéraire, ou au contraire écrits en style « télégraphique », admettant des abréviations, etc...? Quelle est leur dimension optimum ?

Quel type de documents doivent être de préférence analysés dans de tels recueils ? Parmi les publications d'« abstracts » existantes dans les sciences sociales, certaines analysent uniquement des articles de périodiques; d'autres à la fois (mais dans des proportions variables) des articles, des ouvrages et d'autres documents; une expérience vient même d'être faite pour diffuser des abstracts de travaux sociologiques non publiés¹⁰.

3. *Compte-Rendus (« Book Reviews »)*

A peu près toutes les grandes revues de sciences sociales publient systématiquement des compte-rendus des livres récents de leur spécialité en y consacrant un nombre appréciable de leurs pages¹¹. Là encore, il s'agit d'une tradition fort ancienne et quasi universelle. Il est à supposer que les éditeurs des revues s'y plient non pas seulement par respect des traditions, mais parce qu'ils sont assurés de rendre ainsi un service important à leurs lecteurs.

¹⁰ Le Clearinghouse for Sociological Literature, Department of Sociology, University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee, a commencé en janvier 1966 la publication d'un bulletin de ce type, sous le titre de *Current Sociology* (ignorant apparemment que ce titre est depuis 1952 celui d'un périodique de l'Association internationale de Sociologie).

¹¹ A titre d'illustration, voici la place consacrée à des compte-rendus de livres par cinq revues sociologiques importantes dans un de leurs volumes récents: *American Journal of Sociology*, volume de 1964-65, sur 750 pages en tout, 187 compte-rendus en 172 pages (22,9 %); *American Sociological Review*, vol. de 1964, sur 952 p. en tout, 288 compte-rendus en 276 p. (29 %); *British Journal of Sociology*, vol. de 1964, sur 380 p. en tout, 72 compte-rendus en 85 p. (22,3 %); *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie*, vol. de 1965, sur 1016 p. en tout, 101 compte-rendus en 154 p. (15,1 %); *Revue française de sociologie*, vol. de 1964, sur 512 p. en tout, 103 compte-rendus en 107 p. (20,9 %).

Il est intéressant de se demander jusqu'où les conduit cette conviction et comment ils déterminent la place accordée à cette rubrique dans leurs revues, d'une part quant au nombre de pages, d'autre part quant à la partie de leur budget qui y est consacrée. Des observations objectives peuvent être faites en analysant le contenu des revues sociologiques; d'autres informations utiles seraient obtenues en interviewant systématiquement les rédacteurs en chef, les «book review editors» et les membres de leur comité de rédaction.

Quelle fonction principale ces responsables reconnaissent-ils aux compte-rendus qu'ils publient: une fonction informative (faire connaître des publications récentes) ou critique (proposer au lecteur un jugement sur ces publications et ainsi établir une hiérarchie entre elles) ?

Dans la deuxième hypothèse, des limites sont-elles apportées à la liberté de jugement et d'expression de l'auteur de chaque compte-rendu ? Dans quelle mesure d'autre part les lecteurs de la revue partagent-ils sur cette orientation l'opinion de ses responsables ?

Ces derniers ont-ils principalement la préoccupation d'être utiles ou agréables à leurs lecteurs, aux auteurs d'ouvrages recensés ou aux éditeurs ?

L'utilité de ces compte-rendus pour les lecteurs d'une part, pour les auteurs et éditeurs d'autre part, dépend en partie des délais dans lesquels paraissent les compte-rendus. Quelle relation existe entre cette variable et la qualité des compte-rendus, quelle importance y attachent respectivement les responsables et les lecteurs de la revue ?

4. *Etudes bibliographiques*

Nous regroupons sous ce titre diverses publications qui ont comme double caractéristique de couvrir à chaque fois un sujet déterminé et limité, et de présenter de façon évaluative et critique les études qui lui ont été consacrées. L'existence et la fréquence de telles publications sont un élément important dans l'équipement bibliographique d'une discipline. On peut se demander si la sociologie en est aussi bien pourvue que d'autres. On note par exemple qu'elle ne dispose pas d'une *Annual Review*, alors qu'il en existe pour la psychologie, etc.. Par ailleurs, on a remarqué que, dans certains domaines au moins des sciences exactes, les articles exposant le résultat de recherches originales sont fréquemment et rapidement suivis de bilans bibliographiques; on a même relevé pour ces derniers une

proportion de un pour trente ou quarante articles originaux¹². Une telle proportion serait-elle observée en sociologie ?

La publication de telles études bibliographiques est-elle faite au hasard, ou répond-elle à des programmes déterminés ? Si oui, qui prend l'initiative de ces derniers : des institutions de recherche, des éditeurs commerciaux ? Leur initiative s'appuie-t-elle sur une intuition ou sur une connaissance précise du besoin que les usagers peuvent avoir de telles études ?

Du point de vue de ces usagers, ces études leur sont-elles facilement accessibles, et quel rôle jouent-elles dans leur information ?

5. Bibliothèques (dans le sens proposé supra II. 3).

La bibliothèque est assurément la plus traditionnelle des institutions documentaires. Il en existe des types fort divers, qui proposent aux lecteurs des services différents, et toute évaluation de l'usage qui en est fait doit évidemment partir d'une définition précise de chaque bibliothèque et de sa fonction. Les distinctions les plus importantes sont celles que l'on doit faire entre les bibliothèques générales et les bibliothèques plus ou moins étroitement spécialisées. De grandes différences (recouvrant partiellement les précédentes) existent aussi entre les bibliothèques suivant leur rattachement institutionnel : les unes sont liées à des centres de recherche, d'autres à des centres d'enseignement, d'autres sont indépendantes et définissent elles-mêmes les catégories de lecteurs auxquels elles s'adressent.

Un problème fondamental de toute bibliothèque est celui de ses acquisitions. Comment détermine-t-elle sa politique en ce domaine, à l'intérieur des possibilités que lui donnent ses ressources budgétaires ? Quel rôle est tenu dans l'établissement de cette politique par les usagers, dont les besoins peuvent être connus par intuition, par consultation, par questionnaire, par analyse des demandes faites ?

Une autre tâche qui s'impose à toute bibliothèque est celle de mettre à la disposition des lecteurs des fichiers, catalogues et autres instruments de consultation. Ceux-ci sont nécessairement conçus et établis par des techniciens : dans quelle mesure le font-ils a priori, et dans quelle mesure peuvent-ils tenir compte de l'expérience quo-

¹² «It also appears that after every 30 or 40 papers there is need of a review paper to replace those earlier papers that have been lost from sight behind the research front». Derek J. de Solla PRICE, «Networks of Scientific Papers», *Science* 149 (3683), 30 July 1965, p. 515.

tidienne des lecteurs ? Que pensent ces derniers des « facilités » qui leur sont proposées, et dont ils ont le droit de trouver l'emploi bien difficile ? Les emploient-ils effectivement, dans quelle mesure, avec quels résultats ?

Certaines bibliothèques ne se contentent pas d'attendre les demandes des lecteurs, mais vont en quelque sorte à leur rencontre, en prenant dans leur intérêt des initiatives telles que la mise en circulation de revues auprès de catégories déterminées d'usagers, etc. Il serait utile de savoir quel profit les usagers tirent effectivement de services de ce genre, et lesquels ils aimeraient voir développer ou créer.

Il faudrait également savoir dans quelle mesure et avec quel succès les sociologues demandent à leurs bibliothèques des services plus personnels, et pour ainsi dire « sur mesure », par exemple des recherches bibliographiques sur des sujets déterminés. Des variables décisives sont ici l'importance des moyens de travail de la bibliothèque, ainsi que sa propension à accroître son utilité. Mais d'autres dépendent des usagers, notamment la nature des demandes qu'ils formulent, la façon dont ils les formulent, etc..

6. *Archives de données primaires*

Il s'agit là d'institutions d'un type nouveau, dont plusieurs se sont créées depuis quelques années, et qui sont assez particulières aux sciences sociales, par la nature même des documents qu'elles se proposent de rendre accessibles. Ceux-ci sont non pas des études élaborées, des livres ou des périodiques, mais des données originales, soit qu'elles aient été recueillies pour une recherche déterminée et puissent être utilisées à nouveau pour d'autres recherches, soit qu'elles aient été rassemblées à d'autres fins tout en pouvant être ensuite utilisées par des chercheurs (statistiques, par exemple). Les archives établies jusqu'à présent couvrent essentiellement deux catégories de données: les réponses faites à des enquêtes par sondage; et les informations quantitatives sur les unités entre lesquelles sont réparties les populations de certains pays.

Plusieurs sociologues éminents fondent de grands espoirs sur ce type d'institutions. Un numéro spécial de revue leur a été récemment consacré¹³ et nous dispensera de nous étendre davantage. Les articles

¹³ *Social Sciences Information sur les sciences sociales* 4(3), September 1965.

qu'il contient insistent surtout sur les problèmes qui se posent à ceux qui établissent et administrent de telles archives. Il faudra recueillir aussi l'opinion de ceux qui les utilisent ou de ceux qui voudraient les utiliser, savoir quel type d'information ils en attendent ou en reçoivent, comment ils formulent leurs questions, comment ils obtiennent les réponses, dans quelle mesure celles-ci les satisfont.

7. *«Selective Dissemination of Information»*

Nous employons ici une expression anglaise, car il s'agit d'un service qui n'est encore rendu que de façon très exceptionnelle dans les pays de langue française. Même dans les pays anglophones, nous soupçonnons que les sociologues ne sont pas de façon générale les mieux servis à cet égard. On pourrait le vérifier en recherchant combien parmi eux disposent d'un service qui leur envoie fréquemment et commodément des informations correspondant avec précision à la nature et au domaine de leur intérêt scientifique du moment, défini par la combinaison d'un certain nombre de caractéristiques. Il est à présumer que cet avantage est réservé à ceux qui travaillent dans le cadre d'un petit nombre de grandes institutions; mais il faudrait le vérifier concrètement. Il faudrait savoir comment ces privilégiés utilisent ces moyens de travail, quels bénéfices ils en tirent, quelles contributions ils apportent eux-mêmes (ou estimeraient légitime d'apporter) à son fonctionnement; comment ils en évaluent l'utilité.

8. *Automatique documentaire*

Nous voudrions évoquer pour terminer un problème d'une nature un peu différente des précédents. En effet il ne s'agit pas ici d'un moyen parmi d'autres mis à la disposition des usagers pour leur permettre l'accès au stock documentaire, mais d'une méthode de travail pouvant être en principe introduite dans le fonctionnement de toutes les techniques intermédiaires dont il vient d'être question. En rendant automatique une partie des opérations dont ils ont la charge, les manipulateurs de ces techniques espèrent à la fois améliorer le rendement de leur travail et le rendre plus sûr, donc offrir aux usagers à un moindre coût humain des informations plus nombreuses et plus satisfaisantes.

L'utilisateur peut ne pas se soucier de ce problème: du moment qu'il obtient ce dont il a besoin, peu lui importe que ce soit grâce à une procédure partiellement automatisée, ou que ce soit en employant un plus grand nombre de techniciens mieux qualifiés.

Encore faudrait-il vérifier s'il en est bien ainsi. Il n'est pas impossible que la nature et la qualité des services rendus ne soient pas exactement les mêmes suivant la procédure utilisée: pour le savoir, il faudra conduire des enquêtes auprès des sociologues utilisant effectivement des services partiellement automatisés. Il faudra savoir si ceux-ci acceptent le même type de questions, et formulées dans les mêmes termes, que les services «manuels»; si le coût (direct ou indirect) en est le même ou non pour l'utilisateur, en termes de temps, de prix, etc...

De façon générale, nous voudrions inviter les sociologues à s'intéresser en usagers à ces problèmes que se posent les techniciens: de leur solution peut dépendre une amélioration considérable des conditions dans lesquelles travaillent les spécialistes de sciences humaines; et les techniciens ne seront en mesure de trouver les solutions les meilleures et le plus réellement utiles que s'ils les étudient en collaboration étroite avec les usagers.

Peut-être ensuite s'y intéresseront-ils en sociologues. Il reste à faire une sociologie de l'information scientifique; mais cela est sans doute un autre problème.



Nous avouons avoir écrit ce rapport introductif en visant à la fois deux buts, ce qui est peut-être un moyen de n'atteindre réellement aucun des deux. D'une part, certaines des vues présentées ici, parce qu'elles sont contestables, pourront provoquer des réactions et faciliter au cours de la Table-Ronde l'exposé des opinions personnelles des participants et le libre échange de leurs idées. D'autre part, il apparaît avec évidence que les questions évoquées sont fort insuffisamment connues, que des recherches nombreuses sont nécessaires pour les élucider et nous avons donc voulu en suggérer quelques-unes pour contribuer à stimuler des efforts qui nous semblent nécessaires. Mais ce sont les participants à la Table-Ronde qui seront les arbitres et qui, s'ils acceptent le cadre proposé, apporteront par leurs exposés et leurs interventions la substance nécessaire pour le remplir.

THE INSTRUMENTALITY OF EDUCATION SYSTEMS

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SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION AND DEVELOPMENT

SOCIOLOGIE DE L'ÉDUCATION ET DÉVELOPPEMENT

The theme of this paper is the instrumentality of education systems. The World Congress of Pedagogical Research has proposed that organized activities which bear the label 'education' be used as instruments of social purpose. This paper raises the question of the conditions in which education systems can be expected to fulfil that function. What conditions must be present for a national society to plan and carry out its educational programmes so as to contribute effectively to social integration, modernization or emancipation? The question is discussed in relation to Latin America in general, taking examples from a number of countries considered to be underdeveloped or developing.

The term 'education system' is used here in the sense of a social system brought into existence to set out some phase of the institutional order concerned with educating. It refers to the body of norms about a whole interrelated network of roles which the process of educating requires, and to their actual performance, and likewise to the structure by which the roles are related to one another. This structure is roughly analogous with a single administrative system. But it refers not only to the behaviour of persons in the performance of their formal roles, nor is it confined solely to the institutionalized or standardized aspects of their co-activity, but it embraces unstructured groups and informal behaviour in so far as these are brought into being by the system. Thus a government network of primary schools, or a planned programme of health education or community development executed by a single agency, or a regular television education programme — all of these might be considered as 'education systems'. And similarly a single village school may be so considered, even though only a part of an organized network, by virtue of the delegation of the management function to the director of the school. In this paper the main concern is with national and regional systems of primary and secondary education.

THE INSTRUMENTALITY OF EDUCATION SYSTEMS

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Santiago de Chile

The theme of the Round Table discussions on the Sociology of Education and Development to be held during the Sixth World Congress of Sociology rests on a widely held aspiration that organised activities which bear the label «education» be used as instruments of social purpose. This paper raises the question of the conditions in which «education systems» can be expected to fulfil that function. What conditions must be present for a national society to plan and carry out its educational programmes so as to contribute seriously to social integration, modernisation or «mobilisation»? The question is discussed in relation to Latin America in general, taking examples from a number of countries considered to be «underdeveloped» or «developing».

The term «education system» is used here in the sense of a social system brought into existence to act out some phase of the institutional order concerned with educating. It refers to the body of norms about a whole interrelated network of roles which the process of educating requires, and to their actual performance; and likewise to the structure by which the roles are related to one another. This structure is roughly co-terminous with a single administrative system. But it refers not only to the behaviour of persons in the performance of their formal roles, nor is it confined solely to the institutionalised or standardised aspects of their co-activity, but it embraces unstructured groups and informal behaviour in so far as these are brought into being by the system. Thus a government network of primary schools, or a planned programme of health education or community development executed by a single agency, or a regular television education programme — all of these might be considered as «education systems». And similarly a single village school may be so considered, even though only a part of an organised network, by virtue of the delegation of the management function to the director of the school. In this paper the main concern is with national and regional systems of primary and secondary education.

The instrumentality of such systems implies the existence of an agent with a purpose, and an object to be acted upon which responds in accordance with the purpose as a result of the performance of the instrument or «system».

The first question to consider is the agent and his purpose. Fortunately it is not difficult to identify the formally declared social purpose of primary education systems. Marshall Wolfe¹ informs us that 'at the level of public policy, educational planners throughout Latin America have been given quite uniform directives. These derive from two well-known sources: first, there are the directives summed up in Article 26 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights² paralleled and elaborated upon in a long series of regional declarations and national laws. Second, there are the directives originating in the conception of education as a form of investment in «human resources», an essential component in overall planning for economic and social development'. However, he goes on to tell us that in the past planners have worked out internally consistent plans, following their directives, without much concern for social and political factors which might interfere with execution. They have delivered their plans to the politicians and administrators «to do what they liked with.»

Beyond this point it is difficult to discern purpose as a body of aims which effect decisions to any serious degree. Politicians and administrators mobilise educators, educands, parents, and make or continue arrangements for fitting these persons for their roles, for supervising their performance and for supplying them with the facilities required. But «practical concerns» such as the national budget and the concessions and alliances which political survival requires, make serious innovations improbable. Moreover, the programme is enacted in a very real social context which largely es-

¹ Marshall WOLFE, *Has Enough Attention Been Paid to Social and Political Factors in Education Planning?* United Nations, Economic Commission for Latin America, paper submitted to the Seminar on Problems and Strategies of Educational Planning in Latin America, Paris, April-May 1964, (Mimeo).

² Articles 26 and 27 include the following: «Toda persona tiene derecho a la educación. La educación debe ser gratuita, al menos en lo concerniente a la instrucción elemental y fundamental. La instrucción elemental será obligatoria. La instrucción técnica y profesional habrá de ser generalizada; el acceso a los estudios superiores será igual para todos, en función de los méritos respectivos».

capacities the control of the agent. All the potential role-players already have a series of other roles claiming their allegiance, and are subject to pressures inherent in their existing social status. And the facilities which the system requires can only be obtained in competition with the demands of other systems, many of which have acquired firmly bulwarked traditional positions, and most of which exist to satisfy expectations of a much more immediate urgency than the more distant desiderata sought by education systems.

It appears that the motive force or «motor» of the education system can hardly be the formal purpose outlined above. If plans based on these purposes were delivered to a powerful government to execute, and if not only the government but also the main strata in the society were committed to them, instrumentality might be achieved. But this does not correspond to reality. What happens is that formal purpose is not modified, but acquires a theoretical character, becoming a counter in national and international political exchange, and the system itself takes on a skewed career which diverges sharply from the ideal path towards the goals announced. This is indeed no accident, since the latter is the language of the open society in which education is desired as the means to new abilities and new status, while most of the societies we are considering are still dominated by value systems in which status is ascribed³. In the traditional ascriptive society, with its clear distinctions between social strata, and the continuing estate-like association of each class with the performance of particular economic and social functions, there is an appropriate kind of education for each class and sector and no categorical need for their articulation in a single system, with the possibilities of movement from one system through another. The institutional ambivalence at the transitional stage lies in the fact that purpose expresses an aspiration for the future while performance cannot be abstracted from the realities of the present.

What, then, are the motors of these education systems? They can best be described as an «aggregate intention» or «resultant»⁴ emer-

³ For a valuable attempt to construct an analytical model with reference to school systems in the process of modernization see: Luis RATINOFF, *Problemas Estructurales de los Sistemas Nacionales de Educación, Esbozo de una Tipología Analítica*, Instituto Latinoamericano de Planificación Económica y Social, Santiago, July 1964 (Mimeographed).

⁴ The word *resultant* is used here to recall the diagonal in the parallelogram of forces.

ging from the often conflicting intentions of groups of performers whose performance is a «coming to terms with» the existing normative provisions of the system rather than their fulfilment. Performance is characterised in accordance with the relative strength and direction of the sectors in their use of the system. For this reason, the most important relationship between the education system and the social structure is the degree of power which the different groups of performers are able to draw from their status in the society. The greater the power of the group, the more weight carried in the aggregate intention of the system. And the marginal social groups whose integration in the national society is said to be the object of universal primary education carry very little weight in the aggregate intention beyond their mute capacity to take their children out of the school if it fails to satisfy their needs.

The Quechua-speaking peasants of the Ecuadorean highlands⁵ (commonly referred to as «Indians») are one such group. Though they constitute the great majority of the rural population, they are effectively excluded from economic, social and political participation by discriminatory mechanisms and coercive institutions still surviving from the estate-relations which prevailed under the colony⁶. At the same time, the Constitution (1946) of the country establishes compulsory schooling for all children. A reasonably effective primary school system is geographically located in the towns and villages, meeting the needs of the non-Indian population. In the rural areas, apart from activities stimulated and supported by technical assistance programmes from abroad, the strongest sectional pressures come from such quarters as, for example, those teachers who have not been able to get employment in existing schools. An unemployed teacher will «found» a private school in a convenient rural area, teaching spasmodically for nothing or for small fees until he can use his political connections to get the new school recognised and himself nominated as its salaried teacher. This does not mean that these teachers want to work in rural schools or with Indians⁷. It means

⁵ This paragraph arises from studies made in 1960 in Otavalo, Ecuador, where I was associated with UNESCO Major Project No. 1.

⁶ Characteristics of Ecuadorean social structure were carefully analysed by Beate SALZ in *The Human Element in Industrialization*, Chicago, 1955.

⁷ The internationally sponsored normal school near Otavalo exhibited an acute contradiction between originating purpose and the sectorial intention of the students. Set down in a heavily populated zone of Quechua-speaking «Indian» peasants, it was committed to seek solutions to the problems of edu-

that the supply of teachers is in excess of the urban «white» demand, and that the surplus must look for employment in the rural «Indian» sector.

Comparing the «Indian» peasants of Ecuador with those of the highlands of Colombia, where estate-like segregation persists only in isolated pockets, one becomes aware of a different and more homogenous social structure. The peasant belongs to the lowest and weakest major stratum of the society and, in his relations with the town, is at a disadvantage⁸. As in most of Latin America, there is a sharp geographical separation between the peasant who works the land and the village or small town (however poor and traditional this may be) which serves as the political, ecclesiastical, transport, communications and market centre, which houses certain types of craft workers and which generally serves as the link between the peasant and the larger society. Yet the Colombian peasant belongs to the society in a way which the Ecuadorean «Indian» is not permitted to do. He must be taken into account as a voter, as a producer and a consumer. In the last decades he has learned to keep arms near at hand. He can and does move out of the peasantry into the village and on to the industrial cities. The schools established during the last 20 years in most rural neighbourhoods bring a more urban world a little closer and open a path towards it. The institution of schooling has been accepted almost as extensively as first communion. Its actual performance is revealed in the two tables given below and taken from a typical highland region of Colombia⁹.

cating this sector. Yet both students and staff were united in efforts to become a model educational centre for the urban «whites». Students went on strike rather than accept the substitution of the teaching of Quechua for that of French.

⁸ An uncompromising treatment of the problems arising from the contractual inferiority of the peasants, especially in relation to community development, is given in Andrew G. FRANK, *La Participación Popular en lo Relativo a Algunos Objetivos Económicos Rurales*, Mimeographed by the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America for the United Nations Children's Fund, Regional Conference on Childhood and Youth in National Development, Santiago, 1965, but not distributed. See also my *Agrarian Change Trends in Latin America* in No. 3 of the *Latin American Research Review*, University of Texas.

⁹ Instituto Piloto de Educación Rural, Escuela Normal Asociada al Proyecto Principal No. 1, *Investigación Educativa en Norte de Santander 1959-1960*, Departamento Norte de Santander, Mineducación/Unesco, Pamplona, Colombia, 1960.

TABLE I

Sex and Qualifications of Urban and Rural Teachers
North of Santander, Colombia, 1960.

	Total	M	F	Normal schooling	Complete secondary	Other	Primary qualification
URBAN	655	120	535	188	12	25	430 or 66 %
RURAL	682	23	659	29	4	19	630 or 91 %

TABLE II

Urban and Rural School Attendance by Grades in North of Santander,
Colombia, 1960.

	No. of Schools	Pupils registered Total	According to grades				
			I	II	III	IV	V
URBAN	138	21,208	8745	5522	3326	2125	1490
RURAL	658	20,438	14821	5197	370	26	24

The comparative failure of the primary education system to perform as programmed in the towns is apparent in the tables, which show that only about one-third of the entrants complete the course. But the reality of the rural school is that there is effectively no course to complete, and that the transmission of schooling breaks down beyond the urban nuclei, in spite of the fact that the rural families have come to accept it and desire it universally for their children. The peasant demand for schooling lacks the dimension of power, and contributes little to the aggregate intention of the system.

Effective management of rural and small-town schools is in the hands of the parish priest, who holds the *ex-officio* position of local inspector.

The absence of trained teachers in the rural school implies that the cultural content is not transmitted in accordance with the system's norms, but rather as a kind of folklore, passed on from primary school to primary school, as ironically described by Reichel-

¹⁰ REICHEL-DOLMATOFF, *People of Aritama*, University of Chicago, 1961.

Dolmatoff¹⁰. Its explanation is the discontinuity of the educative process in traditionally ascriptive societies which Ratinoff elaborated theoretically. North Santander boasted eleven normal schools, five of which were established as *rural* normal schools, but they belonged to a different system, have application in a distinct social area of the society and for this reason do not provide the country schools with teachers. The demand for normal schools comes from the small-town lower middle class (shopkeepers, craftsmen, petty officials) who have recently woken up to the new possibilities of social ascension through secondary and higher education and who are willing and able to pay the modest fees. The supply is organised by the ecclesiastical system, whose local representatives, the parish priests, are able to secure government subsidies for normal schooling, which for purposes of qualification are regarded as the equivalent of secondary schooling. Teaching in rural schools is not compatible with the status acquired by completing normal schooling. The «normalistas» move on towards the larger towns.

Rural teachers are in effect nominated by the parish priest according to his criteria of suitability, which includes religious devotion and obedience to his authority. They are likely to be girls from the poorest strata of the town who could not afford to complete a secondary course, or from the peasant families living near enough to the town to attend the five-grade primary school.

The marginality of peasant education is also well exemplified in Brazil. Urban primary schools reaching the fifth grade are administered by the governments of the individual states of the Union. Rural schooling is in the hands of the governments of the municipalities, which are financially poor except where they contain a large city. In the state of Rio de Janeiro, economically above the average, only 7% of the rural teachers have been trained. The schools provide no possibility of proceeding to secondary education, and very few children reach the third grade. Once again, the lines of transmission of the cultural content are broken, since the teachers are nominated by the mayor of the municipality who is able to strengthen his political apparatus of conferring teacherships, however badly paid, on the daughters of the families which support him.

In contrast, the town primary school system in the richer states of Brazil enjoys considerable prestige, and caters for both rich and poor. In the following analysis, it will be seen that an «aggregate intention» gives the school the character of a *propedeutic* course

preparatory to secondary education, thereby distorting the implied purpose of the institution of universal primary education¹¹.

In this analysis, the significance of the school is compared for middle-class and for poor families.

Although there are large numbers of private schools in the city, the standing of the public primary schools is high, and most of them, especially in the «better» districts, are regarded by middle-class parents as suitable for their children, and are up to a certain point more effective in their teaching than the private ones. At the time of the study on which this analysis is based¹², the teachers had been recruited almost solely from the middle and upper levels of the middle class, and occupied a privileged position. They earned twice the minimum salary of the worker for five half-days teaching per week during eight months of the year, in addition to various generous benefits, and their salary is nearly always a subsidiary one to a middle-class family budget.

Unanimity was observed amongst the middle-class parents with regard to their aspirations for their children. Perhaps it was on account of their socially and culturally transitional situation, and the overgrowth of government positions which characterizes the federal capital, that they sought for their children the status of professionals and the security of civil servants combined. They wanted their sons to become officers or doctors and their daughters to become teachers. These three careers can all be entered by passing the highly competitive examinations for the three great training institutions at secondary level at which education is free. Should their children fail to win places, then a professional career was only open by way of entrance to fee-paying private secondary schools.

The public primary school held an important place in this system of expectations. The model career for a child in this group was: entry into Kindergarten at 5, entry into first grade at 7, with graduation each year until the fifth grade was reached. Frequently, if the child

¹¹ See Anísio TEIXEIRA, *Educação não é privilégio*, Livraria José Olympio Editôra, Rio de Janeiro, 1957, and Anísio Teixeira, *A Escola Brasileira e a Estabilidade Social*, Rio de Janeiro, 1957 (Mimeographed); also work done by the author and Josildeth da Silva Gomes in 1958-9 under the auspices of the Centro Brasileiro de Pesquisas Educacionais, Rio de Janeiro.

¹² A penetrating analysis, now needing to be brought up to date, of the role of the municipality in the traditional Brazilian political system is: Victor Nunes LEAL, *Coronelismo, enxada e voto*, Rio de Janeiro, Revista Forensé 1948.

was found to be lagging and in danger of failing the annual examination, he would be sent to an «explainer», take private lessons or attend a private school as well as the public school. On reaching the fifth grade, however, a decision had to be made since completion of the five-year primary course with excellent marks was not regarded as a guarantee of success in the competitive examinations. Consequently, many children were taken away from school at the beginning of the fifth year or during it and sent to «cramming courses» where answers to all probable examination questions are learnt by rote. It was this stream of pupils which provided the dynamic of the school and the measure by which it was judged. Since classes were divided into weak and strong groups it was the strong which got the best teachers and the weak ones which had to bear the brunt of changes due to the shortage or absence of teachers. The efforts of the teacher were aided by the parents or the paid explainer. Indeed, such was the deep-seated belief in the rights of the middle-class aspirants to have their security assured by their children becoming civil servants (including teachers) that a political crisis developed yearly at the time of the Institute of Education entrance examinations. Rallies, demonstrations, processions, prayers, the lighting of candles and consultations with spiritualist mediums and cult priests accompanied the protests of the mothers of the girls who failed to gain admittance, and who agitated for a drastic increase in the annual allocation of places, sometimes with success.

Thus, we may characterize the function of the public primary school in relation to the life-situation and expectations of the middle-class family as follows:

(a) Some of the families, described as established, may be regarded as having arrived in a «protected area» in which, through their links with the bureaucracy, their influence, property and professional status, security and comfort were assured. Whether or not they could expect their children to gain free places in the secondary educational institutions was to them a matter of minor importance; they regarded their children as having an inherent right to secondary and higher education and to entry into government service. Their children's performance at school was therefore less of a critical struggle, and in any case the family's social equivalence with the teacher class and their greater familiarity with books made the child's path easier.

(b) The remaining middle-class families were struggling for establishment in a cultural and social situation different from that

in which the parents had been brought up, and the child's entry into the «protected» or «privileged» area thereby to ensure the family's future security and status and partly, also, to affirm their own social achievements.

To the poor parents, school was a benefit which they could expect for their children from the impersonal *patrón*, in this case the city government. Though they felt they had a right to schooling for their children, and knew well the practical and the prestige value of literacy, they knew that to secure that right might not be easy. They soon learned that admission to kindergarten involved special expenses and trouble for the parents, and in any case was regarded as primarily the right of the better-off families. By seven the child had become useful in the home, and if he was the oldest of several he might be difficult to spare.

In any case, as he would not be permitted to work legally until he was 14, there did not appear to be any hurry to initiate the five-year course. But, if the child's parents sought to enroll the child at seven, they might have to queue up unsuccessfully at two or three different schools and fail everywhere to gain admittance, since the scarcity of school places caused tens of thousands of children to be turned away each year, and the poor child, especially if he was dark in complexion, could not compete successfully against a child of good background whose social connections and appearance eased the process of entry.

Thus not only did the poor child in general fail to get the benefit of kindergarten (which would help to initiate him into the processes of school learning) and enter school late; but he also had great difficulty in keeping up with the group which expected to go on to secondary education. He got little or no help at home and was expected to contribute very substantially to the work of the household; nor did his parents' ambitions usually extend to giving him a secondary education with the result that he lacked incentive. His home was likely to be bereft of reading matter, crowded and inconvenient for study. Thus his average expectations of passing the annual examinations and being graduated to the next grade could be described as follows: in five years at school he could expect to fail twice, thus reaching only the third grade during this period. The child of the professional classes, on the other hand, had an even chance of failing once, and on the average made four-and-a-half grades in five years. The great majority of the poor children were faced with the shock of failure at the end of the first year.

Poor parents desired that their children should learn to read, write and calculate, and were usually satisfied with this, but their equally strong desire that the child should learn an occupation was not satisfied, nor did the school provide formal or informal methods of guiding children who were not going on to secondary education towards practical and vocational training institutions.

Thus the primary school, though ideologically universal in function, had in reality been distorted to serve the special interests of the rising and established middle class; it had become a means of covering the greater part of the distance to the entrance examinations for the secondary institutions, in themselves the gateway to secure posts and prestigious professions. The process of distortion had been achieved by the convergence of the aspirations of middle-class parents with the value system of the teachers and administrators and the preponderance of these in the aggregate intention of the system. For the children of the poor, the school opened the way for integration into the ranks of the unskilled workers of the city, and gave them the opportunity of becoming skilled workers only in those occupations which do not require long formal training. The possibility of their obtaining efficient secondary education was remote, but they were likely to expect a greater share of material rewards in return for their labour than their parents did.

The disarray and ineffectiveness of primary education in Latin America is not accidental and is susceptible of sociological analysis. In this paper, attention has been drawn to one aspect of it. According to the model used, we can assert that there is a deficiency of operative power in the agent (government) and in the larger sector of the object («Indians», peasants, the «poor», the popular classes, etc.) which detracts from instrumentally, and opens the way to processes of modification and transformation which can be generalised under two headings, namely «institutional appropriation» and «class appropriation.»

The weakness of primary education may be seen in terms of its institutional appropriation by a system which does not share its purposes. An example of this situation was provided by the municipal school system in rural Brazil. The special role of the municipality in the larger Brazilian political structure¹³ makes this situation pre-

¹³ See Benjamin Edward HADDON, *A Sociological Study of the Institution of Religion in Colombia*, University of Florida, June 1962, and Orlando FALS BORDA, *La Educación en Colombia: bases para su interpretación sociológica*,

dictable. Current changes in this structure, and especially the weakening of the municipality and the transfer of power to the growing regional industrial centres should be watched for the possibilities of establishing some autonomous systems of rural education with a larger regional base.

Institutional appropriation by the ecclesiastical system in Colombia is equally rooted in the essentials of the social structure, and legitimized by a Concordat with the Holy See¹⁸. The role of the *ecclesia* in the national power system must be looked at in terms of the unique vertical bi-party system, in which political allegiance is ascribed by birth rather than chosen.

Of class appropriation there is little more to be said here, except to add that, in the process of penetration of the non-industrialised parts of a country, the various features of modernisation and urbanisation affect the small town first, and have created a social insurgency in these lower-middle class sectors which seems to be affecting the peasants in two alternating modes. Certainly the appropriation of services, not only education systems, destined for rural development, is a widespread phenomenon. But it is also true that these same sectors are contributing to the politicisation of the peasants, and thus helping them to achieve some of the countervailing power without which social justice and participation in the new universal services cannot be enjoyed.

Monografías Sociológicas No. 11, Universidad Nacional de Colombia, Facultad de Sociología, Bogotá, 1962. The problem of the continuance of mission schools raises special difficulties on account of the extra-national basis of the missions. For an interesting case of «institutional subversion», see Juan FRIEDE, *Problemas Sociales de los Araucos; Tierras, Gobierno, Misiones*, Monografías Sociológicas No. 16, Facultad de Sociología, Universidad Nacional de Colombia, Bogotá, Diciembre de 1963.