

TRANSACTIONS OF THE SIXTH  
WORLD CONGRESS OF SOCIOLOGY

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Evian, 4-11 September 1965

ACTES DU SIXIÈME  
CONGRÈS MONDIAL DE SOCIOLOGIE

VOLUME III

WORKING GROUPS AND  
ROUND TABLE PAPERS

VOLUME III

COMMUNICATIONS DES GROUPES DE TRAVAIL  
ET DES TABLES RONDES

INTERNATIONAL SOCIOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION  
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1970

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## THE TREND OF SOCIOLOGICAL RESEARCH

Erwazo Sarda

### UNITY AND DIVERSITY IN SOCIOLOGY

### UNITÉ ET DIVERSITÉ EN SOCIOLOGIE

If we could imagine that the illustrious shade of Max Weber had returned to witness the celebration of his hundredth anniversary two years ago, and had lingered sufficiently long — until the present Conference — to re-examine the development of sociology since his death, what impressions would he have carried away with him on his departure?

He surely would have taken note of the sociological explosion, the vast numbers of sociologists who have had specialized training in sociology and who are employed to teach sociology or who are engaged in the conduct of sociological research. He would have been impressed with the fact that in the United States, Great Britain, France, Japan, Germany, Poland, and Italy, and in many other countries in all the continents, almost all universities have departments of sociology and that in many technological institutes, medical schools, pedagogical training colleges, and schools of business administration, there are either departments of sociology or sociologists employed in various departments such as industrial management, marketing, business organization, etc. The multiplication of sociological research institutes, within and outside universities, conducting research on contract with governments and private bodies from funds supplied by governments and philanthropic foundations would also have impressed him as something which he had not seen in his own lifetime. Likewise, the employment of sociologists by governments, by private business firms, by hospitals, welfare associations, and civic organizations. Of course, there are more common in the United States than elsewhere, but they are growing throughout the world. He would have been impressed with the spread of the subject to parts of the world where in his lifetime it had scarcely existed, countries such as India, Japan, Turkey, many Latin-American countries, etc. He would have been interested in the first emergence of sociology in black Africa among indigenous

## THE TREND OF SOCIOLOGICAL RESEARCH

EDWARD SHILS

University of Chicago

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sociologists, and its re-emergence in Russia after beginnings in his lifetime and a long period of suspension.

He would undoubtedly have been impressed by the general acceptance of the legitimacy of sociology as an instrument of policy-making and administration, and as an intellectual and academic undertaking. He would surely have been impressed by the extent to which governments, political parties, armies, private firms, and public enterprises and institutions employ sociologists to survey opinions, to investigate their internal administrative problems, and even to advise on their solution. In Max Weber's lifetime, a prominent feature of sociology was the widespread concern to legitimate it as a respectable intellectual discipline with its own special subject matter. In its nationally various ways, this constituted a universal feature of sociology in Max Weber's lifetime and for at least a decade after his death. Henri Poincaré once said that sociology was a subject which had a new methodology every year but never had any results. The returning Max Weber would not find this eagerness to establish the methodological dignity of sociology. Sociologists no longer worry about methodology in the sense of defining a method peculiar to sociology that would justify its existence and enable it to take its place among the other longer established academic disciplines.

What would he find now? He would find that sociologists are no longer preoccupied by questions concerning the intellectual legitimacy of their subject; they take that for granted. They have ceased to fret about the status of their subject in the academic world. In universities where it has not become established, sociologists no longer doubt that this is the fault of the university and not the fault of their subject.

There are many reasons why this has happened. Throughout the educated and influential sections of the population in most contemporary societies, there is a greater general sensibility toward one's own society and one's fellow man, a more widely diffused curiosity about what goes on in one's society; there is a greater concern on the part of authorities who rule for the desires and feelings of those over whom their authority is exercised. For these reasons, the study of contemporary society, the techniques and theories it employs, and its vocabulary, too, have all found acceptance among the educated and the powerful as well as among the academic.

The data of sociology have shared in this ascent. In Max Weber's

time, the data of sociology seemed to be lacking in dignity. They referred to the working classes, the lower classes; they seemed to deal with outcasts, failures, broken families, delinquent children, unmarried mothers. Professors of humanistic subjects, of history and literature, had to occupy themselves with human greatness. University teachers of that time formed something like a patrician class and they expected their subject matters and their results to be of corresponding dignity. There was another reason for the problematic status of sociology: it dealt with the contemporaneous. Traditionally, universities had dealt with the timeless and the already transpired. That was where significance was to be discovered. The contemporaneous, the mean, and the particular in combination did not fit into the academic scheme of things. Changes were already discernible in Max Weber's time and country. The emphasis of the historical school on social policy and concrete and particular studies paved the way. New conceptions of the task of universities also opened the way to the admission of the contemporaneous as a fit subject for academic study.

But some of the causes for the change in the status of sociology lie in the changes which have taken place within sociology itself. The increased density and structure of the sociological profession itself is one of these new factors. This diminished anxiety about the status of sociology in the hierarchy of the sciences is a function of the multiplication of sociologists to the point where they can associate exclusively with sociologists and can thus heighten each other's self-confidence. They need no longer dwell in the presence of their contemners in other faculties. (The fact is that the other faculties have come to accept sociology's legitimacy as nearly everyone else in the world does nowadays, regardless of their disciplines, their professions, their politics, or their *Weltanschauung*.) Numbers alone, however, do not account for this increased self-confidence.

The most important changes have occurred within the substance of sociology itself. The stratification of sociologists into theorists and research workers, the old distinction between *Sinnhuber* and *Stoffhuber* has begun to fade away. Sociology has become more unified. There is still a distinction between theory and research and some division of labor, but it is no longer a hierarchy the strata of which do not mingle with each other. They have found a common task and a common ancestry. For the early generations of empirical research workers, the great theorists from Montesquieu

and Comte to Gumplowicz, Hobhouse, and Durkheim were silent or irrelevant. The acknowledged ancestors of the early generation of empirical sociologists were Quetelet, Engel, Booth, Eden, von Thünen, and not Marx or Hegel or Montesquieu or Tocqueville or Comte. It is true that Max Weber himself did not share this view. There was no cleavage among the ancestors and kinsmen whom he acknowledged as members of the sociological family. In this respect the situation to which he might have returned in the middle of the 1960's would have appeared to be perfectly reasonable and acceptable. It was his own view but he was exceptional. To most of his European contemporaries, empirical research did not appear to be a dignified part of sociology. For the most part, it was not done by persons who were called sociologists in the academic world — in so far as there were such persons in European universities in Max Weber's time. The situation was no different in France and the United Kingdom.

If the illustrious shade had not followed the course of events of the 1920's and 1930's from the next world, he would have found the situation which awaited him on his centenary tour not too discontinuous with what he thought appropriate in his lifetime. But had he followed them from afar, then he would have been conscious of one of history's «many cunning passages», of a long detour to the right road.

When Max Weber died in 1920, sociology in the United States was beginning to develop in the direction which has now become a broad worldwide roadway. In the early 1920's, Chicago was the main center of empirical research, and there it was guided by the ideas of William I. Thomas and Robert E. Park. It was not a very elaborate theory and the research was not very technical or differentiated by present-day standards. Nonetheless, there was no sense of a cleavage between theory and research. But through the remainder of that decade and much of the 'thirties, such a cleavage between theory and research did develop. As the participant-observer technique declined in the frequency of its practice and as quantitative and survey research methods grew in importance and power, a «crisis» was precipitated in the relations between theory and research. For years thereafter, an uneasy distrust prevailed, at times even an aggressive distrust, among the partisans of the two apparently distinct paths. «American empiricism» became a sort of cuss-word in sociology, applied to a random enthusiasm for collecting facts in any subject whatever, without regard to their

«meaning». In the 'twenties and 'thirties, certain sociologists who regarded themselves as the custodians of theory conducted a desultory campaign, largely a retreat, in the face of the steady increase in the quality, magnitude, and prestige of empirical research. It is now a little difficult to see what was the issue. There was probably no intellectual issue at all; it was largely a matter of temperament. It was not all pervasive. Numerous inquiries of considerable theoretical importance and implication were conducted, e.g., Dollard's *Caste and Class in a Southern Town*, Roethlisberger and Dickson's *Workers and Management*, Lazarsfeld and Berelson's *The People's Choice*, Halbwachs' *Les Causes du Suicide*, Jahoda and Zeisel's *Die Arbeitslosen von Marienthal*, etc. Nonetheless, there was a feeling of malaise about the relations between theory and research.

Sociology made great progress during these two decades. It developed new habits of work, it established the «culture» of sociological research, extending the scope of its substantive activities tremendously. From the study of villages and neighborhoods, of broken families, juvenile delinquents, and boys' gangs, it moved to the study of occupational mobility, status stratification, race relations, the organization of industrial work, political campaigns, wireless listening practices and tastes, the internal structures of families and not merely broken ones, the effects of unemployment on family structure and moral outlook, a more subtle analysis of the consequences of membership in deprived ethnic minorities, the social structure of new housing estates, leisure time activities, social reform movements, the occupational aspirations of young persons, and many other subjects. The inquiries were vivid and interesting in themselves; they were also self-contained. Each continued an earlier line of inquiry or interest. Particular ancestral antecedents were drawn upon but each continued in its own line of substantive interest. Sociology was on its way toward becoming an empirical discipline, but the only unity which it showed was that of a common procedure and the contemporaneity of its subject matter. Each significant inquiry was a piece of first-hand research, approaching the persons studied directly through interviews, through opinion and attitude surveys, through participant observation and questionnaires. It developed in many centers — the hegemony of Chicago sociology was broken — and emphases and lines of interpretation went off in many different directions.

As it became an empirical discipline, sociology became highly

diversified and fragmentary. The links between the diverse subject matters of sociology were not evident. They were not evident because they did not exist in anyone's mind. There was no general theory which could embrace them and enable each to be seen in relation to the other. Theory — categories for the description of actual behavior, general propositions dealing with the interrelations of different sectors of society — was almost entirely lacking. General theoretical treatises, such as von Wiese's *Allgemeine Beziehungslehre*, Freyer's *Soziologie als Wirklichkeitswissenschaft*, Znaniecki's *Social Actions*, Sander's *Allgemeine Gesellschaftslehre*, etc., tended to be abstract and primarily classificatory; in any case, and for a variety of reasons, they were difficult to apply to the situations which sociological research dealt with. Much of what was called theory was the study and interpretation of the great figures of sociology — Simmel, Durkheim, Comte, Spencer, Hobhouse, Tönnies, Weber, Pareto. There was little attempt to use what they had said about the nature of modern society in the direct, first-hand study of modern society. They did not enter into the daily idiom of sociological discourse.

There were a few exceptions — Mannheim and Merton, at the end of the 1930's, drew on Weber's ideas of bureaucracy and the «Protestant ethic» to account for the phenomena which concerned them. Mannheim was perhaps the first sociologist who attempted to draw into a wider frame of interpretation, derived from Marx, Weber, and Freud, the results of particular pieces of empirical investigation by other sociologists. Merton's work on the history of seventeenth-century science in England in the light of Max Weber's ideas was one of the very few instances of an original, first-hand investigation conducted in general, theoretical categories. The Institut für Sozialforschung drew on Marx and Freud to interpret family structure and political orientations, but such first-hand materials as they gathered bore little relationship to their theory. (It was only in the late 'forties that their theory and research became more intimate.) But the greatest monuments of empirical research of this period, *Middletown*, *Recent Social Trends*, and *New Survey of the Life and Labour of the People of London*, were unaffected by these incipient trends. (*The Negro in America*, which actually appeared in the 'forties but belongs intellectually to the tradition of the 'twenties and 'thirties, was a synthesis of numerous researches on the American Negro, many of them inspired ultimately by Robert Park; it placed the Negro squarely within the framework of American

society, but it had nothing to do with the theory prevalent at the time it was carried out.)

The sociological culture of this period and the major works which it saw produced have left an enduring impression on the development of sociology. The most important of these effects is that nowadays most sociologists regard it as natural that evidence should be provided for whatever a sociologist says and that that evidence should be quantitative and statistically reliable, that even if it is not quantitative, it should be based on interviews and observation — or, if not on these, then on primary documentary sources. Moreover, the evidence should be evidence of something more than itself. Sociology has come to mean research, first-hand research or «re-analysis» of first-hand data. At one time sociology was understood to be a point of view, a mode of analysis and of discourse about society, but that is not so any longer. It may be the latter in conjunction with the former, but it can no longer be the latter alone.

In this sense, sociology has now become more of a science than it has ever been before. And in the course of it, the duality and hostility which endured for many years between theory and research have faded away. It is not that there are no longer theorists in sociology who do relatively little first-hand research; there still are and there are likely to continue to be such theorists. But no theorist, however abstract and however preoccupied with fundamental concepts of variables and relationships of variables, can any longer carry on his work without feeling that an empirical sociologist is looking over his shoulder. He knows now that his work can no longer be self-sustaining but that it must justify itself by what it contributes to research.

The conception of theory has changed. It has ceased or is ceasing to be the ambition of sociological theorists to construct systems which are definitively and cosmically comprehensive and which admit new knowledge only as illustration. Theory is more open and tentative now than it used to be, but it has not yet found the idiom and style most appropriate to a more integral relationship with research. It is still extremely cumbersome to apply, it tends to be too general. The theory which comes from the side of general theory is usually too vague and too undifferentiated for «close» application to the particular events on which research is done. The theory which grows out of research often bears the birthmarks of the particular events for which it was contrived; application to

other particular events in the same class sometimes entails distortion of the data and failure to perceive the unique features of the events studied. There is too much generalization of the accidental in the employment of these concepts. But all these handicaps notwithstanding, the «theorization» of research is one of the major stages in the history of sociology.

Empirical research has ceased to be «the expenditure of \$50,000 to find the location of a bordello», as a detractor of sociology once asserted. It has moved into the differentiated study of a range of institutions and classes of actions which had never been studied before in such comprehensive, balanced, and intimate ways. Hospitals, research laboratories, student halls of residence, boarding schools, grammar schools, military units, trade union locals, religious sects and churches, philanthropic associations, local branches of political parties, government offices, industrial firms, gambling casinos, prisons, have been added to the list of objects of first-hand research. So have the professions: lawyers, physicians, university professors, scientists, army officers, artists and writers, social workers. So have social stratification — occupational mobility, styles of life, aspirations and motivations, images of one's own position in society and of the society within which one has that position, interclass attitudes, beliefs in the justice and injustice of the prevailing system — and political choices or decisions at the level of the voter, the legislator, and the administrator. All these new subjects, and the old ones like the disrupted family, the boys' gang, criminality, suicide, and recruitment to occupations and professions, have engaged the sociological research worker.

The techniques of description are now more rigorous; they are less impressionistic and are very seldom satisfied with anything less than an adequate sample of the universe they study. They are less content with assessments of magnitude which rest only on the clinical skill of the individual investigator. Furthermore, these «objectivized» modes of assessment of particular variables have become more subtle. That is, they have begun to deal with less grossly observable variables. They are trying to cope with those variables which have hitherto been discerned by «insight».

But this is not the main point which we wish to make here. That point is that this greater rigor and artfulness in description is employed to study events which are thought to be «theoretically significant.» Events which were previously investigated because they were of relevance to administrative practice and policy are now

being «theorized.» Attempts are steadily made to subsume them under general, «theoretical» categories or to elicit such general theoretical categories from their analysis. Thus, the study of satisfaction and dissatisfaction in work is not a new interest for sociologists. Nor is the study of criminality and delinquency. Far from it. But to study these phenomena as particular embodiments of *anomie* has been one of the turning points in the history of the subject. (Of course, the results are still indecisive.) Voting preferences have been studied by sociologists for a long time; and the correlation, for example, between voting for the Democratic Party in the United States and being Roman Catholic, urban, and working class, on the one side, and voting for the Republican Party and being Protestant, small town, and middle class, on the other, was a major accomplishment of contemporary political sociology. But it took the process one step further to go behind the correlation and to analyze the primary group links through which these factors operated. The perception of the importance of primary groups in fields of activity as diverse as industrial work, the adjustment of immigrants, the conduct of soldiers, and consumer behavior, is a typical manifestation of this theory-impelled counter-tendency to the fragmentation inherent in specialization. To see apathy in non-voting and to see apathy as a phenomenon generated by the conditions of «mass society» might seem obvious or wrong or even perverse, but it also is a step toward putting particular facts into a more general context. It means that a more *general* variable is sought to be discerned in the concrete or particular event studied. It is not just that the latter is put into a class — that is inevitable — but that the class is somehow connected with a variable which has something to do with the classics of theoretical sociology. The movement toward the theorization of research comes from two directions. One is from what has hitherto been called «theory.» The other is generated in research itself.

Now with respect to the general or systematic sociological theory, it may be said that it has thus far not been a resounding success if success is measured by the extent to which it has been integrally assimilated into empirical research. There is still not much contact along a broad front between general systematic theory and concrete research. The reason is that general systematic theory is not differentiated or particular enough in its categories for the requirements of empirical research. It does not reach down far enough toward concreteness to touch the actual data and, because it does not do so,



it is unable to bring the results of the analysis of the data back into itself. At present the fullest contact of the general systematic theory is with very abstract research such as that performed experimentally in non-real-life situations or with macrosociology which uses comprehensive and relatively undifferentiated categories.

Perhaps general systematic theory should not seek to provide more than a «general orientation;» perhaps it should be content with the provision of certain pregnant concepts — enigmatic and capable of extension — e.g., social system, bureaucracy, charisma, *anomie*, authority. But it should also be said that general theory is a failure only if the criterion of success is its complete adoption in such a way that all subsequent research is guided by its conceptualization of variables and statements of relationships among those variables. But there are successes short of this, and sociological theory can claim some of these. Sociological theories on the grand scale have been like great classical buildings which have been used by ensuing generations, not to live in in the style of their original owners, but as quarries for the materials from which new buildings, more congenial to the tastes and capacities of a new generation, could be built. This is what has been happening in the relations between sociological theory and research.

The most important of all these selective assimilations is the adoption of the concept of system. I think that one could look for a long time in the literature of empirical research before the late 1940's to find institutions, organizations, and relations studied as systems. Thanks, however, to Pareto and then Parsons, many investigators now conceive of the objects of their inquiry as systems. This is not merely a terminological adornment; it marks a substantive change in mode of thought. A new sensitivity to interdependences has been generated by this *systemic* orientation. Again, practically no one uses, to take another example from the work of Parsons, the whole scheme of the pattern variables, but a considerable number of sociologists have found use, in their research, for the ascription-achievement pair, or the specificity-diffuseness pair, or one of his others. Max Weber's threefold classification of the types of legitimate authority certainly has not been assimilated as such into research, but his conception of rational — legal (bureaucratic) authority has become one of the chief sources of contemporary research on organizations. Mannheim's ideas about ideology likewise have been adopted by practically no one in the form in which he put them. but the chain of thought set off by them has certainly had some in-

fluence on sample surveys of political opinion — a field of research once thought among the most «empiricist» and therefore the most impervious to theory. Similarly, Pareto's ideas about elites have never been accepted in the form he gave them, but in a transmogrified form, via Lasswell (and Mills, to some extent), they have markedly changed the character of community studies (e.g., «community power structure») and the studies of certain occupations (e.g., professional soldiers, higher civil servants, etc.).

Thus general theory has reached into research at a number of important points. It is a freer kind of theory which is developing. It is a type of theory which is utilized in the study of particular classes of events. Its results are not theories of delinquency or theories of formal organization but rather studies of delinquency and of formal organization which employ bits of what is called systematic theory and try to work them into more general propositions of their own. Blau's work has its point of departure directly and indirectly in the writings of Weber on bureaucracy — indirectly through Merton; Runciman's work begins with Merton's ideas on reference groups and relative deprivation (these arose from the studies in *The American Soldier* which were relatively untouched by general theory); Eisenstadt's work on youth cultures draws on Parsons' pattern variables; the work of many writers on delinquency draws on Durkheim's idea of *anomie* as interpreted by Merton.

The movement between research and theory, although extremely fragmentary and not yet showing any detectable trend toward unification, is rather intense. It is also very uneven. Some problems or subject matters are in an obviously more highly theorized condition than others. The study of organization, for example, although it is one of the newer fields of sociological study, being in its present form not much more than fifteen years old, has a more differentiated and coherent theory and a closer relationship between theory and research than almost any other field. One of the reasons is that the field came into existence when there already existed a body of literature in a variety of distinctive fields all of which bore on organization and which was simultaneously theoretical and yet fairly particular in its reference. I refer to the writings of Chester Barnard and Herbert Simon, of Max Weber, of Elton Mayo, of T.N. Whitehead, of Roethlisberger and Dickson, and finally Robert Merton's essay on «Bureaucratic Structure and Personality.» Each of these sources was part of or was otherwise connected with the major theoretical orientations of present-day sociology, i.e., Max

Weber and Emile Durkheim, and they helped to give research in this field a focus and direction practically from the very beginning.

It is also likely that the late emergence of the empirical study of organization as a subject of empirical research meant that it did not carry with it the handicap of a relatively long pre-theoretical history. It did not have the background of a large body of empirical literature research — like the study of occupational mobility or of the family — which had never been able to precipitate or have imposed on it a set of theoretical problems. As a result, much information accumulated in a theoretical vacuum.

The closely neighboring field of political sociology is also relatively highly theorized, in the sense that the research attempts to illustrate or demonstrate empirically general concepts or hypotheses, and in addition, it seeks to connect these concepts and hypotheses with some which are drawn from general sociological theory. Within the field of political sociology, the study of party organizations and party systems is perhaps more theorized than the study of voting behavior. The reason again lies in the degree of particularity of the theory of the subject at the moment when it became an object of empirical investigation. Roberto Michels' *Political Parties* contained a basic proposition about the necessary structure of political organization based on his own observations and on Ostrogorski's earlier work (*Democracy and the Organization of Political Parties*). It was also clearly articulated through its relations with Max Weber's ideas of bureaucracy in political organizations (which also went into the theory of organization); certain of Schumpeter's propositions about party competition also helped to create the theoretical point of departure for this field.

In contrast with this, voting behavior studies did not have a similarly theorized point of departure. Before the application of the opinion survey technique, the earlier and simpler ecological analyses, voting studies had no aspiration other than the correlation of voting choice with certain conventionally conceived variables such as class, occupation, age, and sex. The effort to go beyond this point, as we have recently witnessed in studies of consensus and cleavage, has had to fend for itself. Received sociological theory has not offered much and such theory as has been created has been generated largely from the data.

The same situation obtains in many parts of sociology. Because systematic general theory has not supplied in any immediately applicable way the theoretical guidance which has come to be

increasingly demanded by research workers, who seek to account for ascertained differences in behavior, they are being forced to create their own theory — to devise their own more differentiated categories. This process of the generation of theory from research is a function too of the increased volume of empirical research and the consequent increase in the differentiation in which each problem is treated. Within each field of research, categories become more differentiated as efforts are made to «square» or to integrate the results of one's own research with that of other workers on the same problem. The impetus to theory now comes to a greater extent than ever before in the history of the subject from the actual conduct of research. The research workers themselves are driving the theory ahead out of their own internal need.

The picture of the relations between theory and research is thus very variegated. The effort of research to reach outward toward its own theorization seems to be irreversible; it is generating its own theory and is also drawing as well as it can on the present body of general theory.

There are still considerable obstacles to the unification of the theories derived from these two sources. Each still tends to work in a relatively autonomous sphere. The points of connection are limited, very partial. General or systematic theory does not comprehensively enfold the results of empirical research, and empirical research generates its own fragmentary theories, sometimes drawing from general theory what it can use for its immediate tasks within the limits of its knowledge of what is available).

Sociology remains a disunified field, but the lines which separate the various sectors of the field have changed. The separate sectors are not entirely separate. They do show signs of some connection. Certain sub-fields of sociology have been incorporated into the central territory of sociology, sub-fields which at one time had a quite independent existence in relation to the theoretical interests of sociology. Family studies, criminological studies, educational sociological studies (the studies of classrooms, of differential participation in the educational system, etc.) have increasingly come into some modicum of intellectual community with other parts of sociology. The idea that a prison or a school is a social system has carried with it the idea that, as such, they have certain common properties and certain common problems, and as a result the interchange among the studies of these substantively disparate subject matters has helped to create a fundamentally unifying sub-field: the study

of organizations. This is another way in which the fragmentation of sociology, despite the increased concentration of larger numbers of workers and the vastly increased output of literature, with its consequent pressure for the specialization and confinement of the range of attention, is to some extent being offset.

The extent to which sociology has become substantively unified should not be overestimated. There are still pockets of sociological research which have remained relatively immune to any of the newer sociological theory. Rural sociology is one of these fields, but this too is changing. Demography, which is one of the most important fields of sociology, has still not been effectively assimilated into the rest of sociology. Even the study of social stratification and of social mobility, despite the considerable number of very impressive works — e.g., Glass *et al.*, Halsey, Floud, Lipset and Bendix, Geiger, Karlsson, Svastaloga, Blau, Rossi, Inkeles, Reiss, and numerous others, and the traditions of Marx and Weber — has not been much penetrated by theory.

One of the difficulties is that, as techniques of collection and processing of data become more and more sophisticated, existing general theory becomes less adequate because of its generality. At the same time, the research workers themselves seem often to be overwhelmed by the complexity of the material they have assembled, and such theory as they can generate can deal at best only with a limited portion of their data. Moreover, as might be expected under these conditions, the theorized segments of empirical research are still rather discrete, because the bits of theory which they have taken are not visibly connected or easily connectible with each other, even though they might be so potentially or in principle. (For example, how does the theory of bureaucracy stand in relation to the theory of *anomie* or to the theory of charismatic leadership or to the theory of elites?) The linking concepts and hypotheses have not been disclosed.

It is probable that there will never be a complete unification of theory and research because there will never be a complete unification of theory. Such complete unification will be possible only when sociology comes to an end, when it ceases to grow and to strive for new knowledge.

Nonetheless, even if this is granted, a greater mutual penetration of theory and research than now exists is possible and desirable. The great progress of the past quarter-century lies not so much in what has been accomplished in this process of unification as in

the general affirmation of the rightfulness and necessity of mutual penetration. The mutual distrust of the earlier generation has faded because sociologists recognize that they engage in a common enterprise, despite the difficulties of bringing that community fully into being. The task, however, becomes more difficult as more and more data pile up and the machinery for their processing becomes more capable of elaborate operations, and as sociologists themselves become ramified in more and more differentiated practical activities which pull them away from the center of sociology.

Yet, in the face of all these adverse circumstances which do not become more favorable, the fact remains that there is a richer measure of unification than there was when our period began. A common language and a common sensibility have been in process.

## II

This halting, heavily obstructed, but nevertheless real growth of a common language, and a common way of looking at society, has been going on within most of the countries in which sociology is practised on a substantial scale. Certainly it has been going on in Poland as well as in the United States, in England as well as in Sweden. It has also been going on internationally, i.e., across national boundaries. Sociology is beginning to become a single discipline — perhaps a single set of sub-disciplines — despite its cleavages, a common undertaking of sociologists in many countries.

Sociology was never a nationally wholly parochial subject. Because sociology moved in the wake of major intellectual movements — e.g., Comtean positivism and Spencerian evolutionism, and to a lesser extent Marxism — from the time of its pre-academic existence in the middle of the nineteenth century, the leading writers of sociology became known and appreciated outside their homelands. The German influence on the American universities in the last third of the nineteenth century brought across the ocean some knowledge of Simmel, of Tönnies, and of German ethnology. Durkheim was known in Great Britain and the United States. Academic life was an aristocracy and there was some mutual awareness and acknowledgement of the aristocracies across their national frontiers. Sociological theorists were part of this aristocracy and they participated therefore, although modestly, in the lightly attended international concourse.

When sociology turned into a more empirical discipline after the First World War, the international links became much thinner. The great figures who had been known previously had been theorists. They were builders of systems of thought which were their own creations. These individual creations, however idiosyncratic and however steeped in their own national traditions, claimed universal validity and universal interests. This was, to some extent, the basis of such internationality as they possessed.

Yet the fact remains that in Max Weber's lifetime, these sociologies which claimed universal validity were really nationally parochial sociologies which bore the imprint of a few great innovating figures and of the national academic and cultural traditions of their respective countries. Such sociology as existed in England was concerned with social evolution, ethnographic data, and surveys of poverty problems; sociology in France had transcended the evolutionary preoccupation and was focused largely on intensive studies based on ethnographic and statistical materials of certain fundamental social processes and structures.<sup>1</sup> (The first-hand study of contemporary society had not gone very far, despite its powerful beginnings in the work of Le Play and the potential stimulus of Durkheim's study of suicide.) In Germany, empirical sociology, of which Weber himself was perhaps the only significant and generally unknown practitioner, scarcely existed; theory — i.e., classifications of types of groups and relationships, greatly influenced by Tönnies' distinction between *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*, the phenomenological analysis of particular concepts, and the library study of macrosociological problems — held the field. In Weber's lifetime, American sociology, which, via Park, Thomas Giddings, Ross, and Sumner, had taken over elements of French, German, and British sociology, was developing its own unique properties in direct field work, the technique of participant-observer, the study of personal documents. All of these were brought to bear on the study of rural and urban communities, immigration and assimilation pro-

<sup>1</sup> It is true that the French style of sociology was unique to France but it was not parochial in its interests. The great figures of the French school collected information about their subjects from the records of all countries and, in the bibliographical pages of *L'Année sociologique*, they directed their eyes outward beyond the boundaries of France in a way in which no other sociological publication has ever done. Perhaps their exceptional transcendence of parochiality was connected with the fact that they did not do field work.

cesses, family structure, long-term social trends in which urbanization was the major theme. All these objects of inquiry lay within the boundaries of the United States.

The more concrete sociology became, the more it became preoccupied with its own society.<sup>2</sup> If we look at some of the major pieces of sociological research of the 1920's and early 1930's — e.g., Thrasher's *The Gang*, Lynd's *Middletown*, *New Survey of the Life and Labour of the People of London*, Dreyfuss' *Beruf und Ideologie der Angestellten*, Geiger's *Die soziale Schichtung des deutschen Volkes*, or Lederer and Marschak's «Das neue Mittelstand», etc. — we see that a sociologist was studying his own country in his own national tradition and style.

Not only did sociologists, with very few exceptions, concentrate on their own countries in their work of the 1920's and 1930's, but they also did not know much about the sociology written in other countries.<sup>3</sup> I think that the only major exception anywhere to this assertion was Professor Pitirim Sorokin, whose writings throughout the 'twenties and 'thirties showed an exceptional intimacy with the research and theoretical literature in the English-speaking countries, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, and Poland. There were also a few other exceptions — Professor Aron knew about the German literature, Professor Ginsberg and Louis Wirth also knew the German literature, and the Polish sociologists knew the literature of the major countries. But the generally more empirical workers knew little about other countries or the work of their foreign colleagues in countries of international status similar to their own.

There are many reasons for this besides the barrier of language. One of the reasons was the low prestige of empirical research. What tended to be taught in the universities was «sociological theory», which was the knowledge of the teachings of the great figures. It tended for the most part to be taught without reference to empirical evidence. On the other side of the line, empirical research was taught and conducted without reference to the «theory» of the famous sociologists. Thus, while theory remained international within limits, and had, thanks to its academic connections, an opportunity to share in the international academic community, empirical

<sup>2</sup> There were, of course, great exceptions in the early period of empirical studies, for example, Ernst Engel, and Le Play.

<sup>3</sup> Max Weber himself, despite his great erudition, seems to have known very little of the sociological work done in other countries.



research, which did not share the relatively higher status of theory and which was even done in non-academic institutions, ran in nationally unconnected paths.<sup>4</sup>

Because in the early decades of the present century empirical research (except, with qualification, for America) was either unknown or had little prestige in the academic world of each country, its counterparts or parallels in other countries were generally left unnoticed. There were very few, if any, sociological journals with a significant international audience before the end of the Second World War, and they published little empirical sociological research. A substantial part of what we would call empirical social research was done in connection with welfare administration or on problems which social reformers thought should become objects of welfare policy, such as the standard of living and family life of the poor, education, immigration, juvenile delinquency, criminality and penal administration. This occurred at a time when the bearers of the name of sociology, eager to see their subject become a science and academically respectable, were deliberately attenuating their relations with social policy. Then too, much of this unacademic research was extremely particular and often very amateurish. Even when it could be seen and read, it was so often designed in very concrete and *ad hoc* categories, without regard for the categories used by other investigators working on similar subjects elsewhere — in the same and other countries. Little effort was directed toward drawing conclusions even at a very particular and concrete level.

Not all of empirical research was extra-academic. In the United States, a large amount was produced in the universities, mainly by Ph.D. candidates but also by teachers. Poland, Great Britain, France had a good deal — according to the then prevailing standard. Outside the United States, however, a substantial proportion of what we would now call empirical sociological research went on in the education departments, demography departments, psychology departments, and geography departments of universities. This latter fact helped to remove it from international sociological circulation. Empirical research had not yet risen, as it has in more recent years,

<sup>4</sup> Again, an exception must be made regarding those branches of sociological research which were based on the statistical reports of public and private bodies. Halbwachs' works on suicide and on standards of living in the working classes are outstanding examples of this early internationality of empirical research.

to the point where it utilized or felt the need for more general explanations. The particularity of the results of research was not offset by translation into a common, more generalized conceptual idiom. For these reasons, such research was practically lost within the country of its origin; internationally, the parochiality of the preoccupation of the investigators further assured its oblivion by linguistic ignorance and obscurity of place and form of publication.

This was the situation until the outbreak of the war, when as far as we know sociology in most countries, except the United States and perhaps the United Kingdom, stood still.

Immediately the war ended a major change began to take place. Sociology, and with it sociological research, became much more intensively cultivated. The postwar expansion of the universities in every country, the growth of the welfare state and of market research, brought with them sooner or later a corresponding increase in the number of sociologists and in the quantity of research. Amateurism has almost disappeared from sociology so that, unlike the prewar period in which many persons doing sociology had no academic training in sociology even when they held university appointments, most persons who now conduct sociological research have received an academic training in the subject. This has contributed to the formation of a common sociological culture.

This multiplication of sociologists and sociological research and the growth of a common sociological culture within each country could not in itself have furthered the internationality of sociology without the simultaneous change in the substance of sociology which made for a greater community of problems and subject matters across national boundaries. One need only look at the pages of the *Revue française de sociologie*, the *Kölnische Zeitschrift*, the *British Journal of Sociology*, the *Polish Sociological Bulletin*, and the *American Journal of Sociology* to see that social stratification and mobility, mass communications, youth culture, the situation of the aged, voting behavior are now internationally cultivated, using the same techniques and referring to the same international corpus of research and theoretical literature. The efflorescence of market research and the closely associated public opinion poll in so many countries has greatly aided this formation of a common sociological culture. The more intimate relations between university sociology and extra-academic sociology have also helped to make for this common international sociological culture.

Partly as a result of the theoretical aspiration of empirical socio-

logy, certain major peaks of past and current sociological accomplishment began to stand out above the multitude. Certain individuals, living and dead, and certain institutions where such traditions and persons were concentrated, became more central in the field of attention of sociologists in each country and throughout the world. The new life of Max Weber's and Durkheim's ideas throughout the whole world of sociology and the assimilation of a certain amount of Karl Marx's sociological concerns have helped to give sociology a common universe of discourse. Harvard, Chicago, Columbia, Berkeley, Ann Arbor, London, Paris, Oslo, Aarhus, Tübingen, Cologne, Warsaw, Cracow, Leiden, Novosibirsk, Kampala, Tokyo, Delhi (one could cite others) have become foci of international as well as national attention. As a result, there has been a tendency toward a greater concentration on a relatively restricted number of ways of conducting research and ways of conceiving of society and its sub-systems.

The increased size of departments of sociology, with a much larger number of students and teachers doing research, meant that the major centers of radiation of sociological work had a larger body of recipients, continuators, and developers of major themes and subject matters. There have been more contacts of the students and teachers, especially the younger teachers of the subject, across national lines. The foci of attention being more massively cultivated, they acquired more prominence and propagated themselves over a larger area.<sup>5</sup> Of course, sociology has not become uniform throughout the world — just as it has not become unified within any single country — in consequence of this development. Nonetheless, just as sociology has become more coherent intellectually within each country, so it has also become more coherent on an international scale. The result is an international network of mutually attentive institutions (and their constituent and influential individuals).

But it is not only the demographic changes in sociology which have brought this about. Even more important is the change in the ethos of sociological work. The sociologists' conception of the nature of their undertaking has changed. Whereas at one time sociologists with theoretical aspirations were concerned to construct comprehensive and definitive syntheses from which nothing was thought to be omitted and to which, therefore, nothing could be added, they have come to see that their subject is a perpetually

<sup>5</sup> Perhaps the world has at the same time been becoming more uniform.

open one. From a time when the self-sufficient delight of documentary first-hand experience in the field or the provision of descriptions which would arouse public opinion or serve the needs of civic or governmental bodies were the motives of empirical research, the discovery of a meaning deeper than the «facts» themselves has become the ambition of sociologists. Of course, these trends were in process over a longer period than the first quarter-century. The attitudes which they replaced never had the field entirely to themselves. Sociologists, having acquired a different conception of the intellectual cosmos in which they operate, now have a different conception of the social structure of the sociological enterprise. From a condition in which they participated in a particular national identity arising from the sharing of a common intellectual tradition, sociologists have increasingly experienced a sense of membership in a worldwide intellectual community engaged in a common, collaborative enterprise to which national boundaries are insignificant.

Sociology might not yet have become a science, but it has now passed to the stage where it possesses one of the major social structural components of science. This element is the sense of being involved in a joint undertaking, of collaboration with predecessors and those who follow after. In this view, the individual's results are not exclusively his own accomplishment, to stand by itself and to be appreciated for its well-rounded coherence and self-sufficient monumentality. The age of the system-builder — modelled on the great philosophical systems, which were the creation of the synthetic powers of individual geniuses — has passed. Sociologists have come at last to the condition described by Max Weber in *Wissenschaft als Beruf* when he said that

In science, we all know that whatever we accomplish will become out of date in ten, twenty of fifty years. This is the fate to which scientific work is subject; it is inherent in the very nature of scientific work. ... Every scientific «solution» raises new «problems»; it demands its own transcendence and obsolescence. Whoever undertakes to serve the ideal of science must accept this. ... Scientific works ... will be surpassed scientifically. ... This is our common fate: it is in fact our intention. We cannot do scientific work without hoping that others will advance further than we have. In principle, this progress will go on without ever ending.

The process of successive replacement is not the replacement of one self-sufficient system by another self-sufficient system which

negates its predecessor; nor of one body of definitively reported facts by another body of definitively reported facts. It is a dialectical process of affirmation and denial, of acceptance and revision.

Sociologists nowadays regard it as their first obligation to assimilate into their work not only the concepts and the orientation of other sociologists, but the data and the hypotheses based on that data produced by other sociologists. They regard it as their first task to improve those hypotheses by data and hypotheses of their own. Their aspiration now must be that their own work will enter into the stream of the work of their contemporaries and successors, to be assimilated and transformed by them.

Naturally, the community within which sociologists work still tends, in the first instance, to be national. Quite apart from the self-enclosing function of a common language, of a common educational experience, and the much greater probability of individual encounter and interaction with sociologists of their own nationality, the parochial locus and significance of the events from which their data are engendered, of the objects of their inquiries, give them a strong local identity and focus. All this notwithstanding, sociologists are no longer able to confine their concerns to the parochially located and significant. The larger world of the other centers of sociology impinges on their consciousness, either through the research which they produce on closely related subjects or the theory which is separately presented or embodied in their research.

The theorization of empirical research has made them more concretely conscious than heretofore of the affinities of their own local subjects and the local subjects of their fellow sociologists in other countries. The sociologists of other countries, working on their subject matters and problems, have become parts of their «internal populations»; they are coming increasingly to live in the midst of what those others in other countries are thinking and investigating. Occupational mobility or kinship structure in London or juvenile delinquency in Liverpool or reading habits in Bordeaux or bureaucracy in Paris bear on their studies of occupational mobility in California or kinship structure in Detroit, juvenile delinquency in New York, reading habits in Baltimore, etc. The «fit» is far from perfect but there is a conviction that something can still be done with it. So much for the empirical side.

On the theoretical side too a process of international integration moves apace. The transplantation of Max Weber to the United States as a result of the emigration which coincided with an indigenous

growth of interest in his ideas, his later penetration into France, and his return to Germany in consequence of his elaboration and deciphering in America, the reassessment of Durkheim, the renewal of interest in Michels in the United States (following the republication of the 1915 translation of *Political Parties*), have all made for a multilateral and criss-crossing movement of theoretical ideas which have contributed to the incipient formation of a common sociological culture on a world scale.

Like the process of «theorization» and the unity emerging from it within each country, the «internationalization» of sociology is a slow process in which the entire world population of sociologists participates very unequally and intermittently. Only a minority of all sociologists participate in it directly. I think here of Professors Aron, Glass, Lipset, Janowitz, Eisenstadt, Parsons, Lazarsfeld, Szczepanski, Dahrendorf, König, Rokkan — among others — who are among the most influential in their respective countries, and many more participate in the «internationalization» indirectly through their response to research and analyses performed by the international minority.

This process has been aided, of course, by institutional developments which have heightened the mutual awareness of sociologists of different countries, widened their horizons and brought them into an unprecedentedly effective collaboration. The speed of travel and the greater availability of financial resources have increased the frequency of international conferences, of special international commissions and study groups, of refresher courses, of long visits for research and teaching or for simply becoming acquainted with persons and work, which have contributed to this growth of the sociological sector of the international intellectual community. The awareness of one's fellow sociologist as a person, gained from seeing him and corresponding with him, opens sensitivity to his works and the works of his students. It leads to the exchange of offprints and mimeographed preliminary reports on a wider territorial scale, it puts one «on the lookout» for the work of the person one has met, however briefly. It assimilates them into one's mind.

Important though mimeographed «pre-prints» have become in sociological communication, journals still retain great importance among the institutions for the communication of the results of sociological work. The change here is very marked. Before the Second World War, non-Dutch sociologists who wished to know what sociologists in the Netherlands were doing had to read *Mens*

*en Maatschappij*; if non-Polish sociologists wished to know the work of Polish sociologists, they had to read *Przyglond Socjologiczga*; if they were not Scandinavian and wished to know what Scandinavian sociologists were doing they had to read *Nationalokonomisk Tidskrift*. Now they can consult *Sociologica Nederlandica*, *The Polish Sociological Bulletin*, and *Acta Sociologica*. Genuinely international journals like the *Archives européennes de sociologie* and the *International Social Science Bulletin* testify to the transnational character of contemporary sociology.

Of course, it might be said that it is patriotic and personal pride which causes sociologists of every country to wish to have their work known by the sociologists of other countries. But it is not only that. They know that others will be interested in what they are doing, will be interested in their data and in their analysis. Moreover, whatever the motives, the fact now remains that sociologists now have a wider and more inclusive horizon, and the enrichment of the landscape enclosed by that horizon is greater now than ever before in the history of sociology.

### III

This strengthened sense of trans-local and transnational affinities among sociologists has been attended by an extension of the territorial locus of research which scarcely existed before the Second World War. Until very recently, nearly all empirical research was local; and it was mostly the locale of the investigator which was studied. Few sociologists studied anything outside their own countries; those who did first-hand empirical research did so even less frequently than those who did their research in libraries. (The great works of the French school had a more extensive territorial reference than did those of any other school of sociology in the first quarter of the twentieth century, but they did not involve field work.) When data about foreign countries were employed, they were used to test or exemplify a proposition about a specific phenomenon like suicide. There was little interest in the foreign society as such. There were a few exceptions among sociologists, such as Professor van den Hollander's works on the poor whites of the American South and on the society of the Hungarian plains, Thomas and Znaniecki's work on the Polish peasant in Poland and the United States, Bakke's work on the unemployed of Greenwich, and Heberle's work on territorial mobility in the United States.

Today, most research is still local and it is in the nature of sociology as an organ of a society's self-awareness and of its concern for its own improvement that it will remain so. Furthermore, the costs of doing research in a foreign country are considerably greater than doing it in one's own country; linguistic differences add to the difficulties. Nonetheless those who do research outside their own countries are now more numerous, they are covering more subject matters in more different countries. Almond's and Verba's studies in Italy, Mexico, England, and Germany; Dore's and Abbeglen's work on Japan; Geertz and Palmier on Indonesia; Ashford, Gellner and Geertz on Morocco; Bailey and Wiener on Indian politics; Ross on the Indian family; Janowitz on German social mobility; Berger on Egyptian bureaucracy; Dahrendorf on the skilled worker in Great Britain; Rose on voluntary associations in France; Bastide in Brazil; Banton in Sierra Leone; Trow on British universities; Ben-David on academic freedom in America and Europe; Foster on Ghanaian education; Chalasinski on African intellectuals — these are only a few chosen at random. The instances could be greatly multiplied.

What is the significance of this transcendence of parochialism in the location of the objects of research? It means, among many other things, that sociology is becoming more universal in the range of its sympathy and interests, it is becoming more comparative. Of course, general sociological theory has always aspired to embrace all human societies within its scheme of analysis, but on the whole it has done so with insufficient differentiation. But the new movement toward comparative sociology is not comparative in the sense that Herbert Spencer or the German ethnologists of the nineteenth century were comparative; it is not an attempt to assign societies to their respective places on an evolutionary scale. It does not involve the application of a rigid classification or typology of societies. It is more tentative, more exploratory. It is more empirical; it is usually based on field work or on the use of primary archival sources in the country studied. Yet it is also theoretical.

More than the empirical work which sociologists do in their own countries, it is also either directly or indirectly macrosociological, and, as we have indicated earlier, it is easier to be theoretical in macrosociological than in microsociological analyses. (The reason is that many of the classical figures of sociological theory — e.g., Weber above all, Marx, Tocqueville, Michels, and Pareto — had a very strong macrosociological bent.) Thus, the new comparative



sociology aims rather at the understanding of a part of a society in the context of a whole society and of a whole society — within the context, implicit or explicit, provided by another whole society. A sociologist who studies a problem in a country other than his own is almost compelled, by virtue of the fact that his original concepts were formed with reference to problems in his own society and his own culture, to compare the situation he is studying in the foreign society with the situation in his own whole society. This might, of course, result simply in an ethnocentric distortion of his perception of the foreign situation. That, however, is something sociologists try to guard against, and if they are successful in doing so, then the outcome is an enrichment of the sociologist's awareness of the range of variety among societies and of the *macrosocial* differences which affect *microsocial* situations.

The outcome, incipiently visible at present, is a new kind of comparative sociology which sees societies as variants of a single species. There might be evolutionary overtones, which in their turn have moral or political overtones, but the intellectual core is sound and unaffected. The new comparative analysis has grown up in an atmosphere of relatively high detachment, and even the analysis of political development seems to be escaping from the ethnocentrism which was a defect of the older evolutionary comparative approach.

The new comparative sociology which acknowledges the differences among societies breaks away from the historicism which stressed the incomparable uniquenesses of whole societies. It recognizes the identities of societies by seeing, behind the factual differences, an identity of fundamental potentialities, an identity of fundamental problems faced by societies.

A comparative sociology is a sociology which is the study of all human societies and not just of the industrial societies of modern times. Comparative sociology can, therefore, be a study of particular societies within a general theoretical framework or the study of types of societies within such a framework, or it might be the general theory (framework) differentiated enough in its concepts and proportions to cover the whole range of societies and the particular societies within the range. In all these variants it serves to overcome parochialism and moves toward universalism.

The present interest in comparative sociology has been facilitated by the improvements in statistical sources (e.g., national census data, survey data, and the compilations of statistical series by the

organizations of the United Nations). It has been impelled, too, by the interest in economic development, and has been encouraged by the widening of the horizon of sociologists and the extension of their intellectual curiosity and moral sympathy. But it would not have been possible without the effort to construct a general theory of society. Much of the recent comparative work by political sociologists owes a great deal to such theorists as Parsons, Aron, Levy, Eisenstadt, and Almond — all directly influenced by Weber and directly and indirectly by Marx.

Indeed, without the impetus which the attempts at general theory have given it, comparative sociology would not have made such progress as it has; it would not have gone beyond monographic microsociological studies and macrosociological statistical comparisons. It is the still fragmentary and still imperfect general theory of society which has forced these kinds of studies away from the description of uniqueness and differences toward a sense of why the differences exist, not just in the light of their particular historical determinants but in the light, as well, of some conception of the working of society in general, and of types of societies as variants of society in general.

The monographic research guided by a comparative outlook is contributing to an improved sociological theory. Even though the authors of monographic inquiries do not themselves often attempt to formulate their conclusions in an explicitly generalized manner, every additional monograph is a stride forward. It precipitates nascent perceptions, it sharpens the awareness of categories and connections. It makes the unarticulated a little more articulate. Then from time to time, some powerful synthetic effort (e.g., Aron, Eisenstadt, Parsons, *et al.*) advances the whole process of clarification and promulgation. As in the extension of theory into empirical research, so in the movement toward a general theory of society, which is bound to be comparative as it becomes more differentiated, the acceptance of an entire theoretical scheme is not indispensable to its subsequent fruitfulness in research. If even a single part of it commends itself for application, it furthers the process of generalization and therewith of the unification of sociology. One more segment of factual data is put into a general category, certain vaguely intimated hypotheses concerning that variable go with it, and so expectations as to how societies work become more differentiated and more generalized at the same time.

Thus far I have spoken only of the impulse to the formation

of a generalized comparative theory which comes from statistical and monographic field studies of societies other than the sociologist's own. The expansion of the macrosociological interest is another independent factor.

This has been in existence for a long time. In the writings of Montesquieu, Comte, Spencer, Tocqueville, and Marx, it first became available to sociologists. But in the period when sociology began to develop the techniques of investigation which established its reputation for intellectual solidity, the macrosociological interest faded. In the 1920's it was perhaps only Professor Sorokin who kept it alive. It began to revive in the 1930's under the influence of a new interest in Marxism, the second phase of Karl Mannheim's career in which he began to write about «mass society.» But its most important intellectual stimulus came from Max Weber's writings. The early development of political sociology also contributed. The movement into the field of attention of the new states of Asia and Africa, which had not previously been studied on any considerable scale, aside from the village studies of the social anthropologists — and the fact that the focus of concern was the establishment of political society in these states (many of the inquiries were conducted by professional political scientists strongly affected by recent developments in sociological analysis) — also contributed to the renewal of an empirical macrosociology.

The studies of the new states, concerned as they were with the development of political society, could not, even when they confined themselves to local politics, adhere to the microsociological tradition of social anthropology from which they had so greatly benefited. They had to go beyond the village in order to understand the village. They had to look at a process in the village or in a region against a background of national politics. Furthermore some of the inquiries too, like that of Apter's *Gold Coast in Transition* and Coleman's study of Nigeria, began with an interest in the country-wide political society. These studies could not, however, disregard the more parochial collectivities, villages, caste, tribe, lineage and family, etc. Otherwise they could not discuss the problems of national political life. As a result, for the first time in the recent history of sociology, we began to have studies which combined microsociological observations in a macrosociological framework. Dahrendorf, Srinivas, Bendix, Janowitz, Lipset, Austin, Levine, Fallers, Eisenstadt, Geertz, Wriggins, and Zolberg, in their general theoretical works and in their monographic work on Germany, India,

Ghana, the United States, Ethiopia, Israel, Indonesia, Uganda, Ceylon, and the Ivory Coast, assimilated the results of many particular inquiries and observations on communities, parties, business firms, kinship groups, and social classes into a coherent view of the total society.

Macrosociology cannot be done without considering changes in the structure of society. Changes cannot be studied without going into the depth of history. As a result, historical background had to be borne in mind in a way in which the classical empirical investigations of the period up to the Second World War had never done. The historical background can be dealt with in three ways: (1) as a residual category from which everything which cannot be accounted for analytically or theoretically can be explained in an *ad hoc* manner; or (2) as a constellation of traditions and interests operative at the moment under investigation; or (3) as a series of states of a system. Increasingly sociologists have inclined toward the second and third — although the first is still widely practised. The acceptance of the second and third has meant that sociologists are being led to overcome the temporal fragmentation, or, to put it differently, the ahistoricity of the hitherto prevailing practice of sociology. Concepts have had to be given historical depth, processes which were the objects of sociological conceptualization have had to be understood as having a temporal dimension; they can no longer be regarded as occurring in a single moment or over a short series of moments of time. Sociologists have thus been required to become historians — not necessarily historical specialists, although in a few cases they have become these also.

This development occurred at about the same time as certain sociologists, who were not macrosociologists, began to discover the possibility of the application of their techniques to earlier periods. We may mention here historical voting studies as practised by Lazarsfeld and his school. At the same time, the growing persuasiveness of sociology and certain internal developments in historiography were leading certain historians in a sociological direction. We may mention here only the work in historical demography of Laslett and Wrigley, of the great French school which has developed from the work of Marc Bloch, Lucien Febvre, Fernand Braudel, Louis Chevalier, Gabriel Le Bras, Georges Lefebvre, Ernst Labrousse, the still unexhausted riches of the Indonesian studies of Schrieke and van Leur, the political-sociological studies of Sir Ronald Syme, and the historical studies of the structure and fate of particular

classes, such as Lawrence Stone's on the English aristocracy of the seventeenth century, and Eric Hobsbawm's and E.P. Thompson's on the English working classes of the nineteenth century, etc.

Thus as historians have moved toward sociology, the gap between history and sociology has diminished somewhat. This process is now only in its beginnings. It undoubtedly has limits in the nature of the records of past epochs, but these limits have certainly not been even remotely approximated. Certainly the major resource of sociologists — the creation of their own data by interviews, surveys, and direct observation — is not available to historian-sociologists. But even if, «in the end», the data of the historians do not meet all the requirements of empirical sociologists — just as the theories of the sociologists will not meet all the requirements of the historians — the undertaking itself is bound to leave a lasting imprint on the course of sociology. The result will be a sociology which is not confined in its scope to concepts and propositions which are valid only for still existing societies. An understanding of the wide variety of human possibilities disclosed by history, which cannot be disclosed by concentration on the study of contemporaneous societies, is a full requirement of a comprehensive sociological theory. It will be almost as important for microsociology as it will be for macrosociology.

#### IV

The import of this cursory survey of certain features of the trend of sociological research over the past quarter of a century — as full of gaps and injustices as it is — is that sociology, under circumstances which demand incessant specialization, has been experiencing a counterbalancing process of unification. Theory and research, within nearly every country where sociology is carried on, are in a more active interaction and reciprocal assimilation than they have ever been before. Sociologists are forming, more than they have ever done before, a worldwide intellectual community which is pursuing a commonly conceived objective. All the world's societies are being seen more than ever before as members of a single family in which variations and changes occur within a framework of shared attributes and potentialities.

The realization of all these trends which are still only in their

beginnings is still a remote possibility. There are numerous obstacles in the path. The sheer intellectual difficulty of doing what has not been done before is, as it is in all sciences, the greatest obstacle to progress. Then there are other obstacles — language, ignorance, national and cultural pride, and political-ideological antagonism.

Still, the fact of our progress remains. The confidence which that progress encourages, and our faith in the capacities of the human mind, make us believe that the trends we have sketched are bound to go on and, in doing so, will heighten mankind's self-awareness and the sense of its fundamental unity. Sociology will then become a true *science humaine*, as our farseeing French colleagues have wisely called it.

SOCIAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC POLICY:  
AN EXAMINATION OF THE POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS  
OF MODERN RESEARCH  
IDEOLOGY AND SOCIOLOGY  
Irving Louis Horowitz  
IDÉOLOGIE ET SOCIOLOGIE

Economics, sociology, psychology, and the other social sciences have in recent times begun to play a new and problematic role with respect to national and international policy. The problem of social policy has become acute precisely to the extent to which social science has become exact. Legitimation of policy recommendations from social scientists emerged in this period and not in previous periods because of a demonstrable feasibility of putting social science and social theory into a framework of political action. Demand for operational research analysts, tactical data systems, war gaming and simulation experts now reveals the search for basic engineering personnel. There is a paucity of exact informants on how this transvaluation took place, due in part to the novelty of the situation and in part to the novelty of self-examination in the social sciences. What is at stake as a result of this newly acquired influence is not the feasibility of social science, but the credibility of social scientists.

Any discussion of virtues and values, which inevitably is what the study of social science and public policy boils down to, involves two distinct areas. One is the simplicity of present relationships between social science and public policy, its formation and its execution. The other is the question of what the relationship between social science and public policy should be. In connection with both what is and what should be there are two variables. The first is the utilization of social science in the formation of public policy; the second involves the relation between social scientists and policy-makers. The fact that an ever increasing number of individuals can with some legitimacy claim both scientific and policy-making status tends to blur the lines between these issues.

SOCIAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC POLICY:  
AN EXAMINATION OF THE POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS  
OF MODERN RESEARCH

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### I. *Three Styles of Political Exhortation*

The first problem we come upon concerns the factual issues in the character — the relationship between social scientists and the policy-makers, that is how this relationship differs in various social structures. What is the relationship of sociologists to society in a totalitarian state? Or in a welfare state? Or in a *laissez faire* state or system? What are the stresses and strains upon the social scientists and policy-makers in each of national system?

Most social science disciplines require open-ended conditions for their functioning. Invariably and almost necessarily, established dogmas about society must be challenged. In this sense, sociology has been as much a problem for the socialist ideology as astronomy was for seventeenth century Catholicism. For example, do women go to church more often than men in the Soviet Union? From the point of view of Marxism, this is a ridiculous question. Men and women are equal by definition. Only historical antecedents are considered in accounting for differential sexual responses to religious practices in a socialist nation. Therefore, the sexual variable itself tends to be suppressed as a legitimate area of inquiry for Soviet researchers despite the noticeable difference in church attendance between male and female, not only in the Soviet Union but in many countries displaying similar political structures and levels of industrialization.

This discrepancy between fact and theory leads to the conclusion that in a pure command structure the relationship of social science to public policy is not much of a problem because the social sciences, aside from their technical vocabularies, are suppressed. The ideology of science is harnessed to the ideology of the state. This is done by celebrating only the «pure» and the «natural» sciences. Applied social sciences may exist, but what does not exist is an analysis of the whole society. To the extent that meaningful data contradict the established order, the social sciences are suspect. Not accidentally, the more exaggerated the totalitarian system, the less available for public inspection is the social scientists' information. The degree to which the development of the social sciences is permitted within a nation operates as a twentieth century index of freedom. And the extent to which the development of an independent social science is stifled provides a measure of political stagnation. Allowing myself an *ex cathedra* judgment, I do not think

anyone can participate in social research and fail to see a high correlation of good social science and a good society.

The evidence provided by the Soviet Union on this score is illustrative. While the research and academic personnel in the U.S.S.R. engaged in the «arts, humanities, and social sciences» continues to grow numerically — from 620,600 in 1956 to 740,400 in 1960 — this represents a downward percentile trend with respect to the physical and engineering sciences — from 27.9 to 24.0. If this figure is broken down further, it is found that only 3.9 of the scientific personnel are engaged in what would in the West be called the social sciences — and these are gathered in the fields of economics and planning.<sup>1</sup> Undoubtedly, what occurs is a widespread infiltration of social science findings through «alien» fields such as pedagogy, geography, jurisprudence, and even such refined areas as mathematical statistics. More recently, this subterranean approach has been replaced by an opening up of the social sciences at least to include sociology and psychology (the latter has always been available as part of the medical and biological sciences, and now is being thought of as a social science). This indicates a distinct movement in the Soviet Union from totalitarian to authoritarian modalities. That is to say, there is a distinct tendency away from political dominance, and surveillance of all scientific products to a political exclusivity that demands relevance rather than conformity in the products of social research.<sup>2</sup>

In a welfare system, in contrast to a command system, the social sciences tend to have exceptionally close ties with policy-oriented sectors of the society. The two are joined functionally by the Ministries of Science, such as those which exist in England, France, and Germany. Policy-makers for their part often think of the social sciences as a rationale required for any projected change estimated to be in the social interest. Before a major piece of legislation is introduced into the English Parliament, for example, the likelihood is that a survey has already been conducted providing a form of

<sup>1</sup> See Nicholas DEWITT, *Soviet Professional Manpower; Its Education, Training and Supply*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. National Science Foundation, 1955; and more recently, his essay on the «Reorganization of Science and Research in the U.S.S.R.» in *Science and Society*, edited by Norman KAPLAN. Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1965, pp. 303-321.

<sup>2</sup> Allen KASSOF, «American Sociology Through Soviet Eyes,» and Talcott PARSONS, «An American Impression of Sociology in the Soviet Union,» in *American Sociological Review*. Vol. 30, No. 1 (Feb. 1965), pp. 114-124.

social science legitimation. Thus in England, while investment in social science is relatively smaller than in the United States, there is a high payoff for social science information.<sup>3</sup> The social scientist is not only listened to. His advice is fervently sought. Social science has become a recognized aspect of national investment. The welfare system has been a tremendous source for social science growth; and in turn, the social sciences have reformed the «socialist» tendencies within the societies they operate.

The character of the social science practiced in the welfare system tends to be of a strongly applied nature. England no longer produces the great theories about society; rather it paves the way for practices intended to reshape social policy.<sup>4</sup> Empiricism extends deep into the marrow of the policy orientation. Both the opportunities and the payoff are in such a direction. Furthermore, «pure» social science research involves a study and evolution of fundamental theories about man, and neither the pragmatism of the twentieth century British party system nor the empiricism of the educational system place much faith in «fundamentals.»

The linkage between the British political and educational systems may have delayed the evolution of an independent social science curriculum at the more traditional places of learning; but when the penetration did take place (by economics in the eighteenth century, administration in the nineteenth century, and political science in the present century) the situation was ready-made for the close cooperation between social science and social policy. And with the defeat of ideological Toryism (based as it was on «classical studies») by the close of the Second World War, the last shreds of opposition to social science vanished.<sup>5</sup> The impulses of British social science to welfare projects dovetailed neatly with the welfare projects out-

<sup>3</sup> See Irving L. HOROWITZ, *The New Sociology*. New York and London: Oxford University Press, 1964, pp. 43-47.

<sup>4</sup> A new series of articles on «reshaping social policy» appearing in the English publication *New Society* is indicative of this trend. The articles deal with population pressures, urban design, professional practices, and immigration, all as they relate to England. See *New Society*, Vol. 7, Nos. 179-181, March 1966.

<sup>5</sup> For a general outline, see D.S.L. CARDWELL, *The Organization of Science in England: A Retrospect*. London: William Heinemann, Ltd., 1957; and for a more specific essay, see Eric ASHBY, «Science and Public Policy»: Some Institutional Patterns Outside America,» in *Science and the University*, edited by B. R. KEENAN. New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1966, pp. 13-26.

lined by the political apparatus. And the mutual suspicions of scientists and policy-makers characteristic of an earlier epoch in British history dissolved into mutual reinforcement and even joint celebration.

In *laissez faire* consensus systems, the social sciences are compelled to compete with directly involved policy agencies. For example, in the United States executive policy-makers have traditionally consulted those with training in diplomacy, law, and administration. But until well into the present century little attention was given any of the so-called hard social sciences — psychology, economics, and sociology. Furthermore, not until the establishment of bureaucratic modes of social science performance have the social sciences been granted the kind of hearing they enjoy in the welfare state. The extent to which the *laissez faire* system becomes permeated with welfare elements, concerning itself with protecting and caring for the citizenry, to that degree is there a high penetration of the social sciences into the area of government policy.

There appear to be three distinctive factors accounting for the special role of social science in the formation of American policy. They explain not only the significance of social science in policy-making, but the dependence of American social science on policy agencies.

First, a strong social reform tendency developed early in opposition to general theories of change and revolution. American social science has been consciously, almost self-consciously, dedicated to issues of practical reform: elimination of poverty, integration of ethnic minorities, immigration and population issues, urban redevelopment schemes, etc. This has led major foundations and philanthropic agencies to lose interest in the direct alleviation of social problems through charity and to invest heavily in indirect means of alleviation: social science programs.

Second, development of a pluralistic educational system made room for many and diverse social scientific activities. This gainful employment in teaching, while it prevented some of the worst excesses of the German university system from being repeated in the United States — chauvinism, nationalism, anti-Semitism — weakened the status system in American higher education. Status tended to be conferred from the outside, especially from federal and private agencies who drew upon educational expertise as the only sources of non-political opinion. This permitted the American social scientist to retain an independence from government no less than the

policy-maker to reserve judgment on the worth of the social sciences.

Third, an entrepreneurial spirit developed in American social science to accommodate growing government needs. Bureaucratic organizations served to mediate the claims of educational and political establishments, safeguarding both from detriment or disrepute. Social science middlemen emerged in all forms. Bureaus of social research blossomed at the major universities. Independent, non-university agencies sprang up: the RAND Corporation, Institute for Defense Analysis, Aerospace Corporation, Peace Research Institute. Organizations geared to marketing research and national opinion surveys proliferated. These entrepreneurial responses to government needs meant the institutionalization of a buying and selling arrangement. And as is customary in such arrangements, the buyers perform superordinate and the sellers subordinate roles, except in exceptional circumstances.<sup>6</sup>

The following table indicates the network of private military research agencies and their base of military support.

The *laissez faire* consensus system is not an exact description of American society. The system of social science evolved in the special circumstances of United States political and economic history. In effect, its political rhetoric remains steeped in consensus, while its economic characteristics have increasingly been subject to welfare elements. This is one central reason for the «schizophrenia» in applied social research.

As an overall characterization it could be said that (1) in a command society, policy dictates both the character and the activities of the social sciences. Social sciences loses control over both the instruments and purposes of research. The operational aspects become so important with respect to what policy dictates that the social sciences can do little but «plug in to» the going political system and hope for enlightened outcomes. The extent that the sciences do so satisfactorily, they survive. (2) In a welfare system, policy and social sciences interact but without any sense of tension or contradiction between scientific propositions and the therapeutic orientations. The integration is so complete that there is a loss of identity at both the scientific and political poles. Spillover between

<sup>6</sup> See Don K. PRICE, *Government and Science: Their Dynamic Relation in American Democracy*. New York: New York University Press, 1954; and Warren O. HAGSTROM, *The Scientific Community*. New York and London: Basic Books, Inc., 1965.

Table 1

## PRIVATE MILITARY RESEARCH AGENCIES

SUPPORTED BY MILITARY	Contract holdings in millions *
<i>Air Force</i>	
Aerospace Corporation . . . . .	\$ 76.2
System Development Corporation . . . . .	51.6
Mitre Corporation . . . . .	34.4
RAND Corporation . . . . .	11.4
Analytic Services, Inc. . . . .	1.3
<i>Navy</i>	
Applied Physics Laboratory (Johns Hopkins) .	54.9
Franklin Institute (Center for Naval Analyses) .	11.5
<i>Army</i>	
Research Analysis Corporation . . . . .	9.3
<i>Defense Department</i>	
Institute for Defense Analyses . . . . .	2.1
Logistics Management Institute . . . . .	1.0
CREATED AT SUGGESTION OF MILITARY (Major Institutions)	
Lincoln Laboratory (MIT) . . . . .	49.4
Instrumentation Laboratory (MIT) . . . . .	47.0

\* Net value of prime contract award, fiscal 1964.

Source of Data: Defense Department

scientific propositions and therapeutic prescriptions is tremendous; all functions of social science are funneled into a social problems orientation. The result is a decline of interest in the larger analysis of social systems or social forces. (3) In a *laissez faire* system, the social sciences tend to be independent and autonomous of political policy. However, to the degree they remain in this pristine condition, they are also weak in power and status. What takes place typically is an exchange system based on a reciprocal transference of information for money. But this reduces the amount of social science autonomy, which leads to a trade-off of high status for maximum power. This in its turn creates a source of inner tension within the social sciences as to the appropriate role of the social scientist in the forging of public policy.

## II. Socialization into Secrecy

Until now, we have considered the training of social scientists as a given. Here we must take note of their training as policy consultants or advisors. While most officials in government have a series of checks and balances to guide their behavior, few forms of anticipatory socialization apply to social scientists who advise government agencies. Since such social science advisors are asked for operational guidance on sensitive issues, they are often shielded from the consequences of their policy utterances. The anomaly arises that the more sensitive the policy question the less subject it is to public scrutiny.

Secrecy has been maintained about government scientists that is practiced elsewhere in Washington only on behalf of Central Intelligence Agents. As one commentator has recently pointed out: «Not only are the names of some two hundred P-SAC consultants kept secret, but so are those of other paid scientific advisers to government. Spokesmen for both the Air Force and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency recently refused to divulge the identity of certain of their scientific advisers on the grounds that to do so would, (1) expose them to pressure, (2) ensure that they would receive unwanted mail, and (3) put them under public scrutiny, which was exactly where they did not want to be.»<sup>7</sup> Yet, since the purpose of research may have an effect on the judgment of social scientists, why should secrecy be either prized or praised?

The question of secrecy is intimately connected with that of policy because it is a standing assumption of policy-makers never to reveal themselves entirely. No government in the «game» of international politics feels that its policies can be placed on the table for full public review. Therefore operational research done in connection with policy considerations is bound by the canons of privacy. In its most basic form the dilemma is as follows. Social scientists have a «fetish» for publicizing their information. However, policy branches of society have as their «fetish,» as their essential method, private documents and privileged information. How else does one gain in the game of oneupmanship without privacy, without knowing something that the other side does not know? Therefore, a premium is placed not simply on gaining in-

<sup>7</sup> M. GREENFIELD, «Science Goes to Washington,» in *Science and Society*, edited by Norman KAPLAN. Chicago, Rand McNally, 1965, pp. 415-429.

formation but on maintaining silence about such information. A reversal of premiums and a transvaluation of values arises, leading to extreme tension. What often reduces such tension is the sacrifice of the social sciences, their yielding to considerations of policy.

Social scientists yield on such issues not simply because of a power imbalance between buyer and seller of ideas, but because they prefer a recessive role. Social scientists may enjoy the idea of partaking of a secret order of things. There is something tremendously fascinating about being «in» and not being «out.» The cost of this «inside dopest» role may be a heavy one—the institution-ization of a subordinate position. But in being privy to things of secrecy, the feeling of powerlessness is largely eliminated; the subordinate role with respect to political authorities may be more than counterbalanced by a superordinate feeling with respect to other social scientists.

One critical factor reinforcing the common acceptance of the norm of secrecy is the allocation of most government research funds for military or semi-military purposes. As Table 2 indicates,

Table 2

## FEDERAL R&amp;D EXPENDITURE, FISCAL 1965, BY PROGRAM AREA

<i>Program Area</i>	<i>Est. Expenditure (in millions)</i>
* Space Research . . . . .	\$ 6,700
Military Research . . . . .	5,200
* Medical Research . . . . .	1,300
* Nuclear Research . . . . .	1,200
Agricultural Research . . . . .	179
* Oceanographic Research . . . . .	138
* Meteorological Research . . . . .	108
* Water and transportation Research . . . . .	129
Educational Research . . . . .	24
Vocational rehabilitation Research . . . . .	19
Welfare administration Research . . . . .	7
Other (not allocable) . . . . .	87
	15,287

\* Program estimate by Bureau of Budget. Other items estimated by author.

Source of data: 1965 Federal Budget.



approximately 70 per cent of such funds have either a directly military or semi-military basis. Under such circumstances, the real wonder is not the existence of a norm of secrecy, but the relative availability of information.

Social scientists involved with research defined as secret or confidential can easily develop a self-definition of importance derived from their connections rather than the intrinsic merits or demerits of their work. They come to desire secrecy as much as their superordinates because they want to be shielded from public scrutiny of their work. Being publicly called to account in Congressional Committee hearings, for example, has a demeaning effect on status. If an economist or political scientist working for the Central Intelligence Agency filed a report to the government so erroneous that it helped pave the way for policy disasters, public availability of the report would reflect negatively on his standing in the academic community. Thus secrecy is a mutual advantage in the event of failure even more than in successful ventures. In this protected environment, the social science advisory competence becomes an unknown quantity. About the only surety available to the hiring federal agencies is to choose from the elite corps of social scientists and to offer financial rewards high enough to attract such an elite.<sup>8</sup>

The widespread acceptance of the canons of secrecy, no less than the commitment to policy as such, makes it extremely difficult to separate science from patriotism and hence to question the research design itself. The acceptance of the first stage, the right of the government to secrecy, often carries with it acquiescence in the last stage, the necessity for silence on the part of social scientists. The demand for secrecy has its most telling impact on the methodology of the social sciences. Presumably, policy personnel hire or employ social scientists because this group represents objectivity and honesty. The social scientists represent a wall of truth, off of which the policy-makers can bounce their premises and practices. The social scientist is thought to provide information that public opinion is not able (or willing) to supply. To some degree, social scientists are hired because they will say things that may be un-

<sup>8</sup> This was clearly done in the case of Project Camelot. The consultants were drawn from the more eminent members of the social science community. See Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, *Behavioral Sciences and the National Security* (Report No. 4 together with Part IX of the Hearings on Winning the Cold War: The U.S. Ideological Offensive). Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965.

popular but nonetheless significant. For example, that the Chinese Communist system is viable and will not collapse is a difficult position to assert, unless one is a social science expert. Then such a statement can be made with relative impunity — even before a Senate Foreign Relations hearing.

The norm of secrecy overturns the scientific premise of publicity. Since the terms of research and conditions of work require an initial compromise with the methodology of social science, the lofty purpose of truth acquisition tends to be blunted. The social scientist is placed in a cognitive bind: he is conditioned not to reveal maximum information lest he become victimized by those who employ him; and yet he is employed precisely because of a presumed impartiality. Once the social scientist becomes gingerly and clever, his value to social science *qua* social science is endangered. But once his scientific acumen interferes with policy, his «usefulness» to the policy-maker may likewise be jeopardized. The social scientist engaged in policy research walks a tight-rope, with secrecy as the invisible net lest he fall.

Social scientists think they have a good commodity for sale or for hire, and at least one large sector of society shares this estimate. Avid consumers of social science products such as government policy-makers may come into direct competition for services with equally concerned but less affluent consumers of social science. There are people who think highly of social science information and others think poorly of it. However, even those with a high opinion are not always in a position to pay for social science services. Thus, as can be seen in Table 3, funds for research are, for all practical purposes, restricted to government, industry, and university sources.

Given the complex nature of social activities and their increasing costs — both for human and machine labor — the government becomes the most widespread buyer. Government policy-makers get the first yield also because they claim a maximum need. Private pressure groups representing corporate interests are the next highest buyer of social science services. The Bureaus of Social Research vaguely attached to universities service most non-federal research needs. The role of foundations and universities is ambiguous. Theoretically they ought to be encouraging pure research, particularly if government agencies encourage applied research. In fact, rarely are they interested in pure research. If anything, they tend to be as concerned with applied problems as the public and business agen-

Table 3

SOURCES OF FUNDS USED FOR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT,  
BY SECTOR, FROM 1953 TO 1962. (MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)

Year	Total	Federal Govern- ment	Industry	Colleges and universi- ties	Other nonprofit institu- tions
1953-54	\$5,150	\$2,740	\$2,240	\$130	\$40
1954-55	5,620	3,070	2,365	140	45
1955-56	6,390	3,670	2,510	155	55
1956-57	8,670	5,095	3,325	180	70
1957-58	10,100	6,390	3,450	190	70
1958-59	11,130	7,170	3,680	190	90
1959-60	12,680	8,320	4,060	200	100
1960-61	13,890	9,010	4,550	210	120
1961-62	14,740	9,650	4,705	230	155

Source. of data: National Science Foundation

cies, since they are concerned with justifying their worth precisely to business donors and government agencies. Further, big foundations and major universities are often policy extensions of federal agencies — if not directly, then through special laws and rules governing the taxation of philanthropic agencies and universities. The sources of funds for research tend to be exclusively concentrated in the upper classes. The fact that the President can indirectly participate in the selection process of major foundations indicates the intimacy that exists between federal and private controllers of wealth despite legal niceties. This fusion of government and corporate wealth makes it difficult to bring about a countervailing pluralistic system of power with respect to social science funding.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>9</sup> For a defense and an acknowledgement of this, see Paul F. LAZARFELD, «Reflections on Business,» *The American Journal of Sociology*. Vol. LXV, No. 1 (July 1959), pp. 1-26; and for a critique, see Irving L. HOROWITZ, «Establishment Sociology: The Value of Being Value Free,» *Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy and the Social Sciences*. Vol. VI, No. 2 (1963), pp. 129-139.

There is a direct relationship between the ability to pay and belief in the utility of the social sciences. Who are the high users? The federal government, some state governments, basic industries, marketing industries. Who are the low users? Farmer-labor groups, the poor in general, minority groups (with the exception of highly sophisticated groups such as affluent religious organizations that spill over into the high users category). In the main, racial and ethnic groups do not place much value on the uses of social science. Perhaps the use of social science research is itself a suave reflection of wealth. Those who wish to use social science agencies extensively are wealthy enough to afford them; those who disparage social science groups are often rationalizing their own lack of affluence.

The image of social science tends to be far less flattering in the attitude of the poorer classes than in that of the wealthier classes. Ultimately, the social scientists, to the extent that they become involved with policy-making agencies, become committed to an elitist ideology. They come to accept as basic the idea that men who really change things are at the top. Thus, the closer to the top one can get direct access, the more likely will intended changes be brought about.<sup>10</sup>

Two flies can be found in this particular ointment. First, there is slender evidence that information bought and paid for is made the basis of policy in critical times. Indeed, there is just as much evidence for the conclusion that information is used when it suits policy-makers, and discarded when it does not «fit» political plans. Second, there is no evidence that the elitist model is uniquely cast to solve problems of social change. The model of elites changing the world is itself controversial. It may be flattering to think that involvement with elites enables one to determine the course of society. But if a Marxian or mass model is used, what happens to the relationship of the policy-maker to the social scientist? The whole situation must then be perceived in terms of social forces. By minimizing any other historically derived model, such as a mass model, the social scientist leaves unexplored variables which ought to be examined and tested for their significance; these variables simply become heuristically manipulated as part of the ongoing ethos of social life.

<sup>10</sup> See Robert PRESTHUS, *Men at the Top: A Study in Community Power*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1964, esp. pp. 3-63.

An aspect of the norm of secrecy often alluded to informally but rarely publicly is: How is exact information obtained about potentially enemy or alien groups? In situations of relative insularity or isolation, whose judgments concerning the intentions of other nations, races, or groups can be relied upon? The character of the informants no less than the quality of the information itself has become a central problem in decision-making. Nor is this merely a problem for foreign affairs. For example, in estimating the potential for mass violence of American Negroes, how valuable is information supplied by major institutionalized Negro associations? If the leadership of the Urban League is asked about the possibility of mass racial violence, will it provide the same kind of response as the Black Muslims or an opinion survey of the unorganized Negro? The tendency has been to rely upon institutionalized expressions for information concerning «spontaneous» crowd behavior, but reliance upon established organizations may easily distort our vision of a situation. There is a judgmental issue to be settled even before any sampling is undertaken. How serious this can be is reflected in the fact that at the very height of the Negro Revolution, studies of crowd behavior and mass movements in the United States have practically faded from the work done by behavioral scientists.<sup>11</sup>

Even more complicated is the evaluation of foreign affairs. How are the military intentions of Communist China to be estimated? Are studies made in Hong Kong or information supplied by Taiwanese Army officers to be relied upon? Yet, if there is no direct access to the «enemy,» whoever it may be at any time, how is exact information to be derived? The alternative to partisan bias would be to accept the rhetoric of the enemy society at face value. However, reading reports of major political and military figures of the enemy society from afar may create an approach akin to inspirational divinations of Biblical passages. Recent examples of multiple and conflicting interpretations abound. Consider the Chinese addresses that have been monitored concerning the politicalization of military cadres in North Vietnam. These remarks have been «interpreted» as indicating Chinese support for the war effort, Chinese distance and even withdrawal from the war effort, Chinese pleasure

<sup>11</sup> Paul LAZARSFELD, «Political Behavior and Public Opinion,» in *The Behavioral Sciences Today*, edited by Bernard BERELSON. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1963, p. 187.

(and displeasure) with the National Liberation Front. Interpretation too easily becomes a function of policy perspectives rather than an objective study of foreign power intentions.

The filtering process, based as it is on the secrecy norm, leads to an abuse of what can be considered legitimate scientific inquiry. It minimizes possibilities of empirical and ethnographic surveys. Knowing what the «other side» is doing or planning in the main areas of government policy is absolutely necessary for the establishment of informational parity. But this runs squarely against policy rulings having to do with overseas travel, having to do with definition of the enemy, and sometimes having to do with attitudes toward people considered to be less than human. The needs of policy are difficult to square with the needs of the social sciences. Policy may dictate *de jure* non-recognition of a foreign power, but it is impossible for the social scientist to accept such policy recommendations as a *de facto* basis for research. He has to find a way of violating non-recognition in order to serve in a scholarly capacity.

This unanticipated contradiction between science and policy cannot easily be resolved without redefining the enemy in non-partisan terms or accepting the idea of partisanship as an institutionalized limit to scientific enquiry. But to do so would require a general redefinition of the role of social science in a democratic culture. What results in situations of high policy stress is low quality research. Conversely, when there is a low stress situation there can be high yield information. Democracy is linked to social visibility; hence we know a great deal about England and its society. But England poses no immediate threat, and therefore social scientists working in the area of English affairs are less than vital with respect to policy. The more important the subject the less likely is there to be access to critical information. As long as the political situation is defined exclusively in terms of policy needs, the possibility of a social science of operational worth remains seriously impaired.

The proud announcement in the early fifties of the policy sciences has given way to a profound skepticism of such a concept in the sixties. Perhaps the notion of a policy science is a contradiction in terms, not previously recognized as such only because of the enormity of federal and commercial needs for exact information in an age when mass participatory democracy has sharply declined. There can never be a policy science from the point of view of the polity,

because its needs have to do with sovereignty and with the protection of its citizens even if this involves secrecy, war, and deceitful forms of defense or attack. Whereas, from the point of view of the social scientist, the same concept of policy science must be challenged because in the final analysis the scientific community can never accept an exclusively therapeutic definition of social life. Social science can never take for granted the things which make for political sovereignty. Perhaps this contradiction is a creative tension. But I am not so optimistic. My own feeling is that this is a degenerative relationship. The negative features implied both for policy and for science cancel the pragmatic worth of a concept of policy science.

The value free doctrine has been examined at too great a length to require additional commentary. Yet there is an aspect of the fact-value issue which deserves deeper analysis here, since it involves the connection of social science to public policy in a direct way. When translated into a personal ideological expression, this fact-value dualism can provide a rationale for selling information to the highest bidder. It can become a way of saying that facts are for public sale, while values are for private sensibilities.

Quite conceivably, the classical disjunction between fact and value may turn out to be a greater problem for distributors of «hard» science than for those who traffic in «soft» science. For if the doctrine of value irrelevance is taken seriously, it becomes a mandate for any values. Hence the complete separation of fact and value can jeopardize tough policy scientists quite thoroughly. Conventionally, advocates of the value free doctrine have considered it to be a functional instrument safeguarding against any ideological infiltration of the social sciences. However, it is becoming uncomfortably plain that the notion of selling information to the highest bidder is not at all inconsistent with people who have no «higher» values at all, and not only those who refuse to express value preference in their social research.

The more expensive does an originating research design turn out to be, the more differential access to the findings is demanded as the price for an initial expenditure of risk capital.<sup>12</sup> The policy sector demand for differential access may take various forms: (1) The policy agency will insist upon a defined period of lead time before

<sup>12</sup> On this question see the contribution by Richard J. BARBER, *The Politics of Research*. Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1966, pp. 91-108.

release of findings to the public. (2) The results can be made immediately available only if they are initially cleared by the sponsoring agency so that no information of a «delicate» nature is revealed. (3) This often leads to a more formal situation, in which the publication of an exoteric document is allowed, while a more complete esoteric document serves as a special payoff to the agency. (4) Finally, by insisting that all research done under contract is private, the sponsoring agency settles all «problems» of publication. Often the distinction between «liberal» and «conservative» agencies is made on the basis of data released and has no general political moorings.

None of these four types of processing data represent a classical model of social scientific behavior with respect to publication. But the bureaucratic style has become increasingly generalized. New elements have entered into the policy game even at the level of publication. One sensitive issue, for example, is what constitutes publication. Is a mimeographed report an authentic publication? Reports in such non-typographical form appear regularly, and have peculiar qualities. They are not available for public consumption. They are not copyrighted and hence not subject to public review. Even «official looking» mimeographed reports released in bound form remain private documents. This raises not only questions of differential access, but of arbitrary limits to access. It is not only who, but how many, people are in a position to read such documents. The norm of secrecy has become so much part of the character of social science publications that the general risks to unlimited diffusion of information have greatly increased.

The issues can be divided into sponsorship problems and ideological problems. At one level, the policy issue is who sponsors the research rather than the character of the research. At the other end of the spectrum the scientific issue is the goal sought from any given research. More profoundly, as I have already suggested, the issue is the nature of sovereignty and the nature of privacy.

Nations are not often thought to be private entities. Rather we think of them as macroscopic, and publicly available to investigation. However, sovereignty carries with it, if not explicitly then surely implicitly, a notion of restricted public access, that is, privacy. Sovereignty is a statement of the rights of citizens, and such rights impose restrictions upon non-citizens. Therefore, a sovereign, whether in its universalistic national form or a person, has a private side, a private self.



This might best be seen in legal terms of juror performance and jury room wire tapping. From the point of view of social science, the phenomenology of decision-making in a closed setting represents a fascinating problem. How do people interact within «alien» restricted confines? Do the decisions they reach rest upon rational or irrational indicators? What is the character of personal interaction in a jury room? From the point of view of the sovereign, the elements of jury decision-making require secrecy for their realization. The sovereign assumes that people in private interaction, untouched by public pressure, are in a position to make decisions which are more truthful and hence more useful than publicly debated decisions. This is an example of competing needs. The political requirement is different from the scientific requirement. Who is right? Would it be right to implant a microphone in a jury room for the sake of social science, running the risk ultimately of destroying confidence of jurors and potential jurors in a democratic legal system? Or is it right to preserve an irrational kernel of madness that may well be what a jury system is about, simply to maintain the myth of democratic processes?

There is no ready made answer to this kind of dilemma. But raising this sort of problem gives an indication of the anxieties and disturbances felt by sovereign powers in the realm of foreign area research. For what is being tested by the study by one nation of the inner workings of another nation is nothing short of the right to remain private. The justification of such privacy may be quite shaky, based on custom and myth. At the moment, however, the problem is not the *origins* of sovereignty, but rather the *rights* of sovereignty. From this point of view, anxieties concerning foreign area research have to be appreciated, irrespective of social scientific or policy claims.

The sponsoring agent of research may not be as important for the sovereign under scrutiny as for the individuals engaging in a field investigation. Whether sponsorship of foreign area research is under the aegis of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare or the Department of Defense may dwindle in terms of how such research is perceived by the foreign government. But from either the public or the private viewpoint, visibility of research funds is significant. It may well be that openness of sponsorship is a determining element in how far access to a foreign sovereign may be pushed. To put matters directly: the reaction of the sovereign to an investigatory body in some measure depends on the

premises and purposes of the investigatory body. This in turn may require a fresh look at the norm of secrecy — and understanding that such a norm affects sovereignty as well as science.

### III. *University Bureaucracies and Value Systems*

The social ecology of where various activities are performed leaves an imprint on the nature of the findings. Social scientific activities usually take place within a university context. The university, viewed as a social force, has strong feudalistic elements. Some people mistake this feudal ancestry for humanism, possibly because of the historical distance between our epoch and the founding of the university system nearly eight hundred years ago. The feudal core of university life is that a stratum of people is employed to engage in activities which may not be practical. They are paid to be nonfunctional. To put matters in a more exact form, the function of a university is to absorb the welter of non-pragmatic activities which go on within any viable society. University activities may or may not relate to the betterment of man, but pragmatic goals do not exhaust the scholarly role as such. This traditional nonfunctionality has begun to crumble under the impact of courses in basket weaving and jewelry making on one side, and war gaming and systems designing on the other. Still, the great thrust of university life in America through the mid-fifties has been to keep the university a place of general theory and statements of fundamentals, to retain the European notion of *universitas*.

Policy making activities, on the other hand, usually take place in a non-academic or bureaucratic context. Policy as distinct from politics as such is a modern innovation, beginning as a mass enterprise in the industrial era. True, there was a specie of policy connected to political classes in ancient or medieval times where political structure was directly and organically related to class interests. However, policy-making as an autonomous activity, linked to appointment based on expertise, is a twentieth century phenomenon. The style of policy is anti-feudal. It is based on premises having to do with function, operation, instrumentation, utility: premises converting theory into immediate practice. This differs radically from the traditional university bias toward separation and even suspicion of a ready conversion of theory into action.

Table 4

SELECT BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE CONTRACTS RELATED TO FOREIGN AREAS AND FOREIGN POPULATIONS *		
Title	Location	Description
1963 American Mount Everest Expedition.	Berkeley Institute of Psychological Research.	Psychological aspects of stress behavior.
Changing values in Japanese, Americans, and Japanese-Americans.	Institute of Advanced Projects, University of Hawaii	Analysis of how Japanese change their values as they come in contact with American culture.
International conflict (Israel and Egypt).	Stanford University	Analysis of relationship of opinions and writings of decision-makers and the actual actions that took place.
Foreign research symposia.	Social Sciences Research Council	Meetings of American and foreign scholars in Europe in social psychology.
Persuasive communications in the international field.	University of Wisconsin	How foreign nationalities react to various kinds of American communications.
Sociopolitical precursors to insurgency.	Pennsylvania State College	Study of insurgency and causes related to it to determine role Navy plays.
Nationalism and the perception of international crises.	University of Texas	Perceptions that people have of international crises and relating this to the psychology of the persons involved.
Group factors influencing creativity.	University of Illinois	Discovering how a heterogeneous group can establish a common communication system in order to be effective; some of these groups composed of individuals of different languages and cultural backgrounds.
Group equilibrium.	Rutgers University	Studies made in U.S.A. on small group effectiveness have been replicated in Japan.
Role theory.	University of Missouri	Theory of role structure. Work being done with collaborators in Australia and England.
Cross cultural investigation of some factors in persuasion and attitude change.	University of Maryland	Structure and mechanics of attitude change methods; research replicated with Japanese subjects to determine generality of findings.

\* Source of data: *Behavioral Sciences and the National Security* (Report No. 4). U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965.

The invasion of policy-making into university life, in the form of direct capital expenditures no less than through contractual arrangements for specific purposes, transforms this traditional feudal-industrial dichotomy. Indeed, it undermines even the long-standing ties between university life and the business community that arose earlier in the present century. The preceding table on behavioral contracts related to foreign areas is simply one miniscule indicator of the degree to which the social sciences have furthered an interpenetration of social sciences and policy-formation. The investigators are for the overwhelming part professors, and they are located at major university centers. This serves not only to pragmatize university research projects, but also to supply financial support for graduate instructions, funds for administrative and office personnel, and funds for new and improved buildings and equipment.

The Air Force Office of Scientific Research, the Office of Naval Research, and the Special Operations Research Office of the United States Army each maintain separate funding arms. These are in addition to standard funding agencies such as the National Science Foundation and National Institutes of Health. The development of federal funding to universities has become so extensive and sophisticated that sub-contracting is now commonplace. A government agency may provide a cover-all grant to the Smithsonian Institute or the Social Science Research Council, which in turn may parcel out the funds for private agencies and individuals. The total amount spent by the Department of Defense Establishment alone for one year (1965) came to \$27,300,000. Table 5 indicates the distribution of these funds. It is abundantly evident that the disbursements of these funds are usually indirect, through university agencies; and only infrequently direct, through sub-agencies having direct responsibility to the government. And it is apparent to students of the sociology of science that universities are now faced with the alternatives of either maximizing or holding constant such government allocations of research contracts.

This is a problem not of universities in general, but of social science in particular. For to the extent that the social sciences are connected to university styles, to that extent are they concerned with issues beyond those of policy. The growth of bureaucratic mechanisms and institutes to funnel and channelize social science activities, while they have become increasingly important, still do not represent more than a distinct minority of social science staffing in the United States. For the most part teaching remains the core

Table 5\*

	Military departments		ARPA** (contract)	Total		Grand Total
	(Contract)	(In-house)		(contract)	(In-house)	
Selection and classification	\$ 730	\$1,900		\$ 730	\$1,900	\$2,630
Training and education	4,150	1,480	\$ 60	4,210	1,480	5,690
Job design	300	620		300	620	920
Human performance, engineering, and proficiency management	2,230	2,620	470	2,700	2,620	5,320
Manpower management (assignment, retention, etc.)	520	430		520	430	950
Group effectiveness	1,270		240	1,510		1,510
Psychophysiology and stress	1,650	470		1,650	470	2,120
Support of policy planning and strategic concepts	820		210	1,030		1,030
Studies of foreign countries, counterinsurgency, and unconventional warfare	1,790		3,070	4,860		4,860
Foreign areas information	870		250	1,120		1,120
Psychological operations and weapons	380			380		380
Military assistance and civic action	400			400		400
Decision-making in military operations	110	260		110	260	370
Total	15,220	7,780	4,040	19,520	7,780	27,300
Per cent	66	34		71	29	

\* 1965 Budgeted Behavior and Social Sciences Research Funds (in thousands)

\*\* Advanced Research Projects Agency

occupation.<sup>13</sup> It is worth considering the degree to which the strain between social scientific activities and policy-making activities ought to be viewed as a conflict of roles between feudal, university-based and modern state-based institutions. Recognizing the different origins and locales of the distinctive work styles inherent in science and policy will help account for present discrepancies. The strains which exist are not just transient or temporary, not reducible to financial allocations; they are basic differences in the way objects are studied, as well as what is considered worthy of study.

In examining contract social science research, two problems have to be distinguished: first, the sponsorship involved in any kind of research and second, the nature and purposes of the research design. Both problems simultaneously involve methodological and moral dimensions. Methodological guidelines can do everything but answer the question: Why study a field? That is why the moral base of social science is directly involved in the nature of the investigatory proceedings.

Let us restrict ourselves to an issue raised, but not resolved, in the previous section of the paper — the issue of sovereignty. Sovereignty is an ultimate politically, but not scientifically. The investigation of another nation is no more but no less legitimate than the study of another person, for the problem of magnitude is not one of morals. It is hard to envision a situation in the immediate future when national studies, so long a part of social science, will vanish. The whole of the nineteenth century was taken up by Europeans studying the United States, from Alexis de Tocqueville to Harriet Martineau. The tradition has persisted into this century. Many of the so-called classics of the social sciences have a national character, including the work of men like Ostrogorskii and Weber. Indeed, anthropologists have made the nation a basic measure. They may have been accused of engaging in unfriendly acts, or in secular missionary roles, but they were not denied access to data.

The question is: Why has this traditional situation of tolerance not prevailed? First, in the past, social scientists were not working for a government. Therefore they were without special interest

<sup>13</sup> See National Register of Scientific and Technical Personnel, National Science Foundation, *Summary of American Science Manpower, 1964*. Washington, D.C., March, 1966; and Committee on the National Science Foundation Report on the Economics Profession, «The Structure of Economists' Employment and Salaries, 1964,» *American Economic Review*, Vol. LV, No. 4 (December, 1965), Part 2, Supplement.

in bringing to light the private aspects of another sovereignty. Second, the issue of sponsorship has become particularly acute at the present time because to define research in operational terms is necessarily to arouse a considerable amount of fear and trepidation. Operational or instrumental research has a goal beyond the research itself. Such latent political goals elicit fear and even hostility on the part of a «host» sovereign to the social science «vendors.» Third, the problem has become acute because sovereigns of superordinate nations are interested not so much in the public side of life in the subordinate nations they study, but in their private side. The subordinate nations are viewed not as objects of disinterested enquiry, but as objects of instrumental or operational worth.

#### IV. *Autonomy and Relevance in Social Science*

Let us now turn to the connection which the social scientist should maintain with policy-making bodies. Should the policy maker continue to be a separate entity with a separate professional identity, or should he be a social scientist in government? Is it the role played or the functions performed that divide policy-maker from social scientist? Before attempting to answer questions of advantages or disadvantages in various relationships of social scientists to policy-making bodies, we ought to look more carefully into the lines of relationships which presently obtain.

Dividing the «world» into four parts — basic social sciences and applied social sciences on one side, executive and legislative branches of government on the other side — reveals interesting relations. The basic social sciences (anthropology, political science, economics, psychology, and sociology) have government connections different from the applied social sciences (administrative sciences, education, law, planning, and social work). Let us divide the federal government into the presidential or executive government (White House staff and the cabinet level officials) and the permanent or legislative government (career federal executives, the Congress, and federal judiciary).

The State Department and the Defense Department and the various cabinet level executives are the ones who make the highest use of basic social sciences. The State Department, through its diplomatic functions, has long been associated with political sci-

ence and anthropology. The White House, for its part, is directly linked to the economics profession through the Council of Economic Advisors. The State of the Union address institutionalizes the relation of the Executive Branch of Government to economics as a social science. The Defense Department, perhaps because its own power is of more recent derivation, relies heavily upon the younger social sciences, especially psychology and to a somewhat lesser degree sociology. In sum, the basic social sciences are used primarily by the presidential staff and by the executive branch of government as a whole.

The area of applied social science is more often called upon by the congressional and legislative branches. Education, administrative sciences, social work, and particularly law are themselves areas of professional competence for many congressmen. Thus the legislative relationship to applied social science fields is not only one of utility but an organic relationship. The pragmatic base of enacting legislation having to do with changing relations between men insures a continuing demand for applied researches among legislators.

The gap between applied and basic models of social science which obtains in most American universities is paralleled by lines of influence in the government.<sup>14</sup> Policy-making cannot be considered a unified science or a unified role. Quite the contrary, the tendency is for policy-making groups within the executive branch to be related to the social sciences differently from policy-making bodies within the congressional sphere. While it is true that definitions of «basic» and «applied» social sciences vary, there is enough consistency to reveal this differential policy pattern.

What then are the supposed advantages of fusing social science and social policy? The basic advantage is said to be a higher sense of responsibility for the social sciences, and a greater degree of training for policy-oriented personnel. This has, at any rate, been

<sup>14</sup> The judiciary itself makes little direct use of social science findings. If it employs such findings at all, it is through the law journals and periodicals relating to the legal profession. Insofar as social science permeates law journals, to that degree the judiciary reacts to trends in social science. This may be one factor in the length of time it takes for judicial decision concerning Negro-white relations. The access system between the judiciary and social sciences is often so blocked that important social science issues escape the attention of the judiciary for a longer span than any other federal group.



the classical rationale for a tighter linkage between policy-making and social science.

What has prevented this amalgamation from occurring is not simple negligence or sloth. On the contrary, to judge by the amount of federal funds dedicated to bringing about such a union — *de facto* if not *de jure* — the wonder is how slight the steps toward amalgamation have been. The reason is that it is quite impossible to think of therapeutics being the same as science. In order to get a fusion of social science and policy, there would have to be a complete disruption of the present notion of social science as sharply different from reform therapy. While applied social science may be the expression of practical reason in the twentieth century, an applied social science cannot dictate the character of social science findings. The notion of basic science requires a distinct separation of its functions and that of policy-making functions. That high level policy implies a recognition of this distinction can be seen by the extensive use they make of «basic» findings and theories. On the other hand, the more practical the level of policy-making (legislative activities are typical), the more closely linked they are to applied researches. The realities of the situation are such that the utility of the social sciences to policy-making bodies depends upon some maintenance of the separation of the social sciences from the policy situation.

Essential to understanding the present dilemmas about the relationship of science to policy are the radically different conceptions which government officials and social scientists have of that relationship. What concerns social scientists is not only making available the most important findings for «intelligence» needs, but the methods by which the policy process gets put into motion and the results of the study of policy for general scientific theory. What concerns government policy-makers is not so much social science but social engineering. The ready-to-hand bureaucratic research institutions set up at major universities and in the giant corporations provide both the institutional support and the ideological props with which to pursue these engineering «systems» ends with great vigor.<sup>15</sup>

The government in the present period has sought to resolve its staffing problems on key agencies and committees by attracting

<sup>15</sup> See Robert BOGUSLAW, *The New Utopians: A Study of System Design and Social Change*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965.

people whose conception of social science extends to construction but not to criticism. In contrast to the types of men solicited for marginal advisory roles, decision-makers have been chosen from the fields of business administration and urban planning rather than from the «hard» social sciences.

The «constructive» policy-science approach was actually begun in the administration of Herbert Hoover and continued at an accelerated rate by Franklin Delano Roosevelt. Hoover had a deep engineering commitment. In fact, his image of the Presidency often bordered on that of the great engineer, the social engineer. The President's Research Committee on Social Trends (1930-1932) which Hoover created inaugurated the difficult relationships between social science and social policy that have now come to plague the American policy. The degree to which this early effort was a mutually felt need is reflected in the fact that the Social Science Research Council, with its support stemming from the Rockefeller-dominated Spelman Fund, underwrote the President's Research Committee on Social Trends. The demands of social science professionalization coincided with the crisis in the American economy — a crisis profound enough to generate demands from within the policy to seek out support even from previously ignored, if not feared, intellectual currents.

Given the enormous significance of the «generation of the thirties» in founding relations between public officials and social scientists, it might be instructive to single out three important intellectual figures who assisted in the creation of these relations: Charles Merriam, Luther Gulick, and Louis Brownlow. Merriam, a founder of the American Political Science Association and of the Social Science Research Council, was the only one of the three who qualified as an academic figure. Even he had stronger ties to government officials, regional planners, and managers than to other social scientists. Brownlow was Merriam's closest associate at the University of Chicago; his main contribution was as Director of the Public Administration Clearing House. He was, in effect, the chief manager of the nation's city managers. Brownlow had been a city manager in Washington, D.C., Knoxville, and Petersburg (Va.) long before he came to join Merriam at Chicago. Gulick was a different kettle of fish. Like the Dulles, Kennan, and Davies families, he came out of the milieu of the American (Congregational) Foreign Mission Society. John Foster Dulles was, in fact an aide to Gulick's father. He entered government planning service not by way of the social science but through the auspices of the New York Bureau of Muni-

cial Research, which also had the support of large capital (the Harriman banking interests).

These were the men who comprised the Committee on Administrative Management under Franklin Delano Roosevelt no less than under Herbert Hoover. They provided government officials with an early indication of what was to become the dominant «policy-making style,» i.e., an unconcern with politics, or at least a strict division between politics as a mass activity (with which the policy-making social scientists were unconcerned) and policy as an elite activity (with which they were intimately concerned).<sup>16</sup>

Their highest achievement was to draft the Executive Reorganization Act of 1939, which foreshadowed many of the changes which took place in the postwar executive regimes of Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy. The Council of Economic Advisors was, for instance, an early fruit of this reorganization plan. This in turn led to the Council of Scientific Advisors. The men who established the institutional and organizational patterns of social science to social policy were by training and inclination engineers, managers, and planners. When they did link up to a social science, it was invariably to political science — a field which in its successful attempt at rapid professionalization chose alignment with federal interests rather than criticism of such interests as its high road to success.

The dominant view of the relationship of social science to social policy was consequently that social science should fulfill an ancillary function to social engineering — no less, but certainly no more. The policy-makers sought to answer the question «knowledge for what?» in a pragmatic and direct way: Harold Lasswell sought to answer Robert Lynd's defiant stance by asserting the need of knowledge for augmentation and operationalization of federal policies in the areas of health, welfare, and war. During the period between 1930 and 1945, the growth of social science organizations was fused to their increasing acceptance of a professional ideology. This combination of organizational advancement in the social sciences and ideological commitment to the political system served to cement

<sup>16</sup> See Barry Dean KARL, *Executive Reorganization and Reform in the New Deal: The Genesis of Administrative Management, 1900-1939*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963. I would like to acknowledge the suggestions offered by Thomas M. Hill on the critical importance of the New Deal period in establishing the present relationships between the behavioral sciences and government policy-making echelons.

the relations with policy-making branches of government by removing the last vestiges of ideological mistrust.

These new developments deeply affected the autonomous character and growth of the social sciences. Standards of methodological precision were raised, a wider set of people from diverse class and ethnic backgrounds began to permeate the social sciences, and professionalism itself served to both unite and to distinguish between the tasks confronting social science and those of government. The very growth of work styles in the social sciences which were both accessible and amenable to policy-makers also served to raise anew the doubts as to the worth of such a fusion.<sup>17</sup>

This brings us face to face with the relationship of autonomy to involvement. This issue is especially significant in the light of the large number of government contracts and policy-making demands upon the time, energies, and capabilities of social scientists. This is not simply a contrast of citizen responsibility and professional roles, but a question of the nature of the discipline itself — over and beyond the way in which the social scientist perceives institutional affiliations. The autonomy of the social sciences was rarely doubted until the present. The same cannot be said for the autonomy of policy-making sectors of government. Since the latter are openly involved in operational research, they make slender pretenses towards autonomy.

The problem now arises on two fronts in the federally supported research situation. What are the lines of independence, and what are the lines of responsibility from the «vendors» to the «funding agency»? The autonomy of a social science is directly linked to the very existence of each field. The most powerful argument for the maintenance of a distinction between public policy and social science is that without such a distinction the very concept is severely jeopardized. Admitting the risk of inviting dilettantism or «idle speculation» to transform all research into command performances is far riskier. There is no science which does not have an element of autonomous growth. Indeed, a great deal of time and energy in any social science is spent arguing and worrying not about the

<sup>17</sup> See S. M. LIPSET and Mildred A. SCHWARTZ, «The Politics of Professionals,» in *Professionalization*, edited by H. W. VOLLMER and D. L. MILLS. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966, pp. 299-309; and Irving L. HOROWITZ, «Professionalism and Disciplinaryism,» *Philosophy of Science*, Vol. 31, No. 3 (July 1964), pp. 275-281.

social world in general, but about people occupying critical roles or command positions in the world of social science. Nor is such self-reflection and constant auto-examination to be lightly dismissed, since it accounts precisely for the sorts of improvements in the functioning of a scientific theory which provides operational worth to begin with. In other words, the autonomous realm is not incidental either to the formation of the social scientist or to that which makes him truly scientific in his behavior.

The great failing of a policy science approach is that it has not recognized that the price of rapid professionalization and integration is high. By raising the banner of «the policy sciences of democracy» the approach minimizes the autonomous and critical aspects of social scientific development.<sup>18</sup> Without this autonomic aspect to science, one cannot really speak either of a profession or of an occupation. There are standards in a social science, and levels of performance within each science, that link its practitioners together apart from their actions or reactions toward policy questions. When a breakdown of autonomy occurs, when policy questions or ideological requirements prevail, the deterioration in the quality of the social science is a certain consequence. Policy places a premium on involvement and influence; science places a premium on investigation and ideas. The issue is not so much what is studied, or even the way an enquiry is conducted, but the auspices and the purposes of a study.

Finally, the introduction of the relationship of social science to public policy as a question reflects first and foremost the belief (at least among the practitioners of social science) in the efficacy and the feasibility of scientific activities in social life. It is no longer either fashionable or particularly profound to ask: Are the social sciences really sciences? This is a naive question, a meaningless question. The efficacy of social science is firmly established. Were this not the case, the issues herein dealt with would never have arisen in the first place. But precisely at that point in scientific history where efficacy is established beyond any doubt in the minds of both policy personnel and social scientists, the question of the aims of social science loom large. This issue of purpose was not raised when the social sciences were really little else than a

<sup>18</sup> See, for example, Harold D. LASSWELL, «The Policy Orientation,» in *The Policy Sciences*, edited by Daniel LERNER and Harold D. LASSWELL. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1951, pp. 3-15.

specie of literature or belles-lettres. When an individual pontificates about the nature of the world or the nature of man in society, one man's platitudes may be another man's poison. But when someone offers a plan for redesigning the world, and proceeds to do so in a more or less anticipated way, he can be ridiculed and reviled, but not easily ignored. The recognition of this has been so widespread that the value demands upon the social sciences have become central, with decisions as to the performance of the science becoming directly linked to the goals set for the society.

What we witness in the present generation from the point of view of the social sciences is the break-up of the functionalist ideology with its value-free orientation. Because the peculiar autonomous aspects of each social science generate a special internal history, the break-up occurs differently in each discipline.<sup>19</sup>

From the point of view of policy-makers, the break-up of the old way of doing things has been equally profound. Perhaps the largest shock that they have undergone is the recognition that there is probably no such animal as a policy scientist. There has been no definition of a policy-maker which can legitimate his role as a social scientist — basic or applied. Policy-makers in one agency have slender connection with policy-makers in other branches of government. Increasingly, the policy-maker is being confronted with the fact that he is not so much an applied social scientist as he is a representative of the State Department or a representative of Health, Education, and Welfare. In other words, what defines his role is not the policy-making activities but rather the requirements of the agency for which he works. In effect, what he is engaged in is ideology, not policy.<sup>20</sup> Therefore, unless one is willing to speak of the science of ideology, which is a contradiction in terms, it is not possible to legitimately deal with the social sciences exclusively from a policy point of view.

The social sciences are challenged and tested as never before by their involvements with policy organs. This association increases

<sup>19</sup> N. J. DEMERATH III and R. A. PETERSON (eds.), *System, Change and Conflict: Functionalists and Their Critics*. New York: The Free Press, 1966 (pending).

<sup>20</sup> See Irving L. HOROWITZ, «The Life and Death of Project Camelot,» *Trans-Action*, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Nov.-Dec. 1965); and Kalman H. SILVERT, «American Academic Ethics and Social Research Abroad; The Lesson of Project Camelot,» in *American Universities Field Staff Reports* (West Coast South American Series), Vol. XII, No. 3 (July, 1965).

the chances for meaningful research and knowledge scientists may acquire about the workings of the world. It also makes possible the corruption of social science on an scale hitherto unimagined — through the submerging of tasks of inquiry into contract fulfillments. The drive shaft of government agencies' demands upon social scientists is ideological; and yet the larger needs of such agencies are, as never before, a wider understanding of the shape of societies around the world. Perhaps the main problem therefore is not so much the relation of policy to science — a common challenge for social scientists and policy-makers that must be answered in separate and distinct ways — but answered it must be.

## À PROPOS DE QUELQUES QUESTIONS SUR LA CONCEPTION MARXISTE DE LA THÉORIE SOCIOLOGIQUE

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Dans les pays socialistes, les questions concernant la conception de la sociologie et de ses problèmes théoriques et méthodologiques fondamentaux sont devenues, durant ces dernières années, le centre de l'attention non seulement des sociologues, mais aussi des travailleurs scientifiques dans les disciplines apparentées; elles sont devenues un des foyers d'une large discussion scientifique. Nous pensons que le déroulement ainsi que les résultats de cette discussion peuvent être également intéressants pour les sociologues qui dans leur travail partent de suppositions différentes et suivent une orientation différente. Nous sommes heureux de vous faire connaître nos points de vue et nos opinions, ne serait-ce que parce que les informations actuelles sur la sociologie marxiste dans la littérature internationale spécialisée sont très incomplètes et souvent inexactes ou incorrectes.

Dans notre communication nous ne pourrions nous consacrer qu'à quelques aspects de la problématique discutée; notre point de vue sera nécessairement limité par le fait que nous aurons surtout en vue — bien que non exclusivement — le déroulement et l'état de la discussion en Tchécoslovaquie. Nous allons essayer d'exposer notre position à l'égard de certaines questions discutées, sans considérer pour cela nos opinions comme généralement acceptées et admises par les sociologues marxistes. Nous considérons comme tout à fait normal qu'au cours de la discussion scientifique nombre d'opinions se fondant sur la théorie marxiste puissent se différencier, voire se heurter.

Afin d'éviter tout malentendu, disons à l'avance et sans équivoque que dans les pays socialistes, personne ne met en question la nécessité de la sociologie en général; l'accord est encore plus large et plus complet en ce qui concerne la nécessité d'une recherche



scientifique sur la réalité sociale, recherche qui doit être rigoureusement objective et conséquemment critique.

Dans notre communication nous porterons notre attention sur trois ordres de problèmes:

- (a) questions de la délimitation du sujet de la sociologie marxiste et celles de son rapport avec le matérialisme historique;
- (b) problématique de la structuration de base de la réalité sociale en connexion avec les question de la construction d'une théorie sociologique;
- (c) question de la conception générale de la méthode sociologique.

*a. Délimitation de l'objet de la sociologie marxiste et problème du rapport entre la sociologie et le matérialisme historique*

La question de la délimitation de l'objet d'une discipline scientifique est liée étroitement à celle de la méthode de cette discipline, de ses rapports avec d'autres disciplines scientifiques, notamment celles qui lui sont voisines, et elle comprend aussi d'une certaine manière la solution des problèmes abordés. Quant à la conception marxiste de la sociologie, la question de son rapport avec le matérialisme historique se trouve au centre de la discussion; cette formulation du problème s'explique au moins partiellement par le fait que dans la période écoulée, la problématique sociologique dans les pays socialistes s'est développée largement dans le cadre des institutions scientifiques s'occupant de matérialisme historique. Au cours de la discussion concernant la question du rapport entre la sociologie et le matérialisme historique, trois conceptions distinctes et spécifiques ont été élaborées et mises au point. Chacune de ces conceptions à été formulée en des variantes différemment nuancées, plus ou moins développées et explicitement exprimées.

(1) Le premier type de solution représente des conceptions qui d'une manière ou d'une autre, identifient la sociologie marxiste avec le matérialisme historique. Ce type comporte deux variantes qui diffèrent par la conception générale de ces branches scientifiques.

(1a) Certains sociologues partent, dans leurs réflexions, du fait que, dans le passé, on insérait dans le matérialisme historique non seulement la problématique de caractère philosophique, mais aussi la problématique sociologique spécifique, sans faire de différence entre les questions que Engels et Lénine considéraient comme problé-

matique dans le socialisme scientifique et les questions qui étaient traditionnellement le sujet des conceptions sociologiques non-marxistes. Ces sociologues acceptent cette non-différenciation comme un fait donné, et partant de là, ils constatent que le matérialisme historique s'est transformé en théorie générale de la société acquérant ainsi un caractère sociologique; c'est au cours d'un processus progressif de développement pendant lequel des sciences concrètes se sont détachées du cadre de la philosophie que cette transformation a eu lieu. Les partisans de cette conception voient alors dans la sociologisation du matérialisme historique un processus progressiste, au cours duquel ce dernier se débarrasse de son caractère spéculatif et devient une science empirico-théorique.

Bien que cette conception se situe par son esprit dans le cadre d'un effort plus étendu en vue de surmonter les déformations dogmatiques du matérialisme historique, elle ne représente pas à notre avis une solution satisfaisante et efficace. Dans cette conception le caractère spéculatif de la philosophie n'est pas considéré comme une déformation, mais comme une propriété immanente à la philosophie; alors, le processus de dédogmatisation du matérialisme historique apparaît comme processus de séparation du domaine de la philosophie. En outre, l'élimination du matérialisme historique du domaine de la philosophie et son interprétation comme une théorie sociologique de caractère de science particulière ne résout pas, d'après notre opinion, la question de l'objet et de la structure interne de la philosophie, car cette solution ne répond pas à la question de l'inclusion de la problématique de la conception matérialiste de l'histoire dans l'ensemble de la philosophie. L'incorporation de la conception matérialiste de l'histoire à la philosophie n'est pas du point de vue ontologique ainsi que gnoséologique sans importance ou même arbitraire, mais elle détermine qualitativement la conception marxiste de l'histoire. — Du point de vue de la philosophie on pourrait objecter que c'est une attitude de négation et de liquidation à l'égard de la philosophie. Du point de vue de la sociologie cette conception ne représente pas un apport théorique parce qu'elle ne peut établir une différence entre le plan spécifiquement sociologique de la recherche de la réalité sociale et le plan philosophique général et qu'elle crée ainsi entre la philosophie et la sociologie une sorte de court-circuit et, par conséquent ne contribue pas à la précision de la spécificité de la sociologie comme discipline scientifique, enfin qu'elle représente une entrave au développement d'une fructueuse collaboration entre la philosophie et la sociologie.

(1b) La seconde variante du même type identifie le matérialisme historique et la sociologie, mais à la différence de la première interprétation, elle intègre à la philosophie le matérialisme historique conçu comme une théorie sociologique. Pour remédier au caractère spéculatif de la philosophie, on s'efforce de conférer à la méthode du matérialisme historique un caractère plus inductif en y introduisant directement les procédés et les techniques de la recherche sociologique. Nous présumons que cette voie non plus ne conduit au but. Le «caractère empirique» de la philosophie, selon notre jugement, est tout spécifique et il est donné justement par la relation des sciences naturelles et sociales avec la philosophie. Il n'est pas possible de réaliser l'unité de la philosophie et des sciences particulières en les identifiant d'une manière simpliste. Du point de vue de la philosophie, on peut dire que l'insertion des différentes disciplines scientifiques concrètes, de leurs méthodes, procédés et techniques dans la philosophie signifie la substitution à cette dernière des autres sciences et aboutit ainsi à la liquidation de la philosophie. Du point de vue de la sociologie la question de sa conception en tant que discipline scientifique autonome n'est pas un simple problème formel. Aucune science ne peut se développer favorablement sans tenir compte de sa spécificité, de la spécificité de son objet et des ses méthodes. Une conception non éclaircie de l'objet de la science et de son rapport envers les autres disciplines scientifiques peut et doit, en dernière analyse, se manifester d'une manière négative dans la pratique de la science même. Sur les conséquences fâcheuses d'une telle orientation théorique nous pourrions fournir des preuves convaincantes puisées même dans certaines de nos anciennes recherches sociologiques où des court-circuits entre la philosophie et la sociologie se sont produits. C'est pour cette raison qu'une pareille conception ne nous paraît pas justifiée et suffisante; nous la considérons comme conservatrice et comme n'ayant aucun espoir d'être largement acceptée.

(2) Un autre type de solution du rapport entre le matérialisme historique et la sociologie, type d'une plus grande actualité, est celui qui identifie la théorie sociologique et le matérialisme historique et réduit la spécificité de la sociologie uniquement à la méthode. Les partisans de cette conception refusent de considérer la sociologie marxiste comme une science particulière qui serait distincte du matérialisme historique, tout en insistant sur la distinction de notion «sociologie marxiste», «recherche sociologique concrète» et «recherche sociale». — Le matérialisme historique

représente pour eux une théorie générale remplissant des fonctions théoriques et méthodologiques. Ils considèrent la recherche sociologique concrète comme un moyen particulier d'analyse scientifique de la réalité sociale, s'appuyant sur la théorie du matérialisme historique. La recherche sociologique concrète est considérée dans ce cas comme une des formes de la recherche sociale complétant la recherche économique, démographique, socio-psychologique etc. La spécificité de la recherche sociologique en comparaison avec d'autres recherches sociales doit se dégager de son caractère et de son but consistant en une intégration du savoir social à un niveau supérieur; elle examine n'importe quel processus en connexion avec trois variables, c.-à-d. l'économie, les relations sociales et la vie spirituelle de la société.

L'insuffisance fondamentale de ces conceptions selon notre avis découle de la présupposition insoutenable qu'il puisse exister une méthodologie spécifique concrète et partielle, une méthode et technique de la recherche sociologique qui ne s'appuierait pas sur une théorie d'une science spécifique et qui ne suivrait pas en premier lieu la solution des problèmes théoriques d'une science spécifique. Les présuppositions théoriques d'une méthode scientifique ne peuvent en aucune façon être limitées à la théorie philosophique; de même, les objectifs fondamentaux de l'application d'une méthode scientifique concrète concernant toujours la solution des problèmes spécifiques et suivant la mise au point d'un système théorique d'une science particulière. L'explication de la liaison entre philosophie et science particulière n'est possible qu'en respectant la spécificité des deux sphères tant du point de vue théorique que méthodologique. La spécificité de la méthode suppose celle de la théorie et vice versa.

Les mêmes réserves critiques que nous avons exprimées à l'égard des conceptions identifiant le matérialisme historique et la sociologie peuvent être formulées aussi, avec certaines modifications, à l'égard des conceptions présentées ci-dessus.

(3) Avec le troisième type nous abordons la conception qui caractérise la sociologie marxiste comme une science sociale relativement indépendante et distincte du matérialisme historique tant du point de vue théorique que méthodologique. Les auteurs de cette communication soutiennent pleinement cette conception. Le matérialisme historique se conçoit, ici, comme une partie organique de la philosophie, donc comme une conception matérialiste de l'histoire qui serait l'achèvement de l'évolution du matérialisme philosophique.

Le rapport du matérialisme historique et de la sociologie se manifeste alors comme un cas particulier du rapport d'une science particulière à la philosophie. Nous sommes persuadés que seul ce type de solution des rapports entre ces deux disciplines correspond aux principes marxistes de la délimitation de l'objet de la science et qu'il est fonctionnel du point de vue des besoins de développement de la théorie et du point de vue des besoins de la praxis sociale.

Au cours de la discussion il s'est révélé qu'on ne peut pas délimiter l'objet de la sociologie par rapport à l'objet de la philosophie d'un côté et des sciences sociales spéciales de l'autre côté, en prenant seulement en considération le caractère qualitatif de la sphère qui est l'objet de la science et son degré de généralité. Nous sommes persuadés qu'une telle approche théoriquement insuffisante se retrouve assez souvent dans la littérature sociologique. On ne peut pas concevoir l'objet de la science seulement comme une somme de phénomènes manifestants des traits communs où les croisements et le débordement ne s'expliqueraient que par un degré différent de la généralité de la science. Plus précisément, pour aucune réalité ou aucune question particulière on ne peut désigner strictement et catégoriquement une seule discipline scientifique qui s'occupe exclusivement de leur étude, car chaque réalité représente un objet d'étude pour plusieurs sciences en même temps. Les théoriciens qui se rendent compte qu'il est erroné de chercher la spécificité d'une science dans des limites tracées d'une façon simpliste, déclarent d'habitude que la spécificité de la science consiste plutôt dans les points de vue qui permettent à la science d'étudier son objet. Mais en formulant le problème de cette manière, il faut expliquer ce qu'on entend par «point de vue». Afin de pouvoir offrir une explication plus précise de cette question, nous avons introduit la notion de «système de référence» que nous interprétons comme un complexe de rapports existants objectivement, dans lesquels le phénomène donné est incorporé par l'entremise de quelques uns de ses aspects et où il est étudié. Cela signifie que la délimitation de l'objet de la science exige le respect des rapports de structures et de systèmes dans la réalité objective. Nous comprenons par système de référence plus précisément un certain système «d'éléments» par rapport auquel la réalité donnée est étudiée. Cette réalité est expliquée, au niveau donné, si l'on a saisi l'ensemble des rapports essentiels par lesquels cette réalité est liée aux éléments du système de réfé-

rence et à son ensemble. Signalons que la notion de système de référence se rapporte ici à la réalité objective dans certains de ses aspects et ne désigne pas de façon primaire le système des notions dans le cadre desquelles le phénomène donné est expliqué. C'est à la base de l'interprétation indiquée que la définition nette et précise de la sociologie par rapport à l'objet d'autres branches est possible. Si la sociologie s'occupe de l'étude du mouvement de toute la société ou d'un phénomène extrêmement partiel, si elle étudie des lois générales ou des processus uniques, sa spécificité consistera toujours dans son système de référence qui est l'ensemble de la réalité sociale. C'est par ce système de référence que la sociologie se distingue de la philosophie ainsi que des autres sciences sociales qui possèdent d'autres systèmes de référence ce sont en règle générale les différentes sphères de la vie sociale, dans le cadre duquel les sciences sociales de caractère non-sociologique examinent leurs objets. Ces systèmes de référence, bien que partiels, sont aussi bien justifiés que l'approche sociologique. L'idée de système de référence représentait pour nous un des moyens qui nous ont permis de mettre au clair et de préciser l'objet de la sociologie et de justifier ainsi la nécessité d'une forme d'approche spécifiquement sociologique dans l'étude de la réalité et la nécessité de la construction du système de la théorie sociologique conçue comme une science sociale particulière et spéciale.

b. *Analyse catégorielle de la réalité sociale et élaboration du système de la théorie sociologique.*

L'analyse catégorielle de la réalité sociale avec son cadre de référence conceptuel est une des conditions de l'élaboration du système théorique de la sociologie et du travail sociologique en général. Nous sommes persuadés qu'on ne peut pas rejeter la solution de ce problème sous le prétexte qu'il s'agit d'une problématique spéculative. On ne peut l'éviter non plus en déclarant que l'analyse catégorielle ne représente pas encore une théorie. Cette analyse en elle-même ne crée pas l'ensemble du système théorique interprété comme un système de jugements précis, exprimant l'interdépendance spécifique entre les phénomènes étudiés, mais elle représente une certaine description analytico-synthétique de la réalité au niveau de l'essence et de la généralité. C'est pourquoi l'analyse catégorielle et le cadre de référence conceptuel sont les conditions nécessaires du système théorique de

la science et en représentent même une partie intégrale. Le mépris de l'analyse catégorielle dans le travail sociologique a des conséquences négatives; il se manifeste soit directement par le réductionnisme ouvert, soit il conduit à l'omission de certains aspects de la réalité sociale, il les laisse théoriquement inexpliqués ou bien il les traite d'une manière accidentelle. Il en est ainsi, par exemple, de certaines tentatives d'appliquer les théories générales du comportement à la problématique sociologique dans lesquelles les lois et les régularités sociologiques sont expliquées comme des formes spécifiques de manifestation des lois plus générales, agissant dans des conditions particulières. Là aussi, l'analyse catégorielle des traits spécifiques de la structure sociale jouant le rôle de «conditions particulières», s'avère indispensable si l'on veut surmonter l'insuffisance actuelle de ces interprétations où ces conditions particulières restent comme une sphère résiduelle non incorporée dans le système théorique.

Quant au point de vue marxiste sur la problématique du système catégoriel dans la sociologie nous rencontrons souvent un manque de clarté voire une incompréhension des véritables points de vue marxistes.

La première incompréhension se situe dans le point de vue qui explique l'historicisme marxiste comme un refus de l'analyse structuro-fonctionnelle, et surtout comme un refus de trouver des déterminations conceptuelles générales de la structure sociale. Marx se rendait bien compte qu'«il existe des déterminations communes à tous les degrés de la production», mais il a souligné en même temps que des déterminations «ne permettent la compréhension d'aucun niveau historique réel de la production». (K. MARX: *Préface à la Critique de l'Economie Politique*, «Œuvres», v. 13. p. 664).

Il est suffisamment clair que cette formulation ne se rapporte pas seulement à la production mais à toute la réalité sociale. Des analyses structuro-fonctionnelles effectuées d'un côté à un niveau général, de l'autre côté à un niveau spécifique sont en principe en rapport complémentaire. Le fait que le marxisme met l'accent sur la perception de la réalité dans son historicité concrète ne peut pas être expliqué comme un refus total de l'analyse générale. Sur ce point, il serait juste de faire une remarque critique à certains sociologues marxistes qui contribuent à l'incompréhension mentionnée; nous avons à l'esprit telles formulations imprécises et même grossières, d'après lesquelles l'orientation vers les problèmes de la théorie générale en sociologie est désignée sans distinction

comme une attitude «formaliste». Nous insistons sur le fait que leur interprétation est loin d'être marxiste.

Notre seconde remarque concerne la conception catégorielle du système de la sociologie marxiste. Dans ce système, les catégories d'être et de conscience sociales, de base et de superstructure et autres concepts occupent une position significative et importante. On peut dire que ces catégories représentent deux concepts fondamentaux de la pensée marxiste. Pour cette raison, il serait erroné d'exclure ces catégories de l'analyse sociologique-marxiste sous prétexte que ces catégories — au moins quelques unes d'entre elles — par leur contenu sémantique vont au-delà du cadre de la pensée sociologique et orientent l'analyse plutôt dans une perspective de philosophie sociale.

Selon notre opinion, il est impossible de saisir sans ces catégories le mouvement d'ensemble de la société, ce qui constitue la tâche suprême de la sociologie. Cependant, il ne serait pas moins incorrect, si l'on essayait de réduire d'une manière unilatérale tout le système catégoriel de la sociologie marxiste à ces catégories et si l'on tendait de voir en elle la panacée et la clef de toutes les questions de la théorie sociologique. Il ne serait malheureusement que trop aisé d'illustrer une telle fétichisation des catégories de base de la sociologie marxiste par des exemples tirés de l'histoire des déformations de la pensée marxiste. Une telle déformation, à n'en pas douter, a pu se refléter dans les discussions aussi longues que stériles au cours desquelles on s'évertuait à trouver la vocation suprême de la théorie sociologique dans la solution de certaines questions, à savoir si p.e. la langue et la science forment ou ne forment pas une partie de la superstructure ou encore si les relations politiques objectives sont une composante de l'être social ou au contraire de la conscience sociale. De pareilles tendances erronnées ne prennent pas en considération que l'analyse catégorielle dans la science dispose de plusieurs niveaux et de plusieurs points de vue et que la réalité sociale elle-même a plusieurs dimensions, que l'analyse catégorielle comprend surtout l'analyse élémentaire des processus et des phénomènes sociaux et que sa tâche consiste alors dans l'élaboration de l'appareil conceptuel qui est applicable aussi au niveau de mésostructure et de microstructure. Il s'agit donc ici de délimiter une sphère de légitimité, d'employer un système de concepts déterminé à un niveau défini de généralité de telle sorte que le système demeure une abstraction concrète et ne se transforme pas en une abstraction vide.



Marx s'est aussi occupé de la question que nous pourrions caractériser aujourd'hui comme problème de l'analyse élémentaire et de la structuration de base de la réalité sociale. Rappelons-nous l'une de ces intéressantes formulations contenues dans l'«Idéologie Allemande» («Œuvres complètes», vol. 3, p. 34): «Les prémisses dont nous partons ne sont pas des bases arbitraires, des dogmes; ce sont des bases réelles dont on ne peut faire abstraction qu'en imagination. Ce sont les individus réels, leur action et leurs conditions d'existence matérielles, celles qu'ils ont trouvées toutes prêtes, comme aussi qui sont nées de leur propre action. Ces bases sont donc vérifiables par voie purement empirique». Nous pensons que cette formulation saisit déjà dans une grande mesure les dimensions principales de la réalité sociale; on peut par conséquent faire ressortir de cette formulation les points de vue fondamentaux de la théorie sociologique. Il s'agit des mêmes points de vue qui ont été élaborés dans l'évolution ultérieure de certains courants et écoles et qui sont utilisés dans le travail sociologique contemporain.

Si toutefois nous tenons compte du double caractère «des conditions de la vie sociale» d'une part comme conditions naturelles et d'autre part en tant que conditions résultant des activités sociales antécédentes, nous pouvons distinguer les aspects fondamentaux de la structure sociale saisis dans le sens le plus large du terme et les points de vue correspondants de la recherche sociologique:

- (1) les conditions naturelles de la vie sociale tant internes qu'externes (c.-à-d. la nature du milieu externe et la nature chez l'individu) — le point de vue écologique et bio-sociologique;
- (2) les individus en tant que facteurs sociaux, sujets de l'activité sociale et également objets de l'activité sociale — le point de vue démoscopique;
- (3) les activités des individus, lesquelles revêtent différents caractères et se développent dans les différents domaines de la vie sociale — le point de vue de la sociologie de l'action et du comportement;
- (4) les produits de l'activité des individus, lesquels agissent et entrent dans l'activité ultérieure sociale comme des conditions, moyens, modèles; nous désignons l'ensemble de ces produits sous le nom de culture et par conséquence nous parlons du point de vue culturologique.

Nous pouvons analyser la structure sociale de chacun de ces points de vue, chaque aspect renvoie à celui des autres et de quelque façon les englobe même. Nous pourrions dire que la structure «conditions

naturelles — individus — activités — produits culturels» exprime dans la sociologie la structuration authentique la plus élémentaire de la réalité sociale et que les approches spécifiques relatives à ces aspects, c.-à-d. points de vue sociologiques, démoscopiques, actionnels et culturologiques se présupposent les uns les autres et sortent réciproquement les uns des autres de telle sorte qu'ils ne doivent pas être pris pour une sphère de concurrence d'écoles et de courants antagonistes, mais comme des vues complémentaires d'un système théorique unique.

Du point de vue démoscopique, ce sont justement les individus qui font l'objet de la recherche sociologique; ils entrent dans la vie sociale sous de formes différentes en tant qu'individus, groupes sociaux, classes sociales et sociétés globales. Les sociétés globales sont toujours un système déterminé de groupes et dans la société de classes un système de classes. L'ensemble des activités sociales que réalise une société globale par l'intermédiaire de ses groupes est spécifique et relativement autonome. Les sociétés globales ne constituent pas naturellement des ensembles clos, mais elles ont entre elles des contacts plus ou moins intenses, bien que ces contacts se distinguent par leur qualité et leur intensité à l'intérieur de sociétés globales et entre les groupes particuliers. L'humanité en tant que catégorie sociologique apparaît comme un système de sociétés entre lesquelles il existe différents degrés de continuité et de discontinuité. L'unité de l'humanité n'est ni une donnée statique, ni un simple postulat, mais comme l'a montré Marx, elle se réalise au cours du développement historique de la praxis sociale, au cours du processus de différenciation et d'intégration.

Les activités des individus constituent une forme spécifique fondamentale de la manifestation de leur existence. Si nous voyons dans la catégorie d'activité sociale une des catégories de base de la sociologie marxiste, nous répondons par cela non seulement à la tendance actuelle de la théorie sociologique à l'échelle mondiale, mais aussi nous développons en même temps certaines stimulations du marxisme classique dans lequel les catégories de «praxis sociale», d'«activité objective sensible des individus», de «praxis révolutionnaire transformatrice» et des concepts apparentés occupent une place de premier ordre.

Connaître l'objet matériel signifie du point de vue du marxisme connaître la forme du mouvement qui lui est propre; connaître la réalité humaine et sociale signifie connaître et expliquer l'activité des individus. Nous sommes d'accord avec les conceptions con-

temporaires qui montrent que les activités sociales ne peuvent être rapportées seulement aux hommes comme individus et ne peuvent être interprétées exclusivement du point de vue de la psychologie individuelle. On trouve, à juste titre, dans la catégorie d'activité un lien fondamental unissant toutes les sciences sociales; chacune d'elles s'occupe de son point de vue d'un certain aspect ou d'une certaine sphère d'activité humaine. Mais, cependant, il n'est possible de réduire l'activité ni à ses aspects exclusivement subjectifs, ni à ses aspects exclusivement objectifs. D'après la conception marxiste, l'activité humaine est dans son essence toujours une certaine transformation du subjectif en objectif, c.-à-d. elle est une certaine objectivation et en même temps elle est toujours une certaine transformation de l'objectif en subjectif, donc une certaine subjectivation. L'activité humaine implique des moments relativement constants. Ces moments se manifestent dans le processus actuel, mais en même temps ils dépassent d'une certaine manière chacun des processus particuliers instantanés. Les activités humaines ne peuvent alors être réduites à une simple somme de processus actuels subjectifs, mais elles doivent être conçues comme un système qui comprend les régulateurs institutionnels de même que les autres régulateurs culturels. Dans ce rapport donné nous ne pouvons pas nous occuper du système des critères qui sont nécessaires pour les études des activités humaines du point de vue sociologique, mais il faut souligner néanmoins, que dans la littérature sociologique contemporaine on sous-estime souvent l'importance d'une orientation vers des objets et des objectifs spécifiques des activités humaines, l'importance de leurs dimensions de contenu; de ce point de vue il faut distinguer trois dimensions élémentaires des activités sociales qui résultent du fait que les hommes par leur activité:

- (a) résolvent leur rapport avec la nature;
- (b) interviennent dans leurs rapports mutuels;
- (c) satisfont leurs besoins et leurs intérêts en tant que des personnalités.

Nous entendons sous le terme de culture, au sens le plus large du mot, le système de tous les produits de l'activité sociale des hommes, dans la mesure où ces produits entrent dans le cycle ultérieur de la vie sociale, conditionnent les processus particuliers et façonnent une partie de la réalité sociale. Nous ne comprenons pas alors par culture seulement la vie de l'esprit de la société et l'ensemble des produits de l'esprit; la culture dans son sens primaire porte sur la sphère matérielle, sociale et spirituelle de la vie des

hommes. Un produit de la vie sociale doit être objectivé en certaines formes pour pouvoir devenir une part de la culture. En même temps il doit être «subjectivé» pour pouvoir entrer dans le cycle ultérieur de la vie sociale.

Les éléments de la culture se subjectivent en devenant une part de la structure de la personnalité humaine, en s'intériorisant, n'importe qu'il s'agisse des éléments de la culture de la société entière, d'une certaine couche sociale ou de la culture (subculture) d'un groupe partiel. De ce point de vue le processus de la socialisation de l'homme est en même temps le processus de l'acculturation. Dans un de ses contextes de signification les plus élémentaires, la culture est, avant tout, la formation des forces créatrices des hommes. Le rapport culture- personnalité est en rapport dialectique; aucun de ces deux pôles n'existe seulement comme une variable dépendante. La culture se subjective non seulement parce qu'elle entre dans la structure de la personnalité, mais aussi parce qu'elle se manifeste dans les activités des hommes comme un élément ou un aspect important, même lorsqu'elle ne s'intériorise pas et ne s'ancre pas dans la structure de la personnalité; chaque activité sociale est alors en même temps une activité culturelle. La culture et ses éléments se répercutent dans l'activité sociale sous des formes différentes et accomplissent diverses fonctions, ils entrent en jeu comme conditions, moyens, régulateurs des activités sociales et déterminent considérablement leurs objectifs. Une analyse sociologique ne peut pas s'occuper seulement de la question de savoir comment les institutions régissent les activités des hommes, comment l'activité des hommes fonctionne en tant qu'instrument pour la conservation du système social. Une question très importante du point de vue sociologique est d'expliquer comment les hommes forment les institutions, comment ils perdent le contrôle de leur œuvre et tombent dans l'aliénation et comment enfin par leur activité pratique ils surmontent cette aliénation par une transformation et une humanisation des institutions. L'adaptation des hommes au système social et la transformation révolutionnaire de ce système représentent des aspects indivisibles de la vie sociale.

Il résulte de la réflexion esquissée que les aspects cités c.-à-d. l'aspect écologique, démoscopique, actionnel et culturologique ne peuvent pas être considérés comme des aspects isolés et mutuellement indépendants; chaque analyse actionnelle implique, par exemple, des moments démoscopiques et culturologiques, dont elle ne peut pas faire abstraction complète et elle se transforme nécessaire-

ment aussi en analyse démoscopique et culturologique, à condition qu'elle soit conséquente et complexe. On peut plutôt parler des points de vue cités des études sociologiques comme des approches différentes, mais mutuellement liées, qui accèdent à la réalité sociale du point de vue d'un système de rapports; chaque membre de ce système entre par certains de ses aspects dans d'autres systèmes de rapports qui sont organisés d'après d'autres principes, après d'autres dimensions de la réalité sociale.

Les dimensions particulières de l'activité sociale et les aspects correspondants de l'analyse sociologique ne peuvent pas alors être présentés comme des principes suffisants et autarchiques du système entier de la théorie sociologique, mais ils doivent être inclus dans un système supérieur et unique qui respecte toute la complexité de la réalité sociale.

Nous croyons que l'erreur des écoles et des courants différents et rivaux, p.e. du courant behavioriste ou actionnaliste, institutionnaliste et culturaliste de la sociologie et d'autres courants, consiste dans le fait qu'ils ne saisissent pas la structuration fondamentale de la réalité sociale, qu'ils présentent une de ses dimensions comme un aspect universellement valable et qu'ils représentent donc, au niveau de la théorie sociologique générale un certain réductionnisme qui nie ou au moins ne respecte pas les autres dimensions de la réalité de la vie sociale.

### *c. Du problème de la conception générale de la méthode sociologique.*

Un autre cycle de problèmes sur lesquels nous voulons nous pencher concerne les questions de la conception générale de la méthode sociologique. L'éclaircissement des questions méthodologiques dépend dans une grande mesure des conceptions théoriques de la science dans le sens de l'«ontologie régionale» (c.-à-d. l'ontologie d'un certain domaine de la réalité), car la méthode reflète toujours les traits essentiels de son objet. Évidemment, les questions méthodologiques ont également leur aspect plus large et plus général qui dépasse les limites des différentes sciences particulières faisant l'objet de la méthodologie et de la gnoséologie générales. Mais, même à ce niveau plus général, la méthode scientifique représente le reflet de la réalité objective et nous pourrions donc dire que l'analyse générale de la méthode sociologique suppose une certaine

théorie générale de la réalité au moins élémentaire. Il est vrai que l'élaboration d'une théorie générale de la réalité est un processus dans lequel fait défaut jusqu'ici la collaboration pertinente entre la philosophie d'une part et les autres branches scientifiques de l'autre. Mais nous croyons quand même que certains résultats de la philosophie scientifique et certains courants du mouvement interdisciplinaire (nous avons en vue surtout certaines conceptions structuraliste, les théories générales du système et surtout la cybernétique) apportent une contribution précieuse à la solution de cette problématique, bien que cet apport exige en plusieurs sens une certaine réinterprétation et dans certains cas la transformation même des conclusions tirées. Ce sont surtout les catégories de structure et de système qui représentent un appui particulièrement valable pour le travail de recherche sociologique. On peut voir dans ces catégories, si elles sont correctement interprétées, l'incarnation même du principe dialectique d'unité et du rapport mutuel des phénomènes et du principe dialectique de diversité, principe qui est lié au premier. Les catégories de structure et de système s'offrent et se manifestent comme des instruments très concrets, efficaces et immédiatement applicables, permettant aux aspects, aux moments et aux processus les plus divers de la réalité sociale de devenir objet d'études dans leur unité, dans la complexité de leurs interdépendances. Mais il reste toujours à trouver dans quelle mesure les différentes conceptions la transformation du principe dialectique d'unité et son application au plan de la pensée des sciences spéciales sont justes et conséquentes, ou au contraire unilatérales et déformées et surtout, dans quelle mesure l'application du principe dialectique d'unité est liée à l'application du principe de développement; de même une question se pose si on n'utilise pas la projection du principe d'unité dans les catégories de structure et de système en vue de séparer le principe d'unité du principe d'évolution dans le travail scientifique concret et d'opposer les deux principes comme des suppositions et des points de vue extérieurs s'excluant les uns les autres, comme il en est pour la plupart des conceptions sociologiques actuelles.

Mais, dans notre conception, les catégories de structure et de système ne sont pas l'alpha et l'oméga du travail sociologique; c'est sur ce point aussi que notre attitude se distingue des conceptions structurologiques et systémologiques actuelles. Néanmoins, les catégories de structure sont toutefois un indicateur important dans le travail scientifique montrant le chemin qui mène de la réalité

qui se présente au début du processus de connaissance comme une totalité inconnue, vers la totalité concrète: réalité connue, intellectuellement reproduite; c'est un système des déterminations abstraites concernant les rapports entre les aspects essentiels de l'objet en question qui aboutit à la reproduction concrète. La catégorie de structure embrasse et intègre, d'une façon déterminée, des contenus sémantiques qui sont séparément exprimés par d'autres catégories, éventuellement paires de catégories. Il s'agit surtout des catégories d'unité et de diversité, d'ensemble et de partie, de relation et de qualité et à leur façon également des catégories de phénomène et d'essence. C'est pourquoi on peut dire que la catégorie de structure ainsi que celle de système représentent un certain nœud de significations qui introduit dans la pensée scientifique et spécialisée presque tout le système catégoriel et offrent un appui valable pour le travail scientifique concret.

Si la réalité sociale est comprise comme une structure, c'est à dire comme une multitude d'éléments ordonnés d'une certaine manière en unité d'ensemble, la tâche de la méthode scientifique est de dévoiler et de dégager les rapports des connexions actuelles et d'interdépendences qui existent dans la structure étant donnée que ces connexions ont un double caractère: il s'agit d'une part des rapports entre les éléments, d'autre part de rapports entre l'ensemble et les éléments. Les deux types de rapports sont une partie inséparable de la structure et donc également une partie du contenu de l'analyse structuro-fonctionnelle. Nous considérons alors qu'il n'est pas possible d'exclure de l'analyse structuro-fonctionnelle l'étude des rapports entre des éléments du système; ces rapports peuvent être désignés comme des connexités fonctionnelles, étant donné que le terme «fonction» y est appliqué dans le sens le plus élémentaire, on peut dire «mathématique». (Nous parlons du sens «mathématique» du terme fonction, exprimant les connexions mutuelles entre les éléments, parce que cette acception du terme est courante dans les mathématiques, bien qu'elle ne soit pas limitée à cette sphère seulement.)

Si l'objet représente une unité spécifique, c.-à-d. une unité ayant certains caractères de l'ensemble, ce qui est impliqué dans la catégorie de structure, il n'est pas possible d'expliquer la structure ni ses parties seulement au niveau de l'analyse des relations mutuelles entre les parties, mais il est tout à fait indispensable de prendre en considération également leurs connexions avec l'ensemble.

C'est justement ce rapport de l'influence mutuelle de l'ensemble

et des parties qui est exprimé par le concept «fonction» dans un sens plus étroit du mot. De même que ce dernier, le concept de besoin et d'autres catégories liées aux notions précédentes présentent le plus de difficultés quant à leur définition théorique et leur application opérationnelle dans le travail de recherche. Nous ne voulons pas entrer dans une discussion plus détaillée sur la question de la catégorie de fonction et de l'analyse fonctionnelle qui représente d'ailleurs dans la littérature sociologique contemporaine un chapitre particulier de malentendus et d'incompréhension. L'éclaircissement de toute la problématique et l'élimination des incompréhensions actuelles n'est possible qu'en partant de la notion des effets fonctionnels en tant qu'effets produits par l'interaction de l'ensemble et des parties. En principe, il est juste de saisir la fonction comme un effet objectif d'un certain processus sur l'ensemble du système, mais il ne faut pas oublier que l'influence étudiée de l'élément sur l'ensemble est conditionnée en même temps par l'influence de l'ensemble sur ses parties. Cette influence de l'ensemble sur la partie qui lui est incorporée se manifeste ici comme une certaine tendance («directedness»), comme une certaine orientation spécifique qui influence dans son sens le comportement de l'élément sans égard au fait qu'il s'agisse dans le cas donné d'une orientation consciente ou inconsciente.

Le comportement réel de l'élément de la structure n'est, dans la réalité concrète, jamais déterminé uniquement par l'influence de l'ensemble sur la partie, mais il est en même temps conditionné par son propre système de communication et par le champ de force propre de l'élément qui, en lui-même, est une structure plus ou moins compliquée, ainsi que par l'influence d'autres éléments de la structure sur l'élément donné. Tous ces faits sont la cause de ce que le comportement de l'élément donné, dans sa forme finale, ne doit pas nécessairement être déterminé par le rapport de cet élément à l'ensemble de la structure; c.-à-d. ne doit pas être fonctionnel, fonctionnel dans le sens positif, mais peut être afunctionnel ou disfunctionnel. L'analyse structuro-fonctionnelle étudie à ce niveau un réseau de rapports du point de vue de leur fonctionnalité, c.-à-d. du point de vue d'une variable qui peut prendre différentes valeurs. L'analyse structuro-fonctionnelle ne peut alors considérer le rapport fonctionnel positif («eufonctionnel») comme un postulat a priori, comme le fait le fonctionnalisme. Un pareil procédé est une déformation de l'analyse structuro-fonctionnelle, déformation qui dicte à la réalité, parce qu'il énonce ce postulat injustifié que l'élément



ou le processus envisagé est en rapport fonctionnel («eufonctionnel») avec le système dans lequel il est incorporé; il en découle que le fonctionnalisme ne peut plus que repousser d'une manière très simpliste tous les phénomènes s'opposant à un tel dictat et les renvoyer dans la sphère de la pathologie sociale.

À part cela, il faut prendre en considération que dans le cas de l'analyse structuro-fonctionnelle chaque élément est en même temps élément d'un nombre de différentes structures et que par conséquence son comportement peut avoir et a une signification fonctionnelle très différente pour l'ensemble des différentes structures, dans lesquelles il est incorporé. Cette pluralité de dimensions des rapports fonctionnels est particulièrement importante pour la réalité sociale et l'ignorer conduit à des grossières vulgarisations, surtout dans le cas de l'analyse de la structure des classes et des groupes. Le caractère fonctionnel de l'élément ou du processus donné dans la société doit être étudié toujours par rapport à tous les sujets de l'activité sociale à partir de l'individu à travers les groupes partiels et les classes sociales jusqu'aux sociétés globales et à la communauté mondiale entière. Le fonctionnement des éléments et des processus n'est évidemment pas épuisé par rapport aux sujets des activités sociales mais englobe également d'autres points de vue que nous avons déjà indiqués.

Le fonctionnement et le disfonctionnement, le fonctionnement et les antagonismes ou les conflits sont les parties inséparables des processus sociaux. Les deux aspects sont isolés et rendus absolus aussi bien dans les conceptions fonctionnalistes que dans certaines doctrines opposées concernant l'explication du conflit. C'est pourquoi la sociologie marxiste a une attitude critique vis-à-vis de ces deux types de théories. La principale insuffisance des théories de conflits mentionnées ne consiste pas selon notre avis dans le fait qu'elles soulignent l'importance du conflit dans la vie sociale; leur insuffisance consiste dans le fait que l'antagonisme et les conflits ne sont pas déduits de toute la structure de la vie sociale et de celle des activités sociales, qu'on ne voit pas les liaisons entre les aspects de fonctionnalité des processus sociaux et les moments de conflits et que, par conséquence, les conflits ne représentent pas pour eux une des dimensions des processus sociaux, mais qu'ils représentent tout leur contenu et leur sens entier; ces théories aboutissent à une vue extrêmement unilatérale, nous dirions «panconflictualiste» de la vie sociale.

Notre réflexion montre que la contradiction traditionnelle au ni-

veau de l'analyse structuro-fonctionnelle entre la pensée téléologique et causale est surmontée ou au moins dépassée dans son sens original. Tant que le comportement de l'élément n'est déterminé que par son rapport à l'ensemble, on peut parler de sa finalité qu'il s'agisse du comportement conscient ou inconscient. Dans ce sens on peut parler de l'existence objective de la finalité et cela dans la mesure où le comportement de l'élément envisagé du point de vue de la structure donnée est déterminé par l'influence de l'ensemble sur ces éléments. Ces rapports de finalité ne sont rien d'essentiellement différent dans le réseau relationnel de la structure donnée, mais représentent un de ses aspects.

L'étude de l'importance des éléments pour l'existence et le développement de l'ensemble est un aspect partiel de la méthode sociologique, néanmoins un aspect particulièrement motivé et nécessaire.

Considérer la réalité sociale en tant que système des moyens satisfaisant ou pas les besoins des hommes comme des individus et comme des sociétés organisées est, sans doute, une vue d'une grande importance même pour la pratique sociale, car elle forme des conditions théoriques pour rétablissement et approfondissement du contrôle des institutions sociales qui sont le produit et l'instrument des hommes, mais qui, au cours du processus historique et par suite du caractère du système social, s'aliènent, échappent au contrôle, et agissent parfois même contre les besoins et contre les intérêts des hommes.

Si nous concevons la méthode structuro-fonctionnelle comme la recherche des interdépendances dans la structure, nous ne considérons nullement possible de l'identifier avec la méthode scientifique en général et avec la méthode sociologique en particulier. La méthode structuro-fonctionnelle étudie et suppose une structure donnée, existante et fonctionnante. Mais cette méthode seule n'est pas suffisante pour une connaissance adéquate de la réalité; pour le travail scientifique on applique aussi la méthode historico-génétique qui permet d'étudier l'origine et l'évolution de la structure. Toutes les deux méthodes représentent les aspects inséparables de la recherche scientifique, elles se déterminent l'une l'autre et se chevauchent mutuellement, mais chacune de ces méthodes a son existence particulière et sa propre signification. Nous pensons que la méthode dialectique peut être bien interprétée comme une unité de la méthode historico-génétique et de la méthode structuro-fonctionnelle, si, naturellement, les deux méthodes et leur rapport sont

interprétés d'une manière particulière. À la différence de quelques interprètes et de quelques critiques du marxisme, le marxisme ne réduit pas la recherche scientifique d'un objet à son analyse historico-génétique. La connaissance des causes des phénomènes et des processus est, bien sur, très importante, mais en tant que telle, elle n'est pas suffisante pour une connaissance complète des objets. Les causes peuvent être extérieures et fortuites, mais même si elles n'ont pas ce caractère, la cause et la fonction expriment des rapports qui ne peuvent pas être tout simplement identifiés. La compréhension des causes, p.e. de l'origine de l'écriture ou l'explication de la genèse d'une œuvre d'art en remontant à ses sources et conditions historiques est, naturellement, nécessaire pour le processus de la connaissance, mais elle n'est pas du tout suffisante pour une connaissance complète de l'objet dans sa forme variée, ses fonctions et son sens total. On pourrait citer, dans ce contexte, Lénine, qui disait que «la causalité n'est qu'une particule de l'interconnexion d'univers» (*Cahiers philosophiques*, «Œuvres», vol. 38, p. 162); la méthode historico-génétique ne comprend en outre qu'une part des liaisons causales étudiées dans son contexte spécifique.

En outre, nous pensons qu'il est erroné de voir le critère de différence entre la méthode structuro-fonctionnelle et la méthode historico-génétique dans le fait que la première méthode étudie «la structure» et la deuxième «le changement». On peut très bien objecter à une telle formulation que la méthode structuro-fonctionnelle étudie aussi le changement et que la méthode historico-génétique s'occupe aussi de la structure. D'après notre opinion la différence fondamentale entre les deux méthodes consiste en ce que la méthode structuro-fonctionnelle examine les connexités externes et internes de la structure, c'est à dire d'une structure d'un certain caractère qui est manifesté par un certain système relativement constant de processus, tandis que la méthode historico-génétique explique l'origine et l'évolution de la structure conçue d'une part comme le produit de son histoire antérieure, éventuellement comme le produit de «l'histoire des structures» qui l'ont précédée et qui ont formé la base de son origine, d'autre part comme une condition d'autres changements d'évolution de la structure. Le fonctionnement et l'évolution de la structure ne sont que deux aspects du mouvement réel de la réalité sociale. De ce point de vue on peut exprimer la différence entre ces deux méthodes: la méthode structuro-fonctionnelle étudie des changements dans le système, tandis que la méthode historico-génétique s'occupe de processus de la transformation du

système. Le travail scientifique confirme que l'abstraction de ces aspects et rapports est très utile et on peut même dire nécessaire pour le processus de connaissance et la différenciation de deux aspects du «changement» et nécessaire également pour une explication de l'essence des méthodes sociologiques.

Le mouvement est donc le mouvement d'une certaine structure, le mouvement dans une certaine structure et le changement de cette structure. Les évolutionnistes du 19<sup>e</sup> siècle ont commis une erreur, quand ils pensaient que l'explication des lois d'évolution pouvait ignorer les liaisons structurelles et ils ont construit leur «loi d'évolution» par une combinaison assez arbitraire d'éléments et de rapports dérivés et isolés de contextes différents. La conception de la structure comme celle d'un fait donné en dehors du processus d'évolution est l'erreur, presque générale, du structuralisme du 20<sup>e</sup> siècle. La conception marxiste n'oppose pas la structure à l'évolution, elle refuse les conceptions fondées sur les structures en dehors de l'évolution, de même que les conceptions de l'évolution sans structures. La sociologie marxiste explique le mouvement en partant des sources se trouvant dans la structure et elle comprend la structure comme un produit de l'évolution.

Une objection fréquemment adressée à la conception sociologique marxiste est l'affirmation que la sociologie marxiste est trop «moniste» et peu «pluraliste» ou même qu'elle est une «théorie d'un seul facteur».

Le monisme marxiste ne peut pas être interprété comme une supposition de l'existence d'un seul système universel des variables qui pourrait être appliqué à l'explication de n'importe quels processus et changements. Même si nous respectons les connexions et l'interaction des phénomènes, il ne faut pas oublier que les sphères particulières des phénomènes et des processus peuvent être et sont en effet spécifiques dans le sens qu'elles sont déterminées par des faits différents, par des facteurs divers, qu'elles participent aux systèmes différents des variables. Il serait naturellement absurde d'essayer d'expliquer les phénomènes sociaux, hétérogènes p.e. le mouvement naturel de la population, le processus de communication dans un petit groupe ou l'orientation de valeurs d'une classe sociale comme les phénomènes déterminés par le même système de facteurs ou de variables. Également métaphysique serait l'idée que la réalité sociale comprend les phénomènes «actif» et «passif» ou l'idée d'une existence des phénomènes sociaux n'ayant pas leur rôle spécifique dans le déterminisme social. La sociologie marxiste

suppose l'existence de déterminismes sociaux de types différents qui agissent dans de différentes sphères de phénomènes, surtout dans les sphères différentes de la vie sociale et les étapes différentes de l'évolution sociale. Dans ce sens la théorie marxiste de la structure sociale et de son évolution est évidemment pluraliste.

Il n'est pas possible non plus d'interpréter le monisme marxiste dans la théorie sociologique de telle façon que le processus historique entier en sa qualité élémentaire soit compris comme le produit de certaines forces sociales tout à fait constantes. Une telle idée est une déformation dogmatique du marxisme. Il serait paradoxal d'accepter cette idée, même si nous savons que le marxisme accentue les lois spécifiques de mouvement des sociétés particulières et des formations économiques et sociales. Le champ de force des antagonismes et des contradictions qui déterminent le mouvement des sociétés industrielles contemporaines évoluées, à l'époque de l'avènement de la révolution scientifico-technique, est, bien sur, à beaucoup d'égards, tout à fait différent du système des antagonismes et des contradictions, qui agissent en sociétés pré-industrielles. La sociologie marxiste se rend compte du caractère changeant des forces de production à l'époque présente à tel point que même le concept change son étendu et son contenu, surtout parce que la science devient la force de production déterminant l'évolution de la société. Le concept de production et d'activité productive doit être compris, dans l'ensemble de la conception marxiste, comme un concept historique, mobile et changeant. Déjà dans quelques formulations de Marx on ne comprend pas sous le concept de production seulement la production des biens matériels, mais un ensemble des activités sociales pratiques, nécessaires à l'existence et pour l'évolution de la société. Et c'est dans ce contexte de signification plus large qu'on doit comprendre l'accent que le marxisme met sur l'importance de la production (et même de l'économie, au sens un peu différent mais quand même analogue) pour la vie et pour l'évolution de la société.

En ce qui concerne la théorie marxiste du changement et de l'évolution sociale dans son interprétation tant classique qu'actuelle, il faut discerner la conception générale de l'évolution de la société et de l'homme, des conceptions concrètes reflétant les problèmes-clé d'une certaine étape historique formulées comme une condition du changement conscient et délibéré de la réalité sociale. Le «monisme» marxiste ne peut pas alors être identifié à l'économisme vulgaire.

Du point de vue de la sociologie marxiste le «monisme» et le «pluralisme» ne s'excluent pas l'un l'autre dans le cadre du déterminisme social, mais au contraire, ils se conditionnent et l'un suppose l'autre. Les systèmes particuliers des variables qui expriment le déterminisme de certaines sphères des phénomènes, se rapportent, en dernière analyse, à la même réalité, à la même structure sociale et, en certain sens, au processus historique en tant qu'unité et totalité. L'objet de la théorie sociologique est alors surtout la saisie de la réalité sociale non seulement comme une diversité, mais aussi comme une unité. Le principe de l'unité se manifeste dans le déterminisme social au niveau de la méthode historico-fonctionnelle, de même qu'à celui de la méthode historico-génétique. Les fondateurs du marxisme ont un grand mérite d'avoir ouvert le chemin de la compréhension de cette unité et d'avoir trouvé un certain enchaînement des éléments de la structure sociale et un certain ordre de leur action directe ou indirecte.

Le principe du monisme, qui exprime l'unité de la réalité sociale, est expliqué et peut faire l'objet de la recherche aux divers niveaux de la généralité. Mais une définition exacte et une différenciation des moments, des facteurs et des points de vue qu'on peut considérer dans des conditions données comme généraux ou comme spécifiques, restent toujours une question, relativement ouverte, de la théorie sociologique. La liaison du monisme et du pluralisme en théorie sociologique est donnée par le fait que nous comprenons la réalité sociale comme une unité différenciée, c.-à-d. comme une structure.

... dans la pratique la réalisation de cet admirable dessein ne peut s'accomplir par la seule décision aisément prise, en présence de concepts opposés.

On pourrait croire que la controverse entre la sociologie et l'idéologie a été surpassée depuis bien longtemps et notamment par les contributions webériennes distinguant les jugements de réalité et ceux de valeur. L'idéologie apparaît comme une vision déformée et non conforme à la réalité sociale à cause d'une limitation dans les valeurs d'éléments qui ne leur appartiennent pas.

La sociologie serait une discipline essentiellement pure en matière valorative ce qui, considéré en termes précis de logique paradoxale finirait par nous donner une sociologie qui, aseptique au point de vue valoratif, flotterait sur les eaux noires, septiques, du déshérentif.

Il y a une grande différence entre une sociologie «connaissance pure» de laquelle sont exclues les valeurs, sauf la valeur Vérité, et

## IDÉOLOGIE ET SOCIOLOGIE

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L'idéologie et la sociologie ne constituent pas une antinomie inconciliable, sinon une relation de dialectique.

L'idéologie est habituellement considérée comme une vision déformée de la réalité sociale.

Elle est surtout déformée par les intérêts de celui qui l'observe et qui peut ou non s'apercevoir de cette déformation, ou qui, même, peut l'utiliser consciemment ou non pour ses propres fins.

La sociologie, par contre, se présente comme une vision non déformée de la réalité sociale; elle apparaît comme le contraire de l'idéologie et le plus diamétralement opposé à elle. Les idéologies apparaissent multiples tandis que la sociologie est une, et pour cela les puristes de la discipline répudient les idéologies avec indignation.

Par la simplification du contraste conceptuel entre la sociologie et l'idéologie le choix apparaît évident.

Choisissons la sociologie et repoussons l'idéologie, telle doit être notre sûre voie de salut.

Mais, dans la pratique la réalisation de cet admirable dessein ne peut s'accomplir par la seule décision aisément prise, en présence de concepts opposés.

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une sociologie dans laquelle, comme limites, aboutissent toutes les idéologies. Dans cette sociologie s'intégreraient seules les valeurs — enfin valeurs réelles — qui ont une validité universelle et non point une validité restreinte, limitée, relative.

Le problème n'existe-t-il pas?

Que le nie celui qui a peur de l'affronter.

Il n'est pas d'actualité dans les milieux académiques?

Que le dise uniquement celui qui n'a pas examiné cet important document académique qui, heureusement, n'est pas dépourvu de tendances politiques, bien qu'elles ne soient pas agréables à tous, et qui constitue le Programme du VI Congrès Mondial de Sociologie et dans lequel ce problème a été situé.

Le problème est toujours présent. Après tout, Konstantinov avec toute son autorité et par sa situation serait-il le seul indiqué (et non l'un d'eux) pour le traiter?

Le seul fait d'élire un soviétique pour présenter et évaluer un tel problème le condamnerait d'avance dans une réunion dans laquelle la sociologie pourrait être considérée, selon la coutume, par ceux de l'autre côté, comme «la science bourgeoise de l'Occident».

Même sans cette intention méchante et osée, il convient d'observer que le thème n'a pas paru sympathique aux sociologues de l'Occident ou, du moins, il semblait que selon eux il ne saurait plus être question pour l'Occident de parler d'idéologies.

Peut-être a-t-on pensé que si le «Tiers Monde» pouvait parler d'idéologies, il balbutierait à leur propos et n'en parlerait pas avec cohérence, bien qu'il les connaisse de près depuis récemment.

L'homme incarne probablement tout le dramatique, plus que par autre chose, par le degré où il est lui-même et l'espèce, ainsi que par la forme où ses intérêts immédiats et ceux médiats de l'espèce ne vont pas toujours de pair.

La sociologie essaie, pour une bonne part, de concilier l'un avec l'autre. En justifiant son intérêt chaque personne cherche à démontrer que c'est là l'intérêt même de l'HOMME et que sa validité est universelle. Mais si, dans la réalité, les intérêts des hommes s'opposent entre eux, tous ne peuvent avoir raison et tous ne peuvent point se justifier en dernière instance.

Dire que chacun a raison selon son point de vue est certain, facile et lâche.

Dire que les conflits peuvent être facilement résolus par le raisonnement, mais qu'il est difficile de les résoudre dans la pratique, ne



peut que faire résonner en nous-mêmes un accent de désespoir, incompatible avec notre qualité d'hommes. Il semble plus constructif de dire qu'étant donné que nous ne pouvons pas avoir une vision absolue de la société — une sociologie authentique — et que nous ne pouvons pas, non plus, demeurer dans la relativité des idéologies, il convient de les accepter à titre provisoire, non pas en les situant comme les pôles de la sociologie, mais plutôt: (1) les situer avec elle dans une continuité et 2) moyennant une attitude critique, fondée méthodiquement, pratiquée avec rigueur, agir par les unes sur l'autre. — Cette recherche ne devra pas se réaliser exclusivement par le chemin du rationnel, elle devra satisfaire aussi bien la «logique du sentiment» que la pure «logique» et, aussi, cette autre logique, moins explorée, mais non moins vigoureuse qu'est «la logique de la volonté».

Par ce chemin nous rencontrerions à nouveau une sociologie qui ne serait pas un pur formulaire mathématique, mais qui devrait intégrer tout l'humain afin de lui être fidèle et de le servir.

Le social, nous pouvons le comprendre dans la mesure où nous participons à sa création et nous cessons de le comprendre quand nous nous contentons d'être son produit. De là, de nouveau, *seul celui qui participe activement au social peut l'expliquer*. De là aussi l'idéologue initial peut aspirer à devenir, un jour, sociologue.

Bien que la participation dans la souffrance et la joie humaines ne soit pas une condition suffisante pour la connaissance sociologique, elle est, indubitablement, nécessaire et indispensable pour atteindre cette connaissance.

Dans la mesure où par nous-mêmes ou par identification nous participons à la douleur et à la joie humaine, nous nous facilitons cette connaissance. Dans la mesure où notre douleur et notre joie ne sont pas ma douleur et mon plaisir, les plaisirs et les douleurs de ma famille, les douleurs et les joies de mon groupe, de mon peuple, de mon temps, mais les diverses joies et douleurs humaines, nous serons dans une meilleure possibilité de connaître sociologiquement, par dessus les idéologies.

Mais, comme cela se voit bien, le moyen d'atteindre ce but n'est, en aucune façon, le rejet indigné de ces «sales idéologies», «attachées aux intérêts particuliers», «incapables d'être rachetées».

Ce n'est point par appauvrissement, mais précisément par enrichissement et épuration humaine des idéologies que s'entrevoient les possibilités d'une vraie sociologie.

Pour les peuples sous-développés, comme les nôtres, la reconnais-

sance du rôle qu'initialement et pour longtemps devront tenir les idéologies (toujours sujettes à critiques) pour la marche sociologique, est fondamentale. Sans cela il y aura des «latino-américains partisans de la pseudo-idéo-sociologie des États Unis d'Amérique du Nord» et jamais de latino-américains partisans d'idéologies propres, sujettes à de continuelles révisions critiques et qui jugent des idéologies étrangères, sujettes elles aussi à de continuelles révisions, dans un sens convergent de la plus épurée et commune connaissance sociale.

Non pas l'évasion panique de l'idéologie qui crée la diaspora, mais son épuration continue grâce à l'incidence conjointe de la pensée et de l'action sur la réalité; de la pensée qui recherche l'actualisation pratique et de l'action réfléchie qui admet et qui réclame constamment la critique.

## SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL ANTHROPOLOGY IN A COMPLEX SOCIETY

Some Examples from Japan

### SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL ANTHROPOLOGY

University of Tokyo

### SOCIOLOGIE ET ETHNOLOGIE

When sociologists are dealing with Western societies and anthropologists with tribal societies, the two disciplines seem to be peacefully demarcated from each other, and no serious debates should come out between the two — at least there could be no hand-to-hand fights. Problems arise when both sociologists and social anthropologists begin to deal with the same field, the best example of which would be a non-Western complex society; this is not a traditional field, but it is becoming a most attractive field today, for both disciplines. In this paper, I would like to discuss this particular issue, illustrating it from Japan: how Western sociology has been used in Japan, and how I, as a social anthropologist, see the works of sociologists about Japan.

Sociologists, in dealing with Japan by the methods and theories developed through analysis of modern Western societies, face considerable difficulties. For the applicability of the scheme of a Western theory is fairly limited in Japan. The general attitude of Japanese sociologists has been that the parts which cannot be interpreted by the light of the Western schemes are considered as pre-modern, feudal or traditional elements of Japanese society. In such an interpretation, there has been a kind of restrictive and syllogistic view of social evolution: Japanese society will or should become, when it is completely modernized, the same as that of the West. This view also presupposes that the context of the modern part of Japanese society is similar to that of Western society. Certainly, as observed and presented through their analysis, there can be found similarities in any societies when they are industrialized, in such aspects as urbanization and forms and functions of modern institutions etc. However, this kind of analysis does not bring out the structural difference of its contents and of internal organization from that of West. It seems that these sociologists

## SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL ANTHROPOLOGY IN A COMPLEX SOCIETY

Some Examples from Japan

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When sociologists are dealing with Western societies and anthropologists with tribal societies, the two disciplines seem to be peacefully demarcated from each other, and no serious debates should come out between the two — at least there could be no hand-to-hand fight. Problems arise when both sociologist and social anthropologist begin to deal with the same field, the best example of which would be a non-Western complex society; this is not a traditional field, but it is becoming a most attractive field today, for both disciplines. In this paper, I would like to discuss this particular issue, illustrating it from Japan: how Western sociology has been used in Japan, and how I, as a social anthropologist, see the works of sociologists about Japan.

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transplanted Western sociology into their own context, without really being aware of differences between the Western and Japanese contexts. They interpreted Western sociological concepts in their own terms. They saw Western society through the filter of discussions of Western sociologists, so that Western society was perceived by them as a kind of a stereotype image, decocted from the reality. It may be natural for them to accept the Western society in such a form, since most of them have never done any fieldwork nor lived long enough in a Western society to be really familiar with its complexity.

Those Japanese sociologists who dealt with a modern urban community closely linked with industrial organizations, looked for aspects which could be revealed effectively by the application of a Western theory, rather than trying to develop their own original theory or a new scheme of analysis on the basis of their sociological reality. Their major concern tended to be directed to how Japanese reality can be seen in the scheme of a Western sociological theory; and they looked for features common to that of the modern West, and also brought out aspects different from the West. Thus, they certainly have contributed to locating major aspects of the modern Japanese society within a large scale of a quantitative comparison: for example, in terms of urbanizations, industrial organizations and occupational ratings etc...

However, since they employed indices chosen for the analysis of the Western societies, their comparison served for the West, not for, and between, non-Western societies; and particularly such a comparison failed to reveal qualitative differences among societies. In this regard, their works show one kind of limitation of the applicability of a Western theory and method to a non-Western field. This kind of limitation, however, is not confined to Japanese sociologists, but applies also to many Western sociologists who have dealt with non-Western society. Nevertheless, it is interesting to know with regard to Japan, it was among Western sociologists that the importance of the uniqueness of Japanese industrial communities was particularly felt. The best example of this is J.C. Abegglen's brilliant and penetrating analysis of *The Japanese Factory* (1958, Glencoe). Also R. Dore was interested in bringing out characteristically Japanese features in *City Life of Japan* (1958, London), and called for a reconsideration of the stereotypic thinking and approach of Japanese sociologists.

While one set of Japanese sociologists was engaged in transla-

tions and applications of Western theories to the Japanese context, another group of sociologists who were genuinely interested in the non-Western features of Japanese society (mostly rural communities) were struggling with their complications, not easily interpreted in terms of Western sociology. In this field, even a basic sociological concept, like *family*, had to face difficulty in its application. There have been long and heated debates among these sociologists: what is family? How should this concept be applied to the Japanese *ie* (which has peculiar implications, not being found in English terms such as «household» or «family»)? Their resources for the discussion were rather poor: in those days (before the Second World War) they found references only from Western societies through sociologists, and from tribal societies through social anthropologists. Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown had inspired some of them, but did not help much for the analysis of the complex Japanese rural society which was based on a highly developed agricultural economy. They themselves had to find out their own way, having recognized the qualitative differences of Japanese society both from the West and from tribal societies.

Partly due to their early findings of the considerable limitation of theories and analytical concepts of anthropologists of that period in their application to Japan, and partly owing to the disturbance of the War which cut off Japanese scholars from the development of Western scientific theories, after Radcliffe-Brown their knowledge of social anthropology is surprisingly poor. Moreover, in Japan there have been hardly any social anthropologists in the British sense: mostly they are ethnologists though some of them call themselves cultural or social anthropologists. If these rural sociologists had been familiar enough with recent contributions of social anthropology, their works would be greatly helped. What they have been attempting comes very close to the issues of current social anthropologists and much closer than those of Japanese ethnologists. Indeed it is these sociologists who show genuine interest in my anthropological analysis of Japanese society, while the ethnologists' interests tend toward other things.

From the standpoint of the sociologists, what these ethnologists lack is the consideration of the qualitative differences between Japanese and other small-scale societies; at least in their works there are direct applications of concepts and methods developed through studies of African societies or elsewhere to Japan. Such a tendency, however, is not only found among Japanese ethnolog-

ists, but also often even among Western social anthropologists who deal with non-Western complex societies. This kind of attitude is closely comparable to that of those sociologists, already mentioned who directly apply to Japan the scheme and method of sociology developed through studies of Western societies. To my mind, this is indeed the crucial mistake which both sociologists and anthropologists can commit, when they deal with a non-Western complex society. The results of this simple-minded approach are evinced among mushrooming sociological and anthropological works dealing with changing aspects of Westernization or modernization of a non-Western society. Characteristically these essays are both descriptive and quantitative. It seems to be also through the same kind of simplemindedness that a fairly large number of Japanese sociologists (and other social scientists) rely on the Marxian frame of references.

All these kinds of approach tend to overlook the persistence of the traditional structural forces in modern organizations. Thereby, the study of structural differences among societies is neglected. The comparative analysis of social structure is indeed the primary concern of social anthropology. Particularly, if such neglected issues are researched through detailed observations of personal relations, social anthropology which has been engaged in a study of a micro-society, and developed outstandingly the analysis of one important sector of social organization, like kinship, may serve effectively. As an example of what I have in mind, I would like to present here briefly a part of my analysis of Japanese society.

The concept of *ie*, under the name of «family system», has been disputed at great length by Japanese sociologists. And it has been the concensus that, as a consequence of modernization, particularly because of the new civil code established after the Second World War, the *ie* institution was dying out. In this ideological approach, the *ie* is held to be tied particularly to feudal moral precepts, but its use as a fundamental unit in social structure has not been explored.

In my view, the most basic element composing the *ie* institution is not that form whereby the oldest son and his wife live together with the old parents, nor an authority-structure in which the head of the household holds the power, etc., as sociologists put it. Rather, the *ie* is a corporate living group, and in the case of agriculture, or other similar enterprise, *ie* is a managing body. The *ie* is composed of household members (in most cases the family members of

the household head, but others besides his immediate family members can be included), who thus make up the units of a distinguishable social group. In other worlds, it is a social group constructed on the basis of an established frame of residence and often management organization.

What is important here is that the human relationships within this household group are thought of as more important than all other human relationships. For example, the wife and daughter-in-law who have come from the outside have incomparably greater importance than one's own sisters and daughters, who have married and gone into other households. A brother, when he has built a separate house, is thought of as primarily belonging to another unit, *ie* or «household»; on the other hand, the son-in-law who was once a complete outsider, but who was taken into the household, becomes more important than the brother living in another household. Not only can outsiders with absolutely no blood ties be invited to be heirs and successors, but servants and clerks are usually incorporated as members of the household and treated as family members by the head of the household. This inclusion must be completely accepted as a fact to insure that when a clerk is married to the daughter of the household and becomes an adopted son-in-law, the household succession will continue without disruption.

Thus, the household is not a mere indication of a residential group, but is the primarily distinctive sociological unit in the Japanese social organization. This is surprisingly different from societies such as that of India, where the weighty factor of sibling relationship continues paramount until death, and it is the family, regardless of residential arrangements, that forms the basic sociological unit. Theoretically, the stronger the factor of sibling relationship, the weaker the social independence of the household; and certainly, the household system (the institution of *ie*) that is found in Japan is not found in India. (It goes without saying of course that customs such as the adopted son-in-law system seen in Japan are non-existent in Hindu society.) The same is true of Europe.

As it is to be expected theoretically, such a principle as found in the *ie* system contributes to the weakening of kinship ties. In comparison with other societies, even English or American, Japanese regard kinship as of lesser importance, and in fact the function of kinship is comparatively weak outside the household. Their saying «the sibling is the beginning of the stranger» well reflects



their ideas on kinship. A married sibling who lives in another household is considered a kind of outsider. Toward such kin, one's duties and obligations are limited to such things as seasonal exchange of greetings with presents, attendance at wedding and funeral ceremonies, and the minimum help in case of accident or poverty. There are often instances where siblings differ widely in social and economic status. For example, the elder brother is the mayor while his younger brother is a postman in the same city, or a brother is a lawyer or businessman, while his widowed sister works as a domestic servant in another household. The wealthy brother normally does not help the poor brother or sister (who once formed a separate household), so long as they can carry on their lives somehow; and by the same token, the latter will not dare to ask for his help unless they have no bread at all. And society takes this for granted. Moreover, society gives first importance to the individual household, rather than to the kin group as a whole.

This is indeed drastically different from the attitudes towards kin found among Indian and other peoples of Southeast Asian countries, where individual wealth tends to be distributed among relatives; here the kin group as a whole takes precedence over the individual household, and nepotism plays an important role in the societies. It has been surprising to me to find that even in English and American societies brother and sisters meet so often in comparison to the Japanese standard, and that there exists such a high degree of attachment to kinfolk. Christmas is one of the great occasions when these people gather together; in Japan New Year's day is comparable to the Western Christmas, and people are busy preparing to receive subordinate staffs' greetings visits, and then themselves, in turn, visiting their bosses. There is only slender room left to spare for their collateral kin: married brothers, sisters, cousins, uncles and aunts and so on, though they certainly visit their parents and grandparents if they do not live in the same house. Even in rural areas, people say «one's neighbour is of more importance than one's relatives», or «you can carry on your life without cousins, but not without your neighbours.»

The kinship which is normally regarded as the primary and basic human attachment seems to be compensated for, in Japan by a personalized relation to a corporate group based on work, in which one's major social and economic life is involved. In my view, this is the principle upon which Japanese society is built; and it is the household (*ie*) structure in which the principles of Japanese

social group structure can be seen portrayed clearly. As a matter of fact, the concept of the traditional household institution, *ie*, persists still in the various group identities which are termed *ichizoku*, *ikka*, or *uchi* (a colloquial form of *ie*).

Among groups larger than the household, there is that described by the medieval concept *ichizoku-rōtō* (one household group and its retainers). This term represents indeed the concept of *one household*, in which a family with its members and its retainers form an integrated corporate group. Also, there are often marriage ties between them, and in actuality the lines of distinction become blurred for both sides. It is the same relationship as that between family members and clerks or servants in a household. This is a theoretical antithesis to a group which is formed on lineage or kin exclusively.

Today, the people who formerly composed the *ie* and *ichizoku-rōtō* enter modern society and create such terms as «one railroad family» (*kokutetsu-ikka*) for the National Railroad Company. A union, incorporating both the workers and managers, calls this «management-labour harmony». Through the traditional family system, *ie*, is said nowadays to be destroyed, there is in the modern expression «enveloped in family», a strong suggestion that the individual continues to conceive of himself as wholly within family — both a member of his personal family as well as a unit of a family of employees, the head of which is the employer.

The relationship between employer and employee, rather than the contractual relation, is the tie by which management and labour mediate the work. The employers are always concerned with how to manage the people, their view of whom is expressed as «the enterprise is the people». This affirms a belief that the employer and employees are bound in one by fate, a condition producing a tie between man-and-man often as firm and close as that between husband and wife. Such a relationship is therefore not a purely contractual one between employer and employee; the employee is already a member of his own family, and all members of his family are naturally included in the larger company «family» or «household». Japanese employers do not employ only a man's labour itself, but really employ the total man, as shown in the expression *marugakae* (completely enveloped). This kind of social group consciousness, of being one unit, a kind of household, has been achievable in any time period, and has been stressed by moral slogans, supported by a structural base in the formation of social groups, and

justified in traditional morality. In fact, this trend can be traced consistently in Japanese management from the Meiji period to the present.

It is this traditional orientation that creates the driving force in the production of most advanced industrial enterprises in Japan. This is well expressed in the following statement by one of Japanese managers: «Employer and employees of my company are bound by fate. When a set of persons are together at work, the result is not always produced mathematically as one plus one makes two. If two persons join forces, they may produce the result of three times or even five times of one person, or if they are not on good terms, it may be zero... If there is such trouble among employees, their employer has no qualification as a manager. The company with good human relations will have incentive for work and will succeed in its business.» This view is shared by almost all Japanese managers. However, there remains the problem of how this system can accommodate itself to automation and high technical specialization.

This accommodation is indeed the crucial point which managers are facing today. In the course of fantastic economic development in post-war Japan, along with introduction of highly improved technical equipment, modern management as developed particularly in the United States, has become the great concern of Japanese managers and of sociologists specializing in management. Hundreds of books and thousands of essays in journals have been devoted to discussing this issue of introducing American-style management. The major arguments concern the advisability of change from the seniority system to the merit system. The Japanese seniority system is closely linked with the lifetime employment system, characterized by its integral and lasting commitment between employee and employer, which contrasts so sharply with the high mobility of workers in the United States. In the main, managers seem to be still holding to their faith in the seniority system, while scholars and critics are progressively stronger in their urging a change to the merit system. Managers say they cannot risk their companies; it is for them a matter of life or death, while for those scholars it is simply a matter of debate.

This problem shows one of the issues most interesting from an anthropological point of view. The formal organization and the productive system of a large factory or business firm in Japan are designed in exactly the same pattern as those in the United States. However, the informal organization reveals a profound difference

from that of America. I wonder if it will be possible ever to change the informal structure which has been the driving force of Japan's industrial development. A shift from seniority system to merit system would involve not a partial or technical change in payment or promotion methods, but a drastic change in the structure itself beginning with the basic orientation of native values. The merit system could be applied only in a very limited and specific way, as for example, in a section of a large company comprising engineers with highly specialized qualification, or in comparatively new and small private firm, etc., but not to the major body of a large institutional organization. It is important here to remember that the informal structure within the factory or firm is closely tied to the over-all social organization of the country. A change in a major part of the organization will inevitably invite confusion and conflict. That the result of a reform might be an evil far more difficult to face than the existing disease, is the view held by many managers.

This analysis based on evidence in the Japanese field calls for reconsideration of the view that modernization or urbanization weakens kinship ties and creates a new type of social organization based on entirely different criteria. Certainly industrialization produces a new type of organization, the formal organization which may be closely akin to that of modern Western societies. However, this does not necessarily require a change in the informal structure, in which, as in the Japanese case, persistence of traditional structure is seen to a large degree. This demonstrates that the basic informal social structure continues in spite of great modern changes in social organization.

Now, to return to those previously mentioned Japanese rural sociologists, in comparison with those sociologists who are too preoccupied by Western theories, I think they have been at least taking the Japanese issues more seriously. Though they are less successful in the interpretation of Japanese context into scientific terms, they had a command of their own data, and saw the important problems, which had few counterparts in other societies; they believed they should have a method different from either Western-born sociology or social anthropology which they believed suitable only for small scale societies. For example, K. Ariga, who made the most outstanding contribution in this field, was interested in the works of Durkheim, Mauss and Radcliffe-Brown, and was greatly stimulated by Malinowski's field method. He carried out extensive

field work in various villages in Japan, including Ishigami village, where he worked over a period of about thirty years. Realizing the basic differences between the societies of Trobriand and Japan, he developed his own method of dealing with the Japanese field data. His originality is shown by this interpretation of the data in the wider economic, political and historical contexts. His contribution is important, particularly in showing the significant meanings of land tenureship and farm management in his analysis of social organization of village communities.

When we see the problems and manners of dealing of these sociologists so far as they are concerned with Japanese data, they come close to those of the social anthropologists. (Indeed, it was to their own surprise that those who have been recently in the United States found that there they were classified as social anthropologists rather than sociologists.) But it may be more plausible to call them sociologists, as they are classified in Japan, not social anthropologists. Firstly, they do not employ techniques of social anthropology. Secondly, the fact that they are singularly interested in their own (Japanese) society. Even a Western rural society falls out of their concern. They are like Japanese historians who devote themselves into only their own field of Japan, never dealing with data from other societies, though they occasionally read contributions from other countries.

This kind of singular approach produces considerable difficulties in cross-cultural discussions. The best example is the fact that in spite of the formidable and voluminous contributions of the above stated K.Ariga and his colleagues and students, these works are extremely difficult to understand by non-Japanese scholars, even if they are sociologists. Their analytical concepts remain on the level of usage of the Japanese language, and are not processed into scientific terms applicable to a cross-cultural comparison. As a matter of fact, in a symposium on Family held at Tokyo, September, 1965, by sociologists from different countries, Japanese sociologists were unsuccessful in communicating with foreign sociologists, as they failed to present *ie* and *dozoku*, which are their most important key concepts, in internationally understandable terms.

These Japanese sociologists live in Japan and are always discussing among themselves since they are numerous enough. They hardly ever carry out studies, or have even similar interests, in other societies. A few of them made a study of Chinese society and elsewhere, but, if they are not specialists of Chinese sociology, in comp-

arison with their research on Japanese society, the quality of these studies are those of a *pièce d'occasion*. Their sociology seems to have too much Japanese flavour, as Western sociology has Western flavours. When I make a statement such as that social anthropology is stronger in the comparative method, these Japanese sociologists retort that there is no sociology without «comparison.» Certainly, sociology intends to serve for a comparison of different societies. But, the method of comparison, the level of comparison, the context of comparison, indices of comparison, and the effect of the comparison are different from that of social anthropology. I think, this is one of the major distinctions between sociology and social anthropology. The sociologist's primary interest is based on *the* society; and the society mostly means his own society. At least, his major work springs up from his own society, if not, it is one particular society. In contrast, the anthropologist is primarily specialized in a society which is not his own; and mostly he has two or three different societies as his major field. Thereby, the method of an anthropologist may have an advantage not being singularly involved in a particular local configuration or nature of the society, thus serves for a more effective comparison, particularly in terms of social structure.

However, there are also problems for the part of social anthropologists. So far as the society where an anthropologist is dealing is a small-scale one, it is possible to have two or three different fields, but what happens when he begins to deal with a complex large scale society? Research of one particular society may be more than enough to take an entire life, and then the risks which historians and sociologists have already shown to exist may arise. Facing such a new age, I think, the anthropologist can maintain his advantage and vigor by following these rules.

First, to keep the original conviction in which one should study a society other than one's own; and to have intensive field work in at least two different societies. There will be an increasing tendency for the anthropologist to deal with his own society, since this is decidedly a great advantage for getting the background knowledge particularly when his own society is highly complex one. But if it is his only field, he could easily lose the advantage and vigor of being a social anthropologist. Second is the *delineation* of the sector and issues with which the anthropologist is to deal. These should be chosen with the best strategy according to the society. Since, social anthropology is effective in dealing with personal

relations in a micro-setting, and data collected personally by one anthropologist are necessarily limited, the effectiveness of the analysis in a complex society depends largely on which sector is chosen for study. It should be one central to the social configuration, not a peripheral sector by any means. In so far as the selection of issues is concerned, they should arise from the traditional ideas and objectives of social anthropology. Then, in the process of interpretation of the data, and of abstractions and generalizations of his findings, he should take advantage of the availability of researches by sociologists, historians and economists, etc. as much as possible. In such a process, the sociologist could be the best debater as well as the best friend for the social anthropologist.

Those supporting the religious side of the confraternities also pointed out the direct influence of the religious orders (Franciscans, Dominicans and the Flagellants) as well as the spreading of mysticism in the formation of the confraternities in the 13th century. This argument was used in supporting the religious origin of confraternities.

The term confraternity, which for the first time appears in the 13th century documents, both in Italy and France, is described as an association of laymen performing piety and Christian charity.

This definition will be very often found in publications supporting the ecclesiastical origin of the confraternities.

Every confraternity had a religious name, either that of Christ or the Holy Virgin or some of the saints who were at the same time the patron saints of the confraternity. The confraternities celebrated the festival of their patron saint on which day they used to march in procession, sing religious songs dedicated to the occasion and attend a high mass celebrated on that day.

Confraternities also helped the upkeep of churches; especially well-known was their use of candles for lighting altars. Many confraternities had their own chapel or even a church in which a mass was celebrated for the deceased and living members and where the leaders of the confraternity spoke about the pious life of the Christians.

The charitable side of the confraternities was also brought out in connection with the religion — e.g. carrying the body of the deceased member to the graveyard, celebration of the dead mass and looking after the widow and children of the deceased member.

Further, working in hospitals and looking after the poor and orphans also belonged to the charitable side of the Christianity promoted by the church.

All these arguments mentioned above lead us to the conclusion that confraternities were in reality nothing more than para-religious organisations of men and women supporting the Christian way of life, organised and firmly led by the church authorities.

Others, often historians, saw confraternities as bodies very largely responsible for the organisation of medieval towns representing the first organised groups in their development. Confraternities had first of all, they argued, a worldly function — their religious functions were only secondary.

Confraternities are organisations of citizens of a particular town, belonging often to one particular profession. They are actually



non-religious municipal bodies with some religious features only. This is the opposite view on the confraternities expressed by those who rejected their religious origin.

We have here to deal with those supporting the sacred character, others the profane character of the confraternities. Confraternities can be looked upon from another view which, I believe, is nearer to the real character of that organisation and its origin.

First of all, a confraternity is a group — a group of people who formed a voluntary association, sometimes of a particular profession, but later embracing a large proportion of the population of the medieval towns.

As a group, the confraternity is characterised by a group solidarity and mutual aid which is typical of a group and not necessarily connected with the principles of Christian morality. This group solidarity is emphasized by appearing in public as a closed body on different occasions such as the day of the confraternity, different municipal or religious celebrations, burial of a member, etc.

On all these occasions the group solidarity, stronger than the religious or municipal affiliation, comes into prominence. If a member does not appear on such occasions he is heavily fined; he must wear his robe or garment and other insignia of membership on particular occasions and is fined for not doing so. A member of the confraternity was obliged to follow the statutes of the confraternity and the decisions made by their leaders.

Every member was obliged to attend annual meetings and the feasts which followed. It was also expected from every member to contribute towards the costs of the feast, which was obligatory. Failure to attend the feast was liable to severe penalties.

In the attendance of the communal meal of the confraternity the solidarity of a group was even more stressed. This eating together, or commensality, added even more towards the cohesion of the confraternity or the group.

We are well aware of the social implication of commensality being connected with different obligations and attitudes toward the members of the same group. We have the same idea in a number of primitive and rural societies and the group solidarity of the confraternity is much the same. The group solidarity among the rural communities, still evident in the Mediterranean, is another example.

When the church, on many an occasion, tried to forbid the communal feasts of the confraternity she was well aware that

the disappearance of such feasts would very much weaken the confraternity's cohesion. The same applies to the prohibition of the annual feasts by the authorities in France (e.g. Orleans) in 1560, who imposed high fines of 500 livres for trespassers. It is interesting to note that the non-members were usually not invited to join the feast but were offered drinks and food separately. This again stressed the group vis-à-vis the others. On the day of the confraternity's feast, a mass, in which the names of the deceased and living members were mentioned, was held. In this way the group solidarity was again manifested.

In some confraternities on this day new members were admitted. They were admitted in the presence of the members, which, again, functioned as a group. After admittance, the new members usually paid their entrance fee, their first obligation toward a group. Even when members got married they gave some money or wine to the confraternity (e.g. Bordeaux) showing on this important occasion their group solidarity.

When a member died, not only did the other members attend the burial but there were also special instructions to bring the body of a member from a place outside the town or village and even out of the water if a member got drowned. In this way the dead member was taken back to his town and buried by the living members of his group. Many members left their property to the confraternity which again used this wealth for helping other members in distress and making the group stronger. Large amounts of money and property made the group economically strong and independent toward the church and town authorities. This independence and organisation of different professions made the confraternity a political, social and economic factor of extreme importance.

The confraternity became the organization of the newly emerging classes of craftsmen and traders, a counter-balance to the church and the nobility. It represented a real «pressure group» of Medieval society, the only well-organised group except the church and nobility.

It is therefore not surprising that the church and the medieval state tried, being afraid of their power, to destroy them. The special role of the confraternity in the towns was admitted by the authorities. For example, a confraternity controlled the town finances of Tournai in the 13th century. The confraternity of Louvre was responsible for the maintenance of the roads and the church and protected the citizens from excessive taxation. In the republic of Dubrovnik the

confraternities controlled the prices of the wine, oil, grain and bacon. They even controlled the sale of meat, bread and fish. Some even functioned as a police force.

The confraternity on Corsica had the right to impose taxes and the right to elect municipal officials.

In some cases the municipality was not allowed to impose any taxes without previously consulting the local confraternity. The confraternity represented on Corsica an organised factor in defending rights against the local nobility and the Genoese occupation. From all this we can say that confraternities represented organised groups independent of the church and the medieval state or municipality.

As confraternities lived in towns they had many dealings with the town authorities. They were not identical with the municipality but often opposed to it. The same applies to the relationship between the state and the confraternity.

We have for example many instances of conflicts between the king of France and the confraternities. The reason for that was the king's fear of the confraternity as an organised group, in which solidarity towards the confraternity was stronger than towards the state, symbolised in the person of the king. The confraternity represented a serious obstacle in the establishment of the centralized power of the kings in the Middle Ages. For example, in 1306 the King of France, Philippe le Bel, suppressed the unification of the confraternity of weavers, fullers and tavern-keepers and some of their leaders were even executed. In 1381 all assemblies of the confraternity were forbidden by the ruler.

By special king's decree confraternities in Orleans (1560), Blois (1579) and other places were forbidden.

In the republic of Dubrovnik the government became so afraid of the power of the confraternities that they asked the Pope Benedict XIV in 1756 to intervene. Even after the representative of the republic was admitted to the meetings, the confraternities had freedom of action.

The confraternities in Dubrovnik had to swear an oath of allegiance to the republic. In Trogir on the Dalmatian coast, which was under the control of Venice, the Venetian authorities demanded from the local confraternities an oath of allegiance in 1552. Even the books of the confraternities had to be written in Italian. In Dalmatia, as elsewhere in medieval Europe, the confraternities were also the only organised groups vis-à-vis the nobility and the state.

Confraternities even took part in the revolts against the nobility of Trogir in 1357. Similar conflicts existed between the municipal authorities and the confraternities all based on the fear of their group solidarity and the power they exercised.

It would be difficult, therefore, to substantiate the idea of identifying the municipality with the confraternity; so, for example, the town authorities in Pisa issued decrees against the confraternities in 1272 and 1286. The same happened in Florence in 1419. Monti, an Italian expert on confraternities, mentions the abolition of confraternities on the basis of the political agitation against the municipal authorities. In France the confraternities took part in the struggle against the authorities. (e.g. the confraternity of S. Ebois in 1305 or the confraternity of Chartres in 1500).

A particular difference between the confraternities and the municipality was the strong bond which existed between the members of the confraternity, the loyalty toward a group which repeated itself on a number of occasions, including the yearly communal meal. All this strengthened the confraternity as a group, whereby the municipality expected a special oath of allegiance from their citizens, and had the control of the town between its walls.

Confraternities never represented the whole town even if they helped its development to a great extent. Confraternities represented the interests of crafts of which some formed a federation, or the interests of other groups, such as traders, for example. They were suppressed in one way or another by the state or the town.

Basically similar, and often even more conflicting, were the relations between the confraternity and the church. The church, well aware of the solidarity of the confraternities and their power in the towns or villages, always tried to get control over them. They represented for the church a serious threat to their authority. They were even more dangerous, as they challenged the parish, the basic cell of the church organisation. Having their own chapel or even church and playing a role at different religious feasts where confraternities appeared as closed units, they were the only groups which could face the church as an organised group in those days. It is, therefore, not surprising that the history of the confraternities anywhere in Europe is a permanent struggle with the church for autonomy and independence.

Already the «Capitulaire de Hincman» attacked the drinking habits of the confraternities.

Different church councils e.g. in Rouen (1189), Montpellier (1219),

Toulouse (1238), Bordeaux (1255), Avignon (1282), Soisson (1403), etc., demanded the full control of the church over the confraternities. They attacked in particular the «false piety» of such groups and threatened to excommunicate individual members or even the whole confraternity.

It is not surprising that the confraternities tried to get such measures annulled. Thus, for example, the confraternity in Bordeaux asked for special «incommunication fee» from their members in 1444. The tense relationship between the confraternities and the church became particularly vivid in the wars against the Albigenses.

Some of the confraternities in Toulouse came out openly against the church and fought against her. They were known as the «confrerie noire.» The church, in order to counterbalance them, organised special confraternities — «confrerie blanche» — against the Albigenses.

We might here note a number of similarities between the confraternities and the religious sects of the Albigenses but with a strong religious basis.

We have information from Dalmatia and Bosnia about the prohibition of confraternities accused of heresy (1186 in Split and 1203 in Bosnia). Since then the church is permanently trying either to dissolve or to get under control all the confraternities. Some church councils e.g. in Toulouse (1219) or in Avignon (1336) even dissolved suspected confraternities. Other church councils, in particular the famous one at Trento (1562), tried to get the confraternity under the bishop's jurisdiction and at the same time control their finances and in this way gain complete control. By that time (16th century) the church has a strong influence on the confraternity in Italy and tried to influence and suppress the others. «Quacumque» of the Clement VIII in 1604 was another attempt to gain control.

By breaking their group solidarity and by controlling their finances, the church tried to make confraternities second-rate organisations, helping the parish in religious duties and becoming completely controlled by her.

The whole of the Middle Ages is characterised by the conflict between a confraternity as a sacred group or a confraternity as a profane one. This conflict between the sanctification and the profanisation is the main problem of the Middle Ages as a whole and it affected the confraternity as well.

It would be impossible for the confraternities not to have religious elements, as religion had a strong influence on every aspect

of human life in medieval Europe, but the confraternities were not religious bodies. In some cases they came under strong pressure of the church. Later on, the splitting of the confraternities into guilds and corporations, which were really confraternities of professions, keeping all the characteristics of the confraternities and charitable confraternities, made the confraternity less resistant against church domination.

It is therefore not surprising that, from the 18th century onward, confraternities became much more dependent on the church.

Let us now turn to the relationship between the confraternities and the religious orders, so much emphasized by the supporters of the confraternity as a religious organisation.

The religion, influencing every part of the life of medieval man influenced the confraternity as well. We can therefore understand the influence of the religious orders of Franciscans or Flagellantes. However, the principles of the confraternities as a group, with the already mentioned characteristics, are much older and they are an essential factor in understanding the confraternity.

Religion remained only one aspect, as after all nothing could have been organised in the early Middle Ages without connecting it with religion. The confraternity as a body much older than the religious orders continued their tradition as a group, based on individual rights contrary to the orders which were controlled by higher ecclesiastical authorities. The confraternities remained always a group of laymen selecting their leaders and dismissing them if not satisfied.

Even the religious duties of the confraternities were independent of the ecclesiastical authorities, religious orders or the parish (e.g. own chapel or church, own priests, own patron saints, own songs, independent attitude toward the parish). Also these religious duties emphasized the independence of the confraternity vis-à-vis the church. Charity towards their own people also emphasized the group solidarity.

The particularism of confraternities comprising only certain crafts or professions was only a stage in the development, as after that the confraternities embraced other professions and people, becoming in the end the only organised group besides the church and the nobility. Therefore we can say that class mobility among the confraternities was existing, as later a number of different professions and classes (nobles and clergymen) joined the same confraternity and were treated as equals. There were also conflicts between different

confraternities as they tried to gain the leadership in a particular community. But in their opposition towards the church and the nobility they were all alike. They have also strengthened the newly emerging Middle Class against the church and the state controlled by nobles. We could in the end say that the confraternity is basically a group corresponding in all important aspects to similar associations in the «primitive societies», preserving their characteristics throughout the Middle Ages.

After all the man of the Middle Ages, the man of the old rural Europe, is basically similar to the so-called 'primitive man' by his strong affiliation towards a group, his illiteracy, his low level of technical equipment and his social relationship based on strong kinship ties.

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- 10) G. MONTI: *Le confraternite medievali dell'alta e media Italia*, Vol. 1-2, Venezia, 1927.
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- 12) K. VOJNOVIĆ: *Bratovštine i obrtne korporacije u Republici Dubrovačkoj XIII-XVIII Cent.*, Zagreb, 1899.

<sup>1</sup> E.g. by E. H. Carr in *The Social Anthropology*, 1951, pp. 10-11.

## THE END OF ANTHROPOLOGY?

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«Ethnology is in the sady ludicrous, not to say tragic, position, that at the very moment when it begins ... to start ready for work on its appointed task, the material of its study melts away with hopeless rapidity.»

(B. MALINOWSKI, *Argonauts of the Western Pacific*, 1922, p. xv).

This opening sentence of the first great classic of modern social anthropology indeed strikes a tragic note: the spectre of death at the moment of birth. And it is, lamentably and prophetically, true, if, that is, we accept (as Malinowski clearly does) the assumption that anthropology is distinguished from other social sciences in that it deals with a particular *substantive* portion of reality — «primitive» society. This view is still widely held.<sup>1</sup>

Empirically, «primitive» society is, in fact, the area which anthropologists have primarily studied. They have struggled with might and main to eschew what they see as value-judgments — and the problems of typological classification and of the general conceptualization of development — only at the price of producing a relativistic and often largely descriptive corpus of studies. Furthermore, this concentration on the «primitive» implies, in effect, the renunciation of panoptic claims to be *The* «Science of Man», a claim more common in the past, though still by no means unheard of today, especially in the U.S.A., where it is institutionalized in academic curricula which embrace, under «Anthropology», not only Social Man but even Bio-social Man. But in Britain, it is usually only ritually and half-heartedly invoked today. Thus Evans-Pritchard, for example, makes the conventional claim: «*theoretically at any rate*, social anthropology is the study of all human societies and not

<sup>1</sup> E.g. by EVANS-PRITCHARD, in his *Social Anthropology*, 1951, pp. 10-11.



merely of primitive societies, even if in practice and for convenience, at the present time its attention is mostly given to the institutions of the simpler peoples» (p. 10, my italics.).

It is not only that anthropologists have mainly concentrated on «tribal» societies, and rarely turned their attention to advanced industrial societies; even more, they commonly exhibit disinterest in the «modern» sectors of underdeveloped societies — or, more precisely (for the concept of «sectors» smacks of «compartments»), what is analytical better conceived of as a field of emergent social relationships, itself part of ever-wider fields, world-society being the only meaningful «total system» today.<sup>2</sup> The implication of this alternative conceptualization is that increasingly there are not two separate «spheres» or «sectors» in post-colonial societies — the «primitive» and the «modern» — but a single social field. Not all anthropologists, by any means, have thought schematically, in terms of two discrete «sectors», however. The classic debate was begun on this question in the 1930s, as far as British social anthropology is concerned, in the symposium, *Methods of Study of Culture Contact in Africa*, and the view I have suggested as the more analytically profitable one has been «operationalized» in a number of outstanding studies since that time, notably in the work of the Wilsons, Epstein, Mayer, Banton, Mitchell, to name no others. But the tendency is for these researchers to re-define themselves as «sociologists», or to define away the «primitive/advanced» distinction itself. In the process, «anthropology» as a science with a distinct substantive subject-matter, disappears. The actual term «sociology» is frequently used by such writers to describe their own and their colleagues' work, e.g. Gluckman's critique of Malinowski's «sociological» theories (1947), his description of Fortes' work as «An Advance in African Sociology», etc.

A large number of anthropologists, nevertheless, remain obstinately — and often valuably — wedded to the study of what are sometimes conceived of, to one degree or another (and what sometimes are quite misconceived of) as isolated «pre-industrial» tribal societies (with all the recognised ambiguity of the epithet «tribal») and of particular forms of social organisation eminently well-developed in, or even quite peculiar to, such societies: age-set organization, ancestor-cults, lineage-systems, witchcraft, etc., etc.

The rationale of the study of the «primitive» normally advanced

<sup>2</sup> See my *Third World*, 1964, pp. 1-20, 50-51.

is a justification not so much in terms of intrinsic interest (even less, of «applied» utility), but in terms of a justification of anthropology as the *comparative* dimension of the social sciences. True, there are major ambivalences here, one school emphasising the *universals* underlying the variety of socio-cultural forms: that the «exotic» is merely one way of handling problems which men face in all ages and places; the other — essentially pluralistic — emphasising (often holistically) the *uniqueness* of any particular socio-cultural arrangement. Common to both of these apparently quite opposed orientations is a more fundamental shared orientation: a *relativising* perspective which is both cognitive and ethical, since the first orientation emphasises that seemingly exotic customs are, in fact, attempts to deal with similar problems that we handle in different ways. The second orientation suggests that *our* folkways and preoccupations are time- and culture-bound, and that our particular cultural heritage, being unique, is both transitory and by no means superior. There are, it is held, «an incredible number of possible leads all of which... may serve a society to live by.»<sup>3</sup> They are human beings, as are we; we, therefore, are not superior, only different. All societies are unique, and of equal atomic weight for the purposes of comparative sociology. The obscure Australian tribe, is, for these scientific purposes, as important an object of study as is the U.S.S.R. In this perspective, no society is «exotic»; no society «pathological», in Durkheim's sense: all are «normal» variations on common human social themes.

These emphatic kinds of relativism were evoked, historically, by half a century and more of reaction to absolute claims to superiority by racist and imperialist apologists for various cultures, societies, and races. In the event, however, we have eliminated value-judgments about inferiority or superiority, have undermined assumption about the «rightness», «efficiency» or the historical/evolutionary «inevitability» of the advanced industrial societies, and have demolished nineteenth-century theories of social evolution, only at the expense of avoiding problems of typological classification of the variety of human societies, and in particular problems of development, directionality and change. Relativism of these kinds can handle certain kinds of process — homoeostatic or feedback processes, notably 'replacement' change, or the way in which conflict is resolved within, or even so as to strengthen, ongoing wider structures.

<sup>3</sup> Ruth BENEDICT, *Patterns of Culture*, Pelican, N.Y., 1946, p. 20.

But such orientations are incapable of handling directional process, emergence, and radical social change. Anthropologists who wished to avoid being impaled on the dilemma-horns of unique description, on the one hand, and to eschew the older evolutionist options on the other, tended to fall back on propositions about universal trans-cultural mechanisms, e.g. statements about the social functions of conflict. Naturally, they were attracted to the most cognate kind of sociological theory — formalism, particularly that of Simmel<sup>4</sup>; earlier, some had explored cultural typologies — usually non-developmental, and sometimes of a global, psychological kind (e.g. Ruth Benedict) — which transcended cultural relationships shaped by history or geography. Others were based on culture-area assumptions, from early American cultural anthropology, e.g. Herskovits' «East African Cattle Complex» of 1926, to the assumption of a «Mediterranean Culture» more recently. All these styles of approach flinched back from any attempt to construct categories which incorporate directional process. The patent evidence of emergence, of disappearance, and of displacement, which the genesis of the new states has forced on our attention in a now unavoidable way, was blandly not discussed.

Little wonder, then, that the central process of our time, perhaps, in retrospect, one of the crucial thresholds in the evolution of human society: the crossing of the development-barrier: has not been, and could not be, meaningfully handled within such frameworks; nor that so many anthropologists, working as they do in societies where Development Plans, political parties, trade unions, cooperatives, cold and hot war, State intervention in peasant agriculture, massive labour migration, urban explosion, are part of the everyday experience of members of the very societies they are studying, nevertheless appear to be dealing with Platonic insulated micro-worlds where such things, apparently, never intrude.

The paucity, and relative poverty, of comparative studies which even touch upon problems of change from one type of society to another, is equally «built-in», since, for formalist universalism, all societies are temporally equal (the «ethnographic present»), and are never located in any developmental process or classified as cases of particular developmental types; and for holistic pluralism, even in its more sophisticated varieties, categories such as «state» or

<sup>4</sup> See my «Bureaucracy and Decolonization: Democracy From the Top», in *The New Sociology*, ed. I.L. Horowitz, 1965, pp. 370-390.

«stateless» are established, with little or no consideration given to defining the conditions for their emergence, persistence, or displacement. In other words, the typologies in what few comparative studies we possess are static and/or formal, rather than dynamic and processual.

This development of comparative studies explains its converse: the multiplication of monographs that do not cumulatively lead to the refinement and development of a *general* body of theory as part of a collective on-going debate within a community of scholars, but merely co-exist as encapsulated entities that only make the most perfunctory of gestures, in the last few pages, in the direction of current theoretical and methodological debate. In fact, there is no debate. The only relationship established between such works is a physical one of contiguous location in space on library shelves. Comparative «discussion» largely consists of each «owner» of a tribe considering how his society differs from the specific society under discussion. For him, all too often, the central-reference-points are the two societies rather than general theoretical issues. It is not merely frivolous to observe that the conventional opening gambit in verbal discussion «But in my tribe...» reflects seriously the level of generalisation and comparison. It is commonly accompanied by a self-conscious, deprecatory laugh, which communicates an awareness of precisely these shortcomings. But from the point of view of science, this is no joke. The inevitable result is the accumulation of monographs, however sophisticated in technique and presentation, which are ultimately idiographic rather than nomothetic. The real object ought to be to abolish the idiographic/nomothetic distinction altogether.

Because of the absence of any general typology of societies and theory of development, the contribution which anthropology has made to comparative studies has been strangely skewed, not to say arbitrary. If the interest is said to lie specifically in the «primitive», then the number of adequate modern studies of hunting-and-collecting societies, for example, is striking. If the value of anthropology lies in its capacity to contribute to our knowledge of the *varieties* of socio-cultural systems, the absence of study of the «hydraulic society» (which could well be claimed, quantitatively, to be the dominant form of social organisation before modern industrialism, both in terms of the proportion of human beings who have lived in such societies, and in terms of the persistence of these large-scale societies over millennia) is an equally surprising defici-

ency, particularly since the contrast between this form of society and West European «feudalism» has been a key theoretical theme in the literature, both because of its implications for typology and for development theory, and not least because of its considerable implications for contemporary political and social developments in Asia.<sup>5</sup>

Again, though we have a number of important particular studies of pastoral societies by anthropologists,<sup>6</sup> we have had little generalization about pastoralism as a social form (and about the relationship between pastoralists and sedentary peoples) since Ibn Khaldun. That pastoral societies do have common, «transcultural» characteristics, and, as importantly, are *seen* to have by non-pastoralists as well as by themselves, is evident as a contemporary social issue of no mean importance in the high-universal disregard with which pastoralists are treated in «developing» areas, a disregard which ranges from violent forms (Tibet, Kurdistan, or Kazakhstan), to less violent forms in the Sudan or East Africa.<sup>7</sup> Even if we take traditional anthropological self-definitions of the discipline's scientific role as the comparative (pre-industrial) dimension of the social sciences, they can only be said to have done this particular job very patchily, for the study of the diversity of human cultures can scarcely be said to have been carried out very systematically, or taken very far where it *has* been touched upon, when such major types of socio-cultural organization as hunting-and collecting, pastoralism, or hydraulic society have been, to one degree or another, severely neglected. The reason for this basically derives from the theoretical assumption that «societies» are atomic entities of equal comparative weight. They are rarely handled within the framework of any typology of societies, least of all within typologies of a

<sup>5</sup> Edmund LEACH, in his «Hydraulic Society in Ceylon», *Past and Present*, 15, pp. 2-26, make an exceptional, and very valuable, contribution, as an anthropologist, to this discussion.

<sup>6</sup> E.g. EVANS-PRITCHARD's *The Nuer*, 1949, and *The Sanusi of Cyrenaica*, 1949, Fredrik BARTH's *Political leadership among the Swat Pathans*, 1959, and *Nomads of South Persia*, 1961, D. J. STENNING, *Savannah Nomads*, 1959, and I. M. LEWIS' *A Pastoral Democracy*, 1961.

<sup>7</sup> See, e.g. «Settlement of Nomads in the Sudan: a Critique of Present Plans», T. ASAD, I. CUNNISON, and L. G. HILL, unpublished paper, Department of Social Anthropology, University of Khartoum, 1965; T. ASAD, «The seasonal movements of the Kababish of Northern Kordofan», *Sudan Notes and Records*, Vol. 46, 1965.

developmental nature, (except at the level of discussion of environmental/technological constraints).<sup>8</sup>

Comparative work, even at the level of regional studies, has also been very limited, with works like Schapera's *Government and Politics in Tribal Societies* (1950) or Mair's *Primitive Government* (1962) as notable exceptions. It is worth noting that, despite their titles, these are *not* about «tribal» or «primitive» politics, but are regional-comparative studies of Southern Africa and East Africa respectively. What usually passes for comparative works, is, at its lowest level, casual analogy from similar societies; at best, the delineation of parallel mechanisms in otherwise quite differing societies and social situations. These procedures are justified as something called «insights», sc. lack of theoretical system and rigour or isolated *aperçus*. At the very best, they are extremely valuable demonstrations, within a formalist framework, of universal mechanisms, e.g. the postulated segregation of affectual and authority relationships (Homans and Schneider), the resolution of conflict (Gluckman, Coser), the social handling of the biological phenomena of adolescence (Eisenstadt), etc., etc.

A few anthropologists have taken the major alternative open to those who seek to assert the distinctiveness of their discipline: they define it in terms of its techniques and methods, rather than in terms of substantive subject-matter. Firth, notably, has increasingly come to lay the stress, over the years, on anthropology as «micro-sociology,» rather than «the science of primitive society.»<sup>9</sup>

The relevant techniques and methods are, of course, first-hand participant observation, intensive study in depth and with restriction of range (both in time and place), and the case-study or the situational analysis, rather than extensive study, reliance on survey material, and upon secondary data. Such techniques and methods, though primarily, and fruitfully, developed by anthropologists, have now for so long been incorporated into the normal battery of investigatory and analytical procedures of sociologists that they no longer sharply define off the spheres of influence of two distinct disciplines. This crossing of the border-lines is, for the United States,

<sup>8</sup> E.g. Daryll FORDE's *Habitat, Economy and Society*, 1934, and later works by this author; or, at a somewhat more sophisticated comparative level, Julian STEWARD's «multilineal evolutionism» (*The Theory of Culture Change*, 1955).

<sup>9</sup> E.g. «The Future of Social Anthropology», *Man*, 1944:8; *The Elements of Social Organisation*, 1951, pp. 17 ff.

at least as old as the Chicago school of the 1920s, *Middletown*, Hawthorne, and *Street Corner Society*. A parallel convergence was delayed in Great Britain until after World War II. Since then, it has become on increasingly arbitrary operation to attempt to label specific social researchers as either «anthropologists» or «sociologists». These labels are more like ideal-typological poles at either end of a continuum — but the great majority of researchers fall increasingly in the «grey» area between.

The poles, however, remain. If social anthropology continues to uphold its traditional concern with the primitive, it must, inexorably, die out with its subject-matter, though this may take a long time still. It will become increasingly dependent on records of now-extinct societies, and therefore a branch of history. This does not take it out of the realm of the social sciences. (As Evans-Pritchard has correctly emphasized, historiography must become more sociological: history is not a domain of its own but a part of the social sciences.) But it will mean the progressive renunciation of concern with *contemporary* societies as these societies cease to exist. Truly, Maitland's apothegm that «anthropology must choose between being history and being nothing» will have proved prophetically accurate. It is noteworthy that the 1966 Conference of the British Association of Social Anthropologists was on the theme «Anthropological Studies of the Past.» If this option is taken, the entire realm of contemporary societies will become the province of sociology, as «primitive» societies become incorporated into «developing» nation-states and aggregations of nation-states, and of ideological, economic, political, etc. entities often cutting across nation-states, or subsuming them within blocs and groupings.

I would not wish for one moment to denigrate the value, for the social sciences as comparative disciplines, of the «rescue» operation of studying primitive societies before they do disappear. The writer himself has studied an Australian aboriginal community of only some 450 souls. Like most such communities today, however, they were very far from their pre-European condition. Yet there is something incongruous, not to say irresponsible, in the situation I found myself in recently, of discussing with an anthropologist his work on a tiny hunting-and-collecting band at the very foot of a huge mountain-area where half a million people produce a cash-crop which brought in for that country a not inconsiderable proportion of its foreign earnings, but whose land-tenure and land-usage system has never been properly studied, let alone their general culture

and social organisation. To take another striking example, no thorough study has yet been carried out by a sociologist/anthropologist of the enormous Gezira cotton-growing scheme in the Sudan Republic, which brings in some half of the Sudan's foreign earnings and which has been in existence since 1925, despite continuous anthropological research in that country by 'modern' social anthropologists over several decades.

The choice for anthropology is plain. If its practitioners do opt to become the comparative wing of general sociology, they will have to face central problems of theoretical re-orientation. Specifically, they will have to come to terms with the problem of developing a substitute for the structural functionalism which they have been criticising for twenty years, but for which no more powerful alternative has been generated within anthropology itself. In the light of what we know of the sociology of knowledge, and in the light of the traditional conceptions of the proper domain of the discipline, such theoretical innovations are unlikely to develop from within the closed world of anthropological theory. Hence, fruitful new lines of inquiry have notably borrowed theoretical guide-lines from other cognate disciplines: Lévi-Strauss and Leach from linguistics; Fallers, Geertz and others from Weber; Gluckman from Simmel. The work of Sahlins, Wolf and colleagues represents a somewhat different attempt to reintroduce problems of emergence and process, of typology and of development, in a word, of evolution. Unless anthropology grapples with development/evolution, it faces the fate of those animal species that became over-adapted to specialized environments.

A final note. Many of the strictures developed here — and others — could equally well be applied to past and current sociological studies. But that would be a separate task: I have, therefore, deliberately focussed on anthropology in this paper, not to single this discipline out for a critique equally relevant to other social sciences, but because the crisis has reached an advanced point in that particular discipline.



INTERDISCIPLINARY RESEARCHES AND COMMON  
MECHANISMS

RECHERCHES INTER-DISCIPLINAIRES ET MÉCANISMES  
COMMUNS

## COGNITIVE STRUCTURE AND COGNITIVE SITUATION

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Investigation of cognition as a social process involves elucidation of some fundamental methodological problems. In our view, a most important place in studying these problems should be attributed to studying the place and significance of cognition at each specific stage of social progress, and the related problem of individual and social cognition.

The cognitive systems which proceeded from gnosiological Robinson Crusoe — like theories ignored this problem altogether. Their authors treated cognition as a relation between two parties: the cognizing individual and the environment. Any third force could be merely an intruder. Francis Bacon formulated this approach clearly enough in his famous idol theory. Idols are, in fact, but social factors. They have intruded upon cognition and stirred up trouble in the clear source of knowledge, which is in immediate contact between individual man and nature, a series of scientific experiments to be carried out and comprehended by this individual. Thus, society has turned into a force not only alien to cognition but also one directly opposed to it.

In our approach to cognition as a social phenomenon we have to seek an answer to the question, where is the place of the individual in the process of gaining knowledge by society. It is known that any kind of intersubjective reasoning is neither available nor possible; the cognitive apparatus (allowing for the liberty of using this term) is the personal property of each individual. Whatever instruments and auxiliary facilities man places between himself and the object of cognition, the course of gaining knowledge can lead to the individual's mind alone, since awareness is nobody else's property.

The only way of solving this problem lies in treating the social factor as one immanent in the individual. This is just what K. Marx expressed in his well-known description of man as a totality of social relations. This is why it is the social relations that must be proceeded from in defining the individual's role in the process of cognition. In its turn, the individual's role in the process of cogni-

tion is a function of his status in the social structure of the society under consideration.

The reason of the above originates in the fact that cognition as a whole is merely a function of the process in which man transforms nature and himself.

We know that in «The Capital» Marx expressed the idea that every process of labour involving some man-made implements is primarily modeled in the human mind. We regard this idea as a starting point for the analysis of our problem.

As it is well known, production has always been, is and will always remain social in its nature. Man-made tools transform nature when they act as an integral system operated by society as a whole. An individual controls some component of this system as a member of society, and not as a solitary Robinson Crusoe. The size of his contribution to common work, the nature of implements operated by him personally, as well as the volume of the products of labour received by him, are determined by society.

Correspondingly, the ideal model of the labour process is a function of the transformation of the environment by labour with a system of man-made implements created by society. In other words, it is both the product and the property of society. Thus individual cognition is merely an element of the totality of social knowledge.

The process of social life is merely the result of purposeful human activities. Peoples make history, but they make it in accordance with some objective prerequisites, and not offhand. Still, the fact that history is the product of purposeful activities means that social activities also correspond to some mental models of such activities, and it is the social consciousness which serves as this mental model. The measure of the 'transparency' of social processes and, consequently, the adequacy of their reflection in the mental models are estimated relative to the level of the productive forces and the nature of the production relations. Still, these do not exclude purposefulness of social acts, these latter again being more than just a totality of individual actions of certain people. These are activities of numerous individuals linked together in some social organizations or institutions. Eventually, they make up the progress of society as an integral system. Thus again, it is not the individual but society which is the subject of its own cognition, while the cognition of the individual is only an element in the system.

And last, one should bear in mind that the individual's self-knowledge does not originate from his own acts of cognition, as

the content of a human personality is actually determined by the place occupied by the person in society. It is relative to the social status that the system of relations with nature, society, community, other people emerges, which is interpreted in self-knowledge. But this cognition is also exercised by society which works out a mental model of 'averaged man' to be adapted to by an individual.

One should not forget that human cognition itself, as man's way of gaining information of the environment, originates from society.

Human cognition is known to be a process of penetration into the significant ties and regularities existing among real objects and processes. It is in this feature that cognition of the world by man differs from the reflection of reality by any other living being. Animals perceive signals emitted by the surface of reflected objects. They need nothing else — they only adapt themselves to the environment. People transform the environment by employing man-made implements. Therefore they are to reflect in their mind the essence of what is being processed.

It goes without saying that cognition should not be restricted to the sphere of implements of labour. Still it is these objects that are found at the beginning of spiritual mastering of reality, as through them mankind gains contact with a certain sequence of somehow linked objects and processes. Hence the possibility of their cognition.

Naturally, such penetration into reality cannot be performed by one individual — the range of objects viewed by each single person is determined by the efforts of society as a whole rather than those exerted by himself.

Besides, it is society that determines the content of human cognition as it acts as the force which reveals in objects and processes of the real world the significant ties and regularities — those ties and regularities which are incarnated in the notions making up the content of our knowledge. Therefore it is the activities of society that are incarnated in the content of our knowledge. One can *a priori* imagine that in a society developing in another way due to some reasons the content of knowledge of the world would be different.

The place of the individual in the process of cognition is his participation in the social activities aimed at disclosing the inherent ties and regularities of reality.

In this process we encounter a fundamental dialectical contradiction. On the one hand, the individual cannot cognize any object

or process of the world outside society. On the other hand, society cannot get any knowledge without personal participation of individuals. It is only through the awareness of individuals that some information can materialize in words or other signs or systems of symbols and thus become the property of society as a whole.

This contradiction finds its expression in the difference between individual and social cognition.<sup>1</sup>

In this case and in the other cases cognition should be regarded as a process of gaining knowledge. For society cognition will consist only in the acquiring of information not yet materialized in any system of symbols. For the individual acquiring information already known to society but unfamiliar to the person will be cognition, while for society this process contains no cognition.

Still, the process of social cognition cannot occur otherwise than through some people who gain and code knowledge yet unknown to society. Naturally, the cognitive possibilities of society are in direct proportion to the number of people who cognize facts unknown to society and the course of social cognition. The course of this process being determined by the state of society, primarily by the level of the production forces and the nature of the production relations, it in its turn influences the course of producing material benefits and social relations. Thus, in the system made up by society a new subsystem emerges which provides for continuous expansion of the sphere of reality cognized by society.

This means that within the social structure there exists a specific element which supplies society as a whole and its individual members with knowledge. This element, in its turn, has a structural organization. That is why we consider that it is justified to postulate the existence in society of a certain specific cognitive structure which is characteristic of each phase.

In our view, the elements of the social cognitive structure include:

1. People engaged in gaining knowledge still unfamiliar to society and the method of their communication embodied in the institutes into which they are organized.

<sup>1</sup> The notion of «social cognition» is polysemantic as used in modern literature on philosophy. Thus, in some highly competent works it is treated as a synonym of the notion „social consciousness”. Other authors ascribe this term the meaning of cognizing social phenomena. Apart from criticizing these interpretations, we stress that in the present paper the term „social consciousness” has been chosen as the most convenient designation of cognition whose subject is society as a whole.

2. People and institutes engaged in consolidating and disseminating knowledge already available to society.
3. Channels of communication through which knowledge is disseminated in society.
4. The material and logic-methodological possibilities of cognition.
5. Means of supplying people engaged in producing and disseminating knowledge as well as implements and instruments necessary for their functioning with material benefits, energy, etc.
6. Social possibilities of gaining new knowledge.
7. The method for inculcating knowledge in the practical activities of society.

The analysis of the components of the cognitive situation testifies to the fact that we deal with groups of people engaged in a certain type of activity, the relations of these people among themselves and with the rest of society, and a certain state of people as individuals and society as a whole. Thus, the cognitive structure of society remains within the boundaries of purely social relations.

The cognitive structure is a function of the social structure. Like any other social phenomenon, the cognitive structure is eventually determined by the development of the production forces, since it is production of material benefits with implementation of man-made tools which gives rise to cognition in general and thus causes the need for a cognitive structure. Naturally, the specific level of this production affects the associated social cognitive structure, both directly and through intermediate links.

The production forces determine the cognitive structure of society primarily through the segment of reality which, directly or indirectly, is within the reach of society. Yet, the cognitive structure is determined not by the nature of these objects but by the contradiction between the measure of power exercised by society over them and the need for a measure of power dictated by the needs of society at this phase of development. This contradiction gives rise to what we should like to call the cognitive need of society. This term is used to denote the tasks set before society by the degree of resistance offered by objects to all kinds of social activities directed at these objects.

On the other hand, it is the productive forces that create the set of instruments designed to meet the need for cognition.

Available instruments of cognition make people organize in a certain way to operate them with the aim of achieving cognitive

aims. This is how the cognitive structure of society emerges.

Still, it would be utterly erroneous to see the source of the social cognitive structure in the production forces alone. These latter merely make the basis of a need and the prerequisites of satisfying it. The actual realization of the cognitive structure takes place within the production relations. They determine on which of the cognitive needs the labour and material resources of the given society will be concentrated. Cognitive institutes and organizations emerge within the limits of these relations. The production relations inhibit or promote the emergence of a cognitive structure conditioned by a given complex of production forces. By the way, this is one of the influences exercised by the production relations on the production forces.

One should also bear in mind that the production relations themselves create objects of cognition and cognitive needs. Therefore, some of the creative ability of the production forces is realized indirectly, through the relations among people in society.

Finally, one cannot help remembering that the social superstructure also effects both the objects of cognition and cognitive needs and the means of satisfying the cognitive needs.

The superstructure is also characterized by a specific role in forming the cognitive structure, which consists in the fact that it is through the superstructure alone — its activity or inertia — that realization of knowledge gained through the cognitive structure takes place in specific social activities.

The dynamics of the cognitive structure can be eventually traced to the development of society's production forces and it is associated with the progress of the production relations and social superstructure. To sum up, the cognitive structure is a structural element of the socio-economic formation.

Modern mechanized production, rapidly automated and developed along scientific lines, causes sharp division of labour. Society becomes a complex differentiated system. The process of producing material benefits, which is an indispensable prerequisite of society, has become multistaged, both materially and spiritually.

The former statement means that transformation of natural resources into material benefits involves a situation in which people directly engaged in this transformation must be served by a huge social machinery producing implements of labour, tools to produce these implements, power, etc. Only a smaller part of society can influence nature directly, the others are to serve them or continue

processing the raw materials extracted by them. There emerges an interesting dialectical contradiction: the wider the humanized segment of reality the narrower the sphere of individual human activities due to differentiation of trades and social functions.

As the production forces progress and the production relations develop with accumulation of knowledge the number of stages in the process of cognition increases both in time and space.

The former means that each generation masters some stage of knowledge, some level of relative truth. This level is incarnated in the content of the stock of notions available to the given generation and transferred by it to its descendants. For the subsequent generations the content of the notions transferred to them is the initial step in their penetration into things and processes. Thus, every available notion is kind of a flight of stairs the steps of which represent the ancestors' achievements; thus culture as a whole becomes a continuous staircase every step of which is a segment of the Universe spiritually mastered by mankind and the degree of society's self-knowledge.

Spatial multiplicity means that the very process of cognition is broken down in each of its phases. Division of labour also appears here. The process of still deeper penetration into the regularities of objects and processes turns into an extremely complex kind of spiritual production in which each individual participant plays his own specific role. In other words, the cognition of a process or object involves more and more people who are not in immediate contact with this object or process.

In the sphere of spiritual production we encounter the same contradiction: the wider and the more thorough the knowledge, the relatively smaller the role of a single person in the process of gaining and implementing this knowledge.

Thus emerges a cognitive structure reminding one of a system of sharpened wedges driven into reality. Gaining knowledge of nature becomes the business of a specific institute-science to be more exact, of a system of natural sciences served by considerable social forces enjoying the fruits of science. Science itself is also differentiated: it turns into a kind of social system which immediately contacts reality with only some of its elements. Hence the ever increasing importance of the channels of communication in society.

The cognitive structure appears as the source of the individual's opportunities and possibilities to occupy a certain place in the process of cognition. The system of these will be further termed



the cognitive situation. Thus, the cognitive situation is one determining the place available for occupation by the individual in the process of social cognition.

We assume that the production relations in given society are the immediate source of the cognitive situation. They determine the material and spiritual opportunities of an individual in this society. For instance, the nature of the production relations will predetermine what groups of people will get sufficient education, will avail of necessary time for cognition or merely familiarizing with knowledge, what methods will be used to encourage concentration of scientific effort in certain directions, etc...

Hence, an understanding of the individual's place in the process of cognition is possible only upon realization of the sequence of dependencies: from the cognitive need to the cognitive structure, and from the cognitive structure to the cognitive situation.

It is the dynamics of the cognitive situation that makes the dynamics of the individual's place in the process of cognition.

Thus, the cognitive situation associated with the feudal method of production is characterized by immediate contact of each person with natural objects (which are sure to have been dealt with by society) and by an exclusive association with the channel through which information of the model of the world was communicated, that is, the church. Lack of differentiation in production and social life determines the identity of the objects of cognition, both natural objects and social psychology hypostated in religion, and determines the relative identity of individual spiritual lives. The opportunities of gaining a position in the cognitive structure are limited and generally reduced to some appointments within the church hierarchy. Moreover, these opportunities are further limited by the individual's social status which is the true determinant of his place in society as a whole.

The gigantic scope of modern culture has caused a cognitive situation in which the individual is, generally speaking, capable of acquiring vast knowledge of nature and society without a single perceptual contact with natural phenomena and being connected with other people only through channels of communication and objects in which human labour is realized.

And yet, all acts of cognition will eventually merge into a single stock of knowledge of nature and society, a stock belonging to society as a whole while the bulk of information making up this stock of knowledge will never be known to any single member of

society. Thus, distribution of information through communication channels is becoming still more important for the process of cognition.

The process of expanding cognition differentiates accumulation and implementation of knowledge to a still greater extent. Not merely distinction between mental and physical labour is effective; within mental labour scientific theory is differentiated from applied science, science from technology, professionalization of learning from guidance of production and social processes, etc...

As far as the individual as the subject of cognition is concerned, this means a vast matrix of cognitive possibilities.

First, there emerges the possibility of mastering various levels of culture. People may possess information at different temporal levels of cognition. For instance, one person knows the scientific aspect of a phenomenon, another possesses common knowledge, while a third has no knowledge of it at all.

Second, the individual is now valued by his role at the spacial level of cognition. He may occupy some position either in the process of spiritual production or in the process of material production; and the sphere of knowledge in which he participates will conform to his position.

The personal process of cognition basically becomes one of gaining knowledge symbolized in some systems of signs, that is knowledge already accumulated by mankind. It is not through immediate contact with things and processes as they are, but through notions of these things and processes materialized in words, that a greater part of the Universe is cognized. The process of individual accumulation of information stored by mankind takes most of the cognizing subject's time. Still we should bear in mind that most people gain no new, that is, unknown to mankind, knowledge at all.

Hence the invaluable significance of the system of widespread communications, both for the individual and the whole of mankind. It is this system which determines numerous spiritual characteristics of the individual's personality today. It can mislead one and thus guide the person towards erroneous historical acts. Vice versa, a system supplying the individual with true scientific facts of nature and society serves the cause of progress.

The concept of the cognitive structure and the cognitive situation cannot be discussed here in every detail. Its development involves much effort, but the results of such efforts may be fruitful.

## RECHERCHES INTERDISCIPLINAIRES SUR L'ARGUMENTATION

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Une condition indispensable à la fécondité des recherches interdisciplinaires est l'existence d'une théorie qui assure, à la fois, la terminologie et les perspectives des études empiriques ou expérimentales. Sans une telle théorie, les différentes disciplines risquent d'examiner des phénomènes différents ou, du moins, des phénomènes dont il serait difficile de déterminer en quoi ils correspondent à ceux qu'étudie une autre discipline. C'est ainsi que les études bien connues de Festinger et de son école sur la dissonance<sup>1</sup> permettent difficilement leur mise en rapport avec la contradiction, telle qu'elle est définie en logique formelle et l'incompatibilité, telle qu'elle a été définie dans la théorie de l'argumentation<sup>2</sup>.

Pendant de nombreuses années, les études concernant la psychologie du raisonnement ont ignoré complètement l'apport de la logique moderne. C'est le grand mérite de J. Piaget d'avoir, à la fois par son propre effort et par la collaboration avec des logiciens de métier, mis la psychologie en contact avec la logique. De même la sociologie de la connaissance, dont l'intérêt est indéniable, a souffert grandement de l'absence d'une théorie du raisonnement non-formel. Car il va de soi que le raisonnement formel, tel qu'il est analysé par la théorie moderne de la démonstration, ne peut, par sa nature même, être influencé par les conditions psychologiques et sociologiques de la connaissance. Le raisonnement formel est impersonnel et intemporel, ce qui permet de le concevoir en termes platoniciens ou en termes purement formalistes. Seule une théorie de l'argumentation permet de cerner avec précision les points d'impact où les éléments psychologiques et sociologiques exercent une influence indéniable.

<sup>1</sup> L. FESTINGER, *Theory of Cognitive Dissonance*, Evanston, Row and Peterson, 1957 et Jack W. BREHM and Arthur R. COHEN, *Explorations in Cognitive Dissonance*, London and New York, Wiley and Sons, 1962.

<sup>2</sup> Ch. PERELMAN et L. OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, *Traité de l'argumentation*, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1958, § 46.

L'argumentation a pour objet l'étude des techniques discursives visant à gagner ou à renforcer l'adhésion des esprits aux thèses que l'on présente à leur assentiment<sup>3</sup>. Toute argumentation suppose un orateur, celui qui présente un discours (lequel peut d'ailleurs être communiqué aussi bien par écrit que verbalement), un auditoire, ceux que vise l'argumentation (et qui peut s'identifier avec l'orateur dans la délibération intime) et une fin, l'adhésion à une thèse ou l'accroissement de l'intensité de l'adhésion, devant créer une disposition à l'action et, s'il y a lieu, déclencher une action immédiate.

Cette présentation synthétique des bases de la théorie de l'argumentation révèle immédiatement le grand nombre de notions qui y concernent directement la psychologie du raisonnement, la psychologie sociale et la dynamique des relations humaines. Dans notre traité nous avons eu, à maintes reprises, l'occasion de faire état d'études psychologiques relatives au prestige et à la crédibilité de l'orateur, à l'influence de l'ordre de présentation des arguments, au rôle du milieu dans leur acceptation. Dans une très dense contribution au volume consacré à la théorie de l'argumentation, et publié par le Centre Belge de Recherches de Logique<sup>4</sup>, M. Apostel a relevé plusieurs théories psychologiques et sociologiques qui pourraient être utilement appliquées à l'étude des thèses de la théorie de l'argumentation. Son article, intitulé «Rhétorique, psychosociologie et logique»<sup>5</sup>, examine successivement des travaux consacrés à la dynamique des attitudes et des croyances, à la dynamique des groupes et à la théorie de l'information; il présente plusieurs hypothèses concernant leur application possible à l'étude de l'efficacité des schèmes argumentatifs.

Si nous n'étions pas limité par le temps, nous pourrions examiner systématiquement tous les aspects de la théorie de l'argumentation susceptibles d'une étude interdisciplinaire. Qu'il nous suffise actuellement de signaler quelques-uns de ces aspects, parmi les plus remarquables.

Parmi les préalables de l'argumentation, il faut retenir le désir de persuader, celui d'écouter et de se laisser convaincre, l'existence d'un langage commun à l'orateur et à l'auditoire. À quel moment, dans quelles circonstances ces différents éléments apparaissent-ils?

<sup>3</sup> Cf. *Traité de l'argumentation*, p. 5.

<sup>4</sup> *La théorie de l'argumentation, perspectives et applications*, Louvain, Nauwelaerts, 1963, 614 pages.

<sup>5</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 263-314.

Comment s'effectue le passage du commandement à la persuasion ? Quelles sont les conditions psychologiques et sociologiques qui favorisent ce passage ? Il y aurait lieu de distinguer, à ce propos, les conditions qui favorisent une argumentation libre, des procédures qui instituent, dans une société, dans certains cas et pour certaines situations, un contact obligatoire entre orateur et auditoire. Il suffit de penser, à ce propos, aux institutions politiques et religieuses, à l'instruction obligatoire, ainsi qu'à toutes les procédures prévues par le droit, tant national qu'international, et qui favorisent un contact des esprits, tantôt unilatéral, tantôt bilatéral, comme dans un procès ou dans la discussion.

Les problèmes du langage, en tant qu'instrument de communication et d'argumentation, peuvent susciter des études de linguistes et de sociologues. À côté d'un langage commun et profane, on constate l'existence de langues sacrées, de langues techniques, dont les interférences avec la langue commune, à l'occasion de processus d'argumentation, méritent une analyse minutieuse. Un cas typique de telle interférence serait fourni par le langage juridique, présenté tantôt comme un langage hermétique, à l'usage des seuls initiés, et tantôt comme un langage accessible à tous. La matière dont interagissent, en droit, l'usage commun et l'usage technique d'une même notion pourrait être utilement rapprochée de la manière dont les notions philosophiquement élaborées modifient l'usage commun des notions telles que *réalité*, *liberté*, *essence*, *existence*, *nature*, *Dieu* etc.

Toute argumentation, pour être efficace, doit s'appuyer sur des thèses admises par l'auditoire. Comment l'intensité d'adhésion peut-elle être mesurée ou, du moins, appréciée ? Dans quelle mesure, et dans quelles circonstances, les membres d'un auditoire socialement organisé sont-ils, à ce propos, solidaires les uns des autres ? Y a-t-il des personnes dont l'avis est plus représentatif, et comment cette représentativité peut-elle être connue ? Dans quelle mesure peut-on faire fond sur des affirmations antérieures d'une personne ou d'un groupe ? Dans quelles circonstances peut-on, au contraire, s'attendre à un changement d'avis ou d'attitude ? Quel est, à ce propos, le rôle du principe d'inertie<sup>6</sup>, qui permet de tabler sur la continuité des opinions, que l'on n'abandonne pas sans raison, et de la règle de justice<sup>7</sup>, qui exige le traitement égal de situations essentielle-

<sup>6</sup> Cf. *Traité de l'argumentation*, pp. 142-144.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, § 52.

ment semblables? L'on connaît l'importance du *précédent* dans la vie sociale, et spécialement dans la vie juridique. Par des analyses de méthodologie des sciences on pourrait préciser son importance également dans toutes les disciplines intellectuelles. Une telle étude serait spécialement utile, me semble-t-il, pour clarifier une notion propre à la théorie de l'argumentation, celle de *force* d'un argument. Cette notion est étrangère à la théorie de la démonstration, qui ne connaît que des preuves correctes, c'est à dire conformes aux règles, et des preuves qui ne le sont pas. Or il ne suffit pas, dans l'argumentation, de se conformer à une règle pour aboutir à une conclusion contraignante. Des arguments sont forts ou faibles. Comment faut-il apprécier cette force ou cette faiblesse? Faut-il l'identifier avec l'efficacité d'une argumentation, mais celle-ci ne peut être déterminée que relativement à un auditoire déterminé. Faut-il la ramener à la notion de validité, celle-ci étant déterminable par la probabilité calculable de la conclusion? Mais tous les arguments ne peuvent pas être réduits à un schéma de probabilité: il serait certes intéressant de voir quels arguments peuvent être formalisés et quelles seraient les conditions de cette formalisation.

Pour qu'un argument ait quelque effet, il faut qu'il soit perçu comme pertinent. Comment peut-on définir cette notion? Peut-on la concevoir directement ou indirectement, en se servant de la notion d'*irrelevance*? Peut-on la cerner dans les différentes disciplines où il en est fait usage?

Alors que la preuve démonstrative, qui est contraignante, rend indubitable le rapport des prémisses à la conclusion, l'argumentation n'étant jamais contraignante, on peut se demander dans quelle mesure une tentative d'argumenter en faveur d'une thèse risque, au contraire, d'ébranler la confiance que l'on a en elle. Qui s'excuse s'accuse, dit-on. Et effectivement le fait de discuter la réputation d'un homme prouve qu'elle est discutable, qu'elle n'est pas hors discussion. Quand y a-t-il lieu d'argumenter en faveur d'une thèse, qu'est-ce qui provoque sa mise en discussion? Un même problème se pose d'ailleurs pour les définitions: quand cherche-t-on à définir une notion? quand suppose-t-on, au contraire, qu'elle est suffisamment claire pour ne pas devoir être définie? Comme toute argumentation, qu'il s'agisse de délibération intime ou de discussion publique, empiète sur le temps de l'action, qu'elle doit préparer ou déclencher, la mise en question des décisions et parfois même des notions, ne peut être abandonnée à l'arbitraire de chacun. On conçoit que certaines questions ne puissent pas être mises en discus-

sion, et surtout pas remises en question, en tout cas pas à tout moment. Aristote se demande, dans les *Topiques*, quel genre de questions peuvent être discutées. Pour lui, on ne doit pas discuter avec celui qui demande s'il faut respecter ses parents ou si les dieux existent: on doit le châtier. En droit, la chose jugée est celle que l'on ne peut pas remettre en question, sauf dans des circonstances exceptionnelles. L'on comprend que dans une société, soucieuse d'efficacité, l'on règle par des coutumes et des procédures le désir de dialoguer indéfiniment, qui peut se donner libre cours dans des dialogues de morts. C'est pourquoi des études historiques et sociologiques concernant les procédures de discussion, les participants, l'objet, le temps et le lieu, procédures qui débouchent bien souvent sur un règlement juridique, ne manquent pas d'intérêt. Qui peut prendre la parole en telle ou telle circonstance, quelles sont les règles auxquelles il doit se soumettre, quelle est l'origine et la portée de ces règles, comment et pourquoi évoluent-elles? On constatera à ce propos de remarquables variations, depuis la cérémonie religieuse, où l'usage du discours est réglé dans le moindre détail, jusqu'au libre échange de propos entre amis de longue date.

L'esprit critique, nous dit-on, peut s'appliquer à n'importe quel objet. Cela n'est pas entièrement vrai, même aujourd'hui, dans les milieux les plus libres; cela n'a certainement pas été le cas dans la plupart des sociétés historiquement connues. Comment et pourquoi l'esprit critique envahit-il de nouveaux domaines? Pourquoi certaines critiques, à certaines époques, sont-elles sans portée et d'autres, fort semblables parfois, ont-elles une portée révolutionnaire, en politique, en science ou en religion?

Les types d'arguments utilisés, ainsi que leur efficacité, varient-ils avec les milieux, les époques et les disciplines, et comment peut-on les classer? Peut-on distinguer des styles dans l'argumentation, tels les styles classique et romantique, que nous avons cherché à définir et à opposer grâce à l'usage de lieux communs fondés sur la quantité et sur la qualité?<sup>8</sup>

Certains arguments — que nous avons appelés quasi-logiques — semblent tirer leur validité de ce qu'ils évoquent des raisonnements formels, logiques ou mathématiques. On peut se demander si cela

<sup>8</sup> Cf. *Traité de l'argumentation*, § 25, ainsi que l'article «Classicisme et romantisme dans l'argumentation», *Revue Internationale de Philosophie*, 1958, pp. 47-57.

implique que les schèmes formels soient connus, comme tels, des utilisateurs, si les schèmes qui sous-tendent un argument donné sont les mêmes chez l'orateur et chez les divers auditeurs; on peut d'ailleurs se demander à quelles époques, dans quels milieux, ce type d'argument est particulièrement en honneur. À mon avis, ce sont des époques qui n'ont pas encore atteint la pleine conscience d'un raisonnement formellement rigoureux, mais ceci n'est qu'une hypothèse à vérifier.

Lorsque nous rencontrons des arguments particuliers qui nous paraissent inefficaces et périmés, voire ridicules, pouvons-nous discerner ce qui, dans notre réaction à leur égard, est dû à une transformation de nos connaissances, à une modification des valeurs admises, elle-même liée peut-être à une modification de structure sociale?

Tous les schèmes argumentatifs sont-ils également aptes à nous révéler ces modifications? Certains types d'argument, tel l'argument par l'analogie, ne sont-ils pas privilégiés à cet égard?

Le problème de l'argument périmé, inadapté, rejoint évidemment celui de l'argument utilisé dans des sociétés fort éloignées des nôtres. Les argumentations que celles-ci utilisent ne peuvent-elles pas nous révéler non seulement leurs opinions admises, mais aussi leurs valeurs et leur structure sociale? Mais, à ce propos, se pose un problème plus général encore. Y a-t-il des types importants d'arguments qui sont inconnus dans ces sociétés, ou qui ne s'y présentent que sous des avatars qui les rendent méconnaissables? Quelles formes prennent, par exemple, les dissociations<sup>9</sup> (telle l'opposition entre apparence et réalité) dans les sociétés primitives? À quelles incompatibilités permettent-elles de trouver une solution?

Existe-t-il un ordre prescrit dans l'usage des arguments ou un ordre que l'on puisse considérer comme le plus efficace? Dans quelles mesure, et pour quelle raison, l'ordre des arguments peut-il influencer sur l'efficacité du discours? De même, quelle est l'influence du fait que l'on est le premier, ou le dernier, à prendre la parole au cours d'un débat? Y a-t-il un ordre de préséances dans ces questions, et comment est-il établi? On conçoit que toutes ces questions puissent être réglées, et le soient bien souvent grâce à des traditions et à des conventions. Quels sont les domaines qui y échappent? Dans les disciplines ayant pour objet la recherche de la vérité toutes ces questions sont-elles sans importance?

<sup>9</sup> Cf. *Traité de l'argumentation*, §§ 89-93.



Toutes les disciplines scientifiques doivent, pour progresser, élaborer des hypothèses que l'on soumettra à l'épreuve de l'expérience. Le choix de ces hypothèses est-il arbitraire ou est-il guidé par des raisons qui relèvent de l'argumentation? Remarquons, à ce propos, que la formulation même de l'hypothèse nécessite le recours à un langage qui servira, par après, à décrire l'expérience qui devrait la contrôler. Ce langage résulte d'une tradition scientifique qui a permis son élaboration: il existe, en effet, une dialectique de la théorie et de l'expérience, qui s'effectue par l'intermédiaire du langage élaboré et modifié par l'homme de science. Dans la mesure où cette dialectique recourt à des structures conceptuelles, qui intègrent les résultats de l'expérience et du calcul, le rôle qu'y jouent les techniques argumentatives ne peut être nié. Quels sont les types d'arguments qui interviennent dans l'élaboration des sciences inductives? Leur rôle, quand il s'agit de sciences expérimentales, semble, à plusieurs, concerner plus l'invention des hypothèses que la preuve de leur bien-fondé. Ceci est surtout vrai des sciences inductives, qui supposent l'existence de régularités permettant la prévision et le contrôle. Mais ce n'est pas le cas des disciplines, telle l'histoire, qui étudient les faits non-répétables, des sciences humaines, dont il est difficile de dégager des régularités suffisamment isolées de leur contexte pour les rendre comparables. Dans ce cas, les sciences devront se contenter de présomptions que l'on voudrait précises, nombreuses et concordantes. Parfois même, quand ce sont des visions globales de l'homme et de l'univers qui se trouvent confrontées, comme dans une anthropologie philosophique ou une ontologie, les rapports entre les thèses philosophiques et ce qu'on pourrait vérifier, à leur propos, est très indirect, car ce sont deux ensembles d'arguments que l'on oppose l'un à l'autre. Comment apprécier la force de ces arguments? Existe-t-il des critères de validité ou de la force de ces arguments? Existe-t-il des critères de validité ou de probabilité, indépendants des systèmes philosophiques, et qui permettraient de départager les points de vue en présence? Une étude historique et analytique des systèmes philosophiques, ainsi que des arguments qu'ils écartent ou qu'ils favorisent, jetterait certainement des lumières sur cette délicate question<sup>10</sup>.

L'utilité qu'il y aurait à formaliser et à soumettre au calcul divers

<sup>10</sup> Cf. mon article «L'argument pragmatique», *Logique et Analyse*, 1958, pp. 14-23.

types d'arguments est indéniable. Mais cette formalisation, qui nécessite toujours des hypothèses préalables qui rendraient possible la réduction d'un raisonnement non-formel à un raisonnement formel, suppose une prise de position préalable concernant l'importance de ce qui est négligé suite à la réduction au formel. Remarquons que ces prises de position, quand elles sont d'une portée générale sont solidaires d'une philosophie discutable, mais elles sont beaucoup plus facilement acceptées quand elles sont d'une portée plus réduite, méthodologique, pour ainsi dire. Si l'utilitarisme, en général, est une philosophie fort controversée, il est beaucoup plus facile d'admettre la valeur du critère de l'utilité pour comparer des solutions à des problèmes particuliers. C'est la raison pour laquelle l'accord sera plus facile, dans les sciences et les techniques particulières, sur l'utilisation de certains types d'arguments et sur le fait d'en écarter d'autres, que dans les argumentations de portée philosophique. L'étude des arguments qui accompagnent les tentatives de réduction jetterait des lumières non-négligeables sur la méthodologie des sciences et des techniques, comparée à celle de la pensée philosophique.

Nous avons souligné, dans le *Traité de l'argumentation*, l'importance de la présence pour l'efficacité de l'argumentation<sup>11</sup>. L'étude psychologique de la manière dont la *présentation* de certains faits les rend présents à la conscience, et influe par là sur l'efficacité d'une argumentation, ne serait pas sans portée pour la stylistique. Beaucoup de figures traditionnelles de la rhétorique pourraient être examinées du point de vue de leur efficacité argumentative. D'une façon générale, en rapprochant les diverses figures de rhétorique des schèmes argumentatifs auxquels elles se rattachent, on pourrait tâcher de déterminer leur impact sur tel ou tel type d'auditoire, indiquer les cas où leur usage est peu approprié et les cas où il est indispensable. D'ailleurs des études stylistiques et autres devraient être entreprises pour mettre en évidence la manière dont forme et fond interagissent dans l'esprit d'un auditoire. Dans quelle mesure les variations de forme sont-elles possibles sans impliquer des variations sur le fond, dans quelle mesure les deux sont-elles indissociables? Ces problèmes mériteraient une étude différenciée selon les domaines, en allant de diverses disciplines scientifiques jusqu'à la publicité commerciale.

La psychologie, la psycho-pathologie et la philosophie pourraient

<sup>11</sup> Cf. *Traité de l'argumentation*, § 29.

sans doute nous aider à préciser la notion de *raisonnable*, qui ne se conçoit que dans le contexte d'une argumentation. Qu'est-ce qu'un choix ou une décision raisonnable? Qu'est-ce que rationaliser ou présenter comme raisonnable ce qui ne le serait pas effectivement? Qu'est-ce qu'une interprétation raisonnable d'un phénomène, d'un symbole, d'un texte, d'un comportement? La notion de raisonnable peut-elle être exprimée ou définie en termes psychologiques, sociologiques ou philosophiques? Ces divers points de vue se recouvrent-ils ou ne sont-ils que partiellement superposables? Quels sont les rapports d'une théorie psychanalytique de l'interprétation avec les schèmes argumentatifs? L'on sait l'importance que l'école du Dr. Lacan attache à ces questions.

Ce faible échantillonnage de problèmes relevant de l'argumentation, et qui pourraient faire l'objet de recherches interdisciplinaires, a montré, je l'espère, qu'il s'agit là d'un champ d'investigations à la fois fort étendu et très peu exploré.

Il est évident que la formulation théorique sous-jacente à la formulation des schèmes expérimentaux et l'analyse des observations, relève d'une même pensée structurée, capable de réaliser l'adaptation et la synthèse de ces deux aspects essentiels de la connaissance scientifique.

Pour cela, l'économétrie est amenée d'abord à reconnaître le domaine de l'analyse mathématique dont elle dérive essentiellement la portée scientifique: les théories sont alors basées sur des concepts expérimentaux ce qui les adapte aux possibilités expérimentales et accroît leur efficacité dans l'étude des problèmes sociaux. En outre, l'économétrie rapproche expérimentation et théorie en empruntant les méthodes de la statistique mathématique, après les avoir transformées et adaptées en vue des objectifs qui lui sont propres.

Il s'agit d'accorder généralement pour reconnaître — d'une façon certes schématisée — trois niveaux à la connaissance que l'on peut acquérir d'un phénomène déterminé. Cette connaissance pourra être de nature simplement descriptive, avoir un contenu explicatif ou, dans la mesure où elle est reproductible, avoir un contenu prévisionnel; dans ce cas elle sera opératoire.

<sup>1</sup> Dans cette communication, notre intention dominante a été de décrire les recherches fondamentales de l'approche économétrique, afin de faciliter une reconnaissance et un échange interdisciplinaires.

<sup>2</sup> Voir le sous-page 106.

SUR LE CONTENU ET LA PORTÉE  
DE L'APPROCHE ÉCONOMÉTRIQUE <sup>1</sup>

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1. L'économétrie est née du souci de mieux fonder la connaissance et l'action en économie. Elle a certes profité des apports de l'économie mathématique et de la statistique; mais ces deux disciplines, dans leur développement autonome, n'avaient pas su réaliser l'intégration, pourtant nécessaire, de l'approche théorique et de l'approche expérimentale <sup>2</sup> dans le domaine économique. Pareille réalisation, qui constitue le gage de toute connaissance efficace, suppose évidemment que la formulation théorique aussi bien que la formulation des schémas expérimentaux et l'analyse des observations, relèvent d'une même pensée coordonnée, capable de réaliser l'adaptation et la synthèse de ces deux aspects essentiels de la connaissance scientifique.

Pour cela, l'économétrie est amenée d'abord à recouvrir le domaine de l'économie mathématique dont elle élargit sensiblement la portée scientifique: les théories sont alors fondées sur des concepts opérationnels, ce qui les adapte aux possibilités expérimentales et accroît leur efficacité dans l'étude des problèmes concrets. En outre, l'économétrie rapproche expérimentation et théorie en empruntant les méthodes de la statistique mathématique, après les avoir transformées et adaptées en vue des objectifs qui lui sont propres.

2. On s'accorde généralement pour reconnaître — d'une façon certes schématique — trois niveaux à la connaissance que l'on peut acquérir d'un phénomène déterminé. Cette connaissance pourra être de nature simplement descriptive, avoir un contenu explicatif ou, dans la mesure où elle est reproductible, avoir un contenu prévisionnel; dans ce sens elle sera opératoire.

<sup>1</sup> Dans cette communication notre intention dominante a été de dégager les démarches fondamentales de l'approche économétrique, afin de faciliter une confrontation et un échange interdisciplinaires.

<sup>2</sup> Voir la note page 160.

Ces catégories s'appliquent évidemment à la connaissance économique qui, afin de dépasser le stade simplement descriptif, doit avoir recours au concept de modèle. Pour isoler les phénomènes économiques et en établir des représentations abstraites, donc des modèles, on est dès lors conduit tout naturellement à envisager une réalité économique déterminée, c'est-à-dire une tranche de l'économie concrète dans une perspective temporelle, sous forme d'un système évoluant dans le temps, composé :

- a) d'un ensemble de faits pouvant être considérés comme internes (ou endogènes) à la réalité considérée et qui permettent ainsi de la caractériser;
- b) d'un ensemble de faits externes (ou exogènes), caractérisant l'environnement, et qui sont en interaction avec les faits internes;
- c) d'un ensemble de relations entre faits internes et externes, relations qui traduisent justement les interactions existant entre les faits internes eux-mêmes, entre les faits externes et entre les deux catégories de faits.

Dans son évolution, un tel système — muni de «dispositifs endogènes» de régulation — se transforme; les faits et les relations — de nature quantitative et qualitative — se modifient, les limites mêmes entre les deux catégories de faits se déplacent.

La construction d'un modèle économétrique — sa spécification — s'inspire de ce découpage du réel qu'elle adapte et ajuste pour mettre en évidence des relations ayant une portée explicative, voire prévisionnelle. Ces relations auront une portée *explicative* dans la mesure où elles permettent de démonter et de reconstruire les mécanismes fondamentaux qui régissent les transformations du système. Elles auront une portée *prévisionnelle et opératoire* dans la mesure où elles permettent de mettre en évidence celle que l'on peut appeler la «structure invariante» du système. La notion de structure invariante n'aura généralement de sens que dans une perspective temporelle donnée; d'où le caractère relatif, par rapport à un horizon temporel déterminé, de la portée opératoire du modèle. De ces hypothèses d'invariance structurelle dépendent en fait la portée des méthodes d'induction utilisées ainsi que la portée opératoire du modèle.

Il est bien naturel qu'en raison de la complexité et de la mobilité du réel, on ne parvienne pas, en général, à appréhender dans leur totalité les mécanismes fondamentaux. On ne retiendra donc qu'une partie des faits et des relations. Le découpage d'après les catégories envisagées ci-dessus, la mise en évidence des invariants du

système ainsi que leur permanence sont évidemment liés à ce choix; celui-ci se trouve lui-même conditionné par la nature des utilisations envisagées.

La nature de l'explication cherchée (statique ou dynamique, par exemple), de même que le niveau auquel elle se situe (microéconomique ou macroéconomique), nous sont également dictés par l'impossibilité d'appréhender les phénomènes dans leur totalité. Quel que soit le degré d'élaboration du modèle, et à défaut de pouvoir atteindre une représentation parfaitement fidèle du phénomène, nous devons nous contenter de représentations partielles, dont la structure et la portée explicative sont largement fonction de la classe de conclusions que l'on a en vue. Le choix des faits et des relations, leur mise en évidence, qui traduit la façon de décomposer les phénomènes et de démonter les mécanismes des lois économiques, dépendront ainsi des utilisations particulières du modèle que l'on a en vue, d'ou le caractère orienté de nos modèles. On aura par exemple des modèles de prévision à court terme, à moyen et à long terme, des modèles de politique économique, de programmation, de décision, etc., modèles dont la structure variera en même temps que la nature et le niveau de l'explication théorique qui préside à leur spécification. En raison même du caractère partiel de nos connaissances face à la complexité de la réalité économique, tous ces modèles seront contraints de se fonder sur des hypothèses largement simplificatrices. Ils seront toutefois dominés par le même souci de dégager des structures invariantes jouissant d'une certaine permanence pour qu'elles aient une portée explicative et opératoire.

3. La description d'un système économique dans son évolution temporelle suppose que l'on puisse rattacher aux différents faits qui le caractérisent un certain nombre de variables. D'un point de vue simplement descriptif et en supposant qu'il s'agit de variables observables, on pourra alors caractériser un système donné à l'époque  $t$  par un ensemble de variables endogènes

$$(y_j; j = 1, 2, \dots, m)$$

et un ensemble de variables exogènes

$$(x_i; i = 1, 2, \dots, n).$$

À l'époque  $t$  les premières représentent l'état du système, tandis que les secondes traduisent les éléments extérieurs, l'environnement du système.

Quant à la mise en évidence de la structure invariante du système, elle donnera lieu dans le cadre du modèle à la formulation d'un ensemble de relations entre les variables qui caractérisent le système et son environnement.

Les évolutions du système ne pourront généralement révéler que de représentations de nature stochastique. Afin d'être aussi peu technique que possible, contentons-nous d'une représentation déterministe apte toutefois à éclairer les remarques suivantes.

Désignons par

$$(f_j; j = 1, 2, \dots, m)$$

les relations de type fonctionnel retenues entre ces variables, relations qui seront généralement en nombre égal à celui des variables endogènes. On aura ainsi l'ensemble de relations:

$$f_1 (Y_1, Y_2, \dots, Y_m, X_1, X_2, \dots, X_n) = 0$$

$$f_2 (Y_1, Y_2, \dots, Y_m, X_1, X_2, \dots, X_n) = 0$$

$$\cdot \cdot \cdot \cdot \cdot$$

$$\cdot \cdot \cdot \cdot \cdot$$

$$\cdot \cdot \cdot \cdot \cdot$$

$$f_m (Y_1, Y_2, \dots, Y_m, X_1, X_2, \dots, X_n) = 0,$$

que nous noterons, pour alléger l'écriture:

$$f [y, x] = 0,$$

y et x étant les vecteurs  $[Y_1, Y_2, \dots, Y_m]$ ,  $[X_1, X_2, \dots, X_n]$

et f désignant les m relations ( $f_j; j = 1, 2, \dots, m$ ).

Il convient de remarquer tout de suite que pour être plus générale, la transposition formelle de la structure invariante du système doit faire intervenir les enchaînements temporels entre variables endogènes et variables exogènes. En adoptant pour simplifier une représentation discrète du temps, que l'on désignera par la variable numérique t, on aura le système:

$$f[y(t), y(t-1), y(t-2), \dots, x(t), x(t-1), x(t-2), \dots] = 0.$$

Dans cette dernière écriture du modèle, on considère que les valeurs des variables endogènes et exogènes à l'époque t:

$$y(t) \text{ et } x(t),$$

sont liées par les relations f, non seulement entre elles, mais encore aux valeurs des mêmes variables à des époques antérieures, d'habitude en nombre fini.

Nous pouvons ici encore condenser l'écriture ci-dessus en posant:

$$z(t) = [y(t-1), y(t-2), \dots, x(t-1), x(t-2), \dots],$$

c'est-à-dire en définissant par  $z(t)$  le vecteur formé de l'ensemble des variables endogènes et exogènes pour les époques antérieures à  $t$ . Ces variables seront dites prédéterminées.

Le modèle s'écrira alors:

$$f[y(t), x(t), z(t)] = 0.$$

4. Penchons-nous maintenant sur le contenu économique du modèle que nous venons de définir formellement. La distinction entre variables endogènes et exogènes est simple. Elle dépend essentiellement du découpage du réel que l'on a adopté. Celui-ci nous conduit à caractériser la réalité étudiée par un certain nombre de variables endogènes, variables que l'on se propose de relier, par des relations  $f$ , à des éléments extérieurs à cette réalité et caractérisés par des variables exogènes. La composition de l'ensemble des variables prédéterminées dépend du découpage du réel qui nous impose le choix des variables endogènes et exogènes, mais encore de la nature et de la forme des relations retenues qui peuvent faire intervenir des enchaînements temporels portant sur plusieurs périodes.

Signalons au passage la distinction généralement admise entre modèles statiques et modèles dynamiques qui, dans la terminologie adoptée ici, se différencient par l'absence ou la présence d'éléments prédéterminés. Sans entrer dans une discussion détaillée de ces deux approches, soulignons simplement que même si les formulations dynamiques sont logiquement plus générales que les formulations statiques — qu'elles contiennent comme des cas particuliers — en sera souvent amené à utiliser ces dernières — ou des formulations voisines — pour des raisons découlant de difficultés d'ordre expérimental notamment. En raison de la complexité du réel et des limites de nos possibilités expérimentales, nous rencontrons ici la nécessité d'un choix entre diverses méthodes d'approche: les unes logiquement plus générales mais en raison de cela plus exigeantes sur le plan expérimental; les autres logiquement moins générales mais pouvant être mieux fondées pour ce qui est des méthodes d'induction statistique notamment.

L'orientation de nos modèles d'après les utilisations particulières que l'on a en vue est intimement liée à des choix analogues à celui que nous venons d'évoquer.



5. Pour analyser le contenu économique du système  $f$  reliant les trois catégories de variables, il est opportun de distinguer les  $m$  relations particulières qui le définissent. Chacune d'elles traduit, par la liaison qu'elle introduit entre les variables retenues, un certain ensemble de connaissances et d'hypothèses de travail quant à la structure du phénomène considéré. De telles relations pourront alors être classées, du point de vue économique, en se fondant justement sur la nature des lois dont on s'inspire pour les formuler. On retient généralement quatre classes de relations:

- a) la classe des relations de définition;
- b) la classe des relations institutionnelles;
- c) la classe des relations techniques;
- d) la classe des relations de comportement.

Les relations de la première classe, qui découlent de la définition des concepts introduits, sont évidemment les plus faciles à formuler. Elles pourront être de simples évidences (la quantité d'un bien multipliée par son prix unitaire = valeur monétaire de la quantité considérée; bénéfice = recettes — dépenses), ou encore dans le cas des agrégats utilisés par les systèmes comptables nationaux, découler de définitions précises et élaborées. Ainsi, dans le cas de trois variables macroéconomiques fortement agrégées, on aura la relation comptable: Investissement global + Consommation globale = Revenu national.

Quant aux relations institutionnelles, elles transposent dans le cadre du modèle la structure institutionnelle de la réalité considérée en formalisant le cadre et les règles socio-juridiques qui la régissent.

Les relations de la troisième classe traduisent les liaisons imposées à certaines variables par les conditions du fonctionnement technique — au sens large — de l'appareil économique. Par exemple, les fonctions de production permettent de mettre en évidence les liens existant, en raison des techniques de production particulières, entre les quantités utilisées de facteurs et les quantités de produits. Elles explicitent les substitutions techniques éventuelles entre facteurs et entre produits et, en formalisant les effets du progrès technique, permettent d'en étudier les répercussions sur le fonctionnement de l'appareil productif. L'étude des relations appartenant à cette troisième classe ne va pas sans présenter souvent des difficultés importantes, même s'il arrive que certaines liaisons techniques puissent se déduire de connaissances acquises relevant, par exemple, de la technologie industrielle — ce qui permet de les fonder

de façon particulièrement solide — il faudra généralement un assez grand effort d'imagination pour arriver à extraire des concepts de nature essentiellement technique utilisés par les ingénieurs, leur contenu économique. Le contenu économique des réalités techniques ne s'explique pas généralement de façon immédiate et il faudra le plus souvent faire appel à d'autres éléments de connaissance pour compléter et adapter celle qu'il nous fournit.

Le rôle des relations de la quatrième classe est fondamental dans la construction des modèles économiques. Elles complètent les structures définies par les trois autres classes de relation en introduisant des éléments qui reflètent, en le formalisant, le comportement des centres de décision économique. On peut considérer que les relations dites de comportement constituent la caractéristique essentielle des modèles économiques, caractéristique qui les rapproche — dans leur contenu aussi bien que dans les problèmes soulevés par leur formulation — des modèles utilisés par d'autres disciplines parmi les sciences humaines.

Les relations techniques supposent certes, comme nous venons de le voir, un effort d'élaboration de nature essentiellement économique; avec les relations des deux premières classes, elles contribuent à délimiter la structure et à préciser les lois du domaine dans et sur lequel agissent les centres de décision économique. Elles délimitent ainsi en quelque sorte la liberté d'action individuelle de ces derniers. L'étude du rôle des centres de décision est alors essentielle dans la mesure où ils constituent, dans le cadre du domaine défini par les structures techniques et institutionnelles, les éléments moteurs des systèmes économiques.

L'étude des relations de comportement est certes celle qui soulève la problématique la plus ardue. Il suffit pour s'en rendre compte de songer à la diversité des centres de décision pouvant intervenir dans l'étude d'une réalité économique déterminée: gouvernements, dans la mesure où ils sont amenés à prendre des décisions économiques, organismes de planification à échelle nationale ou locale, conseils d'administration, directeurs d'entreprises ou encore de simples consommateurs. Ainsi, la notion commode de centre de décision recouvre des entités sociales plus ou moins complexes par leur structure et par la nature des décisions, aussi bien que par les mécanismes qui permettent de les formuler. De plus, les différents centres de décision s'influencent généralement mutuellement et à des degrés divers.

Dans ce domaine les échanges interdisciplinaires semblent devoir

être les plus fructueux. Selon le niveau d'agrégation auquel on se situe, les apports de disciplines telles que la psychologie expérimentale, la sociologie ou la science politique par exemple, seront souvent indispensables à l'approche économétrique.

Je n'ai fait ici qu'évoquer rapidement quelques aspects majeurs des conditions qui rendent l'étude et la formalisation du comportement économique particulièrement difficiles. Il convient aussi de souligner que, en raison justement de l'influence d'un grand nombre de facteurs, que la complexité du comportement économique et la nature de nos connaissances théoriques ne nous permettent pas d'explicitier, nous serons généralement amenés à formuler des relations de comportement faisant intervenir des éléments aléatoires. Ainsi, en ce qui concerne les relations de comportement notamment, il faudra généralement élargir la définition déterministe commode du modèle que nous avons utilisée jusqu'à maintenant.

Au paragraphe suivant en envisageant les problèmes posés par l'expérience en économie, nous serons conduits à étendre la notion de modèle déterministe en lui intégrant des éléments aléatoires qui nous permettent, entre autres, de rendre mieux compte des comportements individuels des centres de décision. De tels comportements ne sont justiciables en définitive, dans l'état actuel de nos connaissances, que de représentations probabilistes, d'une manière qui traduit en quelque sorte leur liberté individuelle.

6. Pour simplifier la présentation, nous n'avons considéré jusqu'ici que des modèles déterministes.

De plus, nous avons admis que ces modèles étaient complètement spécifiés. Or, il s'agit maintenant d'étendre cette classe de modèles; ceci nous conduit tout naturellement à préciser le lien existant entre approche théorique et approche expérimentale<sup>3</sup> en économétrie.

Il est commode de distinguer ces approches dans la mesure où elles jouent des rôles différents, mais il ne faut pas oublier leur caractère strictement complémentaire. D'une façon quelque peu schématique, nous pouvons certes considérer qu'il appartient au

<sup>3</sup> On envisagera ici l'expérimentation en un sens très large, comme étant toute action directe ou indirecte sur une réalité donnée en vue de susciter ou de recueillir des conséquences observables. L'observation dirigée peut être considérée comme un cas particulier de l'expérimentation. Le rôle de l'expérimentateur se borne au choix de certaines conséquences observables sans qu'il veuille ou puisse en susciter. Toutefois, ce choix lui-même est subordonné au recours à une certaine abstraction initiale.

modèle théorique de nous éclairer sur la structure et les implications propres à la réalité étudiée, tandis que l'approche expérimentale nous permet de juger de la fidélité du modèle théorique, ou encore nous permet d'en préciser la formulation. Toutefois la construction d'un modèle théorique et d'un schéma expérimental pour l'étude d'un phénomène déterminé ne sont pas deux opérations indépendantes. Elles sont complémentaires et s'influencent de façon très intime.

Cette interaction entre approche théorique et approche expérimentale se retrouve d'ailleurs dans le modèle qui, dans sa formulation, doit en quelque sorte réaliser la synthèse des deux approches. Dans ce sens, l'économétrie s'efforce toujours d'aboutir à des formulations qui font intervenir des éléments aléatoires, même si nous les introduisons souvent à partir d'une première formulation de nature certaine. On y est conduit justement en raison :

- a) de la nature et de la genèse des observations expérimentales dont peut disposer l'économétrie;
- b) de la nécessité de tenir compte d'un grand nombre de facteurs que la complexité des phénomènes économiques et la nature de nos explications théoriques ne nous permettent pas d'explicitier.

Ces deux raisons essentielles, qu'ici encore il est utile de distinguer, même si elles se trouvent souvent étroitement apparentées, confirment en définitive la nécessité d'avoir recours aux méthodes d'induction statistique.

Entre les conditions idéales des sciences dites de laboratoire, qui parviennent — jusqu'à un certain point — à isoler les phénomènes et à agir sur eux pour en dégager des régularités empiriques, et la simple observation passive du réel, les possibilités expérimentales sont nombreuses et variées, et participent en partie des conditions de l'une ou l'autre de ces situations extrêmes.

En économétrie, comme dans les autres sciences sociales, nous sommes le plus souvent réduits à pratiquer l'observation, que nous nous efforçons toutefois d'orienter, de diriger. À défaut de pouvoir contrôler expérimentalement la genèse des observations, l'économètre s'efforcera de parvenir à des conditions expérimentales plus favorables, en formulant des hypothèses convenables sur les mécanismes réels qui les engendrent. Les méthodes de la statistique mathématique se révèlent ici indispensables, car elles nous permettent de préciser et de porter un jugement sur la fidélité de ces hypothèses.

Ce que nous venons de dire à propos de l'observation ne doit pas

laisser croire qu'il est toujours impossible de se placer d'emblée dans des conditions voisines de celles du laboratoire. Il en est ainsi par exemple de l'étude expérimentale de certaines fonctions de production — au niveau des cellules microéconomiques — que l'on arrive parfois à déduire des données techniques fournies par les ingénieurs. On peut aussi citer les recherches d'économétrie agraire qui, pour améliorer les possibilités expérimentales font largement appel aux méthodes modernes de planification des expériences.

Une voie nouvelle, partiellement explorée, mais répondant au même souci de mieux connaître expérimentalement les phénomènes de décision, semble se dégager des possibilités qu'offre la simulation — digitale ou non — avec intervention d'éléments humains. Des expériences telles que les jeux d'entreprise, initialement conçues dans un but didactique ou d'entraînement, peuvent revêtir un intérêt scientifique dans la mesure où elles nous conduisent à formuler ou à vérifier des hypothèses de comportement. Sans vouloir exagérer l'apport que l'on est en droit d'attendre de telles méthodes, on peut remarquer que dans leur logique tout au moins, elles se rapprochent des conditions expérimentales des sciences dites de laboratoire. Certes, les limites de ces procédés sont évidentes et de poids. En effet de tels procédés dépendent essentiellement du choix des éléments humains qui interviennent dans l'expérience de simulation, ainsi que des interactions qui s'établissent entre ces éléments humains et l'environnement simulé, qui est en fait un modèle partiellement structuré. Il sera en général très difficile de s'assurer que cette représentation « expérimentale » d'une réalité donnée atteint un certain degré de fidélité. On ne saura dès lors utiliser les conclusions qu'elle propose qu'à titre indicatif, en vue de la formulation d'autres hypothèses et de l'élaboration d'autres modèles.

Quelle que soit, dans l'étude d'une réalité économique déterminée, la nature véritable des observations et leur genèse expérimentale, pour en donner une image assez générale et qui tienne compte des difficultés propres à l'expérience en économie, nous sommes obligés d'avoir recours à des représentations stochastiques. Les valeurs observées des variables intervenant dans le modèle, généralement entachées d'erreurs de mesure, sont alors représentées par des variables aléatoires, dont la spécification — plus ou moins complète — permet de transposer formellement les mécanismes expérimentaux qui engendrent les observations. La spécification du modèle consistera alors:

- en la définition du système  $f[y(t), x(t), z(t)] = 0$  reliant les «valeurs vraies» des variables retenues, et
- en la définition des variables aléatoires  $Y(t), X(t), Z(t)$ <sup>4</sup> qui caractérisent les valeurs observées des variables  $y(t), x(t), z(t)$ .

Par la spécification de ces variables aléatoires — qui ne seront pas nécessairement indépendantes<sup>5</sup> — nous exprimons justement nos connaissances et nos hypothèses quant aux mécanismes expérimentaux qui régissent les valeurs observées des variables  $y(t), x(t), z(t)$ .

7. Au paragraphe précédent, sous b), nous avons évoqué une seconde raison d'élargir la classe de modèles envisagée précédemment. En effet, même en l'absence d'erreurs de mesure liées aux mécanismes expérimentaux, nous ne saurions généralement contraindre une réalité déterminée dans le cadre rigide de représentations déterministes de type fonctionnel. Face à la complexité naturelle des phénomènes économiques, de telles représentations sont en définitive largement simplificatrices et les liaisons qu'elles définissent ne seront vérifiées qu'avec un certain degré d'approximation qui traduit justement les limites de nos connaissances. Ne pouvant pas éliminer complètement ce degré d'approximation, nous nous efforçons d'en préciser le champ de variation et la nature, ce qui nous conduit à définir la loi de probabilité de la variable aléatoire:

$$u(t) = [u_1(t), u_2(t), \dots, u_m(t)],$$

telle que les relations:

$$f_1[y(t), x(t), z(t), u_1(t)] = 0$$

$$f_2[y(t), x(t), z(t), u_2(t)] = 0$$

$$\vdots$$

$$\vdots$$

$$\vdots$$

$$f_m[y(t), x(t), z(t), u_m(t)] = 0$$

soient alors vérifiées.

<sup>4</sup> On ne perdra pas de vue qu'il s'agit de variables aléatoires à plusieurs dimensions. Ainsi:

$$Y(t) = [Y_1(t), Y_2(t), \dots, Y_m(t)],$$

$$X(t) = [X_1(t), X_2(t), \dots, X_n(t)].$$

tandis que l'ordre de  $Z(t)$  dépendra du nombre d'époques antérieures à  $t$  intervenant dans les relations  $f$ .

<sup>5</sup> De plus ces variables aléatoires pourront être liées entre elles dans le temps.

La définition de la variable aléatoire  $u(t)$ , ou plus généralement la définition de la suite aléatoire:

$$u(t), u(t'), u(t'') \dots$$

définie pour toutes les époques considérées, traduira alors, dans le cadre du modèle, les erreurs de spécification dues:

1. au caractère simplifié des relations du système  $f$ , qui reproduisent généralement des lois plus complexes qui nous sont inconnues;
2. au caractère simplifié des représentations à l'aide de variables certaines — telles les  $y(t)$ ,  $x(t)$ ,  $z(t)$  — de composantes qui caractérisent le phénomène étudié et qui ne sont justiciables en définitive que de représentations aléatoires (nous avons déjà cité le cas du comportement des agents économiques et des centres de décision), cela même en l'absence d'erreurs de mesure caractérisées par les éléments aléatoires définis au paragraphe précédent;
3. à l'absence de certaines variables dont nous n'avons pas su expliciter le rôle.

8. Comme nous venons de le voir, la nécessité de confronter nos modèles aux données expérimentales, nous conduit à y englober des éléments aléatoires, des éléments pour lesquels on ne sait au plus que définir la loi de probabilité. Cela nous permet alors d'embrasser les éléments d'explication possibles; ceux-ci nous permettent notamment de rendre compte des mécanismes expérimentaux qui engendrent les observations, ainsi que les lois qui les régissent et dont la complexité dépasse une simple représentation déterministe. Les éléments de connaissance quant à la nature des êtres aléatoires intervenant dans le modèle se traduisent en définitive dans la forme particulière de leurs lois de probabilité: la spécification du modèle sera alors complète lorsqu'on aura défini, à côté des relations  $f$  et des variables certaines, les lois de probabilité des variables aléatoires.

Ces lois et ces relations définissent la structure invariante du système étudié (cf. paragraphe 2.). Or, en raison notamment des limites de nos connaissances quant aux mécanismes qui régissent les phénomènes économiques, nous savons tout au plus définir a priori une classe de structures, c'est-à-dire une classe de relations  $f$  et de variables aléatoires. Ce n'est qu'en nous appuyant sur les éléments observables du système et de l'environnement que nous pouvons atteindre une spécification plus fine, à la limite la spé-

cification complète d'une structure. L'observation de ces éléments doit ainsi nous permettre, par inférence — généralement statistique — de restreindre nos hypothèses initiales. Évidemment la portée de cette démarche repose essentiellement sur les possibilités et les limites des méthodes d'inférence utilisées.

Quant aux hypothèses d'invariance structurelle, leur permanence est admise pour la période d'observation et pour l'«horizon opératoire». Ces hypothèses — qui peuvent être très fortes — sont fondamentales car c'est d'elles que dépendent en fait la portée des méthodes d'induction utilisées, ainsi que la portée opératoire du modèle.

En raison des transformations du système, cette permanence pourra aussi bien être mise en défaut au cours de la période d'observation qu'au cours de l'horizon prévisionnel. Dans les deux cas la portée du modèle s'en ressentira, sans que nous puissions, en général, en déceler l'effet.

En ce qui concerne la période d'observation, il est parfois possible de s'affranchir de la nécessité d'observer le système et son environnement sur une longue période. On essaiera d'y parvenir en observant des systèmes différents, susceptibles d'être représentés par le même modèle. Ce point de vue, qui est à la base des approches «d'analyse transversale», revient à admettre, par rapport à un modèle déterminé, la permanence des invariants pour une certaine classe de phénomènes. Il s'agit en quelque sorte d'une permanence dans l'espace, qui en général sera d'autant plus difficile à admettre que l'on se situe à des niveaux élevés d'agrégation.

Pour ce qui est de l'«horizon opératoire», nous l'avons déjà souligné, les hypothèses d'invariance structurelle n'auront généralement de sens que par rapport à une durée déterminée. En fonction de cette durée l'aspiration opératoire du modèle devra souvent céder le pas à des intentions plus modestes, de nature purement explicative et même n'aboutissant qu'à de simples formulations descriptives.

Le caractère constamment revisable du savoir de l'économètre en découle, ainsi que la nécessité de mettre en œuvre plusieurs modèles pouvant différer non seulement dans leur forme, mais encore quant à leur portée explicative et opératoire.



WORK AND LEISURE  
THE CASE OF JAPANESE INDUSTRIAL WORKERS

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ÉCONOMIE ET SOCIOLOGIE

The attitude of industrial workers to their work is generally considered to be correlated with their attitude to their place of work, and consequently to the company and plant where they are employed. According to this view, a greater degree of their company allegiance is accompanied by a greater degree of their work motivation. For this reason, when the morale of industrial workers is discussed, the term customarily implies both of these types of attitudes. As we shall show below, however, these two dimensions of workers' morale are not always positively correlated. In fact, there are cases in which the degree of their company allegiance is high but their work morale is low, as well as cases in which the contrary is true.

In the case of Japanese industrial workers, the degree of their company allegiance has shown a general decline in recent years, particularly since the latter half of the 1950's. Since the boom which started in 1955, workers' wages have continued to rise,<sup>1</sup> their working hours have been steadily reduced,<sup>2</sup> and the residential and welfare facilities have been markedly improved. Despite these improvements, however, it appears that the attitude of unflinching loyalty to their company and management which was customarily found

<sup>1</sup> The average yearly rate of wage increase for regular employees in all manufacturing industries, for example, was approximately 10 per cent from 1950 through 1964.

<sup>2</sup> In contrast to an average of 40-hour week before the war, the hours worked in all manufacturing industries had been reduced to a 30-hour week by the end of the 1950's. More recently, there has been observed a decline even in the number of companies adopting the 40-hour working week, and an increase in the number of firms adopting the 35- or 42-hour working week. For example, 71 per cent of workers in the petroleum industry and 74 per cent of those in the iron and steel industry worked a 42-hour week in 1962.

WORK AND LEISURE:  
THE CASE OF JAPANESE INDUSTRIAL WORKERS

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I

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<sup>1</sup> The average yearly rate of wage increase for regular employees in all manufacturing industries, for example, was approximately 10 per cent from 1960 through 1964.

<sup>2</sup> In contrast to an average of 60-hour week before the war, the hours worked in all manufacturing industries had been reduced to a 50-hour week by the end of the 1950's. More recently, there has been observed a decline even in the number of companies adopting the 48-hour working week, and an increase in the number of firms adopting the 45- or 42-hour working week. For example, 71 per cent of workers in the petroleum industry and 74 per cent of those in the iron and steel industry worked a 42-hour week in 1963.

among industrial workers in prewar Japan is now gradually decreasing. This tendency is more conspicuous in those firms which contain a larger number of non-manual or white-collar occupations. According to the results of the morale surveys conducted at a number of companies by the Sociology Department of the University of Tokyo (see Table 1), in those companies where manual or blue-collar jobs are more numerous (the «Group X» companies), the proportion of the workers who have favorable («pro») attitudes to the company is greater than that of the workers who have unfavorable or critical («con») attitudes; the reverse tendency is found, however, in those companies whose business involves more non-manual or white-collar occupations (the «Group Y» companies). More important, in those companies and plants where technological innovations, particularly automation, are introduced, there is a tendency for them to include more workers who adopt the «con» attitudes to the company, just as in the case of the «Group Y» above.<sup>3</sup>

The reasons for there being more workers with the «con» attitudes in these companies and plants may be found in the following two points. 1) Those who work on automated jobs need to have a higher level of education. It is customary in Japan, however, that one is required at least an upper secondary education if one is to be employed as a non-manual worker. Since those who have received a higher level of education are in general much inclined to be critical and to have higher aspirations for their own future, they tend to become critical of the policy adopted by management. 2) In no small numbers of cases jobs and occupations in an automated plant are monotonous, repetitive work, and this in turn causes the workers to have a poor opinion of the company.

However, the gradual decline in workers' allegiance to their company appears to be a general trend in recent Japan, not confined to these specific types of companies and plants. In our four surveys conducted at the NKK Steel Tube Company, one of the six largest iron and steel makers in Japan, for example, we found that each successive study showed a decline in the «pro» attitudes to the company and an increase in the «con» attitudes (Table 2). If we assume this to be the general trend for Japanese industrial

<sup>3</sup> According to our survey conducted from 1961 to 1962 at the TDR Electric Power Company, for example, while only 20 per cent of the workers who had the «con» attitudes to the company were found in its power plants of the conventional type, 35 to 48 per cent of those who had the same attitudes were found in its automated new power plants.

TABLE 1

DISTRIBUTION OF COMPANY ALLEGIANCE IN GROUPS X AND Y (%)\*

	Pro- Company	Con- Company	Others	Total (N)
<i>Group X</i>				
NKK Steel Tube, KT Ironworks (1952)	54	18	28	100 (701)
UKS Industries, SM Coal Mine (1952)	52	16	32	100 (336)
NKK Steel Tube, Nine Plants** (1956)	50	21	29	100 (1,861)
NKK Steel Tube, KT Ironworks (1956)	56	16	28	100 (865)
NKK Steel Tube, TT Ironworks (1956)	42	23	35	100 (630)
<i>Group Y</i>				
SDR Electric, Whole Company (1957/58)	30	42	28	100 (1,804)
SDR Electric, Head Office (1957/58)	17	61	22	100 (128)
IST Dept. Store, Male Employees (1959)	28	29	43	100 (549)
SDR Electric, Whole Company (1961)	29	41	30	100 (2,664)
MTY Dept. Store, Whole Company (1961)	10	67	23	100 (2,155)

\* Percentages in this table are the frequency of occurrences to the sample size, excluding the «don't know» and blank responses.

\*\* Include six ironworks and three dockyards, all belonging to NKK Steel Tube.

TABLE 2

DISTRIBUTION OF COMPANY ALLEGIANCE AT NKK STEEL TUBE, 1952-1963 (%)

	Pro- Company	Con- Company	Others	Total (N)
KT Ironworks (1952)	54	18	28	100 (701)
Nine Plants* (1956)	50	21	29	100 (1,861)
MZ Ironworks (1960)	43	28	29	100 (1,051)
Whole Company** (1963)	26	44	30	100 (3,917)

\* See Table 1, note.

\*\* Includes six ironworks, three dockyards, and the head office.

workers in recent times, the above-mentioned reasons alone would provide only insufficient grounds for explaining it. In other words, it seems appropriate to recognize a general decline in the sense of belonging to the organization where one is employed, and a gradual obsolescence of the practice of the so-called «lifetime commitment» to an organization.<sup>4</sup> In place of these traditional practices, it seems that a self-consciousness as free individuals and a spirit of independence have at last begun to develop among Japanese industrial workers. A fact that reveals this change at the behavior level is the increase in labor mobility between enterprises since the latter half of the 1950's.<sup>5</sup>

It is interesting to note in this connection that in recent Japan a decline in workers' allegiance to their labor union has also become apparent, almost parallel to the decline in their company allegiance. However, in this paper we shall not go into this point.<sup>6</sup>

## II

As we have noted above, a decline in workers' company allegiance does not necessarily mean a decline in their interest in the work itself. According to our recent surveys, the following two points stand out in this connection: 1) the work motivation of Japanese industrial workers seems to be fairly high; 2) on the other hand, because of poor leadership on the part of management, it appears that this high motivation of workers has not been fully developed or utilized.

For explaining the first point, the answers given by workers to the following question included in our surveys will be of use: «Of the knowledge and skills necessary for your future life, which do you think is the most important?» At NKK Steel Tube, 66 per cent

<sup>4</sup> See Kunio ODAKA, «Traditionalism and Democracy in Japanese Industry,» International Sociologist Association, *Transactions of the Fifth World Congress of Sociology*, Vol. III, Louvain, 1964, pp. 39-49.

<sup>5</sup> The rate of quitting companies by regular employees in all industries, for example, was only 24 per cent in 1957, but was 28 per cent in 1960 and 34 per cent in 1964. Ministry of Labor, Division of Labor Statistics and Research, *Labor White Paper, 1965 edition* (in Japanese), Tokyo, 1965.

<sup>6</sup> See Kunio ODAKA, «Implications of Dual Allegiance in the Modernization of Industrial Relations in Japan,» Japan Institute of Labour, *The Changing Patterns of Industrial Relations*, Tokyo, 1965, pp. 96-125.

of the workers replied in 1963 to this question in the form, «I wish to acquire the knowledge and skills related to my job.» This is an overwhelming proportion over against such desires as acquiring general education and culture, attaining skills for daily living such as flower arrangement or driving, or learning about the present condition of the company. When the same question was put in 1965 at the SDR Electric Power Company, a firm with many non-manual workers, 81 per cent of the sample ( $N = 2,696$ ) returned the same reply, and when it was put in 1966 at the OKM Manufacturing Company, one of the largest makers of steel furniture in Japan, 69 per cent of the sample ( $N = 606$ ) replied in the same way.

As regards the kind of work desired, the first preference was for a «job in which I can make the fullest use of my abilities,» though next to this there was a tendency to prefer the one from which a high income could be earned. In the case of OKM Manufacturing, these two items alone occupied 66 per cent of the replies. Similar preferences were found when the same question was put to a random sample of ordinary citizens. The latter data were obtained from a national sample in our survey on social stratification and social mobility carried out in 1965, and in this case also the sum of the preferences coming under the two items amounted to approximately 56 per cent.

As can be seen from the above, the desire to extend one's abilities and to distinguish oneself in one's occupation, and at the same time to be a possessor of economic power — in short, the desire for worldly success — is an important motivation in people's work. This fact is ascertained by workers' view of success obtained from our survey at OKM Manufacturing. The first factor considered necessary for success was «effort,» and the second «talent;» the two replies accounted for 67 per cent.

It is only natural that people with this view of work should have an opinion that only those who have real abilities are to be promoted and, eventually, to attain success in life. When asked, therefore, whether opportunities for promotion in the company should be decided by workers' educational background, or by their real ability, 76 per cent of the workers at NKK Steel Tube (1963) and 84 per cent at OKM Manufacturing answered that they should be decided mainly by the latter. It should be noted that this tendency is closely related to workers' age and educational background. At OKM Manufacturing, for example, the supporters of ability were particularly numerous among young workers between the ages of

25 and 34 (91 per cent), and among the graduates of the postwar secondary schools and universities (87-90 per cent).

It seems, however, that the workers' high motivation for their work such as described above has not been fully appreciated by management. This is the second point which may be seen from the following data.

At a number of companies we put the question, «Do you think that your present job is important for the company?» The answers to this question are shown in Table 3. In all cases more than 56

TABLE 3  
WORKERS' EVALUATION OF THEIR WORK IN FIVE COMPANIES (‰)

	Impor- tant	Aver- age	Not Impor- tant	Total	Not			Total
					Appre- ciated	Don't Know	Appre- ciated	
MTY Dept. Store (1961)	56	36	7	100	21	47	31	100
TDR Electric (1961/62)	79	17	3	100	37	36	26	100
NKK Steel Tube (1963)	68	27	5	100	33	42	25	100
SDR Electric (1965)	70	25	5	100	26	47	26	100
OKM Manufacturing (1966)	61	35	4	100	27	53	19	100

per cent of the workers employed by each company returned the answer, «It is important for the company.» This means that these workers had high evaluation of their work and some pride in it. However, when the same workers were further asked if they felt that their important work was «appreciated by the company,» their replies were considerably pessimistic. No more than 37 per cent felt that it was appreciated. The negative replies, «I don't feel that it is appreciated» and «I don't know whether it is appreciated or not», amounted to approximately 70 per cent. By combining these two replies, therefore, we may say that there were fairly many «alienated workers» who felt that their work was important but the company gave them no appreciation. In fact, the proportion of those falling under this category reached about 37 per cent at NKK Steel Tube and OKM Manufacturing, and 45 per cent at SDR Electric.

There were also many workers who felt that the company's policy regarding promotion and wage increase was «unfair» because, while they thought that the policy should be decided according to workers' real abilities, the company still attached great importance to the principle of promotion and wage increase by seniority and educational background. No more than 8 per cent of the workers in the companies cited above felt that the company's policy was «fair.»

As may be predicted from the above, job satisfaction among these workers was by no means great. When asked if they liked their present job at the company, only about 40 per cent replied in the affirmative (Table 4). It is true that those who have higher position

TABLE 4  
WORKERS' SATISFACTION WITH THEIR WORK  
IN FIVE COMPANIES (%)

	Satisfied	Undecided	Dissatisfied	Total
MTY Dept. Store (1961)	34	48	17	100
TDR Electric (1961/62)	41	46	13	100
NKK Steel Tube (1963)	36	49	14	100
SDR Electric (1965)	45	45	10	100
OKM Manufacturing (1966)	40	48	10	100

in the company tend to be more satisfied with their job. At NKK Steel Tube, for example, while only 36 per cent of the rank-and-file workers were satisfied with their job, 65 per cent of the section heads were satisfied with theirs. The percentages of the reank-and-file workers satisfied with their job were even less than those found among ordinary citizens which, according to our stratification and mobility survey in 1965, amounted to 53 per cent.

If we compare the percentages of those satisfied with their job in Japan with those of various countries in the West, we find that the former are considerably smaller than the latter. This point is made clear by a comparison with the data on job satisfaction in six



countries furnished by Alex Inkeles (Table 5).<sup>7</sup> The figures which roughly correspond with the proportion of Japanese industrial workers satisfied with their job (approximately 40 percent) are those for West German manual workers (21-47 per cent). The degree of job satisfaction among Japanese workers does not even come up to that of Italian manual workers. It does not come anywhere near the figures for manual workers in the United States, Sweden, and Norway.

TABLE 5  
NATIONAL COMPARISONS OF JOB SATISFACTION\*  
(PERCENTAGE SATISFIED\*\*)

	U.S.S.R.	U.S.A.	West Germany	Italy	Sweden	Norway
White collar	60	82	33-65		Middle Class	72 88
Skilled worker	62	84	47	68		
Semiskilled	45	76	21	62	Working Class	69 83
Unskilled	23	72	11	57		

\* Adapted from Table 1 in Alex INKELES, «Industrial Man,» *American Journal of Sociology*, July 1960, p. 6.

\*\* Only percentage satisfied for white-collar and manual workers are shown here. Data for U.S.S.R. are those of Soviet-refugees provided by the Russian Research Center, Harvard University.

What can be the reasons for the higher proportion of workers' satisfaction with their job in such countries as Norway, Sweden, and the United States? This is a question which requires a careful study. It is hard to believe that this is so mainly because personnel management is more skillful in these countries than in Japan. At least one of the reasons for the higher proportion of job satisfaction in these countries may be found in the comparative ease for workers in transferring from one company to another. Perhaps we may say that the ideal pattern of employment relations is a state in which the objective conditions are provided for movement of workers from one company to another without any great difficulty and without loss of status, and at the same time the workers

<sup>7</sup> Alex INKELES, «Industrial Man: The Relation of Status to Experience, Perception, and Value,» *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 66, No. 1, July 1960, p. 6.

themselves subjectively possess an enthusiastic attachment to their present job and, consequently, to their place of work where they are employed at present. Although the state of employment relations in Japan recently shows an increase in the rate of labor mobility, it must be said that it is still far remote from this ideal pattern.

### III

How, then, do the industrial workers of modern Japan, who hold the view of work such as described above, use their leisure hours?

In prewar Japan, it was a privilege confined to the «leisure class» in Veblen's sense to enjoy leisure fully and openly. The working masses of prewar years, of course, had some leisure time. However, the content of the activities in which this leisure time was used by the working people was of the nature of rest, or it took the form of humble diversion at their homes. For the great majority of them, pleasures pursued outside their homes during leisure hours — for example, excursions, visiting gay quarters, hunting, golfing, etc. — were experiences of rare occurrence, simply because they were very difficult for them from the economic point of view. In addition, since working hours were much longer than recent times, they had little time to spare for such pleasures. More important, however, the prevailing code of values before the war regarded such pleasures as «corruptive.»

This code of values was based on the Confucian ideology of the Edo Period. Confucianism, the philosophy of conduct in life officially sponsored by the Shogunate, regarded the enjoyment of leisure as dangerous to the established order. This idea was expressed in such words as «Pleasure seeking is a bar to diligence, and in the long run will ruin oneself.»

The influence of the philosophy of Ninomiya Sontoku (1787-1856) should not be neglected in this connection. Sontoku, who succeeded in rehabilitating many impoverished agricultural villages in the Kanto districts toward the end of the Edo period, preached to people thrift and diligence. «Work comes first» was the cardinal point in his teaching. He vigorously exhorted people to work twice as hard and to maximize the production of the goods which provide the basis for food, clothing and shelter. Behaviors contrary to this were censured as «idleness.» Another central item of his teaching

was the idea that the articles produced by hard work should be economized as much as possible, and that one should not consume in a manner disproportionate to, or beyond, one's means or status. Behaviors contrary to this were rejected as «extravagance.» It is to be noted that Sontoku's philosophy consisted not merely of praise of thrift and diligence but taught that those who followed his teaching and worked hard would necessarily attain success, and that those who went contrary to it and gave first place to pleasure, or consumed in a manner unfitting for their status, would necessarily become failures of life. His thought, which exerted a great influence on the view of the art of living among the common people of Japan from the time of the Meiji Restoration up to the Second World War, was a species of «philosophy of success» similar to that of Benjamin Franklin. It was because of this established code of values that before the war the enjoyment of leisure was frequently criticized, and despised, as idleness or extravagance, and that it was usual for people, when enjoying leisure to do it as inconspicuously as possible.

This pattern of leisure activities of the national masses and the values lying at their base, however, were suddenly changed after the end of the war. It may be said that this change was not a phenomenon confined to Japan, but was part of a world-wide change brought about by the arrival of the «era of leisure.» The arrival of this new era in Japan became conspicuous after the boom which started in 1956. Particularly since the beginning of the 1960's, the proportion of people openly enjoying leisure has increased from year to year. At the same time, a new way of thinking which holds that it is only right to enjoy one's leisure during off hours, at weekends, and on holidays, is rapidly becoming widespread. As the causes of this new situation, known in the Japanese language as *rejā būmu* (leisure boom), we may cite the following points.

First of all, there has been a general rise in the income level of the working masses. From the end of the 1950's the low-income stratum with an annual income of less than \$1,000 decreased rapidly, and in its place the middle-income stratum with annual income between \$1,000 and \$3,000 increased considerably. In 1964 the latter income stratum was 2.8 times as large as it had been in 1960. It is clear that this increase in economic power has been the precondition for the «leisure boom.»

Along with this, the reduction of working hours in many enterprises as a result of the introduction of technological innovations

is a cause for the «leisure boom.» According to an official statistical report, the average leisure time in 1960 as compared with 1941 increased from 3.4 hours to 5.2 hours for manual workers, and from 4.6 hours to 5.3 hours for white-collar workers.<sup>8</sup>

Further, as a result of mass production, plenty of consumer durables and a variety of canned products have come to be produced, and their prices have been reduced, so that families equipped with these goods are now able to make a marked saving in the time and energy hitherto required for housework.

An increase in the facilities for leisure is another cause. Since the latter half of the 1950's there has been a considerable increase in the number of such places for amusement as *pachinko* (pinball) halls, bicycle racing tracks, baseball grounds, dance halls, cabarets, bowling alleys, golf courses, skiing grounds, etc. In addition, highways and speedways required for motoring and excursions are in process of construction.

More important, however, is the change in people's values in regard to leisure. This change in values may be characterized as a transition from a way of thinking which places work at the center of life to another view which regards leisure as the aim of living.

The flood of leisure brought about by these factors has become greater from year to year, and some intellectual leaders have come to feel obliged to give warnings to the nation and to criticize the new pattern of values which places leisure at the center of life.

There are many kinds among the activities which today go by the name of «leisure.» The following three categories may be distinguished as a provisional classification. The first is leisure in the form of rest or for the purpose of maintaining health. The term «recreation» seems to have originally referred to such activities. For our present purposes we shall call this type of leisure «resting type» or «R-leisure.»

The second category is composed of a variety of leisure activities of the spectator type. This includes watching television, listening to the radio, reading newspapers and books, seeing films, listening to music, etc. We shall call this type of leisure «seeing type» or «S-leisure.»

In contrast to the above, the third category consists of those leisure activities which one performs oneself. We shall call this

<sup>8</sup> Economic Planning Agency, *White Paper on National Living Conditions in 1963* (in Japanese), Tokyo, 1964.

«performing type» or «P-leisure.»<sup>9</sup> This includes hiking, motoring, sporting, photographing, gardening, rearing pet animals, collecting stamps, and practising various arts and skills. All the activities known as «hobbies» are in the category of «P-leisure.»

In addition, such activities as visiting friends at home, going to church, working for social bodies of various kinds, or do-it-yourself activities are occasionally called «leisure.» Since these activities include some sort of obligation, however, it seems proper to exclude them from «leisure» in a narrow sense of the term<sup>10</sup>.

The forms of leisure activities most common among the Japanese at present are in the category of seeing type or S-leisure — particularly, television watching and newspaper reading. Next to them come mere relaxation and «lying on the floor dozing,» two activities in the category of R-leisure. On the whole, the performing type or P-leisure activities are still comparatively few. According to a recent survey conducted by the Ministry of Labor, however, those who mentioned hiking or motoring as leisure activities increased to 11 per cent in 1964 from the mere 5 per cent in 1960; and the proportion of people in 1964 who said that they would have liked to do these activities was as much as 42 per cent. The proportion of people who mentioned some kind of sport played by themselves also increased from 4 per cent in 1960 to 13 per cent in 1964.<sup>11</sup>

Making comparisons by age, we find that there is a tendency for the younger generation to prefer P-leisure to S-leisure. By income-group, on the other hand, R-leisure is most common among the low-income stratum, while those who mention do-it-yourself activities, sport, traveling, and other forms of P-leisure are most common among the middle- and higher-income strata.<sup>12</sup>

As regards the length of leisure time, surveys conducted in 1960-1961 by the Japan Broadcasting Corporation (NHK) Culture Research Institute show that the national average on a weekday amounts to approximately 5 hours, its breakdown consisting of 1 hour for

<sup>9</sup> The «performing type» of leisure may also be called «active type» in contrast to the «seeing type» which may also be called «passive type.»

<sup>10</sup> Some sociologists call this type of leisure «semi-leisure.» Joffre DUMA-ZEDIER and Nicole LATOUCHE, «Work and Leisure in French Sociology,» *Industrial Relations*, Vol. 1, No. 2, February 1962, p. 21.

<sup>11</sup> Economic Planning Agency, *White Paper on National Living Conditions in 1964* (in Japanese), Tokyo, 1965.

<sup>12</sup> Economic Planning Agency, *White Paper on National Living Conditions in 1960* (in Japanese), Tokyo, 1961.

rest and recreation, 0.5 for newspapers and magazines, 1.5 for radio, 1 for television, 0.5 for hobbies and amusements, and 0.5 for visiting friends and other social activities.<sup>13</sup> On Sundays the time spent in social activities and television watching increases considerably, and the time employed in hobbies and amusements in the P-leisure category increases by approximately three times.

#### IV

Having outlined the main features of leisure activities in modern Japan, we shall now turn to describe the attitudes of Japanese industrial workers to their leisure. Do they still think that work, rather than leisure, is the center of life? Are they, instead, inclined to be leisure-oriented, as some intellectual leaders fear?

In this section, people's attitudes to their leisure will be examined in relation to their attitudes to their place of work, their income level, and their work itself. In other words: 1) How do they regard their home life in comparison with their work at the company? 2) Which is more important to them, an increase in income or increased chances of leisure? 3) Which do they think more important, work or leisure?

With regard to question 1), we have data from about five different companies in our morale surveys already cited. One of the questions common to the questionnaires used at these companies asked the workers to choose out of a list of items the one which they felt contributing most to making their life worth living. The list includes such items as «work at the company,» «leisure spent in hobbies and amusements,» «making and keeping a happy home,» etc. Their answers are given in Table 6. As may be surmised from the decline in company allegiance which we discussed in Section I, a hopelessly small percentage in each company (6-14 per cent) replied, «I feel that my work at the company makes life worth living.» By contrast, a much larger proportion (25-47 per cent) felt that «leisure» made life worth living, and much to our surprise, the highest proportion (36-56 per cent) felt that «making and keeping a happy home» was the center of their life. Another point in this table which deserves note is that at MTY Department Store where the majority of em-

<sup>13</sup> Japan Broadcasting Corporation (NHK) Culture Research Institute, *The Living Time of the Japanese* (in Japanese), Tokyo, 1963.

TABLE 6  
 WORKERS' PREFERENCE AMONG COMPANY'S WORK,  
 LEISURE, AND HAPPY HOME (%)

	Company's Work	Leisure	Happy Home	Others & Unknown	Total
MTY Dept. Store (1961)	6	47	36	11	100
TDR Electric (1961/62)	7	32	56	6	100
NKK Steel Tube (1963)	11	25	51	13	100
SDR Electric (1965)	8	30	55	6	100
OKM Manufacturing (1966)	14	28	38	21	100

ployees (58 per cent) were young females, a higher figure was obtained for «leisure» than for «making a happy home,» while at NKK Steel Tube where female employees were very few (4 per cent), the opposite was the case. Similar findings showing the leisure-oriented attitudes of young females have been obtained from other surveys.

2) In the case of industrial workers, the choice between income and leisure resolves itself into the choice between wage increases and reductions in working hours. It is reported that in the Western countries — e.g., Sweden — the majority of workers desire more leisure time even at the expense of reduced earnings. According to our findings in Japan, however, at least at four companies studied, the great majority (about 80 per cent) replied, «An increase in wages should come before a reduction in working hours.» This fact suggests that Japanese workers still have not attained the economic power sufficient to enable them to enjoy leisure. There are exceptions to this, however. When the same question was put to the workers at a certain petrochemical industry plant in 1964, 43 per cent were in favor of reduced working hours as opposed to 36 per cent in favor of higher wages.

3) What, then, do the industrial workers of modern Japan think with regard to the work-leisure dichotomy? Before we look into this point, let us first classify the patterns of possible ways of think-

ing about this dichotomy. What is at issue here is not a simple either-or choice between the absolutely work-oriented and the absolutely leisure-oriented. Apart from these two extreme cases, we may expect that there will be different views of living depending upon whether one regards work and leisure separately or whether one integrates the two.

First, as regards the either-or choice between work and leisure, we may consider the way of thinking after the fashion of Ninomiya Sontoku as representing one extreme, in which hard work is the basic principle of life. This type of living, which we shall call «work-oriented-unilateral type,» may be summed up in the following statement: «Work is man's duty. I wish to devote myself wholly to my work without any thought of leisure».

At the opposite pole, there is the way of thinking which holds that it is leisure that makes life worth living. Bertrand Russell once advocated this view in his article «In Praise of Idleness.»<sup>14</sup> This type of living, which we shall call «leisure-oriented-unilateral type,» may be summed up in the following statement: «Work is no more than a means for living. The enjoyment of leisure is what makes human life worth living. I wish to enjoy leisure as much as I like.»

It goes without saying that these two views are mutually incompatible. Besides these two, however, people may follow those ways of living which incorporate both work and leisure, and which recognize some sort of significance in each. The distinction here in question is whether one merely puts work and leisure side by side within the framework of one's daily life, keeping the two in a state of mutual separation, or whether one links them with each other in some co-ordinated way which will enable the two to be in a state of mutual stimulation. If the former approach is chosen, life will become dualistic, and will be divided into two unrelated fields. However, this way of living may be easier than the latter approach, which requires a strong will and much more energy for living. A statement characterizing the former way of living, which we shall call «split type,» may be as follows: «Work is work and leisure is leisure. Modern man gets his work done smartly, and enjoys his leisure moderately.»

If, on the other hand, one is to take the latter approach and to integrate work and leisure into a condition of unity, continuous

<sup>14</sup> Bertrand RUSSELL, «In Praise of Idleness,» Eric Larrabee and Rolf Meyerson, eds., *Mass Leisure*, Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1958, pp. 96-105.



co-ordination of work and leisure will be needed, in order to maintain a system in which by devoting oneself to one's work one will enjoy leisure without reserve, and by so doing one will be all the more disposed to devote oneself to one's work. A statement characterizing this way of living, which we shall call «integrated type,» would be something like the following: «Work makes leisure really enjoyable, and leisure gives new energy to work. I wish to work to the best of my ability, and to enjoy leisure heartily.»

In addition to these four, there is a fifth possible pattern of living in which one's work itself is a form of leisure and, therefore, is one's pleasure. This way of living, which we shall call «identity type,» may be expressed in the following statement: «My only pleasure consists of work. There is no distinction between work and leisure. I therefore need not be liberated from work in order to enjoy leisure.»

We may thus distinguish from the above five different types of living with regard to the relations between work and leisure. They are: A) the work-oriented-unilateral type, B) the leisure-oriented-unilateral type, C) the identity type, D) the split type, and E) the integrated type. In a recent survey conducted at OKM Manufacturing, statements designed as the expressions of these five patterns were shown to the respondents, and they were asked which of these five statements was closest to their actual way of living. The results are given in Table 7.

In the data presented in Table 7, the facts which attract our attention are 1) that the number of those who chose the leisure-oriented-unilateral type (B) is unexpectedly small,<sup>15</sup> 2) that the majority chose type D or type E, and 3) that more than half of the respondents regarded the integrated type (E) as representing their own way of living. A survey containing somewhat similar questions was carried out in 1959 by the Institute of Journalism of the University of Tokyo, taking a random sample of about 900 ordinary citizens

<sup>15</sup> However, when the respondents were asked by a different question to give their *opinion*, as opposed to their actual way of living, a fairly large number supported the leisure-oriented-unilateral type (B), reaching as much as 24 per cent. This means that if their economic conditions were improved, this percentage of the workers (instead of the only 5 per cent in Table 7) might change to that type. The reactions to the five types in response to the request for their opinions were as follows: A, 25 per cent; B, 24 per cent; C, 8 per cent; D, 6 per cent; E, 35 per cent; and others and unknown, 2 per cent.

TABLE 7

## WORKERS' PREFERENCE AMONG FIVE TYPES OF LIVING RELATED TO WORK AND LEISURE (%)

	(A) Work- oriented- unilateral	(B) Leisure- oriented- unilateral	(C) Identity	(D) Split	(E) Integrated	Others & Total Unknown	
Whole Company (OKM Manufacturing)	12	5	7	23	51	2	100
Sex & Age							(N = 606)
<i>Male</i>							
Less than 19 yrs.	2	12	11	29	47	—	100
20-29 yrs.	5	5	3	23	62	2	100
30-39 yrs.	21	3	7	23	45	1	100
40-49 yrs.	24	4	8	16	47	1	100
50 yrs. & over	21	5	13	18	41	3	100
<i>Female</i>							
Less than 29 yrs.	4	4	2	26	63	2	100
30 yrs. & over	15	5	12	22	42	5	100
<i>Education</i>							
Primary & New Lower Secondary	14	4	10	25	45	2	100
Old Lower Secondary	26	7	16	11	40	—	100
New Upper Secondary	5	6	4	26	60	—	100
Old Upper Secondary & University	10	4	3	20	63	—	100
<i>Position in Company</i>							
Temporary Operative	15	12	15	18	38	3	100
Regular Operative	8	5	8	25	53	1	100
Supervisory	18	3	5	24	49	2	100
Administrative	22	4	4	22	48	—	100
Technical	23	7	7	7	55	2	100

of the 23 wards of Tokyo, and the results of this survey were fairly similar to those of our OKM Manufacturing survey (Table 8).<sup>16</sup> Further, from a more recent survey conducted in 1966 by the Insti-

<sup>16</sup> University of Tokyo, Institute of Journalism, *The Bulletin of the Institute of Journalism* (in Japanese), Vol. 10, 2, Tokyo, 1961; Keizo OKABE, «Changes in the Desire for Amusement and the Way of Life» (in Japanese), *Shisō*, May 1960, pp. 51 ff.

TABLE 8

## PEOPLE'S PREFERENCE AMONG TYPES OF LIVING RELATED TO WORK AND LEISURE (%) \*

	(A) Work is Duty	(C) Work is Pleasure	(D) Work Requires Recreation	(E) Work Hard & Enjoy Leisure	Others & Unknown	Total
ALL Respondents (Tokyo Electors)	19	12	21	39	9	100
Age						(N = 914)
20-29 yrs.	8	9	25	50	7	100
30-39 yrs.	10	9	23	51	7	100
40-49 yrs.	23	14	25	31	7	100
50 yrs. & over	34	19	11	23	14	100
Education						
Primary	26	17	16	29	11	100
Secondary	11	12	24	46	6	100
Higher	18	7	23	46	7	100
Occupational Status						
Manual in Large Enterprises	16	13	16	50	6	100
Clerical in Large Enterprises	13	5	11	61	9	100
Manual in Minor Enterprises	15	12	24	41	9	100
Clerical in Minor Enterprises	16	10	26	44	4	100
Self-employed	20	16	28	31	5	100
Professional	29	36	7	14	14	100

\* Based on Keizo OKABE, «Changes in the Desire for Amusement and the Way of Life,» *Shisō*, May 1960, pp. 51 ff.

A': «Since work is a duty of man, one must work as long as possible.»

C': «Work is a form of pleasure. I have never thought it necessary to be liberated from work so that I might enjoy myself.»

D': «I like work, but I wish to have time sufficient for recreation and amusements by which I can supply energy for work.»

E': «Work is work and leisure is leisure. I will work hard during the stipulated hours, but when I am free I want to forget all about the work and enjoy leisure.»

tute of Statistical Mathematics in Tokyo, in which a random sample of about 800 residents of the 23 wards of Tokyo was taken, another set of similar results has been obtained.<sup>17</sup>

By cross-tabulating the results from our OKM Manufacturing survey with the workers' ages, educational background, positions in the company, etc., we could elicit the following findings. In the older age-groups, particularly the forty-years-olds, many thought of the work-oriented-unilateral type (A) as representing their own attitude to living. The identity type (C) was also picked out more frequently by them than by younger workers, with the exception of teen-agers. By contrast, among young workers in their twenties those who chose the integrated type (E) were conspicuously numerous. Similar differences by age-group may be pointed out even more clearly in the findings from the Institute of Journalism survey. As regards educational background, those who chose the integrated type (E) were found in large numbers among those with a high level of education, particularly those who graduated from the post-war upper secondary schools or who received a higher level of education. Finally, with regard to positions in the company, those who chose the A type of living were numerous among those who held high positions in the company.

By way of conclusion we may make the following remarks. 1) As far as can be determined from the survey data quoted above, the leisure-oriented-unilateral (B) way of living is, in reality, by no means common among Japanese industrial workers, contrary to the apprehensions of a certain section of intellectual leaders of Japan.

2) The way of living supported by, and actually adopted by, the younger generation is the integrated type (E).

3) By contrast, the pattern of life supported by older people is either the work-oriented-unilateral type (A) or the identity type (C).

4) The work-leisure dichotomy commonly found in the modern Japanese mass-consumption society is not the one between the work-oriented-unilateral type and the leisure-oriented-unilateral type, but rather the one between the former and the integrated type.

<sup>17</sup> In this survey, the respondents were asked about their actual way of living in exactly the same way as in the OKM Manufacturing survey. The percentages responding to the question were: A, 8 per cent; B, 6 per cent; C, 6 per cent; D, 22 per cent; E, 51 per cent; and others and unknown, 7 per cent.

In view of the fact that these two types of living are both work-oriented, we may say that the working masses of Japan today are still industrious and ambitious, regardless of age. The only question for the future in this connection is whether or not the younger generation will be able to fit their leisure-oriented desires into this work-oriented way of life, and maintain a healthy and productive harmony between these two.

Other age-groups, particularly the older age-groups, particularly the work-oriented-intellectual type (A), are representing their own attitude as living. The identical type (C) was also picked out more frequently by them than by younger workers, with the exception of teenagers. By contrast, among young workers in their twenties those who chose the integrated type (B) were considerably more numerous. Similar differences by age-groups may be pointed out even more clearly in the findings from the Institute of Journalism Survey. As regards educational background, those who chose the integrated type (B) were found in large numbers among those with a high level of education, particularly those who graduated from the post-war period secondary schools or who received a higher level of education. Finally, with regard to position in the company, those who chose the A type of living were numerous among those who held high positions in the company.

By way of conclusion we may make the following remarks:—(1) As far as can be determined from the survey data quoted above, the leisure-oriented-intellectual (B) way of living is, in reality, by no means common among Japanese industrial workers, contrary to the apprehensions of a certain section of intellectual leaders in Japan.

(2) The way of living supported by and actually adopted by the younger generation is the integrated type (B).

(3) By contrast, the pattern of life supported by older people is either the work-oriented-intellectual type (A) or the identical type (C).

(4) The work-orientation commonly found in the modern Japanese work-consumption society is not the one between the work-oriented-intellectual type and the leisure-oriented-intellectual type, but rather the one between the former and the integrated type.

(5) The work-orientation commonly found in the modern Japanese work-consumption society is not the one between the work-oriented-intellectual type and the leisure-oriented-intellectual type, but rather the one between the former and the integrated type.

(6) The work-orientation commonly found in the modern Japanese work-consumption society is not the one between the work-oriented-intellectual type and the leisure-oriented-intellectual type, but rather the one between the former and the integrated type.

(7) The work-orientation commonly found in the modern Japanese work-consumption society is not the one between the work-oriented-intellectual type and the leisure-oriented-intellectual type, but rather the one between the former and the integrated type.

(8) The work-orientation commonly found in the modern Japanese work-consumption society is not the one between the work-oriented-intellectual type and the leisure-oriented-intellectual type, but rather the one between the former and the integrated type.

(9) The work-orientation commonly found in the modern Japanese work-consumption society is not the one between the work-oriented-intellectual type and the leisure-oriented-intellectual type, but rather the one between the former and the integrated type.

(10) The work-orientation commonly found in the modern Japanese work-consumption society is not the one between the work-oriented-intellectual type and the leisure-oriented-intellectual type, but rather the one between the former and the integrated type.

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(12) The work-orientation commonly found in the modern Japanese work-consumption society is not the one between the work-oriented-intellectual type and the leisure-oriented-intellectual type, but rather the one between the former and the integrated type.

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(18) The work-orientation commonly found in the modern Japanese work-consumption society is not the one between the work-oriented-intellectual type and the leisure-oriented-intellectual type, but rather the one between the former and the integrated type.

(19) The work-orientation commonly found in the modern Japanese work-consumption society is not the one between the work-oriented-intellectual type and the leisure-oriented-intellectual type, but rather the one between the former and the integrated type.

(20) The work-orientation commonly found in the modern Japanese work-consumption society is not the one between the work-oriented-intellectual type and the leisure-oriented-intellectual type, but rather the one between the former and the integrated type.

(21) The work-orientation commonly found in the modern Japanese work-consumption society is not the one between the work-oriented-intellectual type and the leisure-oriented-intellectual type, but rather the one between the former and the integrated type.

(22) The work-orientation commonly found in the modern Japanese work-consumption society is not the one between the work-oriented-intellectual type and the leisure-oriented-intellectual type, but rather the one between the former and the integrated type.

(23) The work-orientation commonly found in the modern Japanese work-consumption society is not the one between the work-oriented-intellectual type and the leisure-oriented-intellectual type, but rather the one between the former and the integrated type.

COMMON OBJECTIVES OF SOCIOLOGY  
LATE INDIAN NATIONAL SCHOOL

Dr. Srinivasan

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NATIONAL SCHOOLS AND COMMON OBJECTIVES

ÉCOLES NATIONALES ET OBJECTIFS COMMUNS

Out of the excellent paper which was distributed by Mr. A. T. Srinivasan among the members of the group for studying the studies in various national schools in sociology and their relation to sociology, I would like to borrow from a few lines written by Srinivasan concerning objectives in sociology and aims of such national schools. The subject given to our group indicates indisputably that there are common objectives of sociology as a science, or general objectives resulting from its methodological features, as well as those do exist objectives of national schools growing out of historic experiments of the given nations. Srinivasan does not deal in his paper with the objectives of sociology but with the role of a sociologist. It seems evident that that is just another way of discussing the objectives. Thus Srinivasan discusses the intellectual, empirical and administrative role of sociology and also of social engineering. The tasks of sociology then are respectively theory development of phenomena and of social processes. That is science in the exact meaning of the word. Another objective consists in setting up machinery which takes cognizance of values of a kind of social order which would safeguard freedom of human needs without any sacrifice or restraint left. The third objective results in facilitating social engineering, i.e. finding the technique of handling people so as to reach the practical goals in a reasonable way. You might bring before a theory that contains objectives of sociology as a science and mentioning and developing a general theory, the two remaining objectives, however, have to be transmitted to the national schools, but the matter is not as simple as that.

There is evident interrelation between the theoretical objectives and the beginning work, particularly between the theory and the social engineering. The engineering cannot work without the theory

## COMMON OBJECTIVES OF SOCIOLOGY AND POLISH NATIONAL SCHOOL

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### I

Out of the excellent paper which was distributed by Mr. A. Touraine among the members of his group for guiding the studies on various national schools in sociology and their relation to «sociology», simply defined as science, I would like to borrow first a few ideas wanted for determining common objectives in sociology and aims of single national schools. The subject given to our group assumes indisputably that there are common objectives of sociology as a science, or general objectives resulting from its methodological features as well as there do exist objectives of national schools growing out of historic experiences of the given nations. Touraine does not deal in his paper with the objectives of sociology but with the roles of a sociologist. It seems evident that this is just another way of discussing the objectives. Thus Touraine discusses the intellectual, exploring and ideological role of sociology and also of social engineering. The tasks of sociology then are respectively: theory development of phenomena and of social processes, that is science in the exact meaning of the word. Another objective consists in setting up ideology which means creation of vision of a kind of social order which would safeguard meeting all human needs without any anxiety or resentment left. The third objective consists in practising social engineering, i.e. fixing the technique of handling people, so as to reach the practical goals in a reasonable way. You might bring forward a thesis that common objectives of sociology as a science are practising and developing a general theory, the two remaining objectives, however, have to be transmitted to the national schools. But the matter is not as simple as that.

There is evident interrelation between the theoretical objectives and the remaining ones, particularly between the theory and the social engineering. The engineering cannot work without the theory

predicting phenomena. This had been stated in the beginning of the nineteenth century by Saint-Simon, who was dreaming of setting up a theory allowing development of a technique serving effective shaping of societies. He regarded as his model natural history and technical sciences and their pattern of general science cumulating verified theories. There is no certainty whether there exists the same kind of relation between the general theory and the ideology, but on the background of some definitions of ideology, such as the Marxist definition, the relation is the same as between theory and social engineering.

It could be agreed upon then that the opinion of sociology being a cumulative science just as physics or biology is being indisputably assumed as the definition of our subject. The single national schools contribute by their verified achievements of universal importance for every culture and type of society, e.g. theses of interrelation between the group structure and the personality features. Out of such contributions there emerges sociology as a general science, forming the basis for its ideological functions, and first of all for the engineering functions.

Not all the sociologists, however, agree to this model of their science. For many of them this is an historic discipline related to definite periods and types of society, its results do not cumulate but supplement each other, and, consequently, there is not a uniform, general theory being set up but a collection of middle range theories and «ad hoc» theories, as well as a collection of descriptions produced with the help of these theories. Thus the contribution of single national schools consists in adding their results to the collection which can serve as a source of certain generalizations of universal value but which does not allow to build a general theory of universal significance.

I do not think it necessary here to try this issue in order to consider the relationship of single national schools to sociology as a science, understood as a collection of either particular results or general theories. Whatever the case may be, this sociology emerges as a science first on the level of national schools. It is being created by concrete people living amidst a defined nation, sharing the historic experiences of this nation. The sociologist investigates the actual social situation of this nation, the terms he applies come from the cultural and linguistic tradition of that nation, his attention is centered on problems occurring in the nation's group life. His ontological and methodological assumptions are penetrated by



internalized value systems existing in the nation's cultural heritage, and also by terms, phrases and ways of thinking specific for that nation. Thus a style of pursuing sociology in a given country is being made up which is influenced by the cultural heritage, social, economic and political problems of that nation. It is easy, for example, to point out differences between the style of pursuing sociology in the United States and Great Britain, or between the United States and Germany prior to 1933. A comparison of works by M. Weber, G. Simmel, A. Vierkandt and other German sociologists with the work by W.I. Thomas, R.E. Park or W. Burgess or other contemporary American sociologists proves those differences.

Let us try to determine what we are going to mean by national school of sociology. It should be recalled that the term «scientific school» represents at least two meanings according to the old tradition the term «scientific school» is applied to a group of research workers who in their investigations follow a collection of homogeneous theoretic assumptions and apply methods equipped with at least a certain common set of guide lines.

A classical example of such a school was E. Durkheim school the achievements of which have been systematically presented in *l'Année Sociologique*. If as in the case of Durkheim school, his school was almost exclusively dominating in France, it also was the national French school.

Sometimes, however, a national school can be understood as a metaphor when the entire achievement of sociology in a given country is being considered. It then includes the aforementioned certain style of pursuing the science, a way of approaching problems which is specific for the given country, using the concept set-up which reflects traditional values of cultural heritage of the given nation etc. Then even a variety of scientific schools in the proper sense of the word occurring in the given country can be considered collectively as one «national school». This is the meaning which I will give to the «Polish national school» under discussion, fully realizing the variety of theoretic and methodological tendencies coming forward in it.

These broadly defined national schools contribute to the «world sociology» or sociology as a science. It happens that some national sociologies owing to their achievements being taken over by sociologists or other countries or of all the countries become the «world sociology». That was the case of French sociology before World War I, and of American sociology after World War II. Theories,

methods, concept apparatus and specific way of pursuing sociology in those countries became then universally adopted and imitated by sociologists of many countries.

Now, however, we are witnessing tendencies for differentiation of national schools and therefore it is justified that the agenda of a world congress includes the problem of relationship of national schools to sociology as a whole.

## II

Following Touraine's track of thought in his introductory paper I would like to determine some features of the «Polish national school» and point out its contribution to the development of world sociology. While comparing Polish sociology with e.g. sociology pursued at present in the United States, France or USSR we can state a number of differences and of likenesses. Several problems being solved by the sociologists of those countries are approached in the identical way, such as urbanization problem, work and industry sociology etc. There are problems specific for certain countries, as for instance the attention given in the United States to racial conflicts. The differences result from the variety of social structures being investigated by sociologists, from the variety of the system of institutions, the variety of cultural heritage and of historic experiences. That is why I will start the presentation of the Polish school with the general survey of historic experiences of the Polish nation which have contributed to the shaping of value system and ways of thinking of a society which are specific for the Polish nation.

It is difficult to comprise in a few sentences the amount of historic experiences of a nation. Therefore, I will limit myself here to indicating those facts and processes alone, the influence of which was essential. First of all it has to be emphasized that in the nineteenth century when modern European nations were being shaped, Poland was deprived of the status of an independent state. Thus the top priority problem considered by several Polish generations in that century was the recovery of political independence. This was the reason for constant concentration of the social thought in Poland on the problem of political independence, and of giving the top location in the system of national values to the issue of independence and freedom. The social thought in Poland in the nineteenth

century was also deeply absorbed by analysing the social forces which led to the fall of the state and by searching for powers which might lead to recovery of political independence.

The political doctrines such as radical democratic, conservative, socialist and nationalistic trends were not linked with the struggle for political power, as they were in the Western countries, but they were considered from the point of view of mobilizing social forces for national liberation. Therefore also, as it became clearly outlined in the doctrine of Polish socialism, the doctrine of class struggle and social liberation or social revolution in Poland has always been closely linked with the idea of national liberation.

Another problem continually considered by representatives of the social thought in Poland, by politicians and journalists, a problem which became an internalized element of Polish cultural tradition was social development and overcoming backwardness. In the nineteenth century when the positivism reached Poland it became reshaped into a specific social doctrine, so-called «organic work» as the best way to fight economic backwardness.

The idea of progress, ethical and philosophical doctrines in Poland were always tuned to be linked with «the Polish national issue». After regaining independence the struggle for power between the trend represented by the governing group centered around Pilsudski, between the nationalistic rightist extremists, between fascist inclined groups, between democratic peasant movements and the socialist party made it a point that all the competing political programmes had to include in the first place problems of the nineteenth century when the nation had been deprived of its own state and institutions, the existence of which can safeguard political sovereignty. These problems had been left over unsolved by the eighteenth century and they had been the object of struggle in Poland at the moment of the fall of the state by the end of that century. They were the following: the issue of social structure, the priority of landowners and their culture, the issue of land reform, the conflicts of old date between peasants and landowners, the attitude toward the church and the role of the church in the state. In various political programmes which were to mobilize national forces to struggle for independence these matters always took the prior place.

It should be noted that in the two decades after regaining independence in 1918 another trend has developed in the Polish social thought. It was initiated primarily in the professional and Univer-

sity centers end it was called by J. Chalasinski a trend to «Europeanism». It was namely turning away from purely national problems and establishing contact with the academic social thought in Western European countries. There belonged to this trend the school of Florian Znaniecki who was referring to the American sociology of that time, of which he was himself an outstanding representative, and there also belonged the activities of Stefan Czarnowski, linked with the Durkheim school, of which he was a disciple.

However, the war in 1939, the occupation and the underground struggle again gave the priority to the old problems, the traditional Polish struggle for independence. While discussing the problem how Poland should be managed after the war in order to prevent a repetition of the 1939 disaster, priority was given again to political and social issues, revolutionary and conservative programmes, attractiveness of political slogans mobilizing to fight, matters of patriotism and honour which had topped the Polish value system during all the nineteenth century.

The end of the war brought new experiences and made the nation as whole face new issues which were necessarily reflected in the works of the sociologists who are studying the life of their own nation. These issues were: the shifting of frontiers and resettling of millions of people to the Western and Northern territories assigned to Poland by Yalta and Potsdam agreements in return for areas given up in the East, horrible war destruction, the loss of one fifth of the Polish prewar population, the psychological shock of the sufferings during the occupation and the efforts of reconstruction. The leading problems, however, were the revolutionary change of the political system, the land reform and the socialization of economy, the cultural revolution done in the spirit of Marxist ideology, the intense industrialization aiming at creating an economic basis for the new social system.

These war experiences and changes which have occurred in the structure of the society, the new set-up of political and economic institutions, struggle for consolidating the new authority, the building up of the socialist state, the growth of the socialized economy — this was the wide variety of factors shaping the social consciousness of the nation and thus influencing the problems taken up by sociologists, their approach to these problems, their preferences in the choice of methods, and first of all their ontological assumptions, the value systems adopted consciously or not from the cultural heritage of the nation and the general social consciousness.

During the twenty one years of shaping and functioning of the new system there began to form in the Polish society new ways of thinking and patterns of behaviour. These were primarily designated by the principles of functioning of political and economic institutions. The functioning of a socialized enterprise, in particular, is of basic importance here. There are growing new social problems, new types of tensions and conflicts. Sociologists involved in their investigation who simultaneously participate in these problems take the developing ways of thinking as «natural». These ways of thinking influence posing and solving sociological issues. It has to be noted that Poland is a country of young people, as over 41 per cent of the population are under 25 years of age. The research work is taken up more and more by a generation of people who had started their education after 1945, who received their higher education after 1956 and who apprehend and react to the phenomena around them differently from the sociologists who had completed their studies before the war.

### III

I have tried to point out two basic factors shaping the specific features of Polish sociology, namely the historic experiences and the social reality which came into being on the Polish territories as a result of war and postwar reforms. These are not, however, the only factors responsible for these specific features, as we come across the same type of realities in other socialist countries which have developed a somewhat different kind of sociology. Therefore there are to be found other differentiating factors. These are existing in the social consciousness and in the style of pursuing sociology, adopted various frames of references, designating points of view and ways of interpretation of the actual situation. I think that the following theoretic assumptions which are coexisting, inter-relating and crossing both in the social consciousness and in the works of sociologists and their interpretation of the contemporary Polish society, can be indicated as typical for Polish sociology:

1. A set of traditional images of the society which is a compilation of ideas of various theories as well as social and political doctrines developed in the nineteenth century. There is included here the specific theory of a society as an organic community based on essential principles of the national culture and on ethic

values. For the survival of a society in the nineteenth century depended on these values and the maintaining of cultural values decided of the existence of a nation. Further there was the specific theory of progress as the aim of existence for a society and the necessity of subordinating personal interests to the patriotic goals, a theory of «organic work», i.e. systematic contribution to the progress of the whole. Moreover, there are some elements of Messianic theories developed by the mystics of the nineteenth century, recognizing the exceptional position of the Polish nation in the world and reasoning the political defeats of Poles as a historic sacrifice. There are also falling here certain elements of the nineteenth century theories of progress and democracy, becoming criteria of appraisal applied consciously or not in the interpretations of social processes.

So far we do not have any systematic study attempting to analyse the influence of that heritage of the nineteenth century social thought on the Polish sociology. As I have said before, however, the historic experiences after 1939 support the actual meaning of many of them and they are found in those parts of sociological interpretations where the sociologists reach for everyday images or for assumptions considered as evident in the Polish culture. There belongs here, for instance, the specific practicisism of Polish sociology, its involvement in public discussions on current problems of the society, sensitiveness to menace of national interests, concentrating on the development of the society as a whole and the like.

2. The second place among the elements included in the theoretic assumptions of contemporary Polish sociology goes to certain theories developed at the interwar period by sociologists like Florian Znaniecki, Stefan Czarnowski, Kazimierz Dobrowolski, Jan S. Bystron, J. Chalasinski and Ludwik Krzywicki, whose contribution to the development of Marxism will be discussed separately. Though fought down during the Stalinist period those theories survived, particularly the theory of personality of F. Znaniecki, his concepts of the sociology of education, theory of culture of S. Czarnowski, methodological directives of linking history with sociology developed by K. Dobrowolski and others. What deserves special emphasis is the historic point of view always living in Polish sociology and facilitating the acceptance of historic materialism. Another methodological element is the method of collecting personal documents which gathered on a large scale, published in special surveys and elaborated by sociologists. They are the essential element of popu-

larising sociology and at the same time they supply a great number of data on the course of social life in different milieus, vocational groups and social classes.

3. Analysing further the elements of theory of the social thought we also have to point out the theories developed by the Catholic church. The intellectual movement of the Polish Catholics developing in several fractions is keenly interested in sociological problems. It is true that we do not come across the influence of this Catholic sociology in the academic sociology or among the research workers, but it is being intensely developed in the Catholic University of Lublin and in the associations of intellectuals and workers centered around Catholic periodicals. The Catholic church in Poland sees the main source of its power in maintaining fanatic plain and non-intellectual faith of the masses and pays less attention to the development of a social theory, because it believes that such a theory can be fought and replaced by other theories, while the fanatic, irrational and mystic faith is not likely to be defeated by any intellectual movements or by any empiric theory. Nevertheless, the Catholic intellectuals develop sociological theories and try to form conclusions for an effective church reform out of the analysis of the contemporary stage of society.

Another problem is the influence of traditional values represented by the Catholic religion which joined the cultural heritage, such as concept of man and personality, relationship of the individual to the society, evaluation of human behaviour, etc., which are penetrating from this heritage to the sociological assumptions and interpretations.

4. At present in the Polish sociology an important place is taken by Marxist theories, the Marxist theory of society, theory of historic process, of class struggle, of the role of a socialist state and of politics, etc. The influence of Marxism on academic sociology was very strong; it became weakened, however, in the Stalinist period when simplified concepts had been presented as the only scientific ones. The postwar reception of Marxism referred first to the traditions of Polish Marxists, represented at the interwar period by Ludwik Krzywicki, who had submitted his own interpretation of the historic materialism. Also the traditional approval of the historic method favoured this reception. Up till 1956 the now elderly generation of sociologists lived through a period of adaptation of Marxist achievements, getting acquainted with the works of Marx, Engels and Lenin. After 1956 Marxism ceased to play the exclusive role

in education of sociologists. The influence of sociology being developed contemporaneously in the United States and in Western Europe was to be noticed. Polish sociology then became the point of encounter of the two tendencies fighting each other.

The influence of Marxism on Polish sociology consisted in:

- a. selection of research issues and emphasis primarily on the processes occurring in macrostructures and on the transformation of social classes and strata;
- b. philosophical assumptions admitting the thesis of objectivity of a social process and its specific rules;
- c. assumptions admitting the complexity of factors working in this process and the necessity of a versatile analysis of processes and phenomena in all their complexity, i.e. factors aiming at combining various research methods and techniques;
- d intensification of the traditional practical attitude of sociology, and facing the task of pursuing works useful for the economic development;
- e. ideological and apologetic approach to the policy of the party and institutions of the new system.

These basic tendencies were clearly depicted in the descriptions of social processes and in the interpretations of phenomena occurring in the Polish society. Thus e.g. the research work on intelligentsia was oriented on the verification of the theory of building up the «people's intelligentsia», while the investigation on the working class followed the theory of that class as the essential class in the new system; the investigations of political institutions assumed as the starting point the ideological definition of their tasks, etc.

5. As I have mentioned before, ten years ago the Polish sociology has reestablished its contacts with the world sociology which had been broken in the years 1939-1945 and then again in 1949-1956. The departure of a whole generation for studies to the United States and Western Europe, the inflow of literature and periodicals, a continuous collaboration in international organizations — are some of the factors which brought the theoretic concepts of that sociology to Poland. It goes without saying that those theories also significantly influence the approach and description of processes occurring in Poland, their interpretations and conclusions drawn. Nearly all known theories of middle range approved by contemporary sociology could be mentioned as occurring in the works of Polish sociologists and supplying the authors with definition assort-



ment and interpretation schemes. I have in mind theories such as: theories of small groups, theories of frustration and aggression, of cognitive of small groups, theories of frustration and aggression, of cognitive dissonance, theories develop in the sociology of industry and work, theories of mass culture and technical civilization, theories of social mobility and stratification, theories of social system and of social roles, theories of social integration and disorganization and the like. As after the I World War there appeared in Poland a strong tendency for establishing contact with the world sociology and of confirming in it its presence, so after 1956 the same movement could be seen, sometimes acquiring the form of fascination by theories, from which the Polish sociologists had been isolated for a considerable time. On the whole however, this had been a powerful stimulus to the Polish empiric sociology.

Theories developed in the Western countries emphasized these aspects of social processes which had been, so to say, traditionally neglected by the Marxist sociology, and openly disregarded at the Stalinist period, namely processes occurring in microstructures, psycho-social mechanisms. That sociology fascinated by putting more emphasis on the contemporary society rising above the technical and industrial civilization. On the other hand that sociology had no experience or opportunity of investigating the processes occurring in the socialist societies and therefore Polish sociologists trying to describe and interpret these processes had to look for solutions of their own.

What are then the results of collision and encounter of those theoretic and methodological tendencies in the Polish sociology? Clear effects cannot be stated yet. Anyway, what has to be emphasized is the increasing pressure of experiences resulting from the functioning of basic institutions of this society; should the sociologist wish to interpret these experiences into the language of theory there will not do either the assortment of ideas of the traditional historic materialism theory or the theoretic schemes set up in the technical civilization of Western societies. The characteristic feature of changes experienced by traditional social classes after the social were one of the forces transforming that society, so that its activities are a sort of practical test of the ideas. Thus the Polish Marxists have to take into consideration in their investigations the social action of what had been created only by Marx and what had not existed in the society described by him. On the other hand we do not know enough yet about the real effects of socialized economy

or about how the socialized industry changes the society, and so we cannot say what will be the features of the Polish industrial society rising above the contemporary technique working in the framework of socialized and planned economy.

#### IV

Whatever the further contribution of the Polish sociology to the development of the general sociological theory may be, and whether we treat sociology as a cumulative science or just as a collection of contributions of value in a definite period of time, we are able by now to indicate a number of fields into which the Polish sociology has introduced new descriptive materials and generalizations:

1. In the investigation of changes in macrostructures, primarily of changes experienced by traditional social classes after the socialization of economy and winding up private production means facilitating the use of hired labour to a larger extent. In this respect the descriptions of changes occurring in the peasant class, in the intelligentsia working class and in a way also in the social class of smaller entrepreneurs, which were elaborated in Poland, are of essential value for getting to know the general rules.

2. In the investigation of mass migrations, resettlements, setting up new local communities and new groups in the Western and Northern territories, there have also been collected descriptions and materials allowing generalizations and comparison with the processes occurring in other countries where similar phenomena appeared. The tremendous scale of these processes in Poland, however, makes them particularly significant.

3. In the investigation of the rules of social processes linked with socialist industrialization, i.e. with the development of socialized industry carried out by institutions of a socialist state. Not all the processes of this industrialization are identical with the processes known from other types of historic industrialization (England and Western Europe, Japan, post-colonial countries.) In this respect also investigations done by Polish sociologists submit materials unknown in other countries.

4. In the investigation of the social system of socialized industry. The point here is the sociological aspect of functioning of a socialized enterprise, of managing the industry and socialized economy

as a whole. In this field also the results of research work done in Poland are of essential significance for comparative studies. Of a similar significance are the investigations of functioning of political institutions, mechanisms of exercising power, though there are here many more taboo issues than in other fields of investigations, which should not be touched on by a sociologist. There are also to be noted investigations done in Poland on the school system as a factor of transformation of the social structure and economy. These investigations particularly dealt with various aspects of activities and results achieved by higher educational institutions.

5. Interesting results are also brought about by investigations on urbanization processes, migration of peasant population to towns, adaptation of this population to conditions in towns. Particular attention is due to the process which occurred directly after the war which might be called ruralization of the towns, when the peasant population came to deserted and entirely destroyed towns and shaped the urban life according to their traditional way of life. More important, however, is the process of urbanization of the countryside resulting from industrialization and followed by a development of the mass culture. The rapid increase of the urban population after 1945 offered an opportunity to collect descriptions and materials on the subject, materials for typology of those towns. Also construction of entirely new towns offered an opportunity for interesting investigation.

6. Finally, there are worth mentioning the investigations done on the development of specific mass culture of a socialist society, designated on the one hand by the revolutionary leap into the extension of the school system and its democratization, by development of the mass communication media, and on the other hand on the Marxist ideology and traditional values of the Polish culture, both representative and people's culture.

These are not all the fields of sociological investigations done in Poland. I have mentioned only those which might seem interesting on account of analogous investigations carried out in many other countries. They may serve for comparison purposes and they may contribute to enrichment of the «world sociology» or «general sociology.»

Now the question is, if these empiric investigations carried out in the fields of actual situation, variously shaped by the cultural tradition, specific set up of political and economic institutions, internalized values, created by the peculiarities of the historic

process in the past 150 years, can be conducted on the basis of differentiated theoretic assumptions coming from different sources and at the same time so disintegrated internally. Must not the Polish sociology reach a specific synthesis of theoretic outlooks and do not these theories here undergo a less or more conscious simplification, unification and matching?

Several matters have to be told apart here. In our everyday life we do for the needs of everyday activity a continuous «theoretic» interpretation of phenomena occurring around us, not caring in the least about the internal integration of these theoretic assumptions which explain to us the behaviour of our fellow creatures and allow forecasts on which we are basing our activities. In order to live and be active in a society you do not need a uniform and united theory of this society, a number of generalizations will do, stating that in such and such circumstances people behave so and so. It is a similar story with sociology. It may be a whole composed of ad hoc theories and theories of middle range, not very much united inside, but sufficient for interpretation of phenomena in single fields of social reality. With its development and methodological maturity, however, the significance of such general theory is growing. The closer the sociology is to the «practical sociology of everyday life», i.e. the closer it is to more or less systematic colloquial images, the lesser its need for such a general theory. With the growth of methodological requirements and growth of various middle range theories the need for a general theory becomes more explicit.

Such a theory must come out of certain ontological assumptions, referring to the nature of social reality under investigation. Out of these assumptions general methodological directives are being brought about and further on detailed investigation techniques on one hand, while on the other hand an assortment of definitions serving the description and interpretation purposes of the situation being investigated. Marxism, sociologism, behaviourism etc. were to become a general theory, and the theory of social systems also aspires to become a general theory. In the Polish sociology Florian Znaniecki had set up a uniform theory assuming that the social reality is a cultural reality formed by conscious activities of men, that the basic elements of this reality are social actions which in turn make up complexes of social relations, and these again compose social roles as essential components of human personality, while complexes of roles make up social groups. Znaniecki's philosophical concept of social reality resulted in basic methodological directive

— humanistic coefficient — and in research techniques, considering the analysis of personal documents as particularly important. This theory though not approved as a whole by all the sociologists, still fascinates some of them.

Most chances for being approved as a general theory go to Marxism. In its long history, however, Marxism was too deeply involved in political and social struggles and consequently neglected the development of a general theory, which at the Stalinist period was simply set back. That was the reason why Marxists had not tried to interpret in the categories of their theory phenomena and processes occurring in microstructures, phenomena of shaping the personality, social psychology, contemporary technical civilization, social results of scientific revolution and the like. While entering the way of broadly developed empiric investigations Marxists open up a new and revolutionary enough chapter in the development of Marxism, particularly in those countries whose system is shaped by the ideas of Marxism, interpreted in one way or another, and where therefore the empiric investigations will be also a study on practical functioning of those ideas. This kind of empiric test cannot remain without influence on further development of Marxism as a social theory and an ideological doctrine.

We clearly feel in Polish sociology the importance of promotion of a uniform sociological theory which would allow the interpretation of the new social reality. Up till now, due to various reasons, attempts have not yet been initiated to set up such a theory. Nevertheless, the part elements of this kind of sociological theory of an industrial society growing above socialised and centrally planned economy with its specific social differentiations and its typical set up of institutions, are slowly emerging.

The overwhelming influence of national tradition cannot be disregarded here. This tradition becomes a powerful factor shaping human ways of thought and actions in all the countries, not only these of the third world. The sensitiveness to those cultural values which allowed the survival of the nineteenth century to a nation deprived of state and which helped mobilizing forces during the war and occupation is still very strong in the Polish sociology, and not only among the elder generation. Polish sociologists being influenced by it realize that the contribution of Polish sociology to the sociology of the world can result only of theoretic elaboration of their own historic experiences and not of imitating however interesting theories presenting and generalizing experiences of other coun-

tries. Thus, the Polish national school can contribute to the world sociology if it sets up a theory of its own historic experiences and if it submits a theoretic elaboration of essential issues of life of the contemporary Polish society. The knowledge of this chance and of this task becomes more and more realized by sociologists in Poland.

TRADITIONAL PRINCIPLE OF SOCIAL GROUPING<sup>1</sup>  
AND PROBLEMS OF PARTY FORMATION AND MOBILIZATION  
IN NIGERIA<sup>2</sup>

CONFLICT RESEARCH AND RESEARCH IN CONFLICT

RECHERCHES SUR LES CONFLITS ET SUR LEUR RÉSOLUTION  
RESOLUTION

The present population of Nigeria, according to the 1962 census is 55 million. Although the reliability of this number has been disputed even by Nigerians themselves, the number, however, has been accepted as official, and is therefore regarded in this paper as a legitimate basis for discussion and comparison<sup>3</sup>. The National Economic Council before our political independence in 1960 submitted, *inter alia*, that: «The majority of the population live in agricultural areas and some 75 per cent of the adult labour force is engaged in agriculture, forestry and animal husbandry, but the urban is increasing as a result of some movement into the towns from the countryside. This movement is likely to be intensified by the spread of education. The additional employment which industry will provide, largely for urban dwellers, is one of the advantages which will flow to Nigeria from industrialization»<sup>4</sup>.

The post-independent years: 1961-1966, have witnessed in Nigeria great strides which have been taken by Government and people toward intensification of education and the increase of production through the establishment of industry. Regarding identification of

<sup>1</sup> This paper was written in the midst of a very difficult and delicate situation in Nigeria between January and August, 1966 and to the fact that I have to be called away several occasions to serve the Supreme Military Government between May and August. However, the essential mathematics of this paper are the results of my own.

<sup>2</sup> And it is probable that the estimated 55 million covers near the actual number of Nigerians today, if we accept as factual this statement made by the National Economic Council of the Federation of Nigeria in 1964: «At the end of 1962 the population of Nigeria and the Cameroons was estimated at approximately 55 million and it is increasing at the rate of nearly 2 per cent per annum or 1 million every 18 months. See National Economic Council, *Economic Survey of Nigeria, 1965*, printed by the Federal Government Printer, Lagos, 1965, page 1.

<sup>3</sup> National Economic Council, *op. cit.*, *ibid.*

TRADITIONAL PRINCIPLE OF SOCIAL GROUPING  
AND PROBLEMS OF PARTY FORMATION AND MOBILIZATION  
IN NIGERIA\*

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The present population of The Republic of Nigeria, according to the 1963 census is 55 million. Although the reliability of this number has been disputed even by Nigerians themselves, the number, however, has been accepted as official, and is therefore regarded in this paper as a legitimate basis for discussion and comparison<sup>1</sup>. The National Economic Council, before our political independence in 1960 submitted, inter alia, that: «The majority of the population live in agricultural areas and some 75 per cent of the adult labour force is engaged in agriculture, forestry and animal husbandry, but the urban is increasing as a result of some movement into the towns from the countryside. This movement is likely to be intensified by the spread of education. The additional employment which industry will provide, largely for urban dwellers, is one of the advantages which will flow to Nigeria industrialization»<sup>2</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> And it is probable that the estimated 55 million comes near the actual number of Nigerians today, if we accept as factual this statement made by the National Economic Council of the Federation of Nigeria in 1959: «At the end of 1958 the population of Nigeria and the Cameroons was estimated at approximately 35 million and it is increasing at the rate of nearly 2 per cent per annum of 1 million every 18 months.» See National Economic Council, *Economy Survey of Nigeria*, 1959, printed by the Federal Government Printer, Lagos, 1959, page 1.

<sup>2</sup> National Economic Council, *op. cit.*, *ibid.*



education, the Government of the Federation of Nigeria in a Six Year Development Plan: 1962-68, pointed out that our educational programme was designed «to increase as rapidly and as economically as possible the high level manpower which is indispensable to accelerated development», and to achieve this increase the cost of 33.454 million sterling pounds was estimated<sup>3</sup>. Urbanization has proceeded at a very rapid rate. For example, in the Western Group of Provinces, of the 135 towns which in 1952 had a population of 5,000 or more, places like Ibadan, Ikeja, Oshogbo, and Sapele which are in what is now called Mid-Western Group of Provinces, have rapidly increased in population, in response to the rapid economic development which took place in the past years<sup>4</sup>. And in the Northern Group of Provinces, cities like Kaduna, Kano, and Jos have also grown rapidly as a result of economic development; while in the Eastern Group of Provinces those major towns of the section now being designated by the Department of Town Planning as the Port Harcourt — Aba complex: Aba, Umuahia, Enugu, Onitsha and Port Harcourt also have increased very rapidly because of economic development.

Yet, this change in education and industrialization has not reduced the domination of our economy by agriculture. Probably, because of this, the sharply rising total number of enumerated Nigerians has not created a malthusian problem of disproportionate relation between population size and means of sustenance<sup>5</sup>.

Against this brief sketch let us view the state of literacy in Nigeria today. Universal free primary education was introduced in 1955 at the Federal capital during the colonial regime. Three years later (1958), it was introduced to the then Western Region.

Table I shows that on the eve of independence there was a total of 15,620 primary schools, a teaching population of 95,259 teachers within the entire Federation. Three years after independence (1963),

<sup>3</sup> See Federation of Nigeria, *National Development Plan, 1962-68*, published by the Federal Ministry of Economic Development, Lagos, Section II, «Social Overhead Expenditure,» p. 87.

<sup>4</sup> Federation of Nigeria, *National Development 1962-68*, p. 313.

<sup>5</sup> The Current allegation of shortage of food in the Republic of Nigeria is being attributed (a) either to hoarding by traders who want to take advantage of the abnormal situation following the coup d'Etat of January 15 of this year; (b) or to the aftermath of the Western Regional Crisis during the previous regime which forced farmers to flee in large numbers from the villages and from the cultivation of their farmlands in order to save their lives from the looting and arson of political thugs.

TABLE I  
 PRIMARY EDUCATION IN NIGERIA BY POLITICAL AREAS:  
 AVERAGE OF UPILS BY SCHOOL AND TEACHER: 1959-63  
 AVERAGE OF PUPILS

Region	1959				1960				1961				1962				1963			
	No. of School	Teacher	Aver. per Sch.	Aver. per Teacher	No. of Sch.	No. of Teacher	Aver. per Sch.	Aver. per Teacher	No. of Sch.	No. of Teacher	Aver. per Sch.	Aver. per Teacher	No. of Sch.	No. of Teacher	Aver. per Sch.	Aver. per Teacher	No. of Sch.	No. of Teacher	Aver. per Sch.	Aver. per Teacher
North	2340	9964	107	25	2600	10054	109	29	2584	10645	122	30	2568	11587	140	31	2625	13069	156	31
East	6659	45709	207	30	6451	44478	222	32	7008	42267	182	30	6478	44589	196	29	6028	28954	212	33
West	6518	37544	166	29	6540	40115	172	28	6468	40277	175	28	6420	40149	173	28	6311	38856	174	28
Lagos (Federal Capital)	103	2042	644	32	112	2160	665	34	112	2507	699	33	120	3010	821	33	126	3297	854	33
The Republic of Nigeria	15620	95259	178	29	15703	96807	185	30	16127	95696	173	29	15586	99335	182	29	15090	94176	192	31

SOURCE: *Federal Ministry of Education, Statistics of Education in Nigeria: 1963, Series No. 1 Volume III.*

the number dropped to 15,090 schools and 94,176 teachers respectively. And within period of four years, 1959-1963; 530 primary schools were closed and approximately 1083 openings were shut. However, within the same period, the number of pupils per school and the average pupil per teacher rose respectively from 178 to 192 on one hand, and from 29 to 31 on the other. Hence, though we had in 1963 fewer primary schools than were on the eve of independence, the number of pupils over whom the teachers and schools exercised academic responsibilities increased considerably. Of the political divisions of the Federation, the Eastern Region has maintained an all time high average of 207 to 212 pupils per school and an average of 30 to 33 pupils per teacher respectively from 1959 to 1963. Western Region followed with the figures of 166 to 174 pupils per school, and averages of 29 to 28 pupils per teacher respectively. Northern Region, with half the population of the whole of Nigeria, though maintaining the least average sizes of pupils per school and per teacher, nevertheless have been experiencing a rising level of literacy. And the recent publication in the Press about the intention of the Military Government to establish a crash programme in education in the Northern Group of Provinces, after the mid-June disturbances there is a recognition of the great disparity between the three Southern Groups of Provinces and that of the North in matters of education.

The most recent disparity in education, which may be observed from Table I below, took place in 1963, between the average of 156 pupils per school for the North and the average of 386 pupils per school for both Eastern and Western Groups of Provinces together. The Republic capital's (Lagos) average is 854 pupils per school. And in Nigeria, primary school education as the base of the education pyramid in Nigeria is the best indicator of the literacy rates in Nigeria. But the picture of scope of education on that level is reflected in the Secondary Grammar Schools, Secondary Modern Teacher Training Colleges, Technical and Vocational Institutes, and at the University level also.

And if recurrent expenditures can be used also to gauge the scope of educational involvement in the Groups of Provinces, then we may consider the figures from the 1961-62 Estimate of the then Federal Republic of Nigeria. According to this Estimate, the sum of £4,840,880 was earmarked for educational institutions at all levels in the Northern Group of Provinces. Of this, the sum of £608,880 was for central administration. This is in contrast with the £7,378,570 for education in the Eastern Group of Provinces and the £8,879,960 in

the Western Group of Provinces with £486,000 and £808,140 respectively for central administration.

Up to now, I have been dealing with the detailed points of the problem of differential in literacy rates in the Regions of Nigeria. If time permits, which it does not, I should have liked to analyze in equally detailed degree the election results in the various sections of Nigeria for a period of time, say, 1960-64 with a view to establishing the extent of the connexions between the different standards of literacy reached in a particular Region and the effectiveness of party organization and mass mobilization there.

But even then one would have to bear in mind that Nigeria, in comparison with many countries in Latin America and Asia stands low in the literacy percentage <sup>6</sup>.

Furthermore, one would have to also keep in mind when considering the effectiveness of mass mobilization the fact which Professor Lipset called to our attention six years ago, that these four significant variables in economic development: urbanization, literacy percentage, mass media participation, and political participation have multiple correlations between themselves <sup>7</sup>.

#### PARTY FORMATION IN A CONSOCIATE SOCIETY

Nigeria is a consociate society <sup>8</sup>. That is, it is a society whose general structure was formed in a historical process of political unification of several indigeneous West African societies by a Colonial

<sup>6</sup> The World Bank, quoting from the United Nation's *Special Study on Educational Conditions in Non-Self Governing Territories*, 1954, placed Nigeria lower to countries like Ceylon, Columbia, and Mexico, in literacy percentages. See *The Economic Development of Nigeria*, p. 11, footnote 5.

<sup>7</sup> See Seymour Martin LIPSET, *Political Man, The Social Bases of Politics*, Doubleday and Company, Inc. Garden City, New York, p. 58-60. In fact we need to examine more carefully Professor Lipset's proposition: «Given the existence of poverty — stricken masses, low levels of education, an elongated-pyramid class structure, and the «premature» triumph of democratic left, the prognosis for political democracy in Asia and Africa is bleak.» *Political Man*, p. 94, to see how much of the reality of the situation described in the proposition exist in the series of coups and counter-coups now taking place in West Africa. And especially how much of the overthrow of the former civil and military regimes was due to the effects of a rising level of education in the civilian and military populaces.

<sup>8</sup> The concept of *the consociate society* was first proposed by this writer in an unpublished seminal paper: *Tribalism is not All* (Nsukka: 1955, especially on pp. 8-10.

Power during the nineteenth century. These indigeneous societies individually may be described as a speech community or a union of several such communities. In the present four Nigerian Groups of Provinces and in the Republic's Capital we may identify several such speech communities: «in the Midwestern group of provinces» one finds the Edo, Etsko, Ineme, Ivbiosakan, Ishan, Urhobo, and Iso-ko according to R. E. Bradbury; whereas Laura and Paul Bohannan have identified seven 'small tribes' and four 'enclaved groups' in Central Nigeria; while Professor Daryll Forde identified six 'cultural groups' among the Western Group of Provinces: Oyo-Ibadan; Ife-Ilesha; Egba and related groups; Ijebus; Ekiti; and Ondo: as against seven Yoruba 'cultural groups' in the Northern Group of Provinces: Igbolo, Igbonna; Bunu, Yagba, Kabba, Ijumu, and Aworo. In the Eastern Group of Provinces, G. I. Jones identified nine 'tribal groups and sub-tribal groupings': Nri Awka, Elugu, Onitsha, Isu-ama, Oratta-Ikwerre, Ohuhu Ngwa; Abam, Ada, Aro and Ogu-Uku. Among the Ibibio speaking peoples in the East, he also identified six groupings: Ibibio, Annang; Enyong, Eket, Andoni-Ibeno, and Efik. In the Middle Niger Group of Provinces, Gunn and Conant identified these «peoples:» Kambari, Gungawa, Achipawa, Kamuku and related groups, Basa, Dukawa, Dakakari, Koro and related groups, and Hausa»<sup>9</sup>.

When this nature of ethnic diversity is considered along with the differing rates of literacy among members of the Groups of Provinces we behold vividly in our minds the background against which the political processes of party formation and mass mobilization in Nigeria have been taking place.

An aspect of this political background was the division of the Nation into four Regions, each with its own constitution that had «force of law throughout that Region, and which might be altered only by a law enacted by the legislature of that Region»<sup>10</sup>. The constitution also provided for the division of Nigeria into «as many constituencies as there are members of the House Representatives»<sup>11</sup>. According to the provision in the Constitution of the Federal Repu-

<sup>9</sup> See this writer's unpublished paper: *Ethnic Diversity and Political Stability in the Developing Nations: A Framework for the Study of the Case of Nigeria*: Being a paper presented at the Faculty of Social Studies Colloquium on May 5, 1966, University of Nigeria, Nsukka.

<sup>10</sup> See *The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria*, 1963, Lagos, Federal Ministry of Information Printing Division, p. 9.

<sup>11</sup> Ditto — Clause 51, p. 31.

blic, «No constituency shall form part of more than one territory and the boundaries of each constituency shall be such that the number of inhabitants thereof is as nearly equal to the population quota as is reasonably practicable». <sup>12</sup> During the 1964 Federal Election, there were 312 of such constituencies: 14 in the Mid-Western Region or Group of Provinces; 167 in the Northern Region; 70 in the Eastern Region or Group of Provinces, and 61 in the Western Region or Group of Provinces <sup>13</sup>.

After attaining political independence Nigerians found themselves pitched upon many horns of dilemma at the same time.

One horn of dilemma was whether political parties should draw membership exclusively from one speech community, one tribal group and sub-tribal groupings, one people from one Group of Provinces; or should be drawn inclusively and democratically from all Group of Provinces, and language groups.

Another was whether making a living, acquiring and sharing wealth or serving the country should be based upon the criterion of tribal clan or lineage affiliation; or whether it should be based upon skill, or knowledge, extent of training, and degree of competence.

A third horn of dilemma on which Nigerians were placed was whether stalemates among aspirants to power in the new Nation should be settled by a cultivated art of compromise; or whether it should be by open confrontation with their probable consequences. These were some of the dilemmas which confronted Nigeria upon independence.

The former Chancellor of the University of Nigeria, and the first and last President of the first Republic of Nigeria in an address on the development of political parties in Nigeria delivered under the auspices of the Oxford West African Students Union on June 11, 1957, traced the beginning of party formations in Nigeria to 1922. Before that year, according to him «there was no well-established political party in Nigeria», there were only «sporadic attempts to organize pressure groups in order to register protest against certain measures in which their sponsors had interest» <sup>14</sup>. It is a sug-

<sup>12</sup> *Op. cit., ibid.*

<sup>13</sup> To construct an Index of Social Compositive of these constituencies one may use the following factors as indicators: population, dialect, ethnic origin, occupational status, and ratio of renter to owner occupancies.

<sup>14</sup> Nnamdi AZIKIWE, *The Development of Political Parties in Nigeria*, Published by The Office of the Commissioner in the United Kingdom for the Eastern Region of Nigeria, 1957, p. 5. It is significant to note that

gested proposition that in the former colonial territories of West Africa pressure groups are the first type of political associations to be formed before the association of political parties. If we accept James Coleman's distinction between the endeavours of pressure groups and political parties: the one «to influence, but not necessarily to control the government on behalf of the special interests of its members»; the other to «compete periodic elections in order to participate in formal government institutions and thereby influence and control the personnel and policy of government»<sup>15</sup>. Pressure groups as a form of political association, at least during the nineteenth century in British West Africa arose at the time when the indigenous conceptions of rights and property of natural resources in the various colonies were being rejected by Europeans, in Government and Business, who endeavoured to substitute and extend the notion of monopoly of the resources of the land to discovered mining areas; and Africans, rulers and subjects alike, sought to influence Government on behalf of their interest. For monopoly of natural resources by Europeans affected African cosmological belief and would have resulted in the African's alienation from the land. Political parties as a form of political association however was the natural response of the African to the extension of franchise to them.

#### EPIGENETIC AND PREFORMISTIC MODELS OF CHANCE

Amitai Etzioni, most recently, in his essay: «The Epignesis of Political Unification» has introduced us to two sociological concepts which I find extremely relevant to the subject of my assignment<sup>16</sup>. It is not easy at first to describe Amitai Etzioni's view or notion of *nations*. I began to get some understanding of his notions when I tried to assume his conspectus of vision. I did this by thinking the relatedness of a number of concepts which he employed several ti-

this period coincided with the founding and launching of the West African National Congress in Accra, Ghana, in March 11, 1920. The WANC was the avant-garde of a Pan-West African mass movement.

<sup>15</sup> See «Appendix: A Note on Concepts and Terms,» in James S. COLEMAN, *Nigeria: Background to Nationalism*. University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1963, pp. 419-427; particularly p. 424.

<sup>16</sup> See Amitai ETZIONI and Eva ETZIONI (editors) *Social Change: Sources, Patterns, and Consequences*, Basic Books, Incorporated, Publishers, New York, 1964, Chapter 55: «The Epigenesis of Political Unification», pp. 481-497.

mes in this essay. For example, he uses such terms as *international relations*; *emerging communities*; *union*; *supranation communities*; *merging units*; *historical unifications* or *his social unions*, and *nation-states*. Regarding *international relations*, Etzioni states that its empirical referent has become «more amenable to sociological analysis» as *ideology* becomes «a major force», and «institutional bridges» become more numerous<sup>17</sup>. What makes the field of international relations sociologically relevant is «the formation of new unions whose members are nations (e.g., the European Economic Community (EEC))»<sup>18</sup>.

To a sociologist from West Africa this statement by Etzioni is intriguing and arresting. For, «analytically, the emergence of a nation — state from several tribes, villages, or feudal let us say in contemporary Ghana, India or late medieval France — is in many ways similar to supranational unification»<sup>19</sup>. This similarity, I think, lies in the fact that both are types of a «unification of political units that previously shared no few or no political bonds»<sup>20</sup>. Equally intriguing in the description of «The degree to which these units have been foci of identification for their population,»<sup>21</sup> and of «the degree to which the normative substance of this identification was secular — historical...»<sup>22</sup>. Amitai Etzioni goes further to define the term *unions* as «entities that seem to develop in the direction of political community but have not reached such a high level of integration»<sup>23</sup>. He used the term «emerging entities» interchangeably with *political communities*; while the term *unification* refers to the series of changes which occur as social entities develop in the direction of a political community from a previous condition of being. All of these notions offer us the tools for studying the process of nation-building with particular reference to Nigeria.

But by making clear distinction between *epigenesis* and *preformism* as two kinds of the process of social change, Etzioni reached the most important aspect of the essay. For these terms refer strongly

<sup>17</sup> ETZIONI, *op.cit.*, p. 481.

<sup>18</sup> ETZIONI, *op. cit.*, *ibid.*

<sup>19</sup> ETZIONI, *op. cit.*, *ibid.*

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>21</sup> See Amitai ETZIONI and Eva ETZIONI (editors) *Social Change: Sources, Patterns, and Consequences*, Basic Books, Incorporated, Publishers, New York, 1964, Chapter 55: «The Epigenesis of Political Unification», pp. 481-497.

<sup>22</sup> ETZIONI, *op. cit.*, p. 482.

<sup>23</sup> ETZIONI, *ibid.*



to something which may be identified in the nationbuilding process of Nigeria. Epignesis applies appropriately to the series of change which came about in Nigeria as a result of culture contact; while *preformism* applies to the series of change resulting from the natural outgrowth of indigeneous institutions of the Nigerian tribal-states. That is preformism, as a process, is the change which comes natural to institutions in the performances of their roles.

When preformistic model is used to analyse a social system an assumption must be made that the system or community «possesses in miniature all the patterns of the mature one»;<sup>24</sup> whereas when the epigenetic model of change is employed the assumption that must be made is that «'adult' units emerge through a process in which parts that carry out new functions are added to existing ones until the entire unit is assembled»<sup>25</sup>. That the two models have fundamental differences has been stated by Amitai Etzioni, thus: «The two processes are mutually exclusive in the sense that new units are either institutional 'embodiments' of old functions, or serve new ones. They may occur at different times in the same unit: for example, a unit may first follow a preformistic model of development, then shift to an epigenetic model (or the other way around); or it may simultaneously develop some subunits following one model and some the other. But unlike the particle and wave theories, which are used to explain the same light phenomena, the change pattern of all sociological units of which we are aware follows at any given period either a differentiation or an accumulation model»<sup>26</sup>.

It is suggested as a proposition: political party in Nigeria as a form of association came to being as the product of an epigenetic process of change; the indigeneous forms of political association which the British rulers found when they arrived were moving along the preformistic process of change. But the Nigerians in their adoption of Political party as a mode of recruitment into non-kinship grouping injected into political activities some of the elements of indigeneous political behaviour. Non-kinship associations in the indigeneous tribal states included, age-sets, cults, guild associations; women's association, trader's associations, and village groupings. In all but the last, recruitment involved oath taking initiation, some economic obligation on the part of the initiates to the populace, re-

<sup>24</sup> ETZIONI, *op. cit.*, p. 483.

<sup>25</sup> ETZIONI, *op. cit.*, *ibid.*

<sup>26</sup> ETZIONI, *op. cit.*, *ibid.*

cognition of initiates spending and feasting by the conferment of some special title. Several negative sanctions for those who were regarded as having «betrayed» the secrets of the associations took violent forms.

#### PRINCIPLE OF SOCIAL GROUPING IN NIGERIAN TRIBAL SOCIETIES AND PARTY FORMATION

Let us consider, some more, how the principle of social grouping, especially those of kinship and association operated in these societies; and see how they may be applied to the explanation of the phenomenon of party formation in Nigeria. A survey of anthropological writings on Africans, generally speaking, tend to present social groupings of certain age range, and of certain generation. Consanguinity, affinity by marriage and age provide motivations for the formation of all types of association, including political associations.

There is a definite distinction however between the party as a political association, and age sets, age grades, and filiations and kin groups which are corporate bodies. Political parties are «an associative type of social relationship, membership in which rests on formally free recruitment. The end to which its activity is devoted is to secure power within a corporate group for its leaders in order to attain ideal or material advantages for its active members»<sup>27</sup>. Viewed anthropologically, political party may be defined as non-kinship group. And non-kinship groups, according to one anthropologist, Paul Bohannan, are «non-specialized function» groups; while kinship groups are «specialized function» groups<sup>28</sup>. The terms «specialized,» and «non-specialized» are used in a biological sense. Regarding them Paul Bohannan states, «Students of biological evolution assure us that the least specialized organism — that which can adapt itself most readily to the widest variety of demands in the widest variety of environments — has the greatest chance of survival. Kinship groups are non-specialized in that sense: all social tasks can be assigned to them, and in some places will be found assigned to them»<sup>29</sup>. Further as Bohannan pointed out, for all its

<sup>27</sup> Quoted by Alfred DE GRACIA in «Party», published in *A Dictionary of the Social Sciences*; edited by Julius GOULD and William L. KOLB, p. 483.

<sup>28</sup> See Paul BOHANNAN, *Social Anthropology*, «Contracts and Associations», pp. 144-164.

<sup>29</sup> Paul BOHANNAN, *op. cit.*, p. 146.

ubiquitousness, kinship groups are universally inadequate to cope with all the needs of a people. Consequently, nonkinship groups are formed in most societies of the world, with the probable exception of the Brushmen and the Eskimos, in which the individual is free to participate in activities that are «more specialized social forms than the generalized kinship groups»<sup>30</sup>.

The problems of mobilization for participation in the political life of the Nigerian nation becomes clearer if we understand what kinship groups, age sets, and age grades are as corporate specialized forms of association. In village government for example, they are involved in legislative and executive activities. These forms of association are also hierarchically structured and the division of labor in the governmental process is linked with this hierarchy of age. Loyalty to the corporate group is strongly sanctioned, and one can not change one age set or age group for another. Membership is for life. Admission to membership is very often ritualistic and is given to several individuals together on one occasion. Competition in the political life of these between these corporate bodies is cooperative and devoted to seeing which group can outdo the others in the performance of their assigned tasks in the interest of the entire community. When an entirely new age-set, age-groups, filiations, cults, or guilds are created, they generally are the outgrowth of indigeneous institutions as was the case of the long established Reformed Ogboni Society; or the recently banned Owegbe Cult in Benin City, in Nigeria<sup>31</sup>.

Party politics, in contradistinction to kinship association and age sets endeavours to emphasize conflictual competition among the political parties, and the goal of mobilization is the capture of the control of government and the control of the state and nation. Mobilization, for the Party, involves the organization of individual members and the electorate for participation in inter-party conflict. Membership in a party is not necessarily for life as a member may «cross the carpet» to join an opposition Party. Admission is voluntary and self-determined, and the ritual of admission is less elaborate and highly charged emotionally as the admission to age-sets or cults.

<sup>30</sup> Paul BOHANNAN, *op. cit.*, p. 147.

<sup>31</sup> According to a witness at the investigation of the Owegbe cult, Owegbe cult is the religious system of the Owegbe Society; whereas the Owegbe Society refers to the association of persons united by a common political aim. A very valuable publication on this subject is the *Report of the Commission Appointed To Enquire Into The Owegbe Cult*, published by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Information Printing Division Benin City, 1966, 159 pages.

Furthermore political parties are viable coalitions of individuals. Party caucuses are sub-coalitions within parties. Political parties, at least in our contemporary world, are a form of modern complex organization<sup>32</sup>. And as coalitions, parties between one another, have competing needs: the need to win election and to capture the control of power. Political parties seek to cultivate through various means the partisan spirit whose extreme form is expressed often in unreasoning adherence to the cause of the party.

Age sets, cults, guilds, and similar organizations, on the other hand, may be correctly designated as subcoalitions of the traditional complex organization of the Nigerian societies. But as subcoalitions, they are integrated, efficient segmentations of human population. As subcoalitions also they develop specialized complementary corporate activities which are easily integrated for the commonwealth.

In Nigeria, new members into kinship groupings are recruited on the basis of birth and marital filiation. But there are others where age, and sex serve as basis of recruitment. And by far the most significant social grouping in Nigeria, Africa too, is the ageset because of its functions.

«Such a group», says Bohannan, «during the life of its existence, can obviously perform a great many functions: first of all, it marks the progression of its members through the life stages. When its members are young, it provides a basis for education and training, and hence shares with the household the function of enculturating and socializing the young. Next, it acts as a military organization, and as such it has political function in the control of power relationships within the nation and between nations. Then upon its dismissal from active service, it becomes an organ of local government and hence takes on another political function: that of controlling the power decisions made within the local group. Finally, the set is retired and given a religion function in society — upholding the supernatural welfare.»<sup>33</sup>

Other very significant functions of the age set include, «acting as assistant in the protection of one's rights, particularly when they are infringed by one's kinsmen»<sup>34</sup>. For, «in a society with strong kinship groups, it is often necessary to have some other group especially to protect people from being exploited by their kinsmen; the age set is a fairly common answer to this need»<sup>35</sup>. Guilds and similar long-

<sup>32</sup> For a full treatment of the «coalition theory». See Mason HAIRE, *Modern Organization Theory*, New York, John Wiley & Sons, 1959, pp. 79-88.

<sup>33</sup> Paul BOHANNAN, *op. cit.*, p. 152.

<sup>34</sup> *Op. cit.*, *ibid.*

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*

lived organizations according to Bohannan, are «stable social groups which are held together by agreement among members to cooperate for common well-being»<sup>36</sup>. In different regions of Nigeria, these long-lived organizations also have their place in local government.

Political parties do not belong to the categories of age-sets, clan, or guilds. Political parties, like the National Congress of Nigerian Citizens, however may include all of these. Because political parties in general are devoted to conflictual competition and partisanship and to the fostering of the needs to capture the control of office, it became necessary in Nigeria for the professional politicians to seek and secure the protection of kinship groups, in their bid to own election and to capture political offices and the booty that go with them. Here a very important process took place. Instead of the political party «replacing» the kinship and non-kinship grouping of the Nigerian consociating societies, by making political parties perform some of the functions of kin groupings, age sets, and cults, it absorbed their function. Some of the means employed to prepare the masses for active participation in politics included traditional shame songs, pop songs, public debates, clandestine clan meeting; terrorizing of opponent through secret societies; party youth brigades, physical coercion or political thuggery; shouting of slogan; and political cartoons, and the «dash». Dashes may take the form of cash, bicycles, cars plots of land bank loans; girl friends, and the buying off of a political opponent from contesting election. For in a Consociate Society with a low level of literacy and ethnic diversity; where symbolic conflict is traditional a norm, and the martial tradition of by-gone eras still survives; where to capture the redistribution of cash, cattle or favour; it is not surprising that these means of mass mobilization which are elements of indigeneous organizations are employed to meet the ends of political parties.

#### CONCLUSION

Nigerian political parties are an innovation brought about the colonization of traditional societies of Nigeria by the British. Because of this it is correct to regard party formation in Nigeria as an epigenetic growth of an organization which Nigerians, like other West Africans, have been called upon to use in the course of their

<sup>36</sup> Paul BOHANNAN, *op. cit.*, p. 157.

nation-building. The preformistic models of organization which Nigerians traditionally, employed included age sets, clan associations, cults, and guilds. The transition from preformistic to epigenetic models of political organisation has been partial. The former have not completely yielded functionally to Political party. Instead Nigerians, while accepting the structure and function of European political organization, have sought to make it work by incorporating the functions of some traditional social groupings, particularly those of cults, and kinship affiliation.

This fact accounts in part for the «undemocratic» turn of political behaviour which writers and observers of the African scene tended to generalize about, and which some social scientist discovered in West Africa as a whole.

The core of the problem of accepting and adapting without modification, the party as a form of social grouping, to the political life of Nigeria lies in the conflicting nature of the competition and the partisanship which are characteristics of party politics. Regarding this, the late Chief Samuel Ladoke Akintola, then Premier of the Western Region in Nigeria observed in May of last year, 1965:

«I am yet to be convinced that there is a basic difference in the ideologies being professed by the various political parties in Africa. Party partisanship to the extreme which is a feature of Western Democracy is alien to African conception of national unity.»<sup>37</sup>

What Chief Akintola had in mind was the cleavage between ethnic and linguistic groups which occurred in Nigeria as a result of political partisanship. For although our system for electing members to Parliament was based up the principle of territorial constituency representation, yet in practice elections had always followed the lines of ethnic, linguistic and religious cleavages.

We are reminded again of the statement made by Professor Lipsett some six years ago: «Democracy needs cleavage within linguistic or religious groups, not between them»<sup>38</sup>. From the Nigerian experience on the national level, cleavage had been between them. Inter-ethnic, inter-religion, and inter-linguistic group cleavages could not be averted at this phase of nation-building, for parliamentary democracy calls for a form of political association whose functions differ

<sup>37</sup> Quoted from an interview titled: «Akintola Speaks His Mind,» by Sam UBA, published in *Drum Africa's Leading Magazine*, May 1965.

<sup>38</sup> Seymour Martin LIPSETT, *Political Man*, Doubleday and Company, Inc., Garden City, New York, 1960, p. 92.

markedly from the function of political association that have operated in the Nigerian traditional societies. Before democracy as is experienced in the United States or United Kingdom to name a few Western countries, can be established in Nigeria two very important changes must take place. One set of changes must usher in a high level of literacy; opportunities for people to make a living in the urban and rural areas; and city-living as a dominant way of life of the majority of the populace. When these changes occur, one can expect party membership to be easily drawn from many ethnic, linguistic and religious groups; and for cleavages to occur with these groupings instead of between one ethnic group and another, as for example.

Another change must take place: contractual commonwealth groups with what Paul Bohannan calls their «pervasive and compelling modes of agreement», must replace kinship groups with their limitations, in the political lives of the people.

If these two basic changes do not occur in Nigeria then it is useless to continue to advocate multi-party system of democracy. A Multi-party system basically implies some inevitable practice of partisanship. Party partisanship in an essentially communal society means in practice that appeal by politicians for the fullest support would continue to be made to kin group or age sets; and at its worst, to fellow clansmen and tribesmen. And partisanship, in its extreme form may continue to lead to the use of secret cults to terrorize political opponents to the point of their withdrawal from active competition for the control of power and government.

But where neither change occurs, or if either is deemed unnecessary, then Nigerians must devise a «multi-centric power system»<sup>39</sup> and a relevant political party system. Each party within this system must then operate like a unilineal descent group within the area with which it is exclusively associated and develop a mode of mobilizing its members for political action. In such a situation coalition between political parties must proceed according to a certain «rules of the game» which make grievous violent conflicts between sub-coalitions within such a polity easy to manage and resolve.

<sup>39</sup> Paul BOHANNAN, *op. cit.*, p. 282.

CONFLICT AND THE PLURAL SOCIETY:  
IDEOLOGIES OF VIOLENCE AMONG SUBORDINATE GROUPS

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This paper deals with an aspect of political change in plural societies. These I define, in the present context, as societies characterized by cultural diversity and social cleavage arising from the contact of different peoples within a single political unit.<sup>1</sup> The process of political change in plural societies often takes the form of violent conflict, as in Algeria, Zanzibar and Rwanda, and some students believe that this is its general, if not inevitable, form.<sup>2</sup> The movement toward violence is likely to generate appropriate ideologies; and I want here to examine some of the elements and functions of an ideology of violence for subordinate groups in a plural society. In constructing this ideology, I draw ideas mainly from Frantz Fanon's book, *Les damnés de la terre*,<sup>3</sup> where the ideology is formulated with great force and clarity in the context of the extreme violence of political change in Algeria; and I rely also on statements by African political leaders in South Africa, a plural society in which the consummation of political change may be equally violent.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> For discussion of plural societies, see J. S. FURNIVALL, *Colonial Policy and Practice* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1948); J. Clyde MITCHELL, *Tribalism and the Plural Society* (London: Oxford University Press, 1960); John REX, «The Plural Society in Sociological Theory,» *The British Journal of Sociology*, Vol. X, pp. 114-124; M. G. SMITH, *The Plural Society in the British West Indies* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965), P. L. VAN DEN BERGHE, «Toward a Sociology of Africa,» *Social Forces*, Vol. 43, 1964, pp. 11-18, and Leo KUPER, «Sociology — Some Aspects of Urban Plural Societies,» in Robert A. LYSTAD, ed., *The African World* (New York: Praeger, 1965), pp. 107-130.

<sup>2</sup> See, for example, SMITH, *op. cit.*, p. 91.

<sup>3</sup> Quotations in the text are from the English translation, *The Wretched of the Earth* (New York: Grove Press, 1963).

<sup>4</sup> I have omitted for the most part, discussions of the ideologies of the dominant groups and the policies they pursue which provoke subordinate groups to violence. For analysis of these aspects in South African society, see my studies of *Passive Resistance in South Africa* (New Haven: Yale



## I

Common elements in an ideology of violence are the declaration of the necessity for violence as the only efficient means of change, its justification on moral grounds, and the rejection of non-violent techniques; there may or may not be an idealization of violence as creative rebirth for those who use it. Inevitably the elaboration of this ideology calls for assertions as to the nature of the society which is to become the battleground of violent conflict, and as to the qualities of the dominant group which make this inevitable. These assertions describe the society as polarized into the two radically conflicting groups of oppressors and oppressed; and they establish (or seek to establish) the collective destiny of the oppressed and the unyielding domination of the oppressors, thereby guarding against what are conceived to be the erosions of individualism and the illusions of concessions and evolutionary change.

The argument as to the necessity for violence rests in part on repetitive declaration, as for example: «From birth it is clear to him (the colonised) that this narrow world, strewn with prohibitions, can only be called in question by absolute violence.»<sup>5</sup> Or again: «The starving peasant, outside the class system, is the first among the exploited to discover that only violence pays.»<sup>6</sup> And again: «We have seen that it is the intuition of the colonised masses that their liberation must, and can only, be achieved by force.»<sup>7</sup> It also rests, more or less persuasively, on such empirical generalizations as that the history of freedom is written in blood:<sup>8</sup> or on generalizations derived from the many examples of violent political change in plural societies; or on such more specific generalizations as that offered by Fanon when he describes the process of decolonisation as follows: «National liberation, national renaissance, the

University Press, 1957) and *An African Bourgeoisie* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965).

<sup>5</sup> FANON, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 48.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 57.

<sup>8</sup> There is much corroboration from the shelters of the academic world. See, for example, Rupert EMERSON, *From Empire to Nation* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1960). He writes that «The great issues of nationalism and self-determination have been settled not by the genteel processes of votes and majorities but by the revolutionary rising of peoples and the successful waging of wars, which have carried history with them» (p. 331).

restoration of nationhood to the people, commonwealth: whatever may be the headings used or the new formulas introduced, decolonisation is always a violent phenomenon. At whatever level we study it... decolonisation is quite simply the replacing of a certain «species» of men by another «species» of men... The naked truth of decolonisation evokes for us the searing bullets and bloodstained knives which emanate from it. For if the last shall be first, this will only come to pass after a murderous and decisive struggle between the two protagonists.»<sup>9</sup>

The moral justification for violence derives from oppression and humiliation, from the transparency of the connection between the good fortune of those who rule and the misery of those who are ruled, and from concepts of human dignity and the rights of man. But these conditions and beliefs justify radical change, and not necessarily violence as the instrument of that change. Violence, at any rate from the standpoint of civic order and the rule of law, must find its legitimation rather in the qualities ascribed to the plural society and its ruling group, as in Fanon's denunciation of colonialism, which he declares is not a thinking machine nor a body endowed with reasoning faculties: it is born in violence, it is maintained by violence, it speaks the language of violence, and in the final stages of the movement toward national consciousness, it transforms the atmosphere of violence among the colonised into violence in action: it is violence in its natural state, and it will only yield when confronted with greater violence.<sup>10</sup>

The rejection of non-violence, which is the counterpart of the commitment to violence, also finds its legitimation in the structure of the society and the qualities of its rulers. The rejection may be defensive, implying the greater moral worth of non-violence, and justifying the anguished choice of violence as compelled by the imperviousness of the rulers to supplication, petition, reason, argument, demonstration and civil disobedience. It is in these terms of disillusionment with the government of South Africa, and with non-violence in the face of its obdurate inhumanity, that leaders of the African National Congress explain the organization for violent action of *Umkhonto we Sizwe* (Spear of the Nation).<sup>11</sup> And yet even in this movement toward revolutionary struggle, there was

<sup>9</sup> FANON, *op. cit.*, pp. 29-30.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 31, 48, 56 *et passim*.

<sup>11</sup> See KUPER, *An African Bourgeoisie*, p. 384.

a deliberate selection of sabotage as the initial means of violence in preference to terrorism or guerilla war, which could more fiercely inflame racial hatred.<sup>12</sup>

In contrast to the unhappy denunciation of non-violence in the particular circumstances of the plural society, the rejection of non-violence may be expressed in terms of cynicism or contempt for its futility. Thus the Non-European Unity Movement ridiculed the civil disobedience campaign of 1952 for its naive conception of racial domination in South Africa. «The Herrenvolk has made up its mind over 300 years not to climb off the backs of the Non-Europeans of its own accord and free will... There is no possibility of any of these laws being modified or repealed because the ruling class have had it brought to their notice that the non-Whites hate these laws. They are fascists, and they know that we hate them and their laws. There is only deception and self-deception in dealing with «Malanzis» as though they were «democrats» and «Christians» who will suffer pangs of conscience because certain non-white «leaders» are in gaol. The function of leaders is to lead; the gaols are there to hinder and not help the cause of freedom.»<sup>13</sup>

So, too, Fanon reacts to the non-violent reformist techniques with contempt. He describes them as a practice of therapy by hibernation, a sleep-cure used on the people.<sup>14</sup> He sees non-violence as the creation of the colonial situation,<sup>15</sup> functioning like the inevitable religion to calm down the natives. «All those saints who have turned the other cheek, who have forgiven trespasses against them, and who have been spat on and insulted without shrinking are studied and held up as examples.»<sup>16</sup> Indeed, far from a defensive and reluctant choice of violence, there is in Fanon a positive affirmation of violence. He writes that it is in and through violence that the colonised man finds his freedom:<sup>17</sup> only out of the rotting corpse of the settler can life spring up again for the native.<sup>18</sup> Where Gandhi

<sup>12</sup> Nelson MANDELA, *No Easy Walk to Freedom* (London: Heinemann, 1965), pp. 168-174.

<sup>13</sup> KUPER, *Passive Resistance in South Africa*, pp. 152-53.

<sup>14</sup> FANON, *op. cit.*, p. 52. He qualifies his comment with an ironic illustration of success attendant on nationalist reform in Gabon.

<sup>15</sup> Karl A. WITTFOGEL, in *Oriental Despotism* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957) mentions passive resistance as a response to Oriental Despotism (p. 331).

<sup>16</sup> FANON, *op. cit.*, p. 53.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 67.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 72.

sees the realization of truth in *satyagraha*, soul-force, Fanon finds it, for the colonised, in violence. «Violence alone, violence committed by the people, violence organised and educated by its leaders, makes it possible for the masses to understand social truths and gives the key to them. Without that struggle, without that knowledge of the practice of action, there's nothing but a fancy-dress parade and the blare of the trumpets. There's nothing save a minimum of readaptation, a few reforms at the top, a flag waving: and down there at the bottom an undivided mass, still living in the middle ages, endlessly marking time.»<sup>19</sup> And Sartre, in interpreting and endorsing Fanon's ideology of violence for the colonised, declares that «he shows clearly that this irrepressible violence... is man re-creating himself. I think we understood this truth at one time, but we have forgotten it — that no gentleness can efface the marks of violence; only violence itself can destroy them. The native cures himself of colonial neurosis by thrusting out the settler through force of arms. When his rage boils over, he rediscovers his lost innocence and he comes to know himself in that he himself creates his self.»<sup>20</sup>

The ideology of violence, as I have shown, includes a characterization of the plural society. The main component of this characterization is a polarized conception, which directs violence unambiguously against the enemy.<sup>21</sup> The complex patterns of pluralism are reduced to the simple dichotomy of a dialectical opposition. For Fanon, it is a dialectic without possibility of synthesis, without possibility of a higher unity. The colonial world is a world of two species, a world divided into two reciprocally exclusive divisions. Between them, no conciliation is possible, for of the two divisions, one is superfluous.<sup>22</sup> Their roles may change, the quarry may become the hunter, the oppressed the persecutor.<sup>23</sup> But there can be no sharing of power. An irreconcilable conflict, an absolute opposition of interests, separates the parties. Decolonisation is total,

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 117.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 18.

<sup>21</sup> In «Zoot-suiters and Mexicans: Symbols in Crowd Behavior (*American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. LXII, 1956, pp. 14-20). TURNER and SURACE demonstrate a similar process in violent crowd behavior, where an unambiguously unfavorable symbol was required as the rallying point for violence against the Mexicans.

<sup>22</sup> FANON, *op. cit.*, pp. 31-32.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 42.

complete and absolute substitution, without transition: it is the abolition of one zone, its burial in the depths of the earth or its expulsion from the country.<sup>24</sup> In a world of radically opposed and irreconcilable interests, there can be no evolutionary change toward a shared society. Individualism cannot bridge the collective destiny of the parties in the struggle for freedom;<sup>25</sup> and concessions may merely be the cloak for a less blatant, but more complete servitude.<sup>26</sup>

There may be, in plural societies, a necessary association, an ideological fusion, between the call to violence and the conception of polarized groups. Certainly, ideologies of revolutionary violence in South Africa increasingly show this tendency, with dogmatic assumptions as to the unity of the oppressed and the unity of the oppressors, and the reduction of the great diversity in structure, values and function, within each of these categories, to a crude dichotomy of violence.<sup>27</sup>

## II

I have described the call to violence and the associated characterization of the society as ideology, thereby assuming that the ideas are to be interpreted as expressing the needs and desires of those who proclaim them, rather than as offering an analysis of the objective structure of the plural society and its potentiality for peaceful change. But the ideas may nevertheless quite accurately portray dominant tendencies within the society, while at the same time serving sectional interests in a revolutionary challenge to the structure of rule. There may be an extreme polarisation between the ruling and subject group, and violence may indeed offer the only possibility of political change. Instead of assuming the ideological function of the ideas in question, it becomes necessary to examine them in the social context to which they refer.

The empirical evidence hardly sustains the generalisation that decolonisation is always a violent phenomenon. On the contrary,

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 29, and p. 33.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 37-38.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 113.

<sup>27</sup> See my discussion of ideological change in *An African Bourgeoisie*, *op. cit.*, Chapter 23.

many protectorates, mandated territories and colonies have attained independence with relatively little violence. Indeed, with some exceptions, notably in Algeria and Kenya, decolonisation in Africa has been remarkably non-violent. The violent phenomenon was colonisation rather than decolonisation and even then, not all colonial rule in Africa was imposed by violence. A Marxist might argue that there has been little or no decolonisation in Africa; that the contemporary independence of African states is appearance, not reality; that the reality is the persistence of colonialism in the masked form of neo-colonialism; and that westernised African elites, the new incumbents of the old colonial posts, fulfil functions analogous to those of their colonial predecessors. But this shifts the basis of the argument, and finds the necessity for violence in communist revolution, while conceding that important changes in the relations of the races within the plural society, and in the whole structure of the plural society, may be effected without violence.

A more cogent argument as to the generality of violence in the process of decolonisation is that decolonisation must be seen as a global process. From this perspective, the colonial power occupies a field with colonial possessions on the perimeter, and engages in a struggle with other powers for position in a changing world situation. The violence which acts as the catalyst of change is not violence within a particular colonial territory, but violence directed from any point on the colonial perimeter, and the violence, or threatened violence, of international conflict. Viewed in this way, as for example in Fanon's writings *Pour la révolution africaine*,<sup>28</sup> there can be little doubt of the violence of decolonisation, though differences between the French and British Empires in its incidence show that violence is not simply a function of the process of decolonisation.

The empirical evidence for the inevitability of violence is more convincing in the case of settler societies than in colonial. There are many differences between them which have relevance for the probability and intensity of violence, such as the very permanence of the settler population, and its determination to persist in the enjoyment of numerous vested interests. There is the intense involvement of the settlers in their relations with the subject groups, since

<sup>28</sup> Paris: Francois Maspero, 1964. See «Décolonisation et indépendance» (pp. 119-125), «Lettre à la jeunesse Africaine» (pp. 135-140), and «La guerre d'Algérie et la libération des hommes» (pp. 167-172, and especially pages 124, 135 and 171).

privilege and indeed survival may be precarious in the close immediacy of their living together. Fanon asserts a direct relationship between the size of the settler group and the extent of violence, arguing that the violence of the colonial regime and the counter-violence of the native balance each other and respond to each other in an extraordinary reciprocal homogeneity, and that «this reign of violence will be the more terrible in proportion to the size of the implantation from the mother country.»<sup>29</sup> Probably the relationship is more complex. The greater number of settlers would be associated with greater economic development and greater interdependence between the groups. This interdependence is likely to inhibit the outbreak of violence; but if violence does break out, then it may be all the more intense and destructive and intersuicidal by reason of the dependence of the groups on each other.

Perhaps of greatest significance is the contrast in constitutional status. The line between settler and colonial societies is not easily drawn, since colonial status may be associated with a substantial settler class as in Algeria, and colonial societies may have many of the characteristics of settler societies, the so-called «settler colonies» as distinct from the «exploitation colonies.» Yet even in these «settler colonies» the different constitutional status of the colony has the significant consequence that it immediately involves a third party, the colonial power itself. To be sure, the colonial power is a main protagonist, and it may in fact heighten destructive violence, by engaging its relatively great military resources in the conflict. But its role, in an era of decolonisation, may be very different, and include elements of mediation. In the metropolitan center, a measure of detachment from deep emotional involvement in the conflict is possible, or at any rate, groups in the metropolitan center may achieve this detachment and function, in much the same way as a third party, to encourage a non-violent adjustment of interests. Certainly this third party role was a significant factor in the resolution of conflict in Kenya, and may prove so in Rhodesia.

In the conflicts of settler societies, however, no third party, with a possibly mediating role, is automatically involved. The United Nations might so function, but for the cold war which wages international peace through local dichotomies of violence, as in Korea

<sup>29</sup> FANON, *The Wretched of The Earth*, p. 69.

and Vietnam. As Fanon observes: «today, peaceful co-existence between the two blocs provokes and feeds violence in the colonial countries... Between the violence of the colonies and that peaceful violence that the world is steeped in, there is a kind of complicit agreement, a sort of homogeneity.»<sup>30</sup>

If this observation has any validity for colonial countries, in which the colonial power has the opportunity and responsibility to resolve conflict, it will be all the more valid for settler societies, in which independent status offers a freer field for the masked play of international war. In the context of the cold war, the intervention of third parties in the conflicts of a settler society seems likely to foster a polarisation of the society into two hostile camps, corresponding to the strategic needs of the great powers.<sup>31</sup>

The theoretical argument for the necessity of violence as the instrument of change rests on assumptions as to the nature of man and society. I will accept, for purposes of this discussion, the assumption that men have to be forced from positions of dominance, that they will not voluntarily relinquish, or share, the power they have once enjoyed. I will accept and indeed make the case, that there are many special circumstances in plural societies, which render ruling strata extraordinarily tenacious of power and exclusive in their exercise of power. These societies often take the form of domination by a minority of different race and culture with more highly developed technology.<sup>32</sup> The domination is deeply embedded in the political and other institutions of the society, and supports elaborate and strongly fortified structures of privilege. Rationalizations which dehumanize the subject peoples and glorify the civilizing mission of their overlords, justify ready recourse to repression and force. This is encouraged also by greater development of political institutions, the generation of disproportionate political power as compared with economic and other institutional power. Particularly in white settler societies, the monopoly of power, the appropriation of scarce resources, and the contrasts in

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 62-63.

<sup>31</sup> Diversification of international structure, consequent on Chinese international intervention, seems likely to affect the external pressures for polarisation.

<sup>32</sup> For a characterization of colonial society, see Georges BALANDIER, *Sociologie Actuelle de l'Afrique Noire* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1963), Chapter I. M. G. SMITH specifies domination by a cultural minority as one of the characteristics of plural society.



life situations suggest a dialectical opposition of interest between the groups. But even accepting all this, these assumptions and generalisations would only establish the need for great pressure to bring about political change; they do not prove that violence is the only efficient means for that change.

At this point, the argument for violence may move to the assertion, as by African leaders in South Africa, that non-violence has proved ineffective. It does not follow that violence will therefore be effective, though this is always assumed. Nor is it easy to determine whether the possibilities of non-violent action were fully explored, let alone exhausted. There are questions of cost, of the threshold of non-violence, and of the structure of power. Men vary in their tolerance of suffering and readiness for self-sacrifice. Hence a subjective element enters into the assessment of the extent to which such techniques as civil disobedience have been fully tried out; the answer is relative to the perception by the leaders of tolerable cost. Then too, among the mass of followers, the threshold of non-violence may be low, in the sense that culture inclines them toward impatience with non-violence. Other circumstances, in the conditions of the plural society, may contribute to the same result and indeed foster an easy recourse to violence. These conditions would be such as contribute to the formation of mass society,<sup>33</sup> as for example, abrupt discontinuities in culture and authority, and between rural and urban centers; the agglomeration and insecurity of many townsmen in slum and shanty; and the incitement of hardship, humiliation, and brutality. In consequence, the leaders may find that they have little latitude for experimenting with non-violence, and the repressive and violent exercise of government authority may offer them even less. It is to be understood then that they might conclude that they had exhausted the possibilities of non-violent political change, when from the perspective of Gandhian satyagraha, they had merely initiated some preliminary campaigns.

If the society is polarised, then it may be reasonable to infer that political change will be abrupt, revolutionary and presumably violent. Polarisation implies a division into two camps, those of the oppressors and the oppressed, with few relationships that transcend group barriers and restrain conflict by the ties of cross-cutting

<sup>33</sup> See discussion by William KORNHAUSER, *The Politics of Mass Society* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1959), particularly Part II.

loyalties.<sup>34</sup> Interests are in dialectical opposition<sup>35</sup> and values anti-thetical; the subject peoples deny legitimacy to the social order, and the rulers respond with increasing repression. Social cleavages are superimposed,<sup>36</sup> so that domination in political structures coincides with domination in other institutional structures. The dichotomy of values is pervasive, unresolved conflicts cumulate, and minor, seemingly isolated issues, quickly escalate to the level of the total society. There is no neutral ground of detachment from the struggle, which drives all strata into opposing camps; and there is no appreciable intermediate area of living which might serve as the foundation for a more inclusive system of relationship.

Clearly, most plural societies do not conform to this pure type of polarisation: it represents revolutionary ideology, rather than sociological analysis. Perhaps the closest approximation is to be found in the early stages of conquest and consolidation of power. Later, as the plural sections co-exist within the same society, relations of inter-dependence and of common interest begin to mitigate the extreme enmity and to modify the sharp division. These integrative relationships, varying with the nature of the society and its mode of production, may be fairly negligible in an «exploitation colony» and more extensive in an industrialised «settler society,» as in South Africa. Here, the stark simplicity of a model of polarised relationships quite distorts the complex reality of racial hatreds which vary in intensity, expression and direction among different racial groups and social strata. It ignores, in its exclusive concern for cultural conflict and racial cleavage, the effects of shared knowledge and understandings, of common religious beliefs, of inter-dependent participation in an exchange economy, and of social relationships across racial barriers: and it projects, as present reality, social perceptions which derive from an operational blue-print for revolution.

<sup>34</sup> See Max GLUCKMAN, *Custom and Conflict in Africa* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1963), Chapter I and S. M. LIPSET, *Political Man* (New York: Doubleday, 1960), Chapters VI and VII for discussion of consequences of cross-cutting loyalties and cross-pressures.

<sup>35</sup> See FANON's discussion, *op. cit.*, p. 66.

<sup>36</sup> Ralf DAHRENDORF, in *Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959), pp. 213-18, deals with the relationship between the intensity of conflict, and the superimposition of group conflicts and issues of conflict.

## III

These ideologies and the social perceptions they crystallise may serve as an index of the probability of violence. They mark a qualitative change in relations which seems to precede the outbreak of violence; they may, of course, be the agent of that change. This is not to say that violence necessarily follows upon the dissemination and wide adoption of revolutionary ideologies within a plural society. And conversely, violence may erupt quite spontaneously, without ideological overture. Indeed, the relationship between ideology and violence may be reversed, the ideology emerging from the violence, not the violence from the ideology.

The rulers may contribute to the probability of violence by their ideological reactions to the threat of violence. They may declare that these people understand only the moral persuasion of force, which must be firmly used for perservation of law and order.<sup>37</sup> They may refuse concessions, since these would seem to reward violence; they may also believe that concessions are a delusion, leading not to an adjustment of interests, but to the eventual subordination of the rulers themselves. Being convinced of the absolute incompatibility of different sections of the plural society, and the impossibility therefore of social synthesis, they perceive the alternatives as either to rule or to be ruled. There is thus an almost exact correspondence between the ideologies of revolution and of counter-revolution, expressing dialectical opposition, and reflecting a long history of ideological exchange. For theorists who believe that by the inescapable pragmatism of all action, force and the threat of force unavoidably breed more force,<sup>38</sup> the reproduction of ideologies of violence is merely a particular expression of this more general process.

A quite different response so the threat of violence is by way of «concessions,» and these may in fact reduce the probability of violence. Much of the movement to independence in the British African colonies has been in this form, that is to say, in the form of evolutionary change. There are certainly many contrary examples of «concessions» which proved to be quite illusory, and served simply

<sup>37</sup> This is presumably a rationalization for the inability to legitimate their authority.

<sup>38</sup> See, for example, H. H. GERTH and C. Wright MILLS, *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), p. 334.

as devices for maintaining domination. But these historic events, such as manipulations of a qualified franchise, cannot be translated directly into universal laws. It is necessary to specify the conditions which exclude the possibility of evolutionary change by means of concessions. No doubt, these conditions are most likely to be found in settler societies.

Since the violence threatens the very existence of the plural society, the response may be a series of measures designed to knit the society more closely together. This has been the response of the South African Government, regardless of its much advertised policy of apartheid (separation) which professes quite the contrary. The Government has in fact used a mixed strategy of violence, «concessions» and «integration.» Violence is long established in South Africa as an appropriate traditional technique for the governance of people of different race; and I think it probable that, but for the hostile reaction of outside powers to the Sharpeville massacre, the Government would have sought a solution by holocausts of violence. As to «concessions,» the most important are the Bantustans, in which Africans are promised self-rule. These concessions seem to be the very epitome of the concessions ridiculed in the revolutionary ideologies: their promises appear to be illusory, merely a decoy to fragmentation and continued domination. But this is not certain. Underlying the belief in the illusory nature of concessions is the assumption that the initiative rests entirely with the dominant group. Where subordinate groups have some possibility of initiative, as in the Bantustans, the consequences of concessions are indeterminate, depending on the way Africans use them, and not only on the plans of the Government. The Bantustans may, or may not, offer a base for a challenge to white domination.

More immediately significant than these «concessions,» if they can possibly be described as such, are the means by which the Government seeks to bind the society more firmly together. Gluckman, in *Custom and Conflict*,<sup>39</sup> demonstrates from Nuer society the principle that the greater the interdependence between groups, the greater the likelihood of institutional mechanisms for resolving conflict. There is certainly great interdependence between the races in South Africa, resulting from long years of contact, and from high levels of economic growth and industrial development, which draw increasing numbers of all races into a common exchange

<sup>39</sup> *Op. cit.*, Chapter I, and especially p. 15 *et seq.*

economy. This economy rests largely on non-white labour, and is therefore particularly vulnerable to racial conflict. In these circumstances, the Government has not met the threat of violence by the creation of institutional mechanisms for resolution of conflict: and few of these mechanisms have developed spontaneously outside the framework of Government. Instead of resolving conflict, its policy is to contain conflict, and to «integrate» the plural sections, or more specifically to coerce them into togetherness.<sup>40</sup> The Government generates more political power and greater capacity for violence, it elaborates authority structures for total control, and it creates special structures for ordering the parts within the pre-ordained whole.

I have argued that few plural societies show the polar structure ascribed to them in ideologies of violence. There is generally tension between the ideological image and the social reality. For this reason, violence is often directed initially within the group itself. A whole vocabulary emerges to stigmatise those who do not conform to the brutal dichotomy of violence. In terms of graphic abuse, it distinguishes different categories of non-conformist; at the same time it exposes them almost equally, the altruist and the non-racist as well as the spy and the informer, to indiscriminate retribution. A like process engages the rulers. Though at all times they direct aggression outwards, they also pillory their own dissenters. They may rely more on due process, and resort less to summary procedure, but ultimately, as the conflict escalates, they too silence their non-conformists. There is non-conformity within each of the groups, and interrelationship between members of different groups. It is not the society which is polarised, it is the ideology; and it is indeed one of the functions of the ideology to polarise the society. Where the plural divisions are of different race, then the ideology of polarisation becomes racism.<sup>41</sup>

<sup>40</sup> There is a problem in the use of the word «integrate» to describe such societies as the «apartheid» society of South Africa. «Integration» suggests to many sociologists a unity based on consensus, and not a unity which rests largely on regulation and force. Perhaps «integration» might be used where cohesion rests largely on a consensual basis, and «regulation» where its basis is mainly coercive.

<sup>41</sup> FANON attacks racism in many of his writings, as for example in *The Wretched of the Earth* (pp. 115-116, 126-127). See also his paper on «Algeria's European Minority» (in *Studies in a Dying Colonism*, New York, Monthly Review Press, 1965, pp. 147-178), in which he counters group stereotypes by showing the active collaboration of European and other

If the goal is a polarised society, then violence would seem to be an efficient means to that end. It easily multiplies in a plural society, where the intermingling of peoples affords lavish occasion for violence; it deeply engages the personalities of the parties; it spreads sentiments of exclusive solidarity and silences moderation; it recalls ancient wrong and heightens present anguish; it inflames hatred and inspires sacrifice.

For these reasons too, violence may be an efficient means for awakening an apathetic populace and fostering greater political awareness and action. Plural societies often, perhaps generally, take the political form of minority domination, and sometimes these minorities are very small indeed. The subject population, if resolute, might readily effect social change by non-violent means. This is probably true for Rhodesia, and perhaps even for South Africa, though this is much more doubtful. It is not so much that the non-violent techniques are ineffective in themselves, as that the subordinate groups are not ready for effective political action of any kind, violent or non-violent. Given much quietude, apathy and confusion among the people, the leaders are likely to despair of building an effective organisation for non-violent action, particularly under continuous harassment by the authorities. Understandably they may turn to violence, which then becomes also a method of political campaigning and organisation.

Where the commitment is in any event toward violence, and where non-violence is felt to be repugnant, then the problem becomes one of military strategy, which, under the present conditions of the cold war, will include the assistance or intervention of a third party. Where, however, the commitment is toward the peaceful resolution of conflict, and racial or other internal war is perceived as incitement to atrocity and by no means ennobling, then there is a real dilemma in relation to such countries as South Africa. Perhaps it is not true, or perhaps it is only partly true, that the society is so polarised, and so devoid of middle or bridging structures, as to exclude the possibility of non-violent, evolutionary change. Perhaps it is not true, or only partly true, that given the character of the rulers, and their imperviousness to morality and

non-Arab Algerians in the revolutionary struggle. But it is difficult to avoid the racism where dominant and subordinate groups are of different race, and the tenor and the emotional thrust of the general argument in his essay «Concerning Violence» is in fact a powerful call to racism.

reason, only violence can prevail. Perhaps it is not true that the possibilities of non-violence have been fully explored, and perhaps the ineffectiveness of the non-violent campaigns stems in part from political unpreparedness.

Suppose all this is granted (and it would be questioned by many observers), there is still the agonising problem of immediate and intense suffering under a rigidly maintained system of domination. Violence does seem to offer some better prospect of relief. In any event, the parties are moving toward the mutual atrocity of violence. But it seems unlikely that violence will be effective in bringing about political change, unless outside powers assist the revolutionary parties. So too, it seems unlikely that peaceful political change can be brought about by forces internal to the society: in this case also, there will be need for outside intervention. If it is indeed true that effective violent and non-violent action both presuppose active intervention from without, then presumably the final arbiter of South Africa's fate will be the great powers themselves, and the choice between violence and non-violence will be largely determined by their international relations.

## INTERPRETATION SOCIOLOGIQUE DE LA DÉCOLONISATION

Le cas de l'Afrique (1955)

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### NEW NATIONS

### NATIONS NOUVELLES

La sociologie de la décolonisation ou le profilage pose à la sociologie contemporaine. Dans le présent communisme, après lui n'est pas de laisser une "interprétation sociologique de la décolonisation" au gré de la fois les pouvoirs qu'elle implique, mais d'apporter le point de vue de sociologie expérimental à ces sociétés et travailler sur elles. Mais avant d'aller plus loin, certaines pages au point et certaines recherches viennent. Jacques Berger dans les "Perspectives du Monde" nous a invités à la rédaction de la décolonisation. Plus précis de voir, le VI<sup>e</sup> Colloque de l'Association Internationale des Sociologues de Langue Française qui s'est tenu à Beyrouth les 28, 29 et 30 octobre 1965, a essayé de définir une sociologie de la construction nationale dans les nouveaux États. Au cours du V<sup>e</sup> Colloque de la même organisation tenu à Québec en septembre et octobre 1964, les sociologues représentant les pays en voie de développement, nous avaient présenté les problèmes sociologiques relatifs à la formation des classes sociales dans cette situation de décolonisation. C'est dire que nous sommes déjà dans un ensemble d'éléments qui nous permettent de formuler une définition plus générale. Mais le point essentiel sur lequel il faudrait revenir en détail, c'est la diversité des terrains, la diversité des contextes des expériences. Mais il semble en ce point avoir quelques interrogations pour paraître subséquentes, qu'il faille tenter de définir le contenu même de décolonisation. La décolonisation est plus difficile à définir que la colonisation. Georges Fauriol nous avait montré comment le situation coloniale était sous un drapeau dans laquelle s'individualisent à la fois des aspects de décolonisation et des conséquences de frustration. Mais nous ne sommes partie d'une simple définition de la situation coloniale et chercher les pôles pour définir une définition de la situation de décolonisation.

La décolonisation est un ensemble de processus dynamiques continus et latents. C'est un processus dynamique d'abord, car tout de



## INTERPRETATION SOCIOLOGIQUE DE LA DECOLONISATION:

### Le cas de l'Afrique Noire

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La sociologie de la décolonisation est le problème posé à la sociologie contemporaine. Dans la présente communication, notre but n'est pas de tenter une interprétation sociologique de la décolonisation en général et de tous les processus qu'elle implique, mais d'apporter le point de vue du sociologue appartenant à ces sociétés et travaillant sur elles. Mais avant d'aller plus loin, certaines mises au point et certaines remarques s'imposent. Jacques Berque dans «Dépossession du Monde» nous a éveillé à la situation de la décolonisation. Plus proche de nous, le VI<sup>e</sup> Colloque de l'Association Internationale des Sociologues de Langue Française qui s'est tenu à Royaumont les 28, 29 et 30 octobre 1965, a essayé de définir une «sociologie de la construction nationale dans les nouveaux états». Au cours du V<sup>e</sup> Colloque de la même organisation tenu à Québec en septembre et octobre 1964, les sociologues représentant les pays en voie de développement, nous avaient présenté les problèmes spécifiques relatifs à la formation des classes sociales dans cette situation de décolonisation. C'est dire que nous disposons déjà d'un ensemble d'éléments qui nous permettent de formuler une définition plus générale. Mais le point essentiel sur lequel il faudrait insister au début, c'est la diversité des terrains, la diversité du contenu des expériences. Mais il semble qu'au prime abord quoique l'entreprise puisse paraître ambitieuse, qu'il faille tenter de définir la notion même de décolonisation. La décolonisation est plus difficile à définir que la colonisation. Georges Balandier nous avait montré comment la situation coloniale était toute une atmosphère dans laquelle s'actualisaient à la fois des rapports de domination et des complexes de frustration. Mais nous ne pouvons partir d'une simple définition de la situation coloniale et inverser les pôles pour obtenir une définition de la situation de décolonisation.

La décolonisation est un ensemble de processus dynamiques continus et totaux. C'est un processus dynamique d'abord, car trop de

définitions ont insisté sur un aspect linéaire, à savoir: le fait historique daté de l'indépendance politique. Ces définitions insistent mieux sur une date que sur les phénomènes impliqués par cet événement. Il faut donc essayer de saisir la situation de décolonisation comme les nouveaux processus engendrés par ce fait singulier qu'est l'obtention de l'indépendance politique. C'est une situation et un *processus continu* parce qu'aucun des pays dits décolonisés ne prétend l'être encore entièrement. Mieux encore, plus l'on s'éloigne de cette date charnière de cette date historique, de cette date témoin: l'avènement de l'Indépendance, plus surgissent de nouveaux problèmes, plus aussi apparaît la complexité de cette situation. Enfin la décolonisation est un *phénomène total*. Elle intéresse tous les aspects de la réalité sociale; elle intéresse tant les groupes traditionnels que les groupes modernes; elle intéresse tant les cultures en formation que les individus, agents et acteurs de cette situation nouvelle.

#### *Aspects de la Décolonisation*

Toute sociologie de la décolonisation doit considérer deux aspects: un *aspect théorique* et un *aspect pratique*. L'aspect théorique intéresse avant tout le sociologue. Il s'agit de trouver la problématique de cette situation nouvelle, la problématique des conflits nouveaux, la problématique de tous les problèmes à résoudre. Mais du point de vue de l'appareil conceptuel jusqu'ici utilisé et notamment celui qui nous a été légué par la sociologie de la situation coloniale, c'est une révision sévère et sans scrupule qui s'impose. Cette révision se pose comme la propédeutique indispensable à tout travail ultérieur sérieux. Ce n'est pas simplement dans l'adaptation des concepts jusqu'ici utilisés que réside cette tâche de révision, mais dans une meilleure lecture du tableau sociologique qui nous est offert, dans un meilleur déchiffrement des éléments nouveaux que cette situation nouvelle charrie. Mais sous l'aspect de la formulation des hypothèses et de la conduite d'enquêtes pratiques, cette exigence de révision pourrait se formuler de la manière suivante. D'abord il faudrait que les sociologues se mettent d'accord sur un ensemble de concepts de base qui seraient dans un premier temps considérés comme concepts opératoires. Dans un second temps les sociologues accepteraient d'appliquer ces concepts, cet ensemble de concepts à la diversité des terrains que représentent ces pays, de telle sorte que les résultats pourraient être comparables. Les différences éventuelles

que nous révéleraient les enquêtes conduites sur des terrains différents seraient alors attribuées aux paramètres différents spécifiques de ces terrains et pourraient ainsi nous aider à une confrontation objective et circonscrite des résultats d'une part et surtout poser les bases réelles d'une sociologie comparative de la décolonisation d'autre part. Car à moins de se satisfaire d'une phénoménologie sans terrain ou se contentant d'un seul terrain ou de généralités, la sociologie de la décolonisation, pour être effective, pour progresser, a besoin d'emblée de se situer sur le terrain d'une sociologie comparative, voire d'une étude interdisciplinaire. Telles sont les exigences méthodologiques que nous devrions retenir dès le point de départ et que nous devons essayer d'appliquer dans nos recherches respectives.

Mais la décolonisation comporte aussi un *aspect pratique*. Elle ne se situe pas simplement dans le cadre d'une science pure, de la science pour la science. Quand bien même les apports ou les exigences de la recherche fondamentale et de la sociologie théorique seraient notre visée première, il apparaît rapidement que le côté pratique d'une sociologie de la décolonisation ne peut manquer de nous intéresser. Ceci pour une raison très simple: c'est que cette situation précisément parce qu'elle est une situation dynamique veut ou attend du sociologue certaines informations précises. En second lieu, il y a des personnes, des groupes, des sociétés qui voudraient immédiatement être dans une certaine mesure consommateurs de ces résultats. En d'autres termes, il s'agit pour le sociologue d'élucider les éléments de cette situation, de dégager des problématiques éclairantes pour l'homme d'action, quand bien même tel n'est pas au point de départ son projet initial. Mais avant de revenir sur certains aspects de cette problématique, il nous faut maintenant caractériser cette situation de décolonisation.

#### *Caractéristiques de la situation de Décolonisation*

Nous pourrions sans manifester un goût particulier du paradoxe et des oppositions, caractériser cette situation de décolonisation par trois aspects: premièrement la situation de décolonisation apparaît comme une série d'*urgences* («emergencies»); en second lieu, elle apparaît comme une série d'*hypothèses* et en troisième lieu, elle apparaît comme une série de *conflits*. Et précisément le drame, l'imbroglio de cette situation, la complexité de cette situation, est la

dialectique particulière et spécifique, qui dans chaque cas particulier, dans chaque situation régionale particulière s'établit entre ces trois niveaux.

### *La décolonisation comme une série d'urgences*

En parcourant les travaux consacrés aux problèmes des pays dits en voie de développement, l'on est frappé par la permanence sinon la répétition quelquefois ennuyeuse de certains thèmes: développement, éducation, personnalité culturelle, intégration culturelle, etc... Mais ces thèmes, cette répétition de thèmes quelle qu'ennuyeuse soit-elle, témoigne de la présence réelle de certains éléments plus profonds, à savoir qu'ils sont les porte-drapeaux ou les fanions d'exigences réelles et mieux encore d'urgences. La situation de décolonisation est elle-même une situation d'urgence par le fait qu'elle est une brisure avec la situation antécédente; mais elle n'est pas une brisure sans condition, et la manière même d'être à la fois projet pour le présent et l'avenir, contestation et revendication du passé à la fois, implique déjà un conflit fondamental, qui ne sera dominé que dans le temps. Ces exigences peuvent masquer d'autres problèmes non moins sérieux; ces exigences peuvent devenir des prismes déformants qui empêchent le décolonisé lui-même de lire les phénomènes le concernant dans leur juste proportion. Il y a là donc une possibilité de myopie d'un certain côté et une possibilité de grossissement artificiel de l'autre. Mais il ne s'agit pas simplement de faire l'inventaire des urgences. Il faut encore savoir les ordonner et dans toute situation d'urgence, ce qui compte, c'est de savoir quel geste il faut faire en premier lieu, par quoi il faut procéder et comment procéder. Or il apparaît à la lumière des expériences faites dans le domaine culturel, dans le domaine économique, dans le domaine de l'organisation sociale, dans la création de nouvelles institutions etc..., qu'il ne se manifeste pas encore une conscience claire de la hiérarchie des urgences.

La décolonisation apparaît aussi *comme une série d'hypothèques*. Il y a deux sortes d'hypothèques au moins: les hypothèques relevant de la situation antérieure, colportées par la société traditionnelle ou léguées par la situation coloniale, et les hypothèques dues ou engendrées par les premières orientations, par les premiers pas de l'Indépendance. C'est dire aussi le rôle durable, les séquelles de faux pas éventuels dans cette situation de crise, dans cette situation de

passage, dans cette situation ambiguë à la fois de revendication du passé et de projection dynamique forcenée vers l'avenir. Et l'éluclation de ces hypothèques pourrait nous amener à une meilleure compréhension des conflits.

En effet, en troisième lieu, avons-nous remarqué, la *décolonisation est une série de conflits*. Conflits non seulement entre les groupes traditionnels et les groupes modernes, non seulement conflits entre cultures différentes, entre modèles ou éléments culturels différents appelés, soit à s'opposer, soit à composer un compromis, mais aussi conflits des individualités, conflits de l'individu et de la société. Et là le travail le plus pertinent d'une sociologie de ces conflits serait l'étude concrète *des dynamismes de rupture, des dynamismes de réconciliation, des dynamismes de remodelage*. En d'autres termes, la notion d'initiative dans la situation de décolonisation ne peut être étudiée sous le simple aspect d'un retour à la normalité perdue au temps de la situation coloniale. Et nous trouverions dans le caractère quelque peu désordonné des innovations actuelles, une expression vivante, une expression jouée, amplifiée de tous ces conflits, qui relèvent de niveaux et d'âges différents. La décolonisation n'actualise pas simplement les conflits de l'heure, les conflits du moment, elle a permis aussi une sorte de résurgence de conflits anciens; elle a pu dans certains cas, ressusciter des conflits qui avaient été voilés par certain faits de la situation coloniale. Mais le point le plus intéressant certainement, le point, qui doit apporter plus d'informations et d'enseignements quant à cette sociologie de la décolonisation, concerne les significations et le contenu de la décolonisation.

#### *Contenu et signification de la décolonisation*

Nous devons distinguer deux aspects très différents mais qui ne doivent jamais être séparés, qui doivent être regardés comme deux pôles d'une seule et même réalité, comme les deux bouts indispensables d'une même lunette. C'est d'une part le point de vue extérieur et d'autre part le point de vue intérieur c'est-à-dire la manière dont le décolonisé lui-même lit, vit, accepte ou refuse cette situation.

##### a) *Le point de vue extérieur*

Jusqu'ici, et c'est certainement une faiblesse de cette sociologie débutante de la décolonisation, les informations dont nous dispo-

sons, concernent d'abord l'observation extérieure, mieux encore, concernent plutôt les remarques faites de l'extérieur sur ces processus ou phénomènes de décolonisation. Et ces remarques ou observations se colorent, très souvent, de prises de positions, de jugements plus ou moins implicites, qui contribuent encore à déformer cette réalité elle-même plus qu'à nous en donner une image exacte, une image rationnelle. A ce niveau de lecture de l'extérieur, il faut rechercher des critères plus objectifs nous permettant une lecture plus saine de la situation. Et les considérations méthodologiques que nous avons formulées, au début de cet exposé, pourraient certainement aider à atteindre ce but. Mais l'observateur de l'extérieur peut aussi être un simple technocrate, soucieux d'agir ou d'intégrer son action dans une société en décolonisation. Et là, son but premier n'est pas tellement de saisir des processus mais d'engendrer des processus nouveaux à partir de l'observation partielle de la situation qu'il a. Il s'agit donc pour le technocrate ou l'expert de transformer la société dans un sens qu'il a préalablement défini. Mais l'expert et le technocrate ne possèdent pas toujours sur lesdites sociétés les informations indispensables à une saisie exacte de la dynamique dont elles sont le siège.

b) *le point de vue intérieur:*

Mais alors, pourrait-on nous demander, est-ce que l'autre façade, c'est-à-dire le point de vue du décolonisé, *le point de vue de la lecture de l'intérieur*, peut nous apporter quelque chose de plus valable ? Là, il faudrait procéder à l'inventaire d'un certain nombre de thèmes. Pour le décolonisé, c'est-à-dire pour être précis, pour être plus véridique, il y a d'abord des problèmes. Des problèmes, qui relèvent non seulement de ces urgences, de ces hypothèques, de ces conflits mentionnés à l'instant, mais aussi des problèmes *de formulation et d'organisation pratique*. D'abord les formulations. Nous avons vu quelles étaient les difficultés d'une lecture saine, réelle et objective de sa propre situation et comment des prismes, tour à tour, rapetissants et tour à tour, grossissants, contribuent à noyer la réalité dans une vision de « bluff ». S'agissant de l'action, il semble que l'indétermination soit encore plus grande. Les critères ou modèles que charrie la société de décolonisation n'ont pas les mêmes précisions, les mêmes nettetés que ceux que charriaient ou proposaient les sociétés traditionnelles, voire même la société coloniale. Or, rien n'est plus dangereux que d'être indécis, que d'être incertain en face

situation particulière, mais surtout dans une situation provisoire. C'est ce qui nous amène à une réflexion sur les réactions.

### *Les réactions*

Dans une sociologie de la décolonisation, ce qu'il importerait de tester, de faire parler, ce ne sont pas simplement les informations que cette société ou que les membres de cette société nous livrent, mais ce qu'on ne nous dit pas. Les omissions sont aussi caractéristiques de la situation que ce qui a été clairement dit, quand bien même il s'agit d'exigences. En d'autres termes, une étude plus fouillée des comportements et des réactions devrait nous aider à mieux formuler les problèmes concernant cette situation globale. Une remarque toutefois, c'est que, comme corollaire de l'observation faite plus haut, à savoir: la présence de ces prismes déformants, grossissants ou rapetissants, il s'ensuit que l'accent a surtout été mis actuellement sur certains problèmes; mais ces problèmes, en aucun cas, ne doivent être considérés comme les seuls de la situation et surtout comme les seuls importants d'une sociologie de la décolonisation.

### *Les programmes*

La décolonisation en tant que processus continu, processus dynamique, processus total, s'exprime aussi sous la forme de programmes. Certes, la présence de ces programmes est justifiée par la notion d'urgence qui domine la conscience tant individuelle que collective; mais ce qui devrait mieux encore nous intéresser, c'est le contenu et l'orientation de ces programmes. Sur le plan des contenus: ou bien le programme veut intéresser la totalité d'un phénomène dynamique impliqué par la situation, alors il devient trop général, trop complexe et irréalisable; ou, cédant à la pression des exigences, des priorités, il ne concerne que certains aspects arbitrairement retenus de cette réalité sociale, certains aspects qui sont considérés comme les têtes de ports à partir desquelles il faut en bon stratège agir sur l'ensemble de la société et orienter si possible la dynamique générale de la situation. On voit que chacune de ces deux approches présente de grosses faiblesses. Elles ne peuvent, en effet, ni l'une ni l'autre, aboutir à ce modèle d'équilibre, à ce minimum de société stabilisée qui est, qui devrait être le but ultime de la dialectique générale.

Quelle que soit l'habileté des experts définissant ces programmes, quelle que soit la perspicacité du stratège qui met sur pied la formulation principielle de ces programmes, ces programmes sont fondamentalement frappés comme d'une tare congénitale, comme frappés des séquelles d'un péché original. Or, ce péché originel, nous pensons qu'il est le fruit, qu'il est la résultante, qu'il est la conséquence nécessaire de cette situation de décolonisation elle-même.

#### *Les nouveaux groupes*

Ce que nous avons dit à propos des situations, des problèmes, des réactions et des programmes s'actualise encore mieux à un autre niveau: celui des nouveaux groupes. Toutes les études présentées jusqu'à présent sur la dynamique sociale, sur les nouvelles différenciations sociales et sur l'apparition de nouvelles classes sociales, illustrent ces ambiguïtés, illustrent cette complexité des nouveaux groupes. Ces derniers, en aucun cas, ne s'inscrivent ni totalement dans le cadre ancien, ni totalement dans le cadre nouveau et surtout dans la société de l'avenir. Ils sont ou se proposent, dirait-on presque à leurs corps défendant, comme les héritiers nécessaires de la situation précédente ou comme les ponts nécessaires vers la société de l'avenir. Mais s'ils sont héritiers du point de vue de la logique et de la dialectique engendrées par les sociétés traditionnelles et coloniales, ils ne sont pas héritiers à part entière. On peut dire que dans une certaine mesure, les conflits dont ils sont les témoignages vivants illustrent des ruptures parfois dramatiques, illustrent des hésitations, illustrent des options nouvelles dramatiques. C'est dire qu'une étude plus approfondie des phénomènes de classes et de différenciations, constituera certainement l'un des points les plus instructifs non seulement de cette sociologie de la décolonisation, mais pourra même permettre de formuler les principes d'une interprétation prospective des sociétés qui naîtront de cette situation de décolonisation.

#### *Les stratégies*

Il est un peu ambitieux de parler dans ces conditions de stratégies. Certes, nous sommes fondés à le faire puisque les plans, les comportements des groupes semblent confusément se référer à certains principes essentiels dominants, qui sont comme des fils con-



ducteurs de l'action. C'est par cela que nous entendons stratégies. Ces stratégies ne sont pas du tout au sens classique, un plan achevé, partant d'une analyse minutieuse d'une situation, partant d'une pondération objective de chaque élément ou de chaque paramètre de la situation et surtout débouchant sur un but précis qui, en l'occurrence, serait l'image de la société de l'avenir. Or, nous voyons les difficultés qu'il y a au point de départ à définir une véritable stratégie puisque cette définition exacte, précise, nette, claire, n'existe pas au niveau des structures adoptées; il n'y a pas choix délibéré, engouement pour un genre et un certain genre seulement de structures. Incertitude aussi au niveau de la formulation d'une idéologie qui devrait être quelque chose comme la justification idéale du programme ou quelquefois pouvant créer des motivations intenses pour la réalisation du programme. L'étude qui a été faite des éléments idéologiques, qui apparaissent actuellement dans ces sociétés, nous montre plutôt leur côté vague, imprécis, voire contradictoire. Est-ce à dire qu'il y ait une sorte de faiblesse de ces sociétés à élaborer ou à mettre sur pied une véritable stratégie? Nous ne le pensons pas. Tout au contraire, cette hésitation comme il a été noté plus haut, est le fruit, est le résultat, est une séquelle, est un corollaire nécessaire de cette situation de décolonisation elle-même qui n'apporte pas simplement des points positifs mais des points négatifs, qui ne propose pas simplement des voies mais des voies contraires. C'est ce qui explique aussi que ces sociétés soient certes, promptes à définir des tâches nouvelles mais n'arrivent pas forcément à délimiter les contours exacts de ces tâches et surtout à pouvoir présenter une tactique cohérente de la réalisation de ces tâches. Une question fondamentale se pose à la fin de cet exposé. Quand bien même, ces groupes ou ces individus possèderaient la stratégie permettant de conduire rationnellement ces actions nouvelles ou ces tâches nouvelles, quand bien même, elles disposeraient de la tactique et des moyens pour réaliser cette stratégie ou ces stratégies, on peut se demander, dans quelle mesure, la décolonisation parviendra à sa fin finale, à savoir, établir cette mutation ou pour parler plus banalement opérer ce «take off», ce décollage. Il est, en effet utile pour le sociologue qui ne s'intéresse pas seulement à la dynamique des structures sociales mais aussi au destin des sociétés et des cultures, de savoir, si cette action collective sourde, qui est en train de se faire au niveau de ces sociétés, aboutira au résultat escompté, si l'attente de ces sociétés, sera comblée ou déçue. C'est là le grave problème auquel il ne nous appartient pas pour le moment de ré-

pondre. Seules des études plus minutieuses qui esquisseront des synthèses partielles d'abord, plus générales ensuite, nous aideront à poser les éléments objectifs permettant de préciser les implications de cette situation de décolonisation quant à l'avenir de ces sociétés.

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La souveraineté nationale, c'est le droit de chaque nation à l'autodétermination, c'est-à-dire au choix libre de son régime politique, économique et social. Cette interprétation de la souveraineté nationale découle de l'expérience de la lutte de libération des peuples. Le principe de la souveraineté nationale représente essentiellement la reconnaissance de la représentativité de la nation en matière de politique intérieure et l'égalité en droits des nations dans le domaine des relations internationales.

Les aspects sociologiques de la souveraineté nationale expriment le lien qui existe entre cette notion et l'évolution de la société humaine. Ce lien se manifeste dans les points suivants: 1) L'origine de l'idée de souveraineté nationale est indissolublement liée à une étape déterminée de développement de la société humaine, soit à l'apparition des villages, et toute idée sociale doit le dénoter en caractère progressiste et démocratique. 2) La reconnaissance du droit de chaque peuple à être le maître de son sort crée des conditions favorables pour délivrer le nation de toute espèce d'oppression et, par conséquent, contribue au progrès social. Il y a plus. Le système même de la souveraineté nationale se modifie conformément à la marche du progrès social, reflétant non seulement les besoins sociaux intérieurs de telle ou telle nation, mais les besoins globaux de l'époque. 3) La reconnaissance de la souveraineté nationale est un moyen très important pour consolider la lutte (c'est-à-dire pour créer les conditions les plus favorables au progrès social).

Arrêtons-nous pour en détail sur chacun de ces aspects.

1. Les idéologues de la bourgeoisie révolutionnaire ont formulé le principe de la souveraineté nationale à une époque où la bourgeoisie était une classe ascendante, et ils la considéraient comme le droit de peuple à être le maître de son sort. L'autodétermination de la nation en tant que suprême de peuple, telle est en substance la notion de souveraineté nationale dans l'interprétation qu'en donnent les partisans des idées démocratiques, les théologues des révolutions bourgeoises.

Le principe de la souveraineté nationale a été inscrit dans la

## ASPECTS SOCIOLOGIQUES DE LA SOUVERAINETÉ NATIONALE

E. MODRJINSKAĀ

Académie des Sciences de l'URSS

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Déclaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen, adoptée par l'Assemblée nationale française en août 1789. Jean-Jaques Rousseau était un ardent partisan de l'idée de la souveraineté nationale, idée également soutenue par Diderot, qui estimait que la source de tout pouvoir politique et civil était la sanction populaire.

Si la nature démocratique du principe même de la souveraineté nationale reste inchangée, on ne peut en dire autant du caractère des mouvements de libération nationale et, partant, de l'essence sociale de la lutte pour la souveraineté nationale dans les différentes conditions historiques concrètes. L'origine et le caractère des mouvements nationaux et de l'idéologie nationale sont indissociables de l'évolution de la société au cours de l'histoire.

2. Le lien qui unit le principe de la souveraineté nationale aux intérêts du progrès social se révèle non seulement dans son origine historique (en tant que principe dirigé naguère contre la féodalité), mais aussi en ce que le *caractère démocratique* de ce principe permet de prendre appui sur lui dans la lutte de libération des peuples.

Un éminent représentant de la pensée progressiste des États-Unis à l'époque de la lutte pour l'indépendance, Jefferson, écrivait :

« Si une forme quelconque de gouvernement devient néfaste, préjudiciable aux intérêts du peuple, celui-ci a le droit de la modifier ou de la supprimer et d'établir un nouveau gouvernement, en le basant sur les principes et en l'organisant sous la forme qu'il considérera les meilleurs pour assurer sa sécurité et son bonheur. »<sup>1</sup>

À l'époque de la lutte contre le féodalisme, l'essence sociale des mouvements de libération nationale des masses populaires consistait à affermir le mode de production capitaliste qui, bien qu'ayant supprimé la forme féodale d'exploitation, l'avait remplacée par une nouvelle forme, la forme capitaliste. Aussi, cette lutte antiféodale des masses populaires ne pouvait aboutir et n'a pas abouti alors à l'instauration d'États dont la souveraineté aurait été la souveraineté du peuple.

En vertu des lois du développement capitaliste, les pays qui avaient rejeté le joug étranger dans les conditions du capitalisme, devenaient ensuite eux-mêmes soit des oppresseurs impérialistes (comme, par exemple, les États-Unis, ancienne colonie anglaise), soit tombaient sous le joug de nouvelles formes de domination impérialiste (comme, par exemple, les pays d'Amérique latine, qui s'étaient libérés du joug espagnol).

<sup>1</sup> *The Life and Selected Writings of Jefferson*, N.Y., 1944, p. 22.

À l'époque contemporaine, le mouvement de libération nationale est dirigé en premier lieu contre le système colonial d'asservissement politique et national.

Les mouvements de libération nationale, qui se déploient sous la bannière de la lutte pour la souveraineté nationale, contribuent à liquider le colonialisme, un des phénomènes les plus abjects et antihumains de la société.

«La libération des colonies n'est pas autre chose que l'autodétermination des nations», écrivait Lénine.

Cependant, la lutte de libération nationale ne se borne pas à la conquête de l'indépendance nationale par les nations et les peuples.

Dans le monde contemporain, où le rapport des forces entre le progrès et la réaction s'est brusquement modifié, des conditions objectives existent pour une victoire totale du mouvement de libération nationale et la liquidation complète du colonialisme, système d'oppression non seulement politique et national, mais aussi économique, social et culturel des peuples.

En conséquence, le contenu social et économique de la souveraineté nationale se modifie lui aussi. Des conditions réelles existent maintenant pour que ce principe serve non pas aux sordides intérêts des classes exploiteuses, mais à une cohésion des travailleurs telle que le peuple puisse devenir véritablement maître de ses destinées.

Ainsi, dans les mouvements de libération nationale actuels, la souveraineté nationale *prend corps* comme un principe de suprématie et d'égalité des nations, comme le droit des nations à l'indépendance, à l'union nationale et à l'autodétermination jusques et y compris la formation d'un État indépendant, comme le droit des nations à un libre développement économique, social, politique et culturel.<sup>2</sup>

Le principe de la souveraineté nationale à l'époque actuelle garde tout son caractère progressiste et s'enrichit d'un nouveau contenu.

<sup>2</sup> Le principe de souveraineté nationale se rapproche de la notion de la souveraineté de l'État (lors de la constitution par la nation de son propre État), néanmoins ces deux notions ne sont pas identiques car la souveraineté étatique existait encore avant la constitution des nations, est aussi parce que même des États multinationaux peuvent posséder la souveraineté étatique. Celui-ci est l'indépendance de l'État vis-à-vis de l'ingérence de la part d'autres États dans la solution de tous les problèmes concernant sa vie intérieure et ses rapports extérieurs. Le principe contenu de la souveraineté nationale, c'est le droit de chaque nation, de chaque peuple de disposer indépendamment de son sort.

Étant donné que ce principe implique la reconnaissance de la suprématie des nations et des peuples *dans toutes leurs propres affaires*, il préserve les intérêts des peuples de tous les pays, grands et petits, et signifie la reconnaissance du droit de chaque peuple de choisir librement les voies de développement social et économique qui lui conviennent.

En même temps ce principe est dirigé contre l'expansion impérialiste, contre toutes les tentatives des impérialistes d'empêcher les peuples de disposer de leur sort.

Dans les conditions actuelles, la lutte des peuples pour la souveraineté nationale se juxtapose à leur lutte pour la réorganisation de la société sur une base progressiste, socialiste. C'est ce que comprennent les idéologues occidentaux les plus lucides. «Nous devons accepter le fait que les révolutions nationales dans les pays d'Asie et dans les autres régions sous-développées seront dans une grande mesure des révolutions socialistes, et non pas bourgeoises ou défendant le statu quo, écrit William Graves Carleton, professeur de sciences politiques à l'Université de Floride,... les grandes guerres de libération nationale de notre temps assument un caractère non seulement nationaliste, mais aussi socialiste...»<sup>3</sup>

Il faut reconnaître que c'est là une appréciation sensée et sérieuse. À notre époque, on ne peut progresser sans marcher vers le socialisme.

Il existe cependant dans les pays occidentaux des milieux sociaux qui traduisent les intérêts du grand capital monopoliste, s'efforcent de barrer le chemin au progrès social et se prononcent contre les grandes transformations sociales dans les pays libérés. Ils s'élèvent naturellement aussi contre le principe de la souveraineté nationale. Le sociologue indien Harin Shah a très bien défini, par exemple, la politique extérieure américaine en Asie et en Afrique comme «une grande abdication»<sup>4</sup>.

La position de beaucoup d'idéologues américains et ouest-européens peut être également définie comme une «grande abdication» devant les principes de la souveraineté nationale. «La souveraineté nationale est périmée», voilà la formule en vogue dans des centaines de revues et de livres paraissant aux États-Unis et en Europe Occidentale. Les hommes politiques, les spécialistes des sciences

<sup>3</sup> William Graves CARLETON, *Political Thought since World War II*, N.Y., 1964, pp. 425-426.

<sup>4</sup> H. SHAH, *The Great Abdication, American Foreign Policy in Asia and Africa*, Delhi, 1957.

politiques, les puristes et les spécialistes de la politique internationale, les économistes et les sociologues, les philosophes répètent à peu près ce qu'a déclaré en 1960 le professeur américain W. Sharp: «La souveraineté nationale n'est qu'une construction intellectuelle périmée»<sup>5</sup>.

Quels sont les arguments avancés par les théoriciens adversaires de la souveraineté nationale? En règle générale, ils n'expliquent pas leur attitude par leur désaveu ou leur mécontentement des processus vitaux qui se déroulent dans les pays en voie de développement, en lesquels s'incarne aujourd'hui le principe de la souveraineté nationale.

Le plus souvent, les attaques contre la souveraineté nationale sont voilées; on met en cause sans raison valable les intérêts du progrès social, ou bien l'on déforme la notion même de souveraineté nationale, en érigeant en absolu ou en traitant d'un point de vue métaphysique les divers aspects de cette notion.

L'évolution de la société humaine, le progrès social, sont envisagés par le sociologue américain Mortimer Adler d'un seul point de vue, comme un processus de croissance quantitative, comme une expansion menant à l'élargissement incessant des formations politiques. En s'inspirant de cette conception fautive du développement social, Mortimer Adler refuse à l'État national son caractère légitime, adopte une attitude méfiante et négative à l'égard de la souveraineté nationale considérée par lui comme un frein au processus qu'il qualifie d'expansion politique. «L'État national... n'est pas le dernier échelon dans le processus de l'expansion politique, écrit-il. La seule limite à l'expansion politique, c'est l'État mondial. Rien d'autre ne saurait arrêter ce processus. L'État mondial est la limite naturelle de l'expansion, le dernier échelon de l'essor politique qui comprend deux unités fondamentales: 1) l'unité de la planète, en tant que base territoriale pour la vie politique des hommes, et 2) l'unité de la nature humaine qui surmonte toutes les différences raciales et culturelles, en tant que base psychologique de la citoyenneté mondiale»<sup>6</sup>.

Nous avons là, en fait d'arguments, une absolutisation des catégories politiques que l'on détache de leur base sociale et économique. L'État est pris en deux dimensions: la dimension territoriale et la dimension biologique (en tant qu'organisation ralliant tout le

<sup>5</sup> *Revue internationale des sciences sociales*, Paris, 1960, n° 2, p. 217.

<sup>6</sup> Mortimer I. ADLER, *How to think about War and Peace*, N.Y., 1944, p. 205.

genre humain). On fait abstraction de la nature sociale de l'État qui est son indice principal. Or on ne saurait considérer le problème de l'évolution des formes politiques sans tenir compte de cet indice décisif, sans donner une réponse à la question: de quel État s'agit-il au juste? Quelle est la nature sociale et économique de cet État? Il n'est pas difficile de deviner que M. Adler parle d'un État mondial qui, sur le plan social et économique, serait à l'image de l'État américain actuel, seulement son envergure s'étendrait au globe entier. On peut tirer cette conclusion du fait qu'il souligne souvent que la seule forme équitable d'administration est la forme «démocratique» (c'est ainsi que les savants occidentaux qualifient le régime social des États impérialistes); que l'État mondial doit être lui aussi une démocratie; que l'inégalité sociale est inévitable, car elle est liée aux besoins fonctionnels de la société; qu'une des fonctions de l'État mondial doit être de réprimer la lutte de classe; qu'en fin de compte l'État mondial est un organe de force... (voir par exemple, pp. 42, 30, 190, 21 de son livre *How to think about War and Peace*).

Cette manière d'envisager l'État mondial jointe à la négation de la souveraineté nationale montre qu'au fond la théorie de M. Adler est dirigée contre le progrès historique en tant que processus de transformation et de perfectionnement du régime social, processus inséparable de l'activité créatrice des peuples et des nations et de leur droit à l'autodétermination.

Un des moyens déguisés de lutter contre le principe de la souveraineté nationale est de le condamner en le ramenant au nationalisme, c'est-à-dire en érigeant son aspect idéologique en absolu. Mais, tout d'abord, la souveraineté nationale ce n'est pas le nationalisme, et, ensuite, il y a nationalisme et nationalisme.

Le rôle progressiste du mouvement de libération nationale et de l'idéologie anti-impérialiste est apprécié à sa juste mesure par les marxistes. En son temps, Lénine avait averti de ne pas poser de façon abstraite la question du nationalisme, de ne pas confondre le nationalisme de la nation opprimée avec celui de la nation oppresseuse, le nationalisme d'une grande nation avec le nationalisme d'une petite nation.

Les marxistes reconnaissent et tiennent compte de la différence notable qui existe entre le nationalisme chauvin des exploiters et le nationalisme anti-impérialiste des nations d'Asie, d'Afrique et d'Amérique latine, opprimées ou pas encore libérées du joug colonial, et dont le contenu démocratique général est historiquement



justifié. « Dans tout nationalisme bourgeois d'une nation opprimée, indiquait Lénine, il existe un contenu démocratique général dirigé contre l'oppression; et c'est ce contenu que nous appuyons sans restrictions, tout en le séparant rigoureusement de la tendance à l'exclusivisme national... »<sup>7</sup>.

Les marxistes n'ont jamais proposé de cultiver le cloisonnement national, l'isolement et l'exclusivisme des peuples. Les marxistes sont des adversaires convaincus de l'animosité nationale, de l'antagonisme national, de l'isolement national. La théorie marxiste-léniniste envisage la perspective du rapprochement des nations du point de vue du processus objectif du développement social.

Il ne peut y avoir d'autres bases pour le rapprochement et l'alliance des nations que la confiance totale et l'adhésion bénévole. L'histoire montre que la suppression de l'oppression sociale entraîne nécessairement le renforcement de l'alliance fraternelle des différentes nations. L'authentique égalité en droits et l'épanouissement des nations et des cultures nationales suppriment l'hostilité, la méfiance et la malveillance entre les personnes de nationalités différentes. Le nouveau régime social et économique engendre l'amitié sincère et désintéressée des peuples. Ce n'est qu'au fur et à mesure que se renforcera et se développera un monde authentiquement libre qu'il deviendra possible d'instaurer une véritable fraternité de l'humanité tout entière.

Pour ce qui est de la situation présente, nous ne vivons pas à l'époque de la liquidation des nations et de la souveraineté nationale mais à celle de puissants mouvements de libération nationale, du développement et du raffermissement des Etats nationaux et des cultures nationales qui se forment en pleine lutte contre l'impérialisme et le colonialisme.

On assiste parfois à l'absolutisation de l'indépendance en matière de relations politiques. Cette autre interprétation erronée de la souveraineté nationale n'est pas rare. La souveraineté nationale est représentée comme une source « d'anarchie internationale », comme un arbitraire absolu que rien ne limite ni ne modère. « L'anarchie et la souveraineté sont inséparables », déclarent certains sociologues.

En réalité, les tentatives de présenter la souveraineté nationale comme une source d'anarchie internationale, sont inconsistantes pour la bonne raison que la doctrine de la souveraineté nationale est inséparable de la reconnaissance de l'égalité en droits de toutes

<sup>7</sup> V. LÉNINE, *Œuvres*, Paris-Moscou, t. 20, p. 435.

les nations, grandes et petites, ce qui entraîne la nécessité de respecter les droits souverains *de toutes les nations*.

Certains adversaires de la souveraineté nationale avancent la thèse de la liquidation de la souveraineté *absolue*.

Mais il n'existe pas de souveraineté absolue. Les traités internationaux conclus avec les Etats nationaux, les divers engagements qu'ils assument en tant que membres de l'O.N.U., signifient déjà que les Etats nationaux acceptent volontairement une certaine réglementation de leur activité dans certains domaines. Cette voie est la seule valable pour conjurer une nouvelle guerre mondiale.

Parmi les conceptions antiscientifiques qui dénaturent l'essence de la souveraineté nationale il faut également mentionner celle qui voudrait voir en la souveraineté nationale une source du danger de guerre. «La guerre est en fin de compte engendrée par l'existence du concept même de souveraineté nationale», écrit le sociologue américain Walt Rostow<sup>8</sup>.

Nul doute, il existe un lien entre les guerres et la souveraineté nationale, ce lien n'est pas une fiction pure. Mais il est antiscientifique d'en faire un lien *causal*.

Du point de vue de la théorie, déclarer que la souveraineté nationale est une source de guerre, c'est adopter la conception de «l'état dynamique» selon laquelle la puissance et la force (*might of power*) sont l'essence de l'Etat. On rapporte la souveraineté à la catégorie des forces; la guerre en est une conséquence fatale. Suivant cette théorie, les Etats faibles doivent être privés du droit d'existence. Les représentants les plus en vue de cette conception, ont été Thomas Gobbes (1588-1679), l'historien réactionnaire allemand Henrich von Treitschke (1834-1896), et Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900). Rappelons à ce propos les énoncés de Treitschke: «Il existe indubitablement une part de ridicule dans l'existence d'un petit Etat»<sup>9</sup>. Ou encore: «Le recours à la force est une conséquence logique de la nature de l'Etat. Le fait même de l'existence de nombreux Etats implique la nécessité des guerres»<sup>9</sup>. Ces idées sont reprises de nos jours également. Ainsi, le professeur américain S. Possony déclare: «La souveraineté a perdu sa véritable signification pour tous les pays, sauf pour les plus puissants et les plus évolués du point de vue de la technique»<sup>10</sup>. W. Friedmann, pro-

<sup>8</sup> W. ROSTOW, *Stages of Economic Growth*, N.Y., p. 108.

<sup>9</sup> H. VON TREITSCHKE, *Politics*, I, p. 34. Ibid., II, p. 599.

<sup>10</sup> S. POSSONY, *The Idea of Colonialism*, N.Y., 1958, p. 34.

fesseur à l'Université de Columbia, propose de renoncer à la souveraineté nationale et déclare sans ambages: «La souveraineté nationale est en fin de compte le potentiel militaire»<sup>11</sup>.

Mais, c'est bel et bien une substitution arbitraire de concepts! Si l'on identifie souveraineté et potentiel militaire, alors un Etat qui n'a pas de puissance militaire ne doit pas être reconnu comme souverain. Pareil raisonnement est digne des partisans de la politique à partir «des positions de force», mais non de chercheurs qui prétendent à une objectivité scientifique, ni de partisans de relations internationales avec égalité en droits. La vie même contredit les élucubrations selon lesquelles de nos jours seuls des pays au potentiel industriel et militaire hautement évolué peuvent prétendre à la souveraineté. Il suffit de voir le rôle incontestablement accru, que sont appelés à jouer les jeunes États indépendants en politique internationale.

L'interprétation sociologique de la souveraineté nationale est indissolublement liée aux aspects éthiques et juridiques de la question. C'est justement par ses principes éthiques et juridiques que la souveraineté nationale sert le mieux les intérêts de la paix.

3. Le principe de la souveraineté nationale en tant que moyen de consolider la paix, fait fonction: a) de base pour la condamnation morale de la politique à partir des positions de force; b) en se rapprochant du principe de la souveraineté de l'État, il sert de base à l'égalité en droits dans les rapports internationaux; c) en s'incriminant dans le droit international en tant que principe d'autodétermination des peuples et des nations, il sert la cause de la paix dans les conditions du progrès social.

Étant donné que chaque nation dispose de la souveraineté nationale, ce principe confirme l'égalité en droits de toutes les nations et, partant, jette la base morale pour la condamnation de l'emploi de la force dans les rapports internationaux.

L'extension de la doctrine de la souveraineté nationale à tous les États implique le respect de l'entité et de l'invulnérabilité de chaque État, *grand* ou *petit*. La doctrine de la souveraineté est inséparable de la reconnaissance de l'égalité en droits des États souverains, elle implique donc le respect des droits souverains de toutes les nations.

La souveraineté non seulement n'entraîne pas l'arbitraire et l'anarchie dans les relations internationales, mais elle est dirigée contre

<sup>11</sup> W. FRIEDMANN, *An Introduction to World Politics*, London, N.Y., 1956, pp. 47, 67.

eux. La souveraineté étatique, c'est l'indépendance de l'Etat vis-à-vis de l'ingérence d'autres États dans la solution de toutes les questions concernant sa vie intérieure et ces relations extérieures, et partant, la prévention de toute atteinte à l'entité territoriale de n'importe quel État, étant donné qu'ils jouissent tous de droits égaux. La conception de la souveraineté de l'État exposée plus haut est largement reconnue en droit international.

Dans le cours de droit international en six volumes du professeur américain Ch. Hyde, il est souligné que la souveraineté est le principe fondamental du droit international actuel. «Le Progrès du droit qui régit les rapports entre États, écrit-il, est caractérisé par une théorie en vertu de laquelle la famille des peuples est constituée en premier lieu d'États dits indépendants, qui ont cela de commun qu'ils ne s'estiment pas obligés de se soumettre à une autorité commune située au-dessus d'eux, et qui, de ce fait, se trouvent sur un pied d'égalité du point de vue du droit international. La base de ce droit, c'est-à-dire ce qui donne à certains principes généraux la qualité ou le caractère de normes juridiques, a été leur reconnaissance par différents États indépendants...»<sup>12</sup>. Nous voyons que la souveraineté non seulement ne contredit pas l'ordonnance en matière de relations internationales, mais, mieux encore, les accords internationaux et le droit international lui-même se basent sur la reconnaissance de la souveraineté des États en tant que sujets du droit international.

Il sera opportun de préciser à ce propos ce que la souveraineté nationale est à la souveraineté étatique, étant donné que ces notions sont souvent confondues.

Pour comprendre ce qui unit et oppose ces deux notions il faut prendre la souveraineté nationale en tant que catégorie sociologique, et la souveraineté étatique en tant que catégorie juridique.

La notion de souveraineté nationale se rapproche de celle de souveraineté étatique si la nation ou la nationalité est constituée en État indépendant. La souveraineté nationale acquiert alors la forme de souveraineté étatique. Mais l'aspect sociologique de la souveraineté nationale ne cesse pas d'exister pour autant. Si l'État ou le régime politique ne correspond pas aux véritables intérêts de la nation, elle est en droit de le modifier et d'établir un autre régime. Il peut arriver que la nation ne fonde pas un État indépendant, mais

<sup>12</sup> Ch. HYDE, *Le droit international, sa compréhension et son application par les Etats-Unis d'Amérique*, t. I, M. 150, p. 59.

se rattache à un autre État. En ce cas, elle n'acquiert pas la souveraineté mais ne perdra pas sa souveraineté nationale. Dans ce cas la souveraineté étatique appartiendra à l'État multinational.

La souveraineté d'État est-elle seule une catégorie juridique, tandis que la souveraineté nationale n'a rien de commun avec le droit international? En aucune façon.

La souveraineté nationale étant un principe de *caractère sociologique*, elle jouit dans les conditions actuelles de la reconnaissance générale en droit international, ce qui en fait une des *catégories essentielles de la sociologie des relations internationales*.

La Charte de l'O.N.U. et plusieurs de ses résolutions en témoignent.

Le principe de la souveraineté nationale est reconnu en droit international comme *principe de l'autodétermination*, qui a deux aspects: l'aspect externe et interne<sup>13</sup>.

L'*aspect externe* de ce principe prévoit la reconnaissance du droit de la nation ou du peuple: a) à se séparer et à se constituer en État indépendant; b) à se séparer et à se rattacher à un autre État; c) à s'unir à un État dont ce peuple ou cette nation constituait une autonomie, etc.

L'*aspect interne* de l'autodétermination, c'est-à-dire le droit du peuple à gérer ses affaires intérieures sans aucune ingérence de l'extérieur, implique la reconnaissance du droit de la nation ou du peuple à: a) choisir son régime politique et social; b) disposer librement des ressources naturelles de son pays et à régler sa vie économique comme bon lui semble; c) trouver des solutions à toutes les questions relatives à la culture, à la religion, etc.

Le caractère juridique de ces normes est confirmé par de nombreuses résolutions de l'O.N.U.

L'inclusion du principe de la souveraineté nationale dans les normes du droit international, fixées dans les documents de l'O.N.U., a de très grandes conséquences sociologiques, à savoir: 1) La lutte des peuples pour l'indépendance nationale acquiert un soutien juridique international. Sous ce rapport les guerres de libération nationale sont reconnues comme des guerres justes et légitimes. C'est un puissant stimulant pour le progrès social, pour la lutte des peuples contre toutes formes d'asservissement et d'oppression.

2) La reconnaissance des États, des nations et des peuples comme

<sup>13</sup> Pour plus de détails voir: G. STAROUCHENKO, *Le principe de l'autodétermination des peuples et des nations dans la politique extérieure de l'État soviétique*, M., Editions du Progrès.

sujets du droit international signifie que toute tentative d'empêcher un peuple de réaliser son droit à l'autodétermination (par exemple, par une intervention militaire dirigée contre les mouvements de libération nationale) est un acte illégal du point de vue du droit international.

Ainsi, la reconnaissance du principe de la souveraineté comme base des relations pacifiques entre les États indépendants est complétée par la reconnaissance internationale de la légalité des transformations sociales, économiques et politiques réalisées par les peuples et les nations.

La *paix* dans les rapports entre les États, et le *progrès* dans la vie de la société, trouvent un soutien et un appui réel par suite de l'inclusion du principe de la souveraineté nationale dans le droit international moderne.

Nous voyons ainsi que la sociologie des relations internationales révèle son étroite liaison avec le droit international.

Le problème de la souveraineté nationale dans ses aspects aussi bien sociologique que juridique, est un problème brûlant de l'actualité.

Tous les dangereux foyers de guerre sur le globe sont dus dans telle ou telle mesure aux infractions directes ou aux préjudices causés à la souveraineté nationale par les impérialistes. L'opinion progressiste de tous les pays du monde exige la cessation de ces infractions, exige que tous les États, et en premier lieu les U.S.A., respectent strictement la Charte de l'O.N.U. et les normes du droit international.

Le seul moyen de sauvegarder et de consolider la paix dans les conditions d'une réalité sociale qui se modifie et se perfectionne sans cesse, dans les conditions du progrès social, c'est le respect de la souveraineté nationale des peuples.

<sup>10</sup> Pour plus de détails voir: *Le développement, le principe de l'autodétermination des peuples et des nations dans la politique internationale*, de Léon Kozlovitch, M. Éditions du Progrès, 16, r. de Valenciennes, 105, Paris.

IS MODERNIZATION WESTERNIZATION ?  
WHAT ABOUT EASTERNIZATION AND TRADITIONALIZATION ?

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The subject of «modernization» has assumed great importance particularly in the study of the type of social change known variously as «controlled», «guided», «directed», and «planned» which has been taking place in the «new nations». The connotation of the term, however, has not always been clear. It has often been used synonymously with terms like industrialization, urbanization, bureaucratization, and not the least with another much-used but often confused term «westernization». The «modern» has also been conceptualized in contrast with the «traditional» in the study of social structure and social change in developing countries. However, it has increasingly been realized that the process of modernization has many facets, viz., economic, political, social, and cultural, which can be studied singly and in combination.

This paper is an exploration into the concept of modernization in relation to controlled social change in developing countries, with a view to ascertaining whether it can be considered equivalent to westernization and opposed to traditionalism. Two new concepts, «Easternization» and «Traditionalization», will be introduced in connection with the proper conceptualization of the process of modernization. Two further concepts, «Easternization of the East» and «Easternization of the West», will be developed for explaining the process of Easternization.

AN EXAMPLE OF MODERNIZATION-WESTERNIZATION  
SYNONYMITY AND OF TRADITION-MODERN DICHOTOMY

In contemporary writings on social change in new nations or developing countries, examples of equating «modernization» with «westernization» and of placing the «modern» in contrast with the «traditional» are not few. The following statement from a chapter on modernization in a recent work on social change by a noted author

is representative of such instances: «What is involved in modernization is a «total» transformation of a traditional or pre-modern society into the types of technology and associated social organization that characterize the «advanced» economically prosperous and relatively politically stable nations of the Western world».

This definition speaks of the following five characteristics of the process of modernization:

(1) The modern or modernizing society stands in contrast with a type of society designated as traditional or pre-modern;

(2) The aspects of social life which have been considered as undergoing change in the modernization process are the technological, the social, the economic, and the political, which is conspicuous by absence of any reference to ideational factors;

(3) The transformation of a traditional or pre-modern society in the modernization process is «total»;

(4) The modern is synonymous with «advanced»; and

(5) It equates modernization with westernization.

It is possible to subject each of the above points to scrutiny. However, this paper will take into account only those aspects of the above definition of modernization which are relevant to the issue in question.

#### THE PROPER CONCEPTUALIZATION OF MODERNIZATION

In its least complex form, modernization is a temporal concept. The purely temporal concept of modernization is of little use in the study of social change. To the temporal has to be added the spatial dimension. Yet, it is not the purely spatial factor but the spatial factor with properties, that is to say, the social-structural dimension that is of importance in lending meaning to the concept of modernization; this is especially necessary for lending meaning to the distinction between the modern and the non-modern in the sequence of social-historical time.

In so far as any society has had a history, it has, at any point of social-historical time, its non-modern or traditional aspect; in addition, it has its modern aspect, for, at any point of time, it is at a point of latest attainment in the sequence of time. The ages now known as

<sup>1</sup> Wilbert E. MOORE, *Social Change* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963), p. 89.



the ancient and the medieval were in those days the modern. In the study of modernization in a world of increasing interdependence of peoples, the modern and the non-modern societies have to be distinguished with reference to specific social characteristics. Efforts at modernization of some societies presume the hitherto non-modern or undeveloped or backward state of these societies in terms of characteristics of the society that is modern.

Yet a third major dimension remains to be added to the temporal and the spatial dimensions. It is the ideational factor. Social change involves changes in the structure of society as well as in the ideas relating to the social structure. The ideational element becomes all the more important in planned or controlled or guided social change in the developing countries or the new nations.

Thus, the concept of modernization is essentially a three-dimensional one, the dimensions being the temporal, the spatial-structural, and the ideational. *Modernization is a social-historical-intellectual process.*

#### THE OBJECTIVE RELEVANCE OF THE CONCEPT OF MODERNIZATION

As a pattern of social change, modernization has certain characteristics. These characteristics, for our purpose, have to be delineated by placing modernization in relation to controlled social change in the developing countries. The emphasis on controlled social change does not mean that modernization of traditional societies never takes place in the course of social change that comes about automatically under the influence of forces beyond human control. Modernization can accompany both spontaneous and controlled social change, but it is in the context of controlled social change in developing countries that it has acquired special significance in the contemporary study of social change.

The formulation of the concept of modernization as a three-dimensional one, i.e., as a social-historical-intellectual concept, solves much of the confusion and inexact notions that have been created on the subject. This, however, is modernization in its most abstract form, and, as such, it has its worth. In the matter of details, however, contemporary discussion has proceeded along general and specific lines often resulting in a bewildering variety of explanations. However, it has been increasingly realized that modernization has many

facets which can be studied singly and in combination. These facets can well be categorized into four: economic, political, social and cultural. Thus we have economic modernization, political modernization, modernization of social life, and even modernization of culture.

The economist, the political scientist, and the anthropologist have primarily been interested in the economic, political, and cultural aspects, respectively, of modernization. It is the interdisciplinarian in the social sciences and humanities who, more than those who confine their analysis within the framework of any one discipline, is able to develop a better explanation of the process of modernization. Many a contemporary sociologist, whether an interdisciplinarian or not, has succeeded in this pursuit, for, to the sociologist, the economic, the political, and the cultural are but aspects of social life, which studied from the sociological point of view.

In distinguishing between the modern and the non-modern or traditional, one is likely to find a resemblance with the many societal dichotomies that have been developed in the history of sociology. Most of the dichotomies, or even the trichotomies, were in the holistic tradition. The formulation of the distinction between the traditional and the modern does not necessarily have to be in the typological tradition. The approaches can well be holistic or elementaristic, depending on the analyst's point of view, and any resemblance between the characteristics of traditional or the non-modern type of society is taken, for analytical purposes, to be the type of society existing prior to the impact of the modern.

Since the argument of this paper is being substantiated with materials from post-independence India, the following traditional and modern elements as explained in an earlier work on India by the present author could well be stated here.<sup>2</sup> It was found that the traditional elements of thought and social structure which must be taken into account in any policy of social change (with a view to modernizing the society) in post-independence India include: (1) a strong metaphysical and theological outlook on life; (2) a strong a-historical approach to social problem; (3) the autonomous village community; (4) the unique system of caste stratification; (5) the joint family; (6) the handicraft economy; (7) the system of territorial authorities; (8) the plurality of languages and religions; (9) the subordination of

<sup>2</sup> Santosh Kumar NANDY, *The Traditional and the Modern in the Idea of Social-Change in Post-Independence India*, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Minnesota, U.S.A., 1963, p. 10. This work has since been revised for publication as a book soon.

the individual to the family and the community; and the subordinate status of women.

The modern elements of thought and social structure which figure strongly in the consideration of India's social policies in the post-independence period were found to be: (1) an increasing acceptance of the positivistic-scientific view of life; an increasing concern with the here and the now, the mundane and the mortal; an increasing faith in the freedom of the will with a corresponding decrease in the reliance on determinism of fate and destiny; and an increasing cooperation with peoples and cultures outside; (2) science and technology and their application to socio-economic life; (3) nationalism and the national state; (4) industrialization, urbanization, and a national economy; (5) a national culture with uniformities in language, literature, religion, etc.

Modernization has been conceived as a social-historical-intellectual process. The question now is whether modernization is the same as westernization, and also whether modernization of a society, as in the new nations, is essentially opposed to its tradition.

#### *EAST VERSUS WEST: WESTERNIZATION OF THE EAST*

The process of world-historical development resulted in the great social-historical dichotomy of «East and West». The East-West dichotomy has been much debated. The East and the West have often been conceived as polar opposites, or at least significantly different, in many aspects of life, ideational and situational. Many, however, have stressed on a common humanity and have exploded the dichotomy as a myth.

For our purpose, the East-West distinction is more than a geographical distinction. There are peoples located on the same geographical latitudes and longitudes but have marked divergences in life patterns. Eastern and western peoples are as much in common as they are unique in many ways. What have significantly mattered in this dichotomous conceptualization are the social-historical-intellectual aspects of the lives of peoples which interact. In recent centuries, as the West has influenced the social-intellectual life of the East, the concept of Westernization has been extensively used in the study of social change in the developing countries of the East so much so that its acceptance for analytical purposes, until it is abandoned in favour of a better expression, is permissible. The East-West dichoto-

my and the process of westernization acquires special significance in connection with «modernization» in new nations.

The late Professor Benoy Kumar Sarkar, an oriental sociologist who combined in many of his writings the oriental and the occidental, once wrote that down to about 1300 AD the East and the West developed together, institutionally and ideationally. Between 1400 AD and 1600 AD there occurred a Renaissance in the West and a Renaissance in the East. In the period 1600-1750 AD, the development of the new physical or positive sciences in the West constituted a special feature of European Renaissance. The Asian Renaissance produced fine arts but no new positive science worth mentioning. But no genuine social differences between the East and the West were perceptible until then. The pattern of socio-economic life in Asia and Europe remained more or less the same till mid-eighteenth century, though in the positive sciences Europe surpassed Asia. Then, in the period 1750-1850 AD, the Industrial Revolution in the West created a new civilization, the «modern world». East and West differed substantially for the first time. Around 1850, Sarkar observed, the East was behind the West by nearly a century — in technocracy, economic institutions, and general welfare.<sup>3</sup>

The process of world-historical development made for the increasing supremacy of the West on life-in-society in the general world-historical context. In general, the East remained traditional, whereas the West opted for the rational. The traditional in the East was often regarded as the eternal and the fundamental, and the rational was considered to be the ephemeral and the incidental. In the West, the rational became an ideal of life and in the interaction between the traditional and the rational, the defeat of the traditional was a mark of advancement in life-in-society.

But the last few centuries have witnessed an acceleration of social change in the East. This process of acceleration has been possible by the contact of the West and the East in various ways, one of the most significant being Western colonial rule in the East. It is this directed acceleration of the process of social change which began in many of the developing countries in the era of colonialism and has been continued through the period of independence that has been characteristic of the modernization process. Of course, modernization has acquired special significance, as noted earlier, in connection with planned or controlled or guided social change in the period of indepen-

<sup>3</sup> Benoy Kumar SARKAR, *Creative India from MohenjoDaro to the Age of RamakrishnaVivekananda* (Lahore: Motilal Banarsidass, 1937), p. 441.

dence. Often, as stated earlier, this process of modernization, which in many of the eastern countries has been influenced by the ways of the western countries, has been equated with westernization. One such representative case has been stated earlier in this paper.

#### MODERNIZATION IS NOT WESTERNIZATION

If Westernization means the change that has been coming over the countries of the geographical East under the impact of those of the geographical West, modernization cannot be equated with westernization. Actually not all the countries of the geographical West have influenced those of the geographical East. Also, not all countries of the geographical West have attained a level of development which would make them capable of influencing the ideas and ideals of social change in the East. In other words, the eastern countries have not inevitably accepted the ways of life and thought of every country of the West. It is particularly certain countries of Europe and America, or better Eur-America, which have been the regions of a certain type of development which have influenced the process of social change in the East. Countries of southern or south-eastern Europe and of central or south America have not been a significant factor in influencing the countries of the Eastern world in their efforts at planned social change and nation-building, for they have themselves been as less developed or even much less developed than many of the countries of the East. Thus, the geographical or the purely spatial concept of westernization is not significant in the study of controlled social change in the new nations. Modernization, so far, is not westernization.

To the spatial dimension of westernization must be added the temporal dimension. Otherwise, it remains unclear as to whether it is the contemporary West or the historical West or again a combination of the historical and the contemporary from the West that has been influencing the contemporary East in its efforts at nation-building. In the process of modernization of eastern societies, it is not the historical or traditional West so much as it is the contemporary West which has been of decisive influence. Many of the eastern countries have traditions which date much earlier than those of the West, and in the process of modernization the traditions of the East have come into contact with the contemporary rather than with the tradition of the West. Thus, modernization is again not the same as westernization.

The concept of westernization can still be refined. The connotation of the spatial is insignificant unless it includes the social, thereby meaning its structural and dynamic features. The process of modernization of developing countries involves the release and/or acceleration of certain social forces or processes like industrialization, urbanization, and bureaucratization. But these processes have not been totally absent in any form whatsoever in the social history of the East. It is the qualitative and quantitative magnitude of these processes and their far-reaching social consequences as they have developed in the West that have lent them a western character and have led to their inclusion in the westernization process, though they have been present in some form in the East. Modernization, again, cannot be equated with westernization.

Last but not least, in addition to the objective situational factors, account must be taken of the subjective ideational factors released in the process of western influence in the East. In so far as the West has changed the East, it has changed not only its concrete interhuman relational aspects but also its process of thought, its ideas and ideals. In this respect, of particular significance should be the ideals, firstly, of liberalism, with its emphasis on equal opportunities for all, and, secondly, of rationality, with its comparative emphasis on problem-solving attitude, goal-orientedness, this-worldly outlook, and skepticism towards the past.

The argument that modernization is not westernization can be substantiated further with reference to post-independence India. In the task of nation-building in the post-independence period, India has accepted many of the ideas and institutions from a number of countries of Eur-America; among them are the countries with which India had developed contacts during colonial rule in India. These acceptances are manifest in the many efforts at building a national policy, a national society, a national economy, and a national culture in post-independence India. And it is not so much the ideas and institutions of the historical West as those of the more recent West that have been of importance in national policy formation in post-independence India. Again, India's industrialization bears records of a certain type of urbanization<sup>4</sup> and industrialization. The industrialization, urbanization, and bureaucratization on a large scale

<sup>4</sup> Vide: Robert CRANE, «Urbanization in India,» *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 60, March 1955; Bert F. HOSELITZ, «Cities of India and their Problems,» *American Geographical Annals*, Vol. 49, June 1959.

in modern India began during western rule, and these processes have radically changed many of India's traditional social institutions. In the policies of planned social change in the era of independence, these processes have been sought to be regulated in accordance with India's national objectives. Again, while accepting western ideals, e.g., liberalism and rationality, post-independence India has not altogether rejected her traditional ideals which have sustained her through the ages.

#### EASTERNIZATION: EASTERNIZATION OF THE EAST AND EASTERNIZATION OF THE WEST

The western way of life has not been accepted in its entirety in the East. In the process of modernizing their societies, many of the eastern countries have accepted the ways of the West with calculation. Many of them have sought to combine the ways of the East and of the West in a manner consistent with the needs of the time. These needs have been domestic and international, the latter arising in a world of increasing international interdependence. Thus, modernization has often been characterized by a synthesis of the eastern and the western.

For example, in the economic sphere, in place of regional economies, national economies have been sought to be developed, but this has not always been of a type resembling that of any particular country of the West; the western countries themselves have divergent types of national economies. In the political sphere, local territorial authorities have given way to a national polity, but not all the polities of the developing countries have been full-fledged nations of the western type; even in the western countries there are marked divergences in their internal political set-ups. Many of the social institutions, again, such as the family and diverse social groupings have been sought to be preserved rather than radically altered. In the sphere of culture too, the desire to preserve the indigenous has been pronounced. The policy of modernization in post-independence India bears ample testimony to this effect. The following finding in the work on India mentioned earlier should be enlightening: «In the intellectual sphere one of the most radical and epoch-making development in post-independence India has been the increasing acceptance of the scientific-positivistic outlook toward social life. In matters of governmental policy, the traditional metaphy-

sical-theological outlook has been modified by the modern scientific-positivistic outlook. The solution of social problems has not been left to fate or destiny, but has been shifted to the exercise of intelligence and human will. The law of *Karma* is being applied, as it were, to the here and the now, ... to the mundane and the mortal, rather than to the hereafter.». However, the acceptance of the modern scientific-positivistic outlook to social problems in post-independence India has not involved a rejection of the traditional metaphysical approach to life as a whole. In so far as the developmental policies and programs of the Government of India in the post-independence period have not encompassed a totality of the life of the people of India the new approach has accordingly been applied to the understanding of only those issues with which the government has been concerned. Thus, a modification, rather than a total rejection, of the traditional metaphysical aspects of India's life and thought have been affected by the modern scientific-positivistic approach to social problems.

It is also noteworthy that the modern scientific-positivistic method has been applied to the exploration and understanding of India's tradition. Last but not least, the acceptance of the new approach has enabled India increasingly to cooperate with the peoples and cultures outside and thereby enrich the patterns of syntheses which have been in the making in India». <sup>5</sup>

Thus, alongside westernization has been taking place a process which can be called «Easternization». The process here is «Easternization of the East». In the process of westernization, especially during colonial rule, many of the eastern countries felt the loss of their heritage. This loss has been sought to be made up in the course of planned social change or modernization. Modernization cannot be equated with westernization; modernization in most cases has been a synthesis of westernization and easternization.

It is also possible to conceive of «Easternization of the West». This process is not yet so prominent, in so far as the policy of planned social change is concerned. But, given the time and the process of modernization in a world of increasing interdependence of peoples, the process of «Easternization of the West» is bound to set in in the times to come. World history has passed through longer periods of easternization of the West; the «decline of the East» which occurred for a few centuries is now in the process of being made up for; and, once again, the process of easternization of the West is foreseen, at

<sup>5</sup> Santosh Kumar NANDY, *op. cit.*, pp. 253-254.



least in some distant future. At the present stage of world-historical development, Easternization of the East has to precede Easternization of the West.

**MODERNIZATION IS NOT NECESSARILY AGAINST TRADITION:  
«TRADITIONALIZATION» AND «MODERNIZATION OF  
TRADITION»**

The «eastern» and the «traditional» are not necessarily the same. The traditional may include something of the western, for many of the developing countries had already come in contact with the West, for example, during the period of colonial rule. In the period of planned social change in many of the eastern countries, which has often started after the impact of the West, efforts have often been made to retain the best from the East and the West which have become part of their tradition. Policies of social change in post-independence India and of many other developing countries contain numerous examples of such a synthesis of the traditional and the modern. Again, in the case of those in Latin America, the tradition is not that of the geographical East. Their traditions, however, can be considered to have characteristics resembling those of the East, and it is only in terms of social-historical-intellectual factors that the traditions of different countries, as is the case with the modern, can be studied in comparison and contrast.

As a general example of the attempt to synthesize the traditional and the modern or the eastern and the western in a policy of planned social change, the following lines from the Third Five Year Plan of the Government of India may be quoted: «Each major culture and civilisation has certain distinctive features, rooted in the past, which bear the impress of that culture. India, with thousands of years of history, bears even now the powerful impress of her own distinctive features. They are today covered up with widespread and appalling poverty, the result of a traditional society and a static economy in the past, petrified to some extent by colonial rule. But these essential features, though apparently associated with the traditional structure of society are in no sense an integral part of it. They are in fact a set of moral and ethical values which have governed Indian life for ages past, even though people may not have lived up to them. These values are a part of India's thinking, even as, more and more, that thinking is directed to the impact of the scientific and techno-

logical civilisation of the modern world. To some extent, the problem of India is how to bring about a synthesis between these two. Probably no other country in the modern world would have produced a Gandhi; even Tagore, who was typically modern in his approach to life's problems, was, at the same time, steeped in India's old culture and thinking. His message is thus one of synthesis between these two»<sup>6</sup>.

In the process of building new nations in many of the old societies, there appears to be an effort at combining the merits of the old and the new, of the eastern and the western, and of the traditional and the modern. In so far as the desire to revive and preserve many of the traditional values and institutions is pronounced in many of the new nations, the process of nation-building can be said to be characterized partly by an attempt at what can be called «Traditionalization», or better still, «Modernization of Tradition». The transformation of the traditional or pre-modern society in the process of modernization is «not total».

#### THE UNIQUENESS OF MODERNIZATION: THE WAY TO «UNIVERSALIZATION»

Societies in every age have had their traditional and modern aspects of social life, and in times of extensive and intensive interaction among peoples some kind of modernization of social life has taken place. But the modernization of our times is unique in many ways ... in extensity and intensity of interaction among peoples and in the rapid and radical societal transformations resulting therefrom. In a world that is drawing closer than ever, a time may come when the «universal» more than the traditional and the modern will be of greater significance. We may call that process «Universalization».

<sup>6</sup> Government of India, Planning Commission, *Third Five Year Plan*, New Delhi, 1961, p. 1.

## SOCIOLINGUISTIC PERSPECTIVE ON INTERNAL LINGUISTIC TENSIONS AND THEIR IMPACT ON EXTERNAL RELATIONS

JURGEN A. FRIEDLÉ

### CULTURAL OR RACIAL TENSIONS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

#### TENSIONS CULTURELLES OU RACIALES ET RELATIONS INTERNATIONALES

In a too little-known paper which appeared during World War II (1) Ker) W. Deutsch prophesied that language conflict would increase as the speakers of more and more hitherto unrecognized local vernaculars sought to acquire for their mother tongues the recognition and support that had thus far been reserved for a relatively small number of «national, standardized» tongues. Deutsch, whose subsequent volume on «Nationalism and Social Communication» (2) is well known to most social scientists, skillfully traced the increase in national, standardized tongues since the early middle ages. From a mere handful (Hebrew, Greek, Latin, Arabic, Sanskrit and Chinese) they constantly grew until their number had increased more than six-fold by the time World War II began. Foreseeing the birth of the new nations of Africa and Asia after the conclusion of the War, Deutsch believed that these nations would seek to bring upon the world scores of additional national, standardized languages. Deutsch feared that international and intra-national communication barriers would be increased thereby and that these barriers, as well as the language conflicts and jealousies engendered by the «new languages» per se (for there would still remain scores of additional vernaculars not yet accorded recognition), would usher in a new period of intra-national and international discord and conflict.

Today, a quarter century later, we must conclude that Deutsch was only partly correct. The new nations that he foresaw have been born, but only in few cases (particularly in Indonesia, Philippine Rep. and India) have they been greatly concerned with new languages, and only in very few cases have their language tensions had international repercussions. The new African nations have been singularly uninterested in recognizing or in establishing indigenous languages, only two (Tanzania and Senegal) out of more than twenty having done so. On the other hand, longstanding antagonisms have

## SOCIOLINGUISTIC PERSPECTIVE ON INTERNAL LINGUISTIC TENSIONS AND THEIR IMPACT ON EXTERNAL RELATIONS

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### I. Introduction: *Deutsch's Prophecy*

In a too-little-known paper which appeared during World War II (1) Karl W. Deutsch prophesied that language conflict would increase as the speakers of more and more hitherto «unrecognized» local vernaculars sought to acquire for their mother tongues the recognition and support that had thus far been reserved for a relatively small number of «national», «standardized» tongues. Deutsch, whose subsequent volume on «Nationalism and Social Communication» (2) is well known to most social scientists, skillfully traced the increase in national, standardized tongues since the early middle ages. From a mere handful (Hebrew, Greek, Latin, Arabic, Sanskrit and Chinese) they constantly grew until their number had increased more than six-fold by the time World War II began. Foreseeing the birth of the new nations of Africa and Asia after the conclusion of the War, Deutsch believed that these nations would seek to bring upon the world scene scores of additional national, standardized languages. Deutsch feared that international and intra-national communication barriers would be increased thereby and that these barriers, as well as the language conflicts and jealousies engendered by the «new languages» per se (for there would still remain scores of *additional* vernaculars not yet accorded recognition), would usher in a new period of intra-national and international discord and conflict.

Today, a quarter century later, we must conclude that Deutsch was only partly correct. The new nations that he foresaw *have* been born, but only in few cases (particularly in Indonesia, Philippino Rep. and India) have they been greatly concerned with new languages, and only in very few cases have their language tensions had international repercussions. The new African nations have been singularly uninterested in recognizing or in establishing indigenous languages, only two (Tanzania and Somalia) out of more than twenty having done so. On the other hand, longstanding antagonisms involv-

ing «old languages» have continued to smolder or to erupt in places that Deutsch did not anticipate: Canada, Wales, Ireland, Belgium, Switzerland and Italy constituting some recent examples. This paper, therefore, will seek to review the sociolinguistic tensions and solutions that have arisen in recent days in order to see wherein Deutsch was right and wherein he was wrong. More specifically our goal will be to evaluate the importance of language recognition<sup>1</sup> per se in connection with intra-national and international tension.

II. *Groups that differ in language do not necessarily recognize or stress this difference (not even when they differ in other respects as well).*

The intensification of European nationalism as a result of the French revolution, and the appearance of a seemingly endless number of submerged nationalities as western European concepts of democracy, nationalism and socialism spread throughout central, eastern and south-eastern Europe provided an intellectual heritage that has caused many contemporary sociologists to be all too ready to assume that cultural and linguistic differences automatically tend toward demands for nation-formation and language recognition. The post war African experience is, therefore, a puzzle to many sociologists and even the Indian experience, though seemingly more «natural», puzzles those who know that India has many, many times as many languages as those that have either received or demanded formal recognition.

a. At an early juncture for any consideration of the impact of *internal* (intra-national) differentiation on *international* relations it

<sup>1</sup> Following the typology established by Stewart for the purposes of parsimoniously describing the language situation in any country (9) «language recognition» may take differential cognizance of *vitality* (whether a language is the mother tongue of a given speech community), of *historicity* (whether a language has proper parentage and/or is of proper age), of *autonomy* (whether a language is sufficiently independent of the norms of good usage affecting other languages), and of *standardization* (whether a language is sufficiently normed by virtue of grammars, dictionaries, academies, etc.). Recognition, when it comes, may not be total and, particularly in diglossia situations (3) may apply to only certain domains (5) of societal or group functioning (e.g., schools but not government, religion but not the military, laws but not the mass media, etc.).

should be pointed out that *not all language differences that exist are noted, let alone ideologized*. By this I mean that linguists recognize language differences (particularly in phonology, morphology and syntax) that millions of nativespeakers consciously or unconsciously ignore. Thus Wolff has reported several instances in which West African tribes speaking distinct, and, at times, unrelated languages, ignore the differences between them, at times reciprocally and at times unilaterally (10). Wolff claims that mutual-intelligibility is largely a function of inter-group attitudes. Polomè has reported similar data for the Swahili region of central and east Africa (8), Wurm has much the same to say for New Guinea (11), and similar phenomena have long been known to students of south east Asia.

Of course, the opposite also obtains under certain circumstances. There are many instances where linguistic differences are exceedingly marginal, indeed, where they are no greater than the minor dialectal differences existing *within* certain well recognized national standards, but where these differences are emphasized and cultivated. Several such «cultivated» differences exist in the Western World today (see Kloss (7) for the best discussion of such *ausbau* languages in the Germanic area) and are treated as seemingly autonomous languages (Czech and Slovak, Serbian and Croatian, Macedonian and Bulgarian, Russian and Byelorussian), whereas their parallels in the new nations are still rather few (Hindi-Urdu being the prime example).

The general point here is that differences do *not* need to be divisive. *Divisiveness is an ideologized position* and it can magnify minor differences, indeed, it can manufacture differences in language as in other matters, almost as easily as it can capitalize upon more obvious differences. Similarly, *unification is also an ideologized position* and it can minimize seemingly major differences or ignore them entirely, whether these be in the realm of language, religion, culture, race or any other basis of differentiation.

b. Another point that requires our recognition is that *conscious and even ideologized language differences need not be divisive*, whether at the national or at the international level. Thus, the pattern of national diglossia has its international counterparts as well.

In the diglossia situation a single society recognizes two or more languages as its own, albeit each in its own right, i.e. each with its own functionally exclusive domains. Most of Europe is marked by such diglossia if we recognize differences between dialectal varie-

ties (utilized when one is among family and friends) and the national standard (the language of school, government and «high» culture). In former days, European elites were marked by a diglossia pattern in which Parisian French functioned as an international status symbol which alternated with one's own national standard and local dialect in accord with the demands of particular role-relationships, interactional patterns and domains of discourse (5). Today, English is often the diglossia key to «elitemanship» as were Latin, Provencal, Danish, Salish and other regional languages for certain parts of Europe in the past (4).

In non-European settings, particularly in the new nations of Africa and Asia, diglossia is extremely widespread. On occasion it is a traditional diglossia such that two or more languages have long established, functionally separate roots in the same society (e.g. classical and vernacular Arabic in Egypt and Syria, Sanskrit and Hindi in parts of India, Spanish and Guarani in Paraguay, tribal languages and Hausa in parts of West Africa, tribal languages and Swahili in parts of East Africa, Hausa and Arabic in Northern Nigeria, etc.)<sup>2</sup>. Diglossia of a more modern sort exists throughout most of sub-Saharan Africa, Asia and Latin America and involves English, French or Spanish together with one or more indigenous languages. Such diglossia, together with other factors yet to be mentioned, basically accounts for the lack of language divisiveness in most of modern Africa. Instead of trying to cope with hundreds of local languages as instruments of government, education, industrialization, etc. most African states have decided to assign all of them equally to their respective home, family and neighborhood domains and to utilize a single, major European language (usually English or French) for all more formal, statusful and specialized domains<sup>3</sup>. This appro-

<sup>2</sup> It is important to distinguish between (a) diglossia, which normally implies a *societally based and culturally valued functional differentiation* between languages and (b) bilingualism, which carries no such implication. Thus Switzerland, Belgium and Canada may well be bilingual *countries* in which the proportions of bilinguals are rather small and unilateral, precisely because they are *not* diglossia setting (except for German, Swiss-German diglossia) in which a single, unified population views two or more languages as its own for particular purposes.

<sup>3</sup> In several instances the result has been that a native speech community finds itself divided into two segments due to differences in the national diglossia pattern to which different parts of the community have been attached. Thus Hausa speakers in Nigeria are developing English-Hausa-Arabic diglossia and those in Niger: French-Hausa-Arabic diglossia. If

ach tends to minimize internal linguistic divisiveness since it does not place any indigenous language at an undue advantage as the language of nationhood.

c. Two factors have been discussed thus far which account for the low level of linguistic tension in the new nations, contrary to Deutsch's prediction: (a) the *voluntary denial* of linguistic differences in order to pursue certain ideologized similarities and (b) *traditional diglossia* which has accustomed millions to a well circumscribed role for several «own» languages to which a major European language has now been added. Another factor that may be posited in this same connection is (c) *language and nationhood need not be symbolically related*. Hymes has already sensitized us to the fact that language need not be a salient group symbol (6). For some groups their land is such a symbol. For other groups it is their religion, their dress and diet, their kinship system, etc. *Language consciousness is a frequent but not a necessary expression of group consciousness* (and even group consciousness is not necessarily an ideologized phenomenon). Language consciousness may be a mere (i.e. accidental) cultural bias in some cases. It is unlikely to be salient *unless* group consciousness is salient (although the reverse need not be true) and *unless* there is sufficient role compartmentalization at an elitist level such that a class of language caretakers develop (teachers, grammarians, scribes, priests, story tellers) and such that language difference and language purity is ideologized and rendered symbolic of the group, its glorious past and its glorious mission. Notwithstanding our pre-and post- Versailles European heritage these developments are not spontaneous and inevitable on the world scene.

*Most new nations are not ethnic nations*. They are not units as a result of the long and painful struggle of a *people* to unite across local differences, to create heroes and histories, songs and dramas, in order to be their own masters. In Europe the nationalities existed as nations-in-their-own-minds before their states were created. In Africa the states were created before most of the nationalities came into being. In Europe languages became the symbols of suppressed peo-

this split is ideologized it may lead to demands for a Pan-Hausa State, with or without a superposed European language. A similar situation exists with respect to Swahili speakers in the Congo, Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania.



ples who longed to have cultural autonomy if not national sovereignty. In Africa languages have rarely become symbolic of the quest for nationhood because from the very first nationhood implied a *supra*-tribal entity whereas languages remained entirely tribal and therefore pre-national or non-national or even anti-national<sup>4</sup>.

None of the foregoing is meant to predict that linguistic divisiveness may not *yet* play a role in African intra-national and international affairs (as it has in India). However, before that can happen language will have to be related to the ideal of an ethnic state, language differences will have to be maximized, and pre-existing diglossia patterns — some of them hundreds of years old — may have to be disturbed. Some of the divisive opposition to one party states may well develop along these very lines in the future.

### III. *Intra-national Language Tensions as a Factor in International Tensions.*

It seems to me that language tensions represent a definite historical and social stage of human development. Deutsch *may* yet be right and we *may* yet encounter a great deal more of such tension in the future than we have in the past. Indeed, as traditional loyalties to religion and to ethnic folkcustoms grow weaker under the impact of industrialization, urbanization and secularization, language differences per se may grow more prominent in the minds of minority groups. Religious bigotry is counteracted by ecumenism; racial and cultural bigotry, by cultural relativism, by anti-genocide pacts and by egalitarianism; national bigotry, by appeals on behalf of peace and international arbitration. However, no widespread antilinguistic ideology has been developed and language may become the focal point at which the divisive ideologies and sentiments of modern man «dig in» after he is too «modern», too «sophisticated» to subscribe to others. This should render linguistic tensions *less* reasonable, rather than more so, for they will become an arena from which no ideological retreat is possible short of the denial of group uniqueness.

<sup>4</sup> It should be recognized that where the boundaries of ethnicity and nationhood correspond fairly closely (as in Somalia and Tanzania) indigenous or, at least, «traditional» languages were symbolically elaborated into national languages.

Were this state of affairs to come into being the role of intranational linguistic tensions in international affairs would doubtlessly increase. France would no longer be reacted to as godless and as immoral by French-Canada, but rather, as a French speaking bastion. The claims on behalf of Flemish in Belgium, on behalf of various border languages in the Soviet Union (even those on behalf of Yiddish), on behalf of Spanish in the American Southwest, etc. would all be altered significantly if the social and political and religious and economic differences that now divide these people from their co-linguals on the other side of geographic borders were to disappear. Were this state of affairs to come into being we might not only find appeals on behalf of French speakers in Canada coming from France but appeals on behalf of English speakers in India and in Negro Africa coming from England and the United States. Nevertheless, it seems to me that this state of affairs, as a general, world wide problem, is quite unlikely or far distant and for the very reasons I have already indicated, as well as for some others:

(a) as distinct from conditions that existed in pre-Versailles days new languages now become politically consolidated and recognized primarily on the basis of their unity and actual use in the domains of science and technology. Belleteristic and even governmental use are no longer signs that languages have «arrived» as fitting vehicles for elitist use. This state of affairs is merely a reflection of the changed position of technology vis-a-vis literature as a source of status mobility for nations and interest groups.

(b) technology is basically non-ethnic and uniformizing throughout the world. It leads linguistically to but one, two or three world «technology» languages and to essentially similar life-styles regardless of language. This is in sharp contrast to the basically heterogeneous and diversifying role of the languages of belleteristics prior to World War I. The purpose and the function of those languages was to render their speakers maximally different in terms of cultural values and world views.

(c) The uniformizing requirements and consequences of technology are such that for many years to come many monolingual nations in control of «old languages» will need to resort to diglossian compromises in various technological and educational domains. This trend should be much stronger than the countertrend, namely, the

abandonment of diglossia on behalf of new national standard languages with undisputed hegemony in all domains of national expression. Such diglossian compromises mean the end of *forced* language assimilation in the domain of family and friends but they may also mean the end of the exclusivistic sway of a single language in all domains of national life. Both of these factors when viewed in long-term perspective should lead to a diminution of *internal* linguistic strife and, therefore, to a diminution of purely or basically linguistic strife in international affairs as well.

(d) Unfortunately, a linguistically more united world need not be a more peaceful world any more than a world less concerned with religion and religious differences, or with folkways and ethnic differences, has become less dangerously bellicose. The array of human differences that may become ideologized is endless. Chances are, however, that language per se will not be as prominent among them in the foreseeable future as it has been in the past.

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— Existe-t-il une différence fondamentale entre conflits nationaux et conflits sociaux? Apparemment oui. D'un côté s'opposeraient deux sociétés globales, de l'autre deux classes au sein d'une même société; dans un cas, nous aurions affaire à un conflit vertical, dans l'autre à un conflit horizontal. Et pourtant, à y regarder de plus près, ces deux types de conflits s'entrecroisent parfois curieusement. Prenons même deux exemples historiques concrets. Celui de la Révolution française et celui de la guerre de 1914-1918. Voilà apparemment deux cas particulièrement clairs.

— Tout le monde conviendra que la Révolution française a opposé des classes et que la première des grandes guerres a opposé des nations. En posant l'état d'esprit des hommes engagés avec une si formidable passion dans l'une et dans l'autre de ces tourments, s'agit-il radicalement différent? Il est curieux de voir comment arguments nationaux et arguments sociaux s'entrecroisent ici et là dans les polémiques.

— Quel est le thème dominant dans les inépuisables débats justificateurs des prétentions du Tiers-Etat à la veille de 1789? C'est que s'est levé qui a le véritable pouvoir, est créateur de richesses, possède le savoir-faire politique. Or l'Etat ne lui appartient pas, du moins pas en niveau suprême, dans les institutions qui confèrent véritablement honneur et prestige. Il s'en trouve exclu, et par qui? Par une noblesse qui, au fond, est étrangère à la nation. Ce terme fameux de nation et constamment invoqué dans les manifestes révolutionnaires est lancé d'épique. Il signifie l'ensemble du peuple organisé face à une élite noble, au fond étrangère à ce qui est constituée la substance. Et tel est véritablement un argument qui avait été lancé par la noblesse à l'époque de la Régence principalement par le comte de Boulainvilliers, pour justifier ses privilèges, et qui véritablement comme un bouclier, se retourne contre elle, à savoir que la noblesse défendit ses privilèges par droit de conquête, qu'elle était constituée par les descendants des conquérants français qui, au moment des grandes invasions germaniques, avaient conquis la grande masse gauloise.

## CONFLITS NATIONAUX ET CONFLITS SOCIAUX

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Existe-t-il une différence fondamentale entre conflits nationaux et conflits sociaux ? Apparemment oui. D'un côté s'opposeraient deux sociétés globales, de l'autre deux classes au sein d'une même société; dans un cas, nous aurions affaire à un conflit vertical, dans l'autre à un conflit horizontal. Et pourtant, à y regarder de plus près, ces deux types de conflit s'entremêlent parfois curieusement. Prenons même deux exemples historiques extrêmes. Celui de la Révolution française et celui de la guerre de 1914-1918. Voilà apparemment deux cas particulièrement clairs.

Tout le monde conviendra que la Révolution française a opposé des classes et que la première des grandes guerres a opposé des nations. Et pourtant l'état d'esprit des hommes engagés avec une si formidable passion dans l'une et dans l'autre de ces tourments, était-il si radicalement différent ? Il est curieux de voir comment arguments nationaux et arguments sociaux s'entremêlent ici et là dans les polémiques.

Quel est le thème dominant dans les innombrables libelles justificateurs des prétentions du Tiers-Etat à la veille de 1789 ? C'est que c'est lui qui a la véritable culture, est créateur de richesses, possède le savoir-faire politique. Or l'Etat ne lui appartient pas, du moins pas au niveau suprême, dans les fonctions qui confèrent véritablement honneur et prestige. Il s'en trouve exclu, et par qui ? Par une noblesse qui, au fond, est étrangère à la nation. Ce terme même de nation si constamment invoqué dans les manifestes révolutionnaires est lourd d'équivoque. Il signifie l'ensemble du peuple organisé face à une mince couche, au fond étrangère à ce qui en constitue la substance. Et ici on utilise abondamment un argument qui avait été lancé par la noblesse à l'époque de la Régence principalement par le comte de Boulainvilliers, pour justifier ses privilèges, et qui, véritablement comme un boomerang, se retourne contre elle, à savoir que la noblesse détenait ses privilèges par droit de conquête, qu'elle était constituée par les descendants des conquérants francs qui, au moment des grandes invasions germaniques, avaient soumis la grande masse gauloise.

On connaît la réponse que Sieyès donnait à la question posée par son célèbre pamphlet «Qu'est-ce que le Tiers-Etat ?»: «Tout, mais un tout entravé et opprimé». Et il ajoutait: «Que serait-il sans l'ordre privilégié ? Tout, mais un tout libre et florissant... Le Tiers embrasse tout ce qui appartient à la nation; et tout ce qui n'est pas le Tiers ne peut se regarder comme étant de la nation. Remplaçons «ordre privilégié» par «dominateur étranger» et «Tiers Etat» par «nation française, allemande, polonaise, tchèque, flamande, etc...» (et c'est là une substitution qui infléchit à peine l'esprit du texte), et nous aurons la formule exacte de tous les mouvements d'indépendance nationale.

Le sentiment qui domine parmi la grande bourgeoisie, c'est de pleinement se suffire à soi-même, de posséder un degré d'aisance, d'éducation, de savoir-faire politique qui devrait exclure toute direction ou protection extérieures. Elle ne constitue elle aussi qu'une couche sociale fort étroite, et on sait avec quel égoïsme parfois féroce, elle saura défendre sa situation contre les revendications populaires le jour où elle sera installée au pouvoir, combien elle cherchera à sacraliser les privilèges fondés sur la propriété. Et pourtant, face aux privilèges de la naissance revendiqués par la noblesse, elle oppose, à ce stade-là, des principes qui se veulent essentiellement égalitaires. Le manifeste, par lequel elle inaugure son règne, c'est la Déclaration des Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen, c'est l'affirmation de l'égalité de capacité de chaque homme à la liberté et à la citoyenneté. Aussi séparée qu'elle soit d'emblée de la grande masse, elle prétend néanmoins parler au nom de celle-ci, se réclame de la volonté générale. C'est une *nation* de 25 millions d'hommes qu'elle prétend libérer de la domination d'un corps étranger et parasitaire.

Qu'est-ce qui, d'autre part, anime le ressentiment national allemand depuis l'époque des guerres anti-napoléoniennes ? C'est toujours un même thème: Nous sommes méprisés, discriminés; seuls les Français considèrent qu'ils possèdent une culture digne de ce nom! Tout ce qui représente finesse, élégance, tout ce qui a prestige social est français, qu'il s'agisse d'art, de mode, de femme ou de vin. Il est temps que l'élite dirigeante allemande cesse de singer les mœurs étrangères, de se couper de son propre peuple, mais prenne conscience avec fierté des incomparables vertus de ce peuple (de ce *Volk*) — profondeur de pensée, loyauté, discipline, énergie — de l'avenir glorieux auquel il est destiné, le jour où il rassemblera tous ses membres épars, où il aura rejeté toute emprise étrangère politique ou culturelle.

Lorsque, à l'instar des Français, les Allemands auront acquis, et

de quelle étonnante façon, unité, puissance et prestige, tout sentiment de frustration ne disparaîtra pas pour autant, mais c'est sur l'Angleterre qu'il aura tendance à se fixer principalement, au point de commander toute la frénésie nationaliste pendant la première guerre.

L'Allemagne est assurément devenue la première puissance industrielle du monde, mais de ce monde, les Anglais restent les maîtres. C'est eux qui règnent sur les mers, qui partout, par leur empire et leurs vastes colonies de peuplement, se trouvent chez eux, parmi des hommes de leur sang, ce sont eux qui imposent leurs mœurs commerciales. Comme eux, être présent dans l'ensemble du monde par ses hommes, par ses capitaux, par sa puissance maritime, telle est l'ambition suprême de la bourgeoisie allemande dans les années 1900, tel est le sens de la *Weltpolitik*. De telles revendications, animées par des couches dirigeantes qui conservent une conception particulièrement brutale et autoritaire de leur pouvoir, chacun les situera aujourd'hui aux antipodes mêmes de ce qui peut passer pour un mouvement démocratique. Et pourtant elles ont eu l'appui d'hommes aux convictions démocratiques indiscutablement sincères. Pour tout démocrate de 1848, l'émancipation sociale des masses allemandes passait, au premier chef, par une prise de conscience nationale, par la lutte pour l'unité et pour l'intégrité territoriale du pays, pour sa pleine homogénéité et son indépendance culturelle. La lutte, animée par certaines des plus grosses entreprises industrielles et financières allemandes, contre la puissance mondiale britannique est présentée par certains hommes «de gauche» comme revêtant un aspect «socialiste» et «anti-capitaliste» (l'Allemagne tout entière étant censée être un peuple prolétaire), et il se trouvera des «nationaux-bolchéviques» pour l'assimiler à la révolution russe.

Lorsqu'en 1918, l'Allemagne échouera dans son rêve de puissance, ce n'est pas à gauche qu'on manifesterà le moins d'indignation, à l'endroit du régime d'«oppression», d'«esclavage», auquel était censé la soumettre le Traité de Versailles. La moins déchainée à l'époque de Weimar, ne fut assurément pas la propagande communiste. Son thème dominant était, à cet égard, assez simple: l'Allemagne est devenue une colonie du capitalisme et de l'impérialisme mondiaux, aussi sa lutte pour son émancipation nationale est, par essence, une lutte progressiste, elle doit être assimilée à la lutte du prolétariat mondial contre la capitalisme.

Nous avons pris deux cas apparemment extrêmes. Personne assurément ne doute que nul problème de nationalité n'agitait la France en

1789 et qu'une rivalité ayant pour objet la puissance nationale a opposé l'Allemagne à ses adversaires en 1914. Et pourtant, un mouvement aussi indiscutablement social que la révolution française a pu être présenté comme une insurrection nationale contre un corps étranger et, d'autre part, une lutte aussi indiscutablement nationale que celle qui marque les divers jalons de l'unification d'abord, puis de l'expansion allemandes a pu être ressentie comme visant à surmonter une discrimination et une injustice sociales.

Mais que dire alors de tant de situations intermédiaires, où passions nationales et sociales se trouvent d'emblée étroitement entremêlées. Quelle est la vraie nature du conflit qui a si affreusement opposé, en Inde, hindous et musulmans ? La séparation étatique en était-elle le seul aboutissement possible ? Faut-il voir une lutte des classes ou un conflit ethnique dans l'opposition si âpre, au Rwanda et au Burundi, entre Tutsis et Hutus ? Les noirs américains constituent-ils un groupe socialement discriminé ou une minorité ethnique ? L'exploitation indiscutable des masses catholiques irlandaises par les landlords anglais ne pouvait-elle se résoudre autrement que par l'indépendance politique du pays ? La nature même des Irlandais excluait-elle davantage que pour les Ecosais et les Gallois toute intégration dans un ensemble britannique ? L'émancipation des Juifs, la fin des discriminations et des persécutions exigeaient-elles la création d'un Etat national indépendant ?

Voilà des questions auxquelles, selon les époques et les circonstances, il a été répondu fort différemment. Et aucune réponse n'était inscrite dans la nature des choses. En effet, l'idéologie, même si on ne peut la détacher des circonstances sociales qui la font naître, a quand même une sphère d'action propre. A une même situation de discrimination ou de conflit, on pouvait, selon les circonstances, répondre par une exigence d'intégration ou une exigence de séparation. Le degré d'exclusivisme du groupe dominant, la nature de l'argumentation par laquelle il le justifie, l'influence des idées étrangères ambiantes, tout cela peut conduire vers une exigence d'indépendance nationale ce qui, à une autre époque, dans un autre contexte, eût pu aboutir à une exigence d'assimilation. Il est intéressant de voir, à cet égard, comment des situations, objectivement proches, peuvent trouver des rationalisations idéologiques fort différentes.

Il y a eu une énorme importation de main-d'œuvres servile noire aux Etats-Unis et il y en a eu une autre, du même ordre et accomplie à peu près dans les mêmes conditions abjectes au Brésil. De part et d'autre, les populations noires restent marquées par leur statut



originaire d'esclavage et l'affranchissement, ici comme là, a été fort loin de les émanciper et de les intégrer socialement et économiquement. Pourtant tout le monde est obsédé par le conflit racial aux Etats-Unis, et personne ne parle d'un conflit racial au Brésil. Le sort de la grande masse noire brésilienne est nettement pire, sur le plan économique, que celui de la masse noire américaine, et nul n'ignore qu'il y a un dramatique problème de la faim dans le fameux triangle du Nordeste brésilien. C'est pourtant un problème que personne ne pose en termes d'émancipation raciale, de «black power». Il existe bien des analogies entre la colonisation européenne de l'Afrique australe et celle de l'Amérique du Sud. Pourtant, si on reconnaît qu'il y a d'immenses problèmes sociaux dans l'Amérique hispanique, on considère généralement que l'ensemble de ces pays est homogène sur le plan ethnique et personne ne songe à assimiler la situation des Quechuas à celle des Zoulous ou celle des «mestizos» à celle des «Cape Coloureds». Le recours systématique à des explications biologiques parmi les colonisateurs anglo-saxons ou hollandais, leur absence parmi les Portugais ou les Espagnols (ce qui n'exclut pas toujours un racisme de fait) suffisent à imprimer une toute autre marque idéologique à des situations d'exclusion sociale et culturelle, en réalité aussi brutales ici que là.

#### CONFLIT ET PROXIMITE SOCIALE

Revenons à nos exemples initiaux. Parler d'un conflit d'allure sociale entre *bourgeoisies* dirigeantes d'Allemagne, de France et d'Angleterre, voilà qui est assurément audacieux. S'il y a quasi identité de situation sociale, c'est bien ici. Nous avons affaire à des groupes participant à un même ensemble culturel global, possédant le même type de savoir-faire, le même pouvoir social à l'intérieur de leur nation respective, la même richesse accumulée. Assurément, et pourtant il y avait entre ces diverses bourgeoisies, dans leurs relations réciproques, certains éléments de dissymétrie qui, vus de loin, apparaissent quasi imperceptibles, et qui pourtant, pour qui les éprouvait au jour le jour, pouvaient être sources de frictions et de ressentiment. Aucune classe dirigeante n'était assurément plus consciente de sa puissance et de sa valeur que la classe dirigeante allemande. Etait-il admissible que d'aussi éminentes qualités ne s'imposassent pas universellement, qu'en tant que parvenue, elle pût susciter dédain ou méfiance de la part de ses homologues de France ou d'Angleterre.

De minces nuances de prestige et de considération peuvent expliquer les passions les plus furieuses, telles qu'elles se déchaînent lors de la guerre de 1914.

La haute bourgeoisie française qui s'empare du pouvoir en 1789 et, après l'intermède jacobin, le conserve de manière pratiquement ininterrompue jusqu'à une époque fort récente, ne se distingue pas énormément de la noblesse. C'est elle qui dès l'ancien régime, fournit ses cadres à l'Etat et qui finance le fonctionnement de celui-ci. C'est d'elle qu'émane presque toutes les grandes œuvres de l'esprit et, au total, c'est elle qui possède le plus gros de la fortune nationale. Même par ses mœurs et ses goûts, elle ne diffère pas fondamentalement de l'aristocratie dans laquelle, mais souvent avec quelques difficultés et quelques discriminations, elle pénètre fréquemment. Elle n'en ressent qu'avec plus d'aigreur les privilèges honorifiques, économiques et fiscaux dont jouit l'aristocratie, et auxquels, profitant de la faiblesse du roi, celle-ci s'accroche stupidement.

Il est tentant pour la conscience morale de donner à tout conflit la portée d'une lutte pour la défense d'une certaine vision globale de l'ordre politique et social. Défense d'un côté de l'ordre établi, seul garant aux yeux de ses tenants de toute civilisation, lutte pour la libération d'autre part de tous ceux que cet ordre opprime ou rejette. Ce fut bien là la signification que le marxisme assigna à la lutte des classes et c'est fréquemment en ces termes qu'est appelé aux yeux de beaucoup, à s'affronter massivement le Tiers-Monde et le monde industrialisé.

Thème idéal de sermon moral ou de débat académique entre les diverses élites intellectuelles ici, argumentation de circonstance là, combien différemment se posent, dans le concret, les conflits réels, ceux où se trouve effectivement engagée la masse des passions contemporaines ! Ceux-ci, en effet, visent bien moins une mise en question de la structure globale de la société qu'une lutte au sein même de cette structure pour y acquérir sécurité, reconnaissance, promotion ou consolidation des positions acquises. Cette lutte prend d'autant plus d'âpreté que ceux qui la mènent se sentent proches les uns des autres, qu'ils peuvent invoquer la même capacité, la même richesse, les mêmes degrés de culture, les mêmes titres à occuper certaines positions. Cela joue à tous les rangs de la détention du pouvoir dans le monde, aux plus élevés comme aux plus humbles.

Les exemples abondent au bas de l'échelle. Qui n'a entendu parler du racisme des « poor whites » ? Le conflit racial n'oppose point l'Amérique de la surabondance et celle des laissés pour compte de l'expansion.

sion. C'est parmi ceux qui n'ont pas été entraînés, ou ne l'ont été que de manière incertaine et précaire, par l'immense courant de prospérité, que le conflit racial connaît son véritable déchaînement. L'affrontement ne se fait pas entre riches et pauvres, mais se situe à l'intérieur même d'une pauvreté, qui possède assurément ses degrés et ses nuances. La fureur raciste est surtout le fait, dans le Sud d'une masse blanche peu gagnée par l'industrialisation, qui possède vis-à-vis du «Yankee» un complexe de colonisé, dont la position a certains aspects sud-américains, et à qui seul le mépris du noir peut donner quelque conscience d'exister socialement. Dans le Nord, la passion raciste prend toute sa virulence parmi ceux qui, il n'y a guère, étaient eux-mêmes quelque peu considérés comme des hommes de couleur. On sait combien longtemps l'américanisme a été associé au règne de l'Anglo-saxon et du Nordique, combien les lois sur l'immigration ont été discriminatoires à l'endroit des Latins et des Slaves, combien ceux-ci ont éprouvé et éprouvent parfois encore de difficulté à s'intégrer dans la société d'abondance. Et c'est justement parmi ceux qui ont connu et, dans une certaine mesure, connaissent encore gêne et dédain, que l'effroi d'être confondu avec la condition noire est le plus vif.

La situation n'était guère différente en Algérie. Il a toujours été difficile, pour des hommes de gauche, d'admettre que le colonialisme n'était pas un fait spécifiquement capitaliste, le résultat de quelque obscur complot d'immenses puissances financières, mais qu'il pouvait prendre sa forme la plus aiguë au sein d'une population européenne au niveau de vie en moyenne inférieur à celui de la métropole, et que les moins acharnés n'étaient assurément pas ceux qui, replacés dans le contexte social français, auraient incarné la condition prolétarienne, l'humanité souffrante, l'intersubjectivité authentique !

Considéré dans la perspective de la société européenne d'abondance, le monde méditerranéen sous-industrialisé présente de grandes similitudes et ce qui y en afflue de main-d'œuvre est naturellement versé dans la même catégorie sous-prolétarienne, qu'il s'agisse d'Italiens du Sud, d'Espagnols, de Portugais, de Grecs, de Turcs, d'Algériens ou de Marocains. Or, pour proche que soit, vu de loin, le niveau de vie sicilien ou andalou de celui des habitants du Maghreb, c'est bien parmi les immigrants — et les plus pauvres ! — de ces régions que la volonté d'identification avec la société dominante s'est trouvée la plus forte.

L'attitude des petits blancs des Etats-Unis ou des petits Européens

d'Afrique du Nord nous est compréhensible dans la mesure où nous y voyons une expression subalterne d'un fait de domination coloniale. Mais c'est volontiers sur le compte d'un tribalisme primitif qu'on rejettera ce même type de conflit lorsqu'il se situe dans un autre contexte culturel global. Il est malaisé, assurément, dans une perspective européenne, de comprendre la violence des affrontements entre Musulmans et Hindous, et entre les Etats qui se créèrent à la suite de ce déchirement. Si deux pays semblent connaître la même structure sociale, le même développement économique et les mêmes problèmes, c'est bien l'Inde et le Pakistan. Ici comme là, une élite dirigeante très brillamment formée à la culture anglaise, mais écrasée sous le poids des problèmes à résoudre, une grande masse pareillement misérable, une classe d'usuriers et de commerçants aussi irresponsable et parasitaire, les mêmes types de préjugés sociaux et ethniques. Mais justement parce que rien de décisif ne distinguait Musulmans et Hindous, que rien par nature ne leur donnait plus de compétence pour la direction politique ou l'enrichissement économique, ils furent amenés à souligner de la manière la plus âpre ce qui les opposait, à se targuer, chacun, de mille traits de supériorité. Fierté du Musulman de participer à une société conquérante, créatrice d'Etats, disciplinée et refus de se soumettre à une majorité de «païens», aux mœurs, et aux croyances extravagantes et incapable de donner force et structure à l'Etat. Fierté chez l'Hindou de représenter l'authenticité de la culture nationale, de posséder — face à l'imagination stérile et à la foi élémentaire du Musulman — sens artistique, profondeur philosophique, haute sagesse, d'être seul capable de créer un Etat conforme aux exigences modernes de liberté, de tolérance, de respect d'autrui.

Et c'est une même signification que peuvent revêtir les conflits tribaux africains: telle tribu se sent supérieure parce qu'elle a connu une islamisation ancienne et telle autre parce qu'elle connaît une christianisation récente; telle parce qu'elle a connu des formes étatiques relativement développées dans le passé et telle autre parce qu'elle possède plus d'hommes formés aux exigences d'une administration moderne, telle peut s'enorgueillir de sa vie sédentaire et telle autre des contacts que lui a donné son nomadisme; telle de son sens artistique et telle autre de ses traditions guerrières.

Ce qui caractérise toutes ces luttes, c'est qu'elles se situent à un niveau de puissance, sinon identique, au moins semblable. Il se peut assurément que tel groupe soit favorisé par rapport à tel autre dans des circonstances données, qu'il ait réussi à se faire meilleure répu-

tation, qu'il ait montré plus d'habileté à s'emparer de certaines fonctions administratives ou à développer certaines activités commerciales; mais ce sont là des avantages plutôt conjoncturels que structurels, qui ne sont fondés sur aucun élément décisif de supériorité et peuvent à tout moment être remis en question.

Or, telle est bien la situation des grands conflits nationaux qui ont déchiré l'Europe. Vus même d'Europe occidentale — à fortiori de quelque autre partie du monde — le développement social et culturel des Hongrois et celui des Roumains ne paraissent pas présenter de différence bien marquée. Et pourtant, pareille affirmation apparaît comme une atteinte offensante à l'image de la mission historique et civilisatrice que chacun de ces peuples s'assigne. Les polémiques dans lesquelles patriotes de l'un et de l'autre bord se sont affrontés (notamment à propos de ce Cachemire qu'était la Transylvanie), sont-elles d'une autre nature que celles qui opposent aujourd'hui Haousus, Ibos et Yrubas: orgueil chez les uns d'avoir donné son unité à la plaine danubienne sous la couronne de St Etienne et de l'avoir intégrée à la civilisation catholique et occidentale; revendication (soudaine et tardive d'ailleurs) chez les autres des titres de noblesse que leur confèrent leurs origines latines ?

Tout le monde connaît les déchirements qui ont amené la ruine finale de l'empire habsbourgeois. Cet empire était non seulement composite ethniquement, mais il l'était tout autant économiquement, et à certaines différences ethniques correspondaient indiscutablement des différences considérables dans le développement social et culturel. Toutefois, les véritables affrontements ne se sont pas faits entre les groupes ethniques socialement les plus distants, par exemple entre Allemands et Ruthènes, mais ici encore entre ceux qui se trouvaient dans une situation similaire quant à l'image qu'ils pouvaient se faire de leur rôle et de leur influence. La responsabilité finale de l'effondrement de l'empire est généralement attribuée à la volonté d'indépendance des Tchèques, et effectivement aucun des affrontements ne fut plus violent que celui qui, au sein des Etats de Bohême opposa Allemands et Tchèques. Or la Bohême constituait une des provinces les plus développées de l'Empire et le niveau social et culturel des Tchèques était même supérieur à celui des Allemands du Tyrol ou de la Carinthie. Nous étions bien loin de la situation, constamment rappelée dans la polémique, où toute fortune foncière ou commerciale, où toute expression prestigieuse de civilisation, où simplement toute vie urbaine était allemande, où les masses slaves

étaient refoulées dans une misérable condition paysanne. Il restait assurément que les grands propriétaires fonciers, que les grands maîtres de l'industrie, que celle des deux Universités de Prague qui pouvait invoquer ancienneté et rayonnement étaient allemands ou germanisés, mais c'était là une situation que le temps entamait constamment, car les Tchèques, de plus en plus, s'emparaient des fonctions gouvernementales et administratives (profitant d'un bilinguisme que les Allemands rejetaient avec horreur), développaient leurs propres activités industrielles et commerciales, multipliaient les contacts culturels avec l'Occident, avec la France surtout.

Personne, aux environs de 1900, ne pouvait se dire véritablement maître de la Bohême, dans le cadre de l'Empire habsbourgeois, d'où la haine qu'éprouvaient, à l'endroit de cet Empire, aussi bien les Allemands que les Tchèques. Les Allemands de Bohême se lancèrent dans le rêve d'un vaste empire purement allemand où nul ne pourrait contester le règne du *Deutschum*; les Tchèques se mirent à aspirer à un Etat purement Tchèque. C'est parce qu'ils étaient culturellement si proches qu'Allemands et Tchèques conçurent une telle haine réciproque; ils n'avaient nul besoin les uns des autres, chacun aspirait à un Etat pour son seul compte, l'ascension des uns semblait faite de l'exclusion des autres.

Le cas des relations entre Allemands et Tchèques pourrait être riche d'enseignement en ce qui concerne les deux rivalités ethniques les plus graves du monde occidental: celle entre Flamands et Wallons et celle entre Canadiens anglais et français.

Il est courant de les présenter comme des conflits sociaux et certains vont même jusqu'à les assimiler à des luttes anti-coloniales. Or, aussi bien la Belgique que le Canada sont parmi les pays les plus homogènes du monde en ce qui concerne le niveau de vie des diverses régions. Si conflit social il y a, ce type de conflit est du même ordre que celui qui, en France, a pu opposer la noblesse à la haute bourgeoisie ou celui que les Allemands ont cru vivre en menant la guerre contre la France et l'Angleterre. Il se situe au niveau suprême de la puissance, avec toutes ses implications de prestige et de reconnaissance. Il ne met pas en question la structure même de la société, sa nature hiérarchique, le fondement de l'autorité. Il ne pose aucun problème en terme universel, n'émet aucune exigence de promotion générale de la condition humaine.

L'enjeu, en fait limité de ce type de conflit, ne garantit, hélas: pas de la modération des passions qu'il peut déchaîner.

*Université, démocratie et agitation nationale*<sup>1</sup>.

Qu'il nous soit permis de mentionner la propension des universitaires à s'abandonner à ce type de passion ou même à les animer.

Il est peu de groupes humains sur lesquels les sociologues n'aient porté leurs investigations et leurs réflexions. Il existe des études sociologiques approfondies touchant l'aristocratie, la classe ouvrière, les paysans, les instituteurs, les postiers, la criminalité, la prostitution. Mais tout comme les cordonniers sont les plus mal chaussés des hommes, c'est à l'université que les sociologues, eux-mêmes pratiquement tous universitaires, ont porté le moins d'attention. Quelles sont les origines sociales des universitaires, tant enseignants qu'étudiants ? Quelle est la fonction sociale impartie à l'université dans la conscience publique et quelle image a-t-elle elle-même de son rôle ? Consacre-t-elle une stratification préexistente ou est-elle, au contraire, instrument de mobilité ? Quelles sont, enfin, les idées qui y ont cours sur l'art, la religion, la famille, les régimes politiques et économiques, les relations internationales ? Voilà à quoi il est rarement répondu.

Situation paradoxale, en apparence seulement. C'est de l'université qu'est censée émaner la science. Il n'est pas aisé de se mettre en question, de s'interroger sur soi-même, quand on a pour mission de définir le vrai et le faux, qu'on a le privilège de pouvoir s'identifier avec la vérité. Et pourtant les jugements émanant de l'université n'échappent pas à la relativité qui s'attache à tout jugement portant sur des faits humains. L'université est, elle aussi, en situation, est susceptible d'avoir ses déformations idéologiques, ses préjugés, ses passions. Que d'opinions en matière historique, économique, juridique, sociale, proclamées jadis comme l'expression même de la science, et que nous tenons aujourd'hui pour caractéristiques surtout de l'esprit de temps !

Que l'université soit souvent « engagée » politiquement, voilà un fait des plus patents ! Il se passe peu d'événements dans les pays neufs, tant en Asie qu'en Afrique, ou en Amérique latine, où nous ne trouvions les universités sur la brèche, et parfois même initiatrices de l'action. En Europe même, il n'en est pas toujours allé autrement, dans le passé et parfois aussi dans le présent.

<sup>1</sup> Ce texte a été rédigé deux ans avant les événements de mai. Le caractère autoritariste et droitier qu'a revêtu l'agitation estudiantine dans un passé encore récent est-il aujourd'hui totalement dépassé ? C'est à quoi nous nous forçons de répondre pour l'instant !

Ainsi en Allemagne, à un moment où ce pays n'était, politiquement, qu'une série de «membra disjecta», la seule organisation pan-allemande était la fameuse Burschenschaft estudiantine, la principale instigatrice de la lutte pour l'unité de la germanité. L'esprit du Risorgimento trouve son principal foyer dans les universités italiennes, et c'est dans les universités polonaises que s'entretiennent surtout la conscience nationale et le culte de la patrie. Le conflit de nationalités qui déchire la Bohême prend sa forme la plus aiguë dans les deux universités de Prague, la vieille université allemande et la nouvelle université tchèque, créée en 1882, qui, l'une comme l'autre, se sentent la mission de servir de rempart à la conscience et à la culture nationales. Et la situation n'est pas différente en Belgique: c'est autour de la langue d'enseignement à l'université de Gand que se cristallise le combat linguistique. Nul problème ne suscite de passions aussi vives, et ce parmi les défenseurs de l'une comme de l'autre culture. Et pourtant, même si on se réclame du peuple, seule une très faible minorité peut directement être intéressée à l'enjeu d'un tel combat, puisqu'il n'est pas question, pour la grande masse, d'accéder à l'université. Or, pareille situation se retrouve aujourd'hui à l'université de Louvain, ou dans ce que moralement on peut tenir pour les deux universités de Louvain, à l'instar de ce qu'étaient, de 1882 à 1939, les deux universités de Prague. Même une commune appartenance confessionnelle et une même dépendance administrative et hiérarchique n'arrivent pas à atténuer la violence de l'agitation linguistique. Et l'université de Montréal est le principal centre du séparatisme québécois tout comme l'Université Mac Gill constitue, dans la même ville, un centre d'intégrisme anglais.

Où situer politiquement les positions caractéristiques des universités ? Au XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle, point de doute à ce sujet, dans la conscience aussi bien des représentants de l'ordre établi que des démocrates. C'est devant les universités qu'un Metternich, qu'un Nicolas I<sup>er</sup>, que tous les petits autocrates allemands et italiens ressentent le plus d'effroi, c'est à leur endroit que la surveillance policière se fait le plus tatillonne. Pour les démocrates, ils regardent avec enthousiasme l'ardeur de cette jeunesse si sympathique dans sa turbulence, si éprise apparemment de liberté, si prompte au sacrifice.

Et pourtant ces mêmes mouvements, à l'origine «démagogiques» et «subversifs» aux yeux du pouvoir, présentés par l'historiographie courante comme démocrates et libéraux, connaîtront d'étranges péripéties. L'université allemande deviendra le centre de l'idée pangermaniste, se sentira au service du «Deutschtum» éternel; sous le ré-



gime de Weimar, elle est un des principaux foyers d'agitation nationaliste et de lutte contre la république. La Burschenschaft est la première organisation à introduire le paragraphe aryen, et c'est là, qu'en premier lieu, apparaissent les principaux thèmes dont se nourrira le nazisme.

Nulle part la rhétorique grandiloquente à la gloire de la mission conquérante de Rome ne trouve plus d'écho que dans les universités italiennes. C'est là que naît le mouvement, prétendument populaire, pour imposer, en 1915, l'entrée de l'Italie en guerre («Guerra o Rivoluzione»), et ce sont des étudiants qui, en majorité, composent les premiers *Fasci*. C'est le parti national-démocrate, agressivement nationaliste, qui donne le ton dans les universités polonaises entre les deux guerres; il y impose, à l'endroit des juifs, le «*numerus clausus*» et les bancs de ghetto. Spectacle semblable en Roumanie où l'université semble totalement dominée par la Garde de Fer. De même à Zagreb, l'université semble gagnée à l'Oustachi.

Et l'on serait aujourd'hui bien moins tenté de qualifier de «démocrate» le mouvement flamand, qui apparaissait pourtant comme une volonté de promotion et de libération des grandes masses, et qu'une certaine bourgeoisie fransquillonne confondait si aisément avec le socialisme, surtout lorsqu'on songe à l'empreinte que lui ont donnée justement les universitaires, si prompts aux compromissions avec l'idéologie — et aussi avec la réalité — du pangermanisme.

Ces mouvements nationaux-démocrates, nationaux-révolutionnaires, et même socialistes-nationaux (pour ne pas dire nationaux-socialistes), si caractéristiques dans tant de pays européens du XIX<sup>ème</sup> siècle et de pays en voie d'émancipation aux XX<sup>ème</sup> (mais pas pour autant morts aujourd'hui en Europe) sont essentiellement ambivalents. Mouvements de révolte d'un côté, négateurs des principes existants de légitimité, faisant volontiers appel aux énergies et à l'action populaires, mais mouvements se réclamant par ailleurs d'une conception hiérarchique et volontiers autoritaire du pouvoir, prétendant rigoureusement organiser et encadrer ces mêmes masses, mettant l'accent sur le rôle de «l'élite». Aussi les tenants de pareils mouvements redoutent-ils toute action populaire à aspiration égalitaire qui les priverait de ce qu'ils tiennent pour leur mission spécifique et la source de leur autorité.

L'idée nationale, avec les énergies populaires qu'elle met en branle et, en même temps, avec le renforcement de l'autorité qu'elle permet, concilie à merveille ce double caractère. Il n'est pas jusqu'à la guerre, telle que l'a inaugurée la Révolution française, qui ne ré-

ponde aux exigences de cette ambiguïté: appel, d'un côté, aux enthousiasmes et à l'esprit de sacrifice des grandes masses; renforcement, de l'autre, de l'emprise de l'Etat sur ces mêmes masses, plus que jamais encadrées et surveillées, au nom de la patrie en danger, du salut public, de l'union sacrée! On comprend comment, après avoir apparu comme une institution révolutionnaire, comme un moyen d'action populaire (le peuple en armes!), la conscription ait pu devenir un instrument de consolidation, même des pouvoirs les plus réactionnaires.

Or, voilà un genre de lutte pour laquelle les universitaires, plus que quiconque, se sentent disponibles. Ils peuvent, presque dans chaque pays, s'enorgueillir d'un martyrologe proportionnellement très supérieur au faible pourcentage qu'il représente par rapport à la population, dans la lutte pour la liberté, l'unité, la grandeur de la patrie. Produits typiques des universités que tant d'idées si caractéristiques du XIX<sup>ème</sup> siècle, et dont la critique est loin d'avoir encore été faite systématiquement: sur le rôle des langues, la manière spécifique d'être, de penser et de sentir qui s'attacherait à chacune d'entre elles, et l'abâtardissement, le «métissage» qui résulterait de leur confusion, sur l'âme des peuples, des «races», des ethnies, sur la communauté populaire (*Volksgemeinschaft*), sur l'histoire enfin, discipline si caractéristique des universités, appelée à décrire le destin définitivement unique et exclusif de chaque nation, et qui a pu alimenter les plus violentes passions et justifier les plus douteuses revendications.

Peut-être une brève analyse sociologique des universitaires pourrait nous aider à comprendre cette propension vers l'activisme nationaliste, avec parfois ses composantes franchement fascistes. On sait qu'aujourd'hui encore l'accès à l'Université reste, dans une large mesure, un privilège de classe. Même dans les pays considérés comme socialement les plus avancés, la proportion d'étudiants d'origine ouvrière ou paysanne dépasse rarement cinq pour cent de la population universitaire. Cette discrimination de fait ne peut d'aucune façon être expliquée par une diversité des aptitudes naturelles, mais elle ne peut l'être aussi que très imparfaitement par l'inégalité des situations proprement économiques, car l'atténuation de celle-ci ne change pas fondamentalement cet état de choses. Celui-ci doit trouver son explication dans une certaine attitude globale des ouvriers et des paysans vis-à-vis de la société, de ses valeurs culturelles et des possibilités d'ascension qu'elle offre.

Est-ce à dire que l'université ne soit accessible qu'aux nantis? Il

y a certes des jeunes gens qui savent, presque à leur naissance, qu'un cabinet d'avocat ou de médecin, une étude de notaire, un poste brillant au service de l'Etat ou à la direction d'une entreprise les attend tout chauds. Mais combien d'autres ont à faire face à des perspectives moins brillantes ! Après des années de privations, ils végéteront comme petits avocats, comme surveillants de collèges de province ou greffiers d'un tribunal de paix, et la crise risque de les réduire, comme ce fut abondamment le cas dans les années 1930, à un chômage cruel et démoralisant. Ceux-là sont les fils, non de hauts fonctionnaires ou de grands industriels, mais de petits commerçants, d'instituteurs, d'employés. La situation matérielle de leur père est souvent des moins brillantes, pas toujours même supérieure à celle des ouvriers, mais justement, contrairement à ces derniers, ils ont mis leur dignité à faire poursuivre des études à leurs enfants.

Ce n'est pas tellement les étudiants de la première catégorie qui manifestent le plus d'agitation (encore que les moments de crise et la crainte de la subversion puissent les détacher du conformisme bourgeois et de la bien-séance libérale et les pousser au radicalisme contre-révolutionnaire), mais bien plus ceux de la seconde. Ils sont volontiers en révolte contre une société qui ne leur concède pas leur place, leur offre des possibilités d'ascension fort incertaines, et ils en dénoncent à l'envi les tares et les ridicules. C'est eux qui ont su donner aux termes « bourgeois » et « philistins » leur sens le plus infâmant.

Et pourtant s'ils raillent les bourgeois, ce n'est pas pour être confondu avec le prolétaire, car sinon, à quoi bon avoir étudié ? Ils parlent volontiers au nom du peuple, mais ils ne sont pas pour autant le peuple, mais quelque chose de mieux, ses vraies élites. Ils se sentent qualifiés pour en incarner l'esprit, la volonté permanente, les passions, pour l'appeler à l'action et en prendre la direction. Ils ne redoutent rien tant qu'une révolution sociale qui supprimerait direction et hiérarchie, et, face au danger vrai ou supposé d'une pareille révolution, ils se trouvent aisément, et parfois féroce, de l'autre côté de la barricade. Il n'est pas étonnant que les mêmes, qui, à une certaine époque, étaient dénoncés comme de dangereux démagogues, aient pu, à d'autres, apparaître comme les meilleurs remparts de l'ordre établi. Ils avaient trouvé dans l'activisme nationaliste le moyen de satisfaire à la fois leurs ressentiments, leurs besoins de promotion, de reconnaissance sociale, et, d'autre part, leurs craintes d'être ravalés au niveau d'une masse grise avec laquelle, prêts à s'identifier, ils ne voulaient d'aucune façon être confondus.

## CLASS AND NATION

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### SOCIAL CLASSES AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

#### CLASSES SOCIALES ET RELATIONS INTERNATIONALES

Two things seem to be necessary if we are to approach this problem in the right way:

The first is to consider classes and nations as objective social realities. Another approach is known to be widespread among many contemporary sociologists. According to their view the existence of classes and nations is dependent upon the consciousness of the persons who belong to them. Some sociologists in fact reduce classes to class consciousness. R. Coates, an American sociologist, separates those which he considers to be objective phenomena from classes which in his opinion, -- are psycho-social groups, something that is essentially subjective in character, dependent upon class consciousness (i.e. a feeling of group membership).<sup>1</sup>

It would evidently be unwise to deny the important role of class consciousness which profoundly affects the relation between classes. We don't believe, however, that it would be right to take class consciousness as the starting point for defining classes, their existence and the character of their relations. The starting point here should be the objective position of a class within the system of social production, in the structure of economic and, in a wider sense, social relations. By the condition of a given class, that is by its whole social setting, are determined its interests which in turn are reflected in its consciousness. To apprehend the existence of classes as dependent on their class consciousness is in my opinion a great mistake. Indeed both history and the laws of social reality show that classes may exist objectively even if their members have an clearly expressed class consciousness. Class consciousness may for more or less prolonged periods of time, not coincide or only partially coincide with the actual position of the class in society.

<sup>1</sup> R. Coates, *The Psychology of Social Classes*, New York, 1954, p. 77.

## CLASS AND NATION

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The relationship between classes and nations is one of the theoretical problems that are essential for the understanding of contemporary social life.

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<sup>1</sup> R. CENTERS, *The Psychology of Social Classes*, New-York, 1961, p. 27.

No doubt, the processes by which a class comes into being include the shaping of its class consciousness. The awareness by a class of its basic interests and their relationship — of similarity or polarity — to the interests of other classes is an indispensable condition for the transition from spontaneous to conscious class struggle. This may be regarded as a certain indicator of the degree of class maturity which greatly affects the course of struggle the class is waging.

Still more evident is the role of national self consciousness. Without it, at least in its simplest forms (I mean in the first place the awareness of belonging to a certain nation) even the existence of a nation can hardly be conceived. As a rule national self consciousness emerges before and is more elementary than class consciousness. At the initial stage it takes shape under the impact of day-to-day experience, the environment, the community of language etc. In its more complicated forms national self consciousness, like class consciousness, is connected with a certain theoretical generalization, i.e. with ideological processes.

There can be no doubt that national self consciousness plays a great and historic role particularly in the period of formation and awakening of nations. We can see it clearly now when a large number of new nations in Asia, Africa and other parts of the globe are awakening to independent life and after winning political independence become equal members of the United Nations.

And yet, in our view, national self consciousness is not the primary factor determining the formation of nations. National self consciousness itself is the reflection of more profound processes involved in the formation of nations on the basis of certain objective economic, cultural and other factors. National self consciousness is the reflection of objective national interests determined by the position of nations in the system of social relations including international relations. Therefore we cannot agree with those fairly numerous definitions of nation which in fact reduce it to national self consciousness.

Thus Hans Kohn says that «in modern times, it had been the power of an idea, not the call of blood, that has constituted and molded nations»<sup>2</sup>. Ramsay Muir was of the opinion that «in the last resort, we can only say that a nation is a nation because its members... believe it to be so»<sup>3</sup>. Similarly, W. Sulzbach argues that we should derive

<sup>2</sup> See R. MACIVER and Charles H. PAGE, *Society*, London, 1961, p. 297.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 298-299.

a nation from national consciousness and not the other way about. In his definition «a nation may be defined as a group of people which wishes to be sovereign among other peoples and therefore desires a states of its own»<sup>4</sup>.

It is hardly necessary to go on quoting definitions of this kind. We might, however, ask their authors the question: where does this national self consciousness they consider to be the primary source of nations come from? If we assume that it comes from the peculiarities of people's souls, and not from their conditions of existence, then we are leaving the firm ground of science that deals with actual social processes and find ourselves amidst the quick sands of metaphysical speculations. If national self consciousness is a reflection of real conditions in which people live and act, their real interests, it evidently cannot be the primary factor.

To avoid misunderstanding, let me restate once again that in dealing with the relations between classes as well as between nations we should certainly take into consideration the important influence their consciousness exerts upon those relations. It is not the question of taking this influence into account. It should certainly be taken into account. But the essential thing is to establish the correlation between class or national consciousness and the real interests of those communities determined by the conditions of their existence. Only then shall we have a scientific criterion to assess consciousness itself and to judge whether it clearly and correctly reflects the interests of a class or a nation and the relationships between those interests and the interests of other classes or nations. We also should have the possibility to determine the degree in which it is obscured by prejudices and misconceptions which unfortunately so often affect the behaviour of classes and nations and may even become powerful negative factors in social life.

The other condition for a fruitful and scientific approach to the problem is, as I see it, to examine class and national relations not in isolation but in their real interconnection.

At first sight it may appear that class and national relations lie in two different planes that never cross: the former being relations within a nation or society, the latter representing relations between nations and states.

That view was once formulated by the prominent German economist Dr. W. Sombart. He contends that Marx, considering the his-

<sup>4</sup> W. SULZBACH, *National Consciousness*, Washington, 1943, p. 66.

tory of mankind as that of the struggle of classes, expressed one of the greatest truths of the 19th century. But, Dr. Sombart goes on to say, Marx did not express the whole truth. «If we are to reduce the «world history» to a single formula, we shall have to say, I believe that there exists a double antagonism upon which the whole history is pivoted. It is the social antagonism and the national antagonism»<sup>5</sup>.

We believe there is no ground whatsoever for alleging that Marx did not see the antagonism between nations and states in history. The fact is that Marx, unlike those who accept eclectic theory of factors, did not regard social and national antagonisms as two completely independent poles.

The division of a society or a nation into classes and the division of mankind into nations, nationalities etc. are of different historical origin and do lie in different planes. But at the same time we should not isolate the relations between nations from those between classes.

The very process by which nations were and are still being formed in different parts of the world, always has a definite socio-economic content. Thus, the formation of nations in Western Europe and North America was closely connected with the development of capitalist relations. This process involved all the social classes but its driving force was the bourgeoisie which was then coming to power. The formation of many nations in the Soviet Union after the October Revolution took place in conditions that were quite different. Alongside with the nations which had emerged long before the Revolution (the Russians, Ukrainians and others) there was a large number of nationalities and tribes in Russia that consolidated into nations in conditions of Soviet power (the Kazakhs, Kirghis, Tajics etc). The process of national consolidation in this case was closely connected with the development of socialist relations and culture, its driving force being the working class which was in alliance with the millions of the multi-national peasant population of Russia. Naturally, the socio-economic content of the process of consolidation and further development of nations impresses its features upon them. Concrete analysis should also be made of the socio-economic content of the process of formation of new nations in former colonial, semicolonial and dependent countries. In our times this process has embraced wide areas of the world and its content is evidently connected with the way of development those countries are taking, with the social system that emerges in each of them.

<sup>5</sup> В. Зомбарт. Социализм и социальное движение в XIX столетии. СПб. 1905, стр. 5.



The character of relationship between nations also depends on their social-economic structure. Although a nation participates in relations with other nations as a more or less compact whole, the character of these relations depends on which class or classes are dominant within that nation. Relations between classes as well as between nations may either be of cooperation or of mutual hostility, depending on historical circumstances. But in this case there is an essential difference between the relations of classes and the relations of nations. In a number of societies, polarity of interests is inherent in the relations between classes. This antagonism of interests proceeds from the socio-economic structure of those societies. This naturally does not exclude the possibility of cooperation of a number of classes when they, at least for a time, have a certain community of interests. But the basic feature of all the presocialist societies has been the struggle of classes: the very appearance of a class society meant the appearance of antagonistic interests. In relations between nations the fact that mankind is divided into nations is not a source of conflicting national interests. Conflicts and antagonisms of nations arise when there are rival exploiting classes, subjugating and subjugated nations. And this division of nations is the product of social and economic development, it is the creation of class society.

Certainly the degree of sharpness of class and national contradictions may vary with the position and historical level of development of the nation and of the classes that it comprises. But I believe it cannot be denied that it is the class antagonisms which are the source of national antagonisms. The well known post-war conflicts between the Western Powers and the peoples in Asia, Africa and elsewhere did not result from the nature of Western nations or their distinction from those peoples, but from the nature of imperialism, from the policy of the ruling classes under this social system.

Thus, class and national struggles intertwine, they are not two separate and independent lines of development. There may be great diversity of types of their relationship.

One type of relationship emerges when a nation is awakening and struggling for national independence. All or nearly all the classes interested in social progress find themselves involved in the struggle of the whole nation. In this case the interests of the nation as a whole unite to a greater or lesser extent the majority of classes. Certainly, those classes do have their specific interests but for a time they, so to say, recede into the background since the prevailing interest is the liberation of the whole nation from foreign oppres-

sion. And yet, when the whole nation is involved in the struggle each class participates in it in its own way and in accordance with its own class interests. The scale of the struggle for national liberation depends in great, if not decisive, measure on what classes are involved and which of them is the leading force in the struggle. This is convincingly born out by the experience of national liberation movements in Asia, Africa and Latin America. In the countries where broad strata of workers, peasants, craftsmen, democratic intellectuals become active participants and an independent force in the struggle for national liberation, in these countries the tasks of the struggle are most fundamentally solved, the independence and the revolutionary gains are lasting and the way is open for socialist transformations to follow the democratic ones.

Another type of relations between classes emerges when a nation has been formed and common national problems have been solved, for example, when national independence has been achieved. In these circumstances social problems come to the forefront, the conflicting interests of classes that hitherto could jointly participate in an all-national struggle come into the open. The awareness of national community may now recede into the background in the face of class differences.

In actual life the feeling of national unity might sometimes come into conflict with the feeling of class unity. Which of the two will take precedence in this or in that case depends upon the historical background and setting. It is sometimes alleged that Marxism-Leninism does not recognize the existence of nations as stable social and historical entities. It is clearly a misunderstanding. Marxists have never denied the objective reality of nations or their stability, or the real existence of common national interests. Moreover, we believe that national differences persist much longer than class differences. The obliteration of class differences is a process which is now well under way in the life of the Soviet Union. This cannot be said of the national differences. The obliteration of national differences is a more prolonged process and their disappearance is a matter of remote historical perspective. Even this one thing confirms the fact that national differences are very stable.

When Marxists give priority to the community of class interests of all the working people, irrespective of their nationality, they by no means deny the importance of the community of national interests and patriotic aspirations of the peoples, struggling for or defending their national independence. What they uphold is that one can-

not put an end to all national oppression in the world without fighting against the social oppression of the working people. We consider the elimination of class antagonism as a necessary condition for establishing new relations and the elimination of antagonisms between nations.

This position is not only based on the Marxist theory of classes and nations, but it has now been confirmed by practical experience of the peoples making up quite a large part of the population of the globe. From this point of view I would like to refer to the experience of the peoples of the Soviet Union, a country inhabited by about 130 nationalities. In a country like that the problem of establishing friendly relations between nations was of paramount importance.

Marx once said: «In order that the peoples could really be united they need to have common interests. In order that their interests be common the existing property relations must be eliminated because these relations determine the exploitation of one group of nations by another»<sup>6</sup>.

Having eliminated private ownership of the means of production and having brought them under public ownership, the working class of the USSR has for the first time realized this task. It has built a firm economic basis for the community of the fundamental interests of all the peoples of the USSR.

Because of numerous historical factors the solution of this problem was an extremely complicated matter. It was aggravated first of all by the fact that at the time of the October Revolution the peoples of Russia were at different stages of social and economic development. Some of them (comprising a little under one fifth of the total population of the country) had not passed the capitalist stage of development. Along with the community of interests this gave rise to certain contradictions between their specific interests. Those contradictions were overcome by the policy of accelerated economic and cultural development of the peripheral nationalities with the help of the more developed peoples of the central areas of the country. While the overall gross industrial output of the USSR increased 66

<sup>6</sup> K. MARX, Rede über Polen in London am 29 November 1847: «Damit die Völker sich wirklich vereinigen können, muß ihr Interesse ein gemeinschaftliches sein. Damit ihr Interesse gemeinschaftlich sein könne, müssen die jetzigen Eigentumsverhältnisse abgeschafft sein, denn die jetzigen Eigentumsverhältnisse bedingen die Exploitation der Völker unter sich...» (Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe, Erste Abteilung, Bd. 6, S. 360).

times in 1966 as compared with 1913, the growth rate in less developed republics was considerably higher: in the Kasakh SR it was more than 101 times, in the Kirghiz Republic 117 times, in Armenia 119 times<sup>7</sup>.

This line is now continued in the perspective plans for economic and cultural development of the USSR. The Five Year plan for 1966-1970 envisages an increase of the volume of industrial production in the Russian Federative Republic, Ukrainian, Latvian, Estonian Republics — approximately 1.5 times, in Georgia, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Kirghizia and Turkmenia — 1.6 times, in Byelorussia, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Moldavia — 1.7 times, in Tajikistan and Armenia — 1.8 times.

It means that a higher rate of growth of industrial production is planned for the republics where industry was less developed in the past. The plan takes into account the economic peculiarities of each republic and the direction of the further development is chosen accordingly (e.g. the accelerated development of oil, gas and chemical industries in Azerbaijan; electric power industry, engineering and chemical industry in Georgia, etc.).

A considerable levelling out of cultural development of the peoples of the USSR has also taken place. In the past many peoples on the periphery of Russia, especially in the North and in Central Asia were almost wholly illiterate. The percentage of literate population in Russia in 1897 was on the average 28.4 per cent and the variation from area to area amounted in some cases to almost 42 times (from 2.3 per cent in Tajikistan to 96.2 per cent in Estonia). In 1959 in the country taken as a whole the literate people in the 9 to 49 age group constituted 98.5 per cent with the variation from area to area not exceeding 3 to 4 per cent<sup>8</sup>.

As a result of the victory of socialism in the USSR, a levelling out of social composition of the nations has taken place. Industrialization of the country and the collectivisation of agriculture resulted in the elimination from the historical scene of all the exploiting classes which in the past were the main bearers of national enmity and conflicts. In all the republics, including those which did not have their own national working class before, a native working class has grown up as has the native intelligentsia. According to the 1959 census fi-

<sup>7</sup> Страна Советов за 50 лет. Сборник статистических материалов. 1967, стр. 51, 316-332.

<sup>8</sup> Итоги Всесоюзной переписи населения 1959 г. СССР (Сводный том), стр. 88-89.

gures the percentage of the working class in the population of the country averaged 48.2 per cent and in the republics it varied from 21 per cent (Moldavian SSR) to 55.2 per cent (Estonian SSR) or 58.4 per cent (Kasakh SSR). Percentage of non-manual workers (employees and intelligentsia) averaged 20.1 per cent varying from 11 per cent (Moldavian SSR) to 23.6 per cent (Estonian SSR) or 24 per cent (Georgian SSR).

Common social system of economy and the same class composition of the republics and nations of the USSR provide the foundation for the community of their basic interests. But this does not, of course, rule out the existence of specific interests of each republic and nation. The sources of these interests are, in the first place, certain differences in the level of their economic development, in the branch structure of the economy connected with the historical background and with natural and geographic conditions. The division of labour among the republics, certain specialization of their economy (e.g. the development of cotton growing in the republics of Central Asia) create favourable conditions for the expansion of economic links between them. This expansion of links between them contributes to greater community of interests and at the same time determines some specific interests of each republic. The differences in the size of territory and population, in language, national forms of culture, national traditions, etc., also play a part in determining the specific interests of individual republics and nations.

But there is no conflict of interests between the republics and nations. This is an indisputable fact which no honest and objective student of the Soviet Union can deny. I believe that this can only be accounted for by the fundamental changes in social and economic structure of all republics and nations, by the change in the social structure of their population, in the relations between classes in the country. The fundamental change in the relations between classes opened up a new era in the relations between nations.

It would be, however, a simplification of reality to think that the solution of the social problem would automatically eliminate all the national problems. National relations in their turn can and do influence class relations. And while the elimination of class conflicts leads to the elimination of the hotbeds of national conflicts, this does not happen overnight. This is not only because the minds of men are not at once purged of the survivals of the past enmity between nations, of national selfishness and prejudices. It is also important to find practical solutions for the contradictions that may

arise. And this requires that consideration be given to the specific interests of nations and their harmonic combination with the interests they have in common.

As the experience of the Soviet Union shows, this problem can be solved. It has been solved in the Soviet Union not by pitting one nation against another, but on the basis of their equal cooperation, of joint efforts.

The establishment of cooperation, of friendly relations between nations in such a multinational country as Russia in the past seemed to many people to be an unrealizable dream. The socialist system has made this dream come true.

I believe that this practical experience throws light on the theoretical problem of connection between classes and nations, which cannot but attract the attention of sociologists investigating the influence of classes on the relations between peoples.

NEGOTIATION, REGIONAL GROUPS, INTERACTION AND  
PUBLIC DEBATE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONSENSUS  
IN THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY\*

SOCIOLOGY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

SOCIOLOGIE DES ORGANISATIONS INTERNATIONALES

Introduction

As is the case with all representative assemblies, decisions taken by United Nations bodies are shaped only partially by public debate. The public sessions raise questions to the agenda of an organization and thereby insure the attention of members to certain problems. They also offer agreed criteria for making a group decision; but the nature of the public debate and of the decisions agreed upon in the public arena are determined largely by a multitude of more private decisions. Particularly in large bodies with heterogeneous membership, the development of sufficient consensus to make a decision requires considerable activity outside the public arena.

This paper will examine how members of one main committee of the United Nations General Assembly, the 111 nation Administrative and Budgetary Committee, worked for eight weeks on problems presented by disagreement on the financing of the United Nations Emergency Force in Sinai (UNEF) and the United Nations Force in the Congo (ONUC). The disagreement was based partly on the claim of some nations, primarily France, and the Soviet group, that these operations violated the Charter. There was dispute also over the apportionment needed for apportioning expenses among members. The main purpose of this paper will be to show how negotiations and regional group meetings outside the public arena were combined with private discussion, public debate, and voting in the public arena in order to generate resolutions supported by most of the committee.

In order to acquire information reported in this paper the writer attended all twenty-two sessions of the committee during the Special Session, May 14 to June 29, 1963. Through systematic observation,

\* Mrs. Lucille Meyer provided valuable assistance in the preparation of this paper, particularly in the preparation of data in the tables.

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*Introduction*

As is the case with all representative assemblies, decisions taken by United Nations bodies are shaped only partially by public debate. The public sessions admit questions to the agenda of an organization and thereby insure the attention of members to certain problems. They also offer agreed criteria for making a group decision. But the nature of the public debate and of the decisions agreed upon in the public arena are determined largely by a multitude of more private discussions. Particularly in large bodies with heterogeneous membership, the development of sufficient consensus to make a decision requires considerable activity outside the public arena.

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data were obtained on participation in public debate and on delegate interaction that takes place concurrent with public debate. All seventy sessions of the previous session of the Fifth Committee, from September to December 1962, had been attended also. On the basis of contact made with members of the committee in the earlier session, it was possible to obtain information on committee activity outside the public arena. This was achieved through conversations with delegates in the committee room (before, during, and after meetings) and in the lounges, corridors, and dining rooms of the United Nations, and occasionally at locations outside the U.N. In addition to more casual conversation with participants during the Special Session, after the session was over ten of the most active participants in the negotiations were interviewed.

The Special Session of the General Assembly, devoted entirely to U.N. financial problems,<sup>1</sup> was called by the Seventeenth Regular Session in December 1962 in the face of arrears for UNEF and ONUC totaling \$ 105,000,000 and in light of the fact that no assessments had been made on members for peace-keeping expenditures for the period commencing July 1962. Many nations deemed it vital that means be found for getting more nations to pay for UNEF and ONUC. It was believed that a Special Session devoted to the financing of peace-keeping would isolate the problem and encourage wider interest and competence of the United Nations diplomatic community in UN financial problems. The Special Session produced seven resolutions which all received between 79 and 95 affirmative votes. These resolutions: (1) provided general principles to serve as guidelines for the sharing of the costs of future peace-keeping operations involving heavy expenditures, (2) and (3) authorized the Secretary-General to spend \$ 6,580,000 monthly for ONUC and UNEF between July 1 and December 31, 1963, and apportioned the costs among members, (4) appealed to members to pay their arrears for UNEF and ONUC, (5) extended the period in which United Nations Bonds could be sold to December 31, 1963 (6) asked the Secretary-General to investigate the feasibility of establishing a voluntary peace fund, and (7) continued a twenty-one nation working group devoted to developing more long-range solutions to the organization's financial problems. Before proceeding to a more analytic treatment of committee activity, the reader will be given a short chronological account of events leading up to the Special Session and an overview of negotiations during the Special Session.

<sup>1</sup> With the exception of the speedy admission of Kuwait to membership.

*Preparation for the Special Session*

In December 1962 the General Assembly called for a Special Session in the following spring and also established a working group of representatives from twenty-one nations that was instructed to consider the U.N.'s financial problems and make recommendations to the Special Session of the Assembly. This working group was the successor to a fifteen-nation group established in April 1961 which had been unable to develop a broad consensus on peace-keeping finance<sup>2</sup>. The Working Group of Twenty-one held eighteen meetings between January 29 and March 29. It became apparent early that the hoped for, but not expected, consensus on the apportionment of peace-keeping expenses was not to be achieved by the Group as it became clear that the three members from the Soviet group — USSR, Bulgaria, and Mongolia — and also France, had no intention of shifting their positions. There was hope, however, that the remainder of the membership could agree on a single position. If all members of the United Nations but the Soviet group and France, and perhaps only two or three others, could agree on financing arrangements, it was believed that over the long run the few isolated nations would desire to reach some sort of compromise with the rest of the membership. Therefore, many of the members of the Working Group of Twenty-one hoped that the two financial interest groups represented could reach some sort of agreement: i.e., the so-called developed countries (Australia, Canada, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden, U.K., and U.S.) and the so-called lesser developed countries (Argentina, Brazil, Cameroon, India, Pakistan, Mexico, Nigeria, and United Arab Republic).

The Working Group of Twenty-one was not able to provide the Special Session of the General Assembly, to whom it reported, with a solution to the financial problem, but it did educate its members on the political and financial problems to be faced in the Special Session of the General Assembly and developed an embryonic negotiation organization that would handle most of the negotiations during the session. Although the Special Session was not to begin until

<sup>2</sup> *Report of the Working Group of Fifteen on Examination of the Administrative Procedures of the United Nations, A/4971, 1961.* This group was composed of representatives of Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, China, France, India, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden, USSR, United Arab Republic, and United States. The enlarged group, officially named the Working Group on the Examination of the Administrative and Budgetary Procedures of the United Nations, also included Argentina, Australia, Cameroon, Mongolia, Netherlands, and Pakistan.

May 14, the political process was well under way before the session opened. The participants in these negotiations, largely because of their ability to get negotiating mandates from large groups of nations, were to have great influence on subsequent events in the General Assembly. With the Soviet group not able to negotiate because of its stand that all peace-keeping expenses not authorized by the Security Council are illegal, the field was left largely to the developed and lesser developed groupings that had participated in the Working Group of Twenty-one, with the latter composed of two sub-groups, the Afro-Asians and the Latin Americans.

At the end of April representatives of Australia, Canada, United Kingdom, and the United States gathered in New York to discuss drafts of resolutions that would provide financing for UNEF and ONUC for the relevant period. Then on May 3 the eight developed nations who had worked together in the Working Group of Twenty-one gathered to consider these resolutions. On May 10 these eight (Australia, Canada, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden, U.K., U.S.) were joined by Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, and Norway. Although Belgian and French delegates contributed almost nothing to these sessions because their governments were unwilling to pay for ONUC, they kept in contact with the negotiations through attending sessions of the developed nation group. Therefore, they were informed fully of developments at each stage of the negotiation.

At the May 3 and May 10 meetings a broad consensus was developed on a formula for ONUC and UNEF financing and a proposal that a few delegations be designated to carry on negotiations with the lesser developed nations was accepted. Canada, Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States were appointed and given a mandate to negotiate for the entire group. The Canadian representative, who had played a leading role in moving Western consultation along and in obtaining the participation of the lesser developed nations in the proposed negotiations, became the natural chairman of the negotiating team. This was due also to the fact that Canada had played a leading role in U.N. financial questions for some years and played a major role in steering acceptance of the advisory opinion of the International Court on peace-keeping financing through the General Assembly in December 1962<sup>3</sup>.

<sup>3</sup> The Advisory Opinion, published in *ICJ Reports*, 1962, pp. 151-181, declared that all members of the U.N. are obligated to pay assessments levied against them to cover expenses for ONUC and UNEF.

Meanwhile, the Latin American group, that had had a subcommittee on financing for several years, met four times on financing before the opening of the Special Session, on April 14 and 25 and on May 6 and 13. The Latin Americans were the most unified of the three groups (Latin American, Afro-Asian, and developed) to be involved in the approaching negotiations. Although on advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice had caused them to change their former assertion that peace-keeping expenses are not the responsibility of all U.N. members, they maintained a unified stand that peace-keeping financing is mainly the responsibility of the developed nations. The group gave a clear mandate to the delegations of Brazil and Argentina to negotiate with members of other groups.

The Afro-Asian group, consisting of 56 nations that include such widely scattered interests as those of Guinea, Indonesia, and Jamaica did not have the degree of consensus on U.N. financing that was evident in Latin America. Afro-Asia not only encompasses a wider range of cultures and political viewpoints, but in this area are to be found nations involved directly in the conflicts that created the need for peace-keeping operations, as well as the main contributors of troops to these operations. The Afro-Asian group designated India, Nigeria, and Pakistan to represent them in the negotiations. The group, as a whole, had not, however, given the financial question the degree of consideration that it had been given by the Latin Americans and the developed nations. This, in addition to the more heterogeneous nature of the group, was to make the task of representing the interests of their group more difficult for the Afro-Asian negotiators.

#### *Negotiations During the Special Session*

The ten-nation negotiating group began its deliberations on May 10, four days before the first meeting of the Fifth Committee, under the chairmanship of the Counsellor of the Canadian Mission. None of the participants would have predicted that their deliberations would not conclude until June 17 and that their work would require eighteen sessions. Nor did they realize that the negotiation organization that they were creating would schedule over seventy meetings in addition to the twenty-two public meetings of the Fifth Committee, and two plenary meetings of the General Assembly (see Table 1).

TABLE 1

NUMBER OF MEETINGS OF NEGOTIATORS  
AND REGIONAL GROUPS IN SPECIAL SESSION

<i>Negotiators</i>	<i>No.</i>
Developed Countries (DC) . . . . .	12
Lesser Developed Countries (LDC) . . . . .	6
DC and LDC . . . . .	<u>18</u>
Total . . . . .	36
<i>Regional Groups</i>	<i>No.</i>
Developed (W. Europe, Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, U.S.) . . . . .	8
Latin America . . . . .	6
Afro-Asia . . . . .	15
Afro-Asia subgroup (LDC + Cameroon, Japan, United Arab Republic) . . . . .	3
Commonwealth . . . . .	2
Arab . . . . .	<u>4</u>
Total . . . . .	38
<i>Entire Fifth Committee</i>	<i>No.</i>
Public Meetings of the Fifth Committee . . . . .	22

The organization that developed to handle the negotiations did not consist only of meetings of the ten-nation negotiation group. It also included separate sessions of the two five-nation components of the negotiating group and included sessions between negotiators and the regional groups of nations that they represented. The two negotiating teams came to be designated the LDC (lesser developed countries: Argentina, Brazil, India, Nigeria, Pakistan), and the DC (developed countries: Canada, Netherlands, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States). The DC held at least twelve separate sessions and the LDC, chaired by Argentina, at least six. The five DC were responsible to the sixteen nation developed nation group with whom they met eight times after the negotiations had begun. The Latin American negotiators met with their nineteen-nation group six times during this period. The three Afro-Asian negotiators met with the fifty-six nation Afro-Asian caucus fifteen times. The Afro-Asian negotiators also met several times with the other Afro-Asian members of the Working Group of Twenty-one — Cameroon, Japan, and the United

Arab Republic. This meant that Japan, a developed Afro-Asian nation, had some contact with both negotiating teams. It also provided an additional link to the United Arab Republic, whose views on UNEF were important but caused it to refuse to participate in the Afro-Asian negotiating team because of the likelihood that it could not support the UNEF financing resolution that was to be drafted. There were also two Commonwealth meetings, on May 10 and 17. These occasions provided an opportunity for five of the negotiators (Canada, India, Nigeria, Pakistan, and United Kingdom) to discuss financial issues in a different context and to appeal to other Commonwealth nations for support of their point of view. Finally, the Arab nations, a subgroup of the Afro-Asian group, had four or five meetings on financial questions.

In the negotiating sessions between DC and LDC most work was carried on by individuals who might be called «working level» members of permanent missions who represented their nations in the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly. Therefore, most had spent the months of September to December 1962 together during the last regular General Assembly session. Then, most of those who were involved in the negotiations had worked together in the Working Group of Twenty-one from January 29 to March 29. In most cases one man handled most of the negotiations for his nation, this being true for Argentina, Brazil, India, Pakistan, Netherlands, and Sweden. With the Canadian negotiator chairing the DC, DC-LDC, and Western meetings, he made considerable use of an aide. Because the Nigerian Ambassador had been the chairman of the Working Group of Twenty-one, he still continued to serve as a monitor of progress in the negotiations and occasionally entered the proceedings, though one of his aides usually represented Nigeria. Both the United States and the United Kingdom sent their Deputy Permanent Representatives to the negotiations, an Ambassador and a Minister respectively, and both had three other officials rather prominently involved in the negotiations. Two of the United Kingdom delegates came from the Treasury, one permanently posted at the U.N. One of the United States delegates was from the State Department.

The negotiations can be divided into two phases. In the first phase from May 10 to May 31, the negotiators produced four resolutions for approval by the nations that they represented: two authorized expenditures for UNEF and ONUC for the second half of 1963 and apportioned these expenses among members, the third provided a set of general principles to guide the apportionment of expenses

for future peace-keeping operations and the fourth dealt with the collection of arrears in the payment of peace-keeping expenses. The second phase of negotiations, from June 1 to June 19, was required because the Afro-Asian group rejected the results of the first phase. The major difficulty arose over a clause in the general principles resolution that attempted to respond to the insistence of Arab nations that victims of aggression should receive special consideration when assessments are made for peace-keeping operations. Negotiations had removed the words «victim» and «aggressor» in favor of vaguer terminology. The Afro-Asian group demonstrated its displeasure with its negotiators by adding five nations to its negotiating team before the second phase of negotiations began: Cameroon, Guinea, Philippines, Malaya, and Uganda. It took the Afro-Asian group six meetings to reach a formulation of the «victim and aggressor» clause acceptable to the entire group and to the DC negotiators. The agreement put «victim» back in but accepted a substitute phrase for «aggressor» which read: «Member States ... responsible for acts which led to a peace-keeping operation».

After negotiations were completed the Fifth Committee completed its work between June 20 and 26. The four resolutions produced by the negotiations were accepted. In addition, three less controversial resolutions not handled in the negotiations were introduced in the committee and approved. One continued the Working Group of Twenty-one, another asked the Secretary-General to investigate the feasibility of a voluntary peace fund, and a third extended the period in which the U.N. bonds could be sold to December 31, 1963. On June 27 work of the committee was approved by a single General Assembly plenary session. The seven resolutions received between 79 and 95 supporting votes, with 2 to 17 nations abstaining. The Soviet group, including Cuba, cast 12 negative votes for each resolution. The only other negative votes came from France which voted against all but two of the resolutions.

#### *Public and Private Meetings*

As Table 1 has indicated, with 36 meetings of negotiators and 33 meetings of regional groups, the meetings outside the public arena far exceed the 22 meetings of the Fifth Committee. Table 2 shows how meetings are distributed across the eight weeks. Notable is the extent of regional group and negotiation group activity before the

TABLE 2

## MEETINGS OF NEGOTIATORS, REGIONAL GROUPS AND FIFTH COMMITTEE (WEEKLY TOTALS)

Week of	Negotiators			Regional Groups						Public Meetings	Total
	Dev. Countries (DC) <sup>1</sup>	Less Dev. Countries (LDC) <sup>2</sup>	DC and LDC	Developed <sup>3</sup>	Latin American	Afro-Asian	Afro-Asian Members of Comm. of 21 <sup>4</sup>	Commonwealth	Arab	Fifth Committee of GA <sup>5</sup>	
5/6	—	—	1	1	1	1	—	—	—	—	4
5/13	2	—	3	1	1	1	2	1	—	1	12
5/20	5	2	4	2	2	2	—	—	—	3	20
5/27	3	1	4	2	—	1	1	1	—	3	16
6/3	—	1	2	1	1	3	—	—	1	5	14
6/10	2	1	3	1	—	5	—	—	—	3	15
6/17	—	1	1	—	1	2	—	—	—	3	8
6/24	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	4	4
TOTAL	12	6	18	8	6	15	3	2	4 (est.)	22	96 <sup>6</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Canada, Netherlands, Sweden, US, UK.

<sup>2</sup> Argentina, Brazil, India, Nigeria, Pakistan.

<sup>3</sup> 4 Scandinavian, 3 Benelux, Canada, US, UK, Austria, Japan, Australia, NZ, Italy.

<sup>4</sup> LDC plus Cameroon, Japan, Mexico.

<sup>5</sup> Total UN Membership.

<sup>6</sup> Two plenary meetings of the General Assembly were also held.



TABLE 3  
MEETINGS OF NEGOTIATORS, REGIONAL GROUPS AND FIFTH COMMITTEE (PHASE TOTALS)

DATE	Negotiators			Regional Groups				Public Meetings		Total
	DC	LDC	DC and LDC	Developed American	Latin American	Afro-Asian	Afro-Asian Members of Comm. of 21	Commonwealth Arab	Fifth Committee of GA	
May 6-10	—	—	—	2	3	1	—	—	—	6
Negotiation Phase I May 10-31	10	3	12	5	3	4	3	2	7 (27 speeches)	49
Negotiation Phase II June 1-19	2	3	6	2	2	10	—	1	8 (27 speeches)	34
June 20-26	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	7 (63 speeches)	7
Total	12	6	18	9	8	15	3	2	22	96 (est.)

Fifth Committee began its sessions. In the first two weeks there were nine regional group meetings and six negotiator meetings but only one session of the Fifth Committee, its first session on May 15.


Table 3 provides the same information collapsed into four time periods: Phase I of the negotiations, Phase II of the negotiations, and the period before and after negotiations between the LDC and DC. Activity of negotiators and regional groups is most concentrated before or during Phase I of negotiations (70 per cent of the negotiation meetings and 60 per cent of the regional meetings). The distribution of the meetings of the Afro-Asian group, however, runs counter to the general pattern, with five meetings during Phase I and ten meetings during Phase II. This pattern reflects the group's refusal to accept the settlement made by their negotiators during Phase I of the negotiations. Even after they had increased their negotiating team from five to eight, thereby indicating a lack of confidence in their original negotiators, it took the group many meetings to reach an agreement among themselves.

Table 3 also indicates that the activities of the negotiating and regional groups were concluded before the last week of the meetings of the Fifth Committee, the week of most concentrated activity in the public arena. During this week the Fifth Committee convened one third of the meetings held during its six week session. In addition Table 3 reveals that there were more speakers in the Fifth Committee during this week than in the other five weeks of the session.

Table 4 provides a more vivid picture of the relationship between negotiation progress and participation in the public debate of the Fifth Committee. During Phase I of the negotiations the public debate got under way slowly, with only one meeting and one speaker during the first three days. For the remainder of Phase I there was a public meeting approximately every other day, with an average of five speakers per session.

In the first session of the Fifth Committee after the negotiated settlement of Phase I thirteen delegates spoke. But after it became clear that a new settlement would have to be negotiated, the committee returned to an average of five speakers for the next two sessions, the same as during Phase I. Then, as negotiations stalled over the inability of the Afro-Asian group to come to an agreement, Table 4 reveals that the public debate almost ceased. During the last six working days of Phase II, there was only one meeting of the Fifth Committee with only two speakers. Despite continual requests for speakers by the committee chairman, members of the committee refused

TABLE 4  
NUMBER OF SPEAKERS IN FIFTH COMMITTEE FOR EACH WORKING DAY (MONDAY TO FRIDAY)



to participate further in the debate until the negotiating teams had brought forth new draft resolutions. After negotiations had concluded, sixty-three delegates spoke in five days, more than had spoken in the preceding month.

### *Private Conversation in Public Meetings*

An observer of large public bodies, and the U.N. is no exception, soon becomes aware that two kinds of activity are taking place simultaneously before his eyes. There is a continuous flow of *public* debate heard by all in the room, and there are frequent *private* conversations heard only by those delegates involved. In a General Assembly committee delegates are seated at two long horseshoe desks, one placed inside the other. Conversations may be carried on by delegates seated next to each other. Delegates also move around the chamber, sometimes sitting down behind another delegate to talk and at other times standing and talking with others who are circulating.

During the first eighteen of the twenty-two sessions of the Fifth Committee an observer recorded in a notebook each private conversation (interaction) between delegates in the committee. These data were collected, along with similar data on an earlier session of the Fifth Committee,<sup>4</sup> in order to discern whether they might offer useful information to the scholar studying the U.N. political process.<sup>5</sup> It was of particular interest to learn whether interaction patterns reveal anything not obtainable from public debate records. Might they provide information on the negotiation activity that takes place outside the public chamber and about which the public debate record provides very little information?

During the meetings of the Fifth Committee in the Fourth Special

<sup>4</sup> Interaction data on the earlier session reported in C. F. ALGER, «Interaction in a Committee of the United Nations General Assembly,» in SINGER, J. DAVID (ed.), *Quantitative International Politics: Insights and Evidence*, Eulau, Heinz, General Editor, *International Yearbook of Political Behavior Research*, Vol. VI, (New York: The Free Press, MacMillan, 1968).

<sup>5</sup> See Garland C. ROUTH, «Interpersonal Relationships and the Legislative Process,» *American Academy of Political and Social Science Annals*, 195 (January 1938), 129-136, for an exploratory effort to analyze observed interaction in the Illinois Senate.

TABLE 5  
HIGHEST RANKED NATIONS IN INTERACTION AND PUBLIC SPEAKING

Interactions		Total Length of Speeches (in minutes)	
*Canada	315	-USSR	126
*US	149	-Ukraine	71
*India	140	*Pakistan	61
*Brazil	120	-Bulgaria	56
*Netherlands	96	Indonesia	47
*UK	93	-Hungary	45
*Pakistan	91	Cameroon	43
New Zealand	86	Fed. of Malaya	43
Ireland	75	*Nigeria	43
*Nigeria	70	-Poland	43
Bulgaria	69	Cyprus	41
*Argentina	68	-Czechoslovakia	41
Norway	63	*Argentina	39
Australia	60	Ceylon	38
Italy	60	Jamaica	36
-USSR	46	Tunisia	36
Yugoslavia	39	Iran	35
*Sweden	39	Ghana	34
-Hungary	33	-Byelorussia	33
Israel	30	*Canada	33
		-France	33
*Negotiator			
-Dissenter			

Session, 1192 interactions between delegates were recorded.<sup>6</sup> For all nations in the committee there is a .72 correlation between rank in time consumed in public speaking and rank in number of interactions. This rather high correlation could lead to the conclusion that interaction data provide little more than public debate records concerning nation participation in committee activity. But examination of lists of the highest ranked nations in both public speaking and interaction indicate a closer relationship between high interaction and

<sup>6</sup> Only nonseatmate interactions are included on the assumption that a delegate who leaves his seat to talk to another delegate more often is working on Committee business than a delegate who makes a comment to his seatmate. Therefore, 560 seatmate interactions are not included in the analysis.

negotiation participation than is the relationship between high participation in public speaking and negotiation. Table 5 lists the first twenty nations in order of their participation in both public speaking and interaction. The table indicates that only four negotiators were among the first twenty in public speaking. On the other hand, all ten negotiators appear in the list of the twenty highest interactors. Particularly impressive is the fact that negotiators hold the first seven ranks in interaction.

Table 6 provides another perspective on the highest interactors

TABLE 6  
HIGHEST INTERACTING NATION PAIRS<sup>a</sup>


Nonseatmates <sup>b</sup>	
<u>Canada/US</u>	48
<u>Canada/Netherlands</u>	31
<u>Canada/India</u>	27
<u>Canada/UK</u>	24
<u>Canada/Brazil</u>	21
<u>Canada/Ireland</u>	19
<u>Canada/New Zealand</u>	19
<u>Canada/Pakistan</u>	17
<u>Canada/Australia</u>	14
<u>Canada/Italy</u>	14
<u>India/New Zealand</u>	14
<u>Ireland/New Zealand</u>	14
<u>Argentina/Brazil</u>	13
<u>Bulgaria/Byelorussia</u>	13
<u>India/US</u>	13
<u>Brazil/India</u>	12
<u>Bulgaria/USSR</u>	12
<u>Nigeria/Pakistan</u>	12
<u>Bulgaria/Hungary</u>	11
<u>Canada/Sweden</u>	11

<sup>a</sup>Total interactions for all interacting pairs of nations were compiled by using NUCROS, a general cross-classification program. Kenneth JANDA, *Data Processing: Applications to Political Research*. (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1965), Chapter 6, describes this program. On pp. 40-42 he describes how it was used for this study.

<sup>b</sup>Underlining indicates negotiator.

TABLE 7

DIAGRAM OF INTERACTION BETWEEN FIRST TWENTY RANKED NONSEATMATE PAIRS, SPECIAL SESSION



by listing the twenty highest interacting pairs. Once again the strong relationship between the negotiating organization outside the committee chamber and interaction in the chamber is revealed, with pairs of negotiators taking the first five ranks and at least one negotiator participating in sixteen of the twenty pairs.

Particularly notable in Table 6 is the fact that Canada is a member of ten of the first twelve ranked pairs. Canada's central role in the interaction network is portrayed more dramatically in Table 7, a diagram of the twenty highest interacting pairs. Examination of the diagram reveals that eleven nations are linked to Canada, with no other nation having more than four links. Canada's position as highest ranked in number of interactions and in number of links to other high interactors is intriguing in the light of the knowledge that a Canadian delegate served as chairman of the DC negotiating group and as chairman of the negotiation sessions between the DC and LDC. Despite the very prominent role of Canada in the negotiations, Canada ranked only nineteenth in participation in public debate.

Table 5 also raises interesting questions about the character of high participants in public debate. The Soviet Union, a nation that voted against all of the seven resolutions passed by the committee, ranks first in participation in public speaking. Only two of the eleven dissenters appear in the list of high interactors, the USSR (ranked 16) and Hungary (ranked 9). But eight dissenters appear in the list of high participants in public debate. Thus the pattern for dissenters tends to be opposite of that for negotiators, as is summarized briefly in Table 8.

TABLE 8

NEGOTIATOR AND DISSENTER PARTICIPATION  
IN INTERACTION AND IN DEBATE

	High Interaction Participation	High Debate Participation
Negotiators	10	4
Dissenters	2	8



Further insight on the performance of negotiators and dissenters can be obtained by plotting the total length of each nation's speeches and their number of interactions on a scatter diagram. Table 9 provides a plot for each dissenting and negotiating nation. The diagram has been divided arbitrarily into three sectors. In Sector A, to the upper left, are found nations who emphasize speaking and in Sector C, to the lower right, are found nations who emphasize interaction. Between these two is Sector B, where nations are found who emphasize neither interaction nor speaking. It is obvious that dissenters cluster toward the upper left of the diagram and negotiators cluster toward the lower right. Table 10 gives a brief overview of the distribution of dissenters and negotiators in the scatter diagram<sup>7</sup>. Eleven of the twelve dissenters are located in Sector A (speaking emphasis) and none in Sector C (interaction emphasis). The ten negotiators are split equally between Sectors C (interaction emphasis) and B (emphasis on neither), but none are in Sector A (speaking emphasis).

*Overview of Pace of Negotiation, Regional Meetings, Interaction, and Public Speaking.*

In the preceding discussion some indication has been given of the comparative pace of the various activities of members of the Fifth Committee. Table 11 provides a graphic overview that facilitates a summary of earlier comments and also offers new insight. Negotiation meetings, regional meetings, Fifth Committee speeches, and Fifth Committee interactions are plotted for the six week period that began two weeks before the first session of the Fifth Committee and ended with the last session of the committee. For each week the graph indicates the percentage of activity for the entire session that took place during that week.

Table 11 shows definite peaks of negotiation, interaction, and speaking, but regional meetings maintained a steady pace for five weeks and then dropped off. Negotiation activity peaked in the week of May 20-26, as public sessions of the Fifth Committee got under way. Twelve per cent of negotiator meetings were held during this week. Interaction in the Fifth Committee reached a peak two weeks

<sup>7</sup> For additional analysis of interaction in the Special Session see C. F. ALGER, «Interaction and Negotiation in a Committee of the United Nations General Assembly,» *Peace Research Society (International) Papers* (Philadelphia Conference, 1965), Volume V, 1966, pp. 141-159.




TABLE 9  
LENGTH OF SPEECHES AND INTERACTION OF NEGOTIATORS AND DISSENTERS (NEGOTIATORS ARE UNDERLINED.)

TABLE 10  
 RECAPITULATION OF SECTOR LOCATION  
 OF NEGOTIATORS AND DISSENTERS

Sector	Negotiators	Dissenters
Sector A (Speaking Emphasis)	0	11
Sector B	5	1
Sector C (Interaction Emphasis)	5	0

later, in the week of June 3 to 9. Thirty-nine per cent of interaction took place during this week. Public speaking did not reach a peak until three more weeks had elapsed, from June 24 to June 27. During this four day period thirty-eight per cent of the speeches in the public debate were made. This sequence of peaks suggests a process in the development of consensus that moves from negotiation outside the committee to an extension of consensus through interaction that extends into the committee chamber and then to public statements.

The fact that the negotiations in this session went through two phases may explain the secondary peaks which account for sixteen to eighteen per cent of each of the interaction (June 17-23) and public speaking (June 3-9) activities and eight per cent of the negotiation activity (June 10 to 16). If the three primary and three secondary peaks are numbered in sequence, there are two sequences, one for each negotiation stage, both of which peak in the same order: negotiation, interaction, speeches. Had the results of Phase I negotiations been accepted by the Afro-Asians it would be likely that the secondary peak in speaking (June 3-9) would have matured into the concluding phase of the committee's work. Instead it may be conjectured that the developing peak in speaking subsided as committee members became aware that negotiations were not concluded yet.

#### *Summary and Conclusion*

Analysis of information on a number of kinds of activity of delegates of the Fifth Committee of the U.N. General Assembly has revealed that regional groups and designated negotiating teams played




TABLE 11  
DISTRIBUTION OF ACTIVITY BY WEEK

important roles in the development of wide consensus for seven resolutions accepted by the committee. The picture obtained in this committee agrees with Hadwen and Kaufmann's assertion that public debate in U.N. bodies is like the small portion of an iceberg that appears above the surface<sup>8</sup>. The extensive discussion and negotiation system outside the public debate were vital for the achievement of high consensus (with the exception of the Soviet group and France) in resolutions dealing with very controversial issues. It is reasonable to conclude that the high consensus achieved would not have been attained if the negotiations had not been well under way before the public debate commenced. Because negotiations were in progress many delegates were restrained in committee debate so as not to put negotiations in jeopardy and in order to avoid taking positions that would inhibit working in the context of agreements reached in negotiations.

On the other hand, the public forum was found to be more than a public debate. Patterns of interaction that occur simultaneously with public debate suggest that the negotiating system carries over into the public arena. High rank in interaction is a useful indicator of who is involved in negotiation and patterns of interaction seem to offer leads on special roles in the negotiating system. It appears that public sessions could be useful in keeping negotiators in contact at times when negotiations have reached an impasse. It also is the case that fear of what could happen in public sessions stimulates negotiators to reach agreements. As negotiations bogged down in the Fifth Committee session under study, delegates frequently voiced the concern that some nations would become exasperated with the negotiations and directly introduce their own resolutions in the Fifth Committee.

Although high participation in public debate is a much less useful indicator of who is participating in negotiation than is participation in interaction, participation in public debate is a more reliable indicator of dissent. Although the dissenters did not participate in negotiation, and relatively little (compared to negotiators) in interaction, they ranked high in public debate.

While noting the importance of negotiating teams and regional groups to the development of consensus, the significance of individual roles in these activities should not be overlooked. Although

<sup>8</sup> John HADWEN and Johan KAUFMANN, *How United Nations Decisions are Made*. (Leyden: A. W. Sythoff, 1960), p. 55.

the most talented negotiator, the chairman of a negotiation session, or the chairman of a regional group, cannot generate a consensus under all conditions, variation in the capabilities of individuals in these roles makes a difference. Some delegates give the Canadian chairman of the negotiating sessions considerable credit for the successful conclusion of the negotiations. Some delegates assert that the Afro-Asian group needed many sessions to reach a consensus partially because they had an inexperienced chairman. Thus, the outcomes of «parliamentary diplomacy» depend not only on the quality of speaking in the public arena, but probably depend much more on the presence of diplomats able and willing to play the variety of roles that mold divergent national policies into resolutions supportable by many nations.

Finally, this investigation has implications for the research methodologies of the scholar interested in understanding the political process in international organizations. Documentary analysis, observation, interview, and patient development of contact with participants were all used in the collection of information. The contribution of each of these data collection methods suggests that the international organization scholar can employ fruitfully a variety of social science research techniques. Furthermore, the way in which information obtained from different kinds of data collection techniques complement each other illustrates the advantages of research strategies that combine several data collection techniques.

A REORGANIZATION OF THE  
ACADEMIC GOVERNMENT OF A UNIVERSITY:  
A SOUTH AFRICAN SOCIOLOGICAL CASE STUDY

SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION AND DEVELOPMENT

SOCIOLOGIE DE L'EDUCATION ET DEVELOPPPEMENT

The University that is the subject of this Paper ranks as the senior institution of higher education in Southern Africa, tracing its origin to a College founded in 1829 and having obtained its charter as a University in 1918. On the appointed day in 1918 when the charter was implemented it had about 500 students, and in 1959 it has about 6000.

According to the 1918 Act of Incorporation, it was deemed desirable that the College should become an University for the education, teaching and training of students, and the promotion and advancement of learning. Although this expression was omitted from the consolidating Act of 1959, the production of educated and trained students and the promotion and advancement of learning may be considered as having remained the principal goals of the University. The permanent teaching staff sign contracts undertaking to teach, to research, and to assist in administration.

In terms of its present statutory constitution, the University has nine components: a visitor (the State President), a chancellor, a principal, who is also vice-chancellor, a deputy-principal, a council, a senate, convocations, the professors and lecturers, the students. Embracing convocations, these constitute a pyramid headed respectively by the visitor and the chancellor and for day-to-day purposes by the executive head who by statute combines the offices of principal and vice-chancellor. The principal and his deputy have ex officio positions on two intermediate levels of the pyramid: as members of the council, which has the general control of the University, administers all its property, and makes all its appointments, and as members of the senate, in which is vested the superintendence and regulation of the discipline and instruction of the several departments, lectures and classes, and which has the right to be consulted by the council about all academic appointments and to submit to the council such recommendations as it deems expedient regarding

A REORGANIZATION OF THE  
«ACADEMOCRATIC» GOVERNMENT OF A UNIVERSITY:  
A SOUTH AFRICAN SOCIOLOGICAL CASE STUDY

EDWARD BATSON  
University of Cape Town

The University that is the subject of this Paper ranks as the senior institution of higher education in Southern Africa, tracing its origin to a College founded in 1829 and having obtained its charter as a University in 1916. On the «appointed day» in 1918 when the charter was implemented it had about 600 students, and in 1966 it has about 6000.

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In terms of its present statutory constitution, the University has nine components: a visitor (the State President); a chancellor; a principal, who is also vice-chancellor; a deputy principal; a council; a senate; convocation; the professors and lecturers; the students. Excepting convocation, these constitute a pyramid headed ceremonially by the visitor and the chancellor and for day-to-day purposes by the executive head who by statute combines the offices of principal and vice-chancellor. The principal and his deputy have ex officio positions on two intermediate levels of the pyramid: as members of the council, which has the general control of the University, administers all its property, and makes all its appointments, and as members of the senate, in which is vested «the superintendence and regulation of the discipline and instruction of the several departments, lectures and classes», and which has the right to be consulted by the council about all academic appointments and to submit to the council such recommendations as it deems expedient regarding



any matters affecting the University. The broad base of the pyramid comprises the teachers and students.

The remaining statutory component, convocation, comprises the staff and the alumni but not the council or the present students. Its functions are occasional, mainly electoral and advisory, and it is hardly a part of the main University pyramid. On the other hand, the administrative staff headed by the registrar is certainly a component of the pyramid but it is not so described by statute.

Excluding convocation, the University consists at present of about 7000 persons. Within the University as a social system these individuals are linked in several thousands of patterns or sub-systems of which the statutory constitution is only the skeleton.

Some of the sub-systems, especially those within the student body but also some within the body of teachers or within both, are not officially organized. They have no primary purpose to transform aspects of their environment, and such hierarchy or leadership and government as they possess is usually informal. Held together mainly by propinquity and a largely spontaneous sense of common interest, they range from friendship dyads and other small groups, class-mate groups, cliques, and recreational groups, to residential communities and other, perhaps more ephemeral, systems with memberships running into hundreds. Unlike most of the organized structural components of the University, the (sometimes vaguely defined) boundaries of these *gemeinschaftliche* groupings need not be contained within the boundaries of the University. They constitute important vectors of the University's uncovenanted outputs to its social environment, and of that environment's uncovenanted inputs into the University.

Most distinct in nature from the *gemeinschaftliche* patterns within the structure of the University are what may be called its *human mechanisms*. These are concatenations and reticulations which like fire-bucket chains are designed to produce invariant results in specific directions. Also like fire-bucket chains, they sometimes break down, or are resolved into *gemeinschaftliche* or *gesellschaftliche* sets of relationships. So long as they remain effective mechanisms, however, their essential lack of dependence upon *internalized* norms prevents them from being classified as social organizations or perhaps even as social systems of any kind. They appear mainly as components or instruments of the organized structures, differing from the other machines and material vehicles the organized structures use in that their parts are human beings. Examples are the invaria-

ble, or expectedly invariable, routines in committee procedure, the inflexible, or supposedly inflexible, sections of the channels that connect departments, offices, and officers, and in general the whole series of pro forma fixed rules and regulations that are designed to exclude any play of individual motivation at a number of nodal points and over a number of lines of communication within the total interaction process of the University.

Morphologically between the University's *Gemeinschaften* and its human mechanisms are the organized sub-systems which comprise the whole of its statutory constitution plus the congeries of committees which its constitution does not prescribe but either expressly permits or in any event does not prohibit. These are organizations (or quasi-organizations) in the sense that their *raison d'être* (or part of their *raison d'être*) is the rational dedication of specified resources to specified goals. As they are wholly components of the University, their resources are allocations from its resources and their goals are steps towards its goals.

Of the organizations of the University prescribed by statute the most important for its daily operation are the council, the senate, the faculty boards, the faculties, and the departments. Of those established under the permissive aegis of the statutes the most important are a small number of committees of council and some dozen committees (in addition to the faculty boards) of senate. Of those without express statutory authority of either kind, the most important set are the clubs, societies, and committees, and especially the students' representative council, which govern activities within the student body that are not under senate's «superintendence and regulation of the discipline and instruction of the several departments, lectures and classes».

Excepting the visitor, chancellor, and convocation, as not officially concerned with the daily working of the University, its organized structure may be regarded as on three major levels, corresponding to three different types of function in a convergent hierarchy.

A. The function of the elements operating on this level (council, with the vice-chancellor-principal and the deputy principal) is statutorily defined in general terms — the «general control» and «general supervision» of the University. In practice, this means two sets of activities: 1. Receiving from the next level below a continuous transmission of reports, requests, and recommendations covering practically the whole of the organized functioning of the University, and transmitting responses and decisions back to that level. 2. Trans-

mitting to the social environment surrounding the University the products of the processes controlled as described in (1) and receiving from the environment its responses to these transmissions and other inputs from the environment into the University.

Nearly all the requests and recommendations reaching this top level from the level next below are acceded to. This is the kind of cybernetic rubber-stamping where the nature of the propositions submitted for ratification is significantly affected by the expected response. In this way, the constraints and facilities impinging upon the University from the general society of which it is a sub-system make their major impact at the top level and are transmitted, mostly without explicit formulation, to the next below.

B. The functions of the elements operating on the next level (senate, registrar's staff, students' representative council) are more segmented than those of level A. They are also less directly exposed to environmental influences and more directly connected with what goes on at the lowest level, which it is the direct task of level B to «superintend and regulate».

C. The teaching departments, administrative sections of the registrar's office, and recognized student clubs and societies, constitute the primary level of organization of the University in the sense that there are no significant intermediary levels of organization between it and the individual members of the student body and staff. It is the level on which the University generates the processes of teaching and research and the esprit de corps that is understood to foster and support those processes.

Levels A, B, and C have close correspondences with Parsons's «three levels in the hierarchical structure of organizations», the «institutional», the «managerial», and the «technical»<sup>1</sup>. It seems, however, that the division of labour between them, particularly between levels A and B, allocates to level B less of the function of «mediation between the organization and the external situation» than Parsons assigns to the managerial system.

In the organizational structure of the University, as the model emphasizes, the position of the senate is central. In close cooperation with the registrar's administrative staff it carries joint responsibility for «controlling and servicing» all the technical processes of teaching and research that contribute towards achievement of the

<sup>1</sup> T. PARSONS, *Structure and Process in Modern Societies*, 1960, pp. 60-65.

recognized goals of the University. The registrar's staff is formally a bureaucracy in the Weberian sense. In so far as it does not deviate from the *Idealtypus* it is composed of officials holding tenure appointments and receiving promotion within a hierarchy and working impersonally within the constraints of set rules and procedures. The senate too is composed mainly of salaried officers with tenure, but it lacks certain of the characteristics of a classic bureaucracy and has other characteristics that bureaucracies do not have. We may perhaps think of it as an «academocracy», that part of the government of a university which is conducted by academics and not by bureaus.

In this system, the senate is not merely central; it has other singular and important properties. (1) With very few (although important) exceptions its membership comprises those persons whose substantive employment within the University is as heads of and operatives within its production units. Its members thus function continuously on both the «managerial» and «technical» levels, and thus control and are responsible to themselves. This may be regarded as an organizational anomaly, vestigial from a less differentiated system, or as a structural imperative for the preservation of important contemporary values. Either view emphasizes that the senate is the focus of special types of responsibility. (2) This is intensified by the manner of its recruitment. Nine-tenths of its membership is *ex officio*, the professoriate whose members are as the statutes require appointed by council after consultation with senate. The appointments are in principle to *headships of production departments* and the criteria of qualification are in fields where council professes no expertise but members of senate are credited with expertise *ex officio*. This is not a merely formal accreditation. Virtually all members of senate have, before appointment, satisfied an electoral board of the senate that they are competent to conduct, organize, and manage the teaching and research in the fields of their respective departments. By virtue of the combination (whether designed or accidental) of the three links between levels of hierarchy that this process involves — the recommendation-of-appointment from senate sent up to council, council's decision-to-appoint (hardly ever varying from senate's recommendation) effective downwards at the departmental level, the resultant *ex officio* membership returning upward to senate level — senate comes near to being self-perpetuating.

The achievement criteria by which the role of senate member is indirectly conferred are, as follows from what has been said, mainly

in terms of demonstrated performance or promise in teaching, research, and small-branch management («administration of the Department»). Of the present membership of senate, virtually the whole has formal attestation of this in (a) the possession of recognized university doctorates or other degrees or accepted equivalent academic qualifications in the fields of their departments plus (b) evidence of experience prior to appointment of a nature sufficient to generate confidence.

The senate membership also has properties that are not prescriptive criteria for recruitment but that are nevertheless characteristic of its membership. Ascriptively the senate membership is almost wholly male, white, and middle-aged — in contrast to that of the University which is of both sexes, partly multi-racial, and predominantly young. These properties of the senate, with perhaps some reservations in regard to (especially upper) age limits, are not selective criteria deliberately applied by the University itself. Rather they are indices and resultants of social selection in the environment.

In the 1950's members of senate and more particularly of certain of its committees became conscious of unusual strain in the conduct of its business. Probably many causes contributed to these strains: members with different temperaments and different roles were conscious of them in different ways. But perhaps the underlying reason for the feeling of strain was that the growth of the University had reached a stage where it was no longer possible for an academocratic body to continue to fulfil all the management functions it had previously fulfilled in the manner in which it had previously fulfilled them. It was nevertheless reluctant to abandon them.

The first systematic search for relief took a mechanistic form.

The general purposes committee of the senate had been one of its earliest and most successful inventions. Most issues that proved for any reason intractable in senate itself were thence referred to this committee, for report back or with power to act in the name of senate, and seldom without satisfactory resolution. As a remedy for increasing dysfunctioning, to route all senate business through GP in the first place without waiting for the increasing probability of reference back appeared a sufficiently promising expedient for trial adoption. It was however unaccompanied by any planned modification of structure or function in those social sub-systems that it directly affected — the senate (which now received the output of GP); the ten faculty boards and a dozen standing committees (which now provided the inputs to GP); and the GP itself. It thus remained

only a mechanical device, and one that had not been geared to any existing machinery.

The most immediately obvious effect of the innovation was to duplicate in the GP the strains felt in the senate rather than to transfer them, and the burden seemed to have been doubled rather than eased. In some degree this may have been associated with a second important effect. Although the chronological relationship of senate and GP remained unchanged and they continued to meet alternately at fortnightly intervals, their functional relationship and with it the nature of the GP had been changed fundamentally. GP had been, singularly among all the committees in the hierarchy headed by senate, the committee that met after each senate meeting. Without any alteration in the dates, it had now become one of the committees that met before each senate meeting. As new experience began to demonstrate, the GP was not able, and probably no committee would have been able, to handle its new tasks with its old efficiency. Its new function was essentially to screen and edit the agenda for the senate. The function for which it had been developed was in effect to dispose of an agenda screened and edited for it by the senate. It seemed that a body structured to perform the latter function would not be efficient in performance of the former, irrespective of the volume of business.

After sufficient experience of the aggravation of its difficulties that had resulted from the attempt to solve them by exclusively mechanical means, the senate decided to commission an analysis at a deeper level with a view to correspondingly fundamental reorganization. It desired the inquiry to be undertaken as a sociological and administrative research project with scholarly publication ultimately in view. The analysis was entrusted to the author as the sociologist member of the senate, and the task of formulating recommendations to a small committee of which he was the drafting member.

An initial step in the inquiry was to analyse the business conducted by senate in a recent year and compare it with the work it had been doing before the current difficulties had first been felt. Since the whole of the decade since 1945 might in some respects be regarded as not having fully recovered from war-time and immediately post-war organizational aberrations, it was also felt that the pre-war period should be included in the inquiry. It was possible to meet these requirements by choosing three years separated by exact decades, 1937, 1947, 1957. Recollection and inquiry disclosed no reason for thinking that these three years would fail in any material

respect to represent the years immediately before the war, the years immediately afterwards, and the years of the senate's prevalent difficulties.

The utilization of such techniques as those devised by Bales<sup>2</sup> would have been the sociologist's choice for the analysis of the business of senate if such a choice had been feasible. Apart however from the impossibility of applying direct methods of observation to past meetings, a consideration of a different kind would have inhibited the use of them at meetings in the present. It would not have been felt desirable to request the senate to admit a non-member observer to its sessions, and even a member acting in the role-set of sociological participant observer, or perhaps rather of observant participator, would presumably have thereby evoked some kind of system transcending senate proper. As participant he would be strictly a member of senate with the limitations and responsibilities appropriate to that role. As observer he would presumably be a member of a wider system. The two roles would form a pattern variable differentiated along the external-internal axis of the senate system.<sup>3</sup> Whenever a choice between the two became necessary, subordination of the participant's membership role in senate would for various reasons have been cognized as deviance. This would entirely rule out any continuous devotion to a recording or observing function, and indeed to any overt engagement in such a function at all.

Such considerations, however, were academic in all senses, in view of the desire to institute comparisons between the present and the past. If undue reliance was not to be placed on personal memory, the investigation would have to be based on the records, and this in effect meant the senate minute books.

The complete set of senate minute books was available for the research. Every act of senate had been resolved upon or ratified at a meeting of senate, every meeting had been minuted, and every minute had been confirmed. Within its limitations the record was therefore comprehensive and complete. It did not purport however to be an account or even a summary of all that was said and done at senate meetings. Broadly speaking, it comprised (a) the written considerations laid before senate and (b) its decisions thereon, constituting thus a statement of the initial and final steps of each act

<sup>2</sup> R. F. BALES, *Interaction Process Analysis*, 1950.

<sup>3</sup> T. PARSONS, «Pattern Variables Revisited», *American Sociological Review*, August 1960, p. 470.

but little of the process of any act. In other words, it was a record of inputs to and outputs from senate.

It was rather the action within the senate than its role within the University that was of interest in the investigation. Nevertheless, the inputs and outputs were common to both, and their nature and classification would also provide some simple clues to the processes in the senate that had converted the one into the other. They would make possible at least a statistical outline of the action in senate. But it would first be necessary to devise a consistent principle for categorizing and measuring the input and output streams, i.e. for defining the *unit act* of senate business.

No such consistent definition was explicit in the minutes themselves. The primary uses of the minutes were to serve the administration as directives and the senate as precedents. Both uses required a catalogue of issues and decisions, that is to say of individual inputs and outputs. The distribution of business under headings in the minutes as they stood was nevertheless not directly utilizable by the research. Largely for the sake of administrative continuity, the circumscription of an item in the minutes tended to be the same as in its originating agenda, which in turn would usually have been derived from other minutes and agendas and so back to a source inside or outside the University where the principles of delimitation of business need not have been the same as those followed in the senate. The senate minutes might therefore group as one item a number of distinct although connected acts of decision or in other ways present the record in units different from the functional units of the process being recorded.

A further problem for the research arose from the frequent difficulty of determining how many decisions senate had in fact made in dealing with a particular agenda item. Unless rules for reducing complex «items» to simple units could be devised, attempts at quantitative analysis would have either to be abandoned or to fall back on acceptance of the minute item as the definitive unit. It was believed that an adequate rule would fortunately be derivable from the fact that the outputs of senate consisted of decisions: sometimes decisions-to-act, more often decisions-to-recommend, but in any case decisions which were in effect the contribution of the senate as a sub-system to the system comprising the University.

The rule was derived by the following reasoning. The process of convening and interacting is for a body like the senate to some extent an end in itself. It should certainly be regarded as an «inte-



grative» function performed by the senate both within its own interactive subsystem and for the whole University. In so far, however, as this function might be prescindable as nevertheless not part of the organizational purpose of the senate sub-system, it would appear that senate completes a unit of functional action each time it comes to a decision upon an issue that has been presented to it. In the light of this consideration, a working rule was framed as follows: the unit act of senate is the individual resolution which in the light of senate's customary practice *could have been* taken as a separate decision, whether or not it was so separated in fact and whether the decision was argued or was tacit.

The unit of business having been defined, it was a straightforward although laborious task to enumerate the inputs and outputs of each senate meeting in each of the three chosen years. The count completed, its most obvious import was that in twenty years the amount of senate business had nearly doubled. The average rate of increase over the whole period had been similar to the rate of increase in the number of students, and the number of units of business dealt with in each year had been roughly of the same order as the number of students in that year. The second coincidence could presumably have been hardly more than accidental.

FIGURE 1

Number of Unit Acts of Senate  
and Total Student Registrations  
in each of three years

Year	Unit Acts	Students
1937	2570	2116
1947	3668	4239
1957	4851	4732

The increase in the flow of inputs to senate at an average rate of about four per cent per annum may, in terms of Loomis's PAS Model<sup>4</sup>, be regarded as one of the conditions of action for senate. In conjunction with others of its conditions of action, especially time

<sup>4</sup> C. P. LOOMIS, *Social Systems: Essays on their Persistence and Change*, 1960, *passim*.

and membership size, this mechanical constraint had begun to have sociological consequences of an increasingly dysfunctional kind.

Among the chief manifestations of this dysfunction were: 1. Increased time devoted to senate and committee meetings (proliferation of committees, especially ad hoc; more frequent meetings; longer sittings). 2. Decreased time nevertheless available per unit of business. 3. Absence of any rational system in curtailing the time available per unit of business (with dysfunctional by-products in so far as curtailment was therefore fortuitous, or encouraged deviation-al action). 4. Growing proportion of business taken without previous notice in agenda. 5. Increasing sense of stress in meetings. 6. Increasing uncertainty and indecisiveness in the functioning of the system (agendas unfinished owing to lack of time, infectiousness of practice of leaving matters undecided even when there was time for decision). 7. Increasing practice of dealing with unfinished business by (a) «processing» through mechanisms rather than resolving by social action, (b) reference to other systems (sub-committees for report, or as open issues to higher bodies), (c) reference for administrative decision. 8. Although increased resort to mechanisms might not be objectionable in principle, in practice it could be effective only when appropriately applied (whereas it was often applied impromptu and therefore sometimes inappropriately, necessitating either acceptance of a bad decision or time-consuming revision). 9. Reference to sub-committees or other systems often served only to initiate a «loop» which, because subject to the same basic constraints as the original situation, could not materially advance the process of decision, even sometimes generating further loops. 10. Reference for administrative decision in general implied transference of responsibility from the academocracy to the bureaucracy (which formerly as an occasional expedient had served to cushion and stabilize the normal functioning of the system, but as a frequent recourse was now beginning to institutionalize transference of areas of function from the academocratic to the bureaucratic section of the management).

It would have been mistaken to think of these dysfunctional tendencies as arising only from the quantity of business. Pressure from increase of business was the aspect of dysfunction that was most recognizable, but it was not its only source. Had it been, the senate would probably have been able to deal with it. The increase of business was, however, cumulating concomitantly with environmental changes in the sectors of society providing the University's in-

puts and receiving its outputs, and with changing relationships between the several sub-systems of the University itself.

It was found helpful to visualize the resultant situation in terms of a continuum of *bases of evaluation*, employing Becker's categories *proverbial, prescriptive, principial, and pronormless*<sup>5</sup>. With this continuum as a horizontal axis expressing *grounds for decisions*, it was possible to suppose a graph whose vertical dimensions represented the number of unit acts of decision performed in a given period. For any organization, the resultant curve should presumably have a fairly steep mode in the principial sector. Although for the reasons already given there were no statistical data to support this conclusion, indirect evidence suggested strongly that the combined pressures on business in the senate were beginning to enforce a kind of platykurtosis on the distribution of decisions, expressed on the one hand in individual or even collective deviations into some measure of pronormless impatience with rules and standardized values and on the other hand in regressive tendencies towards traditionalism.

Becker's association of the sacred-secular continuum with *boundary maintenance*<sup>6</sup> was found particularly illuminating. The maintenance of a balance between isolation and accessibility, even in «vicinal» and «social» but especially in «mental» contexts, was precisely one of the problems of which senate was empirically most aware and to which attention had been drawn in the terms of reference for the research.

While therefore it was primarily the quantity of business that had made senate aware of dysfunction and that received primary attention in the research, there were qualitative and classificatory factors that the research and resultant recommendations took into account.

Where there had been uncertainty in the application of principles, this had for the most part not been due to doubt of the University's proximate goals. It had arisen rather from failure to distinguish questions of resources and questions of objectives when discussing specific steps towards those goals. All agenda items could be classified as involving one of three types of resources-objectives situation:

Type 1: Objectives undetermined, resources unidentified.

Type 2: Objectives determined, resources unidentified.

Type 3: Objectives determined, resources identified but unallocated.

<sup>5</sup> C. P. LOOMIS and Z. K. LOOMIS, *Modern Social Theories*, 1965, p. 48.

<sup>6</sup> H. BECKER, *Through Values to Social Interpretation*, 1950, p. 166.

A situation of the first type involves *Zweckrationalität* and situations of the second and third types involve *Wertrationalität*<sup>7</sup> (for the referent action-system, in this case the senate) but of two different degrees of complication — differentiated apparently by their having or not having involvements external to the referent action-system. (A fourth type of situation, objectives determined and resources allocated, involves technological issues only and is not appropriate to agendas at the managerial level of organization).

In idealized terms, the intent of the re-organizations that were proposed to senate as arising from the foregoing considerations was:

1. To divert from the senate system, for resolution at the technical level in consultation possibly with administrative officials, all issues of the fourth type.
2. To retain under senate control but divert where possible from senate meetings all issues of the third type.
3. To identify to senate all issues of the second type as not involving discussion of objectives.
4. As far as possible, to divide issues of the first type into problems of objectives and problems of resources.

This intent was given expression in some 25 reorganizational proposals which, with minor reservations, were adopted by senate in a phased series over a period of two years. Besides a number of procedural and structural revisions of a more conventional type, the principal steps of the reorganization were:

1. As a general foundation: replacement of the monthly and largely ad hoc cycle of meetings of senate and committees by an articulated and stabilized *two-monthly cycle* leading to a meeting of senate with a meeting of the general purposes committee a week later if senate transmits business for it.
2. Replacement of a large number of unarticulated committee meetings by a monthly meeting of a committee comprising the deans of the ten faculties. This *committee of deans* is charged principally with the screening of all business for senate involving issues of Types 1 and 2 referred to above and with the elimination or diversion of such business involving issues of Types 3 and 4 as may not have been automatically diverted at an earlier stage of the cycle.

<sup>7</sup> In the formulation of M. WEBER, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, 1964, p. 18.

3. The replacement of a wide sector of senior committee action by a mechanism designed to process business originating at technical or lower managerial levels, and diverted from senate meetings either before reaching, or by decision of, the committee of deans. This mechanism, the *Principal's Circular*, has proved a wholly successful innovation. It has elicited inquiries from a number of universities and a description of it may be welcome here.

The Principal's Circular is a mechanism. It was designed to short-circuit senate meetings by routing most business direct to council, while assuring to senate retention of control over its contents. It is a publication, confidential to members of senate, issued fortnightly during term and less frequently during vacations. Authenticated proposals (mainly from boards and committees but in certain circumstances from individuals) automatically become resolutions of senate seven days after publication in a Circular unless they have meanwhile been objected to by any member. The title Principal's Circular was chosen to accord the document special status; each issue receives the principal's imprimatur in his capacity as chairman of senate. In effect, an issue of the Circular is an agenda of items submitted as unopposed motions to an unconvened meeting of senate.

The Circular would not have been a practicable mechanism unless it meshed properly with other mechanisms, such as the temporal cycle of senate and council meetings and the bureau procedures of the administration. It was also essential that it should be compatible with the functioning of the organizational sub-systems which it connected on all three levels A, B and C.

These constraints necessitated the design of appropriate rules to govern the scope, provenance, and procedure for inputs to the Circular.

The categorization of the types of business that might be submitted through the Circular was primarily a problem of balance, but with qualitative as well as quantitative aspects. With too narrow a field, the Circular would not be worth while. Unless it could carry off at least half the business formerly coming to senate meetings it would fail altogether of its intended effect; a good deal more than half would be necessary if the number as well as the duration of senate meetings was to be curtailed and the average time available for an item nevertheless increased.

On the other hand, every broadening of the scope of the Circular would progressively increase the likelihood of objections to some

of its contents. Furthermore, even if the incidence of objections remained tolerable, it would not be desirable to go so far in the abbreviation of senate agendas as to diminish the importance of the meetings.

Whether a mechanism such as the Circular would be feasible at all therefore depended on the possibility of striking a balance between business which senate would wish to discuss in a meeting and business which it would on the whole be prepared to treat as non-contentious so long as it remained under senate control. If the Circular was to be more than a merely temporary relief, this balance must moreover be capable of continuous readjustment.

The analysis of senate business in the three selected years had revealed that inputs from certain sources, and inputs dealing with certain topics, had been consistently more likely than others to receive a very high percentage of senate approvals. Prima facie, this was a guide to what senate might consider sufficiently non-contentious for routing through the Circular. Nevertheless, the guidance it offered was only rough. Motions which received senate approval might by no means be non-contentious in the sense that all members would have been prepared to subscribe to them without discussion. The list of permitted categories and sources for Circular business that was eventually submitted for adoption by the senate was therefore based not only on the statistical analysis of past business but to a large extent on observations of the process of discussion in senate and also in its boards and committees.

To secure the Circular's initial acceptance and the benefits of gradual habituation, its full intended scope was realized in stages. It now handles more than three-quarters of the business of senate, receiving regular schedules of recommendations from nearly all senate boards and committees in some fifty categories of senate action where there is a consensus as to objectives and where the resources necessary for action are at the disposal of the senate sub-system.

The Circular was not absolutely restricted to its function as a short circuit for the allocation of available resources among determined objectives. It was also designed to be a vehicle for proposals involving *Zweckrationalität* which were too urgent to await committee meetings. This use of the Circular necessitated special rules and procedures not detailed here.

The university must depend on the recognition of its services as good

<sup>1</sup> T. Parsons, *Structure and Process in Modern Societies*, 1954, p. 42.

The reorganization has had effects of the kind intended. The time available for each unit act in senate has been doubled, the number of senate meetings has been halved, and long sittings have been eliminated. The total number of unit acts of senate meetings in 1965 was only 23 % of the figure for 1957 and 20 % of the number expected in 1965 if the trend from 1937 had continued.

The estimated number of unit acts of senate in 1965 including those performed through the medium of the Principal's Circular was 5400, of which the Circular carried 4300.

In order to facilitate implementation of the proposals arising out of the research it was agreed that their adoption should be regarded as experimental and subject to review after two years.

Nearly half the members of senate have volunteered contributions to the review, which to a greatly preponderating extent has attested the benefits of the reorganization. The extensive record of experience and opinion gathered in the course of the review constitutes a quarry of valuable data, at present being analysed. It is hoped that the analysis, together with the full report on the original research, will be of interest on a generalized level to sociologists and university administrators.

In the present Paper it is of interest to mention that there were two topics that in the course of the review were brought up much more frequently than any others: procedure for senior appointments, and the role of the committee of deans and general purposes committee in influencing senate policy. The foregoing discussion has stressed the focal sociological importance of these two functions within the senate sub-system of the University.

The implicit fundamental issue in the review, as also in the research and reorganization that preceded it, concerned the nature of the University's outputs to its environment, that is to say the nature of its goals and the ultimate criteria by which its functioning must be judged. The research had begun by accepting the view, as expressed for instance by Parsons, that «the university belongs quite clearly in the category of pattern-maintenance primacy. Its goal is twofold: it is part of the process of socialization or of education, and it has responsibility for creative modification of the cultural tradition through the processes usually referred to as 'research'. Its functions for the social system are 'expressive' rather than 'operative', and its importance is clear in the long run rather than the short run. The university must depend on recognition of its services as 'good

in themselves' rather than on their short-run utility in the society». <sup>8</sup> This allocation to the «L sector» of the total society was not overtly challenged by any of the data or findings of the research described in the present Paper. But there has been an undercurrent of implication, both in the data and in comments upon them, that environmental pressures upon the University are making it progressively more difficult to resist migration in the direction of the «A sector», where the University's increasing functions are «operative» rather than «expressive» and relatively short-run utility is precisely the relevant criterion. There have also been indications that any such migration may have intimate connexions with the possibilities of transferences of function between the academocratic and bureaucratic sectors of the University's own management. These are aspects of the research which it is hoped to pursue.

The research of which certain limited aspects have been described in this Paper is continuing. The writer would appreciate communication with other universities encountering similar problems to those described, or other sociologists interested in them.

<sup>8</sup> T. PARSONS, *Structure and Process in Modern Societies*, 1960, p. 48.



FIGURE 2

Seasonal Distribution of the Year's Business  
(Unit Acts of Senate:  
percentage in each month of the Session  
and in the Long Vacation)

Session and Vacation	1937	1947	1957
First Term:	63	62	60
March	26	27	21
April	9	11	12
May	22	16	18
June	6	8	9
Second Term:	31	35	37
August	10	12	9
September	4	5	6
October	5	4	8
November	7	9	6
December	5	5	8
Long Vacation	6	3	3
Academic Year	100	100	100

The existence of external constraints upon the flow of inputs to senate is suggested in an elementary manner by its seasonal regularities throughout the year. In each of the three years examined by the research, much more had been handled in the four months of the First Term than in the Second Term and Long Vacation combined, and the first meeting of each Session had been the busiest. Nevertheless, while the monthly curve of business had not changed its general shape over a period of twenty years, its peaks and valleys had been levelled out a little.

FIGURE 3

«Pyramidal» Distribution of the Year's Business  
 (Unit Acts of Senate:  
 percentage dealing with basic strata  
 of the University structural pyramid)

Level of Pyramid	1937	1947	1957
Student	52	47	38
Academic staff	34	37	47
Other or whole	14	16	15
All levels	100	100	100

For a first topical analysis the annual flow of business was classified, in terms of the structural pyramid of the University, as 1. having primary concern with its student base, 2. having primary concern with its academic-staff level, 3. having primary concern with other parts of the pyramid or with the pyramid as a whole. One of the indications of this tabulation was of special interest: although the *total amount* of senate business had continued to approximate more or less to the size of the student base of the University pyramid, the *proportion* that was directly concerned with that stratum of the pyramid had fallen off by 27% over twenty years while the proportion devoted to the teaching-staff stratum had increased by 38%. That is to say, the senate was apparently securing organizational economies of large-scale production in its direct handling of the «product» for which it was managerially responsible but was encountering countervailing increased time-and-energy cost in handling the principal factor of production.

FIGURE 4

External and Internal Affairs  
 (Unit Acts of Senate:  
 percentage of the year's business  
 in each sector)

Sector	1937	1947	1957	1965	1965	
					Meetings	Circular
External	84	83	81	82	46	92
Internal	16	17	19	18	54	8
All sectors	100	100	100	100	100	100

A first analytical classification of the annual flow of business distinguished that which significantly involved the *environment* of the University (whether as a source of inputs — e.g. students, information, money income — or as a destination for outputs — e.g. degrees and diplomas, research and publications) from that which concerned only its *internal structure* (e.g. staff conditions of service, student discipline, committee membership). This distinction, along the same lines as the distinction between the foreign and home affairs of a country, revealed a remarkable stability of the distribution between external and internal business over the whole period 1937-1957, which a sample count showed to have been maintained in 1965. The above table also shows that, although not designed with that express purpose, the Principal's Circular has come to be concerned mainly with external affairs while senate meetings have devoted relatively much more attention than in the earlier years to internal University affairs.

FIGURE 5

Input Decisions and Output Decisions  
 (Unit Acts of Senate:  
 percentage of the year's external business  
 concerned with inputs to and outputs from the University)

External Affairs	1937	1947	1957	1965	1965	
					Meetings	Circular
Inputs to University	49	50	55	59	31	63
Outputs from University	51	50	45	41	69	37
All external affairs	100	100	100	100	100	100

As has been stated in the comment on Figure 4, the external affairs of the University were classified as matters dealing with (a) inputs to it, (b) outputs from it. This classification is the basis of Figure 5. An increase is shown to have occurred over the twenty years 1937-1957 in the proportion of senate business devoted to the inputs to the University from the environment (largely recruitment of membership — student and staff — and procurement of financial and other assets) and the sample count for 1965 showed that this increase has continued. The sample count also showed that in 1965 more than two-thirds of the external business dealt with at senate meetings concerned outputs and nearly two-thirds of that handled by the Circular concerned inputs.

FIGURE 6

Senate Decisions affecting  
the University's Functional System-Problems  
(Unit Acts of Senate:  
percentage of the year's business  
devoted to each system-problem)

System-problem and quadrant	1937	1947	1957	1965	1965	
					Meetings	Circular
Adaptation (A)	41	42	44	49	14	57
Goal-attainment (G)	43	41	37	33	32	34
Integration (I)	13	15	15	12	52	2
Pattern-maintenance (L)	3	2	4	6	2	7
All systems-problems	100	100	100	100	100	100

Crossing the dichotomies of Tables 4 and 5 generates a classification closely resembling that of Parsons's system-problems<sup>9</sup>. It had been hoped that deviational action in the conduct of senate business might prove analysable in terms of the pattern variables respectively appropriate to the Parsonian system-problems. This hope has not yet been fulfilled, mainly because of difficulties in the convincing application of the «instrumental-consummatory» dichotomy to the University's *internal* affairs. It is nevertheless believed that this obstacle may not prove insurmountable, and that at the present stage of the research the above first-approximation tabulation will be of interest.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 164.

## EDUCATION IN THE MODERNIZATION OF CULTURES

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### THE CONCEPT OF EDUCATION APPLIED TO CULTURAL MODERNIZATION

It is not my intention to restrict education to its narrow, traditional definition as I compare two means of modernizing culture. Not that I deny the importance of schools, or of communication media (like books, motion picture films, and radio), or of trained agents of community development. They are important but, as I shall argue, they don't suffice to launch thoroughgoing cultural modernization that profoundly affects people's patterns of activity. The educational factor that has proven to be capable of implementing comprehensive modernization within a single generation consists of more than schools, printed or broadcast messages, and instruction by qualified teachers. Effective education for cultural modernization involves nothing less than constructing for people new social conditions in which they will be motivated to try new ways of doing, growing, and making things and, as a result, will alter their traditional patterns of thought and feeling.

The most important problem of cultural change is not the one most often discussed in basic and applied anthropology, namely, to discover why particular innovations are accepted or rejected by prospective host communities (Honigmann, 1959: ch. 15). From a theoretical as well as a practical point of view, the important question is how substantially to transform a people's life situation in ways that call forth new behaviors. In other words, I am speaking of Howard Becker's (1964) concept of «situational adjustment», which for an explanation of change requires that we «look to the character of the situation for the explanation of why people change as they do» rather than mainly asking «what... is in him [other than a desire to act] that requires the action» he performs.

In this paper I propose to compare two ways of instigating cultural modernization, examples of both of which I have observed and studied. The first I call community development. Here my direct ex-

perience has been in Pakistan where several years ago I closely observed Village-AID in one Punjab village (Honigmann, 1960) while also studying the wider organization of community development in that country and in India. Community development I will compare with radical situational transformation of the kind we have recently heard about in Communist China and on the island of Manus in the Southwest Pacific Ocean (Mead, 1956; Schwartz, 1962). In this regard my direct experience has been in the eastern Arctic town of Frobisher Bay located on Baffin Island, where the Canadian Government has helped to create new living conditions for about a thousand Eskimo (Honigmann and Honigmann, 1965).

My object is evaluative in that I compare the relative efficacy of two approaches. I recognize the difficulty of measuring success and failure in matters of this kind (or, in fact, of educational effectiveness in general) and I am aware that such evaluation may even be premature. Results are far from all in, and long-term changes may be quite different from the short-term consequences observable in 1966. Also the contrasting circumstances surrounding each case and the unequal number of people involved make them far from ideal comparisons. In addition, different kinds of people are involved who possess diverse psychological characteristics about which I am not ready to speculate in detail but which may be crucially significant for the observed differences on which I base my argument. Finally, I acknowledge that the goal of cultural modernization (under which heading I include a higher standard of living, better health, and enhanced opportunities for personal development) is, like any value, open to debate. Although relatively few people would directly challenge those developmental goals, they might question their wisdom in terms of the secondary changes they are likely to promote in traditional societies and the manifold new problems they will unquestionably generate. I assume for purposes of this paper that value lies in modernization. That doesn't imply that I endorse it under all circumstances or regardless of the manner in which it is implemented at a particular time and place. In other words, the end hardly justifies any and all means (*cf.* Tumin, 1957: 53ff).

## COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT IN PAKISTAN AND INDIA

Phrases like «economic and social revolution,» «silent revolution,» and «symbol of the resurgence of the spirit of India» express the enthusiasm with which the governments of South Asia, encouraged by backing from the United States of America, launched community development programs that were counted on to «unleash creative energies of the people.» The phrases also echo the degree to which in some circles community development has assumed the status of a social movement arousing almost religious conviction. Such expressions, however, ought not obscure the fact that those «great» efforts (Adams *et al.*, 1955: 68) are in reality relatively limited ventures. In Pakistan, for example the First Five Year Plan allocated only Rs. 212.9 million for Village-AID work (about 3.2 percent of Pakistan's development expenses) (Mezirow, 1963: 55). To this sum one could add another Rs. 100 million representing the product and labor donated by villagers participating in local projects. On the other hand, the explicitly stated objectives are indeed ambitious, the main one being to raise rapidly the productive output and real income of the villager. To do this, the program in both Pakistan and India insist on entlisting participation by the people themselves, who will work together to improve their own standards of living, stimulate self-reliance, kindle a need for achievement, and so continue development in self-generating fashion. Operations on the local level are no doubt familiar enough to most readers (and have often enough been described — see, for example *Gaon Sathi*, 1956) to require little detail. In step one, a trained agent of culture change (a village worker or *gram sevak*) discovers or helps to catalyze felt needs of the village population. To assist people resolve those needs, he provides villagers with new knowledge, or else communicates with higher echelon personnel to bring better qualified experts to the scene. The villagers by following their tutors' lessons are expected to become culturally transformed. The social span covered by one of these change agents is significant for the evaluation I propose to

<sup>1</sup> In 1961 Pakistan disbanded the Community Development (Village-AID) organization whose agricultural extension functions were taken over by provincial agricultural departments and its other tasks by the recently established Basic Democracies. Although I am writing of the period before 1961, in customary ethnographic fashion I will use the present tense. For a history of community development in India and Pakistan see: Mezirow, 1963: ch. 1; Swezey and Honigmann, 1962.



make. On sample survey in India showed that a single *gram sevak* had 12 to 15 villages under his command; that is, from 4,000 to 8,000 persons, the smaller number of people in mountainous and tribal terrain. His circle of operations covered from 27 to 43 square miles, the latter area being characteristic of mountainous and tribal country. Not surprisingly, outside of his headquarters village the village-level worker remained for only short periods (Government of India, 1958: 47). Although community development in Pakistan and India holds agricultural development to be primary target, the programs are concerned with more, an important mission being to foster village leadership capable of engaging in planning and cooperation. Health and literacy are other target goals. Villagers, it has been shown, are likely to appraise the programs heavily in terms of such services and material benefits brought into the village as better seeds, manures, roads, vaccination for cattle, and their perception is congruent with the programs' dominant ambition (Government of India, 1957: II, 99ff).

Without asserting the total ineffectiveness of community development in South Asia, the character of this effort in Pakistan and India may fairly be described as petty and its success trifling. Ronald Segal (1965: 208-209, 212), describing the «economic precipice» on which rural India is balanced, cites Government sources that point out how community development in that country has failed to coordinate its efforts, fallen short of its own objectives, evoked too little popular initiative, and benefited richer cultivators more than poorer ones or artisans. Pakistan impressed me with the enthusiasm that some officials and western-oriented villagers invested in Village-AID. Yet the demonstration plots I saw the village worker tend, the queues I saw waiting to have him administer inoculations, and the few men I counted attending literacy classes, hardly suggested the kind of rural transformation that I had been assured in Karachi I would witness when after 5 years absence I made my second visit to West Pakistan's villages. True I went to different villages this time, including a village that had been selected for me by the Village-AID organization, but even there I saw no signs of what I would label a threshold of a social and economic revolution.

I suggest that not only the size of Pakistan's and India's effort to secure fundamental change is inadequate but also the procedure they are employing. The belief so firmly implanted in community development, that people will manifest needs which can then be successfully harnessed to induce them to work for better standards of liv-

ing, is doubtful when applied to an entire village or nation. A much longer and far more intricate path leads from, say, a need for better agricultural output to the use of green manuring than the theory of «felt needs» suggests. So small a change as this — the adoption of green manuring — though highly significant from the existential standpoint of a particular actor, is negligible compared to task of modernization facing those countries. Most people remain unaffected when with diligence and skill the *gram sevak* induces one client to move some distance toward agricultural or any other kind of modernization. Consequently, however successful the agent of change may be in individual cases, in the larger context people continue to do business as usual, manifest their customary attitudes, enter traditional social relationships, follow habitual goals. In other words, they continue a cultural momentum hardly deflected by the small change that has been accomplished.

The model of education utilized in community development comes from the schoolroom. It depends on a change agent (equivalent to the classroom teacher) who introduces and demonstrates innovations (new knowledge). Emphasis is put on instilling something into relatively passive pupils who are supposedly motivated — even eager — to learn and who will subsequently, it is hoped, put into practice (somehow, someday) what they have learned. As many people have pointed out, the trouble with this model of education lies in the big gap separating input from output or action. As a result, the method is inefficient and inadequate especially for large-scale cultural modernization, a conclusion that the reports of the respective community development organizations of Pakistan and India support despite their undercurrent of optimism. Such model of education doesn't anticipate the problems pupils face in trying to translate into action what they learn passively (even when they understand it). It doesn't expect that even having learned pupils may still be anchored to customary habits by their largely unchanged milieu of action. For as Margaret Mead (1956: 447) says, «survival of some parts of an old pattern tends to reinstate the rest, and so continually acts as a drag on the establishment of new habits...»

Community development based on the extension agent can certainly achieve some welcome advances in living standards. The emphasis on self-help may even catalyze social responsibility and boost morale, particularly where a cooperative project has been successfully executed. My criticism is that such small-scale attempts at change do not promote cultural modernization fast enough, or secure

it against dragging and retrogression, because they leave the larger situation relatively unaltered. Kusum Nair in her reportorial *Blossoms in the Dust* (1962: 195-196) asks: «In the conditions that prevail in rural India... would it be reasonable to expect that the 'side effects' of physical, institutional, and economic development will bring about the necessary adjustment in the human factor more or less automatically with the help simply of the demonstrations and exhortations of the extension services provided under the Community Development programme? Can we really expect that such a revolutionary transformation will come by itself, when it has not been possible to enforce even simple acts of social legislation, such as removal of untouchability or raising the marriage age of girls and boys?»

Nair overlooks the most important fact that revolutionary changes in India's supposedly rigid system of religion and caste values have come about and precisely when Indians' situation changed radically under the revolutionary impact of western culture (O'Malley, 1941).

#### ESKIMO IN FROBISHER BAY

The Baffin Island town of approximately 2,000 people — over 900 of them Eskimo — that is Frobisher Bay originated in 1942-43 when construction began of an air strip that enabled the place to serve as a staging route in the transfer of war material between the United States and her European allies. At that time probably less than a hundred Eskimo lived at the future townsite. Baffin Island Eskimo had begun to absorb European elements into their culture long before 1942, intensive contact with western civilization dating to the middle of the 19th century when many whalers visited the coast and even employed Eskimo. Missionaries arrived not long thereafter. During the ensuing decades the Eskimo adopted the same assortment of new clothing; guns; traps; flour, tea, and a few other foodstuffs; elements of Christian belief and worship; card playing, and other recreation. As a result, their lives were changed but they were not as radically transformed as they became in the 1950's after a heavy influx of Eskimo families moved into the town in pursuit of jobs that became increasingly available with the construction of a radar site and the eastern Arctic DEW Line. To accommodate the rapidly expanded native population — from 258 in 1956, to 494 in 1957, and 624 in 1958 — the Canadian Government found itself assuming increasing responsibilities and providing more and more ser-

vices for the Eskimo, including houses and a townsite for its native employees; houses for welfare cases as well as for rental, and finally houses for a housing cooperative that its agents had helped to organize. In addition to a hospital, the Government instituted a rehabilitation center to retrain Eskimo who through serious surgery or incapacitating illness were prevented from returning to their traditional land-based careers, and of course it provided schools. Simultaneously many other facilities appeared in Frobisher Bay, not to serve the local Eskimo but to provide weather and airport services to military and civilian air traffic and to administer the region. Stores opened as well as a laundry, power-plant, hotel, and radio station. These facilities provide year-round jobs for some Eskimo and many non-Eskimo. The Government also provides for the distribution of water to, and the collection of sewage from, Eskimo and non-Eskimo homes. Government-operated busses transport children, workers, and as space permits other adults. Volunteers man a fire-fighting station. The provision of these and other urban-type amenities to Eskimo and non-Eskimo does not come cheap in the Arctic. It requires a many-stranded lifeline between Frobisher Bay, the rest of Canada, and then to the rest of the world. In that wider society originate most of the satisfiers that make the town a comfortable place in which to live, including much of the food Eskimo consume; hardware; oil for heat and light; building materials; clothing and clothing materials; engines and other appliances; medicines; gramophone records, tape recorders, and musical instruments; movie films; even the stone which Eskimo carve, as well as the doctors, nurses, teachers, and other specialists who are partly responsible for maintaining Frobisher Bay as it is.

Maintaining the town and its functions provides about one-third of the adult male population (79 in number) with steady jobs and furnishes many more men with occasional wage labor. In addition men seek whatever seasonal opportunities their schedules provides to hunt caribou and seal or to fish. A few men — about 16 — make a more or less full-time career out of living on the land in relatively traditional fashion. But even they by no means wholly insulate themselves from the town's resources, particularly not in winter when they reside in the community for several months. Few if any Eskimo reveal dire poverty. Even the rudest self-made cabins using scrap lumber cannot be compared to the delapidated shacks located at the outskirts of a South Asian city, especially not when their radio-equipped, comparatively well furnished interiors are examined.

We heard nobody complain of chronic hunger; nobody wears rags of necessity. Basic needs are met quite adequately; either through jobs, a combination of jobs and social assistance, or in some cases completely by social assistance. As a result, people's higher needs can be activated, which happens when people plan summer holidays on the land, furnish their homes comfortably (even luxuriously by local standards), and participate generously in recreation.

This, then, is the situation that confronts the Eskimo who live in Frobisher Bay, one that they help to maintain in association with other Canadians. I have heard Government officials refer to their role in the Arctic as «community development», particularly when they describe efforts to help the Eskimo organize fishing and other producer and consumer cooperatives (cf. Iglauer, 1966). It should be apparent that, unlike community development in South Asia, in Frobisher Bay measures affecting the Eskimo do not constitute part of a formal and explicit program. Broad and very vague target goals for Canada's northern people are periodically enunciated by political figures in Canada. Generally they visualize the Arctic manifesting a partnership the indigenous population brought to a high standard of education by representatives from southern Canada. This goal, however, is not being self-consciously pursued and has little immediate relevance for the situation in which Eskimo clerk, repair trucks, perform janitorial duties, cook in a restaurant, keep house in electrified homes equipped with refrigerators and telephones, play bingo, see twice weekly movies, appear in court, and attend elementary school. Development of a new life for Eskimo in Frobisher Bay has an *ad hoc* character, but it has nevertheless rapidly transformed Eskimo culture at practically every observable point. During my 6 months presence in Frobisher Bay in 1963 I observed the people's experience with modernization to be continuing, for example, when the Community Council debated the ineffectual role the Government itself was playing in the town's spring cleanup, when members of the Community Association listened to an annual report and then elected a new board of directors (the majority Eskimo), and when the housing co-operative sought to extend its efforts into a consumer co-op and the Community Association acquired used busses with the intention of branching out into the transportation business. No doubt in those instances the Eskimo acted in frameworks that had been arranged by white men or after a few men had received careful counsel from interested administrators who, among other things, wanted to promote Eskimo initiative and self-reliance. But that in no way

reduces the significance of such actions as steps taken toward modernization. Knowing that officials are officially and unofficially interested in what Eskimo do explicates the character of the learning situation of Frobisher Bay. We have parted company with the model of education in the classroom, in which a teacher instructs and exhorts relatively passive pupils. Education in Frobisher Bay is a matter of practice and action, action that sometimes occurs as Eskimo act in situations which white men have structured or helped to plan.

Compared to community development in the Pakistan village that I remember, the truly remarkable feature in Frobisher Bay is the way Eskimo at almost every turn are able to gear their behavior to a modern culture into which, well within a single generation, they have transformed their lives. New jobs, new housing and house furnishings, new patterns of organization, new forms of recreation, new problems and temptations, new agents of social control, new models — have all appeared simultaneously and invited a wholesale cultural upheaval which, as I have indicated, still goes on. Yet, change has not affected everything. Many people, though they understand English, are comfortable only when they speak Eskimo and even children do not speak English too readily. The Eskimo in the town have not wholly shed their past; sentimentally it retains a strong hold over them and they are intent on teaching hunting and other land-based skills to their children, even if to do so they must take the youngsters out of school to enable them to accompany their parents. Nor can the people be said to have changed wholly at their own pace, for survival in the town depends on meeting promptly the white man's demands and on correcting behavior alertly and quickly when it fails to meet the white man's expectations. From the opposite point of view, a cautious administration has also held the Eskimo back and slowed down change. For example, officials by withholding advice and support have arrested the pace at which Eskimo entrepreneurs can emerge in businesses of their own.

Frobisher Bay does contain some agents of change who seek to develop the Eskimo by talking to and instructing him. For example, we find that familiar educational pattern firmly entrenched in the classroom. But this is not the style of education followed by the industrial development officer, who if he explains the advantages of cooperative organization is also ready to back the desire of the people to own their own houses by putting the resources of the Government to work at cost in securing and shipping prefabricated parts for those houses. In the case of the fishing cooperative, the Govern-

ment provides the engine and building necessary to freeze fish, enlists the labor of fisherman and packers, furnishes nets and fuel for the undertaking, and seeks southern markets for the product.

Like a «total institution,» Frobisher Bay provides an all-encompassing learning situation in which nearly all of the Eskimo's needs are met under circumstances vastly different from those he lived under a short time before (Goffman, 1962). His transformation is geared to many simultaneously operative incentives and negative sanctions. However, he is under no obligation to transform his life. His response to town life is not dictated. He may remain uninvolved or can still quit the town to return to his former settlements and resume his career on the land. On the other hand, the town constitutes more than a mere limiting condition on behavior. The positive quality of the situation lies in its invitation to act and in the ready way it makes possible commitment to a new way of life. When he elects to make that commitment, the town-dwelling Eskimo becomes substantially a different kind of a person.

#### DIFFERENCES AND SIMILARITIES

Further differences and similarities between community development in South Asia and the situation confronting Eskimo in Frobisher Bay can be pointed out. It is quite in keeping with the large number of people to be influenced through community development in poor countries like Pakistan and India that input costs in such programs are relatively low, meaning that goals are achieved at relatively slight cost (Malenbaum, 1957: 6, 17). Villagers provide labor voluntarily, obviating wage compensation. Their reward is intended to come from their successful accomplishments; that is, from higher yields, better roads, cleaner water, and so on. In Frobisher Bay, on the other hand, rewards for labor are monetary, or better put, derive from the satisfiers that money can immediately buy. Maintaining the town of Frobisher Bay requires considerable expenditures by the Federal Government for which Canada in return receives little of economic value. Government-financed housing, a power plant, schools, an airport, administrative offices, and other facilities provide the Eskimo with remunerative work, and with indispensable opportunities to try new behaviors and to form new ideas and values, thereby to modernize. My point is that the cost of such opportunities comes high and in present circumstances can only be borne by a

relatively rich country that needs to provide such services for only a comparatively small number of people.

In both the Far North and South Asia cultural outsiders constitute the agents who are heavily involved in managing the educational process. That is, both the Eskimo and peasant villagers are being led toward modernization by officials or teachers committed to the western world and to modern standards that are at variance with standards traditionally followed by the people in their charge. In Pakistan and India, however, the élite leaders belong in some measure to the same basic cultural and historical tradition as the people they are guiding. Despite this basic link between tutors and learners, the pace of change there is slow. In Frobisher Bay, persons serving as leaders and models belong to a different historic and cultural tradition. They rarely speak the language of the people they are guiding and have limited empathy into the people's perceptions and values. Yet there change has been rapid and thorough! It is proper to conclude that, contrary to what has been claimed, cross-cultural education to be successful need not be founded on a «good understanding» of the culture to be altered.

Community development in Pakistan and India tries deliberately to inculcate values and motivations favorable to cultural modernization, a requirement that David C. McClelland (1957) holds essential for successful development in underdeveloped areas. McClelland lists three ways in which motives favorable to development can be brought about: (1) Through adult persuasion and education; (2) through structural changes in social relations that subtly promote new values (for example, the expropriation of landlords in revolutionary China and the subsequent division of large landholdings), and (3) through childrearing, early childhood being a time which he regards as most highly likely to result in high achievement motive. An early bent toward achievement derives not only from parental coaching but also from appropriate encouragement provided by nurseries, schools, and well-trained teachers. In fact, in a newly developing country those agencies are most important for starting a self-sustaining modernizing program than the family, which is more likely to implant traditional attitudes. South Asian community development, I said, recognizes the need for motivational change as it seeks, with relatively poor success, to create and maintain a need for modernization by persuading villagers to help themselves and by giving them successful experience in carrying out developmental tasks. Community development, however, achieves relatively little



structural change within the village. The provinces and states of Pakistan and India have, of course, for a long time maintained village schools that no doubt help to stimulate interest in cultural modernization. However, the situation in the village allows few means whereby the individual, spurred to modernization by what he learned in school, can readily perpetuate and exercise his new-found motives. Migration from the village is, of course, a possibility, but hardly helps to modernize the village itself. By contrast, in Frobisher Bay relatively little adult education or persuasion occurs which has motivational change as its deliberate aim. However, structural changes that involve the individual in producer and consumer co-operatives and spur home ownership, jobs, and decision-making in nonfamily organizations constitute the very essence of the Eskimo's new situation in the town. Schools in the town, including a pre-school class of youngsters, duplicate the work of formal education in South Asia but in a situation replete with possibilities for the person to try out the motives he learns through that agency. (I must note that I am unable to say how effectively rural schools in South Asia or schools attended by Eskimo in northern Canada implant motives favorable to achievement; my reasoning merely assumes that this occurs).

#### TRANSFORMING THE ARENA OF ACTION

In keeping with the radically new situation confronting Eskimo in Frobisher Bay and presenting those people with many more possibilities for a more modern style of life than available to Pakistan and Indian villagers, the former people are modernizing much more rapidly than the latter.

Not to be misunderstood let me say explicitly that no situation can automatically induce change, which comes only through the response people choose make in their customary behavior. My point is that some situations are better designed than others to induce such a response, although the difficult-to-recognize psychological potentialities of people to offer such responses are also extremely significant. It is quite unlikely that any situation will extend its possibilities of action equally to young and old, men and women, more intelligent and less intelligent. To be specific, in Frobisher Bay, for example, officials with power control access to the arena of action when they deliberately choose some individuals who possess determinable social and personality characteristics for jobs or special at-

tention. However, in some degree the town environment affects all the Eskimo who remain in it and who are capable of perceiving significant cues in their situation to which they suit their behavior. Such cues include wares in the store, instruction and teaching aids in school, types of social dancing, technical skills found on the job, conflict set up between nearly equally desirable alternatives that call for new ways of scheduling mutually exclusive behaviors, and particular Eurocanadians who become patrons or models of particular Eskimo.

The theoretical lesson I draw from my experiences in Frobisher Bay and South Asia has already been stated. Education is well designed for cultural modernization when it presents people with conditions that allow them to try a broad range of new modern behaviors and thereby to transform their lives. The Eskimo's whole arena of action has been altered in Frobisher Bay, leading those people to act in a multitude of new situations and carrying them by long strides toward cultural modernization. As Buchler (1955: 33) says, «action can modify the total relation of the organism to its world.» He adds that when action is performed in traditional fashion it may only «perpetuate the more monotonous responses of an individual to [his] already confined world».

My case studies from the Canadian Arctic and South Asia support an increasingly compelling theory of sociocultural change, namely that wholesale and rapid change is more easily assimilated than slow, partial change. Anthropologists used to visualize change as terribly difficult; therefore they endorsed only small changes unlikely to upset a social system and promote distress in its members. From this position they have moved to a point where they recognize that the least conflictful kind of change may lie in people simultaneously transforming a culture on many fronts. As Margaret Mead (1956: 442) says: «However much it had become clear that change was now inevitable, that it would be rapid, that we must have as our goal the making of some members of every culture world-mobile in one generation, we were still trapped in a one-sided picture that something was being *done to* people, and that by insisting on working as slowly as possible, and through their own cultural values, we were protecting and cherishing them». Her experience in Manus leads her to a contrary conclusion: «Rapid change is not only possible, but may actually be very desirable, that instead of advocating slow partial changes, we should advocate that a people who choose to practice a new technology or enter into drastically new kinds of economic re-

relationships will do this more easily if they live in different houses, wear different clothes, and eat different, or differently cooked, food (*Ibid.*, pp. 445-446).»

Frobisher Bay Eskimo did not change as abruptly as the lagoon people of Manus. Years of familiarity with the trading posts and missionaries had prepared the Eskimo for the dress they now wear, the food they buy, and the ideas they espouse. Their experience is perhaps more comparable to that of European immigrants who speedily adapted to American life not only because the most energetic, intelligent, or resourceful had been selected for emigration but also because of «the transforming experience of entering a world where everything was different, to which one brought only the clothes in which one stood and which were easy to discard» (Mead, 1956: 446). Slow, gradual, or partial change is less a bridge linking old and new than, in Mead's (1956: 447) words a «condition within which discordant and discrepant institutions and practices develop and proliferate — with corresponding discrepancies and discordancies in the lives of those who live within them».

Some unevenness in change is probably impossible to avoid in social life (Wilson and Wilson, 1945: 132-134). Certain categories of people change faster or proceed in different directions than others; some departments of life outstrip other, lagging ones. Several observers have suggested that community development is likely to encourage uneven change when despite a multipurpose ideal, educational efforts concentrate on agriculture, leaving many other departments of life relatively unaffected. To encourage certain people to change — generally those already possessing the highest degree of readiness, i.e., the most modernized — increases the spread and, perhaps, the animosity or envy between «haves» and «have nots». This is also happening in international relations where economic development favors the already most advanced nations.

Unfortunately no practical lesson easily applicable to the rest of the world where modernization is sought can be directly drawn from what has happened in Frobisher Bay. I can deduce from that experience no comparable measures designed to alter arenas of action in the thousands of villages of India and Pakistan. Yet, the mainland Chinese are presumably accomplishing just such a radical transformation in an equally vast, crowded, and economically limited area. The small number of people who live in the Eastern Arctic favors the Canadian Government's plans for cultural modernization, for the Government's relatively huge economic resources do not become

unduly strained when it finances the relatively unproductive North to the extent that it does. This particular model of cultural change is not directly applicable in the crowded, nonaffluent countries of the world. In conclusion I can only reiterate my faith that human intelligence will be fecund enough to devise appropriate methods of large-scale cultural transformation and to administer them through law, never to everyone's equal satisfaction, but hopefully with most everyone perceiving the promise of a more desirable future.

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## LES JOURS DE SEMAINE ET LES DIMANCHES DANS LA VIE DES HOMMES ET DES FEMMES <sup>1</sup>

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### 1. QUELQUES RÉFLEXIONS SUR LES FONCTIONS DES JOURS DE REPOS.

L'expérience humaine millénaire et la science sont en accord en ce qui concerne l'importance des jours de repos: une reprise de forces tant physiques que psychiques exige que les jours de travail soient de temps à autre interrompus par des jours de repos, que la tension causée par les charges et responsabilités quotidiennes soit, à intervalles, soulagée. Il est clair aussi que les jours de repos n'ont pas seulement une fonction physiologique mais aussi des fonctions sociales très importantes, en tant qu'ils forment le cadre par excellence des loisirs et acquièrent, par là, les fonctions bien connues des loisirs en général. De ces fonctions sociales il en est une d'une importance particulière de notre point de vue: le jour de repos coïncidant chez tous les membres d'une communauté est aussi une journée consacrée à des activités ou événements vécus ensemble, servant à renforcer la cohésion du groupe et à accentuer le sentiment d'unité de ses membres. Les diverses communautés — le tribu, la famille, les diverses sectes etc. — ont toujours développé des formes de rencontre ou d'activités en commun qui, s'appropriant souvent du caractère d'une institution sociale, aidèrent à affirmer le sentiment d'appartenance à la collectivité. Ces événements du jour de repos, si simples qu'ils fussent, contribuèrent à marquer ce jour par le seul fait qu'ils contrastaient avec les activités quotidiennes. Gyula Illyés, l'écrivain hongrois, décrit la vie des valets de ferme de la Hongrie d'avant-guerre, une vie caractérisée par une extrême pauvreté, dureté et monotonie. Et même là, chez «ceux de puszta», le dimanche — bien que le temps passé en commun ne pût avoir d'autre contenu que le récit des histoires chez les vieux, le chant en commun chez les jeunes — fut bien le seul jour «pour lequel il valait la peine de tenir pendant toute une semaine, toute une vie».

<sup>1</sup> L'étude est basée sur les résultats déjà disponibles de l'enquête internationale sur les budgets-temps.

Comme on l'a souvent montré, de nos jours et surtout dans la vie urbanisée, tandis que l'importance des communautés traditionnelles est en déclin, la famille nucléaire, tout en changeant ses fonctions, ne perd pas son importance et certains autres groupes primaires, tel le groupe des amis «choisis», gagnent aussi en portée. Par ces changements, le jour de repos devient le jour qui fournit la condition préalable du renforcement de la cohésion de la famille nucléaire et aussi du maintien des relations «sociales», des relations d'amitié. Il me semble que cette dernière fonction du jour de repos devient toujours plus importante, ceci étant dû, au moins en partie, au taux croissant des femmes en général et des mères de famille en particulier qui font un travail en dehors de leur foyer. En effet, une des conséquences de ces développements est que le caractère traditionnel de la relation entre mère et enfant change: ils se rencontrent, pendant la semaine, plus rarement et pour des périodes plus courtes qu'auparavant. Le temps passé ensemble le dimanche devient donc plus précieux pour les deux. (Certains résultats d'une enquête hongroise donnent quelque évidence sur ce point: les mères actives et non-actives répondent à un taux égal que pendant leur temps libre elles s'occupent de préférence de leurs enfants, mais les mères actives aspirent plus que les autres à pouvoir être davantage avec eux: elles disent à un taux à peu près trois fois plus élevé que les non-actives qu'elles s'occuperaient de préférence de leurs enfants si elles avaient plus de loisir<sup>2</sup>.) Une autre conséquence de l'ascension sociale des femmes (voire du niveau croissant de leur scolarisation, leur participation plus active dans la division sociale du travail, qui élargit peu à peu leur champ d'intérêt, etc.) est que par là aussi s'améliorent les conditions pour que le temps passé dans la famille puisse acquérir un contenu plus riche. (Évidemment, actuellement ce n'est qu'une tendance naissante).

Les jours de repos ont donc des fonctions physiologiques et des fonctions sociales, mais les conditions pour qu'ils puissent remplir ces deux sortes de fonctions sont presque identiques. Pour la fonction physiologique, il est nécessaire que la structure des jours de repos soit totalement différente de celle des jours de semaine. Si donc les jours de semaine sont caractérisés par le travail, alors les jours de repos devraient en être autant que possible déchargés. Plus précisément — puisque la définition du travail n'est elle-même pas

<sup>2</sup> Women in employment and at home. Hungarian Central Statistical Office, 1962.



univoque — les jours de repos devraient être libérés des travaux que l'on fait pendant la semaine et qui signifient une obligation par excellence.

C'est un problème particulier, et qui nous mènerait trop loin, de chercher quelles sont les meilleures contre-parties des divers travaux professionnels. L'on sait par exemple que pour ceux qui font un travail intellectuel, tous les sports et même le jardinage forment des contrastes excellents. On en parle moins — et ce n'est pas un pur hasard — des contreparties adéquates des différents travaux manuels. Il est clair, en effet, que des exercices physiques d'un caractère autre que le travail régulier ou toutes les formes d'activités «spirituelles» seraient convenables. Cependant, toutes sortes d'obstacles économiques et culturels font que ces formes de loisirs ne se sont encore point généralisées.

Quant à la fonction sociale au sens plus restreint du mot, elle nécessite qu'il y ait, le jour de repos, *suffisamment de temps libre* (libéré d'obligations) pour pouvoir être ensemble avec les membres de la famille ou des amis. Toutefois, il y a ici une condition complémentaire: il faut que chaque membre de la communauté ait son jour de repos en même temps.

En ce qui suit, je propose de traiter uniquement un aspect de ces problèmes: dans quelle mesure est-il vrai dans les différents pays que les jours de repos le sont vraiment, voire dans quelle mesure sont-ils libérés des obligations quotidiennes et dans quelle mesure coïncident-ils pour les membres de la communauté.

On peut approcher la question des jours de repos encore d'une autre manière, en distinguant notamment deux aspects différents des jours de repos: *l'aspect formel*, et *l'aspect du contenu*. Le premier signifie le cadre des loisirs: en quelle mesure disposent les divers groupes de la société du temps libre comme d'une condition essentielle, sine qua non de repos. Le second aspect se rapporte à l'utilisation de ce temps libre: une fois que l'on en dispose, quel peut être le contenu des loisirs chez les différents groupes de la société. Ici je négligerai donc ce second aspect pour centrer sur le premier qui est un sujet moins fréquent des études sociologiques que l'analyse détaillée des loisirs mais qui pourtant, logiquement, devrait la précéder. Encore faut-il dire que même cet aspect formel englobe plus de problèmes que je ne peux toucher ici. Ainsi la situation très spéciale et, au moins en Hongrie, assez défavorable de la paysannerie ne pourra pas être étudiée ici, en premier lieu parce que les données internationales ne portent que sur la population urbaine.

## 2. COMBIEN A-T-ON DE JOURS DE REPOS ?

Selon une opinion assez répandue, les fins de semaine de deux journées se sont déjà généralisées dans la majorité des pays, et, sinon, les samedis sont au moins des mi-journées de travail. Qu'en est-il en réalité?

On peut conclure des résultats internationaux que les weekend de deux jours ne sont, dans la majorité des pays et pour la majorité des travailleurs, qu'un mythe. Même dans les pays où l'on trouve le plus de samedis libres — en Amérique et en Allemagne de l'Ouest — plus de 50 % des actifs travaillent le samedi, exception faite pour les femmes actives en Amérique, dont plus de 70 % ont le samedi libre. (Ce n'est pas le cas dans le centre industriel qu'est Jackson.) Dans les autres pays les samedis libres sont bien moins fréquents: suivant les pays, on les trouve chez 6 à 28 % des hommes, et chez 9 à 37 % des femmes.

Deux remarques s'imposent ici. D'une part, les fréquences ne se rapportent qu'à un seul samedi de l'enquête. Or, il se peut que ces 60-80 % qui travaillaient ce jour, ne soient pas toujours les mêmes,

POURCENTAGE DES ACTIFS QUI TRAVAILLENT LE SAMEDI,  
DANS QUELQUE PAYS<sup>a</sup>

(L'ordre des pays suit les fréquences des samedis libres des hommes)

	Hommes		Femmes	
	Jours de semaine	Samedi	Jours de semaine	Samedi
USA (villes)	95	53	80	22
RFA	83	55	76	54
Belgique	96	72	88	63
USA (Jackson)	97	77	87	59
France	93	83	95	74
Tchécoslovaquie	92	89	70	79
Hongrie	93	93	93	91
Yougoslavie (Kragujevac)	95	94	82	83

<sup>a</sup> Pour avoir une base de comparaison, on présente aussi le taux moyen de ceux qui travaillent un jour de semaine. Par souci de simplicité, on caractérise les jours de semaine par le mercredi qui ne présente d'ailleurs aucune différence significative par rapport aux autres jours.

cela signifiant que plus de personnes l'ont que dans le tableau précédent, mais elles n'en disposent pas chaque semaine. Une autre question que les dépouillements disponibles ne permettent pas encore d'éclairer concerne les groupes sociaux qui ont le samedi libre. On peut pourtant supposer, sur la base de certaines informations supplémentaires, qu'ils ne sont pas distribués «aléatoirement», le taux des samedis libres étant supérieur dans l'administration et chez les profession libérales qu'ailleurs<sup>3</sup>.

Il nous reste encore à contrôler dans quelle mesure est fondée l'opinion sur les samedis comme des demi-journées de travail. Au premier abord, cette supposition paraît être fondée puisque la *durée moyenne* générale du temps de travail est presque partout réduite par rapport aux autres jours de semaine. Si l'on tient compte cependant des fréquences déjà citées, en calculant la durée du travail chez ceux qui ont *effectivement* travaillé, alors la réduction devient moindre: elle va de 0 à 2,5 heures, de sorte que les durées de samedis dépassent

LES DURÉES DU TEMPS LIÉ AU TRAVAIL, EN MOYENNE  
ET CHEZ CEUX QUI ONT EFFECTIVEMENT TRAVAILLÉ  
(ACTIFS SEULEMENT)

L'ordre des pays est le même que dans le premier tableau  
(Heures et dixièmes d'heures)

	Hommes			Femmes		
	Jours de semaine <sup>a</sup>	Samedi	Différence	Jours de semaine <sup>a</sup>	Samedi	Différence
	a/ Durée en moyenne générale					
USA (villes)	9,4	4,2	5,2	6,8	1,4	5,4
RFA	8,5	4,8	3,7	6,6	4,1	2,5
Belgique	9,5	5,5	4,0	6,7	4,1	2,6
USA (Jackson)	9,2	5,4	3,8	6,5	4,2	2,3
France	8,9	6,3	2,6	7,7	5,1	2,6
Tchécoslovaquie	8,8	6,4	2,4	5,8	5,8	0,0
Hongrie	9,5	9,5	0,0	8,4	8,1	0,3
Yougoslavie (Kragujevac)	8,4	8,4	0,0	6,9	6,4	0,5

<sup>a</sup> Caractérisés par les mercredis.

<sup>3</sup> Entre autres, la différence entre les résultats généraux de l'enquête américaine et ceux de Jackson indique aussi cette tendance.

(Heures et dixièmes d'heures)

	Hommes			Femmes		
	Jours de semaine <sup>a</sup>	Samedi	Différence	Jours de semaine <sup>a</sup>	Samedi	Différence
	b/ Durées chez ceux qui ont effectivement travaillé					
USA (villes)	9,9	7,9	2,0	8,5	6,4	2,1
RFA	10,3	8,7	1,6	8,7	7,5	1,2
Belgique	9,9	7,7	2,2	7,6	6,5	1,1
USA (Jackson)	9,5	7,0	2,5	7,5	7,2	0,3
France	9,6	7,6	2,0	8,1	6,9	1,2
Tchécoslovaquie	9,6	7,2	2,4	7,9	7,3	0,6
Hongrie	10,1	10,1	0,0	9,0	9,0	0,0
Yougoslavie (Kragujevac)	8,9	8,9	0,0	8,4	7,7	0,7

<sup>a</sup> Caractérisés par les mercredis.

sent toujours 7 heures chez les hommes, 6 heures chez les femmes. Chez les femmes d'ailleurs, où les heures de travail sont toujours un peu moins longues, cela vaut aussi pour les samedis, bien que la différence soit moindre là que dans le cas des jours de semaine.

Dans ce cas aussi, il faudra connaître la dispersion des temps de travail, aussi bien en général que par groupes sociaux, mais les données suffisamment détaillées manquent. Toutefois, des résultats connus permettent déjà de dégager quelques conclusions. Du point de vue de notre sujet, la plus importante est que le samedi n'est une journée libre que pour une minorité, mi-libre pour une autre minorité, ces deux groupes ne totalisant, vraisemblablement, la moitié des travailleurs que dans deux pays. Pour le reste, il est une journée de travail ordinaire, qui diffère tout de même des autres jours en ce qu'il précède le dimanche: ce fait influence le soir du samedi (les programmes sont plus fréquents) et quelque peu les travaux de ménage. La seule journée libre reste donc le dimanche, et il nous reste à examiner dans quelle mesure il l'est vraiment.

### 3. POUR QUI SONT LIBRES LES DIMANCHES ?

En ce qui concerne le travail proprement dit, voire le travail rémunéré, de ce point de vue les dimanches ne sont effectivement pas

surchargés, bien qu'ils ne soient pas entièrement déchargés non plus: 16 à 37 % des hommes, 12 à 27 % des femmes travaillent le dimanche aussi. L'horaire du dimanche est partout réduit même par rapport aux samedis, prenant tout de même, chez ceux qui travaillent, de 4 à 7 heures. (Ce n'est d'ailleurs que dans quelques cas qu'elle reste au dessous de 5 heures).

#### LE TRAVAIL RÉMUNÉRÉ LE DIMANCHE, DANS QUELQUES PAYS

(L'ordre des pays du premier tableau est retenu.)

	Hommes			Femmes		
	% de ceux travaillent le dimanche	Durées du temps lié au travail		% de celles travaillent le dimanche	Durées du temps lié au travail	
		en moyenne générale	chez ceux qui travaillent <sup>a</sup>		en moyenne générale	chez celles qui travaillent <sup>a</sup>
USA (villes)	37	1,8	4,9	22	1,3	5,9
RFA	24	1,5	6,3	27	1,4	5,2
Belgique	20	1,3	6,4	24	0,7	3,0
USA (Jackson)	33	1,2	3,6	16	0,6	3,7
Fiance	28	1,9	6,8	9	0,4	4,7
Tchécoslovaquie	16	1,2	7,4	21	1,0	4,9
Hongrie	31	2,0	6,5	13	0,9	7,1
Yougoslavie (Kragujevac)	28	1,7	6,7	12	0,8	6,8

<sup>a</sup> Ces durées — calculées sur la base des deux premières séries — ne sont qu'approximatives.

Donc, pour un quart ou un tiers des familles, le jour de repos ne coïncide pas pour tous les membres. (Il est légitime de parler de familles puisque selon les données plus détaillées les hommes et femmes mariés travaillent le dimanche à peu près autant que les non-mariés, avec cette réserve que dans quelques pays le taux est plus réduit pour ceux qui ont des enfants). Il est certain dans ce cas que ce ne sont pas toujours les mêmes qui travaillent, mais il est non moins certain que le travail du dimanche n'existe que dans les services et dans quelques industries. Donc, même si 40 ou 50 % des actifs travaillaient dans ces branches, chaque second dimanche serait pris chez eux. (Les problèmes sociologiques que pose le travail de

dimanche mériteraient une étude spéciale, d'autant plus que les grands écarts entre les pays laissent à supposer qu'il y a une assez large latitude en ce qui concerne l'indispensabilité de ce travail).

Mais le travail obligatoire ne se limite pas au travail rémunéré. Et si l'on tient compte de toutes les obligations (travaux de ménage, soins aux enfants, etc) alors il est clair que de grands groupes sociaux — les femmes actives qui ont leur ménage, et les femmes ayant des enfants en général — ne peuvent pas pleinement profiter du dimanche, et on n'a guère le droit de parler chez elles d'une vraie journée libre. En effet — à l'exception des Etats-Unis — les travaux de ménage et les soins aux enfants occupent de 4 à plus de 7 heures aussi bien chez les actives que les non-actives. Si l'on prend ensuite en considération tous les travaux, ils totalisent en moyenne de 2,5 à 5 heures chez les hommes, de 4 à 8 heures chez les femmes.

DURÉE TOTALE MOYENNE DES TRAVAUX DE DIMANCHE  
(Temps lié au travail, travaux de ménage et soins aux enfants)  
En heures et dixièmes d'heures

	USA (villes)	RFA	Belgi- gique	France	Tchéco- slova- quie	Hongrie	Yougo- slavie (Kragu- jevac)
Chez les mariés sans enfants:							
Hommes actifs	3,5	3,7	2,5	4,0	5,1	5,5	4,6
Femmes actives	4,3	6,1	4,6	5,6	6,3	5,8	7,4
Femmes non-actives	3,3	4,1	4,1	4,9	5,7	6,8	8,2
Chez les mariés avec enfant							
Hommes actifs	3,2	2,5	2,7	4,0	3,5	5,1	3,0
Femmes actives	5,2	7,0	5,5	6,5	7,5	8,2	6,9
Femmes non-actives	4,6	5,0	4,8	6,2	5,9	8,2	6,8

Il s'ensuit que — bien que le travail rémunéré du dimanche soit moins fréquent chez les femmes que chez les hommes, nécessitant ainsi moins de temps — le temps libre du dimanche des femmes se trouve considérablement réduit. Excepté les femmes non-actives sans enfant, les autres groupent ont de 1 à plus de 3 heures en moins de

libre que les hommes. Ajoutons, toutefois, que ce désavantage n'a pas la même signification chez les actives que chez les non-actives. En effet, chez les ménagères, les jours de semaine présentent aussi des occasions de se reposer (même si toutes sortes de conditions empêchent l'emploi optimal de ce temps libre): même celles des non-actives qui ont des enfants ont à quelques exceptions près, autant ou plus de temps libre les jours de semaine, que les hommes actifs, tandis que chez les femmes actives ce temps est toujours de 1 à 2 heures plus court que chez les hommes.

## TEMPS LIBRE DU DIMANCHE

(En heures et dixième d'heures)

	USA (villes)	RFA	Belgi- que	France	Tchéco- slova- quie	Hongrie	Yogo- slavie (Kragu- jevac)
Chez les mariés sans enfants							
Hommes actifs	8,6	7,6	8,7	6,5	7,2	6,9	8,6
Femmes actives	7,5	5,6	7,4	5,2	5,6	6,0	6,0
Femmes non- actives	8,3	7,1	7,5	6,5	6,5	6,0	4,7
Chez les mariés avec enfant:							
Hommes actifs	8,5	8,7	8,7	6,9	7,9	5,9	8,7
Femmes actives	7,1	5,6	5,2	4,3	4,8	4,3	6,1
Femmes non- actives	8,1	6,5	6,5	5,3	5,6	3,8	6,2

Chez les femmes et mères actives, cette situation est *objectivement* compréhensible si l'on tient compte de certaines conditions actuelles. Cette notion recouvre un grand nombre de facteurs objectifs — tels la mécanisation et le confort inadéquats des foyers dans beaucoup de pays, l'importance traditionnelle que l'on attache en Europe, par exemple à la «bonne chère», le fait que les jours de semaine, y compris le samedi, sont surchargés et les femmes actives doivent se rattrapper le dimanche<sup>4</sup>, elles consacrent en général plus de temps

<sup>4</sup> Ces mêmes facteurs — voire leur absence — permettent d'expliquer en grande partie la réduction de la durée des travaux ménagers aux États-

aux travaux de ménage le dimanche que les autres jours, etc. — mais il y a un facteur sous-jacent qui nous paraît capital. C'est le fait bien connu que la division traditionnelle du travail dans la famille, qui fait des travaux de ménage et des soins aux enfants le lot des femmes, est à peine affectée par les développements nouveaux concernant l'activité économique des femmes. En effet, du total des travaux de ménage, seulement chez les couples ou mari et femme travaillent, on estime qu'environ 20 à 30 % de ces travaux sont exécutés par les hommes, 70 à 80 % incombant toujours aux femmes. (Il est remarquable que ces taux soient relativement constants dans les différents pays malgré la grande variabilité de la durée totale des travaux de ménage).

Peut-être nous permettra-t-on de placer ici une remarque complémentaire. En général, on tient les hommes pour responsables de leur passivité, du peu d'aide qu'ils fournissent à la maison. Mais une institution sociale séculaire aussi profondément enracinée et tenue donc pour naturelle qu'est la division du travail dans la famille ne peut être transformée que pendant une période plutôt longue. Et pour que cette transformation s'effectue, il y aurait besoin de plusieurs générations *éduquées* dans un esprit nouveau. Mais cela tient non seulement à la transformation des hommes, mais aussi à celle des femmes. En effet, actuellement la majorité des femmes considère comme une impossibilité la participation du mari à certains travaux ménagers (tels la vaisselle ou le lavage du linge sans machine), car ces travaux «ignobles» seraient contraires à l'image traditionnelle du «pater familias». Et l'éducation des garçons est — bien naturellement — souvent conforme à ces images.

Ces stereotypes concernant le rôle du mari dans le ménage sont pour ainsi dire partout valables, même en Amérique qui présente pourtant un modèle souvent différent de l'europpéen. Contrairement à ce que l'on entend souvent, les chiffres sur l'aide apportée par les maris révèlent à peu près les mêmes tendances en Europe et en Amérique.

L'autre aspect de cette même situation est qu'une grande partie des femmes, même des actives, se représentent comme leur rôle principal celui de ménagère et de mère (il est à noter que les soins aux

Unis: on peut dire que la civilisation, prise dans le sens d'Alfred Weber, y est plus développée qu'ailleurs, cette civilisation menant «à la rationalisation de l'existence humaine, et à la transformation du milieu extérieur par la technique.» (Cf. R. ARON, *La sociologie allemande contemporaine*, P.U.F., 1950, p. 65.)



LE TAUX DES ACTIFS MARIÉS QUI ONT PARTICIPÉ  
A CERTAINS TRAVAUX DE MÉNAGE<sup>a</sup>

	USA (villes)		France		Tchécoslova- quie		Hongrie	
	Hom- mes	Fem- mes	Hom- mes	Fem- mes	Hom- mes	Fem- mes	Hom- mes	Fem- mes
Cuisine	22	93	35	93	35	92	26	97
Nettoyage et vaisselle	23	89	33	97	37	83	29	96
Linge (lavage)	2	49	7	65	10	56	4	62
Chauffage, entretien	26	38	57	44	52	30	48	36
Achats, services	45	55	36	62	25	59	28	69
Jardinage	9	14	22	13	7	9	34	22

<sup>a</sup> On ne peut pas encore distinguer les deux groupes des maris: ceux dont la femme est économiquement active ou non-active. En Hongrie cependant, selon les données déjà disponibles, ces deux groupes ne présentent pas de différences fondamentales du point de vue examiné ici.

enfants sont souvent plus équitablement partagés que les travaux de ménage), leur activité rémunérée n'ayant qu'une importance très secondaire. Il faut ajouter que cela est en partie dû à ce qu'à l'heure actuelle, dans tous les pays, le niveau de la qualification professionnelle des femmes est de beaucoup inférieur à celui des hommes, donc elles ne peuvent pas tirer autant de satisfaction de ce travail que les hommes. Cependant, ce n'est qu'une explication partielle vu que chez une grande partie des hommes la situation n'est pas meilleure en ce qui concerne l'identification avec le travail, mais le rôle professionnel ne reste pas moins pour eux leur rôle principal.

Tandis que les conditions objectives (y compris la répartition traditionnelle survivant des tâches ménagères) suffisent à expliquer la situation actuelle des femmes et mères actives, on a besoin de recourir à une autre logique, au moins dans certains pays, pour expliquer la situation des femmes non-actives. En effet, les pays semblent se polariser de ce point de vue: dans les uns, en premier lieu aux Etats-Unis, mais aussi en Allemagne de l'Ouest, en Pologne (au moins à Torun, etc.) les femmes non-actives, surtout celles sans enfant, tâchent de réduire leur travail de ménage de dimanche au dessous de 4 heures. Dans d'autres pays tels que la Hongrie ou la Yougoslavie, elles passent, même si elles n'ont pas d'enfant, de 6 à 8

heures à ces travaux. Et dans les deux cas il est vrai que — *ceteris paribus* — les non-actives *font autant*, par fois plus de travail ménager le dimanche que les actives, qui rejettent pourtant sur ce jour-là beaucoup de travaux des autres jours. Il est par exemple intéressant que 46 % des actives, 29 % des non-actives, lavent le dimanche à Győr (Hongrie), les taux respectifs étant 47 et 13 % aux Etats-Unis. Malgré cela, la durée totale des travaux de ménage varie en sens inverse, étant de 5,6 et 6,1 heures à Győr, de 3,1 et 3,2 heures aux Etats-Unis.

Sans doute, les travaux de ménage sont très élastique: la durée d'un même travail peut varier du simple au double ou au triple; il y a des travaux qui, si le temps en manque, peuvent être totalement omis, etc. Il est certain aussi que les femmes actives sont contraintes à apprendre à rationaliser leurs activités ménagères, et ce train accéléré devenu routine raccourcit aussi les travaux du dimanche. Mais il nous semble qu'il y a une explication plus générale qui est valable pour ainsi dire partout, même si dans une mesure plus ou moins grande. C'est que les considérations économiques n'étant totalement absentes d'aucune relation<sup>5</sup>, même pas des relations familiales, et pourtant dans la logique d'une économie de marché, la société ne reconnaissant en tant que travail économiquement utile que le travail rémunéré, le travail ménager paraît être dépourvu d'utilité économique. Les ménagères se croient donc obligées de se justifier aux yeux de la société et surtout peut-être aux yeux du chef de famille. Les résultats du travail ménager ne servent pas cette justification d'une manière satisfaisante car ils sont acceptés comme naturels (et ne sont aperçus que quand ils manquent). C'est donc le travail lui-même dont il faut sentir et faire reconnaître l'existence: le travail allongé ou le travail de dimanche peuvent bien servir cette fin de démonstration (sans que ces considérations soient présentes chez celles qui le font: au contraire, elles sont convaincues de la nécessité fonctionnelle de ce travail).

Ces remarques peuvent contribuer à expliquer différents phénomènes, tel le fait que la durée des travaux ménagers suit les variations de la durée du temps de travail rémunéré des hommes; que les femmes non-actives font autant ou même plus de travail le dimanche que les actives; que la grandeur du ménage et même l'existence d'en-

<sup>5</sup> Une logique semblable se retrouve et règle les conduites dans les sociétés traditionnelles, dans les milieux paysans. Voir p.ex. l'analyse y relative dans *Travail et travailleurs en Algérie*, par P. BOURDIEU, Mouton, 1963.

fants affectent relativement peu la durée des travaux ménagers. (Les différences suivant la taille moyenne du ménage dans un pays sont beaucoup moindres que les différences entre pays, p.e. chez les familles de taille égale). Il est donc vrai dans le cas des femmes non-actives, évidemment seulement pour une partie de leurs travaux, que cette activité «est en un certain sens sa propre fin parce que, à la vérité, elle n'a pas d'autre fin que d'assurer la sauvegarde du respect de soi». (Op. cit. p. 300). Rien ne démontre mieux l'inertie de ces comportements traditionnels que le fait que les tendances révélées chez les non-actives non seulement se retrouvent chez les actives, mais sont encore acceptées tout naturellement comme étant dans «l'ordre des choses». Dans une récente enquête expérimentale hongroise par exemple<sup>6</sup>, conduite dans une institution administrative et visant à mesurer entre autres les préjugés des femmes actives contre elles-mêmes, on a recueilli d'une part leurs déclarations concernant la durée des travaux ménagers faits par elles et par leurs maris et, d'autre part, on s'est informé, si elles jugeaient suffisante cette aide ou non. Bien que les travaux ménagers (sans compter les soins aux enfants) durent presque trois fois plus chez elles que chez les maris, deux tiers (66,2 %) des enquêtées estiment suffisante la quantité d'aide apportée par leur mari. (Signalons encore qu'il s'agit uniquement de femmes actives mariées, non-manuelles, avec une qualification professionnelle bien au-dessus de la moyenne).

Malgré le rôle important que l'on impute à ce facteur «subjectif», l'on ne tient pas cette explication suffisante à elle seule, s'il faut rendre compte des variations entre les pays. En effet, il est indéniable que le travail des ménagères est fondamentalement influencé par le niveau général économique et culturel du pays, qui — s'il est élevé — permet de réduire parallèlement et pour les mêmes raisons la durée du travail rémunéré et celle du travail ménager, qui, tout en fournissant les moyens de les satisfaire, peut réveiller de nouveaux goûts et de nouveaux intérêts. Au contraire, le manque de moyens matériels ou d'une préparation culturelle adéquate peut empêcher l'éveil de nouvelles aspirations et peut, par là, allonger la durée des travaux faits alors faute de mieux, c.-à-d. pour «remplir le temps». (La TV fournit peut être l'exemple le plus éclatant pour démontrer quelle est la force de ces circonstances: l'apparition de la TV dans une famille peut raccourcir d'un jour à l'autre dans une mesure très considérable, voire d'une ou plusieurs heures, le temps consacré jusque là au ménage).

<sup>6</sup> Les résultats ne sont pas encore publiés.

Cependant, une analyse plus profonde des loisirs de dimanche (que l'on doit négliger ici) permettrait de démontrer que même dans les pays où la situation des femmes en général, et des ménagères en particulier, est la moins difficile en ce qui concerne les charges (obligatoires ou choisies), même là on ne peut pas parler d'une manière générale des «dimanches de famille», caractérisés par des loisirs en commun, d'un contenu particulièrement riche. Un seul indice suffira peut-être pour éclairer que la différence entre la situation des hommes et des femmes persiste même quand les facilités nouvelles libèrent les femmes de beaucoup d'obligations pénibles: le temps *passé à la maison* le dimanche est bien plus élevé *partout* chez les femmes que chez les hommes mariés, la Belgique fournissant la seule exception à cette règle. (La différence est bien plus grande que celle qui peut être expliquée par l'écart entre les durées du travail rémunéré).

TEMPS PASSÉ A LA MAISON ET AUTOUR DE LA MAISON  
LE DIMANCHE, CHEZ LES MARIÉS  
(En heures et dixièmes d'heures)

	USA (villes)	RFA	Belgi- que	France	Tchéco- slova- quie	Hongrie	Yougo- slavie (Kragu- jevac
Sans enfant:							
Hommes actifs	16,7	17,9	20,7	17,5	18,5	18,0	17,3
Femmes actives	18,2	19,0	20,5	19,4	20,7	20,6	20,6
Femmes non-actives	20,5	19,4	19,5	21,9	21,7	21,7	21,1
Avec enfant:							
Hommes actifs	18,4	17,3	19,1	18,3	19,9	18,4	17,6
Femmes actives	21,0	21,3	19,7	19,1	21,4	20,7	20,9
Femmes non-actives	19,8	20,0	20,4	21,6	21,2	22,2	20,3

De tout ce qui précède, on peut conclure que la situation des femmes aussi bien actives que non-actives diffère presque partout radicalement de celle des hommes en ce qu'elles ont une possibilité réduite de profiter des jours de repos, si importants pourtant et du point de vue individuel et de celui de la famille. Cependant, les causes de cet état de choses ne sont pas uniformes chez les deux

grandes catégories de femmes: chez les actives, elles découlent des «contraintes objectives», tandis que chez les ménagères non-actives, des contraintes ressenties seulement subjectivement ont aussi un certain rôle. (Evidemment, ces contraintes n'ont pas la même force dans les différents milieux sociaux mais on n'a pas pu analyser ici l'effet particulier de l'absence ou de la présence de contraintes économiques et culturelles chez les divers groupes.) C'est pourquoi la solution de ce problème — si toutefois on estime qu'il mérite d'être résolu, c.-à-d. si l'on ne tient pas cette inégalité pour légitime et naturelle — ne peut pas être uniforme dans les deux cas, et l'on a l'impression qu'elle est encore plus difficile à trouver dans le cas des ménagères. En effet, une riche expérience sociale prouve qu'il est plus facile de changer à l'aide de mesures directes les situations définies par des conditions objectives que les institutions (la pratique institutionnalisée) enracinée dans les comportements traditionnels, dans les systèmes de valeur vécus inconsciemment. Pourtant, il nous semble qu'il y a un élément commun dans les deux solutions. C'est, précisément, que la société devrait reconnaître explicitement — et cela ne peut pas se faire sans donner des preuves matérielles de cette reconnaissance — que le travail fait dans le ménage, auprès des enfants, est aussi un travail socialement et économiquement utile, qu'il est une *partie intégrante* de la division sociale du travail.

## ON THE PRACTICAL USE OF TIME BUDGET DATA

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Concrete sociological researches are carried out in this country on a large scale. They are conducted by a number of institutes of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, by many universities and institutes, they are used by governmental bodies, enterprises, and public institutions.

Concrete sociological researches carried out in the USSR have a number of characteristic features. In the first place, they aim at building communism. To attain this aim, a comprehensive study of social phenomena and processes, their regularities, their reflection and manifestation in separate facts and phenomena, in the minds of people, is imperative. It is highly important to find out the causes of such phenomena and processes and the factors determining them.

In the second place, sociological research serves practical purposes; it helps to solve important problems of our society. This is quite natural for, inherent to marxist sociology is not the mere contemplation of reality, but rather the investigation of it with the aim of its further alternation. Hence every concrete sociological research conducted in our country should solve definite problems. Theoretical and practical inferences and recommendations obtained in this process are used as guiding principles in the economic and political life of the country.

In the third place, sociological researches are usually complex. Many of them are closely connected with research in economics. Economic phenomena and problems are highly complex. Their study requires a complex approach, the study of manysided relations and, above all, the study of factors related to man. For this reason Soviet economic science has quite rightly adopted sociological methods of research.

This thesis, from our viewpoint, is a matter of principle. It is wrong to consider concrete sociological researches as isolated. Facts obtained in their process may reveal only one aspect of this or that phenomenon. But they do not make it possible to find out the causes of this or that phenomenon. Neither can we work out scientific re-

commendations based only on the facts. That is why sociological methods should be applied in various branches of science concerned with the study of society and man, along with other methods used in order to solve problems being worked out. This is not the case of social research of some limited character (for instance revealing opinion on this or that point).

One of the examples of such kind is the time budget research accomplished by economists, philosophers, lawyers, architects.

The whole life of an individual as well as of a group of people goes on in time. Diverse types of their activities have a time characteristic. For this reason the study of the total time fund of the working and non-working population is of great importance. The structure of the time budget for this or that period of time reflects the way of life of the people, their inner life, their duties and requirements, their cultural level and living standard, the measures being taken by the socialist government for improving living conditions. Changes in the structure of the time budget reflect social changes taking place in society, in the way of life of various sections of population.

The structure and time expenditure based on research data should reflect with more or less precision this objective reality.

The wealth of material that time budget research has provided us with has drawn attention to sociological researches of this problem. As it has been noted in the report of G.A. Prudensky, they have been carried out in the USSR from the twenties. In recent years, they have been particularly extensive.

For research work in this field conducted by the Institute of Economics and Industrial Production Organization SO AN<sup>1</sup> USSR the above features are characteristic: they are problems confronting our society and serve to solve them. Along with the time budget different sources, statistical data and documents are studied, and methods of economic analysis are applied. As a methodological basis the tenets of historical materialism and political economy are used. In the process of time budget research conducted in the USSR from 1958 to 1966 an abundance of facts were collected. The total number of 24-hour time budgets amounts to over a hundred thousand. A Summary and analysis of this material made it possible to come to conclusions of theoretical significance and to work out a number of practical suggestions for governmental bodies and enterprises.

G.A. Prudensky has put forward the thesis that free time is an

<sup>1</sup> Siberian Branch of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

economic category inherent in the socialist way of production, that it has a definite socially necessary value. Free time, in the sense generally accepted by Soviet research workers, is closely related to the universal development of personality and to the growth of social labour productivity. Hence the great significance of its increase and rational use.

Time budget researches conducted by the Institute of Economics and Industrial Production Organization SO AN USSR made it possible to establish also the relation between work time, non-work time and free time, the relation between non-work time and labour intensity, its rational organization etc.

All this made it possible to formulate and substantiate a theory of ways and means of the further shortening of work time and the increase of free time, of the indices of non-work time and free time as well as those of life standards, of the criteria of the choice of rational work week schedules etc.

The thesis of non-work time reserves put forward by G.A. Prudensky is one of the most important, having not only theoretical but practical significance as well. Its application early in the process of the first time budget researches conducted in Novosibirsk, Kuzbass, in the Krasnoyarsk Territory in the years 1958-1959 made it possible to find out the total amount of individual time expenditures, the structure of non-work time, its purposeless use and the ways of free time increase. The data have been made accurate by subsequent researches.

The main component of non-work time is free time. Free time, as we understand it, is not idle pastime, not inactivity. It is filled with active occupations connected with the meeting of varied spiritual, social, and physical requirements. These types of activities are not only rest, restoration of forces, but also development of physical and intellectual capacities. They all are significant components of labour force reproduction on a large scale. For this reason, in proceeding from the essence and the content of free time, we must include in it not only rest and recreation, but also time spent on study, improvement of professional skill, performance of various social duties, engagement in hobbies and creative work, physical culture and sports. That is why increasing free time and the possibilities for the universal development of personality are an important socio-economic problem.

This increase, as our time budget shows, may be brought about not only at the expense of shortening the work day in social produc-



tion, but also as a result of reducing the amount of non-work time connected with the work at the factory or some other establishment, time spent on domestic work and other personal needs.

Besides, as our analysis has shown, there exist possibilities for a better use of free time itself, creating conditions and possibilities for its rational use and teaching people how to spend their free time and how to make the most of it.

Ways and means of increasing free time and making fuller use of it are shown in the diagram given below.


Purposeless expenditures of non-work time are reserves for the increase of free time. These reserves are still very large. The analysis we have made and rough estimate show that by using these reserves the free time of the working people may be increased approximately by one hour for men and by three hours for women. These are quite significant amounts.

It is not by chance that, in a number of regions of our country, practical measures are being taken for the use of these reserves. In this connection the experiments in Kuzbass are of great interest. After a study of total time fund in mines, metallurgical enterprises and construction sites made by a group of research workers of the Institute of Economics and Industrial Production Organization SO AN USSR together with the local staff and authorities, a mass objective-oriented research of time expenditures connected with the job has been carried out, using a self-recording method. In the process of research considerable time losses have been registered for miners, metallurgists, and workers of other professions.

Time expenditures connected with the job of the workers of the Kuzbass metallurgical enterprise (KMK) amounted to three hours a day, those of the workers and employees of Leninsk-Kuznetsk to 2 hours, those of the workers of underground mines to 3-4 hours etc. Workers in a number of workshops, for example, spent 35-40 minutes every day only on getting from the entrance gate to the workplace.

Over fifty thousand workers participated in the time expenditure research connected with the Kemerovo region. When filling self-recording cards and noting all the types of time expenditures, they pointed out which of them were purposeless and made suggestions as to what measures should be taken to reduce such time expenditures.

On the basis of these suggestions a number of measures were included in the planning of organisational and constructive measures taken by enterprises and the city council aimed at the reduction



of purposeless time expenditures. Thus, in Leninsk-Kuznetsk the bus schedule was rearranged and the sites of bus stops were changed. At KMK, the schedule of the work day was rearranged and this made it possible to keep the buses from being overfilled at rush hours. Repeated surveys have shown that this and a number of other measures shortened the time expenditures connected with the job by 40-50 minutes per day. In the «Polisaevskaya-2» mine the distribution of work orders was rationalized, self-service was introduced in cloak-rooms and lamp rooms. In this way some 45 minutes more were saved<sup>1</sup>.

Thus, in a number of enterprises, some organisational measures permitted the reduction (without shortening the work-day) of the time spent at the site of the job and the time spent on travel there and back, by 30-40 minutes or more daily.

With the aim of working out measures for improving public services, the Krasnoyarsk Laboratory of the Institute of Economics and Industrial Production Organization, jointly with the editorial staff of the newspaper «The Krasnoyarsk Worker», at the end of 1965 conducted a survey in the Krasnoyarsk silk fabric enterprise using questionnaires. The data were published in the newspaper. In accordance with workers' suggestions, the municipal bodies carried out a number of measures aimed at the reduction of non-work time losses: the work of shops was rearranged, new schedules for bus traffic were introduced etc.

The examples cited above illustrate one of the trends in the practical application of time budget research data with the purpose of the reduction of time losses and the increase of free time.

The data of time budget research have been used in working out the decisions of the 23rd Congress of the CPSU in which important measures were mapped out for the improvement of living standards, for the betterment of cultural and personal services. Putting them into effect will result in the reduction of non-work time losses and in the increase of free time.

The aims of the use of non-work time account for some peculiarities in the methods of time budget study. They have in view not only collecting data concerning the time actually spent on some types of activities, but also learning in the process of the survey, the opinions of the interviewees concerning the types of activities they consider ineffective, and how they can be done away with.

<sup>1</sup> See *Non-work time of the working people*, edited by G. A. PRUDENSKY, Novosibirsk, 1961, p. 99-112.

This methodological thesis bears, in our opinion, a principle character. When studying the way of life and time expenditures we obtain the amount of time spent at different types of activities. But this is not an adequate estimation. In order to determine which of these activities are rational and which ineffective, it is important to know the personal opinion of the people themselves and their suggestions of what should be done to improve time budget use.

The suggestions of the working people on the ways and means of reducing non-work losses were collected for the first time during the survey in the Krasnoyarsk Territory in 1963. The same kind of suggestions were collected when surveys were conducted in the city of Pskov in 1965.

Classification and analysis of the suggestions collected in the Krasnoyarsk Territory, for example, revealed a highly interesting pattern. In the first place, they revealed those weak points which are causes of considerable losses of non-work time. Thus, suggestions concerning traffic within the city limits make up 17.6%; in a number of Krasnoyarsk regions suggestions about the work of shops and institutions of public services make up 20%. One tenth of the suggestions concern problems of food organization and the work of canteens and snack-bars (see table I).

In the second place, classification of the suggestions of the working people according to enterprises in groups of surveyed regions of the Krasnoyarsk Territory revealed significant differences in their proportion. In some groups of regions problems of city transportation are first and foremost (Norilsk, Igarka, the region of eniseysk); in others — problems of organization of meals in dinner-time break (the city of Krasnoyarsk, the eastern regions of the Krasnoyarsk Territory, the region of eniseysk etc.). This is quite natural, for each enterprise, city or region is specific in its cultural and personal services to the population.

In the third place, analysis has shown that a great proportion of suggestions given in the process of surveying concerns the betterment of the work of cultural establishments: cinemas, theatres, clubs, radio and television studios, educational establishments, libraries, organization of physical and sport activities. All these suggestions are directed towards a more rational use of free time.

The analysis of the content of the suggestions submitted shows that they concern not only the prospective non-work time reserves connected, for instance, with the extension of networks of shops, canteens, cinemas etc. A considerable part of them concerns the use

TABLE I

Content of suggestions made in the process of time budget surveys of the working people of the Krasnoyarsk Territory in 1963 (in %)

Content of suggestions	%
<i>1. On the improvement of everyday services</i>	
On the organisation of urban transportation	17,6
On the organization of recreation and meals during dinner break	6,9
On the work of shops	13,5
On the rationalization and mechanization of domestic work	5,9
On the work of every day service establishments	8,2
On the work of pre-school establishments	7,1
On the work and distribution of public catering establishments	3,5
In all	62,7
<i>2. On the improvement of cultural services and recreation</i>	
On the organization of recreation of schoolchildren	2,4
On the work of educational establishments, libraries etc.	1,2
On the work of cinemas, theatres, clubs, palaces of culture	4,2
On the content of broadcasts and telecasts	5,4
On motion pictures	3,1
On fiction and socio-political literature, newspapers and magazines	6,6
On the work of hobby groups	2,6
On the organization of social activity	3,6
On the organization of engagements in gymnastics and sports	4,0
On the organization of recreation and amusements	3,0
In all	36,1
<i>3. On other problems</i>	1,2
Total	100,0

of internal reserves connected with the betterment of existing possibilities. For example, suggestions were offered to change the traffic schedules of buses, trams on Sundays and on days preceeding holidays, to change work schedules of shops etc. There is no doubt that much can be done today to reduce losses in non-work time expenditures.

Another trend in the practical application of time budget research data in the USSR is their use by a number of governmental bodies in long-term planning of cultural and personal services to the population. The first pilot-study with that aim in view has been conducted by the Institute of Economics and Industrial Production Organisation SO AN USSR jointly with a number of research and designing institutes.

This tendency in the conditions of a planned economy is quite natural. In order to increase the efficiency of public investments in the sphere of cultural and personal services, to plan them appropriately and to distribute them so as to meet the cultural and personal needs of the population, it is necessary to quantify the time spent on this or that type of activity by residents of flats, microregions, cities and the country as a whole. These data are necessary both for short-term and long-term planning.

Some of the principles of time budget use for solving town-building problems have been stated in the article of V. Bykov and I. Kravchinskaia «A Scientific Basis of Work Standards of Public Building»<sup>2</sup>. The author's starting point is as follows: «the basis for determining the needs of the population in various types of cultural and educational establishments is non-work time used by the workers for self-education, rest, recreation, sports and social work», they go on to say that the planning of the use of free time» permits the establishing of the required standards of cultural and educational institutions. «... This is possible on the basis of calculations of the amount and structure of the free time of the population viewed in the prospect».

The following principle of calculation is suggested by V. Bykov and I. Kravchinskaia. If on the basis of time budget, it is known that on the average 60 hours are spent by each worker on seeing films, that the average time spent for getting to the job and back-three hours, then we shall have 20 cinema attendances yearly. On the basis of statistical data the workers and employees make up 531 persons for a population of one thousand, about 70 percent of them (372 persons) going to the cinema in the evening.

<sup>2</sup> *The USSR, Architecture* N. 10, 1963, p. 36-39.

Hence the number of cinema attendances for a population of one thousand persons ( $372 \times 20 = 7440$ ) is calculated. With two evening shows this amounts to 10.2 attendances daily. Therefore, for a population of one thousand it is necessary to have 10 seats in the cinema. If the number of attendances increases, it is necessary to increase the number of cinemas and their capacity accordingly.

Calculations for meeting other cultural and personal needs of the population are made in this way.

In connection with the application of time budget data for solving town-building problems and in the sphere of cultural and personal services of the population, the main methodological principle consists in grouping non-work time expenditures and their separate types and groups according to the place of their performance — in the sphere of cultural and personal services and beyond it, and also in working out a proper total time structure depending on the site<sup>3</sup>.


This makes it possible to follow the main tendencies in the way of life. Thus, if goods are purchased practically only in definite shops, meals are taken both at home and in public catering establishments. The role of the public services sphere is ever increasing and this should be taken into account in long-term planning of construction.

Work of this kind is being carried out by central research institutes of educational establishments, of sports, buildings in Moskow and Leningrad. Calculations of the population time budget viewed in this perspective were used as initial data by the Institute Lenproekt in planning the building of a network of cultural establishments on the Vasilievsky Island of the city of Leningrad. The Leningrad Zonal Research Institute of Experimental Designing (LenENIIEP) also used time budget data when developing the network of services of the workers' township Deputatsky.

The cited examples of the use of time budget research data for solving a number of practical problems should be treated only as a preliminary experiment. But experience has already confirmed its expediency. And it is not by chance that in order to solve practical problems of establishments, public institutions and architectural institutes carry out their own concrete sociological researches and study time budget use in particular.

There is no doubt that the application of time budget data for the solution of problems connected with the improvement of cultural

<sup>3</sup> For similar structure see V. D. PATRUSHEV, *Time as an Economic Category*, «Mysl», 1966.





and personal services requires a more elaborate development of methods of time budget research application for these purposes. In this connection of high importance is the working out of calculation methods for time budget models viewed in the prospects and also a profound study of the effects of various factors on the change of separate groups of time expenditures.

THE IMPACT OF TELEVISION ON MASS MEDIA USAGE:  
A CROSS-NATIONAL COMPARISON\*

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
In the past forty years the advent of newspaper wire services, specialty magazines, radio and the subsequent intrusion of television, have dramatically altered both the structure of long-distance communication and the way in which leisure time is spent. In the United States, where media have been developed most extensively, the diffusion of television sets into households has been in a «saturation» state for several years: a quasi totality of urban households possess television receivers<sup>1</sup>. Current media research estimates of television use suggest that receivers are turned on in American households almost six hours per day. While such figures include use at different hours for children as well as adults (and may also register periods in which nobody at all is watching), estimates of leisure time directly devoted to television by individual adults remain thoroughly impressive. Even among its busy respondents of labor-force age, the United States leg of the time-budget survey shows an average of 90 minutes a day viewing television as a primary activity, and more than another half-hour during which secondary attention is being paid to the set. In other words, Americans spend 45 % of their day's «free time» primary activities on one of the mass media and over 30 % just on TV alone.

Indeed, when one considers the entire portfolio of data from ten countries now participating in the time-budget study, the amount

\* In view of other documents available describing the conception, sample design and field work involved in the multi-nation Time Budget Research Project, we shall make no attempt to provide such description here. The American part of the study was made possible by a grant from the National Science Foundation.

<sup>1</sup> The modifier «urban» in connection with United States data refers to the fact that the time-budget survey in the United States was conducted on a probability sample of households in or near population centers of 50,000 inhabitants or over. The definition is such that the more rural 36 % of the United States population was excluded from the sample.

FIGURE 1. COMPARISON OF TV OWNERSHIP RATES IN UNITED STATES (1947-1964) WITH THOSE IN OTHER SURVEY SITES



of time spent by Americans on television is one of the more noteworthy aberrations in the gross summary of activities, although the variation across the survey sites in Europe is itself broad and related in an obvious way to the distribution of television sets by household. Figure 1 summarizes the factual state of affairs for the study sites where television ownership is concerned, and this graph will serve as useful background for our subsequent discussion<sup>2</sup>.

Our goal in this paper is to examine the developmental changes in media use patterns as a function of the increasing intrusion of television, and indirectly therefore to comment upon changes in the allocation of leisure time. Since at this early point in the analysis of the time-budget materials only a limited set of tabular breakdowns for countries other than our own have been available for our use, we have chosen to focus upon variations in media use by education levels across the thirteen country sites.

#### *Previous American Studies of Specific Media Usage*

Previous studies of media usage (Robinson 1965, Wilensky 1964, Steiner 1963, Hero 1959) have shown profound differences in (both quantity and quality of) media usage between respondents of different educational levels. In a 1957 nationwide Survey Research Center study (Robinson 1965), people with a college education, when compared to their countrymen with less than a high school education, were not only six times as likely to have read a non-fiction book in the previous year, twenty times as likely to regularly read sophisticated commentary magazines and fifteen times as likely to read a general news magazine but also three times as likely to read a pictorial and general interest magazine regularly (the best-known of these news magazines is often referred to as «the magazine for

<sup>2</sup> We have taken the rather ethnocentric liberty in Figure 1 of portraying the proportions of television sets in the various survey sites against the backdrop of the penetration of television in the United States during the postwar period. This device is used in part because relatively full data are available to us for the United States, and in part because those American data suggest a pioneer growth pattern. The figure is not intended to assure either that the developmental patterns at other sites will necessarily move in just this manner, or certainly at just these rates. Ownership rates for cities between 50,000 and 500,000 population were about average up to 1954, jumped to about 6% over the average in the mid-1950's and are currently about 2% over the average for the nation as a whole.

those who can 't think» while its pictorial counterpart is called «the magazine for those who can't read»).

Similar education differentials appeared for 1957 newspaper reading habits. While 90 % of college graduates read a newspaper daily, the corresponding figure for those not completing high school was 65 %. More dramatic differences between the two groups appeared when the focus of newspaper reading was examined. Two to three times as many college graduates reported regular attention to serious news and editorials and similar differences were found in a Detroit sample by Wilensky (1964). Wilensky also showed practically no readership of «quality» newspapers outside of the college-educated strata.

More rigorous examination was required to ferret out educational differences in devotion to radio and television in the 1957 study. Average time spent listening to the radio was practically constant (about 110 minutes, 100 minutes for college graduates) for all education levels. Nevertheless, 69 % of the college graduates reported listening to «news» on the radio vs 56 % of those without a high school diploma. Much larger differences in informational radio listening were found in a review of several studies by Hero (1959).

While the college graduate did estimate that he watched over two hours of television daily, this figure was almost 30 minutes less than that given by his non-high school counterpart (who was also less likely to own a TV set) and a full hour less than the estimate given by those who had finished high school. However, similar educational differentials for radio news appeared when attention to TV news was examined. In our current survey, we found that time devoted to TV news programs and documentaries was roughly equivalent for all educational groups. But it will be noted that this represents almost 20 % of the college graduate's use of his TV set compared to less than 10 % of that for the less-educated. However, in evaluating his most used news source (either for general news or for special events, like elections), the college graduate still generally expresses more of a preference for the printed media over either radio or television, the choice of the less-educated (Steiner 1963, Robinson 1965).

Much recent sociological as well as commercial investigation into television usage (e.g., Wilensky 1964, Steiner 1963) tends to play down, if not nullify, such gross educational differences. Wilensky for example finds less revealing differences in indiscriminate TV watching across the grade school — high school — levels, than

those which appear for the small subset of the college graduates exposed either to advanced post-graduate education or attendance at the highest-quality universities. Steiner (1963) and Coffin (1963) find few differences between the favorite television shows of the college graduate and the less-educated. While Steiner did find far more criticism of the non-informational character of almost all American television programs by the college segments of his nationwide sample, college-educated respondents (in a specially-chosen subsample) certainly did not flock *en masse* to their TV sets whenever an informational program did happen to appear. Whether, as Wilensky argues, this reflects a significant infiltration of «mass culture» into the «elite» sectors of the population, cannot be discussed with the data in hand—despite the most interesting nature of the question.

Contrary to some of the above findings, our time budget data (as well as some presented by Steiner and Wilensky themselves) do point to large educational differences in TV usage, consistent with the notion that the better-educated make far less use of the media as an entertainment vehicle. Moreover, it appears that similar educational differences appear in the data from some but not all of our European partners, leaving national differences that are themselves a fascinating source of comparative analysis.

Unfortunately, since most available American studies of the role of television in mass media consumption have been cross-sectional, rather than longitudinal, they have largely ignored the possibility that key audience characteristics may have been undergoing systematic changes as television has moved from a novelty item to a standard fixture in the households of the nation. It would of course be rash to interpret differences in patterns of media use by education across the countries in our study as having unquestionable developmental meaning; as we shall see, the role of television in the United States in the current era of saturation need not represent any end state toward which other sites must move. Nevertheless, some cautious developmental interpretations do seem plausible, and their plausibility may be enhanced by some recourse taken to data from the earlier periods of television in the United States, when diffusion more closely approximated that existing now in some European countries.

*Cross-National Differences in Attention to All Media*


While we shall turn our direct attention to the data on television use from the new multi-nation time-budget study in a moment, it is of value first to draw a few simple comparisons from these materials concerning the role of all the mass media within the «free time»<sup>3</sup> available to the respondents.

First of all, there does exist a moderate ecological tendency across the survey locations for amount of TV ownership to affect quantity of free time devoted to mass media. It is obvious that while TV does cut into time previously spent on the other media, it makes serious inroads into other «free time» (and perhaps even into non-free time) activities as well. There is abundant earlier empirical evidence from the United States' television experience to expect such a relation to hold (although at a much stronger level than indicated by the present data). For example, Coffin (1955) showed that people who bought TV sets after the establishment of telecasting facilities in their community spent 7 minutes less on magazines, 7 minutes less on newspapers and 70 minutes less on radio. Even making the unlikely assumption that all the previous radio time was a primary activity, the 84 minutes lost on these media hardly balanced out the 161 minutes gained by television. Thus upon purchase of a TV set, respondents began spending 41 % more time on all media combined, and this figure is practically constant for two other surveys quoted by Bogart (1958). Using two nationwide samples, drawn in 1947 and 1957 (when the TV ownership rate jumped from 0 % to 86 %), Davis (1958) showed almost no change had occurred in the number of magazines read regularly<sup>4</sup> or the overall amount of reported newspaper reading (there was a decrease in those reading a paper every day, but this was offset by the number reading more than two papers a day). Estimated radio time, considered by most listeners as entertainment in 1947, dropped 64 minutes (or 36 %). This again hardly accounts for

<sup>3</sup> Throughout this paper, the definition of «free time» follows that suggested by the Soviet participants. It includes resting, education, organizational activity, radio, television, reading, social life, conversation, walking, sports, various leisure, and amusements.

<sup>4</sup> On the other hand, Bogart (1958) reviewed a number of studies generally indicating adverse effects of TV on book and magazine reading and also pointing out the demise of a number of «entertainment» magazines since the advent of television. For more recent controversial evidence on the effects of television on reading, see the articles by PARKER and BELSON in *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Spring, 1963.

FIGURE 2. PERCENTAGE OF FREE TIME (SOVIET DEFINITION) DEVOTED TO MASS MEDIA BY EDUCATIONAL LEVEL (ONLY 4 COLLEGE GRADUATES IN HUNGARIAN SAMPLE)





the new block of three hours set aside for television (we assume no large changes in free time occurred in the ten year period).

This fact appears again when examining Figure 2, which shows percent of free time spent on mass media for various educational strata across eleven survey sites. Assume that (as was the case for the U.S.) the less-educated (probably due to the concomitance of less income) strata were the least likely to purchase TV sets in the early stages of television. Note how in the U.S., where TV has made greatest «mass» inroads, attention to media (i.e., television) consumes over half of the free time of the least-educated. On the other hand, among the Balkan survey sites (where TV is still new and large amounts of radio listening as a primary activity are reported) far less free time is spent on media than on resting, various leisure (sewing and other avocations), outside amusements (sports events, movies) and primary group relations (social life and conversation). The amount of «free» time available to the less-educated is also proportionately lower in these countries<sup>5</sup>.

There are obvious differences in the degree and direction of the slopes in Figure 2 among participating countries, some being mainly downward (the United States and West Germany), some being upward (the Balkan sites), others flat (Hungary) and the rest irregular (such as Russia and France). Furthermore, these differing trends in amount of discretionary time allotted to the mass media according to educational level reveal the widest differences across national sites among the least well educated; the trends do converge to more nearly homogeneous media behavior among the most highly educated across the various sites. These data suggest that the introduction of television has far more effect on the use of time among the less educated than it does for the better educated. Among college people, the greatest exceptions to the overall convergence appear for four of the five locations with the highest degree of TV penetration: France, West Germany, Czechoslovakia and the United States<sup>6</sup>.

<sup>5</sup> Although healthier portions of «non-free» time are used up by these people in non-work activities at the place of work, sleeping and household activities (repairs, gardening, food preparation).

<sup>6</sup> In these countries, we note that the college-educated spend more «free» time on educational activity (itself involving a critical communication medium), hobbies (among men), resting (among employed women), amusements (among the Czechs, and among French and American women) and walking (among the West Germans). For the U.S. much larger educational differences were found when we asked how often the respondent participated in 18 types of activities during the past year. Better educated respondents

*Differences Among the Specific Media Across Educational Levels*

More detailed analyses make clear the degree to which television usage alone accounts for the comparative variations of Figure 2. For example, Tables 5 and 21 (from the 66 basic tables made available to all participants) show almost no differences in time spent listening to the radio by level of education, even when examined as a secondary activity (there did appear to be some slight tendencies for radio listening to increase with education for males in the U.S. and Belgium). However, we supplemented the United States diary information with more detailed media questions which did yield some substantial educational (and radical)<sup>7</sup> differences on radio listening.

Since the preponderance of American radio programming now consists of music in some form, we concentrated our specific questions on what types of music were being listened to. Predictably, more of the college-educated listened to classical music than those with less than a high school education (25 % vs 10 %) on the diary day and the same held for show tunes and mood music (42 % vs 21 %). This educational bias was reversed for rock-and-roll and the latest popular music; the less-educated gave figures of 30 % vs 21 % for the college graduate while for country and western (rural) music, the less-educated outlistened the college graduates by a substantial 18 % to 4 % margin. Exposure to other types of radio shows also rises noticeably with educational level, especially radio news programs — with 64 % of the college-educated strata listening to some news on the radio compared to 51 % of those without a high school degree.

As we discovered in our earlier findings, time spent on reading increased most significantly with education across the great majority of country comparisons — more significantly than any other activity category (except perhaps education itself). Our data indicate that it was unfortunate that separate figures for time spent on newspaper

reported significantly more classes, concerts, fairs, club meetings, active sports, outings, hobbies and sports events. Better educated males went to movies, church, nightclubs and shops significantly more; educated women played more cards.

<sup>7</sup> Separate comparisons between White and non-White respondents among the less-educated showed Negro respondents spent 30 % more time listening to music, especially jazz and folk music (28 % to 10 %) and rock-and-roll (35 % to 26 %). About 60 % of both groups listened to the radio on the diary day vs 85 % of the college graduates.


vs magazine-book-report reading were not required in the basic tables. Despite the relatively irregular education-reading relations found in Table 5 of the U.S. national sample, large education differentials exist between magazine-book-report reading (for our data 36 minutes for the college group and 9 minutes for those not completing high school) and newspaper reading (33 minutes vs 26 minutes). In other words, for the less-educated, newspaper reading consisted of almost 80 % of their reading but only for 48 % of the college-educated person's reading time. Some of our fellow participants may want to check whether such large differences between book, magazine and newspaper reading also hold for their countries.

Variations noted in the earlier studies in reading content appeared as expected when more specific probing was employed. These again point to a greater drive among the better educated to use all media for serious informational purposes. Comparing the college-educated with those who had not finished high school revealed these percentages of those who read the following «yesterday»: serious books (5.8 % to .9 %), analytic commentary magazines (2.3 % to none), news and business magazines (8.2 % to 1.5 %), pictorial and general interest magazines (10.5 % to 3.6 %), newspaper editorials (15 % to 7 % as newspaper part read closest), newspaper general news (58 % to 35 % as part read closest) and newspaper national and international news (9 % vs 6 % as part read closest).

Thus far, we have noted generally positive relationships with education appearing for reading and generally flat relationships for time listening to the radio across our survey locations. The trends for television usage were far less generalizable, however, and it is the TV figures which appear responsible for the divergent education-media patterns discovered in Figure 2. This becomes apparent in Figure 3, where the actual amount of time spent on TV is graphed as function of education for the eleven survey sites. Sample estimates based on less than 50 respondents are given special indication, since their values are most likely to be unstable.

We have attempted to divide these graphs into three relatively homogeneous groups: those showing a positive correlation with education, those showing a negative correlation and those showing flat or irregular relations. The general pattern is for those survey sites having over 50 % ownership rates to fall into the negative or irregular categories, with those sites under this figure falling into the positive category. It is interesting to note that data available from the earlier Survey Research Center study (1957) look more like the

FIGURE 3. TIME ON TELEVISION AS A PRIMARY ACTIVITY BY EDUCATIONAL LEVEL (SAMPLE SIZES LESS THAN 50 INDICATED)  
 a = GRADE SCHOOL NOT COMPLETED; b = GRADE SCHOOL GRADUATE,  
 SOME HIGH SCHOOL; c = HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE, SOME COLLEGE;  
 d = COLLEGE GRADUATE




patterns for Poland and Czechoslovakia — which are near to the same level of diffusion — than they do to the results of the current study for the United States, or indeed those holding currently for the Western European sites.

The ambiguity of these patterns raises a crucial question concerning the likelihood that the correlation between education and television usage can be expected to move from positive to negative as diffusion of television sets approaches saturation in any national context. A good deal of evidence, both longitudinal from the United States and comparative across our survey sites, seems to suggest that the least educated show the largest total increases in time devoted to television as the medium diffuses. Such a trend is certainly due in some part to lags in acquisition of sets among these people, but it is not entirely accounted for in this way. The fulfillment of this trend then accounts for the undermining and reversal of the initial positive correlation.

What is less clear is whether or not there is any absolute decline in attention paid to television on the part of the well-educated as diffusion progresses, either because the novelty wears off, or because the level of programming tends to deteriorate, or through some combination of the two trends. It would be of great interest to know whether at any early time in the diffusion of television in the United States one would have found the rather strongly positive relationship between education and television viewing that emerges for those Eastern European countries with less than 50% ownership rates. What little indirect evidence is available casts some doubt on this possibility. While people whose education was limited to grade school have lagged behind those of higher education consistently in records of television ownership covering almost the entire diffusion period (Figure 4), college graduates from the very earliest period showed less enthusiasm about ownership than high school graduates, despite their higher incomes and greater latitude for discretionary spending (Bogart, 1958). This relationship still holds for the practically complete TV saturation state of our current national sample.

While it might be argued that the college-educated offset these ownership trends by spending more time in front of their sets, the meagre amount of data available on this point would discount this possibility. Probably the most reliable account of TV habits for this time (Coffin 1955) reports that time spent on television was greater for the less-educated in the 1950-53 period; unfortunately Coffin does not present any quantitative data, although almost all

FIGURE 4. UNITED STATES' TV OWNERSHIP RATES BY EDUCATIONAL LEVEL OF HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD (BOGART 1958) COMPARED TO THOSE OBTAINED IN TIME-BUDGET SURVEY SITES



research conducted during these early years was confined to fragmentary studies of single communities anyway.

While this fragmentary evidence did imply feelings of less satisfaction with television among the college-educated, it was not until 1960 that concrete evidence was gathered showing this dissatisfaction to be the case on a nationwide basis (Steiner 1963). Steiner found that television was most enjoyed (and most watched) by those who had not finished high school and slightly less by those with a high school degree or some college exposure. Only in the college segments of his sample was much criticism of television evident, although as noted earlier this appeared to be more verbally than behaviorally relevant.

We also asked our respondents to rate how much satisfaction they derived from watching TV (along with 17 other aspects of life which were hypothesized as being most important to people, e.g., work, religion). When graphed against time spent watching television as a primary activity, the average scores of this satisfaction item for the four educational groups of Figures 2 and 3 were almost perfectly linear! Much the same was found for Steiner's data, with one important exception. Both in terms of derived satisfaction and hours watched, our current data show the second highest educational group (high school graduate, some college) closer to the college graduate rather than the grade school graduate, as found by Steiner.

Could it be that we are witnessing the beginnings of a force for long-term improvements in television programming, as many observes (e.g., Wattenberg and Scammon 1965) have predicted as the result of the large rise of educational levels in the United States? Any optimism on this possibility is dampened by past experience that the better-educated continue to watch about the same amount of television no matter how critical they may be and no matter how sophisticated the programming. Furthermore, media research estimates<sup>8</sup> point to a recent jump in the average *increase* in daily time watching television of ten minutes per year for television owners over the past five years, compared to a five-minute daily increase per year for the previous ten years.

There is one piece of evidence of a more nearly behavioral sort which definitely suggests increasing disinterest of the well-educated

<sup>8</sup> We should note that their estimates for current time spent watching television exceed our daily figures (for both primary and secondary watching) by about 25 % !

in one important sector of television programming where we would expect the educated to be most interested in political news and information. Certainly coverage of electoral candidates and campaigns has improved technically since the advent of television. Even here, however, where the (usually more involved and interested) educated citizen has the opportunity to actually follow the live action on the political scene, television continues to lose greater portions of the educated audience — while of course increasing its overall audience.

Evidence for this trend is presented in the table below, where the correlation between education and usage of each media to follow the respective political campaign is presented. In order to offset the tendency for the better educated to become more involved in the campaign and to follow all media more closely, these correlations have been corrected for the respondents' professed degree of involvement in the political campaign.

	1952	1956	1960	1964
Television	.14	.16	.10	-.02
Radio	.06	-.01	-.07	-.01
Magazines	.31	.30	.35	.36
Newspapers	.25	.29	.24	.26

The results could not be more apparent. While the correlations for newspapers have remained practically constant and those for magazines have shown some increase since 1956, television has lost even more ground than radio with the educated viewer.

Any predictions on the ultimate shape of television audiences in countries that are still some distance from saturation must take into account the levels of programming being offered. Although the point is sometimes challenged, it seems hard to dissociate the strong negative relationship between television viewing and education in the United States from the notoriously low level of programming and



the elegant feedback mechanisms which keep the system responsive to the majority of its audience. From the very beginning, American commercial television time has never consisted of more than 30% of what could be called informational or serious entertainment material. More recently, however, a number of educational TV stations have arisen, which appear to offer more of the kind of programs prevalent in those socialist countries that stress the educational potentials of television.

American educational stations seldom draw more than 2% of their potential audience for even their most popular programs. However, educational station audiences do in fact tend to show the positive relations with education found for certain of the Eastern European countries in Figure 3. These educational differentials may be even steeper than those found for commercial stations when informational programs are made available (Hero 1959). Thus educational TV, both in content and audience, may offer a more meaningful comparison between United States and Eastern European viewing habits. Nevertheless, the need for careful indices of the similarity of the content of TV programs is apparent before any more final conclusions can be meaningfully made.

Certainly we do not mean to imply by the above remarks that a negative education-television relation reflects on the lightweight nature of a country's TV programming. In fact, it is our impression that Western European television offers a far more sophisticated bill of fare than the U.S. One glance at Figure 3 will reveal that no country has a steeper educational-television gradient than the American sites.

What the future holds in store for countries about to jump from the 65-75% ownership phase into the 90-95% phase is another matter, however. There is little doubt that the non-college-educated public (about 85% of the total) is still favorably inclined toward television programming in general, as Steiner (1963) found. In the United States at present, it is practically a lawful prediction that informational and public affairs programs will draw one-half to one-third of the potential audiences that a light entertainment program could. Assuming similar tastes between the less-educated in European countries and ours, any tendency to cater to them (as apparently has happened in Britain) will undoubtedly result in even steeper negative relations than found in Figure 3.

<sup>9</sup> Restricting ourselves to «prime» viewing time, a current figure of 5% might be more appropriate.

### Summary

There is a history of studies of mass media usage in the United States which have located distinct tendencies for better-educated people to make greater use of each of the media for informational purposes. These differences were again found in the current United States time survey data. The availability of multi-nation Time Budget Research Project data offered the possibility of verifying the extent to which this relationship holds up across a number of diverse societies. In particular, one can spot any tendency for other societies to show the same negative relationships between educational level and television viewing time as currently appears in the United States. With the increasing diffusion of television, such a pattern would generate larger increases of time on all media for the less-educated than for the better-educated.

While some of the survey sites did report the negative education-television time relationships currently prevalent in the United States, an equal number did not. Since those places which did not reflect this tendency had both lower television ownership rates and apparently different levels of programming, a question arose about which factor was more likely responsible for the different empirical viewing patterns found. Recourse to (incomplete) data on the time spent watching television of Americans when ownership rates were comparable to those found in each of the survey sites indicated no evidence of the «positive» relations which currently exist in those countries with less than 50% ownership rates. Therefore the differences between educational background and television time found in these Eastern European countries were considered more likely attributable to differences in the level of programming — despite the lack of careful indices of differences in the content of television shows in the various locations.

Analysis of the multi-nation data also cautioned against generalizing from internal results from a single country, no matter how strong the relationship appears to be. Despite convergent evidence that intrusion of television increased total percentage of time devoted to all media by at least 40% at the individual level in the United States, this relation showed up far less clearly at the ecological level for the various survey sites.

There appear to be two separate trends in European television viewing habits. In those countries with over 50% ownership rates — largely though not exclusively Western — there is already some

tendency for television to be a more appealing way to spend leisure time than is true for the well-educated. One might expect from American experience that any increasing pressure to cater to «mass» tastes as television diffusion reaches the saturation point will result in greater negative relations between level of education and time devoted to television. The countries with lower ownership rates, on the other hand, tend to be those with the greatest stress on educational and cultural programming, which seem less attractive to the poorly educated. Whatever trends in audiences may develop in these cases is likely to hinge on programming policy.

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