

TRANSACTIONS OF THE SIXTH
WORLD CONGRESS OF SOCIOLOGY

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CONGRÈS MONDIAL DE SOCIOLOGIE

ACTES DU SIXIÈME
CONGRÈS MONDIAL DE SOCIOLOGIE

VOLUME IV

WORKING GROUPS AND
ROUND TABLES
VOLUME IV

COMMUNICATIONS DES GROUPES DE TRAVAIL
ET DES TABLES RONDES

INTERNATIONAL SOCIOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION
ASSOCIATION INTERNATIONALE DE SOCIOLOGIE

1978

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Evian, 4-11 September 1966

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BROADCASTER AND AUDIENCE VALUES IN THE MASS MEDIA:
THE IMAGE OF MAN IN AMERICAN TELEVISION NEWS

HAROLD J. GISS

Joint Center for Urban Studies, Cambridge

MASS MEDIA

COMMUNICATIONS DE MASSE

American television news programs during the broadcasting day, but the most important is a 30 minute one, offered by each of the networks around the dinner hour. Using both reporters and film (but mostly the latter) these programs include the major domestic and foreign news of the day, and short documentary features on less immediate political and neo-political topics, most of them serious but some of an entertaining nature as well.

This paper, which is based on some early and still quite tentative findings of a study of television news, draws on content analyses and on observations and interviews with people who report, write and edit the news. It is part of a larger study of how the national mass media cover the news, how they select what is to be reported, emphasized, interpreted and omitted, and what points of view they express in giving American society its picture of itself and the world.¹

The Images of Man

Just as many men (and women) participate in one way or another in the institution of television news, so are there many images of man. This paper will concentrate on two types of images: the one underlying news content, something man as news-maker; and the broadcaster's image of their viewers, something man as audience. By analyzing these two images, I can also show how the broadcaster decides what news is worthy of being reported.

¹ The study is financed by the Ford Foundation. For other reports of the study, see *The Making of Mass Media Content: Description of a Research Project*, (1962, mimeographed) and *The Making of Mass Media Content: A Study of the News*, Paper presented at the 1966 meeting of the American Sociological Association.

BROADCASTER AND AUDIENCE VALUES IN THE MASS MEDIA: THE IMAGE OF MAN IN AMERICAN TELEVISION NEWS

HERBERT J. GANS

Joint Center for Urban Studies, Cambridge

American television presents about a half dozen news programs during the broadcasting day, but the most important is a 30 minute one, offered by each of the networks around the dinner hour. Using both reporters and film (but mostly the latter) these programs include the major domestic and foreign news of the day, and short documentary «features» on less immediate political and non-political topics, most of them serious but some of an entertaining nature as well.

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Man The News-Maker

Most people are exposed to a considerable amount of «news» every day, almost all of which they receive informally from family members, neighbors and work colleagues. Some of this information is routine, allowing them to function in their principal roles; some of it is of unusual events, which either support the norms underlying these roles, or warn them to act differently. Gossip upholds the norms of family and neighborhood; news about the day's events at the place of work tells people how to prepare themselves for what is ahead.

Perhaps about ten percent of the day's news comes from the mass media. It is about roles, institutions and allegiances which they share, but which are more remote, not requiring direct participation or even continued interest. Consequently, most people do not «need» such news to function; and because they do not need it, they must be attracted to read or view it for other reasons. The kinds of news that seem to attract them most (and most regularly) is news of the unusual and the unexpected: of struggle, conflict, disaster, and novelty. Only people who know all parties involved care when a dog bites a man; but everyone is interested when a man bites a dog, even if they know neither the man nor the dog personally.

The events which have highest priority for coverage are those which are of most *importance* and *interest* to the largest number of people. Important events are those which impinge directly on people, or on their country; interesting ones, those which are sufficiently unusual to appeal to them even if they are not directly involved. In a large and heterogeneous country, events which meet these criteria are not plentiful. Although many things happen to many people every day, few of these are either important or interesting enough to be of concern to most of the forty million or more people who constitute the audience for the evening news program. Events that are important to intellectuals or social scientists, or that would seem of importance to the country as a whole are often judged differently by the broadcasters. For example, internal discussions of major shifts in strategy in the civil rights movement will probably not be covered, because they are not news until they are expressed in personnel changes or action. The same is true of most underlying social trends; what the social scientist sees as coming in the future, the journalist sees only once it has happened. The 1965 electric power failure, a seemingly less important event, was covered in great detail, because it directly affected a sixth of the country's population. Moreover, how

people coped with its inconvenience was reported more fully than its causes, partly because there was no agreement about the causes until long afterwards when the event had lost news value, but mainly because the broadcasters themselves were more interested in how it affected people, and thought their audience would agree. A New York transit strike was covered the same way, since people all over the country would identify with the traffic problems it generated, but would be less interested in the union and municipal politics of New York City which brought it about in the first place. Conversely, disasters which may effect only a few people will also be reported in detail; for example, an unusual explosion which killed six people, because it was a novel disaster.

Action is defined as individual events, and actions which take place repeatedly receive less coverage, because they are thought to be repetitious, and thus of declining interest to the audience. For example, over time, reports of civil rights demonstrations became shorter and more sporadic because one was much like another, and the broadcasters felt white people (who were, after all, the majority in the audience) would be tired of watching them, and might also become resentful of the civil rights movement if too many demonstrations were taking place. On the other hand, the war in Viet Nam has been reported fully, and battle film which looks like previous film is presented even if it is repetitious, because the broadcasters feel people ought to be kept informed about the war, and are thought to be interested in every battle. «Background» information, which explains the sources and causes of individual events, is presented in less detail, partly because it becomes repetitious, partly because it is not easily put on film, and partly because it is hard to get reliable information about the causes of events. Also, reporters are not trained in social science concepts and techniques that would help them understand the impersonal social processes that underlie events.

In the world of news, events come about not because of social processes, but because of people who act and re-act to make news. News-makers are people and institutions who participate in the unusual events that become news, and they can be ordinary people or elites. Generally speaking, however, ordinary people become news-makers only infrequently; they are reported only if what they do or what is done to them is highly unusual. Indeed, the lower a person's status, the more unusual his action must be. If an unknown man murders his neighbor, it is national news only if he uses a novel method; if a celebrity does so, it is news no matter what the weapon.

The unusual is unpredictable; although it must be covered as it happens, no one knows when and how. Some people and institutions in society regularly carry out unusual actions, and journalists are always present to report them. Among the principal «men of unusual action» are government leaders (who make decisions which initiate new policies) as well as soldiers, and policemen, and athletes². Bureaucrats do the same thing every day; they need not be reported but politicians may have a story, and soldiers or policemen are involved in conflict, which always takes new forms. An actor will perform the same play every night, but every baseball or football game is different, and therefore is reported.

A second group of news-makers are «men of authority». Such men not only perform unusual acts more often than others, but having authority, what they say may be as important as what they do. Since what people do is usually more newsworthy than what they say, however, only those with the highest authority are covered regularly. Every public statement by the President of the United States is reported on the news; those of his cabinet officers much less often. Being well-known or of high status is not sufficient; celebrities, for example, are not in the news unless they act in an unusual manner, for example, marry for the fifth time.

Men of authority make news because they speak for the nation, but they are important for another reason. In a pluralistic society, the national news media report a variety of actions and ideas which they give wide publicity simply by reporting them, and which, therefore, may displease cultural and political groups preferring different actions and ideas. In order to minimize disapproval, which may hurt both the mass medium and the companies whose commercial messages «sponsor» the news program, the national media (like local ones) prefer to report actions and ideas about which there is national consensus, and if they must report controversial ones (as, of course, they must) they prefer to do so by attributing these to a man of recognized public authority. In order to remain «objective», and not incur angry letters or phone calls from the audience, network news programs take no sides — unless the reporter has sufficient national repute to be awarded the authority of stating opinions. In fact, tele-

² Government leaders are also covered because something important may happen to them and in America, reporters are near the President 24 hours a day because there is always the possibility of an assassination attempt. This practice antedates the assassination of President Kennedy.

vision news does not cover a controversial idea until it is talked about or acted on by a man of authority (or an institution of authority like the Congress) so that news programs cannot be criticized for being partial. For example, American television news gave relatively little coverage to criticism of the war in Viet Nam (except when it took the form of demonstrations by students or adult «radicals» which were unusual enough to be covered as deviant actions) until Senator Fulbright began to question the desirability of America's participation in the Senate. Had the networks reported a similar opinion by a college professor or intellectual, they might have been criticized for being partial; when a Senator offered the opinion, it became respectable enough for coverage.

Some of the day's events are so important that they must be covered in a half hour news program, and these — for example, events in the war on Viet Nam, in Washington, major disasters and the like are included by every news program. But when it comes to less important events, the broadcasters have some choice about what to cover and what to leave out, and their choice is based partly on their values, and thus of their own image of man. Of course, these values are latent, for manifestly, broadcasters try to be «objective»; they take pains not to express their own values openly. But these creep in, partly in what news is selected for reportage, and partly in how it is reported.

One such value is patriotism and nationalism. In America, and I suspect in all nations, events which make one's country appear idealistic, powerful, and justified in its actions are deemed important news. War reportage is, of course, most nationalistic, and the enemy's atrocities are reported more fully than one's own. When film of American soldiers burning a Viet Nameese village was shown on a television news program in 1965, there was as much public outcry over reporting «unpatriotic» news as over the inhumanity of the act itself. Needless to say, coverage of foreign events views the world from the perspective of the home country; a foreign event is of importance mainly as it affects America. For example, an unpublished study by Ann Stupan of how American magazines report Yugoslavia showed that stories of economic reform emphasized how the Yugoslav economy was beginning to resemble the American one; the actual reforms themselves received only minor mention. If adolescents in Great Britain or Sweden develop new fashions, they are covered in terms of how much they imitate American teenage ways.

A second major value is the maintenance of order. News pays ex-

traordinary attention to the violators of public order, for they create unusual events, whether they are criminals, demonstrators, or revolutionaries. Most often, however, the news of the event gives greater attention to those who bring about order. Stories about revolutions emphasize activities which restore about order; masses of demonstrators are often described as «hordses» or «mobs», and those who maintain or restore order are pictured more favorably. Prison riots are covered from the point of view of prison authorities; the interview is always with the prison warden, and the prisoners' grievances are presented only in passing.

In domestic news, honesty and justice are prime values. Television, like other media, does not ordinarily attack the government, but if a government official is found to be deceptive, particularly with reporters, the news will give it considerable publicity. Television reporters, like all other journalists, want to do exposés. They tend, however, to emphasize moral rather than political injustice; stories about the mistreatment of orphans are more likely to get air time than the mistreatment of constituents by an elected official. Civil rights marches in the South were fully covered by national television(over the protest of Southern stations) and film of white brutality against Negro marchers brought it to the nation's attention, creating popular support for stronger federal civil rights legislation. When the civil rights movement became aware of the political value of television coverage, however, and sought to use the coverage itself to further its aims, some broadcasters became concerned, for while they wanted to report on injustice, they did not want to be used politically, even by a group whose general aims they favored. And once the civil rights movement began to demand changes in the North, particularly housing legislation that would integrate middle class neighborhoods, their coverage became somewhat less enthusiastic.

But perhaps the broadcasters' favorite targets are privilege and corruption, bureaucracy and technology. Journalists are traditionally reformers, and like to report (and expose) graft. They believe in fighting the Establishment, though they define it less in terms of power than privilege, «the pompous and self-important people in Washington, «as one broadcaster put it. Their liberalism is moral rather than political. Stories of bureaucratic inefficiency and red tape are sought out, and so are those which demonstrate the failings of the newest technology. «I love stories that show how the computer screws up,» one broadcaster told me, and many of the lighter feature stories are anecdotes which demonstrate that human ingenuity is su-

rior to the machine, and that old-fashioned machines are better than newer ones. For example, there have been several nostalgic TV news features about the railroads, and one day, a story about governmental efforts to build the supersonic jet was followed by a sentimental piece about a man who rebuilds and flies planes of the World War I era. The broadcasters like stories of rugged individualism, and in 1965, a feature on Rhodesian white farmers (which reported their maltreatment of the black population) commented favorably and at length on their being pioneers in clearing the land, duplicating a 19th century American tradition.

The definition of what is news, and the choices which broadcasters make among potential stories lead to an image of man and society which is quite different from reality — and from sociology. Unlike the sociologist, who reports the actions of large groups of people, the recurring behavior and social processes and the institutional and situational contexts in which these occur, the news focuses on individuals doing unusual things and ideosyncratic events, as often as not in opposition to the social process. Man is seen as an activist who seeks progress by going against the social process, and perhaps the ideal type is the patriotic moral reformer who wants to make people and society honest and law-abiding, democratic and just, yet without suggesting basic change in the society.

Man the Audience

Television broadcasters know little about their audience. Although the networks which employ them conduct studies of the characteristics of the audience, its viewing patterns and program preferences, news broadcasters rarely see these, and have no desire to see them. They are presenting the news, not trying to satisfy an audience, and the less they know of the audience, the more attention they feel they can pay to the news.

Even so, they are broadcasting to an audience, and must have an image of that audience of they are to communicate successfully. This image comes primarily from two sources, letters, and the broadcasters' own social contacts. Their wives, friends and neighbors talk to them about the program, offering criticism and suggestions. Although the broadcaster rarely alters his actions as a result, these contacts do give him one image of the audience. The letters people write to the network or to individual broadcasters come from a small num-

ber of correspondents, some of whom write in regularly once a week or even once a day, seeking a quasi-personal relationship with the broadcasters. Many are socially isolated and emotionally disturbed people, and are considered «cranks» whose opinions need not be taken seriously. Individual programs may, however, evoke letters from other than the «regulars», and these are taken seriously. Whenever profanity is used on the air, there are sure to be letters and phone calls from people who object, and while the broadcasters try to avoid unnecessary use of profanity, they feel that expletives used by people in situations of conflict, as in battle, are justified and that the people who object «have not yet learned to live in the 20th century». If fifty or a hundred people write or call in accusing a program of being partial to one or another side, the broadcasters take notice and make sure that they will be more impartial in the future. They do not mind being attacked so much as being accused of one-sidedness, and as one broadcaster put it, «if the letters accuse us of being both fascist and communist, then we know we have been impartial».

The sources of audience contact are thus extremely limited, and expose the broadcasters to a highly selected sample of the total audience. This affects their view of the audience, which can be divided into three types. On the one hand, they see the audience as extremist and cranky, and as a result, think of it as easily panicked. When they report major disasters, therefore, they are careful to write the news so as to minimize panic. When President Kennedy was assassinated, the broadcasters emphasized that the country was calm, that the government was operating normally, and that there was no need to panic. Although they had no evidence that the assassination would result in panic, they expected it, and structured their reportage in order to prevent it.

A second view of the audience derives from the broadcasters' social contacts. This sees the audience as young, well-educated, liberal and informed middle class people, who are interested in news, and are therefore willing to interrupt their dinner hour to tune in to the evening news program. This is the broadcaster's favorite audience image, for it allows him to put together the news as he sees fit, knowing that whatever he does, the audience will understand and be interested. But there is also a third image of the audience, of the large majority with whom the broadcasters are out of contact. These are viewed as being only mildly interested in the news, particularly in foreign news and documentary features, but since they are assumed to be the majority, and their interest is needed to keep up the ratings

(which must be high so as to retain commercial sponsors), they must be persuaded to watch the news. Although no one knows for certain how they can be persuaded, they are thought to be most interested in the unusual, and when ratings go down, news programs may increase the amount of unusual news and entertaining documentary features.

The Sources of the Images

The image of man in television news should be a familiar one; it is, after all, the same one that has appeared in the newspaper ever since it became a mass medium. Whether the broadcasters were trained in newspaper journalism or not (and most still are) they still look first for action and the unusual individual. Indeed, television favors action even more than the newspaper, for the medium requires pictures. News that lends itself to filming has first priority, and what people do makes more interesting film than what they say. «Conferences of political leaders are only talking heads of a bunch of old men when they are on film», one broadcaster explained. Unless the news is extremely urgent, it will not be covered until film is available (which sometimes may take a day or so) and a good film of a less important event may crowd out a poor or uninteresting film of a somewhat more important one. Television broadcasters assume that the audience relies on other sources for news as well, and see their mission less as reporting the news first than as offering film which put the viewer «next to the story», providing him with the image and mood of the event rather than the facts. The camera has also made the traditional professional norm of journalistic objectivity virtually useless; the reporter who covered events with a pencil in hand was not conscious of selecting aspects of the total event, but when he has a camera, he notices quickly that he can only cover what he points his camera at, and that the camera cannot see everything at once. Other changes, for example, in the sophistication of the audience, support this trend and broadcasters now feel freer to do «interpretative reporting», to explain as well as describe events.

Yet the basic definition of news as action and the unusual has not changed, for though it stems from professional journalism and the way journalists are trained to cover the world, its roots are much deeper. As long as news is reported and distributed by institutions who benefit from having the largest possible audience — whether the

benefits are profits, government allocations or power — then it must seek to attract that audience, and the best (and perhaps the only) way is to emphasize the unusual.

Even so, the image of the audience which underlies the professional definition of news comes neither from the audience nor from the businessmen (or bureaucrats) who make policy for the television network (or the newspaper). Not knowing what the audience wants, the broadcasters who put together the evening news programs sometimes act on the basis of what they think the audience wants.

But most of the time, they do not take the audience into consideration at all; as they report and edit the news, they choose what interests and excites them, on the assumption that the audience will feel the same way once they see it. Whenever I have asked media decision-makers, be they television producers, or magazine and newspaper editors, how they decide what to cover and report, they almost always say what interests them. If so, they argue, it will interest the audience too, but if it does not interest them, they cannot possibly make it interesting to the audience. In essence, then, the broadcaster puts on the news he thinks important or interesting, and functions as a «representative» for the audience in his choices.

Moreover, despite the popular conception of mass media people as unwilling technicians who must report the news the way the newspaper publisher or the owner of the television network wants to have it reported, the broadcasters I have observed work without any supervision from management, and are quite free to cover the news as as they see fit. This may be more true of the national media than of local ones, which are closer to and, therefore, more subject to pressures from advertisers and local powerholders, and it is certainly less true of entertainment programs, which must please sponsors, than news programs which can fight such pressures by insisting on the freedom of the press. As a result, news broadcasters are free from outside interference except when ratings are decreasing (and management insists on changes to attract a larger audience) or when important government officials express their dissatisfaction with the way a story has been reported. Even then, however, the networks are usually able to resist such pressures, especially when they become public knowledge and violate the press's traditional freedom from government interference.

There are four major reasons for the broadcasters' freedom. One is the tradition of American freedom of the press, another, that newsmen are professionals who know how the news should be covered

and disseminated. But two other reasons are more important. First, broadcasters are familiar with the major taboos, and unless the issue is very important, will observe them rather than antagonize powerful figures or large audience sectors. They will not, for example, criticize the government impulsively, and unless they have a full panoply of facts to back up their charges, they will not air controversial and deviant points of view. And as I noted earlier, they will not use profanity without good reason.

Second, and perhaps most important, broadcasters are free to give the audience the news they consider most worthy of coverage because they are themselves like their audience, share its basic values, and are in fact, members of it themselves. They do not, of course, resemble the entire audience, but its most significant segment, the young college-educated portion which is most interested in the news, and which the sponsors are most eager to sell to. News men are not intellectuals, as they often are in Europe, but they represent the more sophisticated portion of the mass audience, and share its major opinions. They generally support government foreign policy and the domestic policies of the Democratic party; as I noted before, they are liberals, who believe in greater justice and equality but only as long as it does not threaten basic middle class interests. They support civil rights legislation, until Negroes begin to demand concessions from the white middle class; they favor labor union activities until a strike inconveniences their own lives. Like most other Americans, they are non-ideological; they lack strong political loyalties or affiliations, and choose, rather, to make up their minds about issues on an ad hoc basis, using the facts available to them. (This, too, is part of the professional journalistic tradition; American newspapermen are pervasive empiricists, who feel that they ought to come to the facts with an open mind, and should only draw conclusions on the basis of the facts they gather). The broadcasters are also like their audience in other ways; like the rest of the upper middle and middle class, they live in the suburbs, spend their leisure hours the same way, adopt the same fads and fashions, and read the same newspapers and mass magazines as everyone else. From my limited interviewing so far, it appears that most read *Time*, *Newsweek*, *Life* and similar magazines, and only a handful ever see the small circulation journals like the *Nation* or the *New Republic* on the liberal left, or the *National Review* on the right. Like everyone else, they see the world through middle class American eyes.

Since many broadcasters have come from humble (usually lower

middle class) backgrounds, and have personally benefitted significantly from American affluence, they have no reason to question fundamental social, economic or political arrangements. For example, since they can afford the plethora of consumer goods made by the major corporations, they are not especially concerned about the current mergers of major corporations which are centralizing the American economy and threaten to give control of that economy to a handful of giant corporations. Because they do not consider it problematic (and because it is hard to put on film), they do not cover it as news. Like members of their audience, they are concerned about inflation and price increases, but they benefit too much from the present economy to be motivated to look for news that would question its basic assumptions. And they feel similarly about most other institutions in American society.

The selection of broadcasters who resemble a major part of their audience is not intentional; people are hired on the basis of their skills as reporters and film-makers, and their cultural and political ideas are rarely ascertained before they go to work. As a result, the ideological congruence of broadcasters and audience develops out of self-recruitment. Of course, intellectuals might not be hired as broadcasters because they could probably not express themselves clearly and simply enough to be able to communicate with the mass audience; and radicals (of the right or the left) would probably not be hired because they would come to the news with preconceptions, violating the empirical and non-ideological approach with which the news is covered in America. But such exclusionary policies are rarely needed; intellectuals and radicals would not often consider working for the mass media in the first place, and even when the latter did so in the pre-McCarthy era, their work rarely reflected their personal political views.

Consequently, the kind of people who choose to become journalists and broadcasters in America today are enough like the audience they serve so that they can be left free to work as they see fit. They produce the kind of news that the audience seems to want, and they create the picture of American society which that audience either accepts, or with which it comes to the media to begin with. Of course, no one knows what the audience really wants or what it would accept, but unless there are large-scale defections by that audience from the current fare of available news, which seems highly unlikely, the broadcasters will continue to be able to express their own image of man and society in the news.

NOTES ON THE THEATER AND THE SERMON¹

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The following remarks originate in a long-range enterprise of the author to inquire into the history of the social controls of the arts in western civilization. I have lately become interested in the ideological origins of formal and informal censorship of artistic production. There is no artistic genre that has uninterruptedly remained the target of social criticism though the sources and scope of power of the criticizing agencies has undergone enormous metamorphosis. I am speaking about the theater, which has continued to be subjected to social and moral criticism by the professional practitioners of the sermon, as well as their self-styled imitators.

Clearly the sociological roots of this tournament change drastically over time, though the sermonizers are consistently legitimizing their position by reference to the verities of Christianity. But to say a word about the drastic sociological differences in this particular controversy on leisure-time culture: for the Church Fathers the theater competes with salvation, and for the puritanic zealots it competes with the needed internalization of work discipline in an unfolding manufacturing and trade economy.

We shall shortly refer to the rather well researched attacks on the theater during the age of the Restoration and then give some examples of the subterranean pamphleteering which has gone on since the middle of the eighteenth century, particularly in England and America. Some of the authors of this pamphleteering are hard to identify but they are obviously clergymen or churchgoing zealots of sectarian Protestant persuasion.

We begin with a reference to the book by Joseph Krutch, *Comedy and Conscience After the Restoration*. Krutch's discussion is, of course, by way of an explanation of the shift from Restoration drama to eighteenth century sentimental comedy. Although his primary interest is in tracing the development of a new genre, he also reports on the debate over the theater as a part of the process of its socio-

¹ With the assistance of Ina Lawson, Department of English, University of California, Berkeley.

logical development. He points out: «The deep-seated distrust of the theater, which at different times finds more or less passionate expression, is in itself perpetual. It is more deep-rooted than Christianity, and arises as a logical application of the much more ancient doctrine of asceticism. As the seventeenth century controversialist was fond of pointing out, not only did the early Church Fathers thunder against the theater, but the sterner sort of Pagans, from whom surely less was to be expected than from Christians, were at best doubtful concerning. True, Aristotle wrote a treatise on the drama, but Plato banished the players from the Republic...»

Speaking of the Church Fathers, the modern sociologist should at least get the flavor of the style of one of these, as, for example, St. John Chrysostom's attack on the theater, to remain aware of the continuity of ideological positions maintained in the Christian era from the Byzantium of the fourth century to the Boston of the twentieth. In speaking of the Roman spectacles, our Church Father thunders: «When then wilt thou be sober again, I pray thee, now that the devil is pouring out for thee so much of the strong wine of whoredom, mingling, so many cups of unchastity ?...»

...as it is, all things are turned upside down. For whence are they, tell me, that plot against our marriages ? Is it not from this theater ? Whence are they that dig through into chambers ? Is it not from that stage ? Comes it not of this, when the wives are contemptible to their husbands ? Of this, that the more part are adulterers ? So that the subverter of all things is he that goes to the theater; it is he that brings in a grievous tyranny». And as if he were speaking out against the predecessors of San Francisco's «topless» night club performers, he continues: «What then ? I pray thee, are we to overthrow all the laws ?» Nay, but it is overthrowing lawlessness, if we do away with these spectacles. For hence are they that make havoc in our cities; hence, for example, are seditions and tumults. For they that are maintained by the dancers, and who sell their own voice to the belly, whose work it is to shout, and to practice every thing that is monstrous, these especially are the men that stir up the populace, that make the tumults in our cities. For youth, when it hath joined hands with idleness, and is brought up in so great evils, becomes fiercer than any wild beast. ... Comes it not hence, when men are forced to spend without limit on that wicked choir of the devil ? And lasciviousness, whence is that, and its innumerable mischiefs ? Thou seest, and it is thou who are subverting our life, by drawing men to these things, while I am recruiting it by putting them down».

To return to Krutch's analysis of the stage controversy in England, he isolates two distinct threads in the debate; one is the ascetic objection, which found its strongest bulwark in Christianity. The Stoic contempt of pleasure became ascetic doctrine in the hands of the Christians, appealing to a less rarified sentiment than did the Stoics. To give up pleasure insured the heavenly reward. This asceticism was fundamentally opposed not only to bad plays (attacking obscenity, profanity, etc.) but to plays, as such, and to all art. As Krutch describes it, «The more one can withdraw from life, the safer he is. The wise man will, therefore, live in seclusion, and only a madman will ...seek to increase the temptations by allowing imagination to strengthen his interest in the world».

The second distinct thread in the controversy is the moral objection, constantly in the background, and often joining with the ascetic element in «unstable union». It is Krutch's view that «the movement for the reform of indecency was confused and even hindered by the introduction of a purely ascetic element, and that those who wished to purify the stage were joined in a somewhat unstable union with those who wished to destroy it». Although it is true that Restoration commentary about the theater was less severe than it had been (partly, at least, because of the political bankruptcy of Puritanism), there still exists a body of criticism that preceded Jeremy Collier and his *Short View of the Immorality and Profaneness of the English Stage* (1698) and made him not something unexpected.

By the time Collier appeared, the ground had been well prepared. It is Krutch's contention that Collier was in the tradition of asceticism and that he did not want to reform the stage, but to destroy it. Collier's «authorities» are Aristotle, Cicero, Livy, Tacitus, Valerius Maximus, as well as Spartan legal measures that banished plays completely. Lactantius, Augustine, Ambrose, and the early Church Fathers «are ransacked for all references, weighty or trivial, against the stage or shows. Authorities are piled one upon another in an effort to damn the whole institution on the strength of traditional opposition». The truth is that Collier was essentially narrow in his views and yet achieved such prominence because he arrived at an extremely opportune moment in the history of the English stage, namely, at the height of the clash between the decadent leisure-time culture of the landed gentry and the new values and style of life of an increasingly prosperous class of manufacturers and tradesmen.

So important was Collier's book that books on the stage «became almost a recognized department of literature, and varied from pon-

derous and unreadable volumes...to modest pamphlets...» Most of the works of controversy are anonymous, and the names we do have are not as arresting as that of Collier.

The seventeenth century and the first twenty-five years of the eighteenth were fertile ground in England for the controversy over the stage. Every class was addressed through the innumerable works written on this topic, and interest in the controversy cut across a large segment of English society. Krutch says that the audience was familiar with three «classic» questions: Is the theater a permissible institution? Is it its duty to teach morality? Can comedies best teach morality by administering poetic justice? Collier was received favorably by a public already predisposed toward reform, a public which awoke to the realization that Restoration comedy did not express the ideals of the age.

There were two distinct schools of opposition: there were those who spoke from positions within the establishment of Church and society, and there were those who spoke from the fringes of the establishment and as spokesmen of the dissenting, non-conformist religious groups. A particularly rewarding source for religious populist undercurrents which were trying to subvert the entertainment aspects of bourgeois leisure activities may be found in an increasing number of pamphlets which began to appear in England and America after the middle of the eighteenth century and have continued to do so almost to the present time. These writings were characterized by a spirit of dogma, a close reliance on Scriptural interpretations as touchstones for attack, and a deep sense of the continuing tradition of declamatory and exhortatory prose. We shall give a sample of this kind of material.

The anonymous author who wrote *The Stage, the High Road to Hell: being an Essay on the Pernicious Nature of Theatrical Entertainments* (1767) addressed his work to «the Reverend Mr. Madan». Although the essay itself is not a sermon, it is written in what might be called the exhortatory style. Secular writers, as well as religious ones, who were involved in the theater debate as opponents, had as their prime model the writings of the Church Fathers. They made the Church Fathers models not only for the lines of attack but also for their manner and mode. For over a thousand years the pronouncements of the early Christian writers in this matter received as little elaboration as they did much attention. This is understandable since, for them, the Word of God was changeless through all time and was not subject to wordly fluctuations or critical accretions.

The author of the above work begins by saying that the arts are proof of the degeneracy of the human species, and thus it follows that theatrical art «must surely be allowed to be the height and summit of all corruption, since stage...shews a fallen creature to himself, and, by laying before him all the various abuses to which the depravity of his nature has subjected him, renders him still more prone to sin...» The author is aware of the support of the theater by those who hold that the presentation of vice upon the stage increases men's distaste for it, but he argues that the stage only presents to man examples of the variety of forms which sin can take. The idea of the theater as education in morality is reversed by the writer; he regards it as education in the varieties of vice. He states further: «I think it can admit of no dispute that dramatic authors have perverted the theater, and done their utmost to increase the temptation to vice, by shewing it in an amiable light». Sin, our author points out, is not only set forth on the stage in all its varieties, but is also made to appear desirable.

As the writer warms to his topic, he turns to an examination of the participants in theatrical production. He tells his reader that playwrights are second only in debauchery to actors, who are no less than «demons in human shape». They are «debauchers», «greater pests of society than murderers» — perhaps an allusion to the Scriptural admonition that those who «kill the body» are less to be feared than those who endanger the life of the soul. No wonder, the writer argues, that acting is considered traditionally a degraded profession, as actors are no more than liars who assume a feigned character. As for English tragedy, it abounds in the most flagrant instances of immorality, «calculated to banish all principle from the minds of the young and inexperienced; to shake the foundations of morality, and introduce the most dangerous skepticism». Even Shakespeare's *Hamlet* concentrates on the theme of revenge, «contrary to the dictates of religion, which expressly forbids the revenging of one crime by the commission of another». Comic writers, he continues, are no better. Dryden is «a monster of all sorts of impurities», Vanbrugh «a man of daring impieties», both of whom ridicule the clergy in their works. Adultery and cuckolding are the constant themes of comedy and are presented in favorable terms.

The diatribe continues and builds to a climax with the description of the French theater. The French stage is the nadir of immorality, for it is in France that homosexuality is rampant in the theater. Molière, says our author, was a homosexual; French figure dancers,

as well as Italian singers, are particularly prone to this unspeakable vice. The French demonstrate that the theater breeds corruption in its participants as well as in its audience. And it is recognized as such: In Paris, actors are buried in dunghills and denied the sacrament if they do not renounce the stage. Character assassination of the lowly as well as the illustrious is easily the next step. We are informed that the actor Wilkes debauched a Mrs. Rigers, a clergyman's daughter. As for the remedy the legislature should outlaw the theater and have it closed forever.

We recognize here many of the themes of the Church Fathers. The dramatization of vice increases the incidence of vice in the audience and in the participants. Playwrights and actors join in a demonic onslaught on private and social morality. The tone and style are in the tradition of the Fathers — righteous indignation and moral wrath — also the tradition of seventeenth century Puritan pamphleteering. The language is powerful, strong, and direct, written from a point of unassailable virtue. The sexual particulars are, however a departure from traditional material. Their aim seems to be to present a shock by naming names and pointing fingers, in order to remove any doubts that may linger in the reader's mind. Apparently the «homosexual playwright» is already an idea of some popular currency; the author is not breaking ground on this point but seems to be playing on already established popular tradition. He admits in the Dedication that the theme of «the theater as a moral sink» will be an unpopular one, and perhaps the sexual gossip is introduced to familiarize and popularize it. Our author is not above a little sensationalism himself to make a point. The sexual gossip departs from the traditional body of material and may very well be a concession to the times.

Another eighteenth century piece, *The Absolute Unlawfulness of the Stage* by William Law (1726), while it follows the general exhortatory style of the first selection, offers a more subtle presentation and is not as gross in manner. It avoids sensational disclosures, and, in a more scholarly manner, uses as its touchstone argument the Scriptural passage, «Let no corrupt communication proceed out of your mouth, but that which is good to the use and edifying...»

The emphasis is on the theater as a communications center. Since corrupt communication is forbidden to individuals (and, as the author carefully explains, offends the Holy Ghost) how much more offensive is it to go to a place set apart for that very purpose? I think the use of the word «communications» is significant because the playhouse

is, after all, the prime competitor of the Church as a communications center. Elaborating on this theme, he writes that corrupt communication involves the whole unit: the stage and the audience; he also includes «filthy jesting», «ribaldy, prophaneness, rant, and impurity of discourse» — the actual substance of the communication — as a sub-topic in his discussion of communication. He adds that «vile and impure communications» can be hidden in «fine language» so that the spoken word becomes an agent of deception, and the divinely given act of communication is further defiled.

The first selection we considered discussed, as does this one, the idolatry of the theater-goer by relating plays historically to heathen worship. Once again, this writer is more subtle; to kneel before images is bad enough, he writes, but «an image is not so contrary to God as Plays are contrary to the Wisdom...of Scripture». It is a more serious offense to sit in the playhouse than to kneel before the voiceless golden calf. Speech is more powerful than images.

Our first writer, in the *High Road to Hell*, wrote: «I am well aware that the piece I now offer to the public will meet with but an unfavourable reception, as it opposes the current of their inclinations and condemns their favorite amusements. Conscience, however, forces me to speak, and endeavor to stem the torrent of corruption by a feeble, but well meant opposition».

One hundred years later the rhetoric of tradition that in the eighteenth century was out of step with this world, has been altered. In 1823 David M'Nicoll's *A Rational Enquiry concerning the Operation of the Stage on the Morals of Society* was published and represents a new direction in the arguments against the theater: «He who fights against the theater, perhaps goes on to dogmatize, as if his own naked opinion were sufficient to give law to the public; and it is well if he does not assume a manner of illogical dictation amounting to overt acts of uncharitableness; and thus his well meant endeavours only injure the cause he means to support». This writer thus criticizes his predecessors and declares himself a «modern» stylist, freed from the religious rhetoric of opposition. Notice the phrase, «assume a manner», which gives us a description of the professional disclaimer of the old style and his deliberate «pose». Heavy-handed pronouncements hurt the cause; moral wrath and divine indignation can too easily be interpreted as «uncharitableness». Exercising a new caution, M'Nicoll represents a softening of the implacable lines of the Church Fathers.

This writer demonstrates in this essay much of the nineteenth

century vogue. For example, he gives the opposition wide berth, such with as would have been unthinkable a century earlier. The psychological point of view is being introduced and the entire argumentation has a more secularised flavor. He points out that the simple pleasure of the stage is not to be denied, that reason tells us that immorality must be part of the play itself in order that it achieve some semblance of probability. What is needed to keep things in check is self-censorship; «Have such arts no bounds?» he asks. Then follows a species of nineteenth century sensitivity to «communications», but now it is more elaborate than we saw in William Law. Wicked language or writing, says M'Nicoll, reaches the understanding; but language used by the «public actor» reaches the passions — a potent force unequalled by the printed word. «History abounds with instances of moral evil; but these are not to be compared with dramatic pictures of this kind». In this pamphlet we find already an awareness of a much more sophisticated and astute variety, of what makes the theater a powerful instrument of communication. The power of the actor upon the public stage is seen as derived from the greater size of his audience, the emotional impact of spoken words, and the sanctity and authority given to public speech by the stage and institution which are the contexts of this form of communication.

M'Nicoll attempts an elementary form of audience analysis. He departs from the view that the theater acts its evil upon innocents and entices them. Rather, his view is that contemporary society is already in a state of corruption: «That society is in a state of actual corruption is indisputable; and the argument is the same, whatever be the origin of the mischief». Therefore, he continues, the inflaming of the passions on a «huge mass of similar corruption...adds momentum to an avalanche...». Rough estimates of the way in which popular entertainment achieves wide audiences is also taken into consideration: «The stage must conform to the taste of the people. This conformity is not denied but is freely acknowledged, and often used as an exculpation of the poet and player». M'Nicoll, while seemingly basing his argument on the scientific mode of reasoning of the nineteenth century, makes his essay a minor compendium of nineteenth century canons of conservative taste. The religious base is discarded almost totally; «reason» has taken its place. M'Nicoll recognizes that «The popularity of the drama leads to monstrous abuses ... of multitudes of writers being brought into operation, who are nearly destitute of the genius and of the knowledge of mankind,

which are necessary to a just conception of character». Here his discussion takes an interesting twist; his argumentation seems closely to approach the utilitarian mood. The theater is not «useful» as an outlet for the men of reason and science; on the contrary, it attracts those pseudo-creative elements in modern society who feed on the need for sensationalism and distraction of the modern audience.

On the possibility of theater reform he states: «Suppose the stage to be completely reformed, and to continue equally popular — a thing impossible in a corrupt state of society — it would then in its fundamental principles be quite another thing compared with the present theater...».

And where, we may ask, are the Church Fathers? In the conclusion, M'Nicoll finally turns to them as little more than reference points. Their weakened status in the theater debate is obvious as M'Nicoll spends time trying to resolve certain quibbles that have grown up around the Fathers' writings. Is it true (as the opposition says) that the Fathers, in their condemnations of the theater, were really talking only about pantomimes? And is it true that St. Chrysostom used to sleep with Aristophanes under his pillow? And if it is true, does this fact neutralize the validity of his opposition to public acting? Here we see that, deprived of traditional supports, M'Nicoll's essay deals with the Church Fathers in the context of a kind of «sociology of ideology» focussing on the relationship of a man's opinions to his behavior. He expresses some insights into the nature of popular culture which serve only to condemn the theater further, and his generalized commentary on theater mores brands them as morally culpable.

The stage is not without defenders, of course. A contemporary of M'Nicoll named Mansel published, in 1814, his *Free Thoughts upon Methodists, Actors and the Influence of the Stage*. Mansel is among the defenders what our anonymous author of *High Road to Hell* is among the opposition: he is full of fire and energy, mincing no words, but he has modulated the old-time «wrath» into modern sarcasm and irony. He begins by examining the opposition's formidable traditions: «The Fathers have unequivocally and avowedly proclaimed their opinion violently and diametrically in opposition to the use of the stage. Most of its succeeding adversaries have followed their mode of condemnation. All its present opponents, who embellish themselves with the name of Christian, look up to the early and learned churchmen as precedents for their conduct. It behooves us, therefore, to search more strictly into this enormous ... display of ecclesiastical

vengeance». In an almost Hegelian tone, but definitely in a historicist mood, he concedes one point — that the Church was correct in condemning the abominations that existed on the stage at the time the Fathers wrote. In addition, he calls into question «the means they adopted to check the profligacy of the thing they condemned». The historical view is joined here by a psychological perspective. As Mansel put it, St. Chrysostom «studied all the dramatic poets», and his famous, eloquent orator borrowed heavily from dramatic writers, while Tertullian had a vivid imagination of his own, to which he was prey. Tertullian, after all, did fall into heresy, and Mansel suggests that his vehemence against the stage was one way he managed to redeem himself. Mansel may be the first writer to call the writings of the Church Fathers «an overwhelming of nonsense and stupidity ... directed against a sublime art». By insisting on relating the Fathers' views on the theater to the specific historical conditions of their times, and by showing how that condemnation did not mitigate the value of theatrical prose which even the Church Fathers utilized, Mansel seeks to discredit these early Christian writers as spokesmen for modern social values.

Mansel, good scholar that he was, substitutes Addison, Milton, and Johnson as great Christians, moral practitioners, and spiritual spokesmen whose contributions to the stage are testimony enough of its moral fiber. Historical distance worked in Mansel's favor; he could with ease point to the clay feet of the Fathers and the defects revealed in their biographies. Moreover, his defense of the stage had behind it the solid tradition of English belles lettres and the humanistic foundations of the English stage.

The few selections offered here need to be reinforced by additional data covering the history of the controversy. The period 1700 to 1900, for example, has to be studied not only in the light of the changes in the nature of the debate but also with respect to changes in the theater itself. After all, the arguments change in part because of changes in the kinds of theatrical activity, and one cannot overlook the change from Restoration to Sentimental Comedy and then to the plays Tennyson and his contemporaries were producing in mid-nineteenth century. In his context the great florescence late in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries of the Realistic theater also come into play.

A DATA ARCHIVE OF LEGAL SYSTEMS
A CROSS-NATIONAL ANALYSIS OF SAMPLE DATA

William M. Evers
University of Pennsylvania

SOCIOLOGY OF LAW

Comparative research on legal systems has for many years been virtually the exclusive domain of legal scholars. The range of scholarship of comparativists is indeed wide. At one extreme, some concentrate on specific problems in a limited number of legal systems, such as the dismissal of civil servants in the United States, Britain and France.¹ At the opposite extreme, some scholars undertake encyclopedic analyses of legal systems, as represented in the work of Wigmore² and Deyal.³ One of the virtues of comparative law, as Elin-Friestad recently observed in his inaugural address at Oxford, is that it allows a scholar to place himself outside the labyrinth of minutiae in which legal thinking so easily loses its way and to see the great contours of the law and its dominant characteristics.⁴

SOCIOLOGY AND COMPARATIVE LAW

From a sociological perspective much of the research in comparative law is concerned exclusively with legal doctrine, is descriptive in nature, or is insufficiently oriented to the interplay of legal action

¹ Revised version of a paper presented at the Sixth World Congress of Sociology in Evian, France, September 4-11, 1965. I wish to express my gratitude to David Edwards for his invaluable help in processing the data for this paper. I am also indebted to the Wharton School of Finance and Commerce of the University of Pennsylvania and its Management Science Center for making it possible to bring this study to a conclusion.

² Mark R. Josselyn, "Legal Problems in the Dismissal of Civil Servants in the U.S., Britain and France," *American Journal of Comparative Law*, 12 (1963), pp. 147-171.

³ John Henry Wigmore, *A Treatise on the World's Legal Systems*, 2 vols. (St. Paul, Minnesota: West Publishing Company, 1929).

⁴ Hans Deyal, *Les Grande Systèmes de Droit Contemporain* (Paris: Dalloz, 1944).

⁵ O. Kahn-Freund, "Comparative Law as an Academic Discipline," *Law Quarterly Review*, 62 (January, 1950), p. 42.

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⁴ O. KAHN-FREUND, «Comparative Law as an Academic Subject,» *Law Quarterly Review*, 82 (January, 1966), p. 40.

tutions with other institutions in society. Thus far, however, few sociologists or other social scientists have ventured into the field of comparative law. Some notable exceptions are Hoebel's comparison of the legal systems of five pre-literate societies⁵, Rose's study of the impact of law on voluntary associations in the United States, France and Italy⁶, and Rabinowitz's implicit comparative analysis of the legal profession in Japan and in Western countries⁷.

All comparative lawyers, except for those with a sociological orientation⁸, would probably dismiss any social science study that purports to supplement the extant approaches in their field. It is, therefore, incumbent upon the sociological trespasser to indicate what he expects to contribute to cross-national research on law.

The sociologist attracted to this type of comparative research can bring to bear some of his distinctive theoretical and methodological biases. Theoretically, the sociologist might wish to investigate, for example, the differing role of law in social change as a function of the degree of bureaucratization, the degree of rigidity of the social stratification system, and the degree of social system integration. Because law pervades all the other institutional subsystems of society, a macro-sociological approach which takes into account the aggregate characteristics⁹ of a legal system would illuminate the relationships law has with other subsystems of society.

Methodologically, the sociologist would be interested in systematically collecting data on a sufficiently large number of societies to test propositions of theoretical and/or practical interest. He might even wish to test some propositions formulated by comparative lawyers. For example, Kahn-Freund recently advanced the tantalizing, if somewhat ambiguous, proposition that «under similar social, economic,

⁵ E. Adamson HOEBEL, *The Law of Primitive Man* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954).

⁶ Arnold M. ROSE, *Theory and Method in the Social Sciences* (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1954), pp. 72-115; «On Individualism and Social Responsibility», *European Journal of Sociology*, II (1961), pp. 163-169.

⁷ R. W. RABINOWITZ, «The Historical Development of the Japanese Bar», *Harvard Law Review*, 70 (November, 1956), pp. 61-81.

⁸ Cf. Jerome HALL, *Comparative Law and Social Theory* (Louisiana: Louisiana State University Press, 1963), pp. 10-15.

⁹ Cf. Paul F. LAZARSFELD and Herbert MENZEL, «On the Relation between Individual and Collective Properties», in Amitai ETZIONI, ed., *Complex Organizations: A Sociological Reader* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1961), pp. 428-429; Ralph H. RETZLAFF, «The use of Aggregate Data in Comparative Political Analysis», *Journal of Politics*, 27 (November, 1965), pp. 797-817.

cultural pressures in similar societies the law is apt to change by means of sometimes radically different techniques»¹⁰. Assuming this proposition were operationalized, the sociologist would put it to a systematic and quantitative test rather than resort to the case method often employed by legal scholars.

PROPOSAL FOR A DATA ARCHIVE

With presuppositions such as these in mind, I proposed in 1964 that a data archive of legal systems be developed¹¹. To be sure, the bookkeeping systems of nation-states, the United Nations, and various international organizations yield vast quantities of statistics. For example, the United Nations publishes data on mortality, fertility, manufacturing, newspaper circulation, etc.; the International Labor Organization publishes statistics on unemployment, number of man-hours lost from strikes, etc. However, the bulk of available data provides surprisingly little grist for the mill of the sociologist interested in cross-national research on legal systems. This is true even if one construes the concept of a legal system in very broad terms, as I have done; namely, as «a set of institutions comprising norms, roles, and patterns of behavior pertaining to judicial, legislative, executive, and administrative processes of a society»¹².

Translating this broad conception of a legal system into a set of quantitative indicators to permit cross-national comparisons is in itself a complex undertaking¹³. There is a strong temptation to focus only on those attributes of legal systems that readily lend themselves to quantification, such as the number of lawyers and judges, and ignore qualitative phenomena that require quantification and may even be more important, such as the degree to which norms of procedural due process are institutionalized¹⁴ and govern judicial decision making.

¹⁰ KAHN-FREUND, *op. cit.*, p. 45.

¹¹ Cf. William M. EVAN, «Toward a Sociological Almanac of Legal Systems», *International Social Science Journal*, XVII (No. 2), 1965, pp. 335-338.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 336.

¹³ Raymond A. BAUER, ed., *Social Indicators*, Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1966.

¹⁴ Cf. William M. EVAN, «Due Process of Law in Military and Industrial Organizations», *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 7 (September 1962), pp. 203-207.

An even more serious obstacle to developing a set of indicators is the diversity of meaning and behavior associated with seemingly unequivocal terms such as lawyer, policeman, and homicide. Lawyers differ substantially in professional training and function, with some countries making a distinction between a barrister and a solicitor while others do not. A policeman may be a local, regional, or national official; he may be known or unknown to the public; and he may perform a predominantly law-enforcement function or a political function¹⁵. As for the meaning of homicide, the United Nations has for some years wrestled with problems of defining major criminal offenses in order to make possible the collection, analysis, and presentation of international criminal statistics¹⁶.

The problems of developing cross-national definitions of terms and comparable quantitative indicators pose a formidable intellectual challenge. This is evident when one examines the provisional list of 36 quantitative indicators included in the proposal that gave rise to the present study¹⁷. This list of items may give the impression of an aimless endeavor. However, though a data-archive must have some theoretical underpinnings, it must also lend itself to the multiple purposes of various potential users if it is to be a useful archive.

EXPLORATORY ANALYSIS OF ILLUSTRATIVE DATA

By way of illustrating, rather than demonstrating, the feasibility and utility of such a data archive, a small body of data has been compiled from United Nations sources, from a document by the World Peace Through Law Center¹⁸, and from several other sources. The legal indicators are quantitative as well as qualitative in nature. Among the quantitative indicators are law schools per 1,000 population, law professors per 1,000 population, lawyers per 1,000 popula-

¹⁵ Cf. Arthur S. BANKS and Robert B. TEXTOR, *A Cross-Polity Survey*, (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1963), pp. 114-115.

¹⁶ Cf. Marc ANCEL, «Observations on the International Comparison of Criminal Statistics,» *International Review of Criminal Policy*, No. 1 (January, 1952), pp. 41-48; U.N. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, Report by the Secretariat, *Criminal Statistics: Standard Classification of Offenses*, E/CN.5/357, 2 March 1959 (Mimeo).

¹⁷ EVAN, «Toward a Sociological Almanac of Legal Systems,» *op. cit.*, pp. 337-338.

¹⁸ Cf. WORLD PEACE THROUGH LAW CENTER, *Law and Judicial Systems of Nations*, Washington, D.C.: World Peace Through Law Center, 1965.

tion, legislators per 1,000 population, divorce rate, suicide rate, and illegitimacy ratio. Among the qualitative indicators are role of police — whether a predominantly political or law-enforcement function, and a classification of legal systems often used by comparatists, namely, civil law, common law, socialist law, and Moslem law¹⁹.

In order to explore the interrelationships of legal institutions and other institutions or social processes, some data on as large a number of nations as possible were collected, principally from United Nations sources and from the handbook of the Yale Political Data Program²⁰. Ten quantitative indicators of non-legal institutions were selected: (1) level of industrialization, which consists of an average rank on three highly intercorrelated variables, namely, GNP per capita, energy consumption per capita, and percentage of labor force engaged in agriculture; (2) degree of urbanization, as measured by the percentage of population living in cities of over 20,000; (3) level of education, which consists of an average rank on three highly intercorrelated variables, namely, students enrolled in higher education per 100,000 population, primary and secondary school pupils as a percentage of the population aged 5-19, and percentage literate of population over 15 years of age; (4) date of political independence; (5) age of marriage as measured by the median age of grooms; (6) percentage of Christians in the population; (7) percentage of Moslems in the population; (8) degree of professionalization of the labor force, as measured by the percentage of professionals and technical personnel in the labor force; (9) degree of bureaucratization of the labor force, as measured by the percentage of administrative, executive and managerial personnel in the labor force; and, (10) the size of the military establishment as a percentage of the population aged 15-64.

All the data in this exploratory analysis, the 9 indicators of legal systems and the 10 indicators of other sub-systems of society, are cross-sectional in character. This precludes the possibility of measuring time lags and tracing feedback effects. Hence, I shall follow the general sociological assumption of regarding the indicators of the

¹⁹ See, for example, DAVID, *op. cit.*

²⁰ Bruce M. RUSSETT, *et al.*, *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1964); Karl W. DEUTSCH, Harold D. LASSWELL, Richard L. MERRITT, and Bruce M. RUSSETT, «The Yale Political Data Program,» in Richard L. MERRITT and Stein ROKKAN, eds., *Comparing Nations: The Use of Quantitative Data in Cross-National Research* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 81-94.

TABLE 1
PEARSON PRODUCT-MOMENT CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS
OF INDICATORS OF LEGAL AND NON-LEGAL
INSTITUTIONS OF SELECTED NATIONS +

Variable	Variable No.	Law Schools per 1,000 population	Law Professors per 1,000 population	Lawyers per 1,000 population	Legislators per 1,000 population	Divorce rate
		1	2	3	4	5
Law Schools per 1,000 population	1					
Law Professors per 1,000 population	2	***				
Lawyers per 1,000 population	3	***	***			
Legislators per 1,000 population	4	***	.42	.46		
Divorce rate	5	.74	.18	.20		
Suicide rate	6	.03	-.09	.24	.04	***
Illegitimacy ratio	7	-.03	-.19	.06	.03	.61
Industrialization	8	.00	.06	-.14	.04	-.52
Urbanization	9	.16	.00	.47	.37	.26
Bureaucratization	10	.21	.17	.54	.25	.26
Professionalization	11	.44	.07	.45	-.19	.24
Level of Education	12	.22	.06	.47	.37	.36
Date of Political Independence	13	.22	.28	.55	.22	.43
Age of grooms	14	.13	.27	.30	.04	-.02
% of Christians	15	-.14	-.14	-.08	.00	-.31
% of Moslems	16	.35	.49	.52	.24	.08
Military as % of population	17	-.24	-.37	-.36	-.08	.02

* Significant at the .05 level

** Significant at the .01 level

*** Significant at or lower than the .001 level

+ The size of the N varies from one pair of variables to another, the largest being 97 nations and the smallest, 20.

Suicide rate	Illegitimacy ratio	Industrialization	Urbanization	Bureaucratization	Professionalization	Level of Education	Date of Political Independence	Age of grooms	% of Christians	% of Moslems	Military as % of population
6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17
**											
-.44											
**	**										
.53	-.46										
*		***									
.35	-.27	.81									
		**	**								
.12	-.27	.59	.49								
*		***	***	***							
.48	-.44	.91	.80	.60							
***	***	***	***	***	***						
.50	-.48	.90	.75	.61	.91						
*		***	***			***					
.32	.06	.49	.40	-.26	-.27	.44					
	***			***	***	*					
-.19	.60	-.29	-.12	-.58	-.50	-.31	.06				
	*	***	***		*	***					
.23	.33	.52	.51	.26	.42	.58	-.51	.11			
		***			*	***	***		***		
-.31	-.18	-.54	-.35	-.31	-.43	-.62	-.35	.00	-.65		
			**		**	***		**			
.07	-.50	.31	.32	.02	.51	.40	-.12	.39	.02	.00	

legal systems as *dependent* variables and the other indicators as *independent* variables, without, however, dismissing the possibility of feedback effects occurring over time.

As a first step in the analysis of the data, a matrix of Pearson product-moment correlations is presented in Table 1 for a «sample» of nations varying from 20 to 97, depending on the availability of each nation's data for a particular pair of variables. Inasmuch as this is an exploratory analysis, a 2-tail probability test is used in deciding which of the correlation coefficients to regard as statistically significant.

To begin with, it should be noted that of the 136 possible correlation coefficients among the 17 variables (7 quantitative indicators of legal systems and 10 quantitative indicators of non-legal systems), 61 are statistically significant, whereas on the basis of chance alone we would expect only 7 significant coefficients. Of the wealth of information in Table 1, a few findings are salient. It is surely not surprising that the variables pertaining to law schools, law professors, and lawyers are mutually interrelated. If they were not, we would have grounds for doubting the validity of the data. It is noteworthy, however, that there is a high positive correlation between the number of law schools and the number of legislators. This is consistent with the findings of several studies of the disproportionate representation of lawyers in legislatures and in other branches of government²¹. Also noteworthy is the correlation between bureaucratization and the number of law schools. As the proportion of bureaucratic personnel in the labor force increases, more legally-educated personnel are required which stimulates the development of law schools. In turn, as the pool of available graduates of law schools increases it raises the level of bureaucratization of the labor force, as is also suggested by the high positive correlation between bureaucratization and the number of lawyers.

Apart from the impact of bureaucratization on the number of law schools and lawyers in a country, the other highly positive correlates are the major social trends of industrialization, urbanization, and professionalization. A scattergram of the correlation coefficient of .47 of industrialization and number of lawyers per 1,000 population in 42 nations is presented in Figure 1. This finding is related to

²¹ See, for example, Donald R. MATTHEWS, *The Social Background of Political Decision-Makers* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1954), pp. 28-32; David GOLD, «Lawyers in Politics: An Empirical Exploration of Biographical Data on State Legislators,» *Pacific Sociological Review*, 4 (Fall, 1961), pp. 84-86.

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17
Military																	
% of population																	
Significant at the .05 level																	
Significant at the .01 level																	
Significant at or lower than the .001 level																	

* The size of the N varies from one pair of variables to another, the largest being 97 nations and the smallest, 20.




Figure 1

Scattergram of Correlation between Level of Industrialization and Lawyers Per 1,000 Population for 42 Nations.

Nagel's more inclusive observation that «The disproportionate presence of professional judges, jurors, lawyers, promulgating bodies, and appellate courts among manufacturing societies can probably be partially explained by the fact that increased industrialization brings increased specialization within the economic system of a society which carries over into the political and adjudicative systems»²².

The general hypothesis that industrialization has a significant impact, directly or indirectly, on the legal system appears to be confirmed by the findings in Figure 1 as well as by several correlations in Table 1. Under the circumstances it seemed reasonable to assume that some of the zero-order correlation coefficients in Table 1 are due to the effects of industrialization. Thus a partial correlation analysis, controlling for the effects of industrialization, seemed advisable. As shown in Table 2, when the effects of industrialization are removed only 15 of the original 61 zero-order correlation coefficient are statistically significant. Among these are some of the salient findings noted above.

The impact of industrialization and attendant social processes on the legal system is also discernible when we examine the findings on the role of the policeman in various countries. In their highly innovative study in comparative social systems, Banks and Textor categorized the role of policeman in 115 nations as to whether it entails a predominantly law-enforcement function or a political function²³. Using their categorization, a statistical comparison was made of the 10 indicators of non-legal systems. On 5 of these indicators, as Table 3 shows, the *t* tests yielded significant mean differences. As important as statistically significant differences, however, is the pattern of consistency in the results: countries in which the role of the policeman is predominantly law-enforcement in nature have higher levels of industrialization, urbanization, education, professionalization, and bureaucratization than countries in which the role of the policeman is principally political in character. Evidently, when the function of the policeman is confined to law-enforcement, the principles of legality and rationality are prized, and such values appear to be consistent with the five major social processes, listed in Table 3, that differentiate nations in the role their policemen perform.

Thus far, our exploratory analysis of some data on legal systems has probably failed to pique the curiosity of the comparative legal

²² Stuart S. NAGEL, «Culture Patterns and Judicial Systems,» *Vanderbilt Law Review*, XVI (December, 1962), pp. 151-152.

²³ BANKS and TEXTOR, *op. cit.*

scholar. He is so oriented to the normative content of legal systems that role structures and organizational structures of legal systems²⁴, which we have principally dealt with, probably hold little interest for him. Therefore, a modest effort will now be made to meet the comparative lawyer on his own grounds by examining some statistical differences associated with the traditional normative classification of legal systems, namely, civil law, common law, socialist law, and Moslem law.

A review of the interrelations of the various quantitative indicators and the classification of legal systems pointed to the importance of three variables: level of industrialization, level of education, and number of lawyers per 1,000 population. The largest differences in mean level of industrialization, as shown in Table 4, are between Moslem and civil law systems, on the one hand, and Moslem and common law systems, on the other. Civil and socialist law systems are virtually identical in mean level of industrialization. Although common law systems are noticeably higher than socialist law systems in their mean level of industrialization, the difference between them is not statistically significant. These findings raise the interesting question of what are the probable long-term effects of a leveling of industrialization on legal systems.

The second variable in Table 4, level of education, yields even more significant mean differences among the four types of legal systems. The lowest mean level of education is found among Moslem law countries and the highest mean among socialist and common law systems, which have virtually identical mean levels. Thus the significant mean differences occur between Moslem law systems and each of the other three types, with the only other significant difference between civil and socialist law systems. The import of these differences in level of education for knowledge of the law, compliance with the law, and the development of a «sense of justice» is probably considerable. Social science research on these questions is still in its infancy, though some notable progress has recently been made by Scandinavian sociologists and legal scholars²⁵.

²⁴ Cf. William M. EVAN, «Introduction: Some Approaches to the Sociology of Law,» in William M. EVAN, ed., *Law and Sociology: Exploratory Essays* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), pp. 1-11.

²⁵ Berl KUTSCHINSKY, «Law and Education: Some Aspects of Scandinavian Studies into «The General Sense of Justice» *Acta Sociologica*, 10 (1966), pp. 21-41; Klaus MAKELA, «Public Sense of Justice and Judicial Practice,» *Acta Sociologica*, 10 (1966), pp. 42-67.

TABLE 2
 PARTIAL CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS OF INDICATORS
 OF LEGAL AND NON-LEGAL INSTITUTIONS OF SELECTED NATIONS,
 CONTROLLING FOR THE EFFECTS OF INDUSTRIALIZATION +

Variable	Variable No.	Law Schools per 1,000 population	Law Professors per 1,000 population	Lawyers per 1,000 population	Legislators per 1,000 population	Divorce rate
		1	2	3	4	5
Law Schools per 1,000 population	1					
Law Professors per 1,000 population	2	***				
Lawyers per 1,000 population	3	.63				
Legislators per 1,000 population	4	**	.42	.37		
Divorce rate	5	.02	.26	.07		
Suicide rate	6	-.82	-.18	.15		
Illegitimacy ratio	7	-.24	-.25	-.28	-.01	.37
Industrialization	8	-.01	.05	-.13	-.11	-.26
Urbanization	9					
Bureaucratization	10	-.01	-.04	.10	-.08	.26
Professionalization	11	.41	.03	.21	-.63	.17
Level of Education	12	.12	.00	.07	.21	.36
Date of Political Independence	13	.28	.33	.08	.07	.21
Age of grooms	14	.19	.02	.42	.16	.11
% of Christians	15	-.27	-.31	-.07	.37	-.10
% of Moslems	16	.25	.38	.01	.13	-.33
Military as % of population	17	-.22	-.40	-.05	.04	.47

* Significant at the .05 level

** Significant at the .01 level

*** Significant at or lower than the .001 level

+ The size of the N varies from one pair of variables to another, the largest being 97 nations and the smallest, 20.

TABLE 3
Comparison of Means on Five Variables
for Selected Nations differing in their Role of the Policeman

Variable	Mean for Nations with a <i>Political</i> Policeman Role	Mean for Nations with a <i>Law Enforcement</i> Policeman Role	d.f.	t-value	Significance Level
Urbanization	32.22 (N = 22)	56.70 (N = 23)	43	5.56	.0000
Industrialization	16.67 (N = 60)	36.53 (N = 30)	41	5.08	.0000
Level of Education	43.24 (N = 47)	70.66 (N = 32)	64	5.03	.0000
Professionalization	3.02 (N = 14)	7.50 (N = 16)	24	4.88	.0000
Bureaucratization	.68 (N = 14)	2.80 (N = 16)	17	3.38	.0035

* Significant at the .05 level.

** Significant at the .01 level.

*** Significant at or lower than the .001 level.

* The size of the N varies from one pair of variables to another, the largest being 67 nations and the smallest, 20.

TABLE 4
COMPARISON OF MEANS ON THREE VARIABLES FOR SELECTED
NATIONS DIFFERING IN TYPE OF LEGAL SYSTEM

Variable	Mean for Nations with Moslem Law	Mean for Nations with Civil Law	Mean for Nations with Socialist Law	Mean for Nations with Common Law	t-Test Comparison	d.f.	t-value	Significance Level
Industrialization	24.86 (N = 6)	42.69 (N = 23)	46.33 (N = 2)	61.53 (N = 6)	Mos. vs. Civ.	12	3.46	.0046
					Mos. vs. Soc.	2	1.82	.2101
					Mos. vs. Comm.	8	3.48	.0083
					Civ. vs. Soc.	1	.32	.8030
					Civ. vs. Comm.	6	1.87	.1111
Level of Education	28.53 (N = 11)	57.24 (N = 30)	69.87 (N = 8)	68.13 (N = 10)	Mos. vs. Civ.	22	4.68	.0001
					Mos. vs. Soc.	16	7.11	.0000
					Mos. vs. Comm.	16	4.07	.0008
					Civ. vs. Soc.	32	2.82	.0082
					Civ. vs. Comm.	13	1.21	.2474
Lawyers per 1,000 population	.18 (N = 12)	.44 (N = 29)	.38 (N = 7)	.57 (N = 10)	Mos. vs. Civ.	29	3.03	.0051
					Mos. vs. Soc.	13	1.72	.1082
					Mos. vs. Comm.	13	2.35	.0352
					Civ. vs. Soc.	12	.52	.6115
					Civ. vs. Comm.	12	.81	.4336
				Soc. vs. Comm.	16	1.05	.3101	

The third and last variable in Table 4 of significance for types of legal systems is the number of lawyers per 1,000 population. The highest mean occurs among common law systems and the lowest among Moslem law systems. And the significant differences in mean number of lawyers are between Moslem and civil law systems and between Moslem and common law systems. The fact that common law and civil law systems have a higher mean number of lawyers than Moslem or socialist law systems suggests a correspondingly higher degree of reliance on legal institutions as mechanisms for resolving conflicts. More problems are probably perceived within these legal systems as likely candidates for judicial decision making for which the availability of an adequate supply of lawyers is necessary. How different legal systems are in their institutionalized use of legal mechanisms for conflict resolution and the sources of these differences are additional frontier problems for a comparative sociology of law.

SOME UNSOLVED PROBLEMS

Our exploratory analysis of a small body of data may have demonstrated the heuristic value of a data archive of legal systems by identifying some relationships as well as some unsolved problems. Among the unsolved problems pertaining to the development of such an archive, at least three bear mentioning. The first is the general question of the nature of a «legal variable». More particularly, how do we conceptualize the content of legal norms, legal roles and organizational structures of the legal system to make cross-national research possible? The second problem is how do we gather data on legal systems which are currently not routinely collected by either governments or international organizations? The use of mail questionnaires to special informants is one promising technique²⁶. The organization of world-wide teams of legal scholars and sociologists is another. To further complicate the data-gathering problems is the need to develop time series if we are to make any progress in testing propositions about sources of structural change in legal and non-legal sub-systems of society.

A third unsolved problem is the relevance of some organizational

²⁶ Cf. William A. GLASER, «International Mail Surveys of Informants,» *Human Organization*, 25 (Spring, 1966), pp. 78-86.

mechanism for accelerating progress in developing a data archive of legal systems. The fact that there is a growing interest in developing a variety of data archives in social science²⁷ may well reduce the magnitude of the burden of developing a data archive of legal systems.

CONCLUSION

Mapping the legal systems of the world is a mammoth undertaking that will require the collaboration of sociologists and legal scholars in various countries for many years to come. Such an effort is not unrelated to the extensive work for many years of comparative legal scholars and others to internationalize and unify legal rules and thus contribute to the «common core of legal systems»²⁸. The very cooperation entailed in implementing the proposal to develop a data archive of legal systems would contribute to the growth of a «global sociology»²⁹. The intellectual challenge is indeed worthy of the members of the relatively new but fast-growing field of the sociology of law and of the relatively old and well-established field of comparative law.

²⁷ Cf. Stein ROKKAN, «Comparative Cross-National Research: The Context of Current Efforts,» MERRITT and ROKKAN, *op. cit.*, pp. 3-25; Ralph L. BISCO, «Social Science Data Archives,» *American Political Science Review*, LX (March, 1966), pp. 93-109; William L. GLASER and Ralph L. BISCO, «Plans of the Council of Social Science Data Archives,» *Social Science Information*, V (December, 1966), pp. 71-96; David NASATIR, «Social Science Data Libraries,» *American Sociologist*, 2 (November, 1967), pp. 207-212.

²⁸ Cf. Rudolf B. SCHLESINGER, «The Common Core of Legal Systems: An Emergent Subject of Comparative Study,» in Kurt H. NADELMAN, Arthur T. VON MEHREN and John N. HAZARD, eds., *XXth Century Comparative and Conflicts Law: Legal in Honor of Hessel E. Yntema* (Leyden: A.W. Sythoff, 1961), pp. 65-79.

²⁹ Cf. Wilbert E. MOORE, «Global Sociology: The World as a Singular System,» *American Journal of Sociology*, LXXI (March, 1966), pp. 475-482.

THREE STEPS HYPOTHESIS OF THE FUNCTIONING OF THE LAW

Three Modifiers of the Operation of the Law

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There is an almost universal implicit view that a properly enacted binding law operates automatically. Is it really so?

Disregarding the paradoxical situation in which the legislator exerts much effort preparing a normative law without interesting himself in its institutional effectiveness (reminiscent of posting a registered letter without giving a return address), it is a fact that the science of law is concerned primarily in its sources and genesis and not in its real functions. Furthermore, omitting certain speculative considerations regarding the functioning of the law, it is necessary to establish a conceptual model of some sort in order to disclose the basic rules governing the operation of the law.

The hypothesis of the three-level functioning of the law means that an abstract binding law influences social behavior by means of three variables. The first independent variable is the content and significance rendered the given legal enactment by the type of socio-economic relations within which it is a binding element of the legal system. The second independent variable is the kind of subculture functioning in the framework of a given socio-economic system as a link between the legislator's directives and the social behavior of those bound by the law. The third independent variable which may variously modify the functioning of an abstract law (within the frameworks of a given socio-economic system and legal subculture) is the type of personality of the subjects finally affected by the law. Abstract laws begin to function and to be expressed in social behavior in conjunction with their human subjects. Into such conjunction enter the law itself and three metastandards: those springing from the nature of the socio-economic system, those deriving their content from given legal subcultures and those flowing from the individual personality of decision-makers on legal behavior.

This hypothesis may be illustrated by the following model: Legis-

lator Given law — Type of socio-economic system — Type of legal subculture — Personality type Legal behavior.

It may appear that the above scheme is still another abstract model of reality constructed from analytical definitions. Varied considerations and data of empirical research presented below aim to establish whether that model constitutes a synthesis of many more or less generalized empirical observations.

The socio-economic system as a variable

Article 93 par. 2 of the penal code adopted July 15, 1932 provides: «Whoever attempts to change by force the Polish State system is subject to a prison sentence of not less than 10 years or of life imprisonment». Almost the same law came into force in 1957 in a completely different socio-economic system that prevailed when it was enacted in 1932. Consequently the same Article has two entirely different functions. Before the war, within the framework of relations based on the private ownership of the means of production and of large landed estates, the Communist Party was illegalized on the strength of this law. Its task then was to maintain the prevailing system, and, among other things, to prevent the realization of the socio-economic conditions now in effect. Whereas now the same law has a reverse meaning, inasmuch as it is directed against the system in which it originated. For any desire to restore capitalist relations is suppressed precisely by applying that law.

The statement that law be regarded as a kind of vessel where the prevailing structural conditions in which it functions deposit a definite material content, is confirmed also by an analysis of the operation of individual institutions of the legal system. We thus read in reference to the Family Code:

«But the most essential element of the new comprehensions of the bases of contradictoriness is a complete break with the passivity of the Court, characteristic to a greater or lesser degree of bourgeois legislation. From the trial court in Peoples Poland the legislator requires an active attitude, expressed in both arousing the initiative and activity of the parties involved and, as much as necessary, in official steps to clarify cases in a many-sided manner. The ordinances of Articles 166, 213, 214 and 218 of par. 1 of the Civil Code may serve as an illustration. Although they derive from bourgeois legislation, these ordinances have only now a true content and full

applicability as a consequence of the changes of court procedure in Civil Law initiated on July 20, 1950 and April 23, 1959. It is necessary to emphasize especially the provisions of Article 218, par. 1 of the Civil Code which under the present system should be understood as excluding the assumption of a passive attitude by the Court. On the contrary, it directs the Court and the presiding justice in particular to show full initiative during the entire procedure of the trial in clarifying basically and all-sidedly the actual state of affairs»¹.

The general proposition that the operation of a constant abstract law is dependent on various additional determining elements which modify its content, adapt and suit it to the needs of the changed socio-economic situations of different structural formations, may also be verified by means of many individual legal constructions. But it is not a question of multiplying illustrating examples. For the question is reducible to the general reflection that the same legal standard may operate in various ways under different conditions of the social structure. It may work in the same or in an entirely different manner or it may not operate at all (despite the fact it retains its binding nature and normative existence). Or it may function in a partly different manner.

The more a law has the character of a legal principle², and not of an ordinance or regulation, the more inert is its normative existence. A legal principle is usually a legal precept which is based also on public recognition, on internalization, on being ingrafted into the legal consciousness of various social groups, or of society as a whole. Every legal principle takes the form of an ordinance, regulation or prescription, but it has also a number of reinforcing ethical or social standards as well as of custom. Whereas ordinances pertain primarily to the formal, procedural side meant for officials who are trained to apply them. Ordinances are creations of legal constructions involving legal principle as the elements which make them meaningful. In this context, with a change in the economic and social structure it's

¹ Kodeks RODZINNY, *The Family Code*, ed. M. GRUDZINSKI and J. IGNATOWICZ, Warszawa, 1955, *Wydawnictwo prawnicze*, p. 543. The amended Civil Code came into force January 1, 1965. But its general principles, including that of contradictoriness, remained unchanged. The numeration of the cited Articles is different however.

² A. PODGORECKI, *Zjawiska prawne w opinii publicznej* [Legal Phenomena in Public Opinion], Warszawa, 1964, pp. 36, 102-109; F. STUDNICKI, *Przeptyw wiadomosci o normach prawnych* [The Flow of Information on Legal Standards], Krakow, 1965, p. 70.

easier, on the basis of rationalised legal apparatus, to alter ordinances and regulations than legal principles. However, if they should remain formally unchanged, that wouldn't mean that their interpretation and application are not different. For at least because of their social roots, it is difficult to frequently change legal principles, but it is easier to alter the conditions of their application, the categories of people they pertain to, their implementation procedure, etc.

Of course, when revolutionary transformations effect structural socio-economic changes while sections of the previously binding legal system remain unchanged in some cases, there is a kind of experimental situation which clearly expresses the action of independent variable which may be constituted by the socio-economic system. Nevertheless, where the change doesn't occur in that manner, but imperceptibly by the alteration of legal regulations and institutions, the illusion may arise that the socio-economic system has no effect on the independent functioning of legal standards.

Hence the first prism which refracts the standards set by the legislator (legal enactments) is the complex of socio-economic conditions of a given social system.

The Legal subculture as a variable

It is assumed that a certain sum of general social values in the form of ideas, science, art, system of institutions, patterns of behaviour, material goods, etc. constitute the culture of a given society. It is also said that the various communities and social circles of a society possess various specific subcultures. The uniqueness of these subcultures consists in the fact that they regard as proper only the values recognized by the various fractional communities, and they sometimes contribute little to the general culture. Moreover, it is often impossible to understand the behaviour of a given group without more detailed explanation of the subculture of that group in addition to the general culture of the society in which it is involved.

It is similar with the legal substructure. Besides the legal system in force (if we leave out of account so-called primitive society) societies possess something more, variously defined as legal consciousness, a legal sense, intuitional law, etc. It may be said, without going into semantic preciseness, that every society has some kind of social practice of realizing legal principles, some kind of respect for the law and a feeling for its prestige, some stratified moral and social

attitudes and customs which reinforce or weaken the functioning of the whole legal system. The generality of these customs and values connected with the acceptance, evaluation, critique and realization of the legal system in force may be defined as the general legal culture of a society. In England, for instance, the driver of an automobile at night will stop for a red light at a completely deserted crossing although he could have crossed it safely with no one there to see him.

There is a differentiation in the general subcultures in respect to certain deviations between particular segments. The degree of respect for the practice of obeying the law differs in various communities. The image of the scrupulous official of the Tsarist bureaucracy, so skillfully depicted by Chekov or Dostoyevski, differs from the generality of administrative functionaries. A community of criminal or thieves has quite a distinct subculture with a wealth of unique «legal» habits within their circle. As a rule they divide the spoils, have their code of morality and honor, their kangaroo courts, old age insurance, etc. All these institutions contain elements of intuitive law, as they understand it, law contrary to that generally in force. The subculture of the military community is based not so much on respect for abstract legal principles, as on obedience to the varied commands and orders by the higher ranks. Passing from a hooligan subculture (through marriage, for instance) to that of a group in the process of stabilization or already stabilized, changes almost immediately the orientation to the legal subculture. There is thus a leap from the virtually complete negation of all social standards not acknowledged by the group, including the basic standards of the legal order, to the acceptance of these standards. For in the new phase of their social life these standards may constitute a fundamental safeguard against any threat to their initially fragile stabilization. In certain merchant communities where respect for all kinds of formalities would check the rapidity of the turnover and the many-sidedness of the economic process, there takes shape the kind of subculture which legalizes all kinds of illegal practices in establishing bureaucratic contact.

The question of legal subcultures is a new one for sociology in general as for the sociology of law. There has been a lack of research on the question. There are some investigations however from which the question may be developed directly or indirectly. It should be preliminarily added that legal subculture may pertain to those who obey the law (i.e., at whom legal standards are directed)

as well as to those who shape the law (those who enforce it, whose profession is to get others to live up to patterns of behavior in accord with the requirements of the law).

Let us begin with a marginal example illustrating some aspects of legal subculture of the subjects at whom the law is directed. In an investigation of 100 recidivists³ (research in the Warsaw district begun in 1956 and completed in 1964) S. Szelhaus asserted that the attempt to influence them by means of classical legal penalties (imprisonment) deepened the perverseness of 87% of them. This is undoubtedly due to the fact that their subculture inoculated these recidivists somehow against any effect of a prison sentence and strengthened the negative internalization of the undesirable behaviour patterns. This is how they themselves explained it: «Only some people are afraid of punishment» (35); «a prison term doesn't harm anyone» (62); «those who are not afraid to steal or act as hooligans are not afraid of punishment either» (59); «those who are afraid of everything don't sit, for they are also afraid to steal» (45); «before the first case I was so afraid of punishment I wanted to jump from the fourth floor» (72); «with prison it's like with a woman, a person is afraid only before the first time» (25); «whoever has once tasted prison can bear up with it» (36); «he is afraid of prison who never sat, after that it's only necessary to adjust one's life» (92); «for those who were punished two-three times it's all the same, they will not return to the honest road-their associates won't allow it and they themselves prefer easy money»⁴. These statements conclusively illustrate the specific atmosphere of the recidivists' subculture, one against which the social rehabilitation function of punishment rebounds like a pingpong ball.

Another investigation shows that only 9% of all juvenile delinquents convicted of crime worked in collaboration with adults (4). The simple fact demonstrates that it isn't adult criminals who directly embroil juveniles in crime (since they worked together in about 1/10 of the cases). There is a specific factor operating here, namely, the particular negative subculture of juvenile delinquents. A. J. Cohen points to futility, spitefulness, and negation as the basic traits

³ S. SZELHAUS, *Młodociani recydywisci* [Juvenile Recidivists], unpublished doctoral dissertation, pp. 172-76 and 198.

⁴ J. JASINSKI, *Kształtowanie się przestępczości nieletnich w Polsce w latach 1951-1960 w świetle statystyki sądowej* [Juvenile Crime in Poland in 1951-1960 in the Light of Court Statistics], *Archiwum Kryminologii*, vol. 2, Warszawa, 1964, p. 134.

of their subculture⁵. (This is confirmed by research in Poland conducted by C. Wzapow and S. Manturzewski). Of course, not all juvenile crimes are direct expressions of that subculture. But those committed by groups, and they are a considerable proportion of the total (35-39 %), bear the stamp of gang crimes and are hence connected with the subculture.

It follows from the above empirical data that the legal subculture (or rather the legal anti-culture) effects a change in the behavior of the subjects to whom the legal precepts are directed. But other research also shows that law enforcement, in particular legal decisions made by various legal functionaries, also depend on their subcultures of legal practice. For it turns out that the practice of prosecutors may vary on the very question of juvenile delinquents cooperating with adults in crime. A rigorous statistical analysis of the matter suggests the assumption that «... the largest percentage of the category of cases involved which were directed to common courts were decided primarily by the local practice of prosecutors and not on the basis of the differences in the type of cases»⁶. The above shows that *usus*, one or another type of practice, determined by the specific subculture of law enforcement officials may influence how acts, identical from a normative viewpoint, will be treated in practice.

Another example pertains to the practices of court procedure⁷. Investigations of convictions or acquittals of persons who evaded military service on the ground of conscience, demonstrate basic differences in the practice of different courts. Thus the courts of Northern and Southern Norway had a tendency to convict in such cases, in contrast to courts in the western and central parts of the country. This difference cannot be explained otherwise than by the distinct attitudes and practices of courts in the different regions. These investigations too seem to indicate therefore that specific practices may develop in institutions (in courts in this case), some socially transmitted manner of arriving at certain locally stereotyped decisions, different from the patterns prevailing elsewhere.

A general proposition may be deduced from what was said about subculture and from the illustrative bindings of empirical research.

⁵ A. K. COHEN, «The content of Delinquent Subculture,» *The Sociology of Crime and Delinquency*. New York, 1962, p. 244.

⁶ J. JASINSKI, *op. cit.*, p. 37.

⁷ V. AUBERT, *Conscientious Objectors before Norwegian Military Courts in Judicial Decision Making*, N.Y., 1963, p. 207.

The second prism which refracts the legal standards set by the legislator is the specific content of the legal subcultures characterising the attitudes of both: executors and obeyers of the law. Furthermore, different legal subcultures within the same socio-economic system will effect different behavior determined by those subcultures.

Personality as a variable

However, the behavior of various subjects acting within or outside the law within the same socio-economic system and legal subculture will vary according to types of personality.

The ultimate influence of personality factors on legal views and behavior was not originally as obvious as it appeared to be. Two hypotheses were advanced in the material on this question, with the accent on the first⁸. It was assumed that the authoritarian personality — inclined to classify everything as either black or white — and the conformist personality — inclined to obedience of superiors and to release a feeling of insecurity by leaning on other, stronger individuals, etc. — will tend to respect the law as a factor guaranteeing stability. It was likewise assumed that a secure individual well situated and adapted socially will be inclined to respect the law, considering that it creates the framework within which it's possible to function rationally and profitably. The second hypothesis seemed more probable.

The initial research was conducted on the basis of an all-Polish representative national sample of the adult population. In 1964, 94 % of the planned sample of 3000 respondents were tested. A number of questions were added to the previous tri-monthly pilot questionnaire. These were legal and indicatory questions pertaining to attitudes and evaluations. The findings were analyzed by means of percentage tables and tests. On this basis were derived a number of hypotheses regarding various correlations between the personality variable and attitudes to the law⁹. Reservations towards the findings based on questionnaire polls in relation to more interesting results in-

⁸ A. PODGORECKI, *Legal Phenomena ...*, p. 143.

⁹ A. PODGORECKI, «Prestiz prawa» [Prestige of the Law], in print and «Wstępne wyniki badan Prestiz Prawa» [Preliminary Findings of Research on the Prestige of the Law]. *Panstwo i Prawo*, 1965, nr. 4, p. 575.

clined to their further verification. The attempt to verify anew or to disprove some of the derived hypotheses was based on a more elaborate questionnaire on views of the law¹⁰ and on the L. B. Cattell personality test (worked out by M. Choynowski and M. Nowakowski), i.e., by using much more subtle test techniques adaptable to varied though small populations.

Most interesting from the viewpoint of personality factors was the question of capital punishment. Although the investigation showed that the majority of the Polish adult population favored the death sentence, there was no correlation established between such socio-demographic characteristics as: sex, education, occupation, social origin, interest in court trials and the attitude to capital punishment. Research on a nation-wide scale indicated that only personality factors: insecurity symptoms, social inadaptability, consciousness of a harsh upbringing, are essentially connected with favoring capital punishment. These intriguing findings were subjected to further tests which showed a lack of correlation between views on capital punishment and other factors, such as: having been an only child, common traits of upbringing, propensities of the same age-group in childhood, authoritarian traits (as measured by the compact F scale and various factors distinguished by Cattell), with the exception of resistance to insecurity. For it was established by data based on the Cattell test that the lower the resistance to insecurity the greater is the inclination to approve capital punishment.

A separate question analysed in all-Polish research is that of rigorism or tolerance in relation to the law. The following general hypothesis can be formulated on the basis of the material collected: the more rigorous the individual, the smaller is his knowledge of the law and conversely. The educational level, public activity, skilled labor (as contrasted to unskilled) are factors in the extent of knowledge of the law. The second general hypothesis predicates that at the basis of these factors lie correlations connected with age, matrimonial and family status, degree of insecurity feeling, adaptation to environment. It thus suggests that a general state of good feeling predisposes to tolerance and the contrary state to rigorism. The conclusion follows that individuals of wide knowledge and good feeling are tolerant while those of poor knowledge and state of bad feeling are rigorous. A check of the above generalization confirms the exist-

¹⁰ Unpublished Master's thesis by J. KURCZEWSKI, *Structure of Views on the Law and Its External Links*.

tence of a syndrome of views favoring harsh punishment. The disposition to harsh penalties is fostered by severe upbringing in childhood, lesser resistance to insecurity feelings and insecurity, low self-esteem.

Of course, it may be claimed in connection with the above that self-declared rigorism and practical behaviour in that direction are two different things, and that it's doubtful if there is a one-to-one correspondence between these elements. It may hence be in place to cite here the research findings of J. Kurczewski¹². In seeking at least a partial reply to that reservation, he investigated the record of a penal-administrative court (M). The court sessions are held in panels, with its members serving in rotation according to a list. But the panel presiding justices sit continuously (12 of them in this case). The median penalties were establishing meted out by 10 of the presiding justices between November 1964 and June 1965. Interviews were held and questionnaires conducted them and the full court rostrum (C). The other presiding justices had no cases in the above period. The attempt to obtain an equal number of adjudication samples for analysis wasn't entirely successful, since the majority of cases were considered by a small permanent group of court members. 82 decisions were analysed in cases of so-called hooliganism. The Spearman row correlation (P) between the point score of the panel presiding judges on scale (S) (harshness) and the median length of sentences in cases of hooliganism turned out to be positive and statistically significant ($P = 654$; $N = 9$; validity level = 0.05).

The result was all the more surprising since a number of factors act on population (C) in the direction of uniformity in the degree of penalty severity, especially in cases of hooliganism and violation of traffic regulation. The penal-administrative court at N has been for years a subject of complaint by the provincial government for its mild sentences i.e., lower than the average in the rest of the province. No small role was played in this situation by the local judicial inspector of the County Peoples' Council. Being also the Recorder he often influenced sentences in the direction of greater severity by the threat of appeal. It also turned out incidentally that apart from the presiding judges, no one played a greater role in that court than the inspector, although panel decisions were made by majority vote. Of course, a single case doesn't justify a general finding. But it does

¹² J. KURCZEWSKI, *op. cit.*, pp. 42-43.

¹¹ J. KURCZEWSKI, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

indicate, at least in this case, an essential connection between declared and actual severity.

Nationwide research and tests indicate at least three different kinds of legalism. The first variant consists of recognizing the law as a principle (the Kantian conception). Disposed to adhere to this kind of legalism would be individuals with strongly developed superegos who exercise great self-control, people of conscience with a considerable degree of emotional and practical stability who are faithful to their marital ties and are over 30. The second variant—understood instrumentally—regards the law as a means of maintaining order of keeping others under restraint. It entails respect for the law even when it's recognized as being in error and is connected with the following personal traits: domination, aggressiveness, unconventionality, extra-punitiveness, lack of regard for the property of others. The third variant consists of obedience to the orders of superiors even when regarded as incorrect. There are certain deviations on this question between the findings of nationwide research and tests. According to the former the tendency to that type of attitude will be exhibited by individuals of 50 and over psychically inhibited but without a sense of insecurity. Whereas the tests link this kind of attitude with the following traits: suspiciousness, fear, poor adaptation to the environment, poor resistance to feelings of insecurity, low self-esteem, depression, pessimism.

The above abbreviated digest of two mutually controlling empirical investigations (deliberately conducted with different techniques and based on diverse populations) confirms the essential modification of views and opinions pertaining to the law according to personality traits. What's more, though fragmentary, research findings indicate that declared attitudes to the law, i.e., dispositions regarding severity of punishment, are essentially actually consistent with decisions rendered in line with law enforcement. Hence the third prism which refracts the abstract legal standards set by the legislator is the type of personality.

Conclusion

The above considerations deliberately omitted, as of secondary importance, a broad, formal-semantic-procedural category of factors which may influence the course of legal standards. The following

analyses are thus omitted: a) the intentional content of the legislator's legal enactments and their actual content, b) the binding interpretations of this content (authentic, official, informal), c) the transmission media of information regarding this content (official and professional publications, the press, radio and television, legal experience of professional circles, of the family and personal, and even of gossip and hearsay regarding the general trend of legal decision making), d) the manner of implementing normative legal enactments by executors of the law, the varied directives for their implementation, opinions of them, etc. For consideration of the above would have to concentrate on the attempt to comprehend these strategically essential social variables of basic importance.

As indicated above, a multi-level, spiral view of the operation of law distinguishes three such basic variables: the kind of socio-economic system, the type of subculture and the personality pattern. This hypothesis may be evolved from consideration of the known socio-technical interrelation to the effect that the degree of acceptance of information depends on the authority of its source, and the circumstance that legal standards also constitute a kind of information. In other words, it may be stated that the degree of acceptance by distinctive variables will influence the efficacy of a given law. Hence of optimum effectiveness will be a law operating in an accepted socio-economic order which is supported by a philo-legal subculture and is implemented by legally disposed individuals. Correspondingly, most ineffective would be a law operating in an unpopular socio-economic system, which is subject to the antagonistic influences of anti-legal subcultures and suits non-legally disposed individuals. The situation of the people and their relation to the occupationists' administration during World War II may serve as an example. The above enumerated factors crisscross in social reality and appear as ideal types in different proportions in various societies. But the diagnostic knowledge of these variables' intensity of influence constitutes the neurologically essential foundation of effective functioning. For it provides the necessary information how to find persons who will effectively fulfil legal directives, and where resistance can be expected. Thus the three-legal hypothesis acquires also an important social engineering value.

The subject matter of the theory of law (understood here as the sociology of law in the narrow sense) may be pursued in various ways. It may be self-directed by those who don't cultivate this science themselves, but decide which trends of reflection are true and

which are false¹³. It may be pursued speculatively by constructing a number of analytical propositions which may be more or less consistent but have not definite relation to reality regarded arbitrarily¹⁴. Or it may be cultivated in a historico-genetical manner, i.e., one aiming to establish the socio-economic factors which influence the forms of various legal systems. In this understanding, the main task of the theory of law is to treat socio-economic reality as the independent variable and legal systems as the dependent one. The theory of law may finally be construed in a way that legal systems or individual laws are treated as the independent variable and human behavior evoking various social, economic or other consequences as the dependent variable. In the present author's opinion only the two latter viewpoints are scientifically fertile, only they can constitute a basis for formulating the laws governing the legal life of society and rational legal policy.

However, since the historico-genetic viewpoint already has important theoretical achievements to its credit, it seems purposeful to concentrate on analyses of the social functioning of law. This is why the hypothesis of a three-level operation of the law constitutes an attempt at a synthesis of various empirical investigations which generalise the knowledge of the impact of law on the living content of social life.

¹³ For instance S. EHRLICH, «Kilka uwag w sprawie metodologii nauk prawnych» [Some remarks on the Methodology of Legal Science]. *Panstwo i Prawo*, nr. 11, 1964.

¹⁴ For instance J. WROBLEWSKI, «O naukowosci prawoznawstwa» [Jurisprudence as a Science]. *Panstwo i Prawo*, nr. 8-9, 1965.

SOME SOCIAL MECHANISMS AFFECTING HIGH SCHOOL DROU-OUT

SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION

SOCIOLOGIE DE L'ÉDUCATION

A. The Problem

This paper¹ deals with some psycho-social mechanisms which are responsible for drop-out from high school. It is a well-documented fact that the pressure for education, especially at the post-primary level, is continually growing; in fact, post-primary education is undergoing rapid expansion in industrial societies, so as to include a larger proportion of adolescents. On the other hand, however, the selectivity of certain school systems not only has not diminished in the light of these developments, but has become even greater. Drop-out is one of the most salient factors of such selectivity.

This pressure for education could perhaps be attributed to rising standards of living in modern societies, which turn post-primary education into a service which can no longer be considered a luxury item. Post-primary education, moreover, is regarded by wide sections of the population as an attainment of, and a necessary precondition for social mobility.²

¹ The empirical investigation on which this paper is based was a part of the author's (unpublished) PhD thesis.

² The following is a random sample of the very rich sociological literature in this field:

J. S. Cooley, *The American High School Year-Old*, New York, McGraw Hill, 1953.

H. C. Beer, *Growth in English Education*, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1954.

M. T. Himmelfarb, *Social Background, Intelligence and School Structure — An Interclass Analysis*, *Yugoslav Society Symposium*, Vol. 2, Summer 1956, (Milano).

R. H. Turner, *Sponsored and Contact Mobility, and the School System*, *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 25, No. 6, 1960.

SOME SOCIAL MECHANISMS AFFECTING HIGH SCHOOL DROP-OUT

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A. The Problem

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R. H. TURNER, «Sponsored and Contest Mobility, and the School System». *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 25, No. 6, 1960.

These developments bring about the exposure to high school education of groups, mainly of the lower classes and ethnic minorities, which have never previously had similar experiences. Whereas certain sections of the middle class used to provide post-primary education for their children even when it was private and not compulsory, it now encompasses the entire age group (up to 15 or 16).

Whether education is really as necessary a condition for social mobility, as a considerable portion of the public seems to imagine, has lately been questioned³. One of the factors which seems to limit the functions of post-primary education in facilitating social mobility, is the phenomenon of drop-out. Most selective school systems experience a drop-out rate of about 50 per cent⁴. It has further been shown that drop-out bears an inverse correlation to social class: the lower the students' class origin, the higher the drop-out rates⁵.

It is, however, worthwhile remembering that a growing percentage of lower class students do graduate from high schools⁶. It should, moreover, be stated that there are factors other than class origin

³ C. A. ANDERSON, «A Skeptical Note on the Relation of Vertical Mobility to Education», *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 66, 1961.
G. CARLSSON, *Social Mobility and Class Structure*. Lund/Gleerup, 1958.

⁴ W. SCHULTZE, «Das Schulwesen in der Bundesrepublik, in Frankreich, England und U.S.A.», *Köllner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie*, Sonderheft 4, 1959: *Soziologie der Schule*.

R. J. HAVIGHURST, *American Higher Education in the 1960's*. The Kappa Delta Pi Lecture Series: Ohio State University Press, 1960.

SCHOOL DROP-OUTS, *National Education Association, Project: School Drop-Outs*, Stock Number of Paper: 732-18906, 1962.

D. SCHREIBER, *Holding Power / Large City School Systems*, National Education Association, 1964.

For further information, see S. M. MILLER et al., *School Drop-outs a Commentary and Annotated Bibliography*, Syracuse University, Youth Development Center, 1964.

⁵ B. JACKSON, *Streaming: An Educational System in Miniature*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1962.

J. FLOUD, A. H. HALSEY, and F. M. MARTIN, *Social Class and Educational Opportunity*, London, William Heinemann, 1956.

T. HUSÉN, «Loss of Talent in Selective School Systems: The Case of Sweden», *Comparative Education Review*, Vol. 4., 2, Oct. 1960.

THE CENTRAL ADVISORY COUNCIL FOR EDUCATION, «*Early Leaving*», A report. London, Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1954.

⁶ E.g. P. H. BOWMAN and C. W. MATTHEWS, *Motivations of Youth for Leaving School*. Quincy, Illinois: University of Chicago, Quincy Youth Development Project, 1960.

which seem to cause drop-out: Family cohesiveness⁷, peer group membership⁸, school climates⁹, and other factors.

The purpose of the research discussed in this paper was to investigate possible additional factors of social and educational selection through drop-out.

B. The Hypothesis¹⁰

We set out to investigate some of the variables which might predict drop-out from high schools. There is no doubt that the variables traditionally accepted as an explanation of drop-out, i.e. ability and social class, are valid. At the same time, as indicated above, it is not sufficient to relate this rather complex phenomenon exclusively to such ascriptive variables. We hoped, therefore, in this study to clarify some of the more complicated psycho-social mechanisms which might explain drop-out beyond these ascriptive variables.

One of our hypotheses was that drop-out might be explained by — among other things — students' future images and mobility expectations, both of which conflict with the education offered by high school.

The basic assumption here was that with the growing heterogeneity of high school populations, an increasing proportion of students would have erroneous conceptions of the nature and functions of this type of education. Such students — we assumed — might expect the mere acquisition of high school education to be instrumental in gaining the desired social mobility, whereas in practice it is only a condition for further study and preparation (which may ultimately, of course, contribute to mobility). Students who discover this fallacy might, therefore, drop out of high school¹¹.

⁷ E.g. S. LICHTER, *et al.*, *The Drop Outs*, Free Press of Glencoe Ill., 1962.

⁸ E. G. R. J. THOMAS, «An Ompirical Study of High School». *Journal of Educational Sociology*, 28, 1954.

⁹ E.g. A. B. WILSON, «Residential Segregation of Social Class and Aspirations of High School Boys», *American Sociological Review*, 24, 1959.

¹⁰ This paper will deal with one hypothesis only out of a number of hypotheses which guided us in the original research.

¹¹ Our hypotheses developed in the process of our work, which consisted of two stages. We shall come back later to the more specific definition of the hypotheses.

C. The Study

Research was conducted in two consecutive stages. The first stage was of an extensive nature and was designed mainly to allow for an elaboration and clarification of the hypotheses to be tested in the second stage. The first stage was carried out in the 1958/9 school year in Jerusalem, Israel. A drop-out was defined as a student who was registered in one of the classes included in the research at the end of the 1958/9 school year, and who did not return to his class at the beginning of the 1959/60 school year.

The population in stage A of the study included all the students in grades 9, 10 and 11 in all full-time academic high schools in Jerusalem. Out of a total of 1,278 students in these classes, 1,017 completed questionnaires. Questions related to the following topics: general information about the student and his family, the student's attitude to school and studies, vocational plans and future expectations, peer group activities, status within such groups and expectations from them. Students' grades in the term during which the research was conducted were obtained from the schools.

At the beginning of the 1959/60 school year all the names and addresses of those students who had dropped out were received from the schools involved. The processing of the students' replies to the questionnaire enabled an analysis of the main characteristics of the drop-outs as compared with those of the students who stayed on at school. This completed stage A.

The purpose of stage B was to investigate more thoroughly the direction and extent of the relations which were indicated by the findings of stage A. The data were collected by means of an open-structured interview. The questions related to those variables which tended to predict drop-out. The sample of students investigated in this stage comprised two groups: (a) approximately half of the 172 drop-outs from stage A, who fitted our definition of drop-out, and (b) an equally large group of those students who had stayed on, and who were individually matched to the drop-outs by ability and social class¹². Thus a control group which displayed similar features

¹² The criterion for ability was the average grade of the students in the three crucial subjects — Mathematics, Bible studies and English — as obtained from the schools.

The criterion for social class was the combined measure of fathers' occupation, place of employment and job.

to the drop-outs, mainly in the area of those variables which are considered allied to drop-out, was established. This procedure was adopted in order to avoid the investigation of those variables which as mentioned before, did not interest us in this study. Matching was complete in 73 per cent of the cases; in 22 per cent of the cases we had to compromise on one of the two criteria and in 5 per cent of the cases the matching did not succeed. This distinct success in the matching was, in itself, significant for this study. There were, then, 172 drop-outs out of a total population of 1278 students, or 14 per cent of the group¹³. 77 drop-outs, or 45 per cent of all drop-outs, were interviewed, together with a matched group of equal size¹⁴.

The main manipulation of the data in the second stage was a comparison between those of the drop-outs and those of the matched non-drop-outs. Any differences discovered between these two groups, were, therefore, (as a result of the matching) due to variables other than those of social class or ability. The main tool of comparison was a series of more than 20 Guttman Scales: the medium score of the drop-outs on a certain scale was compared with the medium score of the matched group on the same scale.

To conclude this section, one methodological remark should be made. In stage B of the research we investigated all those variables which we found in stage A to be predictive of drop-out. The re-investigation of these variables in stage B was more intensive and thorough. In other words, we got indications of the variables predictive of drop-out before drop-out occurred, and we further investigated these same variables, in the same population, after drop-out occurred. We assumed that all variables or mechanisms recurring in stage B and differentiating between the drop-outs and the students who did not drop out — are predictive of the dependent variable, i.e. drop-out.

¹³ This percentage is lower than the average national drop-out rate for Israel. This is explained by two facts. One, we excluded from our definition of drop-out certain cases which are included in the national statistics. Secondly, whereas national statistics report drop-out rates for a whole age-group in their transition from the first to the fourth grade of high school, we dealt here with only one transfer of three different classes of high school students. A comparison with national statistics is, therefore, invalid.

¹⁴ About 80 per cent of the questions in the interview of both samples were identical.

D. The Findings

We shall divide our remarks into two parts: A brief report of the findings of stage A and a description of the major findings of stage B¹⁵.

In analysing the data obtained in stage A we found the following statistically significant differences between the potential drop-outs and the rest of the students¹⁶:

a. The drop-outs tended to rationalize their lack of intention to pursue their fathers' occupations and offered instrumental explanations, or reasons of prestige. The rest of the students, on the other hand, tended to offer as a reason for such lack of intention the claim that their fathers' occupations lacked interest.

b. The drop-outs tended towards a non-professional occupational choice, in public, artistic or other visible fields. The regular students, however, tended towards a choice of the free professions.

c. The expectations of the drop-outs regarding further studies in institutes of higher learning, were, however, in conspicuous contradiction to their occupational choices: the proportion of drop-outs who intended to study in universities was significantly higher than the rate of regular students with similar plans.

d. In the opposite direction, we found that future incomes anticipated by the drop-outs were significantly lower than those of the rest of the students.

e. When asked about hypothetical occupational choice, the drop-outs were significantly underrepresented among those who chose a scientific career¹⁷.

f. The drop-outs displayed a much greater lack of confidence in their chances of fulfilling their plans for the future than those who did not drop out.

¹⁵ We shall not report on the differences between drop-outs and non-drop-outs in class and ability, although, of course, such differences were found.

¹⁶ Each of the differences between drop-outs and non-drop-outs reported below, was based on one question in the questionnaire.

¹⁷ The alternatives for boys were: Air-force officer, writer, senior government official and atomic energy scientist; and for girls: actress, scientist, chief nurse, and air hostess. The drop-outs were represented among these categories, in descending order, as follows: Air force officer or air hostess, writer of actress, senior official or chief nurse and finally scientist. All differences were statistically significant.

In view of these findings, we redefined our hypotheses, in a more specific way, around three foci:

1. We expected drop-out to relate to the strength of the students' mobility aspirations. More specifically we expected a curvilinear relation: drop-outs were expected to reveal both high as well as low mobility aspirations. This hypothesis was based mainly on the finding that the drop-outs revealed high mobility aspirations on the one hand, (para. c) and rather restricted mobility aspirations on the other (paras, b, d).

2. We expected drop-out to correlate with nebulous future plans and with lack of confidence in the chances of fulfilling these plans. This hypothesis was based mainly on the finding that there was a clear contradiction in the drop-outs' future plans (para, b as opposed to c) and an expressed lack of self-confidence (para. f.).

3. We expected drop-out to correlate with short range planning for the future. This hypothesis was based mainly on the hypothetical occupational choice (para. e), which indicated that the drop-outs preferred occupations within easy reach.

1. The first finding connected with the first hypothesis was that the relation between drop-out and mobility aspirations is curvilinear. The main corroboration of this relation was that the four main scales in the area of future orientations and mobility expectations formed «A Scale of Scales of Mobility Aspirations»¹⁸; when we assembled the high and low scores on this scale — as opposed to the medium scores — the results were as follows:

	Non-drop-outs	Drop-outs	Total	
High and low scores on «Mobility Aspirations»	10	17	27	$X^2 = 3.65$
Medium scores on «Mobility Aspirations»	61	43	104	p 0.5
Total	71	60	131 ¹⁹	

¹⁸ The scales were as follows: a) The Subjects' Mobility Aspirations; b) The Subjects' Parents' Mobility Aspirations; c) Scale of Confidence in the Chances of Fulfilling Future Plans; d) Scale of Pressure Exerted by Parents. The Scale of Scales' coefficient of reproduction was 92.3 per cent.

¹⁹ The total number of drop-outs and matches was 148; we did not have full information about mobility aspirations in 17 cases.

One of the main indices in this area was the Scale of Mobility Aspirations. Even though it did not produce a significant difference between the mean score of the drop-outs and the mean score of the matched non-drop-outs, the direction of the difference was as expected — the mobility aspirations of the drop-outs were stronger than those of the non-drop-outs. It seems, therefore, that in spite of the fact that mobility aspirations and drop-out relate in a curvilinear way, the distinct feature of the relation is in the stronger mobility aspirations of the drop-outs as compared with their matches.

We repeated the same procedure in each of the three socio-economic groups. This revealed that a statistically significant difference between the mean score of the drop-outs and the mean score of the non-drop-outs on the Mobility Aspirations scale, was to be found only in the medium socio-economic group. In the low and high socio-economic groups there was no difference between drop-outs and non-drop-outs. We also found that in the non-drop-out group the mobility aspirations of the boys were stronger than those of the girls while there was no such difference between boys and girls among the drop-outs²⁰.

2. In order to test the second hypothesis we constructed a scale of Confidence in the Chances of Fulfilling Future Plans. We found no significant differences between the mean scores of the drop-outs and the mean scores of their matches on this scale. We did, however, find significant differences on those facets of the scale which measured anxiety as to one's future: the drop-outs' score indicated significantly greater anxiety.

Here again, we calculated the difference between the mean score of the drop-outs and the mean score of the non-drop-outs on this scale, for each of the three socio-economic groups. This revealed a significant difference: confidence in the chances of fulfilling their future plans was distinctly greater among the non-drop-outs than among the drop-outs, in the high socio-economic group. In the two other socio-economic groups, no difference was to be found between the mean scores of the drop-outs and the mean scores of their matches on this scale. Among the drop-outs, confidence in the chance of fulfilling their future plans, was greatest in the medium socio-economic group.

We also found that drop-out is related to vague and unclear fu-

²⁰ It should be mentioned that this was one of the very few differences we found between boys and girls in the entire study.

ture plans. We discovered this from the fact that the number of drop-outs whose current secondary education was unsuited to their future plans, was significantly higher than among the non-drop-outs. In other words, we found, among drop-outs, a significantly large number of subjects who either had a professional plan for the future, but after drop-out had transferred to vocational schools, or had a vocational future plan but had transferred to a different academic high school. This brings us to the third hypothesis.

3. We had only one measure in this area. We discerned a difference between drop-outs and their matches in the scope of their future plans. The future plans of the drop-outs were characteristically short spanned i.e., the plans could be realised in a rather short time. The plans of the matched subjects who did not drop out, however, were of a much longer span and their possible realisation lay in the distant future. This difference was statistically significant.

To sum up, therefore, the drop-outs were found to display strong mobility aspirations, lack of confidence in their chance of fulfilling their future plans (mainly in the high socio-economic group), and a blurred image of these future plans. The drop-outs were significantly different from the matched non-drop-outs in all these characteristics.

E. Discussion

Drop-out is predicted, first of all, by the strength or volume of the mobility aspirations of high school students: both very strong mobility aspirations and very inhibited aspirations may be the cause of drop-out. And, as a matter of fact, it seems reasonable that a student who lacks mobility aspirations will not succeed in mobilising the mental resources necessary to withstand the considerable demands made by the academic high school for scholastic achievement and excellence. In other words, it seems plausible that a minimum of mobility aspiration is essential in order to motivate the student to partake in the competitive race characteristic of the modern high school. A student must soon sense that there is little value in a high school education which is not followed up by further academic education; lacking the aspiration for mobility, he might thus drop out.

However, very strong mobility aspirations may constitute an even greater cause of drop-out. The reason for this relation seems

to be inherent in the nature of high school education. Social mobility is not one of the overt and declared goals of high school education; it is, at most, a latent function. There is, therefore, no direct relation between the high school ethos or atmosphere, and social mobility. The high school curriculum includes material and theories which have no connection whatsoever to mobility. The teachers emphasize behaviour and attitudes whose main relevance is for the students' present and not for social mobility. A student with strong and aggressive mobility aspirations will, therefore, be exposed to a cross pressure between these aspirations, on the one hand, and the high school atmosphere, on the other. Such a student might have difficulty in adjusting to those studies which have no direct bearing on his future plans or to all the different school activities which do not contribute to the fulfillment of these plans. Such a student might well react by dropping out.

We found that strong mobility aspirations predict drop-out in two groups in particular the medium socio-economic group, and the girls. It seems that both these groups are in a somewhat ambivalent social position so that their tendency to drop out is explicable. A medium socio-economic group is particularly prone to social mobility. The low socio-economic group has little chance of social mobility and the high socio-economic group does not face the pressure of upward mobility. Social mobility is, therefore, most probable and realisable in the medium socio-economic group. A very strong and aggressive tendency towards social mobility might, therefore, be expected in this group as a result of its unique position in the social structure. Such a tendency, though, might be the cause of drop-out.

The case of the girls may be similar. Even though girls are educated in the same environment and on the same educational assumptions as boys, their chances of social mobility are slighter than those of boys. Social mobility of girls is certainly less influenced by their education. If, however, girls possess mobility aspirations similar to those of boys in extent or volume, they might drop out. In other words, the contradiction, which we pointed out above, between mobility aspirations and the school's culture or ethos might be especially harmful and dysfunctional in the case of girls, if they possess as strong mobility aspirations as boys.

Drop-out was also found to correlate with status insecurity, or lack of confidence in the chance of realising future plans. The most significant fact here is that such lack of confidence predicts drop-

out mainly among the high socio-economic group. As a matter of fact, students in this group are in the most problematic position; once having failed in academic high school, they have practically no alternative educational route to achieve the status to which they aspire. The traditional and normative path in this group, in particular, is high school followed by higher education. It may be assumed, on the basis of these findings, that if students of high socio-economic origin encounter problems during their high school career, they will develop insecurity as to their future chances, since they have no alternative channels, and will tend to drop out more than others in a similar position.

It seems logical, therefore, that the drop-outs will tend to short-range planning and a blurred image of their future. Young people who lack confidence in their chances of realizing long-range plans will obviously tend to develop a program which may be put into action in a not too distant future. It is, therefore, significant that those subjects who, after dropping out from academic high schools, turned to vocational high schools, displayed the greatest amount of satisfaction with their new choice and the strongest confidence in their future. Vocational high school seemed in these cases to be an ideal solution to the conflict, since this type of school prepares its student body for occupational roles which can be reached in a relatively short time.

In conclusion, it seems that the combination of these variables predicts drop-out. The students who dropped out seem to be youngsters whose adolescence had been irregular (for reasons not investigated here)²¹. The combination of strong mobility aspirations projected onto high school plus a lack of confidence in one's own chances and an affective orientation towards one's future which does not allow for long-range planning, seems to be a psycho-social mechanism explaining the phenomenon of drop-out²².

²¹ It might well be a case of rather late maturation — adolescents who are not yet ready to face the intellectual and social challenges of high school and/or whose high school careers do not fit in with their future plans. It might also be a case of early or accelerated maturation — adolescents who have developed strong mobility aspirations as a result of their specific social positions, and who regard high school as the best means of realising these aspirations. However, they have neither the confidence in themselves needed for such realisation, nor the necessary neutral-affective orientation which seems to be essential for the long process of preparation usually called for by mobility aspirations.

²² As mentioned above, we also found additional mechanisms predicting

F. Conclusion

These findings suggest the following conclusions. With the increase of schooling due to educational planning on one hand, and the spreading recognition of the value of education on the other, it is to be expected that a growing rate of the high school population will have a predisposition to drop out, along the lines reported here.

Even though high school is usually considered an instrument of social mobility, its culture is based upon concepts of liberal education which regard learning and education as of value in itself. In other words, education is not seen as a means, but as an end with its own important intrinsic significance²³. It can be assumed that the traditional population of high school — children of well-to-do middle class parents who have themselves, as a rule, had a similar education — will graduate, in spite of the contradiction between the latent functions of secondary education and its explicit manifest functions. There are a number of justifications for this assumption. Firstly, there is a wide congruence in value-orientation between such parents and their children's high schools; these parents regard education mainly as an integral part of the way of life of their social class, even though they, too, realise the importance of education for the maintenance of status stability²⁴. Secondly, these parents usually have future orientations which coincide with the type of role for which a high school education prepares its students.

Successful completion of a high school education, despite the contradiction between the latent and manifest functions of education, may become very much more difficult once high school education becomes a general public service. The congruence mentioned above between the value system of high schools and of the families' cul-

drop-out. Most important were standing and activity in primary groups — mainly age groups — and attitude towards high school in particular, and towards studies in general. These mechanisms will be discussed in a further paper.

²³ This attitude may be found in most literature in the field of Educational Philosophy, and in most educators' publications.

²⁴ See for instance:

T. PARSONS, «The School Class as a Social System: Some of its Functions in American Society». *Harvard Educational Review*, Vol. 29, 1959.

C. LUTKENS, «Die Schule als Mittelklasse Institution». *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie*, Sonderheft 4, 1959: Soziologie der Schule.

ture cannot be expected among the new groups starting to avail themselves of high school education. It seems possible, therefore, that the contradiction between the latent and the manifest functions of high school education may prove highly detrimental to this vast new population of high school students²⁵.

High school itself, on the other hand, has undergone hardly any change, in spite of the growing heterogeneity of its student body. The main adaptation of the school system to its changing population has been the creation of new types of post-primary education which parallel the traditional high school education. (Some of these programs even consist of general theoretical education). All the new types of post primary education, however, differ from high school inasmuch as they do not prepare their students for an academic career. Since, as a rule, the certificates awarded by these schools are insufficient for entry to institutes of higher learning, they can hardly meet the demand for an education which facilitates social mobility. Public demand is, therefore, concentrated upon the traditional type of high school, which is assumed to be the main channel of mobility. The discrepancy between the expectations of great number of students and their parents on the one hand, and the culture of high schools, on the other, seems to result in a growing drop-out rate. If, in view of this development, the policy is not to be the exclusion of these students from high school, the logical conclusion is that the high school will have to adapt itself to the new conditions. The perpetuation of a drop-out rate of about 50 per cent would seem to contradict the spirit of modern educational planning. It is also a waste of financial resources, manpower, and the goodwill and time of the students.

Offering a vocational education to students of the type discussed here seems to be a dubious solution to the problem. For one thing, vocational education does not, as a rule, command the same prestige as an academic education and is therefore not accepted by large sections of the public as a substitute. Hence, if the basic motivation in the planning of modern educational services is the offer of equal educational chances to all, this can hardly be the solution. More-

²⁵ B. JACKSON and D. MARSDEN, *Education and the Working Class*. London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962.

J. TOBY, «Orientation to Education as a Factor in the School Maladjustment of Lower Class Children,» *Social Forces*, 35, 3, March 1957.

D. L. WOLFLE, *America's Resources in Specialized Talent*, New York, Harper and Bros., 1954.

over, due to the vast and rapid changes in vocations in our era, vocational education of the accepted kind is far from answering the problem posed here. It is impossible during the current technological revolution to offer a vocational (artisan) education of the traditional kind which will be fully functional in the occupational market.

This brings us back, therefore, to our assumption that the traditional high school will have to undergo change and adapt itself to the altered composition of its student-body²⁶. We shall suggest here a number of such adaptations which would seem to be in line with our findings. The high school curriculum will have to have much greater flexibility, both in scope or kind of subjects taught, and in depth of analysis. It will thus be capable of offering a curriculum to fit certain students' short-range planning and enable them to make a smooth and direct transition into the labour market after graduation. — High schools will have to widen and increase student activities and student self-government as part of their established program, in order to enhance students' confidence in their own capabilities. Further, it seems that the high school will have to adopt a much clearer stand on the future placement of its graduates. This should entail both personal guidance for pupils and the opening up of a realistic perspective of the chances of mobility for high school graduates.

Adaptations of this kind might, *inter alia*, affect drop-out rates from the traditional academic high schools.

²⁶ We refer here mainly to the continental type of high school which the Israeli schools resemble.

A MODEL FOR THE ANALYSIS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ENGLISH EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM FROM 1860¹

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The development of the educational system of a country is one specific but central example of social change. Historians and sociologists have rarely examined the changing structure of English education in sociological terms², and amongst those who have done so only one has specifically related his analysis to a model of social change. Duncan Mitchell used the changing social class structure in England over the last century and a half as his central analytical theme³. Whilst social class was vitally important in England during this period, to use it as the central analytical concept obviates the possibility of relating this specific example of social change to any more general theoretical model and thereby stands in the way of relating the understanding gained in this specific field to general theories of social change. More particularly, this method fails to identify other important foci in the process of educational development and of social change.

The problem to be considered here, namely the development of the English educational system since 1860, raises certain difficulties of delimiting boundaries since the term «educational system» as used in common parlance includes several sub-sectors, for instance, both the private and the maintained schools or organisations giving

¹ I wish to thank Professors Raymond Illsley, James C. Kincaid and Gordon W. Horobin, all of the University of Aberdeen, for their comments on an earlier version of this paper.

² See, however, A. E. DOBSY, *Education and Social Movements: 1700-1850*, London, 1919; O. BANKS, *Parity and Prestige in English Secondary Education*, London, 1955; S. F. COTGROVE, *Technical Education and Social Change*, London, 1958.

³ G. Duncan MITCHELL, «Education, Ideology, and Social Change in England», in G. K. ZOLLSCHAN and W. HIRSCH, *Explorations in Social Change*, London, 1964. For a somewhat similar approach though not related specifically to the theory of social change see D. V. GLASS, «Education and Social Change in Modern England», in M. GINSBERG (ed.), *Law and Opinion in England in the Twentieth Century*, London, 1959.

both secondary and higher education. Furthermore, other social institutions, such as the family, or the economy, as in the case of apprenticeship, undertake simultaneously some of the same functions as the educational system. For the purposes of this analysis the educational system will be taken to include all those social systems, at whatever level, specifically created to educate.

The Definition of the Situation. Central to the model to be used here is the idea of the definition of the situation. Such a definition indicates in a general form the forces at work in an institutional sphere and is derived from the value system of those who bring power to bear on the formulation of the definition. Actors in the sphere to which the definition is relevant take their goals from it⁴.

In this case the definitions to be considered are those of education taken from Acts of Parliament, official reports or speeches in parliament. From these definitions action has followed. A critic might consider these definitions to be interpretations of the ideology of the ruling class. However, certainly since the Parliamentary Reform Act of 1832, there has been enough real power conflict in British politics for definitions of this type to represent compromises between conflicting interest within a dialogue that assumed a higher level consensus of values about the nature of a democratic system. These definitions were the end product of a bargaining process, a «truce situation»⁵. In this context political parties can be said to inhabit a plural society, and their different value systems from time to time may allow a measure of consensus, which may or may not be marked by an agreed definition of the situation⁶. Where agreement is not reached, the truce situation will be broken when the next change of political power occurs. What can be already seen, and this will become even clearer, is that this process of definition contains within itself the possibility of further change.

From this definition of the situation goals are given to the relevant institutional sphere, in this case to the educational system or to that part of the system for which the definition is operant. As a result of these goals positions are created and norms evolve that govern the roles of the actors filling the new positions. The assumption here is that the goals given influence the system and not vice-

⁴ See T. PARSONS, *Essays in Sociological Theory*, Glencoe, 1954, pp. 143-5.

⁵ J. REX, *Key Problems of Sociological Theory*, London, 1961, pp. 127-9.

⁶ J. REX, «The Plural Society and Social Theory», *B.J.S.*, April, 1959.

versa. The possibility that the educational system will influence the nature of its own goals must be considered at a later stage.

Thus, as a result of a defining of the situation a process is started by which an educational system is either established or reorganised in such a way that it attains the goals given to it. Manpower and materials are claimed in order to fill the positions created for teachers and to provide for the capital and current physical resources that are needed so that the system may adapt to goals defined for it. These resources will need co-ordination, and some administrative element will be necessary to integrate the efforts made to attain the goals laid down explicitly or implicitly by the definition. Finally, the system must ensure that the pattern established is maintained in two ways. Firstly, it must socialise its members, whether newly recruited or already present, into the norms now operating and must attempt to keep the behavior of its members within the range of role behaviour permitted by these norms. Secondly, the system must take measures to see that its products, namely educated beings, meet the requirements laid upon it by the definition. These two needs clearly demand the institutionalisation of conditions of employment in certain roles, for example that of teacher at primary or at secondary level, behind which lie specific levels of education.

The norms and roles in the system will rarely be specified in exact detail, and, therefore, a socially permitted range of indeterminacy will exist within which small differences are possible. This range enables the system to manage a certain amount of tension without a redefinition of the situation, but it also permits cumulative movement towards either limit of the permitted range. This, or, indeed, any other form of experiment within the range allows the development of autonomous change. Such a process is very important for the analysis of the English educational system in view of the fact that it grew in a prevailing atmosphere of «laissez-faire». As a result much scope for freedom has been usual at every level of the educational system.

So far a brief description has been given of a stationary model of the Parsonian type using those functional dimensions of the situation, namely goal-attainment, adaptation, integration, and pattern-maintenance, that Smelser has used for historical analysis elsewhere⁷. Here, however, the Parsonian terms have been used to analyse an administrative process. Care has been taken to allow for the

⁷ N. J. SMELSER, *Social Change in the Industrial Revolution*, London, 1959.

possibility that future change may be generated within the model itself in two ways. Firstly, there is the chance of autonomous development of change within the system itself and, secondly, the definition of the situation has been seen as a result of a power struggle leading to a truce situation which could be changed by an alteration in the power brought to bear or by a change in the values governing the use of that power.

II

The Problem of Change

The various social changes that influence such institutions as the educational system can be put into certain categories. Firstly, changes may be placed on a continuum with the poles major and minor; the demarcation line between the two categories is arbitrary, the criterion being some measure of the effect of the change. An example of major change is the educational reorganisation eventually needed to cope with the demands of the economy as a result of the Industrial Revolution. The minor changes that occur within a system can be absorbed within the range of indeterminacy allowed by the present definition of the situation, but can also be of a cumulative nature, eventually creating such strain that some redefinition of the situation becomes essential for a continuance of the system albeit in a new form. An example here is the cumulative growth of the educational system within the framework erected as a result of the 1870 Elementary Education Act. By the end of the century the educational system had evolved beyond the limits of the original definition. In addition, the different parts of the system for example, the secondary and the technical sectors, were developing at very different rates. As a result a radical redefinition of the situation was essential. In fact, as is often the case, there were exogenous factors such as changes in the power structure and the value system governing its use that hastened the necessary redefinition.

A second continuum against which changes can be categorised is that of sudden gradual. Here the criterion is the rate of realisation of impact. The effect of modern war is sudden. In 1939 the outbreak of war was rapidly followed by the mass evacuation of children from large urban areas and this led to the closing of many schools. Gradual change is illustrated by the effect of industrialisation on a

social system. The structure of the various parts of a system must readjust to meet such a major gradual change. In the case of England during this period the family came to hand over part of its educative function to several parts of the educational system including, for instance the schools⁸.

Lastly, changes may be either general to the whole social system, or to a large part of it, including the institution under consideration or may be particular to that institution. The outbreak of a war or the process of industrialisation are general changes, whilst a technical improvement in teaching method such as the introduction of structural mathematics or the Initial Teaching Alphabet are particular changes only affecting the educational system. Under contemporary conditions, this latter type of change is usually sudden in impact as the existence of educational journals and the holding of technical exhibitions speed up the diffusion of such cultural innovations.

Whether the change is generated within the system or comes from without, strains will appear at an operational level within the system. Thus, at a social system level the educational system may fail to meet the demands put on it by other institutions; for example, the supply of physicists may not meet the demands of the economic or military systems or, again, the nature of education for girls may not meet the needs of a society in which marriage is taking place at an earlier age. At the institutional level one part of the educational system may not meet the needs of another. For example, the secondary system may produce more youths able and wanting to undertake higher education than the tertiary level can absorb. This latter case is an example of the potentialities inherent in a given level of differentiation of the system going to waste.

Autonomous change may develop within the interstices of the system. Where there is indeterminacy in norms and tolerance of slight deviance, ambiguity exists exploitable by those with a slightly different definition of the situation from the agreed one. In this case as Lockwood has said, «authority is never given, but is always contingent upon its exercise»⁹. If sufficient tolerance exists, there is the possibility that either to meet their own slightly different values

⁸ F. MUSGROVE, «The Decline of the Educative Family», *Universities Quarterly*, Sept. 1960, and «Middle Class Families and Schools 1780-1880», *Sociological Review*, 1959.

⁹ D. LOCKWOOD, «Social Integration and System Integration», pp. 246-7, footnote 2 in G. K. ZOLLSCHAN and W. HIRSCH, *op. cit.*

or to meet external needs by shortcutting official action an individual or a group of individuals may redefine the situation and act upon their new definition. A classic example of this was the development of the Department of Science and Art in the second half of the last century. This department was established in 1853 to further the teaching of science and art as applied to industry to members of the lower classes who had left school, but by 1899 when its more or less complete autonomy was ended its activities were in the main aimed at teaching science to middle class boys of secondary school age¹⁰. Eisenstadt has christened groups of this nature that have values at odds with those governing the existing definition of the situation as «anti-systems»¹¹.

III

Redefinition of the Situation

When the strains either at the social system level or at institutional level become sufficiently intense, activity akin to Smelser's collective behaviour occurs¹². The system is at present functioning inadequately. New or somewhat different beliefs are brought to bear on the situation and ultimately a redefinition of the situation is made. The important question here is the determination of «the threshold values beyond which equilibrium will break down»¹³. As Moore has pointed out the idea of «the threshold» stresses that the trigger cause of a great change may be «a small change in one element»¹⁴. The result of this redefinition will be a new truce situation, a resultant of the new balance of power of a political nature either at social system or at institutional level. The nature of this new definition will be governed by the relative strength of the various vested interests, whether for or against change, that bear upon the particular

¹⁰ See P. W. MUSGRAVE, *Technical Change, Education and the Labour Force*, Oxford, 1967, Chaps. 6 & 7, *passim*.

¹¹ S. N. EISENSTADT, «Institutionalisation and Change», *A.S.R.*, April, 1964, p. 247.

¹² See N. J. SMELSER, *Theory of Collective Behaviour*, London, 1962, especially Chaps. 1 & 4.

¹³ T. PARSONS, «A Functional Theory of Change», in ed. A. & E. ETZIONI, *Social Change*, New York, 1964, p. 97.

¹⁴ W. E. MOORE, «Discontinuities in the Theory of Change», *A.S.R.*, April, 1964, p. 334.

and it is in this fact that we must seek the explanation of why change proceeds at a relatively controlled rate. Some of these institutions are at any moment more salient for the institution under consideration than are others and, therefore, bring more power to bear on the establishment or breaking and re-establishing of truce situations. Thus, in the case of the educational system religion was salient until around the middle of the nineteenth century, though it has maintained much influence during this century despite the so-called «decline in religion»¹⁵. After the 1860's the class structure became more salient¹⁶. Over the whole period the salience of the economy has grown gradually greater until since 1945 it has probably had as much salience for education as has social class¹⁷. Symbolic of this struggle for salience between these two institutions is the nicely balanced argument that this country cannot afford to reorganise secondary education on a comprehensive basis in the name of equality because of the possible disruption of the flow of highly educated manpower to the economy. In general, the economy has a great salience with regard to the educational system, since the national income must be a certain size before a significant proportion can be devoted to the creation of a developed educational system, and this is true whether the schools are state provided or not. Yet, paradoxically, in an industrialised society once the national income is of a certain size, or, perhaps, starts to grow at more than a certain rate, the presence of an educational system becomes vital to maintain the system either as stable or in growth. It may be that one institution has greater salience for one part of the educational system than for others either at one moment or through time; the economy has had great salience for technical education throughout the whole of the last century¹⁸.

Before applying the model one point remains. So far the assumption has been made that the educational system does not influence its own goals or, to put it in another way, that education is a resultant but not a determinant of culture. This assumption must be relaxed to account for such cases as the growth of technologies, such

¹⁵ See Charmian CANNON, «The Influence of Religion on Educational Policy, 1902-1944», *Dr. J. of Educ. Studies*, May 1964, especially pp. 154-60.

¹⁶ See Brian SIMON, *Education and the Labour Movement, 1870-1920*, London, 1965, *passim*.

¹⁷ See S. F. COTGROVE, *op. cit.*

¹⁸ P. W. MUSGRAVE, «Constant Factors in the Demand for Technical Education since 1860», *Br. J. of Educ. Studies*, May, 1966.

as metallurgy, brought about by research in pure science within the universities that was completely autonomous, owing nothing to demands from the economy. The model can account for these and similar changes because their ultimate effect is through the transmission of this new knowledge beyond the educational system. Hence the value system outside the educational system is changed, and there is a demand for a redefinition of the situation to meet the new value system and, possibly, a new power structure.

IV

The next step is to trace out the way in which the definition of the educational situation has changed over the last century. There is only space here to treat in a brief way the parts of the educational system that have now become the primary and secondary sectors, though any complete treatment would deal with the various forms of infant, higher and technical education¹⁹.

Prior to the passing of the 1870 Elementary Education Act the educational system was simple in form. What elementary schools existed were mainly financed by voluntary societies of a religious nature; secondary education was provided by private proprietary schools or by grammar and other schools on ancient foundations that were often inefficient. There was no central organisation controlling this rudimentary system and criticism was growing by the middle of the century partly because of various structural strains, but also partly because the facts about the schools were now more fully known and this in itself influenced values. As part of the 1851 decennial census Horace Mann had compiled a report, «Education in England and Wales», which revealed the low proportion of children then attending any school. During the period 1859 to 1868 three Royal Commissions considered the educational system of the country. In the reports of these commissions may be found the definitions of the educational situation by the ruling class of the time for the education of its own children and those of the other social classes. The working class had little direct influence on these definitions. The middle class, however, could bring some influence to bear be-

¹⁹ For a short treatment of this latter field see P. W. MUSGRAVE, «The Definition of Technical Education, 1860-1920», *Vocational Aspect*, Summer, 1964.

cause a generation after the 1832 Reform Act it had representatives in parliament who had begun to make it understood that the British economy needed an efficient educational system to meet contemporary conditions, more particularly the growth of foreign competition.

In 1861 the Newcastle Commission defined Elementary education in terms of the ability to read «a common narrative», writing «a letter that shall be both legible and intelligible» and knowing «enough of ciphering to make out, or test the correctness of a common shop bill» together with a little geography and the ability «to follow the allusions and the arguments of a plain Saxon sermon»²⁰ — in other words a Christian version of «the 3 R's» for boys and girls up to the age of ten or twelve.

In the report of the Clarendon Commission (1864) the upper class defined its own education in terms of a mainly classical diet, but wished to add some mathematics and science²¹. It should be noted that this education was defined mainly in terms of boys. However, it was in the report of the Tauton Commission (1868) that one finds the first plan for the organisation of what today would be called secondary education, a term that Matthew Arnold in his role of H.M.I. was introducing into English educational discourse as a result of his comparative studies of European educational systems. For the first time stress was put on the secondary education of girls by this Commission. Their report suggested three grades of school; the first was for the children of the upper and professional classes and would continue to the age of about eighteen; it was seen as giving «something more than classics and mathematics». The second grade schools stopped at sixteen and were mainly to serve the mercantile and higher commercial classes. Their curriculum was, therefore, seen as containing «a certain amount of thorough knowledge of those subjects which can be turned to practical use in business»; Latin was barely tolerated by this class of people. The third grade schools were for the upper working class («The smaller tenant farmers, the small tradesmen, the superior artisans») and their needs were described as «very good reading, very good writing, very good arithmetic»²².

²⁰ Rep. of R. C. on the State of Popular Education in England, I, 1861, p. 243.

²¹ See Rep. of R.C. on the Revenues and Management of certain Colleges and Schools, 1864.

²² Schools Inquiry Commission, 1868, I, pp. 15-21.

The definitions of the educational situation contained in these commissions represented the truce situation of the time and influenced the patterns of implementation of the Acts that followed the three reports. In fact, the Newcastle Commission's immediate influence was upon the Revised Code (of Regulations for Elementary Education) of 1862, but this Code in its changing forms was after 1870 administered under the Elementary Education Act which founded the state educational system in England. Legislation relating to the secondary field followed both the other commissions and led to some reorganisation and expansion of education at this level.

The truce situation in the elementary sector had been hard to reach because of the difficulty of satisfying the various religious bodies concerned with educational provision. By the 1880's the religious denominations were beginning to question the definition subsumed under the 1870 Act. As a result the Cross Commission was set up to examine the working of the Elementary Education Act. Two further strains led to a questioning of the whole settlement of the 1870's. There was, firstly, a strain between the educational system and another institutional area, namely, the economy. This was due to the relatively slow growth of secondary education when measured against the needs of the economy. This led to the development of post-elementary education, secondary in character, within the elementary sector. Secondly, there was a strain within the educational system itself due to the very diffuse growth of technical education both before, and, particularly, after the 1889 Technical Instruction Act, which was the first Act to define fully the situation for technical education. Most of this latter development was under the control of the Department of Science and Art which appeared to follow a policy completely divorced from that of any other educational body. There was obviously a need for an overall redefinition of the situation to eliminate these strains. In 1894 the Bryce Commission on Secondary Education was set up. Its report in 1895 was soon followed by two major Acts.

The Bryce Commission had recommended a central department to coordinate the educational system. There was a need to integrate the educational activities of the Elementary Education Department, the Department of Science and Art and the educational section of the Charities Commission, which had been responsible since the Taunton Commission for much the reorganisation of the private sector of secondary education. This was achieved by the Education Act of 1899 which established the Board of Education. The 1902 Education

Act established a new truce situation between those with the main vested interest in the provision of schools, more particularly between the various religious denominations, and also between the central government and various forms of local authority. In addition this act paved the way for the establishment and growth of a state provided secondary system. The Bryce Commission had expressed its desire that the «freedom, variety (and) elasticity» of the English system should be preserved²³. There were, therefore, the minimum number of specific definitions of the situation in the Act.

The range of tolerance was wide and the various codes and handbooks that flowed from the new Board set the direction of growth of the system without much difficulty. The Elementary Code of 1904 saw the purpose of this branch of education as «to form and strengthen the character and to develop the intelligence of the children entrusted to it», a much wider definition than that of the Newcastle Commission. The Regulations for Secondary Schools, also issued in 1904, spoke of a «general» and «complete» education «up to and beyond the age of 16». Furthermore, the 1902 Act led to an increased differentiation of the state educational system as it authorised local authorities to establish training colleges for teachers. By 1913 twenty such colleges had been founded.

One of the most remarkable provisions of the 1902 Act was the creation of a Consultative Committee. This body of eminent people, in the main educationalists, was to consider contemporary educational issues referred to it by the government and make recommendations. In fact the presence of this body created within the system the possibility of continuous redefinition of the educational situation, or at least of that part currently being studied by the Committee. Prior to the outbreak of the first world war the system envisaged by the 1899 and 1902 Acts was being developed, and it was only after the war that reappraisal began. A massive redefinition occurred under the impact of several forces. Firstly, the whole value system of British society had become more egalitarian and, therefore, the goals of the educational system were defined in very different terms from those of the pre-war era. Secondly, the severe economic depressions of the inter-war period threw into clearer light the dysfunctional way in which the educational system in certain important respects was serving the economy. Lastly, a more scientific educational technology had evolved; this was typified by

²³ R. C. on Secondary Education, 1895, I, p. 326.

the application of psychology, and particularly psychological testing, to the field of education.

The reappraisal of the social system that was triggered off by the second world war led to a further attempt to redefine the educational situation in the 1944 Education Act, which forms the legal basis of the present system. The bases of this act lie in the definitions of education generated by three of the reports made by the Consultative Committee during the inter-war years. Thus, in 1931 the Committee, with Sir W. H. Hadow as chairman, reported on Primary Education and saw its main task as being the provision to children between seven and eleven of «what is essential to their health growth — physical, intellectual and moral»; the curriculum was «to be thought of in terms of activity and experience rather than knowledge to be acquired and facts to be stored»²⁴.

This redefinition was clearly a direct, though perhaps even more liberal, descendant of the 1904 Elementary Code. The rethinking that was going on in the secondary sector was much more radical. It was possible to receive schooling from the ages of five to eighteen completely within the elementary code. In 1926 the Hadow report on «The Education of the Adolescent» stated that «between the age of eleven and (if possible) that of fifteen, all... who do not go forward to 'secondary education' in the present narrow sense of the word, should go forward none the less to what is, in our view, a form of secondary education, in the truer and broader sense of the word». The term «elementary» was to be abolished and there were to be two stages to schooling, primary and secondary. The new wider secondary education was to be given mainly in either the already existing grammar schools or in the envisaged modern schools, in which «the courses of instruction, though not merely vocational or utilitarian, should be used to connect the school work with the interests arising from the social and industrial environment of the pupils»²⁵.

This redefinition of secondary education as for all children and of the curriculum as much wider in scope than the mere 3 R's of the nineteenth century elementary school was reinforced by the Spens Report on «Secondary Education» published late in 1938. In addition, the Consultative Committee whilst rejecting the establish-

²⁴ Rep. of the Cons. Ctee. of the B. of E. on The Primary School, 1931, pp. 92-3.

²⁵ Rep. of the Cons. Ctee. on The Education of the Adolescent, 1926, pp. xxi-xxiii, and 175.

ment of a multilateral type of school, perhaps comparable to the U. S. high school, recommended the creation of a third type of secondary school, the Technical High School²⁶. Many of these recommendations were contained in the wartime coalition government's white paper, «Educational Reconstruction», published in 1943, though probably the clearest presentation of the definition of the educational situation by educationalists at the time is to be found in the Report of the Secondary Schools Examinations Council, with Cyril Norwood as chairman, on «The Secondary Curriculum and Examinations». This report was published ten days after the white paper on reconstruction which it must have influenced. The Norwood report justified the Spens recommendations of three school types and tried to underpin the argument on psychological grounds by discovering three types of mind to fit the three types of schools²⁷.

The 1944 Education Act was born of these redefinitions, though not all were made explicit. The important switch from codes to stages was clear: «The statutory system ... shall be organised in three progressive stages to be known as primary education, secondary education, and further education»²⁸. The word «elementary» was cut out of the educational vocabulary. Yet there was no definite legislation on how the secondary level was to be organised, or did further education include the universities. The assumed definition of the situation was that there should be a tripartite system as the Spens and Norwood Reports had recommended, though this assumption was very quickly challenged²⁹. The apparent truce situation of 1944 did not seem to meet the more egalitarian value system of the Labour party which now wielded more power at both national and local levels.

Since 1944 the educational situation has not been redefined legally, but a constant and varied number of redefinitions³⁰ have been

²⁶ Rep. of the Cons. Ctee. on Secondary Education, 1938, pp. xix-xxi.

²⁷ Rep. of the Sec. Sch. Exam. Council on Curriculum and Examinations in Secondary Schools, 1943, pp. 2-3.

²⁸ Education Act, 1944, Part II, 7.

²⁹ Compare the Min. of Educ's *A Guide to the Educational System of England and Wales* («three main alternative types of secondary education») 1945, with *The New Secondary Education* («no set guides for organisation»), 1947.

³⁰ Reps. of the Min. of Educ's Cent. Adv. Council «15 to 18» (Crowther), 1959; *Half our Future* (Newsom), 1963, *Children and Their Primary Schools*, 1967, and Rep. of Ctee. on Higher Education, *Higher Education*, (Robbins), 1963.

made amidst a growing state of strain between the educational system and other social institutions. During this time changes in social institutions have occurred that reflect changes in the relevant value systems. The influential values can be traced in the way the various committees have examined these strains. A brief analysis of the influence of various institutions at the present time follows.

The saliency given to the economy at present can be seen in the Crowther Report's invention of and plea for «numeracy», and in the case of less able children in the Newsom Report's stress on the practical, mathematical and scientific sides of the curriculum³¹. The economy, particularly in an age of full employment and with the new stress on research, needs highly educated manpower at all levels. So influential is this demand that the Robbins Committee put as the first objective of «any properly balanced system» of higher education «instruction suitable to play a part in the general division of labour»³². At all levels the social functions of education are now given at least as much weight as its individual functions. Furthermore, the logic of the development of the occupational structure, as the proportion of labour employed in the tertiary sector rises, now has a strong autonomous influence on the direction and rate of development of the demands for specific types of manpower from the educational system. This growing realisation within the economy of the need for trained manpower played a part in the passing of the Industrial Training Act (1964), and the gradual growth of training within industry as a result of this act will raise the problem of defining the boundary between the economy and the educational system at this point.

Manpower problems are often expressed in demographic terms. However, perhaps the main institutional changes that can be analysed in such terms are those concerning the family. The impact on education of changes in the size, age structure and life cycle of the English family were noted by the Crowther committee, as an influence bearing on any redefinition of the education of girls, and by the Newsom committee, as an important factor in differential social class learning. The latter committee also examined the function of education in relation to changes in contemporary moral values and, hence, in the future quality of family life³³. At this point there is

³¹ 15 to 18, pp. 268-281; *Half Our Future*, pp. 128-151. See also *From School to Further Education* (Brunton Rep.), Scottish Educ. Dept., 1963.

³² *Higher Education*, p. 6.

³³ 15-18, pp. 28-35; *Half Our Future*, p. 35, Ch. 7 and 22 *passim*.

a link with another social institution, namely organised religion, that, because of the history of the English educational system, has a vested interest in any future redefinition. Despite a recent temporary redefinition by administrative regulation of the financial position of the various denominations little overt attempt has been made to examine what the next truce situation will be vis-à-vis the churches.

Finally, social class has been given much attention in post-war thought on education, particularly since the Central Advisory Council's report on «Early Leaving» (1954) showed the close connection between social class and leaving selective secondary schools at the minimum legal age before the first external examination. Yet the decreasing importance given to social class in any ideological sense is clear, since social class was mainly used in the «Early Leaving», Crowther and Robbins (though this is not so true of the Newsom) Reports in the analysis of the loss of talent, a problem given importance in an economic context. Furthermore, much of the present consideration of the reorganisation of secondary education, an issue dodged by Crowther and Newsom, has been pursued along similar lines, though the ideological argument of egalitarianism has also been important.

This brief analysis of the saliency of the various social institutions impinging on English education today indicates that the redefinition of the educational situation that seems imminent will be much more influenced by economic interest and much less by organised religion than has been the case at any of the three major truce situations reached over the last hundred years. Indeed, so salient is the economy that the universities may find themselves defined merely as one group of organisations within the general tertiary sector, rather than as special organisations outside the general definition of the educational situation.

V

The main characteristic of the model described here is the idea of the definition of the situation. The advantage of such a starting point is that the model is of general application at both macro and microlevel. Implicit in the argument is a denial of the statement that «each of the special sociologies has its own statics and dynamics and its own empirical problem of discovering uniformities

in the processes which sustain or alter the structure with which it is concerned»³⁴. The position taken here is that a general model can help uncover those uniformities which are of more importance in one specific institutional area than in another.

If the definition of a situation in one particular area, e.g. education, is examined, the particular set of values that govern the goals of that system can be discovered. Yet such a definition, when embodied in legal or quasi-legal form, constitutes a truce situation and hence is liable to change. In addition, change can come because of the range of tolerance permitted by most such definitions or, where the range is narrow, from the antagonism caused by excess rigidity. The agents of change in this model are the actors in the situation who may set up «anti-systems» or reinterpret regulations within the allowed range — the men have been brought back in³⁵.

Here the model has been only partially demonstrated. Further work might convert description into theory. We need to know which power groups were important either consistently or at certain stages in the establishment of truce situations and which strains were crucial in the process of development. A closer analysis might clarify the concept of «the threshold» and indicate how much strain, either of a unitary or of a cumulative nature, is needed to trigger off a redefinition of the situation. The accumulation of discreet changes often seems to occur within such an institutional area as the educational system, particularly in a country like England where the range of tolerance has been wide, and detailed work on such processes might be worthwhile. Any theory, however limited in its predictive value, would have to give some explanation of rates and paths of change. A necessary step in its evolution would be its testing on comparative historical data. This is important if only because, as Ginsberg has said, «societies differ greatly in plasticity»³⁶. Part of the reason for this may well be that the attitude to change differs by society, and it could be that societies differ in their attitude to the changing of any one institutional area, for example, to changes in the educational system.

With more space it would be possible to show how after each major redefinition resources had been claimed for the educational

³⁴ J. REX, in a review of W. E. MOORE, «Social Change», *Sociological Review*, Nov., 1965, p. 349.

³⁵ See G. C. HOMANS, «Bringing Men Back In», *A.J.S.*, Dec. 1964.

³⁶ M. GINSBERG, «On Social Change», *B.J.S.*, Sept., 1958, p. 214.

system, how integration had been achieved and how the pattern of the system had been maintained. But even here some results have been achieved. The analysis has led to the posing of some questions, crucial both to the theory of social change and to an analysis of the history of English education. Some of the important definitions have been isolated and the pattern of redefinition made clear. It would seem that two of the categories of change described above have been of major importance in the development of the English educational system, namely, major gradual general change and minor sudden particular change, especially in the latter case where the change is of a cumulative nature.

LOWER-CLASS MALES' INTEGRATION INTO COMMUNITY AND FAMILY

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SOCIOLOGY OF THE FAMILY

SOCIOLOGIE DE LA FAMILLE

The husband-father's integration into the community is often associated with a neglect of the family's. Community participation appears to be negatively related to performing family tasks and responsibilities. Occupational demands on the professional, business owner, or bureaucratic executive provide a good example. Dedication to the requirements of professional, proprietorial, or managerial positions is essential for the client's welfare in the one case and the organization's continuance in the other. But the man's time and energy resources may be expended at the expense of his family.¹ The wife must take over many household tasks and decisions customarily performed by less occupied husbands, and she must in many cases see herself and her children take a place second to the occupation when their interests conflict. For some occupations men, the family serves primarily as an adjunct to their achievement aspirations. They judge the family's activities according to the father's effect on the occupational world.² The family no longer retains its intrinsic importance but becomes an appendage to the husband's occupational career. Motivative prescriptions separating family and occupational roles are ineffective.

Commitment to voluntary organizations can also lead to family neglect or the subtle skewing of the family's goals to the service of

¹ Integration in the present study means participation in community or family activities, depending upon the situational context. This usage of the concept is consistent with one aspect of De Vriehs's treatment of integration. *Child Development: Problems, Causes, III: The First Five Years, 1958*, pp. 170-202. This study makes only indirect use of another aspect of De Vriehs's conceptual beliefs and values.

² William H. Werry, Jr., *The Organization Man*, Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1956, pp. 161-62; and Robert Barover and Elana Barover, "Work and Family in Contemporary Society," *American Sociological Review*, 36 (June, 1971), pp. 584-85.

³ William H. Werry, Jr., "The Wives of Management's Fantasy," 44 *October*, 1951, pp. 56-60; and William H. Werry, Jr., "Couples and the Wives," *Fortune*, 44 (November, 1951), pp. 128-31.

LOWER-CLASS MALES' INTEGRATION INTO COMMUNITY AND FAMILY

JOAN ALDOUS

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The husband-father's integration into the community is often associated with a lack of integration in the nuclear family¹. Community participation appears to be negatively related to performing family tasks and responsibilities. Occupational demands on the professional, business owner, or bureaucratic executive provide a good example. Dedication to the requirements of professional, proprietorial, or managerial positions is essential for the client's welfare in the one case and the organization's continuance in the others. But the man's time and energy resources may be expended at the expense of his family². The wife must take over many household tasks and decisions customarily performed by less occupied husbands, and she must in many cases see herself and her children take a place second to the occupation when their interests conflict. For some ambitious men, the family serves primarily as an adjunct to their achievement aspirations. They judge the family's activities according to the latter's effect on the occupational world³. The family no longer retains an intrinsic importance but becomes an appendage to the husband's occupational career. Normative prescriptions separating family and occupational roles are ineffective.

Commitment to voluntary organizations can also lead to family neglect or the subtle skewing of the family's goals to the service of

¹ Integration in the present study means participation in community or family activities, depending upon the situational context. This usage of the concept is consistent with one aspect of Durkheim's treatment of integration. Emile DURKHEIM, *Suicide*, Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1956, pp. 170-202. This study makes only indirect use of another aspect of integration-shared beliefs and values.

² William H. WHYTE, Jr., *The Organization Man*, Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1956, pp. 161-62; and Robert RAPOPORT and Rhona RAPOPORT, «Work and Family in Contemporary Society», *American Sociological Review*, 20 (June, 1965), pp. 384-85.

³ William H. WHYTE, Jr., «The Wives of Management», *Fortune*, 44 (October, 1951), pp. 86-88; and William H. WHYTE, Jr., «Corporation and the Wife», *Fortune*, 44 (November, 1951), pp. 109-11.

the husband-father's associational participation. The shared interests and joint activities that rank so high among middle-class marital values may be threatened when the husband-father roles are supplanted by community leader roles. Service club «widows» complain no less bitterly than organization «widows». Whether «widowhood» is due to business or club meetings, and whether the object is occupational advancement or community betterment, the existence of the bereavement metaphor reflects the removal of the husband from the family circle.

Friendship and kinship ties can also compete with fulfillment of husband-father roles, especially in the lower class. Lower-class men, unlike middle-class men, are not likely to prune peer and kin activities to those shared with their wives. Relative and friendship ties are more functional for men at the bottom of the socio-economic hierarchy. They supply economic and emotional support unobtainable in the «formally organized world and among the anonymous incumbents of public bureaucracies»⁴. Men cannot afford to weaken peer and kin ties even to strengthen marital ties.

Despite the research findings and social criticism describing the competition that can exist between the man's involvement in his family and his involvement in community associations, it is the author's contention that this is too one-sided a picture. Particularly in the case of the lower-class male with whom this report is concerned certain kinds of participation in the broader community provide the means that enable him to participate in his family. Still other community associations actively involve him in family concerns. The remainder of this paper will be devoted, therefore, first to developing the rationale for the posited relationship between community integration and family integration for lower-class men, then to drawing hypotheses from the argument, and finally to testing them, using data from a highly urbanized white and Negro sample.

THE RATIONALE OF THE STUDY

The lower-class male's isolation.

The research that has been done on the lower-class male shows a man largely detached from community and nuclear family. His in-

⁴ Albert K. COHEN and Harold M. HODGES, Jr., «Characteristics of the Lower-Blue-Collar Class», *Social Problems*, 10 (Spring, 1963), p. 307.

tegration into the occupational world is at a low level, and the ties are often tenuous. He is employed on unskilled and semi-skilled jobs where the pay is low and layoffs are common. His only organizational ties are those of church and union, which are weakened by his lack of participation⁵. Sociability contacts are largely limited to a narrow circle of kin and friends he has known most of his life⁶. The work setting could provide a wider range of intimates but it does not usually serve as a source of friends, although the neighborhood may. The lower-class male's integration into the community as a result is attenuated and largely depends upon sociability networks of a restricted nature. Moreover, even these bonds disappear as the man grows older. Friends move away, the interests bringing them together fade, and there is less money to spend on recreation⁷. Even contacts with relatives lose their importance for the older man⁸.

The lower-class male's participation in the nuclear family is no less limited. It is not that he is gone from home a great deal; he is probably more often with his family than is the middle-class father. There is, however, little communication between husband and wife, as they lack common interests⁹. In addition, a high degree of marital role segregation separates husband and wife¹⁰. The man sees his primary responsibility as earning a living and so exempts himself from playing an active role in household tasks or child care.

Community ties as enabling participation in the family.

It is apparent that lower-class males are minimally integrated into community or family. It is perhaps less apparent that there are specific ways in which community integration, rare though it is in

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 315. Berger found among his working class respondents in a «company suburb» that 91 per cent reported attending union meetings only occasionally or less. Fifty-six per cent «never» or «rarely» attended church. Bennett M. BEGER, *Working-Class Suburb*, Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1960, pp. 63 and 45.

⁶ COHEN and HODGES, *op. cit.*, p. 308.

⁷ Mirra KOMAROVSKY, *Blue-Collar Marriage*, New York: Random House, 1964, p. 312.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 255.

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 338-39.

¹⁰ Lee RAINWATER, *Family Design: Marital Sexuality, Family Size, and Contraception*, Chicago: Aldine, 1965, p. 32, Table 2-1.

this group, can positively affect the male's playing his husband-father roles. Involvement in community agencies can supply resources needed for role performances within the family. These community ties can with some justification be labeled *enabling associations*. The degree to which the husband-father participates in the occupational world would be classified here. The crucial element is the economic resources the man receives in exchange for his work. The amount of his wages determines the limits on how well he can support his family. When he is working steadily and the family is not in financial straits, he has the economic resources to maintain his power position in the family. His wife caters to his wants, overlooks his shortcomings, and is prepared to reward him for any household task or decision in which he engages. A positive reinforcement cycle of participation, reward, and further participation is set up, drawing the man into ever-deeper involvement in family activities.

Insufficient and unstable earnings, on the other hand, are associated with the man's lack of involvement in the family. The wife has less to reward him for and so provides little incentive for him to involve himself in family concerns. Communication between husband and wife, always problematical in the lower class, is even less among the poverty-stricken element of this class. There is little to talk about other than problems, and such talk only increases anxieties¹¹. Role strain results if the wife obtains a job to supplement the family income. The man is supplanted in his provider contribution to the family division of labor. The breadwinner role will be added to the woman's housewife and mother roles, as the husband is unwilling to substitute for her in «women's roles». Because her wages amount to much the same as his, his self-esteem suffers. There is a loss of marital role reciprocity, accompanied by the withdrawal of the husband-father from family responsibilities. Thus, unemployment and inadequate wages have a dampening effect on the man's family integration.

Enabling associations also foster the lower-class male's family integration through facilitating his communication skills. His inability to take the role of others different from himself cuts down marital communication. He can interact easily with long-time friends and kin of the same sex and age in his peer group society. He gets by with routinized reactions and projections of his own views, because

¹¹ KOMAROVSKY, *op. cit.*, pp. 290-92.

those in the peer group share the same perspective¹². When men follow the same projecting strategy in cross-sex encounters, however, it leads to misunderstandings. Women play different roles in their position as wife-mother and have different interests and values. Contacts on the job, in the union hall, or in other community settings where the man must articulate his thoughts and feelings with new acquaintances in the give-and-take of interaction can increase self awareness with an accompanying understanding of other's differences¹³. Not only will men having such experiences have more to communicate to their wives if they choose — the dearth on subject matter also seems to play a part in the low level of marital communication in the lower class — but they will be better able to adjust their remarks to their wives' reactions and to keep the conversational ball in motion. This greater role-taking facility that comes from participation in the community is accompanied by increased knowledge. Both interpersonal skill and knowledge serve to buttress the man's power position in the family. He has better informational resources to draw upon in making decisions, and he is better able to convince his wife of their rightness. She, in turn, will actively seek his advice and follow his lead.

Community ties as encouraging participation in the family.

It is clear that a number of different community associations can be described as enabling. The provision of economic resources in exchange for the man's work is limited primarily to involvement in the occupational world. Communication facilitation and increased knowledge, however, can result from any contacts providing sustained interaction with initial strangers of somewhat different backgrounds. But provision of resources that would enable the man to take an active part in the nuclear family does not insure that he will so utilize them. Some other community associations are needed that will exert pressure on the man to fulfill his husband-father roles. *Involving associations* can serve this purpose. The positions the lower-class male occupies in the systems encompassing these associations share common role elements with the husband-father position.

¹² Herbert J. GANS, *Urban Villagers: Group and Class in the Life of Italian-Americans*, New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1962, p. 98.

¹³ KOMAROVSKY, *op. cit.*, p. 181.

Role elements consist of the specific behavioral patterns expected of the incumbent of a certain position by the different members with whom he associates by virtue of that position. The more specific and rigorously enforced norms of any role, the central elements, can be distinguished from peripheral elements which are noted only when conspicuously absent¹⁴. It is the overlap in role elements between the family and *involving associations* that make the latter «involving».

When there is an overlap in the norms enforced by the members of several role-sets with whom the individual is involved in role relationships, he encounters greater pressure to conform to these expectations. Even if the behavioral expectations concern central elements in one role but only peripheral elements in the other, there will still be some sanctioning carry-over from one role to the other. This is particularly the case when the roles are situated in group structures having similar characteristics, so that the roles are not hedged about with normative prescriptions to insulate them¹⁵. There may also be an «interlocking directorate» among the members of the different role-sets. Some of the individuals in the role-set associated with a particular position may also be members of the role-set clustered about another position. These others should be better able to sanction the individual's behavior as his change from one position to another sets up no barrier to their observation of his behavior¹⁶.

Here it is necessary to specify the kinds of community associations where the lower-class male's participation activates role elements common to his roles as husband-father. The first type of *involving association* consists of formal organizations. Lower-class men participate in few formal organizations aside from job and job-connected

¹⁴ S. Alexander WEINSTOCK, «Role Elements: A Link between Acculturation and Occupational Status», *British Journal of Sociology*, 14 (June, 1963), p. 144. For a discussion of role-sets, see Robert K. MERTON, «The Role-Set: Problems in Sociological Theory», *British Journal of Sociology*, 8 (June, 1957), pp. 114-115.

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¹⁶ Merton uses the observability of behavior or visibility as the «name for the extent to which the structure of a social organization provides occasion to those variously located in that structure to perceive the norms obtaining in the organization and the character of role-performance by those manning the organization.» *The Free Press*, 1957, p. 351. Visibility in the present study refers to the broadened surveillance of role performance members of an individual's role-set in one social organization are able to exercise because they are members of the role-set in another organization.

organizations which have already been classified as *enabling associations*. They do, however, belong to churches, and peripheral elements of the church-going role have to do with the male as husband-father. Fellow members welcome him as family head and urge him to attend with his family. Another member of the churchgoer's role-set, the minister, presses the lower-class male's participation in the family. The minister's exhortations on family life have to do with the man's actively playing his father roles of model and teacher and his spousal roles of giving nurturance and help. The role-set with whom the man interacts by virtue of his church attendance thus stresses his identity and responsibilities as husband-father. Church attendance for lower-class men also serves to reinforce, if not to encourage, marital values which integrate the man into the family. The minister transmits the marital values of communication, joint interests, and activities¹⁷.

The normative pressure members of the church-goer's role-set are able to exert is increased by the primary group characteristics that the functionaries of many churches self-consciously attempt to maintain as part of their goals. This is particularly true of Protestant churches, though in the typical large Catholic parish social bonds among the members are less emphasized¹⁸. As with the family, there is an emphasis on fellowship and face-to-face contacts rather than on the rule-regulated, impersonal and mediated contacts characteristic of bureaucratic organizations. Moreover, church participation, like participation in the family, is not role specific but diffuse. The churchgoer's activities at home, on the job, and when seeking recreation are all of concern to church functionaries. Because of these similarities, there are few normative prescriptions separating church and family roles. The characteristics of roles in the one are not at odds with those in the other. Besides sharing some of the same role norms, therefore, there is no insulation of the roles of church-goer and family member and so no compartmentalizing the normative pressures of the two role-sets. The church's appeal to all family members also strengthens the family's integration by serving as a common reference group for values. In addition, family members who attend are able to observe the husbandfather's church activities and to sanction those favorable or unfavorable to family interests. Thus church attendance fos-

¹⁷ KOMAROVSKY *op. cit.*, p. 124.

¹⁸ Joseph H. FICHTER, «American Religion and the Negro,» *Daedalus*, 94 (Fall, 1965), p. 1091.

ters the lower-class male's family participation in several different ways.

Certain kinds of sociability ties of the man that integrate him into the broader community also share role elements with the family. His identity as husband-father and the roles the position includes are salient when friends have the same marital status. They constitute *involving associations*. Married friends share some interests and in the lower class many problems. Unlike his unmarried peers, married friends do not constitute a competing group attempting to pull the lower-class male away from the family into the action-seeking life of the unmarried lower-class male. The normative expectations concerning his playing of family roles and what he should expect from his wife that friends express in conversations set minimal performance standards. Married friends also can serve as lightning rods to deflect marital conflict by defining as routine husband-wife disagreements¹⁹.

Husband-father role elements acquire a particular importance in neighborhood friendships. The man's playing of family roles is readily apparent at nearby friends. Not only is his performance highly visible to neighbors, but self-interest dictates that neighbors exert pressure to insure minimal family role performance. The threat to the safety, order, and stability of the neighborhood posed by the irresponsible husband is evident to other family heads. As a result, neighborhood friends are very likely to administer some kind of sanction when the man is neglecting his family responsibilities.

It is clear that the insulation of the man's community activities from his family roles breaks down in relationships with friends, as well as in his church activities. The members of the role-sets in these structures expect and enforce certain aspects of the man's husband-father roles. As a result, *involving associations* exert pressures on the man to participate in the family.

HYPOTHESES

From the discussion of enabling and involving associations it is possible to draw several hypotheses predicting relationships between particular types of community integration and family integration. The first set of hypotheses has to do with *enabling associations*. We

¹⁹ KOMAROVSKY, *op. cit.*, p. 44.

should expect to find lower-class males' participation in family life greater when (1) their ties with economic organizations give them a proportionately higher income than their fellows; (2) they have an opportunity on the job to associate with others; and (3) they participate in union meetings. The influence of work associates and union participation should appear in marital communication patterns because of the positive effect of interaction on the job and in the union on the man's role-taking ability. The influence of the income factor should have a more generalized effect.

The second set of hypotheses has to do with *involving associations*. The lower-class males' participation in the family should be greater when they (1) attend church, particularly when it is a Protestant church; and (2) have best friends who are married. The latter hypothesis can be specified as to frequency of contacts, number of friends, friendship source, and topics of conversation. Married friends who are seen on a weekly or oftener basis should have a more positive effect on the lower-class male's family participation than married friends seen less often. The more married friends the man sees often the more family activities he should perform. This additive effect should increase the higher the proportion of often-seen married friends who were met in the church or neighborhood. Finally, when the lower-class male talks about his family with married friends whom he met in the church or neighborhood, and whom he sees regularly, participation in the family should be highest²⁰.

The difficulty in testing hypotheses concerning the relationship of community integration and family integration lies in the directionality of the relationships. The hypotheses are all concerned with the effects of community participation on family participation. For this reason it is necessary to take all possible precautions to insure that any relationships uncovered between community and family integration do not result from the man's family involvement rather than from his community associations. As far as it was possible, given the limitations of a cross-sectional research design and limited sample

²⁰ A recent evaluation study of a Harlem neighborhood center program designed to help multi-problem families resulted in recommendations consistent with the rationale of the present research. «Programs that would encourage and enable the AFDC mother to work and to be involved in citizen groups would have, we believe, important consequences for these women's sense of well-being and their performance of their role as mother.» Joan GORDON, *The Poor of Harlem: Social Functioning in the Underclass*, New York: Interdepartmental Neighborhood Service Center, 1965, p. 136.

size, variables were controlled that might obscure the direction of the relationship. Variables not of direct concern in the present study that other investigators have shown to affect lower-class males' participation were also controlled. These controls provided some protection against spurious relationships being accepted as supporting the study's hypotheses.

THE SAMPLE AND RESEARCH DESIGN

The data used to test the hypotheses came from long, primarily structured interviews with lower-class married males. The interviews supplied a wealth of information concerning occupational history and job satisfaction, kinship relations, participation in voluntary organizations, sociability contacts, and fulfillment of nuclear family roles. Interviewers were graduate students in sociology, especially trained for the assignment. The sample consisted of 204 men living in census tracts of Minneapolis, Minnesota. The census tracts were selected on the basis of their comparative rankings on income, education, residential mobility, race, unemployment, and occupation. These rankings indicated that the tracts were lowerclass residential areas²¹.

Respondents were limited to married men who held blue-collar jobs when working and who were living with their wives. Unless the couples had been married five years or less, there also had to be children living at home. An area probability sample of three census tracts undergoing urban renewal resulted in 40 cases. Another six cases were obtained from a random check of the city directory of a

²¹ Four of the five census tracts samples were in the bottom quintiles on median family income and median years of school completed by persons twenty years of age and older. One census tract was in the second quintile on education. Three were in the top quintile on percentage of persons over five years of age not residing in the same residence in 1955 as in 1960. The other two tracts were in the third quintile. Three were in the top quintile in percentage of population which was Negro, one was in the fourth quintile, and one in the bottom quintile. Four were in the top quintile on percentage of total employed who were laborers, service, and household workers, with the remaining tract in the fourth quintile. The latter tract was in the bottom quintile on income, education, and in the top quintile on per cent Negro. Four tracts were in the top quintile on percentage of total civilian labor force unemployed. The fifth tract was in the third quintile. *Profile of Minneapolis Communities: An Inventory of School Characteristics and Social problems in the City of Minneapolis*, Minneapolis: Community Health and Welfare Council of Hennepin County, Inc., 1964.

working-man's suburb. The bulk of the cases came from a random sample of families who fit the respondent criteria obtained using the records of public schools serving the census tracts. The refusal rate was 22 per cent²². When respondents were not-at-home, interviewers made three call-backs and were then assigned another case.

The respondents represented the more stable element among lower-class men. They were living with their families, and in 83 cases owned their own homes. Such a sample was a desirable one for testing the study's hypotheses. If it is possible to find a group of men in the lower class, some of whom actively participate in the community and in their families, they should be present in the sample. The sample, therefore, should provide the variation in community and family integration needed to test the hypotheses. Because of the stable character of the respondents, however, it is necessary to distinguish carefully between lower-class men and working-class men. The latter constitute the «solid» blue-collar class. They hold the prestigious blue collar jobs of craftsmen and foremen where the pay is good and there is job security. They tend to be more integrated into the community and into the family. Controls were used, therefore, to determine whether the hypothesized relationships held among the less advantaged laborers and service workers, as opposed to operatives and a third group of craftsmen and foremen²³.

The study also included an examination of other variables extraneous to the research that might affect the results. Since Komarovsky in her study of blue-collar marital relations had found men under 30 and high school graduates to be more integrated into their families²⁴, the relation of age and education to the dependent variables constituted a preliminary analysis. Neither of these factors nor an additional possible confounding factor, home ownership, appeared to

²² Comparison of the characteristics of non-respondents who were willing to give some background information with those interviewed showed that they were more apt to be laborers. They were also more often white and more often lived in one-family dwellings than did the respondents.

²³ The respondents in the sample possessed many of the characteristics traditionally used as indicators of lower-class socioeconomic status. In educational achievement, 151 of the 204 sample members had completed less than 12 years of schooling. As for occupational level, 77 were laborers or service workers according to the U.S. Census occupational categories. Another 67 were operatives and 22 were unemployed. The remainder were craftsmen or foremen. Forty-nine men were Negroes and 17 others were non-whites of whom the greater number were Indians.

²⁴ KOMAROVSKY, *op. cit.*, *passim*.

be related to the dependent variables. For this reason it was not necessary to control for these factors in testing the hypotheses. Since race as well as type of occupation did appear to be related to the dependent variables, these two factors did serve as control variables.

The hypotheses were tested with the analysis of variance statistical procedure. The two-way analysis of variance with unequal cell frequencies permitted the effects of the hypothesized independent variables on the respondents' family integration to be examined while controlling in turn for the effects of race and occupation.

TEST OF THE ENABLING ASSOCIATION HYPOTHESES

The first group of hypotheses had to do with types of community integration that would serve as *enabling associations* for lower-class males. The central hypothesis here had to do with the positive relation between the income resources a man received because of his economic ties to the community and his participation in the family. The weekly pay each respondent reported receiving when divided according to the number of family members at home to allow for variation in the number of dependents, supplied the income measure²⁵.

The dependent variables were indicators of the husband's participation in his family in several areas. The extent to which the husband talked with his wife about a range of problems served as one

²⁵ The income divisions were as follows: 36 low income families with under \$10 per family member; 108 medium income families, \$10-\$29.99 per family member; and 38 high income families, \$30 and over per family member. In making these divisions, I tried to find theoretically meaningful cutting points that would produce groups with sizable enough numbers that race and occupation could be controlled. I followed the same procedure with the other independent variables. The unemployed men were not included in these analyses to prevent the factor of unemployment from being confounded with the factor of low income. The unemployed serve as a control or comparison group in other analyses. Husbands in the low income group received little financial assistance from working wives. Only 16 of the 73 employed wives were married to low income men. Analyses using income from all sources to determine the income per family member produced no differences in the findings. This was also true when the analyses were run using the husband's weekly income instead of the per family member measure.

communication measure²⁶. Similar data were available concerning the wife's communication with the husband²⁷. There were also several indicators of how much the husband engaged in household²⁸ and

²⁶ The Husband's Communication Index was based on how often each respondent reported talking to his wife about a series of problems. They included the following: feeling depressed; health problems; work problems; money problems; and problems with relatives. His answers were weighted as follows: 0 - never; 1 - seldom; 2 - half the time; 3 - usually; 4 - always. The Index consisted of the result when the summed weights of the problems were divided by the number of problems the respondent reported having.

²⁷ The Wife's Communication Index was much the same as the Husband's Communication Index. It consisted of the husbands' reports on how often their wives talked with them about the same list of problems plus an additional one on problems with children. The items were weighted in the same fashion, and the Index derived similarly.

²⁸ The Household Task Performance Index I consisted of the men's reports as to who did the following tasks: shopped for groceries; took dirty clothes to the coin laundry; took out garbage; prepared supper; borrowed money; disciplined children; paid bills; talked with the landlord or dealt with the mortgage company; did laundry at home; and got up with the children at night. Weighting points were assigned as follows: 0 - wife all the time; 1 - both do the task, but the wife more than the husband; 2 - husband as much as wife; 3 - both do, but the husband more than the wife; 4 - husband all the time. Scores on the Index resulted when the summed weights for the number of tasks the respondent reported he and/or his wife performed were divided by the number of tasks done. The scores ranged from zero through four. The Household Task Performance Index II was partly based on the man's answers as to who paid the family bills and who talked with the landlord or dealt with the mortgage company. Two points were given when husband and wife performed the task together; one point if the husband did the chore most or all of the time; and zero points if the wife performed the task most or all of the time. The men also reported tasks they performed in addition to the ones they were specifically asked about and received an additional one point for each with a limit of three points. The Index also included weights based on how recently the wife has asked for help as reported by the husband. He was given two points if he reported she requested help the day of the interview; one point for a request the week of the interview; and a zero for any other answer. Twenty-six cases were eliminated where neither spouse performed one of the tasks, or it was not applicable to the family. A higher proportion of these men were white, but they did not differ from the rest of the sample in their distribution on total per capita income or occupational level. The Index could range from zero through nine. As with all the family participation indexes, higher scores indicated greater husband participation. The second index, as was true of the second decision-making index, permitted me to make some comparison between my findings and those of Blood and Wolfe, because of the overlap in item content. Robert

child care tasks²⁹. In addition, there were data on the extent to which the husband helped in making a number of decisions required in family living³⁰.

Though none of the differences among the income groups on the dependent variables were significant, on both decision-making participation indicators and on the two household task performance indexes including child care items, the trend of the data was in the direc-

O. BLOOD and Donald M. WOLFE, *Husbands and Wives: The Dynamics of Married Living*, Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1960.

²⁹ The Husband's Household Task Performance Index II in some analyses included an additional weight based on the respondent's answer to an unstructured question concerning the ways in which they helped with the children. For the Household Task Performance Index - Boys, men with sons were given one point if they reported disciplining their sons; two points for any other child care task they reported performing; and three points if they performed two or more child care tasks. Men with sons who performed no child care task, received no points. The same weighting procedure was followed with respondents' answers who had daughters for the Household Task Performance Index - Girls. The scores had a possible range of zero through 12. There were 51 men who did not have sons and 58 men who did not have daughters. These cases accordingly were eliminated from analyses with the respective Indexes. The men who were eliminated were much like the rest of the sample in their distribution on total per capita income and occupational level, but were more often white.

³⁰ The Decision-making Participation Index I consisted of the men's answers as to who made the following decisions: what to do when you go out; what bills to pay; whether to move; whether the wife should work; whether a family member is sick enough to call a doctor; how much to spend on clothing and whether to have children. The items were weighted as follows: 0 - wife all the time; 1 - both decide but the wife most of the time; 2 - both decide but the wife most of the time; 2 - both decide together; 3 - both decide, but the husband most of the time; and 4 - husband all the time. The Index consisted of the result when the weights for each item were summed and divided by the number of decisions made by the man and/or his wife. The scores could range from zero through four. The Husband's Decision-Making Participation Index II consisted of two parts. One part contained the man's reports as to who decided what bills to pay; whether the wife should work; and whether a member of the family was sick enough to call a doctor. Each item received two points when the decisions were made together; one point when the husband most often or always made the decision, and zero points if the wife most often or always made the decision. The Index also included weights based on how recently the husband reported his wife asked him for advice. He received three points if he reported she asked him for advice the day of the interview; two points if he reported she had asked that week; and one point if he reported she requested advice the previous week. The Index could vary between zero and nine.

tion of the hypotheses. Husbands earning more money did make more decisions and were more active in performing household tasks when they included child care responsibilities.

TABLE I
HIGHER INCOME MEN PARTICIPATE
MORE IN THE FAMILY

Income per family member	Family Integration Indicators					N
	Decision Making I	Decision Making II	Household Participation	Task Perform- ance Boys	Task Perform- ance Girls	
Less than \$10.	1.6	4.2	3.7	5.6	5.2	36
\$10. to \$29.99	1.8	4.5	4.1	6.2	6.0	108
\$30 and over	2.0	4.9	4.1	6.6	6.8	38

The effect of the lower-class male's contacts on the job, according to the second hypothesis having to do with *enabling associations*, should appear in marital communication patterns. The verbal give-and-take with work mates, the argument went, enables men to become more adept at communicating with others different from themselves. The job contact categories used to test the hypothesis consisted of men who worked alone and men who said they were in a work group on the job. A third residual category contained the unemployed men who lacked economic ties to the broader community. The F-ratio showed a significant difference among the job contact groups in the number of problems and the frequency with which husbands reported they talked to their wives about problems. There was also a significant difference in the extent to which the men in the various job contact groups said they listened to their wives' problems. The unemployed communicated less, as did their wives, than either of the employed groups whether working alone or with others on the job. The failure of the man to be integrated into the economic community, therefore, seems to have a deleterious effect on marital communication. Contacts on the job, however, contrary to the hypothesis, did not increase marital communication. Instead, the man who

TABLE II
THE UNEMPLOYED ENGAGE IN
LESS MARITAL COMMUNICATION

Work Status	Communication		N
	Husband	Wife	
	X	X	
Unemployed men	1.9*	2.4*	22
Men who work alone	2.7*	3.1*	64
Men who are in a work group	2.5	2.9	118
Total sample	2.5	2.9	204

F-ratio = 5.10, d.f. 2, 198 $P < .01$ F-ratio = 4.66, d.f. 2, 198, $P < .01$

* Significant difference as shown by Scheffe's mean separation procedure.
B. J. WINER, *Statistical Principles in Experimental Design*, New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1962, p. 88.

worked alone talked more to his wife, perhaps because of his lack of opportunities for conversation on the job.

Interestingly enough, men whether unemployed or employed, reported being listeners to their wives' problems more than they reported sharing problems with their wives. Men saw their wives as tending to «usually» talk over their problems, but they more often reported telling their wives their troubles only «half the time». The explanation may be, as Komarovsky found in her semi-structured interview study, that lower-class males consider it unmanly to share their feelings with their women-folk³¹. It may also be the result of differential perception with the men being much more conscious of their wives' complaints than of the times they share their difficulties with their wives.

It was possible to classify the sample into four categories to determine whether union participation did serve as an *enabling association* with regard to marital communication as hypothesized. The categories consisted of employed men who were not union members;

³¹ KOMAROVSKY, *op. cit.*, p. 156.

union members who did not attend the meetings; men who attended some union meetings; and highly active participators in union activities³². Statistical analyses showed no significant differences and no consistent trends among the wives in the marital communication patterns. Among the men the trend of the data were contrary to the hypothesis. The greater the extent of union involvement the less the husband's communication³³. The data, therefore, did not support the hypothesis. Thus the hypothesized positive effects of union participation and marital communication did not appear.

TEST OF THE INVOLVING ASSOCIATION HYPOTHESES

The second set of hypotheses were concerned with the positive effect of *involving associations* on the lower-class male's family integration. The first hypothesis had to do with the man's participation in the formal organization of the church. Because of the overlap in the behavior patterns sanctioned by members of the role-set associated with the man in his position as church goer and his family role-set, the argument went that there would be pressure on the man from his church associates to participate actively in the family. The statistical comparison was among the categories of non-members and three groups of church members or church attenders with the latter men divided into low, medium and high participation groups for the analyses³⁴. The data did not confirm the hypotheses.

³² There were 42 union members who did not attend any meetings. The group of 28 who attended from one-tenth to nine-tenths of the meetings held by their unions composed the middle attendance group with the 27 who were present by their report from 90 per cent to all the time constituting the high union participators. There were 77 non-members who were employed. Unemployed men were not included in the analysis to prevent this factor from confounding the results. The sample is also smaller for this analysis, because of cases where there were missing data. Other analyses are also based on varying number of cases for the same reason.

³³ The arithmetic means on husband's communication were non-members, 2.7; union members, but no participation, 2.6; some union participation, 2.4; and union members with high union participation, 2.3.

³⁴ There were 96 men who neither belonged to nor attended church. The high church attendance group of 47 attended weekly church services at least 90 per cent of the time. (The men reported how often they attended services and we calculated the percentages.) Those 29 men in the medium attendance group attended from a fifth to nine-tenths of the time. The low group 30 men, reported attending church services less than a fifth of the time.

A more sensitive analysis of the data, however, suggested that the hypothesis may merit further examination. Because of the emphasis on fellowship within Protestant churches, the original hypothesis had stated that the positive effect of church participation on family integration should be particularly pronounced for Protestants. To examine this hypothesis, the cases were restricted to men who reported belonging to a church. They were divided into Protestants and Catholics with the 15 Jewish men being eliminated from the analysis because of too few cases. The denominational groups each were then divided into high and low church attendance groups, with the low and medium groups on church attendance categorized together to preserve adequate cell sizes. The analyses produced some support for the original hypothesis. Wives of high church participators did communicate significantly more often with their husbands. There was

TABLE III

ACTIVE CHURCH MEMBERS ARE MORE
INTEGRATED INTO THE FAMILY

Church Participation	Family Integration Indicators				N
	Husbands' Communication	Wives' Communication	Decision Making I	Decision Making II	
	\bar{X}	\bar{X}			
Low Church Attendance	2.4	2.7*	1.9	4.2	40
High Church Attendance	2.5	3.0*	2.0	4.3	32

* F-ratio = 5.10, d.f., 1, 68 $P < .01$

also the same trend in the data for husband's communication patterns though the differences were not significant. High church participators whether Catholics or Protestants were also more active on the decision-making indexes.

The specified hypothesis did not fair so well. Although there was a fairly consistent trend for Protestant husbands to score higher than Catholic husbands, only on the first decision-making index did the

men follow the hypothesized rank order in family participation: (1) Protestant high attendance; (2) Protestant low attendance; (3) Catholic high attendance; (4) and Catholic low attendance³⁵.

Integration into the community through informal, sociability ties provided a second type of *involving association* for lower-class men that was hypothesized to affect their family integration. For these analyses the comparison groups consisted of the men who reported no friends and the men with friends. These latter men were differentiated into high, middle and low groups on the basis of a Friendship Index developed from the rationale concerning friendship ties. The Friendship Index gave heavier weightings to friends who were made in church or in the neighborhood, because of the norms the roles of neighbor or church friend shared with husband-father roles. For the same reason the Index also assigned a plus weighting to friends who were married. The number of friends having these characteristics and the frequency with which they saw the respondent and so could influence him also added to the Index score totals³⁶. The hypothesized

³⁵ The average scores on the Decision-Making I for the denominational attendance groups were as follows: Protestant, high attendance, 2.1 (17); Protestant, low attendance, 2.0 (33); Catholic, high attendance, 1.8 (15); Catholic low attendance, 1.7 (7). The numbers in parentheses represent the cell frequencies. Protestants and Catholics in that order scored as follows: husband's communication - 2.5, 2.3; wife's communication - 2.9, 2.7; decision-making I - 2.0, 1.8; task performance I, 1.6, 1.5; task performance II - 4.7, 4.2; task performance, boys - 6.6, 6.6; task performance girls - 6.8, 6.7; and decision-making II - 4.7, 3.6. The latter scores were significantly different. $F\text{-ratio} = 6.75$, $d.f. 1, 68$ $P < .05$. The 72 men who were church members differed little from the remainder of the sample in race, occupational level and total per capita income.

³⁶ Respondents were asked to give the names of their best friends, where they had originally met the friends and how often they saw them. Up to five names were recorded. The Index summarizing the data on sociability ties as *involving associations* was weighted as follows: four points for each friend met in the neighborhood or church who was seen on a weekly or oftener basis; two points for each friend met in the neighborhood or church who was seen monthly; two points for each married friend seen weekly or daily; one point for each married friend seen monthly. Higher scores indicated more *involving associations*. The Friendship Index could range from zero through 30. The analyses based on the Friendship Index did not include men who had friends they met through their wives or children. Friends made through nuclear family members might indicate the effect of the man's family integration on community integration, rather than the reverse, the concern of the present study. The high group on the Friendship Index consisted of the 53 men with scores of 11 and over. The

positive effect on the man's family integration of married friends seen often who were met in the church or neighborhood appeared only as a trend on household task performance³⁷.

A further specification of the hypothesis stated that friendship ties would be particularly associated with family integration when the man includes wife problems in the communication topics he discusses with friends³⁸. They can then exert negative sanctions or give the support or information hypothesized to encourage the man's family integration. Dividing the men in the high, middle and low friendship association groups into those who did and those who did not discuss their wives with friends produced no consistent trends on the family participation measures. The pressures *involving associations* were hypothesized to bring on the lower-class male to fulfill his family responsibilities therefore, were not strongly supported with respect to friendship ties.

RACE AND OCCUPATION AND FAMILY INTEGRATION

The control factors of race and occupation did not affect the results. One interesting finding, however, was that the Negroes in the sample had on the average the same or higher scores than did the white men on the communication, the decision-making and one of the household participation indicators of family integration. These findings are contrary to most previous work in the area of white-Negro differences in the lower class. Blood and Wolfe, for example, in their Detroit study reported that the Negroes in semi-skilled and unskilled occupations helped out less around the house than did whites in the same occupation. The difference was in the same direction as far as decision-making was concerned at every occupa-

56 men whose scores ranged from 6 to 10 made up the medium group. The scores of the low group, 54 in number, fell below 6. Eighteen men reported no friends.

³⁷ On Household Performance II, the average score of men with no friends was 3.4, (17); men with low involvement on the Friendship Index, 3.6, (48); men with medium involvement, 4.2, (50); men who had high involvement, 4.3, (43). The numbers in parentheses represent the cell frequencies. There was a tie on the first household performance index. The average scores of the four groups in the same order were 1.3; 1.5; 1.6; and 1.6.

³⁸ The interviewers asked the respondents, «Do you talk with your friends about these topics?» The list included politics; religion; sports; wife troubles; in-law troubles; financial troubles; and job difficulties.

tional income and social status level. Negro women also communicated their problems less to their husbands than any white social-status group³⁹. To explain the contrary findings from the present study it might be argued that the Negroes and other non-whites in the sample were concentrated in the craftsmen and foremen occupational group where there is more family integration. This study after all, has shown some relation between income and men's participation in their families, and presumably craftsmen and foremen have more money than laborers and operatives. As one would predict, however, knowing the under-representation of non-whites in skilled occupations, the Negroes did not have as high proportions as whites in either the operative or the craftsmen and foremen groups⁴⁰.

Certainly, the findings concerning the Negroes' family integration lend support to those who see the problem of the lack of family involvement of the Negro husband-father in economic terms. As they have argued⁴¹, Negroes' participation in the family is associated with a stable employment history. Forty of the 49 Negroes had held their present job over a year, and only three were unemployed — a smaller proportion than the 12 per cent who were unemployed among the whites. Thus the importance of the lower-class male's economic ties to the broader community for his family integration is underscored. If he is successful as breadwinner, it appears the Negro then has the self esteem and receives the wifely deference that encourage him to participate in other husband-father roles.

The occupational controls also show the negative effects of the male's lack of integration into the economic community already demonstrated for marital communication in the job contact analysis. On the two decision-making indexes as well as on the first task performance indicator, the unemployed scored low.

It should be emphasized, however, that the findings whether specified according to occupation, race or the indicators of enabling

³⁹ BLOOD and WOLFE, *op. cit.*, pp. 66, 34 and 195.

⁴⁰ Fifteen of the 49 Negroes were operatives as compared with 36 per cent of the whites and 6 of 49 were foremen and craftsmen as compared with 22 per cent of the whites. One fifth — eight of 45 for whom there were data — were earning less than \$80 a week as compared with nine per cent of the whites. Twenty-six per cent of whites and 14 Negroes, a slightly higher proportion, had some education beyond high school.

⁴¹ Transcript of the American Academy Conference on the Negro American, *Daedalus*, 95 (Winter, 1966), pp. 287-325, *passim*.

TABLE V
THE UNEMPLOYED AND UNSKILLED PARTICIPATE
LESS IN THE FAMILY

Occupational Status	<i>Family Integration Indicators*</i>							Task Performance-Boys	Task Performance-Girls
	Husbands' Communication	Wives' Communication	Decision Making I	Decision Making II	Household Participation I	Household Participation II	Household Participation III		
Unemployed	1.9 (22)	2.4 (22)	1.7 (22)	4.1	1.4 (22)	4.0 (19)	5.8 (16)	5.5 (17)	
Service	2.6 (76)	2.9 (76)	1.8 (76)	4.6	1.5 (76)	3.8 (67)	5.6 (57)	5.5 (56)	
Operative	2.4 (66)	3.0 (66)	1.9 (66)	4.3	1.4 (66)	4.2 (56)	6.4 (50)	6.4 (44)	
Foreman	2.6 (38)	2.9 (38)	1.9 (38)	4.9	1.8 (38)	4.1 (34)	6.6 (28)	6.3 (27)	

* Numbers in parentheses represent cell frequencies.

and involving associations do not indicate that the sample is composed of lower-class men who are highly integrated into their families. Even those who are most integrated into their families are more often toward the low than the high end on the various family integration indicators. If, for example, these men do not report that they and their wives both make decisions or perform household tasks, it is the wife rather than the husband who takes the major responsibility.

DISCUSSION

The main question that arises from the research is why the hypothesized relation between lower-class men's community integration and their family integration was not better supported. We have just seen that the unemployed with their lack of economic ties to the community and the unskilled laborers and service workers with their presumably tenuous ties do tend to participate in the family less. The tests of the specific hypotheses concerning both enabling and involving community associations also produced a few trends suggesting the hypotheses deserve further consideration. Higher income did seem to enable the man to participate more in his family. Moreover, Protestants and Catholic church members who attended church often did seem to be more involved in family matters. But the differences are slight, the trends few, and the statistical results not significant.

One obvious explanation for the disappointing results is that the study's rationale is at fault. It sees the lower-class males' family participation as dependent upon their ties to the broader community. The results could be interpreted as demonstrating the relative autonomy of the family. Outside factors may have little influence on what goes on within the family. The boundary-maintenance qualities of the family as a system may be stronger than suspected. Yet this interpretation goes against the evidence from much research that the way individuals function within the family is affected by extra-familial factors. And this stance has direct implications for persons working with the disadvantaged. An indirect strategy of strengthening the man's ties to the community in order to increase his integration into the family, as the present study would argue, has much more chance of success than attempting to handle his isolation from the family directly.

A more likely explanation for the findings appears to lie in the

nature of the sample. It contained men from the stable working-class element of the lower class, men who were well integrated into the economy of the community and who were church and union members. Men at the other extreme, however, men who were in the disadvantage lower-lower class were not so apt to be present. Although 77 of the men were unskilled laborers and service workers, they were not characterized by tenuous economic ties to the community. Seventy-six per cent had held their jobs for at least a year, and 75 per cent were bringing home a weekly pay check that amounted to at least \$ 10 per person. As a result, the sample did not provide a comparison group composed of men only weakly integrated into the community. The distribution of men on extent of community integration, accordingly, was truncated at the critical lower extreme.

In addition, the indicators both of community integration and family integration may have been inadequate. The Friendship Index, for example, that provided the measure of sociability ties as involving associations, summarized information on the number of friends, frequency of contact, place where the friends were met and the marital status of the friends. The Index was based on the rationale from which the hypothesis was derived both in the items it included and their weightings. A less complicated index, however, might have proven more sensitive. The indicators of family integration also may have been too restricted in the areas tapped since there were just three dependent variables — communication, household task performance and decision-making.

Given the sample's limitations and the measurement inadequacies, the positive findings though few in number in conjunction with the additional results consistent with the study's rationale, appear to provide sufficient support for the hypotheses' plausibility to encourage further research. Until then, the hypotheses remain not proven but of enough interest to make the question of their validity a lively research option.

¹ See Kung's paper read at the Ninth Session of the Subcommittee on Research for Chinese Society of the Joint Committee on Contemporary China of the Social Science Research Council and the American Council of Learned Societies, Berkeley, 1964.

² Cf. William F. Godekar and Meyer K. Naumov, *Technology and the Changing Family*, Boston: Houghton, Mifflin Co., 1955, and a more comprehensive treatment of the world family patterns, see William J. Goetz, *World Revolution and Family Patterns*, Free Press of Glencoe, 1962. Other studies have dealt with the impact of social change on the family system in general. Cf. K.-C. Yeh, *The Chinese Family in the Communist Revolution*, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1964.

³ For a good summary and evaluation, see W. J. Goetz, *op. cit.*

ON THE USE OF THE REVEALED DIFFERENCE METHOD
IN FAMILY STUDY AND ITS CROSS-CULTURAL SIGNIFICANCE*

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Recent concern over the impact of socio-economic change on family structure — particularly in terms of inter-generational interactions — is useful in relating achievement motivation, and individualism, to the socialization processes of the child¹. It would be important, therefore, to search for clues to the socialization process in parent-child interaction. For those who prefer macrounit analysis of social change, family change can be used as a concrete index to measure relative change in the social system itself². As technological innovations are affecting every known society, there seem to be indications of a trend toward the emergence of certain types of nuclear family³. Since the points of origin for various societies differ

* The writer is grateful to Fred L. Strodtbeck for his suggestions, to Margaret Parkman, Sidney Jacob and Louis Joseph for many technical improvements of data processing completed on UNIVAC 1107 at the University of Notre Dame; to Larry Hong for his assistance; and to Mary O'Hara Ryan for stylistic improvement of this report.

¹ Cf. Rosen BERNARD, «Family Structure and Achievement Motivation,» *American Sociological Review*, XXVI (1961), 547-585; Glen H. ELDER, *Adolescent Achievement and Mobility Aspirations*, Chapel Hill, North Carolina Institute for Research in Social Science, 1962; Fred L. STRODTBECK, «Family Interactions, Values and Achievement,» in David MCCLELLAND, *et al.*, *Talent and Society*, 1958, New York: Van Nostrand, 135-194; and William T. LIU, «Family Interactions and Values: A Study of Refugee and Non-Refugee Families in Hong Kong,» (Paper read at the Ninth Seminar of the Subcommittee on Research on Chinese Society of the Joint Committee on Contemporary China of the Social Science Research Council and the American Council of Learned Societies, Bermuda, 1964).

² Cf. William F. OGBURN and Meyer F. NIMKOFF, *Technology and the Changing Family*, Boston: Houghton, Mifflin Co., 1955; and a more comprehensive treatment of the world family patterns, see William J. GOODE, *World Revolution and Family Patterns*, Free Press of Glencoe, 1963. Other studies have dealt with the impact of social change on the family system in general, Cf. K. C. YANG, *The Chinese Family in the Communist Revolution*, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1958.

³ For a good summary and evaluation, see W. J. Good, *op. cit.*

greatly, the exact pattern of change varies from one society to another. Hence while it is most fruitful to begin a systematic comparison of family systems, it is also difficult to find common bases for making such comparisons.

The dimensions of the methodological problems may be suggested by the fact that family, being a universal human institution, has always been the convergence point of research interests in a number of scientific disciplines, each having its own theoretical framework and set of accompanying research tools. These conceptual variations have been the basis for varied approaches in the study of family system as suggested by Professor R. Hill⁴. Related to the problem of perspective is the problem of the methodological preferences exhibited by investigators. Social anthropologists have long been doing comparative studies; their method is that of verbal description and analysis, involving two or more cultures⁵. Beyond a small number of comparative descriptions, however, verbal analysis becomes unwieldy, and a statistical approach would be more appropriate⁶. Whether verbal or statistical description is used, the essential task here is to present a set of rich material from which some variables can be abstracted for a deeper analytical comparison. The case of the functional-structural school would be a prime example⁷.

There is yet another sense in which the matter of intra or intercultural comparisons assumes importance, particularly at this stage in the development of our methodological techniques. Many who utilize quantitative, aggregate data in cross-national comparisons often conveniently ignore the question of the reliability and comparability of the data. It is undeniable that the efficiency and accuracy of the data gathering agencies in transitional societies vary greatly, with obvious implications for the reliability of the end-product. But of

⁴ Reuben HILL, «Review of Current Research on Marriage and the Family,» *American Sociological Review*, 16 (October, 1951), 694-701; also Reuben HILL and Donald A. HANSEN, «The Identification of Conceptual Framework Utilized in Family Study,» *Marriage and Family Living*,²² (November, 1960), 299-311.

⁵ For paired comparisons, see Margaret MEAD's *Coming of Age in Samoa*, New York: William Morrow, 1928; for more than two cultures, see Ruth BENEDICT, *Patterns of Culture*, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1934.

⁶ Cf. George P. MURDOCK, *Social Structure*, New York: McMillan, 1949.

⁷ Cf. Marion J. LEVY, *Family Revolution in Modern China*, New York: Octagon Books, Inc.; also see M. F. NIMKOFF, «On the Functional-Structural Approach to Family Studies,» (Paper read at the Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association, Chicago: Edgewater Beach Hotel, 1965).

even greater theoretical importance is the matter of actual comparability of seemingly equivalent types of data drawn from different national sources. The categories under which data are gathered, and the definitions and concepts which underlie them sometimes vary considerably from country to country with respect to seemingly similar phenomena, and at times even vary within countries between different time periods. For example, both Italian and Japanese families have been assumed to be authoritarian and patriarchal, but the style of being authoritarian in one case may be characterized by harsh treatment of the son on the part of the father; in another case by permissive loving care. The effect of patriarchal and patrilocal as classifications of family types may not always be completely satisfactory without extensive verbal descriptions of family interactions.

The delineation of concepts and the selection of appropriate indices as indicants of such concepts are not new problems in empirical research. However, as research develops over the years, students begin to discover many facets of a single problem — a necessary condition for later scholars to re-conceptualize the problem and to prepare more sensitive instruments for getting at the information desired. Less than a century ago LePlay was interested in the well-being of worker's families as a reflection of the well-being of the society. «Everywhere», he says, «happiness consists in the satisfaction of two principal needs which are absolutely imposed by the very nature of man». He chose «the practice of moral law and enjoyment of one's daily bread» as the basic needs of every man. When translating the conceptual model into actual research operations, LePlay used three sets of observable data as indicants of family well-being; the job characteristics of the workingmen, family property, and the environmental factors of the family as a functioning unit⁸. Over the years since LePlay's monumental work, numerous aspects of the family and its functions have been investigated, many dealing with the same kinds of problems. Because of new discoveries made in psychology, psychiatry, and social psychology, family well being has been studied from entirely different perspectives. First, the sharpening of psychological concepts has made the study of happiness possible, directly⁹. Secondly, students of small group research develop-

⁸ Frederic LE PLAY, *Les Ouvriers Européens*, Paris: Alfred Mame et Fils, 1879, I.

⁹ For example, Locke and Korlsson compared an American group and a Swedish group of marriages as to happiness and stability, using the same measures of marital happiness. See Harvey J. LOCKE and Georg KARLSSON,

ed a new set of research tools, enabling the investigator, among other findings, to uncover a new set of analytical variables which transcend the socio-demographic characteristics of the family¹⁰. Thirdly, techniques of computer technology now available for social science research are capable of combining several factors into composite indicants, and analysis of the interrelationship of several variables may reveal facts about family processes never before obtainable. Fourthly, quantitative analysis creates needs for objective coding of family behavior which in turn make inter- as well as intra-cultural comparisons possible¹¹. For the remainder of this paper, attention will be centered on the Revealed Difference Method as one such attempt.

Bales' Interactional Process Analysis and the Revealed Difference Method

Bales' *Interaction Process Analysis* was developed first as a device to record dyadic interaction in small groups. The problem of standardizing observations made by investigators in widely different groups under different conditions had to be solved not only in terms of the frequency of interaction, but also of the *quality* and *style* of such interactions. The instrument as it was developed is based on several basic assumptions about social interactions. First, there are certain conditions not only present to an important degree in special kinds of problems, but more or less *inherent* in the nature of the process of interaction or communication itself. Secondly, it was assumed that certain *communication* problems which are common to all small group processes can be exhaustively *classified into* the problem of *orientation*, of *evaluation*, and of *control*. Thirdly, as people try to handle differences of opinion with regard to a certain issue,

«Marital Adjustment and Prediction in Sweden and the United States,» *American Sociological Review*, 17 (February, 1952), 10-17.

¹⁰ For instance, husband-wife communication as studied by Reuben HILL, Joseph STRYOS, and Kurt BACK, *Family Control and Fertility*, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1959; the role pattern study by Elizabeth BORT, *Family and Social Network*, London: Tavistock, 1957, and power relationships by Fred L. STRODTBECK, *op. cit.*

¹¹ My own work of comparing Chinese families, Hong Kong families, and Yucatan's Mexican middle class families; Glen Elder's cross national comparison on family structure is limited by the type of data with which he dealt were not entirely comparable. It is, therefore, clear that some sort of objective coding of family behavior is necessary.

the 'overt' focus of their activity tends to 'circulate' among members, to 'oscillate' from one problem to another and to converge toward some satisfactory solutions. As the process of *making a decision* goes on, the inherent nature of the small group, its model methods of solving problems among its members, reveals tensions and defines the characteristic ways for members to *manage* such *tensions*. Thus the interaction tends to go through a series of 'phases' resulting, toward the end of collective problem solving, in a final stage of integration. Finally, there exist uniformities of 'profile' of *acts* of various kinds which tend to balance each other, and different members of the group tend to form a balance type of give and take interaction¹².

Based on these assumptions, Bales and his associates devised an exhaustive classification system of human interactions, as shown in Table 1.

Initially, the Interaction Process Analysis (to be referred to throughout the text as IPA) had been used in the Laboratory of Social Relations at Harvard. A special room was designed in which groups could meet and be observed through one-way mirrors. The experimenter then observed the group during problem solving sessions and categorized the members' behavior as it occurred, act by act. The data were analyzed later to obtain summary measures descriptive of the group process, from which inferences could then be made as to the nature of underlying factors influencing the process.

Unlike many other coding systems, Bales' system codes an act as either *instrumental* or *expressive* rather than as having both cognitive and affective dimensions. Its original purpose, during the laboratory stage, was to describe the profile and phases of group process — a feed back to the underlying assumptions made about small group interactions. To use the technique for meaningful analysis of actual human groups and the socialization process, Strodtbeck developed a procedure, based primarily on the assumptions of the IPA coding system, which could be applied to husband-wife interaction, particularly with regard to *differential power* assumed by either the husband or the wife¹³. When this was then, at a later date, applied to the husband-wife-child three person group, the relative power of the parents and the subsequent personality development

¹² Robert F. BALES, *Interaction Process Analysis: A Method of the Study of Small Groups*, Cambridge, Mass., Addison-Wesley, 1950.

¹³ Fred L. STRODTBECK, «Husband-Wife Interaction over Revealed Differences», *American Sociological Review*, 16 (1951), 468-473.

TABLE 1.

Set of Categories Used for Direct Observations of Interaction Process

1 SHOWS SOLIDARITY, raises other's status, gives help, reward:
2 SHOWS TENSION RELEASE, jokes, laugs, shows satisfaction:
3 AGREES, shows passive acceptance understands, concurs, complies:
4 GIVES SUGGESTION, direction implying autonomy for other:
5 GIVES OPINION, evaluation, analysis, expresses feeling, wish:
6 GIVES ORIENTATION, information, repeats, clarifies, confirms:
7 ASKS FOR ORIENTATION, information, repetition, confirmation:
8 ASKS FOR OPINION, evaluation, analysis, expression of feeling:
9 ASKS FOR SUGGESTION, direction, possible ways of action:
10 DISAGREES, shows passive rejection, formality, withholds help:
11 SHOWS TENSION, asks for help, withdraws «Out of Field»:
12 SHOWS ANTAGONISM, deflates other's status, defends or asserts self:

of the child were seen to be related¹⁴. The technique, because of its origin in discussions over differences elicited prior to group discussions, was generally called the Revealed Difference Method (henceforth it will be labeled the RD method).

¹⁴ Fred L. STRODTBECK, «Family Interactions, Values, and Achievement», in David C. McCLELLAND, *et al.*, *Talent and Society*, New Jersey, Van Nostrand, 1958, pp. 135-194.

The method can be briefly describes as follows: the investigator gives members of the group identical questionnaires consisting of a number of hypothetical situations all of which require alternative solutions. Each member in the family works independently of the others. When the appropriate solutions are chosen, the three sets of questionnaires are compared. Nine items are then chosen according to the following pattern of coalitions:

- 3 father mother agree, child disagrees
- 3 father son agree, mother disagrees
- 3 mother son agree, father disagrees

The investigator then prefaces each discussion by saying something like this: «As you would expect, there are some questions on which you don't all agree. What I want you to do is to discuss these questions, one at a time, and see whether you can arrive at a unanimous decision about them». Each time the family indicated that it was finished with a discussion, the next story was brought in.

The entire discussion session, then is analyzed by using IPA scores. The outcome of decisions for each family is used to determine the power score of each individual assumed or delegated by others. In subsequent studies, Strodtbeck and his associates combined the socio-emotional factors into one area and compared it with the total acts inter-changed as an index of positive or negative support from one member to another¹⁵. Thus, the entire analysis yields two important variables in family interaction analysis: *Power* and *Affectivity*.

Several other studies have used the RD method; their results showed promise in distinguishing the family processes¹⁶. There were also some serious objections, particularly among those who favored macro-unit analysis of family behavior. Vidich, for example, replicated the RD procedure among a number of families in upstate New York and reported disheartening failure in using laboratory simulated situations for studying husband-wife interaction. Using a slightly different procedure, Vidich reported that a large number of couples failed to take part in the experiment. For those who did participate,

¹⁵ Fred L. STRODTBECK, «Structural Characteristics of Family Interaction in High I.G. Families,» (Paper read at the Annual Meeting of the American Psychological Association,» Philadelphia, 1963).

¹⁶ Cf. Margaret PARKMAN, «Identity, Role, and Family Functioning». (Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of Chicago, 1965); Glenn HUTCHINSON, «Family Interactions among Delinquents», (Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis Proposal, University of Chicago, 1964).

there seemed to be some evidence that the induced nature of the interactions was not satisfactory in telling the whole range of the customary ways in which the husband and the wife talk to each other. In addition, Vidich raised serious questions as to the comparability of private versus public demonstration of conjugal communication¹⁷. While it might be possible that some methodological defects can be detected from reading the published protocols of Vidich's study, the shortcomings of the use of the laboratory method to enhance objectivity at the expense of a whole array of rich descriptive material deserves some attention. When this objection is raised in evaluating cross-cultural studies of family processes, additional questions emerge: can power scores be computed on the basis of decision won alone? Do people of other cultures use verbal deliberations in settling differences as do people in American society? If verbal skills are not important in resolving differences of opinion, would the attention of family members turn both to the strains created in socio-emotional relations and to the solution of the problems? All of these questions place additional burdens on the investigator to prove the validity of Bales' original assumption regarding the group processes which are common to *all* small group behavior.

The Honk Kong Chinese Family

As a way to test the cross-cultural validity of the RD method, the writer collected data among 18 Chinese families in Hong Kong in 1962. The eighteen families are divided equally between those who were born in Hong Kong (labeled later in the text as Hong Kong local) and those who were born in mainland China but came to Hong Kong as refugees from the Communist regime about 10 years prior to the field work (henceforth labeled as Hong Kong refugees). At about the same time twenty families were selected for an experimental study in Chicago to test the hypothesis that family process is related to the cognitive development of the child¹⁸. Hence, in addition to the original data which Strodtbeck collected in New Haven

¹⁷ Arthur J. VIDICH, «Methodological Problems in the Observation of Husband-Wife Interaction,» *Marriage and the Family*, 18 (August, 1956), 234-239.

¹⁸ Fred L. STRODTBECK, «Structural Characteristics of Family Interaction in High I.Q. Families,» *op. cit.*

among the Italian and Jewish families¹⁹, the two sets of data obtained in 1962 are somewhat comparable in that the procedure and instrument are similar. Variations in results may indicate the cross-cultural variation of family behavior and/or variations resulting from the instrument itself.

While it is generally assumed that the classic Chinese family was characterized by patriarchal dominance, collateral cohesiveness, and parent-child inter-dependance²⁰, incipient changes in family structure took place long before the establishment of the Chinese Communist regime. Ideological revolution with regard to family relations was particularly significant during the May Fourth Movement²¹, but full scale change in actual family structure did not begin until later, largely aided by the social disruption caused by the war against Japan and the political changes of 1949. Changes in *ad hoc* role relationships were probably greater in scope than, and antecedent to, changes in the cultural ideals of sex determinants of authority and obedience. The differential patterns of what one would describe as the prototype and the apparent actual variations in such a prototype may reveal certain structural characteristics of family interactional patterns.

Variations may be caused by several factors. First, because of the accepted double standard of morality, mother-child relations appear considerably more important than was generally assumed due to the customary and continuous absence of the father in the male dominated adult world. The practical demands of breadwinning make it unnecessary to rationalize the isolation of family members from the adult male. The situation demands a relationship of greater emotional interdependence between the mother and the child. Furthermore, as adequate living space is generally absent among the majority of the middle and even upper middle class families in Hong Kong, there is a tendency for most social and business activities to be carried on outside the home. The absence of an adequate locus of family interaction gives little opportunity for members of the family to share the process of decision-making. Consequently, it would be logical to assume that the level of positive affectivity between parents is low. While there is sometimes little overt conflict, extensive

¹⁹ Fred L. STRODTBECK, in David McCLELLAND, *op. cit.*

²⁰ Cf. K. C. YANG, *op. cit.*, Marion J. LEVY, *op. cit.*, and Olga LANG, *Chinese Family and Society*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1946.

²¹ Chow TSE-TUNG, *The May Fourth Movement*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960.

use is made of various practical means to maintain control while avoiding direct inter-personal confrontation²².

Secondly, since the demands for new skills and new values in an urbanized society differ essentially from those of the old rural and more stabilized community, a discontinuity of generational identification results. This may take various forms, from the lack of a high degree of consensus of family values to sporadic inefficient communication among members of the family. Estrangement provides a rationale for legitimating disinterest in family decision-making. While overt parental obedience may still prevail — particularly with the presence of non-family members — deviation from the ideal norm may be silently accepted as a face-saving device. Thirdly, there is the interpersonal process which, due to the lack of a set of more stabilized norms with regard to family role differentiation in a time of rapid social change, may bring about a segmentary rather than a coherent pattern of interpersonal exchange of emotions and orientations. It results in a mixture of emotion-ridden and power-displaying behavior on the part of the father, expressive yet indifferent orientation on the part of the mother; complemented by evasive and compliant responses on the part of the child. The actual balance of submissiveness and hostility, of positive support and negative rejections may, in a sense, provide variations of the interactional framework in the Chinese family in Hong Kong which are unobservable, even by a skilled investigator.

It is against the background described above that the test of RD method was administered among the eighteen families. Without previous norms on Chinese families regarding profiles of relative powers assumed by, or delegated to, the father, the assumption was that power, measured by either the decision won or by relative participation, would be greater for the father than either the mother or the son. On the other hand, the father's power on the average would be greater in Chinese families than in Chicago's American middle class families. Secondly, it was assumed that positive support of the son by the father would also be higher than any other paired relationships. The relative comparison of father-son positive supports between Hong Kong's Chinese families and American Chicago families had not been predicted. The *a priori* assumption was that the Chicago sample would manifest a higher mutually supportive index between the father and the son as a typical middle class American nuclear

²² William T. Liu, *op. cit.*

family. At the same time, it would have been as valid to assume that the Chinese family is characteristically *patriarchal* and *asymmetrically supportive*.

Among the Hong Kong Chinese families, it was also assumed that differences existed between the Hong Kong Local and Hong Kong Refugee samples. Changes in the traditional pattern of dominance and submission usually reflect the challenge of power. In the traditional and stable family, there is a greater tendency for the wife to subordinate herself to her husband, accept negative criticisms and constantly be deflated in her ego-pride, to acquiesce in taking verbal directions, and to undertake menial and tedious chores. The fact that her adult role is one of subservience to her spouse, and of finding contentment and itself validation in domesticity would result in greater solidarity with her children, whereas submissiveness to her husband would be functionally necessary for maintaining family solidarity. All this is said about the difference between the traditional and the changing families. The problem then, was to decide which sample — refugee or the local Chinese families — resembles the traditional family, which the changing family? The refugee group, having been uprooted through migration, may have changed some of its stable characteristics. On the other hand, the local group having been exposed to English culture in the Crown Colony, had adapted to the urban economy. The same could be said about the traditional features of each group. The refugee family, for example, may have further strengthened its bond as a result of the migration experience in order to survive in the host community. The uprooting experience might in fact have enhanced the internal cohesion of the group. The local family, because of its continuity in residence, may also have continued the original pattern of family processes with little or no alteration. Under the circumstances, it was felt that the RD procedure might reveal the peculiar pattern displayed by each sample.

Comparison of the three groups, first by using the average decision score by discussion²³, then by relative participation²⁴, is shown in Tables 2 and 3.

²³ The technique is mentioned elsewhere, see F. L. STRODTBECK, «A Summary of Current Work on Family Interaction Studies Using Revealed Differences,» *The Social Psychology Laboratory Working Paper 31*, University of Chicago, 1964.

²⁴ It has been established that decisions won by any individual and his relative participation in the discussion are positively correlated. See William T. Liu, *op. cit.* For a more pointed discussion, see Frances G. Scott,

TABLE 2.
Relative Power Distribution Among
Chicago and Hong Kong Families

Power Scores	Chicago Sample N = 5	H. K. Local N = 9	H. K. Refugee N = 9
Father	14.4	18.4	18.0
Mother	13.0	11.4	10.5
Son	12.6	10.2	11.5
TOTAL SCORES	40.0	40.0	40.0

TABLE 3.
Relative Arc Sin Participations Among
Chicago and Hong Kong Families

Power Scores	Chicago Sample N = 5	H. K. Local N = 9	H. K. Refugee N = 9
Father	39.6	48.1	44.2
Mother	27.6	29.1	21.9
Son	32.8	22.8	37.8

In order to feed the data back to the various questions asked about the cross-cultural validity of the RD method, two evaluations are used: the cross comparison of decisions won with the relative rate of participation of the individual in the group²⁵. Tables 2 and 3 showed rather consistent patterns in Hong Kong sample and the Chicago sample. It is clear, then, that decisions won may be as good a measure of relative power delegated to the individual in the United States as it is in Hong Kong. The second question, concerning the use of verbal deliberations in settling individual differences, is not one to which a simple answer can be found. Verbal skills are developed

«Family Group Structure and Patterns of Social Interaction,» *American Journal of Sociology*, 68 (1962), p. 214.

²⁵ Arc Sign transformation has been performed on the Hong Kong data for relative participations. For the Chicago data, comparable procedures have not been performed for this presentation.

only in an environment where equal exchange, by members of different status, of orientations and evaluations is permitted. Hence small group discussions which embody the «phases» of forming consensus after differences are revealed would be highly, if not entirely, contingent upon the basic structure of the group as a whole. Assuming that the Chinese family is less democratic, resolving differences would rely less upon deliberations and the use of verbal skills, more on the use of emotions and negative psychological controls. The resultant pattern of discussion would reveal a pattern deviating from the usual profile given by the «phases» hypothesis²⁶. The following Table confirmed this expectation.

TABLE 4.
Phases in Verbal Communication in Resolving
Family Disagreement in H.K.'s Local & Refugees
Families as Compared to Predictions

Bales Categories	Predicted Patterns	LOCAL			chk w/	REFUGEES			chk w ^o
		1st	2nd	3rd		1st	2nd	3rd	
Shows solidarity	Lo-Me-Hi	25	34	43	Yes	38	18	44	? ^o
" Tens. Relse	Lo-Me-Hi	9	39	52	Yes	26	21	53	?
Agrees	Lo-Me-Hi	26	28	46	Yes	32	25	43	?
Gives Suggestions	Lo-Me-Hi	45	32	23	Reversed	48	21	31	?
Asks for Suggestions	Lo-Me-Hi	60	40	40	Reversed	33	67	0	?
Gives Opinions	Lo-Hi-Me	31	34	35	n.s.*	36	23	31	Reversed
Asks for Opinions	Lo-Hi-Me	33	31	36	n.s.	30	33	37	?
Gives Orientations	Hi-Me-Lo	34	34	32	n.s.	33	37	30	?
Asks for Orientations	Hi-Me-Lo	33	40	27	?	36	28	36	?
Disagrees	Lo-Me-Hi	28	31	39	Yes	27	46	27	?
Shows Tensions	Lo-Me-Hi	48	31	19	Reversed	28	44	28	?
Shows Antagonism	Lo-Me-Hi	28	38	34	?	10	40	50	Yes

^o indicated irregularities

* not significant

²⁶ Cf. Robert F. BALES and Fred L. STRODTBECK, «Phases in Group Problem Solving,» *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1951, 485-495.

The failure of the Hong Kong data to support the phases hypothesis may not be satisfactory in either confirming or rejecting the validity of the RD method. In this regard, it does, however, lend evidence to the effect that verbal deliberation in resolving problems may not work the same way in Hong Kong as it does in the United States where verbal skills are important as a criterion of interpersonal competence. At any rate, the relative gains obtained in using the RD method are encouraging.

Tables 2 and 3 further suggest that while the difference between the two Hong Kong samples with regard to the father's power is nil, the differences in mother and the son relationships are significant between both groups. In the case of the local group, mother's power is in between that of her son and her husband; whereas in the refugee group the son who commands more power than his mother. While the Chicago sample shows relatively balanced power among all three persons, by contrast the Chinese family — combining both the local and the refugee groups — shows a power imbalance in favor of the male head of the nuclear group. The pattern thus far presented by the use of the RD method may be worth noting.

With regard to the socio-emotional atmosphere of the family, a series of dyadic relationships within all three groups are shown in Table 5.

TABLE 5.

Socio-Emotional Relationships Among Chicago Middle Class Families and the Hong Kong Samples

Groups	Fa-Mo		Fa-Son		Mo-Fa		Mo-Son		Son-Fa		Son-Mo	
	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-
HK Refugee	26	70	23	30	20	24	17	22	28	23	37	53
HK Local	36	44	46	65	31	36	33	64	14	24	24	49
Chicago	39	39	34	39	47	38	41	41	42	43	41	42

The table shows that the H. K. refugees are characterized by low positive support from the father to the mother, complemented by a higher positive support from the son to both of his parents. Negative criticism, however, focuses on the mother from both her husband and her son. Among the local families in Hong Kong, the son was

put in his place by both parents. This was accompanied by high negativism from the son to his mother. The Chicago middle class displayed amazingly equal mutuality among all dyadic relationships.

A number of conjectures can be made from the preliminary data thus far analyzed. The precise relationships among members in the Hong Kong sample would have to be scrutinized by studying each family individually. What seems to be clear is the fact that qualitative change in family processes takes place usually within the interaction pattern of minor members of the family. The authority of the male head is the last to crumble.

Relevant to the interpersonal process in family relations is the fact that there was a clear lack of affective reciprocity among Hong Kong's Chinese families. Perhaps observations made at any time during the process of family change may not be sufficient for knowledgeable speculation on the eventual maturity of the unit in group process which would lead to a more balanced mutuality toward the final stage of integration, as suggested by Bales. Moreover, the study showed a distinctive pattern in the family's socio-emotional atmosphere. In contrast to the middle class American family, there seemed to be a conspicuous lack of positive support among the members, indicated by their disproportionately negative criticisms of one another. This finding concurred with some macro-anthropological observations on the Chinese family. Wolf, in her investigation of child behavior among Hokkien villagers in Taiwan, reported that generally the mother neither praises nor expresses affection toward older children because affective response is thought to weaken interpersonal control²⁷. Wolf's findings have been further confirmed by Ward who reported that parent-child relations among villagers in the New Territory of Hong Kong was characterized by low-affectivity²⁸. Hence, affectivity in the present Chinese cultural setting may be thought of as being functional in both stabilizing power relations within the family and in defining status along sex and age divisions.

²⁷ Margery WOLF, «Child Training in a Hokkien Village», Paper read at the Ninth Seminar on Chinese Society. The Joint Committee on Contemporary China of the Social Science Research Council and the American Council of Learned Societies, Bermuda, 1964.

²⁸ Barbara E. WARD, «Temper Tantrums in Kau Sai», Paper read at the Ninth Seminar on Chinese Society, The Joint Committee on Contemporary China of the Social Science Research Council of Learned Societies, Bermuda, 1964.

Advancement of Index Construction in Family Studies by Using the RD Method

The cross-cultural experience of using the RD method to study family processes is both promising and frustrating. It is promising because the RD method is relatively easy to administer, although it is difficult and tedious to code the resultant protocols. It is a method which enables the investigator to obtain a set of objective data without necessarily having to learn the cultural baseline of family behavior. But a good deal of rich material must be obtained through the traditional ethnographic method of description and analysis. When the RD method is used together with a sample survey operation, the relative pay-off is somewhat more satisfactory. The RD method is capable of eliciting data for precise comparison of the microdetails of interpersonal behavior, but additional work must be done to combine single variables for a multi-variate analysis of family types.

Several attempts have been made to get more mileage from the IPA analysis of family processes. The first was the attempt to combine IPA procedures with panel judgement sessions by experts who are generally familiar with the cultural baseline of the families studied. Strodtbeck used both methods and added interpersonal *semantic differential ratings* which yielded a total of 55 attributes of family variables. These variables were then factor analyzed to produce eight orthogonal measures²⁹. The enormous complexities of these procedures, even with good results, make them impractical relative to their pay-offs. Strodtbeck's second approach is to use only the IPA classifications for intensive analysis of the act-to-act structures for each family and for a number of families. A total of six measures then is produced. The six measures are: equality of participation; category usage for each member; socio-emotional support rates; phase patterning; act by act sequence analysis; and length of bursts of continuous speech³⁰. With the aid of computer technology, a

²⁹ Cf. F. L. STRODTBECK, «A Summary of Current Work on Family Interaction Studies Using Revealed Differences,» *op. cit.* The eight measures are: Warmth, Health and Positive Personal Evaluations; Mother's Assurance and Conviction; Child's Assurance and Conviction; Mother's Socio-Emotional Specialization (Contra Father); Child Socio-Emotional Specialization; Father's Self-Assurance and Masculinity; Mother's Power (Contra Father) and Child's Power (Contra Parents).

³⁰ See Margaret PARKMAN, «The Interactional Process Analyzer,» (Social Psychology Laboratory Working Paper #33), University of Chicago, 1965.

large number of family protocols with up to five person-interactions can be analyzed at an unprecedented speed³¹. Since such measures are fundamental in all human interactions in small groups, data other than family studies can also be similarly analyzed.

With finer precision in measuring specific components of family interactions, construction of family types is also capable, or between a greater comparability in one culture through time, or between two cultures. Since every act theoretically elicits another act in the process of interaction, it is possible to arrange the data into a matrix showing the pattern of support between any two persons. The rates of total support output (how much support was given by a member to all other members) and intake (how much support was received by a member from all other members) were computed for each family member. It was then possible to quantify the precise relationships between any two members or between one member and the rest of the family.

The co-efficiency of mutual affective support for the Chicago sample, for instance, is shown in Table 6.

TABLE 6.
Affective Exchange Pattern, Chicago Sample *

		b	c	d	e	Mo-Fa f
Fa-Son	a	83	74	76	93	82
Son-Fa	b		63	78	81	68
Mo-Son	c			81	79	90
Son-Mo	d				74	81
Fa-Mo	e					90

* Chicago Sample includes boys and girls here.

In contrast, the Hong Kong sample reflected a greater gap in mutual affective support, as shown in Table 7.

³¹ The program was developed by Sidney Jacob of the University of Chicago and by Louis Joseph for the use on UNIVAC 1107, University of Notre Dame.


TABLE 7.

Affective Exchange Pattern, H.K. Samples **

		b	c	d	e	Mo-Fa
Fa-Son	a	43	41	23	35	64
Son-Fa	b		24	51	47	42
Mo-Son	c			56	46	51
Son-Mo	d				44	46
Fa-Mo	e					58

** Combined refugee and local families.

Combining the co-efficiency of affective support with the power score of each member, the locus of the family in a two dimensional space may be obtained. Changes that take place over a period of time may reveal the qualitative changes in family relationships. Differences of culturally determined relationships may also be discerned. Theoretically, the «norm» of a nuclear family for any culture can be compared through time. The following graph may be suggested.



When such comparisons are systematically repeated between every two members of the family, thus obtaining a series of affective co-efficiencies, one older person — the paternal grandfather or maternal grandmother — could be included. This would yield additional information on the precise social role such a person plays in nuclear

family decision-making. With the same method, an inclusion of the eldest son and the youngest son may also enable the investigator to obtain information on the significance of birth order for the relative family status structure³².

From the viewpoint of family research, protocols obtained by means of *revealed difference* discussions may potentially be a powerful aid to delineate family types apart from the traditional classifications. As now used by family analysts, the term «nuclear family» is technically an *ideal* type; it is a theoretical construction in which several crucial variables have been combined to form a hypothetical structural harmony in the same way Weber conceptualized the «Protestant Ethic». Nuclear family essentially is a series of interpersonal relationships which may be viewed as a number of reciprocally adjusted habitual responses, binding a number of participant individuals collectively to one another. The basic difference between a nuclear family and an extended family system that in the case of the latter type, members of the consanguineous kinship group perform institutionalized roles relative to one another by virtue of their biological or legal bonds. In the nuclear family system, kinship relatives would tend to be socially ambiguous particularly with regard to decision-making processes which only concern members of the nuclear unit. Since the larger kinship group can no longer perform a crucial role in sustaining emotional affinity with the nuclear family members and since marriage is based primarily on mutual attraction, the conjugal unit is the main focus where the affective input-output balance of the husband and wife is maintained. The emotional relationships are likely to be intense. To extend this reasoning further, it is also true that since the only kin commonly recognized by both the husband and wife is their offspring, the latter would be regarded somewhat *differently* than either the parents of the wife or parents of the husband. Authority extended to the offspring, herefore, would also be somewhat more important than authority extended to either wife or husband by their respective parents. Use of the RD method, then, can distinguish more precisely the degree of affectivity as well as the weight of authority displayed among members of the nuclear unit *vis-à-vis* the interactional patterns of kinship members as a whole.

³² An attempt, by using slightly different procedures, has been made by Frances G. Scott, *op. cit.*

Conclusion.

In order to achieve a higher degree of precision in comparative study of family behavior, the use of objective coding of family processes seems to be necessary for two obvious reasons: (1) when observation is made on the family composition and family relationships at any point of the entire process of social change in a society, the family more often than not resembles neither the prototype of the extended family nor the prototype of the nuclear family; and (2) that quantitative changes discernible about family behavior such as birth rates, occupational mobility and intergenerational change of marriage age and the like, usually come long after qualitative changes which have already taken place for some time. Furthermore, survey methods often times employed in cross-cultural work resulted not only in the relative non-comparability of terms and concepts due to linguistic and cultural differences, but also in the basic problem of isolating interviewer-respondent interactional effect³³. By using a more basic unit of analysis, it would be possible to combine various dimensions of the interaction data for comparisons on a quantitative basis.

Our effort in comparing data collected in Hong Kong with data collected in the United States was aimed at a progressive evolution in refining the technique itself rather than at obtaining definitive and accurate descriptions of any particular family type. However, during the course of improving the instrument we discover additional theoretical questions concerning the nature of change in nuclear families, particularly when characteristic modes of family interaction, of making decisions, and of verbal deliberations on issues are related to the motivations and personality development of its members.

Returning back to the broad concern which the writer stated in the beginning of the paper, the use of RD method is only the beginning of using objective coding to quantify micro-ethnographic material. If the combination of small group technique and cross-cultural survey material are used together, the impact of family structure and family processes on the next generation of adults can be better understood, a viable theory on the «human factors» of socio-economic change may be possible. Above all, political processes and economic decision-making are all special aspects of small group behavior. Participations

³³ See William T. Liu, «Progress Report I, Hong Kong Adolescent Study,» 1962 (unpublished).

of political and economic lives require, more often than not, a person to relive his familial experiences.

On the level of social change, one may even raise many additional theoretical questions concerning the basic pattern of family interactions and how they may be used as indicants to measure the subtle, often times invisible, change of the basic interpersonal relationships in a changing society. This seems to be a classic problem dating back to Simmel, Durkheim, Tonnies, and many others. The present writer, for example, is looking into the pattern of family processes when the husband and the wife play segregated roles — i.e., each making his or her own decisions and carrying out such decisions. In a highly sex-role segregated society such as Japan or Mexico, or Hong Kong, many household decisions are made without the interference of the spouse. The effort to carry out RD procedures is comparing highly segregated conjugal roles with highly communicative husband wife relations will probably open up new questions with regard to the utility of the method itself, if one may assume that segregated conjugal roles do not necessarily imply the subservience of the wife to the husband in decision-making.

CERTAINS ASPECTS SOCIOLOGIQUES
DU DEVELOPPEMENT CULTUREL
EN TCHÉCOSLOVAQUIE

LEISURE AND MASS CULTURE

LOISIR ET CULTURE POPULAIRE

Dans une société qui a atteint un certain niveau de développement industriel, où l'accroissement du niveau de vie est à la fois réalisé et exigence constante, où les loisirs de l'homme augmentent, on voit également se poser de nouveaux problèmes culturels.

On peut rendre compte du développement culturel à différents niveaux. Concentrons notre attention sur le domaine le plus symbolique, probablement, et que visent la majorité des hommes modernes, peints par la société socialiste, à savoir le processus de la démocratisation de la culture, qui va de pair avec la démocratisation économique et politique. Autrement dit, c'est l'homme — «consommateur» des valeurs culturelles — et les voies, par lesquelles la culture lui parvient, qui nous intéressent par excellence. En admettant l'existence des valeurs culturelles de niveaux différents, le processus de démocratisation peut être exprimé par deux exigences fondamentales :

- a) permettre au nombre maximum d'hommes d'accéder aux valeurs culturelles de niveau supérieur;
- b) faire en sorte que cet accès aux valeurs culturelles se transforme en une participation active au processus même de la création et de la diffusion de ces valeurs.

De quoi dépend la réalisation de cette exigence ?

En formulant une thèse générale, on peut dire que toute une série des facteurs entrent en jeu, notamment les facteurs socio-économiques. Leur action est directe et surtout indirecte, dans ce sens qu'ils influencent les conditions et les moyens de diffusion de la culture et déterminent le caractère, les besoins, les attitudes et les intérêts du consommateur lui-même, soit son système de valeurs et son mode de vie.

Ces questions posent des problèmes difficiles, ayant certains traits communs dans les différents types de sociétés industriellement développées qui existent dans le monde actuel. C'est pourquoi l'industrialisme national peut jouer un rôle positif.

CERTAINS ASPECTS SOCIOLOGIQUES
DU DÉVELOPPEMENT CULTUREL
EN TCHÉCOSLOVAQUIE

BLANCA FILIPCOVA

Académie des sciences, Prague

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Influence du développement industriel

1. Déjà par son développement d'avant-guerre, la Tchécoslovaquie se plaça parmi les pays industriels les plus avancés. Cette position s'est encore renforcée par son développement économique pendant les deux décennies d'après-guerre. Dans les années 1953-1964, la production industrielle nette a doublé (accroissement annuel de 6,7 %). Si l'on compare la situation avec celle de 1937, avant la deuxième guerre mondiale, l'indice d'accroissement pour 1964 s'exprime par les données suivantes: le revenu national a augmenté de 258 %, la production industrielle brute de 482 %; toutefois, on assiste à une stagnation de la production agricole qui se situe à peu près au niveau d'avant-guerre: 103 %. Le revenu national par tête d'habitant est aujourd'hui d'environ 9 % inférieur à celui de la République démocratique allemande et d'un tiers supérieur à celui de la Pologne.

2. Il convient de mettre en lumière le rythme de l'industrialisation de la Slovaquie. Ce pays agraire arriéré est devenu en peu de temps un pays industriel. Le volume de la production industrielle brute est 12,3 fois plus grand en 1963 qu'en 1937 (pendant ce temps celui de la Bohême et de la Moravie augmentaient de 4 fois). On peut donc dire sans exagération que l'industrialisation de la Slovaquie, réalisée avec l'aide de la Bohême et de la Moravie, est un exemple de ce que Pierre Massé appelle l'«économie de solidarité». Les chiffres suivants en sont d'ailleurs un témoin éloquent:

TABLEAU 1¹

La part de la Slovaquie dans le développement économique de la Tchécoslovaquie

	Année:	Part de la Slovaquie en %
Volume de la population	1962	30,6
Création du revenu national	1962	22,5
Utilisation du revenu national	1962	27,2
Investissements	1962	30,8
	1948-1963	30,2
Construction de logements	1948-1963	41,6

¹ *Vingt années de la Tchécoslovaquie*, p. 197.

Cet essor économique, accompagné par le développement du réseau des équipements culturels, constitue la base de l'accroissement du niveau de vie et du niveau culturel de la population de la Slovaquie ainsi que de l'homogénéité croissante de la Tchécoslovaquie.

3. Ce rythme rapide de l'industrialisation a attiré beaucoup de main d'œuvre vers la ville. L'industrialisation est ainsi accompagnée d'une urbanisation: en 1950 48,7 % de la population habitait en Tchécoslovaquie les villes de moins de 2000 habitants — aujourd'hui, 60 % habite des villes de plus de 2000 habitants (11 % dans 42 villes de plus de 20 000 habitants et 15,1 % dans six villes de plus de 100 000 habitants dont Prague avec un million d'habitants)². Il se pose donc le problème d'assurer un certain équilibre désirable entre le développement culturel de la ville et celui de la campagne.

4. Cette évolution industrielle et urbaine a modifié la structure de la population active, tant du point de vue de l'âge que de l'occupation. La proportion de la population active et non-active a aussi évolué; le poids relatif de la population non-active présente une tendance légèrement ascendante (surtout pour le groupe d'âge de plus de 60 ans). En 1937, la population non-active constituait 36,8 % de tous les habitants (soit 25,5 % pour les jeunes de moins de 14 ans et 11,3 % pour les vieux de plus de 6 ans). En 1964, ce chiffre a atteint 40,6 % (25,9 % de jeunes de moins de 14 ans et 14,7 % de vieux de plus de 60 ans)³. L'accroissement du groupe d'âge de plus de 60 ans (lié à l'augmentation de la durée de vie moyenne: 54,9 pour les hommes et 58,7 pour les femmes en 1937 et respectivement 67,5 et 73,4 en 1963)⁴ montre que le problème du «troisième âge» devient en Tchécoslovaquie d'actualité.

La structure de la population active a aussi évolué. La Tchécoslovaquie est un des pays socialistes qui a le moins de paysans dans sa population et le plus grand nombre de personnes actives dans le secteur tertiaire. En 1963, la répartition de la population active était la suivante: agriculture: 22 %; industrie: 47 %; services: 31 % (dans la République démocratique allemande cette répartition est, respectivement la suivante: 16 %; 48 % et 36 %)⁵. En Pologne, en 1960, le

² *Revue sociologique*, No 2/1966, p. 283.

³ *Annuaire statistique tchécoslovaque*, 1965, p. 84.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 106.

⁵ KUTTA-LEVČIK, «Effet de la révolution scientifico-technique sur les changements dans le contenu du travail et la structure de la main d'œuvre», *Revue sociologique*, No 2, 1966, p. 188.

nombre des personnes travaillant dans l'agriculture atteint 47 %, de la population active en Yougoslavie 57,3 % en 1962⁶.

5. L'accroissement du pourcentage des femmes occupées va de pair avec l'industrialisation. La Tchécoslovaquie se place aujourd'hui parmi les pays avec le plus haut degré d'occupation de femmes: 75 % des femmes d'âge actif travaillent et constituent 44 % de toute la population active. Cet état de choses est dû non seulement à l'industrialisation du pays, mais aussi à une politique considérant le travail social de la femme comme la seule voie — bien qu'épineuse — réellement susceptible de conduire à son émancipation. Ainsi que le montre le résultat de l'enquête «La femme mariée dans sa famille et dans son travail»⁷, la femme conçoit d'abord son travail comme source de revenu — 79,7 % des femmes motivant leur décision d'aller au travail par des raisons financières — mais ce n'est pas d'habitude l'unique motif. Il est lié à une série d'autres: 24,9 % des femmes sont convaincues de l'utilité de leur travail pour la société, 9,1 % veulent utiliser leurs connaissances professionnelles, 8,3 % éprouvent un désir d'indépendance et 9,8 % ne trouvent pas de satisfaction dans leurs travaux ménagers.

6. L'industrialisation pose certaines exigences quant aux connaissances de l'homme-force de travail. Si le développement industriel au cours des 17^{ème} et 19^{ème} siècles est lié à un élargissement de la formation élémentaire générale, combien plus grandes sont alors les exigences posées par le degré du développement technique actuel ! Quelles sont les exigences que pose l'ère de la révolution scientifico-technique qui s'ouvre aujourd'hui en la Tchécoslovaquie ?⁸ Le rôle de plus important des intellectuels est un fait indiscutable. Le pourcentage des travailleurs intellectuels dans le nombre total des personnes économiquement actives augmente; en 1950 il était de 19,8 %, en 1961, 21,9 %. En 1970 il doit atteindre 28,6 % et, en 1980, 30,1 %. L'accroissement du nombre des personnes travaillant dans le domaine de la recherche scientifique est particulièrement marquant. En effet, de 1950 à 1964 il s'est accru de six fois⁹. Les opinions sur

⁶ *Annuaire statistique polonais*, 1964, p. 549.

⁷ J. PROKOPEC, «La femme mariée dans sa famille et dans son travail», revue *Démographie*.

⁸ Sous ce terme nous entendons l'ensemble des processus liés, dans la production, au passage de la mécanisation à l'automatisation, à l'utilisation des sources nucléaires d'énergie, à l'application de procédés chimiques dans la technologie, conditionné par la transformation de la science moderne en force productrice directe.

⁹ *Vingt années de la Tchécoslovaquie*, p. 44.

le rythme du développement de l'instruction différent. Actuellement, en Tchécoslovaquie, 35 à 40 % des jeunes passent dans les écoles secondaires et 7 — 8 % dans les écoles supérieures; le taux des travailleurs ayant une formation supérieure, par rapport à l'ensemble des personnes actives, était de 2,9 %, celui des personnes ayant une formation secondaire de 12,1 %. Selon certaines analyses récentes, qui ont pris comme point de départ les besoins de l'essor technico-économique de la société, ces proportions devraient changer d'ici 1980 de façon que le taux des travailleurs ayant une formation supérieure s'élève à 9 %, celui des travailleurs ayant une formation secondaire à 20 % et celui des ouvriers qualifiés à 50 % (par rapport à 25 % en 1962) ¹⁰.

Quelles que soient les opinions sur le rythme nécessaire et possible du développement de l'éducation exigée par la technique, qu'elles soient optimistes ou sceptiques, il semble certain que la révolution scientifico-technique changera le rôle de la force productive dans le processus de la production. Nombre de théoriciens (économistes, philosophes, sociologues) estiment que c'est le «facteur humain» qui constitue le facteur décisif du progrès des forces productives. Le degré de formation et le niveau culturel général de l'homme, le développement général de sa force créatrice, dépassant de loin le cadre d'une simple régénération de la force productive, deviendra probablement de plus en plus nécessaire, prenant le caractère de *facteur économique* décisif. Nous savons bien qu'il ne s'agit pas d'un processus unilatéral, que le développement de la révolution scientifico-technique, surtout à ses débuts, ne signifie aucunement une augmentation linéaire de l'éducation de toutes les couches de la population, etc. Nous voulons tout simplement saisir la tendance fondamentale de ce développement.

L'anticipation théorique de l'orientation possible du développement est indispensable à l'orientation actuelle de la société en ce qui concerne la solution des problèmes de la formation et de l'éducation. Dans ce domaine, l'urgence de la prévision du développement culturel est pour le moment la plus évidente.

Vers une consommation de masse

L'essor économique des dernières vingt années a aussi rendu possible un *accroissement du niveau de vie* relativement rapide de

¹⁰ J. HAVELKA, *Revue sociologique*, N° 2, 1966, p. 199-201.

sorte que l'on peut actuellement affirmer que la Tchécoslovaquie se trouve au seuil d'une consommation de masse, avec tous les problèmes nouveaux que pose cette situation.

1. Le tableau No 2 caractérise l'accroissement du niveau de vie sur le plan des salaires réels.

TABLEAU 2

Développement des salaires réels du total des personnes actives et des ouvriers dans l'industrie, par rapport à l'année 1937

	1937	1953	1964
Indice des salaires nominaux de tous les travailleurs	100	142	187
dont des ouvriers dans l'industrie	100	199	260
Indice du coût de vie	100	128	111
Indice des salaires réels de tous les travailleurs	100	111	168
dont des ouvriers dans l'industrie	100	156	234

Les revenus réels donnent une indication plus complexe sur l'accroissement du niveau de vie, car ils comprennent l'utilisation des services non payés provenant des fonds de consommation sociale (santé publique, enseignement). Le revenu réel par tête d'habitant a presque doublé en 1963 (198) par rapport à 1948. On peut dire qu'en prenant le niveau des salaires comme 100 %, la consommation sociale l'augmente de 40 %¹¹.

2. L'accroissement des revenus réels a permis l'accroissement de la consommation individuelle, cette dernière ayant augmenté en 1964 de 84 % par tête d'habitant par rapport à 1937.

De 1955 à 1963, les postes où prédominent les services (5, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12), atteignant 166,0 %, croissaient plus rapidement que les postes où prédominent les biens matériels (1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7) qui n'ont atteint que 135,0 %. Voir tab. 3 p. 151.

3. Quelle est l'évolution de la consommation des biens liés aux loisirs ? C'est dans ce secteur, dépassant les limites élémentaires de la satisfaction des besoins humains indispensables (c.-à-d. dans une

¹¹ *Vingt années de développement de la Tchécoslovaquie*, Prague, 1965, p. 189-191.

TABLEAU 3

Structure de la consommation individuelle aux prix fixes¹²

	1955	1963
1. Produits alimentaires	46,2	41,2
2. Boissons	7,3	7,0
3. Tabac	3,4	3,1
4. Vêtements et autres articles personnels	13,3	13,8
5. Loyers et eau	2,6	2,4
6. Chauffage et électricité	3,1	3,1
7. Meubles, installations domestiques	5,4	6,8
8. Ménage	2,9	4,1
9. Hygiène personnelle et santé	0,9	1,3
10. Transport et communications	6,2	7,5
11. Loisirs	5,5	5,9
12. Divers services	3,2	3,8
Total	100,0	100,0

situation où la quasi-totalité de la société possède ces biens), que la consommation de masse pose des problèmes socio-culturels fondamentaux d'une importance extraordinaire.

En 1965, 64,3 % des foyers possédaient une machine à laver contre 4 % en 1937; 34 % possédaient un aspirateur contre 6 % et 33,5 % un réfrigérateur contre 0,7 % en 1937.

100 % des foyers ont actuellement un récepteur radio (environ 5 % possèdent deux ou plusieurs récepteurs), plus de 56,2 % des foyers ont un téléviseur.

La situation de l'équipement des foyers en automobiles est moins favorable; en 1960, 5,4 % de foyers possédaient une voiture, en 1965, 9,5 %. Selon les prévisions, 15,2 % des foyers posséderont une voiture en 1970 et 32 % en 1980. En 1965, 33,6 % des foyers possédaient des véhicules à deux roues (motocyclettes, scooters)¹³.

Le tableau suivant donne une certaine idée de l'équipement des foyers en ces biens, en le comparant à la situation dans d'autres pays.

¹² *Informations économiques*, Prague, Institut de recherches de la planification économique, 1965, p. 32.

¹³ Sources: *Vingt années du développement de la Tchécoslovaquie*, Prague, 1965, p. 107.

CERVINKA et autres, *Travail et loisirs*, NPL 1966, p. 83.

TABLEAU 4

Equipement de la population en certains articles en 1960-1962, avec comparaison à la situation dans d'autres pays¹⁴

	Nombre d'articles par 100 foyers				
	Postes radio	Télé-viseurs	Machines à laver	Réfrigérateurs	Moto-cyclettes
Tchécoslovaquie	100	34	61	18	21
Rép. dém. allemande	90	29		9,5	4,4
Pologne	50	6	18	1,8	9,6

En 1962, il y avait en Tchécoslovaquie 87, en République démocratique allemande 84 et en Pologne 34 abonnés au service téléphonique sur 1000 habitants¹⁵.

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L'élévation du niveau de vie, trait symptomatique des pays industriels, est un processus plein de contradictions, engendrant toute une série de problèmes. Tout d'abord, un certain «fétichisme» du consommateur que la société socialiste ne peut éviter¹⁶. Les besoins humains, aujourd'hui concentrés notamment dans la sphère matérielle, sont de plus en plus variés et exigeants, non seulement en raison du développement national de chaque pays, mais aussi par le processus d'une certaine «universalisation». En effet, le commerce international ainsi que les moyens de communication de masse et le tourisme influencent les conditions dans lesquelles la création des besoins humains prend des dimensions de plus en plus «universelles».

Or, la consommation croissante n'est pas seulement l'expression d'une aliénation de l'homme, de son asservissement par les produits qu'il a lui-même créés, ainsi que la littérature, aussi bien occidentale que socialiste, a souvent tendance à interpréter les problèmes de

¹⁴ *Vingt années du développement de la Tchécoslovaquie*, p. 198.

¹⁵ *Annuaire statistique polonais*, 1964, p. 602.

¹⁶ L'intérêt suscité par l'œuvre de E. FROMM, brochant le tableau de l'homme de nos jours considéré comme l'«homme consommateur», indique combien la société actuelle est sensible aux problèmes de la consommation. Le premier des trois livres qui seront publiés en Tchécoslovaquie, *The art of loving* a paru cette année en 23000 exemplaires vendus en quelques jours.

la consommation; elle est aussi la réalisation des besoins humains, en laissant de côté la question des besoins authentiques et des pseudobesoins de l'homme. La saturation maximum des besoins matériels de l'homme est le moyen le plus sûr de son affranchissement de la domination par les objets.

Dans une situation où cela n'est pas encore possible, se pose le problème d'éviter que l'homme ne s'oriente dans sa vie uniquement vers ces valeurs, au lieu de chercher à s'affirmer dans d'autres sphères. En ce sens, le climat social général joue un rôle important. En effet, il peut soit renforcer le sentiment de l'homme qu'il se réalise notamment dans la sphère de la consommation, soit lui montrer le chemin et offrir les moyens réels lui permettant de comprendre les limites de ce «bonheur du consommateur». Certes, on ne saurait s'identifier avec l'idéalisation romantique de l'insuffisance des biens matériels. «... Théoriquement, la seule forme d'aborder le problème de la consommation moderne est basée sur la compréhension de la dialectique de l'aliénation et de la désaliénation. De même, la consommation moderne et les problèmes de «homo consumens» comprennent cette contradiction dialectique, force motrice du progrès historique». ¹⁷

Il est fort discutable, voir insensé, de dire que l'homme possédant une voiture est plus aliéné que celui qui va à pied. La menace de la consommation se saurait être discernée dans ce rapport partiel entre l'homme et l'objet, où c'est surtout l'aspect «instrumental», «service» des choses qui est mis en relief; il faut la chercher dans la situation générale de l'homme dans la société moderne à consommation massive où il existe toujours une différence (bien qu'à différents niveaux) entre les besoins (excités de telle ou telle manière) et les possibilités de les satisfaire. Ainsi, c'est seulement sur ce plan général que l'on peut se demander dans quelle mesure le rôle joué par les objets dans la vie de l'homme se modifie, les objets pouvant se transformer de *moyens* en *objectifs*; dans quelle mesure la vie humaine soumise à ces objectifs est une vie aliénée où les objets produits par l'homme asservissent leur créateur. C'est une telle situation qui cache le danger réel de l'«enfantilisation» de l'homme, toujours plus saturé et toujours plus avide, oubliant dans son souci de saturation qu'il peut se transformer en un enfant, dirigé à chaque pas par ses parents, ses moniteurs et ses surveillants.

¹⁷ J. FILIPEC, «Konvergenzen und Divergenzen der Industriegesellschaft in Ost und West» [Convergences et divergences de la société industrielle à l'Est et à l'Ouest], *Die moderne Industriegesellschaft*, Mayence, 1966.

La démocratisation sur le plan de la consommation fait *partie intégrante* de la démocratisation politique et culturelle; en même temps, elle peut la *menacer*.

Le grand dilemme d'une société techniquement développée du type capitaliste ou socialiste est la formation du *citoyen actif* dans les conditions de la consommation massive, dans les conditions d'une organisation toujours plus complexe de la société exigeant une direction scientifique, ce qui complique eo ipso la pénétration de sa nature même, de son système de fonctionnement. Comment former un homme qui ne serait pas renfermé dans un monde des valeurs individuelles, mais qui serait sensible à tous les problèmes sociaux, *participant* à la vie de la société.

Nous pensons que cette participation se réalise à trois niveaux:

- a) participation à la production des valeurs;
- b) participation à leur consommation;
- c) participation à la gestion de la société (à travers les institutions sociales).

Bien entendu, le rapport de ces trois sphères de participation renferme une contradiction; en brossant un tableau très schématique: le développement de la participation au niveau (b) peut menacer ou ralentir le développement au niveau (c), de même que (a) peut compliquer le développement au niveau (c).



Le système socialiste en Tchécoslovaquie créa un réseau dense d'organisations sociales, dotées de larges compétences, qui réalisent les conditions objectives de la participation à la *gestion* (par participation à la gestion de la société nous entendons la participation liée à une certaine compétence, y compris la possibilité de prendre des décisions à tous les échelons — local, d'entreprise et national — influançant le développement dans n'importe quel domaine de la vie économique, sociale et culturelle). Le type participant est surtout membre ou fonctionnaire d'une organisation sociale. Un sondage entrepris par la Commission centrale du contrôle populaire et des statistiques en 1961 montre combien de temps les membres des différentes couches sociales consacrent à l'activité publique.

Ces données élémentaires quantitatives ne disent naturellement rien des motifs ou de la qualité de la participation.

Par ailleurs, des problèmes sérieux découlent de la participation elle-même. La question de la compatibilité de l'exigence d'une direc-

TABLEAU 5

Temps consacré à l'activité publique (en minutes par jour)¹⁸

	A	B		A	B
Ouvrier	24	10	ouvrière	8	1
Employé	35	14	employée	14	2
Etudiant	14	10	étudiante	13	2
Paysan	32	16	paysane	10	2
			femme de ménage	5	1

A = jour ouvrable; B = dimanche

tion scientifique de la production de toute la société, exigeance d'autant plus impérative et frappante, que la société est techniquement développée, et de l'activité liée à un pouvoir de décision entre les mains de non-spécialistes, souvent des personnes ne possédant pas les *qualifications nécessaires*¹⁹ devient de plus en plus brûlante. Dans ces conditions, est-il du tout possible de substituer, dans une société techniquement développée, la participation des masses au gouvernement de telle ou telle élite (technocratique, «managérielle», bureaucratique, etc.)? Aujourd'hui, où la Tchécoslovaquie réalise son nouveau système économique devant frayer le chemin à la révolution scientifico-technique qui signifie en même temps une plus grande autonomie des entreprises, mettant l'accent sur les rapports de marché entre les entreprises et leur intérêt accru à la prospérité, bref dans une situation où les experts doivent diriger les choses plus que jamais, tous ces problèmes complexes deviennent plus ardu à résoudre.

La conscience de cette situation constitue un des motifs constants de l'effort de la société socialiste de développer toutes les formes de l'éducation scolaire et extrascolaire. Cette expérience historique — la réalisation de la participation des masses à la gestion d'une société techniquement développée — est un élément essentiel du développement culturel de la société socialiste.

¹⁸ Commission Centrale du Contrôle Populaire et des Statistiques.

¹⁹ Les problèmes de ce genre sont aussi soulevés par la composition sociale tout à fait démocratique des députés élus en 1960 à l'Assemblée Nationale (35,5 % d'ouvriers; 26,7 % de paysans-coopérateurs; 19 % d'intellectuels et employés; 5,3 % des services publics; 13,5 % d'autres couches sociales) — Z. MLYNÁR, «Démocratie et activité politique des citoyens», *Démocratie nouvelle*, Mai 1964.

Budget-temps

1. En Tchécoslovaquie on passe actuellement de la semaine de 46 heures à celle de 44 heures (en 1937: 48 heures) avec un cycle de deux semaines de travail de cinq jours par mois. Pour se faire une idée de la durée du travail, il convient également de mentionner 7 jours fériés par an, reconnus par l'Etat, la durée du congé payé variant entre 12 et 28 jours par an (selon les années de travail; en 1937 les ouvriers avaient un congé de 6 à 11 jours et les employés de 2 à 4 semaines). Or, les heures de travail réelles ne sont pas identiques aux heures de travail normales; selon les résultats d'une enquête effectuée par l'UKLKS²⁰ en 1960-61, un ouvrier travaillait en moyenne 48 heures par semaine, un employé 48 heures 25 minutes, une ouvrière 42 heures 51 minutes, une employée 52 heures 31 minutes (une partie des femmes ne travaillent pas à plein temps). D'ici 1970 on compte réduire la semaine de travail à 40 heures.

Par ailleurs, les heures de travail sont réduites par la prolongation de la fréquentation de l'école obligatoire d'un an par rapport à 1937, et seulement 15 % des jeunes vont travailler directement à la sortie de l'école obligatoire, les autres continuent leurs études (environ 50 % dans des écoles d'apprentissage et 35 % dans les écoles de formation générale et professionnelles).

2. Le chemin vers l'accroissement des loisirs ne passe pas seulement par la réduction des heures de travail, mais aussi à travers le changement de la structure du temps en dehors du travail. Il semble qu'en Tchécoslovaquie, cette deuxième voie est plus importante que la première. De grandes pertes de temps sont notamment dues aux transports. En Tchécoslovaquie, 43 % de tous les travailleurs utilisent des moyens de transport publics pour se rendre au travail. (L'enquête précitée de l'UKLKS indique les pertes suivantes: chez l'ouvrier: 5 h 16; chez l'employé: 4 h. 49; chez l'ouvrière: 3 h. 44 et chez l'employée: 4 h. 4 par semaine).

Les soins consacrés au ménage représentent un élément particulièrement important du point de vue du budget-temps. Le rythme du développement des services est lent, plus lent que dans nombre d'autres pays techniquement développés; or, pour une travailleuse, ils constituent la seule solution réelle de son problème difficile: comment lier heureusement son travail avec les soins qu'elle doit consacrer à sa famille et à son ménage.

²⁰ Commission centrale du contrôle populaire et des statistiques.

En Tchécoslovaquie, la femme consacre, en moyenne, 5 heures par jour aux travaux ménagers (environ 4 fois plus que l'homme). Son budget-temps diffère largement du budget de l'homme (les hommes dorment, en moyenne, 2 heures par semaine de plus que les femmes, consacrent aux repas une heure de plus, disposent environ de deux fois plus de loisirs, etc.). Ainsi, la revendication traditionnelle de l'«égalité des droits» se situe à un autre niveau. Il ne s'agit plus de l'égalité des droits des femmes dans le sens de leur droit au travail, mais d'une égalité dans le mode de vie, dans les loisirs, le droit aux divertissements, au repos, à l'accès à la culture et à l'instruction.

Le plan de développement du niveau de vie attribue aujourd'hui une importance primordiale non seulement à la nécessité d'assurer le rythme nécessaire de l'accroissement, mais aussi de réaliser certains changements de structure, dans le sens du renforcement du secteur des services, en réduisant ainsi les disproportions existantes qui se répercutent défavorablement sur le rythme et le style de vie de chaque famille.

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La réduction des heures de travail et l'accroissement des loisirs constituent un fait indiscutable dans le développement des sociétés industrielles avancées capitalistes et socialistes. Ce processus est déclenché par une série de facteurs objectifs dont deux, au moins, exercent la plus grande influence:

1. Le développement de la technique moderne lui-même, qui
 - a) permet de réduire les heures de travail grâce à l'accroissement de la productivité du travail;
 - b) crée un nouveau genre de fatigue de travail, multiplié par la fatigue due au milieu urbain et industriel, exigeant plus de repos (le problème de la classification des différents genres de fatigues de travail — en fonction de l'équipement technique, de la division et de l'organisation du travail — et du type adéquat de repos n'est toujours pas résolu et constitue une tâche des recherches scientifiques).
 - c) demande une main d'oeuvre toujours plus qualifiée et alors plus de temps pour l'instruction.

2. L'accroissement du niveau de vie qui, à un certain niveau, pose des exigences accrues en ce qui concerne le temps. Cela est d'autant plus vrai que les besoins humains élémentaires sont satisfaits et la consommation s'oriente vers le confort et devient plus riche et

plus variée. Dans cette situation le temps est une condition sine qua non de sa réalisation. Plus l'homme a de comforts (télévision, voiture, maison secondaire, etc.) plus il a besoin de loisirs pour qu'il puisse utiliser les valeurs acquises. Le loisir stimule vice versa la demande de consommation. L'homme doit alors faire le choix: travailler plus pour qu'il puisse mieux vivre dans ses loisirs ou avoir plus de loisirs. Mutatis mutandis, cela est tout aussi valable pour la société. La société, elle aussi, doit choisir si oui ou non, et quand, elle doit préférer la réduction des heures de travail à l'accroissement du niveau de vie. Aujourd'hui, il n'y a probablement pas de pays dans le monde qui puisse donner à son peuple les deux — assez de loisirs et pleine satisfaction des besoins matériels et culturels croissants.

On voit alors se créer un *conflit* susceptible de devenir une source de mécontentement. En effet, les besoins non réalisés sont une force réelle qui participe à la formation de la conscience de l'homme.

Au cours des dernières années, on a vu se créer en Tchécoslovaquie une situation curieuse. On peut supposer que le temps dont on dispose pour les loisirs n'a augmenté que très légèrement (des données plus précises seront disponibles après la comparaison des résultats obtenus dans deux grandes enquêtes, celle de la Commission centrale du contrôle populaire et des statistiques de 1960-61 et de la recherche de Weiner de 1965).

En même temps on assiste à un accroissement rapide de la valeur des loisirs; dans le système de valeurs individuelles, les intérêts et les activités de loisir sont de plus en plus préférés (les modifications de la structure de la consommation — voir Tableau No 3 — donne une indication de ce processus)²¹.

Cette réalité pose aussi de nouveaux problèmes culturels.

Nouvelles tendances du développement culturel et loisirs

1. Il semble que notre situation actuelle est généralement caractérisée par certaines métamorphoses de l'hierarchie des valeurs ainsi que des intérêts et du mode de vie des hommes. Il s'agit de valeurs dominantes, conférant un certain caractère à notre époque. De tou-

²¹ La nomenclature utilisée dans la structure de la consommation individuelle ne convient pas du point de vue de l'analyse des rapports entre la consommation et les loisirs; les postes liés à l'utilisation des loisirs sont dispersés dans plusieurs groupes (4, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12).

te évidence, ces métamorphoses sont liées au dynamisme intérieur de la société socialiste elle-même, au sein de laquelle on voit s'esquisser deux phases d'évolution.

Les années d'après la révolution sont l'étape d'édification d'un nouveau régime social, naissant dans une opposition violente à la vieille société. Dans cette étape on trouve un certain type d'homme ayant un système de valeurs où prédomine l'intérêt social accompagné même d'une certaine tendance sacrificielle. Les valeurs de ce genre ne sont pas seulement octroyées de l'extérieur, mais, intériorisées, elles deviennent partie intégrante du mode de vie de couches sociales relativement très larges. Les modèles de l'homme socialiste en tant que l'homme pour qui le travail est devenu le premier besoin de l'homme, qui préfère les intérêts sociaux aux intérêts individuels, la vie collective à la vie individuelle, etc. (modèles que nous critiquons actuellement comme simplifiés et ne répondant pas à la situation réelle) sont nés précisément à cette époque d'un mélange d'anticipations de l'évolution possible ou désirable et de reflets plus ou moins adéquats ou illusoire des processus ayant lieu au cours de ces années d'après la révolution.

L'époque de la stabilisation du socialisme en tant que régime établi, est liée au développement industriel et à l'accroissement indiqué du niveau de vie. Or, le problème du travail prend alors une forme beaucoup plus complexe que celle représentée par l'optimisme simplifiant des années précédentes. En effet, on peut discerner même sous le socialisme des traces tout-à-fait concrètes de l'aliénation conditionnée surtout par la division du travail. L'hypothèse humanitaire de Marx du travail libéré, liée à la supposition que cette division traditionnelle est surmontée, doit être soumise à un nouvel examen; en particulier il faut la confronter avec l'évolution actuelle et future de la technique moderne en cherchant des chaînons intermédiaires susceptibles de relier un pôle à l'autre.

A l'heure actuelle, le travail garde toujours le caractère de *moyen* de gagner sa vie; il reste toujours dans une grande mesure dans la sphère du nécessaire, tandis que les loisirs constituent le domaine de la liberté, de l'autoréalisation de l'homme (la question de savoir dans quelle mesure cette liberté et cette réalisation sont illusoire ou réelles est en suspens).

Les possibilités données par les loisirs mettent au premier plan les demandes réelles de l'individu, telles que bonheur individuel, désir d'une vie agréable. L'homme ne se contente plus de se projeter dans l'avenir, mais demande l'accomplissement présent.

2. La valorisation des loisirs est accompagnée de quelques changements dans les intérêts et les besoins culturels de la population, témoignant de leur variété et de leur complexité croissantes. On assiste à un accroissement frappant des activités qui permettent, à l'homme vivant dans un milieu urbain et industriel de rétablir ses liens perdus avec la nature dont il faisait jadis partie intégrante.

Citons quelques faits symptomatiques:

Selon l'enquête entreprise par la Commission centrale du contrôle populaire et des statistiques de 1960-61, environ 34 % de la population non-paysanne passent les weekends en dehors de leurs foyers. Nous supposons qu'à l'heure actuelle, grâce à l'introduction de deux samedis libres par mois et au nombre presque doublé de foyers possédant une voiture, ce pourcentage a encore considérablement augmenté²².

Aux cours des dernières années, le nombre des maisons secondaires augmente aussi rapidement. Sans disposer de chiffres exactes, nous pouvons citer les données approximatives pour Prague où environ 10 % des foyers sont équipés d'une maison de weekend. Au cours de 5 années la vente des maisons préfabriquées a quadruplé.

Une grande partie de la population passe ses vacances en dehors de son foyer (selon l'enquête de l'Institut de recherche du commerce de 1961, 34,3 % des personnes interrogées).

Ce processus provoque de nouveaux problèmes auxquels réagissent en premier lieu les architectes et les urbanistes. Comment satisfaire les exigences de séjour dans la nature dans un pays où la densité de la population est de 108 habitants par km² avec un accroissement prévu de 25 % au cours des vingt années à venir ? Dès 1964, on a établi un plan de l'utilisation territoriale de notre pays, prévoyant les besoins du développement de l'économie nationale, de la construction d'immeubles et spécifiant des zones destinées à telle fonction de récréation.

Le désir de voyager à l'étranger augmente également; en 1960-63 le nombre des personnes ayant passé leurs vacances à l'étranger et utilisé les services des bureaux de voyages, a triplé. En 1965, 7 % de la population, soit 1.034.000 de personnes, ont passé leurs vacances à l'étranger. Certains estiment que c'est là un phénomène passager

²² Il est caractéristique que l'introduction de deux samedis libres par mois a immédiatement conduit à une forte pression de la part des parents demandant que les écoliers soient également libérés; le ministère de l'enseignement a réagi promptement en introduisant 10 samedis libres au cours du deuxième semestre de l'année scolaire 1966/67.

de snobisme moderne. Nous ne sommes pas d'accord avec cette interprétation. L'homme vit actuellement dans une situation particulière, on pourrait même dire paradoxale. Pendant toute l'année il suit la routine quotidienne de ses devoirs de travail, familiaux et sociaux, plus ou moins immuables; il circule dans l'espace restreint de son foyer et de son lieu de travail. Or, son destin individuel est vécu pendant un temps dont les traits caractéristiques sont tout-à-fait différents. La technique, l'économie, la politique, les sciences, la culture, tous ces phénomènes sont très dynamiques et portent une empreinte d'universalité. Et l'univers pénètre dans le micromonde intime de chacun de nous, notamment par l'intermédiaire des moyens de communication de masse. Nous sommes entraînés dans le tourbillon des événements universels, dans une certaine mesure réellement et, en partie, illusoirement. Comment pourrait-on alors éviter que ce climat fasse naître un homme avide de connaître le monde? Et comment un homme ne connaissant pas le monde, pourrait-il y exister? N'est-ce pas cette contradiction certaine entre la situation individuelle de l'homme et le caractère de l'époque, qui stimule la recherche, dans ses loisirs, des valeurs susceptibles de l'aider à la surmonter?

L'essor rapide de la télévision (au cours de la première décennie de son existence elle se répandit trois fois plus rapidement que la radio au cours des années vingt) a sans doute influencé le développement des intérêts culturels²³. Les téléspectateurs passent, en moyenne, 16-18 heures par semaine devant les écrans (les enfants 12-14 heures). Ces simples données quantitatives nous donnent bien le droit de parler de l'influence incontestable de la télévision sur la formation des autres intérêts culturels de la population. Cependant, une analyse approfondie de ces rapports n'existe pas encore. Nous pouvons seulement constater que c'est, probablement, la télévision qui est la cause de la baisse constante de la fréquentation des cinémas qui a commencé en 1957 (en 1964 cette baisse a atteint 71,6 % par rapport à 1957). La situation est la même dans le domaine du théâtre²⁴. Les autres domaines ne sont pas atteints par l'essor de la télévision.

²³ Comme nous l'avons déjà indiqué 56 % des familles tchécoslovaques possèdent un téléviseur.

²⁴ Le même processus est observé en République démocratique allemande où depuis 1958 le nombre des spectateurs de cinémas et depuis 1957 le nombre des spectateurs de théâtres baissent constamment; en Pologne la fréquentation des cinémas baisse, mais celle des théâtres reste au même niveau.

Les conférences suscitent un intérêt accru (le nombre de ceux qui ont entendu les conférences données par l'Académie socialiste a doublé au cours de six années), de même que la lecture (en 1954-64 le nombre des lecteurs abonnés aux Bibliothèques populaires a augmenté de 2,5 fois, le nombre des livres empruntés de 4 fois et le nombre des membres du Club des Lecteurs publiant à l'intention de ses membres des œuvres de la belle littérature nationale et étrangère, de 6 fois).

Le nombre des visiteurs des musées et galeries augmente légèrement, tandis que le nombre des personnes allant aux concerts reste au même niveau.

3. L'essor de la télévision a accéléré le processus de cristallisation du problème de la place des moyens de communication de masse dans la culture actuelle; toutes les études effectuées jusqu'ici sont unanimes à constater que la télévision, le film, la radiodiffusion et la presse prédominent dans la culture quotidienne. Il est de plus évident que la culture liée aux moyens de communication de masse, représente un courant particulier, plein de contradiction, qui ne saurait être saisi par des schémas en noir et blanc. Dans ce contexte nous voulons indiquer deux hypothèses auxquelles nous amènent également les conclusions des premières études partielles.

(a) L'attitude du téléspectateur envers la télévision confirme la supposition — valable, probablement, d'une façon plus générale — qu'il existe un désir très intense de s'amuser et de se divertir non seulement chez les jeunes, mais chez les personnes de tous les groupes d'âge et de toutes les couches sociales (dans une enquête récemment entreprise par une revue télévisuelle, 89 % des 14 000 lecteurs ont dit qu'ils attendaient de la télévision qu'elle leur apporte un divertissement). Cette demande traduit-elle un besoin de compenser la fatigue causée par le milieu de la civilisation industrielle et urbaine, la quantité croissante d'informations dont l'homme est quotidiennement submergé justement par l'intermédiaire des moyens de communication de masses, ou une nécessité d'un changement susceptible de rendre supportable la monotonie immuable de tous les jours ?

(b) La création culturelle, de même que le goût et les exigences du public, sont grandement différenciés. Mais il est à supposer que les moyens de communication de masses renforcent un certain processus de nivellement pénétrant dans la sphère culturelle à travers la démocratisation socio-économique. Il est probablement impossible de saisir ce processus par la fréquente antinomie de la culture d'élite,

authentique, et de la «culture de masses», comprise dans un sens unilatéralement négatif. Il semble que le type précis de réception culturelle est remplacé, dans une certaine mesure, par un type à large gamme de réception, mélange de goûts et intérêts dans lequel des valeurs de qualités toute différentes sont parfaitement compatibles (l'étude de Karbusicky sur le sens actuel de la musique constate un haut degré de corrélation positive entre l'intérêt manifesté à la musique de danse, au jazz et à la musique sérieuse; les films représentant les points culminants de la création tchécoslovaque et mondiale, rassemblent un grand nombre de spectateurs tout comme des films purement commerciaux tels que «Vinnitou»). En ce sens, les moyens de communication de masses influençant toutes les couches sociales jouent un rôle important et le genre spécifique de culture qu'ils dispensent pénètre dans la conscience de tous les groupes de la société.

Il importe donc de voir quelle culture est diffusée par les moyens de masses; dans certaines conditions sociales, permettant de limiter ou d'éliminer les influences commerciales, nous pensons que l'on peut assister et que l'on assiste effectivement à la naissance d'une certaine «culture moyenne», contenant des éléments de vulgarisation dans le mauvais sens du terme tout en contribuant à la distribution dans les masses des valeurs de haute vulgarisation. Cette culture «moyenne» peut jouer le rôle d'intermédiaire lorsqu'il s'agit d'atteindre un niveau plus élevé de communication authentique et directe dans le domaine de la culture.

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Certaines opinions sur les aspects nouveaux de l'évolution de la culture actuelle de notre société ont le caractère d'hypothèses préliminaires, basées sur l'analyse des données statistiques et quelques études. Nous les interprétons plutôt comme des points de départ de travail qu'il faut vérifier par des recherches scientifiques ultérieures afin de trouver comment il convient de comprendre le concept de la culture et du développement culturel en rapport avec ces changements. Les loisirs déplacent ces problèmes au-delà des limites traditionnelles étroites où la culture s'identifie avec les domaines des connaissances et des arts, et on passe à un concept très large selon lequel la culture signifie le développement de toutes les forces créatrices de l'homme, physiques et intellectuelles. Que veut dire alors cette thèse dans sa relation concrète avec les différents milieux so-

ciaux, les différentes couches sociales et groupes d'âge, les besoins de l'individu et de la société ? Quels sont les critères qui permettront de distinguer les processus désirables des processus non-désirables afin de définir dans ce contexte les besoins culturels « authentiques » ?

Les organismes sociaux et les besoins culturels

1. Les problèmes mentionnés ne sont pas purement théoriques; ils ont leur pendant dans la politique culturelle pratique de l'Etat, des organisations sociales et des institutions culturelles.

Par ailleurs, ils impliquent un autre problème qui ne saurait être éliminé — quel type d'homme nous voulons et pouvons former dans une époque historique donnée. Que ce problème soit formulé explicitement et résolu théoriquement ou non, l'activité sociale doit le résoudre sur le plan pratique.

Le socialisme a adopté comme base le modèle marxiste de l'« homme total »; il cherche toujours de nouvelles variantes concrètes et des degrés intermédiaires de sa réalisation dans les conditions données. Il semble tout aussi nécessaire de confronter ce modèle avec les tendances à longue échéance de l'évolution industrielle, que de vérifier concrètement les objectifs fixés, surtout du point de vue

- a) des tendances objectives de l'évolution des besoins culturels, des intérêts et activités, avec lesquels les critères finals peuvent être en contradiction;
- b) des résultats et des conséquences de cette évolution, en partie prévus et en partie imprévus et surprenants, et
- c) des possibilités concrètes, toujours limitées dans une étape historique donnée.

Il faut souligner que la complexité de l'évolution culturelle en Tchécoslovaquie se trouve multipliée par la nécessité de résoudre l'expérience de la réalisation de certains processus spécifiquement socialistes dans le cadre du processus général de l'évolution culturelle dans les pays industriellement développés.

2. Le développement culturel a été jusqu'ici lié en premier lieu au processus de la démocratisation de la culture où la démocratisation de l'instruction assume une importance toute particulière.

En Tchécoslovaquie, où toute l'éducation scolaire est gratuite, ce qui élimine, en liaison avec une certaine politique des bourses, tous les empêchements créés par la différenciation des revenus réels des différentes couches sociales (d'ailleurs minime), la composition so-

ciale des étudiants a changé. En 1948, 11 % des élèves des écoles secondaires et 7 % des étudiants des écoles supérieures étaient originaires de familles ouvrières et paysannes; durant l'année scolaire 1963-64, 41 % des élèves des écoles secondaires étaient des enfants d'ouvriers et 6 % des enfants de paysans et dans les écoles supérieures respectivement 38 % et 8 %.

Les disproportions entre le niveau scolaire en Bohême et Moravie d'une part et en Slovaquie de l'autre, sont progressivement éliminées; durant l'année scolaire 1936/37 la Slovaquie avait une école supérieure (3 facultés) et 2079 étudiants tandis qu'en l'année scolaire 1963/64 elle avait 16 écoles supérieures (35 facultés) et 47500 étudiants (à l'heure actuelle, l'enseignement supérieures, de même que les autres institutions culturelles — théâtres, etc. — correspond quantitativement à la structure de la population, soit au rapport d'environ 2 (Bohême et Moravie) à 1 (Slovaquie).

Le développement de l'enseignement supérieur est mis en relief dans la comparaison des nombres d'élèves en 1955/56 et 1963/64: le nombre des élèves des écoles secondaires est passé à 135 %, celui des écoles secondaires professionnelles à 167 % et celui des écoles supérieures à 197 %.

En dehors des formes traditionnelles de l'enseignement scolaire, on assiste à un développement des formes particulières, études en travaillant (environ 34 % de tous les étudiants dans les écoles supérieures), d'un système ramifié d'écoles d'entreprise et d'enseignement extrascolaire.

Le fait indiscutable de l'accroissement quantitatif permanent de l'instruction et de tout le système d'enseignement, de la transformation de la structure sociale, est accompagné de toute une série de problèmes en suspens. L'idée fondamentale de la démocratisation «assurer l'instruction maximum à tous», idée passée par toute une série de transformations se heurte à une situation pleine de contradictions quant aux exigences des qualifications professionnelles, conditionnées par le caractère de l'évolution industrielle. On n'a toujours pas résolu la question de savoir si l'étendue, le système et le contenu de l'enseignement scolaire et extraordinaire correspond à l'étape donnée de l'évolution technico-économique et à ses tendances réelles. La proportion de l'éducation professionnelle et générale est-elle conforme aux besoins objectifs? L'instruction actuelle n'est-elle pas plutôt une accumulation de connaissances et d'informations partielles, ou développe-t-elle une certaine méthode de penser, permettant à l'homme une perception réelle du monde dans lequel il vit et

qui est son produit ? Quelle est la proportion existante et la proportion désirable de l'aspect instrumental de l'éducation devant fournir à l'homme les connaissances nécessaires pour l'accomplissement de son rôle social et du «but en soi» ? En effet, l'éducation constitue une valeur humaine également dans le sens existentiel du mot; elle transforme la personnalité humaine, affirme l'homme dans son rapport envers les autres valeurs culturelles.

3. La création d'un système culturel puissant, la multiplication des canaux par lesquels la culture parvient à l'homme, fait partie intégrante du processus de démocratisation.

Le nombre des théâtres en Tchécoslovaquie a atteint 84, en 1964, contre 52 en 1937 (14 000 spectacles et 5 millions de spectateurs en 1937 contre 24 383 spectacles et 10 560 000 spectateurs en 1964).

Le nombre des cinémas a doublé (passant de 1 650 cinémas à 3 397 avec plus d'un million de places), et le nombre des films produits en Tchécoslovaquie a augmenté de plus de 3 fois (de 266 à 904).

Le nombre des livres publiés n'a augmenté que légèrement par rapport à 1937 (6 490 contre 7 002), mais le nombre des exemplaires a augmenté considérablement (32 000 000 contre 53 335 000).

En Tchécoslovaquie, on publie actuellement 4 livres par an par habitant. Nous publions aussi au total 1 300 revues avec un tirage de plus d'un milliard et demi de copies par an (en 1964). Le réseau des bibliothèques est si dense, qu'une bibliothèque existe (à quelques petites exceptions près) dans chaque commune et dans chaque entreprise. Depuis 1945 on a fondé 10 000 clubs (dont environ 3 500 dans des maisons particulières) etc.

Toutefois, une disproportion considérable existe entre les possibilités de réaliser une activité intellectuelle et esthétique et celles d'exercer une activité physique où on éprouve une insuffisance absolue d'installations sociales, même dans les nouveaux quartiers. En Tchécoslovaquie, il y a une piscine pour 11 200 habitants, 1 terrain de sport pour 750 habitants, un stade (avec environ 3 000 places) pour 39 000 habitants et 1 stade (avec environ 10 000 places) pour 152 000 habitants.

Si les études des loisirs montrent que l'activité physique, les sports, jouent dans la vie de la majorité des gens un rôle marginal, il se pose la question de savoir dans quelle mesure les faits précités contribuent à cet état de choses.

Quel est en général le poids des installations culturelles dans le processus de la formation des besoins culturels des hommes ?

Dans quelle proportion faut-il construire des installations culturel-

les dans les entreprises et sur le lieu de résidence ? Certaines études confirment que dans les loisirs ce sont les rapports sociaux noués en dehors du lieu de travail qui prédominent (l'enquête entreprise cette année dans les établissements TESLA-Pardubice montre que 24,33 % des personnes interrogées passent leurs loisirs le plus souvent avec leurs relations de famille, 15,58 % avec leurs amis en dehors de l'entreprise, 13,64 % ne voient personne et 8,35 % fréquentent leurs collègues les plus proches; seulement 3 % connaissent le programme du club d'entreprise du mois écoulé)²⁵. Peut-on alors supposer que l'on préfère lier ses loisirs à son foyer plutôt qu'à son entreprise?

Par ailleurs, dans le développement même du système d'installations culturelles, réalisant, sans aucun doute, les conditions d'une participation réelle aux valeurs culturelles, certains problèmes apparaissent, surtout dans une confrontation avec le dynamisme des intérêts individuels, qui posent la question de l'utilisation optimum des sources économiques.

4. Dans l'activité culturelle des organisations et institutions sociales et des artistes eux-mêmes, il existe un effort conscient pour intensifier la participation active de l'homme à la vie culturelle. Une lutte, menée d'une façon plus ou moins heureuse, pour que l'homme ne soit pas un simple consommateur, mais qu'il devienne, dans une certaine mesure, co-créateur. Malgré le soutien considérable (et non seulement financier, mais aussi sous forme de direction experte) accordé à toutes les formes de la «création artistique populaire» (qui a en Tchécoslovaquie une longue tradition), l'intérêt manifesté envers cette activité est stagnant (le nombre des différents ensembles et groupes est d'environ 1 demi million depuis nombre d'années). Dans l'étude des intérêts culturels des jeunes de 15 à 18 ans la création artistique et technique figure à la dernière place, tandis que les moyens de communication de masses occupent la première place dans cette hiérarchie.

Néanmoins, le rôle des moyens de communication de masse ne va pas nécessairement uniquement dans le sens du soutien de la consommation passive comme on le pense souvent. La télévision tout comme la radiodiffusion déploient de grands efforts dans la recherche de formes permettant d'«activer» le public (en particulier à l'aide de séries d'émissions éducatives où l'on pose des questions à la fin de chaque émission, ou dans des émissions télévisées du type «Puis-je dire quelques mots à ce propos?»).

²⁵ *Revue sociologique*, N° 4, 1966, p. 553.

Ce ne sont là que quelques indications légères des efforts qui n'en sont pas moins remarquables, de poursuivre le but dans son contenu même, lorsque les possibilités quant à sa forme sont limitées.

Les efforts visant à former un type d'homme actif qui, à bien des égards, ne peut se réaliser que dans les conditions d'une société industrielle avancée où il se heurte en même temps aux barrières créées par le développement de la technique elle-même, remettent continuellement cette possibilité en cause.

La conscience de toutes ces contradictions, des tensions pouvant se créer entre les buts poursuivis, l'évolution objective des besoins individuels et sociaux d'une part et les possibilités limitées des sources dont nous disposons de l'autre, est de plus en plus forte. Il est de plus en plus évident que les problèmes du développement culturel des loisirs, du mode de vie, ne sauraient être résolus sans une recherche socio-scientifique, et plus particulièrement sociologique.

Les comités nationaux sont, peut-être, les plus dynamiques en ce sens qu'ils sentent de façon palpable l'existence de ces problèmes, notamment en liaison avec les plans de construction des villes et villages. Le comité national de Liberec a organisé cette année un symposium international de jeunes architectes et sociologues afin de discuter les constructions sur le terrain assaini au centre de la ville. Le sujet du symposium s'intitulait «La ville et les loisirs» (parmi les gagnants il y avait, à côté du groupe tchécoslovaque les groupes français, anglais et polonais).

Sur l'initiative du Comité national, la ville d'Ostrava prépare une recherche sociologique complexe où les mêmes problèmes jouent un rôle essentiel; une recherche analogue doit être entreprise à une date ultérieure à Prague, également sur l'initiative du Comité national.

La sociologie tchécoslovaque, qui vit une époque de renaissance, et certaines disciplines apparentées (telle que justement la sociologie des loisirs) sont en train de se constituer. Elles se trouvent dans une situation difficile: ne pas se contenter du rôle d'observateur et de critique, mais contribuer à la recherche des diverses voies d'une *évolution possible et positive*; par ailleurs, notre sociologie a la possibilité de mettre à son profit les interventions pratiques du pouvoir d'Etat à tous les échelons, en tant que champ d'action d'une expérience sociologique.

Une telle coopération augmente la responsabilité sociale et, peut-être à la fois, la «possibilité de réalisation» de cette science.

Si la sociologie des loisirs veut jouer un rôle actif dans l'information et l'orientation de la politique culturelle, elle doit chercher la réponse à toute une série de questions en suspens (ou, éventuellement, transformer en questions les certitudes apparentes).

1. Quelle est la culture et quels sont les besoins culturels de différents milieux et groupes sociaux, quelles sont les tendances de leur évolution dans les conditions, où: (a) la structure de classes de la société est changée; (b) la différence entre la ville et le village diminue, entre autres du fait que les coopératives font pénétrer à la campagne des éléments du travail industriel (régime de travail vacances); (c) on peut supposer certains changements au sein de la couche des intellectuels (du point de vue des changements de la structure de la provenance sociale et l'âge moyen auquel on achève les études supérieures); (d) il existe un nivellement considérable des revenus; (e) et la division du travail traditionnelle est maintenue dans ses grandes lignes.

Le processus tendant vers une plus grande homogénéité de la vie culturelle sont-ils prédominants, ou la culture des différentes couches et milieux reste-t-elle sensiblement différenciée ?

2. Si l'on veut étudier ces problèmes, il ne faut pas se limiter à une analyse quantitative, mais il est nécessaire de passer à l'analyse des contenus et des significations: (a) des valeurs culturelles acceptées (quel est le rôle joué dans ce contexte par la décommercialisation de la culture liée à l'élimination de la création de rebut du plus bas niveau); (b) des intérêts et activités culturels (à quel niveau, à quelle intensité, mesurée par l'activité du sujet, cette activité a lieu).

3. Comment assurer que dans l'évolution des loisirs: (a) les besoins culturels de la société tout comme de l'individu soient respectés; (b) et un certain équilibre optimum soit atteint, étant donné que toute hypertrophie, soit de l'intérêt individuel, soit de l'intérêt social, renferme le danger d'une déformation de la vie humaine.

4. Quels sont les critères du développement culturel ? Pour répondre à cette question, il faut: (a) élaborer des modèles du développement désirable à courte et longue échéance (comme une chaîne de maillons intermédiaires); (b) chercher les corrélations entre les tendances objectives de l'évolution des besoins, les possibilités des sources dont on dispose et le modèle à réaliser.

5. En cherchant à former un certain type d'homme tout en étant obligé d'intervenir dans le domaine du développement culturel et

des loisirs, comment peut-on: (a) éviter le dirigisme tout comme le volontarisme, et (b) créer un système de stimulants objectifs susceptibles de former les besoins et les intérêts de l'homme en l'orientant dans le sens désiré tout en lui laissant, voire même renforçant, la liberté de choix.

6. Quels sont les facteurs et dans quelle mesure influencent-ils la formation des besoins et intérêts culturels, quel est le rôle joué dans ce processus notamment par le caractère de l'activité de travail? S'agit-il d'un déterminisme des activités de travail par rapport aux activités des loisirs selon une quantité variable? Quel est le dynamisme de la détermination et de l'autonomie de la sphère de travail et des loisirs dans l'évolution actuelle et future, éventuelle, de la société?

La solution des problèmes précités dont l'énumération ne saurait être complète, suppose la combinaison de toute une série de méthodes (analyse de l'importance sociologique des statistiques économiques et culturelles, études comparatives historiques, recherches empiriques); nous pensons que les études comparatives des loisirs (entre les pays socialistes tout comme entre des pays aux régimes sociaux différents) pourraient tout particulièrement contribuer à l'approfondissement de la connaissance du phénomène étudié et donner ainsi la réponse à la question des divergences de la culture actuelle, telle qu'elle existe dans différentes couches des sociétés avancées du type socialiste et du type capitaliste, en esquisant les alternatives de l'évolution de telle ou telle société.

SOCIETY, COMMUNICATION AND POPULAR
CULTURE IN A TRADITIONAL SOCIETY:
THE «CANTADORES» OF NORTH-EAST BRAZIL (1)

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Sociological studies of communication and popular culture in advanced societies have tended to concentrate on the process of communication and its effects on the content and impact of popular culture. The purpose of this paper is to explore the relationship between these and their structural context in a comparatively simple society, particular attention being paid to the structural changes that affect the recruitment of communicators, the form and content of popular culture, and the functions of communication in the society. It must be emphasised, however, that the analysis cannot but be tentative, and that the conclusions will almost certainly have to be modified in the light of subsequent research.

We are here concerned with the poetry of the *cantadores*. In the *sertão* of the Brazilian North-East there are an estimated 12,000 professional *cantadores*, who wander from town to town and from village to village singing duels of improvised verse (*desafios*) with other poets or singing memorized ballads (*romances*). These poets are recruited from the peasant class, and make a living from contributions made during the performance by the audience. There are three main problems connected with this poetic tradition. Firstly, the professionalization of the *cantadores* is a comparatively recent phenomenon, and their numbers are increasing. What are the reasons for this? Secondly, the character of their poetry has been changing. Is this related to the increase in the number of poets, and if so, in

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what ways? Thirdly, what has been the effect of the modernization of the rest of the country on the content and functions of this poetry?

The argument here put forward is that the changes which have taken place in this tradition are caused by the combination of the structural characteristics of *sertanejo* society, the effects on this structure of economic and political changes that have taken place outside the region and the effects on social structure of demographic changes in the region. The tradition cannot be understood in isolation; it must be examined in its regional and national context. Discussion of this context must, for reasons of space and in view of the preliminary nature of the research, be schematic. Minor variations of economic structure and social relations within the region will be disregarded in this paper.

I

The *sertão*² is the arid hinterland of the Brazilian North-East. This dry flat plain is interrupted only by the occasional dry river bed and range of hills; and although these cover a small area their economic importance is considerable³. The river beds are the only areas of the *sertão* that can be said to have a topsoil; in them, and around the waterholes, water is retained and subsistence agriculture is possible. The hills often have natural springs; they afford refuge during the dry season. But the *sertão* properly speaking is flat, dry and stony. The vegetation consists of *caatinga* (a low and sparse brushwood) and cactus. The average yearly rainfall of between 500 and 700 mm is very concentrated, and the fewer the rainy days, the lighter the rainfall⁴. Periodically, the region is afflicted with drought: the average precipitation falls, and this is concentrated in a few heavy showers. At times there is no rainfall at all for a year or more.

The effects of drought on the population of 8 million are aggravated by the economic structure of the region. The *sertão* was coloniz-

² On the *sertão* see especially Graciliano RAMOS, *Vidas Sêcas* (S. Paulo, 1938); José LINS DO RÉGO, *Pedra Bonita*⁴ (Rio, 1948); Euclides DA CUNHA, *Os Sertões* (Rio, 1902); Manuel DIÉGUES JUNIOR, *Regiões Culturais do Brasil* (Rio, 1960), Ch. VI.

³ Manuel CORREIA DE ANDRADE, *A Terra e o Homem no Nordeste* (S. Paulo, 1965).

⁴ CODENO, *A Policy for the Economic Development of the Northeast* (Rio, 1959), p. 65.

ed in the late 16 th. and early 17 th. centuries⁵, and a cattle economy was established to provide meat and motive power for the flourishing sugar civilization of the coastal strip. However, since the region is so arid that on average 10 hectares are needed for every head of cattle, and since here, unlike the fertile *pampas*, the cattle required constant attention, a relatively large labour force was needed. This labour force was maintained by subsistence agriculture in the river beds and near the water-holes. In some areas a third economy was superimposed in the 19 th. century, with the introduction of arboreous cotton and coffee⁶. Originally, in the cattle economy, the peasant had a right to one quarter of all new-born calves, chosen by lot⁷; as cattle increased in value, the landowner began to insist that the peasant sell his portion to him at the time of division. With the further increase in the value of cattle this custom, too, was superseded, and the peasant was paid in cash a fixed sum considerably below the value of the calves that were originally his right. This is now the standard arrangement.

In exchange for his labour (three, four and sometimes even five days a week), the peasant receives two forms of payment: the first is this cash payment; the second is permission to occupy a small plot of land (usually under 5 hectares) and to cultivate it during the remainder of the week for his own and his family's subsistence. As the value of the first falls, the importance to the peasant of the second increases. As the landowner responds to changes in the market demand for his product, the peasant is forced to rely on the subsistence economy. But since the market value of the cattle depends on the amount of attention it receives, the landowner attempts to limit the amount of time spent by the peasant on the subsistence economy. We have here a conflict of interests that reflects the contradiction between the two economies revealed by changes in market conditions outside the *sertão*. The effects of this contradiction are aggravated by demographic changes. The official statistics of the state of Ceará are the most useful as evidence, since this basic economic structure occupies about 80 % of its total area. In 1900 there were

⁵ Pedro CALMON, *História da Casa da Torre*² (Rio, 1958) and CORREIA DE ANDRADE, *op. cit.*, pp. 173 ff.

⁶ CORREIA DE ANDRADE, *op. cit.*, pp. 186 ff. The relations of production in the coffee and cotton areas are analogous to those in the cattle economy; for simplicity, I shall discuss the economic structure as if it were everywhere composed of two economies.

⁷ Correia DE ANDRADE, *op. cit.*, Ch. V.

5.7 persons per square kilometre in this state; by 1940 this had risen to 13.7, and by 1960 to an estimated 21.9 persons per square kilometre⁸. In periods of drought, it is this increasing number of peasants who suffer most, since the subsistence crops on which they depend for survival are harder hit than the cattle. Thus, in the drought of 1951, the production of meat and other animal products in the state of Ceará fell by 40%, whereas that of maize fell by 76%⁹.

This, then, is in outline the economic structure of the *sertão*: a number of large estates in which cattle is reared for the landowner by peasants who in return are allowed to cultivate small plots of land for their own subsistence¹⁰. The number of peasants is increasing rapidly, but the land under cultivation is not: for land given over to subsistence crops is lost to the cattle. Thus, despite large-scale emigration, the standard of living of the peasant is declining steadily. These factors must be borne in mind when we consider the evolution of the social relations and cultures of the *sertão*.

In the sugar civilization of the coast¹¹, the large estates, granted by the Portuguese king to members of the gentry, comprised small kingdoms in themselves. Their structure was pyramidal. At the apex was the sugar lord, the head of the landowning family. Below him were members of his family, and below them the various adjuncts to the family: the priest, the children's tutors, the managers of the estate. Below them was a number of free but dependent white peasants. Below them was the mass of African slaves. The life of this pyramid revolved round the sugar plantation, and hence around the head of the family. The pyramid was held together by an elaborate system of favours and obligations. The landowner would perform favours for those below him and would help those in need. In return the client owed loyalty to his patron. The system found cultural expression in the institution of the *compadrio*. The landowner would become godfather to the child of one of his dependents, and would be responsible for the child's welfare. The landowner and the child's father would then be *compadres*: their mutual obligations, and the

⁸ J. V. FREITAS MARCONDES, *First Brazilian Legislation relating to Labour Unions* (Gainesville, 1962), p. 50; Hélio GALVÃO, *O Mutirão no Nordeste* (Rio, 1959), p. 22; Stefan H. ROBOCK, *Desenvolvimento Econômico Regional: O Nordeste Brasileiro* (Rio, 1964), p. 49.

⁹ CODENO, *op. cit.*, pp. 66-7.

¹⁰ Cf. Keith GRIFFIN, "Reflections on Latin American Development", *Oxford Economic Papers*, 1966.

¹¹ Gilberto FREYRE, *Casa Grande e Senzala* (Rio, 1933).

power differential involved when such an institution exists in a hierarchical structure, were thus given ritual legitimization.

This structure was transferred to the *sertão*, but the transfer involved important modifications. The number of slaves was very much smaller, since in the *sertão* close supervision was impossible. The base of the pyramid was formed by free white peasants who came from Portugal¹² and placed themselves under the protection of the landowner. The conquest of the *sertão* — the fight against the Amerindians and against the harsh climate — produced a mentality unknown in the coastal areas. The fight against the Amerindians was seen as a continuation of the crusades and the *Reconquista*¹³. This crusading and pioneering mentality, and the values associated with it, was transmitted from father to son. Its main characteristic was an admiration for the strong, independent, self-reliant individual. So long as the pyramid remained cohesive these values were integrated into the patriarchal structure: it was the landowner who was admired. But this admiration, which extended to the skilful cowboy or to the man who would defend his honour to the death, could be transferred to a rebel: a man who took a strong stand against the landowner's authority would soon acquire a following. The geographical dispersion of the population — and later the growth of absenteeism — contributed to this decentralization of power and to the disintegration of the old structure.

What caused this disintegration? Firstly, there were in the *sertão* two forms of economic activity. One of these, the cattle economy, was oriented towards external market structures; the other, on which it was based, was purely internal. Changes taking place outside the *sertão* — the growth of cities on the coast, the industrialization of the South — affected the cattle economy, and modified its relationship with the subsistence economy. As we have seen, this revealed a latent conflict of economic interests. From being based on cooperation and solidarity, the *compadrio* relationship became more and more openly based on power. Combined with the pioneering values of the peasants, and the decentralization of power, this increased the potentialities of conflict.

Other factors, based on the relative isolation and permanence of the social relations and the cultures of the *sertão* as compared with the remainder of the country, contributed to the weakening of the

¹² Clovis CALDEIRA, *Mutirão* (S. Paulo, 1956), p. 48.

¹³ CALMON, *op. cit.*, pp. 73, 81.

structure. In 1888 came the emancipation of the slaves. This had little direct effect in the *sertão*, but it implied the end of the landowners' dominance in national politics. The rise of a merchant and business class and of an urban working class culminated in the populist dictatorship of Getúlio Vargas (1930-45). With motorized transport and the effective centralization of government the new Brazil began to penetrate the *sertão*. As the peasants began to look away from the *sertão*, the landowners were forced into it — this was their only remaining sphere of influence. Conflict between landowners, which until the late 19 th. century had taken place on a national as well as a local scale, became limited to the *sertão*; their violence increased¹⁴. At the same time, the steady rise of the peasant population, having weakened the hold of the landowner on the peasant, compelled him to resort to force. Already in the 19 th. century, the society of the *sertão* was fragmented and disorganized.

II

There are three main forms of reaction to this situation: messianic movements, banditry, and the *cantadores*. Despite their differences, these three forms of collective behaviour have certain characteristics in common. We are here primarily concerned with the *cantadores*¹⁵, and an extended discussion of the other two lies beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, they are important for the understanding of the relationship between the *cantadores* and the disorganized state of *sertanejo* society.

The messianic movements of the *sertão* can be regarded as primarily the result of a search for an alternative explanation of the world-order¹⁶. This search takes place on two levels. At one level there is the leader, who puts forward the alternative explanation. At this level there is no question of collective behaviour: it is rather a case of the social-psychological maladjustment of an individual —

¹⁴ Levy Cruz, „Funções do Comportamento Político numa Comunidade do S. Francisco”, *Revista Brasileira de Estudos Políticos*, 1959.

¹⁵ See now Robert ROWLAND, «Estructura y Cambio Social en el Nordeste del Brasil», *Aportes*, 1967.

¹⁶ Maria Isaura PEREIRA DE QUEIROZ, „Messiahs in Brazil”, *Past and Present*, 1965, and *Réforme et Révolution dans les Sociétés Traditionnelles* (Paris, forthcoming); Euclides DA CUNHA, *op. cit.*; Waldemar VALENTE, *Misticismo e Região* (Recife, 1963); Rui FACÓ, *Cangaceiros e Fanáticos*² (Rio, 1965); M. B. LOURENÇO FILHO, *Joazeiro do Padre Cicero* (S. Paulo, n. d.).

be he a renegade priest (Padre Cícero) or a layman for whom the present order has lost its meaning through a personal catastrophe (Antônio Conselheiro). At the other level there is the potential reaction among the peasantry to a state of chronic disorganization, sometimes accentuated by a period of increased violence or a drought. This potential is activated by contact with the leader's alternative explanation. There then takes place a mobilization of followers, who congregate around a given place. The movement acquires certain characteristics related to the traditional structure — usually a re-creation of the old pyramid around the person of the leader — and can then follow one of two main paths: they either attempt to create a City of God on Earth (Canudos, Caldeirão) or they prepare for the imminent end of the world, in which only the faithful will be saved. Such movements are seldom allowed to flourish for long before being put down by the authorities. There are two important characteristics of all these movements. Without exception, they involve an attempt at recreating a social order free from the chaos that characterizes life outside the community. Secondly, the ideology of these movements is largely based on traditional beliefs: thus there were several messiahs who claimed to be reincarnations of Dom Sebastião, the «king who will one day return»¹⁷. But if the «Forces of Good» are traditional, the «Forces of Evil» are often represented by local institutions or practices held to be at the root of the troubles of the times — corrupt politicians and moral decadence in the Padre Cícero cult, the Republican civil marriage laws («the Laws of the Devil») in Canudos. The evils are present evils, the solutions are variations on traditional themes originating in Medieval Europe and passed down from generation to generation.

The bandits¹⁸ are in some ways analogous to the messiahs. The bandit properly speaking, the *cangaceiro*, must be distinguished from the landowner's gunman, the *capanga* or *jagunço*. The *capanga* had existed from colonial days, and was used against other landowners or against renegade peasants. The *cangaceiro* is a more recent phenomenon. Here we have individuals who react against violent provocation with violence. The case of Virgulino Ferreira da Silva,

¹⁷ Norman COHN, *The Pursuit of the Millennium* (N. York, 1961), pp. 55-6; VALENTE, *op. cit.*, and the ballad on the death of Vargas, below.

¹⁸ FACÓ, *op. cit.*; Luis DA CÂMARA CASCUDO, *Vaqueiros e Cantadores* (Pôrto Alegre, 1939), pp. 116 ff.; Leonardo MOTA, *Violeiros do Norte*² (Fortaleza, 1962), pp. 217 ff. and *Sertão Alegre*² (Fortaleza, 1965), pp. 33 ff.; Verjíssimo DE MELO, *Cantador de Viola* (Recife, 1961), pp. 69 ff.

nicknamed Lampião, the most famous of recent bandits, is a good example.

«Just as it happened
to the great Antônio Silvino
so did it happen
to Lampião Virgulino
who embraced the *cangaço*
forced by Destiny.

For in the year of twenty
his father was murdered
two leagues away
from Rua de Mata Grande
and the police force
was the author of the crime.

Lampião from that day on
swore to be avenged
saying «An enemy
I'll kill him with no questions
in this world I only respect
Padre Cícero and no one else».¹⁹

Each leader soon found new recruits and formed a band. Here we have the effects of the pioneer mentality. By rebelling against the world and the powerful, the bandit leader usurps (or rather, re-creates for himself) the patriarchal authority of the landowner which has been diluted by geographical dispersion, his absence from the estate, and the increase of the peasant population. His reaction is not directed specifically against any individual or individuals, but nevertheless he tends to conform to the Robin Hood pattern by attacking only the powerful. The peasants support him and conceal him from the authorities: his violence is reserved for police detachments, shopkeepers, and landowners and their gunmen; the peasants do not come into his conflict, except when the authorities take arbitrary reprisals. In this case, the bandit group acquires some more members. The violence of the *cangaceiro* and the violence of the landow-

¹⁹ From the romance *A Vida Completa do Célebre Lampião*, quoted in MORA, *Sertão Alegre*, p. 37.

ner's *capanga* are similar. Landowners attempt to use the *cangaceiro* against other landowners, and sometimes afford him shelter. After a band has been dispersed its members either join another leader or become *capangas* in the pay of a landowner²⁰. The bandit leader is usually captured and killed after betrayal, but more recently *cangaceiros* succumbed to the use of motor transport against them. Large *cangaceiro* bands disappeared around 1940. Sporadic violence on a smaller scale has persisted to this day.

These two forms of reaction have certain characteristics in common. The messiah is an individual who produces an alternative ideology as a result of a personal crisis. Given the possibility of gathering a following around himself and this ideology, his movement takes a form based on the original social relations that have disintegrated. Both the ideology and the concrete form taken by the movement aim at restoring (in this world or the next) what has been lost. The bandit leader is likewise an individual who reacts to a particular crisis. He has no ideology, he cannot identify a supposed cause of the present state of affairs. His action is at the same time a reaction against this state of affairs and an intensification of it; by the simple act of standing out against the world he activates sentiments that have survived the disintegration of the old order and re-creates certain aspects of the old order, incorporating other aspects characteristic of its disintegration: he creates a new pyramid oriented towards the violence that assisted the disintegration of the old one. In both these cases, then, the reaction recombines certain of the surviving elements of the old order.

These two forms of reaction have almost completely disappeared. Periodically, and especially after droughts, there are outbreaks of violence, but these are soon brought under control. A messianic movement is in process of formation in Bahia, and the cult of Padre Cícero is as strong as ever; but it seems unlikely that there will be anything approaching a repetition of the Canudos episode. The progressive centralization of government and the consequently greater penetration of the outside world have ruled out recourse to the traditional means of reaction — messianism and banditry on a large scale — but have, far from removing the structural causes, intensified them. At the same time they have introduced a political vocabulary into the ideologies of protest and made possible the organization of

²⁰ On the institutionalization of violence cf. Orlando FALS BORDA, „Violence and the Break-up of Tradition in Colombia”, in Claudio VELIZ (ed.), *Obstacles to Change in Latin America* (Oxford, 1965).

peasant leagues²¹. Without going as far as those who see in the leagues only a conscious manipulation of the peasant masses by the inheritors of the patriarchal tradition, one can nevertheless discern a re-creation of a pyramidal structure based on favours and political power. The reasons for this are perhaps to be sought largely in the persistence of certain structural patterns in the peasants' image of society²². If, on the other hand, the messianic movements, banditry and peasant leagues are seen as continuums of power extending from the base (the peasant mass) to the source of power, significant differences emerge which help to explain the different durations of individual manifestations. A messianic movement is organized around sacred power, and the messiah is an intermediary between the peasant and the supernatural. When the authorities crush a movement, this mediation continues in the form of messianic aspirations — as in the Padre Cícero cult. The bandit leader has no superior power to whom he can turn, and the dispersal by the authorities is usually complete. In the peasant leagues, the organizer can use the phantom of revolution to extract political favours from the central government and so increase his power and appeal. Political centralization — which effectively ruled out large-scale messianic movements and banditry — in fact made the peasant leagues possible. Their dissolution after the *coup* of April 1964 operated at two levels: the military take-over removed the channels between the state and the leader, and the local landlords, no longer faced with rival political power, were able to complete the liquidation at the lower level. The continuance of peasant organizations — leagues or rural trade unions — will in this sense depend on the partial or complete restoration of channels of power and mediation between the state and the peasants.

III

The third traditional form of reaction, the *cantadores*, has, unlike the other two, developed even more vigorously following on the incursions of outside civilization²³.

The peasants who first colonized the *sertão* brought with them

²¹ FRANCISCO JULIÃO, *Que São as Ligas Camponesas?* (Rio, 1962).

²² BENNO GALJART, „Class and, Following 'in Rural Brazil', *América Latina*, 1964. Cf. ROWLAND, *op. cit.*

²³ CASCUDO, *op. cit.*; MOTA, *Violeiros do Norte and Cantadores*³ (Fortaleza, 1961); CASA DE RUI BARBOSA, *Literatura Popular em Verso, Antologia*, vol. I (Rio, 1964).

many cultural elements from Portugal — they came «with their world in their memory»²⁴. Songs, dances, legends, folk-tales, superstitions were transplanted from Portugal to the *sertão*. There this folk culture coexisted with the «official» culture, the rites of the Church, the institutions such as the *compadrio*. This folk culture was above all a peasant culture. It operated in three main spheres. The first was the religious sphere. As Thales de Azevedo emphasises²⁵, folk Catholicism in Brazil is not institutional: devotion often centres round an image or altar in the home. The second sphere was that of work. Work-songs brought from Portugal were adapted to the new conditions, and the isolation of a few men taking the cattle to pasture — which often involved several day's journey — stimulated the further development of improvised song. A particular form of improvisation was particularly suited to these circumstances — the improvisation of alternate stanzas by two men, in the form of a poetic duel. Duels of this kind existed all round the Mediterranean, and it was in its Gallego-Portuguese form that the *desafio* reached Brazil. Throughout the colonial period it appears to have been particularly associated with the *vaqueiro*, or cowboy. The third sphere was that of leisure. Here we find the traditional stories, anecdotes and superstitions of medieval origin whose survival to this day testifies to their continuing importance in the life of the peasant, despite the changes that have taken place in *sertanejo* society.

The explicit value-content of this folk tradition was low; but it had one set of implicit values that was important for the subsequent development of the tradition: the stress it laid on the need for horizontal solidarity²⁶. The institution of the *mutirão*, or *adjunto*, is an example of this tradition of solidarity in action²⁷. The need for co-operation in the struggle against a world that is felt to be hostile gave

²⁴ CASCUDO, *Literatura Oral* (Rio, 1952), p. 176 and Ch. V.

²⁵ *Social Change in Brazil* (Gainesville, 1963), pp. 70 ff.

²⁶ Despite the lack of adequate historical evidence, one can hypothesize that one reason for this was the nature of the land tenure system in Northern Portugal, which escaped feudalism. Land-holdings appear to have been distributed more or less equally, and on an individual basis; contact with the central government was minimal; and, given the pressure of population on the land — which was one of the causes of emigration — the creation of a surplus from which power differentials could arise was difficult.

Cf. T. Lynn SMITH, „The Social Relationships of Man to the Land in Portugal”, *Sociologica*, 1963; Maurice GODELIER, „Objet et Méthode de l'Anthropologie Economique”, *L'Homme*, 1965; Gerhard LENSKI, *Power and Privilege* (N. York, 1966).

²⁷ CALDEIRA, *op. cit.*; GALVÃO, *op. cit.*

rise to this form of mutual aid. A peasant in need of help for a particular task can call on the neighbourhood for assistance. If a peasant has suffered some misfortune the neighbourhood will often come to his aid spontaneously, great care being taken that the assistance will come as a surprise to him. Those who take part in a *mulirão* perform a day's labour free, on the understanding that they can expect similar help if ever they need it. The day's labour ends in a traditional celebration, with food and drink provided by the beneficiary. If he is unable to provide it, the neighbours bring their own: for the celebration, with its singing, dancing and *desafios*, is indispensable. On a more general level, the fact that this was an «unofficial» peasant culture, a culture that pervaded those aspects of their life that were not shared with the landowner, meant that by means of it they defined themselves in terms of what they were and what their fathers had been before them. And in the context of life in the *sertão*, this implied strong bonds of solidarity with those who were in the same situation: it implied horizontal solidarity.

It was the poetic and expressive part of this folk tradition that showed the most vitality. Already in the 18th. century long poems (*romances*) dealing with famous or legendary runaway steers were being sung in the *sertão*²⁸: these appear to have developed from shorter cowboy songs — they are unrelated in form and content with the Spanish and Portuguese *romances*, which survived independently — and were passed down by oral tradition. The *cantador* was at that time a peasant cowboy well-known for his poetic ability and skill in improvisation. We have information about a few famous *cantadores* of the 19th. century²⁹, and for most of them poetry was a subsidiary occasional activity. And if this was the case with the few whose names have survived in the popular tradition, it must have been true of the lesser names, all those whose singing and poetry enlivened the emptiness of the *sertão*. The end of the 19th century brought two important developments. Traditional *romances* were rescued from oral transmission and began to be written down. They were printed in crude leaflets, as were new *romances* based on traditional themes. The composition and printing of *romances* became a full-time occupation, and by the turn of the century there were over a thousand different *romances* on sale in the markets of the region. The *cantadores*, too, began to leave the land and take up poetry as a profession. They

²⁸ CASCUDO, *Vaqueiros e Cantadores*, p. 71 ff. Cf. Théo BRANDÃO, „Novíssimos Romances do Gado”, *Revista de Etnografia* n° 2 (n.d.).

²⁹ CASCUDO, *op. cit.*, pp. 248 ff.

would wander round the *sertão* singing in market-places, bars and individual farmsteads. They would sing memorized *romances*, and they would fight duels of improvised verse with other *cantadores*. The increase in the number of professional *cantadores* had two effects. Firstly, it made known the existence of a profession that was a more attractive alternative to working on the land under the conditions outlined above but which did not involve the cultural shock of abandoning the *sertão* for the twentieth century by emigrating to the South. Secondly, it increased the frequency of poetic performances, and so increased the young *sertanejo's* familiarity with the techniques of oral composition. The number of *cantadores* increased still more, until today it is estimated that in the five states comprising the North-East properly speaking (Ceará, Paraíba, Pernambuco, Rio Grande do Norte, Alagoas) there are approximately 12,000 professional *cantadores*³⁰. The population of the *sertão* and the *agreste* (which is culturally a part of the *sertão*) in these states is estimated at 11 million (1960).

To understand the reasons for these developments it will be necessary to consider in greater detail the characteristics of the *cantadores'* poetry and the changes that have taken place in this poetry.

The *cantador* is first and foremost a poet who sings *desafios*. These duels are everyday occurrences in any community of more than a few hundred inhabitants. A *cantador* will arrive in a village, town or farmstead. If there is another in the neighbourhood he will be challenged to a *desafio*. A crowd will gather where the duel is to take place. Armed with their *violas* (the *viola* is a smaller, primitive version of the guitar) they sit opposite each other and begin. One poet will sing a stanza, the other will reply, and the duel is on. Since the first line of each stanza must rhyme with the last of the previous stanza, improvisation is ensured. The traditional *desafio* would develop as follows: the poets introduced themselves; they praised their own poetic powers by enumerating famous poets they had defeated and exalting the Muse and the *viola*; they poured scorn on the other poet's claims to be a poet; they hurled insults at each other; they tried to outwit the other with riddles and questions; they challenged the other to sing on a particular traditional topic — often the battles of Charlemagne and the Twelve Peers of

³⁰ This figure is based on estimates made by *cantadores*, and should be regarded as provisional.

France — thus displaying their knowledge, or to show their skill by singing in one of the more difficult verse-forms; they tried to trip each other up with tongue-twisters; finally, after a struggle that lasted several hours, in which these forms of attack were repeated with variations, one poet would declare himself beaten by laying down his *viola*. The essence of the traditional *desafio* was the conflict between two poets; the form of the duel, and the circumstances of the performance, were such as to permit the inclusion of a great number of topics related to the life of the peasant and cowboy, both directly and also indirectly, through the traditional themes that formed part of the folk tradition. But this aspect was subordinated to the fact that this was a duel.

At about the turn of the century this traditional form began to change. The element of conflict was played down, and the *desafio* changed from being a duel properly speaking to something resembling a conversation — and the word *cantoria* («sing-song») came to be used interchangeably with *desafio*. Still within the traditional framework, the poets would forget their antagonism and sing about Life — the lot of the peasant, local incidents, the delights of the rainy season in the *sertão*, the suffering during the droughts, laments for the death of Lampião, the art of being a skilful cowboy, the perils of marrying a beautiful woman —

«If I ever get married
my wife will be ugly
for a beautiful woman
takes outside customers
marrying a beautiful woman
is like share-cropping.

Whoever marries an ugly woman
leads a life of ease
he lunches without worries
he goes to work without cares
the only thing he doesn't have
is many friends or visitors».

— and so on. This conversational element has now come to dominate the *desafio*. No longer is the victor the poet who outwits his opponent; if there is a «victor», it is the poet who is judged to have

sung best³¹. The change can be summarized according to two main aspects: firstly, virtuosity is displayed for its own sake — new and more complicated verse-forms have become more common in recent years — and not as a means of defeating an opponent; secondly, the *desafio* has become more «philosophical», more related to the common experience of the *sertanejo*.

A similar development has taken place in the *romance*. The earliest *romances* dealt exclusively with scenes from cowboy life; at the end of 19th. century these and other *romances* medieval in origin were written down. As news from the outside world began to penetrate the *sertão*, the printed — and subsequently sung — *romance* became the means of diffusion of this news. The author would take an item of news and compose a *romance* on the subject; the choice of theme, and its presentation, depended on the significance it would have for the *sertanejo*. The coming to power of Vargas in 1930 initiated the penetration of populist themes such as Vargas the father and champion of the poor against the rich. This slant became incorporated into the local tradition which ascribed the suffering of the poor to Destiny: the rich joined Destiny, and Vargas joined the saints who could be persuaded to intervene on the side of the helpless peasant. Thus outside political developments had two main effects on the *romance*: it brought outside events into the *sertão*, where they were interpreted in the light of the *sertanejo's* experience; and it brought a wider, more political, perspective to local themes. But this outside influence is never felt directly: it is always incorporated into the traditional outlook of the peasant. Brief summaries of two of these *romances* will make the process clearer.

Sacco and Vanzetti in the Eyes of the World: «This story is taken from newspaper reports. Everybody, in the whole world, from the Capital to the *sertão*, was filled with pity for the fate of these two men. Sacco was born in Italy. Knowing that in his own land he could not get on he decided to go to America, filled with hopes of prosperity. Arriving there he was disillusioned and could find no work, but at last he found a job and a wife. Vanzetti, too, was born in Italy. He decided to go to the United States, the land of opportunity. There he could not find a good job. At this time the world was in upheaval, and the workers were forming societies. Sacco and Vanzetti joined the Anarchists. One day, returning from a meeting, they

³¹ Ariano SUASSUNA, „Nota sôbre a Poesia Popular Nordestina”, *Revista DECA*, 1962.

were arrested and accused of a crime they had not committed. They were imprisoned and sentenced to death. Before being executed Sacco bade farewell to his mother, wife and son. Vanzetti bade farewell to his friends, the land where he was born, and his mother. The world was filled with grief at their execution. Such is life: a man is forced to leave home filled with hope for a better life and dies in jail.

To leave one's native land
to go to another land
dreaming of freedom
to die in jail
Life is strange
so many lost hopes
so many sand-castles.

It's like the motherless child
it's like the bird without nest
it's like the plant that grows
despised by the roadside
the bird has no home
the plant has no care
the child has no love». ³²

Here we can see clearly the way in which the plight of the *sertanejo* who emigrates to the cities of the South and ends up in the slums has given meaning to the fate of Sacco and Vanzetti. The vocabulary, the treatment, the philosophic reflections, are those used when writing and singing of the *sertanejo* in the South.

The Arrival of Getúlio Vargas in Heaven and his Trial: «When Getúlio died the world was filled with grief. The workers said they had lost their champion. St. Michael gave the sad news to Jesus. Jesus reprimanded him for not having prevented Lacerda's plotting and for having abandoned Getúlio. He wanted Getúlio in Paradise, and sent St. Michael and St. George to fetch him. The Angel took him in his arms to heaven via the planets, where the great men of history saluted Getúlio, the champion of the poor. At the trial, Jesus was in the throne, St. Liborius was the prosecutor, Our Lady his defence. Liborius claimed Getúlio had been a criminal — his suicide proved that. Our Lady denied it, and said that like her son, he had suffered to save the poor. Jesus demanded an explanation for the

³² CASA DE RUI BARBOSA, *op. cit.*, pp. 177 ff.

suicide, and Getúlio claimed he had died for his people. Jesus forgave him, and promised to send him back to earth to redeem the poor». ³³

Vargas is thus made into a messiah similar to Padre Cícero: he will return from the tomb to save his people.

In others the political element is more explicit: attacks on rising prices, which are all the fault of the rich (but about which the *sertanejo* can do nothing); *romances* in which a brave *sertanejo* deceives a landowner and runs off with his daughter; another in which Lampião invades Hell, takes it over, expels the rich and makes it a paradise for the poor; prophecies in the messianic tradition of the end of the world and the redemption of the poor. All these influences from the outside world are beginning to change the consciousness of the peasant, but they are entering his consciousness through an old and fundamentally fatalistic tradition. The fact that the peasant hears all this from the *cantador*, who will also sing of the deeds of Charlemagne, adventures of medieval knights, kings and princesses, the deeds of famous bandits, the droughts that usher in the end of the world, and so on, means that the potentially revolutionary effect of these influences is small. The peasant's world has become larger, but he sees others in his own predicament and cannot conceive of any action of his being able to alter the situation. And when it is a new interpretation that is imported, it is assimilated to the traditional interpretations (see Appendix).

These developments are all inter-related. The rise in population has forced a large number of peasants off the land. Some emigrate, lured by the gold-paved streets of Rio or São Paulo, and end up in the slums. Others remain and become *cantadores*. *Cantadores* are recruited exclusively from the peasant class, and the factors that lead them to take up the profession are both economic and social. In the *sertão*, as we have seen, the landless peasant has little inducement to remain on the land: the conflict between the interests of the cattle economy and the subsistence economy both reduces the standard of living of the peasant and limits the land available for cultivation. In the neighbouring area of the *agreste*, which is culturally part of the *sertão*, there are two types of land tenure. Most of its area is covered by large estates, whose economic structure is similar to that of the *sertão*. The economic pressure here is the same. But in this area there is also a large number of *minifúndia*, small

³³ *Ibid.*, pp. 357 ff. Cf. SUASSUNA, *Auto da Compadecida* (Rio, 1957).

plots of under five hectares, the result of continuous subdivision through inheritance. Here we have the same economic pressures — increasing population and a limited amount of land — operating in a different context.

Thus the first effect of population increase in both these areas is to force peasants off the land. Another factor is the increase in primary schools since 1940. The traditional association between literacy and non-manual occupations increases the pressure on the literate peasant to leave the land; the absence of any alternative form of employment renders the profession of *cantador* more attractive³⁴.

The population increase has also had effects on the social relations: it is one of the factors which weakened the solidarity between landowner and peasant. This it did both directly and indirectly: directly, by reducing the personal contact between each peasant and his landlord; indirectly by bringing to the surface the conflict between the cattle and subsistence economies and the opposition of interests between landowner and peasants. We have examined the external factors that have assisted the disintegration of the old vertical solidarity, and we have seen how the development of the traditional peasant culture in its expressive aspects has substituted this peasant culture, with its emphasis on horizontal solidarity, for the institutionalized culture in disintegration. The professionalization of the *cantador*, caused by the population increase in a rigid economic structure, has resulted in the replacement of an old culture, weakened by this same population increase, with another traditional culture. The fact that it is literate peasants who are induced to take up the profession of *cantador* has exposed the poetic tradition, and through it the peasants, to external cultural influences. These have changed the character of the *romance*. But since the external cultural influences only began to reach the *sertão* in any quantity after the rise of Vargas, they came after the combination of internal and external economic factors had weakened the patriarchal structure sufficiently for it to have been replaced by the mo-

³⁴ Dr. Eric Hobsbawm has pointed out to me the importance of the Catholic religion in limiting the alternatives for the peasant. The Negro in the South of the United States had a further alternative: free-lance preaching and religious sects. Brazil being a Catholic country, these opportunities do not exist; it is therefore to be expected that the number of poets should be high. The recent spread of protestantism among the peasants, despite the ferocious opposition of the Church, emphasises this point.

dified folk tradition — administrative centralization came after the effects of outside economic conditions on the cattle economy, after the main messianic movements, after the period when banditry flourished, after the professionalization of the *cantador*. They thus encountered not the old culture but a replacement culture, a culture that was trying to explain rather than justify the present situation. External elements were absorbed into the replacement culture without causing any fundamental change in the popular consciousness. It was the fact that there was a considerable time-lag between changes in the economic structure of the country as a whole and the effects of those changes on the country's political culture that determined the ineffectiveness of new ideas when they reached the *sertão*.

IV

The discussion has so far been at a very general level. Having outlined what appears to be the relationship between the *cantador* tradition and structural factors, and between the tradition and the other two forms of popular reaction to the disintegration of the «official» culture, we must consider the process as it operates on the individual.

How does a man become a *cantador*? The individual's decision to take up the profession depends on the relative unattractiveness of working on the land and the relative attractiveness of being a *cantador*. We have discussed the factors determining the former; the latter depends on two things: the degree of exposure to the tradition and the regard in which the poet is held by the community. Of these, the first is the most important for determining his ability to be a *cantador*. Every child is exposed to the tradition from an early age. As has been shown for the *guslari* of Yugoslavia, the oral technique is not something that is consciously learned: it is nearer a second language, absorbed, as language is, unconsciously.

The poet's own comments on why they began, recorded in 1965, are instructive. Three main reasons are given: a) it was in the family; b) I felt inspired, and c) I couldn't find a better job. The first and third are clear; the second is largely a romanticised rationalization of the other two.

«The vocation summoned me. You can't learn it, it's a gift from the cradle (...). One has to hear in order to learn. Poetry is a gift, but someone without hearing it doesn't know what it is».

«I sing with a *viola* because I like poetry and feel pleasure in my

life as a poet. I think it's beautiful. And then, it's my way of earning a living. Rustic poetry. And then, it comes from the cradle, it comes from my grandfathers».

«It was in the family. I thought I was, besides feeling that I was a poet, or rather, that I am a poet, when I felt the fire of poetry burning inside me, then I was happy to know that I'm the grandson of Manoel Galdino Bandeira. And be being a great *cantador*, I began there and was happy in my profession, he being a great *cantador* left all paths open for me. Then, I was able to sing. And besides, at home there are more poets. There's me, who am a professional *cantador*, João Bandeira, my brother, a professional as well, Francisco Bandeira, professional, Ciça Bandeira, a poetess, in short, at home, nearly everyone understands about poetry, thank God.

«I began because of a liking for it, a lack of education, I couldn't get a better job. So I embraced the *viola*.

«It comes from the cradle. My father sang, my grandfather sang, I have a brother who's a *cantador*, a great *cantador*, and then, as a profession. I didn't have a job, I didn't have any means of earning enough, so I embraced the *viola* and let myself go».

«I began as a means of working with the hoe, because I felt a facility for making verses and rhymes, and admired the old *cantadores*, and thought that it would be easy for me».

«I am grateful for the kindness
of Jesus my creator
for if Fate made me poor
he made me a poet».

If, having been exposed to the tradition, an individual feels attracted by it, he will learn *romances*. From these, and from hearing *cantadores* improvise, he acquires a facility for improvisation within the formal framework of verse. If he is successful in his first attempts at fighting a duel and if poetry is, for him, sufficiently more attractive than working on the land, he will become a *cantador profissional* and travel round the *sertão*. When he fights a duel, a hat or plate is placed beside the two poets, and the audience contributes small sums of money. The proceeds are then divided equally between the two poets. Since *cantadores* are also paid by bar-owners in the towns to sing and so attract customers, and then return to the rural areas where they spend their earnings, they do not constitute as heavy a burden on the peasantry as might appear: in fact,

they siphon off some of the high profits of the commercial sector and redistribute them to the depressed agricultural sector.

Since the art of improvisation is virtually independent of poetic ability, the number of poets is not subject to this constraint. But even the technical art of improvisation imposes a limit on the number of peasants who can be *cantadores*. At first, those who could not improvise would have given up; but as the pressures forcing them off the land increase, they become singers of *romances*. The real *cantadores* feel this as a threat to their status as artists. «Some are exploiters. They are not poets. Some are exploiters. For example, the singers who go to the markets to sing other people's *romances*, these are exploiting poetry but they are not poets».

«It's enough for a fellow not to like
 living as a share-cropper
 he takes a *viola* by his side
 buys the «Romance of the Peacock»
 «the Duel of Riachão with the Devil»
 and «The Story of Pedro Malasarte»,
 he goes into the world bragging
 to yell for money in the markets
 parasites like these
 are lowering the standards of my art».³⁵

Thus we have in the *sertão* what may be regarded as an elementary but pervasive communications network which has been created by the members of the society to fulfil a need — both economic and cultural — and which has developed in response to changes that have taken place both within and outside the society. The *cantadores* are intermediaries, both between the present and the past and between the *sertão* and the outside world; but since the first was their original function, and they perform it well, they perform the second only partially: for it is only the «information» that is compatible with the process of oral composition that is transmitted (see Appendix). This is due in part to the nature of the medium, in part to its accepted function. The *cantador* speaks the language of the *sertanejo*. This, apart from the content of his poetry, has in itself a reassuring function. As with the singers and «intellectuals»

³⁵ CASA DE RUI BARBOSA, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

of Chicago's Hobohemia³⁶, so with the *cantadores*. Not only does their poetry create a sense of cultural unity and of solidarity in the face of a world that is against them, but it also expresses the beliefs and experiences of the members of the audience. For the *sertanejo*, as for the hobo, it is something merely to have a voice.

V

What, then, are our main conclusions? Firstly, the increasing number of professional *cantadores* is largely the result of a rapid increase in population in a society whose economic structure cannot, in its present form, absorb it. Secondly, it is also a reaction against the disorganized state of a society that after a long period of immobility is suffering the effects of its survival into the twentieth century. Thirdly, the character of their poetry has changed in response both to the internal situation and to outside influences. And, lastly, its traditional nature has prevented its being a vehicle for any radical change in the outlook of the peasant.

If this analysis is correct — and confirmation will depend on more detailed research — the nature and functions of this primitive communications network can only be understood in the light of the factors that have influenced its development. Taken by itself, it is a curiosity, no more. Seen in its structural context, it helps to explain the conservatism of the peasants of the *sertão* in addition to providing a symptom of the disorganized state of the society.

The purpose of this paper has been twofold: firstly, to explore the relationship between beliefs and social action in a situation of social change, and to suggest how an analysis of the process of communication, when seen in its structural context, can be used to relate the two; secondly, to indicate an approach that may prove useful in the analysis of popular culture in urban societies. There are sim-

³⁶ Nels ANDERSON, *The Hobo* (Chicago, 1923), 1961 edn., p. 214: «In song and ballad the hobo expresses life as he sees and feels it. Through poetry he creates a background of tradition and culture which unifies and gives significance to all his experiences. His ballads of the road and his battle songs of protest induce a unanimity of sentiment and attitudes, the strongest form of group solidarity in the hobo world,» and p. 229: «(The kerbstone orator) is merely a thinking hobo. In him the homeless man becomes articulate. It is something to these outcast men to hear in these kerbstone forums the reverberations of their own unuttered thoughts. It is something for the homeless man merely to have a voice.»

milarities between the tradition discussed in this paper and certain forms of popular culture in other societies — the early stages of jazz in the United States, for example, the recent development of a «Hippie» contra-culture in San Francisco and elsewhere, or the Dutch *provo* movement — and their study — as well as our understanding of the structural factors that underlie expressions of discontent and protest in modern societies as well as in the underdeveloped world — may benefit from the kind of analysis that has here been applied to what seems at first sight to be an exotic curiosity but which turns out to be related to some of the most pressing problems of our times.

APPENDIX

Thematic innovation in oral poetry

Considerable work has been done on the study of oral composition in oral epic³⁷, but in the essentially lyrical tradition of the *sertão* certain modifications have to be made. Detailed discussion of the process of oral composition lies outside the scope of this paper, but the following general features can be noted. The poet's thematic material is coded for him by the tradition into constellations of images with associated rhyme-patterns, forms of expression and patterns of thought. The poet works by association at the levels of rhyme, of images, and of broader themes. For example, the poet will possess a constellation that can be classified under the heading «the *viola*». This constellation will include elements that have been found convenient in the past for stanzas about the *viola*, and these linked elements will be associated with one another either in terms of rhyme, assonance, the visual similarity of images, etc. or in terms of joint opposition to a single element which under different aspects participates in a relation of opposition to each of them. He will also possess a constellation of elements traditionally used in discussing «woman». The comparison between the *viola* and a wo-

³⁷ Albert B. LORD, *The Singer of Tales* (Cambridge, Mass., 1960); G. S. Kirk, *The Songs of Homer* (Cambridge, 1962), „Homer and Modern Oral Poetry: some confusions”, *Classical Quarterly*, 1960; George DIMOCK, „Homer to Novi Pazar and Back”, *Arion*, 1963; T. G. ROSENMEYER, „The Formula in Early Greek Poetry”, *Arion*, 1965; Antônio CANDIDO, „Estímulos da Criação Literária”, in *Literatura e Sociedade* (S. Paulo, 1965).

man will be made by combining elements from the two constellations. It is essential that the poet's material be structured in this way if he is to use it in improvised verse. New elements can only be used if the poet can associate them with one of the old constellations. The result of this structuring is a process of selection that effectively prevents the importation of radically new elements into the tradition directly through the *cantador*. Thus only when the new can be assimilated into the old is it included at all; if it is capable of assimilation it is incapable of altering the essentially traditional nature of the old.

MARRIAGE, MOTHERHOOD AND MEDICINE*

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SOCIOLOGY OF MEDICINE

SOCIOLOGIE DE LA MÉDECINE

There has been much popular as well as sociological interest in Britain in recent years in questions concerned with women's participation in the economy of the country.

The demand for higher education for women and for their right to enter the learned professions and managerial occupations on equal terms with men which gathered momentum in the early 20th century was prompted not only by considerations of equitable treatment. It was also a response to a demographic situation in which differential sex mortality and emigration rates left many women without the opportunity to marry and made it imperative for them to support themselves economically.

Until the second world war it was still largely assumed that women's optimal state was one of matrimony, which implied economic security as much as economic servitude, and that if she was successful in achieving it she would neither need nor wish to continue to do paid work. Indeed, the rules of many employing units, including those of the civil service and the state schools, expressly laid it down that women must resign on marriage.¹ It was this in the context of a surplus of women in the child-bearing ages and the strong likelihood that many would fail to find a husband, that girls were encouraged to seek higher education and professional training.

* The author wishes to thank the Medical Practitioners' Forum and the Office of Health Economics for permission to reproduce tables first published in *Women in Medicine* by Margo JAFFAR and P. M. BAXTER, 1962.

¹ These rules tended to be supported by single women who were battling for equal pay. The employment of married women whose earnings were not the only source of their household's income might have made the case more difficult to argue. The employment rules were sometimes relaxed in favour of widows who ceased to work to support themselves and their dependent children.

MARRIAGE, MOTHERHOOD AND MEDICINE *

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Introduction

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During the second world war the demand for professional, scientific and managerial staff in all branches of the country's economy could only be met by increasing the proportion of women entrants to higher education and professional training and by encouraging married women with higher education or professional qualifications to work. The rules of employing units prohibiting the employment of married women were gradually relaxed although often in the first instance for the duration of the emergency only. Although no compulsion was exercised in the case of mothers with dependent children, day nurseries were provided so that those with very young children could leave them while they worked. In other words, mothers as well as childless married women were encouraged to undertake two roles and helped by the provision of communal child-minding facilities to overcome some of the practical difficulties involved in performing them simultaneously².

In the immediate post-war years, the extent to which women with higher education or professional training would wish to combine marriage and motherhood with a career and should receive public approbation or disapproval for doing so became for the first time a subject for serious debate.

At the end of the war there was understandably an increase in the marriage rate and a substantial increase in the birthrate. Demobilisation from the armed forces brought professionally qualified men back to civilian employment and a backlog of male entrants to universities and other institutions for higher education. There was also some indication at the time that many men felt that their status in the family and in the community which rested on their position as sole family income earner would be threatened if their wives were also earners. While they had been willing to tolerate such a position in the special circumstances of the war, they assumed it would not be perpetuated in «normal» times³.

These facts together with the continued and ever-increasing shortage of domestic workers suggested that both the supply and the demand for women with higher qualifications in industry and the services would contract. Moreover, there had been some indication during the war that communal childminding facilities were not an unmixed blessing, especially from the point of view of the child's

² INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE., *The War and Women's Employment*, 1946.

³ Thomas GEOFFREY, *Women at Work*, 1944, Government Wartime Social Survey (mimeographed.)

health and social development and misgivings on this score increased on the publication of John Bowlby's disquieting work on children who had been deprived in infancy of maternal love⁴. Consequently, most of the day nurseries provided by the local authorities were closed and admission to the remaining ones restricted almost entirely to the children of women who had to work because they had no other financial support.

These then were the characteristics of the economy and of the social system which in the immediate post-war years tended to discourage adult women from attempting to play simultaneously the two roles of mother and worker and suggested that little effort should be made to extend openings for women in professions like medicine which required long years of training.

In the twenty years since the end of the second world war there have been other countervailing influences at work. The more extensive employment of women during the war in occupations hitherto the almost exclusive preserve of men was followed up by more pressing requests for freer entry to professions and equal pay for men and women. The main influence, however, on attitudes to wives' work has been the growing and unsatisfied demand in both the public and the private sectors of the economy for personnel with professional and scientific qualifications and with managerial ability and know-how. In a situation where nearly all suitably qualified men and childless women were already employed, mothers represented the only substantial untapped source of labour. Hence, more and more employers began to consider ways in which they could attract wives and mothers as workers by offering them conditions of work which would minimise the likely conflict between their marital and maternal duties on the one hand and their occupational role on the other.

At the same time, technological developments in household equipment and in retail management have helped to reduce the burden of domestic work which forms a considerable part of the woman's familial role function. Vacuum cleaners, washing machines, launderettes, floor polishers, refrigerators, frozen and packaged foods and

⁴ J. BOWLBY, «Maternal Care and Mental Health», *World Health Organization Bulletin*, No 3, 1951. Bowlby's thesis based on children living in institutions was applied indiscriminately in many quarters. It was commonly used to disparage mothers who sought only a few hours regular relief weekly from the constant care of their children.

self-service stores — even the better control of air pollution — have all played a part in easing the time and effort required to meet high normative standards of household management. The private car now within the means of a third of all households in Britain has also helped to reduce the conflict of roles by effectively bringing home and workplace closer together in time and distance. The television has taken some of the hard work out of supervision of young children outside school hours.

Furthermore, a generational move from complementary and segregated husband-wife roles in the family to joint and interchangeable roles⁵ has affected not only the part which a husband plays in the home, in domestic work and in the care of children but also attitudes to the wife as an income earner. Among all classes of society there was much less disapproval and more positive support for mothers who worked in 1959 than there had been in the immediate post-war years⁶.

A number of studies by sociologists which appeared in the 1950's helped to prepare a new and favourable climate of opinion concerning women's work outside the home. By pointing out how earlier marriage, smaller families and improvements in domestic amenities had changed women's traditional role, studies like those of Titmuss⁷ helped to bring about a radical change of public opinion. Although stress was laid on the importance of mothers devoting themselves exclusively to their maternal role in the first five years of their children's life, the positive advantages accruing from rather than the potential conflicts involved in women performing two roles thereafter and throughout married life began to be emphasized.

A number of empirical studies served to reinforce the message. Some showed that fears that the children of working wives were neglected to the detriment of their health or social behaviour could not be substantiated⁸. Others emphasized the negative aspects of the

⁵ E. BOTT, *Family and Social Network*, 1957.

⁶ V. KLEIN, *Britain's Married Women Workers*, 1965.

⁷ R. M. TITMUSS, *Essays on the Welfare State*, 1957. See also, R. K. KELSALL and S. MITCHELL, «Married Women and Employment in England and Wales», *Population Studies*, Vol. XIII, Pt. 1, 1959, and C. M. STEWARD, «Future Trends in the Employment of Married Women», *British Journal of Sociology*, March 1961.

⁸ Cf., for example: A. CARTWRIGHT and M. JEFFERYS, «Married Women Who Work: their own and their children's health», *British Journal of Preventive and Social Medicine*, 1958. Vol. 12, p. 159, and P. JEPHCOTT, *et al.*, 1962, *Married Women Working*.

lives of wives who were forced by the absence of suitable work facilities and prevailing concepts of the maternal role to deny themselves a work role and to play only the maternal role.⁹

The increasing acceptability of the view that it is not desirable that the maternal role should preclude the playing of other roles has undoubtedly helped to reduce the conflict which mothers who work may feel between the demands of their two roles. Moreover, the continuing shortage of labour in many branches of the economy has induced many employers to try to modify the conditions of employment offered to married women in such a way as to minimize the conflicting demands of home and work.

Nevertheless, prejudices inherited from an earlier age die hard and the traditional organization of work tasks which place married women with compelling home commitments at a disadvantage vis-à-vis their male or unmarried female colleagues survive. Moreover, the difficulties of combining work and familial roles differ from occupation to occupation and from area to area. For example, the coincidence of working hours and holiday periods of school children and school teachers, makes it easier for the school teacher mother of school age children to avoid one aspect of the role conflict which afflicts women in most other professions. Similarly, the demand for school teachers is more evenly spread throughout the country than, for example, the demand for architects, lawyers, journalists, scientists, technicians and administrative staff which is heavily concentrated in metropolitan and other large centres of population. Opportunities to continue after marriage a career for which a woman has received the requisite training will consequently depend on the type of area in which she lives.

Thus, issues associated with the work of married women and with the entry of women to higher education and professional training excite as much interest as ever. In this paper, information obtained in 1962-63 from medically qualified women about their work and their marital and maternal status is used to illustrate the problems this professional group faces of combining occupational, marital and maternal roles and the degree to which they succeed in doing so.

⁹ Cf. J. HUBBACK, *Wives who Went to College*, 1957, H. GAVRON, *Captive Wives*, 1966.

The data

The data were obtained in 1962-63 by the Medical Practitioners' Union who sent a mailed questionnaire and where appropriate reminders to the 11,594 women doctors whose names appeared in the Medical Directory for 1960 and on the Registration lists for 1960, 1961 and 1962 and whose addresses indicated that they were resident in the U.K. The mailing excluded those who indicated in the directory that they had qualified before 1920 and retired permanently from professional work.

Replies were received from 8,209 women giving an overall response rate, after those who were found to have died or removed from the U.K. had been excluded, of 75 percent. The response rate varied to some extent with age. It was lowest among women of 55 and over. Moreover, owing to the system of provisional registration after qualification, numbers of the most recently qualified women were excluded from the initial circularization. The information presented is consequently more reliable for medically qualified women aged 30 to 55 than it is for those under 30 or over 55¹⁰.

The informants were asked about their age, marital status, the date of qualification, higher degrees, their present work and their area of residence. The married were further asked for their date of marriage, number and age of children, and whether or not they were married to a doctor. Those who were not working were asked why they were not and whether they wanted work. Those who were working part-time only were asked whether they wanted more work.

The Results

Sixty-five per cent of the respondents were married and a further five per cent widowed or divorced. Only 30 per cent were single. A comparison of the marital condition of different age groups, however, shows that matrimony was more common among women doctors of less than 50 years old than it was for generations now over 50. (Table I). For example, 73 per cent of the 30-34 year olds had already married compared with only 67 per cent of the 50-54 year olds.

¹⁰ A fuller description of the data will be found in M. JEFFERYS and P. M. ELLIOTT, *Women in Medicine*, 1966.

TABLE I

The marital status of women doctor respondents and the female population of England and Wales in 1961

(per 1,000 in each age group)

Age group	Doctors			Population *		
	Single	Married	Widowed and Divorced	Single	Married	Widowed and Divorced
20 — 24				420	577	2
25 — 29	381	619	—	157	835	9
30 — 34	273	719	8	109	875	15
35 — 39	236	744	20	98	875	27
40 — 44	229	734	37	97	859	44
45 — 49	222	695	83	105	828	67
50 — 54	328	583	89	122	778	99
55 — 74	359	470	171	141	661	198
65 and over	465	349	186	156	343	502

* Register General, Census 1961

However, compared with the female population of England and Wales in 1961 of like ages a greater number of women doctors had remained single. For the older age groups the differences imply a greater proportion of life-time celibates among those who chose medicine as a profession. On the other hand, given the continuation of present trends, much of the difference between medical women and all women at younger ages is due to the later age of marriage of medical women. (Table II). The trend to marriage before the age of 25 which has been marked in the post-war years for women generally has not been shared by women doctors. On the contrary, the trend if anything, has been the other way, that is to the postponement of marriage until after the age of 25.

Most women who choose medicine postpone marriage at least until the year in which they qualify. Over the years there has been a steady increase in the proportion of each cohort of entrants who marry before qualifying, but it still only accounted for 12 per cent of the cohort of women who qualified and registered in the years 1960-1962.

TABLE II

Year of marriage	Per cent of married women marrying before the age of 25	
	Doctors	Population (England and Wales *)
1931	—	57.8
1938	—	57.2
1940 — 44	33.4	—
1945 — 49	31.1	—
1939 — 50	—	66.0
1950 — 54	28.5	—
1951 — 55	—	72.3
1955 — 59	27.9	—
1956 — 60	—	77.5
1960 — 63	16.7	—
1961 — 62	—	80.1

* Registrar General's Statistical Review, 1962, Part II

Although women doctors marry later than women generally, they do not appear to have fewer children than other married women. The proportion of childless medically qualified wives aged 45 to 49 in 1962-1963 was much less than the proportion of childless wives of comparable age in the general population had been in 1951¹¹. (Table III). The proportion of medical wives with three or more children, on the other hand, was substantially greater than the equivalent proportion of married women generally.

Whether a doctor was working whole-time or part-time or not at all and the type of work undertaken were found to be related to her age, marital and maternal status and area of residence and to the possession of higher qualifications.

The relationship between age and working status is shown in Table IV. Nearly half the respondents had full-time appointments

¹¹ Unfortunately at the time of writing fertility information from the 1961 Census was not available. Hence the unsatisfactory and necessarily guarded comparison between doctors in 1962-63 and all women in 1951.

TABLE III

*The family size of married women doctors aged 45-49 in 1962-63 and of all married women in England and Wales of the same age in 1951**

No. of children	Doctors	All married women
	%	%
0	12	20
1	15	26
	29	24
3 or more	44	30
All	100	100
No. in group	685	238,301

* Data from Census 1951 «Fertility report» Registrar General. H.M.S.O. 1959

TABLE IV

Age and working status

Age group	Per cent				No. in group
	Working Whole-time	Working Part-time	Not Working	Total	
Up to 29	57.5	20.9	21.6	100.0	1,261
30—34	40.8	35.7	23.5	100.0	1,299
35—39	40.3	38.7	21.0	100.0	1,570
40—44	43.3	39.5	17.2	100.0	1,120
45—49	47.2	40.9	11.9	100.0	881
50—54	55.9	34.2	9.9	100.0	564
55—64	52.8	31.6	15.6	100.0	1,139
65—over	34.1	36.9	29.0	100.0	276
All ages	47.1	34.2	18.7	100.0	8,209*

* Including 99 age unknown

and a further third part-time ones. Approximately one in five was not working. The age group 50 to 54 was the one with the highest proportion of women at work. Apart from those aged 65 and over the women doctors least likely to be working were in their early thirties.

The relationship between work and marital and maternal status is shown in Table V. With few exceptions single women were engaged in professional work, the majority on a whole-time basis. Those who were not working were mainly women of 60 or more, although there were a few younger ones who were prevented from doing so by ill-health. Five out of six married women without children were also working, but they were more likely than single women to be working part-time. Some of the childless married women may have been pregnant at the time of the enquiry and withdrawn partly or wholly from work on that account¹²; but pregnancy is not likely to have accounted for the whole difference in working habits of single and childless married women since the differences persisted in women aged 45 and over who were unlikely to be pregnant¹³. Marriage by itself is clearly responsible for some withdrawal from professional work.

TABLE V

Marital and Maternal Status and Work

Marital and Maternal Status	No. in group	Per cent				Total	Per cent of workers working whole-time
		Working whole-time	Working part-time	Not working			
Single	2,437	81.7	12.6	5.7	100.0	87	
Married/Childless	1,032	54.4	28.8	16.8	100.0	65	
Married/Child(ren) under 5	2,058	17.3	46.1	36.6	100.0	27	
Married/Child(ren) not under 5	2,217	30.1	50.5	19.4	100.0	37	

¹² Women were not asked whether they were pregnant at the time of the enquiry.

¹³ Cf. M. JEFFERYS and P. M. ELLIOTT, *op. cit.*, Table III.

Nevertheless, it was motherhood rather than matrimony which was associated with the partial or absolute withdrawal from the practice of medicine. Only 17 per cent of mothers of children under 5 years old were working whole-time and over one-third were not working at all. Those with children of 5 or more were more likely to be working, but much more likely than childless married women to be in part-time rather than whole-time work.

Nearly half (46.5 per cent) of the respondents had obtained a degree or a diploma in addition to their basic medical qualification. These women were rather more likely to be working than those who had only their primary medical qualification. (86 per cent of the former as against 77 per cent of the latter)¹⁴. Those living in the London conurbation were more commonly working than those who lived in other areas of Southern England (88 per cent as against 78 per cent) while those living in the more industrialised, urbanized north of England occupied an intermediary position (83 per cent). Scottish residents were the least likely to be working. (71 per cent only)¹⁵.

Type of appointment also was related to maternal status. The hospital service which employs nearly all the specialists in branches of clinical medicine provided 36 per cent of the whole-time appointments. (Table VI). However, it provided only 18 per cent of the whole-time appointments of women with children compared with 44 per cent of the appointments of those without children. On the other hand, general practice and local authority services provided proportionately more opportunities for mothers and less for childless women in whole-time work¹⁶.

The data presented provide eloquent evidence that in the U.K. a minority only of medically qualified women in 1962-63 combined matrimony and motherhood with the *whole-time* practice of medicine. While more than four out of five single women were in whole-time work, the proportion among childless married women was only 62 per cent and fell to 17 per cent and 30 per cent among mothers with children under and over five years old respectively.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, Tabl X.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, Table XI and XII.

¹⁶ The position in relationship to *part-time* appointments was rather different. Compared with full-time appointments, few were in the hospital and general practice services and more in local authority services and in medical work outside the statutory National Health Services, for example, in universities, industry and family planning clinics. *Ibid.*, pages 39-41.

TABLE VI

Marital and maternal status and type of whole-time appointment

Whole-time appointment	Single	Childless	Other Married	All
	%	%	%	%
Hospital	44	45	18	36
General Practice	34	31	51	39
Public Health	16	17	25	19
Other	6	7	6	6
Total	100	100	100	100

On the other hand, nearly half those who were mothers were practising medicine on a part-time basis, and the responses of those who were not working at all indicated that nearly two-thirds of them would have liked parttime work¹⁷. In short, the majority of married women doctors want to undertake professional work, but on a part-time rather than a whole-time basis.

In the U.K. at the present time there is an unsatisfied demand for medically qualified personnel in the hospital, general practice and local authority sectors of the National Health Service in almost every part of the country¹⁸. The non-employment of married women doctors is not, therefore, occasioned by a shortage of work suitable for medical practitioners. Nor is it a function of a positive desire on the part of most women to abandon professional work altogether on marriage. It is a result of the difficulties which married women encounter in reconciling the demands made upon them in their maternal role with those imposed upon them in their professional career.

Respondents aged 49 or under were asked why they were not working, and by their answers they could be grouped roughly into four categories (Table VII). The first and most numerous group attri-

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, Table XIII.

¹⁸ There is great concern over the number of qualified doctors (estimated at approximately 300) who leave the U.K. each year for temporary or permanent employment overseas. They are partly replaced by doctors from Asia and Africa who come to the U.K. for postgraduate training. Most of the latter leave after two or three years.

TABLE VII

Non-employed respondents aged 49 or less grouped by the reasons given for not working

<i>Group</i>	<i>Per cent</i>
A. Domestic reasons only	30
B. Domestic reasons <i>plus</i> lack of suitable work	27
C. Lack of suitable work	19
D. No desire to work	18
E. Other reasons only or no comment	6
All groups	100
No. in all groups	1,205

buted their involuntary non-employment entirely to domestic exigencies of one kind or another. They emphasized the impossibility of finding suitable domestic workers to assist in the care of children or the household tasks. The second and only slightly less numerous group also mentioned difficulties in finding adequate substitutes to replace them in the home, but also claimed that there was no suitable work available. By this latter, they generally meant either that the hours or conditions of available work for which they were qualified were not compatible with their domestic duties or that they did not have the higher qualifications required for posts which would otherwise have been suitable. The third and numerically smaller group attributed their involuntary non-employment entirely to the absence of suitable work and did not specify domestic obstacles. The fourth group did not wish to work.

These responses indicated that well over half of those who did not practise gave unresolved domestic difficulties as one reason for being unable to work. Slightly under a half mentioned the lack of suitable work opportunities, that is presumably of work which they considered compatible with the fulfilment of their maternal roles.

Conclusions

The mailed, largely pre-coded questionnaire is at best a blunt instrument and unsuitable for eliciting subtle nuances. Much more

information, obtained by personal interview and more detailed questioning, is needed from both male and female doctors if further light is to be thrown on the ways in which the performance of professional roles are influenced by and influence marital and parental roles¹⁹.

Nevertheless, the data from this study point to certain conclusions. In common with the generality of their sex medical women of each succeeding generation are more likely to marry than their predecessors. Compared with their female married contemporaries, however, over 80 per cent of whom now marry before age 25, the majority postpone marriage until they are between 25 and 30, that is until they have qualified or are on the point of qualifying. Again, childlessness among married doctors is not common. In short, most women in this professional group do not deny themselves either matrimony or motherhood in order to practise medicine. This is particularly true of those qualifying most recently compared with those qualifying before and during the second world war.

Comparatively few of the women who have children continue to practise medicine on a whole-time basis while their children are young. Their role conflicts are resolved only by taking part-time work or giving up professional practice altogether. As their children grow older most women re-enter the profession, but work for the majority remains on a part-time basis.

Despite the numbers already engaged in part-time work there is an unsatisfied demand from young mothers for more such work. Most of this comes from those who are not working; but some comes from women who want to increase their working commitment beyond the few hours weekly they already give to their profession.

If medically qualified women who want to practise are to do so, employing units must modify still further the organization and deployment of their medical work force to accommodate women who see in part-time employment only the possibility for role conciliation. In particular the two branches of the National Health Service which employ the most medical personnel, that is the hospital and general practitioner services, must provide more opportunities for the part-time married woman practitioner. They must also extend

¹⁹ I have in mind information such as that elicited by Kosa J. and R. E. Coker. «The Female Physician in Public Health. Conflict and Reconciliation of the Sex and Professional Roles», *Sociology and Social Research*, April 1965, Vol. 49, No. 3.

part-time training facilities for the various specialties of medicine so that women who marry and have children before or shortly after qualifying can acquire higher qualifications which in turn will extend the range of suitable employment opportunities open to them.

The solutions which women find to the conflicts which they face in combining marital and maternal roles with professional ones are not merely matters of academic sociological interest. The resources which the community invests in the training of doctors are considerable²⁰. At present about a quarter of those selected for medical training are women. It is clearly in the interests of the community that those who are trained in medicine should use the professional knowledge and skills which they have acquired. At the same time, it is neither equitable nor feasible to insist that medically qualified women should forego marital and parental relationships in order to practise medicine. It is reasonable, however, to consider how by re-arranging work tasks in the health services to suit women as well as men, and how by reducing onerous and unrewarding household tasks, both sexes can effect the best reconciliation between their familial and professional roles.

²⁰ These have been variously estimated at from £10,000 — £20,000 per minimally qualified doctor.

¹ Talbot F. James, Robert F. Harz and Edward A. Suss: Working Parents in the Theory of Action, *Glencoe, Ill.*, 1953; James, 'Patterns Variables Revisited: A Response to Robert Collins', *Am. Sociological Review*, 25, 1960, p. 467-497.

² Our empirical data are based on interviews with 221 of 326 independent physicians in the district of a German university town. 8% of the interviewed physicians are working equally in private organizations, in hospitals or in the public health service. About the same number is practising in small colleague-practices which is customary in Germany within the same medical specialty, and exists almost exclusively as a cooperation between married couples.

SOCIO-CULTURAL VARIABLES IN THE DOCTOR-PATIENT RELATIONSHIP

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This essay is an attempt to apply some hypotheses of general sociological theory¹ to the field of sociology of medicine, testing them with regard to the doctor-patient relationship. At the same time we hope to make a contribution to the international comparative analysis of the doctor-patient relationship by presenting some of our empirical data collected in Germany².

From the theoretical point of view we would like to analyse the interdependence between the functional sub-systems: economy, health service, and the family on the one hand, and, on the other the structural aspects in the authoritative relationship between doctor and patients as dependent upon the differentiation, resp. integration in diffuse-particularistic or specific-universalistic group structures. The first aspect of functional differentiation between social sub-systems is of importance in order to assess the various functional rôle aspects in the field of medical practice. In this context, the establishment of a social sub-system in the health service can be considered as one step in the process towards increasing the differentiation of family functions. While the rôles within the family-structure are organized rather diffusely in relation to the other members, the rôle of the independent, professional physician is directed more specifically towards therapeutic activities, which are comparable to the specific productive functions of the entrepre-

¹ Talcott PARSONS, Robert F. BALES and Edward A. SHILS, *Working Papers in the Theory of Action*, Glencoe, Ill., 1953; PARSONS, «Pattern Variables Revisited: A Response to Robert Dubin», in: *American Sociological Review*, 25, 1960, p. 467-487.

² Our empirical data are based on interviews with 223 of 320 independent physicians in the district of a German university town. 8 % of the interviewed physicians are working equally in complex organizations, i.e. in hospitals or in the public health service. About the same number is practising in small colleague-practice which is permitted in Germany within the same medical speciality, and exists almost exclusively as a cooperation between married couples.

neur, both equally differentiated from the diffuse family functions. But, as well as the economic or «adaptive» sub-system being differentiated again into complex sub-systems (e.g. bureaucracies), therapeutic medical sub-system, too, shows complex organizations (the hospitals), besides the independent physician. In these complex organizations the rôles are even more specially directed to certain specific functions than in the solo-practice. On the whole, however, medical diagnosis and therapy can be treated within these terms of reference as a specific, adaptive contribution of a specialized profession within a complex industrial society.

On the other hand, the physician's functions cannot be limited to this adaptive contribution because of his application of «technical» knowledge; he also exercises integrative or controlling functions.

In this rôle-aspect he decides, whether, and for how long, a person is free from his occupational rôle within the adaptive sub-system, and if the person is integrated during this period into a «diffuse solidarity group» resp. into a diffusely and particularistically structured organization (e.g. the family) or into a «specific function organization» resp. into a specifically and universalistically structured organization (e.g. the hospital). Thus, one — though not dominant — functional aspect of the physician's professional rôle fulfills an «interstitial» function which coordinates «objectively», i.e. unrestricted by particularistic influences on either side: the interests of the family and the economy. In this context it is of special importance to distinguish between the rôle of the solo-practitioner who is tied more closely to the patient's family, integrating the patient into the family setting, and the rôle of the hospital physician who integrates the patient into the «specific function organization» of the hospital. From this point of view the competent autonomy of the physician from lay-control gains a particular analytical significance.

In the first situation, with which the interviewed physicians were confronted in the questionnaire, a patient tries to be certified as ill on non-medical grounds; in the second situation the patient visits several physicians in order to compare the diagnosis. The physicians were asked how often these situations occurred in their practice, what they did resp. what they would have done in such situations: did they consider that the patients had a right to control their activities or not, and what did they think their colleagues ought to have done in such situations.

If we want to classify the physicians' reactions, it is necessary

to know how often patients try to control their activities. This gives us information about the empirical structure of authority in the doctor-patient relationship, which may be empirically far from being regulated by «taboos»³.

About 65% of the physicians in solo-practice reported to have been asked by their patients for a sick leave on non-medical grounds: the average frequency being about 13 patients per year. Only 48% of those interviewed stated experiences with patients «shopping around», controlling the competence of the medical diagnosis; here the average number of those patients recorded was less than 11 per year. On the whole, we did not find much lay-control in these two directions, particularly if we consider these figures in relation to an average number of 30-40 patients per day. We cannot assess in this context whether the reasons for this are lacking «sophistication»⁴, lacking motivation or interest on the part of the patients, or a «cultural» taboo prohibiting the shopping around, or the absence of strains as symptoms of social desintegration which might raise the number of «shopping around» patients⁵ and the quest for medically unjustified sick leave⁶. We can only note that (probably due to formal reserve from the public⁷) the physicians in hospital are less exposed to those attempts of patient control, that there is no difference between urban and rural areas with regard to the request for sick leave, but that shopping around is rather an urban than a rural pattern of patient behavior: 53% of the urban physicians, compared to 35% of their rural colleagues, recorded such experiences⁸.

Following the observation that lay-control is an exceptional situa-

³ PARSONS and Neil J. SMELSER, *Economy and Society*, London, 1957, p. 152: «... prohibition of 'shopping around' in the sense that the prospective patient seeks the independent advice of several physicians before choosing among them. Such taboos clearly impede short-term economic adjustments between the supply and demand of such services..»

⁴ Cf. FREIDSON, «The Organization of Medical Practice», in: Howard D. FREEMAN, Sole LEVINE and Leo G. REEDER, *Handbook of Medical Sociology*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1963, p. 304.

⁵ René KÖNIG, «Ideologie und Wirklichkeit der ärztlichen Berufsrolle, Zur Soziologie des ärztlichen Berufs, unpublished paper, Köln, p. 11.

⁶ Mark G. FIELD, «Structure and Strain in the Role of the Soviet Physician», in: *The American Journal of Sociology*, 58, 1952, p. 502.

⁷ In Germany the patients are admitted to hospital only on recommendation by an independent practitioner (with exception of «private» patients, i.e. those 20% of the population who are not members of the public health insurance).

⁸ Cf. FREIDSON, *op. cit.*

tion in medical practice we come to analyse the reactions of the physicians in the presence of such attempts. We classified the reactions according to their relation to the specific medical competence of the doctors without any regard to «external», non-professional criteria. Thus, the rejection of medically unjustified certification as ill, and the medical attention of patients, irrespective of their shopping around, will be regarded as decisions corresponding with specific professional competence. 56 % of the physicians who had ever been confronted with patients shopping around, stated that they had nevertheless treated them, and 45 % refused the demand for sick leave on a non-medical basis. The acceptance of «shopping around» by 56 % of the physicians can be regarded as conformity to that norm, while the degree of 45 % of the physicians refusing the request for sick leave, indicates that there is a process of innovation towards a new normative structure. If we consider that the hospital physicians acted up to even 100 % in conformity with their professional norms, we may assume that the professional activities in private practice are stimulated by other influences than in the hospital service. From this point of view it may be questioned, whether the often assumed «professional autonomy»⁹ of the physician applies to private practice, which seems to be much nearer to the diffuse and particularistic family structure, instead of acting as an «objective», interstitial agent between family and economy. Referring to this aspect we shall describe, in the following paragraphs, the cultural and social situation of the interviewed physicians, showing the independent variables for the analysis of the authority structure in the doctor-patient relationship.

Regarding the «cultural» definition of the professional medical situation we find that nearly all solo-practitioners admit that their form of practice is not directed primarily towards the realization of specific medical ability, this being operationalized as «optimal allocation of scientific knowledge».

It is interesting to find that 65 % of the solo-practitioners think that the «universalistic performance» values are better realized in the hospital organization. On the other hand, only about 29 % of all doctors (equally in all breakdowns) acknowledge «performance» and «universalism», operationalized here as «specific knowledge and

⁹ Cf. PARSONS and SMELSER, *Economy and Society*, *op. cit.*, p. 153: «... the professional practitioner gives up only a small quantity of rights to intervene by virtue of his technical competence and corresponding authority; he remains the judge of how his labour power is to be exercised ...».

techniques», as a general characteristic of the professional medical culture¹⁰. Measuring the corresponding «sanction» attitudes, i.e. «professional approval of performance», we found the same proportion as for the «performance» attitudes in the group of solo-practitioners (22 0/0), while the hospital physicians legitimate the sanction aspect more than twice as much (54 0/0) as the performance aspect. This may lead us to the assumption that the professional reference groups have much more influence (if not as an informative, performance-stimulating agency, then as a source of specific professional rewards) in the complex hospital organization than in the solo-practice.

The contacts between physicians in the solo-practice are mostly informal ones; only the specific activities designed for gaining information (medical congresses) are a formal basis for professional contacts. We have tried to classify the contacts according to their typical structure as «diffuse» and «particularistic», and as «specific» and «universalistic». We evaluate as diffuse and particularistic contacts all private and friendly relations, which may allow, but are not primarily intended for professional «shop-talk». Meetings of professional associations which are not directed towards «specific information-getting» can be classified as diffuse, but not necessarily particularistic activities. The following activities are considered as proving specific and universalistic contacts: «shop-talk», consultations, referring of patients, participation in medical congresses, etc. These indications lead us to the following observations: free practice is totally isolated from the hospital with regard to diffuse and particularistic contacts, and almost totally isolated with regard to specific and universalistic contacts, too. There is a total reciprocal social distance between the country doctor and the hospital physician, while the urban solo-practitioner keeps his distance from the hos-

¹⁰ Cf. especially PARSONS, *Essays in Sociological Theory*, Glencoe, Ill., 1964, p. 311 & 399 and Hansjürgen DAHEIM, «Soziologie der Berufe», mimeographed article, Köln, 1963, p. 9: The authors do not only point to the functional dominance of adaptive activities in industrial societies but equally to the structural dominance of a value system which can be closely described in terms of the universalism-achievement (or performance) pattern and which is most extensively recognized in the USA. Parsons further indicates that the value system in the health service cannot be analysed without reference to the dominant societal value structure. Cf. Talcott PARSONS, *The Social System*, Glencoe, Ill., 1951, p. 454 sq., or: «The Profession and Social Structure», in: *Essays in Sociological Theory*, *op. cit.*, p. 34-49.

pital physician more distinctly than the other way round. As the diffuse and particularistic contacts are typical among country doctors, and specific and universalistic contacts are typical among hospital staff, we can assume that there exist two extremely different structures of interaction in these two spheres of the medical profession. As to the urban solo-practitioners, the in-group contacts predominate the out-group contacts both relating to particularistic and diffuse contacts, and to specific and universalistic contacts, although the latter to a smaller extent.

These findings are especially striking, if we consider that they were collected in a university town, where far more hospital physicians than private doctors practise. With the exception of the medical superintendents, who are at the same time admitted to free practice, there is almost no interaction, neither «private» nor professional, between the independent and the employed hospital physicians.

This difference between hospital and private practice is seen in yet another aspect, which equally refers to the basic structural pattern. As we pointed out at the beginning, the hospital has developed in a process of functional differentiation from the diffusely and particularistically structured family. The independent medical practice is, in contrast to this development, typically not separated from the family organization: only a few physicians have their offices away from their homes, and the majority of the physicians' wives assist their husbands in their practices. These particularistic patterns of professional organization are different in urban and rural milieus: while in urban practice it is much more usual for the spouse to assist her husband (80 % in the town vs. 38 % in the country), the rural practice is more closely bound to the home (90 % vs. 60 % in the town). This particularistic reference system is not confined to the physician's own family, it refers to the patients' families, too: the solo-practitioner in the country is especially bound to families by his long years' diffuse medical attention. Following the perception of the interviewed physicians this diffuse, family relationship has, however, been declining over the last five years.

Nevertheless we can conclude that, contrary to the assumptions of «independent» medical practice, in Germany as well as in the USA¹¹, the solo-practitioner is integrated into a primarily informal network of diffuse and particularistic interaction systems, either by his own family or by that of their patients. It is necessary to examine

¹¹ FREIDSON, *op. cit.*, p. 303.

in this structural context the expectations and obligations which the physician directs towards the patients and to his colleagues. It is interesting, for instance, that 85% of the «independent» physicians acknowledge the right of the patient to control the diagnosis of the doctor by attending other physicians («shopping around»). Lay-control seems to be legitimate as far as it leaves room enough for competent professional medical decisions. It is therefore not a barrier on the side of the doctor, which prevents patient-control over the physician's activities. On the contrary, even the professional expectations on the part of his «peers» oblige the doctor to treat a patient who is shopping around: after all, 50% of the physicians expect their colleagues to do so, a percentage which is less evident in the country (35%).

Summing up our findings with regard to the doctor-patient relationship we can state that, contrary to the information on the American solo-practitioner, the professional medical practice in Germany allows for patient-control in so far as it does not interfere with the specific-universalistic standards of professional performance. On the other hand, these standards are not unequivocally the basis for professional activities in those situations of lay-control. In the following paragraphs we shall try to explain the differences in these professional activities by controlling their dependence on the socio-cultural variables described above. Though the small empirical basis of our sample does not permit to analyse two factors simultaneously, we hope to provide some material for comparative criticism by presenting our correlations. We have organized our hypotheses according to two analytical levels: a) the level of the «personality system», i.e. to «individual» orientations of the physicians, and b) to the level of the «social system», i.e. to different structures of interaction.

The following 4 general hypotheses, from which, by reciprocal linkage, another 6 hypotheses could be derived, will be applied to our special problem and tested with our data:

The specific-universalistic reaction in interactions depends

1. on the «individual» acceptance of universalistic performance values;
2. on the dominance of universalistic performance values in the reference group;
3. on the integration of the person into a universalistic, performance-oriented interaction system;
4. on the separation of the specific activities from diffuse-particularistic interaction structures.

H1: The first hypothesis postulates that the specific-universalistic reaction of the physician to an attempt of patient-control depends on the «individual» acceptance of universalistic-performance values. This was measured by a question for the typical criterion of medical professional activities in general, «specific knowledge and techniques» being the indication for universalistic performance values (Table 1).

TABLE 1

RATES OF SPECIFIC-UNIVERSALISTIC REACTIONS TO PATIENT-CONTROL AS DEPENDING ON INDIVIDUAL VALUE-ORIENTATIONS *

Individual universalistic performance orientation («specific knowledge and techniques»)	Percentage of specific-universalistic reactions:	
	to the plea for sick leave	to patients shopping around
Yes	48 % (N = 48)	66 % (N = 29)
No	39 % (N = 97)	59 % (N = 78)

* The figures in brackets give the absolute bases for the percentages. The absolute numbers for the independent variables differ because we could take into account only those doctors who were confronted with the plea for sick leave resp. with patients shopping around.

As we can see from Table 1, this hypothesis is affirmed by the data, though with no great differences. We have more or less the same results with another, more indirect operationalization of the individual value-orientation, i.e. by asking for appropriate criteria for his son's occupational choice. These results cannot, however, give us enough information to explain why physicians act this or that way. There are still 52% of the physicians who acknowledge specific-universalistic values, certifying their patients as ill on non-medical grounds, and 42% refusing attention to patients shopping around. On the other hand, many of the physicians who do not accept universalistic performance values nevertheless react according to these standards to patient-control. This probably indicates that individual goals are not decisive in those cases where structural or normative barriers limit their realization, or, in other words, that the ideological assumption of professional «independence» and «autonomy» is

wrong in so far as structural barriers exist. It seems appropriate, therefore, to treat the variable of «personal goals» only as an intervening variable¹², and to examine more closely the social context, i.e. the integration of the personal system into different group structures. In this context it will be less important to our analysis to consider the conditions for discrepancies between individual goals and success and the resulting strains; it will be more relevant to analyse the (traditional) channels of social control, by which «deviant» behavior and personal frustrations are settled. The mechanisms of social control depend, however, on the collective goals in the various interaction structures.

H2: The second hypothesis postulates that the specific-universalistic reaction of physicians to an attempt of patient-control depends on the dominance of universalistic performance values in the reference group of the physician.

There is an indication for the verification of this hypothesis, although the sample is small with regard to the hospital physicians, and does not allow any concrete conclusions (Table 2).

Nevertheless we can assume that there is a correlation between a dominant ascription of universalistic performance realization («optimal allocation of scientific knowledge and techniques») to the hospital organization both by the solo-practitioners (65 %) and the medical superintendents (77 %) and a typical specific-universalistic reaction to patient-control in this socio-cultural and structural setting of the hospital. Because of the limitations of our sample it is not possible to discover whether the «individual» performance orientation of the physicians corresponds to variations in the collective values of their reference group. This would have made it possible to find out whether persons with equal value-orientations behave differently in different contexts of value dominance. We have already noted that the «individual» performance motivation is only an intervening variable considering the dominant values of the actor's reference or interaction group.

¹² PARSONS, «The Motivation of Economic Activities», in: *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*, 6, 1940, p. 187-203; SMELSER, *Theory of Collective Behaviour*, London, 1962, especially p. 62-64; SMELSER, *The Sociology of Economic Life*, Englewood Cliffs, 1963, p. 34 f.; SMELSER, «Notes on Functionalism and Scientific Analysis», in: *Transactions of the Fifth World Congress of Sociology*, Vol. IV, 1962, Washington, D.C., 1964, p. 66 f.

TABLE 2

RATES OF SPECIFIC-UNIVERSALISTIC REACTIONS TO PATIENT-CONTROL AS DEPENDING ON THE DOMINANCE OF SPECIFIC-UNIVERSALISTIC GROUP VALUES

- a) Rates of physicians ascribing universalistic performance realization to types of medical practice:

Ascription by	Percentage of ascription to Solo- or group-practice	Hospital organization
Solo-practioners	22 % (N = 210)	65 % (N = 210)
Medical superintendents	8 % (N = 13)	77 % (N = 13)

- b) Rates of specific-universalistic reactions to patient-control as depending on type of practice*.

Reaction by	Percentage of specific universalistic reactions:	
	to the plea for sick leave	to patients shopping around
Solo- or group-practitioner	42 % (N = 138)	52 % (N = 108)
Medical superintendents	71 % (N = 7)	100 % (N = 5)

* Cf. note to Table 1.

H3: The third hypothesis postulates that the specific-universalistic reaction of the physician to an attempt of patient-control depends on the integration of the physician into a universalistic and performance oriented professional interaction system.

Table 3 gives us some information about the mechanism of social control; with respect to our problem, we distinguish two types of control: the one directed towards the observance of a norm, the other towards the diffusion of an innovation (Table 3).

TABLE 3
 RATES OF SPECIFIC-UNIVERSALISTIC REACTIONS TO PATIENT-CONTROL DEPENDING ON PATTERNS OF LOCAL PROFESSIONAL INTERACTIONS

<i>Contact to local:</i>	Percentage of specific-universalistic reactions:	
	to the plea for sick leave	to patients shopping around
informal, diffuse-particularistic professional associations (shop-talks)		
Yes	43 % (N = 124)	64 % (N = 94)
No	33 % (N = 21)	45 % (N = 11)
informal, diffuse-particularistic professional associations (private and friendly relations)		
Yes	41 % (N = 115)	56 % (N = 91)
No	59 % (N = 27)	40 % (N = 20)
formal activities designed for gaining medical and other information (participation in medical congresses)		
No	31 % (N = 48)	55 % (N = 44)
Only diffuse	37 % (N = 32)	75 % (N = 20)
Specific	58 % (N = 58)	61 % (N = 43)

* Cf. note to Table 1.

The situation of «normative» control refers to the treatment of patients shopping around, because the majority of the physicians have accepted this as a norm. The other situation refers to the negative reaction of 45 % of the physicians to the unjustified request for sick leave; this negative response can be regarded as an innovation which is not yet accepted by the majority.

We shall try to find out the corresponding interaction structures between these two different aspects of social control, distinguishing formal and informal controls, which can be directed either specifically to professional performance, or diffusely bearing on particularistic references. As Table 3 shows, the integration into an informal, specific-universalistically organized group of colleagues intensifies the structural innovation with regard to the doctor-patient relation-

ship (43 % vs. 33 %). By integration into a formally organized specific professional group this tendency is increased even to 58 %. Reversely the integration into a diffuse and particularistic structure of interactions has rather an impeding effect on the diffusion of innovations (41 %), compared to the isolation from those structures (59 %). This means that an innovation in a sub-system (as the doctor-patient contact) can only be intensified if the more general interaction structure is similarly built, while the conformity with a norm, i.e. with a structure supported by a majority, can be maintained by integration in any kind of professional network of control, be it an informal, formal, diffuse, or specific one¹³. These tendencies cannot, however, gloss over the fact that our conclusions for integration and isolation only explain variations of 31 % at best.

H4: The fourth hypothesis postulates that the specific-universalistic reaction of the physician to an attempt of patient-control depends on the separation of specific professional activities from diffuse-particularistic interaction structures, e.g.

- a) from diffuse and particularistic professional interactions,
- b) from the family.

We have already pointed out that, as far as innovations are concerned, isolation from diffuse and particularistic professional structures may intensify the specific performance pattern. As to the maintenance of an established normative structure this hypothesis could not be sustained. As to the family as a diffuse group of solidarity with dominating emotional gratification there are, on the other hand, considerable differences to a performance-oriented professional structure¹⁴. Here we could safely assume a strong influence on the part of the personal and ecological separation on specific universalistic reactions within the professional activities. The results in Table 4 strongly confirm this assumption with regard to the distance from the patients' families, and to a smaller degree concerning the separation from the physician's family (Table 4).

¹³ We assume that this hypothesis can also be applied and supported with regard to the innovation and diffusion of new drugs. The findings of J. Coleman, E. Katz, and H. Menzel at least indicate that particularistic friendly relations with colleagues support the diffusion of new drugs only after they have been cumulatively taken up with the aid of specific professional contacts and prescribed by a great collectivity of colleagues («The Diffusion of an Innovation among Physicians», in: Mathilda WHITE RILEY, *Sociological Research J.*, New York, S. 540).

¹⁴ PARSONS, *The Social System, op. cit.*, p. 454 sq.

TABLE 4

RATES OF SPECIFIC-UNIVERSALISTIC REACTIONS TO PATIENT-CONTROL AS DEPENDING ON PATTERNS OF SOCIAL INTEGRATION WITH LAY-REFERENCE SYSTEMS*

<i>Rates or differentiation from:</i> patient's family (number of home attending)	Percentage of specific-universalistic reaction:	
	to the plea for sick leave	to patients shopping around
None	50 % (N = 19)	87 % (N = 16)
Little	45 % (N = 69)	73 % (N = 44)
Much	38 % (N = 55)	47 % (N = 38)
Physician's family: (personnel separation)		
Wife aids in practice	38 % (N = 63)	51 % (N = 43)
Wife does not aid in practice	45 % (N = 51)	68 % (N = 34)
(ecological separation of practice from home)		
No	44 % (N = 92)	60 % (N = 63)
Yes	42 % (N = 53)	74 % (N = 35)

* Cf. note to Table 1.

Only the ecological separation of the practice from the home shows deviations from our hypothesis, though no significant ones. The causes for this deviant result will have to be examined further in another context.

The present study is intended only to give first suggestions in the direction of possibly important variables and of a general theoretical approach which could be applied to different fields of sociological research. Referring to this, we are fully aware of the deficiencies of our paper with respect to the «technical» exhaustion of the empirical material used.

LES ORIGINES SOCIALES DES ELITES EN SUISSE

E. GROSS

Université de Berne

POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY

SOCIOLOGIE POLITIQUE

Quelques-uns des premiers auteurs de l'étude des élites, W. Parson et E. Michels, étaient des étudiants à des universités suisses, ils ne se sont pourtant jamais intéressés à des problèmes de pays dont ils étaient les hôtes. Pourquoi expliquer leur silence par la réserve qu'ils se seraient imposée devant les problèmes particuliers au pays qui les recevait ? Ou ne faut-il pas plutôt en rechercher la cause dans des raisons plus profondes, dans la crainte que les Suisses eux-mêmes n'aient eu de toucher à ce sujet ? En réalité, pas plus les historiens que les sociologues ou les politologues ne se sont encore penchés sérieusement sur les élites suisses. Ce n'est que tout récemment que deux études, dues à des sociologues, ont abordé le problème, mais dans le cadre de recherches sur les structures de classes en Suisse¹. L'auteur de ces lignes vient de faire paraître une histoire de l'Assemblée fédérale de 1848 à 1920². Dans le second volume de cet ouvrage le problème des élites n'est guère qu'esquissé³. Nous tenterons nos propres essais généraux à la période antérieure, mais limités à aux cadres institutionnels, aux membres des deux chambres législatives, du Conseil national et le Conseil des Etats. Une petite enquête supplémentaire nous permettra d'aborder aussi le recrutement de l'autorité suprême du pays, le Conseil fédéral.

Malheureusement nous ne possédons pas la moindre documentation pour les autres domaines de la vie publique ni pour l'armée, ni pour l'administration, pas plus pour les universités ou les tribunaux que pour les

¹ Maurice Halpern, *Éléments d'une sociologie des classes sociales en Suisse*, Roger Grosse, «Éléments politiques et classes sociales en Suisse», Centre international de sociologie, 1965, pp. 2-23, 23-24.

² L'Assemblée fédérale suisse 1848-1920, vol. I, Biographies, Berne, 1966.

³ L'Assemblée fédérale suisse 1848-1920, vol. II, Sociologie et statistique, Berne, 1966. Cependant, le matériel documentaire sociologique et statistique relatif à cette dernière rubrique le présentateur de données plus étendues et plus exactes sur les élites suisses. Nous avons recueilli environ 1500 biographies de parlementaires et fonctionnaires des cantons helvétiques de l'époque des élites. La seule source de renseignements qui couvre les 50 dernières années, l'Annuaire des cantons fédéraux, ne donne que des réponses si partielles et si incomplètes qu'on ne peut que très difficilement en tirer usage.

LES ORIGINES SOCIALES DES ELITES EN SUISSE

E. GRUNER

Université de Berne

Quoique les promoteurs principaux de la théorie des élites, W. Pareto et R. Michels, aient été attachés à des universités suisses, ils ne se sont pourtant jamais préoccupés des élites du pays dont ils étaient les hôtes. Faut-il expliquer leur silence par la réserve qu'ils se seraient imposée devant les problèmes particuliers au pays qui les recevait ? Ou ne faut-il pas plutôt en rechercher la cause dans des raisons plus profondes, dans la crainte que les Suisses eux-mêmes auraient eue de toucher à ce sujet ? En réalité, pas plus les historiens que les sociologues ou les politologues ne se sont encore penchés sérieusement sur les élites suisses. Ce n'est que tout récemment que deux études, dues à des sociologues, ont abordé le problème, mais dans le cadre de recherches sur les structures de classes en Suisse¹. L'auteur de ces lignes vient de faire paraître une histoire de l'Assemblée fédérale de 1848 à 1920². Dans le second volume de cet ouvrage, le problème des élites n'est guère qu'esquissé³. Nous limiterons nos propos en général à la période antérieure citée plus haut et aux cadres institutionnels, aux membres des *deux chambres législatives*, le Conseil national et le Conseil des Etats. Une petite enquête supplémentaire nous permettra d'aborder aussi le recrutement de l'autorité suprême du pays, le *Conseil fédéral*.

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¹ Maurice ERARD, «Esquisse d'une sociologie des classes sociales en Suisse»; Roger GIROD, «Milieux politiques et classes sociales en Suisse», *Cahiers internationaux de sociologie*, 1965, pp. 3-28; 29-54.

² *L'Assemblée fédérale suisse 1848-1920*, vol. I, Biographies, Bern, 1966.

³ *L'Assemblée fédérale suisse 1848-1920*, vol. II, Sociologie et statistique, Bern, 1966. Cependant, le matériel documentaire sociologique et statistique réuni à cette occasion autorise la présentation de données plus riches et plus exactes sur les élites suisses. Nous avons contrôlé environ 1500 biographies de parlementaires en fonction des critères habituels de l'étude des élites. La seule source de renseignements qui couvre les 50 dernières années, l'*Annuaire des autorités fédérales*, ne donne que des réponses si partielles et si inégales qu'on ne peut que très difficilement en faire usage.

affaires. Erard, pourtant, dans son article, se demande si la Suisse n'est pas, elle aussi, soumise à une élite composée des forces dominantes de l'économie; il ne craint pas de donner une réponse affirmative à sa question pour le temps que nous vivons. Il déduit d'une analyse statistique minutieuse des strates sociales l'existence d'une bourgeoisie dirigeante équivalant à 4 % de la population. Celle-ci, d'après lui, se compose d'une «bourgeoisie proprement dite» (2 %) et de groupes annexes (cadres dirigeants, têtes de gouvernement et d'administration). La «bourgeoisie proprement dite» se répartit entre une «bourgeoisie d'affaires» relativement peu nombreuse et une couche supérieure d'entrepreneurs et de commerçants. Erard accorde au premier groupe la puissance prépondérante sur la Suisse. Il choisit comme critère d'appartenance à ce groupe le nombre de conseils d'administration dont disposent ses membres. Il dénombre ainsi 103 personnes qui constituent le noyau dirigeant. C'est vraisemblablement l'image des «200 familles» françaises qui conduit Erard à définir ainsi les «100 familles dirigeantes de Suisse», qui forment le cœur de l'élite helvétique. Malgré sa précision, cependant, le résultat ne nous paraît pas concluant. Erard néglige en effet de nuancer, en le pondérant, le pouvoir du capital et ses possibilités réelles d'influence; il ne mentionne pas, surtout, les relations des individus qui détiennent le pouvoir entre eux (rivalités, oppositions, etc) et avec d'autres détenteurs. Il n'aborde pas plus les différences de langue et de culture que celles de confession religieuse. Il ne traite pas du problème de la balance des forces et de la «contervailing power». Il est pour le moins unilatéral, lorsqu'il réduit l'élite dominante de la Suisse à des limites si étroites sans examiner avec plus d'attention l'origine sociale, la formation, la carrière professionnelle et les relations de parenté de ses sujets.

Nous n'échapperons pas, nous aussi, au reproche d'unilatéralisme si nous nous *limitons* aux membres des autorités supérieures *législative et exécutive*. Il est évident qu'on ne peut pas assimiler l'élite d'un pays aux membres des institutions de gouvernement. Les détenteurs de fonctions officielles ne sont jamais les seuls à posséder de l'influence sur le déroulement de la vie publique ou sur les décisions touchant l'ensemble de la société. Nous ne sommes pas autorisés à élargir nos propos, faute de connaissances, aux détenteurs d'autres positions d'influence. Cette limitation a ceci de valable, cependant, que, dans la période que nous étudions de plus près, l'élite politique de la Suisse entretient en fait d'étroits rapports avec les *institutions*, grâce auxquelles elle exerce le pouvoir politique.

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Mais venons-en maintenant à la manière dont se recrute l'élite politique. Le poète Jakob Bosshart note dans son journal: «Les élus au parlement fédéral n'y parviennent pas en raison de leurs qualités, mais grâce à leur grade dans l'armée de milices, à leur position dans l'industrie, par des relations d'amitié ou de cousinage. Les idéalistes, gens d'esprit ou désintéressés, restent en dehors du gouvernement et du parlement»⁴. Ce jugement nous étonne. Bosshart n'était-il pas lui-même le gendre du conseiller fédéral Ludwig Forrer (1845-1921, membre du Conseil national 1875-1878, 1881-1900, du Conseil fédéral 1903-1917), dont la carrière est l'exemple vivant du contraire ? C'est bien à ses qualités personnelles que Forrer, fils d'une pauvre veuve, dut son ascension de conditions très modestes à la charge suprême du pouvoir politique ! La Suisse possède-t-elle réellement une espèce d'«Establishment» qui exerce une influence invisible, mais d'autant plus efficace ? Ou connaît-elle, comme la France, une classe dirigeante qui se distingue par des analogies de carrière et une esprit de corps très solide et exclusif ? L'armée, l'influence économique et la parenté sont-elles réellement les véhicules décisifs de l'ascension sociale ?

Jetons un regard sur l'origine sociale des parlementaires suisses. Au moment de la fondation de l'Etat fédératif, quatre grands réservoirs de recrutement se partageaient le terrain, avec de 16 à 23 %: les universitaires, les commerçants, les artisans et travailleurs, et les paysans. Au cours des années, la répartition se modifie au détriment des fils d'artisans et de travailleurs, alors que les trois groupes augmentent, et parmi eux surtout les fils de paysans. Comme il s'agit, pour ces derniers, la plupart du temps de fils de paysans fortunés, le niveau social s'élève légèrement. Cette hausse diffère d'ailleurs sensiblement selon les partis. Les fils de paysans se trouvent surtout parmi les catholiques-conservateurs et, dès sa fondation en 1919, dans le parti agrarien. La gauche radicale au contraire, à l'origine parti des petites gens, devient au 20^e siècle, de plus en plus, le parti des fils d'universitaires et d'entrepreneurs. On ne peut en aucun cas déceler, comme Dogan le fait pour la France de 1870 à 1958, un passage «from the reign of Dukes to the reign of middle class». En Suisse, la transformation décisive s'accomplit presque d'un coup au moment de la fondation, en 1848, de l'Etat fédératif.

⁴ Jakob BOSSHART, *Bausteine*, Zürich, 1929, p. 289.

C'est à cette date que débute la prépondérance absolue du «*parti majoritaire libéral-radical*», qui durera, sans variations considérables, jusqu'en 1920. Le recrutement, dans d'autres démocraties européennes, est limité vers le bas par des obstacles constitutionnels (cens, absence de jetons de présence, etc). En Suisse, ce sont des limitations artificielles de *l'exercice des droits politiques*, essentiellement des manipulations des cercles électoraux, qui servent exclusivement à défavoriser les arrondissements conservateurs. Plus tard, ces mêmes moyens sont utilisés contre les prolétaires et maintiennent les socialistes dans des cadres étroits. Il est donc compréhensible que le parti majoritaire radical, en se défendant contre la droite et contre la gauche, soit amené à devenir le défenseur des intérêts des couches sociales élevées. L'introduction de la représentation proportionnelle en 1919 lui fait perdre d'un coup sa prépondérance, ainsi que le montre le tableau suivant: ⁵

Année	Nombre de sièges au Conseil national						Total
	Socialistes	Radicaux	Libéraux	Cath. conserv.	Pay-sans	Divers	
1914	19	111	14	38	—	7	189
1919	41	60	9	41	29	9	189

Ces quelques remarques montrent clairement que l'appartenance au *parti de gauche radical*, qui devient très tôt le *parti majoritaire gouvernemental*, est un facteur de première importance pour l'accession à l'élite politique. La minorité conservatrice puise pendant longtemps dans le réservoir des traditions politiques, c'est-à-dire dans le milieu des universitaires, des officiers et des propriétaires fonciers, soit dans les anciennes familles dirigeantes. La gauche constitue donc, jusqu'au début de la lutte des classes, vers 1890, le tremplin le plus sûr pour l'ascension sociale. Nous ne possédons que peu de données sur la *vie interne des partis suisses* au cours du 19^e siècle

⁵ Il nous faut faire remarquer ici que nous ne nous occupons que des partis fédéraux suisses, et que la situation varie fortement d'un canton à l'autre. En effet, le système du parti majoritaire est abandonné plus tôt dans les cantons que dans la Confédération, et on accorde un siège gouvernemental aux partis d'opposition, si bien que se développe progressivement le système du gouvernement de tous les partis qui s'est ancré définitivement en 1959 dans l'Etat fédéral. Cf. Roger GIROD, «Le système des partis en Suisse», surtout «Les coalitions gouvernementales», in *Revue française de science politique*, 1964, n° 6, pp. 111 ss.

mais le peu que nous savons de *la structure des partis* nous montre bien qu'elle est conçue selon le mode démocratique, c'est-à-dire que les militants se réservent le pouvoir de décider des problèmes importants, entre autres de choisir les candidats au Conseil national. Wilhelm Hasbach établit, dans son ouvrage sur la démocratie moderne⁶, que la Suisse s'est gardée, aussi bien de facto que dans ses structures, du danger que constituent les oligarchies de parti et que signale Michels. Sans doute est-il difficile d'arracher leur sceptre aux chefs en place; mais le citoyen ne se sent pas lié par la liste de candidats établie en petit comité. «Un comité électoral radical de canton n'oserait pas proposer la candidature d'un citoyen peu populaire, même s'il appartient au parti. Sa proposition n'aurait pas de succès et verrait en surgir d'autres»⁷. James Bryce confirme ce jugement⁸. Des recherches limitées à Bâle et au canton de Vaud ont mis en évidence le fait que 30 % environ des candidatures sont «indépendantes», arrêtées spontanément par l'assemblée générale du parti⁹. De nos jours, pourtant, la tendance au surgissement d'oligarchies de parti s'est développée, et cela principalement dans un parti centralisé comme le parti socialiste. C'est ce que François Masnata a montré de façon indiscutable dans son ouvrage fondamental sur le parti socialiste¹⁰. Ce parti ne compte, de 1919 à 1962, que trois présidents centraux, qui restent en fonction 14 ans en moyenne. Une grande part des équipes dirigeantes provient des cadres syndicaux. Il y a bien une opposition, mais qui reste minoritaire et n'obtient que rarement le droit d'être entendue. Les autres partis sont sous ce rapport beaucoup moins exposés à ce danger, parce qu'ils sont organisés selon le type fédéraliste. Alors que les statuts du parti socialiste subordonnent complètement les sections cantonales à la direction centrale, les partis cantonaux radicaux et catholique-conservateurs sont libres et font régulièrement et largement usage de cette liberté; la durée des mandats des présidents centraux y est limitée habituellement à 6 ans¹¹.

⁶ Wilhelm HASBACH, *Die moderne Demokratie*, Jena, 1912, p. 510, 501 ss.

⁷ HASBACH, *op. cit.*, p. 501.

⁸ James BRYCE, *Moderne Demokratien*, München, 1923-26, vol. I, p. 493.

⁹ Félix BONJOUR, *Souvenirs d'un journaliste*, Lausanne, 1931, II, p. 57, 122.

¹⁰ François MASNATA, *Le parti socialiste et la tradition démocratique en Suisse*, Neuchâtel, 1964, p. 29 ss., 70 ss., 93 ss.

¹¹ Marco VASELLA, *Die Partei- und Fraktionsdisziplin als staatsrechtliches Problem*, Winterthur, 1956, p. 47, 123; François REYMOND, «Votations fédérales sur les arrêtés conjoncturels du 28 février 1965», *Annuaire suisse de science politique* 1966.

Ces propos nous ramènent à la *question spécifique du recrutement*. Il résulte de ce que nous venons d'écrire qu'un «*homo novus*» peut s'élever au niveau de l'élite politique institutionnelle avec l'aide d'un parti, dans la règle avec l'aide du parti majoritaire radical. L'ascension sociale est ainsi ouverte largement à celui qui se consacre à la carrière politique, dont la progression n'est pourtant pas toujours rapide. Bornons-nous à remarquer ici que la condition même de l'ascension réside dans un «*cursus honorum*» bien réglé, qui commence par une activité au sein des autorités législative ou exécutive de la commune pour parvenir, après le niveau cantonal, à la troisième étape qui est celle de la Confédération.

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Tournons-nous maintenant vers la question centrale. Cette carrière politique est-elle vraiment ouverte à chacun de la même manière, ou bien n'est-elle pas indépendante des autres moyens d'ascension énumérés par Bosshart, à savoir les *liens de parenté*, les *carrières militaire ou économique* ? Un examen des *professions initiales* et de la *carrière professionnelle* ultérieure des parlementaires suisses nous conduit à établir que la corrélation la plus importante est celle qui lie politiciens et *universitaires*. Plus des deux tiers de nos conseillers sont des universitaires, sans variation appréciable dans le temps. Pourtant, l'ascension sociale en Suisse n'est aucunement liée au fait d'avoir été inscrit à telles ou telles université ou école, comme c'est le cas en Angleterre avec Oxford et Cambridge ou en France avec les Grandes Ecoles dont sort l'aristocratie administrative. Au contraire, c'est l'appartenance à une *société d'étudiants* plutôt qu'à une autre qui facilite le succès politique. La part des anciens Zofingiens au Conseil national reste constante, soit un huitième, si l'on excepte les dix premières années où elle fut plus grande. Celle des Helvétiens monte d'un minimum de 3% environ en 1848 à un maximum de 18,6% en 1881, puis retombe à 4,8% en 1919; la prospérité politique des Helvétiens se situe entre 1872 et 1893, où ils sont plus de 10%. La Société suisse d'étudiants, corporation des catholiques, monte de 0,8% en 1851 à un huitième en 1890, comme les Zofingiens. Le renforcement numérique de la société catholique va de pair avec celui du groupe conservateur-catholique. L'affinité des Helvétiens avec les radicaux ressort aussi nettement des chiffres que celle qui lie la Société suisse d'étudiants aux conservateurs. On peut dire ainsi que la gauche radicale et que la droite conservatrice dis-

posent, dans les sociétés d'étudiants qui leur sont proches, de moyens d'ascension facilement accessibles, et que des jeunes gens d'origine modeste y trouvent aussi la possibilité d'arriver aux succès politiques. Cet état de choses n'est plus valable aujourd'hui que pour la droite conservatrice.

Mais la société d'étudiants n'est pas le seul préalable à une carrière publique. Comme d'autres démocraties, la Suisse connaît aussi de véritables *professions politiques* qui contribuent puissamment aux premiers succès politiques. Les 7 dixièmes des universitaires (600 sur 900 environ) ont fait des études de droit. Seul un petit nombre de ce groupe se consacre directement à la magistrature judiciaire ou à l'administration. Pour la grande majorité, au contraire, l'étude d'avocat constitue le point de départ essentiel à une carrière. Les études d'avocat et les greffes de tribunal sont les centres de prédilection des activités de partis, et les jeunes gens n'y accomplissent leur stage que pour s'acquérir les relations politiques nécessaires. Les propriétaires de ces études sont souvent, en outre, des « anciens » de sociétés d'étudiants. Les chances d'ascension, dans ce cas, augmentent.

Il arrive fréquemment que des associations politiques de ce genre soient renforcées par des *liens de parenté*. De même que, dans les cantons conservateurs, la tradition politique est l'apanage de familles qui se la transmettent de génération en génération, de même dans les rangs radicaux, se forment des filiations et des dynasties politiques caractérisées. Dans les cantons industriels, ces liens sont mêlés aux associations familiales d'affaires. En gros, une image d'*hérédité politique démocratique* en résulte. Un quart des 1500 parlementaires étudiés sont des fils de pères politiciens; dans ce quart, le 30 %, soit 100 conseillers, avait un père député aux Chambres fédérales. En outre, nous avons dénombré 28 couples de frères et 21 cas où se trouvent des oncles et des neveux, des grands-pères et des petits-fils du même nom. Les associations par les femmes sont aussi sensibles: il y a en tout 224 cas de parenté directe par les femmes. C'est donc un total de 44 %, parmi les parlementaires, qui accuse des liens de parenté.

Celui qui veut faire une carrière politique en Suisse n'échappe pas en règle générale, même s'il est avocat, à la nécessité de revêtir des charges et des dignités au *niveau communal et cantonal*, donc de s'engager dans le « *cursus honorum* » évoqué plus haut. Et, pour en finir avec les avocats, qui sont souvent les rédacteurs du journal du parti, nous constatons que les juristes constituent un réservoir inépuisable de politiciens. A côté d'eux, seuls les *entrepreneurs* for-

ment un groupe professionnel considérable. Il y a des cantons industriels, dans lesquels le métier d'entrepreneur joue exactement le même rôle que celui d'avocat ailleurs, ainsi à Zurich, par exemple, à Neuchâtel (horlogerie) et à Glaris (textiles). Signalons tout de même que des professions initiales modestes comme celles d'ouvrier, d'artisan et d'employé de bureau fournissent un contingent appréciable de politiciens; joint à celui des instituteurs, ce groupe est presque aussi grand que celui des entrepreneurs.

La disparition progressive des entrepreneurs de la scène politique est un phénomène caractéristique d'un passé récent. Alors qu'ils étaient 30 % au Conseil national à la fin du 19e siècle, ils ne sont plus que 10 % environ en 1920 et 7 % de nos jours. Si nous comparons la représentation des entrepreneurs suisses dans le corps législatif avec celle d'autres pays, elle est relativement trop élevée au 19e siècle et trop basse au 20e. Au 19e siècle, le parlement britannique est, selon le mot de Palmerston, une «chambre de propriétaires fonciers». Au Reichstag allemand, la proportion oscille autour de 10 % entre 1870 et 1930, à l'exception des années quatre-vingt où elle monte à 18 %. Au 19e siècle, en France, le pourcentage est aussi bas qu'en Allemagne, alors qu'il monte jusqu'à 17 en 1928. Faut-il considérer, comme Max Weber, la diminution du nombre des entrepreneurs politiciens au 20e siècle, phénomène d'ailleurs sensiblement analogue en Allemagne et en Suisse, comme une migration de l'élite du domaine politique vers celui de l'économie ? Nous ne le croyons pas. Cette baisse a plutôt sa source dans la *diminution, déjà soulignée, du pouvoir radical en 1919.*

Max Weber veut voir une *sélection négative* dans cette migration de l'élite, et il la considère comme une conséquence du système de Guillaume II. En ce qui concerne la Suisse, la migration nous paraît devoir être due pour l'essentiel au mouvement de *concentration* de la vie économique. Les entrepreneurs, toutefois, gardent leur représentation au parlement, avant tout par le truchement de leurs *avocats*, qui, faisant partie des conseils d'administration, ont de nombreuses relations politiques et économiques. Ces avocats se trouvent le plus souvent en Suisse alémanique, tels les futurs conseillers fédéraux Edmond Schulthess et Hermann Obrecht. La *statistique des conseillers d'administration* que nous avons dressée reflète d'ailleurs ce changement. L'augmentation du nombre des membres de conseils d'administration est un phénomène lié au développement économique, bien sûr; mais on est frappé par le fait que le nombre de députés siégeant dans les conseils d'industries, de banques et

d'assurances passe de 30 en 1872 à 86 en 1911 au Conseil national. Comment les sièges de conseils se répartissent-ils entre les quelques 500 parlementaires qui en détiennent ? La majorité dispose de 1 à 2 sièges; environ 10 % de 3 à 4; seuls 20 députés siègent simultanément dans 5 conseils d'administration ou plus. C'est au sujet de ces derniers que la question de Jakob Bosshart prend de l'intérêt: la puissance économique est-elle la condition du pouvoir politique ? 15 d'entre eux ne disposent, au moment de leur élection au parlement fédéral, que de un ou deux sièges dans des conseils, et fréquemment dans les conseils de banques locales ou cantonales sans grande influence. Ils n'obtiennent les sièges plus importants qu'après leur entrée au Palais fédéral. La carrière politique précède donc indiscutablement la carrière économique. Il faut naturellement apprécier de cas en cas si la cumulation des sièges provient de l'accroissement de l'influence politique, ou si un siège occupé au préalable n'en a pas attiré d'autres par la suite. La prépondérance du politique sur l'économique est la plus fréquente parmi les députés d'origine sociale modeste. Et, entre eux, on trouve de célèbres avocats d'entreprises qui ont établi leur influence économique par la politique seulement. Ceux-ci, certes, cèdent le pas de plus en plus devant les *fonctionnaires d'associations économiques*, qui constituent aujourd'hui, avec 18 %, le plus fort groupe du Conseil national. Les liens étroits qui unissent partis et associations rendent pourtant plus grande l'influence des représentants d'associations, sensiblement, que ce chiffre ne l'indique. Celui-ci ne se rapporte en effet qu'aux politiciens professionnels des associations, mais non à l'ensemble des représentants d'intérêts économiques en tant que tels.

Jakob Bosshart paraît donc avoir vraiment raison pour une période définie de l'histoire suisse, celle où la prépondérance politique du mouvement radical est la plus frappante (1890-1919). Les proportions maxima d'anciens étudiants membres d'Helvetia, de francs-maçons, d'officiers supérieurs se placent toutes au tournant du siècle, au moment où les radicaux régnaient sans limitations. Ce parti avait notablement perdu son caractère de parti populaire couvrant toute la population et était devenu le représentant des intérêts d'une bourgeoisie élevée qui représentait essentiellement les paysans et les employés, les artisans et les entrepreneurs de la Suisse protestante. Pour le détail, le jugement de Bosshart semble s'appuyer d'abord sur quelques personnages que la cumulation de charges avait mis au premier plan.

Et pourtant, la puissance de cette élite vient buter contre des ob-

stacles insurmontables. En effet, plus le parlement et le Conseil fédéral sont les chasses gardées du parti gouvernemental radical, plus ceux qui sont exclus du pouvoir se servent des moyens classiques de la *démocratie directe*, du référendum. Le nombre de lois rejetées par le peuple est en étroite corrélation avec la cumulation des pouvoirs à la tête de l'Etat. Les conseils législatifs se voient ainsi confrontés à un mur, qu'ils ne peuvent franchir que s'ils tiennent compte de cette *opposition muette* qui s'organise chaque fois à nouveau. Voilà qui renforce, dans les partis, le rôle des militants ! De nos jours, les campagnes référendaires sont conduites avec les coûteux moyens des sondages d'opinion et de la publicité moderne; le recours général au référendum en est ainsi limité, car seuls les groupes de pression peuvent, dans la règle, réunir les fonds nécessaires. L'élite représentée au parlement se voit donc opposée à une autre élite, celle des associations, qui a l'habitude de mener sa politique par ses propres moyens.

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Les caractéristiques de l'élite politique suisse proviennent encore, mais pour d'autres raisons, des particularités de la *démocratie référendaire*. Le citoyen suisse ne choisit pas, comme c'est le cas dans d'autres démocraties, la politique gouvernementale des années à venir en élisant ses conseils. Nos élections n'ont donc rien d'une décision spécifique définitive, et sont souvent des actes de routine. Le Suisse ne fait pas de politique avec sa liste électorale, mais avec son *bulletin de vote*. Par conséquent, la position de l'autorité exécutive suprême du pays, le *Conseil fédéral*, à laquelle nous allons consacrer quelques remarques, en est profondément marquée. Son élection, sa composition échappent pratiquement complètement à l'influence du corps électoral. Mais, grâce à la fonction de contrôle qu'il assume dans la législation, celui-ci exerce indirectement des effets de grande portée sur l'élaboration de la politique du Conseil fédéral. Il reprend, dans un Etat qui ne connaît pas de renversement du parti au pouvoir, le rôle de l'opposition.

Une seconde caractéristique s'ajoute à celle-ci: le Conseil fédéral, formé de 7 membres, n'est pas un cabinet qui dépende de la confiance que lui accorde une majorité au parlement et qui puisse être contraint à démissionner par un vote de méfiance. Il est donc pratiquement inamovible. Dans cet ordre de choses, le rejet d'un projet de loi par le peuple reste sans conséquences. Enfin, le Conseil fédéral

est une *autorité collégiale*. Aucun ministre ne peut être tenu pour responsable d'un domaine politique particulier: le Conseil entier porte la responsabilité politique de son activité. Cela n'est pas sans déteindre sur son *mode d'élection*. Les conseillers fédéraux sont élus par l'Assemblée fédérale (Conseil national et Conseil des Etats réunis) pour la durée d'une législature, selon le système du scrutin de liste, c'est à dire l'un après l'autre dans l'ordre de leur ancienneté.

Examinons maintenant les effets de cette situation juridique particulière sur la composition du Conseil fédéral. Puisqu'il est inattaquable, il est compréhensible que la *durée de fonction* moyenne soit élevée, soit 11 ans, alors que dans le canton de Genève, au contraire, qui est beaucoup plus agité, la durée de fonction à l'exécutif cantonal n'est que de 6 ans en moyenne. L'éligibilité n'est limitée que par une seule prescription juridique, à savoir qu'un canton ne peut disposer que d'un représentant au Conseil fédéral. Pourtant, les trois cantons les plus grands, Zurich, Berne et Vaud, disposent de facto d'un siège en permanence. Au temps de la prépondérance du parti libéral-radical (1848-1920), l'exécutif est composé presque exclusivement de représentants de ce parti. Le passage au système actuel de gouvernement de tous les partis, qui veut que les quatre grands partis nationaux soient représentés au Conseil fédéral proportionnellement à leur force électorale, se déroule en une très lente succession de concessions. Ainsi les conservateurs-catholiques (en 1891 et en 1919), les agrariens (en 1929), les socialistes (en 1943 et en 1959) se voient accorder un siège, voire deux. Le parti radical perd la majorité absolue, mais en 1943 seulement.

Le nombre total de conseillers fédéraux en fonction de 1848 à 1966 est, pour les raisons que nous venons de mentionner, beaucoup plus petit que celui des pays qui connaissent le renversement des ministères: il s'élève à 79. Bien que la charge de conseiller fédéral soit beaucoup plus lourde aujourd'hui qu'autrefois, en exigences de temps et de forces, la durée de fonction actuelle moyenne, 8,7 ans pour la période de 1950 à 1966, n'est pas sensiblement moindre que celle des premières décennies, 9 ans pour la période de 1848 à 1870. Ce n'est qu'entre 1890 et 1910 que la moyenne s'élève considérablement et atteint 15,2 ans. Cette constance accroît la valeur des remarques qu'on peut formuler sur cette institution dans son ensemble.

Les particularités de la position juridique et politique du Conseil fédéral nous induisent à poser d'abord la question du recrutement et des voies d'accès, puis celle des changements. Quoique on ne puisse pas tirer d'enseignements valables en pourcentages quand on

a affaire à un si petit nombre de sujets, nous nous servirons cependant de cet auxiliaire par souci de clarté.

L'image de l'*origine sociale* n'est pas fondamentalement différente de celle qui se dessine à propos des parlementaires. Ceci n'a rien pour étonner, du moment que presque tous les conseillers fédéraux ont appartenu avant leur élection à l'un des conseils législatifs. Mais il est significatif que la préférence soit donnée aux candidats qui se situent dans les moyennes établies pour les parlementaires. L'examen de la *profession des pères* donne un quart d'universitaires, à peu près un cinquième de commerçants et un cinquième de paysans, un sixième pour chacune des catégories que constituent les artisans et ouvriers d'une part, les fonctionnaires d'autre part. Le temps ne fait pas intervenir de variations sensibles dans cette répartition. Les fils de fonctionnaires augmentent en nombre au détriment de ceux de commerçants. Si l'on s'en rapporte spécifiquement aux couches de population, un sixième des conseillers fédéraux est issu de la couche la plus basse, et un sixième de la couche supérieure. Les deux autres tiers proviennent pour la plupart de la couche moyenne inférieure, pour le reste de la couche moyenne supérieure.

Il ressort très nettement de l'examen des carrières que la *voie d'accès* la plus fréquente passe par les bancs de l'université (69 cas sur 79). Plus encore qu'au parlement, le juriste l'emporte avec 49 représentants sur les autres. La profession initiale des juristes est presque exclusivement la pratique d'avocat. Leur *carrière professionnelle et politique* paraît dans presque tous les cas s'être déroulée selon un modèle constant préétabli. Le métier initial de juriste conduit la plupart des futurs conseillers à celui, si caractéristique de la Suisse, de politicien professionnel, comme journaliste et membre d'une autorité communale ou cantonale. Plus des deux tiers des conseillers fédéraux sont membres d'exécutifs cantonaux au moment où ils sont élus à leur nouvelle et haute fonction. Un tiers exactement d'entre eux a revêtu en outre, auparavant, une charge du même ordre au niveau communal. 80 à 90 % des conseillers ont été députés dans les parlements cantonaux et aux Chambres fédérales. La voie d'accès paraît donc tracée de façon presque stéréotypée, et constitue un «cursus honorum» analogue à celui de la Rome antique, qui s'est ancré progressivement dans les mœurs depuis plus de cent ans. A côté de cela, une position dirigeante dans le *parti* ne constitue pas un préalable indispensable, comme dans de nombreuses démocraties parlementaires où le chef du parti devient automatiquement celui du gouvernement. Cependant, elle contribue manifestement à faciliter

l'ascension politique. Sur les 79 conseillers, 49 ont occupé avant leur élection une fonction dirigeante dans leur parti (la plupart du temps comme président du parti cantonal). 15 d'entre eux ont été présidents centraux du parti ou présidents du groupe parlementaire. Ce phénomène est sensible dans tous les partis et à toutes les époques, sans différences.

Si on les compare à l'homogénéité qui caractérise la durée moyenne des mandats, les *changements* qui interviennent à la *tête du pouvoir* semblent être presque des opérations de routine. La régularité des retraites et des renouvellements vient confirmer cette impression. La régularité est certes due aussi à la position juridique particulière du conseil fédéral, qui ne peut être renversé comme un cabinet ministériel. Ce que nous connaissons des motifs de démission nous permet d'éclairer d'une autre manière le mécanisme des renouvellements. Alors que l'âge moyen d'entrée au Conseil est de 50, et celui des retraites de 62 ans, les vacances causées par le décès, les considérations de santé ou d'âge sont un phénomène normal: c'est ce que l'on rencontre dans 70 % des cas. Seuls 11 des 79 conseillers fédéraux poursuivent une carrière après leur retraite en acceptant des charges dans une grande organisation internationale domiciliée en Suisse ou dans l'économie privée, par exemple. Ces cas ne sont pas plus fréquents aujourd'hui que pendant les premiers temps de l'Etat fédératif. Rares sont les non-réélections ou les démissions provoquées par la pression de l'opinion publique; il n'y en a que 7 en tout. Dans 4 cas seulement, la démission a été provoquée par la décision personnelle du conseiller de répondre par ce geste au rejet par le peuple d'un projet de loi qu'il avait dû défendre.

Qui veut tirer des conclusions des remarques faites au cours de ce travail doit souligner de phénomène fondamental suivant: le Suisse, dans sa grande majorité, considère l'accès à l'élite politique comme le préalable à l'ascension sociale. L'explication en est simple: la Suisse, plus que tout autre pays, est une *nation politique*. Le fait d'être Suisse s'accompagne d'un facteur qui détermine l'attitude qu'on prend à l'égard de la politique et de l'Etat. Faute d'une langue et d'une culture communes, l'élément le plus important de notre existence nationale réside dans la conscience politique collective de la Suisse. C'est la préoccupation constante et intensive des problèmes de l'Etat, qui, selon l'historien suisse de la littérature Karl Schmid, constitue l'essence de ce qui différencie la manière d'être et de penser du peuple suisse de celle des autres pays européens.

THE STRUCTURE OF ELITES IN POST-WAR GERMAN POLITICAL PARTIES*

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1. Introduction

The present study will compare the elite structures of two German political parties: of the Christian Democratic Party (CDU) and of the Social Democratic Party (SPD). These two parties seem to be reasonably comparable because they are the two major political forces with a considerable mass basis and an extensive organization. Both parties claim to be a «Volkspartei», i. e. a representation of various societal interests¹. On the other hand, the internal system of the two parties exhibit some conspicuous differences that make a comparison even more interesting.

In contrast to elites in communities or whole societies, it is relatively easy to delineate the elite structure of formal organizations. It is true that the center of political decision making cannot be located a priori; it may lie in the executive board or in a central commit-

* This paper is a summary report on some particular aims, problems, and empirical findings of a larger research project which has recently been initiated in the Berlin Institut für politische Wissenschaft. The paper was finished before the CDU-SPD coalition has been established in December 1966. In addition, it should be mentioned that according to the Law on Political Parties (Gesetz über die politischen Parteien), passed in July 1967, the CDU leadership structure has been reorganized.

I wish to thank Jürgen Dittberner, assistant at the Institut für politische Wissenschaft, for collecting the data on the Social Democratic Party and for various valuable suggestions for the first draft.

¹ In the last federal elections the CDU and the SPD got together around 75 % of the total vote. On the lowest level of organization the CDU has 4,400 local groups while the SPD has about 7,770. The membership figures are: CDU 300,000, SPD 710,000. The CSU (Christlich Soziale Union) with 107,000. members has been omitted from the analysis because it is a regional (Bavarian) organization. The fourth party that counts in national politics, the Liberal Party (FDP = Freie Demokratische Partei) with 80,000 members could not yet be studied intensively because there are only few relevant data at hand.

tee of the membership party, and one can also imagine that it is located in the leading group of the parliamentary party (fraction and/or cabinet). Furthermore, the center of decision-making may also vary from time to time and according to different problems to be decided upon. Nevertheless, it can be assumed that final decisions are made within a limited number of executive bodies and central committees which altogether can be called the «zone of leadership». This term is used here for analytical purposes only; it is meant to encompass not only the members of the executive board but also those in central committees and commissions of the membership party as well as of the parliamentary party.

It must be emphasized that political decisions of and for the party may actually originate from informal cliques of party leaders or even from groups outside the party, e.g. in associations, governmental institutions, trade unions, pulpits, etc. But decisions, if they are to be authoritative for the party, must be at least formally *sanctioned* in one or all of the central bodies which together make up the «zone of leadership». In this sense, the analysis of party elite structures is meant to delineate the institutional framework in which decisions are assumed to be made.

The organizational structure, the social composition, and the political functions of party elites are different from those of other voluntary associations because of the unique functions of the political party itself: firstly, a major political party is normally not the representation of a single societal interest or of only one social class or group but a plurality of interests. Secondly, a political party does not only serve as a transmission belt of societal interests into parliament and government but it is also responsible for, and to a greater or lesser degree bound by, the policies of its parliamentarians and/or cabinet members. Voluntary associations may also have «their» members as deputies in the parliament or even in the cabinet in order to influence directly the legislation and the governmental actions. But such channels of communication function normally as a means of pressure politics in one direction, — from the association into the legislative or governmental bodies. In contrast, there is a reciprocal relationship between the parliamentary party and the membership party, both being equally held responsible to the electorate.

The concrete forms of the relationship between the parliamentary party and the membership party depend on a variety of factors, e.g. the governmental system, the party system, the ideology

and internal structure of the relevant parties. We are concerned here with the type of a three-party system (two major parties and a smaller one) as is the case in the Federal Republic. In a multi-party system or in one-party system the problems may be different.

It is my hypothesis that one cannot analyze the elites of political parties without taking into consideration at least two fundamental aspects: (1) the organizational structure of the membership party, and 2) the relationship between the party leaders in parliament and the leaders of the membership party. Theoretically, it may be said that the more a political party becomes a «Volkspartei», the more its executive board becomes a body of «representation» or a «clearing house», and that the function of leadership transfers into a smaller circle, the members of which are generally also the leaders of the parliamentary party. We may call the last mentioned phenomenon «overlapping leadership».

2. Two Approaches to the Study of Party Leadership

Research on the structure, the social composition, and the power of party leadership has for long been moulded by the «classic» elite theory. It was especially Robert Michels who, while summarizing and reformulating the elite theories of Pareto, Mosca, Sorel and others, laid out the path for an inquiry into «anti-democratic», oligarchical tendencies which were conceptualized as a quasi natural outcome of the growth of modern «mass parties»². Even the critique on Michels' thesis has mainly followed his lines of theoretical thinking³. One of the most conspicuous examples of this tendency in recent times (although the book is already called a «classic») is Duverger's analysis of «party leadership» which can be labelled as an elaboration of Michels' «law of oligarchy»⁴.

Without going into the details here,⁵ one can summarize the elite

² Robert MICHELS, *Zur Soziologie des Parteiwesens in der modernen Demokratie*, 1911, 2. ed., Stuttgart, 1925.

³ See A. SCHIFRIN, «Parteiapparat und Parteidemokratie», in: *Die Gesellschaft*, 7 (1930), pp. 505-528.

⁴ M. DUVERGER, *Political Parties*, English ed., London, 1951, see esp. I, chap. III.

⁵ See S. M. LIPSET, «Introduction to R. MICHELS, *Political Parties*, New York, 1962; J. LINZ, *Roberto Michels and Political Sociology*, New York, forthcoming.

theory — which we call for the sake of brevity the «Michels Approach» — as resting on two assumptions: (1) modern mass parties, like all other mass organizations, have to be visualized fundamentally as a relationship between «the masses» on one side and «the leaders» on the other; (2) the emergence, the composition, the stability, and the authority of the leading elite must be understood — not only, but essentially — as the products of certain psychological factors on the side of «the masses» (which want to be led) as well as on the side of the elite (which wants to hold the power by isolating itself).

Although Michels' empirical analyses of the socialist movements were extremely penetrating and differentiated, his organizational model was comparatively simple. What so heavily bothered him was the contradiction that those parties with a genuine democratic program and self-perception became, nevertheless, an authoritative system. The elected leaders became an incapsuled elite vis-à-vis their electorate which transforms into pure «followers». The leaders and the masses ideologically reject what they in fact practise. Psychological factors on both sides in combination with a quasi natural transformation of political movements into stable organizations make the emergence of a ruling group inevitable.

It may be questionable whether Michels paid enough attention to the historical facts when he formulated his «iron law of oligarchy». Even at the beginning, the German labor movement can hardly be called a «democratic» organization in the sense of Michels' Rousseau' an ideal-type. Lassalle's «Workers' Union» (Allgemeiner Deutscher Arbeiterverein) was — in Weber's terms — a charismatic, authoritative association. The «Socialist Workers' Party» (Sozialistische Arbeiterpartei Deutschlands) which was founded by August Bebel, and, later, the united «Social Democratic Party» (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands) tried hard to maintain intra-party democracy; but even there, the executive board and at times the socialist parliamentary party held a considerable degree of power over the whole party, due mainly to the anti-socialist laws and to various legal restrictions which prohibited the establishment of a fullscale political workers' organization until the beginning of this century⁶.

There can be no doubt that Michels' analyses helped considerably to illuminate some basic problems of modern organizations. His work

⁶ Cf. W. SCHRÖDER, *Geschichte der sozialdemokratischen Parteiorganisation in Deutschland*, Dresden, 1912; Th. NIPPERDEY, *Die Organisation der deutschen Parteien vor 1918*, Düsseldorf, 1961; G. ROTH, *The Social Democrats in Imperial Germany*, Totowa, N.J., 1963

stirred up a wide discussion among students as well as among functionaries of political parties. But despite these merits, the Michels Approach seems not only to be incapable of coping with legal, governmental and other factors which lie in different party systems and may shape the structure of parties and its elites; there seem to be, additionally, some contradictions in this «classic» elite theory itself.

Firstly, a considerable numerical increase in party membership means a more or less concomitant increase in organizational differentiation. Ideal-typically one may say, that, in contrast to Michels' assumption, those parties could more correctly be called «mass» organizations which have a restricted membership basis, i.e. which appeal to only *one* social group or *one* social stratum and give voice to certain irrational feelings. But in so far as a party appeals to a wider electorate (in order to mobilize new social groups or strata) and to a more diversified social basis for membership recruitment, the organizational structure will also tend to broaden vertically and horizontally. In addition, the members of new groups or strata which are incorporated into the party, bring with them their own particular interests, political aims or ideologies. And they will accordingly try to build up specialized intra-party organizations or informal associations. The concrete extent to which an increase in membership effects the internal pluralization of a party varies according to the socio-economic and cultural conditions in different countries. With respect to modern pluralistic societies it may be assumed that a major increase in membership does *not* make the party a «mass» aggregate (in the socio-psychological sense) but a more complex system in which a plurality of social and political interests find their expression.

The same theoretical conclusion follows if one adopts Sigmund Neumann's classifications. In his perspective there is a historic development from the older type of «parties of representation» toward the newer one of «parties of integration»⁷. With this ideal-type Neumann referred especially to the German Social Democratic Party (during the Weimar Republic). The second concept was meant to emphasize the fact that political parties of that type «integrate» the member through interference in as many of his public and private spheres of life as possible, thus binding the member closely to the

⁷ See esp. S. NEUMANN, *Die Parteien der Weimarer Republik*, rev. ed. Stuttgart, 1965, pp. 105 ff.

party and making the membership a permanent one. On the other hand, the «party of integration» is everything else but a «mass party». Although a variety of factors may intervene, the very «integration» (in Neumann's sense) will normally also mean a pluralization of the whole party in so far as «integration» necessitates the proliferation of various specialized agencies, offices, institutions, and «supporting organizations» which do the task of «integration» in the respective fields. All these groups and institutions which may be within the formal party structure or are more or less closely associated with it, make the total party a highly differentiated organization; when they themselves begin to establish a hierarchy of their own and develop specific political interests they may even jeopardize the unity of the party, as Herbert Sultan has pointed out⁸. One can thus speak of a «dialectic» of the «party of integration» in the sense that the stabilization of a numerically broader membership by «integration» (in Neumann's terminology) feeds back to the total organization in making it more instable unless it develops special devices for the integration of its pluralized structure.

Secondly, one can criticize the Michels Approach from another angle. In the course of a considerable increase and pluralization of a party in a modern society the need for functional differentiation (division of labor) will also increase. The appropriate management of a major party, the effective political formulation and transmission of diversified interests within the party and in the electorate, and the efficient handling of parliamentary or governmental responsibilities make for the emergence of a variety of experts in the relevant fields of political action. Thus, the whole party, including its bureaucrats, press officers, parliamentarians, cabinet members, town mayors, etc. will move away from the type of a «mass» movement towards an association of more or less specialized and stratified personnel. Under this perspective the concept of a «mass» party, as it underlay the Michels Approach, becomes not only meaningless for analytical purposes but also contradictory as a theoretical type.

I may add that our discussion of the Michels Approach does not only pertain to the situation of major parties in Western countries but also to those socialist countries which are socio-economically highly developed. Bucharin, in his critique of the Michels Approach⁹,

⁸ H. SULTAN, «Zur Soziologie des modernen Parteiensystems», in: *Arch. f. Sozialwiss.*, 55 (1926), pp 91-140.

⁹ N. BUCCHARIN, *Theorie des Historischen Materialismus*, Hamburg, 1922, p. 365 ff.

pointed out that «the masses» must not remain as «incompetent» as Michels assumed. According to Bucharin, the phenomenon of «masses» will disappear in the socialist society because of the rapid development of technology, of economy, of talent, etc. Thus, on the whole, the society will be even more differentiated than it was under capitalistic conditions. How much this has actually had an effect on the structure of parties in socialist countries cannot be discussed here. It seems probable, however, that those parties also must integrate their highly pluralized structures, although the means and modes of integration may be different from those of political parties in other countries. In this connection, it must be emphasized that the type of «cadre parties» which is often neglected in comparative party research ought to be taken into consideration.

The brief discussion of some shortcomings of the Michels Approach has already pointed to an alternative which we may call here the Organizational Approach. By this I mean an approach which abandons the model of a simple power relationship between «the elite» and «the masses» and, instead, conceptualizes an organization as a complex structure of communication and reciprocal influence. Thus, a political party is viewed as a pluralistic system. One can assume that within major parties in modern pluralistic societies the hierarchy of authority is not only stratified *vertically* (from the top to the bottom) but also *horizontally* in so far as there may exist within the party particular associations which have a full-scale vertical organizational structure of their own. Additionally, one can conceptualize a third dimension of organizational differentiation which may be called a *functional* one. With this I mean for instance the relationship between the membership party and the parliamentary party or between the executive board and various functionally specialized commissions which are located on the same organizational echelon. A further example for functional differentiation in political parties is the relationship between the political leadership and the party bureaucracy; this aspect has been especially emphasized (in contrast to Michels) by Max Weber¹⁰.

Samuel Eldersveld has recently pointed out that a major political party should be visualized as an «alliance of substructures or sub-coalitions»¹¹. As such it constitutes a system of multiple conflicts which have to be tolerated if the party is to function effectively as

¹⁰ D. HERZOG, «Max Weber's als Klassiker der Parteiensoziologie, in: *Soziale Welt*, 17 (1966), pp. 232-252.

¹¹ S. J. ELDERSVELD, *Political Parties*, Chicago, 1964.

a clientele-oriented, open, interests articulating organization. According to Eldersveld, the «balkanization» of power relations is reflected in the composition of the party leadership. He assumes, further, that the «very heterogeneity of membership, and the subcoalitional system, make centralized control not only difficult but unwise»¹².

It is not my task here to step into the details of organizational theory. Nor can I take for granted before closer inspection that Eldersveld's theoretical propositions which may be relevant for American parties must all be equally appropriate for the study of European, especially German, parties. I only want to outline the Organizational Approach which I assume to be applicable in my analysis of the structure of leadership in the German CDU and the SPD.

As stated earlier, it is my proposition that one of the basic dilemmas (which have to be resolved in one way or the other if the party is to function effectively) of party leadership lies in the reconciliation of two contradictory principles:

(1) Given the party as a conflict system of multiple subcoalitions with legitimate specific interests, the central leadership bodies have not only to be responsive to these demands but must also be open for an incorporation of the «representatives» of those subcoalitions; this may be viewed as a mechanism for the balance of intra-party powers. Additionally, those party members have to be incorporated who are the spokesmen of interests outside the party. At times the numerical size of leadership bodies may even have to be adjusted to the changing power constellations in the subcoalitional system, in the sense that new subcoalitional «representatives» have to be incorporated or others dismissed. So one can speak of an «integrative» or «representative» function of leadership bodies.

(2) On the other hand, it is clear that, in principle, subcoalitional representation is opposed to general political leadership. If a «representative» of a subcoalition is elected or coopted into an executive board only because of this qualification, his role in the leadership body will be limited accordingly; he is, then, a spokesman of a particular interest with a quasi imperative mandate, thus being not really qualified to take part in decisions which concern the *bonum communis* of the whole party or the society at large, especially in decisions which are directed against the interests of his own subcoalition. In short, a party executive cannot function only as an agency

¹² ELDERSVELD, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

for intra-party conflict resolution; if the party wants to take part efficiently in national politics, the executive must also be active in shaping new issues and political programs which means that the party executive must be a relatively homogeneous team.

Moreover, compromises have to be found rapidly if the party is to avoid prolonged internal factionalism and thus stay incapable of effective participation in national politics. Therefore, leadership bodies cannot be too large or else there must be smaller circles for rapid decision-making. In this respect, it may even be appropriate for the party as a whole that one person, the leader himself, if he is not the «representative» of particular intra-party interests, is entrusted with some «lonesome» decisions. In short: the dilemma of leadership bodies lies in a reconciliation of their «representative» function on the one hand, and of their leadership function proper on the other.

A second dilemma which I would like to use as a starting point for my analyses (chapter 5) is generally not encompassed by organizational theory because it concerns only political parties. I may briefly formulate it theoretically in the following way: if the party is to integrate and articulate a plurality of societal interests, the leading elite has to be responsible to (i.e. it must be elected by) the membership party. On the other hand, politics are practically made in the parliamentary party (cabinet and/or fraction). Therefore, and for various other reasons which need not be discussed here, a close communication between these two parts must be institutionalized.

This is done differently in different countries. R. T. McKenzie for instance, has argued that in Britain «followers outside Parliament become little more than a highly organized pressure group with a special channel of communication directly to the Leader, the Cabinet and the parliamentary party»¹³. According to R. Rose, the influence of the membership party on the political decisions in Parliament (in Britain) is even more restricted because the «party leaders must work in conjunction with extra-party institutions and influences if they are to make decisions of consequence for their society»¹⁴. In Germany the history of the Social Democratic Party gives ample evidence for the continued struggle over the distribution of power between the membership party and the parliamentary fraction.

Ideal-typically one can distinguish between a relationship where

¹³ R. T. MCKENZIE, *British Political Parties*, 2. ed. London, 1963, p. 642.

¹⁴ R. ROSE, «Complexities of Party Leadership», in: *Parl. Aff.* 16 (1963), p. 272; cf. J. BLONDEL, *Voters, Parties, and Leaders*, rev. ed. London, 1965.

the leaders of the parliamentary party and those of the membership party are identical, and a different type of relationship where there are two statutory and personally distinct leadership bodies. As it will be shown later, the cases of the CDU and the SPD in the present time seem to lie in between these two theoretical types: leadership of the parliamentary party is statutorily distinct from that of the membership party, but a close connection is ensured through «Ämterkummulation», a phenomenon which I call here «overlapping leadership». This concerns only the elected leadership bodies; the relationship between the central party office and the executive bureau of the parliamentary fraction (and the ministerial bureaus when the party is in government) may also be of major interest but cannot be dealt with in the present study.

3. Structural Characteristics of the CDU and of the SPD


The organizational structures of the CDU and of the SPD are similar in many respects. Both parties have three levels of organization: (1) local (Ortsverband; Ortsverein), (2) district (Kreisverband; Unterbezirk), and (3) regional (Landesverband; Bezirk)¹⁵.

On the federal level (see tables I and II), both parties hold Party Congresses which meet at least every two years to elect the executive. The SPD Congress consists of 300 delegates which are elected in the regional organizations according to their respective membership. The CDU has a mixed electoral system: each regional organization is numerically represented in the Party Congress according (a) to its membership and additionally (b) according to the votes cast in the respective region for the CDU in the last general elections. The last Christian Democratic Party Congress in 1966 had 576 delegates.

In both parties a Party Council (Parteirat; Bundesparteiausschuss) exists as an intermediary body between the Congress and the executive. The Social Democratic Council functions in general as a body for harmonizing politics of the regional levels and of the federal level. With around 118 delegates it is nearly as large as that of the CDU. Whereas the SPD Council is composed exclusively of ex-

¹⁵ A valuable source of information for the analysis of the structure and politics of post-war German, political parties is: O. K. FLECHTHEIM, ed., *Dokumente zur parteipolitischen Entwicklung in Deutschland seit 1945*, 5 vols., Berlin, 1962-66; cf. M. G. LANGE et al., *Parteien in der Bundesrepublik*, Schriften d. Inst. f. pol. Wiss., vol. 6, Stuttgart, 1955, and Ulrich LOCHMAR, *Innerparteiliche Demokratie*, Stuttgart, 1963.

TABLE I
GENERAL STRUCTURE OF THE SPD



officio members, the Christian Democratic Council has additional representatives from the regional organizations. Therefore, it can be looked upon as an «intermittent party congress» which normally meets every six months and is directed by the party chairman.

It can be assumed that in both parties the Councils have relatively little influence.

On the top of the organizational hierarchies are Executive Boards (Vorstand) and Executive Committees (Präsidium) which constitute smaller circles within the Boards. The structure and the composition of these two leading bodies will be analyzed in the following chapter. What has to be emphasized here is the fact that the Social Democratic Executive Committee is also a body of administrators who have specific directory functions in the central party office. In contrast, the members of the CDU Executive Committee generally do not fulfill bureaucratic functions. The CDU central office has an appointed director.

The Control Commission (Kontrollkommission) which has 9 members is a peculiar feature of the Social Democratic organization. Originally meant to supervise not only the administrative but also the political activities of the Executive Board, its power has declined considerably in the course of time. Today it is hardly more than a body which takes stock of the party funds every two years and gives a report before the Party Congress.

One of the most interesting, yet rarely analyzed, phenomena are the «supporting organizations» (Arbeitsgemeinschaften, Vereinigungen etc.)¹⁶. These organizations are meant to mobilize particular strata, professional groups or other sectors of the society, but, in turn, may also exercise strong pressure on their own party. If they have full-scale organizational hierarchies, large memberships and self-elected leaders, they may influence party politics on all organizational levels, even in parliament. Thus, they constitute a complex intra-party conflict system.

The Christian Democratic Party has 5 statutory defined supporting organizations,¹⁷ and some more informal, yet nevertheless pow-

¹⁶ About the supporting organizations of the German Social Democratic Party in the twentieth see N. DIEDERICH, «Sozialistische Organisationen neben der SPD», in: *Neue Gesellschaft*, 5 (1958), pp. 347-51.

¹⁷ Junge Union (youth)

Frauenvereinigung (women)

Sozialausschüsse (workers)

Kommunal-Politische Vereinigung (local interests)

Mittelstandsvereinigung (middle class professions).

erful, ones¹⁸. Most of them have their own budget, periodicals and offices. Therefore, they are relatively independent from the party. It may be interesting to note that, for instance, the Christian Democratic youth organization (Junge Union) joins as members many young people who are not members of the party. The more influential a supporting organization is the more it functions also as a distinct career ladder within the whole party.

On the side of the Social Democrats, 10 supporting organizations exist presently¹⁹. But it seems that, in general, they are less influential than those in the CDU. Some of them have no full-scale organizational structure, thus playing actually only the role of additional commissions for the assistance of the central party executive. Their dependence on the party seems to be relatively strong, for instance with respect to their leaders who have to be acknowledged by the party.

Comparing the structural characteristics of the two parties, it can be said that the Christian Democratic membership party is the more pluralistic and decentralized one (with a geographically distinct, independent organization in Bavaria), whereas the Social Democratic Party is more centralized. Nevertheless, the latter can hardly be called a monolithic organization because it seems also to exhibit a constant trend toward structural and ideological diversification.

4. *Pluralistic Structure and Subcoalitional Representation*

The internal pluralism of the Christian Democratic Party, which is in reality an alliance or regional organizations, functionally dis-

¹⁸ E.g. Evangelischer Arbeitskreis (protestant association)
Ring Christlich-Demokratischer Studenten (students)

¹⁹ Arbeitsgemeinschaft sozialistischer Ärzte und Apotheker (doctors and pharmacists)

Arbeitsgem. sozialdemokratischer Juristen (advocates, barristers, judges)

Arbeitsgem. sozialdemokratischer Lehrer in der SPD (teachers)

Arbeitsgem. ehemals verfolgter Sozialdemokraten (victims of the Nazi regime)

Bundesarbeitsgem. «Selbständige» in der SPD (professions)

Bundesarbeitsgem. sozialdemokratischer Wohnwirtschaftler und Wohnungspolitiker (housing politicians)

Jungsozialisten in der SPD (youth)

Sozialdemokratischer Hochschulbund (students)

Sozialdemokratische Hochschulgemeinschaft (university teachers)

Sozialistische Jugend Deutschlands «Die Falken» (youth).

tinct associations, parliamentary fractions and cabinet members, is clearly reflected in the structure and composition of its leadership bodies. In contrast to that of the Social Democratic Party, the CDU Executive Board (Vorstand) has probably never been conceived as a team of political decisionmakers but as a meeting place for discussion, for compromises between divergent interests, and for ratification of decisions. This is not only shown by the fact that the Board has always been too large but also that it has been reorganized constantly. In addition, only some of its members are elected, others are coopted, while most of them are ex-officio members. In order to give the party a more effective leadership, a smaller circle, the Executive Committee (Geschäftsführender Vorstand, later called Präsidium) emerged. But even in that body one can notice a constant tendency toward enlarging and reorganizing its structure so that the group can function as an integrative mechanism by granting seats to subcoalitional «representatives».

The Executive Board which was elected in 1950 as the first leadership body of the unified party consisted of 16 ordinary members: 1 Chairman, 2 Vice-Chairmen, 1 Executive Chairman, 1 Treasurer, 10 additional members, and the chairman of the parliamentary fraction. In reality, however, though not mentioned in the statute, the Executive Board consisted of 38 members because of cooptation of: 2 more Executive Chairmen, the chairmen of all regional organizations and all those Prime Ministers of the Lander who were party members. This reflects the power of the regional organizations which, from the beginning, wanted to check the central party authority. The broadening of the Board shows also the desire to coordinate party politics on the federal and on the regional levels.

In 1956 the first statutory reorganization took place. While a part of the Executive Board was transformed into an Executive Committee, the Board itself was enlarged considerably. In addition to those already mentioned, the Board consisted from now on of the following members: 2 more Vice-Chairmen (elected), the Secretary General, the vice-chairman of the parliamentary fraction, the President of the federal parliament (Bundestag), in case he belongs to the party, the Chairmen of the «supporting organizations», 3 coopted members, and all cabinet members who belong to the CDU. This reorganization shows the same tendency as just shown above: (a) integrating the party by giving subcoalitional representatives a seat, and (b) connecting the membership party with the parliamentary party (cabinet and fraction). The structure of the Executive Board was partly

reorganized in 1960 and 1962, but its composition remained essentially the same.

The nomination procedure in the CDU is also different from that in the SPD. Whereas all members of the Socialist Executive Board are elected by the Party Congress, the procedure is more complicated in the Christian Democratic Party. Only a small percentage of the Board members are elected by the Party Congress; others are elected by the Federal Council or are cooptated, while the rest have-ex-officio seats. It must be emphasized that the last mentioned category has nearly always been in the majority. (See Table III)

TABLE III
MEMBERS OF THE CDU EXECUTIVE BOARD *

Year	I Elected by Party-Congr.	II Elected by Fe- deral Council or cooptated	III Ex-officio	Total	Ratio I + II : III
1950	3	12	1	16	15 : 1
1952	3	14	21	48	17 : 21
1954	3
1956	5	15	29	50	20 : 29
1958	5	14	22	41	19 : 22
1960	5	38	21	64	43 : 21
1962	7	19	32	58	26 : 32
1964	7	19	34	60	26 : 34
1966	11

* Ex-officio members who were also elected have been counted only once as «elected».

Although the statute requires the Executive Board to meet at least every three months, it is clear that its numerical size as well as its composition narrow the chance for rapid decision-making and effective leadership. Its function is rather a «representative» and integrative one.

The case of the Social Democratic Executive Board is different because it is a relatively small body. Although the Party Congress has the statutory right to varyate the number of Board members, actually, since World War II, there have always been 33 members. The Board consists of: 1 Chairman, 2 Vice-Chairmen, 1 Treasurer, 29 additional members.

All members are elected (in a two-year term) by the Party Congress. One can assume that among those 29 additional members some play the role of a subcoalitional «representative». But the fact that neither the regional organizations nor the functionally distinct associations and «supporting organizations» within the party have a statutory right to be represented in the Board shows clearly that this body is basically meant to form a team of decision-makers, irrespective of particular subcoalitional interests.

Furthermore, in contrast to the Christian Democrats, the Socialist parliamentarians and Cabinet members in the Länder have no ex-officio seats on the Board.

In the fifties, both parties established Executive Committees. Evidently they have been organized to centralize authority at the very top of the party hierarchy. But even here the structure, the composition and the mode of election of the Social Democratic and of the Christian Democratic Executive Committees are conspicuously different.

The CDU has statutorily changed its Executive Committee more often than its whole Executive Board. First established in 1956, it encompassed 13 members; after successive reorganization it consisted since 1960 of 24, since 1962 of 7, since March 1966 of 15 members. Accordingly, the composition has also changed. At the beginning, the Executive Committee consisted of the Chairman, 4 Vice-Chairmen, 3 Executive Chairmen, the Treasurer, the Secretary General, plus the chairman and the vice-chairman of the parliamentary fraction and the President of the Bundestag. Only the first mentioned five members were elected by the Party Congress.

Between 1960 and 1962 the Christian Democratic Executive Committee comprised: the Chairman, 4 Vice-Chairmen, 16 additional members (elected by the Executive Board) and 3 coopted members. After a further reorganization a troika emerged plus 4 additional members, all elected by the Party Congress.

Finally, since March 1966, the Executive Committee consists of: the Chairman, one Vice-Chairman, two more Vice-Chairmen, one Executive Member (Geschäftsführendes Präsidialmitglied), the Treasurer, the chairman of the parliamentary fraction, the Secretary General, Mr. Adenauer honoris causa, and 6 additional members. Among these six are cabinet members, chairmen of regional organizations and of «supporting organizations», and the President of the Bundestag.

All these organizational changes seem to indicate two general characteristics: (1) In the Executive Committee there has always been

the tendency to combine leadership positions in the membership party and in the parliamentary party; (2) there have always been some positions which were functionally not specified («additional members») and the number of which has changed from time to time. In this respect it seems that one cannot discern a general trend. It must be assumed, therefore, that the positional structure and the personal composition of the Christian Democratic Executive Committee has always been changed in order to meet the demands of sub-coalitional «representatives», thus stabilizing, each time anew the heterogeneous power system of the whole party.

An interesting example for this mode of conflict resolution was the recent process of reorganization of, and nomination for, a new Executive Committee in March 1966. The whole matter was not at all left to the discretion of the Party Congress, nor to the Executive Board or even to the (former) Executive Committee, but to a special ad-hoc commission. Apart from its chairman, Mr. Dufhues, all other six commission members did not belong to the former Executive Committee. That means that the planning for the reorganization of the top leadership body of the party was given to a quasi-neutral group. Actually, in a relatively long period of extensive discussions, the Dufhues-commission began first to nominate all those «representatives» of special interests and intra-party substructures which had to be represented in the new Executive Committee. Only after that compromise was settled, the commission invented the titles of the more or less specified organizational functions for the already nominated personalities. Some people even proposed to give all chairmen of the 18 regional organizations ex-officio seats in the new Committee, but this would seemingly have gone too far in the direction of establishing at the very top of the party an unworkable body of «representatives». It is interesting to note that the task of the Dufhues-commission was officially formulated as «to suggest an organizational solution which would do *justice to the heterogeneity* of the party and *guarantee its efficiency*», — in other words, to harmonize two theoretically contradictory principles.

Prior to 1958, the Social Democrats had no statutory Executive Committee. In practise, however, six members of the Executive Board (plus the Chairman of the party) used to meet as a distinct executive group. They were the only members of the Board who got regular fees. Each of them directed one of the six departments in the central party bureau.

A new structure was inaugurated in 1958. From that time on,

the SPD Executive Board had to nominate an Executive Committee with 9 members, the number being fixed by the Party Congress (since 1966 10 members).

This reorganization was of considerable importance. The new statutorily established Committee was primarily meant to form a group of political leaders who could be viewed by the electorate as a «shadow cabinet». Whereas only two (out of seven) members of the former Executive Committee were MP's, the new Committee consisted of seven parliamentarians (out of nine), who were, moreover, also in the executive committee of the parliamentary fraction. Thus, on the whole, the reform had a double effect: (1) The power of the salaried «bureaucrats» was repressed through the installation of a team of political leaders (although most of them have additional «bureaucratic» functions); (2) the top of the membership party was firmly connected with the leading group of the parliamentary fraction through a considerable degree of overlapping membership in both groups. The same holds true for the composition of the Committee in successive years. Today, seven (out of ten) members hold also leading positions in the parliament.

It may be annotated that, in contrast to the often changing structure of the CDU Executive Committee, there does not seem to be a comparable tendency toward making the Social Democratic Committee also a body of subcoalitional «representatives». In this respect, its power over the whole party (including the parliamentary fraction), is probably greater than that of the Christian Democrats. This hypothesis can also be proved, as will be done in the next chapter, by analyzing the respective numbers of overlapping leadership positions in both parties.

5. *Overlapping Leadership: The Party-Parliamentary Elite*

The problem of overlapping leadership in political parties has several dimensions which can be distinguished for analytical purposes. We can, for instance, analyze the overlapping of leadership positions in parties and in voluntary associations, institutions, (e.g. television stations, universities, economic corporations), public administration, etc. I am concerned here only with the phenomenon of overlapping leadership with respect to the membership parties and to the parliamentary fractions (and/or cabinet) in the German Bundestag.

One can assume that a party executive which is identical with the

cabinet members and/or leading parliamentarians who belong to the party is the most powerful one, whereas the dispersion of positions within the total sphere of leadership is identical with a more pluralistic system of several distinct leadership groups and single personalities. It is clear that each type has a different effect on the stability and functioning of the parliamentary system. But this is not my problem here.

My questions are (a) whether one can speak of a fairly unified party-parliamentary elite in the CDU as well as in the SPD (although, formally, there is in each party at least a twoheaded leadership: one of the membership party and the other of the parliamentary fraction), and (b) whether or not a party being in government or in opposition makes a difference in this respect.

Unfortunately for scientific purposes, the Christian Democrats have always been in government (since 1949) and the SPD in opposition, so that one lacks contrasting cases. Moreover, my data are not yet complete; the generalizations can, therefore, only be made tentatively²⁰.

Starting with some general observations, statutory regulations about the relationships between the membership party and the parliamentarians can be shown for both parties. For instance, the leaders of the parliamentary fractions must give reports in the Party Congresses. These regulations are the same in the CDU and in the SPD.

On the other hand, according to the Social Democratic statute, one tenth of the parliamentary fraction have seats in the Party Congress (although they have no right to vote). A similar rule does not exist in the CDU statute.

More important, the regulations concerning the seats of leading parliamentarians in executive bodies of the two parties are conspicuously different. It has been mentioned earlier that, in the Christian Democratic Executive Board, the leader of the parliamentary fraction (and his substitute), all cabinet members and the President of the Bundestag (if he belongs to the CDU) have ex-officio seats. Thus the connections between the top of the membership party and of the parliamentary party is statutorily established.

The SPD does not have a comparable rule. All members of its executive must be elected by the Party Congress. Only the cabinet mem-

²⁰ For a comparison between the situation in the Netherlands and in the Federal Republic of Germany see: I. LIPSCHITS, «Partijbestuur en fractie», in: *Acta politica*, 1 (1965), pp. 154-171.

bers (in case the SPD is in government) have ex-officio seats in the Council, but this body is of minor political importance.

It must be emphasized that statutory rules are only one side of the coin. It makes a difference if a leading parliamentarian (or a cabinet member) has an ex-officio seat in the party executive or if he is elected by, and therefore directly responsible to, the membership party. Furthermore, it can be shown that the Social Democratic executive, the members of which must all be elected by the Party Congress, is in fact strongly composed of leading parliamentarians.

Going beyond mere statutory explorations, I will subsequently focus on two aspects of overlapping leadership: (1) on the parliamentary position of the party leader, and (2) on the combination of party and of parliamentary positions of Executive Committee members. I shall concentrate on the Executive Committees (and not on the total Executive Boards) of the two parties because it can be assumed that the Committees are the leadership bodies proper.

Between 1949 (when the first national parliament after World War II was elected) and 1962, the chairman of the Social Democratic fraction (Kurt Schumacher, later Erich Ollenhauer) and his substitute were always those elected for party chairman (and vice-chairman). Thus, the leader of the major parliamentary opposition party was identical with the leader of the membership party. This combination of positions has broken down since Willy Brandt, the Mayor of Berlin, who has no seat in parliament, was elected for Chairman of the SPD. So we have, since 1962, a double leadership in the SPD: (1) the Chairman of the membership party (who was the party's candidate for Prime Minister in the 1961 and 1965 elections), and (2) the leader of the parliamentary opposition, Fritz Erler, who is also one of Brandt's substitutes in the party executive. (One could also speak of a triple leadership, if one includes Herbert Wehner who plays the informal role of a director of the central party office).

On the side of the Christian Democrats, we see a typical combination of the positions of party Chairman and of Prime Minister. Only after Konrad Adenauer's retirement from office and Ludwig Erhard's becoming Prime Minister in 1963, the two positions separated temporarily. But after 30 months, the former positional combination was restored. Thus, among nine party elections since 1949, the CDU Congress chose only once a Chairman who was not the Prime Minister.

This combination of party Chairman + Prime Minister, respectively party Chairman + leader of the parliamentary opposition, seems to be generally recognized in both parties as an appropriate way of

coordinating party politics and parliamentary politics. In so far the structure of leadership seems to develop in the direction of the British model. But it must not be forgotten that (a) in Germany the party leader is *not* elected by the parliamentary fraction but by the membership party, and (b) that, on the side of the majority, the position of the Prime Minister is distinct from that of the leader of the majority fraction (although there are no statutory or legal objections against such a combination or positions).

With respect to the Social Democratic opposition, one can speak of a parliamentary party in so far as all party members in parliament constitute one group with an elected leader of its own. But this very organizational unity of the Social Democratic parliamentarians seems, in turn, to foster the chance of a relatively strong congruence between the decisions of the parliamentary fraction and those of the membership party.

The Christian Democrats, on the other hand, have at least two parliamentary groups with distinct leaders, — the cabinet members and the parliamentary fraction. This bifurcation of parliamentary leadership, typical for a party in government (in the German parliamentary system) is, with respect to the CDU, further strengthened by two other factors: first, the Prime Minister has always been the head of a coalition government which means that he has to be responsive to colleagues from one or more other political parties. Second, the role of the Christian Democratic fraction leader is different from that of the leader of the Social Democratic parliamentarians because the Christian Democratic fraction is itself an alliance between two groups, the CDU parliamentarians and those of the Bavarian CSU. The latter ones, being the parliamentary representatives of an organizational distinct membership party, hold separate meetings and have a chairman of their own.

Comparing the total elite structures of the two parties, one can see various differences between the two.

Prior to 1958, the SPD Executive Committee resembled more a board of bureaucratic officials than a political elite. Aside from the Chairman and the Vice-Chairman, the group was positionally not connected with the party's parliamentary elite.

Since the organizational reform in 1958, the Committee has been characterized by a strong concentration of political power. Neglecting minor variations in the course of time, the general type of the new SPD party-parliamentary elite can be outlined in the following way:

On the one hand, the former principle has been upheld, according to which each Committee member has administrative functions in the party office and controls, additionally, the activities of coordinated central commissions. On the other hand, from then on, the majority of the Committee members has had also leading positions in parliament. Only two out of nine members are not MP's (among them the party Treasurer). The others are ordinarily not only members in the executive of the parliamentary fraction but also have positions in various other parliamentary groups. In the SPD a frequent and typical combination of leadership positions in the following:

- a) Member of the party Executive Committee,
- b) Director of a department in the central party office,
- c) Chairman in coordinated central party commission,
- d) Member of the executive group in the parliamentary fraction,
- e) Chairman in a commission of the parliamentary fraction,
- f) Chairman (or vice-chairman) of a parliamentary committee.

Frequently, b, c, e, and f are leadership positions in groups that work in the same political field, e.g. welfare politics, or military defence, or economic politics. (See Table IV).

The case of the Christian Democratic political elite is different. Although the ratio of parliamentarians among the CDU Executive Committee members is as high as in the SPD, the number of combined party-parliamentary positions is very low. There were at times only one or two Committee members who simultaneously held the chairs in a party commission or in a functionally similar parliamentary group. (See Table V).

This dispersion of leadership positions seems to be due to the peculiar situation of a party in government. Firstly, it is true that political leadership is concentrated in the cabinet. But cabinet members cannot simultaneously be chairmen of parliamentary committees or of commissions of the parliamentary fraction. Secondly, federal bureaucracies which are at the disposal of a cabinet member work more efficiently than equivalent commissions of the party. (Therefore, these party commissions of the CDU are relatively unimportant, and the chairmanships are, normally, left to less influential party politicians). Thirdly, the central party office of the CDU has little political influence. This is partly due to the fact that the CDU started as, and remained, a strongly decentralized organization with an enduring suspicion by regional leaders against the power of the central party authority. But it can be argued also that, during the long (16 years) stay in government, the shaping of practical politics has largely

been done in federal bureaucracies. Even pure party politics have been directed to a great extent by the cabinet members with the aid of their bureaucratic officials.

There are many in the CDU who call for a more extended and more efficient party bureaucracy which could serve as a body of experts in times when the party would be in opposition.

Strictly speaking, one can say that there is no one party-parliamentary elite in the the CDU but that there are several elite circles on different levels, — in the cabinet, in the parliamentary fraction, among the leaders of regional organizations, etc.

The opposition party, on the other hand, must rely heavily on the technical and administrative facilities of its own party bureaucracy and of specialized party or fraction commissions. Therefore, a relatively great amount of overlapping leadership, i.e. a manifold combination of leadership positions in the total party-parliamentary elite, seems to be both necessary and efficient if the opposition party wants to counterbalance the federal bureaucratic power which is largely at the disposal of the party in government.

6. Concluding Remarks

Effective leadership in formal organizations is identical with the centralization of authority. This is a necessary, although not sufficient, prerequisite for the stability and functioning of the total organization. The concentration of power in an oligarchical elite or in the hands of a single leader may be appropriate in organizations with a relatively homogeneous social composition and with a clear-cut interest, program or ideology. But if the organization is hierarchically stratified and functionally diversified in the sense that a variety of legitimate interests and competing subgroups or subcoalitions exists within the organization, its elite structure must accordingly be more or less pluralistic, i.e. the executive body tends to become a «clearing center» where the «representatives» of subgroups meet and compromises between divergent intra-organizational interests can be found. This is the case especially in political parties which want to mobilize a wide range of different strata and groups in a pluralistic society.

On the other hand, compromises between subcoalitional «representatives» cannot replace leadership. Often decisions have to be made rapidly. Furthermore, decisions with far-reaching consequen-

ces for the party or for the whole society cannot do justice to *all* interests involved but must discriminate between more or less urgent demands. In both respects, an executive body with subcoalitional «representatives» is generally unfit for proper leadership.

Under this theoretical perspective the changing structures of executive bodies in both major political parties in the Federal Republic have been analyzed. In the Christian Democratic as well as in the Social Democratic Party the proliferation of *two* executive bodies can be understood as a consequence of their internal pluralism. The numerical size, the peculiar composition (ratio of ex-officio members!) and the constant reorganization of the Christian Democratic Executive Board seem to reflect the need for the integration of a highly heterogeneous party, i.e. for the representation of subcoalitional interests. Therefore, a smaller circle of leaders, the Executive Committee, emerged in order to meet the demands for rapid decision-making. But even there, one can notice a trend toward adjusting the composition of the Committee to the changing power constellations in the subcoalitional system. Thus, the transition of party leadership into the cabinet, seems to be not only a temporary characteristic of the foundation period of the new party. The concentration of party authority in the hands of a few parliamentary leaders and cabinet members and the authoritative regime of Konrad Adenauer, that Heidenheimer has emphasized as a distinctive feature in the formative period of the CDU²¹, can be sociologically conceptualized as a general and typical characteristic of a major «Volkspartei» which is in government.

Similar trends can be found with respect to the Social Democratic elite. The more the party develops towards a pluralistic organization, the more its executive can be assumed to become also an agency for subcoalitional conflict resolution while the proper leadership function concentrates in a smaller circle of the party executive.

Comparing the positional systems of the two Executive Committees, it has been found that in the Social Democratic Party the amount of overlapping leadership positions in the membership party and in the parliamentary elite is by far greater than in the CDU. This can be interpreted as typical for an opposition party vis-à-vis a party in government.

The author wants to express his debt to Natalie Bogoff Kennedy, as the paper has drawn upon literature suggested by her unpublished paper «The

²¹ A. J. HEIDENHEIMER, *Adenauer and the CDU*, The Hague, 1960

Supposing that the German party system remains essentially as it is now, especially that both major parties continue to function as a «Volkspartei», I would assume that

(a) the party in government has to rely heavily on its parliamentary and cabinet leaders, otherwise its pluralistic party-parliamentary elite would not be appropriate for effective leadership;

(b) that, for the same effect, the opposition party must establish and maintain a fairly homogeneous and relatively small party-parliamentary leadership unit.

It goes without saying that, through the analysis of structural prerequisites for political decision-making, the sociologist can only delineate, hypothetically, the «chances» for action (in Max Weber's sense); how political actors will in fact behave, remains an open question.

THE STUDY OF NATIONAL ELITES:

SAMPLE SURVEY DESIGN OR SOCIOMETRIC APPROACH ?¹

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1. Introduction

In this paper I shall, by way of a discussion of some general properties of élite studies, focus attention on some limitations imposed on these studies by a probably insufficiently clearly formulated set of assumptions. I shall try to show that these assumptions are tied up with a very special and highly limited type of technical analysis, viz. cross-tabulation of individual properties. In the subsequent parts of the paper I shall argue that this theoretical limitation is in no way a necessity, and I shall, in a sketchy fashion, show how some of the thinking about élites has been hampered by this unconscious limitation, and how its removal may lead to highly different kinds of data utilization as well as conceptual changes.

2. A feature of élite studies: individual actors classified by individual properties

Most useful in the study of élites is, I think, an assessment of its place relative to other types of studies. If we classify studies with regard to the intensity of the interaction between the individuals covered by the study, we find that they fall somewhere in between the small group and the entire population of a society. It is well known that these two types of entities are studied in highly diverse fashions: the small group is studied by means of *sociometric* techniques, or, to put it somewhat more ponderously, by eliciting information fitted, if carried far in formalization, for the interaction ma-

¹ The author wants to express his debt to Natalie Rogoff Ramsöy, as the paper has drawn upon ideas suggested in her unpublished paper «The Social Net».

trix². Conversely, the entire population has been handled by means of the sample survey technique. This elementary difference has placed élite studies in a peculiar position: while much loose *thinking* about élites is filled with notions of a definitely sociometric variety (less seldom brought out explicitly in theory or given priority in research) its methodology has borrowed heavily from the sample-survey design. The implications of this dualistic position of élite studies, as well as its causes, require some few comments.

If we first look at the implications it might be useful to look somewhat closer at the properties of the ordinary sample survey study.

Let us look at the possibilities for analysis of a set of survey data, for example the normal random sample survey's of about 2000 persons, the common Norwegian figure for Gallup sample surveys. 2000 individuals, scattered all over the country, are interviewed, and what is extracted from them is punched on cards. It is characteristic that analysis of such data normally will take the form of studying the relationship between properties of individuals, e.g. correlating opinions with background variables. There is hardly ever any question of other types of relationships, and there will in no case, and just *because* this is a sample survey, be any question of analyzing relationships *between* individual cases in the sample. This simply cannot be done, because the chances are that these people will hardly know each other, they will be pulled randomly, and consequently in a scattered fashion from all over Norway, and it is a crucial point, and a valuable asset of the survey method that it does not get down to relationships between persons. To the extent that two persons in a 2000 man sample should know each other, this is strictly accidental, and the infrequent occurrence of this is the very glory of the sample survey method. Frequent occurrence should be subjected to some kind of methodological or practical scrutiny to ensure that the event would not turn up in subsequent studies.

This method is rather absent when we look at the study of the small group. Here the socio-metric methods have been most common, subjecting *all* the members of the group to an inquiry concerning ties to *other* and *specified* members of the group. Consequently, an entirely different type of study emerges.

² See Leon FESTINGER, Stanley SCHACHTER and Kurt BACK: «Matrix Analysis of Group Structures», in *The Language of Social Research. A Reader in the Methodology of Social Research*. Edited by Paul F. LAZARSFELD and Morris ROSENBERG, New York, The Free Press, 1965.

The problem is now: why is it that the élite studies have followed the sample survey design rather than the small group sociometry approach? Since the élite studies are quite frequently of the middle range with regard to the number of subjects this requires an explanation. I shall venture a few of those and show how they work as mutually reinforcing.

By and large, the élite studies have posed problems other than sociometric ones. The problems have essentially concerned the relationship of one group to some other group, problems of recruitment and overlap. Usually very few background factors have been investigated (social class, university background and a few others). Little interest has been devoted to the analysis of the *inner structure* of an élite, (though exceptions may be found) and still less work has been devoted to the systematic classification or typologies of structures. Intellectually, this type of study grew out of a simple semi-Marxian assumption: past experiences or early background was supposed to have left its stamp upon a person and a clue to how a person might act would be his origin or earlier experiences. The élite studies originated within this variety of sociological assumptions.

However, more immediately *practical* reasons might have worked to preserve this type of study well beyond its initial and most useful phase. The handling of sociometric data seems to have been one of the more central ones. While the cross-run of properties allowed for simple bivariate or simple multivariate tables the sociometric approach would require much more cumbersome procedures. Simple technical devices did not exist. Only the gradual development of the techniques for data-analysis, in particular the EDB-methods have made a sociometric, or network analysis of large numbers of individuals a practical possibility.

In turn, the absence of practical devices have had a profound influence on much theorizing about élites since it has not allowed the sociometric approach to develop. The availability of data and the character of methods worked to cramp theorizing.

This has essentially led to an inadequate conceptualization and proposition-production concerning the character of political linkage-structures. C. Wright Mills' propositions concerning the nature of

§ A study of the Norwegian *Storting* (the national assembly) by Gudmund HERNES is explicitly concerned with the reputational as well as the interaction sociometry of this political body. The study is still in progress.

the American «power élite» are really geared to a study of network interconnections, but almost all the data he presents concerns the social composition or the modal ideological temper of certain sectors of society⁴. William Kornhauser essentially thinks in network terms, but without fully letting this become a part of his theorizing, and his hard data are figures on differences between those who are members and those who are not with respect to support of political democracy⁵. As with Mills he is best in his theorizing exactly where the data are missing, because there he is not bound by the paradigm of the sample survey design, but thinks more freely in linkage categories. Indeed, the character of their data keeps them from utilizing fully the fruitful implications of their theories.

One can also easily see that even thinking outside the «pure» élite studies may profit from these network considerations; the studies of anti-democratic ideologies is a case in point. From the more naïve notions of *The Authoritarian Personality* a very speedy development has taken place, which is moving rapidly towards a network formulation. This can be seen very clearly in the writing of Seymour Martin Lipset on extremist movements. His first work was called «The Radical Right: A Problem for American Democracy»⁶ and his later article «Working Class Authoritarianism»⁷ pursued the same theme, one of place in the social hierarchy, with the possible refinement of rank disequilibrium. His later work on the same subject⁸ and his article on the Goldwater backlash⁹ are much more couched in terms which indicate place in a network, and particularly distant positions. These ideas are fruitful because they do not require any similarity between the object of hostility among the different fringe groups with an axe to grind, thus stripping the thinking about the «extremist» — «authoritarian» — «intolerant» of the overdose of personality psychology from which it has suffered, and because it

⁴ C. Wright MILLS, *The Power Elite*. New York, Oxford University Press, 1956.

⁵ William KORNHAUSER, *The Politics of Mass Society*. Glencoe, Illinois, The Free Press, 1960.

⁶ Seymour M. LIPSET: «The Radical Right: A Problem for American Democracy». *British Journal of Sociology*, 1950, pp. 176-209.

⁷ Seymour M. LIPSET: «Working Class Authoritarianism». *Political Man*, New York, Doubleday, 1960.

⁸ Seymour M. LIPSET: Three Decades of the Radical Right: Coughlinites, Mc Carthyites, and Birchers», in *The Radical Right*, edited by Daniel Bell, New York, Doubleday and Company, Inc. Garden City, 1963.

⁹ Seymour M. LIPSET: «Beyond the Backlash.» *Encounter*, Nov. 1964.

allows for differentiation between a *political* network and a *social* network, notions not easily incorporable in Kornhauser's conceptualization. This is mentioned because a study of élites should be able to rest on broader studies of the structure of the larger society.

3. Norwegian studies of élites: what has been done and what is missing?

Within the last years a number of studies of various sectors of the Norwegian élite have been carried out by political scientists and sociologists working at or linked to the Institute for Social Research. These studies are essentially of two kinds: studies of the professional elite and studies of the political elite. Both these two sets of studies have produced rather comprehensive personnel archives, and they are continuously being expanded in several directions. As they have formed the basis of a series of articles and monographs on the political structure and development of Norway, their utility can hardly be questioned. We would have been worse off without them. In keeping with the general criticism just presented I will, however, call the attention to a neglected aspect of the Norwegian élite and suggest some ideas for research along lines slightly different from the ones pursued up to now.

I think it can be said as a broad characteristic of the existing élite studies that they have studied the élites and their interrelationships in terms of a Leontieff-matrix. Most of the findings can be fitted into an inflow-outflow chart as flow coefficients. This provides us with possibilities for studying these coefficients comparatively. One may either compare the flow from different classes into different types of élites, or one may use material from other nations as the basis for comparisons of the same élite across national borders. If we suppose that such studies will become more and more systematic and cover ever larger sectors of the élites in different societies, one might also envisage some kind of overall characterization of the entire table, i.e. the entire élite structure. Methodologically, there is a long way to go, but this seems to be the not too distant goal. The construction of a chart like this seems feasible on the basis of Norwegian data.

It is, however, noteworthy that we have so far been most concerned with the composition of various élites with regard to certain

background variables. We have been interested in the recipe for concocting different élites. Considerably less attention has been given to such questions as the average chance of certain social élites to become members of the political élites. There is not any immediate basis for this choice of emphasis. To be sure, the composition may be of importance for an understanding of the policies pursued (though arguments against an overemphasis on this element are easy to come by), but the average chance of ever holding office, or of knowing who does is at any rate a good runner-up with regard to importance, and the combination of these two types of data promises the best understanding of the character of the élites in politics.

But let us for a moment assume that we have to choose between these two types of data. What are the most important purposes for which outflow data may be used (figures presenting the proportion of one élite entering another, preferably the political élite) where inflow data are not useful? The answer is simple: they tell us more about the links between different élites. To know that a certain group of people constitute 10 or 20 % of the political élite is of interest, but it is also useful to know how much these 10 or 20 % amount to in terms of their part of the entire group of people with those characteristics. To be more concrete: we may want to know how large a percentage of the school teachers is in the parliament, but also how large a part of the school teachers is in parliament.

This leads us rather directly to the question of the size of a political system, and its implications for the outflow rates. Norway, Sweden and Denmark are known for rather limited rates of professionals with a university training in the national assemblies. But if the percentages are computed the other way around, the chance of ending up in parliament for a Scandinavian professional may quite possibly be very considerable as compared to other political systems, and we may consequently have a system where the large portion of comparatively lower class groups in the national assembly take a leading part in the shaping of policy and in providing the symbolic basis for the identification of the lower classes with the political system, while the various social élites still have more «*percentagewise access*» than in a number of other societies. To be sure, we are still far from a real sociometric approach, but I think that this example of a neglected line of analysis of material gathered may serve as a useful bridge to the next part of the argument, since it pinpoints the size of a country as relevant to the kind of links

that may exist, and brings us to that point where I think that we have been the least imaginative with respect to data-collecting and reflection. I shall make a trivial point and subsequently try to spell out its non-trivial implications.

Norway is a comparatively small society. This means that in spite of a relatively high level of industrialization the division of labour among the élite is not carried particularly far, and it makes for an amount of contact, friendship and mobility across élite borders normally not common in a country of that level of modernity. It infuses relationships with a certain diffuseness and «Gemeinschaft» in situations where such societies as the USA would be lacking it altogether. The various implications of this situation for the way in which high society in Norway ticks has been described elsewhere; here I shall limit myself to the problem of how to study it.

Quite clearly studies of inflow will not do, and studies of outflow will, though not quite as irrelevant, not really do the trick either. What is required is some kind of national macro-sociometry, where the different personal contacts of professional links are charted. It is quite possible that at the initial stage of such an investigation one should not be too strict with regard to methods, but allow a relatively soft approach to harden very gradually into more easily researchable problems.

But in one respect there are possibilities for more immediate application of more «hard» data. While real sociometric data may be rather expensive, one might envisage the utilization of a different type of data. Suppose that we collect all the lists available for membership in various boards of voluntary organizations, parties, public commissions and the like. We will then be equipped with a number of data that in many respects may pass for sociometric data, since they tell us that all the people in one board have at least that minimal property of having seen each other at a board meeting and done some small amount of interacting there. Let us suppose that we assemble as many such lists as we can lay our hands on. These data can be analyzed by means of what is called the McQuitty technique, which is a technique for picking out from a number of individuals those individuals who are «alike» in most respects. Such procedures will allow us to select what we might call «cores of condensation» within the élite, and provide us with quite nuanced images of the internal élite structure: is it like a cobweb with one center, does it have two poles, or is it like an irregular mountain range? The procedure does not in any way suffer from the introduction of irrele-

vant or superfluous data, and seems to offer an amazing number of possibilities for the translation of common sense notions of elite structure into researchable propositions, and it seems to be very well fitted for the investigation of the problems of Norwegian elite structure and functioning which so far have been omitted from systematic investigation.

CONTRIBUTION A L'ETUDE DE L'ADAPTATION DES NOIRS EN FRANCE

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PSYCHIATRIC SOCIOLOGY

SOCIOLOGIE PSYCHIATRIQUE

Une étude de nature d'adaptation des Noirs en France, et plus particulièrement à Paris. Nous avons été amenés à distinguer en dehors du personnel des Ambassades, Consuls et Institutions Internationales (UNESCO, etc.) trois groupes celui des étudiants, celui des stagiaires et celui des travailleurs.

Cette typologie repose sur un certain nombre de facteurs de différenciation sociologiques qui caractérisent chacun d'eux.

Les étudiants pourrissent dans l'Université française des études supérieures en trois points identiques à celles de leurs camarades français. Certains d'entre eux, même, ont achevé dans des lycées de Métropole leurs études secondaires. Leur durée de séjour sera donc longue, la plus longue des trois groupes. Les membres de ce premier groupe partagent sur tous les plans à la vie d'étudiant qui peut être une existence hors du réel, sociologique, culturelle aussi bien pour les Blancs que pour les Noirs. La mentalité élevée chez les étudiants français souligne la fragilité des individus constituant cette classe. Remarquons, à ce propos, que les étudiants africains reflètent dans leur pathologie mentale davantage une étiologie en rapport avec le coefficient de mortalité de leur discipline d'étude qu'en rapport avec leur origine africaine. (Dr. Paladej¹).

Le groupe des ouvriers se singularise sur tous les plans du groupe précédent. La plupart d'entre eux sont métropolitains, peu parlent un français même véhiculaire. La durée de leur séjour est brève — ne devant plus de 2 ans — et, chose capitale, ils forment des communautés séparées au milieu des blancs dès qu'ils ont satisfait à leurs obligations professionnelles.

On a pu parler de rétrogradation dans la mesure où on assiste à des recrudescences dans certains foyers ou fiefs de Paris, de sujets qui viennent du même village ou de la même région et qui y restructurent leur identité africaine, y consacrent des fournitures indi-

¹ Table Noire sur l'Adaptation des Africains en France, Paris, Editions E.P.H.E., 1964.

CONTRIBUTION A L'ETUDE DE L'ADAPTATION DES NOIRS EN FRANCE

R. BASTIDE et F. RAVEAU

Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes, Paris

Une étude du milieu d'Afrique Noire en France, et plus particulièrement à Paris, sous-entend un inventaire préalable de cette population. Nous avons été amenés à distinguer en-dehors du personnel des Ambassades, Consulats et Instances internationales (UNESCO, etc...) trois groupes: celui des étudiants, celui des stagiaires et celui des travailleurs.

Cette typologie repose sur un certain nombre de facteurs de différenciation sociologique qui singularise chacun d'eux.

Les étudiants poursuivent dans l'Université française des études supérieures en tous points identiques à celles de leurs camarades français. Certains d'entre eux, même, ont achevé dans des lycées de Métropole leurs études secondaires. Leur durée de séjour sera donc longue, la plus longue des trois groupes. Les membres de ce premier groupe participent sur tous les plans à la vie d'étudiant qui peut être une existence hors du réel, anxiogène, conflictuelle aussi bien pour les blancs que pour les noirs. La morbidité mentale élevée chez les étudiants français souligne la fragilité des individus constituant cette classe. Remarquons, à ce propos, que les étudiants africains reflètent dans leur pathologie mentale davantage une étiologie en rapport avec le coefficient de morbidité de leur discipline d'étude qu'en rapport avec leur origine africaine. (Dr. Falade)¹.

Le groupe des ouvriers se singularise sur tous les plans du groupe précédent. La plupart d'entre eux sont analphabètes, peu parlent un français même véhiculaire. La durée de leur séjour est brève — rarement plus de 2 ans — et, chose capitale, ils forment des communautés fermées au monde des blancs dès qu'ils ont satisfait à leurs obligations professionnelles.

On a pu parler de retribalisation dans la mesure où on assiste à des condensations dans certains taudis ou îlots de Paris, de sujets qui viennent du même village ou de la même région et qui y restructurent leur hiérarchie africaine, y consomment des nourritures indi-

¹ *Table Ronde sur l'Adaptation des Africains en France*, Paris, éditions E.P.H.E., 1964.

gènes, etc... Leurs loisirs sont essentiellement consacrés à la visite de leurs «frères», à un véritable bain d'Afrique natale. Que la pathologie somatique de ces sujets soit catastrophique, comme le soulignent à plusieurs reprises le Professeur Brumpt et le Docteur Jaeger² — tuberculose, affections cutanée et digestive particulièrement — ceci est dû à leurs conditions de travail (chômage fréquent) et d'habitat (taudis). Par contre, leur pathologie mentale directe est pratiquement inexistante. L'aspect protecteur de la communauté joue là un rôle principal. Nous avons montré³ en effet que les africains prolétaires rencontrés dans les hôpitaux psychiatriques de Paris et de la Seine ne provenaient pas directement de leur communauté, mais de services hospitaliers où leur mauvais état de santé somatique les avait conduits. Brusquement isolés par la maladie, séparés de leurs frères, sans moyen de communication, ou presque, perdus dans le monde des hommes en blanc, ils présentent rapidement des troubles du comportement qui, secondairement, peuvent les conduire à l'hôpital psychiatrique.

Enfin, il existe un troisième groupe, intermédiaire des deux extrêmes que nous venons rapidement d'esquisser dans leurs grandes lignes: les *stagiaires* sont des africains d'âges variables, envoyés en France par leurs jeunes nations pour acquérir en peu de temps une formation qui les rende aptes à servir de cadres moyens dans les différentes sections de la vie administrative, économique, technique que ces pays en voie de développement doivent créer afin d'être compétitifs dans le monde des sociétés contemporaines. La durée de leur séjour varie de 1 à 3 ans. Isolés parfois de la vie française pendant leur formation théorique accélérée, ils sont le plus souvent mêlés aux français par les stages pratiques qu'ils effectuent dans la deuxième partie de leur séjour. Leur formation initiale est la plupart du temps primaire ou équivalente à la fin du 1^{er} cycle de l'enseignement secondaire. Par conséquent, plus fortement imprégnés de la tradition africaine que leurs camarades étudiants, ayant vécu souvent leur enfance dans la brousse, ils sont plus à même que leurs compatriotes prolétaires de s'ouvrir à la civilisation occidentale, donc d'en subir les chocs culturels.

A leur niveau, les différents conflits que la confrontation des cultures traditionnelles africaine et occidentale produit, vont être plus

² «La Pathologie du Noir Africain en France», *Revue des Sciences Médicales*, oct. 1964, Homme et Migration, ESNA, Paris.

³ R. BASTIDE et F. RAVEAU, *Table Ronde sur l'Adaptation des Africains en France*, Paris, éd. E.P.H.E., 1964.

nettement dessinés que dans les deux autres groupes. C'est pourquoi nous avons décidé d'étudier ce groupe plus particulièrement dans notre Centre de Psychiatrie Sociale.

Mais cette division « tripartite » de la population africaine reste un peu factice car il existe des sujets intermédiaires entre ces divers groupes. Les étudiants que de nombreux échecs ont découragés, privés de leur bourse, vont survivre en se livrant à des travaux variés, souvent manuels, qui ne leur épargnent pas un certain dénuement. Des stagiaires ambitieux et désireux de monter dans l'échelle sociale de leurs pays, vont essayer d'intégrer l'université ou des instituts périphériques. Certains ayant raté leurs stages ne veulent pas revenir dans leurs pays riches de leurs seuls échecs et rejoindront ces étudiants sans l'être, accroissant ainsi cette masse flottante d'africains non intégrés. Le groupe des travailleurs contient aussi des sujets qui, soucieux d'acquérir une formation plus spécialisée dans certaines techniques, vont réussir à s'intégrer dans le monde des stagiaires.

Nous sommes là dans la mouvance la plus grande, où nous rencontrons une morbidité mentale et sociale très forte.

Cela est pour nous important, car le point central de notre recherche est l'étude des rapports existant entre la désadaptation mentale individuelle, au niveau des causes psychologiques, et la désadaptation sociale de l'individu ou du groupe, d'origine sociologique. D'où une méthodologie particulière qui vise à serrer au plus près les histoires de cas normaux et pathologiques, par des biographies, des tests psychométriques et psychocliniques et des examens biomédicaux individuels.

Nous reportons ensuite en terme de groupe la masse de nos résultats ainsi acquis fragmentairement. Cette synthèse permet alors de saisir la dynamique de certains facteurs sociologiques dépassant le groupe, pour aborder les domaines des cultures et des sous-cultures confrontés dans l'adaptation. Ajustement de la culture-hôte — en l'occurrence la française, ajustement des cultures-invitées — en l'occurrence africaines.

Notre étude aura bientôt 4 ans d'existence. Elle avait été précédée par une première approche, au moment de la transition entre la colonisation et la décolonisation, par l'un des deux auteurs de ce rapport.

L'histoire va vite et nous pouvons déjà parler d'une certaine évolution dans les rapports existant entre les cultures africaines et la culture française hôte.

Mais avant de l'aborder, il nous faut signaler encore un fait sociologique extrêmement significatif, celui de l'importance de la contribution du séjour en France sur la formation des futures classes sociales en Afrique.

Les trois groupes africains que nous venons d'esquisser ont entre eux, et à Paris même, une relation faite de tension qui reflète bien ce processus classificatoire. Le développement économique et social de ces jeunes pays se traduit par une différenciation croissante des fonctions et des professions, d'où davantage de choix et de possibilités de mobilité sociale verticale et ascendante. Mais le corollaire en est une nouvelle stratification, ce qui débouche sur une concurrence âpre pour les postes les plus élevés que la décolonisation libère progressivement. Cette concurrence va se refléter en France dans les tensions qui existent entre les stagiaires appelés à remplir des fonctions largement subordonnées et les étudiants qui attendent des postes de direction et de commandement. Cette genèse de la future classe moyenne se prépare en France et déjà, on y a constaté l'ébauche de la lutte des classes qui se manifeste plus clairement au retour dans le pays.

Sur le plan individuel, cela va se traduire dans le groupe des étudiants et des stagiaires par une lutte serrée autour des diplômes qui signent la réussite et la place dans la nouvelle stratification sociale. L'étudiant, s'il échoue, risque de tomber et de se retrouver rejeté de l'enseignement supérieur dans l'enseignement technique. Le stagiaire ne peut acquérir — ou maintenir — son statut de membre de la classe moyenne que par la réussite des épreuves que son passage en France lui impose dans un délai bref — deux ans, la plupart du temps.

Dans certaines nations, les conflits inter-ethniques ou inter-castes parfois aigus vont se retrouver magnifiés dans ces luttes pour la promotion sociale par le diplôme. Appartenant à une élite en place (chefs, notables, population conquérante) il faut se maintenir, ou bien, si l'on est membre d'une minorité jusqu'alors brimée ou d'une caste subordonnée, il faut faire de l'éducation un tremplin pour renverser les hiérarchies traditionnelles.

Or la sociologie des maladies mentales, telle qu'elle s'est constituée pour le monde des blancs, a bien établi: 1^o) l'importance des troubles psychiques en liaison avec les échecs dans les efforts de mobilité ascendante, 2^o) l'extension des névroses avec la mobilité exceptionnellement forte des sociétés contemporaines.

Il n'est donc pas étonnant que nous retrouvions pour les groupes

africains des phénomènes analogues. Une analyse plus poussée nous permet même, dépassant ici notre propos, de montrer que le sentiment de culpabilité, si bien mis en lumière par l'éthnopsychiatrie africaine et qui est à la racine de la sorcellerie, va — dans cette population acculturée en partie — se cristalliser autour de l'échec scolaire; ou encore comment les rivalités des sociétés traditionnelles, par exemple entre cadets et aînés, se retrouvent sous-jacentes dans ces transferts du pathologique de la culture occidentale.

Mais le sujet africain en situation d'adaptation et ne trouvant pas dans son milieu (groupe des africains transplantés) le calme ou la détente souhaitée va-t-il pouvoir se reporter sur le milieu extérieur, en l'occurrence la culture-hôte française pour y retrouver des barrières de sécurité ?

Nous pouvons distinguer en gros trois moments :

— Dans une première période, qui est celle où le groupe des stagiaires était tout petit par rapport à celui des étudiants, ne comprenant même le plus souvent que les étudiants ayant échoué, et recyclés dans le technique, et qui a été la période de transition entre la colonisation et la décolonisation, l'Africain réagit par des idéologies politiques ou culturelles qui lui permettent, dans la lutte et les manifestations agressives ouvertes, de compenser ses anxiétés. Les histoires de cas de nos stagiaires nous montrent, en Afrique, où ils se trouvaient alors comme élèves ou lycéens, des phénomènes analogues.

— Avec l'indépendance, s'ouvre une nouvelle période. L'agressivité ne peut plus se manifester ouvertement. Mais le stagiaire vient en France pour s'y imbiber de cette culture française contre laquelle il venait de lutter; partisan de la négritude, il vient pour se donner une mentalité de blanc, et somme toute, pour jouer dans sa Nation le rôle qu'y jouait avant le colonisateur tant honni. L'agressivité ne pouvant se tourner contre le blanc (d'autant plus que nous sommes à la période de la guerre d'Algérie et que tout le racisme français étant alors dirigé contre le Nord-Africain, par réaction le Noir est l'objet de sympathies manifestes) va se retourner contre lui-même, et déterminer des états de conflits psychiques, générateurs de névroses plus ou moins graves, avec une forte charge anxieuse.

— Dans une troisième période, actuelle, le nombre d'Africains a augmenté et nous assistons en ce moment au passage d'un certain seuil qui fait penser à ces solutions qui, saturées, cristallisent brusquement et révèlent des réseaux de structures jusqu'alors cachés. Les études parallèles aux nôtres, menées en Angleterre par l'«Insti-

tute of Race Relation» de Philip Mason et l'«Institute of Inter-Ethnic Relations» du Professeur F. Henriques, de l'Université de Brighton, ont nettement montré que la société anglaise contemporaine était brusquement devenue hostile à la couleur quand l'immigration jamaïcaine avait, au cours des années 1955-1958, dépassé un certain pourcentage. En France, avec quelque retard sur l'Angleterre, dû au fait que le problème social de la couleur ne se pose pas qualitativement de la même façon, nous assistons à un processus identique. Et cela, nous l'avons, grâce à notre méthode d'histoire de cas, d'abord perçu au niveau des individus lors des différentes campagnes électorales des années 1964-1965. En effet, des groupements politiques ont très publiquement exprimé par voie d'affiche et de tract, par la radio et la télévision, par des meetings largement suivis, leur hostilité à l'aide apportée par la France aux nations africaines «sous-capables».

Le coefficient d'anxiété apprécié par test de personnalité chez 100 sujets, s'est immédiatement accru d'une façon considérable, servant de voie d'entrée dans diverses entités névrotiques. Des syndromes d'influence ont pu être très fréquemment constatés, s'étendant en tache d'huile des individus aux groupes. Ainsi, nous avons, au cours d'entretiens, relevé la fréquence de croyances telles que celle qui consiste à être persuadé que les voitures conduites par des chauffeurs blancs recherchent systématiquement à écraser les noirs sur les passages cloutés ou les trottoirs.

Mais, à côté de ce temps que nous pourrions appeler «politique», et qui est un temps collectif, le temps individuel joue aussi ici comme révélateur de la fragilité des sujets au cours de leur progression sur le parcours d'adaptation.

Au préalable, il est nécessaire d'analyser les étiologies possibles. Nous distinguons alors trois catégories parmi notre échantillon:

— d'abord ceux qui présentaient des troubles mentaux (importants ou mineurs) en Afrique et qui voient ceux-ci se développer en France: évolution normale d'une névrose obsessionnelle, d'une psychose maniaco-dépressive, par exemple. Remarquons cependant qu'un certain nombre, très peu important, voit disparaître tous les symptômes pendant le séjour à Paris. Deux d'entre eux les ont vu réapparaître lors de leur retour en Afrique.

— un autre groupe est représenté par les sujets qui paraissent parfaitement «normaux» en Afrique, et qui, en France, le demeurent ou décompressent. Pour l'appréciation de la normalité africaine, nous n'avons pas seulement fait appel aux critères cliniques (fréquence

de consultation, etc...) mais à certains paramètres sociologiques tels que la constellation familiale et sa morbidité possible perçue à travers des critères psychanalytiques habituels. L'instabilité socio-professionnelle, la fréquence des changements de lieu géographique, etc... nous ont également aidés à dégager les profils normaux ou non. En France, par les batteries de tests, la réussite scolaire et les informations concernant l'intégration sociale, nous possédons évidemment des références plus solides. Si nous constatons une détérioration mentale de ces sujets au cours de leur séjour, une attention toute particulière est portée aux causes biologiques qui peuvent faciliter les processus morbides. Tous les stagiaires sont soumis dès leur arrivée à un dépistage médico-biologique complet: constante sanguine, analyse d'urine, graphie pulmonaire etc⁴.

— un dernier groupe, enfin, beaucoup plus intéressant, est constitué par des stagiaires qui, déjà «cas limites» en Afrique, voient leur état s'aggraver en France et se révéler comme franchement pathologique. Là aussi la réciproque est vraie, bien que très rare, dans la mesure où l'éloignement du milieu originaire traumatisant (famille désorganisée, opposition entre les deux éducations suivies, musulmane et laïque, par exemple) paraît avoir un effet thérapeutique salutaire.

Remarquons que si la thérapeutique, l'évolution et le pronostic sont différents pour ces trois groupes de stagiaires, une constante est commune: ce sont les événements révélateurs rencontrés au cours du parcours d'adaptation. Nous avons pu établir en fonction de la durée du séjour de 800 stagiaires africains et de la fréquence des troubles mentaux psycho-névrotiques un graphique qui souligne l'importance des différentes étapes.

Ces événements révélateurs sont:

dans les 3 premiers mois: logements (refus des français de louer aux noirs des chambres, même dans les hôtels, premier sentiment de discrimination); éléments bioclimatiques (l'année scolaire commençant en automne, au moment des premiers froids); éléments diététiques (l'Africain, obligé d'accepter une nourriture nouvelle, et ce changement d'alimentation se traduisant par des troubles digestifs); travail du stage; la confrontation entre la représentation que l'Africain se faisait de la France et la réalité qu'il vit.

⁴ G. JAEGER, «Dépistage des stagiaires en France», Moscou, Congr. International d'Étiologie, 1965, *Bulletin de l'Institut des Hautes Etudes d'Ou-tre-Mer*.

au cours de l'année: rôle de l'asthénie physique et psycho-affective⁵; le galop d'essai qui est un pré-examen, au milieu de l'année scolaire; l'examen de fin d'année; problèmes sexuels: a) pour les célibataires; b) pour le couple; les événements politiques (français, intérieurs, campagne électorale); b) africains (nationaux) stages en province; conflits inter-africains en France (association); examen; retour.

Si la communauté des facteurs sociologiques, pour nos trois groupes de stagiaires et leur localisation bien déterminée à tel ou tel moment de la durée de leur séjour en France, nous sont apparus à travers les histoires de cas (névrosés) et les enquêtes — par tests ou par interrogation d'un groupe de contrôle — il n'en reste pas moins que ces facteurs «révèlent» des faits différents au niveau du premier et du troisième groupe. Dans la mesure où le troisième groupe est constitué par des «cas limites» en Afrique, les facteurs sociologiques agissant en France sont, sinon créateurs de troubles, du moins créateurs du passage du pathologique latent au pathologique manifeste. Dans la mesure où le premier groupe est constitué par des Africains ayant déjà présenté des troubles mentaux dans leur pays natal, les facteurs sociologiques agissent seulement comme facteurs de répétition (un peu comme dans la psychanalyse classique, les faits actuels réveillent les traumatismes de l'enfance et la névrose résulte de l'addition de deux chocs successifs).

Notre étude nous permet donc de mettre en lumière, dans un cas privilégié, la dialectique jouant entre les faits d'adaptation mentale et ceux d'adaptation sociale. Les difficultés de l'adaptation sociale — à un nouveau milieu sociologique, où domine le blanc, et à une nouvelle culture, celle de l'enseignement français — se manifestent par des troubles de l'adaptation mentale — échecs aux examens, fuites dans l'imaginaire, recherche de la solitude — et réciproquement les difficultés d'adaptation mentale qui sont repérables à travers l'histoire du sujet, au cours de son enfance, et à travers les tests, se traduisent extérieurement à l'arrivée en France, par des difficultés d'adaptation scolaire — ce sont les discordances entre les résultats d'intelligence et le comportement scolaire — ou sociale (aussi bien d'ailleurs dans les rapports avec les autres africains stagiaires qu'avec les africains non stagiaires et les français).

Remarquons enfin l'importance de la non-adaptation sexuelle,

⁵ F. RAVEAU & E. FALIK-ELSTER, «La fatigue dans l'adaptation de l'Africain en France», Paris, Congrès International de Psycho-somatique, 1966.

comme si la sexualité cristallisait autour d'elle les conflits antérieurs et les conflits raciaux et comme si l'échec et la réussite, scolaire ou sociale, ne pouvaient mieux se révéler qu'à travers l'impuissance ou le Don Juanisme.

Le sociologique (et nous n'entendons ici par sociologique que le sociologique du nouveau milieu français où les stagiaires vont vivre) apparaît donc à des niveaux et sous des formes qui varient d'une catégorie à l'autre.

Ou bien il fournit un cadre dans lequel on peut mouler d'anciens conflits, qui peuvent prévenir des difficultés familiales en Afrique, mais dont l'analyse échappe à cet exposé — comme si le séjour en France permettait la création d'une nouvelle symbolisation des anciens conflits inconscients, ce nouveau symbolisme plus facilement verbalisable jouant naturellement le même rôle dissimulateur que le symbolisme archaïque, c'est-à-dire cachant pour l'individu plus profondément encore que l'autre, les vraies racines de sa névrose.

Ou bien il oriente les difficultés internes déjà révélables dans la période infantine ou pré-adolescente, sur de nouvelles voies; il est alors plus qu'un cadre ou un fournisseur de symboles, il est une « plaque tournante » qui transforme par exemple le conflit aînés-cadets ou de lignage paternel-lignage maternel, en un autre conflit plus acceptable par l'individu, celui de deux mondes contradictoires, le monde des blancs et le monde des noirs.

Ou bien, enfin, il est agissant au niveau étiologique, l'individu n'arrivant pas à intégrer en une unité harmonieuse les deux systèmes entre lesquels il est partagé. Mais, dans ce dernier cas, le conflit se situant plus sur le plan intellectuel que sur le plan affectif, ou plus exactement l'affectif n'apparaissant que comme le retentissement du décalage entre deux systèmes de références différents, la thérapie prend une forme particulière, extrêmement intéressante puisque l'intégration au nouveau monde des blancs (et de la pensée occidentale) se fait par l'intermédiaire du transfert au thérapeute blanc: lorsque ce dernier est accepté, il permet le passage obstrué jusqu'alors, à une synthèse entre l'ancien et le nouveau, l'Afrique et l'Occident.

ATTITUDES OF YOUTH TOWARD MENTAL ILLNESS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY

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A. SAMPLES AND PROCEDURE.

It is a truism to state that what a society does about its mentally ill members is a function of how mental illness is perceived by the majority. But it is an important truism: (1) it helps to define what mental illness means in the society, and to a considerable extent mental illness is what it is socially defined to be: (2) It suggests what can be done in the society to detect and control mental illness. Psychiatrists who hope to successfully restore persons said to be mentally ill to a functioning community must know as much about that community as about the individual ill persons.

Early impressions are probably very important in forming life-long attitudes toward mental illness. While later acquisition of knowledge and experience may change the intellectual content of attitudes, their emotional set is likely to be formed by the age of 15 or 16. This does not mean to say that basic attitudes *cannot* be changed in the adult years, but that there is probably nothing in most societies at the present time to cause a basic re-orientation of most people's attitudes toward mental illness during their adult years. Whether or not this is true, it is valuable to ascertain the attitudes of youth of this age toward mental illness¹.

Social attitudes are formed in a cultural context, of course, even when they are toward such an «objective» phenomenon as mentally ill persons. Our study will examine attitudes in three very different societies: India, Finland, and the United States². The com-

¹ To our knowledge, this is the first study of youth attitudes toward mental illness. Previous reports from this study have been published (7, 8). At least seven earlier studies have been conducted on the attitudes of *adults* toward mental health problems (1, 3, 4, 5; 6, 10, 11). Our study has borrowed some questions from the unpublished study conducted by Shirley Star (10).

² It is hoped that comparable studies will be carried out, under the

parison will enhance our perspective both toward mental illness and toward the three societies in which the study was made. The same questionnaire was used in all three countries, translated into the local language by the sociologists conducting the study, and approximately the same procedures were used to gather the information. The questionnaires were administered in four schools of Ahmedabad, India, by A. A. Khatri, a social psychologist employed at the B.M. Institute for the study of disturbed children in that city (N = 348); in one school³ in Helsinki, Finland, by Leif Sonkin and Juhani Hirvas, members of the departments of sociology and psychology of Helsinki University (N = 166); and in three schools in Minneapolis, U.S.A., by Arnold M. Rose, Professor of Sociology at the University of Minnesota (N = 470). The cities from which the samples are drawn are thus of fairly large size. The Finnish sample centers on 15 years, the Indian sample on 16 years, and the American sample between the two, but all three samples have a slight variation in age. The schools were chosen to have the full range of socio-economic levels represented in them, although it is not believed that this was attained for the Indian schools. While the samples from the three societies were intended to be the same and thus to permit cross-national comparisons to be drawn, it was obviously not intended to permit these small and unrepresentative samples to stand for the whole societies of which they are a part. In this sense, we are reporting a pilot study until our samples become more representative.

The questionnaires, pretested for clarity and comprehensibility, were filled out by the youngsters themselves during regular school hours. The questionnaires were administered by the study directors, with the aid of one or two assistants who were available to answer questions and maintain order. The study was represented as

ageis of the Research Committee on Psychiatric Sociology of the International Sociological Association (of which the author is chairman), in France, West Germany, Israel, Nigeria, Norway, and Uruguay.

³ The Finnish team conducted their survey in four schools located in different areas of their country, but only the Helsinki sample is reported in this paper because Helsinki is the only Finnish city of comparable size to Minneapolis. Each city approaches a half million in population. The Minneapolis metropolitan area is much larger, comparable to Ahmedabad in size (1-1/4 million). The Indian investigator conducted his study in six schools, but two of them had only male students: In order to maintain comparability, only the four schools sampled for which data are available on both boys and girls are included in the present report.

one designed to elicit attitudes about mental health problems, and the subjects were invited to answer freely and frankly, as nothing they wrote would be reported back to their schools or otherwise appear on their personal records. The subjects were in their regular study halls or in the school lunchroom, and there was a certain amount of conversation among them while they were answering the questions, although they were asked to maintain silence and not be influenced by what the others answered.

Where differences among the three groups of children are reported as differences on the following pages, the 5 per cent criterion of statistical significance was followed. This is admittedly arbitrary (9).

B. FINDINGS

1. *Salience of Mental Illness*

The three groups of young people show great differences in reported contact with mental illness. An introductory question asked: «Everybody hears a lot about sickness and disease, but do you hear much about the kind called *mental* illness, or sickness of the mind?» The response, «hear much about it», was checked by almost 49 per cent of the Indian students, followed by 34 per cent of the American students, but only by 11 per cent of the Finnish students. Most of the rest checked «hear little about it», while only tiny proportions in all three samples answered «never hear about it». While we have no information about the actual amount of discussion about mental illness available to the three groups of youngsters, the above figures suggest a great difference in the subjective salience of mental illness for them.

Another question indicating salience asked, «Did you ever know anyone who had a mental illness?» The differences between the three groups of students in their responses to this question are in the same direction as to the previous ones, but not of such a great magnitude. Fifty-five per cent of the Indian youth claimed to have such personal contact, as compared to 45 per cent of the American youth, and 40 per cent of the Finnish youth. When asked who it was they knew that had a mental illness, a considerably larger proportion of the Indian children said it was a relative, either of the immediate family, or the extended family; 32 per cent of the total

sample of the Indian children indicated a relative, as compared to 15 per cent of the American children and 13 per cent of the Finnish children⁴. The proportion indicating that the mentally ill person was a close friend was also higher among the Indian youngsters: 10 per cent, as compared to 6 per cent for the Americans and 3 per cent for the Finns. The proportion indicating that an «acquaintance» was the one they knew who had a mental illness, however, was highest among the American youngsters (29 per cent), next among the Finns (18 per cent), and lowest among the Indians (12 per cent). Five per cent of the Americans and 13 per cent each among the Indians and Finns mentioned others, such as neighbors, and «acquaintances». Because the question called for only one response, those who answered «relative» or «friend» are likely to have closer and more frequent contact with the mentally ill than are those who gave one of the other answers.

It would be impossible to collect comparable statistics from official sources to ascertain differences in the incidence or prevalence of mental illness in the three societies, because of different procedures of detection and different official definitions of mental illness, and because there is poor record keeping, at least in India. There may also be differences in the three countries in the extent to which children are protected from contact with mentally ill persons. It is probably the case that in India more mentally ill persons are exposed to the community rather than hidden in mental hospitals (simply because India can afford fewer hospitals than the United States and Finland), and that the relative lack of treatment facilities there increases the prevalence rate even if it may not affect the incidence rate. Our data suggests that, as a subjective experience, more Indian children are exposed to mentally ill persons than is true for Finnish and American children. This finding should at least throw some doubt on the stereotype that industrially developed societies have much more mental illness than less industrial societies. It would seem reasonable that less industrialized societies, which have few facilities for treating or caring for mental cases, would have higher prevalence rates than richer societies. On the basis of our finding that Ahmedabad children report much more exposure to mental cases

⁴ Indian children are probably more familiar with more of their relatives than are American or Finnish children, because of the joint-family system, and this may help to explain why they report relatives as mentally ill more frequently. But it does not explain their generally greater proportion of contact with mentally ill people.

than do Helsinki or Minneapolis children, we feel justified in speculating on the possibility that Ahmedabad has even a higher incidence of mental illness. It should be understood that Ahmedabad is a heavily industrialized city in a country where about 80 per cent of the population lives in villages. It may be that a high incidence of mental illness occurs with the *first contact* with industrialization in a developing country like India, but that the rate becomes stabilized or goes down as a population adjusts to industrialization⁵. If this is true, it could still be the case that the *total rate* of mental illness in India is lower than in industrialized countries, because so much of the Indian population is rural. Our data certainly do not prove such hypotheses but allow us to entertain them as plausible. We believe that the data do indicate clearly, however, that the Ahmedabad children have more contact with mental illness than do the Helsinki or Minneapolis children.

2. *Meaning of Mental Illness*

The youngsters were asked to describe mental illness («What do you think a mental illness is like? In what ways does a person with a mental illness differ from others?»). Their answers varied from «someone with brain damage» to «someone with strange thoughts» and «can't control his behavior», but all were within a conceivable definition of mental illness — indicating that the youngsters were thinking along the same lines that the investigators were, even though they might choose different language to express their ideas. The more specific attitude items with check-list answers will be used to compare the three groups of children. One question was: «How many of the people who have mental illness, would you say, are out of their minds?» Fourteen per cent of the Indian children, as compared to 5 per cent of the American children and 4 per cent of the Finnish children, answered «everyone» or «nearly everyone». The most frequently given answer, among all three groups, was «some are out of their minds, others are not». The differences between the three groups of children in answers to this question were quite small and not statistically significant.

A better technique for finding out what the respondents had in mind when they answered questions about the characteristics of the

⁵ Support for the hypothesis that the rate of psychosis becomes stabilized in an industrialized society comes from Goldhamer and Marshall's study of psychosis rates in Massachusetts over a century (2).

mentally ill was to present them with three brief case descriptions (early in the questionnaire), and after each description to ask them, «Would you say that this man (woman) has some kind of mental illness or not?» The first case was of a man exhibiting paranoid suspicions and occasional violence against those he believes are working against him. There is not much difference in the proportion among the three groups of respondents who identify this man as mentally ill: 72 per cent of the Finns and the Americans do so, as compared to 65 per cent of the Indians. About 15 per cent of the Indians and Finns say he definitely does not have a mental illness (as compared to only 4 per cent of the Americans). The remainder identify him as having a temporary mental aberration, or say they «don't know».

The second case description was of a withdrawn and apathetic girl. Regarding her, the majority of all three groups were not willing to say that she was mentally ill. The largest proportion identifying her as mentally ill was among the Indian students: 40 per cent of them said so, as compared to 34 per cent of the Americans and 30 per cent of the Finnish. While almost a quarter of the Finnish students said they «don't know» whether she was mentally ill or not, the plurality of the Finns (over 46 per cent) said she definitely was not mentally ill — suggesting that schizoid behavior is somewhat more acceptable in Finnish society than in the other two societies. The third case description was that of a compulsive girl, who has to check her household before leaving it and who is afraid of elevators. This was a poor question to ask Indian children because some of them may not know what an elevator is, and ten per cent among the Indians did not answer the question. Still, there was little difference in the proportion identifying the girl as mentally ill: 19 per cent of the Indian children did so, as compared to 11 per cent of the Americans and 10 per cent of the Finns. These questions on the meaning of mental illness found the three groups of children with the smallest percentage differences (mostly not statistically significant) in their responses — suggesting that their images of what mental illness is are not greatly different, even though their experiences with and attitudes toward mental illness are quite dissimilar.

The Indian youngsters were much more likely to say that they could tell by looking at a person whether or not he has a mental illness: 47 per cent of the Indian children said this, as compared to 21 per cent of the Finnish children and only 8 per cent of the American children. The discrepancies are even greater when the answer

was a definite denial that a mentally ill person could be identified by appearance: 64 per cent of the American children, 40 per cent of the Finnish children and 8 per cent of the Indian children took this position. The remainder were «not sure».

3. *Attitudes toward the Causes, Cure, and Prevention of Mental Illness.*

The Finnish youth were the ones most likely to attribute mental illness to heredity: 21 per cent of them said that a mentally ill person was born with his affliction, as compared to 12 per cent of the American children, and only 4 per cent of the Indian children. This corresponds to the author's guess as to the differences among the three cultures in the tendency to find biological interpretations of human behavior generally.

In a partial sense this is related to the three groups of respondents' beliefs concerning whether mentally ill persons can be cured. The Americans are most sanguine in this regard: 35 per cent of these say that all of them can be cured, as compared to 22 per cent of the Indians and 19 per cent of the Finns. Most of the others say that «some can, some cannot». Those saying that none of the mentally ill can be cured include 8 per cent of the Indians, but only 1 per cent each of the Americans and the Finns. On the other hand, it is the Indian group which has the highest proportion believing that the mentally ill can get over their problems by themselves (36 per cent, as compared to 17 per cent of the Finns and 11 per cent of the Americans). The majority of all three groups recognize that the mentally ill need help, but the differences are significant: 77 per cent of the Americans, 69 per cent of the Finns, and 55 per cent of the Indians say that the mentally ill need help to overcome their problem (and an additional 10 per cent of the Finns mention both self help and outside aid). The Indian children are probably least likely to be familiar with psychiatry, or perhaps their culture includes the belief that personality changes are induced internally; for either reason they are the least likely to say that the mentally ill person needs the help of others.

In American society, one of the first ways a person thinks of when he thinks of helping a mentally ill person is to place him in a mental hospital. This is not necessarily true in other societies, depending on what public information exists about mental hospitals and the quality of the hospitals themselves. The question was asked of

our respondents. «Do you think a person who becomes mentally ill should be placed in a mental hospital, or not?» Whereas only 6 per cent of the American youth answered «should *not*», 46 per cent of the Indian youth gave this answer, and 19 per cent of the Finns. The Finns were most inclined to give qualified answers: 12 per cent gave some such answer as «keep them home if they are not dangerous», 4 per cent said they favored hospitalization only if the patient were dangerous, 15 per cent said that the decision with regard to hospitalization depends on the illness, 1 per cent favored «different surroundings», and more than 16 per cent said they did not know. Only the Americans gave a majority of their answers (over 62 per cent) in unqualified favor of hospitalization and 24 per cent more gave various types of qualified answers, as compared to only 39 per cent of the Indian youth favoring hospitalization and 10 per cent giving qualified answers. Clearly, the Americans see hospitalization as a major way of helping the mentally ill, while the majority of Indians do not. The simplest explanation of this gross difference is that mental hospitals are very poor in India, and that Indian youngsters learn something about this.

The Indian youngsters are also the ones most likely to believe that a former mental patient would always show some signs of having been mentally ill once. The proportion having this pessimistic outlook for the mentally ill is over 66 per cent among the Indian youth, 33 per cent among the Finnish, and 22 per cent among the Americans. The relatively high proportion among the Indians may be due to a relative lack of knowledge about the possibilities for «cure» of mental illness, or to a more realistic assessment — perhaps based on their direct experience — that some scars remain with the ex-mental patient. A related question asked, «If you found that someone you knew who seemed all right now had been in a mental hospital once, do you think you'd feel any different about being around this person?» Consistent with their answers to the previously mentioned question, it is the Indians who include the largest proportion saying they would feel differently: 57 per cent said this, as compared to 34 per cent of the Finns and only 19 per cent of the Americans. Clearly, the Indians are the ones most likely to believe that mental illness has permanent effects, at least in some respects. The attitude may be in accord with their personal experience.

Although the Indian youth are least likely to be optimistic about eliminating the effects of mental illness, they are the ones most likely to be optimistic about preventing mental illness. Seventy-one

per cent of the Indian youth, as compared to 66 per cent of the American youth and only 39 per cent of the Finnish youth, answer that steps can be taken to prevent mental illness from developing. While the Finnish youth include the largest proportion of outright pessimists in this regard (34 per cent, as compared to 24 per cent among the Indians and 15 per cent among the Americans), they also include the largest proportion of those who indicate that they «don't know». The probable reasons for these cultural differences may lie in the Finns' greater propensity to attribute mental illness to biological causes.

Beliefs about prevention or cure are related to images of the psychiatrist. It seems likely that few children in any of the three societies have clear-cut or experientially grounded images of a psychiatrist. After defining a psychiatrist as a doctor who specializes in the treatment of mental illness, a question was asked. «Do you know any people who you think would be helped if they'd see a psychiatrist?» While psychiatrists are much less available in India than they are in Finland or the U.S.A., the largest proportion answering «yes» was found among the Indians (34 per cent, as compared to 30 per cent among the Americans and 16 per cent among the Finns). This could merely reflect the Indians' greater contact with mentally ill persons rather than a greater confidence in psychiatrists, but the answers to the next question dispel such an interpretation: «It's been said that a lot of us would be helped if we'd see a psychiatrist about some of our problems. Do you think you would want to see a psychiatrist?» Fully 62 per cent of the Indians answered «yes», as compared to 33 per cent of the Americans and 22 per cent of the Finns. This should not necessarily be taken to mean that Indian youths are more likely to find themselves in need of a psychiatrist; it could simply mean that Indians are more willing to seek aid whenever it becomes available, or that the stigma of visiting a psychiatrist is least among Indians. While the Finns had the lowest proportion of students wishing to see a psychiatrist, it is not because there are more of them opposed to psychiatrists than among the Americans, but because more of them place themselves in the «don't know» category.

4. *The Stigma of Mental Illness.*

Indians are more accepting of the fact of mental illness in yet another way — in their willingness to reveal that a member of their

family is mentally ill. The question was: «If a member of your family became mentally ill, do you think you would tell your friends about it, just as you would tell about any other sickness, or would you try to keep it as quiet as possible?» Fifty per cent of the Indian respondents said they would tell about it to friends, as compared to only 18 per cent among the Americans and 17 per cent among the Finns. The highest proportions among the latter two groups were the ones in doubt, rather than the ones who would definitely «keep it secret». There would seem to be more of a stigma attached to mental illness in Finland and the United States than in India. Also, of course, in India there is the joint-family system of living and more overcrowding of population, and hence generally greater difficulty in keeping family secrets from becoming public. But, for whatever reason, there is less of a negative connotation associated with mental illness in India. Since more of the Indian students claimed to have family members with mental illness, as we noted earlier, their greater willingness to let outsiders know about their mentally ill relatives probably means that the Indian community is in fact more aware that it has mentally ill members than in the United States or Finland.

When asked, «Do you think *most* people who are mentally ill are dangerous to be around, or not?» the Indian students answered in by far the largest proportion that most mentally ill people were dangerous to be around. Sixty-two per cent of the Indians, as compared to only 24 per cent of both the Finns and the Americans, believed that most of the mentally ill were dangerous. This is disconcerting in view of the fact that the Indians are most likely to have direct contact with mentally ill persons, but this fact may also make them the most realistic in this regard. The behavior syndromes of mentally ill people in Indian society have not been adequately described yet in the psychiatric literature, so we cannot be sure that Indian psychiatric cases are in fact more violent. But violence is generally closer to the surface of Indian social life than it is in American or Finnish society.

C. CONCLUSIONS

The comparison of the three groups of children is quite revealing. The differences in the proportions answering the questions in the same way are quite sharp except for the questions on the mean-

ing of mental illness. In response to the three case descriptions, for example, most of the children answering the questionnaire — in all three countries — were more or less agreed that the paranoid person was mentally ill and that the compulsive person was not; they disagreed about the schizoid person but this was true to about the same extent in all three countries. This suggests that the children are defining mental illness in about the same way in the three countries. But their responses to all the other questions were quite different. The Indian children claimed to have much more and closer contact with mentally ill people than did the children in the other two countries. They also were much more likely to claim that they could identify a mentally ill person by mere observation. The Finnish children were the ones who most frequently attributed mental illness to heredity and were also the ones who least frequently believed mental illness to be preventable or curable. The Indian children were the ones who expected that the mentally ill would have to overcome their affliction by themselves, but they are not opposed to psychiatrists. In fact, the Indian children were the ones most frequently willing to visit a psychiatrist themselves. The Indian children were also the most accepting of mental illness: A much higher proportion said they would reveal a relative's mental illness to outsiders, even though they were also much more likely to think a mentally ill person is dangerous.

From all the information gathered in the survey, it would seem that while mental illness means about the same thing in all three societies, it is much more salient to children in Indian society, that they react to it in a much more accepting way, that they believe it has more effects in terms of longlasting scars and danger to others. The Finnish and American children are rather similar in their answers, except that the Finns are more likely to attribute mental illness to biological causes, and less likely to believe that it can be prevented or cured.

The study reveals some of the cultural meanings and values associated with mental illness in three societies (if we are willing to take the selected samples as typical of the urban youth of the societies). It suggests how some of the conditions prevailing in a society — such as the poverty of mental health treatment facilities in India — influence experience and attitudes.

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THE NEUROSES AS COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS¹

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I. *Introduction*

1. What is a neurosis? Which are its determinants? These old questions are crucial to the various disciplines dealing with personality disorders, and it seems that no clearly satisfactory answer has yet been given, from a scientific point of view.

For the sake of our discussion, three wide groups of problems may be distinguished:

- i. The conceptualization of the patient's behavior: definition and description to the so-called neurotic behavior;
- ii. The operations by which descriptive concepts are related to theoretical concepts about non-observable processes, i.e., about personality mechanisms;
- iii. The construction of temporal models of the learning processes, in order to formulate the laws of the genetic development of the neurosis.

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The field work has been done chiefly at the Service of Psychopathology and Neurology of the Hospital «Prof. Dr. Gregorio Aráoz Alfaro» of Lanús, Province of Buenos Aires, Argentina (Chief: Dr. Mauricio Goldenberg). Through this Service and for the final steps of this first stage, we obtained the aid of the Foundations' Fund for Research in Psychiatry administrated by the Pan American Health Organization, W.H.O.)

2. Traditionally, in many psychiatric approaches to mental illness in general and neurosis in particular, the differences between the concepts and propositions related to each of these groups of problems have often been stated rather vaguely, with the ensuing confusion as to which elements play a decisive role in the development of explanatory propositions, and which correspond to the description of the object (the disorder) and its observable properties.

But as new and more sophisticated criteria from an epistemological point of view were introduced in psychiatry, there began to be a more general agreement concerning the importance of adopting an interpersonal point of view, in order to find a satisfactory answer to those questions. The methodological tools have been refined, but the object itself has become increasingly complex.

3. The purpose of this paper is to suggest that the approach of communication theory is useful to state in clear terms the first of our two initial questions in so far as it allows both to refine the distinction between the different operations involved in conceptualization and to describe the interpersonal nature of neurotic disorders in adequate terms.

We also suggest that it provides a sound research strategy when the second question is placed in a sociological perspective.

II. *The study of neurosis as an information-processing problem*

1. If we consider the study of neurosis as a special case of the «black-box» problem (ASHBY, 1956 and 1958), we have to specify the transformations of sets of inputs and outputs involved in the three groups of problems mentioned above (Fig. 1). This approach describes the observer-object relationship as an information-processing system, including therefore the general problem of the relations between observables and hypothetical constructs in scientific theory.

From that point of view, the first group of problems would in turn offer two main aspects:

a) The transformation of outputs (observed pieces of behavior of the neurotic patient) into a set of meaningful data in connection with the problem under study (T_1). In other words, by means of what set of categories do we adequately describe the properties of a behavior we regard as neurotic? This paper will be devoted

mainly to an effort of elaboration of this first set of transformations. Here it will be enough to point out that in order to obtain a body of relevant data, the «outputs» will undergo not only one transformation but a series or sets of transformations (T_1).




Fig. 1

- b) In so far as research on neurosis is based on the hypothesis that it is important to take the interactional context into account in order to describe the disorder or, in other words, that the disorder is a strategy to deal with interpersonal relationships, a second set of transformations (T_2) must be applied to the inputs, which in this case will be observable pieces of behavior of other people. Between the set of outputs (the patient's behavior), seen as stimulus, response and reinforcement at the same time (cf. BATESON, 1963) and the set of inputs, a complex system of functions will have to be specified. Therefore, this set of functions is a third set of transformations (T_3).

2. On the basis of this third set of transformations, models of the «inside» of the box may be built, i.e., propositions describing internal mechanisms and structures which account for the functions established between inputs and outputs; this is then our second group of problems. Assuming that we have a good description of what we call «neurotic strategies for handling interpersonal situations», it will be necessary to arrive at operational definitions establishing the relationships between these observable data and the hypothetical constructs which make up what is usually known as the personality system. It is well known that, in this respect, the behavioral sciences are still quite far from adequately fulfilling the epistemological re-

quirements of a well integrated theoretical structure (cf. TORGERSON, 1958, Chapter I; HEMPEL, 1965). The «black-box» approach, however, warns us that we will always find not one but a series of models, each of which, given certain inputs, will allow us to predict the outputs, the central problem being here the formulation of isomorphisms among these several possible models.

At the present stage of development of socio-psychiatric theory and research it seems obvious that these two groups of problems are inseparable and that they can only be analytically distinguished. The kind of personality theory we choose determines to a large extent the kind of behavior we consider relevant to describe neurosis. No general agreement as to the properties of behavior is independent from propositions about non-observable mechanisms and processes. This means that the theoretical and methodological problem we are facing is in fact previous to the one usually described in cybernetics as the «black-box» problem: before considering the way in which we obtain, from the protocol of inputs and outputs, the redundancies describing the non-random behavior of the system in order to make inferences about the «inside» of the box, we must explicitly state which are for us the relevant inputs and outputs or, rather, which our units of observation are. However, it is also true that at the practical and usually intuitive level of diagnosis, relative coincidence is likely to exist in spite of the variety of theoretical orientations. It is this coincidence which makes the systematic description of the units of observation particularly important.

3. The third group of problems introduces the time factor into the model of neurosis. Here the aim is to understand the genetic process of a neurotic disorder which, at a certain time of the patient's life (usually when he gets into touch with the psychiatrist, one way or another), appears crystallized and stereotyped as a «style» of behavior recognized through diagnosis. This is indeed a key issue, since in all likelihood it involves the problem of causality in regard to neurosis.

The practical difficulties of a longitudinal study being in truth formidable, this third group of problems may be characterized, in more realistic terms, as having two main aspects:

- a) To establish the transformation rules between inputs and outputs (T_0) corresponding, not to the situations in which the neurosis operates as an already established «style» of interaction, but to learning situations, i.e. recurrent situations in which in-

puts (others' behavior) are more likely to lead, in the long run, to neurotic responses than to other types of responses. As in the case of the first group of problems, here we shall also need criteria designed to transform the output (T_4) and input (T_5) behavior into data.

- b) The setting up of transformation rules meant to describe the shift from the T_6 set of functions to the T_3 set mentioned above, that is, propositions describing the evolutionary laws of the disorder (T_7). In so far as this process of development cannot be directly observed, the T_6 set (transformation rules between inputs and outputs in learning situations) may be considered as input, and the T_3 set (transformation rules between inputs and outputs describing the interactional characteristics of a neurosis already established in the individual) as output, and so stating the study of the evolutionary process itself as a «black-box» problem.

Some methodological and technical issues related to the first group of problems are commented in sections III to V; section V deals also with some more general questions of research strategy in terms of the general formulation just described.

III. *Inputs and outputs: interaction as informational events*

1. To define the neurotic disorder as a communication system implies that the information received by the neurotic individual is processed in terms of a code, the properties of which must be discovered. Since reception operations (codification of «inputs») are not directly observable, the observables we must start from in order to reconstruct the code or codes operating in a given type of neurosis are necessarily the outputs, i.e., the patient's behavior. If outputs are viewed as «messages» transmitted in an interactional situation, the code or codes to be discovered can be defined as the constrictions such outputs are subject to, in so far as they are relevant to what we call a given neurotic disorder. The first step, then, must be to specify the «universe of messages» we must explore in search of such systems of constrictions. This has been done elsewhere in greater detail (VERON, 1963).

Here we shall only recall that in a dyadic situation as minimal interactional situation, where messages are exchanged between individuals which are at the same time senders and receivers, there are three distinguishable series of informational events (cf. Fig. 2):

- a) The audible-linguistic series (ALS), which comprises all the sounds belonging to the language system. This is the only strictly digital series, and its codes are studied by linguistics.
- b) Audible-paralinguistic series (APS), which comprises a whole gamut of sound variations which, from a strictly linguistic viewpoint are irrelevant or non-distinctive.
- c) The non-audible-paralinguistic series (NAPS), comprising all the visual messages originating in the body: gestures, mimicry, posture, etc.

Each individual receives messages which are «gestalten» made up of fragments of the three series, and sends messages through the three series. A concrete message in an interpersonal situation is always a «package» (PITTINGER, HOCKETT and DANEHY, 1960: 240-242) of the three types of constituents ².




Fig. 2

² In every situation there exists, as a matter of fact, a fourth group of elements: the situational context itself. When an individual «enters» a social situation, he receives a whole variety of indicators through which he is able to «categorize» the situation (role definitions, hierarchical relationships, arrangement of the physical space with the view of developing a certain kind of interpersonal relationships, etc). These elements may imply redundant messages, when the situation is a familiar one, or else they represent a sort of information that is not really a part of any of the three series mentioned above. This context influences many of the semiological mechanisms taking place in the series.

2. The complexity of this «universe of messages» present in interpersonal communication seems obvious. The first difficulty is that in one and the same piece of behavior we can recognize a host of different systems of constrictions, according to the level of analysis we choose in order to study that behavior as a message: certain properties of verbal communication derive from the syntactic rules of language; semantic properties may be associated, for instance, to the sender's social class (BERNSTEIN, 1959); some paralinguistic characteristics may depend on ways of codifying that are subculturally determined, etc.

How can we identify the level of analysis that will enable us to discover in the outputs those properties which are meaningfully related to the fact that the sender is a neurotic individual? At the present stage of research, this question can only be answered through the empirical exploration of the messages, guided by some tentative hypotheses.

3. Accordingly, we assume that:

- a) The different neurotic disorders may be defined, from this point of view, as special «techniques» for handling the meanings transmitted in interpersonal situations. This implies that the kind of analysis we need in order to obtain our first set of transformations (T_1) will be a semantic analysis of messages;
- b) Such techniques have to do not so much with the semantic contents as with the way in which those contents are organized in the messages' structure; an attempt must be made, therefore, to evolve a structural analysis.

We have studied communication in phobic, hysteric and obsessive-compulsive patients, using the tape-recordings of psychiatric interviews³. In a first step, we have been able to verify that obses-

³ The interviews consisted of a conversation, 10 or 15 minutes long, in the Neuro-psychiatric section of a General Hospital. The average length of the interviews was 17 minutes. 44 interviews were carried out: 16 hysteric patients, 17 phobics and 11 obsessives), plus 9 second interviews, chosen at random, 3 per each type of disorder. The second interviews were included in order to control the variations of the variables studied, between the first and the second interview with each type of patient. The average interval between the first and second interview was 18 weeks. The total length for first and second interviews amounts to 799 minutes, that is 13 and a half hours of tape-recorded material. The first selection of the patients was based on the psychiatric diagnosis made at the Service to which the patient resorted for treatment. The final selection was made on the diagnoses obtained through the administration of Phillipson's Test of Object Relations

sive patients could be distinguished from phobics and hysterics by analyzing the speech disturbances present in their messages after having classified them according to semantic criteria (cf. MAHL, 1959 and VERON et al., 1966). Having obtained this result, we have made a preliminary exploration of the semantic structure of the messages of these three types of patients. Both kinds of analyses were applied to verbal communication, mainly to the audible linguistic data.

IV. *Semantic analysis of neurotic outputs*

1. We call semantic structure the system of relation between semantic units distinguishable in a message or set of messages. The emission of a message supposes selection within a repertory, and combination in the syntagmatic chain (JAKOBSON and HALLE, 1956). It is possible then to characterize a given source by the system of rules describing its selective and combinatory operations. The structure of a message or set of messages emitted by that source may then be seen as the result of the functioning of that system of rules; conversely, the study of the structure of the messages would allow us to infer the system of constrictions that characterizes that source, on a semantic level of analysis. We can then define this analysis as the reconstruction of the semantic *paradigm* starting from the *syntagm*.

On the other hand, structural analysis may be characterized in terms of the operations to which the communicational material is subject. This material in its «natural state», is a linear sequence. Structural analysis means here the transformation of this linear chain into a multidimensional model or series of models.

2. The first set of transformations (T_1) of the verbal output of the patient, gives us a sequence of n semantic units that can be distinguished from one another, and numbered from 1 to n , in the order in which they have appeared in the syntagmatic chain. The minimal level of organization that must be considered is determined by the

(Phillipson, 1952). Those cases that showed discrepancies between both diagnosis, or in which the patient could not be classified by the Phillipson in any of the three types, were discarded. The data offered here correspond to the cases of «clear predominance» (16 cases), that is, those in which the Phillipson test revealed features belonging to only one of the three types studied. A detailed description of the research design will be found in VERON et al., 1965.

relations between any two given units. If we consider this universe as a whole and we have a system of categories or types of semantic relations between any two units, we can represent it as a matrix of $n \times n$ boxes. In each box the type of relation between the two corresponding units will be recorded.

3. This matrix represents a first level of organization of the semantic structure, defined then as the set of all the paired relations of all units. The more complex levels of organization may be defined through a two-dimensional matrix, that expresses all possible relations, representing in the columns and rows the elements of the set of the parts of the initial group of units. As we know, the set of the parts of a set N is the set composed by all the sub-sets of N , including N and the empty set. Therefore, we would obtain a matrix of $2^n - 1$ by $2^n - 1$ (we subtract one because we do not consider the empty set), where n is the number of semantic units.

This model is a way of representing the whole universe of semantic relations that define the structure of a set of messages segmentable into units. Fortunately the semantic structure to be studied from a pragmatic point of view, is likely to be far more reduced than this universe. All the same, on a given sample of messages of a certain kind, an electronic computer may be programmed so as to make a complete analysis.

4. We will now describe the exploration we made of the semantic structure of the messages emitted by the three types of patients⁴. The interview material was transcribed *verbatim* from the tape, and segmented into minimal semantic units. In fact, the heuristic criterion for this segmentation approximately coincides with the sentence as a grammatical unit of discourse. Once segmented, the units of each interview were numbered from one onwards, and the identification number of each unit was recorded on a special blank. The categories applied to the relations between units and the proportion of each category for each type of neurosis are shown in Table 1.

⁴ This preliminary analysis has been made on all cases of «clear predominance», by taking the first two minutes of the interview (which comprised the answer of the patient to the initial fixed instructions), and a third minute selected at random within the interview. This sample included, for the three groups of patients, a total of about 1,200 units.

TABLE 1. *Categories of relation between semantic units and proportion of each category for each type of neurosis (clear predominance)*

	Hysterics %	Phobics %	Obsessives %
<i>A. Logical 'operators'</i>			
1. Equivalence (\equiv)	7.0	5.5	8.0
2. Inference (\rightarrow)	—	—	2.0
3. Conjunction (.)	8.0	5.0	10.0
4. Opposition (/) (includes disjunction)	2.5	9.0	9.0
5. Class membership (\in)	1.0	2.0	7.5
6. Definition (Def.)	1.0	3.0	1.0
7. Condition (Co)	1.0	3.0	3.0
<i>B. Specifiers</i>			
8. of Cause (Ca)	3.0	4.0	6.0
9. of Circumstances (Ci)	1.0	6.5	—
10. of Purpose (Pu)	1.5	1.0	—
11. of Reasons (Re)	1.0	2.0	2.5
12. of Motives (Mo)	3.5	5.0	2.5
13. of Quantity (Qua)	2.0	4.0	7.0
14. of Time (Ti)	3.5	4.0	6.0
15. of Information Given (IG)	14.0	4.0	7.5
<i>C. Others</i>			
16. Sequence (Se) (mere sequence between facts described)	2.5	1.5	5.0
17. Historical sequence (HSe)	8.0	2.5	1.0
18. Repetition (R)	2.5		4.0
19. Subject-boundary (SB)	14.0	17.0	12.0
20. Non Scorable (NS)	17.0	21.0	6.0
Total of relations scored	100.0 (355)	100.0 (471)	100.0 (251)

The list of categories was fundamentally derived from empirical criteria. We are well aware that it will be necessary to reorganize the list in terms of systematic criteria that have not been yet stated. We must point out that, if we arrived at this list and not at another, it was as a result of successive approaches as we analyzed the material. As a general observation, we think it is necessary to avoid two equally dangerous extremes: that of a purely logical analysis and that of a grammatical analysis. In order to study the semantic organization of communication within the frame of social sciences, we must work on a level different from these two. The structures we are interested in, are located on a higher level of complexity than the one in which a linguist stands to analyze the verbal syntagm, and *suppose* the level of organization of speech; on the other hand, the strictly logical analysis would mean a reduction of the material under study which would imply the loss of the properties we want to formalize.

V. *Semantic structures in neuroses*

1. All the relations between contiguous units were codified. The bi-univocal relations between non-contiguous units and between groups of units were also recorded every time their presence became manifest in the course of the analysis. Once this codification was completed, we made a preliminary study of the matrix of relations between contiguous units. That is: the temporal sequence of *units*, once all the *relations* between contiguous units are analyzed, may be represented as a *sequence of biunivocal relations* between contiguous units; this sequence of relations may in turn be transformed into a matrix that makes it possible to establish, given a certain relation, the frequency with which that relation is followed by another given relation. On the basis of this matrix we can estimate, for the total of messages, and for each category of relation, the probability that, given a specific relation, another relation will then follow. This matrix of sequence probabilities between pairs of consecutive relations, can in turn be represented as a tree, in which the most probable sequences are included. This tree represents the semantic structure of the communicational sequence, when we analyze the probability of sequential association (in the syntagm) between the pairs of contiguous relations. The semantic structure found in the messages of hysterics, phobics and obsessives through this analysis, is reproduced in Tables 2, 3 and 4.

TABLE 2. Semantic structure of the messages of hysteric patients (clear predominance): sequential analysis of contiguous relations.





TABLE 3. Semantic structure of the messages of phobic patients (clear predominance): sequential analysis of contiguous relations.



2. It must be taken into account that this analysis of the contiguous pairs of relations allows only for the representation of a minimum organizational level: if we confine ourselves to this analysis, we assume that the relations between relations, apart from the contiguous relations between pairs, occur at random. In other words, this analysis supposes that the probability of a certain class of relation appearing in the sequence, depends only on the immediately preceding one. With this procedure, we have found clearly distinct structures for each type of disorder; however it must be remembered that a further analysis of the more complex levels of organization can produce data that may considerably modify these models. The present remarks, then, must be considered provisional.

It will be noted, first, the clear difference between obsessives on one hand and hysterics and phobics on the other hand: in the latter, the non-scorable category has the highest proportion over the total of semantic relations codified in the sample (Table 1) and therefore this category appears in most of the sequences (Tables 2 and 3). We have here a good indicator of the much more confused semantic structure present in hysteric and phobic messages, compared with obsessives. The obsessive discourse seems to be more «clear» from a semantic point of view.

In the second place, taking as a base the categories of semantic relations that appear if we analyze sequences of up to five consecutive relations, the obsessive messages show a wider range of categories: we find in the obsessive tree, fifteen out of twenty available categories (Table 4). By contrast, there are seven categories out of twenty in the case of hysterics, and eight in phobics (Tables 2 and 3). The obsessive discourse seems to be, then, more «flexible» than that of the other two groups of neurotic patients.

Third, if we analyze the sequences with highest probability, we may note that there is a set of categories which are common to the three groups of patients: subject-boundary (SB), equivalence (\equiv), conjunction (\cdot), specification of information given (IG), opposition ($/$) and non-scorable (NS). Probably, most of these categories are basic semantic relations that would appear as means of articulating any kind of semantic structure in verbal communication. In any case, this problem needs further and more detailed analysis. If we put aside this set of common categories, we find others that seem to be peculiar to one group of patients: Specification of circumstances (Ci) has a high proportion in phobics (Tables 1 and 3) and is entirely absent from

the other two trees (Tables 2 and 4). Historical sequence (HSe) appears as a central category for hysterics (Table 2).

In fact, when hysterics talk about their illness, they tend to tell the interviewer a story. The frequency of semantically confused relations between units create a sequence whose alternatives are difficult to grasp. The effect on the receiver is the image of a story «in some way» related to the illness. The historical sequence category has a fundamental role in the creation of ambiguity: the illness «came after» a series of episodes that are enumerated; it is impossible to know what other relation — apart from the purely historical nexus — exists between the story and these episodes. In hysterics, the illness image seems to be built in terms of historical temporality.

In the case of phobics, the semantic nucleus associated with the illness theme consists in the exposition of a series of circumstances: places or situations in which they feel badly; places or situations in which they feel better. In phobics, the illness is codified in terms of its relation with different kinds of circumstances, and the relation itself remains undetermined.

In obsessive messages, the categories of specification of time, class-membership, cause, sequence (non-historical), and quantification, seem to play a more important role in the obsessive communication than in the other two groups of patients. At the same time a higher proportion of logical relations appears in obsessive speech (40.5 %) than in phobic (27.5 %) and hysteric messages (20.5 %) (Table 1).

It is impossible here to extend further these comments on the semantic data. They have been included in this paper mainly to exemplify the technique we are applying in the analysis of verbal communication material. Let us state briefly the importance we ascribe to this research strategy.

a) In the long run, our purpose is to obtain a definite model of the semantic structure characterizing the organization of the messages in each type of neurosis. A systematic analysis of semantic structures in verbal communication will require the use of an electronic computer.

At the same time, it will be possible to operationalize and quantify several semantic properties of verbal communication, in structural terms: degree of ambiguity, degree of organization or «structure», degree of «isolation» of semantic units (measured in number of relations of a given unit with others in the same context), etc.

b) The detection of the basic semantic structure may allow us, on one hand to formulate hypotheses about the code with which each

- type of patient organizes the information received from the environment and, on the other, to understand the effect produced on the receiver by each kind of message, in interpersonal situations.
- c) On this basis, perhaps it would be possible to formulate tentative hypotheses about the properties of interpersonal relations with different types of neurotic patients, trying to define the neurotic mechanisms as rules of handling meanings in interpersonal situations.
 - d) We think that, using the technique here described for the analysis of messages (that must still be far more carefully elaborated) it would be possible to establish the co-ordinates of what we should call *the semantic field of the 'illness' theme*. We suspect (although we have as yet no empirical evidence) that the structural characteristics of this semantic field are in some way related to the semantic properties (from an interpersonal point of view) of the communication situations that originated the pathological behavior and strengthened its organization.
 - e) A final word about the use of the electronic computer. At present, we are studying the elaboration of two very different kinds of programs. On one hand, a program for the analysis of certain messages, with the purpose of building the model of their semantic structure. In other words, a program by which the computer would analyse the messages, formalize the structure and indicate, as a result, that the messages studied are of a certain kind (e.g., of phobic, hysteric or obsessive patients). On the other hand, programs with which the computer could «learn» to give, as output, messages with certain definite characteristics, i.e., programs to simulate the process of learning that could produce as output, sequences of messages of a given semantic structure. The relation between these two kinds of programs may be the beginning of the exploration of our set of transformations (T_3), i.e., the functions between inputs and outputs in neurosis.

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STRATIFICATION AND SOCIAL MOBILITY

STRATIFICATION ET MOBILITÉ SOCIALES

STRATIFICATION ET MOBILITÉ DES CLASSES OUVRIÈRES: INTRODUCTION

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Une classe sociale résulte par définition d'une force qui pousse des groupes très divers par le métier, le niveau de vie, les mœurs, etc. à s'organiser en une unité d'action. Toute la réalité de la classe sociale est dans cette tendance à l'intégration d'éléments différents en une totalité dynamique. Dans ces conditions, l'étude des classes sociales comporte, d'abord, logiquement tout au moins, la démonstration de la réalité de cet amalgame, c'est-à-dire un inventaire des principales parties dont la classe est faite, suivi d'une analyse de leurs rapports. La détermination des relations entre classes constitue, en principe toujours, une démarche qui suppose les précédentes. Comment, en effet, établir ces relations, sans posséder quelque idée de la structure des formations en présence ? Ou bien ces totalités existent effectivement, et c'est leur action réciproque qu'il convient de mettre en relief, ou bien elles n'existent pas, et alors il n'y a de relations qu'entre d'autres genres d'ensembles sociaux: des clans idéologiques, des organisations professionnelles, des associations d'intérêts, des partis, par exemple, à considérer comme des groupes agissant par eux-mêmes, ou en tant qu'organes de sur-groupements autres que des classes.

Au sein de leur classe, les individus peuvent passer d'une position à une autre, selon des processus de mobilité non moins intéressants, a priori, que ceux qui régissent les transferts d'une classe à l'autre.

Enfin, les éléments constitutifs des diverses classes sociales, de même que leur degré d'intégration et la nature de leurs rapports sont susceptibles de varier, ce qui influe d'ailleurs sur l'état des rapports entre classes.

Nul peut-être, mieux que Georges Gurvitch, n'a mis en relief à la fois l'extrême multiplicité des parties constitutives des classes sociales, et le caractère fluctant des formes et degrés de leur réunion.

Ces quelques remarques suffisent sans doute pour rappeler les principales raisons des travaux relatifs à la stratification interne des

diverses classes, ou, pour mieux dire, à leur structure, et à la circulation des individus dans ce cadre.

Disons aussi que ces travaux sont plus nécessaires encore en ce qui concerne les classes les plus vastes, celles qui sont susceptibles de comprendre la grande masse de la population (les agriculteurs, les ouvriers, les employés) que pour ce qui est des autres, plus restreintes, et sans doute relativement plus homogènes. L'organisation des premières fait appel à des mécanismes spécialement complexes, en effet.

Nous allons passer en revue maintenant, à titre d'introduction à cette séance, quelques-uns des problèmes qui entrent dans le champ des études relatives à la stratification et à la mobilité des classes ouvrières.

L'intérêt d'une discussion sur des études de ce genre est évidemment accru quand elles proviennent, comme c'est le cas ici, de l'Est et de l'Ouest. Une occasion nous est ainsi offerte de confronter, au moins sous quelques aspects, le point atteint par les classes ouvrières dans des régimes qui s'efforcent, par des voies différentes, de déprolétarianiser les masses.

1. *Formes de travail, professions.*

Les classes sociales que l'on a l'habitude de distinguer au sein des sociétés modernes rassemblent des individus qui tirent leurs ressources d'un même genre d'activité professionnelle¹, et c'est cette communauté de situation économique qui est censée être le facteur majeur de leur tendance à la communauté d'action dans le domaine politique, de leur inclination vers les mêmes convictions, de la similitude de leur rang social, et ainsi de suite. Toute vérification un peu sérieuse de ces idées entraîne une analyse serrée des différentes catégories de travail. En quoi les ouvriers ont-ils des fonctions qui se ressemblent entre elles et qui, par ailleurs, diffèrent de celles des catégories adjacentes, petits agriculteurs et artisans, employés non dirigeants, notamment ? C'est là une première question à se poser, et c'est à propos d'elle que l'opposition entre marxistes et non-marxistes est le plus tranchée.

¹ Indirectement pour les personnes rangées dans la classe du chef de famille parce qu'elles n'ont pas d'activité professionnelle, du moins très consistante.

Les seconds, d'une manière générale, considèrent que la spécificité du travail ouvrier est très approximative. Les frontières entre activités ouvrières et non ouvrières, dans cette perspective, apparaissent comme la projection de stéréotypes assez contestables, et devraient être remplacées, avec le progrès des recherches, par des délimitations plus rationnelles. La théorie marxiste de la formation de la valeur établit au contraire une distinction radicale entre travail salarié productif et autres formes de travail salarié, en attribuant au surplus aux fournisseurs de travail salarié productif (la classe ouvrière par excellence) un rôle historique déterminant. Cependant, la fixation d'une ligne de partage entre salariés productifs et non productifs n'est pas chose beaucoup plus aisée pour les marxistes, que n'est, pour les autres sociologues, la recherche d'un critère permettant de justifier de façon claire et convaincante la distinction entre salariés «manuels» et «non manuels» ou toute autre distinction du même ordre. En pratique d'ailleurs, les groupes professionnels qui sont rangés par les uns et les autres dans les classes ouvrières sont à peu près les mêmes.

Quoi qu'il en soit de ce point, il reste que, même si elles sont censées être de même nature à certains égards, les fonctions ouvrières diffèrent par beaucoup d'autres côtés. Les classifications selon le degré de qualification et la branche (avec subdivisions éventuelles selon la grandeur de l'entreprise, la base — horaire, mensuelle, etc. — du salaire et entre le secteur public et le secteur privé) sont à peu près les seules qui soient d'usage courant, pour rendre compte de ces différences, et pour examiner leurs incidences sur les modes de pensée et d'action.

Ces classifications sont très peu rigoureuses, car sous une même dénomination (par exemple, ouvrier mécanicien qualifié payé à l'heure, opérant dans une usine privée, vouée à la fabrication des automobiles), se cachent en fait des formes de travail extrêmement diverses (monteur accomplissant des tâches complexes en manipulant des outils traditionnels, contrôleur du fonctionnement de machines automatisées auquel on demande surtout de l'attention, tourneur de pièces faites en série limité à des gestes très simples, etc).

L'écart entre les classifications usuelles et la nature réelle des tâches s'élargit d'ailleurs à mesure que la production se mécanise et se rationalise. Une «nouvelle classe ouvrière» naît-elle de ces transformations des modes de production ? C'est là l'un des thèmes favoris des auteurs spécialisés dans l'étude du monde ouvrier. Il faut souhaiter que des comparaisons internationales, étendues à des

régimes différents, soient faites dans ce domaine, car, le contenu des tâches n'est pas fonction que des techniques, mais aussi de l'organisation sociale du travail, elle-même fortement solidaire de la forme globale de la société. Jusqu'à quel point le travail réel des ouvriers évolue-t-il, de ce fait, dans des directions différentes, selon le cadre social ? Voit-on effectivement s'esquisser, ici ou là, une tendance importante vers la suppression des tâches ouvrières de type parcellaire, grâce à une division du travail qui doserait de façon nouvelle opérations manuelles et opérations intellectuelles, exécution et décision ?

La position de chaque catégorie d'ouvriers dans l'action de leur classe, peut varier beaucoup selon les époques. Les groupes professionnels les plus actifs dans un contexte donné ne le sont pas nécessairement dans un autre, ou peuvent même tendre à se séparer de leur classe pour s'intégrer à une autre. L'orientation exacte des diverses catégories socio-professionnelles et des diverses professions que comprennent les classes ouvrières, les rivalités, les alliances de ces catégories et professions (à l'intérieur des classes ouvrières et au-dehors), font l'objet de travaux nombreux, de la part des historiens surtout. Ces recherches ont encore assez peu influé pour tant sur les spécialistes de la théorie sociologique des classes.

2. *Caractéristiques individuelles.*

Sous cette étiquette, il sera question du développement physique et mental des individus, de leur appartenance « ethnique » (ou nationale), et de leur niveau d'instruction.

L'inégalité sociale devant la maladie et devant la mort subsiste dans une certaine mesure. Il appartient à la sociologie de la santé et à la médecine d'en évaluer l'ampleur, et, autant que possible, d'en mettre en évidence les causes.

L'inégalité dans le développement mental moyen, selon les catégories socio-professionnelles, est un autre fait à prendre en considération. A cet égard, il n'est pas du tout certain que l'évolution se fasse dans le sens de la réduction de l'écart entre les classes ouvrières, prises globalement, et les autres catégories sociales. Certes, la médecine et l'éducation sont susceptibles de contribuer beaucoup à réduire le nombre des déficients et de stimuler le développement intellectuel des autres individus. Néanmoins, dans toute population, le classement des individus par rapport au niveau moyen

d'aptitude mentale ne saurait manquer sans doute, dans l'avenir prévisible, de correspondre à un éventail très ouvert, avec de larges groupes classés fort au-dessous de la moyenne, et d'autre fort au-dessus.

Or, plus le système de la sélection scolaire et professionnelle se rationalise, plus il tend en principe, à faire correspondre le type de profession de l'individu et son niveau mental à l'âge scolaire, et cela au détriment des classes ouvrières, dans toute la mesure où, par un préjugé détestable, la société admet que les moins doués pour les exercices intellectuels et scolaires de l'enfance doivent être orientés vers les fonctions ouvrières, et les plus doués vers les autres métiers. Quelle est exactement la situation sur ce point, dans les divers pays ? Quelles sont ses conséquences réelles sur la capacité des classes ouvrières de participer à la vie culturelle de la collectivité, et au jeu de la démocratie ?

Les classes ouvrières sont, d'autre part, très loin d'être homogènes du point de vue des niveaux d'instruction. Elles comprennent des groupes qui occupent toutes les positions entre l'absence d'instruction scolaire (une partie des travailleurs provenant des zones sous-développées des pays fournisseurs de main d'œuvre d'appoint, notamment) et une formation poussée jusqu'au niveau des écoles professionnelles du cycle secondaire supérieur. Le comportement de chacun de ces groupes présente vraisemblablement des particularités. Compte tenu du fait que, dans tous les pays modernes, l'école se donne pour tâche, entre autres choses, de contribuer à l'abaissement des barrières de classe (à l'Est, par le renforcement de la conscience socialiste; à l'Ouest, par l'élimination des formes de comportement et de pensée typiquement populaires, au profit d'une culture générale qui émane avant tout des classes moyennes évoluées), il serait intéressant de savoir si plus l'instruction du sujet a été complète, moins il s'oppose, dans la moyenne des cas, aux pressions et incitations de l'ordre établi.

Il convient d'évoquer maintenant les fossés que creusent, entre catégories d'ouvriers, les différences de race et de nationalité, là où elles sont associées à des pratiques de discrimination (et où ne sont-elles pas ?). Ces faits ont des conséquences importantes sur le mode d'organisation des classes ouvrières, sur leur mentalité, sur leur comportement politique, entre autres. L'opposition entre ouvriers «blancs» et de «couleur» est la plus connue. Mais il ne faut pas méconnaître pour autant celle qui existe, trop souvent, entre autochtones et travailleurs étrangers. Comme la civilisation moderne in-

tensifie la circulation des travailleurs, elle accentue l'importance des phénomènes de cet ordre.

3. *Niveau de vie, statut social.*

L'étude des différences de niveau de vie, au sein des classes ouvrières, selon les régions, les professions, les types de régime, et de leurs incidences morales, idéologiques, etc. est d'un intérêt si évident, que je ne crois pas nécessaire de le souligner.

L'ouvrier occupe dans la société, du point de vue du statut social (rang dans les relations quotidiennes, prestige) une position défavorisée. Il y a là un lointain héritage des civilisations dans lesquelles la dignité d'homme n'était pleinement reconnue qu'aux individus affranchis des travaux jugés matériels. Mais, toutes les catégories d'ouvriers ne sont pas logées, à cet égard, à la même enseigne. Au surplus, l'échelle des statuts sociaux varie selon les types de communauté locale (différences régionales liées à des disparités de civilisation, différences tenant à la dimension de la communauté, à son économie et à d'autres facteurs) et aussi, bien entendu, selon les types de société globale.

Sous ce dernier rapport, les études déjà effectuées tendent à conclure que l'écart serait assez faible, d'un régime à l'autre. Mais il s'agit de travaux de pionniers qui mériteraient d'être poursuivis méthodiquement.

4. *Sous-culture, milieu.*

Pour peu que les professions, les rangs sociaux, les groupes ethniques, etc. dont nous avons parlé, aient élaboré des normes spécifiques de comportement, ce qui est le cas le plus souvent, ils constituent des sous-cultures. Au demeurant, il faut qu'il en soit ainsi pour qu'ils jouent un rôle très actif dans le système formé par l'organisation dynamique des classes, et, plus généralement, dans la société. La forme, la puissance, l'orientation générale de ces sous-cultures sont très variables, cela va de soi. Leur action se coniuge avec celle de la religion, des traditions locales, des mass-media, des institutions culturelles officielles, des valeurs et idées propres à des groupes dont l'individu n'est pas membre, mais qui n'en exerce pas moins une influence sur lui. L'ensemble détermine l'ambiance d'ordre intellectuel et moral particulière dans laquelle se trouve plongé le sujet.

La partie la plus agissante sans doute de cet environnement est constituée par les formes de culture qui sont propres à l'entourage primaire (famille, voisinage, amis, etc.), celui qui assure la formation de la personnalité avant même l'école, et qui, ensuite, exerce sur les conduites de l'individu un contrôle intime et direct. Les cellules sociales primaires de chaque communauté se répartissent, plus ou moins nettement, en quelques grands genres, chacun de ceux-ci correspondant à un milieu où se perpétuent, en évoluant, des manières d'être spécifiques. Ces ensembles sont à étudier en tant qu'organisations sociales d'une espèce spéciale, selon moi, possédant leurs structures propres, leurs divisions du travail (celui qui consiste à élaborer, entretenir, ajuster et diffuser des modèles de conduite, et à en contrôler la mise en application). Ce sont les ateliers où s'élaborent l'essentiel des mœurs. Le terroir, la région, la nation, en tant que supports de traits particuliers de culture ont des fonctions voisines.

Les interactions qui se produisent entre les schémas de conduite issue de ces sources et ceux qu'engendre la classe commencent à peine d'être entrevues. Les données que l'on peut trouver ici ou là sur ce point indiquent en tout cas que l'influence du milieu est déterminante dans des domaines importants. C'est ainsi qu'à égalité de revenus, de type d'emploi, etc., l'attitude des familles ouvrières par rapport aux études de leurs enfants varie profondément selon le genre de milieu moral et intellectuel (relations, habitudes, valeurs, groupes de référence, etc) auquel ces familles se rattachent dans la vie quotidienne. Ces différences d'attitude de la famille ont une influence très nette sur la carrière scolaire des enfants, et, par voie de conséquence, sur leurs chances de mobilité sociale. Le milieu explique également dans une très large mesure les préférences politiques des ouvriers, et, plus encore, leurs attitudes religieuses, les particularités de leur comportement dans le loisir, etc.

Loin d'être forcément une subdivision d'une classe sociale, un milieu est susceptible d'agir sur des fractions plus ou moins étendues de classes très différentes. Nul ne contestera d'ailleurs que des parties importantes des classes ouvrières se rattachent à des univers moraux et intellectuels dont les foyers se situent dans d'autres classes.

Ce fait constaté depuis longtemps d'une manière tout empirique, n'a pas encore fait l'objet d'analyse très approfondies (mises à part les études sur les mécanismes des influences inter-individuelles, sur les leaders informels, etc. de Lazarsfeld, par exemple).

En marge des divers milieux à genre de vie normal, existent des milieux marginaux, ceux de la criminalité et de la déchéance, et aussi ceux de la misère pure et simple. Ces derniers sont formés d'économiquement faibles et d'handicapés, qui sont souvent des ouvriers particulièrement déshérités. Ce sous-prolétariat peuple les quartiers de taudis et les bidonvilles. C'est la forme moderne du Lumpenproletariat des grands centres industriels du 19^{ème} siècle, mentionné par Marx, et qui était aussi le monde des «Misérables» de Victor Hugo. Ces groupes entretiennent avec les classes ouvrières proprement dites des relations fluctuantes, en matière politique notamment (contamination des syndicats, et des partis populaires, etc. par des éléments douteux, par exemple) assez mal connues, tout bien pesé.

Ces groupes sont étudiés actuellement, surtout au point de vue de l'évaluation du degré d'efficacité des programmes d'action mis en œuvre pour réduire les zones de pauvreté extrême qui subsistent malgré l'expansion économique et en dépit du progrès des institutions sociales (nous ne parlons pas ici du sous-prolétariat des pays en voie de développement, puisque notre séance est consacrée aux ouvriers des sociétés industrialisées).

5. *Idéologie, politique.*

Le degré d'intensité de la «conscience de classe» des ouvriers, de même que les autres aspects de leur comportement idéologique, de même aussi que les formes et les tendances de leur action politique diffèrent d'un pays à l'autre (et souvent d'une région à l'autre dans un même pays). Cela s'explique par référence aux circonstances historiques qui sont à l'origine de l'existence d'un éventail donné de sources d'influence idéologique et de forces politiques, agissant en liaison plus ou moins stricte avec les milieux dont il a été question plus haut. C'est, en particulier, en pensant à tout ce qui sépare, sous ce rapport, la population ouvrière de l'URSS, de celle des Etats-Unis, de celle de l'Espagne, de la France, de la Scandinavie, etc. que j'ai préféré, dans mon titre, parler des classes ouvrières plutôt que de la classe ouvrière. En effet, c'est avant tout par les faits de mentalité qu'elles engendrent, spécialement au plan de l'idéologie, et par leurs activités d'ordre politique, que les classes sociales pleinement développées se définissent les unes par rapport aux autres.

Dans les pays libéraux, la division idéologique et politique de ces classes apparaît dans toute son ampleur, ce qui fournit une raison de plus d'employer le pluriel.

Ces divisions coïncident-elles avec des divisions selon les types d'activité professionnelle, ou plutôt avec des oppositions de milieu, etc. ? C'est là l'une des questions que rencontre le spécialiste de l'analyse du comportement politique des ouvriers.

Les facteurs du militantisme, les conditions du recrutement des leaders leurs tendances fréquentes au bureaucratisme, déjà signalées par Michels, constituent par ailleurs des thèmes classiques.

6. *Changement, mobilité sociale.*

Tous les points qui précèdent pourraient être repris au titre des évolutions et des transformations: changement des formes du travail ouvrier, avec leurs conséquences de tout genre; modification de la position réciproque des ouvriers que séparent des différences «ethniques» ou nationales; incidences de l'élévation des niveaux d'instruction d'une génération à l'autre; montée et déclin des diverses tendances idéologiques et politiques au sein des classes ouvrières; étape de l'assimilation des ouvriers immigrés dans les zones en expansion, etc.

Mais je voudrais mentionner plus particulièrement certains problèmes de mobilité sociale.

Nous avons déjà évoqué au passage le fait que les chances de mobilité des enfants d'ouvriers sont très fortement fonction du style de vie de la fraction des classes ouvrières dans laquelle ils sont nés et ont été élevés. Comme les différences de style de vie sont considérables dans l'univers ouvrier, les disparités enregistrées sous cet angle le sont aussi.

La mobilité sociale est étudiée surtout au point de vue des passages d'une catégorie socio-professionnelle (manœuvres, ouvriers semi-qualifiés, ouvriers qualifiés, employés, cadres, dirigeants, par exemple) à une autre.

Certains de ces transferts se produisent à l'intérieur des limites des classes ouvrières (ceux qui consistent en mouvements entre les trois premières catégories de l'énumération qui précède). Ils sont certes intéressants.

Cependant il faut leur ajouter toute une micro-mobilité dont l'importance est au moins aussi considérable, à la fois par son ampleur

quantitative, par sa signification vécue et par ses conséquences de tout genre. Il s'agit de celle qui correspond à des passages d'un type de poste de travail à un autre (plus apprécié, ou moins apprécié), sans changement de catégorie socio-professionnelle.

Cette micro-mobilité, peu étudiée, est sans doute en expansion à l'heure actuelle, dans les professions ouvrières, entre autres. En effet, la conjoncture économique permet, à chaque niveau socio-professionnel, de remplacer par des nouveaux venus, un grand nombre de travailleurs qui quittent des postes peu attrayants à leurs yeux pour en occuper d'autres, qui les attirent plus. Les nouveaux venus, souvent issus de régions peu développées, éprouvent dans beaucoup de cas le sentiment d'une promotion, par rapport à leur situation antérieure. Ceux qu'ils remplacent ne sont pas toujours guidés par le désir d'une amélioration de salaire, notons-le. Beaucoup sont mus par la recherche d'un supplément de prestige, par l'attrait d'un travail plus libre, d'une ambiance humaine plus sympathique, et par d'autres mobiles semblables.

A ces mouvements «intra-générationnels» (changements dans la carrière du même ouvrier), il faut ajouter la mobilité «inter-générationnelle» (différence entre la situation de l'ouvrier lui-même et la carrière à laquelle accèdent ses enfants), forte à notre époque. «Intra-générationnels» ou «inter-générationnels», ces mouvements sont généralement ascendants.

Ces courants vers le haut dont beaucoup d'ouvriers font l'expérience, directement ou par l'intermédiaire de leurs enfants, sont sans doute à compter parmi les causes de ce que l'on appelle parfois la «mort des idéologies», phénomène qui consiste avant tout en une atténuation de l'ardeur des passions et luttes prolétariennes, sensible aussi bien à l'Est sous les espèces de la «destalinisation» progressive que dans l'attitude toujours plus réformiste des divers courants du mouvement ouvrier occidental. Mais, pour plausible qu'elle soit, cette hypothèse est loin encore d'avoir été démontrée.

7. Remarques finales.

Les problèmes passés en revue ci-dessus — et il ne s'agit que de quelques exemples — peuvent tous, considérés en eux-mêmes, donner lieu à des travaux d'un réel intérêt. Néanmoins la question fondamentale à laquelle il convient de s'attacher surtout, du point de vue de ce qui a été dit au début de ces quelques pages, est celle du degré de réalité des classes ouvrières comme totalités actives. Dans

quelle mesure l'orientation de l'action collective des groupes qui forment le monde ouvrier est-elle déterminée par la pression de la classe comme force structurelle, ou plutôt, structurante ? Dans quelle mesure retrouve-t-on une influence du même ordre à l'échelle des conduites individuelles ? L'idée d'une classe, ouvrière ou autre, qui se présenterait comme une unité parfaite, dont tous les éléments constitutifs concourraient en pleine conscience au même but, est toute théorique. Mais l'existence d'un puissant mouvement ouvrier aux tendances multiples (communiste, social-démocrate, chrétienne-sociale, etc.) étendant leur influence au monde entier montre bien que la structuration des classes ouvrières est très avancée. L'action de ces foyers d'organisation constitue l'aspect volontaire de processus qui comportent en outre des mécanismes de fait, ceux qui correspondent au conditionnement des formes d'existence des ouvriers par les particularités de leur situation objective dans l'économie et dans la société. Ces forces, volontaires et objectives, agissent de façon diverse, ne rencontrent pas nécessairement les mêmes obstacles et entraînent des effets variables selon les pays. Il appartient à la sociologie comparée des classes ouvrières de détecter ces différences, et d'en rechercher les raisons.

THE PROMOTION OF SOCIAL MOBILITY

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The Promotion of Social Mobility

In recent years sociologists have been deeply concerned about the rates of social mobility. Less attention has centered on the issues of how to promote social mobility. While there have been discussions of the role of education in social mobility, few have gone beyond the issues of expanding educational openings. The present paper is an attempt to encourage sociologists to examine the issues of social mobility in a public policy framework, directly raising the question of how to promote social mobility.

Modes of increasing intergenerational social mobility have been approached in two ways: (1) structural and aggregative, and (2) familial and individual. The structural approach emphasizes changing the opportunities and incentives for large aggregates to be mobile. The effort is to increase the number of persons engaged in mobility by making such structural changes as the expanding of educational facilities and the increasing of employment opportunities. Thus, the approach works through both the demand and the supply sides of the labor market. The familial approach, on the other hand, is more selective and tends to be bias towards a particular segment of the potential supply of labor.

The Structural and Aggregative Approach

A study has been made which explored a multiplicity of variables that may effect the rate of social mobility. These variables included national product per capita, education, political stability, urbanization and motivation¹. Education alone explained large per-

¹ Education was measured by primary and secondary school pupils enrolled as a percentage of population, aged 5-19; economic development was measured as gross national product per capita; urbanization was measured

centage of the variance in manual outflow. The higher the level of educational attainment by a nation, the lower the amount of the downward mobility, and the higher the percentage of upward movement². These findings are presented in Table 1 to demonstrate the supreme importance of education in upward social mobility.

Economic expansion by itself does not seem to be adequate to foster mobility³. Economic growth may occur simply through a proportionate increase in all factors of production with little mobility across the manual-nonmanual occupational boundaries, or growth may be related to geographical shifts in the labor force with more horizontal than vertical mobility. Further, the degree of occupational mobility, i.e., across the manual-nonmanual divide, depends upon the sector which is being developed. The expansion of a service sector may produce the highest rates of such mobility⁴.

Because of the significance of education, it has been suggested that

as percentage of population in localities 20,000 and over; motivation was measured by McClelland's index of achievement motivation; and political stability was measured by Lipset's dichotomy of stable and unstable democracies. The countries included in the study were Denmark, Finland, France, Great Britain, Hungary, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the United States and West Germany. See Thomas G. Fox and S. M. MILLER, «Economic, Political and Social Determinants of Mobility: An International Cross-Sectional Analysis,» *Acta Sociologica*, 1966.

² For an expression of strong skepticism regarding the ability of education to play a key role in promoting vertical mobility, see: C. Arnold ANDERSON, «A Skeptical Note on the Relation of Vertical Mobility to Education,» *The American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. LXVI, No. 6, 19, May 1961.

³ This finding corroborates those of earlier studies, S. M. MILLER and Herrington J. BRYCE, «Social Mobility and Economic Growth and Structure,» *Kölner Zeitschrift für Sociologie*, Summer, 1962; and Herrington J. BRYCE, «Immobility and Economic Development: A Comparative Analysis,» (paper presented at the Eastern Sociological Society, Philadelphia, 1966).

⁴ The assumption that the growth of a service sector produces more manual-nonmanual mobility is based on Clark's theorem. See Colin CLARK, *The Conditions of Economic Progress*, London: Macmillan Company, 1951. This theorem has not gone unattacked; cf. P. T. BAUER and B. S. A. YAMEY, «Economic Progress and Occupational Distribution,» *Economic Journal*, 61, (1951), pp. 741-55; A. L. MINKES, «Statistical Evidence and the Concept of Tertiary Industry,» *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 3 (1955), pp. 366-373; Simoo ROTTENBERG, «Note on Economic Progress and Occupational Distribution,» *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 35 (1953), pp. 168-70; Margaret S. GORDON, *Employment Expansion and Population Growth, The California Experiences: 1900-1950*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1954, p. 30; and S. M. MILLER, «Tertiary Employment and Occupational Mobility,» *Eastern Sociological Society*, New York, 1955.

TABLE 1
MATRIX OF SIMPLE CORRELATIONS AMONG
MOBILE AND OTHER VARIABLES

Variables	X ₃	X ₄	X ₅	X ₆	X ₇
X ₁ Manual Outflow Mobility	.569	.803	.503	.417	.451
X ₂ Nonmanual Outflow Mobility	-.270	-.149	.385	.475	.441
X ₃ Gross National Product Per Capita	1.00	.571	.626	.372	.487
X ₄ Primary and Secondary School Enrollment		1.00	.373	.593	.444
X ₅ Political Stability			1.00	.443	.192
X ₆ Population in Localities over 20,000				1.00	.199
X ₇ Achievement Motivation					1.00

Source: Thomas G. Fox and S. M. MILLER, «Economic, Political and Social Determinants of Mobility: An International Cross-Sectional Analysis,» *Acta Sociologica*, 1966.

a widespread increase in educational opportunities will greatly increase actual rates of mobility. In addition, large-scale expansion of education might have the value of augmenting the number of youths from lower social strata who have access to education. Smelser and Lipset note that expanding various forms of educational opportunities in rural and isolated areas increases the possibility that graduates of these programs will be willing to work in these areas rather than concentrating in urban regions. In turn, a more effective distribution of the educated among rural and urban regions will affect the possibilities of gaining more educated and mobile persons in the following generation because the number of qualified teachers available to rural youths will increase and new kinds of role models will be available to the youth in rural areas⁵.

Another structural factor is that of urbanization. For many, the move from rural areas and agricultural occupations into urban areas

⁵ Neil SMELSER and Seymour Martin LIPSET, «Social Structure, Mobility and Development,» in SMELSER and LIPSET (eds.), *Social Structure and Social Mobility in Economic Development*, Chicago, Aldine, 1966.

and industrial occupations is an advance in economic and social status. The change may also be a gain in political status since rural areas are more likely than urban areas to have de facto limitations on the role of the citizen. For others, however, the shift may not represent upward mobility but horizontal mobility. (For a few, there may be a decline in status).

The most significant mobility gain may, however, be exhibited in the generation which succeeds the fibrants to the cities. For this urban generation will have had better opportunities for education in the cities than it would have had in the rural areas and will be more acutely aware of the possibilities and routes of social mobility. The improved educational opportunities are not automatic, however, for the urban centers have to construct schools and create the teacher-pupil environment which lead to better education. In the United States, for example, the migration of Negroes and poor whites from rural areas led to concentrations of poverty in the cities. While the education they received in the cities was, in the main, much superior to that available in their former homes, it was not good enough to put these Negroes and poor whites in a strong position in the competitive race for mobility in the large city where educational qualifications were higher than in rural areas. Much current educational activity in the United States is devoted to changing this situation.

Urbanization does not automatically result in enhanced social mobility opportunities, but it does provide a framework which may be more economical than that of most areas in promoting mobility. Efforts to promote urbanization, despite immediate social costs, are seen as contributing to increased mobility.

Moore has suggested a different kind of structural approach to the promotion of mobility. To reduce family ties which impede social mobility, he suggests that «developmental strategy should emphasize forms of association and also such provisions of social insurance as are financially feasible. Social insurance is likely to be regarded as a luxury available only to prosperous countries. The suggestion here is that it be given higher priority because of its importance as a device for social transformation»⁶.

The Moore analysis emphasizes the supply side of mobility — the interest and availability of individuals for mobility. Kingsley Davis

⁶ Wilbert E. MOORE, «Problems of Training, Balance and Priorities in Development Measures», *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 2, 1954, p. 248.

has suggested another set of variables in increasing the demand for individuals to be mobile. He argues that developing regularized modes of entry into occupations instead of dependence upon family and connections promotes mobility. «Such things as public schools, recruitment by examination, wages geared to productivity, licensing of professions, up-to-date patent and copyright laws are thought of in terms of national efficiency rather than in terms of class circulation, but they have an effect in stimulating the latter nonetheless»⁷.

The reduction of particularistic requirements and substitution of universalistic and achievement oriented criteria for entry into and achievement in occupations may make it possible for those at the lower social levels to advance. On the other hand, some societies have utilized particularistic criteria to augment opportunities for those at the bottom. Several Eastern European socialist societies at various points have limited the number of the middle class students at universities to favor the offspring of workers; some U.S. universities have relaxed entrance requirements and organized special efforts to gain Negro students. Traditional, particularistic criteria in general operate against the lower classes but particularistic professions which single out those at the bottom for favorable attention can serve to improve, at least in the short run, their mobility chances.

The thrust of the structural approach is to build the institutionalized mechanisms (whether of education, economic change, or social insurance) and not to bother much with the sorting process and the individual difficulties of gaining ascent. Obviously, however, individuals do not benefit equally from expanded opportunities, for selective factors of various kinds affect who may and who may not profit.

The Familial and Individual Approach

The familial and individual approach to the promotion of social mobility looks at the problem from the other side — who are those who move à head and how can their mobility be quickened? This approach may suffer from the strong individual emphasis, for some analysts write as though the mobility pressures from individual and

⁷ Davis, *op. cit.*, p. 72.

family are effective regardless of economic and social circumstances. While some can move ahead despite difficult circumstances external to them, large numbers cannot.

The studies of mobility determinants from the individual and family side concentrate on the movement from manual to nonmanual occupations. The general sense of the studies is that the mobile are more likely to be better off than those in the same strata who are not mobile. This result occurs, in part, because the manual category is so broad, but other things are operating here.

The mobile person is in many ways more like others in the stratum into which he moves than like those in the stratum from which he originates. He is probably of higher measured I.Q. than nonmobile manual persons. Taussig and Joslyn, in their study of American business leaders, presented evidence that sons of manual workers who entered upper business levels were generally of measured intelligence superior to that of sons of other manual workers⁸. In general, the mobile manual son, Svalastoga has reported, is more likely than the nonmobile son to have a parent with more than average education for the manual stratum.

An important reason for the superior background of the mobile manuals is that they are more likely to have had a grandfather who was in the nonmanual category. Of two children of the same status level, the one with a grandfather of higher status is more likely to improve his position. The family that has been downwardly mobile is more likely to have offspring that will eventually rise in social status. *How can the functional equivalent of having a middle class grandfather be provided?*

The advantages of having a higher level manual family consist of at least those elements: knowledge, stimulation, motivation, attitudes, rewards, confidence, models, financial assistance. In offering the following comments, there is no pretense at comprehensiveness. The concern is with illustration. Examples have been drawn primarily from the United States, not because they have worked better than procedures elsewhere, but because they are better known. The intention is not to encourage the adoption of the particular illustration but to indicate the *kind* of activities which could be pursued. (Indeed, some of the examples have not been effectively developed in the United States).

⁸ Frank M. TAUSSIG and C. S. JOSLYN, *American Business Leaders*, New York, The Macmillan Company, 1932.

Knowledge. Frequently, motivational resistances are introduced as an explanation for the ineffectiveness of educational efforts among the low-educated. One reason for the resistances is that most low-educated people simply have no knowledge about education and school. Persons in the mobile higher-level manual category tend to have understanding of the role of education and the school know-how which leads to effective performance in school.

In the United States, for example, many Negro parents express high interest in the education of their children. Nonetheless, offspring of these interested parents frequently do poorly in school and are early school leavers. The parents do not know how to translate their concern into aid for their children in school. They lack understanding of what the school demands of them and what they can do to help their children. One element of a successful program in St. Louis, Missouri, was to make clear to the parents how much homework was expected of their children each night. The parents could then make appropriate demands of their children.

Similarly, students frequently do not understand what the school is demanding of them in terms of classroom attention and work. Youth from higher-educated families learn quickly what is expected of them in school. Some early home demands may deliberately mirror the later school demands in order to prepare the child for the school setting. Schools attempting to attract, keep and develop children from low-educated families should not assume that attendance at school automatically insures swareness of school expectations. The school may have to provide concrete and vivid leads as to what is expected rather than relying on the child (or his family) to learn rapidly and easily «the school ropes».

Educational support. As indicated previously, well-motivated parents may not know how to help their children in school. A side from helping the parents to work more effectively with their children, the schools can adopt programs of a supportive nature which facilitate educational advance for those from low-educated families. For example, a number of low-income communities in the United States have recently been provided with homework centers, in and out of school, where children from crowded or noisy homes can do their homework and have needed library facilities. In some places, homework helpers are provided to aid the student in his studying, a task which a highly-educated parent is likely to assume with his children.

Stimulation. The high mobile-potential family is likely to stimulate

its child toward educational progress by providing educational-like pre-school experiences at home, by heavy parental involvement in school and educational activities, and by the utilization and reinforcement at home of school achievements.

Similar stimuli can be provided by distributing free books to be looked at and read at home. This can start even before the child has entered school. In the United States, one stress in some schools in low-income areas is the adoption of teaching techniques which are more stimulating to students who, because of their backgrounds, do not find traditional school programs of great intrinsic interest.

Motivation. Many of the upwardly mobile have been pushed by members of their family or some outsider, especially a teacher. If the family cannot be relied on to promote effective motivation for investment in educational activities, then the school can assume this role. By taking a personal interest in children from low-educated families, the teacher may be able to develop in them an interest in and concern about school.

An appropriate setting is necessary for motivation of the students. Channeling students into different types of curricula at an early age tends to reduce the number who go on to higher education. Frequently, the «lower-level» program gets less funds and less adequate teachers. Often, all students in these curricula are considered lacking in potential and teachers may not devote themselves wholeheartedly to their development. The labeling process is important; the way a student is classified is likely to determine his progress. For example, in one school system in the United States some students who should have been assigned into high-level Group A on the basis of their scores were put into low-level Group B, while others who should have gone into Group B were placed in Group A. When the mistake was discovered, it was learned that the B-level students in Group A had done better than the A-level students in Group B. The way the students were viewed by their teachers deeply affected their progress in the schools.

If a school system does have a system of tracks to separate students with some homogeneous characteristic, then there should be a requirement that a minimum percentage of students do actually move from one track to another. In Great Britain, while it is theoretically possible to move from the non-college preparatory to the college preparatory track, few actually do make the move. Merely providing a mechanism for transfer without actually using it is meaningless; a minimum requirement about transfers will at least

force attention to the issue of periodic review of student interests and performance. Since students can never be completely adequately classified and since they do change and develop over time, the route for movement in and out of a track should be well traveled. Some analysts strongly advise, at least in the United States contexts, against any form of tracking because it impedes social mobility (those from low-educated families are most likely to be placed in the slow track). Further, tracking may stereotype students and discourage schools and teachers from assuming the responsibility of expanding the capabilities of all students.

Obviously, in rural areas of industrializing societies, several educational tracks are unlikely to exist within the same community. But for the nation as a whole, they may operate. A society concerned about social mobility as well as the development of talent will be concerned about the impact on social roles of the selection procedures of the multiple systems which comprise any educational system.

Reward. The possibilities of reward are an important element in motivation. On the economic level, increased education should lead to improved economic status. If this does not occur, and a nation has unemployment or underemployment in the white collar group, those from low-educated families are discouraged from furthering their education. Educational expansion must be keyed to the effective placing of the increased numbers of graduates in jobs commensurate to their training.

At the psychological level developing close peer groups of youth interested in education may promote their involvement in school and provide some immediate returns of satisfaction in the school years. Schools and universities could deliberately plan for the development of positive peer groups.

The reward for effective school performance should perhaps be more frequent than is customary in many school systems. Infrequent and vague reports should be supplanted by frequent and clear indication of status. Rewards might be built up for the family as their children advance in school. Frequently the advance of a child cuts him off from the family. To combat this tendency, the family could be continually involved in the advance of the child through personalized progress reports, public recognition for the family for the work of the child, closer contact between the family, the community, the school and the child. By providing rewards for the family — not just for the child — the family may function more effectively in furth-

ering the child's progress. Going up should not automatically mean going out of the family.

Confidence. Closely involved with knowledge at many points is confidence — in the ability to carry through the educational program; in the eventual significance of the education; in the relation of what one is doing day-to-day to eventual outcomes.

F. von Heek has suggested that students of working-class origins would leave Dutch universities less frequently than they do if they had a residential dormitory situation⁹. In the Dutch universities, there is no regular provision of residential quarters for students. They find rooms in town as best they can. The students of working-class origins find this situation more uncomfortable than do the middle class because typically they are less sure of themselves in their new surroundings, less able to make friends and to manage financially. A dormitory situation where students participate in socializing each other in the new situation could increase the upwardly mobile student's confidence in being able to manage the educational obstacles.

Models. The youth of high-educated families constantly see people who have been educated and are occupationally successful. Low-educated youth know fewer models and do not learn of the steps toward mobility that others have taken.

If the family and community cannot easily provide models of mobility, then the school might develop a program which presents living models. In some slum areas of the United States in order to promote educational mobility aspirations of Negro youth, successful Negroes have been brought into the schools to describe their ascent. They make real the possibilities and routes of mobility.

Financial assistance. Education is expensive. It is expensive for the state to provide the facilities and staff and expensive for the family to support the student. The expenses of the student and his family include not only the direct costs of maintaining him but also the earnings foregone during the educational period. While it may be economically rational for a family to undertake these expenses in order to benefit from the higher income potential of the youth as he enters and succeeds in the world of work, many families cannot afford this kind of rationality. Only the higher-educated, higher-in-

⁹ This suggestion was made in the discussions of the Sub-Committee on Social Stratification and Mobility of the International Sociological Association.

come families can afford to forego current earnings. Lower-income, low-educated families cannot. Therefore, the provision of adequate financial assistance by the state will augment the number of students and will enhance the upward mobility of those at the bottom of the social structure.

In the United States, several different kinds of procedures serve to promote educational expenditures by the family: special tax advantages (in several states) for families whose children are going to college (this provision benefits the higher-income more than the lower, but may provide some incentive to the latter); the continuation on public welfare of families where children are going to college (formerly, a youth of 18 would no longer be kept on the welfare rolls if he decided to further his education); scholarships to the needy. In nations with family allowance schemes the age at which a child is no longer eligible might be raised if he continues his education. In effect, the family's costs in foregone earnings are reduced.

The general strategy which results from this discussion is to enlarge the school's role to include activities which higher-educated families might perform for their offspring. The school can perform a more effective role through the deliberate fostering of peer-group interaction; the closer intervening of school and community; the examination of school in socio-psychological as well as pedagogic terms. In other words, the effort should be concentrated on building the school as a broad social institution.

An effort has been made to convey the possibilities rather than the difficulties of promoting educational mobility. Obviously, attempts at social engineering can be highly manipulative and can interfere with the liberties of family and community. This danger should not be discounted and competes with the desire to promote educational advance.

Conclusion

Development is different today than it was in the past: it is more conscious. Nations want to have great achievements with minimum social upheaval and costs. Multiple goals rather than a single goal are the target. Objectives are publicly stated. Policies are more directed and deliberate than *crescive*. Consequently, blame can be apportioned and accountability somewhat measured.

The self-consciousness of contemporary development efforts builds

in new strains: the developers are identifiable, decisions may be fairly obvious and usually public, results are to be evaluated. These occurrences contrast with the beginning days of capitalistic industrialization in Western Europe and the United States where much less was publicly scrutinized and evaluated.

The emergence of new strains contributes to the likelihood that largescale development plans cannot be executed as originally designed; only intermittent progress is likely to occur as intermediate targets are not met, multiple goals compete, and political considerations require adaptations and modifications in targets and pace. The structuring of educational goals and plans so that they are phased and flexible seems to be most appropriate for the kind of development which is likely to take in many countries — uneven and tense, requiring shifting adaptations to emergency and exigency.

At this point it is not known how much and what kind of mobility and education are needed for development nor how much development is needed to foster mobility and education. These are issues which require much analysis. But it is already clear that education is becoming the crucial developer and sorter of people in a society. Clearly, too, the caliber of many societies is being measured by the extent to which social justice in the sense of upward social mobility is fostered. Social mobility may not be needed in order to achieve all types of development, but it is becoming an important criterion of the success of development. Social mobility is, thus, not only an instrument of economic progress; it is a major measure of the extent of that progress.

STRATA AND STRATA INTEREST IN SOCIALIST SOCIETY TOWARD A NEW THEORETICAL APPROACH

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The question of the class structure of socialist society is the subject of lively discussion among Polish sociologists and economists. Apart from the findings of empirical research on particular classes and strata (conceived in the traditional fashion as the working class, the stratum of intelligentsia and the class of small peasants) several articles recently appeared with new theoretical propositions regarding the class structure of socialist society¹. In their interest in these problems Polish scientists are by no means alone. A similar trend can be noted in other socialist countries².

The present paper is intended as a contribution to the current discussion. This discussion is steadily widening in scope and hence it seems worthwhile to present some of its problems to the wider circles of experts working in the field of social stratification.

The ideas outlined below constitute a preliminary inquiry rather than a definite solution.

In the current Polish discussion the economist Bronisław Minc

¹ Cf. B. MINC, «Klasy i warstwy w społeczeństwie socjalistycznym» [Classes and Strata in Socialist Society], *Polityka*, No 39, 42, 46, 1961; J. WIATR, «Uwarstwienie społeczne a tendencje egalitarne» [«Social Stratification and Egalitarian Tendencies»], *Kultura i Społeczeństwo*, No 2, 1962; B. GALESKI, «Niektóre problemy struktury społecznej w świetle badań wiejskich» [Some Problems of Social Structure in the Light of Investigations of the Rural Communities], *Studia Socjologiczne*, No 1, 1963; B. MINC, «O rozwarstwieniu społeczeństwa socjalistycznego» [«Social Stratification in Socialist Society»], *Kultura i Społeczeństwo*, No 3, 1963; W. WESOŁOWSKI, «Proces zanikania różnic klasowych» [«Process of Disappearing of Class Differences»], *Studia Socjologiczne*, No 2, 1964; S. WIDERSZPIŁ, «Interpretacja przemian struktury społecznej w Polsce Ludowej» [«An Interpretation of Changes of Social Structure in People's Poland»], *Nowe Drogi*, No 1, 1963.

² Cf. P. N. FIEDOSIJEW (ed.), *Ot socjalizma k komunizmu* [From Socialism to Communism], Moscow, 1962; *Socjologija w SSSR* [Sociology in the Soviet Union], Vol. I, Moscow, 1965; *Socjologija*, No 1-2, 1966, Błograd (special issue of the Yugoslav sociological journal devoted to the problems of «Socialism and the Changes in Class Structure»).

has advanced the most original and at the same time controversial conception. Lack of space prevents a full exposition of that conception. It is nevertheless necessary to mention it at least briefly since I advance a clearly varying proposition. Both our conceptions are based on general Marxist sociological principles. But they propose different concrete theoretical solutions.

Minc proposes³ to distinguish in socialist society (where socialist construction has been completed, e.g. where there are no longer any private factories, nor the private ownership of the means of production) two social classes: a class of workers of the State sector and a class of workers of the cooperative sector. His point of departure is the assumption that a socialist society retains the «relation to the means of production» as the criterion of class differentiation, since two different economic sectors continue to exist. One is the State sector in which the means of production are the general property of the nation; the second is the cooperative sector in which the means of production are owned by a smaller group (members of a given cooperative).

According to Minc, two manual workers (turners, for example) will be considered to belong to two different classes only on the basis that one works for the government and the other in a cooperative enterprise. Analogically, the class affiliation of two engineers or two directors would be determined by the fact that they are employed in two different economic sectors.

Besides class division, Minc also proposes division by strata on the basis of income, qualification and power groups. His «strata» propositions are not elaborated particularly with regard to the relation between the class and «stratum» structures. Basic to his conception is the proposition regarding «class» differentiation.

Sociologists cannot accept these propositions since they are too formalistic. The crucial argument against them is that under the socialist economic system the social consequences of being employed in the State or in the cooperative sector are not important enough to be regarded as a basis for social differentiation. Sectors do not determine to any significant extent the distribution of crucial stratificational variables or, in another words, the distribution of the important social status characteristics such as income, life chances, power, prestige etc.

³ Cf. B. MINC, «Klasy i warstwy w społeczeństwie socjalistycznym», *loc. cit.*

Through the theory of the two classes, based on the two sectors of economy, Minc wants to stress the lasting role of the «relation to the means of production» in the socialist society and in this way to retain Marx's «classical» criterium of classes as valid for that type of society. This author believes, on the contrary, that the new social situation resulting from the «socialized» economic system demands a new theoretical approach. It is unwarranted to stress so heavily the classical criterium, while its role is gradually diminishing and some other factors «enter» in its place.

1. *The Marxian Class Theory and Socialist Society*

The Marxian theory of class structure stipulates first of all the existence of two mutually antagonistic groups involved in the process of production. These are so-called «basic classes». They differ from each other by their relations to the means of production. One of these classes owns them; the other is deprived of them although it operates them. This relation determines the character of the first as an exploiting, and of the second as an exploited class.

The objective conflict of interests is rooted in the antagonistic positions of the two classes, and a different consciousness arises on the foundation of these antithetic social positions. The emergence of the class struggle demonstrates the existence of such classes.

This brief summary leads to what has become a commonplace, that proletarian revolution abolishes the thus conceived class structure. Socialization of the capitalist-owned means of production means the liquidation of one of the elements of the antagonistic capital-labour relations. And with this disappears the fundamental class relation typical of capitalist society. Without their «opposite poles» the workers cease being a class in the old sense of the term. For there has ceased to exist the basic characteristic constituting them as a class in capitalist society: exploitation by the owners of the means of production. In the Marxist sense, they are no longer an «actual class», but rather a «former class».

The above statement is deliberately simplified to underscore the fundamental difference. When the workers free themselves from their «Siamese twin» they lose the principal characteristic of their social position but they are not thereby automatically deprived of other characteristics. These other traits make it advisable to continue to call them «the workers», although not «the class» in Marx's

sense of that term. Perhaps it would be convenient to call them «stratum of workers». The workers continue to be linked with a certain type of production (industrial production) and a specific type of labour (manual labour). They are characterized by certain social and cultural traits. In other words, the workers occupy a given place in the social division of labour; they have a definite type of income, education, way of life, political attitude and a number of other important social characteristics or attributes.

Involved here is one of the important, though not always clearly perceived, characteristic traits of the Marxian theory of classes. In that theory one characteristic and one social relation connected with it — the monopoly of the means of production on one side and deprivation of them on the other —, are regarded as the bases of the complex structure of class characteristics.

The class characteristics create a sort of specific hierarchy and causal chain of interrelations. There is a constellation of characteristics on the side of the capitalists and a different one on the worker's side. Ownership of the means of production puts the capitalist in control of the production process and gives a privileged position in the division of income derived from production. The worker carries out orders in the course of the production process and suffers discrimination in the division of income derived from production. From the combination of these elements flow further characteristics of the social position of capitalists and workers. These may be defined as unequal opportunities to attain and benefit from various values, such as education, health, enjoyment of cultural assets. On the basis of all these characteristics of the social position there takes shape different ways of life, a different consciousness and dissimilar political attitudes.

It is true that some of these attributes were heavily stressed by Marx, while others were merely mentioned. In writings of many later Marxists some of these attributes were overlooked. But they were present in Marx's deliberations.

It should be noted in addition that the causal relations are not like a uniform linear chain. For instance, the relation to the means of production shapes class consciousness by determining the income level and status in the social organization of the labour process. The magnitude of income reacts on class consciousness by the opportunities it offers and by social prestige. There is furthermore an interaction between some characteristics.

The above are two versions of a simplified scheme of the connec-

tions between class characteristics. They are presented in this manner because depending on the point of view some characteristics may be termed variously and considered in different combinations in analyses. The two versions are meant to emphasize that the terminology is not maintained to be definitive. I am concerned with exemplifying the general idea that Marx took into account a number of characteristics and the given connections between them⁴.


The relation to the means of production was regarded by Marx as the decisive criterion of class differentiation because it determined a number of social characteristics. I conventionally call them here characteristics of the social position (or status). One set of characteristics pertains to the contradictory nature of the relation between the opposing classes, the other designates the differences in degree between them. The first type represents such traits as «manual» and «non-manual», «directors» and «directed». The second people with «high incomes», «medium incomes», «low incomes» (or «medium», «high» and «low» educational levels).

The given class characteristics from the «upper layers» of the diagrams pertain to classes in the aggregate and not necessarily to all individuals belonging to the class. For instance, there are proletarians who due to certain circumstances managed to acquire a higher education. But the opportunities for a higher education are unequally distributed between the workers and capitalists taken collectively, as groups. The same can be said about the way of life⁵.

⁴ The above enumeration of class characteristics of social position reveals that the difference between Marxists and non-Marxists students of social stratification is not so much in their choice of the set of characteristics as in their perspectives in approaching that set of characteristics. The Marxist approach could be called «deterministic», the non-Marxist approach, «operational». Marxists look at the whole structure of status characteristics «from the bottom up». Most of the non-Marxists divide all inhabitants of a given community into «prestige - classes», being less interested in the «underlying structure» of other characteristics. Of course, there are other differences between the two approaches. But it is worth while to see also similarities. This point was further elaborated in the present author's introduction to the Polish edition of C. W. MILLS, *White Collar* [cf. *Białe kołnierzyki: Amerykańskie klasy średnie*, Warsaw, 1965].

⁵ The current tendency in capitalist countries is for the government to take influence on some of the status characteristics of the working class by introducing social legislation, giving grants, fixing minimum wages, etc. As a result, the direct dependence of some of the status characteristics on the relation of the given social group to the means of production is weakened, though the two basic classes (capitalists and workers) continue

SCHEMES OF CONNECTIONS BETWEEN CLASS CHARACTERISTICS



Scheme 2

Scheme 1

The external influence on two elements of our scheme of characteristics structure requires extended treatment. One of these is prestige and the other is social consciousness. The prestige of members of a class results from the «application» of the given system of values to their objective characteristics. This system of values is linked with the ideology of the ruling class. Thus, according to the system of values proper to capitalist society, the workers have a low and the capitalists a high prestige. This is why our scheme designates prestige as influenced from the «outside»-by the dominant ideology.

Similarly, class consciousness is formed by openly competing class ideologies propagated by political parties as well as national, religious and other ideologies disseminated by various organizations and institutions (sometimes maintaining open and often secret connections with the public class ideologies). These influences are also designated in the diagrams.

Thus, the determining role of the relation to the means of production — the basic element of the entire structure — may be modified and its effect weakened by the influence originating from the outside of the whole structure. But on a mass scale it is not eliminated.

To sum up, the following facts are important for our treatment of the question of transformation in the class structure of socialist society: (1) the abolition of the capitalist production relations eliminates the fundamental connections and basic characteristics distinguishing the workers in capitalist society (setting in motion the means of production belonging to another class) but (2) all the other characteristics of their social position do not automatically disappear as a result. While «free» or «cut out» from the previously determining characteristic, namely relation to the means of production, these other attributes of workers are retained. They continue to fulfill their differentiating role, no longer in relation to the capitalists, but to other groups or strata.

Capitalist society is composed not only of «basic classes»: capitalists and workers but also of some other classes and strata. These strata are also «inherited» by socialist society. Usually they are conceived by Marxists as the «stratum of intelligentsia» (understood as the broad group of non manual workers) and the small commodity agricultural producers (farmers).

to differ sharply in their status characteristics, which in the last resort depend on the relation to the means of production.

Those other strata have definite sets of status characteristics similar to those included in our schemes. The characteristics of «intelligentsia» are peculiar in that they do not comprise any «relation to the means of production» which would put this stratum in antagonism to any other class. (Marxists therefore insist on calling the intelligentsia a stratum, rather than a class). What distinguishes the white-collar workers as a stratum are: type of occupation (non-manual labor), income (usually defined as «medium», that is somewhere between the income of capitalists and that of the laborers), opportunities, way of life, prestige etc.

The peculiar characteristics of the farmers as small-scale agricultural producers consist in the specific nature of their means of production and their relations to those means of production. In capitalist society, the farmers, as is true of white-collar workers, have no direct polar relationship to any other class, unlike the laborers and capitalist. The farmers are owners of their means of production but they employ their own labor to use them. As in the case of the laborers or capitalist, the above characteristic of the farmers determines a number of other characteristics of their social position. The structure of status characteristics is roughly the same as those included in our scheme.

Thus the small commodity agricultural producer — like the worker and the representative of the intelligentsia — is characterised by a certain syndrome of traits. With respect to individual characteristics, his position may be compared to that of the worker or intellectual (in the proportion of manual and mental labour, size of income, etc.).

The transformation of the class of small commodity producers under socialism takes the direction of turning its members into employers of the socialized sector. The aim of the socio-economic policy of the State is to make their relation to the means of production conform to that of labourers and mental workers. This means a desire to eliminate their relation to the means of production as a characteristic distinguishing this group from others. This is accompanied by the desire to deprive this characteristic of its role of decisive determinant of the social position and psychological attributes specific to that group.

This process may be of shorter or longer duration and it may also take different forms. We shall leave that question aside. It may be said, however, that the transformations in the class structure inherited from capitalism evolve toward: (a) equalization of the relation to

the means of production of the former small commodity producers, the workers and intelligentsia, (b) complete deprivation of the relation to the means of production of its decisive role in determining other status characteristics (income, prestige, opportunity, etc.). *From here on the relation to the means of production is uniform for all citizens. And if there appear differences in income, character of labour, prestige, opportunity, political attitude, it is not this relation which determines them.*

2. Process of Disintegration of Class Characteristics

The following conclusion is suggested by the above: the evolution of the class structure in socialist society consists of the gradual evening-out of the relation of different groups of the population to the means of production. Parallel with that occurs a gradual diminution of the role of that relation as a determinant of other status characteristics and of the content of social consciousness.

Hence the role of differentiating characteristics of society is assumed to an ever growing degree by such status characteristics as: the nature of labour, income, education, prestige, etc.⁶. These characteristics, removed from the determining influence of the relation to the means of production, retain an «autonomous» existence under socialism. Thus, although classes (in Marx's sense of that term) disappear in a developed socialist society, there remain social differentiations which may be called social stratification.

This stratification may be conceived in a dual manner. The first conception refers to income, occupational or prestige stratifications along its various dimensions. This is a fairly simple theoretical concept which lends itself easily to research. It would involve the application of a simplified concept of multi-dimensional stratification to an investigation of socialist society. Each characteristic would then constitute a separate research subject and its intensity would be a criterion for distinguishing the stratification levels.

The second concept is more complex, but it therefore enables a

⁶ Until now we have used the terms: «class characteristics» or «class attributes». From here on we will use rather the term «status characteristics» or «status attributes» since the «relation to the means of production» ceases to play any important role in our deliberations. The characteristics of social position from the «upper layers» of our schemes (see p. 352) are usually associated with the term «status» or «social status».

better grasp of social processes and structures. It is the multidimensional approach proper.

It should be recalled here that for Marx, classes differ in respect to a number of related characteristics. The bourgeoisie enjoys a high income, high educational level and high prestige. The workers have low incomes, a low educational level and low prestige. The petty bourgeoisie have a medium income, enjoy medium prestige and their educational level is above that of the workers and below that of the bourgeoisie. This class concept appears not only in Marx but in a number of non-Marxist theoreticians.

There hence arises the very important question: to what extent is there a congruence of certain characteristics among the strata of a socialist country? Is there a correspondence, for instance, between income on the one hand and education and prestige on the other? It is the problem of «status crystallization» in Lenski's terms⁷.

The processes of revolutionary transformation effect a certain disintegration or «decomposition» of status characteristics. The given character of labour, size of income, level of education and degree of prestige tends to disintegrate. There are groups with low education and high incomes, or with high incomes and low prestige, etc. This is brought about by the changes in the economic system and in ideology. Many evidences of these «disintegration processes» are to be found in Poland. Their theoretical significance is overlooked by sociologists and economists.

The processes of disintegration of status characteristics intermingle with the processes of evening-out of some differences. Some decompositions may be considered as the processes leading to equalization. If, for instance, an unskilled labourer earns as much as a doctor, this may be considered an equalization of their social position in respect to one area of difference (income), while the difference in another area (education) is retained. The same applies to the equalization of the earnings of a turner and an engineer, for example. But other processes are also taking place. When a turner earns more than an engineer, or a miner enjoys greater prestige than a lawyer, the disintegration of status characteristics exceeds the bounds of the equalization of levels and leads to a deeper or «more distant» dislocation. Certain groups begin to differ one from another

⁷ G. LENSKI, «Status Crystallization. A Non-Vertical Dimension of Social Status», *The American Sociological Review*, No 4, 1954. See also: L. BROOM, «Social Differentiation and Stratification», in: R. K. MERTON, L. BROOM, L. S. COTTRELL, Jr. (eds.), *Sociology Today*, New York, 1959.

as being in a reverse relation with respect to certain attributes than was the case in the previous socio-economic system.

The disintegration of social status characteristics may hence assume two forms. One is the equalization of the «levels» of some characteristics pertaining to some particular former classes or strata. The second is the case of one class «leaping ahead» of another in relation to some of these characteristics.

By way of example we present below some empirical material on the disintegration of three status characteristics in contemporary Poland. These are: the nature of labour, size of income, and degree of prestige.

In inter-war Poland (1918-1939) virtually every non-manual worker earned more than a manual worker. (The average wage of a non-manual worker was nearly triple that of a manual worker). Table 1 presents the comparative income structure of the two groups today⁸.

True, the table shows a higher percentage of manual workers among the lowest paid and a higher percentage of white-collar workers among the highest paid. Nevertheless, two other phenomena indicated in the table are no less important. Thus a high percentage of manual and non-manual workers earns the same amount (from

TABLE 1
GROSS MONTHLY EARNINGS OF EMPLOYEES
(by income groups in 1963)

Income group	Manual workers	Non-manual workers	
701- 800	10.7 %	1.3	} % 59.2
801-1000	7.2	5.4	
1001-1200	8.7	9.1	
1201-1500	15.6	17.1	
1501-2000	24.7	26.3	
2001-2500	15.9	16.3	
2501-3000	8.5	10.4	
Over 3000	8.7	14.1	
	100.0	100.0	

⁸ *Poland in Figures 1944-1964*, Warsaw, 1965, p. 104.

1200 to 2000 zlotys a month). This speaks for income equalization. Then there is a large number of workers who earn more than white-collar workers. Of manual workers 33.1 % earn more than 2000 zlotys, while 59.2 % of non-manual workers earn less. Here we enter the trail of the disintegration of two characteristics: nature of labour and size of income.

TABLE II
JOB AND OCCUPATION EVALUATION ACCORDING TO
SOCIAL PRESTIGE⁹

Rank		Score
1	University professor	1.22
2	Physician	1.44
3	Teacher	1.71
4	Engineer	1.78
5	Airplane pilot	1.83
6	Lawyer	1.97
7	Agriculture expert (university grad.)	1.97
8	Government minister	2.07
9	Journalist	2.13
10	Skilled steelworker	2.18
11	Machinist (skilled factory worker)	2.27
12	Priest	2.35
13	Nurse	2.38
14	Factory foreman	2.53
15	Bookkeeper	2.54
16	Private tailor	2.70
17	Independent locksmith	2.73
18	Office department director	2.77
19	Farmer	2.78
20	Army officer	2.79
21	Shopkeeper	3.01
22	Railway conductor	3.18
23	Policeman	3.21
24	Office clerk	3.43
25	Secretary	3.50
26	Sales clerk	3.59
27	Building trades worker	3.95
28	Charwoman	4.08
29	Farm labourer (on state farm)	4.16

⁹ W. WESOŁOWSKY i A. SARAPATA, «Hierarchia zawodów i stanowisk» [«Hierarchies of Occupations and Positions»], *Studia Socjologiczne*, No 2, 1961, p. 101.

An investigation of occupational prestige in Poland today suggests the disintegration of another pair of characteristics: the nature of labour and social prestige. Table 2 illustrates the hierarchy of occupational prestige among Warsawians. It indicates that some manual occupations enjoy greater prestige than some non-manual vocations. Thus skilled workers occupy a higher place in the prestige hierarchy than do clerks and similar categories of white-collar employees. In contrast a sociologist wrote about the corresponding pre-war situation: «Perhaps nowhere is the social gulf so glaring as in Poland between non-manual work — even of the most subordinate kind — and manual work, no matter how constructive»¹⁰.

TABLE III
EVALUATION OF OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS ACCORDING TO
MATERIAL REWARDS AND SOCIAL PRESTIGE¹¹

Occupational group	Material reward		Prestige	
	Rank	Score	Score	Rank
Private entrepreneurs	1	1.81	2.81	3
Professionals	2	2.35	1.74	1
Skilled workers	3	2.40	2.33	2
White collar	4	3.30	3.17	4
Unskilled workers	5	4.12	4.06	5

Also evident is a partial separation of income and prestige. For instance, earnings in the teaching and nursing professions are relatively low today. A school teacher earns from 1500 to 2000 zlotys monthly and a nurse about 1500. But they occupy a higher place on the prestige ladder than do the turner with three to four thousand zlotys or the private merchant whose income is still higher.

Members of the society are of course aware of this disintegration process. In the above cited investigations the respondents were asked to evaluate the same two occupations according to the criteria of material benefit and prestige. The hierarchies of the two did not correspond. In contracted form this is shown in Table 3.

¹⁰ S. RYCHLIŃSKI, «Warstwy społeczne» [«Social Strata»], *Przegląd Socjologiczny*, Vol. VIII, p. 180.

¹¹ *Ib. idem*, p. 104.

It should be noted here that a certain decomposition of status attributes of some categories of manual and non-manual workers is also noted in some contemporary capitalist societies. But its range is smaller than in the socialist societies.

3. *Contradiction of Interests in Socialist Society*

We may now turn to the sphere of social interests. The problems involved here are of extreme complexity. Until now they were rarely and rather incidentally studied by Marxist scholars. This author has no ambition to give a comprehensive treatment of this difficult problem, but merely to make some preliminary suggestions.

At the very beginning some distinctive features of the capitalist vs. the socialist society should be pointed out. This might help to understand some peculiarities of the socialist society.

According to Marx, the capitalist mode of production is characterized by the presence of two social classes of which one appropriates the results of the labor of the other. The capitalist class seizes the «surplus value» produced by the workers. This kind of class relations is connected with the distribution of goods according to «the ownership principle of distribution». When this principle is in operation a person need not be working to take part in the distribution of economic goods. Moreover, he can enjoy privileges in this distribution.

The «ownership principle of distribution» ceases to operate with the abolition of the capitalist ownership of the means of production. In socialist society, the place of the ownership principle is taken by the principle of distribution «according to work», i.e. the quality and quantity of work done by that individual.

Let us examine some questions connected with the application of the formula «to each according to his work». The problems of social stratification are related to that part of formula which postulates wages as a function of the quality of labor, that is a function of the level of skill and education required for the performance of a given job. There is a marked difference in that level between, e.g. the unskilled laborer and the university professor¹².

¹² In this paper the question of the unity of interests in a socialist society is omitted. This important problem has been discussed in the present

It is necessary to clarify what situation we have in mind as creating the «contradiction of interest». It should be recalled that Marx had a very broad concept of the «contradiction of interests». He wrote about contradictions of interest between the capitalists and workers as well as between two workers competing for the same job. Following his approach, this author is inclined to look for a contradiction of interests wherever there is a scarcity of generally desired goods (or broader — values) and their distribution is by necessity such that any increase of the share of one group is bound to bring cuts in the share of another group (or limits such an increase).

3.1. *Two Types of Contradiction Resulting from the Uneven Distribution of Goods*

If we consider the formule «to each according to his work» and the proposed definition of the «contradiction of interests» we come to the conclusion that the uneven distribution of goods among the socio-occupational groups (or strata) may take two forms. The first occurs when the uneven distribution of goods is conditioned by the operation of the principle «to each according to his work». The second, when the uneven distribution is due to other factors than the operation of this principle, or to inadequacies in the application of this principle. In either case we face an objective contradiction of interests. And yet there is a significant difference between these two situations.

The principle «to each according to his work» is regarded as the basic principle of distribution in socialist society, but it is not always strictly implemented. In the first place because economists have failed so far to develop precise measures of labor quality that would account for the level of skills involved (and some other factors which should be taken into account e.g., the degree of creativity and risk). Existing measures are largely intuitive. As long as precise measures are not available, it is extremely difficult to tell to what extent the wage of, for instance, a lawyer and a nurse, or a public servant and a factory manager, or a turner and a university professor, and in general, the whole system of wages, conform to the principle «to each according to his work».

author's *Klasy, Warstwy i Wladza* [Classes, Strata and Power], Warsaw, 1966, Chapter 4.

Two problems have to be considered here. One is connected with the extent to which the objective contradiction of interests is compatible with the socialist system. It could be said that a departure from the socialist principle of distribution may result in the «overpayment» of one and «underpayment» of others due to their particular work. As a result, the socialist contradictions of interests could grow into something like antagonistic contradictions, for the overpayment or underpayment may be viewed as a peculiar form of the «exploitations» of some people by other people (in conditions of the social ownership of means of production).

On the other hand, there is the psychological aspect of interest contradictions in socialism. The employees (in Poland, for instance) are sensitive not so much to inequalities in wages as to the relative level of wages paid to people in different occupations. There is a general feeling that a «just» and «equitable» pay is the one which conforms to the principle «to each according to his work». People are on their watch lest somebody else gets thier «sawbuck», These findings suggest that «overpayment-underpayment» practices may result not only in a quasi-exploitation but also in augmentation of discontent. It seems that the objective contradiction of interests involved in the uneven distribution of goods in conformity with the principle «to each according to his work» itself does not evoke such strong conflict-generating tendencies.

The term «contradiction of interests» is used here to denote an objective state of affairs. The term «conflict of interests» is conceived as reflecting the subjective interpretation of a state of affairs as being the subject's interests. These being two different phenomena, the need was felt for two different terms.

3.2. *Limitation on the Principle «To Each According to His Work».*

We shall now turn to some additional factor influencing the system of wages. The principle «to each according to his work» fails to be applied with consistency not only because of the lack of precise measurements. There are some other formulas that are considered part of the socialist credo and they set limits to the implementation of the first one. As a result, there may be overpayments and underpayments compatible with the principles of socialism in spite of the discordance with the cardinal formula of remuneration.

One such departure from the formula is the overpayment of less

skilled laborers and underpayment of highly skilled professionals. Both minimum wages and limitations on extra-high wages are in all likelihood departures from the principle «to each according to his work». And both these phenomena seem to exist in socialist society¹³.

The second departure consists in giving advantages to workers employed at big investment projects located far from the existing urban and industrial centres. Such new developments require plenty of manpower — manpower which is not sufficiently mobile. A worker has his home, his family, his friends, his favorite haunts and is likely to be attached to his domicile. In agreeing to move to a far-off place or a newly built factory he may be forced to acquire some new skills, to live without his family in a workers hostel, and to adapt to a new environment which is still lacking the attractions of urban life. The comparatively higher wages for workers employed in those conditions should be seen as a kind of compensation for the unfavorable working and living conditions he had agreed to accept. Such a wage may be viewed as a normal wage multiplied by a factor that accounts for the additional social and psychological costs incurred by the worker. In contrast with the purely «economic» wage, this kind of payment has been termed «socio-economic wage»¹⁴. In addition to labor as such, this wage accounts for a number of deprivations suffered by the worker.

We have defined some of the departures from the principle «to each according to his work» which are due to the operation of other principles which are also consistent with the ideas of socialism. But the mechanics of social life being today a highly complex affair, there is no room in everyday life for the man in the street to follow it in all details. There is a tendency for people to assume standards of judgment based on plain facts and simplified formulas that catch their imagination and suit their sense of morality. And for that reason it seems that any departure from the formula «to each according to his work», whether fully justifiable on social and economic grounds, or caused by unwarranted and inequitable privileges, or else generated by lack of objective measures of quality of labor — all these appear to lead to one and the same: a deepening of the awareness of conflicts of interests in socialist society. Of course it is a matter

¹³ Z. MORECKA, «Płaca w gospodarce socjalistycznej» [Wage in a Socialist Economy], in: O. LANGE (ed.), *Zagadnienia ekonomii politycznej socjalizmu*, 1960.

¹⁴ Z. MORECKA, «Płaca ekonomiczna czy socjokonomiczna» [«Economic or Socio-Economic Wage?»] *Zycie Gospodarcze*, No. 8, 9, 1958.

for future empirical studies to decide to what extent awareness of conflict is generated by the very abjective contradiction of interests involved in the operation of the socialist distribution principle «to each according to his work», on the one hand, and by departures from this principle, on the other. Difficult as they are, such studies would prove very revealing.

Certain other hypotheses deserve to be tested empirically. For instance, there are probably two factors that either generate, or simply aggravate, the awareness of conflict. One could be defined as «the burden of the past» and the other as «anticipation of the future».

The «burden of the past» is felt among members of those groups that received higher wages in the past (in the capitalist system). These people keep asking: why does a laborer get so much, and why does a physician get so little? Conversely, members of the previously handicapped groups tend to «anticipate the future» i.e. the principle «to each according to his needs», postulated for communism, by asking: why does the charwoman get so little and the manager so much?

Moreover, there seems to be a «natural» tendency toward conflict awareness among members of extreme income groups. Consequently, even in the socialist system some people (especially those earning little) tend to speak of «the rich» and «the poor», of «the privileged» and the «plain folks». This is understandable if we consider the relativism of human judgment with respect to one's own economic position.

3.3 *Interest Contradictions and the State.*

In the socialist society the uneven distribution of goods in high demand is mediated by the mechanism of government decisions. The general system of wages is determined by the government, as is the income of the individual citizen. Contradictions of interest may occur here on two planes: one is the plane of contradictions between groups with different incomes the other the plane existing between these groups and the «general regulator» represented by the government (in the broad sense of the word).

The government's role as direct regulator accounts for a peculiar psychological situation. People with discrepant incomes tend to blame the government (as the regulator of their income) rather than

the better-off groups. This tendency is much less common and much less explicit in the capitalist system. There, interest contradictions are chiefly conceived as contradictions between different social groups. This difference between the two systems is of tremendous importance for any discussion of conflicts of interests.

The concepts of «overpayment» and «underpayment» as well as the distinction between objective interest contradictions and subjectively felt conflicts, enable us to delve deeper into the theoretical complexities of the situation created by the direct regulatory function of the State.

Let us consider a number of possibilities.

In determining the system of wages, the government may be acting in one of the following ways: (1) respecting fully the principle «to each according to his work», (2) applying this principle with certain departures in favor of the highly skilled, (3) applying this principle with departures in favor of unskilled strata. Considering the marked discrepancies in the systems of wages of the various socialist countries, those three alternatives are likely to exist in reality.

In the first example, the government acts as «just» and «impartial» regulator of wages. The better skilled workers are assigned higher wages, in line with the socialist principle of remuneration. But the contradiction of interest arising in this case between different social and occupational groups (or strata) is a direct result of government policies. This alone may give rise to an awareness of conflict on the part of the lower-paid people, and their feelings will be directed against the state (government). There is an objective contradiction between the interests of different social and occupational groups, but at the same time there is also the awareness of conflict on the part of the lower paid people directed against the government. We are facing here a «transfer» of conflict awareness against the «general regulator».

Evidently, this type of inter-group contradiction of interests is unavoidable in socialism.

The situations described under (2) and (3) are of a different nature. Here the government «overpays» some and «underpays» other social and occupational groups (or entire strata). This may well enhance the satisfaction of some but will also aggravate the awareness of conflict among some others. The conflict-generating tendencies are born from the «partiality» of the government; the resultant contradictions transgress the framework of the socialist system of remuneration. The awareness of conflict among the people is heightened

in view of such bias, the more so when the «underpayment» concerns the unskilled, and hence less well-off people. The reverse occurs perhaps more frequently in practice. In Poland, for example, if any group is overpaid it is the less skilled group. For society as a whole this appears to result in a reduction of the awareness of the conflict.

Finally, one more possibility is given in the situation in which the group responsible for fixing the wage system (meaning the political leaders of the country at large) is «overpaid». Whereas in the previous examples the leaders as a group did not stand in a non-socialist contradiction of interests to the (or some) other groups, the latter example provides for precisely such a contradiction. This is a fertile ground for a sharp rise in awareness of conflict.

The situations listed above are purely theoretical. They derive from a specific, broadly conceived interpretation of interest contradictions and from the conception of «overpayment» and «underpayment». In order to employ those conceptions in empirical research we must first determine objective measures of the social value of different types of labor. These measures will have to account for not only the «purely economic» value of labor but also for some other factors of a «socio-economic» nature. Though it might not be easy to determine such measures, one cannot think of any other way of effectively studying the objective interest contradictions existing in socialism.

3.4. *Contradictions of Interests Concerning Non-Economic Goods.*

Besides an uneven distribution of income, we also find in socialist society an uneven distribution of various other values. The distribution of income involves the distribution of some other goods, owing to the partial convertibility of those values. In a situation where a wide range of non-economic values (e.g. cultural) can be obtained for money in the market, the acquisition of other goods is determined by the distribution of income. We may therefore feel justified to focus our attention on the distribution of income. Being fully characteristic of capitalist society, the above conditions apply to a marked degree to socialist society also. But a peculiar feature of the latter is the weakened interrelation between size of income and participation in other values. In effect, the non-economic goods distributed through separate channels are subject to extremely important contradictions of interests. Among those values are: education, some

goods in the sphere of the so-called cultural consumption (e.g. holidays at reduced rates), health benefits, and many others.

Take for example education. Education is free in socialist society; it is provided through a network of state-owned schools. But it is unevenly distributed at present, and there are mechanisms that predetermine its future distribution (to the next generation). These two facts are the source of interest contradictions involving education as a social value.

Take the relatively simple case of the current inequalities in level of education. Some people are more educated, others are less educated, and education is a value high in demand among the population. That demand is caused by two factors: the inherent value of education, and the merits of education as an instrument for obtaining other values. Education is one of the determinant of individual's participation in such values as income, prestige, stability of employment, and political influence.

Some more attention should be paid to the instrumental role of education in socialist society. In any industrial society, the individual level of education is a major component of professional qualifications, and the latter form the foundation of the individual's general status. In capitalist society, however, this interdependence does scarcely apply to members of the capitalist class. Their status and opportunities are chiefly determined by the amount of capital at their disposal, rather than by their education. Education represents here only an additional bonus enabling the capitalist to take up some occupation.

In socialist society, the situation of any individual is largely determined by his occupational status, and the latter depends very much on his education (and the skills ensuing from that education). Thus education is the decisive factor in an individual's professional career. And since there is a direct link between occupation and both income and social prestige, education amounts to an important instrument for obtaining various other values.

We have just referred to the intra-generational instrumental role of education, but there is also an intergenerational one. Education is the chief instrument serving to define the future occupational position of a young man on his entering adult social life.

It should be borne in mind that in those societies where school education is not free, the level of education acquired by a young person depends largely on the income of his parents his future income is in turn determined by his education. As a result of that mechanism,

the status is subject to a «hereditary» tendency. (In the above general model, no consideration is given to modifications resulting from the system of scholarships and grants for gifted children from poor homes).

In socialist society, where education at all levels is free, the interrelation between the parents' income and the educational opportunities of their children is greatly reduced, although the education acquired by an individual is a major determinant of his future income and social status. This reflects the reduced inter-generational instrumental role of income and the increased inter-generational instrumental role of education in that type of society.

But there is as yet no abundance of secondary and higher schools in the socialist countries. Consequently there is ground for interest contradictions between social strata as regards the criteria of admission to educational institutions at secondary and higher level. This contradiction applies to the operation of channels through which education, an instrumental and «autonomous» value with regard to income, is distributed.

The peculiar social conditions underlying that contradiction are connected with the discrepancies in the general intellectual development of children from workers and peasant homes on one hand and the children of the intelligentsia. This is highlighted during entrance examinations at universities and colleges, but also during similar examinations at secondary schools.

The differentiated cultural conditions in individual homes account for differentials in the initial achievements of children from different social strata. In view of this, the workers and farmers favor the preferential system of school admission, under which their children are granted additional counts for social background. This system works toward reducing the chances of admission of the children of the intelligentsia. Hence the educated people are in favor of a system of selection based on the outcomes of purely competitive examinations. The latter system tends to reduce the chances of admission of children from workers' and farmers' homes, of course.

In conditions of free education, the lack of equilibrium between the supply of educational facilities and the demand for education is the source of contradictions of interests concerning the principles of selection.

3.5. *The Cumulative and Noncumulative Distribution of Values.*

The distribution of values in capitalist society is largely cumulative: high income, great political influence, high education, and high prestige are vested in one and the same people, whereas other people suffer from inadequancies in those respects. Thus there is a high congruence of status characteristics in capitalist society, especially when we consider the two «basic classes» in the Marxist sense.

In socialist society we observe a decomposition of characteristics of social status as resulting from the noncumulative distribution of generally desired values. Income, education, political influence and prestige are distributed more independently one from another. The effect of this phenomenon on the sphere of interests is enormous.

Two general hypotheses may be advanced in this connection.

(1) The cumulative distribution of values and as its result, the congruence of status characteristics both favor the development of fairly well-defined social strata or classes.

(2) The same phenomena result in an aggravation of objective interest contradictions between the groups (strata) by creating parallel and correlated spheres of social inequalities.

Those two hypotheses lead us to another general proposition: Both the objective contradictions of interests and the subjective awareness of conflicts of interests tend to decrease in socialist society when compared with capitalist society.

4. *Two Tendencies*

Our stress on the decomposition of status characteristics in socialist society was due to the relative novelty of this phenomenon, which is often neglected or overlooked by sociologists. It would be wrong, however, to forget existing congruences of characteristics. The latter may be either a heritage of the past, or may result from the socialist mechanisms of good distribution. In fact, there is good reason to search for the sources of congruences in status characteristics.

The principle «to each according to his work» operates toward synchronizing at least some of the status characteristics.

It may be assumed that certain severe decompositions observed in Poland were caused, among other things, by the disregard for this principle practised under pressure of egalitarian ideology as well

as by certain economic necessities (manpower shortages in certain occupations).

The principle «to each according to his work» contributes to synchronization of status characteristics in that it regulates income according to the «quality» of work and hence to education and the ensuing professional skills. Formal (i.e. school) education is of decisive influence on professional qualifications in highly developed industrial societies. Adherence to the principle «to each according to his work» tends to increase the congruence between education and income. There is a similar tendency toward congruence between position (in power or management structures) and income. The same synchronizing tendency is reinforced by the dependence of prestige on education.

At the same time an opposite tendency is at work. Certain decomposition tendencies are aroused by those deliberate departures from the principle «to each according to his work» that are aimed at raising the income of the least skilled people. The result is a discrepancy between skills (e.g. low) and income (e.g. medium).

Similar effects are produced by departures from the principle such as wage limitations for highly skilled people.

Generally speaking, the scale of skills seems to be greater than the scale of income. This «levelling out» of income to a middle position results in certain decompositions of status characteristics. But these are decompositions in the form of «levelling out» rather than in the form of «leaping ahead». There has been a rise in one status characteristic in a certain social and occupational group or a whole stratum, whereas all other characteristics have remained unchanged. Such decompositions are probably the most common.

It is easier to observe such a «partial decomposition» of status characteristics against the background of a wide range of status characteristics. Take prestige, for example.

There are groups of highly skilled people in Poland who enjoy great prestige but get only medium pay (e.g. physicians, or junior research workers). There are occupations that require medium qualifications, ensure low income, and enjoy medium prestige e.g. nurses. In the first case the skill and prestige are uniformly high, while income is lowered toward the «middle» of the scale. In the latter case, qualifications and prestige are the same, and against income «lags behind». Both cases exemplify a partial decomposition of status characteristics, and both demonstrate a higher congruence of prestige and qualifications than prestige and income. There is also some

indication in them for an autonomization of prestige in relation to other status characteristics.¹⁵

Thus in socialist society we find two opposite tendencies in the realm of the distribution of values representing important status characteristics (education, income, and social prestige). Either tendency is connected with different socialist principles. One tendency (the congruence of status characteristics) is connected with the principle «to each according to his work». The other tendency is associated with egalitarian ideals and leads to a decomposition (at least partial) of status characteristics.

¹⁵ The nature of social prestige appears to be changing gradually in socialist society over what it was in a capitalist society. Hence it is subject to greater autonomization in relation to certain objective status characteristics (income, power etc.). The present paper leaves no room for any wider discussion of that problem.

SOCIOLOGY OF WORK AND OF ORGANIZATION
SOCIOLOGIE DU TRAVAIL ET DE L'ORGANISATION

A DIMENSIONAL ANALYSIS OF ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE: SOME RESULTS

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The literature of organization theory resounds with calls for precise comparative work. From the United States Udy (1965), writing the chapter on «The Comparative Analysis of Organizations» in March's recent Handbook of Organizations, «feels that comparative analysis is an appropriate initial, boundary-setting approach to general organization theory» (p. 704). Without it, case-studies remain haphazard and generalizations remain dubious. From Europe, Mayntz (1964) writing Current Sociology's trend report on «The Study of Organizations» is of the same mind. But she fears that to regard all organizations as comparable «systems» is so abstract that «propositions which hold for such diverse phenomena as an army, a trade union, and a university must necessarily be either trivial or so abstract as to tell hardly anything of interest about concrete reality» (p. 113). This may well turn out to be right; but equally it may turn out to be wrong. There is not yet more evidence on the side of pessimism than there is on the side of optimism. We of the Industrial Administration Research Unit have been trying to add to that evidence, and to devise research techniques that will help to gather it.

Sample

We have data on 52 organizations in the Birmingham area. 46 of these constitute a random sample, stratified by size and trade, drawn from the population of 293 organizations in this area which employ over 250 people. These are work organizations, i.e. they pay their members. The sample includes firms making motor car bumpers, and making bars of milk chocolate, municipal departments repairing roads and teaching arithmetic, large retail stores, small insurance companies, and so on. In ownership the sample organizations range

¹ C. R. Hinings is now at the University of Birmingham.

through independent family-dominated firms, companies owned by many private shareholders, a co-operative, branch factories of large groups, and municipal and state organizations. But our definition of a work organization excludes voluntary organizations.

Analysis of Structure

Our purpose is to compare the structures of organizations, and to relate differences in structures to differences in the contexts in which these structures function, e.g., differences in organizational size, market, output, technology, etc. (Table I). Patterns of contextual and structural relationships will then be related to organizational performance, and to group and individual behaviour (Pugh, D. S. et al, 1963).

We have analysed the structures of our sample of organizations in terms of five major conceptual dimensions:

Specialization, the degree to which the activities of organizations are divided into specialized roles:

Standardization, the degree to which activities are governed by routine procedures:

Formalization, the degree to which procedures, rules, duties, instructions, etc., are put in writing:

Centralization, the degree to which the authority to take decisions is centralized:

Configuration, the shape of the structure as signified by a number of dimensions such as its «height» (the number of jobs between «chief executive» and operating level), and the size of its «supportive component» to use Haas et al's (1963) term, or «non-workflow personnel» to use ours.

Methods

Data has been obtained by interviews in each organization, beginning with the «chief executive» (who may be a works manager, an area superintendent, a chairman, or whatever), and including all or most department heads. Interviews have been conducted with standard schedules listing what had to be found out, but since this was descriptive data about structures, and not personal to the respondent, no attempt was made to standardize procedure during the

interview itself. Wherever possible documentary evidence was sought to substantiate verbal accounts.

Analysing the data with the five concepts of structure, we have devised 66 scales measuring the various facets of these five dimensions. Some of these scales are proving redundant or uninteresting. Some are straightforward scales such as the percentage of clerks employed, or the number of employees in sales and service departments. But many scales present the problems of non-equal interval measurement familiar in psychology. As an interdisciplinary research group, we have applied scaling technique from psychology, such as item analysis using a general biserial coefficient, and cumulative scaling, to sociological data.

An Example: Specialization

As an example, the scaling of Specialization began with the development of a list of activities which every work organization *has to* perform (Table II). For instance, «activities to obtain and control materials and equipment» (which means Purchasing and Stores) must occur whether the material and equipment are the bar steel and lathes of an engineering factory or the paper and typewriters of an insurance company. (Our rather jargon-ridden definition for such activities are necessitated by the scope of our sample which compels us to use terms wider than those which are customary in, say, manufacturing alone). In the course of refining the Specialization scale a list of sixteen such activities was eventually arrived at. Thus in effect we ask each organization «Are there specialists in any of the following sixteen activities?» Summing the positive replies we get a Specialization score for each organization. The fact that we are scoring on a uni-dimensional scale is demonstrated by a cumulative scaling procedure which gives the sixteen items a mean coefficient of 0.76 (Brogden 1949). This is satisfactory for a first attempt.

In the use of such scaling methods in this field it is early days yet for placing confidence in the results. Just as non-systematic observation can be accused of producing idiosyncratic descriptions, so many of these scales can be accused of using samples from unknown populations of items. For instance, our Formalization scales use lists of documents, but we do not know the entire number of documents which a work organization may potentially use, and therefore we do not know the limits of the population our scales are sampling. On

TABLE I

<i>Contextual variables</i>	<i>Activity variables</i>	<i>Structural variables</i>	<i>Performance variables</i>
Ownership and Control (concentration in management participation in management status of organization)	Identification (charter, image personnel)	Specialization (of function of role)	Efficiency (profitability productivity market-standing)
Size (assets number of employees percentage of market)	Perpetuation (thoughtways, finance, services, etc.)	Standardization (of procedures of roles)	Adaptability
Charter (purpose ideology)	Work-flow (production, distribution)	Formalization (of written procedures)	Morale
Technology (automaticity complexity power per employee)	Control (direction, motivation evaluation communication)	Centralization (of authority)	
Location (sites localization)	Homeostasis (fusion, leadership problem-solving legitimization)	Configuration (of authority structures)	
Resources (human financial material)		Flexibility (of structure)	
Interdependence (market suppliers trade unions memberships)			

A CONCEPTUAL SCHEME FOR THE EMPIRICAL STUDY OF
WORK ORGANIZATION

(cf. PUGH, D. S., HICKSON, D. J., HININGS, C. R., MACDONALD, K. M., TURNER, C. and LUPTRON, T., A Conceptual Scheme for Organizational Analysis, *Administrative Science Quarterly*, Vol. 8, No. 3, December 1963, pp. 289-315.)

the other hand, we can define precisely the items that are used in the scales, and these are precisely comparable across 52 organizations. Moreover, using the scales is producing interesting results. As an instance, scores on the scales can constitute a test of the classic Weberian bureaucratic type.

Testing the Bureaucratic Type

When Weber (1948) developed his concept of bureaucracy as an «ideal type», he recognized that «pure types, after all, are to be considered merely as border cases which are especially valuable and indispensable for analysis. Historical realities, which almost always appear in mixed forms, have moved and still move between such pure types» (p. 244). With measurement we may now begin to test empirically Weber's formulation in a way that he himself could not have done.

By definition, an «ideal type» bureaucracy would have an extreme high score pattern on our scales. That is, it would appear as highly Specialized with many narrowly defined specialist «offices», as highly Standardized in its procedures, and as highly Formalized with documents prescribing and recording all activities and available in the files as precedents. If everything has to be referred upwards for decision, then it would also score highly Centralized. In Configuration it would have a high proportion of «supportive» or administrative or «non-workflow» personnel. But of 52 organizations, none show such a profile. Perhaps extreme total bureaucracy exists only among the bureaux of central governments — which are not represented in our provincial sample.

This result serves to keep the «ideal type» notion in perspective it does not of itself challenge the usefulness of the concept of bureaucracy, if treated as a variable and not as a static type. For the tendency is indeed for an organization which is high on one set of scales to be high on most others. Representing each structural dimension by only one main scale, for the sake of simplicity, intercorrelations are found between Role Specialization, Standardization, Formalization, and Configuration (percentage of «non-workflow» personnel) ranging from 0.46 to 0.83. Even the lowest of these correlations, 0.46, is significant beyond the 1% level; and the mean of these 6 positive intercorrelations within structure is 0.64. As an example, Overall Role Specialization correlates 0.68 with Overall For-

malization, i.e. more specialists means more documents. The personnel man, the methods man, the accountant all create paperwork for everyone.

The distinctively different relationship is with Centralization of decisions. Centralization correlates *negatively* with all other structural scales except one. The more Specialized, Standardized, and Formalized the organization, the *less* it is Centralized, or to put it the other way round, the more it is decentralized. Therefore on these scales as developed so far there can be no unitary bureaucracy, for an organization which develops specialist offices and the routines which go with them does not also «pass the buck» upward for decision — it is decentralized. Perhaps the explanation is that when the responsibilities of Specialized roles are narrowly defined, and activities are regulated by Standardized procedures and are Formalized in records, then authority can safely be decentralized because the organizational machine will smoothly run, as it has been set to run, and decisions will be made in the way intended without checking at the top.

Two Types of Bureaucracy ?

On further scrutiny, however, our data does more than merely fail to give an example of a unitary bureaucracy; it forces a re-examination of the concept of bureaucracy itself in the classic form.

As we have already said, our aim is to relate differences in structures to differences in the contexts in which these structures function. We cannot here describe our attempts to measure aspects of such contextual variables as the technology of organizations and their ownership, but we have 55 scales ranging from very crude two-point or three-point scales to more sensitive measures. We have used multiple regression correlation to expose the relationships between these scales of contextual variables and the scales of structural variables. We find, for example, that with information on size, on degree of integration of technology, on status as branch installation or as major unit, and on certain major changes, we can predict Specialization to the degree of 0.76. In other words, knowing how big an organization is, what its equipment and flow of work is like, and how major a unit it is in any owning combine, then we can estimate how Specialized its role structure is.

This multiple regression analysis, across 46 organizations, suggests

two sub-types of bureaucracy, which we might call «Workflow Bureaucracy» and «Personnel Bureaucracy».

«Workflow Bureaucracy» is the routinization of production activities, or as we prefer it, workflow activities (for this term is not restricted to manufacturing industry). Such bureaucracies show the general pattern of structure described previously — high Specialization of roles, high Standardization of procedures, high Formalization of paperwork, a high percentage of «non-workflow» personnel; and relative decentralization. This is a pattern which includes very large Specialized sections for controlling workflow activities (in manufacturing terms, production planning and scheduling), for controlling the quality of outputs (inspection, testing, etc.), for devising work methods (work study, etc.), and for designing and developing outputs (research and development departments, etc.). Going with these large Specialized sections is the Standardization and Formalization of the workflow activities affected by them.

«Workflow Bureaucracy» is predicted by high scores on scales of producer-goods manufacturing, technological integration, impersonal ownership, and size. In short, it is typical of larger manufacturing organizations with comparatively automated or process-type technologies which have experienced the «managerial revolution» and are owned by anonymous investing institutions. Among the examples are factories in the vehicle accessory and vehicle assembly industry, factories making machine tools, and mass producing foodstuffs and confectionery.

«Personnel Bureaucracy» differs sharply. In a «Personnel Bureaucracy» workflow activities are *not* bureaucratized (relatively speaking). Ways of acquiring and controlling personnel *are* bureaucratized. There is a distinctively high score on our Scale No. 52.02. That means set formal procedures governing recruitment, selection, and discipline, and fixed staff establishment figures; very much a civil service pattern. Furthermore, scores on this Scale correlate *positively* and significantly with Centralization. Here, unlike a «Workflow Bureaucracy» officials *do* have to refer to the top. This kind of structure is predicted by a pattern of scores on contextual scales that picks out the municipal department — it may be running schools or bus services, — the state-owned agency, and the cooperative retail chain.

The question that jumps to mind is «What is a manufacturing organization like if it is also publicly owned?» The hypothesis being that it should show *both* forms of bureaucracy. Our sample does include

such an organization, a medium-sized state-owned engineering factory. Examining its structural scores, we do indeed discover that it is a «Workflow Bureaucracy» and a «Personnel Bureaucracy».

The popular stereotype of the cartoonists proves to be surprisingly accurate in characterising «Personnel Bureaucracy». We are not commenting here on the bureaucratic dysfunctions that they lampoon, but it does appear that publicly owned service organizations have a characteristic brand of bureaucracy. What the cartoonists have not spotted is that so has big business.

Nor did Weber (1948) suspect this. Giving examples of «rather distinctly developed and quantitatively large bureaucracies» he cites Egypt, China, and the Roman Catholic Church; and both «public corporations since the time of princely absolutism» and «the large modern capitalist enterprise» (p. 204). His scholarly penetration saw the coming bureaucratization of industry. What has not been so apparent is that *bureaucracy takes different forms in different settings*. Of course, this generalization arises from findings that are as yet preliminary. But nevertheless it comes from empirical data and measurement. We look hopefully to the continued simultaneous refinement of measures and of concepts.

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STRIKES AND MUTINIES; A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN RULERS AND RULED.*

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In the sociology of organizations, the study of conflict is as underdeveloped as in any other branch of sociology.¹ This state of affairs would not be worth mentioning were it not for the fact that industrial sociology, from which organizational sociology received its main impetus, has by no means neglected the analysis of conflict. Given the wealth of data and theories on work-stoppages and lock-outs in industry, it seems rather obvious to undertake the study of such conflicts between rulers and ruled on a comparative basis,

* Mr. Ph. M. Bosscher, historian attached to the Bureau for the Maritime History of the Royal Netherlands Navy, aided me in locating literature on mutinies. Mr. H. Philipsen of the Netherlands Institute of Preventive Medicine advised me on methodological and theoretical points regarding this research project. Mrs. I. Seeger-Wolf, Mrs. E.J. Wentholt-Haig, Miss M. E. Broks, Mr. F. J. L. I. Breuer and Mr. J. H. F. M. Crabbendam completed the editing, secretariat, coding and statistical work. I am grateful to all of them for their valuable assistance in preparing this paper.

¹ See J.G. MARCH and H.A. SIMON, *Organizations*, New York/London, Wiley, 1958. A. ETZIONI, *A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations. On power, involvement, and their correlates*, New York, Free Press, 1961. P. M. BLAU and W. R. SCOTT, *Formal Organizations*, San Francisco, Chandler, 1962. Th. CAPLOW, *Principles of Organization*, New York/Chicago/Burlingame, Harcourt, Brace and World, 1964.. A. ETZIONI, *Modern Organizations*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice Hall, 1964. J.G. MARCH ed., *Handbook of Organizations*, Chicago, Rand McNally, 1965 (particularly the contributions by Zaleznik, Etzioni and Udy). W. R. SCOTT, 'Theory of Organizations', in: R.E.L. FARIS ed., *Handbook of Modern Sociology*, Chicago, Rand McNally, 1964. Only March/Simon and Caplow devote a special chapter to organizational conflict, although Blau and Scott also (in various chapters) pay a good deal of attention to this subject. On the whole, however, 'horizontal' conflicts are emphasized in all these treatments. As regards 'vertical' conflicts (between rulers and ruled), I could locate in the literature mentioned above only brief references to revolution (one), rebellion (three cases), strikes (six cases), and mutiny (one), but no analyses of a comparative nature.

now the outlook of industrial sociology has broadened by extension into the sociology of organization.

The hypothesis is warranted that conflicts between rulers and ruled in military, penitential, educational, and medical organizations may not be genotypically different from strike-conflicts. For practical reasons the discussion will be limited to conflicts in industrial and military organizations in which participants at the lowest hierarchical echelon (seamen, soldiers or workers) oppose their superiors or higher authorities. It is the aim of this paper to show that strikes and mutinies can be analyzed in terms of the same theoretical framework. To substantiate this claim, *the typical forms* taken by such conflicts, particularly their *goal-structures* and *the determinants* and *the outcome* of such struggles will be examined.

To furnish some kind of empirical test of the hypotheses involved, several sources (sociological, historical, and journalistic) were examined to locate case-studies of strikes and mutinies that supplied at least a minimum of information with respect to the crucial variables of the theory. Of course, by no stretch of the imagination can the series of strikes and mutinies that are described in some detail in the literature, and which happened to come to the attention of the author, be said to constitute a random sample of all kinds of strikes and mutinies throughout history.

However, since the case-studies were selected on grounds other than their degree of correspondence with the author's hypotheses, this verification effort has some value. On the basis of this evidence, at least the usefulness of this theoretical approach for further and better research can be evaluated.

Strikes and mutinies as social movements.

Both strikes and mutinies can be viewed as forms of collective behavior, more specifically as *social movements*. Killian reports in his survey of definitions of social movements that some agreement exists with respect to two features of social movements: action to promote or resist change, and behavior that is collective². It goes without saying that strikes and mutinies generally satisfy both criteria. Only the hypothetical case of a purely «expressive» strike or mutiny, in which the participants do not intend their collective

² L. M. KILLIAN, 'Social Movements', in: FARIS, *op. cit.*, Ch. 12, p. 430.

action to bring about change or to maintain the *status quo* but simply wish to manifest their protest, could no be called a social movement. Since no such case was encountered in the literature, and since it does not seem very plausible that laborers, sailors, and soldiers would often engage in such risky actions as strikes and mutinies just to release their pent-up feelings, we can legitimately discard this type of collective action.

To establish the fact that strikes and mutinies belong to a more inclusive category of phenomena, i.e. social movements, is not very enlightening unless we can discover additional similarities between the two types of conflict. That can indeed be done. Strikes and mutinies can be seen as a special subclass of social movements because they have in common several components that are relevant from the point of view of a sociological theory of organizations: (a) the *context* of the conflict, (b) the *participants*, (c) the *strategy* used, and (d) the *goals* at which the strategies of collective action are aimed.

Strikes and mutinies are collective actions (a) *in formal organizations*, (b) *by lower-level members of organizations, who try to wrest from higher level decision-makers* (c) *by means of suspending their usual tasks and/or by means of violence* (d) *certain advantages* (or to prevent certain threatened disadvantages).

No further comment is needed as regards points (a) and (b). As to (c), it must be said that work-stoppage and violence are not the only possible sanctions applied by lower members to pursue their objectives. In addition to thwarting the output of the organization and using physical force laborers, sailors, or soldiers can use other means (the *threat* of violence, persuasion, depriving their superiors of certain rewards, etc.) to realize their goals.

Since means and ends are related to one another in strikes and mutinies, this point will be taken up shortly in the discussion of the *goals* of strikes and mutinies, a topic whose importance justifies devoting a separate section to it.

Goals of strikes and mutinies

Most people associate with the word «strike» a bread-and-butter fight, whereas «mutinies» are perceived in the romantic light of gallant but savagely oppressed sailors who finally deliver themselves from their cruel captain by force and escape to a desert island. The

story of the *Bounty* stands as a model for this kind of mutiny. This common-sense distinction refers to two types of social movements in formal organizations:

- the *promotion-of-interests* movement: a collective action to improve or maintain the position of the group involved with respect to its income or other work conditions.
- the *secession* movement: a collective action to gain autonomy by the group involved.

A third type may be added:

- the *seizure-of-power* movement: a collective action by a group of subordinates to replace a (group of) superior(s).

While for the layman it would seem rather obvious that these three types correspond respectively to *strikes*, *mutinies*, and *rebellions*, to the sociologist this is less apparent.

First, in some strikes laborers attempt not merely to promote their interests but also to change power relationships. The ideological concept of the «general strike» as a final and decisive weapon in the class struggle refers more to seizure of power than to promotion of interests as goal.³ In European history and even today in Latin American countries strikes aiming at more or less permanent changes in the political structure of society do occur. Moreover, the anarcho-syndicalist strike is likewise oriented to seizure-of-power aims, although of a more limited nature. In this kind of movement a reversal of power positions in the plant or enterprise is striven for.

Second, contrary to popular belief, most mutinies are *not* of the «Bounty-mutiny»-type. Generally, the sailors or soldiers involved use collective insubordination (work stoppage) to defend or acquire certain privileges (e.g. rights to certain kinds of food and drink; shore-leave), to strengthen wage-demands, or to get rid of bullying superiors. This is not generally known, for the simple reason that Navy or Army authorities quite often hush up such «strikes», which legally are mutinies.

In days of old, when military organization was still rather loose, in some armies this sort of «strike» was a common occurrence and even institutionalized. The Dutch nation even owes its inde-

³ See on this point, e.g. A. M. Ross, 'The Natural History of the Strike', and P. TAFT, 'Ideologies and Industrial Conflict' (Chapters 2 and 19) in: A. KORNHAUSER, R. DUBIN and A. M. ROSS, *Industrial Conflict*, New York/Toronto/London, McGraw-Hill, 1954. 'Goal' in this paper is used in the way in which Etzioni, 1964, p. 7, defines *real* goals.

pendence to some extent to this sort of «labor-management conflict». ⁴ In the Eighty Years' War with Spain, namely, the Spanish commanders of the expeditionary force sent out to crush the rebellion in the Low Countries were usually extremely short of money. Often whole regiments of mercenaries struck when they had for months received no pay whatsoever. Such «furies» (as these strikes were sometimes called) repeatedly frustrated the efforts of Spain to win decisive victories in The Netherlands.

To illustrate this state of affairs, the strikes and mutinies in our sample were tabulated according to the main goal involved, as seen from the perspective of the strikers or mutineers (Table 1). All strikes, except for the Loray strike, ⁵ and even the majority of the mutinies appeared to be primarily of the «promotion-of-interest» type. It is quite likely that this finding may be generally applicable to all strikes and mutinies. Promotion-of-interests movements are obviously characteristic of organizations with *utilitarian compliance* as a primary or secondary pattern. ⁶ Secession movements probably occur often in *coercive* organizations. Such collective escape efforts are found not only in military establishments, but also in industrial organizations with a coercive compliance structure. On the plantations in Dutch Guyana, for instance, it was a fairly regular occurrence for groups of slaves (sometimes after killing the plantation-owner, sometimes without resort to violence) to take to the woods, where they formed the tribes of the so-called «Bush-Negroes». ⁷ The

⁴ See e.g. R. FRUIN, *Tien Jaren uit de Tachtigjarige Oorlog. 1588-1598*, Utrecht/Antwerpen, Het Spectrum, 10th ed. (first published 1857), pp. 68, 87, 114, 122, 127-128, 130, 141. J. PRESSER, *De Tachtigjarige Oorlog*, Amsterdam/Brussel, Elsevier, 1963, 4th. ed., pp. 83, 88-89, 110.

⁵ Since all the strikes and mutinies constituting our sample, together with the sources from which the data were derived, are listed in an appendix, no separate footnotes will be given for each reference to certain events relating to those strikes and mutinies.

⁶ See ERZONI, *op. cit.* (1961), Chapters I, II and III for the distinction between coercive, utilitarian and normative compliance structures. His treatment (pp. 56 ff.) of the dual compliance structure of combat units is especially relevant to the problems dealt with in this article.

⁷ See R. VAN LIER, *Samenleving in een Grensgebied. Een sociaal-historische studie van de maatschappij in Suriname*, The Hague, Nijhoff, 1949, pp. 52-59, 150-151. Such secession movements, of course, were not confined to Dutch Guyana, but also occurred in Brazil, the Caribbean, etc. Some of them even took the form of collective suicide. Many slave revolts, furthermore, were clearly of the seizure-of-power type. (e.g. the successful uprising on Haiti). See for data on these revolts M. J. HERSKOVITS, *The Myth of the Negro Past*, New York/London, Harper, 1941, Chapter IV.

only phenomenon in modern Western enterprises bearing some resemblance to secession is the lockout, though here, since secession is forced on the laborers by management, it becomes a sort of secession-movement-in-reverse.

If promotion-of-interests movements are typical of utilitarian organizations, and secession of coercive ones, one wonders whether seizure-of-power movements are bound to take place in *normative* organizations. Perhaps seizure of power is a goal for lower-level participants in organizations in which they are indeed morally involved, while at the same time fundamentally rejecting the prevailing normative order.

TABLE 1

Goals of 40 strikes and mutinies *

goals	strikes	mutinies
promotion of interests	19	13
seizure of power	1	2
secession	—	5
Total	(N = 20)	(N = 20)

* For composition of the sample, see Appendix. The strikes and mutinies are classified according to the main goal involved, as seen from the perspective of the strikers or mutineers.

We must conclude that the distinction between strikes and mutinies, however useful as a legal concept, is of limited value for sociological analysis. The necessity of classifying such movements as mutinies and strikes not according to legal criteria but according to sociologically more relevant variables becomes even more clear when it is realized that the goals involved (1) *are often multiple*, (2) *sometimes succeed each other in the course of time*, and (3) *differ according to the definition of the situation by various parties*.

(1) It goes without saying that *promotion of interests, secession, and seizure of power are not mutually exclusive goals*. Seizure of power can even be seen as an extreme form of promotion of interests, but apart from that it can be safely assumed that bread-and-butter issues play a role even in the most purely ideological struggle for power. Seizure of power, furthermore, is in mutinies often a necessary subgoal when secession is aimed at. Secession goals and

promotion-of-interest goals are usually quite difficult to disentangle. Looting of the ship's and the officers' properties are reported in several instances of secession mutinies. In most cases of this type, escape from the coercive organization seems the dominant, and enrichment the subsidiary, goal. Sometimes, however, the reverse may be true. In the extremely weird «robbery-mutiny» of the *Batavia* (a merchant vessel sailing for the Dutch East Indies in 1629) the aims of stealing (some treasures of the United East Indies Company, which happened to be on board), and — to add a romantic flavor — «redivision» of the available women seem to have been at least as salient as the secession-goal.

Another remarkable case in which multiple goals were involved was that of the Dutch cruiser H.M. *De Zeven Provinciën*. The crew seized the ship (in 1933) north of Sumatra and planned to sail for naval headquarters at Surabaya (on the island of Java) in order to protest against the government decision to lower naval wages. In this instance promotion of interests was a primary goal, while seizure of power was seen as instrumental toward that ultimate aim.

The mixture of goals discerned in many mutinies is characteristic for most strikes as well.

Even if one does not take the extreme position of authors such as Dahrendorf that strikes are basically always power struggles,⁸ it must be granted that every strike contains an element of «show-down». Therefore, in most promotion-of-interests strikes, seizure of (some more) power is necessarily also aimed at by the strikers. The degree to which leaders and led in strikes consciously strive for an increase of their power (relative to management's power over them) either as an end in itself or as a means to realize their demands for better (or not worse) working conditions, is, of course, quite variable.

(2) *Goal succession* may be exemplified by the famous case of the Potemkin mutiny in 1905. One gets the impression that for quite a number of crew members involved the movement was started to promote certain interests (protest against the maggot-infested meat). After that, revolutionary leaders swung the movement in the direction of capture of power on board, in the Imperial Russian Navy, and in the Russian nation at large. When the revolutionary attempts at Odessa were crushed and the mutineers lost hope of achieving

⁸ R. DAHRENDORF, *Industrie- und Betriebssoziologie*, Berlin, De Gruyter, 1956, p. 84.

victory, they finally decided to back out. Secession having become their aim, the crew of the *Potemkin* fled to Constanza (Roumania).

Goal succession also appears in the case of strikes. When strikers do not succeed in attaining certain ends such as wage-raises, they often switch to the goal of maintaining the status quo. In some cases one might even say that after they have had to give up promotion of interest as a primary aim, their salient goal becomes «avoidance of secession». When their employers try to exploit a position of strength by firing strikers, particularly «ringleaders», they fight for their re-employment.

These examples show that goal succession can be a result of opposing forces which render impossible the realization of their initial goals by the strikers or mutineers. The dynamics of goal succession, therefore, usually cannot be well understood without reference to the goals and efforts of the party against which the movement is directed. Another case illustrating this interaction of the goals of the contending parties is the Loray-strike. Here the goal of promotion of interests, according to Pope, soon shifted to seizure of power in the mill and the community, primarily because of the vigour with which management of the mill and community-leaders drove the strikers in that direction.

(3) There is *not necessarily general agreement among participants in a strike or mutiny with respect to the goals aspired to*. There may well be a discrepancy in this respect among leaders, between leaders and rank and file, or among rank and file. Even more conspicuous are the sometimes widely diverging views of the participants in the strike or mutiny and their adversaries. Interestingly enough, in several cases encountered, at successive hierarchical levels different definitions of the situation prevail. In 1930 on H.M.S. *Lucia*, a British submarine depot ship, part of the crew refused to work on a Sunday. Presumably, the sailors had nothing but promotion of interests in mind. The commanding officer, however, defined the situation according to formal procedures as «mutiny» (that is, as an attempt to upset power relationships) and had the participants arrested. Higher naval authorities later changed the definition of the situation, and some of these sailors were finally tried not for mutiny but on a charge of «wilfully disobeying the lawful command of their superior officer». According to the author of the report on this mutiny, this «mild» treatment was widely believed to have been inspired by the First Sea Lord, a socialist! (the cabinet of Ramsay MacDonald being in office at that time).

More usual, perhaps, is the pattern whereby the commanding officer shares the view of his mutinous sailors that nothing but a «strike» is taking place, while higher naval authorities and/or government start to deal with the situation in terms of «mutiny». Preceding the mutiny on H.M. *De Zeven Provinciën* there were several minor incidents in the Dutch fleet. In each case the crew partly or wholly refused to carry out some duty, whereupon the commanding officer (taking it as a simple protest against the pay reductions, which he himself also considered to be unjust) either persuaded the men to resume work or summarily dealt with the delinquents. Likewise, the officers of H.M. *De Zeven Provinciën* did not try to resist the «mutineers» by force, although in this case not only sins of omission (work stoppage), but also sins of commission (seizure of power) had occurred. Only later, when the Admiralty at Surabaya became involved, did Dutch public opinion become incensed by the event, and after the matter had been taken up by the cabinet, the official view became «mutiny», with the consequence that the ship was retaken by force (bombing).

Exactly the same discrepancy as to the nature of the movement can be found in the history of management-labor relations. In Czarist Russia strikes were illegal and seen as attempts to undermine the authority of the State.⁹ This is probably true for all totalitarian regimes. When Polish laborers struck at Poznan (1956) and East-German workers at Berlin (1953), the authorities likewise defined the situation in terms of «mutiny».¹⁰

However, the history of non-totalitarian countries, too, includes many examples of employers and governmental authorities with a tendency to define a fight by employees for better working-conditions as «revolutionary» attempts to upset the industrial and even the social order. In the words of Mayor Hanson (in 1919 during the Seattle General Strike): «We refuse to treat with these revolutionists. Unconditional surrender are our only terms!» or in the words of Steinemann, (a prominent entrepreneur of the city of Antwerp during the 1907 dockworkers' strike): «Nous voulons la soumission pure et simple!»

⁹ At least, this is what may be inferred from Bendix' description of prevailing managerial ideologics in Czarist Russia. See R. BENDIX, *Work and Authority in Industry. Ideologis of Management in the Course of Industrialization*, New York/London, Wiley/Chapman & Hall, 1956, pp. 162 ff.

¹⁰ BENDIX, *op. cit.*, pp. 391 ff.

The observation that in many strikes and mutinies the goals involved are multiple for the same participants, different for the specific parties involved, and shift in the course of time, does not imply that it is useless to look for the principal goals or rather for the constellation of goals. Because of the interdependence of goals and means, the sequences of events in such movements show quite different patterns according to the main ends striven for by the parties involved. Two types of «natural history» are discernible, each corresponding in a different way to the main goals involved¹¹. As Scheme A illustrates, when *promotion of interests* looms large in the perception of strikers or mutineers, the movement usually has a nucleus of leaders with a following. The leaders may try to recruit as many supporters as possible before taking action.

It is equally likely, though, that the leading group is more or less «recruited» or set in motion by its «following». In any case, some mass support from a dissatisfied group of workers, sailors, or seamen who have a grievance is required, because the collective action proceeds by refusal of the participants to engage in their usual tasks. Whether or not there is a clear-cut design for the movement depends largely on the degree to which initiation of the action comes from the nuclear group or the «following». The authorities usually respond by doing nothing (trying to wait the situation out in the hope that the strikers or mutineers will become convinced that their ends cannot be achieved this way), by putting economic sanctions (e.g. lockout) or social sanctions (e.g. appealing for moral support from community leaders) into operation or by offering to negotiate (either directly or indirectly). All this usually takes quite a while, during which interested «third forces» (governmental authorities, trade-unions, «public opinion» via the press, special committees etc.) intervene more or less successfully. The conflict ends when the strikers or mutineers resume their usual work or seek other employment.

In movements to *secede or seize power*, there is usually a small group of conspirators who start to seek «mass support» only after the initiation of their *coup*. They rely primarily on surprise action by violent means according to a carefully planned strategy. Within

¹¹ In the following section I may have unwittingly committed a plagiarism. I have never been able to obtain a copy of E. T. HILLER, *The Strike*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1928. I understand, however, that Hiller also presents a 'natural history of the strike', so he may have arrived at the same or similar conclusions as I do.

SCHEME A

Comparison of typical sequences of events for promotion-of-interests movements and secession or seizure-of-power movements:

<i>sequence of events</i>	<i>promotion-of-interests movement</i>	<i>secession or seizure-of-power movement</i>
— social structure	nuclear group, with some mass support	nuclear group, planning with utmost secrecy
— main weapon of strikers or mutineers	work stoppage	violence (imprisonment or killing of superiors)
— strategy of strikers or mutineers, planned in advance	varies from none at all to highly elaborated	always elaborate
— counteractions by authorities	negotiations; 'freezing out' of strikers or mutineers	counter-violence
— duration of conflict	variable, but usually more than half a day	a few hours
— intervention by 'third forces'	during the conflict	after the conflict
— end of the conflict	strikers or mutineers resume work or leave organization	strikers or mutineers remain in power, desert collectively or are imprisoned or killed

a relatively short time either the first goals of their action are realized or the uprising is crushed by the armed opposition of their superiors and the «loyalists». Whether or not their ultimate goals are achieved is always determined by the subsequent intervention of «third forces». Either they are imprisoned or killed by auxiliaries of the authorities they oppose, or they are aided to spread the revolution (in seizure-of-power movements) or to escape (in secession movements).

Apart from minor deviations, all except two of the 40 analysed strikes and mutinies tend toward one of these two types of «natural history», according to the principal goal of the movement. The deviant cases are not without interest. The first of the

two is the Loray strike, which at the summit of its development had strong seizure-of-power overtones, but which shows many features resembling the sequence of events typical of promotion-of-interests movements. This is not too surprising, since at the outset the movement was intended by most of the participants to promote their interests. The second exception is the mutiny on the *Zeven Provinciën*. Here we meet an extremely rare type of movement. There can be no doubt that the leaders and followers intended to promote their interests (by protesting against pay-reductions), but the shape of the movement is the one found typically when capture of power or secession is aimed at. This seeming contradiction, however, results from the simple fact that the «strike-leaders» on the cruiser planned a «temporary secession» (sailing the ship under their own command to Surabaya in order to hold a protest-demonstration for the Admiralty there) to lend force to their demands.

It goes without saying that this analysis of the goal-structure of strike and mutiny movements and of the implications of goal-orientation for the natural history of the movement is a rather superficial one. A more refined analysis would undoubtedly bring to light various «sub-types» of the two types of natural history roughly sketched here. Such endeavours are certainly worthwhile, since this way one can try to specify the dynamics of this kind of social movement. For the purpose of this paper, however, such a more thorough treatment is not necessary. What matters in terms of the central problem at stake in this context is the fact that:

- conflicts between rulers and ruled in industrial and military organizations show similar goals and similar mixtures of goals;
- regardless of the type of organization, similar goal-structures apparently have similar consequences for the sequence of events in such conflicts.

Determinants of strikes and mutinies

Kerr and Siegel have offered a theory to explain the «propensity to strike» and succeeded quite well in substantiating their hypotheses on the basis of the available data.¹² Briefly stated, this theory points to the location of the worker in society and to the character of his

¹² See C. KERR and A. SIEGEL, 'The Interindustry Propensity to Strike; an International Comparison' (Ch. 14 in KORNHAUSER c.s., *op. cit.*).

job and of his occupational «personality» as explanatory variables. The more workers form an «isolated mass» in the encompassing society, and the tougher the job (and consequently the tougher the kind of laborers attracted to this kind of job), the more they are predisposed to settle their disputes by the strike weapon. Since Kerr and Siegel attribute more value to the «isolated mass» than to the «toughness» hypothesis, we shall focus on the former to see whether social conditions promoting the chance of strikes also heighten chances of mutiny in military organizations.

Kerr and Siegel mention the following characteristics of «strike-prone» communities:

- isolation from the rest of society
- homogeneity (in terms of kind of work and experience)
- no occupational stratification (e.g. a skill hierarchy)
- no opportunity for horizontal mobility
- no opportunity for vertical mobility
- no attachment to the employer.

Military units in general measure up to these criteria. One would even expect the «strike-prone» conditions to be more readily apparent in military life than in industrial life. In one respect only might military establishments be less, or at least not more, «strike-prone» than industrial ones: attachment to one's organization. For professional soldiers and sailors in particular, their organization is often to some extent of the «normative» type.¹³ Loyalty to one's unit, one's commander or even to the army, navy, or air force may be quite strong, or in any case no less strong than in most «utilitarian» organizations.

Table 2 shows a comparison of the social conditions in which the strikers and mutineers found themselves in our 40 cases. Of course, the available data do not often permit a reliable basis for conclusions as to the degree of isolation, homogeneity, stratification, etc. prevailing in the community in which the participants in the movement lived. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that our index of «strike-prone conditions» registers a statistically significant difference between strikes and mutinies. Given the fact that most military units in our sample are either fleets or single ships, it is not surprising that the military *milieu* seems even more «strike-prone» than the industrial setting.¹⁴

¹³ See Footnote 6.

¹⁴ When one looks at the differences between strikes and mutinies for each of the items of which the index of 'strike-proneness' consists (see

TABLE 2

*Presence of 'strike-prone' social conditions in 40 strikes and mutinies**

	<i>% of cases with a high score on the index of 'strike-proneness'</i>
strikes	10 (N = 20) **
mutinies	80 (N = 20) **

* For composition of the sample, see Appendix. The index of 'strike-proneness' consists of 6 items (isolation from the rest of society; homogeneity in terms of kind of work and experience; absence of occupational stratification; absence of horizontal mobility-chances; absence of vertical mobility-chances; absence of attachment to employer). Each strike and mutiny was scored on each of these variables (2 = 'high', 1 = 'medium', 0 = 'low'; high means highly strike-prone in terms of the Kerr-Siegel theory), so that the scale for the total index could vary from 0 to 12. Scores of 9 or higher were regarded as 'high' on the index of strike-proneness.

** The difference between both samples is statistically quite significant (chi-square test), p being smaller than 0.002.

To a certain extent, therefore, these data give some support to the notion that the Kerr-Siegel theory not only explains differences in «strike», but also in «mutiny» proneness. There is one serious flaw, however, in the logic of this inference. Even apart from the question of the extent to which our sample is representative of what kinds of movements, there is the simple fact that all the characteristics of strike-prone communities found to be present in mutinous military units are in all likelihood also to be found in most military units in which *no* mutinies occur(red).

Moreover, although no statistics on mutinies are available, it may be safely assumed that promotion-of-interests movements during the past two or three centuries were more typical of industrial organizations than even of naval units at sea, in spite of the fact that on the whole naval life resembles the «strike-prone» characteristics more closely than does any kind of industrial life.

To take up the last point first, mutiny is a capital crime; this legal fact is known to every (or almost every) soldier or sailor, so

Table 4) it appears that for mutinies (as compared to strikes) there is more isolation, less occupational stratification, less opportunity for vertical mobility, and less attachment to the employer (contrary to my expectations). On these points the differences are statistically significant.

that most of them would expect to encounter severe *negative sanctions* should they undertake any collective action to promote interests, to seize power, or to secede. Still, it is not likely that, as a deterrent, these negative sanctions form the main reason for the relatively low frequency of mutinies in military units. On the whole, fear of punishment, even fear of capital punishment, may not be all that effective.¹⁵

Another reason why military men so seldom «strike» could very well be the simple fact that in general they consider the strong *taboo on mutiny as legitimate*. This taboo in all likelihood forms part of the military mores. Most soldiers and sailors consider work stoppages to be inadmissible because they regard such collective action to promote their interests as being incompatible with military discipline and, therefore, as constituting a serious threat to the functioning of their units. By and large, military men value the smooth functioning of their units because they usually identify to some extent with either the goals or the means (their ships or regiments, their commanding officers, their jobs, their skills, etc.) of their organization. Therefore, in the final analysis, such commitments reinforce adherence to the military mores in general and to military discipline and the «strike taboo» in particular.

From the above exposition it may be inferred that extreme hardship and injustice will provoke mutiny when one or both of the following conditions are met:

- when there is widespread belief that no serious negative sanctions will be applied in the event of collective action;
- when basic commitments to the goals and means of the organization become or are so weak that the taboo on mutiny is no longer considered legitimate.

The collective perception on the part of military men that no, or no very rigorous, disciplinary action will be taken, may of course arise from the *leniency with which authorities in comparable circumstances have previously dealt with mutineers*. Several of the mutinies comprising our sample (Nos. 5, 11, 13, 14, 15, 18, 19, 20).¹⁶

¹⁵ See e.g. the interesting discussion by Ahrenfeldt on the ineffectiveness of the death penalty as a measure to prevent desertion in the British army. R. H. AHRENFELDT, *Psychiatry in the British Army in the Second World War*, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1958, pp. 271 ff.

¹⁶ The numbers between parentheses in this section refer to the numbers of the mutinies as listed in the Appendix.

had indeed been preceded by more or less successful promotion-of-interests movements on other ships of war.

The operative factors here may be not only disbelief in the readiness of authorities to apply coercive sanctions but also the awareness that higher authorities could neither quickly nor easily crush the uprising by force. These may be the reasons why army units are so «under-represented» in our sample, and why air-force units are completely absent. A ship, particularly a ship under way, is not easily boarded or taken if its crew or part of its crew offers resistance, and it may take days, if not weeks, for other units to arrive on the scene. In the case of army or air-force units, military police or loyal troops can usually be rushed to the spot at short notice.

Basic commitment to the goals of the military organization is obviously weak when the men are not convinced of the righteousness of the cause they are fighting for. This may be due to the fact that the potential participants in a mutiny belong to ethnic minorities or to foreign nations (Nos. 2, 7 and 15)¹⁷ or disagree with the political aims of a military action (Nos. 10, 11, 12 and 13). The role of «subversive influences» is usually overstressed for strikes as well as mutinies. Nevertheless, diffusion of the belief in the legitimacy of the strike from the labor movement and leftist political movements to the armed forces seems to have played some role in several cases (Nos. 8, 10, 13 and 15).

A weakening of attachment to organizational means, to work or the work milieu may also release some of the institutional constraints that tend to reduce mutiny chances. Ties with work or

¹⁷ Evidence on the role of aliens in promoting a secession mutiny may also be found in: M. LEWIS, *A Social History of the Navy, 1793-1815*, London, Allen & Unwin, 1960, who reports (pp. 131-132) that the British ship *Albanaise* deserted to the French in 1800 after a mutiny in which Portuguese and Italians, as 'foremost abettors' after the British ringleader, played a prominent role. Likewise: F. WALLISCH, *Die Flagge Rot-Weiss-Rot*, Graz/Wien/Köln, Verlag Styria, 1956 (pp. 280 ff.), mentions a secession mutiny in 1917 by the *Torpedoboot 11* of the Austro-Hungarian Navy, precipitated by a Czech and a Slovene. Also for the case of the *Cattaro* mutiny, this author indicates that primarily non-German, non-Hungarian seamen participated in the mutiny. The 'secession tendency' of aliens has also been noticed in cases of desertion. See A. VAGTS, *A History of Militarism, Civilian and Military*, London, Hollis & Carter, 1959, pp. 254 ff. and E. A. SHILS and M. JANOWITZ, 'Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II', in: *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 1948, 12, pp. 280-315.

outfit can be severed during long periods of inactivity (No. 10), because of recruitment practices (Nos. 2 and 8) or because of mismanagement on the part of officers (Nos. 3, 6, 8, 10, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 and 20).¹⁸

Finally, loss of faith in authorities higher than the immediate superiors is reported in several instances (Nos. 4, 5, 10, 14 and 15). Such a loss of confidence in the highest organizational decision-makers, particularly when gross injustice is attributed to them, could perhaps mean a breakdown in the over-all «legitimacy-structure» of the organization. One gets the impression that the men, as it were, consider their contracts with the «employer» to be no longer binding because the «employer» is evidently not keeping his part of the bargain.

The hypothetical conclusion seems warranted that the conditions specified by Kerr and Siegel are equally «strike prone» in industrial and in military organizations, but that because of certain features of the military institution as a whole, such factors get less chance to bring about the «strike-effect» in military organizations. These «institutional constraints» are not, however, altogether absent in industrial life.

As has already been pointed out, the use of coercive measures was in former times, and is still today in totalitarian countries condoned by the institutional rules of industry and the State. Similarly, during recent decades belief in the illegitimacy of the strike may have become generally stronger in the Western world.¹⁹

¹⁸ Such mismanagement is not necessarily always due to 'personality-factors'; 'structural' factors may also be involved. For instance, there used to be quite a controversy in the British navy between 'gentlemen' and 'tarpaulins' (officers risen from the ranks). See N. ELIAS, 'Studies in the Genesis of the Naval Profession', *British Journal of Sociology*, I (1950), pp. 291-309. It is of some interest that Captain Bligh of the *Bounty* was a typical 'tarpaulin', while the master's mate (Fletcher Christian), the leader of the mutineers, was a gentleman. The status-inconsistency involved in the relationship between this commanding officer and his subordinate may very well have been a determinant of Bligh's tyrannical behavior which brought about the ensuing mutiny.

¹⁹ In a survey among Amsterdam and Rotterdam dockworkers the question was asked: 'When difficulties arise during wage negotiations, do workers consider striking? Do you think the workers should strike in such cases?' 15%-30% of various categories of workers replied: 'no, never' to this question, while about 40%-60% answered: 'only in the last extremity'. Although no data about dockworkers in days of old are available, it seems hardly likely that some decades ago about 2/3 of all workers

Nevertheless, the legitimacy and possibility of crushing mutiny by means of negative sanctions is, on the whole, much more characteristic of military than of industrial organizations. Furthermore, for various reasons it seems plausible that «collective-grievance-action» is condoned less by the military than by the industrial *mores*. Therefore, it may be stated that military men are apt to use the «strike-weapon» to settle disputes with their authorities only when the operation of the «micro-social» factors (pointed out by Kerr and Siegel) is adequately enhanced by certain «meso-social» (institutional) factors (disbelief in readiness of or chances for authorities to enforce anti-mutiny regulations; breakdown in commitment to goals and means of the organization, resulting in loss of faith in the legitimacy of the «mutiny-taboo»).

The outcome of strikes and mutinies.

Following Coser we may define conflict as: «a struggle over values and claims to scarce status, power and resources in which the aims of the opponents are to neutralize, injure or eliminate their rivals.»²⁰ Strikes and mutinies of course always show a certain amount of conflict. But what factors account for the outcome of such a struggle?²¹ In the first place, the *strength* of the movement

on the waterfront would have perceived the strike as completely or almost illegitimate. These data are taken from an unpublished report by the Nederlandse Stichting voor Statistiek (1960) for the Sociological Institute of the University of Leyden (p. 89, report no. 8). P.J.A. ter Hoeven (director of this research project) has in several publications drawn attention to the relatively low 'strike-readiness' of the laborers and to the difference in this respect between organized and unorganized workers (the latter category being more strike-prone). See P.J.A. TER HOEVEN, *Arbeidersprotest en Vakbeweging*, Leyden, Stenfert Kroese, 1963, and by the author: 'De Beleidsproblematiek van een niet-erkende Vakorganisatie', *Mens en Maatschappij*, 39, 1964, pp. 423-437.

²⁰ L. A. COSER, *The Functions of Social Conflict*, Glencoe, Ill., Free Press, 1956, p. 8.

²¹ Naturally, the classification of the outcome of a strike or mutiny as 'successful' (for the strikers or mutineers), 'partly successful', or 'failure' is rather dubious. See on this point, K.G.J.C. KNOWLES, 'Strike-Proneness and its Determinants', *The American Journal of Sociology*, 1954, LX, p. 215. Knowles reports that British statisticians have given up the effort to classify strikes in this way, since the concept of 'results' is rather hazy and since 'immediate results of a strike may be a very poor guide to its long-term results'. However true this may be, I still maintain that there is something to be said for attempting to analyse 'outcome' (seen as im-

is an important factor. Looking at the four characteristics of social movements mentioned by Killian,²² it would seem that a collective action stands a better chance of realizing its objectives, the higher the degree of participation in the movement by all those whose grievances or desires are involved. Furthermore, the clearer the goals and the means to attain those goals are to the strikers or mutineers — in other words the more they dispose of one or more well-defined strategies — the greater the chance of success for the participants in the strike or mutiny. Of course, even though all those concerned in the issue have a sense of «we-ness» that induces them to participate, and even though there are clear strategies, this is of no avail unless there is some sort of agreement on goals and on norms with respect to the means to be used (particularly concerning strategy) among the movement's leaders.

Therefore, we may define the *strength* of a movement as *the degree to which the potential membership actually participates in the movement's activities according to well-defined strategies about which the movement's leaders agree.*

Probably always, but certainly in the case of strikes and mutinies, the opposition movement to some degree arouses (or is aroused by) a *counter-movement*. Superiors or higher authorities may, to varying degrees, *participate* in the anti-strike or anti-mutiny movement; they may act according to a more or less clear-cut *strategy*; there may be *unison or discord among the leaders* concerning the counter-strategy or strategies.

Consequently, in trying to predict the outcome of strike- or mutiny-conflicts we must focus not only on the *strength of the counter-movement*. Therefore, who wins will probably depend on the *relative strength* of opposition- and counter-movements.

Strikes and mutinies, however, cannot be seen as two-party contests. Much has been written in industrial sociology and other

mediate results of a strike or mutiny), even though there may be no correlation between the 'outcome' and the long-term effects of such a conflict for the participants, for their organization, and for society at large.

²² KILLIAN, *op. cit.*, p. 430, mentions the following characteristics: 1. The existence of shared values — a goal or an objective sustained by an ideology. 2. A sense of membership or participation — a 'we-ness', a distinction between those who are for and those who are against. 3. Norms — shared understandings as to how the followers should act, definitions of outgroups and how to behave toward them. 4. A structure — a division of labor between leaders and followers and between different classes of each.

branches of our discipline during the last decade about the neglect in sociological research of external influences on internal relations in organizations. To avoid this error, it is imperative to take into account the possibility that the *intervention of «third forces»* also determines to a certain extent the way in which the disputes are settled. In many case-studies of strikes a conspicuous role is played by mayors of cities, official or unofficial Government mediators, community leaders, the press, other trade-unions (e.g. by proclaiming sympathy strikes) and other employers or their organizations. Contrary to what could be inferred from Marxist theory, intervention by the community in strikes is often *not* in support of the «powers that be». Mayors and other governmental functionaries frequently have interests which do not coincide with those of either the strikers or the employers. For example, the Mayor of Antwerp during the dockworkers' strike in 1907 wanted to avoid estranging the dockworkers because he depended on them for political support. Moreover, he certainly had the goal of preserving «law and order» in mind, which implies the goal of getting the dispute settled as soon as possible. His striving for this law-and-order goal (no doubt a universal role-expectation of mayors) was probably reinforced by his personal interests: the status of a mayor and his chances of re-election usually depend to a great extent on the degree to which he has shown himself to be capable of providing his citizens with a smoothly functioning, orderly community.

The same is true for «third forces» in the case of mutinies. Usually higher authorities (admiralty, government) or commanders do interfere, but not necessarily always to support the «counter-movement» in a vigorous way. For instance, at Invergordon, when the whole fleet «struck» in 1931, neither the Admiralty nor the government wanted a showdown. Public opinion, moreover, definitely favored the side of the seamen, who suffered «relative deprivation» because the pay reductions hit them much more severely than their officers. Another kind of «third force» usually playing a role in secession movements consists of the governments of foreign nations, since they can either provide a sanctuary for the deserters or extradite them. In any case, there is reason to presume that the intervention by third forces varies rather independently of the strength of the two movements involved, and should therefore be treated separately.

To test the idea that strikes and mutinies can be analyzed by means of the same theoretical scheme, it was decided to try out a

very simple predictive model on strikes and on mutinies separately. In both cases we suppose that the outcome of the conflict is a function of the relative strength of opposition- and counter-movements and of the direction of intervention by «third forces». Table 3 shows the results of this analysis.

TABLE 3

Correlations between outcome of (strike- or mutiny-) conflict, relative strength of opposition- and counter-movements, and intervention of 'third forces', for 20 strikes and 20 mutinies separately:*

	strikes		mutinies	
	R**	R(part.)**	R**	R(part.)**
— correlation between outcome and relative strength	0.51	0.54	0.43	0.56
— correlation between outcome and intervention	0.18	0.27	0.67	0.74
— correlation between relative strength and intervention	-0.10		0.01	

* For composition of the sample, see Appendix. The index of *strength* of the movement consists of three items: (a) degree of participation, (b) degree of agreement among leaders, (c) degree of clarity of strategy. Each strike or mutiny was scored on each of these variables (2 = high, 1 = medium, 0 = low) twice, once for the movement of strikers or mutineers, once for the countermovement. The score for *relative strength* of both movements was obtained by subtracting the sum of subscores for the countermovement from the sum of subscores for the movement of strikers or mutineers. When this difference proved to be positive (strikers 'or mutineers movement stronger) it was given a score of 2; when it proved zero (both movements equally strong), a score of 1; and when it appeared to be negative (countermovement stronger) a score of 0.

The index of *intervention* is a three-point scale (2 = 'third forces' on the whole favoring strikers or mutineers, 1 = 'third forces' on the whole not favoring either of the parties, and 0 = 'third forces' favoring on the whole the countermovement).

The index of *outcome* likewise consists of a three-point scale (2 = speedy realization of most of the goals of strikers or mutineers; 1 = realization, either in whole or in part, of some of the goals; 0 = no, or almost no, speedy realization of the goals of strikers or mutineers).

** R = Pearson's R; zero-order correlation. R (part.) = Pearson's R; partial correlation (the third variable kept constant). Using a two-tailed test, a correlation coefficient of 0.38 is significantly different from zero at the 10 % level, and one of 0.44 at the 5 % level. The multiple correlation between outcome on the one hand, and relative strength and intervention on the other, proved to be 0.56 for strikes and 0.79 for mutinies.

In general, the data support the notion that the outcome of a conflict is in part a function of the relative strength of the two movements. *Intervention of third forces apparently tips the balance rather often in the case of mutiny, but cannot be shown to be a decisive influence in the case of strike.* Of course, the unreliability of the data and of coding procedures²³ may be a large factor here. In cases of mutiny the «third forces» are usually fewer in number and take more clear-cut actions, so that their role may be more easily recognized than in strikes.

On the other hand, an interesting difference between strikes and mutinies may be revealed by this point. Due to the institutional features of the military establishment, the parties involved in a mutiny could to a lesser degree than those involved in a strike be relatively «free agents» who can settle the dispute more or less «between themselves». Conceivably, the fact that any mutiny (even an innocent promotion-of-interests movement by only part of a ship's crew) is subject to severe negative sanctions according to common and martial law, means that, by definition, «higher decision-makers» than the ones who try initially to deal with the movement have a final say in such matters. Only an Admiralty or Government can ultimately decide either to avoid the label 'mutiny' or to set the legal machinery in motion (backed up by the *mores* of the institution and usually also by the loyal military forces at their disposal).

Similarly, it could be argued that in the case of secession move-

²³ The code was drafted by the author, discussed with an assistant, and tried out on 9 of the strikes and mutinies in the final sample. After complete agreement had been reached on these 9 cases and on the coding procedures in general, the author and the assistant, who was completely unaware of the hypotheses and of the indices for which the items were destined, proceeded to code the other 31 strikes and mutinies. It appeared that for the main indices used the degree of agreement was rather variable. Agreement was very high for the 'outcome-index', rather low for the 'intervention-index', and moderate for the other indices. Since the author was presumably highly biased (because of his commitment to the hypotheses), the assistant's codes were considered to be more reliable and were used (except for a few instances in which certain facts had obviously been overlooked) as final data for the analysis. Later on, two different versions of Tables 1, 2 and 3 were drawn up for the 31 strikes and mutinies which had been coded separately by the author and his assistant, one version on the basis of the author's code, the other on the basis of the code of his assistant. For what such a check may be worth, it turned out that the data showed the same trends in most cases, regardless of who had done the coding.

ments the fate of the mutineers rests, in the final analysis, in the hands of a foreign government that can choose between endorsing or putting aside the legal regulations applicable to the deserters in their own country. As regards seizure-of-power movements, it may also be supposed that the norms and values of society so strongly disfavor such movements that, ultimately, local or national authorities hold the «trump cards». No such revolution can succeed unless powerful outside agencies support the movement (as happened at Kiel). In other cases, however, a conflict of this kind between rulers and ruled in military organizations is such a potential danger to the established social order that an unbeatable alliance of «third forces» is formed to crush the movement (as happened in the case of the *Potemkin* mutiny during its second phase).

Summing up the results of this analysis, we may state that similar forces have similar effects on the outcome of struggles between rulers and ruled in both military and industrial organizations. However, as in the case of the determinants of strikes and mutinies, these more or less «universal» mechanisms are conditioned in the manner in which they operate by the institutional context. Variables to be discerned at the «meso-level» determine the degree to which these basic, «micro-level» relationships hold.

Conclusions.

In this paper an effort has been made to arrive at generalizations concerning conflicts between rulers and ruled in formal organizations. First, it was argued that the typical forms taken by such movements depend more on the kind of goals aimed at by the lower participants than on the institutional context (industrial, military, etc.). Second, the hypothesis that the same social conditions conducive to strike conflicts in industry heighten the chances of mutiny in military units, was examined. Third, an analysis was undertaken to determine whether the same variables provide a basis for predicting the outcome of a conflict in military and industrial organizations. Although the available data were neither quantitatively sufficient to allow rigorous verification or denial of the propositions tested, a reasonable amount of support for the hypotheses under examination was found. In any case, the value of these theoretical notions for further investigations along similar lines is indicated. It would, for example, be interesting to find out to

what extent the same approach is applicable to other types of organizations besides industrial or military ones. Some of the available material on revolts in universities²⁴ and riots in penitentiary institutions²⁵ suggests that the same kind of movements and the same kind of forces are operative in such organizations as in the military and industrial types.

Another fruitful line of inquiry would be examination of the long term effects of such conflicts between rulers and ruled on organizational structures. Further investigation of the sample of strikes and mutinies analyzed in this paper, indicates that on the long run quite often such conflicts — even though on the short run none of the goals of the strikers or mutineers were realized — contribute, for example, towards constitutionalization of the relationships between rulers and ruled in industrial and military organizations (e.g. recognition of trade unions; instituting grievance procedures etc.).²⁶

A sociology of organizations has to steer clear of the Scylla of assuming that «all organizations are the same», regardless of their institutional structure, while at the same time evading the Charybdis of the axiom that «organizations are entirely different», all according to the institutional sphere to which they belong. The result of this analysis of strikes and mutinies indicates that sociologists can usefully try to formulate generalizations cutting across the traditional boundaries between industrial sociology, military sociology, etc. On the other hand, the operation of rather general principles, valid for various spheres, is to some extent dependent on conditioning factors pertaining to specific institutional arrangements. It is for the time being an open question to what extent further specification of such institutional conditions would lead to higher-level generalizations, which again could be more or less independent of the traditional division of society into a number of institutional spheres (industry, agriculture, medical care, the State, the military, etc.).

²⁴ See e.g. S. M. LIPSET and S. S. WOLIN (eds.), *The Berkeley Student Revolt. Facts and Interpretations*, New York, Anchor Books, 1965, especially pp. 1-9.

²⁵ See e.g. F. E. HARTUNG and M. FLOCH, 'A social-psychological analysis of prison riots: a hypothesis', *The Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science*, 1956/1957, 47, pp. 51-57.

²⁶ H. A. LEMAIRE, *Stakingen en muiterijen; een vergelijkende analyse van de gevolgen van organisatieconflicten voor de verhouding leiding - geleiden* (unpublished thesis; Leyden, 1967).

APPENDIX: Composition of the sample of strikes and mutinies, and sources

Strikes

1. at Leyden — Weavers. 1895.
H.P.M. GODDIJN, 'De Weversstakingen van 1895 in de Leidse Katoenfabriek', in: *Leids Jaarboekje* 1964, pp. 71-93.
2. at Amsterdam — Dockworkers. 1903.
A.J.C. RÜTER, *De Spoorwegstakingen van 1903, een Spiegel der Arbeidersbeweging in Nederland*, Leyden, E. J. Brill, 1935, pp. 222-301.
3. The Netherlands — Railway-workers. 1903 (January).
RÜTER, *o.c.*, Chapter V.
4. The Netherlands — Railway-workers. 1903 (April).
RÜTER, *o.c.*, Chapters VI-VIII.
5. at Antwerp — Dockworkers. 1907.
Karel VAN ISACKER, S.J., *Meesters en Huurlingen*, Antwerp, De Nederlandsche Boekhandel, 1962.
6. at Seattle — General. 1919.
R. L. FRIEDHEIM, *The Scattle General Strike*, Seattle, University of Washington Press, 1964.
7. at Twente — Textile workers. 1923/1924.
Talk (based on unpublished materials) given by C. E. VERVOORT on this strike at a seminar at Leyden University, Febr. 1963.
8. at Loray — Cotton-mill workers. 1929.
Liston POPE, *Millhands and Preachers*, New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1942.
9. at Twente — Textile workers. 1931/1932.
Talk (based on unpublished materials) given by C. E. VERVOORT on this strike at a seminar at Leyden University, Febr. 1963.
10. at Yankee City — Shoe-laborers. 1933.
W. L. WARNER and J. O. Low, *The Social System of the Modern Factory; The Strike: A Social Analysis*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1947.
11. Gypsum Company — Gypsum workers. 1950.
A. W. GOULDNER, *Wild-cat Strike; a Study of an Unofficial Strike*, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1955.
12. Saylor Company — Textile workers. 1951.
B. KARSH, *Diary of a Strike*, Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 1958.
13. at Manchester — Dockworkers. 1951.
Social Research Series: *The Dockworker; an Analysis of Conditions of Employment in the Port of Manchester*, Liverpool, The University Press, 1954, pp. 227-249.
14. at the Ommelanden — Dairy-plant workers. 1951/1953.
J. J. DE WIT, *Correcties op de Eeuwgrens. Het Anachronisme van de Ommelanden, Sociaal-psychologisch beschouwd*, Assen, Van Gorcum en Comp., 1957.

15. at Antwerp — Sea pilots. 1953.
R. GUBBELS, *La Grève, Phénomène de Civilisation*, Bruxelles, Université Libre, Institut de Sociologie, 1962, pp. 35-37.
16. at Belgium — Iron and steel workers. 1957.
«La Grève pour la Double Pécule de Vacances», in: GUBBELS, *o.c.*, 23-34.
17. at Belgium — Public utility workers. 1958.
GUBBELS, *o.c.*, pp. 38-42.
18. at Hainaut — Coalminers. 1959.
GUBBELS, *o.c.*, pp. 43-56. — C. DEJEAN, «Les Grèves de février 1959», in: *Socialisme*, No. 44, March 1961, Vol. VIII.
19. at Amsterdam — Dockworkers. 1960.
P.J.A. TER HOEVEN, *De Economische en Sociale Functies van de Erkende Vakorganisaties*. Unpublished report, 1961.
20. at Belgium — Protest against «loi unique». 1960/1961.
GUBBELS, *o.c.*, pp. 66-91.

Mutinies:

1. on the *Batavia*. 1629.
J. C. MOLLEMA, *De Nederlandse Vlag op de Wereldzeeën; De Vlag in sjouw*, Amsterdam, Schelkens en Giltay, Chapter I.
2. on the *Nijenborg*. 1763.
MOLLEMA, *o.c.*, Chapter IV.
3. on the *Bounty*. 1789.
C. NORDHOFF and J. N. HALL, *Mutiny on the Bounty*, New York, Pocket Books Inc., 1943.
4. at Spithead. 1797.
S. E. MANWARING and B. DOBRÉE, *The Floating Republic*, Bless, 1935.
W. JAMES, *The Naval History of Great Britain*, Vol. II, London, MacMillan and Comp., 1902, pp. 25-30.
5. at the Nore. 1797.
MANWARING and DEBRÉE, *o.c.* — JAMES, *o.c.*, pp. 71-73.
6. on the *Hermione*. 1797.
D. POPE, *The Black Ship*, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1963.
7. on the *Delphine*. 1820.
J. BOELEN Jzn., *Het Merkwaardig Dagboek van een Nederlandsch Zee-man 1795-1860, De Indische Tijd*, Amsterdam, J. H. de Bussy, 1943, pp. 130-145.
8. on the *Potemkin*. 1905.
R. HOUGH, *The Potemkin Mutiny*, London, The New English Library Ltd., 1964.
9. at Cattaro. 1918.
F. WALLISCH, *Die Flagge Rot-Weiss-Rot*, Graz/Wien/Köln, Verlag Styria, 1956, pp. 281-283.
10. at Kiel. 1918.
E. ALBOLDT, *Die Tragödie der alten deutschen Marine*. Berlin, Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft für Politik und Geschichte, 1928. — A. ROSENBERG, *Entstehung der Weimarer Republik*, Frankfurt am Main, Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 1961, pp. 231 ff.

11. on the *Vindictive*. 1919.
K. EDWARDS, *The Mutiny at Invergordon*, London, Putnam, 1937.
12. at Newport. 1931.
EDWARDS, o.c., pp. 72-76.
13. on the *Lucia*. 1930/1931.
EDWARDS, o.c., pp. 90-114.
14. at Invergordon. 1931.
EDWARDS, o.c.
15. on *De Zeven Provinciën*. 1933.
J. C. MOLLEMA, *Rondom de Muiterij op «De Zeven Provinciën»*, Haarlem, Tjeenk Willink, 1934.
16. at Salerno. 1943.
R. H. AHRENFELDT, *Psychiatry in the British Army in the Second World War*, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd. 1958, pp. 215-220.
17. Airborne Regiment, 1946.
AHRENFELDT, o.c., pp. 220-221.
18. on the *Athabaskan*. 1949.
Report on certain «Incidents» which occurred on board H.M.C. Ships «Athabaskan», «Crescent» and «Magnificent», Department of National Defense, Naval Service, Ottawa, 1949 (mimeographed).
19. on the *Crescent*. 1949.
Ibid.
20. on the *Magnificent*. 1949.
Ibid.

URBANISATION ET POLITIQUE
QUELQUES ASPECTS DU PROBLÈME EN SUISSE

URBAN SOCIOLOGY

SOCIOLOGIE URBAINE

I. QUELQUES TRADITIONS DE L'URBANISATION EN SUISSE

1. Évolution de la notion de ville.

La définition de la ville, actuellement en vigueur dans l'administration fédérale, à savoir les communes de 10000 habitants et plus, n'a pratiquement aucun sens pour la Suisse de l'Ancien Régime: au XVIII^e siècle, quatre villes seulement dépassaient ce chiffre.

Dès le début du moyen âge, le mot de ville fut un concept juridique et politique, correspondant à une collectivité locale constituée essentiellement d'artisans, de commerçants, de clercs, etc., qui avait acquis — ou à laquelle on avait octroyé — une charte. En d'autres termes, une ville se définissait par l'existence communale¹. Bien que ce ne soit pas le unique trait spécifique de ces collectivités, c'est néanmoins de lui que découlait presque toujours les autres: marché fortifié, consuetudes communales, droit de battre monnaie, etc. En 1798, la Révolution française abolit cette situation. L'Acte de Médiation, en 1803, restaure l'auto-collégie communale, mais à toutes les localités sans exception, qu'elles soient urbaines ou rurales. Les transformations constitutionnelles de 1848 et 1874 consacrent définitivement cette situation.

¹ Il faut appeler ici que le concept de la Suisse est due au mouvement communal qui, contrairement à ce qui s'est passé en France, en Italie, etc., n'a pas été le privilège des villes. Plus encore, en Suisse le mouvement communal s'est manifesté en trois phases: une dans des régions rurales. Le Pacte de 1291 n'est autre chose qu'une liste de communes rurales, à laquelle se joint, par la suite, celle des villes.

URBANISATION ET POLITIQUE: QUELQUES ASPECTS DU PROBLEME EN SUISSE.

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I. QUELQUES TRAITS DE L'URBANISATION EN SUISSE

1. *Evolution de la notion de ville.*

La définition de la ville, actuellement en vigueur dans l'administration fédérale, à savoir les communes de 10.000 habitants et plus, n'a pratiquement aucun sens pour la Suisse de l'Ancien Régime: au XVIII^e siècle, quatre villes seulement dépassaient ce chiffre.

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2. L'urbanisation² de la Suisse sous l'Ancien Régime.

A l'heure actuelle, il est impossible de chiffrer d'une manière précise quelle était, sous l'Ancien Régime, l'urbanisation des régions qui constituent la Suisse actuelle. Nous ne possédons que quelques chiffres souvent sujets à caution.

Un premier fait d'importance à signaler, c'est que les villes suisses actuelles datent de deux époques très éloignées l'une de l'autre: le XIII^e siècle, et la période de 1945 à 1960. En effet, un peu plus de la moitié de ces villes (N = 34) ont été fondées au moyen âge. Le reste (N = 32) sont des localités qui ont acquis leur statut de ville après la Deuxième Guerre Mondiale.

Jusqu'à la fin du XII^e siècle, on ne compte pas plus de 24 localités qui ont les attributs d'une ville. Cent ans plus tard, on en dénombre plus de 170. Une véritable frénésie bâtisseuse s'était emparée des personnes et des collectivités de l'époque. La majorité de ces villes furent fondées par des seigneurs, en vue d'augmenter leur puissance, ou de la défendre. Mais cette urbanification de la Suisse ne se poursuit pas. Alors qu'en France, en Italie, en Allemagne, pendant la Renaissance et plus tard, la création de villes nouvelles est aussi importante qu'au moyen âge, en Suisse, de cette époque jusqu'en 1960, on ne compte pas plus de cinq fondations de villes nouvelles.

En outre, jusqu'à la fin du XVIII^e siècle, les villes suisses restèrent de petite dimension. La population des plus grandes villes suisses du XVI^e siècle (Berne, Genève, Zurich, Bâle) variait entre cinq et dix mille habitants, tandis que les villes flamandes ou italiennes dépassaient déjà 50.000 habitants. Au XVIII^e siècle, seules les villes suisses sus-mentionnées avaient franchi le seuil de 10.000 habitants. A cette même époque sept villes comptaient entre 5.000 et 10.000 habitants.

Quant à la croissance de ces cités, elle n'est pas supérieure, sur trois ou quatre siècles, à 70 %. Seules Genève, Berne et Schaffhouse connaissent, pendant cette période, une croissance supérieure à 100 %. Fait frappant, cette langueur n'est que l'apanage des villes. Les campagnes sont d'un dynamisme démographique très vif. «La Suisse du XVIII^e siècle était un organisme dont le corps (les cam-

² Nous entendons par là, l'accroissement de la proportion de la population urbaine de la Suisse (Pu) par rapport à la population totale (Pt). ($U = Pu/Pt$).

pagnes) se développait avec une rapidité presque malade, alors que la tête (les villes), siège de la pensée et de la volonté nationales, semblait atteinte d'atrophie».^[12].*

Sur la base de ces quelques indications, le taux d'urbanisation de la Suisse au XVIIIe siècle ne devait pas, semble-t-il, dépasser 3 %.

3. L'urbanisation de la Suisse moderne.

Avant d'examiner en détails le réseau des villes suisses, analysons rapidement la hiérarchie des localités urbaines et rurales suisses ainsi que son évolution de 1850 à 1960 (tableau VII). Nous remarquons tout d'abord que, pendant cette période, le nombre total des localités a diminué d'une centaine d'unités. Ensuite, bien que restant toujours de très loin majoritaires (77 % en 1960 et 88 % en 1850), les collectivités de 100 à 1.999 habitants ont perdu quatre cents unités. Finalement, les villes ont énormément accru leur contingent, mais elles restent toujours une toute petite minorité (en 1850 0,2 % et en 1960 2,1 %).

Toutefois, ces chiffres, a eux seuls, ne sont pas pleinement significatifs, ceux du tableau VI leur donnent une dimension nouvelle. En effet, en 1960, ce sont les villes (catégorie la moins importante, le 2,1 %) qui rassemblent le plus grand nombre de personnes domiciliées en Suisse: le 42 %, alors que le 77 % des localités suisses (celles de 100 à 1.999 habitants) ne comportent que le 27 % de la population du pays. En 1850 la situation était considérablement différente, puisque les villes (0,2 % des localités) rassemblaient le 6,4 % de la population, et la catégorie des communes de 100 à 1.999 habitants (89 % des localités) comptait également la majorité de la population du pays: le 68 %.

Pour revenir maintenant strictement au réseau urbain suisse, nous constatons que:

- des villes millionnaires n'existent pas en Suisse
- les 5 plus grandes villes ont entre 100.000 et 500.000 habitants
- les 4/5 du réseau sont des petites villes.

Un des traits typiques du réseau urbain, c'est qu'un peu moins

* Les chiffres entre crochets se rapportent à la bibliographie à la fin de l'article.

de 1/3 des villes suisses ont à proprement parler une fonction de capitale³.

L'infrastructure des villes suisses est assez ancienne. Les moyennes et grandes villes (sauf deux) datent du moyen âge. *Les 3/5 des petites villes, sans être à vrai dire des villes nouvelles, ont acquis leur statut urbain à la fin de la Deuxième Guerre mondiale. Elles représentent un peu moins du 50 % du réseau urbain actuel.*

Dans le paragraphe précédent, nous avons noté la stabilité démographique des villes suisses sous l'Ancien Régime. Des tendances nouvelles apparaissent dès le tout début de la Révolution industrielle. Du XVIIIe à la moitié du XIXe siècle (soit en moyenne dans un laps de temps de cent ans) la croissance des quelque dix villes de l'époque est au moins égale à celle qui eut lieu lors des trois ou quatre siècles précédents; et dans les cent-dix années qui suivent 1850, leur développement est foudroyant (tableau III) sans commune mesure avec celui du passé.

Cependant on ne peut pas dire que, dans son ensemble, le développement des villes suisses soit très fort; 1/5 seulement d'entre elles (N = 13), en cent-dix années, ont une croissance qui dépasse le décuplement. Les autres ont des taux de croissances faibles et moyens (tableau II). Toutes les villes qui, en 1960, ont plus de 50.000 habitants enregistrent une croissance forte ou moyenne. 27 villes, petites et moyennes, n'atteignent pas un taux de croissance annuelle de 3,6 %. En revanche, si l'on examine la croissance entre les années 1950 et 1960, ce sont les grandes villes et les villes moyennes qui ont les taux les plus faibles; les 2/3 des petites villes ont une croissance moyenne et forte. La majorité de celles-ci se trouvent être des villes suburbaines, alors que la majeure partie des villes qui ont la croissance la plus faible sont soit des capitales, soit des villes indépendantes.

Le tableau IV indique l'évolution de l'urbanisation de la Suisse en fonction des différentes catégories de villes. Il confirme certaines tendances que nous avons déjà relevées. Premièrement, entre 1950 et 1960, le taux d'urbanisation d'après les grandes villes fléchit, alors que le taux général accuse une très nette accélération; les taux calculés d'après les villes de 20.000 habitants et plus, et de

³ Rappelons brièvement que la Suisse est un Etat fédératif, composé de 25 cantons et demi-cantons, bénéficiant d'une autonomie politique, administrative et judiciaire très étendue, impliquant évidemment, pour chacun de ces états, une capitale. Cependant 5 cantons suisses ont une capitale qui, en fonction de nos critères, n'est pas encore une ville.

50.000 habitants et plus croissent toujours mais à une cadence très inférieure à celle des décennies précédentes. Deuxièmement, les grandes villes sont un phénomène qui date du début du siècle; il vaut la peine de relever que c'est avec l'apparition des grandes villes (en 1900) que sur 11 périodes décennales (entre 1850 et 1960), le taux d'urbanisation augmente le plus fortement.

Si l'on en croit certains spécialistes, une société n'est urbanisée que lorsque au moins 1/3 de sa population vit dans des villes de 100.000 habitants et plus. On se rend compte que la Suisse est encore loin d'avoir atteint ce stade. En Europe elle se trouve après le Royaume-Uni, le Danemark, les Pays-Bas, l'Autriche, la République fédérale allemande, l'Espagne, l'Italie, mais avant la France et la Belgique, etc. Cependant, la Suisse ne se trouve pas très loin du taux global européen. (Celui-ci, en 1955, s'élevait à 21 %).

Pour récapituler cette première phase de notre analyse, nous pouvons considérer comme acquis les points suivants:

- a) la Suisse n'est pas encore un pays très urbanisé; elle n'a pas de villes millionnaires et que peu de grandes villes;
- b) l'urbanisation de la Suisse est due essentiellement à des petites villes. Entre 1950 et 1960 elles doublent approximativement leur nombre;
- c) les villes suburbaines représentent un peu moins du 1/3 des villes suisses; elles constituent la majorité des villes à très fort taux de croissance;
- d) les capitales cantonales et les grandes villes, entre 1950 et 1960, sont les localités urbaines qui ont le taux de croissance le plus faible;
- e) la moitié des villes n'ont acquis leur statut urbain qu'après la Deuxième Guerre mondiale.

4. Urbanisation et développement économique.

En général on considère que l'urbanisation est un corollaire de l'industrialisation. Le cas de la Suisse est intéressant car, selon les critères que nous avons utilisés, urbanisation et industrialisation ne sont pas en corrélation.

Comparée à d'autres pays, la Suisse, bien que très industrialisée, n'a pas un taux d'urbanisation correspondant. K. Mayer a mis en relief ce phénomène dans son étude sur la population suisse [9]

Le tableau VIII, qui donne l'évolution de la population active

selon les trois secteurs économiques de C. Clark, met en rapport cette évolution et le développement de l'urbanisation. Il est frappant de constater que s'il y a une relation évidente entre l'urbanisation, la décroissance du secteur primaire et la croissance du secteur tertiaire, il n'y a aucun rapport entre le taux d'urbanisation et le pourcentage de la population active dans le secteur secondaire. Alors qu'en 1888 ce pourcentage atteignait presque un plafond, l'urbanisation avait à peine débuté: 15 % de la population vivait dans des villes de plus de 10.000 habitants. Il y avait en tout et pour tout 18 villes entre 10.000 et 100.000 habitants.

Le tableau IX, confrontant en 1960 l'urbanisation de chaque canton de la Suisse à sa population active comprise dans les secteurs primaire, secondaire et tertiaire, ainsi qu'à celle des activités bancaires et commerciales, nous permet de calculer quelques coefficients de corrélation très significatifs⁴. Il y a un rapport relativement étroit ($\rho = 0,69$) entre l'urbanisation de chaque canton et la diminution de la proportion des activités agricole. En revanche, entre urbanisation, secteur secondaire et secteur tertiaire, le coefficient de corrélation est très bas. (Respectivement $\rho = 0,28$ et $\rho = 0,14$). C'est avec les branches économiques du commerce et des banques que l'urbanisation est le plus étroitement en corrélation ($\rho = 0,84$).

Quelle est l'explication de cette situation? Elle remonte au-delà de la Révolution industrielle.

A. Il a été établi d'une manière certaine que, sous l'Ancien Régime, les guildes urbaines n'ont jamais pu concentrer complètement dans les villes le commerce et l'industrie. Il a toujours subsisté dans les campagnes une très forte proportion d'artisans et de commerçants. En fait, selon les historiens, l'industrie et le commerce ne pouvaient se développer nulle part ailleurs aussi librement qu'en Suisse.

B. Bien que les campagnes aient été dominées politiquement par les villes, les paysans n'ont jamais été exploités au point de devoir abandonner leurs terres et de se transformer en un sous-prolétariat urbain. Les villes suisses n'ont pas connu à la veille

⁴ Pour ces calculs nous avons utilisé le coefficient de corrélation de rang:

$$\rho = 1 - \frac{6 \sum_j d^2_j}{N^3 - N}$$

de la Révolution industrielle ces masses prolétariennes urbaines, si typiques en France, en Grande-Bretagne, etc.

- C. Aussi, avec l'industrie naissante (essentiellement l'horlogerie et les textiles), ce fut la petite entreprise dispersée qui prédomina. L'industrie s'établit près de la main-d'œuvre, et non le contraire.
- D. La pauvreté en matière première de la Suisse et l'abondance des cours d'eau qui mettaient à la portée de très nombreuses localités une énergie peu coûteuse, stimulèrent cette tendance du développement de petites entreprises en milieu rural.

Ces quelques faits n'expliquent cependant pas pourquoi, actuellement encore, une grande partie de l'industrie suisse reste localisée dans des régions rurales. Selon certains économistes, *cette décentralisation a été maintenue grâce à la cartellisation poussée de l'industrie et de l'artisanat*. La Suisse est considérée comme un des pays les plus cartellisés au monde [3]. *Il n'est pas exclu que ce phénomène soit dépendant de la structure fédéraliste du système politique suisse.*

II. POLITIQUE, DÉVELOPPEMENT URBAIN ET URBANISATION

1. Rapport entre villes et campagnes.

Bien que nous ayons l'intention de centrer notre analyse sur les rapports politiques de ces deux univers, il nous sera difficile de ne pas en mentionner les aspects économiques et culturels.

Les rapports entre villes et campagnes passent, en Suisse, par deux phases nettement distinctes:

- la première correspond à une prépondérance économique des campagnes et à la suprématie politique et culturelle des villes; cette phase s'achève à la Révolution française;
- la deuxième, qui débute à la chute de l'Ancien Régime, marque une domination politique des campagnes, mais une prépondérance économique et culturelle des villes. L'évolution du phénomène urbain suisse semble indiquer qu'on s'achemine vers une troisième phase: la suprématie économique, politique et culturelle des villes sur les campagnes.

Phase 1

Nous considérerons cette première phase du début du moyen âge à la chute de l'Ancien Régime. Au cours de cette période, mises à part quelques exceptions, qui dit ville dit politique.

- A. La plupart des fondations de villes médiévales ont été, en Suisse, un acte politique: une création seigneuriale en vue de préserver ou d'augmenter les privilèges des maisons féodales. C'est après coup seulement que les bourgeois s'emparèrent du pouvoir «soit en transformant les officiers seigneuriaux en magistrats élus par eux, soit en substituant leurs organes à ceux du seigneur.» [8]. Les villes, très rapidement, devinrent des corps politiquement autonomes.
- B. Ce mouvement ne se poursuit pas. Une minorité de villes acquirent par conquête ou par rachat les prérogatives du pouvoir public, soumièrent des territoires ruraux plus ou moins voisins, devinrent des «Princes» avec tous les avantages découlant de la souveraineté. Les autres localités urbaines de l'époque furent assujetties et, partant, elles ne furent plus considérées comme villes.
- C. Par un accaparement total des leviers politiques, les villes contrôlaient tout. Cependant en Suisse, comparativement aux pays environnants, la domination des villes n'était pas écrasante. K.W. Deutsch et H. Weilenmann pensent qu'il s'agissait plus d'une alliance que d'une exploitation. [4]. En effet, malgré la position de force des villes
 - l'imposition des campagnards n'était pas exorbitante,
 - le commerce et l'industrie n'étaient pas monopolisés.

En échange les villes s'assuraient l'appui militaire des campagnes, indispensable pour leur sauvegarde et pour maintenir la sécurité des voies de communication internationales. Le fait que, pendant toute cette période, les paysans restèrent continuellement armés sans se rebeller prouve qu'ils acceptaient assez aisément la domination politique des villes.

Incontestablement les villes, au cours de cette période, exerçaient donc une domination sur les campagnes. Cependant, étant dépendantes économiquement et militairement des campagnes, les villes n'ont jamais eu avantage à pousser cette domination à l'extrême.

Phase 2.

Dès 1803, la distinction entre localité sujette et localité régnante disparaît. Quelle que soit la dimension de la commune, on ne parle plus que de localité autonome. «L'ex-ville régnante des cantons-villes prit place à côté des communes qui lui avaient été soumises.» [7]. La Constitution de 1848 consacre cette situation: «Tous les Suisses sont égaux devant la loi, il n'y a plus ni sujets, ni privilèges de lieu, de naissance, de personne ou de famille.» (art. 4). On comprend l'importance politique que prirent les campagnes, d'autant plus que, numériquement, elles représentaient l'immense majorité de la population. En 1850, 68 % des Suisses vivaient dans des localités de 1 à 1.999 habitants et, en 1888, 38 % de la population active travaillait dans le secteur primaire. Mais, en même temps que les campagnes acquéraient leur suprématie politique leur déclin économique commençait. Ce dernier a atteint actuellement un niveau encore jamais égalé:

- 11 % de la population active travaille dans l'agriculture,
- le revenu de l'agriculture ne représente que le 7 % du revenu national,
- à cause des charges de l'héritage, de la spéculation foncière, du protectionnisme, la classe paysanne suisse assume un endettement dix fois supérieur au paysan moyen français. Etc.

Cependant, malgré cette décadence, les campagnes constituent toujours une importante force politique. Le parti des «paysans, artisans et bourgeois» est un des plus puissants du pays. Il se range après les partis socialiste, radical et conservateur. En outre, ces quatre partis, qui à eux seuls rassemblent le 85 % des voix du corps électoral, recrutent le 70 % de leurs électeurs dans les communes non-urbaines. Les 88 % des sièges au Conseil national sont entre les mains de ces quatre partis. (Tableau X).

Bien entendu, la classe paysanne a tenté d'utiliser cette suprématie politique pour s'assurer (par un système légal complexe de subventions, de crédit, de dégrèvements fiscaux, de prix garantis, etc.) le débouché de ses produits. Cela évidemment au détriment des classes urbaines: «les prix garantis des produits agricoles de la Suisse sont les plus élevés d'Europe occidentale.» [8]. Mais cette politique n'a pas pour autant amélioré la situation économique des paysans. Les raisons qui sont avancées par les autorités pour justifier cette politique sont entre autres d'ordre moral et de défense nationale:

- *moral*, parce que la Suisse a été créée par des paysans; c'est une «nation de guerriers et de paysans»; la classe paysanne est la gardienne de la cellule familiale, etc.;
- *défense nationale*, à cause de la situation géographique de la Suisse et de sa neutralité politique; en cas de conflits internationaux, elle doit pouvoir assurer une autonomie alimentaire maximum⁵. Pour la Suisse l'agriculture est une «forme de défense nationale tout aussi importante que la protection militaire.» [10]

Nous terminerons ce paragraphe par l'examen de la couleur politique, en 1959, des villes et des campagnes. (Tableaux XI et XII). C'est le parti socialiste qui est le plus important de Suisse et c'est aussi le plus urbain des trois principaux partis: 32 % de citoyens votent pour lui. Cependant, même pour ce parti, le poids de la campagne surpasse celui de la ville: le 57 % de ceux qui votent citoyens votent conservateurs et, plus la ville est grande, moins socialiste sont domiciliés dans des communes rurales. 15 % des citoyens votent conservateur et, plus la ville est grande, moins on vote conservateur; d'ailleurs le 77 % des électeurs qui votent pour ce parti habitent des communes rurales. Le parti radical a une clientèle très bien répartie: une proportion égale de citoyens et d'habitants de communes rurales votent pour lui; cependant 65 % des radicaux résident dans des localités rurales et parmi les citoyens, ce sont ceux qui habitent les petites villes qui ont le plus d'affinité pour ce parti. Quant au parti agrarien des paysans, artisans et bourgeois, cela n'a rien d'étonnant, il recrute le 87 % de sa clientèle électorale dans des communes rurales. Trait frappant de la force de ce parti: la population active du secteur primaire a passé, de 1920 à 1960, de 26 % à 11 % de la population active totale, mais le parti agrarien n'a perdu que deux sièges au Conseil national. Finalement, les petits partis sont avant tout des partis de citoyens, mieux encore de citoyens domiciliés dans des grandes villes.

2. Systèmes politiques et participation politique en milieu urbain.

Dans cette dernière partie, nous désirons mettre en relief quelques aspects du fait politique en milieu urbain.

⁵ Lors de la Deuxième Guerre mondiale, l'agriculture suisse a assuré à 80 % l'autonomie alimentaire au pays.

L'organisation politique des villes.

Nous avons vu précédemment que la Constitution suisse de 1848 avait consacré l'autonomie de toutes les communes suisses. Cette autonomie est encore actuellement très réelle, malgré une assez forte tendance à la centralisation. Chaque localité élit ses autorités (pouvoir législatif et exécutif) sans que l'état cantonal ou fédéral ait le droit de confirmer ou de contester ces nominations. En une multitude de domaines (instruction publique, culture, police, protection civile, budget, urbanisme, services industriels, assistance, etc.) chaque commune est souveraine, évidemment dans le cadre de la Constitution et des lois.

Dans les grandes lignes, on distingue deux types d'organisation politique des communes. Nous les caractériserons par deux types de démocratie: le système direct et le système représentatif. Dans le premier cas, le pouvoir législatif est entre les mains d'une assemblée communale, primaire et souveraine, qui se réunit chaque fois que cela est estimé nécessaire. Dans le système représentatif, les citoyens de la commune élisent, pour une certaine période, un conseil municipal qui, lui, est souverain et tranche toutes les questions. Plusieurs cantons ayant adopté ce système, le complètent par la possibilité de soumettre au peuple par voie de référendum les décisions du Conseil municipal. Les rapports entre la dimension de la commune et son organisation politique sont certains. En 1950, pratiquement toutes les villes de plus de 20.000 habitants avaient adopté le système représentatif; de plus ce type se généralise dans les petites villes et même dans les communes rurales. En somme, plus les villes croissent et deviennent prépondérantes, plus la démocratie directe semble devenir impraticable.

Participation électorale.

Ce problème nous fait déboucher sur celui de la participation politique, que nous examinerons uniquement sous l'angle de la participation électorale. Là aussi il y a un rapport étroit entre la dimension d'une commune et la participation électorale. Cette dernière, en général, est en relation inverse avec la dimension de la localité. Si le taux de participation varie en fonction de l'objet de la consultation (référendum fédéral, élections nationales, cantonales ou communales, etc.) ce rapport semble toujours subsister.

Nous avons calculé le coefficient de corrélation entre urbanisation des cantons et participation électorale des citoyens de ces cantons⁶. Pour cela nous avons distingué les votations fédérales des élections nationales. Pour ces dernières nous avons pris en considération les élections au Conseil national de 1959. Les premières datent de 1960 et consistent en deux référendums: l'un était relatif au «Maintien des mesures temporaires en matière de contrôle des prix», l'autre concernait «L'économie laitière suisse.» Les coefficients de corrélation que nous avons calculés pour ces deux types de scrutins sont très différents. Le coefficient de corrélation relatif aux élections représente le double de celui relatif aux votations fédérales (respectivement $\rho = 0,65$ et $\rho = 0,34$) ce qui signifie que plus un canton a un taux d'urbanisation bas, plus ses citoyens participent aux scrutins, et cette corrélation est d'autant plus étroite que le scrutin consiste en une élection.

Système des partis.

Pour terminer cette rapide étude, nous allons examiner les rapports entre urbanisation des cantons et système des partis en fonction des gouvernements cantonaux. Selon les travaux de R. Girod [5], on distingue quatre systèmes cantonaux de parti:

- parti solitaire: «tous les membres du gouvernement se rattachent à un seul parti» qui «ne se heurte à l'opposition d'aucune force organisée» [5];
- parti majoritaire ou parti dominant;
- tripartisme: «trois partis dominent la vie politique du canton» mais aucun n'a la majorité au gouvernement;
- multipartisme: quatre partis ou plus sont représentés au gouvernement.

Le tableau XIII fait ressortir un rapport entre l'urbanisation et la complexité du système des partis. En effet les sept cantons les plus urbanisés ont tous un système tripartiste ($N = 1$) ou multipartiste ($N = 6$), alors que les huit cantons les moins urbanisés (mis à part ceux d'Argovie et de Glaris qui, sans être urbanisés, sont hautement industrialisés) ont un système de parti majoritaire ($N = 5$) ou solitaire ($N = 1$). Les neuf cantons restants, qui sont moyennement

⁶ Nous avons classé ces deux taux dans un sens inverse: urbanisation dans un sens décroissant et participation dans un sens croissant. En d'autres termes, nous avons associé le plus urbanisé avec le moins participant.

urbanisés, ont en général un système tripartiste ($N = 4$) ou multipartiste ($N = 2$), sauf trois Etats qui maintiennent un système majoritaire. En résumé, nous ne croyons pas forcer la réalité en affirmant que plus un canton s'urbanise, plus il s'achemine vers un système complexe de partis.

CONCLUSION

En bref, nous pouvons dire que le caractère très dispersé de l'industrie suisse serait la cause du faible taux d'urbanisation de la Suisse. Mais cette dispersion industrielle serait elle-même déterminée et maintenue par le système politique de la Suisse: le fédéralisme et la suprématie de la cellule communale.

Il est très intéressant de noter que, si le système politique a conditionné le phénomène urbain, il apparaît maintenant que ce dernier est un des plus importants facteurs contribuant à la modification des réalités politiques. Depuis 1950, l'urbanisation semble s'accélérer très fortement et à cette tendance correspondraient:

I. le déclin de la participation électorale, qui est d'autant plus prononcé que la localité est grande ou la région urbanisée. En outre ce déclin est beaucoup plus accentué:

A. lorsque le type de scrutin est un référendum législatif plutôt qu'une élection;

B. lorsque l'enjeu du scrutin est national plutôt que local ou régional.

En d'autres termes, moins une société est urbanisée, plus les problèmes locaux et régionaux accaparent l'opinion et le corps électoral. Inversément, plus une société est urbanisée, plus les problèmes locaux et régionaux accaparent l'opinion et le corps électoral. Inversément, plus une société est urbanisée, plus les problèmes nationaux passent au premier plan.

II. le déclin de la démocratie directe, aussi bien au niveau local que cantonal (assemblées communales, landsgemeinde, etc.).

III. l'accentuation du multipartisme qui n'est qu'un aspect du pluralisme des sociétés urbanisées: multiplication des associations volontaires de tout genre, diversification des relations sociales, etc.

TABLEAU I
Répartition des villes en fonction de leur dimension
et de la situation géo-politique

	Capitales	Villes suburbaines	Villes indépendentes	Total
Villes de 100.000 h. & +	5	—	—	5
Villes de 50.000 à 99.999 h.	2	—	2	4
Villes de 20.000 à 49.999 h.	5	1	2	8
Villes de 10.000 à 19.999 h.	9	18	22	49
Total	21	19	26	66

TABLEAU II
Répartition des villes en fonction de leur dimension
et de leur croissance entre 1850 et 1960

	Croissance entre 1850-1960			
	Faible 0 à 400 %	Moyenne 400,1 à 1000 %	Forte 1000 & +	Total
Villes de 100.000 h. & +	—	4	1	5
Villes de 50.000 à 99.999 h.	—	2	2	4
Villes de 20.000 à 49.999 h.	6	1	1	8
Villes de 10.000 à 19.999 h.	21	19	9	49
Total	27	26	13	66

TABLEAU III
Comparaison de l'évolution de quelques villes
sous l'Ancien Régime et à l'ère industrielle

		Croissance du 18 ^e s. à la moitié du 19 ^e s.	Croissance de 1850 à 1960
Bâle	Du 15 ^e au 18 ^e ~ 68 %	82 %	638 %
Genève	Du 15 ^e au 18 ^e ~ 208 %	56 %	464 %
Zurich	Du 15 ^e au 18 ^e ~ 76 %	48 %	2483 %
Berne	Du 16 ^e au 18 ^e ~ 140 %	130 %	492 %
Lucerne	Du 14 ^e au 18 ^e ~ 43 %	134 %	570 %
Fribourg	Du 15 ^e au 18 ^e ~ 0 %	74 %	259 %
Schaffhouse	Du 16 ^e au 18 ^e ~ 120 %	40 %	301 %
Soleure	—	57 %	243 %
Coire	Du 15 ^e au 18 ^e ~ 68 %	137 %	318 %
St.-Gall	—	124 %	579 %
Hérisau	—	68 %	71 %
Lausanne	—	242 %	638 %

TABEAU IV
Evolution de l'urbanisation de la Suisse de 1850 à 1960

	1850	1860	1870	1880	1888	1900	1910	1920	1930	1941	1950	1960
1. Urbanisation en fonction des villes de 100.000 & +	—	—	—	—	—	7,8	8,6	11,5	15,6	17,7	20,6	19,9
2. Urbanisation en fonction des villes de 50.000 & +	—	—	—	2,1	4,2	11,6	14,2	16,6	20,4	24	24,6	25,7
3. Urbanisation en fonction des villes de 20.000 & +	3,6	5,1	6,4	8,8	10,4	17,9	21,1	22,8	24,9	27,8	29,2	30,1
4. Urbanisation en fonction des villes de 10.000 & +	6,4	8,5	10,0	13,3	15,1	22,0	25,4	27,6	30,5	32,9	36,5	42,0

TABLEAU V

Evolution du nombre des villes de 1850 à 1960

Villes de:

100.000 & +	—	—	—	—	—	2	2	3	4	4	5	5
50.000 à 99.999	—	—	1	2	2	2	2	3	3	4	3	4
20.000 à 49.999	3	4	5	6	6	7	9	8	6	6	7	8
10.000 à 19.999	5	6	7	10	10	10	12	14	18	17	27	49

TABLEAU VI

Evolution de la population résidente des communes
 Pourcentage de la population résidant dans des communes de:

	0-99 %	100-1999 %	2000-4999 %	5000-9999 %	10000 & + %
1850	0,5	67,7	19,9	5,5	6,4
1860	0,4	64,3	20,5	6,3	8,5
1870	0,4	60,4	21,8	7,4	10,0
1880	0,4	55,8	23,5	7,0	13,3
1888	0,4	53,8	22,6	8,1	15,1
1900	0,3	47,6	21,7	8,4	22,0
1910	0,3	41,4	21,8	11,1	25,4
1920	0,3	39,6	21,6	10,9	27,6
1930	0,3	37,0	21,9	10,3	30,5
1941	0,3	35,1	20,0	11,7	32,9
1950	0,3	31,5	20,0	11,7	36,5
1960	0,3	26,8	18,8	12,2	41,9

TABLEAU VII

Evolution du nombre des communes

Communes ayant	0-99	100-1999	2000-4999	5000-9999	10000 & +	Total habitants
1850	152	2849	174	21	8	3204
1860	150	2839	187	25	10	3211
1870	151	2790	210	30	12	3193
1880	151	2755	236	31	17	3190
1888	142	2761	231	36	18	3188
1900	148	2713	241	41	21	3164
1910	153	2640	277	61	26	3157
1920	145	2619	282	62	28	3136
1930	165	2563	298	61	31	3118
1941	167	2543	291	75	31	3107
1950	173	2485	318	83	42	3101
1960	207	2389	337	97	65	3095
1850	4,8 %	88,9 %	5,5 %	0,6 %	0,2 %	100 %
1960	6,7 %	77,2 %	10,9 %	3,1 %	2,1 %	100 %

TABLEAU VIII
Urbanisation et activités économiques

	1888 %	1920 %	1950 %	1960 %
Secteur primaire	38,3	26,5	18,0	11,2
Secteur secondaire	37,1	41,1	44,2	40,0
Secteur tertiaire	24,6	29,4	37,8	48,8
Urbanisation	15,1	27,6	36,5	41,9

TABLEAU IX
Urbanisation et activités économiques des cantons suisses en 1960

Cantons:	Urbani- sation %	Primaire %	Secondaire %	Tertiaire %	Banque Commerce %
Bâle-Ville	99,7	0,7	35,0	63,6	21,7
Genève	72,9	2,9	31,6	65,5	22,0
Zurich	67,6	5,3	40,3	54,4	19,3
Schaffhouse	62,4	9,7	52,9	37,4	8,9
Neuchâtel	58,3	6,4	53,2	40,4	12,4
Bâle-Campagne	45,4	7,1	48,0	44,9	13,1
Vaud	45,3	12,7	30,8	56,5	17,2
Lucerne	38,8	18,4	36,2	45,4	12,8
Zoug	37,7	10,5	46,8	42,7	10,1
Berne	37,0	14,4	39,2	46,4	11,7
Saint-Gall	29,4	12,2	47,1	40,7	10,4
Appenzell Rh.E	29,3	13,9	47,2	38,9	8,1
Soleure	28,1	7,6	57,1	35,3	9,1
Thurgovie	23,4	16,7	49,7	33,6	7,6
Grisons	23,3	20,2	20,3	59,5	9,2
Tessin	22,2	10,5	30,3	59,2	13,1
Fribourg	20,5	27,2	29,5	43,3	9,7
Schwytz	14,1	18,6	39,6	41,8	7,5
Argovie	13,5	10,5	55,1	34,4	9,0
Valais	9,4	24,9	24,6	50,5	8,3
Appenzell Rh. I.	0	35,7	7,7	56,6	5,5
Nidwald	0	17,9	30,4	51,7	7,9
Obwald	0	27,2	25,2	47,6	5,9
Glaris	0	8,8	54,2	37,0	6,5
Uri	0	17,5	33,5	49,0	5,9
		q = 0,69	q = 0,28	q = 0,14	q = 0,84

TABLEAU X

Force des partis politiques suisses en 1959

	Nombre approximatif de voix	%	Nombre des sièges au Conseil national
Socialiste	264.000	26,4	51
Radical	238.000	23,7	51
Conservateur	237.000	23,3	47
Paysan	117.000	11,6	23
Indépendant	54.000	5,5	10
Parti du travail	26.500	2,7	3
Libéral	23.000	2,3	5
Démocrate	21.000	2,2	4
Évangélique	14.000	1,4	2
Autres	9.500	0,9	—
		100,0	196

TABLEAU XI

Répartition proportionnelle des électeurs de chaque groupe de communes par parti en 1959

Pourcentage de citoyens par groupe de ville votant pour le parti:

	Socialiste	Radical	Conservateur	Autres partis
Grandes villes ¹	31,8	19,4	12,4	36,4
Villes moyennes ²	33,8	27,9	17,5	20,8
Petites villes ³	32,8	29,4	19,2	18,6
Communes rurales	23,1	23,7	27,8	25,4
Ensemble des villes	32,5	23,6	15,1	28,8
Moyenne suisse	26,4	23,7	23,3	26,6

¹ 100.000 habitants et plus² de 30.000 à 99.999 habitants³ de 10.000 à 29.999 habitants

TABLEAU XII

Répartition proportionnelle des électeurs par groupes de communes en 1959

Pourcentage d'électeurs de chaque parti domiciliés dans des:

	Grandes villes	Villes moyennes	Petites villes	En tout	Communes rurales
Paysans et bourgeois	7,3	1,4	4,2	12,9	87,1
Conservateurs	10,2	4,6	7,9	22,7	77,3
Radicaux	15,8	7,2	11,9	34,9	65,1
Démocrates	14,5	14,4	10,9	39,8	62,2
Socialistes	23,3	7,8	12,0	43,1	56,9
Évangéliques	42,4	5,5	6,5	54,4	45,6
Libéraux	45,4	2,1	9,4	56,9	43,1
Indépendants	44,5	9,2	9,5	63,2	36,8
Parti du travail	64,5	5,8	6,4	76,7	23,3
Autres partis	2,9	1,1	6,1	10,1	89,9
Électeurs en tout	19,3	6,1	9,6	35,0	65,0
Électeurs inscrits en tout	22,1	6,0	9,5	37,6	62,4

1 Nous n'avons pas tenu compte pour le calcul de corrélation des cas-
 sous où la participation au scrutin est obligatoire.
 2 Id (1) + les cantons où l'élection se fait directement, et les cantons se
 constituant d'un arrondissement électoral.
 3 P = multipartisme accentué.
 4 T = tripartisme.
 5 M = parti majoritaire.
 6 S = parti solitaire.

TABLEAU XIII

Urbanisation et participation électorale

Cantons:	Urbanisation 1960	Participation aux votations fédérales 1960 ¹	Participation aux élections au C.N. 1959 ²	Système des partis en 1962
Bâle-Ville	99,7	25,9	60,3	P ³
Genève	72,9	33,5	45,7	P
Zurich	67,6	68,8	69,7	P
Schaffhouse	62,4	—	—	T ⁴
Neuchâtel	58,3	28,0	55,8	P
Bâle-Campagne	45,4	33,1	61,5	P
Vaud	45,3	31,5	55,0	P
Lucerne	38,8	42,0	85,0	M ⁵
Zoug	37,7	29,3	63,5	M
Berne	37,0	35,7	65,3	T
Saint-Gall	29,4	—	—	T
Appenzell Rh. E.	29,3	61,5	—	M
Soleure	28,1	35,1	83,3	T
Thurgovie	23,4	—	—	P
Grisons	23,3	44,9	73,5	P
Tessin	22,2	18,3	69,2	T
Fribourg	20,5	28,2	69,6	M
Schwytz	14,1	42,5	75,0	M
Argovie	13,5	—	—	P
Valais	9,4	39,9	74,1	M
Appenzell Rh. I	0	38,7	—	S ⁶
Nidwald	0	49,9	—	M
Obwald	0	31,9	—	M
Glaris	0	43,1	77,5	P
Uri	0	53,4	—	M
		$\bar{q} = 0,34$	$\bar{q} = 0,65$	

¹ Nous n'avons pas tenu compte, pour le calcul de corrélation, des cantons où la participation au scrutin est obligatoire.

² *Id.* 1) + les cantons où l'élection se fait tacitement, et les cantons ne constituant qu'un arrondissement électoral.

³ P = multipartisme accentué.

⁴ T = tripartisme.

⁵ M = parti majoritaire.

⁶ S = parti solitaire.

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THE ZONGO COMPLEX OF URBAN GHANA

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An interesting structural feature of Ghanaian towns is the Zongo¹ complex comprising one or more exclusive neighbourhoods of semi-permanent huts inhabited mostly of largely Islamised tribes of northern Ghana as also by Hausa, Yoruba, Fulani, Wangara, Moshi, Grunshi, Yagada and other Moslem and near-Moslem Sudanic immigrants. This seems to be a universal pattern throughout urban Ghana. Both Dr. Busia and Mrs. Acquah referred to the existence of zongos in their respective studies on Sekondi-Takoradi and Accra.² Kumasi and Cape Coast include several zongos within their boundaries. Also smaller towns like Saltpond, Winneba and Kommenda have their own zongos. The zongo complex exists even in northern Ghana. Tamale, the largest town in the region, has several zongos of which the Moshi zongo, named after the dominant tribe inhabiting it, is perhaps the most prominent. The towns in the Volta Region that are known to have zongos are Keta and Ho, while in the Eastern Region Koforidua and Nsawam are to be specially mentioned in this connection.

The significance of the zongo complex in a Ghanaian town is to be judged in terms of its physical and social structure. Physically a zongo is situated near the market place, relatively isolated from residential quarters of the locally dominant tribe, a large stretch of closely-built hutments, interspersed between which are narrow lanes and tracks that can be passed only by pedestrians. Its physical isolation corresponds roughly to its socio-political autonomy symbolised by the existence of mosques, Quranic schools, and a political system which, although legally unrecognised, is yet effective.

My purpose in the present essay is to describe the structure of a zongo in Cape Coast set against the physico-social system of the town and then to examine the manner in which it is integrated to

¹ I did not get a satisfactory explanation of the origin of the word. Possibly it is derived from the Hausa word *zango* which means «day's march», «camp» or «caravanserai».

² K. A. BUSIA, *Report on a Social Survey of Sekondi-Takoradi*, London, Crown Agents, 1950.

Ione ACQUAH (Mrs.), *Accra Survey*, London, 1958.

the total urban society. It may be noted that the way the zongo complex in Cape Coast is incorporated to the larger society of the town spells out, with some modification, the pattern for other Ghanaian towns as well, except that the smaller and the more homogeneous the town, the sharper and more dramatic is the exclusiveness of the zongo complex therein.

Data for this essay have been collected through interviews and participant observation of the more important activities in the four zongos of the town between December, 1964 and March, 1966, with occasional breaks. Material thus collected has been supplemented by the compilation of relevant facts from Government publications including census reports. I have also made use of files in the Ghana National Archives which have proved to be a storehouse of information about immigrant tribal life in urban Ghana that has indeed a very close bearing on our topic.

II

Cape Coast is the largest Fante town in Ghana. Originally a trading outpost for coastal tribes, it came into prominence in the middle of the 16th century with the beginning of European rivalry for gold and slaves on the Guinea Coast. The town was finally conquered by the English in 1664 and from that time until it was superseded by Accra in 1876, it remained the headquarters of the English merchants in the Gold Coast.

Forces which are resulting in urbanization elsewhere in Africa have been operating in this part of the country too. And under their impact the town has undergone a slow but steady expansion as will be evident from the following table.³

Year	Population of the Town
1911 ...	11,269
1921 ...	14,921
1931 ...	17,685
1948 ...	23,346
1960 ...	56,910

³ Figures for this table have been collected from:-

- (a) *Census Report*, 1911 (London-1902), Appendix B, p. 50.
- (b) *Census Report*, 1921 (Accra-1923), p. 69.
- (c) A. W. CARDINAL (Chief Census Officer), *The Gold Coast*, 1931 (Accra-not dated), p. 158.
- (d) *Census Report*, 1948 (London-1950).
- (e) *1960 Population Census of Ghana* (Accra-1964).

Understandably the town has drawn people from the immediate hinterland, other parts of the country and even from neighbouring territories of West Africa. According to the Ghana Census of 1960,⁴ Cape Coast in 1960 had 1,320 Yoruba, 1060 Mande (including the Busaga and Wangara), 1,480 Hausa and 1,620 members of the Moie-Dagbani group. Yet it has remained essentially a Fante town inasmuch as roughly 72% of the total population are Fante. Many of them have migrated from nearby villages and towns, built houses and settled in Cape Coast permanently. The local name of Cape Coast is Oguaa or market place which indicates that consideration of trade was in the beginning an important pull for drawing migrants from the interior. We can presume that in the earliest stage of development people came mostly from Fanteland and, since the same clans are found among all the Fante, migrants were assimilated by Cape Coast clans without difficulty. However, assimilation took place also through the Asafo system (traditional Fante military system composed of patrilineal units). And in a number of cases even non-Fante immigrants were Fantized when they were assigned specific positions in the indigenous politico-administrative system through the Asafo organization. Thus when the Swedes settled in Cape Coast sometime in the middle of the 17th century they brought artisans from the Benin area. With their help they built the castle and settled newcomers nearby. In due course these people formed themselves into an Asafo Company under the name of Brofumba (Whitemen's children) or Brofunkwa (whitemen's servants).⁵ Similarly the Danes brought skilled workers from the Accra district and assigned them a stretch of land a little east of the main town. In course of time these men became the seventh Asafo Company (Amanfur) of Cape Coast.⁶

Later strangers who came to Cape Coast were perhaps too numerous and too different to be assimilated by the local society. And so it is that today Islamized tribes from northern Ghana, Nigeria, Niger, Upper Volta and Mali tend to concentrate in urban Zongos with their mosques Quranic schools and their own politico-administrative systems.

It may be useful here to delineate the urban setting of Cape

⁴ 1960 *Population Census of Ghana: Special Report E (Tribes in Ghana)* (Accra-1964), Table S1, Appendix C, C7, C9.

⁵ Arthur FFOULKES, *The Company System of Cape Coast Castle* (an unpublished account kept in the *Ghana National Archives*, Cape Coast branch).

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 1-2.

Coast with particular reference to the place of the zongo complex within it.

As we have already indicated, Cape Coast has been growing slowly over a period of three hundred years. The earliest urban quarter to develop lies between the Castle and the Lighthouse on Dawson's Hill and from the Fosu Lagoon in the west to Anarfo (Low Town) in the east. This area, the nucleated heartland of the town, was within easy reach of the guns of the Castle and many rich Fante traders built permanent structures here so as to live under comparative security. Houses in this neighbourhood are well-connected, with paved and well-laid-out streets. Drains are open but on the whole well-maintained. Houses and streets are provided with electricity and pipe-borne water. Ethnically, inhabitants of the heartland are overwhelmingly Fante. Indeed it is here that the traditional Fante social system still has an over-bearing presence with lineages organising funeral processions, Asafo Companies displaying their martial dance, and traditional priests and priestesses «possessed» with their respective deities dancing to the tune of native band.

Later when the town population increased in size by the arrival of new immigrants, they were settled on the outskirts of this nuclear heartland. Reference has already been made to the Danish import of skilled workers from Accra and to their settlement half a mile to the east of the town (Amanfur). Later through constructional expansion Amanfur became a part of Cape Coast. This physical extension as indicated earlier, was coupled with the social incorporation of Amanfur through the Asafo system.

The physical spread of the town at a later stage swallowed such villages as Adisadel, Antem, Siwdu and the four Zongos. Of these the only Fante settlement is Siwdu, the others being inhabited by peoples from northern Ghana as well as by non-Ghanaian tribes like the Wangara, Hausa, Yoruba and Moshi. Today these are Cape Coast's outlying neighbourhoods attached to the urban nucleus in a semi-circular ring. Barring parts of Amanfur these hamlets and settlements are characterized by semi-permanent buildings, narrow lanes within, and only a limited provision of electricity and pipe-borne water. On the other hand each of them possesses a settlement-focus in the form of a church, mosque, shrine of a traditional god, or an Asafo Company post.

Today the municipal boundary of Cape Coast has spread beyond this semi-circular ring to reach hitherto autonomous villages in the

north of the town. And thus an outer ring of essentially rural communities has been added to the town. People in this outer ring are largely Fante but, unlike those in the urban heartland, they depend principally on agriculture. They live in distinct, autonomous communities spatially separated and endowed with their respective administrative systems headed by a headman or sub-chief as the case may be. Like settlements in the intermediate zone the villages in the outer ring mostly have semi-permanent structures. Like them few huts here are supplied with electricity and pipe-borne water. However, the outer ring is much less congested than the intermediate zone. Villages here have much more open space and tracts and lanes within a village are not as narrow as those in a zongo.

The physical structure of Cape Coast can thus be seen as consisting of three distinct zones. The first, the heartland, the oldest neighbourhood of the town, is surrounded by an intermediate zone of settlements established later, with a number of disparate autonomous villages constituting the outer ring of the town which was incorporated into the municipal area at a much later date. The physical pattern may be related to the social structure of the town. In the heartland much of traditional Fante life, modified though it may have been, still persists. This homogeneity of the heartland stands in direct contrast to the middle zone which, in many significant respects, differs from the former. And although communities living in this zone (barring Amanfur) have a certain unity, yet structural differentiation among them is too glaring to be missed when seen from within. The middle zone is surrounded by an outer ring that is, like the urban nucleus, socially homogeneous and chiefly Fante.

IV

The zongo complex in Cape Coast lies in the middle belt and consists of four distinct settlements, viz., (i) Kotokuraba; (ii) Ayiku-Ayiku; (iii) Kokoado Bisa; and (iv) Ngua Malam Baku. These are very congested areas with unplanned houses, separated by narrow lanes that can be used by pedestrians only. Very few of them are provided with electricity and pipe-borne water. Open drains flow along and sometimes over narrow lanes. Few houses have any privacy. Most of them are without attached latrines and all are built of cheap stuff: mud-and-swish wall with tin, asbestos or iron-sheet roof. As a result many of the huts are in a precarious condition. According to a slum-clearance plan made by the

Town and Country Planning Division of the Central Region (in which Cape Coast is situated) in Kotokuraba zongo of a total number of 190 huts and houses 5 have fallen down and 87 are in a dangerous condition, while in a second zongo in Cape Coast more than 30 % of a total number of 63 houses have either collapsed or are in danger of collapsing.⁷ The congestion and generally unsatisfactory condition of housing in a zongo has been reported from every town in Ghana. And what we said about Cape Coast zongo complex largely represents the general condition of the zongo complex throughout the country.

Of the four zongos the Kotokuraba zongo seems to be the oldest in Cape Coast. The settlement here grew with the rehabilitation of demobilised Hausa soldiers who fought on the British side during the Anglo-Asante wars. Local Hausa traditions have it that when the first Hausa came here there were neither any railways nor motor transport. The first settlers came on foot from Nigeria via Dahomey and northern Togo to Gonja, settled for some time at Salaga and then came to the south on the Guinea coast. This version of Hausa migration to southern Ghana that I obtained through field investigation in Ghana fitted in remarkably well with the late Professor Herkovits' finding in Kano where in 1931 old Hausa traders could describe in details the route they took to Akanland. Herskovits maintained that each point mentioned by Hausa traders was located on maps, thus providing a check on the validity of the information.⁸ However, this tradition does not agree well with the thesis that the earliest zongo settlers in Cape Coast were demobilised Hausa soldiers, for, it is unlikely that the latter came on foot from Nigeria via Dahomey and northern Togo. But it is possible that two groups of Hausa converged here. In the first place demobilised soldiers who had already been brought to the south were resettled in the zongos and these were joined later or at about the same time by Hausa merchants who gradually penetrated to the South from the northern territories after the latter had been taken over by the British.

Whatever the origin, the zongo complex in Cape Coast today bears unmistakable marks of its separateness, reflected in physical conditions, demographic structure and occupational pattern. Such

⁷ Town and Country Planning Division (Central Region), Ghana, *Plan No. TCP/CWR/CC/299*, Date 27th August, 1964.

⁸ M. J. HERSKOVITS, *The Human Factor in Changing Africa*, Routledge, 1962, p. 194.

separateness is also seen in the Quranic schools, mosques, congregations and autonomous political systems.

The zongo complex in Cape Coast⁹ has approximately 7,000 inhabitants divided between four settlements. The male-female ratio for them shows a rather even balance with 103 men for every 100 women. However, this can be contrasted with that for the town as a whole where there are 97 men for every 100 women. The near sex-parity is partly an indicator of the relative stability of the zongo population. But that the stability is far from complete is further borne out by the disproportion between age groups. Among zongo-dwellers the percentage of children between 1 and 14 comes only to 41 % of the total population. The corresponding figure comes to 49 % for the town as a whole. Likewise the proportion of people over 64 years to the total population is 4.1 % for Cape Coast and 3.1 % for the zongo complex. Thus the relative preponderance of able-bodied persons (age group 15-64 years) in the zongo complex comes to 56 % as compared to 47 % for the town.

The first zongo in Cape Coast is said to have been founded late in the 19th century. It is no wonder, therefore, that most zongo-dwellers were born in the town. Indeed some young men have known no other country save Ghana. All the same in 1960 about 12 % of the inhabitants of the zongo complex were born in Africa outside Ghana, whereas for Cape Coast as a whole the corresponding percentage was roughly 6 %. The discrepancy is considerably greater if we take men only, for about 8 % of the town's male population were born in African countries other than Ghana, whereas for male zongo-dwellers it was more than 17 %.

The point which emerges from the above facts is that, although many of the actual inhabitants of the zongo complex have themselves migrated to their present places of residence, for most zongo-dwellers migration has been permanent. Links are indeed maintained with the original tribal societies but contrary to Professor Southall's contention,¹⁰ settlement here is far from temporary.

We should, however, be careful not to take the demographic structure of Cape Coast zongos as representative of the zongo

¹⁰ A. SOUTHALL (ed.), *Social Change in Modern Africa*, Oxford Univ. Press, 1961, Introductory Summary, p. 37.

⁹ Demographic data of the Cape Coast Zongo Complex have been prepared on the basis of figures contained in various tables of the *1960 Population Census of Ghana*. Special Report A (Statistics of Towns with 10,000 Population or more (Accra-1964).

complex throughout Ghana. Although all zongos show varying degrees of demographic imbalance, the lack of urban stability is most pronounced in Sabon zongo and Nima of Accra. The following table gives a general picture of the demographic structure of zongos in various towns of Ghana.

A GENERAL PICTURE OF THE DEMOGRAPHIC STRUCTURE OF FIVE ZONGOS IN FOUR TOWNS/CITIES OF GHANA ¹¹

Name	1A	1B	2A	2B	3A	3B	4A	4B
Cape Coast zongo complex	97	103	49 %	41 %	4.1 %	3.1 %	6 %	12 %
Sekondi zongo	117	115	41 %	41 %	1.2 %	1.4 %	14 %	15 %
Kumasi zongo	112	116	42 %	38 %	1.3 %	1.9 %	11 %	16 %
Sabon zongo (Accra)	114	128	39 %	38 %	2.3 %	1.5 %	15 %	33 %
Nima (Accra)	114	137	39 %	33 %	2.3 %	1 %	15 %	36 %

Note:

- 1A = number of men for every 100 women in the town/city in which the zongo is situated.
- 1B = number of men for every 100 women in the zongo.
- 2A = % of children (1-14 years) to the total population of city/town in which the zongo is situated.
- 2B = % of children (1-14 years) to the total population of the zongo.
- 3A = % of persons of over 64 years to the total population of the town in which the zongo is situated.
- 3B = % of persons over 64 years to the total population of the zongo.
- 4A = % of inhabitants born in Africa outside Ghana to the total population of the town/city in which the zongo is situated.
- 4B = % of inhabitants born in Africa outside Ghana to the total population of the zongo.

¹¹ These ratios have been calculated on the basis of figures given in the 1960 *Population Census of Ghana: Special Report A Statistics of Towns with 10,000 population or more (Accra - 1964)*.

In urban Ghana occupational specialisation does not entirely follow lines of tribal division. Yet certain communities are more engaged in given occupations than others. In Cape Coast those who are engaged in the primary sector are mostly Fante, while a majority of zongo-dwellers are believed to be dependent on petty trade and various semi-skilled and unskilled production processes. This goes with a minimum dependence on clerical and administrative services and agriculture. It has been estimated that a little over 10% of the adult males of Cape Coast depend on agriculture. But in the zongo complex it comes down to just over 1%. Unfortunately detailed data about the occupational structure of the Cape Coast zongo complex are not available. But the following figures highlight the difference in the occupational pattern of a town/city and that of a zongo within it¹².

OCCUPATIONAL DIVISION IN % OF EMPLOYED MALES OF 15 AND OVER IN FOUR ZONGOS SITUATED IN THREE CITIES OF GHANA

Occupation	Accra	Sabon zongo	Nima		Kumasi zongo	Sekondi Takoradi	Sekondi zongo
Clerical	13 %	5 %	4 %	7 %	4 %	13 %	17 %
Trade	9 %	11 %	9 %	16 %	27 %	6 %	13 %
(Retail)	(6 %)	(8 %)	(7 %)	(12 %)	(21 %)		
Farming, Fishin, Hunting, etc.	6 %	1 %	2 %	7 %	4 %	6 %	1 %
Craftsmen, Production process workers & labourers, etc.	46 %	63 %	64 %	44 %	43 %	46 %	

¹² The percentages have been calculated on the basis of figures given in the 1960 *Population Census of Ghana: Special Report A Statistics of Towns with 10,000 Population or more* (Accra - 1964), Table 7. For the sake of simplicity only four occupational categories have been selected here.

Apart from a demographic imbalance and a different occupational structure, a zongo complex is also characterized by the presence of a chain of mosques and schools which serve it as distinctive socializing agencies.

Thus it is usual for every zongo complex to be endowed with one or more Quranic schools. Zongos in Cape Coast have five of them with about 400 students of both sexes and eight teachers. Of the five schools, three belong to the Hausa where the medium of instruction is Hausa, although one of the five teachers who serve these schools is Yoruba. Of the remaining two, one belongs to the Yoruba group with the Yoruba language as the medium, while the fifth has been started by the Wangara. All these schools are managed separately and enjoy almost complete autonomy. The zongo complex in Cape Coast does not have a central organization to recommend and enforce a common policy with regard to general administration and such matters as a common syllabus. On the whole what is taught and how depends on individual teachers. By and large however, the school curriculum includes the teaching and learning by heart of the Quran, a smattering of Arabic, simple arithmetic and the history of the rise and growth of Islam.

As the schools are not recognised by the Government of the country, no government grant is made available to them. Fees from students and contribution by the local Jama'at (congregation) keep them going. In some cases the school is housed in the local mosque itself, while occasionally the drawing room of a locally influential Moslem may become its venue.

Theoretically every school is open to all. In practice, the medium of instruction largely conditions the social composition of the student body. Thus the Wangara school is attended overwhelmingly by Wangara children and the Yoruba school by Yoruba children. But the three Hausa schools include a number of non-Hausa (including Fante) children. Educationally backward tribes like the Moshi, Fulani and the Grunshi have not yet started their own schools. But of course founding a Quranic school is only one way of asserting the autonomy and exclusiveness of a tribe. The other convenient way is to start a separate place of worship or mosque.

In Cape Coast there are six mosques. A Moslem zongo-dweller will deny that such proliferation has anything to do with tribal division, asserting that any Moslem can go to any mosque and pray there. Theoretically, of course, this is true in the sense that a

Moslem cannot be debarred from praying in any of the mosques which are indeed open to all members of the faith. In actuality, however, proliferation of mosques should be seen in the context of internal structural differentiation of the zongo complex. A largely Islamised tribe, even when living in a zongo with other Moslem tribes, tends to organize its social life around a mosque and a congregation of its own. In the mosque their language is spoken and the principal tasks of the congregation include maintenance of the mosque, informal arbitration in cases of dispute within the tribe, provision for schooling, arrangement for funeral, extension of help, financial and moral, in case of need, and for that matter any other issue relating to the general welfare of the tribe. Important social events and religious rites may also be celebrated in or around the mosque which may further be the venue of small gossip groups in the evening. The congregation (*Jama'at*) is loosely structured being composed of all adult males who generally attend prayers and participate in the activities of the tribe. The chief and tribal elders (*mallam*) enjoy much authority but matters of common interest are normally placed before a general meeting of the adult population of the tribe.

All the same it would be wrong to see the mosques as isolated centres of worship based on tribal identity and entirely dissociated from the zongo social structure. There is evidence that, in some cases at least, after a public mosque had been constructed it was handed over in unambiguous terms to the Serikin zongo (chief of the entire zongo complex) and his Imam as custodians. But even otherwise where there has been no such express grant of authority, the power of the latter has largely been recognised especially in the period when the colonial government was following the policy of grouping together Moslem or largely Islamised tribes living among the Fante, a policy that was symbolised by the practice of conferring the title «Headman of the Mohammedan Community» on the Serikin Zongo. The zongo chiefs were generally aware of the policy and by intelligent use of the opportunity thus provided entrenched their position in the zongo social structure. Thus in 1943 on the occasion of the election of the chief Imam of Cape Coast, the then Serikin Zongo of the town argued and established the point that all mosques in the zongo complex were under his control and that the chief Imam could function in all of them. When an opposing faction planned to elect a Hausa elder as Imam in one of the mosques, the zongo chief decided to lock it up, a right which was recognized

by the Colonial Government¹³. This was to be sure an unusual case. Ordinarily the zongo chief is not out to establish his authority so bluntly. The day to day administration of a mosque is vested in its Imam and its tribal congregation. And whatever control is exercised by the total zongo complex comes through the chief Imam rather than from the Serikin Zongo. Of course the Chief Imam himself is in charge of one of the mosques (perhaps the largest in the town) where he conducts the *juma* prayer on Friday afternoon. But he also stands out as the symbol of the religious unity of the zongo complex.

The election of the Chief Imam is effected by a committee of all the headmen of Islamised tribes and their elders in the presence of the Serikin Zongo. As in the election of the Zongo chief, here too by means of informal discussion and lobbying a large measure of argument is created. However, for the Imam a good grounding in Arabic, Islamic law and the Quran is essential. And since the availability of such men is extremely limited, the election for Imamship is not usually a hard-fought battle. This is all the more so because in Cape Coast the Chief Imam, by convention, used to be a Yoruba. The conventional arrangement by which a Hausa becomes the Serikin Zongo, and a Yoruba is generally elected to the office of the chief Imam is an interesting structural principle of the zongo complex in Cape Coast in that it associates two of the most numerous and prestigious tribes with the zongo social system thereby contributing to its stability.

If the Chief Imam functions at the apex of the religious wing of the zongo structural complex, the Serikin Zongo (zongo chief) operates at the head of the secular wing. At a lower level each of the large tribes living in the zongo complex has its own chief, responsible for the internal administration of the affairs concerning the tribe. Perhaps it is more appropriate to call them tribal clusters rather than tribes, for it seems that each of them consists of several distinct tribes the difference between which is ignored in the urban environment. According to the Serikin Zongo there are at least a dozen Hausa tribes in the four zongos of Cape Coast as for example, the Kano, the Sokoto, the Zazzau, the Katsina, the Gobir, the Zampara, the Gondo, the Birine-kabo, the Dawura and several

¹³ Ghana National Archives (hereafter referred to as GNA), Cape Coast, Case No. 184/1920: «Hausa Zongo of Cape Coast», *Cape Coast List*, item, No. C82.

others. In the Kotokuraba zongo alone Hausa tribes number half a dozen. Yet an outsider is hardly aware of these internal differences. And what is equally important, faced with an overwhelming Fante presence, an individual Hausa himself is less aware of them. We can thus say internal matters of every tribal cluster are dealt with by the chief in collaboration with his elders. But an inter-cluster dispute may involve a conference of heads of tribal clusters, if the wronged party does not get redress for his grievances from the chief of the offending party. An unsettled dispute can be taken to the Serikin Zongo as the supreme chief of the entire zongo complex.

Till recently the Serikin Hausa (Hausa chief) of Cape Coast was ex *Officio* the Serikin Zongo. As such he had to handle not only the internal matters of the Hausa but also those of all zongo residents. He constituted an informal court of arbitration, informal because various Naive Administration Ordinances never gave him legal power to do so. All the same everybody knew that for certain purposes the Serikin Zongo acted as an arbitrator not merely for the Hausa but also for other tribes in the zongo complex.

The Serikin Zongo's office is not hereditary. It is elective in a loose way. There is no voting by the entire population, not even by all adult males. Moslem elders, at the death, deposition or retirement of a zongo chief, meet and discuss the merits and demerits of candidates for the vacant office and after due deliberation decide upon the most suitable person. Thus during the election of the third Serikin Zongo, Bukhari, in 1919, the successful candidate was supported by elders of such tribes as the Hausa, Yoruba, Grunshi, Wala, Salaga and Moshi, by elders of the Dagomba, Fulani, Grunshi and Zabrama as well as by several individual members of the Wangara tribe.¹⁴ Similarly the fourth Serikin Zongo of Cape Coast, Mahama Musa Wogyi, was elected in June, 1921 by elders of the Hausa, Yoruba, Wangara, Grunshi, Wala, Moshi, Kotokoli and Zabarama tribes resident in Cape Coast zongos as well as by representatives of the Hausa community of Saltpond, a small town 18 miles east of Cape Coast¹⁵. Records say that after election electors can claim from the new Serikin Zongo a fee of £ 22 as the Recognition and Allegiance Fee which is distributed in «proportionate shares» among different tribes.

¹⁴ GNA, Cape Coast, Case No. m 76/22, Subject: Mohamedan Community, *Cape Coast List, item*, No. 214.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

In such elections unanimity does not always prevail. Indeed the election of the third Serikin Zongo, Bukhari Mamadu Damborunu II, was opposed by the influential headmen of the Wangara tribe.¹⁶ And despite an official move to end factionalism on the eve of the election of the fifth Serikin Zongo, Ismailia, a small Hausa faction remained unreconciled to the latter's election.

In the absence of unanimity what counts is a majority decision coupled with appropriate government recognition. Usually in the colonial days this was granted after a representation had been made by zongo elders to the District Commissioner followed by an official «presentation» of the new Serikin Zongo to the latter.

Although individual qualities are of primary importance in election, it appears that some consideration is generally given to the hereditary factor as well. Thus the third Serikin Zongo of Cape Coast was the son of the first Serikin Zongo. But since at the death of the latter, the former was a minor, someone else was appointed as the second incumbent of the office. When the second zongo chief died, the third Serikin Zongo replaced him. However, soon the third chief was found incompetent and was accordingly deposed. The present Serikin Zongo is the son of the fourth incumbent and has been functioning since 1924.

Like the electoral process, the process of removal of a zongo chief is loose and vague. But there has been at least one case of deposition in 1921. And it will not be out of place here to highlight the important features of this event. The move to impeach the then Serikin Zongo, third incumbent, Bukhari, was initiated by the chief Imam of the zongo complex and a number of elders of the Yoruba, Hausa, Grunshi, Wangara, Fulani and Wala tribes. The charges brought against the Zongo chief were as follows: (i) illegal extortion of money from his subjects and Moslems elsewhere; (ii) disrespect to elders; (iii) misappropriation of property left by a deceased person; (iv) liberal grant of divorce on receipt of money; (v) commercialisation of arbitration; (vi) maintenance of close links with a gang of burglars; and, (vii) collection of a sum of 2s from every Moslem. The charges were brought to the notice of the Serikin Zongo and when the latter's self-defence was not found satisfactory, the elders removed him from office and informed the District Commissioner about their action. After the latter had been satisfied that the move had the backing of a large majority of zongo dwellers,

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

he gave his approval. After this in 1937 a similar attempt was made to depose Chief Ismailia on the ground that he had married the wife of his «linguist» without the approval of the woman's family and even before she had been divorced by her husband. When the charge was proffered against him, Ismailia said that he would prefer living with the woman to continuing as the zongo chief. At this stage certain influential elders intervened and the dispute was settled with Ismailia remaining the chief.¹⁷

The Serikin Zongo does not receive any remuneration, although as chief he gets occasional tribute from his subjects. The present incumbent is a tailor by profession and he earns his own living. There is no public house built for his residence. And the Serikin Zongo lives in his own house which, however, is referred to as the palace by the local zongo-dwellers.

It is easy to see the structural autonomy of the zongo complex in Cape Coast. This is a collection of residential wards, distinctly isolable from their neighbourhoods. Their inhabitants belong to northern and foreign tribes. Most of them are Moslem by religion. A large part of their social life is centred round the mosque. Their children attend Quranic schools where they pick up a smattering of Quranic learning. Up to the time when the Serikin Hausa was recognised as the Serikin Zongo he was the symbol of the political unity of the zongo complex. And it was through him at the top that the zongos were structurally integrated to the local political system. When the CPP Government some years before withdrew recognition from Chief Ismailia as the Serikin Zongo, the participation of zongo-dwellers in local politics was largely articulated through the Moslem Association that claims to speak for all Moslem residents of Zongos. Finally, on important occasions of the life cycle of an individual zongo dweller the structural unity of the zongo society is brought to the fore in unmistakable terms. Marriages, funerals and naming rites of a Moslem belonging largely to Islamised tribes are attended by chiefs, Imams and mallams of all these tribes. These gatherings are perhaps the clearest expressions of a transtribal consciousness centring round Islam and with the Hausa as an integration focus, for, here the common language is Hausa and mallams, imams and chiefs make their public pronouncements in the Hausa language. On one Sunday morning I saw the same multi-tribal gathering solemnising five marriages in different

¹⁷ GNA, Cape Coast, Case No. 184/1920, *op. cit.*

zongos of the town. In three cases the parties were Hausa, one was a Yoruba marriage and the fifth was a marriage the partners of which came from a minor, partly Islamised tribe. Later, the same gathering took part in a Yoruba funeral.

In face of such overwhelming structural unity, one tends to ignore the sub-systems existing in the zongo complex. Yet they are as much real as the morphological integration of the latter. Inhabitants of zongos still remain members of different tribes. In worshipping, a large Islamised tribe tends to have its own mosque which, however, is theoretically open to all Moslems. Thus one speaks of the Wangara mosque or the Yoruba mosque. In schooling once again a large Islamised tribe is likely to run its own Quranic school with its own language as the medium of instruction. Thus the Wangara and the Yoruba possess their own schools in the Kotokuraba zongo. In residential pattern there are small settlement clusters of members of the same tribe, although it is not possible to delineate compact tribal neighbourhoods, distinct and separate from one another within a zongo. In marriage a tribe remains ordinarily the largest endogamous unit. Inter-tribal marriages do take place. But they are few and far between. Last but not least, each large tribe has its own political system headed by a chief and tribal elders.

Indeed the self-assertion of a tribe manifests itself through the possession of a recognised headman no less than through the organisation of a separate Quranic school and the construction of a separate mosque. It seems that whenever a group of tribal immigrants in the Zongo complex attained sufficient numerical strength and an adequate level of self-consciousness, it pressed for some kind of recognition, however vague, of its autonomous status from the Government and the Serikin Hausa. Although our examples are taken mainly from Cape Coast, there have been similar developments in Kumasi and Accra.

In Cape Coast attempts, often repeated, have been made by several tribes to establish the independence of their headmen. Since the policy of the colonial Government has been to group together Moslem and largely Islamised tribes into one «Mohammedan Community» under the Serikin Hausa as the Serikin Zongo, such attempts were directed at least partly against the Serikin Zongo. Thus as early as in 1918¹⁸ «chiefs» of Wangara settlements in the

¹⁸ GNA, Cape Coast, Case No. 98/1919, Subject: «Hausa and Wangara Settlers in Cape Coast», *Cape Coast List*, item, No. D. 526.

Zongo complex and a number of villages in and around Cape Coast sent a petition to the Commissioner of the Central Province for official permission to elect one of them as the «head chief» of the Wangara directly under the paramount chief (Omanhene) of Cape Coast and independent of the Hausa chief. The grounds for such a move were adduced as follows: (1) that the Wangara language and customs were different; (2) that the Serikin Hausa imposed heavy fine on Wangara when they appeared before the Hausa tribunal; and (3) that in Cape Coast and nearby villages there were about 1,000 Wangara inhabitants, a total sufficiently high and respectable, to justify the recognition of a separate and independent chief.

As could be expected, this move was opposed by the Serikin Zongo. And although the Wangara request received the sympathy of the District Commissioner, it was later rejected by the Secretary of Native Affairs in Accra on the ground that it would «encourage disintegration» and that the Government could «not recognise a Wangara headman's right to hold any tribunal, however informál». A similar attempt was made early in 1919 but in vain, both the Serikin Zongo and the Colonial Government having squarely rejected it.

The official non-recognition of the Wangara demand far from reflects the real situation of the administration of affairs of immigrant tribes. It is true that the Wangara headman was not recognised as a chief or headman, for purposes of law, with authority to hold tribunal. But neither was the Serikin Hausa invested with this right under the existing Native Administration Ordinance. What the Wangara seemed to have wanted is their independence of the Serikin Hausa (Serikin Zongo) and direct relationship with the traditional Fante paramount chief of Cape Coast. The latter would have enabled them to approach the colonial authority without having to move through the Serikin Zongo. In this, of course, the Wangara did not succeed. But the Government policy failed to force them to cooperate with the Serikin Zongo, a fact which was brought into bold relief on the occasion of the death of the Serikin Zongo, Musa, and the installation of his successor, Bukhari (October-November, 1919). The conflict between the two continued with occasional but short-lived reconciliation, until the early 1960's when the CPP Government having refused to recognise the Serikin Hausa as the Serikin Zongo, a society, the Moslem Association by name, with government patronage, took upon itself the task of

speaking for the zongo complex and the Wangara chief, as the President of the society, assumed greater importance than the Serikin Hausa, as far as dealing with the Government was concerned.

Thus, for a member of a large tribe in a zongo complex there are three levels of social participation outside his domestic group, viz., as a member of his tribe or perhaps tribal cluster, as an inhabitant of the zongo complex, especially if he is a Moslem or near-Moslem, and as a citizen of Cape Coast. At the first level he is subject to a system of social relationships involving his immediate kinsmen, if any, and co-members of the same tribe or tribal cluster loosely organised into a congregation (*jama'at*) that runs a mosque and a school, when the tribe is large enough. At the second level he is a zongo-dweller and is generally tied to a network of social relationships articulated through his allegiance to the Serikin Zongo and the Imam. And lastly as a citizen of Cape Coast he also functions in the context of the total urban society.

At what level are individual zongo-dwellers integrated with the total social structure of Cape Coast? A migrant is part of the local society by entering into patternised relationships with its other members. In the social field the scope of relationships of reciprocal obligations between zongo inhabitants and Fante citizens of Cape Coast is limited. Neighbourhood relationships are possible only for those who live on the periphery of the zongos and that too, if there are Fante living on the outskirts. Marriage and affinity are rare. Common religious affiliation affects only a handful of Fante. Common membership of voluntary associations is equally scarce. In the economic field, on the other hand, migrant-Fante association may become closer. When a migrant takes a plot of land on the outskirts of the town from a Fante lineage, when he regularly buys from and sells to his Fante customers or when he works with Fante mates in the same undertaking, he enters into a multitude of repetitive and contractual relationships with Fante counterparts, being thereby absorbed into the urban economy.

As contrasted with such relationships which engage individual zongo dwellers and individual Fante, the politico-administrative system of the zongo complex as a whole is joined at its apex with the traditional Fante political system of the town. Throughout the colonial period the traditional Fante political system of Cape Coast was recognised as the indigenous framework of government to which were grafted at different stages the town council and the municipality for certain purposes and which was superseded by

various District, Provincial/Regional and national agencies for certain other purposes. When zongos were implanted in the Fante milieu, the Colonial Government had to determine their precise relationship with the indigenous political system. And on many occasions elders of immigrant tribes were reminded of the dominant position of the latter.

V

In conclusion, let us summarise the ideal structural features of a zongo complex in urban Ghana. Briefly they are as follows:

- i) physical separation from the residential quarters of the locally dominant tribe;
- ii) an insufficiently stabilised population in terms of demography;
- iii) occupationally a minimum dependence on administrative, professional, and clerical services as well as on primary production (especially fishing and farming), except in Asante where coca-farming is too lucrative to be missed entirely even by zongo dwellers;
- iv) occupationally a major stress on crafts and semi-skilled production processes and services;
- v) considerable structural autonomy centred round a chain of mosques with the chief Imam and the Serikin Zongo at the top;
- vi) marked internal differentiation whereby a large tribe or tribal cluster provides a secondary system of relationships for its members within a zongo complex;
- vii) integration with the locally functioning traditional authority system at the top.

In some of these features the Cape Coast zongo complex can be taken as representative of zongos in Ghana. However, in the demographic structure, it appears to be more stable than the Accra zongos which contain a considerable floating population and a high percentage of first-generation immigrants.

Yet various though they are, the zongo complexes in urban Ghana can be seen as integration foci with Islam providing the framework within which a large part of one's social life is articulated and with Hausa (in addition to the local lingua franca) as a medium of communication. Evidently this integration-focus has a long-term impact on social development in Ghana. But its short-term effects are nonetheless negligible. The zongo complex is an adjustment mechanism

for new immigrants to «strange» towns. Growth of modern economic activities in Ghanaian urban centres with considerable opportunities for employment and earning money have brought in migrants who have little in common with the locally dominant tribes but discover and accept Islam as a focal point around which their precarious existence in a strange urban milieu can be maintained and regulated.

Thus it is that in a zongo a lonely immigrant will find shelter and nourishment until he is able to earn his living. Here he will find persons who speak his language and follow his way of life with whom he can contract intimate relationships. In this the zongo complex is an extension of the traditional society from which he has emigrated. Yet it is different too, having grown under urban conditions and within the social milieu of a foreign tribe. And it is exactly this duality that enables the zongo complex to make a significant contribution to urban stability of Ghana.

A NOTE ON SOME RURAL INFLUENCES IN BRAZILIAN CITIES

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A proportion now closely approaching, if not surpassing, one half of the Brazilian population¹ would be classified by the Census as «urban»; and of these the majority are concentrated in the cities of a narrow eastern region of the country, particularly in Rio de Janeiro, and in São Paulo with its satellite industrial municipalities. The social and political dominance of the eastern cities is evident throughout Brazilian history; and during the past fifty years the country's economic centre of gravity, accompanying the growth of industry and the gradually dwindling importance of primary rural products, has also moved to the cities. Much recent Brazilian history, probably not excepting the *coup d'état* of March, 1964, can be understood in terms of conflict between rural and urban interests — a conflict in which the former have faced until recently an almost unbroken series of defeats. As the cities gain at the expense of the countryside, both Brazilian and foreign commentators see Brazil's future lying almost exclusively in the urban areas.

Hitherto the outward pattern of change has followed fairly familiar lines. But behind it lies a set of close rural-urban relationships creating a situation differing fundamentally from much European and North American experience. Despite an immense discrepancy separating extreme cases (separating, for example, the rich urban merchant from the poverty-stricken *camponês*) there exists in a significant sense a social continuum preventing utter divorce of sympathy and understanding between the city dweller and his rural compatriot. In this Brazil differs from Europe and North America. If there are Brazilian city jokes about the country

¹ The preliminary results of the 1960 Brazilian Census (all that are so far available) give 45.08 per cent. urban; and this may well be an underestimate, for various reasons, even for the Census year. Between 1950 and 1960, the percentage urban rose, according to the Census, from 36.16 to 45.08. If this rate of increase has continued through the years 1960-1966, the current proportion is likely to be about 50 per cent. Cf. Brasil: *Sinopse preliminar do Censo Demográfico*, Rio de Janeiro, Serviço Nacional de Recenseamento, 1962, p. 10.

yokel, as there as rural jokes about the city slicker, these are regarded somewhat as jokes within the family, tending in consequence to be socially cohesive, rather than socially divisive as in other societies. The Brazilian city-dweller is more aware of his relationship to the rural *nordestino* and the *fazendeiro* of the west, for example, than the Londoner of his connection with the Scottish fisherman or even the farmer in the Home Counties. There is in short a continuity of thought and behaviour joining together urban and rural Brazil that has influenced, and continues to influence, the character of the Brazilian city, its planning, its layout and its administration.

The main reasons for this continuity can be observed in Brazilian history, where we see that links joining town and country have always, except for brief intervals of friction, been extremely powerful. If it was in the cities that the political life of the nation has been guided, the guides themselves were either landowners or closely related to those who were. Many rural magnates had city houses which they occupied during part, perhaps a larger part, of the year. Their domestic staff was large, and their dependent relatives numerous, most of the former, and many of the latter, being likewise of rural origin. Mercantile and commercial, rather than industrial centres as the cities were until quite recent decades (this being one source of the conflict of rural and urban economic interest that rises to the top of Brazilian affairs from time to time) they were socially and economically dependent on the countryside. Movement between town and country was incessant, the most sophisticated of city people having rural roots; and the Brazilian social historian, Oliveira Vianna, sees in this a key to the Brazilian national character. By customs, manners and in the most intimate constituents of his character, Vianna writes,² the Brazilian reveals himself a countryman, held to the countryside alike by its sweetness (*doçura*) as by the social importance of being a landed proprietor. «The great rural gentleman makes his house his world. Within it he passes his existence as if within an ideal microcosm: and all is as if society did not exist». It is true that during the Colonial period Portuguese administrators had given to urban life a greater significance than it was to possess later; but this epoch ended with the defeat of the «foreign», urban, element, in whose place domestic interests took over. The vacuum left by the departure

² Oliveira VIANNA, *Populações Meridionais do Brasil*, vol. 1, pp. 47-48; 66-67, Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio, 5th edition, 1952.

of colonial administrators was filled by the only group equipped to do so — the large landed proprietors, to whom the intellectual and professional groups were related by blood or closely linked, socially and economically.

The representatives of rural interests preserved in the cities a basically rural point of view that has not entirely disappeared (*pace* the Brazilian intelligentsia) beneath an upper layer of European urbanism. The recent and confusingly rapid growth of some Brazilian cities does not alone account for the persistence within them of rural peculiarities. There are, of course, certain cases (notably, for example, Rio de Janeiro, Salvador, Santos) where accidents of terrain have permitted a close physical conjunction of the rustic and the urban. The violently mountainous character of Rio de Janeiro's physical setting brings the choked tropical vegetation of the hillsides within a minute's walk of the most strident, Chicago-like, street life. Apartment blocks of the rich and the middle-class in Copacabana are overlooked by the migrant peasants' mud and wattle (*pau a pique*) huts, in some districts set in their plots of maize, banana and other easily-grown produce. The constant incursion within city boundaries of striking topographical features, *serra*, swamp, lake, river, forest, sea, (or their close proximity easily visible from the many vantage points of hilly Brazilian cities) gives urban living the constant companionship of the countryside in a manner the Bois de Boulogne or Hyde Park cannot imitate. To this extent, and because the «urbanisation» of the natural setting is an intractable and expensive task, it may be agreed that urban growth has been too rapid to allow the complete submersion of rural characteristics. But it is not to these factors, significant as they have been, that we wish to draw attention. The rural habits and rural assumptions brought to the cities first by the landlord-politician, and later by the rural migrant of more lowly origin, have contributed even more to the creation of a Brazilian *rus in urbe* of a peculiar kind.

To understand this we must return to Oliveira Vianna's evaluation of the «rural nobility» as a fundamentally domestic class, «domestic by temperament and by morality; domestic by habit and by general tendency».³ Unlike the Englishman, who, sharing perhaps something of this domesticity of outlook, separated it from his public life, the Brazilian politician and administrator of tradition allows it free play, although not easily compatible with

³ *Ibid.*, p. 67.

the entirely different demands of urban living. Rural life in the isolation of the vast Brazilian interior created a man typically inward-facing, self- or family-centred. Society for him was a mere system of relationships between members of the extended family, and between these and the tenants, share-croppers, employees and hangers-on of the *fazenda*. A man worked and negotiated entirely in the interest of himself and of those dependent upon him. A wider vision of society as a whole was not only irrelevant: it was almost impossible of achievement. The Brazilian countryside produced no Tolstoy, no Kropotkin; no frustrated revolutionary Brazilian landowner sweated in the fields with his men to give his life a meaning in the simple pursuits of the peasant labourer. Local government, in so far as it effectively existed, and bereft as it had to be of a civic sense, followed lines that sometimes indirectly, but more often directly benefited the interests of the landowner. Central government was an extra arm to be used in the pursuit of individual and family interests. To this system was linked, as far as the rural peasant was concerned, that pseudo-feudal relationship of patron-dependant whose nature we have more fully described elsewhere.⁴ This relationship, with its diverse social, economic and religious roots, ubiquitous in Brazilian life, leads to the substitution of self-reliance by a dependence on the assistance of the powerful. It followed that, with the taking-over of political power by landed interests, and the subsequent and increasing migration to the cities (both by the rich and the dependent poor) and in the absence there of a pre-existing sense of civic obligation,⁵ Brazilian government in general, and urban administration in particular, has retained many facets of an obviously rural origin.

The pursuit of personal interest we have mentioned as being so characteristic of the rural magnate transforms the nature of urban administration to a point where public welfare becomes of secondary importance. To this generalisation there are two important qualifications. First, there have been governors and *prefeitos* who have fought the traditional system, who have placed considerations of public welfare before personal interest (or have appeared to do so), and have administered their cities in accordance with other ideas

⁴ B. HURCHINSON, «The Patron-Dependant Relationship in Brazil», *Sociologia Ruralis*, vol. VI, n° 1, 1966, pp. 3-30.

⁵ On the lack of this sense among the Portuguese, cf. Marcus CHEKE, «The Portuguese Character», in H. V. LIVERMORE (ed.), *Portugal and Brazil: an introduction*, Oxford, The Clarendon Press, 1953, p. 45.

of what constitutes civic morality. Secondly, even those operating what the United States has called the «spoils system» are not necessarily opposed to «good» administration if this does not reduce significantly the benefits they expect to accrue to themselves. Many instances, indeed, could be cited where the path of «good» administration has coincided with that of political advantage, and has been pursued accordingly, at any rate partially, or at certain periods. Yet at both the central and at the local government level the chief interest of politics for most participants does not lie in the opportunity it offers for the realisation of plans for the public welfare. The struggle for political power is but a series of moves in the search for personal aggrandisement. City planning and administration reflects this system, so that whatever fund of goodwill or idealism exists at executive levels tends to be rapidly exhausted.

If we leave these levels to examine concrete cases of rural habits within the city environment, the position appears more striking. A survey conducted during 1960 among the adult population of six Brazilian cities showed that among these about fifteen per cent. were rural-born. Another third had been born in small townships of the interior.⁶ Probably half had arrived in the cities in the years since the end of the Second World War, many in the years 1950-1960. We need feel no surprise, then, at the persistence among a sizeable section of Brazilian city populations of habits of behaviour essentially rural in meaning. These may be observed at a superficial level by the visitor to the larger cities — and often accounted for, equally superficially, on the grounds of illiteracy, ignorance or bad manners. Maltreatment of urban amenities, insanitary habits (in an urban context), lack of consideration for the interests of fellow citizens and the like: common as these phenomena seem to be from the viewpoint of visitor accustomed to more stringent demands on urban living, they are explicable sociologically, not in terms of social ethics. The question of the hillside settlements, or *favelas*, which sheds so dramatic a light on Brazilian cities, must be understood as one of rural migration rather than of true urban poverty and administrative neglect. For the problems the *favelas* present are not essentially urban: they are the chronic problems of the Brazilian countryside disturbingly transferred to the more visible setting of the cities. It is this fact that makes their popula-

⁶ B. HUTCHINSON, «The Migrant Population of Urban Brazil», *América Latina*, vol. 6, n° 2, 1963, pp. 41-71.

tion less militantly discontented than the naive observer expects. The most unfortunate, or the least energetic, *favelado* regards himself as at any rate no worse off than he would have been in the country. The majority have a recognisably higher standard of living. As for the lamentably poor material living conditions — the wooden hut, the lack of running water and of sewerage, of electric light, paved roads and refuse collection — these do not perturb the *favelado* (or better, do not perturb him as much as might be expected) because they are familiar. It is interesting to note *how* familiar. The rural population in Brazil habitually lives without piped water or sewerage. Houses in the country, as in the *favelas*, are built precariously of wood and clay, roofed with straw, leaves or inferior tiles. The rural water supply lies at a distance from home, to which it must be carried by younger members of the family, as happens in the *favela*. The rural home, like that of the *favela*, lies as close as possible to the place of work. At the level of physical environment, therefore, the *favelado's* life has much in common with the rural areas whence he very often comes.

A similar resemblance is visible in his social life — indeed, the shock-absorption offered to him by the *favela* is an important advantage for the newly-arrived rural migrant⁷, who finds in it some continuation of a way of life he has left behind. The migrant's transition to urban living is made easier, not so much because the *favela* accelerates learning, but because it retards it. The *favelas* (and it must be remembered that in Rio de Janeiro about half-a-million people, or between 12 and 15 per cent. of the city's population, live in them) create a social enclave within which it is possible to continue living physically and spiritually along quasi-rural lines. At this point there enters a linkage between the political power structure, whose basically rural origin we have mentioned, and the working and poorer classes of the urban population. If the politician and the administrator still think in terms of the recruitment of dependants in support of personal power, the poor and the underprivileged think in complementary terms of influential patrons, and their exploitation for individual advantage. For city administration these interlacing tendencies create a situation in which the serious application of planning is extremely difficult. Reforms, improvements, rehousing and other administrative action, in any case handicapped by scarce financial resources, fall prey to merely poli-

⁷ On this, see Carlos Alberto DE MEDINA, *A Favela e o Demagogo*, São Paulo, Livraria Martins, 1964, pp. 52-53.

tical and demagogic considerations. New water supplies for neighbourhoods needing them, welfare services for the poor and the ill, «slum» clearance and rehousing, are often ad hoc responses by the executive to demands by politicians on behalf of their constituents; and these last repay their debt by voting accordingly (or did so until recent events deprived the popular vote in Brazil of its significance). It is largely because of influences of this kind, for example, that the architecturally celebrated and carefully planned new Capital, Brasília, depends for its day-to-day functioning upon a labour force living in conditions scarcely distinguishable from the *favelas* of older and internationally less admired cities.

In summary, it is suggested that many current problems of life in the greater Brazilian cities flow more or less directly from the persistence in them of rural habits of mind and action. It is true that this phenomenon has advantages at periods of heavy rural-urban migration in making the adjustment of migrants less severely painful. But in circumstances of heavy urban growth which has created in decades cities numbering their populations in millions, the problem arising from it are equally significant, presenting serious obstacles to the emergence of a civic loyalty and the conventions of urban living that have been found necessary in cities of more antique foundation. Structurally the outlook and expectations we have mentioned bring about a multiplicity of vertical associations (in the class sense) in place of more useful horizontal ones. Neighbourhood loyalty is minimal; so is class or group solidarity. The understanding of the demands of «public welfare», a consideration for the interests of others, a concept of the city as (to adapt Corbusier's phrase) «a machine for living in» rather than as a field open to the private pursuit of personal social and economic advantage: these are largely absent; and they are absent because there has been neither temporal opportunity nor outside pressure for their adoption. The character of Brazilian cities naturally reflects the Brazilian interpretation of the meaning of life. Yet it can be already seen how increasing industrialisation is striking at the roots of a traditional view of life; and as first generation migrants give way to those of the second generation, old rural habits show signs of disappearing in the centres of greatest economic growth. This is the case of São Paulo, the demands of whose massive industrial and commercial growth are beginning to make of it the most organised city in the country, and within whose boundaries social values derived from the technological revolution are replacing those of rural life.

THE MODELS
LES MODÈLES

LIST OF PAPERS PRESENTED AT THE CONGRESS ¹

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V. CAZZULLI (Université de Bologne, Milan)	«Typologies in Relation to Mathematical Models»
V. CANTILLANO (Université de Rome)	«Problèmes du monde contemporain: La sociologie vis-à-vis des exigences de la théorisation et de la planification socio-économique»
H. LITZBERGER (Université de Pittsburgh)	«The Joint Welfare Functions»
J. MURAS (Université hébraïque de Jérusalem)	«Social Mobility and Social Structure: Some Insights from Linear Models»
E. REICHMANN (Institut pour l'avancement des sciences, Vienne)	«Games with Imperfect Conditions»

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¹ Les chiffres romains de I à IV qui suivent certaines communications signifient qu'elles ont été publiées dans les volumes correspondants de la série des Actes du 6^{ème} Congrès mondial de sociologie.

¹ The roman numbers from I to IV which follow certain papers mean that these papers have been published in the volumes corresponding to the serie of the 6th World Congress of Sociology.

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- R. BOUDON (Université de Bordeaux) «Models for Analysis of Survey Data»
- V. CAPECCHI (Université de Bocconi, Milan) «Typologies in Relation to Mathematical Models»
- V. CASTELLANO (Université de Rome) «Problème du monde contemporain: La sociologie vis-à-vis des exigences de la théorisation et de la planification socio-économique»
- B. LIEBERMANN (Université de Pittsburgh) «The Joint Welfare Function»
- J. MATRAS (Université hébraïque de Jérusalem) «Social Mobility and Social Structure: Some Insights from Linear Model»
- R. REICHARDT (Institut pour l'avancement des sciences, Vienne) «Games with Imperfect Coalitions»

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¹ *La Critica Sociologica*, vol. I, n° 1, Spring 1967, p 5-15.

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¹ *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. XI, n° 1, March 1967, p. 40-51.

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¹ *Social Forces*, 1968.

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¹ *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. XI, n° 2, June 1967, p. 139-152.

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¹ *Revue internationale de Sociologie.*

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¹ *Annuaire suisse de science politique*, n° 6/1966.

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¹ *Information sur les sciences sociales*, vol. 7, août 1967.

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¹ In G. BALANDIER, *Mélanges Georges Gurvitch*, Presses universitaires de France (sous presse).

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¹ *Etudes et Conjoncture*, 1966.

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- P. L. BERGER (New School for Social Research, N. Y.) «Phenomenological Influence on the Sociology of Knowledge»
- M. BLEGVAD (Copenhagen) «Sociology of Knowledge in Denmark»
- F. H. BLUM (Hemel Hempstead) «Comments on the Sociology of Knowledge in Great Britain».
- J. E. CORRADI (Argentine) «The Sociology of Knowledge in Latin America»

- D. HYMES (Université de Pennsylvanie) «Socio-linguistic Determination of Knowledge: Notes on the History of its Treatment in American Anthropology».
- A. IZZO (Bologne) «The Sociology of Knowledge in Italy»
- J. KATZ (Université hébraïque, Jérusalem) «Sociology of Knowledge in Israel»
- F. KOLEGAR (Université Roosevelt, Chicago). «The Political Attitudes of American Men of Letters».
- J. F. MARSAL (Institut Torcuato di Tella, Buenos Aires). «The Latin American Intellectuals and the Problem of Change»
- V. MEJA (Allemagne de l'Ouest) «The Sociology of Knowledge in Germany (1918-1933)».
- J. T. SCHEFF (Université de Californie) «Consensus as a Unifying Concept in the Sociology of Knowledge».
- T. T. SEGERSTEDT «Sociology of Knowledge in Sweden»
- R. J. SILVERS (Univ. Mc Master, Hamilton, Ontario) «Alienation and Creativity»
- J. SZACKI (Université de Varsovie) «Sociologie de la connaissance en Pologne contemporaine».
- J. SZIGÉVI (Budapest) «The History of the Hungarian Sociology of Knowledge».
- A. TILMAN-TIMON (Centre national de recherches sociales, Paris) «Instant et éternité: du système le plus large»
- K. H. WOLFF (Université Brauneis, Waltham) «The Sociology of Knowledge in the United States of America»¹.
- G. K. ZOLLSCHAN (Wellesley College) «Is Scientific Sociology possible?»

SOCIOLOGY OF LAW
SOCIOLOGIE DU DROIT

Président: R. TREVES (Université de Milan)

J. F. GLASTRA VAN LOON et E. VERCRUIJSSE² «Towards a Sociological Interpretation of Law»

¹ *America Latina* (à paraître).

² *Sociological Neerlandice*, vol. III, 1966.

- M. GRAWITZ (Faculté de droit et de sciences économiques de Lyon) «De l'utilisation en droit de notions sociologiques».
- VAN HOUTTE (Université St. Ignatius, Anvers) «La notion du droit dans la sociologie du droit».
- W. KAUPEN (Université de Cologne) «The Role of Law and the Lawyer in Modern Society». (IV)
- O. MANDIC (Université de Zagreb) «General Sociology and Sociology of Law».
- E. MORIONDO (Université de Milan) «The Ideology of Italian Judges».
- B. M. PERSSON BLEGVAD (Institut d'organisation et de sociologie industrielle, Copenhague) «A Case-Study of Inter-Organizational Conflict»¹
- A. PODGORECKI (Université de Varsovie) «The Three-Steps Hypothesis on the Functioning of the Law» (IV).
- A. ROSE (Université de Minnesota, Minneapolis) «Cross-Cultural Research in the Sociology of Law».
- V. STEINBERG (Université de Riga) «Subject and Methodology of Sociology of Law».
- H. STEINER (Institut d'économie, Berlin) «Social Origin in Structure of the Judge in Eastern and Western Germany: Subject, Possibilities and Limits of a Comparative Research»²
- R. TREVES (Université de Milan). «The Sociology of Law: Problems and Researches»³.

SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION
SOCIOLOGIE DE L'ÉDUCATION

Président: A. H. HALSEY (Université d'Oxford, Oxford)

- C. ADLER (Université hébraïque, Jerusalem) «Some Social Mechanisms affecting High School Drop-out» (IV).

¹ *Scandinavian Review of Sociology*, 1966.

² *Soziologie und Wirklichkeit. Beiträge zum VI Welt Kongress für Soziologie*.

³ *Edizioni Comunità*, Milan.

- O. ALBORNOZ (Université Harvard, Cambridge, Mass.) «Controversial Issues and Latin American Students».
- W. B. BROOKOVER (Université de l'Etat de Michigan) «Self-Concept of Ability and School Achievement».
- M. CONSTANTINESCO (Comité national de sociologie de la Rép. socialiste de Roumanie) «Quelques problèmes méthodologiques de la sociologie de l'enseignement».
- J. EGGLESTON (Université de Leicester, Leicester) «Some Social Correlates of Extended Secondary Education in England»¹.
- H. FRIIS (Institut national danois de recherches sociales, Copenhague) «A Study on the Physically Handicapped in Denmark».
- G. GRIGNON (Centre de sociologie européenne, Paris) «Older People in Three Industrial Societies: A Comparative Social Survey on Living Conditions and Behaviour of the Aged in Denmark, Great Britain and the U.S.A.».
- H. HEINZE (Berlin) «Apprentissage d'un métier ou acquisition de la culture: les apprentis à l'école».
- E. I. HOPPER (Université de Cambridge) «Social Progress and Higher Education under Socialist Conditions».
- S. KOWALESKA (Académie polonaise des sciences, Varsovie) «A Conceptual Schema for the Classification of Educational Systems».
- Z. KOWALESKI (Académie polonaise des sciences, Varsovie) «Preliminary Methodological and Conceptual Notes Industrialization and the Problem of Convergence».
- J. LAMBIRI-DIMAKI (Centre social des sciences, Athènes) «Higher Education and the Preparation for Industrial Work in Poland».
- D. W. LIGHT (Université de Chicago) «Some Problems concerning the Preparation of Scientific Workers».
- J. J. MANGALAM (Université de Kentucky) «The Family Background of Athens University Students».
- «Social Participation in Public and Catholic Schools».
- «Rural-Urban Differences in Academic Performance of Pakistani College Students and their Implications for Change».

¹ *Comparative Education*, Vol. 3, n° 2, march 1967.

- P. MINON (Institut de sociologie, Université de Liège) «Statut social de la famille et première orientation scolaire; l'évolution dans la région liégeoise de 1941 — 1949 à 1961».
- P. MUSGRAVE (Université d'Aberdeen) «A Model for the Analysis of the Development of the English Educational System from 1860». IV
- V. L. OLESEN (Université de Californie) «Some Thoughts on Images of Man Implicit in Sociological Studies of Professional Education».
- PEARCE (Iles Fiji) «Communication Media and Secondary School Students in Lautoka, Fiji».
- H. K. SCHWARZWELLER (Université de Kentucky) «Educational Aspirations and Life Chances of German Young People».
- W. SEWELL (Université de Wisconsin, Malison) «Socioeconomic Status, Intelligence and the Attainment of Higher Education».
- D. F. SWIFT (University of Oxford) «Social Class, Mobility-Ideology and 11 + Success»¹.
- M. SZANTO (Académie hongroise des sciences, Budapest)
- W. WATTS — D. WHITTAKER (Université de Californie) «Students of Life: A Study of the Berkeley Non-Student».

SOCIOLOGY OF THE FAMILY
SOCIOLOGIE DE LA FAMILLE

Président: R. HILL (Fondation Ford)

Président de séance: L. ROSENMAYR (Université de Vienne)

H. T. CHRISTENSEN (Université Purdue)

S. DEL CAMPO (Université de Barcelone)

P. CHOMBART DE LAUWE (Groupe d'éthnologie humaine, Paris).

J. ALDOUS (Université de Minnesota, Minneapolis) «Lower-Class Males' Integration into Community and Family» IV

¹ *The British Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XVIII, n° 2, June 1967.

- O. BURIC et A. ZECEVIC (Institut des sciences sociales, Belgrade) «Family Authority, Marital Satisfaction and Social Network in Yugoslavia»
- C. CAMILLERI (Université de Tunis) «Les Changements des représentations sur la famille en Tunisie» — (No 6)
- C. CARISSE (Université de Montreal) «Accommodation conjugale et réseau social des mariages bi-ethniques au Canada»
- K. DOBBELAERE (Université de Minnesota et Université de Louvain) «Ideal Number of Children in Marriage in Belgium and the USA»
- W. DUMON (Université de Louvain) «The problem of Sampling and Instrument Construction in a Study of the Entrepreneurial Family in Belgium and in the United States»
- A. GOLINI (Université de Rome) «Aspetti sociali della dimensione media della famiglia in Italia»
- M. W. GRAEFF-WASSINK (Ambassade de France, Beyrouth) «Etude d'opinion sur les mariages mixtes au Maroc»
- R. HILL (Université de Minnesota, Minneapolis) «Introduction»
- D. KANDEL et G. S. LESSER (Université de Harvard, Cambridge, Mass.) «Comparative Influence of Family and Peers on Adolescent Values and Behaviour in the United States and Denmark»
- A. KHARTCHEV (Association soviétique de sociologie, Moscou) «Quelques tendances de l'évolution de la famille en URSS et dans les pays capitalistes»
- K. ISHWARAN (Université York Toronto) «The Interdependence of Elementary and Extended Family».
- M. KOTABI (Université de Téhéran) «Famille et union de famille en Iran».
- T. W. LIU (Université de Notre-Dame, Indianapolis) «On the Use of the Revealed Difference Methods in Family Study and its Cross-cultural Significance» IV
- P. MARRIS (Institut des études communautaires, Londres) «Family, Kinship and Economic Network in Nigeria»
- E. MARX (Université de Tel-Aviv) «The Division of Domestic Tasks between Spouses among the Negov Bedouins».

- A. MICHEL (Centre d'études sociologiques, Paris) «Données comparatives sur l'interaction dans la famille française et américaine».
- H. Ph. MILIKOWSKI (Université de sociologie, Leiden) «The Unmarried Mothers: Prejudices in Scientific Literature»
- M. MOKRANE (Université d'Alger) «Pattern of Family Authority, Affective Relations and Child Behavior in Algiers»
«Les changements dans les Modèles d'autorité paternelle à Alger depuis l'indépendance»
- K. MORIOKA (Université Kyoiku de Tokio) «Life Cycle Patterns in Japan, China and the United States»¹
- Y. OKADA (Université Kyoiku de Tokio) «Cross-Cultural Research of Asian (Japanese, Korean and Chinese) Families»
- D. SAFILIOS-ROTHSCHILD (Institut Merrill-Palmer de développement humain, Detroit) «A Comparison of Power Structure and Marital Satisfaction in Urban Greek and French Families».
- B. M. SUSSMAN (Western Reserve University) «The Organization of Cross-National Family Research: A Perspective»
- D. SWEETSER (Université de Boston) «Finland-USA — Cross-National Study of Kinship Ties — Theoretical and Methodological Problems»
- D. F. SWIFT (Université d'Oxford) «Social Class, Mobility — Ideology»
- A. D. ULLMAN, G. A. MORSELLI et M. FURUARI «Household Differences in two Types of Rural Southern Italian Villages»
- P. VIEILLE et M. KOTABI (Université de Téhéran) «Famille et union de familles en Iran»

¹ *Journal of Marriage and the Family*, 1967.

POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY
SOCIOLOGIE POLITIQUE

Président: S. M. LIPSET (Université Harvard)

Secrétaire: S. ROKKAN (Université de Bergen)

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| N. ABADAN (Université d'Ankara) | «The Role of Regional Opinion Leaders During the 1965 Elections in Turkey». |
| A. A. AKIWOWO (Université de Nigéria, Nsukka) | «Traditional Principles of Social Grouping and Problems of Party Formation and Mobilization in Nigeria». |
| K. AZUMI (New York, Université) | «Dimensions of the Japanese Party System». |
| R. BENDIX (Université de Californie) | «Towards a Definition of Modernization». |
| S. BERNARD (Université libre de Bruxelles, Centre de théorie politique) | «Note sur l'étude comparative des systèmes politiques». |
| D. CANTON (Institut di Tella, Buenos Aires) | «Universal Suffrage as an Agent of Mobilization». |
| O. CORNBLIT (Institut Torcuato di Tella) | «Politics in New Nations: A Model of Social Change for Latin America» ¹ . |
| S. CHODAK (Université de Varsovie) | «African Political Parties and Traditional Religious Shrines». |
| R. EBBIGHAUSEN (Université libre de Berlin) | «Inner-Party Democracy as a Research Topic». |
| E. GRUNER (Université de Berne) | «Les Origines sociales de l'Elite Suisse». |
| D. HERZOG (Université libre de Berlin) | «The Structure of Elites in Post-War German Political Parties». IV |
| G. IONESCU (London School of Economics) | «Patterns of Opposition in One-Party Systems». |
| R. KOTHARI (Centre pour l'étude des sociétés, New Delhi) et J. WIATR (Académie polonaise des sciences) | «A Comparison of the Indian and the Polish Party Systems». |

¹ *Information sur les sciences sociales* (à paraître).

- K. LIEPELT (Datum, Bad Erdesberg) et R. SEGAL (Université de Chicago) «The Structure of Party Identification in Germany, England and the USA»,
«An Approach to the Comparative Analysis of Political Partisanship».
- J. LINZ (Université Columbia) «The Past and the Future Party Systems in Spain».
- J. LINZ et H. M. MAKLER (Université Columbia) «The Social Origin and Social Mobility of the Portuguese Business Elite, a Comparative Study».
- D. MARVICK (Université de Californie) «Political Activists in Munich and in Los Angeles».
- J. P. NETTL (Université Leeds) «The Inheritance Situation — An Analysis of the Initiation of Contemporary Modes of Development».
«The System of Modern Societies».
- T. PARSONS (Université de Harvard)
- A. PRZEWORSKI, J. J. WIATR (Académie polonaise des sciences, Varsovie) «Methodological Problems in the Cross-Country Study on Local Politics».
- G. ROTH (Université de Californie, Davis). «Personal Rulership, Patrimonialism and Empire-Building in the New States».
- U. TORGERSEN (Institut de Recherches sociales, Oslo) «The Study of National Elites: Sample Survey Design or Sociometric Approach». IV
- M. C. VIGUIER (Albi, France) «Attitude politique et vie de groupe des étudiants étrangers à Toulouse: une analyse et structure latente».

PSYCHIATRIC SOCIOLOGY
SOCIOLOGIE PSYCHIATRIQUE

Président: A. ROSE (Université du Minnesota)

- R. BASTIDE et F. RAVEAU (Centre de psychiatrie sociale, Paris) «Contribution à l'étude de l'adaptation des noirs en France» IV
- P. CABINETMAKER (Université de Bombay) «Socio-Economic Background of Mental Patients in Bombay Hospitals»

- P. H. CHOMBART DE LAUWE (Groupe d'éthnologie sociale, Paris) «Hypothèses: pour une psycho-sociologie de la fatigue»
- R. ENDLEMAN (Université Adelphi, Garden City, NY) «The Value of Tension: Implications for a Transcultural Psychiatry».
- H. FLEGEL et U. SCHUTT (Düsseldorf) «Mental Illness and Social Conditions in Düsseldorf»
- H. HALBERTSMA (Amsterdam) «The Prevalence of Psychoses and Neuroses in Amsterdam»
- J. HIRVAS et L. SONKIN (Université de Helsinki) «Custodialism and Social Structure: Attitudes towards the Mentally Ill in Finland».
- V. JAKOVljeVIC (Université de Belgrade) «Socio-Pathological Nature of Mental Disorders».
- A. A. KHATRI (Université de Jacksonville) «Attitudes of Adolescents in Ahmedabad (India) towards Mental Illness».
- R. KLEINER (Université Temple, Philadelphie) «Effects of Attitudes towards Psychiatry on Epidemiological Findings».
- J. KRUPINSKI (Institut de recherches sur la santé mentale, Melbourne) «The Mental Health of Immigrants»¹.
- E. LEUCHTERHAND (Université Yale, New Haven) «Early and late Effects of Imprisonment in Nazi Concentration Camps: An Examination of Conflicting Interpretation in Survivor Research».
- R. MAISEL (Université de Californie, Davis) «Community Acceptance of the ex-Mental Patient: an Interpretation».
- T. MATHIESEN (Institut pour la recherche sociale, Oslo) «The Sociology of Prisons: Problems for Future Research».
- MCCORD (Université Rice, Houston) «The Source of Violent Ethnic Conflict — Some Observations on Negro Violence in America».
- R. MORGAN (Université de L'Ecole médicale de Lagos) «Suicide and Mental Breakdown among Medical Students at the University of Ibadan, Nigeria».
- B. NELSON (Hôpital Graylingwell, clinique psychiatrique de recherche, Chichester) «The Measurement of Marital Interaction in a Study of Neurotic Patients and their Partners and in Control Couples».

¹ *Soc. Sci. et Med.*, vol. 1, pp. 267-281, 1967.

- M. OPLER (Université d'Etat de New York). «Contributions of Social Science to Psychiatry and Social Psychiatry».
- S. PARKER (Université de l'Etat de Michigan) et R. J. KLEINER (Université Temple) «Migration and Mental Illness: Some Reconsiderations and Suggestions for Further Analysis».
- O. POLLAK (Université de Pensilvanie, Philadelphie) «Social Change and Psychotherapy»
- A. ROSE (Université de Minnesota, Minneapolis) «Cross-National Research on Attitude of Youth Toward Mental Illness». IV
- G. SAENGER (Mental Health Research Unit, Dept. d'hygiène mentale, Syracuse, NY) «Characteristics and Treatment of Patients in Community Mental Health Clinics in the United States».
- L. SONKIN (Fondation finlandaise pour études sur l'alcool) Helsinki «Youth's Attitudes Towards and Knowledge about Mental Illness, and the Connection of these variables with Various Background Variables».
- J. SPADIJER-DZINIC (Belgrade) «Suicide in Vojvodina, Yougoslavia».
- L. STROLE (Université de Colombie) «Geel (Belgium) Community Program of Foster Family Care of the Psychiatrically Impaired»
- E. VERON, F. KORN, R. MALFE et C. SLUZKI (Institut Torcuato di Tella, Buenos Aires) «Neuroses as Systems of Social Communications».
- H. WECHSLER (Université Harvard, Boston) «Fit of Individual and Community Characteristics and Rates of Psychiatric Hospitalization».

SOCIOLOGY OF MEDICINE
SOCIOLOGIE DE LA MÉDECINE

Président: G. READER (Université Cornell, New York)

Présidents de séance: R. STAVENHAGEN (Centre latino-américain de recherches et de sciences sociales, Rio de Janeiro)

O. SEPULVEDA (Université du Chili)

E. FREIDSON (Université de New-York)

- J. BEN-DAVID (Université hébraïque, Jérusalem)
- M. SOCKOLOWSA (Académie polonaise des sciences, Varsovie)
- G. READER (Université Cornell, New York)
- L. ARAN et D. J. BEN (Université hébraïque, Jérusalem) «Specialization and Career Patterns as Determinants of Productivity of Medical Researchers».
- J. BEJNAROWICZ (Académie polonaise des sciences, Varsovie) «Social Rehabilitation of the Amputee»¹
- R. BUCHER (Université d'Illinois, Collège de médecine) «Conditions for Professional Socialization».
- H. BYNDER (Université du Colorado, Boulder) «Some Problems in the Doctor-Patient Relationship».
- R. R. BYNES (Université de l'Etat de l'Ohio) et J. E. HASS et E. L. QUARANTELLI «Administrative, Methodological and Theoretical Problems of Disaster Research».
- B. COGSWELL (Université de la Caroline du Nord) «Rehabilitation of the Paraplegic — A Process of Socialization».
- R. COSER (Hôpital McLean, Belmont) «Evasiveness as a Response to Structural Ambivalence».
- F. DAVIS (Université de Californie, Centre médical San Francisco) «Professional Socialization as Subject Experience — The Case of Student Nurses».
- M. DAVIS (Université Cornell, New York) «Deviant Interaction in an Institutionalized Relationship: Variation in Patients — Compliance with Doctor's Orders».
- D. FISH (Association des Collèges médicaux canadiens) «The Resident's Evaluation of the Royal College — Programme and his Training Experience».
- E. HAAVIO-MANNILA (Université de Helsinki) «The Occupational Value Structure of the Finish Medical Profession»
- M. JEFFERYS (Université de Londres) «Women in Medicine» IV
- H. KAUPEN-HASS (Institut pour la recherche des couches sociales moyennes, Cologne) «Socio-Cultural Variables in the Doctor-Patient Relationship». IV

¹ *The Polish Sociological Bulletin*, 1967, 1/15, pp. 94-100.

- P. L. KENDALL (Université Columbia, New York) «Attitudinal Studies among Medical Students in the United States».
- H. KING (Institut National du cancer, Bethesda) «The Socioepidemiology of the Clergy: A proposed Conceptual Scheme for the study of Occupation Risk in Clergyman».
- I. MATEI (République socialiste de Roumanie) «L'organisation des services de prévoyance sociale dans le milieu rural».
- H. MENZEL (Université Columbia, New-York) «Physician's Information as affected by Milieu, Contact with Colleagues, and Current Awareness Activities».
- C. MULLER (Université Columbia, New York) «The Study of Prescribing as a Technique of Examining a Medical Care System».
- P. MURESAN et O. H. ZAHARIADE et I. IONESCO (Rép. soc. de Roumanie) «La méthodologie de l'enquête visant l'état de santé, effectuée sur 1 million d'habitants de la République socialiste de Roumanie».
- R. RODRIGUEZ (Université de Porto Rico, San Juan) «L'apport de la sociologie française à la sociologie de la connaissance».
- A. SARAPATA (Académie polonaise des sciences) «Industrial Doctor's Standing».
- O. SEPULVEDA et S. DIAZ (Université du Chili, Santaigo) «Workshop on Application of Medical Sociology in Developing Countries».
- J. SHUVAL (Institut hébraïque de recherches appliquées, Jérusalem) «Some Aspects of Medical Practice in Ethnically Heterogeneous Society».
- B. D. SINGER (Philadelphie) «Some implications of Differential Psychiatric Treatment of Negro and White Patients».
- M. STACEY (University College, Swansea) «The Sick Child as a Family Member and Hospital Patients: Some Theoretical Consideration».
- Z. STAIKOV (Sofia) «Activités primaires et activités secondaires»,
«Etude sur le budget du temps de la population en République Populaire de Bulgarie»,
«Secondary (Simultaneous) Activi-

- ties and their Influence on the Elements and Structure of the Time Budget».
- Z. STEIN et MW. SUSSEY (Association pour l'aide des enfants estropiés, Londres) «The Social Dimensions of a Symptom: Socio-Medical Study of Enuresis».
- E. SUCHMAN (Université de Pittsburg) «Social Factors in Preventive Accident Behavior: An Experimental Study of Innovation».
- W. WARDWELL (Université de Connecticut, Storrs) «Socio-Environmental Antecedents to Coronary Heart Disease in 87 White Male».
- C. ZAHARIADE et G. H. PATRU (Roumanie) «Contributions à l'étude de l'organisation du Régime de vie dans une unité de malades chroniques».
- J. KOSA (School Public Health, Chapel Hill) «The Place of Morbid Episodes in the Social Interaction Pattern».
- R. WHITE (Université Cornell) «Identity and Role Prescriptions in Hospital Administration»

SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION SOCIOLOGIE DES RELIGIONS

Président: C. LERAS (Centre d'études sociologiques, Paris)

- M. BARASH (Université Hofstra, Hempstead, N. Y.) «The Role of Traditional Religion in a Developing Nation»
- G. L. GOLLIN (Université Howard, Washington) «The Religious Factor in Social Change: Max Weber and the Moravian Paradox»
- W. HWEI-LIN (Université nationale de Taiwan) «Catégories de totémisme asiatique»
- C. LALIVE D'EPINAY (Université de Genève) «Changements sociaux et développement d'une «secte» — Le Pentecotisme au Chili (1909-1960)»
- J. J. MOL (Université nationale d'Australie, Canberra) «A Collation of Data about Religion in Australia»
- A. MUSTEIKIS (Collège des sciences, Sofia) «Coexistence and Religious Freedom»

- J. OCHAVKOV (Académie des sciences, Sofia) «Problèmes méthodologiques d'une enquête sur la religiosité en Bulgarie»
«Les résultats d'une étude sociologique de la religiosité en Bulgarie»
- A. F. OKULOV (Association soviétique de sociologie, Moscou) «On certain Aspects of Sociology of Religion in the URSS»
- J. SEGUY (C. N. R. S., Paris) «Les oecuménismes du XVII^{me} siècle et les relations internationales de l'époque»
- St. T. STOITCHEFF (Académie des sciences, Bulgarie) «Certaines particularités de la conscience religieuse en Bulgarie»
- J. G. VAILLANCOURT (Université de Californie, Berkeley) «A comparative Study of contemporary Catholicism: Progress Report»
- I. VARGA (Budapest) «Secularisation in Hungarian Youth»
- Hwei-lin WEI (Université Nanzan, Nagoya) «Catégorie du totémisme asiatique»

STRATIFICATION AND SOCIAL MOBILITY
STRATIFICATION ET MOBILITÉ SOCIALES

Président: R. DAHRENDORF (Université de Constance)

Président de séances: R. DORE (The London School of Economics)

R. GIROD (Université de Genève)

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N. ROGOFF RAMSY (Université d'Oslo)

- B. ABU-LABAN (Université d'Alberta, Edmonton, Canada) «Some Correlates of Educational Aspirations of Lebanese Youth».
- J. BERTING (Université d'Amsterdam) «White-collar Worker in Large Organization».
- N. BISSERET (Centre national de la recherche scientifique, Paris) «Sélection à l'université et Stratification sociale».
- L. BROOM et J. F. LANCASTER et J. ZUBRZYCKI (Université nationale australienne) «Five Measures of Social Rank in Australia».

- H. BRYCE et S. M. MILLER (Université de New York) «The Promotion of Social Mobility — Longitudinal Analysis of Age Cohorts». IV
- R. DAHRENDORF (Université de Constance, Allemagne) «The Present Position of the Theory of Social Stratification».
- B. EREMEIEV (Institut de philosophie de l'Académie des sciences de l'URSS) «Distinctions professionnelles et culturelles des ouvriers et leur activité créatrice».
- E. GALL (Comité national de sociologie de la Rép. socialiste de Roumanie) «Considérations sur la sociologie des intellectuels».
- R. GIROD (Université de Genève) «Stratification et mobilité des classes ouvrières», IV
«Principales phases de la sélection sociale jusqu'au seuil de la vie adulte».
- A. HEGEDUS (Budapest) «The Place Occupied in the Division of Labour as the Most Important Determinand of Social Structure of Socialism».
- C. IONESCO (Comité national de sociologie de la Rép. soc. de Roumanie) «Problèmes méthodologiques des études sociales entreprises sur les conditions de la vie des salariés de la zone urbaine».
- J. KLOFAC et V. TLUSTY (Prague) «On Problems of the General Theory of Stratification and Class Structure»
- P. MACHONIN (Université Charles, Prague) «Social Structure of Contemporary Czechoslovak Society».
- M. MOD (Budapest) «Statistical Social Surveys in Hungary Stratification and Time-Budget Studies»
- C. MURCESCO (Sté. Nat. de sociologie de la Rép. Soc. de Roumanie) «Influences de l'industrialisation sur la mobilité sociale».
- A. NIMBARDK (Troy, NY) Institut polytechnique Rensselaer «A Paper for the Session on Cultural and Racial and International Relations».
- K. ODAKA (Université de Tokio) «The Middle Class in Japan»
- O. YEN (Université d'Oslo) «Social Class, Conservatism and Sub-

- mission to Longitudinal Research: the Reaction to Project Metropolitan in Norway»
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