

TRANSACTIONS OF THE THIRD
WORLD CONGRESS OF SOCIOLOGY

ACTES DU TROISIÈME
CONGRÈS MONDIAL DE SOCIOLOGIE

AMSTERDAM, 1956

VOLUME III

INTERNATIONAL SOCIOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION
ASSOCIATION INTERNATIONALE DE SOCIOLOGIE

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CONGRÈS MONDIAL DE SOCIOLOGIE

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General Theme

PROBLEMS OF SOCIAL CHANGE IN THE 20TH CENTURY
LE PROBLÈME DU CHANGEMENT SOCIAL AU 20ÈME SIÈCLE

VOLUME III

Changes in Class Structure
Changements dans la Structure de Classes

INTERNATIONAL SOCIOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION
ASSOCIATION INTERNATIONALE DE SOCIOLOGIE

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PART ONE

General Survey of Changes in Social Stratification in the Twentieth Century

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The task assigned to the sub-section for which I speak is to examine the changes that have been taking place in social stratification during the 20th century. The material submitted is mostly in the form of papers on change in a particular country written by a representative sociologist of that country; this material is supplemented by one or two papers of a more general character (e.g. those by Professors Jessie Bernard, Ossowski and Eisenstadt). The emphasis is placed on changes in the structure of social systems rather than on the movement of individuals and groups within the systems; the latter topic belongs to sub-section 2. The approach is, in the main, historical, but it would be wrong to say that its function is to provide an historical background for the sociological analysis undertaken by Professor Gurvitch and his colleagues of sub-section 3. Social stratification is a subject about which it is impossible to write "straight" history; every statement must be based on a careful analysis of social structure and a clear definition of concepts. And, as the account moves forward through time, the subject-matter changes and the concepts need to be re-examined and refurbished, and perhaps supplemented, to fit the new situation. This is a task for sociologists; nevertheless one may say that my colleagues and I are concerned primarily with the "what", the "when" and the "where" of social change, and Professor Gurvitch and his colleagues with the "why" and the "how". It should further be noticed that the theme allotted to my sub-section is "stratification", not "class". There has been a good deal of discussion of the question whether classes are necessarily associated with strata (see the opening sentences of Professor Ossowski's paper), but the wording of our theme does not assume that they are; it means only that, in our discussion, the focus is on the phenomenon of stratification, whatever its basis.

The choice of "social change" as the subject for this Congress was a bold one, since there is some truth in the assertion that modern sociologists have been prone to neglect this branch of sociology. In no field of study is this neglect more evident than in that of "social class". This is not altogether surprising. If change is to be fully understood, it should be possible to examine the beginning and the end of the process with the help of the same instruments. Where the phenomena studied are highly institutionalised and documented, this can be done with considerable completeness; where they are neither,

it can hardly be done at all. It is therefore easier to study change in economic structure than in class structure. For many of the facts relevant to the latter lie concealed in the minds and in the unrecorded informal actions of men, and the refined modern methods used to disclose and assemble them by direct observation of a living society cannot now be applied to societies that have passed away. Concentration on the present is natural, but it is not simply on this account that some recent studies have been criticised.¹ Even an instantaneous picture of social stratification can throw light on structural change if it pays attention to the dynamic forces at work at the moment of study—the tensions and adjustments, the expressed regrets and hopes of the older and younger generations, which reflect the processes which have turned the past into the present and foreshadow those which will turn the present into the future. But the authors of these instantaneous pictures often deliberately eliminate these dynamic forces in an endeavour to discover the essence of the present system, viewed in its own right as a system. They sometimes go even further and take little account of the interaction processes within the system as a whole, and still less of those between it and the world outside. They describe what it looks like, or perhaps what it feels like, rather than how it works. It is to studies of this kind that Professor Mayer refers in his paper when he speaks of “the essentially static approach which has characterised the many studies concerned with the delineation of status hierarchies in various local communities that have long dominated the field of stratification research in the United States”.

Material of this nature, whatever its intrinsic quality, is not easy to use for the purpose we have in hand. And when we try to piece together a number of “static” individual studies in order to draw conclusions of a comparative or developmental kind, we are faced with a further difficulty. Terminology is not standardised; authors employ different concepts, and sometimes refer to different things when using the same word—or to the same thing when using different words. This is particularly confusing to the student of change, for he cannot always be sure whether the difference between pictures drawn at two dates is due to change in the phenomenon described at the start of the period, or to a shift of interest on the part of the investigators to a new phenomenon which is still being called by the old name. The way in which these troubles have bedevilled the study of the “middle classes” and the “bourgeoisie” is familiar to all.²

However, it may be possible to make a virtue of necessity and to turn to advantage the apparent defects of the material—the shifts of interest, the multiplicity and ambiguity of concepts, and the vagaries of terminology. These studies are empirical, and we must assume that the aim of the authors is to describe what they find. The confusion in the literature, therefore, may reflect the complexities of the subject-matter. If we can disentangle the first, we may make progress towards

understanding the second. It may be that changes in the focus of attention reflect changes in the structure of society, and not merely in the fashions current among sociologists—though one cannot be sure of this. This, at least, is a possible line of attack on the subject and the one which I propose to adopt in this paper, namely to search among the tangles of concepts and controversy for clues as to the nature of social change. My aim will be, in the first instance, to try to identify the crucial questions that must be asked about each modern society. The advantage of this apparently rather timid procedure is that one can fruitfully ask the same questions about a fairly wide variety of types of society, whereas any attempt to summarise answers to questions, would have to be much more narrowly limited. Even so, what I have to say will refer mainly to what are loosely called “western” societies, but will, I think, be in some measure applicable also to established Communist societies and to the more recent developments in the more “westernised” societies of the East. To put it another way, if one accepts the familiar classification of types of stratification into “caste”, “estate” and “class”, my analysis should apply, with minor modifications, to societies in which the institutions of caste and estate do not enter into the story of recent social change.

The omission of these two terms still leaves us with quite a number to consider. Those in most general use are “class”, “social class”, “status”, “social status”, and “prestige”. The structure to which these contribute may be described as “stratification”, “hierarchy”, or “rank order”. No such battery of concepts is found in studies of social systems dominated by caste and estate. So our first question asks whether this multiplication of terms indicates the growth of a multiplicity of stratified systems in each society. In an address delivered something over two years ago, Professor Milton Gordon spoke of the growing “recognition that social class phenomena are multi-dimensional in nature. This point of view—briefly adumbrated by Max Weber and developed more systematically by recent writers—recognizes that, under the rubric of stratification, an economic dimension, a social status dimension, and a political power dimension may be distinguished, and that other variables, such as cultural way of life, group separation, class consciousness, social mobility, and ethnic and group identification, are a part of the total picture.”³ Notice that he said there has been a growing “recognition” that the phenomena “are” multidimensional. He did not say that the phenomena have in fact been becoming multidimensional, or increasingly so. But this is precisely the question we must put and the hypothesis we must examine.

It is both remarkable and slightly ludicrous that it should prove necessary to carry out the most elaborate research in order to discover what the shape of stratification is in modern societies. To past generations it constituted the “social order” by which their lives were, and should be, governed, and they had no doubts about its nature. It is

reasonable to suppose that our modern difficulties arise from the gradual replacement of a simple, clear and institutionalised structure by a complex, nebulous and largely informal one. But the term "multidimensional" is not enough by itself to describe the new order. Its use may, and sometimes does, obscure the distinction between three significantly different phenomena. The first, to which Professor Gordon was referring, is multidimensional stratification proper, that is the coexistence in one society of two or more systems of stratification, based on different principles or interests. Now in any advanced society, in which economic, political, social and cultural activities are well developed, it is almost certain that several dimensions of stratification will operate. The really important question is not whether they exist—they are bound to—but whether, and to what extent, their products converge. These dimensions may be more or less autonomous in their action, and the hierarchy of groups based upon them may coincide to a greater or lesser degree in size, shape, and membership.

Where the groupings created by different dimensions coincide, the result is a structure composed of what Professor Sorokin calls "multibonded" groups. He defines such a group as "the totality of interacting persons linked by two or more unbonded ties (values, meanings, or norms)".⁴ With these as units we should have, not several distinct systems of stratification, but one system based on the combined effect of several criteria. The two concepts—"multidimensional" and "multibonded"—are related but different. In fact we may say that we become most acutely aware that stratification is multidimensional when it fails to produce strata that are multibonded. I am inclined to go further and suggest that the impression that stratification in modern societies has been becoming more multidimensional may be due to the fact that it has been becoming less multibonded.

But there is a quite different set of conditions which can produce two or more distinct systems of stratification in one society. And that is when the society as a whole is not a true unit for stratification in terms of a particular dimension, but must be divided into two or more sections or regional areas each with its own stratification structure. The most familiar example is a society fairly equally divided into agricultural and industrial—or rural and urban—sectors. The social status dimension can be applied to both, but the results cannot be combined into a single scale; the question whether a farmer stands higher or lower than a works manager may be quite meaningless. It is to such discrete social areas that Paul Hatt proposed to give the name of "situs".⁵

This brief glance at some recent arguments about terms and concepts leads us to a set of questions about the effects of social change. What has been its effect on (1) the number and nature of the dimensions relevant to stratifications; (2) the extent to which these dimensions combine to produce multibonded groups; (3) the extent to which stratification within the various major functional and regional sectors

of the society fuses together to produce, with respect to any dimension or all of them, a single system for the whole society ?

On the first question we can start with Max Weber's trilogy of the economic, social and political dimensions, or of Class, Status and Party. Of the first he says that "the factor that creates 'class' is unambiguously economic interest" and that "with some over-simplification, one might thus say that 'classes' are stratified according to their relations to the production and acquisition of goods ; whereas 'status groups' are stratified according to the principles of their consumption of goods as represented by special 'styles of life'".⁶ His second dimension I prefer to call "social status", simply because the term "status" already has two useful meanings and can hardly be expected to carry a third. It is used by lawyers to denote membership of a group carrying distinctive rights or duties, capacities or incapacities, determined and upheld by public law. And it is used, more broadly, by sociologists and social psychologists, following Linton, to denote any position in a social structure associated with a distinctive rôle. Neither of these usages necessarily involves the concept of stratification at all, but "social status" does. The comparative, or invidious, element is essentially implied.⁷ Social status, then, is membership of a multi-bonded group whose various criteria (or dimensions) are valued, weighted and combined so as to produce a single assessment. But each assessment scale may be valid only within a limited area of the society. Of the political dimension it should be noted that, in modern democracies, there can be no stratification of individuals on the basis of voting power, since it is equally distributed. But there may be stratification of political groups or parties in terms of their size and strength, and there must be stratification within parties and within governmental structure (or sphere of political action) as expressed in such a scale as "leaders, officials, active members, voters", or in the bureaucratic hierarchy of the civil service and so forth.

We can now ask whether these three dimensions still figure in current analysis of stratification, whether there has been any change in the relative importance attached to them, and whether any new dimensions have forced themselves into the picture. It is clear, I think, that the second, social status, has made a strong bid to steal the stage from the other two. At the same time there have been protests that the first, class, must not be overlooked, since it exerts a greater influence than the second on the ways in which social systems work and change. Nevertheless, it is curiously elusive. If class is linked with production, then occupation must be its chief index. But we find that, in study after study, occupation is used only as an index of social status. Or again, if we turn to studies of the influence of social and economic position (including position in the production system) on political attitudes and behaviour—an aspect crucial to the Marxist and Weberian concepts of class—we find that class does not emerge as a substantive social group, but is little more than a middle term in the chain that

links position to opinion. Richard Centers, for example, writes: "Just as people who differ in socio-economic position differ in class affiliation, so people who differ in class affiliation differ in turn in politico-economic orientation".⁸ But, when one looks closer, it seems that this "class affiliation" can hardly be said to have any independent existence, and that no concrete social group can be pointed to which is the "class" towards which this "affiliation" is felt. To find out what is known about the dynamics of class (in the restricted Weberian sense) one must turn to researches in the field of industrial relations, trade unionism, and the bases of power in the economic world. These are often microcosmic, and are not, as a rule, conceived of primarily as contributions to the study of stratification. The same might be said of the third dimension, the political. When politics and stratification are thought of together, the focus of interest is more often the effect of social stratification on political life than the effect of the political factor on stratification. When attention is directed to the hierarchical pattern in politics—to the rise of oligarchy in political parties or parliamentary government, or to the operation of pressure groups—the relation between these and social stratification in general is not the paramount interest.

We can now expand the first of the three questions listed above introducing some indication of possible answers. Confining ourselves to the three dimensions of class, status and party, we may ask: (1) has class (in the Marx/Weber sense) been losing importance as a feature of social structure? (2) has social status been gaining importance as a feature of social structure? (3) has class been becoming less closely related to stratification? If an affirmative answer were given to question (2) it might assert that the growing importance of social status was absolute, or only that it was relative to the other dimensions. The papers submitted have a good deal to say on these issues, but it will be best, in order to economise in space, to reserve the survey of the evidence until we can at the same time explore the second of the first set of three questions, namely, the extent to which the various dimensions combine to produce multibonded groups. But before we can take up this point we must ask whether any new dimensions have entered the picture.

Among the additional variables listed by Professor Gordon only one, ethnic affiliation, could qualify as a separate dimension, and obviously that is not a new factor in society. Another candidate for consideration, in many respects a similar and a related one, is religious affiliation. It might be expected that, in the period under consideration, these would be factors of diminishing importance in systems of stratification, owing to the movement towards equality of human rights, religious liberty, and the retreat of imperialism (with, of course, certain notable exceptions), and to progressive assimilation of immigrants in countries having a "melting-pot" character. But one notices

recent observations like the following: among Catholics in Elmira "the religious affiliation (and the ethnic differences it represents) appears to be a stronger influence upon the vote than any other single factor".⁹ and "the most striking fact about Quebec politics is that ethnic solidarity has overridden class divisions within the French-Canadian community".¹⁰ This suggests the possibility that ethnic and religious affiliations have been, in some cases, of growing significance in community life, not because they have been gaining absolutely in strength, but because the competing loyalty to class has become less compelling as a determinant of social action. They may not be, strictly speaking, dimensions of stratification, but may nevertheless contribute to the confusion and complexity of the stratification system as a whole by providing alternative preoccupations and drives.

Another disturbing factor to which attention is sometimes drawn is the effect of mass media and publicity of all kinds in building up hierarchies of celebrities in the worlds of sport, adventure, radio and cinema and the rest. There is a kind of stratification here which certainly does not fall under the concept of class, and does not fit in easily to the pattern of social status, especially if the latter tends to build more and more on local assessments of position on the scale (a point to which I must return later).¹¹ The point I wish to make here is simply that, if the clear-cut lines of stratification are fading, this may be due, not merely to the growth of more dimensions of stratification, but also to the emergence of more dimensions of social grouping of all kinds—possibly only their emergence from the shadow of the all-compelling class loyalty of the mid-capitalist phase of social history.

We can now bring in the second of the original three questions and ask whether the dimensions have been diverging or converging in their impact on the system of stratification. I have once or twice above spoken of the Marx/Weber concept of class, basing this term on the fact that both of them described class as economic in character and related to production and the distribution of power within the economic system of production. But on the point before us now they differ. Weber saw class as one of three principles of organization all of which could co-exist in the same society. For Marx class was a unique and dominating principle. It was economic in essence, but "the struggle of class against class is a political struggle" from which emerges a "ruling class", and "the ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas".¹² This implies that, as a social system establishes itself, the three dimensions will converge until the economic, political and cultural hierarchies are identical. By a different route Mosca came to a somewhat similar conclusion that "in all societies . . . two classes of people appear—a class that rules and a class that is ruled".¹³ Finally we must remember the prophecy of James Burnham that managers, having ousted the property-owners from the control of industry, would assert their power over the political machine. Are there any signs in recent history of this trend towards a fusion of two

or more of the three dimensions so as to produce something in the nature of a ruling class ?

The answer, so far as "western" democratic-capitalist and/or socialist societies are concerned must be in the negative. The reverse is nearer the truth. As Raymond Aron put it, in a study which goes deeply into this question, "the fundamental difference between a society of the Soviet type and one of the Western type is that the former has a unified élite and the latter a divided élite".¹⁴ A divided élite is a collection of persons coming from different social origins and drawing their personal power from different sources ; it is the antithesis of a ruling class, for the simple reason that it is not a class. But it would be very rash to generalise about the trend of social change in this respect. For one thing political systems differ too much from one country to another. For another there are some conflicting features about observable trends in recent years. Although David Butler, a close student of British elections, may say that "class interest by itself is quite inadequate as an explanation of voting behaviour"¹⁵ it is by no means certain that the correlation between class and voting has been weakening; it may even have been getting stronger, especially in the professional and business classes.¹⁶ If it were to do so in the future, and one party were to obtain, for itself or by coalition, a permanent title to govern, this would amount to a return towards a ruling-class situation. It has also been noticed that party officials and members of parliament are usually drawn from a narrower social range than the rank and file of their supporters; there is a tendency towards concentration in the broad middle areas of the social scale. Now Mosca, it will be remembered, said that there must always be a "second stratum" of the ruling class, more numerous than the first, and containing "all the capacities for leadership in the country". The bureaucracy, he maintained, even if nominally open to all, "will always be recruited from the second stratum of the ruling class".¹⁷ The concentration of candidates for political and administrative office in the middle ranks of society may be a fact; but the description of this middle section as part of a ruling class does not ring true. Several contributors point out that, in many countries, the middle class has been expanding until it contains nearly the whole population; there is hardly anything left for it to rule. Also, when educational opportunity is equal, it would be as true to say that the middle class is recruited through the bureaucracy as that the bureaucracy is recruited from the middle class. However, it would be worth while to consider whether there are any signs that social selection through an open educational system may produce a new species of "unified élite" in democratic societies, and perhaps in time a new type of ruling class. Could stratification by education come to dominate, and to oust from the scene, stratification by other dimensions ?

Quite different causes for the emergence of a ruling class are discussed by Professor Eisenstadt who writes of stratification in a society which

has recently won its political independence or undergone a major revolution. The system here, he suggests, is likely to be "monolithic" and dominated by the political factor. The "power variable", he says, "has an autonomy of its own", and in certain circumstances "the holders of power tend to establish it as the most important criterion of stratification, to which all other criteria and rewards should be subordinated". If we accept this view as reasonable and if we infer that the trend towards more multidimensional stratification is characteristic of well-established independent societies, what shall we expect to find in a country which has become settled after a major revolution, for example, in the Soviet Union? One may suggest that the "dictatorship of the proletariat", operating through the militant arm of the Party, is an example of "monolithic" or unidimensional stratification dominated by the political factor. But has any tendency towards multidimensional stratification developed as the new social order settled down? It is clear that there is a hierarchy of political power within the Party, even though it may be disputed whether the Party as a whole is a "stratum" in the sense in which that term may be used of the hereditary aristocracies or feudal "ruling classes" of the past. Professor Ossowski maintains that economic classes exist, based, for example, on the division between agriculture and industry, but that these have nothing to do with stratification. Granted this use of the term "class", the conclusion may be accepted. If all power is ultimately political, there can be no stratification on the basis of economic power as a separate dimension. But the intriguing question is whether there is a "social status" dimension of stratification, arising from a combination of prestige ranking in the political hierarchy, of individual esteem derived from exceptional services, and of the institutionalised inequality of incomes. Of the latter Professor Ossowski says that it is a "scheme of simple gradation" which cannot produce stratification when there is no private ownership of the instruments of production. This may be true if one thinks of class in terms of power, but does not answer the question if one is thinking of stratification in terms of social status. On this point it might be more fruitful to compare the situation in the Soviet Union with an example of the unfettered private ownership of the instruments of production in an extreme form, such as the northern United States in the days of rapid economic expansion. It may be argued that here there was a "scheme of simple gradation" based on income, and that, in spite of great inequalities of this kind, all men were treated as of equal worth as men and citizens, and all were supposed to be equally exposed to the chance of rising or falling in the scale of wealth. We have here, perhaps, two rather different examples of the irrelevance of income inequalities to social status.

We might also take note here of two other references to the political factor which occur in the papers submitted. The first is the statement by Professor Heberle that in the Southern United States, in which there

had been something like a ruling class of planters (though, he maintains, this was not in origin a hereditary aristocracy), there occurred in the early 20th century "the growth of a new economic ruling class of top executives and managers, many of whom are not natives of the South". This class exercised great, and often decisive, influence over local and state government, although its members rarely held public office. This has a distinct flavour of Burnham about it, and it would be interesting to discuss whether this is an exceptional phenomenon in the picture of 20th century social change.

The second reference is in the paper by Professor Raymond Aron about France. He describes (in Section III) how, in the post-war period, the classical form of class conflict between employers and employed yielded place to a permanent battle in which the various competing or conflicting social groups directed their action mainly against the State, a battle "qui différait essentiellement des notions traditionnelles de lutte de classes". As soon as the State ceased to regulate wages, "le conflit employeurs-employés est redevenu réel". But at no time did the government, which was the centre of this turmoil, appear as the representative of a particular class.

From this brief survey I extract two propositions about unidimensional, or monolithic, stratification in the post-estate era. First, that a ruling class based on the political factor is most likely to exist (a) following on revolutionary change and (b) where political power is centralised and state action is all-pervasive, i.e. in a planned society. Second, that a ruling class based on the economic factor is most likely to exist (a) where the dominating political principle is one of *laissez-faire* so that state action does not profoundly affect the life of the people, and (b) where government is decentralised, or federal, and the economic factor can assert itself over the political in local and regional government. The first may be rather platitudinous, but the second might have some value for an interpretation of the last fifty years in the light of the preceding century.

What I have been saying refers to possible forms of convergence in which the political dimension plays a crucial part. I must now consider the same theme with reference to the two dimensions of class and social status, and take up at the same time the three questions I listed earlier (see p. 4 above) when I asked whether class has been losing importance, whether social status has been gaining in importance, and whether class has been becoming less closely related to stratification. It is with problems of this kind that most of the papers are mainly concerned, and I can therefore deal with them more briefly and in large part by reference to what can be read elsewhere in the documents which have been circulated.

The most general treatment of this theme is that of Professor Jessie Bernard. She contrasts the modern economy of abundance with former systems based on scarcity. Because, in modern mechanised civilisations, the prosperity of the masses is necessary as the basis of

the market through which the few become rich (or relatively richer), Marx' prophecy of a growing gulf between "haves" and "have-nots" is falsified and reversed and the force of class-consciousness and class-conflict dwindles. The result is not a homogeneous or wholly egalitarian society, but one in which social status counts for more than class interest as a basis of stratification. Professor Aron follows a similar line of thought when he says that the general trend of progress in capitalist societies has followed the principle of Colin Clark instead of that of Karl Marx; with the growth, in turn, of the secondary and tertiary sectors of the economy the standard of living has risen, and the central gulf in the social order has been bridged and filled by a new and varied collection of middle-class occupations. Professor Aron's purpose is to argue that it is because this development has not taken place in France that French society is marked by conflict and political extremism whereas other societies are marked by peace and political moderation. Professor Girod analyses Swiss history with the use of the same concepts, and Mr. Brennan, writing about the British Working Class, stresses the point (mentioned also by others) that the working class, from being "regarded as one of the raw materials of industry", has been fully admitted into society in terms both of culture and of actual or potential power. Similarly Professor Ossowski admits that Marx' forecast became inapplicable after the rise of the new middle class and the welfare state.

One may distinguish three elements in this picture. There is first the aspect of consumption—the rise in the level of consumption as a whole and the compressing of the scale, which becomes at the same time both shorter and more continuous; it is less likely that differences in standard of living will produce self-conscious, antagonised social groups. There is secondly the aspect of the rights of citizenship—the admission of all to full membership of the society, which carries with it rights to freedom, to political power and to welfare. And there is thirdly the structural change in the economy which makes the distribution of property less decisively determinant of the distribution of power, and less important than the distribution of productive forces between the primary, secondary and tertiary sectors.

It should be remembered that Colin Clark's principle of analysis does not lead, by any means, to any simple generalisation about trends in all developing economies during the last half century, and that it may prove less helpful towards understanding the phase of change into which the world is now moving. But, leaving such comments aside, the important point is to consider whether the trends of change about which there seems to be a considerable measure of agreement have led to, and might be expected to lead to, a diminution in the power of class as a social force. Now, position in the production system is not something that could be identified, by a complete outsider, by simple objective tests; it is not definable in terms of the technical function performed, the skill used or the article produced.

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It is a social concept, as Marx saw very clearly, depending on the relevant relations between men in the production system and on the values attached to them; it has a psychological element. Some factor or factors must come into operation to decide whether the multitude of jobs and occupations is going to split up into three classes, or three hundred, or three thousand. Among the possible factors are invidious comparison and conflict of basic interests. As Marx wrote in *The German Ideology* (1938, p. 49): "the separate individuals form a class only in so far as they have to carry on a common battle against another class; otherwise they are on hostile terms with each other as competitors". There is a clear case for arguing that, as extreme poverty, exploitation and "alienation" diminish, so will the drive towards such a battle grow less strong. One would then expect the classes to break up into smaller functional groups, acting as units in pursuit of their much more specialised interests. But it does not seem that this is what has been happening. At least in the U.S. and the U.K. the quite recent trend has been towards even larger trade union amalgamations. There may have been some pressure in the opposite direction, but it has been counteracted. And this has happened in spite of the strength of the factor to which Professor Aron has referred, the central position of the state as director of economic planning, and its entry into direct relations with each functional group concerned in the operation of its plans. He attributes to this the temporary decline, at least in France, of the classical form of class conflict. A similar tendency may be seen elsewhere, but it seems to have been held in check.

I am suggesting that it would be rash to conclude that class has been losing its importance; but it may be true that it has been changing its character. And it may be that this change consists in a detachment from social stratification in the old sense. Compare the following two pictures. (1) the economic structure of society places a large number of people in fundamentally the same position, so far as the social relations arising out of their productive labours are concerned. This fact, and the common interests arising from it, lead to the formation of a social group, or quasi-group, which becomes conscious of itself in terms both of these interests and of its level in the social hierarchy; it becomes a social class. Out of this group there proceed certain forms of behaviour, both individual and collective. (2) Within the economic structure of society there are many functionally distinct groups, each based on its productive rôle and the conditions under which it is performed. On some matters the interests of these groups differ; on others they are the same. Associations exist, and spread, for the pursuit of these common interests whenever they arise and with such degree of combination of groups as they demand. The members of these combining groups differ greatly in social level, and the organisations are for them rationally designed instruments for the achievement of certain specific and limited ends, albeit very important ones. In

the latter case one need not postulate the existence of the middle term, the "social class", membership of which induces certain kinds of behaviour. And the associations do not necessarily permeate the whole lives of their members, as social classes do, nor are they always in action; and at times the constituent sub-groups may be more important than the largest aggregate. Perhaps there has been a trend from (1) in the direction of (2), which might be described, not exactly as a weakening of class, but as a detachment of class from stratification—or social class—in the old sense. This might be described as a weakening of class in the Marxian sense, on the grounds that the operative interest-groups are no longer determined by the social relationships within the system of production, that is primarily by property. This, on the whole, is the view taken by the late Theodor Geiger in his penetrating essay, *Die Klassengesellschaft im Schmelztiegel* (especially pp. 133-136). Or one might maintain that economic interest-groups, standing to one another in a relationship of superiority and inferiority in terms of the normal location of institutionalised power and the day-to-day chain of command, are still important elements in social structure, but that they do not reflect the more generalised and deeply permeating inequalities which determine the system of social stratification. Or, to put it crudely, the differences of social level between such groups may not be much greater than those within each group.

One small point might be added, drawn from Professor van Doorn's paper about the unskilled workers in the Netherlands. It might be thought that the unskilled workers would remain untouched by these mollifying influences, and that class would remain for them a deep and continuing influence closely associated with their inferior general position, that is with stratification. The evidence suggests that this would be so in the case of some of them at least, because they lie outside the continuum of economic citizens that stretches from the semi-skilled wage-earner to the manager, were it not that they are a heterogeneous, fluctuating, unstable collection of persons with no basis for common consciousness or common action. They are all that is left of the proletariat, thrown back to where it started from. They are, as Professor van Doorn puts it, "residual groups" forming part of "a rather isolated social bottom layer, living on the border of social maladjustment". In a study of the British working-class, Dr. Dahrendorf uses the same term, "un groupe résiduel",¹⁸ but applies it to the unskilled workers as a whole, whereas Professor van Doorn is speaking only of the lowest elements among them; but the difference of application may be largely a matter of the definition of the term "unskilled".

We must next consider the question whether the dimension of social status has been gaining in importance, either absolutely or relatively to the class dimension. Here we might expect to find some difference between the European countries whose past structure was based on estates which, by a process of de-institutionalisation, have transmitted

a system of social status to the present (which is in turn being eroded by increasing equality of welfare and opportunity), and those countries, most notably the United States, which never had estates and in which social status may have developed fairly recently as economic inequalities became stabilised and linked with cultural values.

As regards the former type, the evidence points to a diminishing real importance of social status in recent years. But this judgment must be qualified in two ways. First, it must be remembered that our period includes the time when the new middle class was expanding and seeking to consolidate its position between the proletariat and the higher ranks of the bourgeoisie and was, in the process, acquiring, by imitation of its superiors, a strong and even exaggerated pre-occupation with the insignia of social status. Secondly, as the real importance of social status differences diminishes, some sections of society may cling to whatever remains of them, grasping all the more desperately at the shadow because the substance seems to be slipping away.

That something of this kind has been happening can hardly be doubted. One might refer, for views on the fading of status differences, to Geiger's work on Denmark¹⁹ (probably applicable broadly to Scandinavian society as a whole), and, for further views on this and on the survival of status anxieties, to Professor Schelsky's paper on Western Germany submitted to the Liège Congress,²⁰ and to Professor Bernard's contribution to this Congress. One can also note the point made by Professor Hofstee about the small farmers and agricultural workers in the Netherlands. As the wages of the latter rise above the earnings of the former, "the feeling of inferiority towards the small farmer is beginning to disappear". And the sons of the small farmers leave the land, but they do not become industrial wage-earners; they seek places in handicrafts, trade and administration. "Social position and a certain feeling of freedom and independence seem to count more for them than income."²¹ This warns us to be careful not to exaggerate the change. When some social status differences are obliterated, others may replace them in the lives of the people affected. Similarly, as the prestige attached to hereditary, or ascribed, social status declines, more opportunities may arise for the achievement of social status—though it is important to remember that this in itself involves a considerable change in the structure of stratification. It is safe to conclude that, in the countries of Western Europe during the last fifty years taken as a whole, the real importance of the social status dimension has not increased.

The picture in the United States looks at first rather different. A people, most of whom were untouched by snobbish pride fifty years or so ago, now responds readily and with apparent understanding to the spate of questionnaires on social status with which it is bombarded, as though this phenomenon had become for it a matter of

familiarity and consequence. But here again one must beware of exaggeration. The responses, though ready, are not wholly consistent, suggesting that the feelings behind them are not very deep. And part of what is found may be due, as in Europe, to the belated growth of "status anxiety" in the minds of the new middle class. Professor Mayer points out that "the image of America as a society where 'everybody is middle class' has persisted long after it ceased to be in accordance with economic and social reality", and that in quite recent years economic change has been making the image truer to the facts. And he adds that "most Americans tend to perceive and interpret objective economic differences as individual, not as class, differences". Any considerable strengthening of the social status dimension would be expected to have the opposite effect in both cases.

This brings me to my final point, which is in a sense an amalgamation of two or three points mentioned earlier. Has social status been becoming more local, individual and autonomous in recent years? To save time and space I will again use the expository device of presenting a bold hypothesis. Let us suppose that the social status dimension, as a factor creating nation-wide stratified social groups, closely related to economic classes and therefore to fundamentally economic interests, has been diminishing in force, but that the position of the individual within the social hierarchy of his local community remains a matter of importance and concern to him, and one in which his interest is shared by the members of a rather nebulous and amorphous group clustered round the point in the social scale at which he stands. Let us then suggest that this would solve the problem of reconciling the evidence for the declining real importance of social status with the signs of continued and widespread anxieties about it. It would also explain the point of those "static" studies of "status hierarchies in various local communities" to which Professor Mayer referred. We may then add the proposition that class, in the Marx/Weber sense, has been developing into a structure of functional interest-groups, not exactly determined by stratification, and that, in terms of the objective facts of income and standard (possibly also style) of living, most western societies have been developing an enormous middle class (with relatively little above and below it), and that the social status hierarchies just described do not, and cannot, correspond very closely to either of these. In this sense, perhaps, social status has been becoming more local, individual and autonomous.

If we revert to the method suggested at the beginning of this paper of seeking clues in the use or misuse of concepts, some confirmation can be found. The term "social class" (as distinct from plain "class" and "social status") is beginning to sound old-fashioned. It suggests groups possessed both of real and vital common economic interests and of a group-consciousness of their general position in the social scale. In other words it refers to a product of converging dimensions and a system of multibonded groups. "Social status," on the other

hand, does not necessarily imply the existence of groups at all; it could be used with reference to a continuous scale of invidiously valued positions. Nor does it imply a system wholly determined by economic interest derived from position in the productive system; other factors may enter, and traditional values may outlive the economic circumstances to which they originally referred. Another popular term is "prestige", which is rather less institutional than "social status" and makes possible the inclusion in the picture of a man's personal qualities as well as the consensus as to the social ranking of the position he occupies. It might include what I have elsewhere called "personal social status" as distinct from "positional social status".²² And finally, if this were the general trend of social change, then clearly the unique features of the local community would gain in importance as compared with the general characteristics of the total society, since only by reference to them can, in most cases, the more personal factors be weighed and valued.

In conclusion I should like to say that much of what I have written is highly speculative; this represents a deliberate attempt to provide material for discussion. Also, I have tried to suggest the direction of social change during the last fifty years (almost entirely in Europe and North America), but I have not attempted to measure its extent. I do not suggest that these changes have progressed to the point at which a new society emerges; far from it. Nor is it by any means certain that the direction of change will not alter long before such a revolution has been produced.

NOTES

¹ See Kurt Mayer, *The Theory of Social Classes*, in *Transactions of the Second World Congress of Sociology*, Vol. II, Part 6.

² See, for instance, Georges Lavau, *Les Classes moyennes*, in M. Duverger, *Partis politiques et classes sociales en France*.

³ Milton M. Gordon, *Social Class and American Intellectuals*, in *Bulletin of the American Association of University Professors*, Vol. 40, No. 4, pp. 519-20.

⁴ P. Sorokin, *Society, Culture and Personality*, p. 236.

⁵ Paul Hatt, *Occupation and Social Stratification*, in *American Journal of Sociology*, LV, May, 1950.

⁶ Quoted from H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, *From Max Weber*, pp. 183, 193.

⁷ See T. H. Marshall, *A Note on "Status"*, in *Ghurye Felicitation Volume* (Bombay, 1955).

⁸ R. Centers, *The Psychology of Social Classes*, p. 210.

⁹ R. Berelson and others, *Voting*, p. 65.

¹⁰ Dennis H. Wrong, in a paper submitted to the 1955 Congress of the International Political Science Association.

¹¹ On this whole question see H. H. Hyman, *The Psychology of Status*, *Archives of Psychology*, No. 269, 1942.

¹² Quoted in R. Bendix and S. M. Lipset, *Class, Status and Power*, pp. 30-31.

¹³ G. Mosca, *The Ruling Class* (1939), p. 50.

¹⁴ R. Aron, *Social Structure and the Ruling Class*, in *British Journal of Sociology*, Vol. I, 1950, p. 10.

¹⁵ David Butler, *Voting Behaviour and Its Study in Britain*, in *British Journal of Sociology*, Vol. VI, No. 2, p. 102.

¹⁶ See Berelson *op. cit.*, p. 57 and John Bonham, *The Middle Class Vote*, Ch. 7.

¹⁷ G. Mosca, *op. cit.*, pp. 404, 408.

¹⁸ R. Dahrendorf, *La situation de la classe ouvrière en Angleterre*, in *La Revue Socialiste*, No. 89, July, 1955.

¹⁹ T. Geiger, *Soziale Umschichtungen in einer dänischen Mittelstadt*, especially pages 110-112.

²⁰ H. Schelsky, *Die Bedeutung des Schichtungs-begriffes für die Analyse der gegenwärtigen deutschen Gesellschaft*, in *Transactions of the Second World Congress of Sociology*, Vol. II, Part 6.

²¹ E. W. Hofstee, *Changes in Rural Social Stratification in the Netherlands*, in *Transactions*, Vol. II, Part 2, pp. 78-79.

²² T. H. Marshall, *The Nature and Determinants of Social Status*, in *Year Book of Education*, 1953, p. 35.

Old Notions and New Problems: Interpretations of Social Structure in Modern Society

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CLASS STRUCTURE AND SOCIAL STRATIFICATION

In the programme of the Third World Congress of Sociology, Section III, we find two terms which seem to be used as synonyms: "class structure" and "class stratification". Such interpretation of these terms is suggested not only by the text of the programme but also by the name of the chairman of Sub-section I, who wrote some time ago in his study of class conflict: "We are discussing a particular kind of group, whose nature is indicated by the phrase: *social stratification*. The groups, that is to say, lie one above the other in layers".¹

This is, however, not the only way of interpreting class structure. Class structure was not reduced to social stratification in Madison's conception of class structure at the end of the 18th century, nor in Stalin's view of the non-antagonistic class structure of Soviet society in the middle of the 20th.

In order to get a clear apprehension of the sphere of problems involved in the discussion about changes in class structure, a classification of the main types of interpretation of class structure will, perhaps, be useful; I mean a classification which would be independent of the current distinction of "objective" and "subjective" notions of class (as, e.g., Marx's distinction of "die Klasse an sich" and "die Klasse für sich" or Centers's distinction between "class—as a 'sociopsychological phenomenon'—and 'stratum'").

An interesting proposition has been presented in a concise recent study by Alain Touraine,² where Centers's notion of stratum ("le strate") is opposed to the notion of class, conceived rather in conformity with the Marxist tradition. But the problem of different visions of class structure seems more complicated.

CLASSES AS COMPONENTS OF A SYSTEM

In spite of all the ambiguities of the term "social class", it seems that there are certain common assumptions in all different theories of social class. One of these assumptions takes for granted that classes are components of a system of two or several groups of the same kind, forming together a society. It means that any definition of any social class must imply relations of this class to other groups of the same system: to explain, e.g., who is a proletarian in the Marxist sense of the word we must take into account his relation to the capitalist; the notion of the middle class implies again the notions of the lower and the upper classes. Such an implication constitutes a basic difference

between a class and a professional group. When we treat a professional group as a component of a *system* of basic groups in a social structure it becomes for us a social class without ceasing to be a professional group from another point of view (e.g., agriculturists, priests or warriors in a feudal system).

MAIN WAYS OF CONCEIVING CLASS STRUCTURE

There are two kinds of relations which enable us to speak about a system of social classes: *relations of order* and *relations of dependence*. We have correspondingly two types of schemes of class structure: schemes based on relations of order and schemes based on relations of dependence.

Schemes of Gradation

Class division is conceived in the first case as a division according to the degree of a quality treated as a criterion of class participation, e.g., according to the amount of income. This scheme of class structure may be called *the scheme of gradation*. An asymmetrical transitive relation determines the place of each class in this scheme. Let us take as examples the Warner six-class scheme, or schemes connected with the term "stratum" of some authors, like Centers and Touraine, or the old distinction of the upper, the middle and the lower classes.

Within the schemes of gradations we can distinguish the scheme of *simple gradation*, where people are ranked according to one objective criterion, and the scheme of *synthetic gradation*, where the class position is determined by the inter-relation of several criteria which have no common gauge. Only in the first case have we to do with an objective ranking: any scale established as the result of a synthesis of two or several objective scales (where a lower position on one scale can be compensated by a higher position on the other) is not an objective scale if particular criteria, as e.g., wealth and education, are incommensurable. The ranking based on several criteria, e.g., the ranking which is the subject matter of Warner's study, can be treated only as an expression of attitudes of a given social environment. This important difference has not usually been taken into account by those who speak about ranking the strata from the point of view of "one or several objective criteria".

Schemes Based on Relation of Dependence

If we understand by a class system a system of relations of dependence, we characterise particular classes by different attributes. We have to do with two kinds of dependence in different conceptions of class structure: with a one-sided dependence and with a mutual one.

One-sided dependence in a system of social relations is understood usually as a subjection to somebody's power. *Mutual dependence* in a class system may have two different aspects. In the first one it appears as an "organic" dependence: classes constitute a system, since each one

has its particular functions in the life of society; so in Adam Smith's scheme one of the three fundamental classes has to furnish land, the second, capital, the third one labour. In the second aspect the mutual dependence of social classes consists in a negative correlation of interests: successes of one class are failures of the other. We find such a view also in Adam Smith's work, and more explicitly in Madison's articles, if we look for Marx's predecessors.


Two schemes based on relation of dependence are to be distinguished in connection with the two kinds of dependence in social relations to which we have referred.

The first one is a dychotomic scheme, where two classes are terms of an asymmetrical relation: I mean the relation of one-sided dependence. These classes are characterised by attributes mutually opposed: dominating—dominated, exploiting—exploited, propertied—non-propertied, working—idle or leisure class. Let us call such a scheme of class structure a *dychotomic scheme of one-sided dependence*. This one-sided dependence, however, may be interpreted, from another point of view, as a mutual dependence of antagonistic interests. Antagonism is, of course, a symmetrical relation.

Simple schemes may be combined into composed ones. The classical Marxist three- or four-class scheme of social structure in capitalist society is formed by the crossing of three dychotomic divisions based on different criteria: (a) those who possess and those who do not possess the means of production, (b) those who work and those who do not work, (c) those who employ hired labour and those who do not.

The second main scheme of class dependence may be called the *functional scheme*. Society is here divided into classes bound together by some relation of mutual dependence, conceived in its "organic" aspect (which does not exclude, however, some negative correlation of interests). They are characterised by different, but not by contradictory attributes. This is the case in the mediæval idea of society as composed of those who pray, those who defend and those who work, or in Adam Smith's three-classes scheme, or in the Stalinian scheme of non-antagonistic classes (see diagram below).

Classification of types of interpretation of class structure.



DIFFERENT VISIONS OF THE SAME SOCIETY

The same society can be classified according to different schemes. From legendary Agrippa, from Aristotle to Herbert Spencer and Durkheim, from St. Clement of Alexandria to modern papal encyclicals, to Oxford Movement declarations and fascist manifestos, the defenders of the existing order endeavoured to represent it as based on mutual dependence resulting from the division of tasks equally useful for the whole society, while the oppressed classes did perceive the same social reality in a dichotomic asymmetrical scheme.

Through visions of the social structure, visions characteristic of particular classes or particular environments, we approach most vital social problems. An aspect of social structure, more or less universally accepted in a given environment, can be an important element of the social situation.

THE IDEAL TYPE OF CAPITALIST SOCIETY AND ITS IMPACT ON ACTUAL INTERPRETATIONS OF CLASS STRUCTURE

The three main schemes of social structure we have tried to discern seem to represent very general aspects of class society, since the examples cover thousands of years. Nevertheless the various historical forms of social organisation suggest one scheme rather than another; and the criteria of interhuman dependence have been conceived differently in different epochs.

The modern theories of social class began to develop in a period when a new ideal type of society was taking shape in the social mind of Western Europe. The concept of social structure as a system of interhuman dependences corresponded strictly, in that ideal type, to the concept of economic gradation. In other words, the scale of wealth had to be the only regulator of social position. All power was expected to result from the possession of wealth. Political power had to perform only a stabilising function in the system of interhuman dependences and was not to have any place in the image of the social structure in its constitutive lines.

This ideal type of a capitalist society was suggested by the dynamics of real social changes of that time. The importance of economic power reached then an unprecedented level. The state began to be treated as "an executive committee" of the dominating class not only by the Marxists: a conviction, that those who govern the state can be bought like any other merchandise, was sometimes not concealed by business men; and the liberal conception of the state as a passive guardian of the existing order fitted also very well into the Marxian formula.

Moreover, the people of that period—especially after the American Civil War—expected a further evolution towards that ideal type. In this respect, the author of *Capital* was in accord with the representatives of the liberal bourgeoisie, although for them the goal of this evolution

had to be the highest form of civilised social organisation, and for him—the last phase of capitalist society.

History did not follow that way. Lenin was already obliged to introduce some important corrections into the Marxian predictions, and liberal writers became aware with dismay that the line of progress was broken and that “the course of civilisation took an unexpected turn”.³ This “unexpected turn” separates the civilisation of classical capitalism—when the conceptual frame of sociology, as a new science, was formed—from the civilisation of world wars, of big monopolies, of new socialist states and social planning on an unprecedented scale.

SOCIAL CHANGES AND INTERFERENCE OF TWO DENOTATIONS OF A TERM

One of the fundamental postulates of the ideal type of society we have spoken of was that history in its main lines had been a result of innumerable individual spontaneous actions. This opinion, shared also by the socialists,⁴ was reflected in the 19th century conception of social class as a group shaped spontaneously by the independent actions of individuals.

It has been associated with a new term. Sieyès in 1789 spoke about *estates* in French society; for Babeuf, six years later, France was divided only into *classes*. The word “class”, in the sense of social class, was used occasionally in the 18th century, but it was only after the French Revolution that it gradually became *a term*, which soon gained citizenship in most of the European languages. Even Adam Smith in his distinction of the three main classes of the society still employed the word “orders”, and not the term “classes”, which his disciples employed. The new term became so strongly connected with the social structure of 19th century bourgeois democracy that not long ago P. Sorokin, in his explanation of the meaning of that term, regarded as one of the peculiarities of its designate that class is a group “characteristic of the western society of the 18th, 19th and 20th centuries”.⁵

Although *the term “class”* in capitalist society has been opposed to such terms as “estate” or “caste”, at the same time in certain contexts it has taken the place of the older terms, “order” and “estate”, in their most general sense, as names of basic groups in any class society. Its connotation, influenced by the opposition of the new order to feudal society, led to confusion in some general theories of social development and in some analyses of precapitalist societies. To-day—in the absence of a more general term—there is some analogous trouble in connection with social structure of “post-capitalist” societies too, where changes in social structure are included in the plans of state activity.

CLASSES AND ORGANISATIONS IN SOCIAL STRUCTURE

The view that it is the free activity of spontaneous forces that ultimately shapes social life, has led to the thesis that the classes, as

non-organised groups, have a dominant rôle in the social structure, conceived as a system of interhuman dependencies. But the functions of large organisations in the structure of society have changed very much since the time of Marx and J. S. Mill. It is enough to mention the rôle of state organisations in the socialist countries, the rôle of the capitalist state in war economy, the continuous increase in the number of state, communal and trade union employees, the prospects opened up by the discovery of new sources of energy which surely cannot be entrusted to the play of spontaneous activities. Already before the last war some aspects of the social structure connected with the old idea of social class collided with new experiences of powerful organisations in the capitalist countries: the influence of huge monopolies on the life of society, struggles of antagonistic working class organisations propagating different class ideologies in the name of the same class, the penetration of the monoparty organisations into the social structure in the fascist states. While the fact that humanitarian or national slogans frequently mask a class interest was known long ago, new experiences revealed that it is no less possible to mask the interests of an organisation by class slogans.

The history of the 20th century has taught us in this way that the relation between social classes and social organisations is more complicated than might be supposed from the patterns of social structure and social dynamics inherited from former generations.

THE MARXIST CRITERION OF CLASS IN THE PRESENT WORLD

The Marxian conception of social class, as defined by its relation to the means of production, succeeded in disclosing a very essential criterion in the epoch when private ownership of the means of production seemed to be the almost only durable way of exploitation of other people's labour, and to determine entirely the whole system of interhuman subjection in the Western world.

This conception, however, seems to-day much less adequate, even in regard to the capitalist countries. It is not only because we have had occasion to get acquainted with fascist methods of compulsion on a mass scale, and not only because of the expansion of the planning functions of the state or because of the development of such institutions as social assistance (health service) in post-war England, in which the communist rule "to everybody according to his needs" seems to be realised. It is also because of the changes in the occupational structure of society. In the United States, e.g., the middle class, in the Marxist sense (small independent producers), declined during the last century in accordance with Marx's prediction. But at the same time a new middle class has arisen which once constituted only an insignificant margin and which does not fit in the classical Marxist notion. Our opinion then as to the fulfilment of Marx's prediction about the fate of the "middle class" depends on the interpretation of that term which in Marx's time did not provoke any such trouble.

On the other side, the birth and development of socialist states has shown that the abolition of private ownership of the means of production has not, as yet, put an end to economic inequality or class division. The inadequacy of the classical Marxist-Leninist conception of class in regard to socialist society has found its expression in Stalin's notion of "non-antagonistic classes" in the U.S.S.R.

TWO INTERPRETATIONS OF CLASSLESSNESS

At the beginning of this paper we pointed to interpretations of "class structure" where this term did not imply class stratification. Nevertheless the social importance of the modern notion of class is connected with the postulates of democracy and with the struggle of the oppressed for equality.

Democratic slogans, which guided people in their attempts to overthrow the feudal order, became later a common possession of new classes in their struggles with one another. The defenders of the new social order had to cope with the postulate of equality. A new problem of interpretation then appeared: in what sense has "classless society" to be demanded by those who accept the ideas of the French and the American Revolutions? "Classlessness" did not mean the same for the representatives of bourgeois democracy and for Marx or Bakunin. It did not mean for those democrats the economic equality demanded by the founders of the *Conjuration des Égaux*. Since the new class structure was so much less rigid and visible than the social order of the *ancien régime*, Guizot could affirm that there were no more social classes in French society, and the same was proclaimed by the school manuals of the Third Republic. Social structure in the United States is now sometimes interpreted as a *continuum* of social positions without any class divisions. The term "classlessness" was applied to American society in some post-war discussions, and this "classlessness" did not mean the sort of equality which Tocqueville attributed to American society a hundred years ago.

The problem is not limited to the capitalist countries. The existence of classes in the U.S.S.R. is accepted by communist social science but the existence of class stratification is denied, as it is supposed that even considerable inequalities of income cannot constitute a basis for class stratification if private property of the means of production does not exist. The class structure of that country is not interpreted there in conformity with the scheme of gradation, although the tendency toward levelling all revenues ("uravnilovka") has been strongly combatted. The scheme of gradation, however, is applied to the social structure of the U.S.S.R. by the representatives of the western non-communist milieux; we can easily find examples in American sociological and political reviews.

Hence a further question: How denotations of two terms: "egalitarian society" and "society without class stratification" are to

be related? Under what conditions should even a considerable economic inequality not be interpreted as a symptom of class division?

CONCLUSION

Taking as a point of departure the more or less perennial aspects of class society, I have tried, within the narrow limits of this paper, to show some problems suggested by the inadequacy of the inherited nineteenth century ideas of social structure in our new world. These problems, as we have seen, arise when we take into consideration the inter-relationship of spontaneous and planned processes in the changing society, the relation of social classes and social organisations, the distinction of the means of production and the means of compulsion, or when we have to do with the inter-relation of two denotations of the term "class" and with different interpretations of the term "classlessness".

Among new social conditions on the world scale, the most important, from this point of view, is perhaps the coexistence of socialist and capitalist states. We need, I think, a new frame of notions to compare, by means of the same conceptual categories, changes of social structures in socialist and in capitalist countries; we need a frame of notions both wide enough to enable us to unveil similarities disguised under different names, different interpretations and different appearances, and subtle enough to shed light on essential particularities and contrasts.

NOTES.

¹ T. H. Marshall, "The Nature of Class Conflict", in *Class-Conflict and Social Stratification*, Le Play House, 1938, p. 97.

² *Rapport sur la préparation en France de l'enquête internationale sur la stratification et la mobilité sociales*, I.S.A., mimeographed papers, vol. 1, 1953.

³ F. A. Hayek, *La route de la servitude*, Paris, Librairie de Médicis, p. 15.

⁴ Cf., e.g., Fr. Engels, *Ludwig Feuerbach und der Ausgang der Klassischen Deutschen Philosophie*, chapter IV.

⁵ P. Sorokin, *Society, Culture and Personality*, Harper and Brothers, 1947, p. 271.

Class Organisation in an Era of Abundance : A New Principle of Class Organisation

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In the middle of the 19th century, Karl Marx saw industrialised societies becoming polarised into two great classes, one getting richer and the other poorer. It seemed to him that in time this polarisation would be completed and society would break down into the Haves and the Have-nots, the Bourgeoisie and the Proletariat. The inevitable conflict would finally end, he predicted, in the dictatorship of the Proletariat, and ultimately in a classless society.

The history of industrialised societies does seem to be in the direction of a "classless" society, but not by way of the route predicted by Marx. Social scientists no longer find the concepts "bourgeoisie" and "proletariat" useful in analysing industrial societies. But if we think instead of a "middle class" the evidence in all the advanced nations points squarely to its expansion at the expense of both the upper and the lower classes.¹

From the point of view of the distribution within countries of the goods produced, a certain levelling process appears to be under way in countries with relatively high and expanding national incomes: the poorer groups are receiving a larger share of the total income; wage differentials between occupational groups are narrowing; progressive labour legislation and systems of social security are defining minimum levels of welfare below which society does not permit individual members to sink—and these levels are being progressively re-defined upwards.

In income, in education, in occupation, and in consumption patterns, then, the differences among people in industrialised societies are becoming attenuated. The concept "toiling masses" becomes laughable when it is almost impossible to distinguish between a group of workers in street clothes and a group of businessmen. The concept "capitalist," similarly, loses much of its usefulness when some corporations such, for example, as the American Telephone and Telegraph Company have more owners than employees and when a large class of professionally trained trustees manage huge capital investments in industry, much of the capital owned, furthermore, by welfare and pension funds which workers themselves have built up by their own contributions. Instead of "toiling masses" we now have the concept "labour force," and the labour force includes the business and professional man as well as the factory operative. The "classless" society, then, is coming not through

a transitional dictatorship of a proletariat, but by the enormous expansion of the middle class which tends to absorb those below it.

The fact seems to be that modern technology introduces a wholly new principle of class organisation, a principle based on abundance rather than, as in the past, on scarcity.

In an age of scarcity, the existence of a class of Haves depends on the existence of a large class of Have-nots. Where there is not very much, someone must be poor in order for someone else to be rich. An aristocracy in an age of scarcity can have leisure and luxury only because the masses have none. In an age of abundance, on the other hand, the existence of a class of Haves depends, not on a large deprived class, but on an expanding class of Haves. A mass-oriented economy depends on a mass-market. There can be no rich families like the Fords and the Chryslers unless there are also millions of families able to buy their product. The very existence of families able to afford Cadillacs depends on the existence of millions of families able to buy Chevrolets. An economy of abundance,² in brief, is quite different from an economy of scarcity; it cannot operate if there are too many Have-nots. It creates Haves and Have-mores rather than Haves and Have-nots.

Stalin's formulation of the basic economic law of capitalism—"the securing of the maximum capitalist profit through the exploitation, ruin and impoverishment of the population of the given country"—might well be taken as a statement of the principle of class organisation operating in an economy of scarcity; his statement of the law of socialism as "the securing of the maximum satisfaction of the constantly rising material and cultural requirements of the whole society through the continuous expansion and perfection of socialist production on the basis of higher techniques,"³ might similarly be used as a statement of the principle of class organisation operating in an economy of abundance, based on a mass market.

Whether or not abundance with its resultant equalising tendency was an inevitable concomitant of industrialisation might well be mooted. It is conceivable that modern technology could have been institutionalised on a start-stop basis, as Marx thought, so that abundance would not have resulted. If that had been possible, the rich might indeed have become richer and the poor poorer. Long periods of unemployment might have used up any accumulations workers might find possible. Actually, however, the principle of continuous operation of men and machines has been adopted as a policy for guiding modern economies, with increasing dependence on a high level of consumption by means of a mass market. In the United States, for example, the so-called Full Employment Act was passed in 1946 to make provision for employment by the federal government if or when private industry could not provide for it.

It has also been argued that modern technology has its own *élan* or drive or rationale which requires it to increase in productivity. The

kind and quality of personnel which it demands and creates—technicians, engineers, managers, professionals, analysts—are efficiency-minded. (Indeed, so much so, that ordinary workers—as industrial sociologists have shown—organise to slow down the almost inevitable increase in productivity). This class of worker is not likely to submit to a start-stop principle of operating modern technology.

Whether or not it was inevitable, however, as a matter of historical fact, the tendency of modern technology has been in the direction of widespread abundance and with abundance, an attenuation of class differences, a drive toward equality.

SOME POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE NEW PRINCIPLE OF CLASS ORGANISATION

The Marxist formulation of class envisaged the major issue between classes—the Haves and the Have-nots—as one of power. Observers of the current American scene view the major issue as one of status. The picture is not one of an upsurging class of Have-nots challenging the power of a class of Haves, but rather of a class of upwardly mobile and therefore conservative persons clinging to newly-acquired gains. And, also conservative but for different reasons, a class of downwardly mobile persons clinging to what is left of their former status supremacy, a status based in many cases primarily on ethnicity. Status, in brief, rather than power or interests constitutes the clew to understanding political alignments in an era of abundance.⁴

Political life is not simply an arena in which the conflicting interests of various social groups in concrete material gains are fought out; it is also an arena into which status aspirations and frustrations are . . . projected. It is at this point that the issues of politics, or the pretended issues of politics, become interwoven with and dependent upon the personal problems of individuals. We have, at all times, two kinds of processes going on in inextricable connection with each other: *interest politics*, the clash of material aims and needs among various groups and blocs; and *status politics*, the clash of various projective rationalisations arising from status aspirations and other personal motives. In times of depression and economic discontent—and by and large in times of acute national emergency—politics is more clearly a matter of interests, although of course status considerations are still present. In times of prosperity and general well-being on the material plane, status considerations among the masses can become much more influential.

If we take attitude toward non-conformists as an index of conservatism, a recent study documents this new alignment. This study was a cross-section of the American public in 1954. In addition, community leaders were also polled. On every issue studied, presidents of labour unions were more conservative than presidents of Chambers of Commerce; and officers of the organisation known as Daughters of the American Revolution were more conservative still.⁵

Analyses of voting behaviour has shown similar trends. After two decades of accelerated social and economic reform under the New Deal and the Fair Deal, a period of great conservatism was ushered in in the 1950's. No doubt a large variety of factors was involved in this change. Among them some observers have found a number which are related to status. The politically conservative of the 1950's, for example, include both the downwardly mobile—including many "old Americans"—and the upwardly mobile—children of immigrants who have risen and who wish to protect their newly acquired gains.⁶

Consider first the old-family Americans . . . Large members of them are actually losing their . . . claims to status. For there are among them a considerable number of the shabby genteel, of those who for one reason or another have lost their old objective positions in the life of business and politics and the professions, and who therefore cling with exceptional desperation to such remnants of their prestige as they can muster from their ancestors. These people, although very often quite well-to-do, feel that they have been pushed out of their rightful place in American life, even out of their neighbourhoods. Most of them . . . have felt themselves edged aside by the immigrants, the trade unions, and the urban machines in the past thirty years. When the immigrants were weak, these native elements used to indulge themselves in ethnic and religious snobberies at their expense. Now the immigrant groups have developed ample means, political and economic, of self-defence, and the second and third generations have become considerably more capable of looking out for themselves.

Consider next the upwardly mobile. The following statement is doubtless an exaggeration, but it highlights a situation which more sober students also report.⁷

This all-prevailing discontent does not arise as during the 19th century from rebellion against entrenched wealth. The American people are more prosperous than ever, especially those who were formerly impoverished. These latter cannot be called middle-class groups; they lack the usual attributes of a middle-class culture. I can only describe them as nouveaux riches proletarians, whom I first discovered during my war journeys through our industrial centres. Then these people, just off relief, had enjoyed bonanza war salaries for two years, yet they were very unhappy. "We thought all our troubles would be over if only we had enough money" they said to me. "But now we find that our troubles have just begun." They found that possession of gadgets and comfort was not enough. . . . The psychology of this newly rich proletariat is not unlike that of the nouveaux riches Texas oil millionaires for they have the same history. Both groups are conservative because they want to hold on to their money. They are isolationist for the same reason.

Another writer points out that instead of a liberal-conservative political alignment we have what he calls Reconcilables and Irreconcilables, based on status criteria.⁸

Do the Reconcilables and the Irreconcilables fall into any identifiable groups? We have some clues. There is the obvious fact that a strikingly heavy percentage of the Irreconcilables in Congress are from west of the Appalachians and north of the Mason-Dixon line. Every public opinion poll which touches on questions relating to the struggle between the Reconcilables and the Irreconcilables points to this correlation: the less education the more likely a person is to hold Irreconcilable opinions. A varied body of evidence indicates another alignment: the most intense support for Irreconcilable ideas seems to be found among old-stock Americans who are going down in wealth or status and among immigrants who have recently made great advances. The Westerner, the downward mobile, the upward mobile, the uneducated joined against Easterners and Southerners, the educated, and those with a more stable position in society—this is a crazy quilt indeed, and it leads inevitably to the inquiry whether there is some common characteristic which makes sense out of each grouping. . . . The jumble of class, regional, and educational lines which divide the Reconcilable from the Irreconcilable could bear some relation to . . . a sense of inner security. The uneducated man is not only without the status that comes with schooling; he lacks the relaxing assurance, which education alone can bring, that Rome was not built—nor was it destroyed—in a day. The old-stock American who is not doing too well fidgets at the thought that he will be pushed out of leadership in the community by the upward lunge of new stock. The new immigrants, so much on the rise economically, are only the more concerned about that final prerequisite of respectability—being undoubtedly, unassailably, 100 per cent. American.

Abundance, in brief, with its powerful drive toward equality, alters not only the principle of class organisation but also the issues which divide classes. Political behaviour reflects not a picture of power being sought by a long-disinherited class to wrest the control of wealth from a class with vested interests but rather one of a holding action on the part of both the upwardly and the downwardly mobile against any kind of change which they feel as a threat to their status.

SUMMARY

Modern technology, by making abundance possible, has introduced a new principle of class organisation into society. Instead of, as in an economy of scarcity, a class of Have-nots and a class of Haves, abundance tends in the direction of equality. With this change in class organisation, the characteristic political issues tend to become those of status rather than primarily of economic interest or power. The

“proletariat” has not absorbed the middle class but rather the other way round. The trends are here described in the United States, but they are probably characteristic of all societies based on modern technology. In the sense that the class structure here described reflects modern technology, it vindicates the Marxist thesis that social organisation is “determined” by technological forces. The precise manner in which these forces operate and the result they bring about, however, belie the Marxist dialectic.

NOTES

¹ United Nations, *Preliminary Report on the World Social Situation* (United Nations, 1952), p. 3.

² Economists may well cavil at the use of the expression “economy of abundance,” on the grounds that it is a contradiction in terms; there is no “economy” where abundance prevails. The reader will understand what is meant, however; and there is no satisfactory substitute term to convey the meaning intended.

³ Joseph Stalin, *Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R.* (International Publishers, 1952, pp. 31–34).

⁴ Richard Hofstadter, “The Pseudo-Conservative Revolt”, *The American Scholar*, 24 (Winter, 1954–55), p. 17.

⁵ Samuel A. Stouffer, *Communism, Conformity and Civil Liberties* (Doubleday & Co., 1955), pp. 31, 34, 37, 42, 52, 139 and 194.

⁶ Richard Hofstadter, *loc. cit.*, pp. 19–20.

⁷ Agnes E. Meyer, “Learning and Liberty”, *American Council of Learned Societies Newsletter*, 6 (Spring, 1955), pp. 7–8.

⁸ Eric F. Goldman, “What is Prosperity Doing to Our Political Parties?” *Saturday Review*, Oct. 8, 1955, p. 36.

Changes in Patterns of Stratification Attendant on Attainment of Political Independence

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THE PROBLEM

This paper is a brief analysis of the changes in the system of social stratification brought about by the achievement of political independence. While many societies in human history have passed through this stage, our analysis will necessarily be limited to contemporary examples. The hypothesis presented here will be derived mainly from data from post-colonial societies, i.e., those which have recently attained political independence after prolonged colonial status (India, Ceylon, Pakistan, Burma, Indonesia, The Gold Coast, etc.),¹ to a smaller extent on data from Latin America,² from East European "succession" states after the first world war (Poland, the Baltic and Balkan states, etc.)³ and on some data from Israel⁴ where I naturally have a more detailed and first-hand knowledge of the situation. For reasons which will subsequently be explained, we shall also to some extent draw on material from Soviet Russia and Communist China, where the sudden change in political régime may be likened to the gaining of political independence elsewhere. Since very few fully reliable historical and sociological studies on these problems have been published, the analysis presented here will be very brief and should be viewed as a tentative effort to provide a series of hypotheses to be worked out and tested in further studies.

DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL ELITE AND BUREAUCRACY AND THEIR MAIN GENERAL TENDENCIES.

One of the basic characteristics of these situations is that a totally new sphere of power emerges in a society—a fact which necessarily has manifold repercussions on its whole structure. Herein lies the parallel between post-colonial and "post-revolutionary" societies. Usually a successful revolution also entirely transforms the whole structure and hierarchy of power in a society and establishes an entirely new sphere of power.

What are then the specific influences of such a rapid change in the political situation of a society? It is obvious that they will vary greatly in different societies. But in order to estimate and evaluate the extent of such variations and their causes it is first necessary to analyse aspects which seem to be more or less constant. One factor, which seems to be more or less common to most of these societies, should be emphasised, as it has important repercussions on the problem analyzed here. This is the fact that both the attainment of political independence and a

successful revolution are usually accompanied by intensive activities of small primary groups of revolutionaries led by charismatic leaders, etc., who manipulate various collective symbols in an attempt to draw wider strata of population into co-operation. These groups usually become the nucleus of the new ruling group after the attainment of independence or the success of a revolution. They strongly influence, if not outright direct, many new developments of the societies. Two of these developments, which are of great interest from the point of view of this analysis, can be found in almost all cases.

A. The attainment of political independence and the establishment of a new state always entail the establishment of new power positions which exercise a strong influence on the economic structure of the society, and greatly widen the various instrumental rewards and gratifications which can be allocated through political and administrative channels.

B. The attainment of political independence necessarily gives rise to new collective symbols of identification, mostly surrounding the new political élite, which claims special solidary acceptance because of its leadership in the struggle for independence. Thus in addition to the extension of the field of instrumental rewards concentrated in the new spheres of power, we find also an intensification of claims by the élites to solidary acceptance and prestige.

Let us briefly enlarge on these two points :

The enlargement of the sphere and of allocation of instrumental rewards through these new political and administrative agencies, is almost self-evident. This process is still more understandable if we remember that most of these states have attained their independence in an historical period which has witnessed a growing concentration of economic power and direction by the state. Moreover, most of these states were relative late-comers to international economics, and usually found that many of the best positions in that sphere were already monopolised by the older states. They were also relatively poor in original capital and entrepreneurial skill, because of their former colonial or semi-colonial status and dependence on outside, and often alien, sources of capital. For these reasons, the increasing importance of the state and increasing economic power are evident in all these societies.⁵

This growing power of the state manifests itself in the expansion of its administrative services and in the continuous enlargement of the bureaucratic apparatus. This expansion is not purely quantitative. It gives rise to relatively new social groups, the political élite and bureaucracy, which, whatever the extent of their cohesion and homogeneity, claim a special position of power and prestige, and attempt to supervise many activities of other professional, economic and cultural groups in the society.

These claims to social *importance* are common to both the active political top-circles and to the top and middle strata of the bureaucracy.

Both groups derive their strength not only from their hold on important power positions but also from their close attachment to the solidary collective values of the community; from their would-be personification of the attainment of political independence and from the glory of the "revolutionary" days when they formed the nuclei of the revolutionary political and social movements. Moreover, they quite often justify their claims to power and instrumental rewards in terms of their solidary activities and values. But whereas in the pre-independence days their claims to prestige and influence were based solely on such collective solidary grounds, after the attainment of independence these claims became strengthened by power. This process is, in some of its basic characteristics, similar in both post-revolutionary⁶ and post-colonial societies. Its most outstanding feature is the potential claim of the political and bureaucratic élite to the monopolization of the highest positions of prestige and power in the instrumental, the solidary and the cultural fields alike.

Thus it may be said that from the point of view of the system of stratification, in most such countries, there is a strong tendency for the political élite and bureaucracy to monopolize the upper positions of power and prestige, to transform political power into one of the highest values of society both from the solidary and the instrumental points of view, and to establish itself, on the basis of these claims and criteria, as an upper stratum within the society.

This is connected with :

(a) Attempts to strong unification of the hierarchy of status in terms of the relative proximity of different positions and strata to this upper stratum and to political power, and

(b) Efforts to gear many economic, professional and cultural activities to the political-collective sphere;

(c) Efforts to direct most processes of social mobility by the different political élites and groups.

These claims, which are mostly based on collective, solidary and charismatic criteria, are at the same time oriented towards the attainment of instrumental positions and facilities, and are based to a large extent on the glorification of political power as such. This gives rise to certain internal contradictions and tensions, which have important repercussions on the system of stratification, and which are closely connected with the state of moral malaise which seems always to accompany processes of "routinization" and institutionalisation of political authority.

THE SOCIAL BACKGROUND OF THE MONOLITHIC TENDENCIES OF THE POLITICAL ELITE AND BUREAUCRACY

In order to understand fully the repercussions on the system of stratification of these activities of the élite, some additional historical facts should be remembered. These are common to all these countries,

although differences in historical development are of great importance for our analysis.

Firstly, in most of these countries, a process of social transformation—usually growing differentiation, modernisation, secularisation—has been evident well before the attainment of independence, under the impact of the colonial situation or before the ripening of the revolution. The processes of change have modernised the old “traditional” system of stratification and have given rise to various new developments in this sphere. Perhaps the most important fact here is the development of a growing scale and diversity of social relations which undermine the autonomy of the old traditional systems, cut across the traditional groups and foci of power and prestige and gradually establish new social strata and economic groups.⁷

Secondly, there is the fact that in most of these societies a sharp polarity of social and economic strata existed, and that the economic pyramid was very steep.⁸ Either this was an original feature of these societies, or it was initiated by colonial developments.⁹ However, the outcome is usually quite similar—a very low standard of living among the greater part of the population (usually peasants) and dearth and weakness in the various so-called middle and professional groups.¹⁰

Thirdly, in most of these countries little economic and occupational differentiation and specialisation existed. This is most clearly connected with the relative weakness of the middle and organized working classes, the unbalanced development of towns, etc.¹¹

In other words it may be said that in most of these countries—although to differing degrees in each—the undermining of the old system of stratification, and the growing scale and diversity, did not always give rise to new cohesive occupational, professional and status groups, but sometimes created a certain “social vacuum” and lack of adequate integration.

This lack of integration was not always obvious in the colonial (or pre-revolutionary) period, when the colonial power provided some external integration and a focus against which communal solidarity could direct itself. However, with the attainment of independence this problem became much more acute, as in most of these countries, the new ruling groups were forced with grave problems of stabilisation and economic development.

The developments of the political and bureaucratic élite and their attempts to establish a “monolithic” system of stratification, and the various tensions due to the routinization of the élites’ activities can be fully understood only within this context. We may begin by analyzing some of the main concrete manifestations of these tendencies and tensions.

THE MAIN MANIFESTATIONS OF THE MONOLITHIC TENDENCIES OF THE POLITICAL ELITE

First tension and ambivalence tend to develop in the relations between the political élite and the various economic élites. The

bureaucracy tends to derogate the importance and efficiency of purely economic activities and their claims towards some social autonomy. It claims great, if not absolute, power over these activities and greater prestige than the economic élites. In this way many aspects of economic activity and entrepreneurship may be stifled and discouraged. Moreover, the political élite may attempt to undermine the autonomous development of the middle classes and the workers, and entirely link their positions to political activities and directives. This pattern of activity may quite often—especially in post-colonial countries with a small amount of indigenous capital—undermine the economic basis of the state's development programmes. A similar, sometimes even more intensive, development occurs in the relations between the political élite and bureaucracy on the one hand and professional and cultural élites on the other. If direct regimentation is not often attempted—a feature which is usually limited to post-revolutionary totalitarian societies—a general tendency towards the direct linking of these activities with collective goals as represented by the élite and bureaucracy can still be found. Thus greater emphasis is put on cultural professions (teaching, creation of new traditional symbols) than on medicine, architecture and other professions, which seem to be more "neutral" in relation to collective goals. The situation of the lawyers is usually much more complicated, mainly for two reasons. Firstly, the attainment of independence usually entails the extension of the legal sphere of activity. Secondly, in the colonial period the vocation of law was one of the main avenues for political activity, and so it quite often remained after the attainment of independence. This sometimes leads to a hypertrophy of the legal profession, which remains in close relations with the sphere of politics. This hypertrophy of the legal profession is in itself a manifestation of the tension resulting from the institutionalisation of political power—as within this profession some of the solidary and collective, but much more the instrumental and power aspects of politics are emphasised.

Closely related to these problems are the attempts of the political élite and bureaucracy to direct all the social developments of the country, especially the raising of the standard of living and the development of new occupations and of mobility within them. In this way they hope to maintain their hold on most potential centres of power and to control their development. But these attempts may defeat their own ends, as the close control exercised by the bureaucracy may undermine the efforts of economic development, create more aspirants to new posts, etc., than are available and thus put the bureaucracy itself in an insecure position.

The problematic and uncertain place of the political élite and especially of the bureaucracy is most clearly seen in a fact which seems to be common for most of the countries studied: the bureaucracy itself experiences difficulties in recruiting adequately trained personnel, and because of the financial problems of the country large sections of

personnel are underpaid and different types of corruption develop. For both these reasons the efficient functioning of the bureaucracy is often problematic—a fact which on the one hand increases its attempts to attain social prestige and power, while on the other hand it may both alienate large parts of the population from the bureaucracy and undermine some of the social and economic aspects of its activities.¹²

SOME MAIN TYPES OF SYSTEMS OF STRATIFICATION ARISING IN THESE SOCIETIES

The monolithic tendencies of the political élite and the bureaucracy can be successful only in post-revolutionary settings as in Russia, China and the “people’s democracies”—where the revolution has more or less demolished all other centres of social, economic and political power, and has, therefore, rendered possible unitary regimentation of the stratification system through the new political élite.¹³ But in other cases the situation is different. Other active and effective social forces, strata and centres of power exist with which the rising political élite and bureaucracy has to reckon and on which to some extent they even depend economically and politically. The interplay of these various forces influence, or even determine, the development of the system of stratification in these countries. In most of them the monolithic tendencies of the political élite and bureaucracy have been at least to some extent checked and many other centres of power and prestige have developed and maintained their hold on the bureaucracy itself.

In general it may be proposed that the development of the monolithic tendencies of the political élite and bureaucracy may be impeded or facilitated by the nature of the process of modernisation, which undermines the old social structures and systems of stratification.¹⁴ The limitations of the monolithic tendencies of the bureaucracy seem to be inversely related to lack of social integration which developed in these countries as a result of the general process of “modernisation”. The stronger such integration the better it can be checked by the strength of either traditional or more modern social groups and strata. But the repercussions of these forces on the system of stratification are markedly different in different cases and circumstances.

It will not be possible to analyze here all these types. We shall limit ourselves to two types which will be analyzed as “ideal-types”. But first it would be worth while to indicate some of the common features of these societies which are significant for their patterns of stratification. First is the problem of economic development and modernization with which most of these countries are faced. Second is the increase in social mobility which occurs as a result of the undermining of the old systems of stratification. Third is the degree of steepness or flattening of the social pyramid which develops under these conditions. We shall see how these problems are solved in each of the types with which we shall concern ourselves.

The first type is characterized by the relative strength of the "traditional" forces (e.g., old aristocracies or plutocracies, mostly based on pseudo-feudal agrarian relations)¹⁵ which are able to engulf, in the beginning at least, the new political élite and bureaucracy. It can be exemplified by Kuomintang China,¹⁶ by many Near Eastern states and to some extent also in the Balkans. The old aristocracy usually adopts many of the social tendencies of the bureaucracy and tends to join forces in underrating and keeping in check the new middle and professional classes, in stifling their development and in limiting their opportunities. While these developments could not be entirely checked the "older" forces try to undermine the autonomous activities of these new groups and to tie them closely to the upper strata. These policies tend to aggravate the steepness of the social pyramid. The standard of life of most of the population does not rise. Within that steep pyramid a process of social mobility develops which evinces the following characteristics:

1. The bureaucratic apparatus is the main channel of mobility.
2. At the same time, however, a strong discrepancy exists between supply of and demand for mobile persons. As a result a very strong competition and lack of common solidarity develops.
3. Because of this and the relative weakness of economic development the process of mobility tends to widen the gap between different groups and strata and to alienate the mobile individuals from their groups.¹⁷

In these societies the system of stratification changes not usually in the basis of the pyramid (as is evident in the small extent of agrarian reform) but in its upper strata and in the various channels of mobility. In these strata we note a hypertrophy and somewhat artificial enlargement of the number of candidates for scarce bureaucratic positions. There is an uneasy alliance between the "aristocratic" and the modern-political bureaucratic forces. In varying historical circumstances one or other of these may become dominant (as was the case for instance in Egypt and in some Latin American countries with military juntas), but no great change takes place in the overall system of stratification and its predominantly pseudofeudal agrarian basis. However, the very existence of internal tensions in these systems may, under certain specific circumstances, facilitate the development of more modern autonomous groups and gradually give rise to another type of stratification. The most important example of this process is Republican Turkey. But the analysis of these historical changes and their conditions is already beyond the scope of our analysis.

A different situation develops where more modern forces—professional, business and industrial groups, organised workers and well-to-do persons have succeeded in developing in these countries, and have played a part in the struggle for independence, or where older élites have successfully adapted themselves to the new tasks and identified

themselves with the struggle for independence. Such situations exist to some extent in India,¹⁸ Ceylon, Burma,¹⁹ in some of the British African dependencies,²⁰ and in the later stages of development of Republican Turkey.²¹

These modern groups or strata tend to counteract the centralising and regimenting tendencies of the political élite and to set up centres of power and prestige independent from it. They can to some extent compete with the political élite; they may also help in directing the transition from the traditional to the more modern order and thus co-operate with the political élite. In so far as they are able to do so, they influence the structure and social orientation of the political élite and bureaucracy, and may internally weaken their monolithic tendencies.

In these cases we usually witness a gradual rise in the general standard of living, and a slight flattening of the economic and social pyramid. Some of the disintegrating tendencies of the process of mobility, are counteracted by some general group mobility (resulting from increases in the standard of living) together with the different types of individual mobility. In this type, unlike in the former, a development, even if very slow and gradual, of (a) changes in the basis of the pyramid of stratification (resulting in agrarian reforms and organised working groups), (b) greater flexibility and overlapping between different "middle" and professional strata, and between them and some groups of the political élite itself; and (c) organisation and some cohesion in different urban strata, takes place.

Obviously enough, the development of such a pattern of stratification is dependent on the internal strength of the different modern strata, on the mutual relations between them and the political élite and on various international and internal economic and political conditions. If these conditions are unfavourable the monolithic tendencies of the political élite will necessarily find a much greater scope—or this élite itself may be overturned by another, more powerful and revolutionary. But even when all these conditions are favourable, the political élite and bureaucracy, even if limited in their monolithic tendencies, occupy a high place in the system of stratification—higher than in any "traditional" or western society.²² They constitute an important status group which holds positions of high prestige and power, and their influence in the total society is very strong. The existence of other centres of power, wealth and prestige limits, both internally and externally, their monolithic tendencies, but cannot negate their specific place in the social pyramid, nor the greater importance of power as an autonomous criterion of status, although it may limit it by the existence of other criteria, and by denying it total control over other types of rewards.

These are but brief indications of the differences between these two main types of stratification in "post-colonial" societies. They are presented here in an "ideal type" way, without any reference to

possibilities of overlapping and of historical transition between them; to other possible types, or to their internal differentiation. These indications should be viewed only as hypotheses yet to be tested, verified in comparative research. However, it is hoped that they may be found useful as starting points for such research.

CONCLUSIONS

The analysis in this paper may throw some light on the place of the "power-variable" in systems of stratification. It shows—as has been repeatedly emphasized in recent literature²³—that this variable has an autonomy of its own and that under favourable circumstances the holders of power tend to establish it as the most important criterion of stratification, to which all other criteria and rewards should be subordinated. This "natural" tendency of power finds its fullest manifestation in attempts to establish a monolithic and unified status structure, with as little "loose" areas as possible—and in which all types of positions and rewards would be allocated according to a unified hierarchy. But in any modern society—or a society in a state of transition towards the modern pattern—such a total monolithic status structure is impossible because of the inherent functional needs of the complex division of labour. The tensions arising from this point of view, in various totalitarian societies have been fully analysed in the relevant literature and need not be dwelt upon here. However, the problem also exists in other societies, albeit in a somewhat different form. The "power-variable" does not exist in a "social vacuum". The natural tendencies of power holders work out only in the context of

(a) The various economic, political and cultural needs, necessities and aspirations of these societies, and

(b) The existence of other social forces which can, to different degrees, fulfil some of these needs. The interplay of these factors broadens or limits the scope of possibilities open to the power holders and gives rise to the different types of stratification systems we have analysed above. It should, however, be re-emphasised that in all these systems which developed out of sudden change in the power system of a society, the trend towards a more monolithic and "closely" integrated system of stratification is much stronger than in other societies which have undergone a different process of historical development.

NOTES

¹ The literature on these countries is vast, but it contains few systematic analyses. See for instance R. Linton (ed.) *Most of the World*, N.Y., 1950; Mills, e.a.: "The New World of Southeast Asia", Minneapolis, 1949; W. I. Holland, "Asian Nationalism and the West", N.Y., 1953.

² See especially the collection *Las Clases Medias en America Latina*, published by the Pan American Union, Washington.

³ Among the best accounts of these countries are: D. Tomasic, *The Structure of Balkan Society*, A.J.S., (1946), pp. 132-140; R. Troutton, *Peasant Renaissance in Yugoslavia*, London, 1952; D. Warriner, *Revolution in Eastern Europe*, London, 1950.

⁴ See S. N. Eisenstadt: "La Transformation d'une société de pionniers en un Etat organisé. Aspects de la sociologie politique d'Israël", *Revue Française de Science Politique*, 1954.

⁵ See M. Zinkin, *Asia and the West*, London, 1952, ch. xix and O. Reischauer, *Wanted—A Policy for Asia*, N.Y., 1955.

⁶ See for instance B. Moore, *The Dilemma of Power*, Harvard, 1950.

⁷ See on some aspects of the problems of growth in scale, G. and M. Wilson, *Analysis of Social Change*, Cambridge, 1945.

⁸ See D. Tomasic, *op. cit.*, *Las Clases Medias en America Latina*, *op. cit.*, Israel seems to be the only exception from this point of view.

⁹ See for instance H. Boeke: "Agrarian Reforms in the Far East," A.J.S., 1952; J. S. Furnival, "Colonial Policy and Practice," Cambridge, 1946; and F. H. Hsu, "China," in R. Linton (ed.), *Most of the World*.

¹⁰ See also O. Reischauer, *Wanted—A Policy for Asia*, N.Y., 1955, ch. ix.

¹¹ See S. N. Eisenstadt, "Some Aspects of Urban Organization in Underdeveloped Countries", International Conference on Underdeveloped Areas, Milano, 1954.

See O. Reischauer, *Wanted—A Policy for Asia*, *op. cit.*

¹² On some aspects of the problem of recruitment into the bureaucracy see B. Hoselitz, "The Recruitment of White-Collar Workers in Underdeveloped Countries", *International Social Science Bulletin*, vol. vi, no. 3, 1954, pp. 433-442.

¹³ See B. Moore, *op. cit.*, and A. Inkeles, "Social Stratification and Mobility in the Soviet Union, 1940-50," *American Sociological Review*, 1950, pp. 465-479.

¹⁴ As there are only a few full-fledged researches on this matter, we shall have to confine ourselves to some general propositions and hypotheses.

¹⁵ See A. Bonné, *State and Economics in the Middle East*, 2nd ed., London, 1955, and Ch. Issawi, *Egypt*, London, 1954.

See also P. Mus, *Viet Nam, Sociologie d'une Guerre*, Paris, 1952.

¹⁶ See J. Fairbanks, *China and the U.S.A.*, N.Y., 1950.

¹⁷ One of the best case-studies of such mobility may be found in R. Troutton, *op. cit.*

¹⁸ See M. Zinkin, *op. cit.*; R. Linton, *Most of the World*, *op. cit.*; K. Davies, *The Population of India*, Princeton, 1952.

¹⁹ See M. Zinkin, *op. cit.*; Mills, e.a., *op. cit.*; J. Furnival, *Colonial Policy and Practice*, *op. cit.*

²⁰ See C. G. Haines (ed.), *Africa Today*, Baltimore, 1955, especially pp. 225-256, part IV and part V, and the March, 1955, issue of the *Annals of the American Academy of Political Science*.

²¹ One of the best analyses of this process in Turkey is the as yet unpublished study by D. Lerner on "Modernizing the Middle East".

²² See on this M. Zinkin, *Asia and the West*, *op. cit.*, and O. Reischauer, *Wanted—A Policy for Asia*, *op. cit.*

²³ See in addition to the classical exposé of M. Weber—T. Parsons "A Revised Analytical Approach to Social Stratification" in S. Lipset and R. Bendix (ed.), *Class, Status and Power*, Glencoe, 1953, pp. 93-128, and K. B. Mayer, "The Theory of Social Classes", *Transactions of the Second World Congress of Sociology*, I.S.A., vol. II, pp. 321-336.

Remarques sur les particularités de l'évolution sociale de la France

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En Europe occidentale, le fait probablement le plus frappant, dans l'ordre social, des dix années qui se sont écoulées depuis la fin de la deuxième guerre mondiale, est l'absence de troubles graves, le climat de paix qui règne non pas seulement entre les classes ou les partis mais à l'intérieur des partis socialistes ou des syndicats. Jamais, me semble-t-il, l'Europe occidentale n'a été aussi conservatrice qu'en 1955, en dépit (ou faut-il dire à cause ?) du rideau de fer, abaissé au milieu de l'Allemagne, qui sépare un monde où dominent partis communistes et idéologie marxiste-léniniste, d'un monde où survivent capitalisme, pluralité des partis, syndicats de revendications ou d'opposition. A ce conservatisme européen, France et Italie semblent faire exception.

Nous nous proposons, dans les pages suivantes, de rechercher dans quelle mesure la paix sociale de Grande-Bretagne et l'agitation française sont imputables aux particularités de la stratification sociale ou aux changements de cette stratification dans les deux pays.

I

Si nous comparons l'après-première guerre mondiale et l'après-seconde guerre mondiale en Grande-Bretagne, les différences apparaissent immédiatement aux yeux. Après 1918, la victoire favorisa le maintien au pouvoir de ceux qui avaient conduit la nation en guerre. Les conservateurs gouvernèrent pendant dix ans—mise à part la courte phase d'un gouvernement travailliste de minorité—dans l'esprit du retour à la normale, c'est-à-dire l'avant-guerre, et avec la volonté farouche de rétablir la parité ancienne entre la livre et le dollar. La crise mondiale, survenue en 1929 (date homologue à celle de 1955, dans notre comparaison), eut pour résultat de frapper le parti travailliste, qui se trouvait au pouvoir, sans majorité solide, au moment où la dévaluation de la livre devenait indispensable. Le gouvernement national, constitué pour prévenir cette décision, s'y résigna bientôt et s'en trouva bien.

On objectera que ces péripéties, à beaucoup d'égards accidentelles, ne se retrouvent pas dans les autres pays, et nous en conviendrons volontiers. En Allemagne, le schéma est autre : d'abord, la montée soudaine de la gauche, surtout social-démocrate, à la faveur de la défaite et de l'effondrement impérial, puis, pendant une dizaine d'années, la République parlementaire s'installe et vit tant bien que mal, en 1929

la crise mondiale ébranle le régime et, quatre années après, le national-socialisme s'empare de l'Etat.

Si l'on essaie de retrouver une régularité, on emploiera, me semble-t-il, à peu près les formules suivantes. Au lendemain de la première guerre, dans les pays vainqueurs, la tendance restauratrice l'emporte, en dépit de troubles sociaux plus ou moins violents que connaissent aussi bien la France que la Grande-Bretagne. Dans les pays vaincus, les régimes anciens, traditionnels plutôt qu'autoritaires, sont abattus par la tempête et des régimes démocratiques parlementaires s'installent, affaiblis dès l'origine par l'opposition conjointe des tenants du passé et des extrémistes révolutionnaires, les fascistes, révolutionnaires d'un nouveau type, créant une opposition supplémentaire, dans certains pays dès les années 20, dans d'autres à partir des années 30.

La cause, probablement décisive, de ces mouvements politico-sociaux est, d'assentiment général, la conjoncture économique. L'effort vers le rétablissement de la parité monétaire, en Grande-Bretagne, est à l'origine du chômage permanent et de la grève générale, la violence de la crise mondiale déclencha partout des phénomènes—baisse de salaires, chômage—qui ne pouvaient pas ne pas s'exprimer en révolte politique. Si l'on se souvient que la France ne stabilisa sa monnaie qu'en 1926 pour être atteinte par la crise dès 1930, que la livre ne fut dévaluée, sous la pression irrésistible des circonstances, qu'en 1931, que l'Allemagne ne sortit de l'inflation qu'en 1924-25 pour entrer dès 1929 dans la dépression, on ne s'étonnera pas que la période entre les deux guerres n'offrit dans aucun des pays affectés par la guerre (tout au plus dans les pays nordiques) le spectacle d'une évolution sociale et politique orientée vers un ordre stable et pacifique.

Au lendemain de la deuxième guerre, le souci dominant n'était pas la restauration de l'état normal ou de l'avant-guerre, mais la volonté de ne pas retomber dans les fautes ou les misères du passé. A cet égard, le cas britannique est typique. En dépit de la victoire, du prestige de Churchill, c'est le parti travailliste qui l'emporta aux premières élections, avec des mots d'ordre réformistes (plein emploi, nationalisations, Etat de services sociaux, réduction de l'inégalité des revenus, etc.).

Dix ans après, les partis modérés sont revenus au pouvoir, en Grande-Bretagne et dans la plus grande partie de l'Europe occidentale, mais le plein emploi et l'expansion économique sont maintenus, les acquêts des réformes travaillistes intégralement conservés (dans les autres pays d'Europe, on en trouve l'équivalent). Nulle part, on n'observe de menace révolutionnaire, soit à droite, soit à gauche.

Sans doute, les événements politiques et la constante prospérité expliquent le conservatisme européen du milieu du XXe siècle. Les fascismes, au sens de mouvements à objectifs révolutionnaires, recrutant leurs adhérents surtout dans les masses non prolétariennes, ont été disqualifiés par les horreurs du nazisme et plus encore par la victoire de la coalition antihitlérienne. Le révolutionnarisme de gauche est

à la fois servi et desservi par le lien qu'il maintient avec la puissance dominante du continent. Il se pare de la gloire des succès remportés par l'armée rouge ou par l'industrie soviétique, mais il se prête lui-même à l'accusation de nationalisme étranger. Il restreint ses possibilités de recrutement et, comme toute prise de pouvoir par un parti communiste est tenue pour l'annonce d'une conquête russe ou, du moins, d'une extension de la sphère d'influence russe, il se heurte à l'opposition violente des Etats qui sont ou se croient menacées par le bloc russo-soviétique.

En dépit de cette élimination ou de cet affaiblissement, pour des raisons historiques, de l'extrémisme de droite ou de gauche, le conservatisme européen résisterait malaisément à une crise économique. Je n'entends pas que le communisme deviendrait d'un coup irrésistible mais que le parti travailliste, par exemple, ne laisserait pas aisément la direction aux secrétaires de syndicats et aux intellectuels modérés.

La part ainsi faite aux causes historiques et aux causes économiques, il reste un phénomène social d'importance considérable par lequel sociologues et journalistes ont tendance à expliquer le conservatisme européen d'après la deuxième guerre mondiale, à savoir les transformations de la stratification sociale que tend à produire le développement spontané de la société industrielle.

Le schéma marxiste de l'évolution sociale, qui a tant influé sur la pensée socialiste au siècle dernier et qui continue de peser sur elle, est en train d'être remplacé par un schéma que nous appellerons "schéma Colin Clark" et qui rend compte du mouvement historique orienté vers la paix sociale.

Le mouvement historique de l'économie serait défini non par le capitalisme ou le socialisme, non par la dispersion ou la suppression de la propriété privée, non par l'extension ou la restriction des mécanismes du marché mais par le progrès économique et l'industrialisation. On ne compare pas les pays selon le point où en est arrivée la concentration des moyens de production ou la planification mais selon la répartition de la main d'oeuvre entre les trois secteurs de Colin Clark, selon le produit national par tête de la population, selon la valeur produite par chaque travailleur dans chacun des trois secteurs.

Dans cette perspective, l'évolution serait exactement contraire à celle que Marx anticipait. Au lieu d'un abaissement du niveau de vie, une élévation des rémunérations ouvrières, au moins proportionnelle à l'augmentation des ressources collectives. Au lieu d'une prolétarianisation, c'est-à-dire de la confusion de millions de travailleurs dans la condition ouvrière, des différenciations croissantes et parmi les travailleurs d'industrie et parmi les professions extérieures à l'industrie, au sens étroit du terme.

La non-paupérisation et la non-prolétarianisation ne datent pas de la deuxième guerre mondiale, certains pays d'Europe et d'Amérique en ont tiré les bénéfices dès avant la deuxième ou même avant la première

guerre mondiale. On inclinerait plutôt à retenir le "schéma Colin Clark" comme représentant les tendances à long terme de l'évolution économique-sociale des civilisations industrielles, les conséquences de la première guerre mondiale et de la crise de 1929 ayant détourné et parfois renversé ces tendances majeures. En revanche, des événements favorables—continuité de l'expansion, disqualification de l'extrémisme de droite et de gauche, accélération des réformes—ont renforcé, depuis dix ans, les tendances séculaires.

Ces tendances ne se réduisent pas à la non-paupérisation et à la non-prolétarianisation. Le progrès économique que, par comparaison de diverses sociétés, nous baptisons normal, a de multiples implications sociales que nous pouvons, me semble-t-il, résumer dans les quelques points suivants.

1. Le progrès économique, dans les sociétés industrielles, implique la diminution, toujours en pourcentage, souvent en nombre absolu, de la main d'œuvre agricole. A partir d'un certain point, la main d'œuvre industrielle cesse d'augmenter en pourcentage, l'accroissement proportionnel étant réservé à la main d'œuvre tertiaire. Comme d'ordinaire le revenu par tête est plus élevé dans le secondaire que dans le primaire, dans le tertiaire que dans le secondaire, le mouvement, à long terme, va dans le sens de l'élévation des revenus réels. En même temps, le transfert de la main d'œuvre s'opère dans le sens des métiers de prestige inférieur vers les métiers de prestige supérieur.

2. Ces transferts de main d'œuvre peuvent se produire de diverses manières, dont les résultats statistiques sont analogues mais dont les mécanismes sont tout autres : ou bien la main d'œuvre agricole demeure la même, le surplus seul émigrant vers les villes, ou bien la main d'œuvre diminue en chiffres absolus, la même production ou une production accrue étant obtenue, grâce au progrès du rendement, avec un travail réduit. D'autre part, les transferts de main d'œuvre, d'un secteur à un autre, d'une branche industrielle à une autre, s'opèrent soit continûment grâce à la sortie et à l'entrée des travailleurs, soit par les changements de métier auxquels sont contraints les travailleurs au cours de leur existence. Les modifications de la répartition professionnelle sont d'autant plus faciles qu'elles sont davantage réalisées par le premier mécanisme et moins par le deuxième, autrement dit par le fait que les jeunes quittent les campagnes ou choisissent un métier différent de celui de leur père et non par le fait que les travailleurs des champs ou de l'usine sont forcés de quitter leur travail, leur métier étant devenu sans utilité sociale. Comme certains des métiers supprimés sont socialement appréciés (artisan qualifié), certains des métiers créés socialement dépréciés (ouvrier spécialisé à la chaîne), le jugement d'ensemble varie selon les phases de l'évolution économique, selon la proportion, réelle ou supposée, des métiers supprimés et que l'on regrette, des métiers créés et que l'on déplore, aussi selon le mode sur lequel s'effectuent ces transferts.

3. Dans l'ensemble, le développement de la civilisation industrielle exige un niveau plus élevé d'instruction que les civilisations pré-industrielles. Les sociétés occidentales et la seule société asiatique qui a pris celles-ci pour modèle, le Japon, ont pratiquement éliminé l'analphabétisme. La proportion des jeunes gens qui font des études secondaires augmente, comme augmente le nombre des étudiants dans les universités ou dans les écoles techniques. Manifestement, les besoins de l'industrie gonflent le nombre des fonctions techniquement ou administrativement de haute qualification. En d'autres termes, le développement normal de la société industrielle permet de satisfaire, sans révolution, sans même de répercussions graves sur le sort des milieux dirigeants, le désir d'ascension sociale d'une partie de la population.

4. L'existence et le renforcement des syndicats ouvriers ne sont peut-être pas impliqués par la civilisation industrielle. L'exemple soviétique suggère que l'encadrement indispensable des masses ouvrières peut être assuré par des syndicats étatisés aussi bien que par des syndicats libres de s'opposer à l'Etat. Mais, à partir du moment où ces syndicats ont le droit de s'organiser et d'agir, ils acquièrent une force considérable et ils exercent une influence sur la répartition du revenu national, sur la hiérarchie des salaires, etc. Ce n'est pas ici le lieu de marquer les limites de cette influence. Le fait est que l'"institutionnalisation de la lutte de classes", pour reprendre une expression de T. Geiger, a d'ordinaire pour conséquences d'atténuer la violence des conflits sociaux et de favoriser certaines réformes : sécurité sociale, fiscalité progressive, le tout entraînant une redistribution des revenus selon certaines considérations extra-économiques.

5. Tous ces phénomènes joints, quand ils sont portés au plus haut degré d'intensité, contribueraient à atténuer la distinction des catégories sociales. Une certaine sorte de "société sans classes" s'est constituée dans les pays scandinaves. Non que ces sociétés soient sans hiérarchie sociale, de revenus, de pouvoir ou de prestige, sans groupes conscients de leurs singularités et de leurs différences par rapport aux autres groupes, mais le niveau de vie des groupes inférieurs est suffisamment élevé pour qu'ils participent des biens caractéristiques de la société tout entière, pour qu'ils se logent, se vêtissent et se nourrissent dans des conditions qui ne se distinguent pas essentiellement de celles des groupes moyens ou supérieurs.

6. La tendance, en Europe occidentale, est-elle à une mobilité sociale accrue ou diminuée ? Avouons qu'il est difficile de donner une réponse catégorique, faute d'enquêtes assez nombreuses et précises. De toute manière, la mobilité que permet la transformation de la société elle-même est difficile à séparer de la mobilité proprement dit, la répartition professionnelle étant supposée constante. Il semble pourtant que la mobilité entre les catégories moyennes et les catégories élevées ou à l'intérieur des milieux supérieurs ait tendance à s'accroître

avec l'extension du recrutement des étudiants. Moins les chances de promotion au point de départ sont inégales, plus la mobilité doit être grande. Il va de soi que la réduction institutionnelle, légale de l'inégalité au point de départ n'implique pas l'abaissement des barrières sociales d'ordre psychologique, de telle sorte que l'on se gardera de jugements catégoriques. Il n'en reste pas moins que l'élargissement des milieux dirigeants semble probable.

Les différents facteurs que nous avons analysés se retrouvent, à un degré ou à un autre, dans tous les pays d'Europe occidentale. La singularité de la Grande-Bretagne, dans la deuxième après-guerre, est que tous les facteurs semblent être présents à un haut degré d'intensité. Lois sociales, redistribution des revenus, élargissement du système d'éducation se sont ajoutés à l'élévation du niveau de vie, dont l'amélioration du logement et la diffusion des biens de consommation durable (télévision) sont le symbole. En Allemagne, lois sociales, redistribution des revenus, élargissement du recrutement universitaire ne sont guère visibles, mais la progression économique, depuis 1948, est éclatante et une sorte d'américanisation trouve place dans des cadres socio-psychologiques traditionnels.

Ajoutons qu'il serait redoutable de généraliser hâtivement, à partir de l'expérience de ces dix dernières années, comme il l'aurait été de généraliser à partir de l'expérience de l'entre-deux-guerres. Ni les catastrophes de cette dernière, ni l'harmonie du récent passé ne révèlent la loi de l'avenir. Les circonstances favorables d'aujourd'hui (progrès économique, plein emploi, conquêtes sociales des masses) ne sont pas garanties pour demain : une dépression économique, le chômage remettraient tout en question.

Sans même évoquer ces bouleversements imprévisibles, il suffit de considérer le cas des pays qui font exception, la France par exemple, pour discerner certaines des conditions, non garanties définitivement, de cette réussite pacifique.

II

La France connaît-elle une évolution sociale essentiellement différente de celle des autres pays d'Europe occidentale ? Ou encore, en quoi l'évolution sociale de la France diffère-t-elle et en quoi ces différences expliquent-elles les singularités psychologiques et économiques du pays ?

La répartition professionnelle évolue, en France, dans le même sens qu'ailleurs, mais l'évolution est moins avancée que dans les pays typiques d'Europe occidentale. En 1950, le pourcentage de personnes actives employées dans l'agriculture est plus élevé qu'au Danemark, en Suède, en Norvège, en Suisse, en Hollande, en Allemagne, en Belgique, en Grande-Bretagne, le pourcentage occupé dans l'industrie inférieur à celui de ces pays.¹

Une première remarque nous est suggérée : le retard de l'industrialisation, la volonté à demi consciente de maintenir une France agricole

et de ralentir l'expansion de la France industrielle n'ont pas été favorables à la stabilité sociale, en dépit des idées répandues jusqu'à un récent passé.

La deuxième particularité de l'évolution économique-sociale française a pour origine des facteurs démographiques. Au cours des cinquante dernières années, la population française n'a presque pas augmenté (2% de 1900 à 1910, -5.5% de 1910 à 1920, 6.7% de 1920 à 1930, 1.9% de 1930 à 1950). Si l'on tient compte simultanément du pourcentage de la population en âge de travailler, des mouvements de la main d'œuvre étrangère et de la durée du travail, la quantité totale d'heures de travail a certainement diminué en France entre 1929 et 1955. La main d'œuvre agricole a diminué, depuis 1929, à un rythme relativement rapide (-0.9% par an), la main d'œuvre industrielle n'a pas augmenté au même rythme.

Nous ne nous proposons pas, dans cette note, d'analyser les causes et de la stagnation démographique et de la lenteur de l'industrialisation ou des transferts de main d'œuvre. Nous voulons nous borner à une remarque fondamentale. Si l'on prend pour norme les transformations sociales des pays d'Europe occidentale, Allemagne, Grande-Bretagne ou Suède, l'exemple français prouve que cette évolution normale n'est pas nécessaire: des circonstances nationales peuvent l'arrêter, la détourner ou la ralentir.

Organisation des syndicats ouvriers, lois sociales et redistribution du revenu national, mobilité sociale, ces trois sortes de phénomènes apparaissent-ils en France? Sont-ils atténués ou déformés par les particularités du devenir économique? En ce qui concerne l'organisation syndicale, la particularité française est l'influence dominante du parti communiste, autrement dit le maintien d'une attitude révolutionnaire, au moins verbalement, alors que l'évolution normale semble orientée vers le réformisme. En matière de lois sociales, on souligne d'ordinaire le contraste entre l'importance de la fraction des salaires redistribuée par l'intermédiaire de la Sécurité Sociale et l'injustice ou l'inégalité du système fiscal (la faible proportion de la fiscalité directe). Enfin, le plus souvent, on insiste sur la cristallisation de la structure sociale et la survie des distinctions de classes, au sens objectif et subjectif à la fois, c'est-à-dire la différence dans les manières de vivre et la conscience de ces distinctions dans les différents groupes.

Laissons de côté provisoirement le fait de l'influence communiste dans les syndicats qui peut se diviser en deux éléments: une attitude de mécontentement ou de révolte, qui appelle une explication d'ordre sociologique, un ralliement à une organisation communiste qui peut s'expliquer par des circonstances historiques.

Dans la mesure où la redistribution du revenu passe pour caractéristique de l'évolution normale, la France est à la fois au-dessus et au-dessous de la normale, au-dessus en fait de Sécurité Sociale et surtout d'allocations familiales, au-dessous en fait d'imposition directe. Les

deux phénomènes s'expliquent d'ailleurs très simplement. Les versements de Sécurité Sociale étant financés par les versements des employeurs sont inévitablement prélevés sur les salaires directs. Quant à la fiscalité directe, elle suppose, pour être pleinement efficace, que les revenus soient fiscalement définis. Or, la part des revenus mixtes, selon les statistiques fiscales de la France, est plus élevée que dans les autres pays d'Occident (32·1% du total des revenus personnels en France, en 1952, contre 11·7% en Grande-Bretagne, 16·4% aux Etats-Unis). Sur 21·5 millions de Français au travail en 1952, 11,850,000 étaient des salariés, 9,650,000 vivaient d'entreprises personnelles, patrons ou aides familiaux.

Ces chiffres illustrent le retard de l'évolution économique-sociale de la France par rapport à la norme britannique ou scandinave. Dans l'agriculture, dans l'industrie, les entreprises personnelles tiennent encore une place considérable. Même dans l'industrie, la concentration est faible, le nombre des ouvriers qui travaillent dans des entreprises de moins de 10 ou de moins de 50 employés est plus élevé qu'ailleurs.

On serait tenté de résumer ces observations dans la formule: un système normal de lois sociales a été plaqué sur un état anormal (au sens de retardé) de développement économique. Ou encore: l'évolution française n'a été conforme ni au schéma marxiste de l'expansion capitaliste, qui aurait impliqué l'élimination des petites entreprises, la concentration technique et financière, la prolétarianisation de la masse ouvrière, ni au "schéma Colin Clark", tel qu'il se réalise en Europe occidentale. La France permet de dessiner un troisième schéma qui, dans la théorie actuelle, pourrait être appelé celui du sous-développement relatif dans un pays occidental. En un sens, la France n'est pas assez capitaliste, pas assez prolétarisée, elle n'a pas assez connu le développement que Marx annonçait à l'avance conforme à l'essence du capitalisme et, de ce fait, inévitable. En un autre sens, elle demeure trop capitaliste, trop prolétarisée, si l'on entend par là que la collectivisation de la propriété et du pouvoir, l'uniformisation des conditions de vie ne se sont pas produites. Les deux explications, les formules d'hyper et d'hypo-capitalisme sont toutes deux vraies, puisqu'elles marquent toutes deux l'écart de l'évolution française, par rapport à la norme européenne.

Cet écart tend-il à se maintenir? Explique-t-il les phénomènes politiques, psychologiques qui singularisent la France?

Pour répondre à la première question, il serait nécessaire d'entreprendre une recherche approfondie—ce qui n'est pas possible dans le cadre de cette note—sur les causes de l'écart lui-même. Sans pouvoir ici préciser, nuancer, mesurer les causes, disons que la stagnation démographique, la protection agricole, le faible dynamisme de l'industrialisation, la répartition régionale de l'industrie se sont combinées et comme multipliées l'une par l'autre. Le résultat en est que l'industrie française est concentrée dans un petit nombre de régions et que la productivité

de l'agriculture varie grandement selon les régions.² Dans l'agriculture et aussi dans l'industrie, la résistance aux changements, à la modernisation vient de ceux que l'évolution normale menacerait dans leur façon de vivre, leur habitudes de travail, leur statut. D'une certaine façon, les producteurs marginaux qui résistent au progrès, sont victimes eux-mêmes du retard français mais, en l'absence d'accroissement de la population, ils devraient s'adapter, au cours même de leur existence. En fait, ils deviennent conservateurs de leur existence médiocre. Les propriétaires, de terre ou d'un petit commerce, peu importe, sont en majorité d'opinion et de vote modérés, même quand ils sont révoltés.

Et pourtant, si l'on se donne une période suffisamment longue, la probabilité est que l'évolution française se rapproche de la norme. En effet, les causes de l'écart tendent à s'atténuer, les facteurs du dynamisme de modernisation à se renforcer. La natalité s'est accrue sensiblement (classe d'âge de 200 à 300,000 plus nombreuse qu'avant-guerre), le sens de la production et de la productivité dans l'industrie, même le souci de modernisation dans l'agriculture se sont assez largement répandus. L'exemple étranger est davantage présent, de même que l'exemple des régions modernisées fait prendre aux autres régions conscience de leur retard.

Cet écart par rapport à la normale socio-économique permet-il d'expliquer les particularités psycho-politiques que nous avons notées au début de cette étude ? Le mécontentement chronique de la classe ouvrière est-il imputable à un niveau de vie trop bas ? On est tenté d'abord de répondre affirmativement puisque les régions riches et les industries modernes, indirectement, subventionnent les régions pauvres et les producteurs marginaux. D'autre part, la crise du logement et la redistribution des salaires par la Sécurité Sociale, qui défavorisent les éléments jeunes et actifs, suscitent, à coup sûr, dans une fraction de la classe ouvrière, malaise, revendications, révolte. Cela dit, il reste que le niveau de vie de la plupart des ouvriers français, dans les secteurs où la comparaison a pu être faite, n'est pas inférieur, souvent supérieur, à celui des ouvriers allemands. L'attitude révolutionnaire des syndicats a donc aussi des causes autres que celles que nous venons d'esquisser, causes de caractère historique qui appelleraient une autre étude.

Une fois acquise l'attitude révolutionnaire d'une importante fraction des masses ouvrières, l'attitude conservatrice d'une importante fraction des éléments individualistes, il devient inévitable, dans la période actuelle où attitude révolutionnaire est confondue avec procommunisme, que le gouvernement de la France s'appuie sur les partis qui recrutent bon nombre de leurs adhérents parmi les éléments que la modernisation menace dans leurs habitudes. Gouvernement et administration sont convaincus de la nécessité de combler l'écart entre l'évolution française et l'évolution normale, mais la majorité parlementaire représentée, en partie, les groupes conservateurs, fussent-ils conservateurs de leur médiocrité.

Il suffit de lire les rapports sur les comptes de la nation pour voir à quel point les jeunes fonctionnaires sont impatients des obstacles que leurs ministres, soucieux des désirs de leurs électeurs, élèvent sur la voie de la rationalisation de l'appareil productif.

III

Si cette analyse est exacte, on conçoit à quel point est complexe la rivalité des groupes sociaux dans la France, confuse la lutte entre les groupes privilégiés.

La première phase d'après-guerre a été dominée par l'inflation et la pénurie alimentaire. Les groupes sociaux privilégiés étaient ceux qui étaient en mesure de profiter de l'excès de pouvoir d'achat en quête de biens réels. La période était marquée par la tension entre campagnes et villes, détenteurs de revenus fixes et catégories susceptibles d'obtenir la réévaluation de leurs gains en fonction de la dévaluation monétaire. Sans doute des grèves multiples marquaient-elles la prolongation des conflits classiques entre employeurs et employés, mais ces grèves étaient d'ordinaire dénuées de passion : les employeurs n'étaient guère tentés de résister aux revendications ouvrières et celles-ci ne visaient pas moins l'Etat que les employeurs privés. Les sociétés nationalisées connurent autant ou plus de grèves que les sociétés privées. L'inflation suscitait entre les groupes sociaux une bataille permanente, dont l'enjeu était la répartition des sacrifices et qui différait essentiellement des notions traditionnelles de lutte de classes. L'action sur l'Etat était une des armes utilisées par les groupes, l'effet ultime des mesures prises par l'Etat dépendait de la dynamique économique bien plus que des intentions des gouvernants.

La phase suivante, dans laquelle nous vivons, qui comporte l'expansion économique sans inflation, présente un tout autre caractère. Les traits marquants m'en paraissent les suivants. L'industrialisation, qui change la face des sociétés modernes, est visiblement déclenchée en France aussi. La motorisation, en particulier, fait de rapides progrès. Vespas et vélomoteurs sont en train de bouleverser les conditions de vie dans le pays tout entier. D'ici peu d'années, la télévision va se répandre comme en Grande-Bretagne. Petite bourgeoisie, couche supérieure du prolétariat accèdent ou vont accéder à la jouissance des biens de consommation durable, caractéristique de la civilisation industrielle. A cet égard, ce que nous avons appelé l'écart français par rapport à la norme européenne est en train de se combler.

Les crises ou tensions, héritées de la période précédente de stagnation ou d'inflation survivent, parfois à peine atténuées. L'insuffisance des logements crée une inégalité choquante entre les bien logés et les mal logés (ou non logés). La redistribution des salaires par la Sécurité Sociale, en réduisant les salaires directs, irrite les jeunes ou les célibataires. Parmi les gens âgés, les victimes de l'inflation antérieure sont en grand nombre. Les revenus qui leur restent sont actuellement

stabilisés, mais stagnants, alors que ceux de la population active progressent.

Simultanément, les difficultés de l'expansion se font déjà sentir parce que cette expansion est, régionalement et industriellement, inégale. Les régions déjà industrialisées se développent plus vite que les autres. Les différents secteurs de l'industrie ne profitent pas également de la conjoncture favorable. Bien plus, certains, comme ceux du textile ou du cuir, sont en régression, au moins relative. L'absence d'inflation et le progrès des entreprises les plus efficaces mettent en péril les entreprises marginales, en particulier le petit commerce des régions qui s'appauvrissent relativement (M. Poujade appartient à cette catégorie).

Dans cette phase, les groupes défavorisés comptent essentiellement sur l'Etat pour atténuer ou guérir les maux qui les frappent. Paysans ou commerçants marginaux, dans la phase précédente, étaient sauvés par l'inflation. Désormais, l'Etat est leur dernier recours, d'où l'action des groupes d'intérêts sur les partis et l'administration. Le conflit employeurs-employés est redevenu réel, parfois virulent, depuis que l'Etat a cessé d'être responsable de la fixation des salaires et que les écarts se sont creusés entre les branches et les industries, selon le degré de prospérité ou de gêne. De plus, le progrès incontestable du niveau de vie depuis trois ans a multiplié les désirs : les produits de l'industrie moderne commencent d'apparaître à la portée des travailleurs eux-mêmes. La compétition entre producteurs renaît mais l'Etat continue de jouer un rôle considérable pour protéger les uns, subventionner les autres, garantir les prix.

Cette analyse de la conjoncture sociale rend compte, semble-t-il, de certains phénomènes, qui frappent l'observateur étranger : par exemple, les mouvements, au langage violent et révolutionnaire, de petits bourgeois, commerçants ou artisans, l'impatience des revendications ouvrières, en dépit des années de progrès, l'indiscrétion des groupes professionnels dans leurs efforts pour influencer les gouvernants. La vingtaine d'années de retard, prise par la France dans la croissance qui eût été normale, explique, pour une part, les souffrances accrues : une croissance retardée est plus douloureuse parce que l'évolution sociale ne s'est pas arrêtée et que les prétendants aux fonctions intellectuelles et semi-intellectuelles ont continué de se multiplier, plus vite que le progrès de l'industrie ne le permettait. Il y a d'autres causes mais le décalage entre développement économique et développement social en est une, caractéristique, importante.

Retard et inégalité de croissance ne sauraient, malgré tout, expliquer tous les phénomènes psycho-politiques de la France actuelle. L'analyse sociale suggère une disponibilité des masses ouvrières à la révolte, elle ne montre pas que le noyautage des syndicats par le parti communiste ait été ou soit nécessaire. La "communisation" des organisations ouvrières, la conquête de cinq millions d'électeurs par le parti communiste sont des *événements* que l'analyse sociologique aide à comprendre mais que seule l'histoire (Front populaire, Résistance, Vichy,

Libération) achève de rendre intelligibles. De même, la faiblesse des gouvernements français, la division du parlement en groupes nombreux et instables a certaines causes que l'analyse sociologique révèle. La dispersion de l'appareil productif dans l'agriculture, l'industrie et le commerce ne favorise pas la formation de partis de masses, cohérents et disciplinés. L'hétérogénéité de structure, selon les régions, l'hétérogénéité extrême de qualité selon les entreprises, l'hétérogénéité de conditions selon les branches industrielles, les tensions virtuelles entre régions, entreprises et secteurs tendent à renforcer les forces de désagrégation. Cela dit, il serait absurde de s'en tenir à une explication socio-économique. Certains des traits caractéristiques du régime politique français sont visibles depuis un siècle et demi. Sous la monarchie de juillet, Tocqueville plaisantait déjà, dans ses lettres à Reeve, l'instabilité ministérielle. Les nations durent, semblables à elles-mêmes, à travers les phases de leur développement économique.

La note précédente prétend moins à étudier une situation, trop complexe pour se prêter à un résumé, qu'à suggérer quelques idées. De Marx à Colin Clark, les économistes ont été enclins à dégager les grandes lignes de l'évolution socio-économique et à les tenir pour plus ou moins inévitables. Il a fallu les pays sous-développés pour que l'on prit conscience que le danger, pour la plupart des sociétés, n'était pas seulement l'irrésistible accumulation du capital mais les obstacles à la croissance. On rejette aussi bien l'idée de la marche fatale à la catastrophe que l'idée d'une harmonie spontanée des intérêts ou d'un développement sans larmes. La croissance de l'économie industrielle a été partout une victoire sur les forces de conservation, victoire toujours imparfaite, jamais définitive et peut-être ne faut-il pas souhaiter que cette victoire soit complète.

La France est un exemple de croissance retardée. Les principales caractéristiques de la conjoncture sociale en résultent. Et, sans qu'on ose généraliser la leçon de l'exemple, il semble que le retard aggrave les maux de la civilisation industrielle.

*Qui n'a pas l'esprit de son âge
De son âge a tout le malheur.*

NOTES

¹ Selon les modes de calcul, le pourcentage de la main d'œuvre agricole oscille entre 30 et 35%, le pourcentage de la main d'œuvre industrielle semble quelque peu inférieur à 30%.

² La valeur de la production par travailleur masculin, dans l'agriculture, étant 100 pour l'ensemble de la France, l'indice, selon les régions, varie entre 149 dans le Nord et 70 dans le Sud-Est, la Bretagne se situant à 89, le Sud-Ouest à 81.

Social Stratification in Brazil: A General Survey of Some Recent Changes

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The subject of the present paper could not have been chosen voluntarily as material for a thesis to be submitted to a scientific Congress by one who has already devoted many years of study to it. It would lend itself better to a dissertation by some scientifically irresponsible person, or as the object of deep and detailed research, but on a much wider scale than that of a mere communication by a sociologist. However, in the case of the present paper, it is neither of these alternatives, but a third purpose that we are bent upon, namely the presentation, in preliminary form, of a general idea of the field into which we are now beginning a larger enquiry.

The invitation received to submit a paper to the Third World Congress of Sociology on "The recent changes in Brazil's social stratification system" arrived precisely at the time we were engaged in planning and carrying out a lengthy investigation on this same subject at the C.B.P.E. (Brazilian Centre for Educational Research). Thus, for the moment, the only alternative left was that of resorting to earlier researches on partial aspects of the question in order to offer herein the hypotheses and main ideas that have been the basic guiding lines of the more general survey of the problem in question. This explanatory statement is made now in order to allow for possible changes in the author's points of view, that is, changes which may emerge as a result of deeper consideration of the subject.

These are the main points which will be dealt with in developing the theme:

- (1) The fundamental processes of social change which, in contemporary Brazilian society, have led to correlated alterations in the profile of social stratification.
- (2) The repercussions of social change on the process of stratification.

It is unnecessary to emphasise the importance of studying the social stratification of our contemporary society. Bibliographical surveys recently carried out in different countries reveal the growing interest in research of this kind, not only because they point to an increase in the number of studies in this sector, but also because they indicate a qualitative improvement in the methodology of the investigations and of the work done in connection with these studies. It might even be said that *academic* sociologists, after long refusing to admit the importance of the subject, and insisting upon regarding it as the mere sub-product of an ideology, suddenly "discovered" that social categories,

social classes, let us say, really do exist and thereupon resolved to make up for lost time, doing within a very short time all that had been left undone for so long. . . . However, in the literature recently published in this field, and which is rapidly accumulating, one does not always find the necessary understanding of the fact that in the so-called "new countries"—so often looked upon as the laboratories of such research—the problem we are considering has unique and very characteristic features and peculiarities which have little in common with the usual pattern found in the older capitalist societies.

Indeed, in the national communities of Asia, the Arab world and Latin America, for instance—all of them societies which have lately begun to feel the impact of modern economic development, and wherein are found, simultaneously, a crisis in the older patterns and a rapid expansion of a new social order—one striking fact is observed. A glance at these regions suffices to show, beyond any doubt, that the social revolutions of our day and age do not necessarily follow the course set by the native European or American communities whose industrialisation began during the second half of the eighteenth century.

It is not our intention here to mention in detail, nor even to discuss, the different characteristics of these two historical processes. Nevertheless, it was felt that these disparities should be referred to broadly, and attention drawn to them, because it is only in the light of such preliminary remarks and observations that many of the concepts and statements which follow can be fully understood.

Basing our opinion on the principle that the system of social stratification is an integral part of the social structure itself, it is our view that any study of the changes which are occurring in that process must perforce start with an analysis of the more general and fundamental alterations taking place in the structure of a society, and which are manifest in the different levels or layers, including that of stratification.

In short, we propose to begin by commenting upon the main processes of change which are at present taking place in Brazilian social structure, as a whole. Subsequently, reference will be made to the main repercussion of these changes on the stratification of that society.

1. GROWTH OF THE POPULATION

The population of a country is the physical universe in which the phenomena of social stratification present themselves. The growth or decrease of that population therefore is, as a rule, directly connected with the classes and class differences that are formed, and transformed, within the whole.

From the historical standpoint, Brazil's population is growing at an extraordinarily high rate. To be more precise, the number of its inhabitants rose from 30,635,605 in 1920 to 41,236,315 in 1940 and to 51,944,397 in 1950, that is to say, an increase of 10,708,082 between 1940 and 1950. This represents a growth of 25.97 per cent. in just ten

years, which is one of the highest growth rates of the world's population. Indeed, the country now has roughly half of the population of the Latin-American continent within its frontiers.

Only approximately 19 per cent. of this increment can be ascribed to immigration, the population's high reproduction capacity being the main factor for this amazing growth rate. It has been estimated that during the hundred-year period 1850-1950, excluding the contribution of the immigrant element, the natural increase of the Brazilian population was of about 38 million inhabitants. During the twentieth century, whereas the birth rate fell heavily in most of the western world, in Brazil it declined only slightly, remaining at about 44 per 1000 even now. Taking into account a lower death rate, which, incidentally, is the result and reflection of the country's social progress, the natural growth rate was 24 per thousand.

Hence, it will be seen that the country's annual rate of population growth is now approximately 3 per cent. And, despite the danger of any demographic prophecy, it could be estimated without exaggeration, that, by the end of this century, the Brazilian population will have reached, and even possibly exceeded, the hundred million mark.

2. INDUSTRIALIZATION

Historically, Brazilian society was founded on an agricultural economy. The fundamental productive unit in that type of economy was the "*fazenda*", or plantation, the output of which flowed toward the world's markets. These *fazendas* were not small peasant holdings, worked by the farmer and his family, and producing only enough for their own consumption. They were vast single-crop farms, based mainly on slave labour, and directing their production principally to export activities. In this sense, insofar as their type of organisation and their economic style are concerned they were rather more agromercantile than strictly agricultural units. In an economic structure of such a nature, the powerful landowners and their families, on their huge estates, were—over a large part of Brazilian social history—the leading class and, therefore, controlled all the institutional media on which depended the operation of the system as a whole.

Since the end of the nineteenth century, and especially since the end of the First World War, Brazil's domestic market for consumer goods began slowly to fall into the hands of the country's nascent industrial enterprises which, since then, have expanded steadily. During these last 30 years, its industrial plant has increased rapidly—a statement which the data available confirm fully, both as regards the volume and speed of the process. In fact, over the ten-year period 1940-50, the number of industrial undertakings rose by 91 per cent. and the volume of industrial labour by 59·3 per cent.

These and many other statistics emphasise the existence of a strong industrial development which has substantially altered the traditional pattern of our economy. In the course of this paper, it will become

clear that these radical changes in the country's economy had sharp repercussions on the whole social structure and especially on social stratification.

3. URBANIZATION

As a result of the agricultural basis on which Brazilian society was founded, the country's social life was predominantly centred within the agrarian structure. The early towns grew up around the old "*fazendas*", within their sphere of influence, or along the coastal belt, where the products of commercialised agriculture were exported. It is for this reason that the rural sector has always constituted the overwhelming majority of the population, while urban areas contain only a small fraction of the total population of Brazil. Even in 1940, the census figures showed that 68.8 per cent. of the inhabitants lived in the rural area.

Developing concurrently with the process of industrialisation, and to a great extent conditioned by it, the trend toward urbanisation is actually one of the deepest social transformations that have been effected in Brazilian society lately. During the short space of ten years, as may be seen from the census data recorded for 1950, the urban and suburban populations showed an increase of 41.5 per cent. and 58.3 per cent. respectively in relation to their position ten years earlier, while the rural population, over the same interval, rose only by 17.4 per cent. This would imply that a rapid and intensive process of urbanisation is now taking place. We propose to show that this tendency has decisively contributed to the formation of a new basis for social relations, and a new style thereof, contrasting very sharply at times with the traditional pattern of the country's society.

One of the most flagrant effects of urbanisation was the professional diversification of the population as a result of the multiplicity of activities and services, which were practically non-existent in the classic rural society with its very much more simplified professional structure and composition.

4. BUREAUCRATISATION

These changes which, as has been noted, took place in the professional composition of the population, are also closely connected with another aspect of the transformation that Brazilian society is undergoing, namely bureaucratisation.

In a measure with the progress of industrialisation, it was necessary to *rationalise* economic activity correspondingly. (It must be explained that the term "rationalisation" is used here in the same sense and with the same meaning as Sombart and Weber have employed it). Now, this rationalisation of industrial and commercial enterprise gave rise to endless multiplication of the hierarchy of intermediary functions, or occupations, in between the directive and the executive organs, within the industrial and commercial undertakings themselves.

In the course of time, this multiplication of the intermediary functions within the two spheres of activity mentioned above, high-lighted the problem of defining the position of these layers within the social structure as a whole. Again, simultaneously with the development of bureaucratisation in private enterprise, we find a parallel, large-scale movement in the civil services, into which bureaucratisation expanded deeply and intensively. This trend was the natural upshot of the growing sphere of state intervention in the economic life, of the geographic extension of the effective area which governmental action could encompass, and, finally, of the inexorable widening of the country's administrative programme, which, in turn, was the logical consequence of Brazil's increasing rate of development.

In short, inevitably, and as a result of the innovations in the basic institutional patterns, the emphasis on bureaucratism likewise contributed substantially to the introduction of new occupational categories, and, as a corollary, to the formation of a new attitude of mind in these groups as regards other groups and in relation to the values that are recognised and admitted by the social organisation.

5. INFLATION

To be more explicit, it might be said that the penetration of bureaucratism into private enterprise and into the civil service gave birth to an urban middle class in Brazil, an event which is of relatively recent date in our social structure. The composition of this class closely resembles that of the so-called "new" middle classes, comprising managers, technicians, administrators and organisers. It is usual to distinguish between this "new" middle class and the "older" middle class, which sprang up in the early days of the capitalist economy, and which based its social position on the ownership of small property. In fact the "new" middle class may be regarded as doubly "new" since the characteristic social strata, known as the "older" (European-type) middle classes, never encountered favourable conditions for their development, either in the economy or in the social structure of Brazil.

In the midst of the process of their evolution, the urban middle classes were subjected to the violent impact of an inflation which has grown steadily in intensity since the '30's, and which increased sharply after the beginning of the Second World War.

It is evident that, as usually happens in these cases, the inflationary spiral wound tightest around the wage-earning middle classes, whose economic position deteriorated correspondingly, at this stage of their development, owing to the disrupting effects of the increasing monetary devaluation then taking place. The inflationary crisis, bearing down heavily as the economy developed, paved the way to what was apparently a paradoxical situation. While on the one hand, a series of factors was responsible for the appearance of a wage-earning urban middle class, on the other, inflationary factors that were no less objective, sent up the cost of living indices and the gap between the

rise in prices and that of wages, enhanced the instability of these middle classes, and sowed the seeds of social, ideological and political unrest.

In the face of the general increase in the cost of living, and despite the lower average wage level for labour, an effective increase of real wages took place from the labour standpoint, over the period 1920 to 1955. This improvement was achieved through the real increase in the degree of skill of the working classes, the militant efforts of labour unions and perhaps chiefly through the "populist" (in the sense of being directed to the working classes) policy adopted by the government immediately after the revolutionary outbreak of 1930. Meanwhile, however, real wages for skilled labour of a higher technical level, particularly in the civil service, have been reduced by about 64 per cent.

The development of the factors which cause a quantitative increase of the wage-earning middle classes and, similarly, the influence of the inflationary factors that lower the standards of living in these classes, leading them toward obvious instability and unrest, would appear to constitute two further characteristic and highly significant elements in the changes which have recently taken place in Brazil's contemporary process of social stratification.

6. IMMIGRATION

Since the middle of the nineteenth century, after the abolition of slavery, increasing numbers of immigrants have entered Brazil. They are of Portuguese, Italian, German, Spanish, Slav and Japanese origin, mainly. This trend prevailed, and was even growing in intensity until the Second World War, and though, since then, its level has fluctuated, the migratory current towards this country still flows steadily. Despite these fluctuations, and although the main stream of the current is now directed mainly to the southern part of the country, immigration into Brazil has exerted considerable influence on the demographic and social structures. During the initial period, at least, the foreign element came to this country drawn by the idea of its being in formation, of there being endless opportunities and chances; they came with ambitions enough to encourage them to make use of the existing channels but enough, too, to inspire the creation of new means of social improvement, new means of "climbing the social ladder".

In the rural areas of Southern Brazil, the immigrants have played an important part in the establishment of a rural middle class consisting of small landholders and farmers. In the urban zones, they have been drawn toward business activities, industry and services in general. Some of the studies which have been made in connection with the assimilation of the immigrant in Brazil lead one to the assumption that sharply competitive situations occur in the process, particularly as regards the economic and professional aspects. The attractions seen, or felt, in certain professional categories and by definite nationalities,

would seem to indicate that the immigrants arriving in this country adapt themselves more easily in the occupational groups in which there are large numbers of workers of the same nationality, who had entered the country previously. Furthermore—and this can be readily seen—the fact that one encounters foreign (not including Portuguese) names figuring among the lists of business, industrial and financial leaders, would suggest that the evolution of capitalism in Brazil has opened the door of social “climbing” to immigrants.

Indeed, this is a subject which only lately has become a source of worry for the experts and upon which practically no serious research has been undertaken.

7. INTERNAL MIGRATIONS

In addition to international migration, there is another type of migration which is also related to social mobility and to the alterations which are taking place in the profile aspect of Brazil's social stratification, namely migration within the country. The marked differences of a geographic nature, as well as of economic resources, social situation, population density, level of production techniques, educational standards and possibilities for development, between the different regions of the country, have lately weighed heavily in encouraging the displacement of the population from one part to another of the territory. This applies particularly in the case of migratory currents between the rural and urban areas, between the Eastern and North-eastern regions and the Southern and Central-Western regions and finally between the northeast and the extreme north of the country.

These shifts in the regional distribution of the labour force evidently have a direct repercussion on social stratification.

Let us examine, for instance, the position with reference to the state of São Paulo. In this case, its agricultural and industrial progress have created a solid demand for labour. Since 1928, the number of Brazilian workers from other states who have made their way to São Paulo has been consistently higher than that of foreign labour entering this particular state. From the data set forth in a survey which appeared recently, it would be logical to conclude that the migratory pattern, within the country and from abroad, has been broadly as follows: The first generations of European labour went into agricultural activities, mainly to the coffee plantations. With the spurt of industrial development in São Paulo, the generations of descendants of these earlier immigrants concentrated in the cities and towns, but principally in the state capital, where they were attracted by industrial prospects. The subsequent labour shortage in agriculture was then met by Brazilian workers from other parts of the country.

These internal migrations cause various different types of repercussions on the social stratification. In the case of migration to the town, from the country, a great mass of incoming labour increases the ranks of the industrial proletariat in the urban area, or, alternatively, is

absorbed in bureaucratic occupations or in services. Another presumably numerous contingent of these migrants goes to make up the "*lumpen*" of the big cities. The heaviest intra-rural migrations are those between the under-developed sectors of eastern and north-eastern Brazil, where share-cropping is the rule, and the pioneer lands of the south, where the predominant practice is the payment of wages. Only a small proportion of these migrants manage to make their dream of owning a small piece of agricultural land come true, the vast majority eventually becoming a part of the rural proletariat on the coffee and cotton plantations of São Paulo and Paraná.

There is still another type of migration—though far smaller in size—and that is the constant flow of intellectuals and members of the liberal professions who move away from the provinces toward the metropolis—either Rio de Janeiro or São Paulo, in search of better openings in the social scale. However, the qualitative implications of this type are far greater than their quantitative significance; this displacement introduces a competitive element into the field of intellectual activities, an element, in fact, which deserves closer investigation in order to ascertain, by sociological research, whether or not the phenomenon does have the importance which the common sense of city-dwellers would ascribe to it.

8. EDUCATION

While these changes were taking place in the structure of Brazilian economy and society, the network of educational facilities was being substantially increased in a quantitative sense. Whereas, under the classic economic pattern, although possessing only a minimum of skill, slaves took essential part in the productive process, now the demands of industrialisation and a rationalised economy require, as a fundamental condition, that the masses should have some form of instruction. The higher educational standards of the leading classes and the ignorance of the masses were the most typical manifestations of the social distance which separated these two groups in the earlier pattern of stratification. Hence, for the ascending strata, instruction became a desirable and valuable objective, an instrumental value with which to rise in the social scale, and as such, it was important. As was to be expected, this instrumental aspect of instruction led to its quantitative increase at the expense of its quality. Even those who point to the danger of Brazil's educational system, sacrificing quality in favour of constant expansion, far beyond real requirements, are willing to admit that the country's school system was forced into this position in order to meet, at least partially, the growing demand for instruction arising from the ascending layers of the population. Any criticism made of a school which is solely concerned in providing instruction for as many students as possible only goes to confirm the significance of education as an instrument of social mobility within the limits of a given society that is undergoing a rapid process of economic development.

9. SECULARISATION

The importance of instruction—not only as an objective factor of change in social stratification but also as a positive value, sought as a means of social improvement—has developed in a measure with the decline of other traditional values and institutions. At every level of Brazilian life, from the technical and economic to the political, moral and religious, one can observe the so-called process of *secularisation* creeping ever forward in the mass society that is now in formation. The classic mechanisms of social integration, such as the patriarchal family, or the almost official Catholic religion, witness the loosening of their control over individual behaviour, as a result of the development of a new type of contractual relations that are characteristic of these mass societies. This secularisation of life, or rather of the attitude toward life which is one of the effects of the social change on the traditional scale of values—involves likewise, and fundamentally, values connected with the hierarchy of social situations. Moreover, it develops a critical attitude in the common man of the rising classes, an attitude which at times borders on the iconoclastic, when he comes up against the former ruling elites, who were in the old pattern the sole arbiters of the situations and the values which they represented.

This secularisation and this critical attitude to the spheres of social life, hitherto regarded as sacred, are gradually gaining ground in Brazilian society, so that they are being consolidated into a state of mind and are attaining a high degree of acceptance as a basic social process. Because it is perhaps the least spectacular of all, as a compensation, this secularisation seems to be the deepest alteration taking place at the root of the social stratification process which Brazilian society is undergoing.

Having briefly summarised some of the fundamental aspects of the social changes which are taking place in the Brazilian scene, let us now examine, equally briefly, the more visible effects of these changes on the system of social stratification.

It seems obvious that within the limitations of a paper such as this, one cannot include any other than the more general aspects of the recent changes in social stratification, although we are at present engaged, as had been mentioned earlier, in an exhaustive study of the subject.

I. AGRARIAN CLASSES

The crisis in Brazil's agrarian structure, by reason of its archaism, hinders the creation of a domestic market, that is, it puts an obstacle in the way of what is an essential factor in our economic development. Subsequently, this crisis led to still another that involved the social position of the old ruling agricultural classes, who, ever since the time of Brazil's Independence, had held and controlled the basic instruments of leadership. Although by no means wishing to imply a denial of the qualitative importance of these groups in contemporary Brazilian

society, the fact is that the rise of the merchant and industrial classes, stemming from the capitalistic expansion of the country's economy, has been achieved at the expense of the position and the prestige of the agricultural aristocracy.

II. THE MERCHANT AND INDUSTRIAL BOURGEOISIE

The repercussions of the rise to positions of leadership of these new upper classes—which process, in itself is the inexorable consequence of prevailing economic development trends—have, on occasion, included conflicts and struggles for the upper hand between the former groups and the older ruling agrarian groups. Indeed, the political history of the republican period is rich with accounts of these struggles, although it was not in every case a question of open antagonism. There were, it must be confessed, many times when compromises and accommodations were made between these classes, especially as between the merchants and farmers, when their respective interests were at stake. In practice, this tempering of antagonistic attitudes was rendered easier by the unchanging commercial nature of extensive agricultural enterprise in Brazil, which was directed to the export market. Moreover, from the political and ideological standpoint, there is every reason to believe that these agreements were established on an objective basis; this would appear to be true to the extent that, quite recently, the presence and political actions of the industrial proletariat and the urban petty-bourgeoisie is now voicing its own views more intensively, threatening established situations and leaders as such, quite independently of the nature of their economic basis, that is, quite apart from the agricultural, commercial or industrial activity in which they are supported.

III. THE URBAN INDUSTRIAL PROLETARIAT

The quantitative increase of the industrial working classes was, as well might be supposed, to foster the development of this class as one of the main, if not *the* main influence of recent Brazilian social evolution.

The historical background of Brazil's industrial workers is made up of slave labour, which was abolished in 1888, and immigrants. In recent times, because of domestic migratory currents, large numbers of the rural population have joined the working classes already settled into the urban industrial centres. This variety of origin and composition of the industrial working classes has hampered, but not prevented, their presence and activity in Brazil's social organisation from being the spring-board for the creation of new social problems and the starting point in the search to discover new ways to achieve new aims. Although numerous and active enough to pose these problems, as a class, the industrial workers have not yet sufficient political experience to find their own solutions for the problem. Hence, very visibly in every sector, and particularly in the political field, this immaturity

leads to the success of false leadership a fact that has become typical of modern Brazilian politics. These political and ideological trends in contemporary Brazil have become known as "*populism*".

IV. THE MIDDLE CLASSES

The heterogeneous mixture that comprises what is called "the middle classes" actually has no deep roots in Brazilian social history, whose social structure, until very recently, seemed intrinsically adverse to its growth. The Brazilian middle classes may thus be regarded as a relatively new phenomenon. In the Brazilian social order, the "*funcionário público*" (government employee) is the "ideal type" which can be taken to be representative of the Brazilian middle classes. In this aspect, our middle classes resemble rather more those of China and the former Russian régime, as well as those of Germany, insofar as their historical formation is concerned. For the same reason, they differ from the middle classes of France, England, Belgium or Holland, whose growth was based on the development of the small-holding system.

Closely linked to the development of bureaucratisation as it is, the Brazilian middle class is essentially an urban layer and is chronologically new in the process of social stratification. Everything points to the conclusion that the problems of this group are at present the consequence of the joint but contradictory effects of the series of factors mentioned above, namely *a*) the structural factors which promote its expansion and *b*) the economic factors of an inflationary order that gnaw away at its revenue. In this case, we are before the fact that among the wage-earning groups that co-exist in Brazil's social pattern, the middle class wage-earning groups are the most unstable, a feature that is not characteristically Brazilian yet which, undoubtedly, must be the result of the process of social stratification in the country.

V. ELITES

These changing social processes inevitably culminate in problems connected with the formation and transformation of élites and the definition and re-definition of their rôle in social order. In Brazil, nowadays, nothing is heard more frequently, from daily common statements to bombastic parliamentary affirmations, than the opinion that there is a "crisis of elites" or, alternatively, the statement that "the masses no longer believe or trust the elites", or other similar verbiage. From our point of view, there are sound objective reasons for believing that these lamentations are genuinely true and that they do no more than confirm the expectations that the learned students of contemporary conditions voiced long before the phrases became daily statements of common people.

Obviously, since they are not set loose in the air around us, every élite is of necessity linked to a given structural and objective situation, the interests and values of which will be defined and protected by the

élite. It is for this reason that the natural end to the successive crises through which social changes have historically been brought about is that, sooner or later, that crisis will also reach the level of the elites. In the course of the process, there is a short-lived co-existence of decadent and rising elites, which creates the idea of crisis, not because of any lack but rather because of the multiplicity of cliques discussing and arguing over the overall social leadership, and proposing endless definitions and interminably re-defining the path they should follow with that aim in view.

Thus, it will be seen that the analysis of a social situation which is characterised by the rapid changes it is undergoing makes it easier to understand that this change is, in fact, the fundamental phenomenon to be sought out in studying the process of Brazil's social stratification. This change, which is now in full blast, causes this sort of *structural marginality*, that is the predominant feature of the process in this country and that is the result of the co-existence, and of the conflict, in the present day and age, of two styles, two standards, two systems, one alongside the other.

Someone has already referred to Brazil as "the country of contrasts"; the place one goes to in order to feel in the twentieth century, at its most intense pitch, . . . or to escape from it. It is a country within whose frontiers, when one flies from the coast toward the interior, the voyager can travel back in time as well, speeding from the present into the past. The system of social stratification, which is the backbone of the social order likewise reflects this dichotomy, this duality of the "two Brazils" which coexist in the real Brazil.

The future work done in connection with the programme of research which is being carried out under our direction at the Brazilian Educational Research Centre will, in due time, prove the validity, or otherwise, of the main outline traced herein.

Recent Changes in the Class Structure of the United States

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I

An increasing number of publications testify to the growing interest of students of social stratification in the facts of social mobility both in Europe and in America. Several recent studies¹ have furnished not only new evidence about the rate and extent of vertical social movement in various countries but have also cast doubts on some longstanding assumptions about the nature of mobility trends in different societies. This is especially true of the United States where two favorite notions, widely held by social scientists and general public alike, have recently been challenged: (1) that the rate of upward mobility has been slowing down and class lines are becoming more rigid in the United States²; (2) that nonetheless the rate of upward mobility has always been and still is higher in America than in other countries.³ The evidence adduced to date on either of these points is by no means conclusive—indeed, the challenge to the second assumption rests on precarious grounds so far—but the debate has been joined and several major research projects currently in progress or in various stages of planning may be expected to make substantial contributions to our knowledge of the facts concerning social mobility.

The growing interest in mobility represents a welcome step forward from the essentially static approach which has characterized the many studies concerned with the delineation of status hierarchies in various local communities that have long dominated the field of stratification research in the United States. If we want to understand fully the nature of social stratification in rapidly changing urban-industrial societies we can obviously not confine ourselves to topographical structural studies of local communities but must attempt to analyze changes through time in the class structure of the nation as a whole. Insofar as mobility studies measure not only the present rate and extent of vertical movements but also attempt to assess changes in mobility rates and in the direction of trends they make valuable contributions to a dynamic analysis of social stratification systems.

One major limitation should be clearly recognized, however: practically without exception current research on mobility is concerned with the *movement of individuals* in the class hierarchy. They either compare the social status of fathers (occasionally also of grandfathers) and sons, or trace the movement of individuals during their life career, or both. Yet individual mobility is merely one measure of the fluidity or rigidity of a social structure. Equally important is the mobility of groups and

entire classes. For a truly dynamic approach we need information about changes in the class structure itself: is the class hierarchy stable or are some classes rising while others are declining? Are some classes expanding and others contracting? Unfortunately, these important questions are rarely dealt with in modern stratification research although it is perfectly obvious that changes in the class structure itself must have a major import upon the opportunities of individuals to move between the various levels of the class pyramid.

Indeed, the most refined of the recent attempts to measure changing rates of occupational mobility, both in Britain and in the United States, expressly exclude the effects of changes in the occupational structure from consideration.⁴ The results of these calculations are interesting enough: they indicate little change in the rate of individual mobility in either Britain or America since the beginning of this century and also seem to show little difference in the amount of mobility between the two countries, *provided* the effects of structural changes are eliminated. In reality, however, structural changes have been of major proportions and the pursuit of refined measuring techniques should not lead to their neglect. In the United States, certainly, a good deal of evidence has been accumulating in recent years which points to far-reaching shifts in the distribution of income and property as well as in the occupational structure and the educational composition of the American population. These developments are bound to have major repercussions on the relative position of different classes and on the class structure as a whole. It is the purpose of this paper to draw attention to these trends and to attempt a preliminary analysis of their significance.

II

As with all major social changes, one cannot adequately evaluate contemporary shifts in class relations without some historical perspective. No detailed historical analysis of the American stratification system can be undertaken here, but at least the most fundamental transformations will be outlined very briefly. From the very beginning the class structure of the American population differed sharply from that of European societies: it was characterized by the predominance of a broad middle class. For one thing, both the Pilgrim Fathers of Massachusetts and the settlers of Virginia were largely of middle class origins. More important, in the absence of feudal restrictions and privileges, most of the virgin territory was occupied by free farmers who individually owned the land they cultivated. To be sure, the inhabitants of the American colonies did not consist of an undifferentiated mass of freeholders at any time. There always existed definite social distinctions between small farmers and large landowners, between craftsmen, ministers, and town merchants. There were also considerable numbers of propertyless men, journeymen and mechanics, and those who not only owned no property but were themselves the property

of others, indentured servants and Negro slaves. Yet the division between freemen and indentured servants was not permanent: although quite badly treated by their masters, the bondsmen were generally imbued with middle class ideals and frequently succeeded in becoming independent owners once their term of bondage was served. We also have evidence that not a few of them managed to rise rapidly in the social scale: of the members of the Virginia House of Burgesses in 1662 no less than 43 percent had reached the shores of the New World as indentured servants.⁵ No such mobility, of course, was available to the Negro slaves, but slavery did not loom quite as large as is sometimes assumed. Confined largely to one section of the country, slaves never constituted more than a limited proportion of the total American population.⁶

If the propertyless classes formed but a minority of the early American population, the upper class was conspicuous mainly through its absence. Contrary to fond legends there were very few noblemen among the permanent settlers of the American colonies, even in Virginia. Almost without exception the illustrious group of Southern planters who acquired large estates and became the leaders in the struggle for independence and the establishment of the young republic were the descendants of immigrants of plain yeoman stock. Of course, the vacuum in the accustomed social structure created by the absence of the nobility was quickly filled by able and ambitious men of humble social origin who rose to the top, amassing large acreages or acquiring wealth as merchants, traders, and shippers. But the number of great landowners remained small and was even reduced by the confiscation and break-up of large northern Loyalist estates after the American Revolution.

In summary, the following classes are clearly distinguishable in the social hierarchy of pre-industrial America:

1. At the top ranked a small group of large landowners and wealthy merchants, followed by
2. a broad stratum of rural freeholders, urban artisans, professional men, storekeepers and small traders. Just as the upper class jealously guarded whatever social distinctions it could legitimately claim—"persons of quality" were not subjected to corporal punishment in colonial times, and titles like "Mr." and "Gent." were not only claimed tenaciously during life but were customarily carved upon tombstones as well⁷—so the middle-class property owners, who in colonial New England called each other "Goodman" and "Goodwife", were very particular about badges of social distinction which set them apart from
3. propertyless wage-earners and journeymen who formed a third class and were addressed by their Christian names alone.⁸ Below them came
4. indentured servants, and
5. at the very bottom of the hierarchy, Negro and Indian slaves.

The relative size of each of these classes varied considerably from North to South and from the Eastern seaboard to the moving frontier, and changes occurred over time as well. But it is a fact of great significance that in comparison with contemporary European societies America's early social hierarchy appeared like a truncated pyramid: lacking both an hereditary aristocracy and a peasantry in the European sense, the broad middle class of independent producers was the dominant stratum socially and economically, if not politically. We have no definite statistical information about the size of the middle class although some estimates hold that in the 1820's-30's as many as four fifths of the free people who worked were owners of their own means of livelihood.⁹ The present writer is inclined to consider these estimates rather high but there is little doubt that in the early 19th century the middle class image of a society of independent small enterprisers was in approximate accord with the facts. Rank and position rested upon the amount of property owned, income was derived from working with and on one's property. Moreover, even those who worked for wages did not intend to remain wage-earners all their lives. There was so much movement in and out of the small enterpriser level that property-less men appeared justified in believing that they, too, could acquire independence before long. One may, therefore, hold without undue exaggeration that this society as a whole was a middle class society.

III

The middle class world, which had given birth to democratic political institutions and to a philosophy of social equalitarianism that has become firmly established as a permanent American ideal, was in fact decisively changed by the impact of the industrial revolution. With its emphasis on mechanization and occupational specialization the industrialization process radically transformed the simple society of independent, small enterprisers into a nation of wage-earners and salaried employees. This development began to gather speed in the decades before the Civil War, between 1840 and 1860, when the expansion of manufacturing activities attracted increasing numbers of young people from the farms as well as immigrants from foreign shores to the rapidly growing cities. It also forced large numbers of handicraft producers to give up their independent means of livelihood, converting them into factory workers selling their labor power instead of the products of their work.

These trends were accelerated after the Civil War when the rate of industrial development attained its peak. The first reliable statistics on occupation, collected by the Census of 1870, show that the great occupational shifts which were transforming America's social structure were then well under-way. As can be seen from Table 1, the urban working class had grown mightily while the number of farmers had fallen off. By 1870 there were more dependent industrial wage earners

than there were independent farmers. Although the self-employed still made up 40 percent of the total working population they were now outnumbered by manual wage-workers who constituted more than one half of the total labor force. But the rising middle class of salaried white-collar people was then still in its infancy.

In the ensuing eighty years the shrinkage in the old middle class of independent producers has continued unabated. From 40 percent in 1870, the proportion of self-employed individuals has dropped to 13 percent in 1954. This has been due in large part to the precipitous decline in the farming population: the proportion of independent farmers declined from 27 percent of the total working population in

Table 1. *Distribution of the Working Population of the United States by Major Occupation Groups, 1870-1954.*

Occupation	Percent of Working Population			
	1870	1910	1950	1954
<i>Self-Employed</i>	40.4	27.1	14.4	13.3
Farmers	27.1	17.7	6.9	5.9
Business Enterprisers	11.4	8.3	6.4	6.0
Professionals	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.4
<i>Salaried Employees</i>	6.6	16.1	29.1	30.8
Professional	1.8	3.4	6.2	7.5
Technical-Managerial	1.1	2.9	4.0	3.8
Clerical	0.6	4.0	12.6	13.1
Salespeople	2.5	4.6	6.3	6.4
Others	0.6	1.2	—	—
<i>Wage-Workers</i>	52.8	56.8	56.5	55.8
Farm Laborers	13.1*	7.7	5.1	4.1
Industrial Workers	28.2	37.4	51.4	51.7
Others	11.5	11.7		

* Partly estimated.

Sources: Data for 1870 and 1910 adapted from Lewis Corey, "Problems of the Peace: The Middle Class", *Antioch Review*, 5 (Spring, 1945), Table 1, p. 69; data for 1950 and 1954 adapted from *Current Population Reports*, Series P-50, no. 59 (April, 1955), Table iii, p. 4.

1870 to barely 6 percent today. But the rapid diminution of the enterpriser stratum did not imply the disappearance of the middle class as such: while the process of industrialization destroyed one element of the middle class it created another. The startling rise of the new middle class of salaried employees from less than 7 percent of the working population in 1870 to almost 31 percent in 1954 has replaced the shrinking cadres of entrepreneurs (See table 1).

The proportion of manual workers continued to rise until 1910 when it reached 57 percent of the total working population. Since then the relative size of the working class has been remarkably stable. Increases in the ranks of the urban wage-workers have been offset by the decline in the number of farm-laborers, so that the total percentage of manual wage-earners has fluctuated narrowly between 55-57 percent for more than forty years.

This tabulation of occupational shifts reported by the Census provides clear evidence of the fundamental transformations of the American class structure which have been caused by the impact of great economic and technological changes. In the course of a hundred years the early society of independent enterprisers has virtually disappeared. Only a small fraction of the population still consists of self-employed persons. They have become a minority of the modern middle class where they are now greatly outnumbered by salaried employees. Throughout the first half of the 20th century the middle class as a whole has been a minority, well over half of the working population have been earning their livelihood as manual wage-workers.

Yet, and this is of great importance, no major psychological reactions have followed the objective changes in the social structure, which have never been fully acknowledged in the popular mind. The image of America as a society where "everybody is middle class" has persisted long after it ceased to be in accordance with economic and social reality. To be sure, as numerous public opinion polls have shown, contemporary Americans are well aware of the sharp differences in wealth, power, and prestige,¹⁰ and studies of voting behaviour show that by and large they are inclined to vote in accordance with their objective interests.¹¹ Yet at the same time it is a striking fact that most Americans tend to perceive and interpret objective economic differences as *individual*, not as *class* differences. They cling tenaciously to the traditional belief that the United States is a land of promise where golden opportunities beckon and all able and ambitious men can "get ahead" regardless of their social origins. In 1937, only a few years after the greatest depression in the history of the nation when unemployment was still widespread, an attitude survey in Chicago posed the following question: "Do you think the following idea is true: In America there is no 'working class'. Working people and their children can rise to better positions; they do not have to remain ordinary workers?"¹² The affirmative answers by income classes were as follows: prosperous 78 percent, upper middle 71 percent, lower middle 70 percent, poor 64 percent. Several later studies which presented similar questions between 1940 and 1947 bring out the same point of view: while percentages varied from survey to survey in every case the majority confirmed its belief in the continued existence of wide opportunities.¹³

The sharp disparity between the objective reality of 20th century American class structure and the national mentality is one of the most important contrasts between American and European systems of stratification and poses many fascinating problems. In the present context, however, we need not explore this phenomenon further.¹⁴ We merely note that the imagery of middle class society has persisted and is strongly embedded in contemporary American life. This fact will certainly play a significant rôle in the coming realignment of social classes which appears to be in the making at the present time.

IV

For, amazing as it may seem, the continuous expansion and mechanization of the American economy which first transformed the nation from an agrarian middle class into an urban working class society is now about to re-convert a substantial part of the working class into a brand-new middle class stratum. Evidence of this metamorphosis of large groups of manual workers, which promises fair to become the most spectacular instance of mass social mobility ever known, is clearly visible in the shifts in income distribution, occupational structure, and educational composition that have been changing the profile of American society during the last 25 years or so.

Most dramatic are the shifts which have occurred in the distribution of personal income in recent decades. Between 1929 and 1953 the number of income receiving units in the United States (families and unrelated individuals) has grown from 36.5 million to 51.2 million, an increase of 40 percent, but the total cash income at their disposal, after taxes, expressed in 1953 dollars, rose from 118.4 billion in 1929 to 221.6 billion in 1953, an increase of 87 percent.¹⁶ This great increase in real income has meant not only a very substantial upward revision of the nation's living standards as a whole, it has also been accompanied by a significant redistribution of various income receiving groups. Between 1929 and 1953 the proportion of low-income families has been greatly reduced while the ranks of those receiving middle-size incomes have expanded sharply. Table 2 indicates the narrowing of the income

Table 2. *Income Distribution of Families and Unrelated Individuals in the United States, 1929 and 1953.*

Cash Income after Taxes in 1953 dollars					Percentage of Income Receiving Units	
					1929	1953
Less than \$1,000	16.4	9.6
\$1,000-\$1,999	26.3	13.3
					42.7	22.9
2,000-2,999	23.3	14.8
3,000-3,999	12.9	17.4
					36.2	32.2
4,000-4,999	6.6	19.5
5,000-7,499	8.5	15.4
					15.1	34.9
7,500-9,999	3.6	5.7
10,000 and over	2.4	4.3
					6.0	10.0
TOTAL	100.0	100.0

Source: Adapted from Editors of Fortune, *The Changing American Market*, p. 262.

pyramid's base and the concomitant bulging of its middle ranges. All groups receiving less than \$3,000 cash, after taxes, have declined while every group above this level has expanded. The sharpest contraction has occurred in the proportion of families getting less than \$2,000 which dropped from 42.7 percent of the total in 1929 to 22.9 percent in 1953, while the group with incomes between \$4,000 and \$7,500 has more than doubled in size: from 15.1 percent in 1929 this middle-income group¹⁶ has grown to 34.9 percent in 1953. No less than 58 percent of the family units in 1953 were in the \$3,000-10,000 income brackets, compared to 31.7 percent in 1929.

Table 3. *Income Distribution of Non-Farm Families in the United States, by Occupation of Family Head, 1953.*

Occupation of Family Head	Families with Cash Incomes after Taxes of							
	\$0-1,999		\$2,000-3,999		\$4,000-7,499		\$7,500 and Over	
	Million	%	Million	%	Million	%	Million	%
Professional, Proprietor and Managerial	0.3	8	2.0	17	4.1	27	2.5	51
Clerical and Sales	0.4	10	1.3	11	2.4	15	0.6	12
White-Collar	0.7	18	3.3	28	6.5	42	3.1	63
Skilled	0.2	5	2.5	21	4.0	26	1.1	23
Semiskilled	0.4	10	3.2	27	3.5	23	0.6	12
Service and Unskilled	0.8	21	2.4	21	1.4	9	0.1	2
Manual	1.4	36	8.1	69	8.9	58	1.8	37
No Earners	1.8	46	0.3	3	0.1	—	0.0	—
All Families	3.9	100	11.7	100	15.5	100	4.9	100

Source: Adapted from Editors of Fortune, *The Changing American Market*, p. 264.

The magnitude of this upward thrust of large numbers of families and individuals into the middle-income ranges is impressive in itself but its full significance becomes apparent only if we examine the occupational distribution of the income receiving families, shown in Table 3. This tabulation indicates that 58 percent of the heads of the 15.5 million families in the \$4,500-\$7,000 income range today earn their living not in any of the white collar occupations traditionally associated with this middle-income bracket, but as manual workers. Indeed, 23 percent of the breadwinners in this group are semi-skilled workers, and 9 percent are even classified as service workers and unskilled laborers. Nor are the manual wage-earners absent from higher income levels: 37 percent of the families with after-tax incomes of \$7,500 and over were headed in 1953 by manual workers.

Equally significant is the finding that over one half (53 percent) of all the 20 million American families headed by manual workers had incomes exceeding \$4,000 in 1953. And this was due not merely to

the favourable earning situation of the skilled craftsmen, 65 percent of whom have incomes above the \$4,000 mark, but it held good also for the semi-skilled "operatives", the factory workers, truck drivers, miners, etc., 53 percent of whose families also had incomes of \$4,000 and over.

This truly remarkable rise of more than half of the working class families into the middle-income categories can be traced to three major casual factors. First, the increasing mechanization of industry has wrought considerable changes in the occupational structure of the working class. Although the growth of the salaried white collar group has been much commented upon, it is not always realized that important structural shifts have at the same time occurred within the blue-collar group. To be sure, the relative size of the manual working group as a whole has remained quite stable throughout the 20th century,

Table 4. *Occupational Distribution of Manual Wage-Workers in the United States, 1910-1954.*

Major Occupation Group	1910	1920	Percentage		
			1930	1940	1954
All Manual Wage-Earners	100·0	100·0	100·0	100·0	100·0
Skilled Workers and Foremen	18·8	22·9	22·4	20·3	24·4
Semi-skilled "Operatives"	23·6	27·3	28·4	35·7	37·0
Service Workers	10·9	9·2	11·9	13·6	19·9
Laborers, except farm	23·5	24·8	22·4	18·2	11·3
Farm Laborers	23·2	15·8	14·9	12·2	7·4

Sources: Adapted from *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1951*, Table 220, p. 188; and from *Current Population Survey, Series P-50*, no. 59 (April, 1955), Table m, p. 4.

as we have pointed out before, but significant changes have nevertheless occurred in the internal occupational composition of this group. Table 4 shows the sharp reduction which has occurred in the lowest-paying, unskilled occupations, and the steady shift into the better-paying jobs. The proportion of workmen who earn their living as common laborers, on the farm and in the city, has dropped from almost 47 percent in 1910 to less than 18 percent in 1954, while the percentage of wage-earners engaged in skilled, semi-skilled, and service occupations has grown rapidly.

At the same time, and this is the second factor, industrial mechanization, growing productivity, and the pressure of labor unions have resulted in a great increase of wage rates. Thus the average hourly rate of production workers in manufacturing industry has risen from about 90 cents (in 1953 dollars)¹⁷ to about \$1·84 today,¹⁸ and in many heavy industries the hourly rate is now well over \$2.

Thirdly, it must be realized that despite high wage rates and virtually full employment more than half of the manual workers' families with incomes exceeding \$4,000 are in this category only because somebody

besides the family head is earning, too—at least part-time. These supplementary earners are mostly wives. Additional earners are important not only to working class families. In fact, of the 41 million families in the United States in 1952, about 17 million, or 42 percent, had at least one additional earner beside the family head.¹⁹ Yet, as the following tabulation shows:

Occupation of Family Head	Percentage of Families in Each Income Group who depend upon Supplementary Earner's Income to attain a higher Group			
	\$0-2,000	\$2,000-4,000	\$4,000-7,500	\$7,500 and Over
Professional, Proprietor and Managerial	—	25	32	36
Clerical and Sales	—	12	33	82
Skilled	—	31	46	50
Semi-skilled	—	6	46	83
Service and Unskilled	—	25	71	100

Source: Editors of Fortune, *The Changing American Market*, p. 264.

families headed by manual workers depend more heavily upon the earnings of an "extra" worker to lift them into the middle-income range than do families whose heads are engaged in a non-manual occupation. But what is really relevant, of course, is the willingness and the ability of a great many working class wives to supplement the husband's earnings sufficiently to attain a middle- or even upper-middle income.

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Of course, the middle-income category is not in itself identical with middle class, although it is true that in the past the middle class tended to be also the middle-income group. The shifts in income distribution and occupational structure which have made the entrance of 10 million families of manual workers into the over-\$4,000 income brackets possible, represent merely the first, but indispensable, steps on the road to full-fledged middle class status. It is conceivable, of course, that many of the middle-income manual workers may not travel this road to the end. It could happen, as C. Wright Mills predicts, "that in the course of the next generation a 'social class' between white-collar and wage-workers will probably be formed".²⁰ But in view of both the demonstrated strength of the traditional American middle class ideology and the fact that other important structural changes are currently taking place, it does not appear likely to the present writer.

One major difference that has traditionally set the wage-worker sharply apart from the middle class employee has been the gap in formal education between the two. For many years a high school education was virtually a middle class monopoly which "paid off" well both in cash and in superior prestige. As late as 1940, as can be seen from

Table 5, this differential appeared clear-cut in census data showing the educational attainments of employed males 22-64 years old. On every occupational level white collar men had an average of at least 12 years of school completed while none of the manual groups could boast more than 8.6 years on the average. By 1950, however, it was apparent that the educational achievements of manual workers as a whole are rising. This becomes especially evident if one examines the educational attainments of the younger men alone who have had more opportunities for formal education than their elders. A comparison of the median years of school completed in 1950 by the men in the 25-29 year age group shows that the educational gap between the white collar

Table 5. *Educational Attainment and Occupation of Employed Males in the United States, 1940 and 1950.*

Major Occupation Group	Median Years of School Completed		
	Employed Males 22-64 Years Old		Employed Males 25-29 Years Old
	1940	1950	1950
White Collar			
Professional and Technical ..	16+	16+	16+
Managers, Proprietors and Officials	12.0	12.3	12.6
Clerical and Sales	12.2	12.3	12.6
Manual Workers			
Craftsmen and Foremen ..	8.6	9.6	11.9
Operatives	8.4	8.7	10.4
Service Workers	8.4	9.5	11.2
Laborers, except farm	7.4	7.4	8.9
Farm			
Farmers and Farm Managers ..	7.1	7.6	9.0
Farm Laborers	6.8	7.4	8.3

Sources: Adapted from Paul C. Glick, "Educational Attainment and Occupational Advancement", paper submitted to the Second World Congress of Sociology, held at Liège, Aug. 24- Sept. 1, 1953 (mimeographed), Table III, p. 17; and from 1950 *Census of Population*, Special Report "Education", Table XI, p. 89.

and most of the blue collar group has become much narrower. Clearly, the general rise of the educational level in recent decades is rapidly breaking down one of the most important barriers between the middle class and large parts of the working class.

Yet other recent developments point in the same direction. For example, another significant difference has been the method of remuneration. An invidious distinction has always been made in the public mind between the comparative insecurity of the hourly pay or piece-rate wage of the manual worker as against the relative security of the weekly, monthly, or annual stipend of the salaried employee. But the successful fight of the labor unions for seniority rights, paid vacations, pensions, and a variety of health and insurance benefits has materially reduced this difference in recent years. And the first steps toward a guaranteed annual wage, now written into the 1955 contract between

the Automobile Workers Union and Ford and General Motors will eventually go far to blur the distinction altogether. For, as has been pointed out correctly, "the annual wage is but another name for the salary . . . (which) offers not merely steady income but dignity and responsibility to the job and its holder".²¹

Another time-honored invidious distinction which may well be started on the way to oblivion is the ancient notion that manual work is degrading because it is "dirty". The automatization of manufacturing processes has already greatly reduced the number of jobs where "you've got to keep your hands in oil and grease all day",²² and the much advertised "automation" of whole factories is bound to accelerate this trend further. It may be slightly visionary "to imagine a point very few decades off when almost every employee in the plants of Detroit will be an engineer of one kind or another",²³ but it is reasonable to expect that before long a majority of wage-earners will be able to satisfy their desire for a "clean" job that can be performed without getting one's hands greasy. And if, as seems by no means impossible, the "dial-watching" factory workers should one day decide to wear street clothes at work, even the last symbolic distinction between manual worker and salaried employee would have disappeared.

One need not indulge in flights of fancy, however, to see that middle class patterns of consumption are spreading rapidly among manual workers in the United States. A quick glance at a few statistics tells an eloquent story. Home ownership—this veritable symbol of middle class respectability—has increased from 41.1 percent of all non-farm homes in 1940 to 53.4 percent in 1950.²⁴ The ownership of automobiles—another major symbol of the American standard of living—has risen from 54 percent of all American families in 1948 to 65 percent in 1953.²⁵ Whereas only 44 percent of all homes in the United States had mechanical refrigerators in 1940, over 80 percent were so equipped in 1950,²⁶ and no less than 98 percent of them have at least one radio set today.²⁷ By the end of 1953 over 60 percent of all the nation's homes wired for electricity had television sets, and in cities with more than 500,000 homes 85 percent had television sets.²⁸

These are merely some of the major manifestations of the spreading middle-class style of life. There is no room here for details, but the booming sales of cameras, records, books, golf clubs, fishing, hunting, and boating equipment, and the massive increase in recreational travel all testify to the "democratization" of the style of life.²⁹ These erstwhile luxuries are made available in large quantities through mass production methods and installment buying while the demand is stimulated by the mass media of communication which are relentlessly "educating" the working class individual to adopt middle class patterns of consumption.

As this assimilation of life styles proceeds, the traditional social distinction between white collar and manual occupations, never as sharp in the United States as in Europe, is becoming increasingly

blurred. It is not surprising that recent field researches report that the overlap between the lower levels of the white collar and the upper levels of the blue collar world is pronounced and growing fast so that the line cannot usefully be distinguished any longer. Thus, a group of 12-year old boys in the Boston Metropolitan area, being interviewed about their occupational and educational aspirations, "did not make sharp distinctions between white and blue collar work . . . Prestige was based on income and style of life, not on the color of one's work collar".³⁰ In passing, it is well worth noting that these developments represent the exact opposite of the classical Marxist prediction that eventually the salaried employees would become homogeneous in all important respects with the proletariat and join their ranks politically. Precisely the reverse is happening: the "proletarian" wage-earners are becoming homogeneous with the white collar workers and are joining the middle class.

If these trends continue, and there is no reason to assume otherwise at the present time, the class structure of American society will once again become predominantly middle class in the near future. As the following projection shows, the time is close at hand when a majority of the income receiving units (families and unrelated individuals) will have crossed the boundary line which permits a middle class style of life:

Percent of family units with incomes of \$4,000 and over (cash income after taxes in 1953 dollars)	1929	1941	1947	1953	1959*
..	21.3	35.0	37.5	44.9	52.0

* Estimated.

Source: Adapted from Editors of Fortune, *The Changing American Market*, p. 268.

It seems, then, as if history were about to come full circle, or, put differently, as if the facts were once more catching up with the ideology. To be sure, the parallel should not be carried too far: the middle class of the 20th century is consumption- not production-oriented and differs profoundly in many respects from the early 19th century middle class of independent producers. But this does not lessen the significance of its expansion which has not yet received the attention it deserves.³¹ Yet students of social stratification cannot afford to overlook such fundamental changes in the class structure much longer if their research is to keep in touch with reality.

NOTES

¹ Cf. Richard Centers, "Occupational Mobility of Urban Occupational Strata," *American Sociological Review*, vol. 13 (April, 1948), pp. 197-203; Reinhard Bendix and Seymour M. Lipset, "Social Mobility and Occupational Career Patterns", *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 57 (January and March, 1952), pp. 366-374, 494-504; Natalie Rogoff, *Recent Trends in Occupational Mobility* (Glencoe, Illinois:

The Free Press, 1953); D. V. Glass, ed., *Social Mobility in Britain* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1954); Reinhard Bendix, Seymour M. Lipset, and F. Theodore Malm, "Social Origins and Occupational Career Patterns", *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, vol. 7 (January, 1954), pp. 246-261; A. J. Jaffe and R. O. Carleton, *Occupational Mobility in the United States, 1930-1960*; and *Transactions of the Second World Congress of Sociology*, vol. II: Social Stratification and Social Mobility (London: International Sociological Association, 1954).

² The argument that mobility has declined has recently been restated by W. Lloyd Warner, *American Life: Dream and Reality* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), and by J. O. Hertzler, "Some Tendencies toward a Closed Class System in the United States", *Social Forces*, vol. 30 (March, 1952), pp. 313-323, while the opposite position has been asserted by Gideon Sjoberg, "Are Social Classes in America Becoming More Rigid?", *American Sociological Review*, vol. 16 (December, 1951), pp. 775-783; William Petersen, "Is America Still the Land of Opportunity?", *Commentary*, vol. 16 (November, 1953), pp. 477-486; and Seymour Martin Lipset and Reinhard Bendix, "Ideological Equalitarianism and Social Mobility in the United States", in *Transactions of the Second World Congress of Sociology*, *op. cit.*, pp. 34-54. For a non-committal evaluation see Ely Chinoy, "Social Mobility Trends in the United States", *American Sociological Review*, vol. 20 (April, 1955), pp. 180-186.

³ Cf. Seymour Martin Lipset and Natalie Rogoff, "Class and Opportunity in Europe and the United States", *Commentary*, vol. 18 (December, 1954), pp. 562-568. Some of the assertions contained in this article have been questioned by the present writer in a letter to the Editor of *Commentary*, "Social Mobility: America versus Europe," published in the April, 1955, issue, pp. 395-396; and by Herbert Luethy, "Social Mobility Again—and Elites", *Commentary*, vol. 20 (September, 1955), pp. 270-273.

⁴ Cf. Glass, *op. cit.*, and Rogoff, *op. cit.*

⁵ Cf. Dixon Wecter, *The Sage of American Society* (New York: Scribner, 1937), p. 17.

⁶ The first federal census of 1790 enumerated 697,000 slaves, constituting 17.7 percent of the total population. This proportion declined steadily from decade to decade. In 1860, the last census taken before abolition showed 12.6 percent slaves.

⁷ Wecter, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 42-43.

⁹ Cf. Lewis Corey, *The Crisis of the Middle Class* (New York: Covici-Friede, 1935), pp. 113-114; and C. Wright Mills, *White Collar* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1951), p. 7.

¹⁰ Cf. Arthur W. Kornhauser; "Analysis of 'Class' Structure of Contemporary American Society: Psychological Bases of Class Division", in George W. Hartmann and Theodore Newcomb, eds., *Industrial Conflict* (New York: Gordon, 1939), pp. 230-250; Alfred Winslow Jones, *Life, Liberty and Property* (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1941); Richard Centers, *The Psychology of Social Classes* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949); and Herman M. Case, "An Independent Test of the Interest-Groups Theory of Social Class", *American Sociological Review*, vol. 17 (December, 1952), pp. 751-755.

¹¹ Cf. Kornhauser, *op. cit.*, and Centers, *op. cit.*, pp. 65-69. See also Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet, *The People's Choice* (New York: Duell, Pearce and Sloan, 1947); Gerhart H. Saenger, "Social Status and Political Behaviour", *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 51 (September, 1945), pp. 103-113; Angus Campbell, Gerald Gurin and Warren E. Miller, *The Voter Decides* (Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson, 1954); Alfred DeGrazia, *The Western Public: 1952 and Beyond* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1954) and Bernard R. Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and William McPhee, *Voting* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1954).

¹² Kornhauser, *op. cit.*, p. 238.

¹³ Cf. the *Fortune* Surveys of Public Opinion of February, 1940, and January, 1947.

¹⁴ For a brief analysis of the several factors involved in the co-existence of sharp class differences with the conspicuous absence of militant class consciousness see Kurt B. Mayer, *Class and Society* (Doubleday Short Studies in Sociology (New York: Doubleday, 1955), Chapter 7.

¹⁵ Cf. The Editors of *Fortune*, *The Changing American Market* (Garden City, N.Y.: Hanover House, 1955), p. 262.

¹⁶ There exists, of course, no objective definition of what constitutes a middle-income. But it has been pointed out with considerable justification that a \$4,000 boundary line is not wholly arbitrary. Average-size families who can dispose over \$4,000 cash after taxes today have some "discretionary" buying power beyond the minimum necessary to keep body and soul together. They can afford some extras and luxuries and have a fairly wide choice in their expenditures. "Indeed, the middle-income units by themselves now buy half the nation's new cars, and half its new houses, too". Cf. Editors of *Fortune*, *The Changing American Market*, *op. cit.*, pp. 53-54.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 60.

¹⁸ *Monthly Labor Review*, May, 1955.

¹⁹ Cf. *Current Population Reports*, Series P-60, no. 15 (April 27, 1954), table 5, p. 11.

²⁰ Mills, *op. cit.*, p. 297.

²¹ Nelson Foote, "The Professionalization of Labor in Detroit", *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 58 (January, 1953), p. 375.

²² Typical excerpt from interviews with automobile workers, reported by Ely Chinoy, *Automobile Workers and the American Dream* (New York: Doubleday, 1955), p. 70.

²³ Foote, *op. cit.*, p. 372.

²⁴ *Statistical Abstract of the United States*, 1954, table 951, p. 790.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, table 648, p. 565.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, table 959, p. 799.

²⁷ Editors of *Fortune*, *op. cit.*, p. 122.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 120.

²⁹ It should be pointed out that the "democratization" of the style of life extends upwards as well. To begin with, taxes have sharply reduced the ranks of top income receivers: in 1929, 1,076 income tax payers reported incomes that amount to more than \$1 million in 1953 dollars, after taxes, and 43,500 returns reported between \$100,000 and \$1 million. *Fortune* estimates that in 1953 only 70 taxpayers reported over \$1 million after taxes, and only 7,000 between \$100,000 and \$1 million (*op. cit.*, p. 221). This has greatly reduced the exhibitionistic spending, the number of million dollar yachts and large country estates is diminishing rapidly. Moreover, even the people in the \$25,000-100,000 after-tax brackets have fewer servants (the number of domestic servants declined from 2.3 million in 1940 to 1.5 million in 1950), and they buy fewer custom-made clothes, shoes, etc. To be sure, they buy more luxuries than people in lower income brackets, but they increasingly buy the same type of goods. They, too, are conforming more and more with middle class consumption patterns.

³⁰ Cf. Joseph A. Kahl, "Educational and Occupational Aspirations of 'Common Man' Boys", *Harvard Educational Review*, vol. 23 (Summer, 1953), p. 191.

³¹ One notable exception are the recent articles by William F. Ogburn, "Technology and the Standard of Living in the United States", and "Implications of the Rising Standard of Living", which have appeared in the *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 60 (January, 1955 and May, 1955), pp. 380-386, 541-546.

Transformation des couches sociales en Suisse depuis un siècle environ

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Nous voudrions examiner ici quelques aspects de l'évolution des couches sociales en Suisse depuis un siècle environ, en plaçant ces transformations dans une perspective qui permette de les interpréter à titre de cas particuliers des changements intéressant les phénomènes de stratification sociale en général.¹

1. TENDANCES GÉNÉRALES

Nous ne traitons pas ici de l'évolution de la société suisse considérée dans son ensemble. Néanmoins, les modifications qui affectent les couches sociales sont profondément influencées par un certain nombre de facteurs démographiques, culturels et économiques que nous voudrions brièvement évoquer dans leurs grandes lignes en commençant.

En Suisse, au cours des 100 dernières années, la population a passé de 2, 3 à 5 millions à peu près et le nombre des emplois a presque doublé. De 1860 à 1950, plus exactement, la population active a passé de 1, 2 à 2·1 millions. L'accroissement (920,000 emplois) est de 75% par rapport aux effectifs occupés en 1860. En moyenne 10,000 emplois supplémentaires ont ainsi pu être occupés chaque année.

D'autre part, des changements d'ordre techno-économiques se produisent dans la structure de cette population active en expansion. Ils sont reflétés à certains égards par le tableau I.

Tableau I. *Population dépendant des secteurs économiques primaire, secondaire et tertiaire, en Suisse de 1860 à 1950**

En % de la population totale.

		Primaire	Secondaire	Tertiaire	Divers	Popul. Totale
1860	..	49%	34%	13%	4%	2·51 millions =100%
1910	..	27%	42%	24%	7%	3·75 millions =100%
1950†	..	18%	44%	29·5%	8·5%	4·71 millions =100%

* Chaque catégorie comprend toutes les personnes employées à n'importe quel titre (patron, ouvrier, employé, etc.) dans des entreprises d'un des secteurs ci-dessous, plus les membres non-actifs de leur famille. Primaire: agriculture, forêt. Il n'y a pratiquement pas de mines en Suisse. Secondaire: industrie et artisanat. Tertiaire: transports, commerce et autres services. Divers: rentiers et inclassables.

† Par rapport à la population active, en 1950: Primaire, 17%, secondaire, 46%, tertiaire, 36%, non classés 1%.

Les changements dans la structure des couches sociales et les passages individuels d'une couche à l'autre (§2 et 3) sont avant tout des implications des phénomènes rappelés ci-dessus, c'est à dire de la production d'une quantité sans cesse plus grande de fonctions dans le secondaire et le tertiaire et de l'élimination d'emplois primaires (500,000 environ en 1860, 360,000 en 1950).²

Le rendement de l'économie, d'autre part, augmente. Voici un signe de cette évolution: en 1868, il fallait à un manoeuvre à Genève 415 heures de travail pour gagner de quoi se procurer un certain ensemble de choses, caractéristiques du niveau de vie populaire de l'époque. En 1910, il aurait pu se procurer le même "lot" en travaillant 331 heures; en 1952, en travaillant 155 heures.³

Par ailleurs, les horaires de travail sont moins longs, la durée moyenne de la scolarité a augmenté, l'hygiène est meilleure, etc. . . . Ces tendances expriment un accroissement général des ressources matérielles et non matérielles dont dispose la collectivité. Elles conditionnent évidemment pour une bonne part les changements enregistrés dans les conditions sociales (§4 et suivants).

2. COUCHES SOCIALES

La statistique des "situations professionnelles" reflète assez directement l'état des pratiques par lesquelles nos sociétés discernent certaines grandes catégories de "conditions sociales"⁴: condition de manoeuvre, d'ouvrier qualifié, d'employé, de directeur, d'agriculteur, de commerçant, etc. . . . L'histoire de ces classifications révèle qu'elles correspondent d'abord à une projection sur la société entière des catégories propres à l'univers de l'entreprise typique de la fin du XIXe siècle: le chef d'entreprise, ses hommes de confiance, la main d'œuvre de l'atelier. Nous ne pouvons développer ici ce point. Nous nous conformerons simplement à l'usage et nous appellerons "couche sociale" l'ensemble statistique, la strate, formé par la somme des

Tableau II. *Principales couches sociales en Suisse, 1860-1950*

	<i>En % de la population active</i>		
	1860	1900	1950
<i>Salariés (total)</i>	60·5	73	81
ouvriers	—	60·5	53
employés	—	8·5	22
non classés	—	4	6
<i>Non salariés (total)</i>	38	27	19
agriculteurs	16·5	14	8
Industriels, commerçants, prof. lib., etc.	21·5	13	11
<i>Divers</i>	1·5	—	—
Total (de la population exerçant une profession)	1,236,000 (=100%)	1,555,000 (=100%)	2,156,000 (=100%)

titulaires d'une même " situation professionnelle " et des membres de leur famille sans occupation lucrative, dans les limites d'une collectivité donnée. Voici comment ont évolué en Suisse les catégories que l'on peut constituer de cette manière à partir des données des recensements.

Le tableau III indique, pour 1950, le volume des couches sociales que l'on peut obtenir à partir de différents critères. Il suggère de considérer avec les nuances qui conviennent les données présentées dans les autres tableaux. A chaque critère, en effet, correspond un groupement d'une portée différente.

Tableau III.

Salariés I (C, D, E)	52%	Couches moyennes I (A, H)	19%
Salariés II (B, C, D, E)	56%	Couches moyennes II (A, H, I et J)	25%
Salariés III (B, C, D, E, F)	71.5%	Couches moyennes III (A, H, I, J, G)	28.5%
Salariés IV (B, C, D, E, F, G)	75%	Couches moyennes IV (A, H, I, J, G, F)	44%
Salariés V (B, C, D, E, F, G, I, J)	81%	Couches moyennes V (G, H et J)	16%

CLÉ

A=Agriculteurs exploitants
B=Ouvriers de campagne.
C=Manceuvres (non agricoles).
D=Ouvriers semi-qualifiés (non agricoles)

E=ouvriers qualifiés (non agricoles)

F=Employés.

G=Directeurs.

H=Indépendants (du commerce, de l'industrie, artisanat, prof. libérales. Agriculteurs exclus).

I="membres coactifs" de la famille d'un agriculteur exploitant (personnes travaillant pour le compte d'un agriculteur auquel elles sont apparentées de manière directe; qui est leur père, par ex. ou leur frère, etc.).

J="Membres coactifs" de la famille d'un "indépendant" (même principe).

Cette clé est utilisée également pour tous les autres tableaux.

La couche des Salariés V, par exemple, ou totalité des salariés au sens juridique du terme, englobe des situations allant de celle du fils d'un agriculteur ou d'un commerçant travaillant chez son père à celle de directeur de banque et de journalier agricole. En revanche, les Salariés I groupent le prolétariat ouvrier au sens le plus précis et constituent une catégorie pour laquelle les conditions de vie, les conditions de la pensée et de l'action, en particulier politique, sont beaucoup plus homogènes. Mêmes remarques en ce qui concerne les couches moyennes. Les couches moyennes III représentaient en gros le 40% de la population il y a un siècle. Sur ce point, la situation a moins changé qu'on ne le croit. D'autant plus qu'à bien des égards beaucoup

d'employés sont dans des situations de fait de type "bourgeois" et peuvent sociologiquement être ajoutés, au moins dans les circonstances actuelles, à ces couches moyennes III.

Les tableaux IV et V combinent évolution des couches sociales et évolution des secteurs économiques.

Le primaire diminue globalement, mais en conservant sensiblement sa structure interne, en dépit de la mécanisation, des conditions nouvelles de vente, d'approvisionnement, etc. . . . Dans le secondaire, la concentration des entreprises est le fait dominant, accompagné d'une extension des bureaux et d'une faible diminution de la proportion des ouvriers. Dans le tertiaire, ce sont ces deux dernières tendances, beaucoup plus fortes, qui dominent. L'évolution générale du volume

Tableau IV. *Composition sociale des secteurs primaire, secondaire et tertiaire, en Suisse, 1900-1950*

En % de la population active.

	<i>Primaire</i>		<i>Secondaire</i>		<i>Tertiaire</i>	
	1900	1950	1900	1950	1900	1950
Salariés II ..	26.5	24	72.5	70.5	55.25	42.5
Employés (F et G)	0.5	1	6	16	25.25	40.5
Couches moyennes II ..	73	75	21.5	13.5	19.5	17
Total des personnes travaillant dans chaque secteur..	486,131 (=100%)	361,714 (=100%)	649,463 (=100%)	998,141 (=100%)	366,786 (=100%)	772,786 (=100%)

Tableau V. *Répartition des membres des principales couches sociales entre les secteurs primaire, secondaire et tertiaire, en Suisse, en 1900 et en 1950*

En % de la population active.

	<i>Salariés II</i>		<i>Employés (F et G)</i>		<i>Couches moyennes II</i>	
	1900	1950	1900	1950	1900	1950
Primaire	15	7.5	1	1	58.5	50
Secondaire ..	55	62	30	33	26.75	25
Tertiaire	24	29	69	65	14.75	25
Non classés ..	6	1.5	—	1	—	—
Ensemble des personnes actives de la couche sociales en question ..	856,365 (=100%)	1,134,741 (=100%)	134,224 (=100%)	481,307 (=100%)	608,271 (=100%)	540,007 (=100%)

Tableau VI. *Origine sociale des membres de quelques couches sociales interrogés en 1954*
(hommes seulement)

Situation du grand-père* paternel et du père†	Situation de la personne interrogée.						Couches moyennes V
	Cultivateur exploitant 1	2	Ouvrier (Salaire I) 3	4	Employé (F) 5	6	
Cultivateur expl. ..	90	89	38	21	34	13	27
Ouvriers (Salaire I) ..	2	3	19	48	11	17	11
Employés (F) ..	1	1	7	12	11	38	10
Couches moyennes V ..	5	7	21	16	39	32	48
Autre ..	2	—	15	3	5	—	4
Cas ..	186	186	269	269	325	325	352
	(=100%)	(=100%)	(=100%)	(=100%)	(=100%)	(=100%)	(=100%)

* Situation du grand-père, colonnes 1, 3, 5, 7.

† Situation du père, colonnes 2, 4, 6, 8.

des couches sociales, en bref, est la résultante d'un ensemble de tendances économiques et technologiques qui se manifestent de manière fort diverse suivant les branches.

3. PASSAGES INDIVIDUELS D'UNE COUCHE SOCIALE A L'AUTRE

Ces passages ont lieu sous l'influence des tendances dont il vient d'être question en ce qui concerne les changements qui se produisent dans la structure du système économique. Mais ces tendances générales rencontrent d'autres dynamismes traduisant les possibilités d'éducation qui s'offrent aux membres de chaque couche sociale, les valeurs qui s'attachent aux situations, la nature des relations entre les différentes sections de la société, l'écart existant entre leur niveau de vie, leur type de culture, etc. . . . Les tableaux VI et VII montrent comment s'est opérée dans ces conditions, le recrutement social des différentes couches de la société suisse d'aujourd'hui.⁵

Tableau VII. *Passage d'une situation salariée a une situation non salariée et passage inverse, d'une génération à l'autre (hommes seulement)*

		<i>Situation de la personne interrogée.</i>			
<i>Situation du père* et du gd. père paternel †</i>		<i>Non salarié‡</i>		<i>Salarié§</i>	
		1	2	3	4
Non salarié‡	82	78	66	39
Salarié§	15	22	26	61
Autre	3	0	8	0
Cas	474 (=100%)	474 (=100%)	666 (=100%)	666 (=100%)

* Colonnes 2 et 4.

† Colonnes 1 et 3.

‡ Agriculteurs, artisans, commerçants, industriels, prof. lib. et intel.

§ Ouvriers, employées, directeurs.

Ces phénomènes ne s'accompagnent pas d'une très forte mobilité géographique: 66% des personnes interrogées sont nées dans le même canton que leur grand-père et la plupart y vivent encore. Cela évidemment n'empêche pas les changements de cadre à l'intérieur du même canton, et notamment, les passages de la ville à la campagne.

4. CHANGEMENTS DANS LES CONDITIONS SOCIALES: PERSPECTIVE GENERALE

Etre ouvrier en 1850 signifiait une chose, être ouvrier aujourd'hui signifie évidemment autre chose, au moins à beaucoup d'égards. De même pour les autres conditions sociales. Ceci revient à dire que les observations que l'on peut faire sur l'évolution du volume des couches sociales et sur les passages d'une couche à l'autre ne cessent d'être superficielles que dans la mesure où l'on peut analyser parallèlement les changements qui se produisent dans les éléments, innombrables,

difficiles à saisir—situation du point de vue de la propriété des moyens de production, fonctions professionnelles, niveau de vie positions politiques, éducation, manières de se comporter, attitudes et idéologie, etc. . . . —qui composent les phénomènes auxquels correspond le concept de condition sociale.

Certains de ces éléments évoluent moins que d'autres. Dans un pays comme la Suisse les rapports de propriété, en particulier, n'ont pas fondamentalement changé au cours de la période qui nous intéresse ici. Sous cet angle, les conditions sociales n'ont donc pas évolué radicalement. Il y aurait cependant d'importantes données à retirer d'une analyse sociologique des changements secondaires qui sont survenus dans les droits réels liés au salaire et au profit. L'ouvrier du siècle dernier vendait au jour le jour, le plus souvent, sa capacité de travail. Aujourd'hui, il contracte des engagements généralement plus durables et plus complexes, impliquant de la part de l'employeur et de la société la reconnaissance d'un grand nombre d'obligations inconnues naguère.

D'autre part, du côté des gens qui vivent de profits, d'honoraires, etc., on voit augmenter la proportion de ceux qui dépendent en fait, moins d'une clientèle, que de grandes organisations concentrées : gestion de l'agence locale d'une grande marque, spécialisation de certains juristes dans la défense des intérêts de deux ou trois compagnies, liens entre le paysan et des super-entreprises agricoles, ou des coopératives, etc. . . . Nous avons fait quelques observations limitées sur certains autres aspects des changements survenus dans des éléments de la condition sociale. Comme les faits de mobilité sociale déjà évoqués et comme tous les éléments de la condition sociale d'ailleurs, les phénomènes dont il va être question peuvent être considérés sous deux angles principaux : du point de vue de l'organisation des diverses activités⁶ collectives dont se compose la vie sociale ; du point de vue de la position qui tend à être dévolue d'habitude aux membres des différentes couches sociales en tant qu'individus dans le cadre de cette organisation, compte tenu des effets qui s'ensuivent en ce qui concerne leur état physique, leur revenu, leur perspective intellectuelle sur le monde, notamment sur les problèmes politiques et sociaux, et leurs autres attitudes, etc. . . . Organisation de la vie collective—arrangement des activités sociales au niveau de la société globale, au niveau des collectivités locales, des groupes de travail, de la famille, sur le plan de la production et des échanges, de l'exercice du pouvoir politique et ainsi de suite—et positions sociales sont évidemment liées. A tel processus d'activité correspondent telles positions. Simplement, la recherche peut mettre l'accent plutôt sur l'évolution des structures d'une activité sociale donnée ou plutôt sur l'évolution du genre de position qu'occupent par rapport à cette structure les membres d'une certaine couche sociale, à supposer qu'il y ait une corrélation à cet égard. Notons encore que dans chaque cas la position d'une catégorie d'individus par rapport à un processus collectif d'activité peut être

considérée elle aussi sous deux angles : du point de vue du rôle éventuel de ces individus dans la réalisation de ce processus ; du point de vue de l'action que ce processus peut avoir sur eux, Dans le premier cas, on regarde s'ils sont agents de ce processus, s'ils y *participent* comme *sujets*, s'ils y ont une fonction active ; dans le second, s'ils sont *exposés* à ses effets s'ils en sont de quelque manière les *objets*.⁷

5. DIFFERENCES DE REVENU ENTRE LES COUCHES SOCIALES

Etudier ces différences et leurs variations historiques, c'est en bref étudier la position qu'occupent en général, d'une époque à l'autre, les membres des différentes couches sociales comme objets par rapport aux processus par lesquels la collectivité répartit l'argent.

Tableau VIII. *Salaires annuels* dans différentes couches sociales à Genève, 1868-1952*

	1868	1910	1952
Couches moyennes V† ..	650 et plus	500 et plus	300 et plus
Employés (F) (messager-comptable ou équivalent)	160-321	148-313	111-178
Salariés I (manœuvre-menuisier ou équivalent).	100-200	100-164	100-141
<i>Base</i> (salaire annuel du man- œuvre du bâtiment). ..	750 frs. (=100)	1,150 frs. (=100)	6,240 frs. (=100)
Pouvoir d'achat du salaire annuel du manœuvre du bâtiment‡	7	8	15

* Compte tenu du nombre d'heures effectuées par an pour les ouvriers payés à l'heure.

† Le salaire annuel des hauts fonctionnaires municipaux est pris ici comme critère provisoire, en partant du principe que la coutume est d'assurer à ces fonctionnaires un salaire qui leur permet de vivre à peu près comme on vit dans les couches moyennes, dont ils sont issus pour la plupart et au sein desquelles ils demeurent.

‡ Par rapport au lot type mentionné au paragraphe 1. Nombre de lots que le manœuvre du bâtiment peut acheter avec son salaire annuel.

La différence entre le haut et la base de l'échelle des revenus considérés a diminué de moitié de 1868 à 1952. Par ailleurs, l'écart séparant le messager et les autres auxiliaires des employés tels que les comptables a également diminué. Idem en ce qui concerne les manœuvres et les qualifiés. Si l'on compare l'employé moyen (2ème commis ou équivalent, 190 en 1868 et en 1910 ; 134 en 1952) et l'ouvrier bien qualifié (menuisier ou équivalent) on s'aperçoit que le travail manuel qualifié procurait un revenu égal^{1/2} ou supérieur au travail ordinaire de bureau au milieu du siècle dernier, un revenu inférieur vers 1900 et un revenu de nouveau à peu près équivalent ou supérieur vers 1950.

L'évolution des niveaux de vie, dont l'évolution des revenus n'est qu'un des signes, et celle des différences séparant les couches sociales à cet égard conditionnent de multiples modifications dans les expériences quotidiennes des individus (culture, loisirs, relations sociales, etc. . . .) c'est à dire dans nombre des activités auxquelles ils participent ou s'exposent et dans les attitudes qu'ils forment en ces circonstances.

6. CHANGEMENTS DANS L'ORGANISATION DU TRAVAIL

Ces changements font en somme que les membres des différentes couches sociales sont exposés de par leur métier à l'influence de conditionnements qui évoluent d'une époque à l'autre. En effet les activités auxquelles ils participent comme sujets et celles auxquelles ils sont exposés comme objets dans le cadre de leur travail se transforment, en fonction de l'évolution de l'organisation technique des processus de travail et des systèmes de rapports sociaux ou de "relations humaines" qui leur correspondent, et cela contribue évidemment à modifier les points de vue des intéressés, leur idéologie, leurs modèles de comportement, leurs intérêts et leur statut social, le bagage intellectuel résultant du mode de formation professionnelle—au sens le plus large—qui est le leur, etc. . . . L'analyse du changement des "perspectives de carrière"—possibilité de promotion et d'augmentation de gain, pouvoirs ouvrant ou fermant les portes à ce sujet, valeurs attachées à l'avancement individuel, etc. . . . —et celle du changement dans le "contenu des tâches" fournissent d'intéressantes données sur certains aspects de l'évolution de l'organisation du travail au sens qui vient d'être indiqué.

La "perspective de carrière" des travailleurs "manuels" comportait vers le milieu du siècle dernier des modalités multiples, situées en somme entre deux extrêmes: la situation du journalier inorganisé, louant ses bras à la journée, la situation de l'ouvrier très qualifié (horloger, charpentier, etc.) vendant en quelque sorte ses produits à divers entrepreneurs. Nombre d'ouvriers de ces deux catégories se considéraient alors, pour des raisons bien différentes, comme des indépendants et leur perspective de carrière était celle de travailleurs isolés, dépossédés de toute possibilité réelle d'amélioration dans le cas des uns, en mesure de conclure éventuellement des marchés meilleurs dans le cas des autres. Entre-deux se situaient les différentes catégories de travailleurs "manuels" formant la main d'œuvre d'industries bien déterminées, traités de manière assez uniforme par leurs employeurs. Les perspectives de carrière des ouvriers de ce dernier type sont celles qui sont propres aujourd'hui à la grande majorité des ouvriers: traitement uniforme pour de larges catégories de travailleurs, améliorations déterminées par des actions collectives, possibilités d'avancement individuel très limitées. Cependant, le "boom" économique de ces dernières années tend à susciter dans divers secteurs une certaine concurrence individuelle: pour pouvoir exécuter ses contrats l'employeur est parfois amené à accorder des avantages particuliers à des ouvriers

qu'il ne pourrait pas facilement remplacer ; d'autre part, il arrive que des ouvriers constituent des équipes qui organisent elles-mêmes leur travail en s'engageant simplement à réaliser dans un temps donné une certaine tâche, et qui peuvent améliorer leurs gains en accélérant, en intensifiant leur effort, en acceptant des tâches pour plusieurs entrepreneurs à la fois, etc. . . .⁸

Pour les " cols blancs ", on peut distinguer très schématiquement, trois phases successives dans l'organisation des bureaux et dans les perspectives de carrière correspondantes : phase familiale (pendant laquelle le patron, secondé par des membres de sa famille et, éventuellement, quelques commis plus ou moins polyvalents, très proches de lui par l'éducation et le genre de vie, assure le fonctionnement du bureau de l'entreprise), phase familière (pendant laquelle le nombre des commis augmente, pendant laquelle aussi, la division du travail au sein du bureau s'affirme, mais sans que les employés cessent d'être sociologiquement des " proches " du patron, des membres de son entourage social et culturel immédiat), phase administrative (que marque le développement de la division des tâches et l'atténuation ou la disparition des rapports sociaux exprimant une sorte d'identification entre le patron et les employés de bureau).

Dans les entreprises commerciales ou industrielles moyennes, à en juger d'après certaines de nos constatations, le bureau correspond assez bien au premier de ces types jusque vers 1900, il évolue vers le second aux alentours de 1914-1925, puis vers le troisième autour des années 1930-50.

Les perspectives de carrière sont évidemment très différentes d'une phase à l'autre : l'estime personnelle du patron est capitale dans les deux premières ; l'action collective, syndicale, de plus en plus importante à mesure que se généralise la dernière. Toutefois, pour l'employé, en tout cas pour l'employé moyen et supérieur, la perspective de carrière demeure dominée par les problèmes de l'avancement personnel. La gamme des fonctions et des traitements est beaucoup plus grande que du côté des travailleurs " manuels ". De plus, pour les employés, les normes que peuvent faire varier les campagnes syndicales fixent seulement, sauf exception, des taux minimums de rétribution. Les traitements réels, dans des cas normaux, se situent au-dessus. Ils demeurent en général secrets et souvent, de ce fait, au sein du bureau des entreprises, une réelle concurrence s'affirme entre collègues, de manière plus ou moins voilée. Il s'agit de se perfectionner (apprendre une langue, une technique comptable nouvelle, etc.) mais aussi, parfois, de mettre en évidence des aptitudes quelque peu machiavéliques pour se faire valoir aux yeux des arbitres de ces rivalités. Au total, perspectives ambiguës pour beaucoup d'employés.

Les tendances qui viennent d'être signalées sont liées au développement des techniques de travail et s'accompagnent donc de changements dans le contenu des tâches. Du côté des " manuels ", la machine fait en particulier diminuer la proportion des travailleurs de force. Le

manœuvre moderne est bien souvent très proche du semi-qualifié : un ouvrier qui sert une machine. Il ne termine pas ses journées aussi épuisé que l'homme à la pelle et à la pioche d'hier ; son emploi a des chances d'être plus stable, parce que, notamment, la machine au fonctionnement de laquelle il participe doit travailler régulièrement pour être amortie. Or ces machines, bien souvent—pelles mécaniques, etc.—sont conduites par des équipes dont les membres sont habitués à travailler ensemble, ont organisé fonctionnellement leur tâche, réparti entre eux certains rôles techniques. On ne peut pas reconstituer du jour au lendemain une telle équipe. Pour que la machine fonctionne bien et régulièrement, il faut donc autant que possible que l'équipe dure.

Du côté des travaux d'employés, les effets de l'évolution des techniques sont peut-être plus prononcés encore. Dans les bureaux genevois d'une grande banque suisse, que nous avons étudiée, on a passé de 1910 environ à aujourd'hui de l'ère des gros registres où tout était inscrit à la plume à celle des fiches perforées. A la veille de la guerre de 1914, il n'y avait pas une machine (machines à écrire comprises) pour 10 personnes dans ces bureaux ; aujourd'hui, au contraire, l'effectif des machines est supérieur à celui du personnel. Mais, le rôle le plus important dans la mécanisation des travaux de bureau est joué par des mécanismes à peu près entièrement immatériels, des systèmes codifiés d'opérations. Les écritures sont, par exemple, reproduites en multiples exemplaires sur fiches perforées. Les machines à trier ces cartes se trouvent en un seul point du pays où sont centralisées toutes les opérations importantes pour lesquelles on les utilise. Le bilan de l'ensemble des sièges régionaux est calculé chaque jour de cette manière. On se trouve en présence d'un vaste servo-mécanisme dont les éléments, répartis dans l'espace, sont liés par un réseau de connexions largement automatisées (code rigoureux des opérations, fonctionnement des machines proprement dites). Le rythme des unités les plus dynamiques tend à se communiquer à l'ensemble, par une sorte de nécessité fonctionnelle. Cependant, si la forme et la cadence des opérations insérées dans de tels systèmes sont déterminées par des dynamismes qui débordent de loin les possibilités de contrôle de chaque employé, le contenu qu'il convient de leur donner d'un cas à un autre dépend pour beaucoup d'un diagnostic difficile à établir, qui demande des échanges de vue souvent complexes, avec des collègues ou avec des clients. Pour effectuer ces tâches, des connaissances techniques spécialisées sont requises, alliées à une forte culture générale et, souvent à la maîtrise de plusieurs langues. Ainsi, dans la banque prise ici à titre d'exemple, la proportion des auxiliaires et des simples copistes a diminué au cours des 40-50 dernières années, remplacés qu'ils sont pas des machines, au profit des spécialistes à formation universitaire ou para-universitaire. Rationalisation et synchronisation des tâches vont ici de pair avec un accroissement des connaissances qu'elles réclament.

7. CHANGEMENTS DANS LES ATTITUDES EN FACE DES PROBLÈMES SOCIAUX

Les changements dont il a été question aux paragraphes précédents ne sont que des aspects particuliers de l'évolution générale du milieu social, de ce qui se passe, a lieu dans la société. C'est à dire : d'une part, des conditions dans lesquelles les individus et les groupes forment leurs attitudes (l'organisation de leur système de perception et de valeurs, de leurs schèmes d'action, etc.) et, d'autre part, des situations (problèmes objectifs, stratégie socio-politique, etc.) auxquelles, ainsi équipés de par leur expérience passée, ils se trouvent affrontés.

C'est dans cette perspective que les faits suivants⁹ prennent, nous semble-t-il, leur sens. Ils reflètent plus ou moins directement trois genres de changement en effet : dans les questions objectives qui se posent aux syndicats ; dans l'attitude du public—syndical et non-syndical—avec lequel les journaux analysés dialoguent¹⁰ ; dans l'idéologie des dirigeants syndicaux.

L'analyse qualitative (analyse de ce qui est exprimé à propos des principaux centres d'intérêt) montre :

(a) au début du siècle, les associations d'employés envisagent la solution des problèmes par la collaboration avec le patronat ; leur attitude envers les syndicats ouvriers est méfiante.

(b) Après 1914-1918, elles ne s'identifient plus aussi étroitement avec le patronat et cherchent une "troisième solution" (où les employés formeraient un pont entre patrons et ouvriers, ou encore seraient l'élément de base d'une société où le salariat serait dépassé.)

(c) à partir de la crise de 1930, puis de plus en plus après 1945, les associations d'employés abandonnent leurs propres plans de réorganisation sociale pour adopter un programme qui est parallèle à celui des syndicats ouvriers, quoique exprimé dans des formes quelque peu différentes.

(d) Il faut noter que cette convergence s'explique pour une large part par l'évolution des syndicats ouvriers eux-mêmes qui suivent aujourd'hui dans leur ensemble une politique beaucoup plus "réformiste" que par le passé.¹¹

8. HYPOTHÈSES EXPLICATIVES

Les propositions suivantes, s'ajoutant aux remarques du paragraphe 4, nous paraissent susceptibles de faciliter l'interprétation explicative des phénomènes du genre de ceux qui ont été examinés ici et la formulation d'hypothèses à vérifier par des observations concrètes.

(1) Chaque couche sociale est une collection statistique d'individus chez lesquels on constate d'habitude la présence d'un certain ensemble de traits : pouvoir d'achat, fonctions, participation plus ou moins poussée à l'action des groupes réels¹² comme ceux que forment les classes en train d'agir comme telles, etc. . . . Ces traits sont présents de manière plus ou moins complète et intense chez chaque individu.

Tableau IX. *Evolution des centres d'intérêt de deux journaux syndicaux, l'un (E) publié par une association d'employés, l'autre (O) par un syndicat ouvrier (bâtiment) de 1933 à 1953, à Genève.**

+	1933		1936		1938		1939		1940		1943		1948		1951		1952		1953	
	E	O	E	O	E	O	E	O	E	O	E	O	E	O	E	O	E	O	E	O
A	46	5	45	5	48	6	46	7	44	4	37	6	45	7	49	6	30	5	31	..
B	41	49	30	52	30	45	31	39	35	32	24	34	24	29	21	38	24	34	21	..
C	—	15	—	14	—	13	—	14	—	20	—	10	0·5	19	—	12	0·5	21	2	..
D	4	25	23	26	17	31	18	32	13	40	7	45	19	38	20	32	37	33	41	..
E	7·5	5	—	2	3	2	2	5	7	2	3	1·5	3	5	3	10	4	4	1	..
F	1·5	1	2	1	2	3	3	3	1	1	29	3·5	8·5	2	7	2	5·5	3	4	..

* Les chiffres expriment en % par rapport au lignage total la place accordée à chaque thème :

A: "Partie morte": titre, annonces publicitaires.

B: Vie intérieure de l'association: convocations, comptes-rendus de séance, budgets, etc.

C: Le milieu ouvrier et ses problèmes syndicaux: la politique du syndicat du bâtiment et des autres syndicats ouvriers au plan local, fédéral et international. Idem pour les employés.

D: Le reste de la société: organisation sociale générale, politique, idéologie, etc.

E: Variétés, divers.

F: Formation professionnelle: horaire des cours professionnels, articles techniques, etc.

Ils constituent les caractéristiques de la "condition sociale", telle que la distingue la pratique quotidienne.

(2) Chacun de ces traits peut être considéré en tant qu'attribut personnel de l'individu, ou dans ses rapports avec certains processus d'activités collectives.

(3) Le degré de probabilité de sa présence chez les individus dépend du mode d'organisation des processus en cause: là où s'exercent des actions très fortement structurées (répartition de l'argent p. ex), cette probabilité est extrêmement élevée (les chances de trouver des ouvriers dont le niveau de vie s'écarte beaucoup de la moyenne propre à leur couche sociale sont minimes), au contraire là où s'entrecroisent de manière aléatoire des processus moins structurés, cette probabilité est plus faible (multiples influences conditionnant les attitudes idéologiques, par exemple).

(4) Les individus d'une couche sociale donnée sont mêlés, du fait de la dynamique sociale, plutôt, à certains de ces processus qu'à d'autres, d'où le conditionnement typique de leur façon d'être. Cela dépend surtout de la fonction juridico-professionnelle (rapports de propriété, rôle technique) qui leur revient dans les processus de production et d'échanges économiques. Chaque couche sociale en effet s'est constituée autour d'un élément principal formé de personnes exerçant des fonctions assez bien localisées dans ces processus: travail effectué à l'atelier ou sur le chantier; travail effectué dans les bureaux, etc. . . . Le volume de chaque couche sociale varie donc principalement en liaison avec le nombre d'emplois d'un type donné qu'offre le système économique à ses différents stades de développement.

Cependant, à ce noyau sont agrégés d'autres éléments qui ont des fonctions assez différentes mais une condition sociale par ailleurs semblable (ex: cheminots englobés dans les couches ouvrières, employés supérieurs dans les couches moyennes, etc.)

NOTES

¹ Note bibliographique: l'indication "E.D." renvoie aux "Etudes et documents" du Centre de Recherches sociologiques de Genève, il s'agit de cahiers où sont exposés en détail les résultats de certaines recherches de ce Centre, ainsi que les méthodes employées.

² Roger Girod, *Secteurs économiques et couches sociales en Suisse*. Annuaire de la Société helvétique, Berne, 1956; idem, plus détaillé, *L'évolution des effectifs des couches sociales et des secteurs économiques en Suisse, 1860-1950*, E.D.

³ Joseph Starobinski, *Prix, salaires et stratification des revenus, à Genève, de la seconde moitié du XIXe siècle au milieu du XXe*, E.D. Le "lot" qui sert de moyen de comparaison comprend le logement et une liste déterminée d'aliments fondamentaux, d'objets et de services courants.

⁴ Voir § 4.

⁵ Extraits des résultats déjà utilisables d'une étude de mobilité sociale du Centre de recherches sociologiques de Genève, réalisée grâce à l'aide du Groupement romand pour l'étude du marché à Lausanne et qui va être encore complétée. Sondage à l'échelle nationale sur des hommes de 20 à 60 ans environ. Ces données ne concernent que les changements d'une génération à l'autre et laissent donc de côté les cas dans lesquels un individu passe d'une couche à l'autre en cours de carrière.

⁶ Activités reconnues (production économique, gouvernement, etc.) ou non (actions par lesquelles les idées typiques de telle catégorie d'agriculteurs ou d'employés leur sont communiquées, traitement différentiel de facto des individus, aboutissant à des différences de taille, de morbidité, d'espérance moyenne de vie, suivant les couches sociales, etc.).

⁷ Ces 2 aspects de la position des individus par rapport à un processus d'action collective ne sont évidemment pas incompatibles. Dans une action consistant à discuter un problème, chaque individu est à la fois émetteur et récepteur d'idées; dans les processus de travail, il est sujet en tant qu'il effectue sa tâche et objet en tant que la répétition de cette tâche, les relations sociales qui y sont associées, etc., exercent sur lui leur influence.

⁸ Exemple: Plâtriers-Peintres.

⁹ Extraits d'une analyse de contenu comparée de journaux syndicaux d'ouvriers et d'employés à Genève, de 1900 environ à aujourd'hui et, plus spécialement, de 1933 à 1953. *Attitudes de la presse syndicale des ouvriers du bâtiment et de celle des employés en face des problèmes sociaux au cours de la première moitié du 20ème siècle, à Genève*, par Dan Gallin. E.D.

¹⁰ La presse n'est pas monologue, mais dialogue. Implicitement ou non, le rédacteur d'un article tient compte des positions du public, même et surtout s'il veut les changer. Le contenu d'un journal est donc comme le vestige d'une moitié de cet échange, l'autre n'ayant pas laissé de trace immédiatement apparente. Il s'agit de se faire une idée de cette partie du dialogue d'après celle qui subsiste pour utiliser l'analyse de contenu comme instrument d'étude du changement des attitudes du public et pas seulement de celles des rédacteurs.

¹¹ Notons à toutes fins utiles que, sur le plan national, vers 1900, le taux de syndicalisation (% des syndiqués par rapport aux effectifs totaux de la population active de chaque couche sociale) était voisin de 5% tant chez les employés que chez les ouvriers, tandis qu'il était de l'ordre de 30%-35%, pour les uns et les autres également, en 1950.

¹² Dont les membres sont liés dans l'action comme sujets; par opposition aux collections statistiques d'individus présentant simplement des ressemblances.

Changes in the Social Stratification of the South

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INTRODUCTION

The changes which have occurred in the social stratification in the Southern United States since colonial times are partly changes in the relative size, power, and prestige of the various social strata, partly qualitative changes in the system of stratification.¹ A change of the second kind was induced by the abolition of slavery and there are indications that another qualitative change is impending.

In this paper we shall attempt to trace and to interpret the major changes during the past century and particularly those which have occurred in more recent decades. In view of space limitations the discussion will focus upon the most important and in some instances upon the more controversial aspects of this development.

I. Southerners are inclined to view the social life of the old South as something unique ; they are, as a rule, quite unaware of the fact that there were during the 18th Century other regions in the Western world where a very similar kind of agricultural and commercial society existed. Seen in world wide perspective the Southern United States were one of the frontier regions of modern capitalistic society.

Rüstow has pointed out that the plantations in the new world came into existence at the same time when agriculture in eastern Europe (including most of eastern Germany) began to assume capitalistic aspects and the landowning nobility turned to large scale market-oriented production of staple crops. It is indeed significant that Southern agriculture has been from the very beginning a market-oriented, capitalistic kind of economy. In contrast to some other parts of the U.S.A., Southern society has been almost from its beginning, definitely and conspicuously stratified.

The once widely accepted image of the ante-bellum South as a society of slave owning planters with only a small number of "poor whites" in the backwoods has been completely reversed, since William E. Dodd first turned the spotlight on what Southern historians call "the plain folks of the old South," meaning in particular the farmers (whether they owned a few slaves or none) who constituted by far the majority of the rural people. Nevertheless the small class of slave-owning planters, together with the wealthier urban merchants, bankers and lawyers formed quite definitely the ruling class. The planters enjoyed

the highest prestige ; to become a planter was the aim of most ambitious people. Cities were as a rule small, widely scattered and mainly commercial centres, lacking a broad white working class. Even the white craftsmen were few in numbers since the cruder trades were in the hands of negro slaves and the better qualities of manufactured and industrial goods were mostly imported from Europe.²

Southern society at this time would have been a typical capitalistic class society had there not been the large population of negroes and mixed breeds (reaching about 38 per cent. in 1840 and then declining) who had a different status. This interpretation of the ante-bellum stratification system is at variance with the conventional view which maintains that the planters, at least the wealthiest among them, constituted an aristocracy. The existence and the nature of this aristocracy is however subject to a great deal of controversy. One of the best interpreters of Southern culture and society, W. B. Cash,³ leads one to the conclusion that most of the small number of planters who were wealthy and secure enough to emulate in their style of life the British aristocracy and its off-shoots in the tidewater zone of Maryland and Virginia were really not descendants of Cavaliers but *nouveaux riches* who came up from the small planter and farmer classes. Furthermore, the planters were, from the beginning, capitalistic entrepreneurs who operated in a market economy "like the modern industrialist." The planter of course acquired the habit of command, as Edgar T. Thompson observes, and the planter families furnished most of the political leaders and the personnel for the higher administrative offices, as well as the officers in the armed forces. Given enough time, the wealthier planters' families might have developed into a new aristocracy, that is a political élite no longer preoccupied with the acquisition and accumulation of wealth but rather devoted to public service. The beginnings were made mainly in the older indigo, tobacco and rice plantation areas of the Southeast ; the cotton planters on the other hand were still largely newly rich upstarts⁴ when the entire development was cut short by the catastrophe of the civil war. The younger members of the emerging aristocracy suffered extremely heavy losses on the battlefields, many came home to find their mansions destroyed, their slaves gone, their finances ruined. Those who took up farming again had to do it under conditions which left little chance for aristocratic pretensions ; instead of becoming a leisure class of grandseigneurs they had to manage their plantations, even to personally supervise the freed Negro workers, assuming thus the responsibilities once left to the overseers, that despised class which now in many cases took over the abandoned or bankrupt plantations.

II. Before we pursue the changes in the planter class any further we have to throw a brief glance at the transformation of the Negroes into a class of wage workers. In ante-bellum society Negroes had

been divided into two status groups : slaves and a much smaller number of free coloured people, mostly of mixed blood. I call these status groups because their legal position (status) differed essentially from that of the white population. Economically, nearly all Negroes were manual workers. Emancipation therefore transformed most of them into a class of wage earners : farm hands, domestic servants, craftsmen and casual laborers. In strictly economic terms they became thus the peers and competitors of the white wage laborers. In all other respects however they were, after a brief period of political equality, reduced again to a subordinate social position, regardless of wealth, skill or educational attainment. In particular the legal impediments on inter-marriage with whites were maintained, as well as customary limitations on inter-dining. It is this complex of legal and customary disqualifications and discriminations that has induced some American sociologists to compare the situation of the Southern Negro to that of an underprivileged caste. The problem is too complex to be adequately treated within the scope of this paper. I can merely point out that the Southern "etiquette of race relations" lacks the religious sanction and magic safeguards characteristic of the Hindu caste system.

A serious objection against the statement that the mass of ex-slaves formed a colored working class or proletariat could be raised on account of the predominance in agriculture of a new system of tenancy. As a matter of fact the Census reports after the Civil War show an increase in the number of farms operated by white and Negro tenants. However, the share-tenant or cropper was not, like the British renter, an independent operator, but rather an agricultural laborer who received part of his wages in kind and shared the risk of the operation with the landlord. On plantations, the share-cropper worked as a rule under close supervision by the landlord and his earnings had to be considered as compensation for his labor, that is, as wages.

III. We now resume the discussion of changes in the stratification of the white population after the civil war.

(1) Among the planters there emerged a large proportion of new men, coming up from the ranks of overseers and from the farmer classes. On the other hand, many of the old plantation families, having lost their land and capital, turned to business and to the professions. A certain amount of absentee landlordism developed, but this did not mean the formation of a leisure class living on rents and able to devote much time and energy to politics and public service, for the absentee landlord was likely to be engaged either in business or in the professions, particularly the legal profession.

(2) Out of the poorer yeoman farmer class of ante-bellum days there developed a white tenant and share-cropper class, whose economic

position was in most cases not better, in many even worse than that of the Negro share-tenants. War damage on farms, other financial losses caused by the war and later by crop failures and the fall of cotton prices were among the main causes of this development. For the first time in Southern history large masses of white people had reason to consider themselves as economically exploited and politically oppressed by a ruling class of planters and commercial entrepreneurs—a sentiment which was to express itself in the populist movement (Farmer's Alliance) of the 1890's and which persists in parts of the South until the present day.

(3) In the cities and towns there emerged a new and growing class of supply-merchants and bankers, who functioned as sources of operating credit for the planters. While the planters continued to enjoy the higher prestige, these urban entrepreneurs constituted the economically more powerful part of the dominating strata.

(4) In the major cities and in favorably located rural communities there came into existence a broader class of industrial entrepreneurs, mainly in the lumber, food, and textile industries. It is not quite clear from what classes these men came, but much of the evidence points towards origin from planter and merchant families, also from the legal profession; some of them were Yankees who had the advantages of previous experience and of capital.

(5) The workers (wage earners) in these industries were predominantly white in the skilled jobs, almost exclusively white in the textile industry, whereas Negroes were employed mainly in unskilled and "dirty" jobs largely in the lumber, food, tobacco, turpentine and fertilizer industries. The common feature of Southern industries was a combination of low unit-value of product, labor intensity and low wage levels. Apart from the iron and steel industry, which was concentrated in Birmingham, most of the industrial plants were located in small towns and mill villages, which the employers ruled in a more or less benevolent paternalistic fashion. It seems that many employers patterned their labor-management relations after the model of the plantation—and here again we are tempted to draw parallels between Eastern Europe and the South.

By the end of the second decade of this century the social stratification of the South showed the characteristics of a predominantly agricultural region, with about two-fifths of its labor force engaged in primary industries and only one-fifth in manufacturing; by 1950 the economic structure of the region had undergone significant changes, with only 12.5 per cent. of the employed labor force in primary industries more than one-third (33.7 per cent.) in secondary industries, and 54.0 per cent in tertiary industries. No accurate comparable data concerning the size of social classes are as yet available, but the following data about the change in broad socio-economic groups of the male

labor force will indicate the general direction of the changes within the social stratification :

Socio-Economic Groups in Male Labor Force, Census-South 1930, 1940, 1950*.

	1930	1940	1950
Owners and Managers	33.4%	31.8%	26.1%
White Collar Workers	11.7%	13.4%	16.9%
Wage Earners	54.9%	54.8%	57.0%

Sources: 1930—Edwards, A. M., *Socio-Economic Grouping of Gainful Workers in U.S., 1930*, Table 18.

1940—*U.S. Census of Population Summary*, Table 42.

1950—*U.S. Census of Population Summary*, Table 159.

* Gainfully employed workers 1930, employed persons in labor force 1940, 1950, omitting "occupation not reported" and "unpaid family workers".

It is important to note that the proportion of farmers and farm managers (including tenants) declined from 26.3 per cent to 16.5 per cent., while the proportion of managers, officials, and proprietors (other than agricultural) increased from 7.1 per cent. to 9.6 per cent. Important is also, within the wage-earning group, the decline of farm laborers and foremen from 16.6 per cent. to 7.9 per cent. Finally, the increase in the proportion of white collar workers should be noted. actually this group increased even more, because many salaried employees are included in the classification "proprietors, managers, and officials."

IV. The depression of 1929 hit the South severely ; its impact was the greater since the economic foundation of most of the region, cotton farming, had for a long time been in a critical condition due to the boll-weevil, soil depletion, erosion, and foreign competition. For the second time in less than a hundred years many planter families lost land and home. Corporations bought up some of the best plantations, consolidating in some instances two or more into very large operating units. Considerable downward social mobility occurred also among business men and white collar workers just as it happened all over the country. This was the time when Huey P. Long was carried to power in Louisiana by a wave of belated populist resentment against the dominating minority of planters and big business interests. His régime dramatized what was occurring throughout the South in the prewar-decade, the political awakening of the poorer white classes.

With the defense-and-war-boom and postwar prosperity the South became, within a decade and a half, one of the economically most progressive regions of the country. The changes in social stratification which occurred in the past twenty-five years were of course by and large the continuation of trends which began about forty or fifty years ago. The effects of the war economy and of recent economic development have been to speed up these trends rather than to introduce essentially new features into the system.

(1) First of all, the quantitative significance of the planter class has declined, partly because of urbanization, partly because of a decline in the number of privately owned plantations. The farmer class, which after abolition of slavery increased, seems also to have reached a peak and is beginning to decline in numbers. This is largely the consequence of the two main changes in Southern agriculture : mechanization and diversification. Both tend to result in an increase of the average farm size and a decline in the number of farms.

(2) These tendencies and also the increase in cattle grazing have led to a replacement of share-tenants by wage laborers or a transformation of the former into the latter ; in the end however, the number of agricultural workers has declined throughout the region. The agricultural proletariat of the plantation areas is gradually being converted into a smaller but better paid class of agricultural wage earners who can no longer be ruled in the neo-feudalistic fashion still prevalent in the 1920ies.

(3) In the Appalachian region we observe the emergence of the mountaineers from isolation and from the poverty of a frontier situation that had become permanent. The TVA and the efforts of the U.S. Department of Agriculture as well as industrialization have been main factors producing this change. There seems to be coming into existence in the Southern Appalachians a new class of industrially employed part-time farmers of mountaineer stock. Equally significant is the gradual disappearance of the "poor whites" (in the technical sense) on the marginal soils outside the mountains. Eradication of hookworm and malaria, improvement of transportation and communication, dietary reform and improvement in the school systems, but, most important of all, the increase in employment opportunities in industry have contributed to the salvaging of these people whose physical and moral degeneration has been so drastically depicted in "Tobacco Road."⁵

One can say quite generally that all through the region those white people who under the old plantation economy had been pushed out or squeezed out onto marginal soils in the sandhills and in the swamps and coastal marshes are now being re-integrated into the economy and society of the region. Thus the once rigid class distinction between planter and poor white is being levelled off.

(4) A new phase of industrialization which started in the decade before the first World War, added to the older types of manufacturing industries certain more recently developed mass production industries like petroleum refining, basic chemical production, rayon and related products, also aluminum and plastics. The plants in these industries are nearly without exception operated by large corporations, usually with headquarters outside the South. The result—as far as the class structure of the region is concerned—has been the growth of a new economic ruling class of top executives and managers, many of whom are not natives of the South.

I use the term ruling class deliberately because recent research in at least two Southern cities has shown that these corporation executives, although they rarely hold public office, exert a great and often decisive influence on local government, not to speak of the notorious influence of corporations on state governments. The point to be emphasized is that the corporations quite methodically delegate their executives into all kinds of policy making committees, clubs and civic organizations, and that their endorsement is as a rule the pre-condition for success or failure of many kinds of civic projects.⁶ The result is in many communities a loss of power and even prestige for the proprietors and leaders of the once dominating local small business class.

(5) Another consequence of the growth of big business is the considerable increase in numbers and proportion of the clerical, sales and professional employees, that is, the white collar workers. This, though by no means a Southern speciality, is of particular importance in a region where these intermediate positions have been for a long time rather small in numbers. It means in particular a greater variety of employment opportunities for white women, who formerly had very few choices, since domestic service was traditionally acceptable only to colored women. The Southern lady, more specifically the spinster and widow, who attempts to lead a genteel life of leisure in poverty is dying out as a social type.

It must be said, however, that Negroes are still barred from most white collar jobs, except in the educational field.

(6) The new industries, being characterized by a very high ratio of capital investment per job, can afford paying high wages. The type of worker that has developed in these industries is in level-of-living and in many other respects⁷ very different from the mill hand or the sawmill worker who formerly were regarded as typical representatives of Southern labor.

The mill villages are going out of existence and paternalism is slowly giving way to more contractual relations between employers and employees, although unionization is still lagging behind in the South. Strongholds of paternalism are today mainly the small isolated communities in which the managers of the single sawmill or cannery control all employment opportunities and have the sheriff and other public officials at their beckoning.

By mid-century the following rough figures indicating the approximate size of social/economic classes can be derived from occupational statistics: The "business" class, consisting of proprietors of industrial and commercial enterprises and farms but including also "self-employed" persons working on their "own account" and certain persons in the professions, made up about 25 per cent. of the male labor force; probably more than half of this category have to be considered as small farmers and very small business operators.

The "new middle classes" of managerial, clerical and other "white collar" workers constituted about 20 per cent. of the male labor force. The remaining 54 to 55 per cent. were wage earners engaged in manual and menial work. If wives, children and other dependents, whether working or not, were added to each of these broad categories, the working class would be proportionately larger and the other classes would probably both be smaller.⁸ Unfortunately it is not possible to compute comparable figures for previous census years.

(7) These changes in the class structure were accompanied by changes in the prestige structure. The high rank once monopolized by the planters is now shared with commercial and industrial entrepreneurs and corporation executives. Among the professions those of law and medicine seem to have held their high prestige better than the clergy.

By and large one can say the class structure of the South has become more similar to that of the remainder of the U.S.A. The relatively simple stratification of an agrarian society has been replaced by the more complex stratification of an urbanized industrial society.

Also the differences in social mobility between North and South have been levelled off. The rigidity of stratification once so characteristic of the South has given way to considerable mobility between the white classes. This is due in part to the greater diversity of the economy and in part to urbanization; both have resulted in a greater variety of job opportunities, and urban society with its greater degree of "anonymity" offers better chances to the poorer whites from families of low prestige. The improved educational facilities and opportunities are of great importance in this respect; in a society where property ownership has become less important for class and prestige position than income from salaries or wages the chances of rising economically and socially are largely determined by the amount of formal education attained. On the other hand, the once highly dynamic stratification system of the North, especially of the Middle West, has become more rigid.

The great anomaly in the South is of course the position of the Negroes. The Negroes have developed a complex stratification in their own society, which is a kind of skewed replica of white social stratification, since Negroes are still mainly small farmers and unskilled workers. Consequently the few small business men, doctors, lawyers and the more numerous schoolteachers constitute the top stratum in terms of prestige.

Otherwise one can say that the South is becoming more like the rest of the country as far as structure and dynamics of stratification are concerned.⁹

V. CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS AND ITS POLITICAL EXPRESSIONS.

Contemporary Southerners, like Americans in general, tend to deny the existence of social classes, pointing out the high degree of social mobility, the predominance of egalitarian manners and the importance

of non-economic factors for a person's prestige in the community. Even those who recognize that "objective" class distinctions exist are likely to deny the existence of class consciousness. This is more surprising since the memory of sharp class distinctions in the ante-bellum South is quite lively. Most likely the very changes in the system of stratification which have been discussed in this paper have had the effect of toning down what consciousness of class existed in the past.

Nevertheless there are strong indications that when it comes to political decisions, these are somehow determined by class interests. The most conclusive evidence is contained in election returns. In view of the predominance of a one-party system in most of the Southern states one has to focus one's attention on the factions within the Democratic party. In several of the Southern states these factions represent rather well defined class interests. Furthermore, there is, at least for Louisiana, strong evidence for the contention that those categories of voters who voted for the Republican candidate in the presidential elections of 1948 and 1952 were the same who in a gubernatorial primary will cast their votes for a candidate who represents—or appears to represent—the interests of the major commercial and industrial entrepreneurs and the planters.

This recent trend in voting behavior may be explained only in part by migration of business executives and professional and managerial personnel from Northern states. There must be among the larger Southern business men and their associates in the professions a growing awareness of their class interests; the great significance of this lies in the fact that among these powerful elements of the property owning and managerial classes, consciousness of class seems to be becoming stronger than the will to maintain white solidarity which formed the basis of the power monopoly of the Democratic Party.

NOTES

¹ Theoretically I distinguish three types of social strata: castes, status groups (*Stände*) and social classes; the latter I define in conformity with the classical tradition by source of income or functional position in the economic system. The kind of stratification which Lloyd Warner and his school have "discovered" I shall call differentiation in terms of prestige or esteem (using both terms synonymously). Prestige, like power, is enjoyed by classes, castes or status groups in various degrees. Southern speech is rich in terms denoting prestige differences; for example, if a Southerner refers to a person as a "hill billie" he means a person of low prestige, but that person may be a farmer or a laborer or an insurance salesman.

² White craftsmen were largely itinerant. A brief and comprehensive analysis of social stratification in the Ante-bellum South has been given by W. E. Moore and Robin M. Williams in "Stratification in the Ante-bellum South", *American Sociological Review*, vol. vii, no. 3, June 1942.

³ W. B. Cash, *The Mind of the South*, first edition 1941. Reprint: New York, Doubleday & Company (Anchor Books).

⁴ Edgar T. Thompson, "The Planter in the Pattern of Race Relations in the South", *Social Forces*, vol. xix, no. 2, December 1940.

⁵ Den Hollander, A. N. J., *De Landelijke Arme Blanken In Het Zuiden Der Vereenigde Staten*, Den Haag: J. B. Wolters, 1933. The author distinguishes between the "poor white" in the strict sense of a physically and often morally degenerate type of small farmer on marginal, infertile soils, and other categories of

poor white people who are not degenerate but simply "backward". The sturdy inhabitants of the Appalachian highlands belong to the second group.

⁶ Floyd Hunter, *Community Power Structure*, Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1953; and Roland J. Pellegrin and Charles H. Coates, "Absentee-Owned Corporations and Community Power Structure: a Case Study", *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. LXI, March 1956.

⁷ Among them we do not find that high degree of migratory mobility once so characteristic of the textile workers.

⁸ These computations are possible since the Census of Population, 1950 differentiates in all occupations between (a) employers and self-employed, (b) private wage and salary workers, and (c) government workers. Category (a) is the basis for the "business classes", (b) and (c) can be divided, on account of occupation into "working class" and "new middle classes" (or white collar workers). Unfortunately, it is impossible to allocate the category (d) "unpaid family workers" to the appropriate socio-economic classes—about 331,000 male unpaid family workers in agriculture would belong probably mainly to the small farmer and the agricultural labor classes, but how they should be divided is impossible to determine.

⁹ White Southerners are apt to point out that in the South "money alone" does not determine an individual's class position but that "family background" is also or even more important. What this statement really means is that a difference in prestige exists between old wealth and new wealth, and that a person belonging to a family of old wealth will enjoy high prestige in a Southern community even if he or she is merely a white collar worker by the force of circumstances which have reduced the wealth of his family. This of course is a phenomenon quite common in the older American communities, and the South shares it with the northern seaboard region.

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The Working Class in the British Social Structure

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Recent researches into the social stratification of British society and mobility within it have confirmed the essential stability of its structure over the past two or three generations.

This is not to say that there has been little movement within the structure; it is likely that social mobility in Britain has been greater than in most other European countries. But typical intergeneration changes of status have been of one or two steps at a time; there has been downward movement as well as upward movement with the result that the British social structure has retained its characteristic form.

Yet even superficial observation shows that there have been in the past 50 years enormous changes in the British social scene which are of interest to sociologists. It is the purpose of this paper to describe some of them, not in a discussion about social mobility or social stratification as such but in a discussion about the place of one class—the working class—in the whole structure.

The changes in the place of the working class in British society since the beginning of the present century appear no matter which aspect of life is examined. Looked at widely it is only a slight exaggeration to say that the working class has risen from the position of being regarded as one of the raw materials of industry to that of a class at least capable of being the ruling class. How real was the power wielded by working class bodies during the the period of the Labour Government from 1945 to 1950 is a matter for dispute but at least we know that it was incomparably greater than anything which could have happened fifty years earlier. The trades unions in the same period from being protest groups have become part of the machinery of authority of the state. This was true even before the political wing of the Labour movement gained power in Parliament. Though educational opportunity is by no means equal for all, the possibilities of educational advancement for working class students have increased enormously.

In economic affairs too the lot of the working class has improved, but so has that of most other people in Britain, and it is here that we see most clearly the difficulties of making judgments about the relative place of one group in the social structure from this kind of information. For example, in 1889 Booth estimated that about 30% of the working class population of London were living in poverty. Nearly forty years later using comparable standards Bowley estimated the figure at 9%. Again according to Rowntree's estimates the proportion of the working class population of York living below his "poverty line" was 14·2 per cent in 1936 and only ·37 per cent. in 1950.

Such figures point clearly to an overall change for the better but the improvement has not been constant through time nor has it been evenly spread over the whole working class. For example, it has been estimated that the proportion of the national income going to wages fell between 1880 and 1913 from 42 to 36 per cent. During something like the same period real wages fell by about 10 per cent. so the wage-earning class lost place absolutely as well as relatively. Then again money wage rates in 1949 were about 82 per cent. above those of 1939. This just equalled the rise in working class cost of living or in other words this period was one in which real wages were stationary. Over the same ten years Bowley estimates that real wages for many workers in skilled trades actually fell.

The point of this discussion so far is to show that though there have undoubtedly been changes in the place of the working class these have been, as it were, the net results of other more general class movements in British society. Whole classes have not moved neatly up or down. All kinds of things have happened both inside and outside Britain each of which has had its effect. The meaning of "the working class" and its whole role has changed and it is suggested here that it is in the light of its new role that its place in the whole structure of British society can best be seen. How the more general movements have operated to being about the change of role of the working class, which in turn explains its place in the whole social structure, can best be seen by examining changes which have taken place inside the working class itself.

The internal structure of the working class will be briefly discussed from three aspects—the strictly economic aspect, the occupational aspect and what might, though only loosely, be called the cultural aspect.

Dealing first with the economic aspect mention has already been made of the general improvement noted by successive social surveys. Though the bases of the two estimates are not strictly comparable, Bowley's estimates of 1928 compared with those of Booth in 1889 show not only a reduction in the size of the section of the population living in poverty but also a more homogeneous distribution of income over the whole working class. Similarly with Rowntree's two sets of figures for 1936 and 1950, which divided the working class families of York (standardised for differences of composition) into five economic groups. The intervals dividing the groups are comparable at the two dates, taking account of changes in the cost of living, and, as the figures quoted below show, standards in 1950 were more homogeneous than in 1936.

For example the two highest groups in 1950 contained 78 per cent. of the population against 50 per cent in 1936 and the three highest groups over 97 per cent. in 1950 as against 69 per cent. in 1936.

Much the same result is shown by two enquiries into earnings of manual wage earners in the United Kingdom in 1906 and 1938. The

Rowntree's estimate of distribution of Working Class Population of York according to family income adjusted for differences of composition.

<i>Economic Group</i>	1936	1950
A (lowest) ...	14.2	.37
B	16.9	2.40
C	18.9	19.23
D	13.9	19.76
E	36.1	58.24
	100.0	100.0

average earnings for men were 69 shillings in 1938 and 29.2 shillings in 1906 but as the Table below shows the average was more representative in 1938 than at the earlier date.

The lower quartile in the case of men was 60 per cent. of the upper quartile in 1906 and 71 per cent. in 1938.

The changes in the range of women's earnings were of the same order e.g. the lower quartile was 61 per cent. of the upper quartile in 1906 and 69 per cent. in 1938.

Distribution of average weekly earnings in United Kingdom for manual wage earners

	1906		1938	
	Men	Women	Men	Women
Average (shillings)...	<i>s. d.</i> 29 2	<i>s. d.</i> 13 7	<i>s. d.</i> 69 0	<i>s. d.</i> 32 6
Lower Quartile ...	22 2	10 0	55 11	25 0
Medium Quartile ...	27 9	12 9	68 0	32 3
Upper Quartile ...	35 3	16 8	80 9	38 7

Quoted from *Journal of Royal Statis. Soc.*, p. 39, vol. cxii, 1949.

Given this as the general situation some sections of the working class must have lost and others gained relatively to the rest.

From the sociologist's point of view and in this context the important changes have been the loss of status of the skilled worker, the improvement in the status of women and, in the latter part of the period under discussion, the disappearance of the depressed industries and localities in Britain.

Although the premium on skill is probably less in Britain than in most other European countries now it may not have been so in the past. Before the first world war in many trades there was a differential between skilled and unskilled workers of about 50 per cent. That is, the unskilled worker got 50 per cent. of the earnings of the skilled workers. In 1945 he got 80 per cent., in 1950—85 per cent.

Not only did unskilled workers earn relatively less than skilled workers but their relative position varied from industry to industry. In 1880 the difference between the highest and the lowest differential was about 18 per cent.; now it is about 1 per cent. Thus not only is the unskilled worker better off relatively to the skilled worker but his position from one industry to another is more uniform.

The growth of collective bargaining and the consequent need for simplification in Trade Union practice has reduced the numbers of separate skills in each trade. The further division of labour in mechanised trades has actually abolished some skills and brought into being a large number of semi-skilled occupations. The granting of flat rate increases to meet rises in the cost of living, particularly during and after the second world war, and the spread of the ideas of the welfare state which stress the needs rather than the productivity of labour, have all worked in the same direction—that of reducing the differential for skill.

This leads naturally to a discussion of the changes in the occupational make-up of the working class. Not only has the skilled worker in many trades lost place economically but the whole idea of an aristocracy of labour based on skill has changed too. Many skills in industry are difficult to learn and the fact of having served an apprenticeship and learned them gave the skilled working-man pride of place among his fellows. The organisation of trades unions by crafts reinforced and safeguarded the skilled worker's position in industry. The "Butty" system of sub-contracting work to skilled tradesmen who employed labourers as assistants worked in the same direction. In some parts of the cotton, coal and pottery industries this system held right up to post-war years and even where there was no formal sub-contracting, the practice of paying skilled workers on piece-rates while labourers, who had their speed of work set for them, were paid on time rates had something like the same effects. But while the aristocrats of labour held their place in the factory they held it socially too. The earnings which were "extra for skill", like those which are now "extra for overtime", were more often spent on luxuries, and the display of wealth in a working class setting reinforced the skilled status of the craftsmen who could spend freely.

The new consumer-goods industries brought into being a large number of semi-skilled occupations the workers in which were paid on piece rates and organised by general unions which were, for various reasons, very successful in raising the economic status of their members. The trade union movement had meantime moved over to a cautionary role between the workers and employers. With their skill deprived of its mystery and their labour organisation rivalled by the powerful general unions, the skilled workers have found it impossible to maintain their old position.

There have been other changes in occupational structure which affected the relative position of all male workers in industry and not

just skilled workers. The growth of secondary industries and the so-called "service" industries of building, distribution, transport and commerce have created a new group of routine non-manual workers of their own as well as the clerical staff in industry. Though most such workers are counted as working class and themselves claim to belong to the working class the number of such jobs was on the increase before popular regard had down-graded "the office" relatively to "the works" and the occupants then regarded themselves as belonging to the middle class.

Between the two wars a relatively new phenomenon in British social life was associated with the size of this group i.e. the growth of the suburbs around our large cities—the move out to the city boundaries—and an increase in the number of owner occupiers of small houses. In 1939 the British public owed to Building Societies which financed the purchase of (mainly suburban) houses, £700m. and in 1938 alone the Societies advanced £137m. Building took place mostly in the southern counties of England but even elsewhere this new aristocracy—the suburbanites—whose place depended only slightly on occupation and even less on skill took the place of the older aristocracy of skilled craftsmen. Their standards rather than the craftsmen's standards became increasingly accepted by the rest of the working class.

The rise in the status of women in Britain since the beginning of the century has, of course, been widely remarked but nowhere has it been greater than in the case of the typical working class woman. One has only to compare with the present position the prewar relationship between the working class domestic servant and her middle class employer to see the fundamental nature of the change. In the conditions of full employment which have held since the end of the war, paradoxically, the relatively unorganised state of the female labour force has led to further advances in the economic and social position of women—unrestrained as some sections of the male labour force have been by their own organisation.

The discussion now turns to a number of more general observations about those particular aspects of working class culture which are relevant in this context.

An important part of working class culture is what is usually called "the working class movement", a movement combining many features which have shifted in importance and relative position as the composition and values of the working class itself have changed. It is an oversimplification, but sufficiently near to the truth for present purposes, to say that for the first twenty years of the Century the movement combined sections which were Christian and ethical in approach and concerned with problems of equality, others which were revolutionary and though then, as now, the lower paid workers took little active part in voluntary organisation, a large section which was a protest movement of the "have-nots". By 1926 the movement had become mainly Socialist and, particularly after the General Strike of that year, the

Trade Unions had become conciliatory and were increasingly concerned with managing their own membership. But the movement was still very much a class movement and was led at the local level by the skilled workers. The history of the depressed areas of South Wales and the North East Coast particularly, the strongholds of the skilled iron, steel and coal workers, emphasised the national and class character of the movement. There was little point in holding protest meetings on Tyneside or in South Wales where everybody else was unemployed and representation had to be made on a national level. The working class movement for a long time sought to organise its own culture through movements parallel to those of the rest of the nation—the consumer co-operatives, the Workers Educational system, insurance Friendly Societies, Sports Clubs, holiday associations, and so on. All these movements no less than the working class political party and working class occupations contributed to the culture of the working class and its place in the whole social structure.

Although some parts of the movement like the trade unions, for example, are now more powerful than ever, the loss of autonomy of the individual and the small groups in the working class movement has led to the surrender of those working class values associated with an independent social movement. The various parallel organisations looked at as possible substitutes for the original ones which they were designed to replace are everywhere on the decline. One might say that important features of the movement have disappeared and in so far as these features were features of the working class itself it too has lost some of its distinctive character. The disappearance of the depressed areas, the new role of the trade unions, the downgrading of skill in industry, the rise of the new industries and the increase in the status of women (for the older movement was largely a man's movement) together have contributed to the present position.

What exactly the present position is remains a matter for argument but it does seem that within the working class (and perhaps elsewhere in the structure) the importance of upwards and downwards movement is declining. Or if this is not so, it has at least come to be believed that upwards and downwards movement is achieved in new ways—not by skill or occupation as it used to be but in other ways which are largely a matter of luck or chance—the chance of living in one kind of house or district rather than another—of working in a firm or industry which pays on piece rates, or, perhaps more importantly, on the composition of the household in which one lives. Before the earnings of juveniles and women rose relatively to those of men an extra earner, which usually meant a juvenile, in a household made relatively little difference to standards. Now as often happens when the eldest child leaves school and the mother goes back to industry a household will find its income more than doubled immediately. Such households are very much better off than their neighbours—so are those who have been in the same rented house for several years and are paying for similar

accommodation 6 per cent. or 7 per cent. of their earnings instead of 25 per cent. as many do—so are those who win football pools!

To conclude, the main thesis of this paper is that the composition of the working class is more homogeneous than it used to be when it is regarded as a mainly occupational group but that for many of the purposes in which the concept of the working class is used by sociologists the concept itself is not nearly so useful as it appears to be.

NOTES

The basic British social surveys referred to in this paper are:

- Charles Booth, *Life and Labour of the People in London, 1892-1903* (17 vols.).
- B. S. Rowntree, *Poverty: A Study of Town Life*, 1901.
- B. S. Rowntree, *Poverty and Progress*, 1941.
- B. S. Rowntree and G. R. Lavers, *Poverty and the Welfare State*, 1951.
- A. L. Bowley, *Has Poverty Diminished?*, 1925.

The Changed Position of Unskilled Workers in the Social Structure of the Netherlands

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I. INTRODUCTION

The aim of this study is to indicate the relation between the recent development of Dutch social structure on the one hand and changes in the social status of the unskilled worker on the other. Since at this stage knowledge of this subject is not very well advanced, it is impossible to do more than just indicate such relations. The present attempt to tackle this problem may be justified by the following considerations. In the first place, although the unskilled workers constitute a numerically very important group in every industrialised country, their status has not been given much attention. Secondly, a study of the historical background as well as the present situation of this occupational category throws an interesting light on the development and structure of the society as a whole. A third consideration is that this group, seen from the viewpoint of social policy, is often regarded as a "problem group".¹

It should be pointed out, that in this article the term "unskilled worker" stands for the industrial worker without special occupational training. That the borderline between this category and that of the skilled worker will thus remain rather vague, will prove to be of little consequence for a study of this kind.

Although the unskilled worker is found in practically all important branches of industry in the world, his history and status in North-West Europe shows a number of special characteristics. This is to some extent due to factors of a very factual kind, such as the relatively early industrialisation of these countries. In part however, it is connected with the ideological—in this case the Marxist-socialistic interpretation of the social status of the industrial worker. This specifically historical and ideological context makes it inevitable to connect his former and present social position with the well-worn problems of the "proletariat", "capitalism" and "class struggle". Even though the discussion around this subject is in itself no longer up-to-date, it is worthwhile to become acquainted with it since it clarifies the present situation of the unskilled worker.

It is clear that the Dutch social system, though showing affinities with the general N.W.-European system, possesses a number of specific characteristics, due among other things to the fact that industrialisation came relatively late in comparison with neighbouring countries. A generalisation from the Dutch situation however, is by no

means impossible. As a starting point and at the same time as a general vein of this study, we may consider the inadequacy of modern, largely American-influenced, industrial sociology. This branch of knowledge had, apart from its many merits too much the character of a "factory sociology" to be able to do full justice to the European system of relations which is so strongly connected with historical-ideological factors. The standpoint of the old German "Betriebssoziologie" (Weber, Briefs, Geck, De Man, Herkner, Bernays) with its emphasis on the relation between social structure and industrial development was in this respect more fertile. To a certain extent its tradition has been continued by the French school of Friedmann.

Also in the Netherlands, the antithesis between the more limited and the broader standpoint has been the subject of much argument. The "bedrijfsociologie" (industrial sociology) introduced after 1945 (Oldendorff, Ydo, Horinga)² leaned strongly towards the Mayo-Roethlisberger-school, whereas Kuylaars³ even wanted to attach the problem of unskilled work in the first instance to the nature of the work, thereby focusing on its effect on the personality structure and via this concept on the whole society. Haveman⁴ on the other hand, studied the unskilled worker as a special social type with a clearly determinable social environment of its own and its own subculture. The generalisation of this viewpoint was sharply criticised.⁵

The study of the unskilled worker should necessarily be based on a study of the development of the industrial work-process, to which the unskilled worker, in fact, owes his name. The central problem is, however, whether this kind of work is carried out by a category of individuals occupying an exceptional position in a social as well as in a cultural sense. In other words: does the unskilled worker constitute not only an industrial type, but also a social type?

In the following line of argument, the status of the unskilled worker will be considered in connection with the evolution of a number of structural elements in Dutch society during the last 70 to 80 years.

II. THE UNSKILLED WORKER AS AN INDUSTRIAL TYPE

Unskilled labour is as old as humanity, but the unskilled worker in our sense is a product of industrial development in the last centuries, and is therefore a relatively recent occupational type.

In the 19th century there was in fact no clear type of unskilled industrial worker in evidence in the Netherlands. Even the factory worker belonged to a heterogeneous category since industrial production took place more often in workshops than in factories. This implies, that there existed a great deal of work differentiation: the unskilled worker was an apprentice, that is, he was temporarily "unskilled", but he would later have the function of skilled workman, either master or foreman.⁶

All through the 19th century home industries and crafts remained important. Only when the Taylor system gained the upper hand, a

process of "unlearning" began to take place, a process which Kuylaars calls "drainage" of work. It was this development which brought into being the large category of workers who can be termed "unskilled workers". Knowledge and initiative, training and insight are now to a considerable degree delegated to those who are their superiors in the industrial hierarchy: the representatives of the "Thinking Department".⁷

Further industrial development leads to further differentiation of labour. Linework, teamwork, shift-work, casual work, assistant's work as well as a very large differentiation according to the technical nature of the work, are the results. All this tends to obscure the borderline between skilled and unskilled work. The shift from professional training to a sense of responsibility as pointed out by Touraine,⁸ has also been found in a few large industries in the Netherlands—for instance at the Hoogovens (blast furnaces) at Velsen⁹—but this is still exceptional.

It can, however, be said that the relation between the unskilled worker and the industrial concern has been subjected to important changes. The social policy of the government, the influence of the trade-unions and the viewpoints current in employer's circles have increasingly tended to change this relation in favour of the worker. In the main, however, workers who perform exclusively unskilled work and who draw their maximum wages in about their 20th year of age, still constitute a very large part of the industrial labour force.

III. THE UNSKILLED WORKER A SOCIAL TYPE ?

The origin of the unskilled worker as an *industrial* type lies in the modern factory organization of the production process, as a social type he originates from the 19th century proletariat. By "proletariat" in this context is meant the category of wage-labourers in industry, who are compelled to sell their labour in the economic market and who derive the main part of their subsistence from this source.¹⁰ Briefs has drawn attention to the fact that this category of wage-labourers, seen from an historical angle, started out by gradually detaching itself from the masses of the poor. Only some time after Marx "stösst die Arbeiterfrage das eigentliche Armeleute-Problem von sich ab".¹¹

In the Netherlands in the middle of the last century factory workers were drawn from the mass of paupers to such an extent that they were indistinguishable from this group and were heaped together as "the poor".¹² Industrial work, for that matter, had a clearly philanthropic character and was in part carried on in workhouses. The position of this proletariat was here, as in neighbouring countries, far from attractive: classed as the lowest stratum of society, badly paid, compelled to keep very long working-hours and having very little social security, their situation was indeed truly "proletarian".¹³

The unskilled worker was in every respect part of this proletariat. Although on the one hand some mention is made of specialized workers

—mostly foreigners—who occupied a more favourable position, there was no separate category of unskilled workers. Much more accentuated than the difference between skilled and unskilled was the differentiation as to type of work and work-conditions found in industry and factory work, the various branches of industry and the various regions of the country.¹⁴ Also important was the difference in position between “permanent” and “casual” workers.¹⁵

In the last fifty years unskilled labour has become a phenomenon of more and more gigantic dimensions. Large numbers of unskilled workers are at the moment crowding the Dutch industrial concerns. The question whether this has made the unskilled worker into a clearly delimited *social* type, can only be answered by an analysis of the historical evolution of the industrial proletariat.

The changes in the situation of the proletariat appear to be quite considerable. Among them the following will be mentioned :

(a) the change from “situational class into mentality class”,¹⁶ that is, a growing consciousness of one’s own value and strength, and concomitantly the struggle to improve one’s living conditions ; (b) the enormous rise in prosperity, in which wage labourers had an important share ; (c) the social democratization and in connection therewith the social integration of large parts of the formerly more isolated working-class into the society ; (d) the cultural democratization and the tendency among a large part of the proletariat to acquire bourgeois characteristics ; (e) the political deradicalization taking place in the last decades.

Evidently this development has not proceeded in every part of the country to the same degree—Holland too has what are called its “ontwikkelingsgebieden” (development-regions), which can be compared with the underdeveloped regions elsewhere. In the main, however, the effect of the processes mentioned above cannot be denied. The questions which now have to be answered, are :

(1) has the proletariat in all its sections experienced equally important changes of position and if not, which groups are in any way lagging behind ?

(2) Is it true, as might be expected and as has been contended,¹⁷ that it is the unskilled worker who has lagged behind in this evolution, even, in the opinion of some authors, to such an extent that his position gravitates towards a social and cultural isolation ?

(3) In what fields has such a lag shown itself or does it become manifest in all fields ?

(4) How can the lag at certain points and with certain groups be explained ?

(5) What does such an explanation tell us about the future development of the position of the unskilled worker ?

IV. THE UNSKILLED WORKER AND CHANGES IN SOCIAL STRATIFICATION

The social structure of the Netherlands in the 19th century possessed all the characteristics of a mixed estate and class structure.¹⁸ Next to the old patriciate and large groups of citizens and craftsmen with strong status characteristics, fast growing new groups of entrepreneurs and industrial workers had appeared. But though the structure was extremely differentiated, it was clearly based on a number of large strata, which, in relation to one another, occupied a rather stable, hierarchical position.

The socio-economic and cultural development which took place afterwards radically changed this relatively simple structure. The units of the estate—and class structure broke down as the result of a growing importance of occupation in determining the status of the individual, while at the same time occupation detached itself from the estate and class structure. The macrostratification of estates and classes receded into the background as occupational stratification grew in importance.¹⁹

In the last decades this occupational stratification has become more and more functional, that is, more organized in vast, aim-directed associations such as big industrial concerns, government services, and army. This accentuates the formal character of labour and it brings the persons carrying various occupational functions into strictly hierarchical positions.²⁰ This development implies for the unskilled worker that his social position becomes sharper in outline, while it is moreover fixed at the bottom of the occupational ladder. The process of internal differentiation to skilled, trained and unskilled, as already indicated by Briefs and Herkner²¹ goes in this development of organizational functionalism, in the direction of further elaboration and refinement. Such concepts as job analysis and work classification, which are now coming to the forefront, are logical consequences of this development.

In the first place, the various types of unskilled labour can now be more sharply defined. This increases on the one hand the differences in distance between the unskilled workers and between them and the skilled, who occupy a higher status ; on the other hand there is the fact that the unskilled has been formally accepted in organizational groups, which give him status and fulfil his need of security and safety.

A second point is that social mobility becomes more connected with function. A new type of mobility²² arises which for the unskilled worker is sometimes more unfavourable since it refers in the first instance to job qualifications—but which at other times offers increased possibilities for mobility, since an ability to carry out functions will smooth the way to higher status. Particularly in big enterprises much attention is paid to an increase of these possibilities for climbing. The facts prove that—contrary to what was expected—social climbing is far from being a rare phenomenon among the

unskilled, also in the second generation.²³ It is also remarkable that the division made in industrial enterprises between the skilled and the unskilled has in many cases not created obstacles to social contacts outside the work situation.²⁴

It is not denied, that there are groups of unskilled workers, who lead a rather isolated existence and who live at the periphery of the society, often in the social environment of problem-cases and asocial persons.²⁵ They live in pauperized neighbourhoods where social norms are accepted which are rejected by other labourers. These more or less socially isolated groups of the unskilled are residual groups which are only incidentally, partly, and with some difficulty, integrated with society. They consist of casual workers, recipients of relief, hawkers and other independents with small means, among whom this peripherous group of unskilled factory workers has found a place. They move in the social milieu of the underdogs, from which it appears to be difficult to escape, while the existing education-patterns also block the road to escape for their children.

V. THE UNSKILLED WORKER AND THE CHANGES IN INCOME LEVEL

One of the most important socio-economic phenomena of the last fifty years is the deproletarianization of the majority of the industrial workers. It can be stated that they have often surpassed the small independents in economic position. This goes in the first place for the skilled worker, but it is equally true for many unskilled ones.²⁶ Moreover, the income of the unskilled does not differ a great deal from that of the skilled,²⁷ though within the group of workers, the former naturally form the weaker party. Up to a point the unskilled worker is still a "proletarian", as he has nothing to offer but his physical force, while he cannot refer to specialistic abilities. Nevertheless, his position in the economic structure is not that of the lowest group. Below him is the category consisting of costermongers, seasonal workers, casual workers and recipients of poor relief, small independents and pensioners. About the year 1938 these groups were estimated to comprise about 10% of the Dutch population. The unskilled factory worker does not, as a rule, belong to this lowest stratum.²⁸

His economic position however remains precarious. If other factors come into play, he may be expected to sink to the lowest prosperity-level—the rearguard in the army of the economically emancipated.

VI. THE UNSKILLED WORKER AND THE CHANGES IN CULTURAL PATTERN

Hendrik de Man has in his writings²⁹ drawn attention to the fact that the "Proletkult", propagated by early socialism, was a failure. In the Netherlands one finds until the thirties, though decreasingly, attempts to establish "socialist" or "labour" culture, namely in the style of the youth movement. At present, however,

the middle-class character of the working class can no longer be denied. The unskilled worker in the Netherlands, like the rest of the population, has adopted the cultural patterns of the middle class and lower middle class and he cultivates these patterns to the best of his ability. This is expressed in dress, food, furniture, education and leisure, as well as in manners and forms of address.³⁰

This does not mean that the diffusion of bourgeois-patterns has spread over the whole group of the unskilled. Some less superficial elements of culture such as aspirations for further education, intellectual interests³¹ and the like, are certainly less accepted in working class than in middle-class circles and less among the unskilled than among the skilled. It is probable that on these points the gap between working class and middle class (non-manual workers of higher social status) is wider than between the skilled and the unskilled, although this differs according to the cultural elements concerned.³² It is certain that part of the workers largely but not exclusively the unskilled, have remained more or less outside the process of adoption and assimilation of middle-class values. These workers are part of the cultural bottom layer of the society, a stratum to which also belongs the socially maladjusted. In the main they lack middle-class desires, while their cultural luggage consists of a mixture of middle-class "gesunkenes Kulturgut" and traces of folk culture. In these old working-class communities in particular, such old cultural forms appear to have maintained themselves longest as a separate subculture.³³

VII. THE UNSKILLED WORKER AND CHANGES IN POLITICAL ORGANIZATION

As happened in other European countries, the growing self-consciousness of the proletariat led in the last half of the past century to a political radicalization in the direction of socialism. The pioneers of this movement, largely originating from the group of the skilled, have since 1894 (the foundation of the Social-Democratic Labour Party)³⁴ led socialism into reformative channels. Industrialization which, contrary to the situation in countries like Great-Britain and Belgium, started late and could therefore avoid the worst excesses, promoted, together with the Dutch sense of moderation, the speedy decline of a chiliastic anarchism (*Domela Nieuwenhuis*).

After a few conflicts between both wars (danger of a revolution in 1918; mutiny on the man-of-war "Zeven Provinciën"; unemployment-riots in the thirties), the political labour party became "settled", a process which was actually completed after 1945. The S.D.A.P., which in that year was rechristened: "Partij van de Arbeid" (Labour Party) aims at becoming a national party (the so-called break-through towards the confessional groups).

It seems plausible that the existing political radicalism, as expressed for instance in communism, has to be found mainly in the group of unskilled workers. When comparing the number of the unskilled

(25% of the total working population, while another 45% is semi-skilled) with the number of those who voted for the communists (in recent years always under 10% of the total number of votes), it appears however, that the preference for communism is only found among a minority of the unskilled. It also becomes apparent, that the regional distribution of communists is determined by socio-cultural factors, to such an extent, that at present there is no evident general relationship between unskilled workers and leftist radicalism, since there are cultural, social and religious factors crosscutting such a relationship. The steady decrease of communist influence since 1945 adds to the impression that it was not the status of unskilled worker which gave political radicalism its support, but an interplay of local and historical factors among which this status was only one.

VIII. THE UNSKILLED WORKER AND CHANGES IN THE LOCAL COMMUNITY

Dutch urban life of the working classes was in the 19th century still strongly determined by the neighbourhood environment. Such *working class neighbourhoods* can be defined as limited local units, established a long time ago and usually situated in the old part of the town, units which are characterized by a specific cultural style and a sense of social cohesion. They are socially, but not socio-economically homogeneous. The pauper as well as the priest, the casual worker as well as the shopkeeper, they all "belong".³⁵ Examples of neighbourhoods, which have long (till a few decades ago) retained this character, are the "Jordaan (Amsterdam) and "Wijk C" (Utrecht).³⁶ In a sense such neighbourhoods are the characteristic territorial substructures of a society of which the lowest stratum consists of a working class which is functionally little differentiated.

Around 1900 these working-class neighbourhoods became involved in a process of disintegration. The most energetic inhabitants—as a rule industrial workers—left these districts for the newly-built quarters at the urban periphery. Although the formation of a mentality class of industrial workers, promotes the disintegration of working class neighbourhoods, the modern workers' *residential districts* can on the other hand be seen as a visible symbol of the emancipation of the proletariat. The inhabitants all have a relatively similar socio-economic status; they are for the most part factory workers, whether predominantly skilled or predominantly unskilled.

The working-class neighbourhoods, drained by this process, sink to a very low level. They become the districts of the casual workers, spivs, hawkers, mixed with mainly unskilled workers, who are unable or unwilling to give up the neighbourhood relations. Where the process of pauperization has progressed far, the unskilled also often leave the neighbourhood.³⁷ His outlook on work and his work rhythm, his social aspirations and economic position, induce him to select a different place of residence.

These migration-processes took place mainly before and after the first world-war, and in older industrial towns had already started in 1870.³⁸ After 1945 this process has started anew, now covering a larger area. The present mass housing projects, which in the big towns (Amsterdam, Rotterdam and the Hague) have resulted in the building of residential quarters for tens of thousands, have effected an unprecedented mixing of social groups. The unskilled workers have shared in this process and have for the first time to a considerable extent taken up their residence amidst other occupational groups. It is at present impossible to forecast, to what extent this social mixing will continue also after the housing shortage has disappeared. It is certainly true that skilled and in part also unskilled workers have learned to accept co-residence with traditionally middle class groups.

IX. THE RECRUITMENT OF THE UNSKILLED WORKER AND THE PERIOD OF INDUSTRIALIZATION

A very important factor is finally the effect of the period of industrialization on the status and attitudes of the unskilled worker. It makes a considerable difference whether the recruitment of factory workers started about 1850 or about 1950. In the former case, recruitment often led to proletarianization and pauperization of the people concerned, whereas in the latter case the social policy of government and industrial concerns aimed at mitigating the disintegrating effects of industrialization and at meeting them half-way. The transition to the industrial labour process therefore proceeded without great shocks or tensions.

Even to this day, the historical background of the industrialization process can still clearly be discerned in the social situation of the unskilled worker. The existence of political radicalism and a traditional class opposition in the large towns and in some old industrial districts can in part be traced back to an early industrialization.³⁹ The rather high degree of pauperization of a large number of the unskilled in old industrial towns like Maastricht and Den Bosch has had its influence on the present high percentage of socially maladjusted persons.⁴⁰

On the other hand, the labourers who were drawn into industrial work for the first time with the present intensive industrialization of the rural regions were much less subjected to processes of political radicalization and social isolation. From the agrarian sphere they landed in an industrial environment, which led them straight on the road towards cultural bourgeoisie and social integration. (South-east Drenthe).⁴¹

Other factors such as the socially integrative power of active religious politics (the mining district of South-Limburg) are also indicative of the importance of the period when the unskilled worker made his appearance as an industrial type. This factor cuts through the general tendencies in the status-development of the unskilled worker, and it explains regional differences in status as differences in the phase of industrialization.

X. CONCLUSIONS

In the years since 1860-1870 the Dutch social system has developed in the direction of functional integration, economic progress, middle class cultural norms, political deradicalization and disintegration of the old ties based on local residence. This development has spread to the majority of the members of the former industrial proletariat.

In spite of the fact that these processes take place at different rates of speed while various parts of the country are in different stages of development, it is possible to indicate the formation of a number of residual groups, the members of which show a serious lag compared with the "normal" tendencies in the society. Although the unskilled take part in most of the processes mentioned, they often occupy also in the residual groups a numerically strong position.

As it seems likely that this development is still going on, a further drainage of the residual groups can be expected. That the processes of social and cultural integration seem to get increasingly less hold of the residual groups, indicates that the drainage has had the effect of a negative selection. It is to be feared that the resistance against integration will increase as the isolated position of these groups will more and more be connected with mental deficiency, maladjustments, asocial attitudes, criminality, etc. If then from these residual groups there are still individuals who offer their services as unskilled workers, it may well appear that they do not meet the minimal demands made by the industrial production process. The separation between unskilled workers and proletarian rearguard will then be complete.

A final conclusion is, that "the" unskilled worker does not, at the moment at any rate, constitute a homogeneous social type. This category is too much "in transition", too much involved in a number of rapid changes in the society, to be, so far as the Netherlands are concerned, a useful concept in the sociological analysis of social structure.

This also implies that it is dangerous to approach—as is sometimes done by industrial sociology—the problems of the industrial worker from the viewpoint of industrial categories. It is not the industrial concern which mainly determines the structure of society, but the structure of the industrial concern results from the totality of social processes going on in the society at a certain point of time.

NOTES

¹ This is evident from the book of J. Haveman, *De ongeschoolde arbeider* (1952), also from a few postwar, government-sponsored studies, dealing with the problem of so-called "mass-youth", a category sought mainly in the environment of unskilled workers. See: *Maatschappelijke verwildering der jeugd. Rapport betreffende het onderzoek naar de geestesgesteldheid van de massajeugd*. Den Haag 1952; *Bronnenboek, bevattende gegevens ten grondslag liggend aan Rapport Maatschappelijke verwildering der jeugd*. Den Haag 1953; *Moderne jeugd op haar weg naar volwassenheid*. Den Haag 1953.

⁵ A. Oldendorff, *De betekenis van de bedrijfs sociologie voor de sociale wetenschappen*, in *Sociologisch Jaarboek*, VII, 1953; M. G. Ydo, *Plezier in het werk*, 1947; D. Horringa, *Mens en groep in het moderne bedrijf*, 2d ed. 1953.

⁶ A. M. Kuylaars, *Het verband tussen werk en leven van de industriële toonarbeider als object van een sociale ondernemingspolitiek*, 1951.

⁷ Haveman, op. cit.

⁸ J. A. A. van Doorn, *De proletarische achterhoede*. Een sociologische critiek, 1954.

⁹ A. Touraine, *Veranderingen in de beroepsstructuur der Franse mechanische industrie*, in *Mens en Maatschappij*, XXVIII, 1, 15 Jan., 1953, pp. 20, 21. Compare: I. J. Brugmans, *De arbeidende klasse in Nederland in de 19e eeuw*, 2d ed. 1929, pp. 75 ff.

¹⁰ Touraine, 22, 23.

¹¹ p. 20 ff.

¹² W. J. Bruyn, *Rapport betreffende het onderzoek*, etc., in: *Sociologisch Bulletin*, VI, 1, 1952.

¹³ G. Briefs, *Das gewerbliche Proletariat in: Grundriss der Sozialökonomik*, IX, 1, 1926, p. 150.

¹⁴ Briefs, 143.

¹⁵ Brugmans, 77 ff.

¹⁶ Particularly Brugmans, chapters II, III and IV; summary in L. J. G. Verberne, *De Nederlandsche arbeidersbeweging in de negentiende eeuw*, 1940, chapter II.

¹⁷ Brugmans, 136f. and passim in chapter II.

¹⁸ Particularly where irregular work demands a large number of casual labourers, as for instance at the docks. Cf. for example, P. J. Bouman and W. H. Bouman, *De groei van de grote werkstad. Een studie over de bevolking van Rotterdam*, 2d ed., 1955, 47 ff.

¹⁹ Terms introduced by Van Heek following Kruyt's example of analogous concepts. F. Van Heek, *Klassen- en standenstructuur als sociologische begrippen*, 1948, p. 12. 33.

²⁰ Haveman's book entirely concentrates on the thesis that there exists a fundamental dichotomy between the unskilled and "others" (p. 187), that these unskilled are clearly living in isolation and possess a separate subculture (e.g. p. 203).

²¹ Following Van Heek's definition (1948): "A society has an "estate"-structure, if it consists of a vertical ranking of socially unequal groups which are mutually distinguishable by a difference in the degree of social prestige, a different style of living and an unequal distribution of rights and obligations" (p. 7); "a society has a class structure if it consists mainly of groups which in a system of predominantly individual property, are socially unequal since in the market of goods and services, where they have opposite interests, they occupy market-positions of different power" (p. 12).

²² Van Heek, *Stijging en daling op de maatschappelijke ladder* (1945), 43 ff. 50 ff.

²³ Cf. J. A. A. van Doorn, *Het probleem van de beroepsstratificatie*, in: *Sociologische Gids*, II, 6 Juni, 1955.

²⁴ Briefs, 218, 220.

²⁵ Cf. the "old" and "new" type of mobility in S. M. Lipset and R. Bendix, "Social Mobility and Occupational Career Patterns" in: *Class Status and Power, a reader in social stratification*, London 1954, pp. 457 ff.

²⁶ This refers to investigations carried out by Van Heek, Buurma, Tobi and Luyckx, and Bordewijk. A summary of the results in: J. A. A. van Doorn, *Proletarische achterhoede*, 43 ff. 57 ff. Also G. Kuiper, *Mobiliteit in de sociale en beroepshierarchie*, 1953, chapter XIII.

²⁷ This refers to investigations carried out by Van Heek, Buurma, Kuiper, and others.

²⁸ Haveman, 42 ff.; H. P. M. Litjens, *Onmaatschappelijke gezinnen*, 1953, *passim*, particularly p. 156 ff.

²⁹ L. F. Jens, *Criminaliteit te Utrecht in verband met familie en wijk*, 1940, 32; H. Verwey-Jonker, *Lage inkomens*, 1943, 77 ff. 168.

³⁰ Thus, for instance, in Nov. 1948 the average wages of an unskilled worker were f0.95 per hour (weekly wages: f47.05), of a trained worker f1.-- (weekly wages f49.06) and of a skilled worker f1.08 (weekly wages f53.38). Quoted from Kuylaars, p. 160.

³¹ Verwey-Jonker *passim*.

³² Particularly in his *Psychologie van het socialisme*, 2d ed. 1929, among other places: chapter IX: *Proletarische cultuur of verburgerlijking?* (p. 171ff.).

³⁰ It would be interesting to study the introduction of the words: "heer", "dame" and "mevrouw" (respectively: gentleman, lady, madam), used in the post-war press to indicate every labourer's wife, contrary to the situation previously. As regards the spending of leisure time, see: the report of the Central Bureau for Statistics, *Radio en vrijetijdsbesteding*, 1954, 57 f. and other places.

³¹ J. P. Kruyt, *Arbeiders en nieuwe middenstand*, 1947, 13. Van Doorn, *Proletarische achterhoede*, 42 ff.

³² Central Bureau for Statistics, *Radio*, 57 f.

³³ Van Doorn, *Proletarische achterhoede*, 13-23; Cf. *Enige aspecten van sociale wijkopbouw*, 1955, 20 ff.

³⁴ Verberne, 127.

³⁵ Van Doorn, *Proletarische achterhoede*, 16 ff.

³⁶ Van Doorn, 16 ff.; on Rotterdam: Bouman and Bouman, 53.

³⁷ Van Doorn, *Proletarische achterhoede*, 17 f. and the authors quoted there: Jens, De Vooys, and others; I. E. van Hulst, *Stijging en daling in een modern grootbedrijf*, 1954, 42.

³⁸ P. de Jong, Hoogvliet, de groeiende satellietstad onder de rook van Rotterdam, in: *Sociologisch Bulletin*, VII, 4, 1953, 31 ff.

³⁹ F. van Heek, Twee richtingen in de bedrijfs-sociologie, in: *Mens en Maatschappij*, XXVIII, 1, Jan. 1953, 13.

⁴⁰ Litjens, 95, 96.

⁴¹ Haveman, 129 ff.

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PART TWO

Some Introductory Remarks on Social Mobility¹ and Class Structure

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DEFINITIONS

Many difficulties at present encountered in the study of social mobility are due to a confusion in the interpretation of terms used. Although short definitions of some concepts applied in this article are likely to make dull reading, they may be useful.

Social mobility takes place within the framework of social stratification. Most writers are agreed that the general concept of social stratification implies a relative ordering of a population in strata along some value hierarchies.² Parsons defines social stratification simply as a ranking system.³ If there is some degree of consensus as to the definition of social stratification as a system of inequality, there is almost none on the question: Inequality with respect to what?

According to the literature available, stratifications may *inter alia* consist of the following kinds of strata:⁴

(1) Politico-economic classes (ranked according to power, income or wealth);

(2) Social classes (relatively permanent groups, each consisting of persons who consider themselves more or less to be social equals. Each social class has its own life-style and is as such group-conscious, though its boundaries are difficult to indicate).

A special social class is one which is consciously based on the same economic interests in the labour market. It typifies a particular social structure, such as that of Western society at the end of the 19th century.⁵

(3) Statistical prestige aggregates.

Aggregates of individuals having similar positions on a scale of prestige (e.g. those employed in a number of occupations which rankers have placed near to each other on the occupational ladder).

(4) Status groups.

These groups are ranked according to criteria of social prestige known to their members; but they need not have the structural characteristics of a social class, e.g. a specific life-style. (Those occupying a certain rank in a bureaucratic hierarchy constitute a status group, without necessarily having as such a life-style of their own.)

(5) Elites and the people influenced by them.

Elites are defined as relatively small numbers of individuals, having the power of decision with respect to the content and distribution of various types of value.

Each of the above-mentioned five concepts may be a means to define specific forms of social mobility.

The question has been widely discussed in how far a social stratification can be built up of classes with precise and exact boundaries.⁶ It is often possible for political and economic stratifications based respectively on the criteria of power, income or wealth, to be distinguished by strata forming precisely definable statistical units. However, this does not by any means imply a division into units which are group-conscious.

As to the distinction between successive social classes, here differences seem to range along a continuum with imperceptible gradation from one person to another, so that no objective exact boundary lines can be drawn. One may argue that the number of social classes and the clear distinctions between them are not given in the world of empirical research, e.g. the occupational prestige stratification, but are artifacts of the operations employed and problems examined by the investigator.⁷

Statisticians point to the fact that striking breaks, e.g. in an occupational stratification, are often caused by the accidental omission of occupations in the ranking-list, which occupations would have filled the gaps if they had been included in the list. In distinguishing the strata of the occupational stratification Moser and Hall are right in observing that "it cannot be assumed that there are significant and abrupt gaps in status between the standard categories". The divisions drawn between some aggregates of ranked occupations "should be regarded merely as arbitrary but convenient boundaries".⁸

So an occupational ladder only ranks occupations according to their occupational prestige. Social classes cannot be defined as to their character and size by means of an occupational ranking system.

IDEOLOGICAL BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY OF MOBILITY

In our opinion the discussions carried on during the last few years on the most effective methods of mobility study have too much ignored the question as to what social motives underlie these scientific researches. This question cannot be answered without giving a short historical survey of the ideological background of the study of social ascent and descent.

It is remarkable that sociological research during the liberal era of the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century should have paid so little attention to the obstacles impeding the free development and application of individual talents. The opinion then prevailing was that ample opportunities existed for every talented individual to occupy a place in society most in agreement with his capacities.

This opinion originated in social darwinism which pretended to notice in human society the same evolution resulting from the struggle for life that biologists had observed in nature. It is no wonder that an ideology accepting the idea of equality of opportunity even at the

summit of the era of capitalism, should rouse little interest in the social factors affecting social mobility.

Strangely enough the slight interest in this social problem was likewise partly due to Marxist socialism, the great antagonist of liberalism. The Marxist way of thought looked upon individual mobility as a problem of minor value, except in the cases of proletarianisation falling under the "Verelendungstheorie". For according to these views of historic materialism the emancipation of individuals from their class environment remains too much an individual and incidental phenomenon to be an important subject of study.⁹ According to Marxist socialism the lower social strata and the individuals belonging to these strata had no opportunities of social rise apart from those which would be realised collectively by the Marxist revolution.

So neither Marxism nor liberalism was likely to promote the concrete study of vertical mobility. Nineteenth century liberalism was blind to the problem; Marxism attached little importance to it. It was especially the revisionist socialist movement and the radical democratic current within liberalism which laid the foundation for mobility research.

This increased ideological interest received another impulse from the first world war and the great social changes which took place in Eastern Europe after it. So the impact of these conditions is noticeable in the pioneering attempts made by Sorokin, Michels and Mitgau before 1930 to make a concrete study, as complete as possible, of social mobility as an independent problem.¹⁰

As to the situation in the United States it is undeniable that interest in phenomena of social stratification and mobility on the part of American sociologists was greatly stimulated by the economic depression, which intensified the adverse criticism of the belief in the idea of "from rags to riches".¹¹ However, this belief, being a part of the "American Dream", is still firmly rooted in the social structure of the United States.¹²

Nevertheless times had become ripe for elaborate mobility studies, whose objects, derived from applied sociology, were obviously and in the first place directed towards the removal of irrational obstacles to social ascent and descent. In the introduction to the extensive study of social mobility in England¹³ the editor makes the following remarks: "There are two primary reasons for wishing to see the possibility of high social mobility in a community. First, in order to increase economic and social efficiency, since with a fluid social structure there is more likelihood that positions requiring high ability will in fact be held by individuals who possess high ability. A fluid social structure is also, on that account, more capable of adapting itself to internal and external change. Secondly, from the point of view of the individual, social mobility should ensure that there are fewer square pegs in round holes, and the existence of opportunity to rise in status will in any case provide an incentive for the fuller utilisation of a person's capacities.

There may, as a consequence, be less feeling of personal frustration and a greater possibility of social harmony."

Besides the advantages of the possibility of high social mobility the above-mentioned study also points, though with less emphasis, to the drawbacks of this phenomenon, which also require to be studied and will be discussed later in this article.

In view of the motives which led to the study of mobility, it is interesting to trace the ways in which this research has developed methodologically in the last few decades.

SOME IMPORTANT METHODOLOGICAL ALTERNATIVES

In a paper read to the I.S.A. Congress of 1953 Professor Nelson Foote [U.S.A.] and his colleagues gave a useful bird's eye view of the present range of alternatives in stratification and mobility research.¹⁴

One of their most important remarks is that since much of the sociological interest in stratification springs initially from practical concern with controlling the pattern of inequality in society, this objective calls for more policy-oriented research than hitherto.

Though neither approach (applied or pure research) can claim to be more realistic or more basic, the policy-decision approach does seem to force more often explicit clarification of research objectives and research assumptions. To take the policy-decision approach implies a conception about the ultimate use of the research findings.

The above-mentioned originally weak ideological incentives promoting mobility study may partly account for the fact that particularly the static community stratification studies have paid little attention to the policy-decision approach.

The question whether mobility study should or should not take the requirements of applied research into account is of direct importance in connection with the methodological alternative of single versus multiple approach. The single approach proceeds from an overall system of stratification, e.g. the occupational ladder. The multiple approach, on the other hand, wants as fully as possible, to take the fact into account that society is characterised by multiple overlapping and even contradictory criteria of status.

The single occupational approach is critically examined in Miller's paper. He denies that occupational rating should be an adequate reflector of changes in the objective circumstances attached to a job, e.g. income, skill, power over others and stability of income. According to Miller the single occupational approach expects subjective statements about occupations to be accurate standards of the non-subjective dimensions of jobs.

Miller points to the lower white-collar jobs. He shows that the economic differentiation between factory and lower white-collar workers has diminished; often factory hands receive slightly higher wages than

white-collar workers. Most striking perhaps is the realisation that in **not** a few ways the factory worker with a strong trade union and a **shop** steward system is more independent of his employer than the **white-collar worker.** Miller doubts, not without reason, if these recent changes in the politico-economic strata are adequately reflected in the occupational prestige scale.

On the other hand, it may be pointed out that in some local areas these changes in the objective economic and power sphere are actually reflected in the ranking of the occupational ladder, so that the skilled worker is ranked higher there than the lower white-collar worker.¹⁵

However, the difficulty remains that the single occupational prestige approach, important though it may be as a standard in our modern industrial and bureaucratic society and showing a remarkable correlation of local and even national occupational ladders,¹⁶ does not sufficiently reckon with those important stratification criteria of power, wealth and culture.

A related question is to what extent a rise on the occupational ladder is followed by a corresponding rise of the social environment of the person concerned, which may be manifested in his social participation.

This adverse criticism does not of course refer to the multiple approach as applied for instance by Warner and his associates in their community studies. This multiple approach affords more possibilities to balance the various stratificational aspects of the person to be ranked. But the great difficulty with these community studies is that they "stubbornly resist generalisation, so rooted are they in local idiosyncrasy".¹⁷ Warner himself writes: "It must be said, too, that community studies give only part of the evidence about the vast superstructure of American life. The greatly extended economic and political hierarchies, for example, whose centres of decision are in New York and Washington, can be only partly understood by these studies".¹⁸

Anderson moreover draws our attention to the fact that none of the valuable field studies of the Warner group contain mobility data.¹⁹ One of the most thorough mobility studies of one community again takes occupation as a standard.²⁰

So we see that both the single and the multiple approach present their specific difficulties. The single approach gives a too one-sided picture; the multiple approach, as far as it has been applied up till now, resists generalisation and often proves to supply few data for a mobility study. It is of importance to realise, however, that these two approaches may reflect quite distinct predictive interests, with the advocate of the single system view being largely interested in the more gross, mass society predictions, and in predictions more or less independent of inter-personal relationships on a concrete level. The multiple system on the other hand is more appropriately geared to the problems of dissent and deviance, social change, and interpersonally specific relations.²¹

The question in how far these approaches are capable of being combined into one method, will be discussed at the end of this article. But even if it should not be possible to bridge the gap between the single and the multiple approach, they would neither of them be superfluous, as they have different aims, especially at this stage of development of mobility study.

CLASSIFICATION AND DISCUSSION OF SOME CONCLUSIONS OF THE PAPERS SUBMITTED

Miller's paper gives a useful provisional listing of the interests in mobility, which were for the greater part also discussed at the I.S.A. Working Conference held at Amsterdam in 1954. In summarising some aspects of the papers submitted we shall follow his classification scheme.

- (1) A description of the total vertical mobility of a society. (Such information provides a basis for comparing one society with another or a society with itself at previous or later points of time.)

This heading may include Van Tulder's study. His paper summarises the results of the cross-national occupational mobility study carried out in the Netherlands on the initiative of the I.S.A. This representative enquiry demonstrates that there has been a distinct increase in the frequency of occupational vertical mobility in the Netherlands since 1919. A detailed analysis indicates the strata of the occupational ladder in which this change is most evident, viz.: the social rise from the semi-skilled and unskilled manual level.

An important aid used in this enquiry is the concept of historical occupational mobility. By this concept is meant the change occurring in the composition of the various social strata in the course of time, and the way in which this change was brought about. This analysis requires a reconstruction of the past, which makes it possible to measure both the rise and fall *from* the mobility *to* the various strata.

- (2) Special research concerning the movement into the élite positions in society.

Von Ferber's paper is concerned with an enquiry into the social origins of German university professors since 1865, an enquiry held by the Sociological Seminary of the University of Göttingen. The author points to the importance of the social origin of professors and poses the hypothesis that as science is gradually emerging from its tower of ivory and is becoming more and more concerned with problems of direct social interest, scholars will be recruited to a greater extent from population groups in favour of a close contact between science and society. His enquiry shows that among the fathers of professors the academic and artistic professions as well as those of publicity have decreased since 1864 from 67 to 44 per cent. This decrease in the number of representatives from the professions just mentioned is the

more remarkable since the share of academic professions among the fathers of students has hardly changed. The author attributes this situation to the above-mentioned changes in scientific interest. On the other hand the number of economically non-liberal professions among the fathers of professors has doubled since 1864. Of course the fact that the percentage of people employed in these occupations has strongly increased has played its part in this process. But the chief cause the author mentions is the extent to which the German universities and academic colleges have succeeded in diminishing the economic risk of young graduates between their graduation and the attainment of a permanent appointment as a professor.

The author also points to the drawbacks of this increasing social heterogeneity among university professors, particularly with regard to their sense of solidarity, while it may also involve the loss of valuable traditions. However, this increase in mobility is an inevitable and a desirable development: science in this century has found a more "rational" basis, also in the recruitment of its prominent scholars.

Kuiper's study deals with "The mobility to the learned professions in the Netherlands" and distinguishes between liberal professions (physicians, dentists and veterinary surgeons, lawyers) on the one hand and academic engineers and economists on the other. His conclusion is that long distance mobility to the professional occupations just mentioned is rare. A remarkable fact is that the rate of long distance mobility of physicians is much larger than that of lawyers, in spite of the fact that the study of medicine is an expensive one and a young physician usually needs some capital to start a practice. However, high though the cost of buying a practice may be, it seems to be easier to borrow money than to build up social relations.

Mobility over three generations shows that primary school teachers are proportionately strongly represented in the series of ascent as a medium of social upward mobility (the father of the informant being a primary school teacher). Another remarkable fact is the high frequency of the agrarian origin of these teachers. In rural districts the teaching profession is the principal medium of social rise, followed by the trades. The fact that the professions of primary and secondary school teachers are important rungs on the social ladder appears from the relatively high percentage of secondary school teachers whose fathers were manual workers, namely $7\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. (0.7 per cent. for the liberal professions, 2.8 per cent. for economists and lawyers). As many as 16.8 per cent. of the grandfathers of secondary school teachers belonged to the working classes. This figure is 3.9 per cent. for the liberal professions and 11 per cent. for the group of academic engineers and economists. The conclusion is that the teaching professions are the most attractive ones for the members of the lower social strata, probably because they are most familiar to them; especially the profession of primary school teacher.

Another reason may be the special financial facilities granted to the students preparing for these occupations.

Vinke made a representative study of the mobility to the group of chief executives of large public companies in the Netherlands, whose shares enjoy official Stock Exchange quotation. He made a simultaneous study of a group of chief executives of comparable private companies.

With regard to the mobility of the generation of their fathers the chief executives for the greater part derive from the higher layers of stratification (university graduates, executives of large companies), in spite of the fact that these strata constitute only 2 or 3 per cent. of the total Dutch occupied population. Less than two-fifths of the chief executives derive from the middle classes and only a fraction from the lower strata (skilled and unskilled labourers). According to Vinke a rise over one generation from the lower strata to the group studied by him is hardly possible. Strictly speaking, this also holds good for two generations. About ten per cent. of the grandparents of the chief executives belonged to the lower strata, though these constitute 70 per cent. of the total occupational population. Remarkable is the occupational stability of the "career pattern" at the level of chief executive: since the first world war re-organisations involved the dismissal of no more than 10 per cent. of the managers and directors holding these positions during the re-organisation of their companies. Moreover, several of these people were very old. A comparison between the chief executives of public and those of private companies shows that the former, who are not the owners of the companies, have a lower rather than a higher vertical mobility than the managers and directors of the private companies. A fact which strongly contradicts the ideas propounded in Burnham's theories.

Anderson and Lewis studied the "Social Origins and social mobility of businessmen in an American city", particularly the executives of relatively small and medium-sized industries. Compared with other factors considered in this study, schooling is closely associated with business success as here measured. Equally important, however, are the numerous exceptions; these exceptions are asymmetrical: few men of advanced schooling operate small firms, but a sizeable share of large firms are headed by poorly schooled men. The authors point to contrasts between the modes of advance through success in independent business and through corporate management. If business is exceptional in that unusual men with little schooling may be highly successful, this is primarily achieved through independent business.

In his study concerning a random sample of the population of the district of Schleswick-Holstein (Northern Germany), Bolte considers social mobility under two aspects, viz. as movements between social status categories and as movements between fields of occupation (e.g.

agricultural, administrative, mechanical ("handwerklich") and technical). He found that the occupations of the sons are not distributed more or less symmetrically over all other spheres, but that there are certain fields of occupation specially preferred or avoided.

Mandić (Yugoslavia) gives a survey of the problems connected with the formation of new social and economic élites after the social revolution in his country.

(3) The effects of mobility upon class attitudes and class-consciousness, particularly in the working classes.

Sombart was one of the first sociologists who saw the relation between high vertical mobility and a low degree of "class-consciousness" and political "class antagonism",²² especially in the United States.

This idea has probably been a strong motive in the development of mobility study. Miller remarks that implicitly, many researchers are inquiring: is in this particular society mobility at a level which will retard or speed up class consciousness and social change? But he is right in adding the warning that rates of mobility are but one pressure in the pushes and pulls which affect class-consciousness. The general level of economic conditions and the particular conditions of life of certain sections of the population are in many ways as important—if not frequently a more important element—in affecting class-consciousness.

Janowitz quotes Lipset and Bendix: "The existence of widespread social mobility may be compatible with a society in which status differences are emphasised rather than minimised".²³ The situation in the Soviet Union might be interesting in connection with this aspect.

Van Tulder's cross-national sample study of the Netherlands reveals an increasing frequency of occupational mobility from the lowest strata, together with an undeniable decrease of antagonistic class feeling. It is difficult, however, to isolate the factor of mobility frequency in this connection. Probably the economic and social improvements in the status of the working classes in the Netherlands have been a stronger factor in diminishing class antagonism.

The study of this problem requires a detailed enquiry into the mental attitude of the lower strata resulting from a higher or lower frequency of short distance or long distance mobility. A distinction should then be made between the effect of vertical mobility upon the limited number of individuals who have climbed socially and its effect upon the vast lower strata from which they spring. Janowitz gives data about the political behaviour in the United States of mobile individuals. Empirical research leads to the conclusion that upward social mobility produces political behaviour which tends to reflect the interests of the higher strata.

On the other hand downwardly mobile people showed in voting and affiliation strong ties with the strata from which they came. It is pointed out that these findings are limited to a social context of general economic development and expansion.

(4) The effect of personal attitudes and attributes on an individual's or group's possibilities of moving, or the effect of the educational system upon an individual's or group's possibilities of moving.

Svalastoga (Denmark) remarks that "With due recognition of work already done in this field, it still appears that we know more about the antecedents of divorce and criminal recidivism than of the antecedents of social ascent and descent". This comparison stresses the fact that little study has been made as yet of the factors affecting vertical mobility. In this connection the author draws the attention to the "retrospective community cohort method", which studies those born in a certain community during a certain time-interval. A selection is made from this cohort for the purpose of making a thorough analysis, consisting of detailed interviews with the cohort members themselves and with their community of origin, including family, neighbourhood, playgroup, school, church, local administration and associations. This research includes documentary, observational and interrogational methods. The method especially concentrates on population groups which for some particular reason possess a characteristic feature affecting vertical mobility. The author therefore studied a sample of males, aged 21 and over, having received no schooling or other training after their seven years' compulsory education. He considers as the most interesting group those men who in their answers do not refer to their lack of ability, nor to the absence of any desire to obtain further education. It is worth noting that irrespective of personal ability or desire respondents tended in retrospection to regard the obtaining of further education as deviant behaviour.

The author points in this connection to the fact that the proportion of university students of working class origin has changed very little over the last generation, in spite of increased welfare-state efforts towards achieving equality of opportunity.

(5) The effect of mobility on the mobile individual.

Janowitz presents an interesting survey of some consequences of vertical mobility in the United States. He distinguishes between primary and secondary groups. As to the consequences of vertical mobility on primary groups, many of the empirical researches, according to the author, confirm the theoretical work done by Durkheim. In a wide range of subject-matters, such as family organisation, prejudice, and mental health, his conclusions repeatedly refer to the dysfunctional, disruptive and disorganising contributions of social mobility. Exactly as Durkheim had anticipated, disruptive consequences are to be found for downward as well as for upward social mobility, especially rapid social advance. However, to observe the dysfunctional effects of social mobility on primary group structures in particular strata does not mean to deny the special conditions of social creativeness in particular groups stimulated by the release from traditional norms, which is implied in such disruptive processes.

Scientific research has traced out in detail the effects of social mobility on the child in consequence of marked and sudden upward changes of social position.

Competition for status, the insecurities generated by mobility and the need to incorporate new norms, may also release tension and hostility towards out-groups.

While American social scientists are much concerned with the adjustment of upwardly mobile people, they have not overlooked the range of secondary group structures which are being formed and continue to support the family unity under circumstances of social ascent.

A remarkable part is played by religion in this connection. The many-sided institutions of organised religion have served to supply standards of behaviour and an integrative device for the mobile sons and daughters of lower class immigrant groups entering into the lower-middle class.

Summarising Janowitz' paper we can say that even the limited number of studies on the consequences of social mobility in the United States point to important implications of vertical mobility for social attitudes. The problem arises what may be the consequences of vertical mobility in other countries. A study of this matter in the Netherlands concerning an industrial community with efficiently organised secondary groups reaches less pessimistic conclusions than the paper quoted above. The Dutch enquiry concluded that "the difficulties in the life of rising individuals are peculiar to their situation, but probably do not differ essentially from those problems which life puts before anyone who, in an industrial society which is socially unstable, tries to reach a certain degree of integration."²⁴ The question might be asked if factors like long range migration as well as racial and ethnic problems also contribute much to the phenomena ascribed to vertical mobility in the United States.

Reynaud and Touraine deal with the development of the attitudes of medical students deriving from the low social strata (working classes, small farmers and subordinate officials).

Their study establishes the fact that these upwardly mobile students usually have the same professional ambitions as the students coming from the higher social strata. For instance they also prefer to be physicians with a free practice rather than take up a position with a fixed salary. A typical example is afforded by the medical scholars, who would financially be absolutely unable to buy a practice, yet prefer to start a practice of their own rather than accept a salaried position. Only very reluctantly and under stress of circumstances do they choose the latter way. This duality creates a conflict between the ambitions of the upwardly moving individuals and their concrete prospects.

Remarkable is the authors' information that the proportionate number of students from the highest social stratum increases as the

medical study approaches its completion. No mention is made of the forces causing this fact.

In his paper "Intermarriage and Mobility in Hawaii" Broom discusses *inter alia* the necessity of an enquiry as to the relation between race heterogamy and class homogamy and the extent to which intermarriage modifies vertical mobility and the elements of the population for which it holds good.

STARTING POINTS FOR FURTHER ENQUIRY

The International Sociological Association, by organising working conferences and congresses and by supporting enquiries, has greatly stimulated the study of social stratification and mobility. So far, however, these studies have been somewhat one-sided by concentrating on the single occupational prestige approach. It is desirable now to consider some other starting points.²⁶

It has already been observed that thoughtful attention should be paid to the ultimate objects of the study of vertical mobility. The question "Knowledge for what?" may also be applied to this section of sociological research. The choice between single and multiple approach is to a great extent determined by the objects in view.

(1) Should an enquiry be made into the question whether mobility in a country has increased (a problem which may also be useful for applied research in the field of educational sociology), it might endeavour to gain a provisional impression by means of occupational mobility research. Such a single approach does not ignore the fact that the method is imperfect for the purpose of measuring other aspects of social mobility, such as changes of power or wealth. But it is also true that multiple methods to approach practical national mobility problems—methods which were not only formulated but also used—have so far been lacking.²⁶ A certain degree of improvement in measuring vertical occupational mobility may be attained by using Hatt's two-dimensional classification of occupations, consisting of the vertical or status dimension and the horizontal or situs dimension, an approach which is recognisable in the general plan of Bolte's study.²⁷

A similar method is applied in Van Doorn's poly-hierarchical occupational stratification, which is based on a study of firmly closed groups distinctly objectively stratified—in this case organisational associations—and a subsequent analysis of the various groups as parts of more or less closed hierarchical systems. This method is concluded by an enquiry into the degree of integration of these systems in larger units and in the social structure, and into the integration of the specific standards of stratification directly related.²⁸

Such an enquiry, however, has not been made yet.

If social stratification in itself is the object of study, for instance in connection with interpersonal specific relations and problems of dissent and deviance, the multiple index approach is the most effective method, using such standards as social participation, index of wealth,

and life-style. Such researches may be of great importance for the local relations of social classes and status groups and may devote full attention to personal adjustment. Those who have applied the multiple and single approaches have often criticised one another.²⁹ Their collaboration might at this stage benefit both pure and applied sociological research.

(2) When the height, frequency and stability of mobility has been established with the aid of the above-mentioned methods, the first question to be asked in connection with our subject is: How does this mobility affect class structure? We referred to the opinion held by some authors that a high frequency of mobility could diminish class tension and class antagonism, while other research workers were of quite a different opinion. It should be remembered, however, that social mobility should be considered as only one facet of the research on social structure. An enquiry into the causes of changes of class attitude should keep the effects of the frequency of mobility as much apart as possible from the changes in the objective socio-economic level of the labour classes.

(3) In this connection the time seems to have arrived to pay more attention (than has so far been done) to the causes and consequences of a high frequency of long and short distance vertical mobility.

As to the *causes*, the study of extreme types discussed at the previous I.S.A. congress drew attention to the very complex intertwining of sociological, socio-psychological and economic factors, which stimulate or check vertical mobility to and from different social strata in various geographical areas. It should be especially stressed that education is only one of these factors, though a very important one.³⁰

As for the social *consequences* of a high frequency of long distance vertical mobility, research should be stimulated according to approaches referred to in Janowitz' paper.

A clear distinction should be made between the consequences of horizontal and those of vertical mobility, while special care should be taken to avoid rash generalisations of the results of small enquiries, or enquiries made under specific local circumstances.

(4) Research into individual vertical mobility should take more and more notice of the dynamic development of social stratification. In this connection attention should be paid to the models of mobility as construed by Goldhamer and Rogoff;³¹ Van Tulder's concept of historical mobility may also be useful. In above-mentioned models the raw rate of mobility is adjusted for the rate of mobility attributable to changes in the occupational structure. The residual is the mobility which is not due to the exigencies of occupational change and is thus a better indicator, it is believed, of the fluidity of a society.

(5) Downward mobility should be given more attention than has been the case so far. The material available shows that the occupational ladder is a particularly unfit medium for measuring downward

mobility, because those people who have descended socially, often prefer to be supported by their relatives or by the community rather than take up occupations with a considerably lower social prestige than those held in their milieu of origin.

An attempt to approach the problem of downward mobility is Korstanje's enquiry held in the Netherlands into the social origin of the recipients of public relief, which study will shortly be published within the framework of the relative I.S.A. research.

We have reached the end of our introductory comments. It appears that in spite of, or perhaps thanks to, its present critical stage, mobility study receives much attention from the younger generation of research workers. This great interest is a warrant that the contradictory opinions so characteristic of our subject have not led to agnostic apathy. On the contrary, it may be expected that the next decades will see a greater integration of methods and a closer collaboration of research workers to the benefit of pure and applied sociology.

NOTES

¹ With limited space at our disposal, we shall in this introduction only discuss the problem of vertical social mobility. Other forms of social mobility are only indirectly of significance to our subject.

² Harold W. Pfautz, "The current literature on social stratification, critique and bibliography," *The American Journal of Sociology*, January, 1953, p. 392.

³ Talcott Parsons, "*The Social System*," Glencoe, 1951, pp. 132 and 172.

⁴ Cf. H. W. Pfautz, "Social stratification and sociology," *Transactions of the Second World Congress of Sociology*, Vol. II, p. 311.

⁵ The English language has no special word to indicate the social class which has become group-conscious on account of the same economic interests in the labour market. German distinguishes between "Stand" (based on social prestige and life-style) and "Klasse" (based on similarity of economic interests). Not every status group is a "Stand" (cf. our definition of status group).

⁶ John F. Cuber and William F. Kenkel, "Social stratification in the United States," New York, 1954, p. 12.

⁷ Cf. Nelson N. Foote, Walter R. Goldschmidt, Richard T. Morris, Melvin Seeman and Joseph Shister, "Alternative assumptions in stratification research," *Transactions of the Second World Congress of Sociology*, Vol. II, International Sociological Association, 1954, p. 387.

⁸ C. A. Moser and J. R. Hall, "The social grading of occupations," included in *Social mobility in Britain*, ed. D. V. Glass, London, 1954, p. 36.

⁹ Typical in this connection is Engel's statement: "Alles was der Proletarier zur Verbesserung seiner Lage selbst tun kann, verschwindet wie ein Tropfen am Eimer gegen die Fluten von Wechselfällen, denen er ausgesetzt ist und über die er nicht die geringste Macht hat".*

* F. Engels, *Die Lage der arbeitenden Klassen in England*, p. 119.

¹⁰ P. Sorokin *Social Mobility*, New York/London, 1927. R. Michels *Umschichtungen in den herrschenden Klassen nach dem Kriege*; Stuttgart, 1934. The first edition had appeared earlier. J. H. Mitgau, *Familienschicksal und soziale Rangordnung*; Leipzig, 1928.

¹¹ Cf. C. Arnold Anderson *Recent American Research on Social Stratification*, Mens en Maatschappij, November, 1955, p. 322.

¹² S. M. Lipset and R. Bendix, "Ideological Equalitarianism and Social Mobility in the United States," *Transactions of the Second World Congress of Sociology*, Vol. II, p. 34.

¹³ Cf. *Social Mobility in Britain*, ed. by D. V. Glass, "Introduction," p. 24.

¹⁴ Foote, *ibid.*, p. 378.

¹⁵ Cf. I. van Hulst, *Stijging en Daling in een modern grootbedrijf*, Leiden, 1953, p. 24; and by the same author, "Summary of a Study on Social Mobility in the Philips Works, Eindhoven," *Transactions of the Second World Congress of Sociology*, Vol. II, p. 81.

¹⁶ See Verduynde's mimeographed paper and Alex Inkeles and Peter H. Rossi, "National Comparisons of Occupational Prestige," *American Journal of Sociology*, January, 1956, p. 329.

¹⁷ Cf. Paul K. Hatt, "Occupation and Social Stratification," *American Journal of Sociology*, May, 1950, p. 535.

¹⁸ W. Lloyd Warner, *American Life*, Chicago, 1953, p. 34.

¹⁹ Cf. C. Arnold Anderson, *Recent American Research on Social Stratification*, Mens en Maatschappij, November, 1955, p. 324.

²⁰ N. Rogoff, *Recent Trends in Urban Occupational Mobility*, see R. Bendix and S. M. Lipset *Class, Status and Power*, *ibid.*, p. 442.

²¹ Foote, *ibid.*, p. 386.

²² W. Sombart, *Warum gibt es in den Vereinigten Staaten keinen Sozialismus*, Tübingen 1906.

²³ Seymour M. Lipset and R. Bendix, "Ideological Equalitarianism and Social Mobility in the United States," *Transactions of the Second World Congress of Sociology*, I.S.A., pp. 34-54.

²⁴ I. E. van Hulst, "Social Mobility in the Philips Works, Eindhoven," *ibid.*

²⁵ In this connection we also refer to the valuable suggestions for constructive research in Miller's paper.

²⁶ At least according to the provisional opinion of the author of this paper. Information concerning this subject at the Congress-session would be very valuable.

²⁷ Cf. Paul K. Hatt, "Occupation and Social Stratification," *The American Journal of Sociology*, May, 1950, p. 533. See also Bolte's paper.

²⁸ J. A. A. van Doorn, "Het probleem van de beroepsstratificatie," *Sociologische gids*, June, 1955, p. 88.

²⁹ For a critical appreciation of the single occupational prestige approach see *inter alia* A. Touraine, *Rapport sur la préparation en France de l'enquête internationale sur la stratification et la mobilité sociale*, cp. 1-2, Liège Congress, 1953, and Miller's paper. An elaborate critical discussion of the multiple community approach as it is applied for instance by Warner is found in the article by R. Rosner Kornhauser, "The Warner Approach to Social Stratification," in R. Bendix and S. M. Lipset, *Class, Status and Power*, p. 224.

³⁰ The author of this paper gave in an extreme-type study a survey of factors influencing the low frequency of long distance vertical mobility at Enschede (Netherlands). The influence of the following factors was striking, by the side of the well-known educational factors: eccentric situation and relatively small size of the town, temperament of the local population, strong family sentiments in higher strata, the very gradual social rise of these strata. The following economic factors were also of importance: the large-sized optimal economic business unit for the local textile mills, the scarcity of skilled labour in these mills, and the one-sided specialisation in the economic structure of the town. Special attention should also be paid to the size and composition of the parental family.*

* Cf. F. van Heck, "The Method of extreme types as a tool for the study of the causes of vertical mobility," *Transactions of the Second World Congress of Sociology*, p. 391, and by the same author, *Stijging en Daling op de maatschappelijke ladder*, Leiden, 1945, p. 220 ff.

³¹ See discussion in Miller's paper referring N. Rogoff, "Recent trends in Occupational Mobility," Glencoe, 1953.

The Concept and Measurement of Mobility

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I. INTRODUCTION

The recent rise in interest in mobility has not been characterised by much theoretical discussion of the concept.¹ As excellent a survey as that of Ely Chinoy² has little reference to the concepts involved. If we go back to the pioneering work of Pitirim Sorokin,³ we find almost no discussion of the concept of mobility except that it involves movement towards or away from elite positions.

Since research on mobility has expanded so rapidly, it may be well to reflect on its character, even though a full review may not be possible at this time. In the following remarks, the emphasis will be on the multi-dimensional character of mobility and on the multi-dimensional character of each of its indicators.

The mobility with which we are concerned is but one type of a wide range of behaviour. A more pronounced and widespread mobility is geographic, in which the individual may move from rural to urban or vice versa, from one part of a city to another, from one part of a country to another and from country to country. Such movement is not only sociologically important but has many implications for (social) mobility, especially when the movement is rural to urban.

In addition to geographic mobility, there are the various types of mobilities discussed in labour market analysis: movement from one job to another job in the same firm, movement to the same or a different position in another firm, movement to another industry or labour market in the same or different position. Many of these movements would constitute mobility in our sense, although most would not since the majority of occupational moves do not constitute a change in one's economic or social position.

II. THE CONCEPT

The clarification of a concept depends on more knowledge, but we can use as a working definition the following: The mobility with which we are concerned involves a *significant* movement in an individual's or stratum's economic, social and political position.

The concept which is best for us depends upon the problem with which we are concerned. Here, it would seem is one of the sources of the difficulties with our concept of mobility; we have assumed that all who talk about mobility are concerned essentially with the same problems, while, in actuality, there have been a variety of different concerns

in studying the mobility trends. The following is an incomplete listing of the interests in mobility:

- (1) A concern with a description of a society—how much fluidity of movement does it have? Such information provides a basis for comparing one society with another or a society with itself at previous and later points in time.
- (2) A concern with the opportunities open to individuals to utilise their talents. In a sense, this is the problem listed in (1) but from the point of view of the individuals in the society.
- (3) An exclusive concern with movement into the elite positions in society. Other movement in society is ignored.
- (4) An exclusive concern with the movement of the working classes of the society. Movements of other groups is residual.
- (5) The effects of mobility upon class attitudes and class consciousness, particularly in the working class.
- (6) The effects of personal attitudes and attributes on an individual's or group's possibilities of moving, or the effects of the educational system upon an individual's or group's possibilities of moving.
- (7) The effects of mobility upon the mobile individual.

Despite the diversity of interests, mobility has been studied in a limited and traditional way. Namely, that mobility involves a major change up or down in an individual's occupational position. Chief issues involved are (a) how well does occupational mobility reflect all aspects of mobility and (b) what characterises a positive or a negative change in occupational position? A number of other issues are also important, and we shall deal with them in a fairly systematic review of the steps involved in measurement of mobility. At each step, some issues are raised.

III. THE MEASUREMENT OF WHOSE MOBILITY?

Mobility is measured as that of a family or that of an individual. The former is inter-generational mobility, where an individual's position is compared with that of his father and possibly that of his grandfather.⁴ One issue involved is at which points to compare the older and younger generations. Rogoff compares them at the same age:⁵ while this procedure has merit, in many cases it may be desirable to compare generations at equivalent points in career, which may not be the same as age equivalence because of changes in educational requirements.

In *intra-generational* mobility, an individual is compared with himself at another point of his career.⁶ Has he moved into a higher, or lower position or has he not materially changed his position? Which points should be compared: the first job or the first *regular* job after completing education with the end of the career or the height of the career?

Frequently neglected is the *stability* of the occupational change. If workers can start an independent business but have little chance of surviving in it and therefore drop back into the working class, no effective mobility is involved. Therefore, the stability of an occupational advance must be studied.⁷

The individual career history is to be used discriminately, since individual mobility does not, of course, connote family mobility. If an individual has risen, we do not know anything about the movement of his children. Yet many of the problems of stratification, and therefore of mobility, revolve about the family as a transmitter of status.⁸ If we want to turn to an analysis of mobility *trends* in society, intra-generational studies are to be interpreted carefully.

A neglected element in measurements of mobility is the possibility of *stratum mobility*, that while an individual may not be mobile, his stratum might be.⁹ Thus, some have begun to argue that the position of working class people is improving in the United States, in both absolute and relative terms. Without leaving his stratum, the working class son of a working class father may show great movement, relative to his father and relative to other classes, in obtaining material goods and comfort.¹⁰ While the author sees difficulties in this thesis, it is one which will, undoubtedly, be offered increasingly and will lead to more study of some of the frequently neglected *objective* characteristics of occupational position.

IV. ATTRIBUTES OF MOBILITY

Mobility can be measured in terms of frequency, stability, and height. Some aspects of frequency are discussed below; stability has been briefly discussed above; height remains to be analysed.

Height refers to the degree of change involved in a mobility move, as compared to frequency which lumps all movements defined as mobility into one category for the purpose of calculating rates. Generally, we are interested in the size of the mobility change: Has a mobile person changed his position to a small or to a great degree? While gross rates of mobility for a society as a whole or for particular segments are important, it would be well to compute rates for selected movements, e.g., from lower class into upper class. In this way, we can obtain height-frequency rates which are extremely useful.

V. TYPES OF MEASUREMENT AND TERTIARY EMPLOYMENT

Mobility data are of two kinds:¹¹ (1) data about individuals or (2) data about a population or aggregates. The first type refers to data describing an individual's movement relative to himself or to his father, while the second type refers, for example, to occupational distributions and demographic shifts of groupings treated as a whole.

From data about aggregates, one cannot make statements about conditions of individuals.¹² This condition is particularly so where the categories of the aggregate data are of a crude quality. Frequently

in national studies of mobility, the Colin Clark typology of primary, secondary and tertiary employment is used.¹³ If a larger percentage of individuals are now in tertiary employment than before, mobility is believed to have increased. This conclusion is based on the premise that a tertiary position is an improvement economically and socially. Yet if the category of tertiary employment is studied, it is seen to include a wide range of jobs—from a sales clerk in a department store to a fireman on a railroad train—some of which might well be improvements in occupational status but some of which probably are not.¹⁴

Another difficulty is that tertiary employment is the characteristic employment of women in highly industrialised societies. Yet, most of our interest in mobility is with the male, as the main transmitter of position. Therefore, it might be well to use occupational distribution data which referred only to males.

Ignored as well is the nature of changes within each category. For example, in the United States, relative and absolute employment in agriculture is declining, as correctly shown by the Clark system. What it does not reveal is that within the agricultural category, there may be downward mobility as a result of "a steady decline in the possibility of moving up the so-called agricultural ladder, whose steps went from hired hand to tenant to farm owner. . . ."¹⁵ In the Clarkian analysis, a smaller percentage in agriculture connotes mobility, but of the smaller percentage in agriculture, many may be downwardly mobile. Many who moved out of agriculture into other fields are not assured of an improvement in their economic or social circumstances, particularly if they had been farm operators.

The Clarkian approach is useful for it gives us easily accessible data (at least in nations with a national census system) for the entire population. But it is doubtful if we can use his categories; a more microscopic examination of each occupation, viewed over time, is necessary before we lump occupations together into broad exclusive categories, indicative of a definite upward or downward mobility trend.

VI. WHAT IS BEING MEASURED ?

Mobility is generally regarded not only in economic terms but in social and political as well. Studies of mobility, however, tend to concentrate on movements in occupational positions. *This emphasis neglects other dimensions of mobility: movements in economic and/or political power; movements in social position in the community.* While occupational change correlates to an extent with changes in income, social position and political power, it is not a reliable indicator of such change.¹⁶

A great need in mobility research is, then, to study the *variety* of dimensions rather than to restrict it to the occupational dimension.¹⁷ In many ways the most interesting aspects of mobility are the

connections among the various systems of the community: does, for example, an improvement in occupational position inevitably lead to a change in one's relations to others in the community? Many of the dynamic aspects of the effects of mobility upon behaviour depend upon the character of such interrelationships. The frequent observation that a group whose condition is improving rapidly is the one most pressing for deep social change may be due, in part, to the unevenness of its progress.

VII. THE MEASUREMENT OF OCCUPATIONAL CHANGE¹⁸

The difficulties in employing occupational change as an indicator of mobility illustrate the kinds of issues which are involved in using any indicator of mobility. The fact that occupational mobility predominates in sociological research on mobility is another reason for more closely examining it.

At first blush, change in occupational position seems to be a statement about objective aspects of class position.¹⁹ Yet higher or lower are defined in terms of the prestige ratings of the occupations. Sometimes the prestige ratings are based on a particular study of a sample's ratings of occupations, as, for example, in the well-known and widely used United States study by Hatt and North for The National Opinion Research Centre.²⁰ At other times it may be what is commonly regarded to be the usual way that individuals in a particular society have of rating occupations. Whatever basis is used to obtain a prestige rating, it may be that the rating is not an adequate reflector, at a particular moment of time, of changes in the objective circumstances of a job, e.g., income, skill, power over others, stability of income. We are expecting subjective statements about occupations to be accurate statements about the non-subjective dimensions of jobs—their pay, their skill requirements, etc.

How well do the community's prestige ratings reflect the objective differences among occupations? We can see the problem more clearly if we examine the crucial white collar fields. Movement into white collar work from factory work has been commonly regarded as mobility. In the United States, at least, the economic differentiation between factory and white collar workers has lessened. In 1890, white collar workers received twice as much pay as factory workers; today factory workers receive a little more pay than do white collar workers—a radical swing.²¹ Once white collar workers had special days off as well as paid vacations while factory workers had neither. In many cases today, factory workers through their union contracts, are better off than non-union white collar workers. On point after point, the advantages which once marked off white collar from factory work are diminished or overturned. Most striking perhaps is the realisation that, in not a few ways, the factory worker with a strong union and a shop steward system has more independence from the employer than the white collar worker.

Even in the area of skill, it is not clear that the white collar job is more demanding than the factory job. With increasing mechanisation and routinisation (and the pressure of automation), the office employee in the United States frequently is a machine tender like the factory worker.

In the area of income, skill and discretion, the favoured position of the white collar worker has been reduced. Objectively, many white collar jobs are no longer of a much higher level than factory work in terms of the attributes which distinguish jobs—mainly income and skill. Yet, many investigators despite their troubled feelings about the present day status of white collar work,²² use movement of factory workers or their offspring into white collar work as an automatic marker of mobility. Largely, this procedure is followed because it is felt that white collar work still is accorded higher *prestige* (subjective evaluation) than is factory work. There is some evidence that this higher prestige for white collar work no longer exists.²³ If the Hatt-North study were redone today, it is quite likely that the demarcations in prestige between white collar and factory positions might be narrowed.

The use of prestige scales must be more carefully examined, for it is unclear what they show. When a person is asked to rate occupations, does he indicate how he personally rates them or how he thinks they are generally rated? Is he reporting his view of what the community thinks rather than his own personal perspective?²⁴ Also, are there significant differences among members of various classes and occupations in rating occupations?

Prestige rating of occupations is more complex than usually regarded and cannot be easily substituted for the study of the objective dimensions of occupations—skill, income, discretion, etc. Frequently, even what are regarded as objective differences among types of manual work, as defined by the U.S. Census and other agencies have to be considered with care. Is a skilled worker of today on the same level of skill as his father of 1900? Do we not now have a looser definition of "skilled worker?" Today, the category of semi-skilled worker includes all belt-line operators, some of whom may be trained for the job in 30 minutes. Are they at the same level of skill as a semi-skilled worker of earlier periods? For the purpose of the census, perhaps yes; for the purpose of the study of mobility, they may not be; the census classification may not have the same orientation as the mobility study.

These questions do not lead to the destructive conclusion that nothing can be done, but to a requirement that great care be taken (a) in separating objective and subjective elements and using each where they are proper, and (b) in reviewing traditional classifications and categories to see if they are appropriate for the mobility research problem.

Other indicators of mobility have to be viewed in the same careful lights, if we are to develop a full scale analysis of mobility trends in

which one can have confidence. Mobility cannot be viewed in a uni-dimensional way, nor can its indicators be treated as having but one dimension.

VIII. MODELS FOR RESEARCH

Data on mobility as such do not lend themselves to statements that "mobility is high or low . . ." To make such statements requires criteria to which one can relate mobility data. The construction of such criteria involves conceptual and mathematical operations.

The Goldhamer-Rogoff²⁵ approach looks at mobility in terms of the opportunities for it offered by the occupational structure. The raw rate of mobility is adjusted for the rate of mobility attributable to changes in the occupational structure. The residual is the mobility which is not due to the exigencies of occupational change and is thus a better indicator, it is believed, of the fluidity of a society. It might be asked whether raw rates of mobility might also be adjusted for differential class rates of fertility at particular times; the mobility of the lower classes may be due to a situation where the upper groups are not reproducing themselves. Adjusting for both occupational distribution changes and for fertility may be a better statement of fluidity in the Goldhamer-Rogoff approach.

Alternative to this approach has been the more commonly thought of question: How much mobility would one expect of a class group if its sons had access to positions equal to that of the sons of upper groups in societies?²⁶ Some important comments have been made in regard to the most effective ways of organising and analysing data derived from this approach.²⁷

Some kind of model is important. The best way of developing such a model depends upon the purposes of the model. For certain kinds of cross-national comparison, the Goldhamer-Rogoff approach is preferable. For a concern with problems of class identification, it would not seem to be as useful. Here again, we should be careful not to employ conceptual organisations for one type of problem in analysing problems of quite a different character.

IX. LIMITATIONS ON MOBILITY ANALYSIS

Fields of research that have grown rapidly may easily become a fad, in that studies are made without regard to their usefulness or appropriateness for a given purpose but because the investigator is uncritically following a trend. Mobility research, because of its great potential contribution, might prove to have such a diverting lure. It is important, therefore, to recognise some of its limitations.

Much of the interest in mobility centres about the subjective aspects of stratification. Implicitly, many researchers are inquiring: In this particular society is mobility at a level which will retard or speed-up class consciousness and social change? Since mobility research has

been primarily "objective" in the sense that it is descriptive of the circumstances and conditions of individuals' lives, it can say little about the subjective, attitudinal response to these circumstances and conditions. We have to be very wary in moving from the data about objective conditions to statements about attitudes. Lipset and Zetterberg²⁸ are on the right track, I believe, when they cite the need for not only collecting data on rates of mobility but for also studying some of the subjective reactions to situations.

If I am correct in interpreting much of the interest in mobility research as springing from an interest in trends in class consciousness, then a number of other warnings must be offered. Rates of mobility are but one pressure in the pushes and pulls which affect class consciousness. To centre only on this pressure may be misleading, for under particular circumstances other pressures may be more important. In many ways as important, if not frequently a more important element in affecting class consciousness, is the general level of economic conditions and the particular conditions of life of certain sections of the population. If, for example, working class or peasant groups live at a chronically poor level, their class consciousness may be growing whatever mobility trends may be. Similarly, if economic conditions improve, rapid changes in class consciousness in *either* direction may take place.

These examples point to another difficulty with mobility analysis. It is essentially a long-view approach which is certainly crucial to the understanding of the dynamics of subjective class awareness. But it is only one of the long-term historical forces and experiences that is important. Nor should the short-term, more immediate forces—of war, depression, oppression—be ignored, in studying class consciousness.

Even if mobility were the major determinant of class consciousness, it would be difficult to appraise its effects. For example, if a society were divided 50 per cent. into lower class groups and 50 per cent. into upper class groups and if there were high mobility in that every individual has an equal chance of being in either class section, then 50 per cent. of the sons of lower class fathers would move into upper class positions and 50 per cent. would remain in the lower class. The upper class would have a similar breakdown, and the lower class, would, therefore, be made up of 50 per cent. of sons of lower class fathers and 50 per cent. of sons of upper class fathers. In this highly mobile situation would there be any chance of class consciousness in the lower strata? The answer is likely to be yes, because 50 per cent. of the lower class groups would have a lower class family background (assumed to be conducive to class consciousness), and 50 per cent. of the lower class group would have fallen in the class structure (also assumed to be conducive to revolutionary class activity). Thus, with high rates of mobility, class consciousness would not necessarily decline. (And what would happen if the lower class suffered economic calamities?)

Mobility is to be considered consequently, as only one of the elements in stratification, both in terms of the objective aspects of class position and in terms of the subjective attitudinal reactions to class position.

X. CONSTRUCTIVE RESEARCH SUGGESTIONS

In this paper we have reviewed some of the orientations to research on mobility and have indicated some of the difficulties involved. To avoid a nihilistic effect, we shall list in this concluding section some of the promising approaches to mobility.

(1) Mobility research should be considered as one facet of research on social stratification. For certain interests in stratification, e.g., subjective attitudes, it may not always be most important.

(2) Mobility should not be considered as exclusively referring to occupational change. Research should attempt to get at the other dimensions of mobility—changes in community prestige, changes in power, etc.

(3) Careful attempts should be made in research to separate those elements which are attitudinal from those elements which involve non-attitudinal data. Not only is this distinction important in studying occupational change in which subjective or objective data are involved, but in examining the other dimensions of mobility mentioned in (2). A reappraisal of occupations to see the objective differences among them should be undertaken in each nation.

(4) Broader historical trends should be studied as well as pursuing detailed investigations of historical changes in what is to be considered mobility.

(5) Microscopic studies of samples of a population might well be coupled with studies of the broader aspects of the economic and social character of the society.

(6) More attention should be paid to the height of the mobility change and to its stability. Frequency of mobility change in a group is not sufficient.

(7) Special research might be done on the specific experiences of working class groups, as constituting these groups with which we generally are most concerned in studying the degree of mobility in society.

(8) Models of mobility should be constructed, along both the Goldhamer-Rogoff lines of analysis and along the Glass approach.

(9) Mobility research should go beyond collecting the raw facts of mobility and attempt to study the attitudes conducive to and resulting from mobility.

(10) Study should be concentrated on males rather than on the total population.

(11) More concern should be directed to the downwardly mobile—who are they, what leads to downward mobility, what attitudes do they have?

NOTES

¹ The present paper has been influenced by the approach taken in the unpublished manuscript of Seymour M. Lipset and Hans L. Zetterberg, *A Proposal for Comparative Study of Social Mobility, Its Causes and Consequences*, Bureau of Applied Social Research, Columbia University, 1954. This document is, in many ways, the most advanced presentation of which the author is aware.

² Ely Chinoy, "Social Mobility Trends in the United States," *American Sociological Review*, 20, 1955, pp. 180-186.

³ Pitirim Sorokin, *Social Mobility*, New York, Harper and Brothers, 1928.

⁴ D. V. Glass (ed.), *Social Mobility in Britain*, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1954.

⁵ Natalie Rogoff, *Recent Trends in Occupational Mobility*, Glencoe, The Free Press, 1953.

⁶ A. J. Jaffe and R. O. Carleton, *Occupational Mobility in the United States 1930-1960*, New York, King's Crown Press, 1954.

⁷ The issue of the stability of mobility has applicability beyond the sphere of intra-generational mobility.

⁸ Kingsley Davis has again reminded us of this sociological orientation in his "Reply," *American Sociological Review*, 18, 1953, pp. 378-94.

⁹ S. M. Miller, "The Concept of Mobility," *Social Problems*, 3, 1955, pp. 65-73.

¹⁰ See David Potter, *People of Plenty*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1953.

¹¹ Cf. Chinoy, *op. cit.*, p. 181.

¹² William Robinson, "Ecological Correlations and the Behavior of Individuals," *American Sociological Review*, 15, pp. 351-57.

¹³ Colin Clark, *The Conditions of Economic Progress*, London, Macmillan & Co., 1951.

¹⁴ Recently, a number of studies have appeared which are critical of the primary-secondary-tertiary categories. Most of the points raised in these criticisms apply to cross-national use of the categories; in the present paper the criticisms are made specific to the use of the categories within an economy rather than among economies. The section below on "The Measurement of Occupational Change" introduces additional questions about the Clark approach. The critical comments have been raised in: P. T. Bauer and B. S. Yamey, "Economic Progress and Occupational Distribution," *Economic Journal*, 61, 1951, pp. 741-755, and have been extended by A. L. Minkes, "Statistical Evidence and The Concept of Tertiary Industry," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 3, 1955, pp. 366-73, Simon Rottenberg, "Note on Economic Progress and Occupational Distributions," *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 35, 1953, pp. 168-70, and Margaret S. Gordon, *Employment Expansion and Population Growth, The California Experience, 1900-1950*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1954, p. 30.

¹⁵ Chinoy, *op. cit.*, p. 184.

¹⁶ Some of the difficulties involved in using occupations are discussed in the following section.

¹⁷ See Lipset and Zetterberg, *op. cit.* The typically ignored dimensions of mobility that are listed above or by Lipset and Zetterberg are incomplete and will probably vary depending on the orientation of the research problem and the resources of the researcher.

¹⁸ A fuller analysis of the source of the problems discussed in this section will be found in S. M. Miller, *op. cit.*

¹⁹ For the terminology, "objective" and "subjective" see the concise review by Kurt Mayer, "The Theory of Social Classes," *Harvard Educational Review*, 23, 1953, pp. 149-67.

²⁰ Reprinted in Reinhard Bendix and Seymour Martin Lipset, *Class, Status, and Power*, Glencoe, The Free Press, 1953, pp. 411-26.

²¹ Robert K. Burns, "The Comparative Economic Position of Manual and White-Collar Employees," *Journal of Business*, 27, 1954, pp. 257-67.

²² Seymour M. Lipset and Reinhard Bendix, "Social Mobility and Occupational Career Patterns," *American Journal of Sociology*, 57, 1952, p. 495.

²³ Joseph A. Kahl, "Educational and Occupational Aspirations of 'Common Man' Boys," *Harvard Educational Review*, 23, 1953, p. 191.

²⁴ Notice the wording of the Hatt-North question: ". . . please pick out the statement that best gives your own personal opinion of the general standing that such a job has . . ."

²⁵ Natalie Rogoff, *op. cit.*

²⁶ David Glass, *op. cit.*, pp. 194 ff.

²⁷ See the articles and remarks by S. J. Prais, A. Gabor, W. Z. Billewicz, J. Durbin, and W. Scott, *Population Studies*, 9, 1955.

²⁸ Seymour M. Lipset and Hans L. Zetterberg, *op. cit.*

A Theory of Social Mobility¹

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The lion's share of the studies of social mobility to date are descriptive. Most researchers have been preoccupied primarily with the construction of measures and with the establishing of rates of mobility,² or, they have been concerned with the background of members in certain élite groups.³ It is our contention that enough descriptive material has now been collected to suggest a shift in the emphasis of future research. While we still have to answer many further questions of the type "*how much* mobility?" we might now also begin to ask such questions as "*what causes* account for this rate of mobility?" and "*what consequences* follow from this rate of mobility?" more consciously and systematically than has been done in the past.

To contribute to this shift from descriptive to verificational studies we would like to offer a simple theory of social mobility. We shall present (1) a few definitions delineating different kinds of mobility, and (2) a few hypotheses about factors affecting (a) the extent of mobility, and (b) the political or ideological consequences of various kinds of mobility. These hypotheses will be illuminated with some data already available, but for the main part, they require a great deal of additional empirical support.

1. SOME DIMENSIONS OF MOBILITY

Max Weber has indicated how useful it is to conceive of stratification along many dimensions.⁴ More recently Parsons has suggested that one way of viewing stratification is to conceive of it as "the ranking of units in a social system in accordance with the standards of the common value system".⁵ This approach also affords a multitude of cross-cutting stratifications. Of this multitude we would like to single out a few for discussion. They deal with the ranking of occupational and economic statuses, and with the ranking of certain properties of rôle relationships such as intimacy and power.

(1) *Occupational Rankings*

From Plato to the present occupation has been the most common indicator of stratification. Observers of social life—from novelists to pollsters—have found that occupational class is one of the major

factors which differentiate people's beliefs, values, norms, customs and occasionally some of their emotional expressions.

We now have good measures of the prestige ranks of various occupations which can be used as bases for computation of occupational mobility. Occupations are differentially esteemed and studies show a remarkable agreement as to how they rank in esteem. In a well-known survey 90 occupations ranging from "Supreme Court Justice" and "Physician" to "Street Sweeper" and "Shoe Shiner" were ranked by a national sample of the United States.⁶ On the whole, there is substantial agreement among the raters from different areas of the country, different sizes of home towns, different age groups, different economic levels, and different sexes. Lenski reports that occupations not mentioned in the survey can be fitted into the original rank order with high reliability.⁷ Thus it appears that we have available a technique which makes the notion of occupational rank quite feasible for the researcher. Occupations receiving approximately the same rank will be called an *occupational class*. There appears to be a great deal of international consensus about occupational prestige classes. A recent analysis by Inkeles and Rossi compares the relative position of occupational categories as judged by samples of Americans, Australians, Britons, Japanese, Germans, and Russian defectors.⁸ They report a very high degree of agreement among the people of these six countries. The fact, however, that these studies were for the most part conducted separately, and that the analysis could only deal with published results, did not make possible any basic study of the variations in occupational prestige, or in the relative desirability of different occupations as occupational goals in different countries. Popular as well as academic consensus (which, of course, cannot be trusted as a substitute for actual measurement) suggest that civil service occupations have higher prestige in much of Europe than they do in America. Similarly, most American intellectuals believe that intellectual positions have lower prestige in the United States than they do in Europe. (The above mentioned study of the prestige of occupations in the United States, incidentally, throws doubt upon the common belief of American intellectuals that business men are overly appreciated as compared with themselves; a college professor ranks higher than an owner of a factory that employs 100 people.) New cross-national research might want to focus on such presumed difference in the prestige of occupations.

The above approach to occupational classes in the form of ranking of different occupational titles is theoretically neat and operationally easy. However, one must be aware that it sometimes obscures significant shifts such as those involved in movements from a skilled manual occupation to a low-level white collar position, or from either of these to a modest self-employment. All these occupations might at times fall in the same prestige class. The difficulties inherent in relying solely on this method of classification can be observed most vividly in the fact that many changes in social position which are a

consequence of industrialization would *not* be considered as social mobility since they most frequently involve shifts from a low rural to a low urban position. This points to the need of recording not only occupational class but also *occupational setting*, that is, the kind of social system in which the occupation is found. Changes between occupational settings may also be important: white collar workers behave differently in specified ways from small businessmen or skilled workers although the prestige of their occupational titles may not differ greatly. For example, most researchers in the United States place small business ownership higher than white collar employment, and the latter, in turn, higher than the blue-collar enclave of the same corporation. When estimating their own social status level, white collar workers and small businessmen are much more likely to report themselves as members of the "middle class" than are manual workers who may earn more than they do.⁹ Studies of occupational aspirations indicate that many manual workers would like to become small businessmen.¹⁰ Political studies suggest that at the same income level, manual workers are more inclined to support leftist parties which appeal to the interests of the lower classes, than are white collar workers or self-employed individuals.¹¹

(2) *Consumption Rankings*

It is theoretically and empirically useful to separate occupational and economic statuses. For example, economists have for good reasons differentiated between their subjects in their status as "producers" in the occupational structure, and in their status as "consumers". Both statuses might be ranked but it is not necessarily true that those who receive a high rating in their producing capacity would also receive a high consumption rating.

The ranking of consumer status is difficult. Yet it is plain that styles of life differ and that some are considered more "stylish" than others. Those whose style of life carries approximately the same prestige might be said to constitute a *consumption class*. Changes in consumption class may or may not be concomitant with changes along the other stratification dimensions.

At the same occupational income level, men will vary in the extent to which they are oriented toward acting out the behaviour pattern common to different social classes. For example, highly-paid workers may choose to live either in working-class districts or in middle-class suburbs. This decision both reflect and determine the extent to which workers adopt middle-class behaviour patterns in other areas of life. A study of San Francisco longshoremen has indicated that longshoremen who moved away from the docks area after the income of the occupation improved tended to be much more conservative politically than those who remained in the docks area.¹² A British Labour Party canvasser has suggested that one can differentiate between Labour Party and Conservative voters within the working-class by their

consumption patterns. The Tory workers are much more likely to imitate middle class styles.

The changes which have occurred in many western countries in recent years in the income of different occupational groups point up the necessity to consider consumption class as a distinct stratification category. In countries such as the United States, Sweden, and Great Britain, the lower classes have sharply improved their economic position, while the proportion of the national income going to the upper fifth of the population has declined.¹³ An interesting result in many countries having a long-term full employment economy combined with a reduced working-class birth rate is that a large number of families headed by men in low prestige occupations receive higher incomes than many middle-class families in which the wife does not work, and the children receive a prolonged education. A vivid illustration of this may be seen in the fact that over 100,000 families in the United States, whose principal breadwinner is a "labourer" have an income of over \$10,000 a year.¹⁴ (This income is, of course, in most cases a consequence of having more than one wage-earner in the family.)

It is plain that as an index to consumption class, total income is inadequate, although it obviously sets the ultimate limit for a person's consumption class. It is the way income is spent rather than the total amount, that determines a man's consumption class. The best operational index to consumption class is, therefore, not total income, but amount of income spent on prestigious or cultural pursuits. The fact, however, that lower prestige occupations now often have incomes at the level of white collar occupations is likely to affect both the style of life and the political outlook of manual workers in a high income bracket and of salaried members of the white-collar class in a relatively lower income position. A comparison of these two groups in terms of their consumption patterns or styles of life is thought to be of particular importance in forecasting future political behaviour, as well as crucial for an understanding of the factors related to other types of mobility in different societies.

It is, of course, difficult to measure the extent of the shift up or down in consumption class. In part, this might be done by comparing the consumption pattern of families at the same income level whose occupational class or income has changed over some particular period of time. Perhaps the best, although most expensive way of dealing with the problem, is to employ a "generational" panel. That is, to interview the parents of a portion of the original random sample, and to compare income in father's and son's family, and their scores on a consumption scale.

(3) *Social Class*

Much of the research in stratification in America has been concerned with *social class*. This term, as used by American sociologists, refers to rôles of intimate association with others. Essentially, social classes

in this sense denote strata of society composed of individuals who accept each other as equals and qualified for intimate association. For example, the Social Register Association of American cities considers only candidates for membership after three or more individuals already belonging to the Social Register certify that they accept the candidate as a person with whom they associate regularly and intimately. Men may change their occupational class by changing their job, but they may improve their social class position only if they are admitted to intimacy relationships by those who already possess the criteria for higher rank.

One method of studying social class mobility would be a comparison of the occupational or economic class position of husbands and wives before marriage, or of the respective in-laws.¹⁵ Another index of social class might be obtained by asking respondents in a survey to name the occupational status of their best friends. These latter methods would give us some measure of the extent to which upward or downward mobility in the occupational structure is paralleled by upward or downward movement in the social class structure. Such research would be best done in the context of a study which used a "generational" panel.

(4) *Power Rankings*

Certain rôle-relationships are also authority or power relationships, that is, they involve subordination on one part and superordination on the other. The extent to which a person's rôle-relationship affords the means to impose his version of order upon the social system might be ranked as his power, and persons having approximately the same power might be said to constitute a *power class*. It is plain that power classes may be, in part at least, independent of other classes. A labour leader may have a low occupational status and yet wield considerable political influence. A civil servant or parliamentarian whose office is vested with a great deal of political power may enjoy a high occupational and social class, but not be able to meet the consumption standards of these classes. Power as a vehicle for other kinds of social mobility has so far been a neglected area of research.

The most feasible way of using information about improvements in power status is to analyse its effects on economic and occupational position and political orientation. The findings of a recent British study are suggestive in this regard. On the basis of a study of participation in community affairs in Wales we learn that "the adult sons of [low-level unpaid] local union leaders . . . achieved middle-class occupational status much more frequently than others of their generation".¹⁶ In a study of members of the Typographical Union in New York City it was found that men holding the equivalent of shop steward's positions in the union were much more likely to say that they would try to get a non-manual occupation if beginning their work career over again, than were men who did not hold these offices.¹⁷

When one considers that at least 10 per cent. of the members of the trade union movement hold some unpaid union office, and that many more have held one in the past, it is probable that this avenue to power mobility plays an important rôle in the dynamics of social mobility. Of course, politics, itself, may be even more important (than trade unions) in providing opportunity for power-mobility. Various students of American politics have pointed out the way in which different ethnic groups, in particular, the Irish, have been able to improve their position through the medium of politics. In Europe, the Labour and Socialist parties undoubtedly give many lower class individuals an opportunity to secure power and status far above their economic position. Robert Michels, among others, has suggested that the children of socialist leaders of working-class origin, often secure higher education and leave the working-class.¹⁸

An operational index to power class is difficult to construct. The public debate in Western societies seems rather shy when it comes to matters of power. While there is a fairly freely admitted consensus about the desirability of high occupational consumption and social status, there is less consensus about the loci of power, and less admittance that power might be desirable. Perhaps the best one can do at present is to ask a panel of informed social scientists to list the various types of power positions available to individuals at different class levels. Among workers in the United States, for example, these might include positions in political parties, trade unions, veterans' organizations, and ethnic groups. After collecting the data on all positions held by members of a sample, it should be possible to rank the relative importance of different posts.

The complexity of this problem is of such a magnitude that one cannot anticipate more than fragmental findings on *individual* changes of power class position. The relative power position of various *groups*, however, may change over time, as witnessed, for example, by the return to power of the industrialists in Germany, the decline of the gentry in England, and throughout the Western World the manifest increase in the power of organized labour. It is plain that individuals change in their power class to the extent that they belong to these groups. Such membership (easy to ascertain by survey methods) may reflect itself in different feelings of political involvement and influence; for example, a study of two cities in Sweden by Segerstedt and Lundquist indicates that workers have these feelings to a greater extent than the white-collar class.¹⁹ Likewise, the British worker may experience himself and his class as politically less impotent than, say, the American worker.

This concludes the discussion of the dimensions of social stratification which seems to us theoretically most rewarding and which are accessible by available research techniques. Previous studies of class mobility have, for the most part, ignored the possibility that a society may have a higher rate of mobility on one of these dimensions and a lower one

on others. Similarly, an individual may rank high along one dimension while occupying a lower rank along another. We would like to draw attention to the possibility that such a multi-dimensional approach makes it possible to draw more qualified and accurate conclusions about comparative mobility and stratification systems, and above all, might enable us to deal with many interesting problems of intra-society dynamics, particularly in the realm of politics.

A METHODOLOGICAL NOTE

A basic difficulty inherent in most discussions of social mobility has been the absence of a comparative frame of reference. That is, when faced with a table showing that a given per cent. of males in certain occupations are of lower class origins, one does not know whether this proportion is relatively high or low. The conception of high or low mobility, after all, assumes a comparison with something else which is higher or lower. Basically, there are three types of comparison which can be made. The first is a comparison with the past, i.e., is there more or less social mobility today than in the past. The second comparison is with other areas or countries; is the U.S. a more mobile society than Germany or Great Britain. Efforts at such comparisons lead into the third type, comparison with a model expressing equal opportunity. How nearly does a given country approach the utopian concern for complete equality? Thinking of mobility in terms of equality rather than absolute rates leads us to recognise that there may be more mobility in country A than in country B, and yet less equality of opportunity. For example, if a country is 90 per cent. peasant, even with completely equal opportunity, most children of peasants must remain peasants. Even if every non-peasant position is filled by a peasant's son, only about eleven per cent. of them could change their occupation. On the other hand, if a country undergoes rapid economic transformation and the proportion of non-manual positions increases to, say, one half of all positions, then 50 per cent. of the children of manual workers would have to secure non-manual work in order to meet the criterion of equality.²⁰

A word should be said about the conventional operational method of ascertaining mobility in comparing a father's position with that of his son. If one asks in a survey "what is your occupation?" and "what is your father's occupation?" most of the time we obtain the father's position at the peak of his career while the information for the son refers to a period prior to his peak occupation. It is, therefore, wise to record also the occupation of the father at an earlier time, for example, by asking "what was your father's occupation when he was at your age?" Also, one should not overlook the possibility of measuring intra-generational mobility, that is advancement from the first position held to the present. It might well be that the length of the leap along the rank ladder might be substantially greater in one country than in another although the same proportion of the population can obtain a better position than their parents in both countries.

2. SOME CAUSES OF SOCIAL MOBILITY

Much of the discussion about the degree of openness of a given society is confused by the failure to distinguish between two different processes, both of which are described and experienced as social mobility. These are:—

(1) *The supply of vacant statuses.* The number of statuses in a given stratum is not always or even usually constant. For example, the expansion in the proportion of professional, official, managerial, and white-collar positions, and the decline in the number of unskilled labour positions require a surge of upward mobility, providing that these positions retain their relative social standing and income. Demographic factors also operate to facilitate mobility, when the higher

classes do not reproduce themselves and hence create a "demographic vacuum".²¹

(2) *The interchange of ranks.* Any mobility which occurs in a given social system, which is not a consequence of a change in the supply of statuses and actors must necessarily result from an interchange. Consequently, if we think of a simple model, for every move up there must be a move down. Interchange mobility will be determined in large part by the extent to which a given society gives members of the lower strata the means with which to compete with those who enter the social structure on a higher level. Thus the less emphasis which a culture places on family background as a criterion for marriage, the more class mobility that can occur, both up and down, through marriage. The more occupational success is related to educational achievements, which are open to all, the greater the occupational mobility.

The description of these processes does not, of course, account for *motivational* factors in mobility. If mobility is to occur, individuals need to be motivated to aspire to secure higher positions. The obvious common sense starting point for a discussion of mobility motivation is the observation that people do not like to be downwardly mobile: they prefer to keep their rank or to improve it.

An insightful motivation theory which accounts for men's desire to improve themselves, as well as to avoid falling in social position may be found in Veblen's analysis of the factors underlying consumption mobility.

"Those members of the community who fall short of (a) somewhat indefinite, normal degree of prowess or of property suffer in the esteem of their fellowmen; and consequently they suffer also in their own esteem, since the usual basis for self-respect is the respect accorded by one's neighbours. Only individuals with an aberrant temperament can in the long run retain their self-esteem in the face of the dis-esteem of their fellows.

"So as soon as the possession of property becomes the basis of popular esteem, therefore, it becomes also a requisite to that complacency which we call self-respect. In any community where goods are held in severality, it is necessary, in order to ensure his own peace of mind, that an individual should possess as large a portion of goods as others with whom he is accustomed to class himself; and it is extremely gratifying to possess something more than others. But as fast as a person makes new acquisitions, and becomes accustomed to the resulting new standard of wealth, the new standard forthwith ceases to afford appreciably greater satisfaction than the earlier standard did. The tendency in any case is constantly to make the present pecuniary standard the point of departure for a fresh increase of wealth; and this in turn gives rise to a new standard of sufficiency and a new pecuniary classification

of one's self as compared with one's neighbours. So far as concerns the present question, the end sought by accumulation is to rank high in comparison with the rest of the community in point of pecuniary strength. So long as the comparison is distinctly unfavourable to himself, the normal, average individual will live in chronic dissatisfaction with his present lot; and when he has reached what may be called the normal pecuniary standard of the community, or of his class in the community, this chronic dissatisfaction will give place to a restless straining to place a wider and ever-widening pecuniary interval between himself and this average standard. The invidious comparison can never become so favourable to the individual making it that he would not gladly rate himself still higher relatively to his competitors in the struggle for pecuniary reputeability."²²

Implicit in this passage seem to be the following hypotheses:—

- (1) The evaluation (rank, class) a person receives from his society determines in large measure his self-evaluation.
- (2) A person's actions are guided, in part at least, by an insatiable desire to maximize a favourable self-evaluation.

Hence, if the society evaluates a high consumption standard favourably, the individual will try to maximize his consumption level, since he thereby maximizes his self-evaluation. This theory can easily be generalized to any other dimension of class. Since any ranking is an evaluation by the society, it will be reflected in a person's self-evaluation; since any person tries to maximize his self-evaluation, he tries to maximize his rank. This would go for all the rankings we discussed earlier, that is, occupational, consumption, social and perhaps also power classes. The basic idea is that persons like to protect their class positions in order to protect their egos, and improve their class positions in order to enhance their egos. For example, societies with a more visible occupational stratification—for example, Western Europe—are likely to produce stronger ego-needs favouring occupational mobility. Societies which place less emphasis on visible signs of occupational class and stress themes of equality—for example, the United States—are likely to produce less strong ego needs favouring mobility.

We cannot discuss here all the qualifications that modern research must impose on the Veblen theory of motivation for mobility. However, the theory is interesting from the point of view that it does not assume that mobility occurs only as a result of specific social norms pressuring people to be mobile. Instead, the motivations for mobility are placed in the realm of more or less universal ego-needs, operating within stratified societies. This is not to say that the presence of norms to the effect that people *should* be mobile are without effect. It seems to be a general law of social psychology that those who conform to norms are rewarded by more favourable sentiments from their

environment.²³ Motivation arising from norms pressuring for mobility might supplement the motivations to rise derived from ego-needs. It is perhaps precisely in societies where these ego-needs are weakest due to cultural themes of equality that mobility norms are most necessary. Thus, the intriguing paradox arises that the United States because of the emphasis on equality must emphasize also mobility norms in order to furnish the motivation necessary to fill higher positions.

This theory, stressing supply of actors and statuses, interchange of rank, and universal ego-needs, goes a long way to explain one of the most intriguing findings that seems to emerge from comparative mobility research. Popular and academic consensus have long held that occupational mobility in the United States is higher than in Western Europe. Examination of available evidence suggests that this is perhaps not the case.²⁴ It is now possible to expand the empirical basis for this conclusion. It has been possible to locate data from ten countries which have been collected by survey methods on national samples. The studies comprise Denmark, Finland, Germany (two studies), Great Britain, Italy, Soviet Russia (post-war emigrés), Sweden (two studies), and the United States (three studies). The studies afford only very crude international comparisons, largely using the three categories of manual, non-manual, and farm occupations. In presenting these materials in Table I we make the assumption that a move from manual to non-manual employment constitutes upward mobility among *males*. This assumption may be defended primarily on the grounds that most male non-manual occupations receive higher prestige than most manual occupations, even skilled ones. It is true, of course, that many white-collar positions are lower in income and prestige than the higher levels of skilled manual work. Most of the less rewarded white-collar positions, however, are held by women. The men among them are often able to secure higher level supervisory posts. Consequently, we believe that using the division between manual and non-manual occupations as indicators of low and high occupational status is justified as an approximate dichotomous break of urban male occupations. It is important to recognize, however, that like all single item indicators of complex phenomena, this one will necessarily result in some errors.

When examining the results of these studies, especially the ones for the United States, France, Switzerland and Germany (which are most comparable), there can be little doubt that the advanced European societies for which we have data have "high" rates of social mobility, if by a high rate we mean one which is similar to that of the United States. In each country, a large minority is able to rise above the occupational position of their fathers, while a smaller but still substantial minority falls in occupational status. A British research group, under the direction of David Glass, attempted a quantitative comparison of their data with the findings from the French, Italian and the

Table 1. *Social Mobility in Ten Populations**

Respondent's Occupation	Father's Occupation				U.S. (g) Man. and Farm	U.S. (h) Man. Farm	U.S. (i) Man. Farm	U.S. (j) Man. Farm	U.S. (k) Man. Farm	U.S. (l) Man. Farm
	France (a) Non-Man. Man. Farm	Germany (b) Non-Man. Man. Farm	Germany (c) Non-Man. Man. Farm	Russian Emigrés (d) Non-Man. Man. Farm						
Non-Manual	73%	58%	80%	90%	12%	24%	81%	56%	56%	22%
Manual	18	38	20	10	19	46	19	70	44	78
Farm	9	4	—	—	70	30	—	—	3	—
N	(1109)	(579)	(236)	(265)	(139)	(323)	(259)	(399)	(376)	(541)
Non-Manual	Switzerland (e) Non-Man. Man. Farm				U.S. (f) Non-Man. Man. Farm		Great Britain (j) Non-Man. Man. Farm		Denmark (k) Non-Man. Man. Farm	
Manual	84% 44% 27% 71% 35% 23% 64% 31% 20% 20% 20%				13 54 19 25 61 39 34 67 2 2 80 80		3 3 4 4 4 38 1 2 49 44		56 21 70 9% 51% 51% 51%	
Farm	3 3 54 4 4 4 38 1 2 49 44				3 3 54 4 4 4 38 1 2 49 44		3 3 54 4 4 4 38 1 2 49 44		3 3 54 4 4 4 38 1 2 49 44	
N	(582) (239) (303) (319) (430)				(582) (239) (303) (319) (430)		(582) (239) (303) (319) (430)		(582) (239) (303) (319) (430)	
Non-Man. and well-to-do peasants	Finland (f) "Working class" "Farmer"				Italy (l) Non-man. and well-to-do peasants		Sweden (m) Sons, age 22-28		Sweden (n) Non-Man. Man.	
Manual	11% 11% 21% 21% 70 70 9% 9% 8% 8% 8%				11% 11% 21% 21% 70 70 9% 9% 8% 8% 8%		11% 11% 21% 21% 70 70 9% 9% 8% 8% 8%		11% 11% 21% 21% 70 70 9% 9% 8% 8% 8%	
Farm	33 33 70 70 9% 9% 8% 8% 8% 8% 8%				33 33 70 70 9% 9% 8% 8% 8% 8% 8%		33 33 70 70 9% 9% 8% 8% 8%		33 33 70 70 9% 9% 8% 8% 8%	
N	(1868) (2302)				(1868) (2302)		(1868) (2302)		(1868) (2302)	
Non-man. and well-to-do peasants	Father's Occupation				Sweden (n) Non-Man. Man.		Sweden (o) Non-Man. Man.		Sweden (p) Non-Man. Man.	
Manual	Better situated				67 59 32 39		67 59 32 39		67 59 32 39	
and poor peasants	Middle class				1 1 1 2		1 1 1 2		1 1 1 2	
N	Worker				(472)		(472)		(472)	
	Respondent's Occupation				Sweden (o) Non-Man. Man.		Sweden (p) Non-Man. Man.		Sweden (q) Non-Man. Man.	
	Better situated				54% 39% 7% 7%		54% 39% 7% 7%		54% 39% 7% 7%	
	Middle class				54% 39% 7% 7%		54% 39% 7% 7%		54% 39% 7% 7%	
	Worker				54% 39% 7% 7%		54% 39% 7% 7%		54% 39% 7% 7%	

* While these studies, viewed comparatively, constitute a significant addition to our knowledge of international variations in stratification and mobility, they present many difficulties to anyone who is interested in making any systematic generalizations. Only a few of the sets of data were collected for stratification or social mobility

studies. For example, six of the national surveys which collected mobility data did so in the context of research focusing on other problems. The German, and one set of American data have never been published, since they were unrelated to the major problem of the research. These were obtained through private correspondence. But more important than this is the fact that most of the data were gathered without any reference to the need for international or even national comparisons. For example, the three American studies are not comparable with one another. One reports only the relationship between the occupation of fathers and sons who are urban dwellers. The other two report mobility patterns for the entire population, but one secured the information about father's principal occupation while the other asked for the occupation while "you were growing up". The Italian study used a third method, by asking for the father's occupation when he was the respondent's age, while the Danish study contrasts occupations of father and son at age 30. It is possible to argue that each form of the question is worthwhile, but clearly, using different versions makes comparison difficult if not impossible.

An even more serious problem is inherent in the system of classification of the occupational or social status of respondents and their fathers. Most of the studies employed non-comparable systems of classification. Thus, the Danish, British, Italian and second Swedish studies differ from the others in classifying rural occupations in the same categories as urban occupations of presumed comparable status. Farm owners are grouped with high level non-manual occupations, while farm labourers are placed in the same category as semi- and un-skilled urban workers. All other studies differentiate between urban and rural occupational strata. The British and Danish study, in addition, does not differentiate between manual and non-manual occupations. Lower levels of non-manual employment are classified with skilled workers, while all other studies keep manual and clerical occupations separate. Some of the European studies classify "artisans", i.e., self-employed workers such as carpenters, together with manual workers, while other studies group them with independent business men. We have reclassified for consistency and placed artisans in the same category as other non-manual jobs. Some studies differentiate between salaried and free professionals, the first group being classified as "officials", while others use the category "professional" for both groups. The Finnish study differed from all the others in using a different system of classification for fathers and sons. All the studies except the second Swedish one are given in terms of their relationship between fathers' and sons' occupations. The latter does not allow us to present it in comparable terms since the number of cases in each cell is not given. It should also be noted that all the tables, except the Finnish and Swedish, deal with fathers' and sons' occupations. The latter ones include women among the respondents.

(a) M. Bresard, "Mobilité sociale et dimension de la famille," *Population*, Vol. V, No. 3, pp. 533-67.

(b) This table was computed from data kindly supplied by the U.N.E.S.C.O. Institute at Cologne, Germany, which were secured in their study of German attitudes in 1953.

(c) This table was computed from data kindly supplied by the Institut für Demoskopie, at Allensbach, Germany, from one of their national surveys of West German opinion.

(d) Robert A. Feldmesser, "Observations on Trends in Social Mobility in the Soviet Union and Their Implications," in A. Kassof *et al.* "Stratification and Mobility in the Soviet Union: A Study of Social Class Cleavages in the U.S.S.R." (Cambridge, Harvard Russian Research Centre, mimeo, 1954), p. 8.

(e) Re-calculated from data kindly supplied by Professor Roger Girod from his paper in this volume.

(f) This table was derived by Natalie Rogoff from data published by the National Opinion Research Centre. See N.O.R.C., "Jobs and Occupations," *Opinion News*, September 1, 1947, pp. 3-13.

(g) This table was computed from data kindly supplied by the Survey Research Centre, which were secured in their study of the 1952 presidential election.

(h) Richard Centers, *The Psychology of Social Classes*. (Princeton University Press, 1949), p. 181.

(i) Tauno Hellevo, "Pöimintatutkimus Säätykierrosta" (A Sampling Study of Social Mobility). *Suomalainen Suomi*, No. 2, 1952, pp. 93-96.

(j) This table was adapted from material in David V. Glass, ed. *Social Mobility in Britain*. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1954.)

(k) We are indebted to Professor K. Svalastoga, University of Copenhagen, Denmark, for these data based on a probability sample.

(l) L. Livi, "Sur la mesure de la mobilité sociale," *Population*, January-March, 1950, pp. 65-76.

(m) This table was computed from data kindly supplied by Svenska Institutet för Opinionsundersökningar, Stockholm, Sweden, from a probability sample of youth.

(n) Elis Håstad, "*Gallup*" *Och Den Svenska Väljarkåren*. Uppsala: Hugo Gebers Förlag, 1950), p. 271.

third American study. Glass and his associates concluded that Britain, the U.S. and France had similar rates of mobility.²⁵ The Italian and Finnish findings, however, indicate a lower rate of social mobility than in the other countries. It is difficult to make any clear judgment concerning the Finnish data, since father's occupation in the Finnish study is based on the reply to "what class do you consider your father belongs(ed): white-collar, working-class, or farmer?" while the sons are grouped according to their objective occupation.²⁶ The British, Danish, Italian and second Swedish studies combine urban and rural occupations in the same classes. This has the consequence of increasing downward mobility since many sons of farmers who are middle-class become urban workers. It also reduces upward mobility since children of farm-laborers are less likely to move up than the offspring of manual workers.

The data from these studies tend to challenge the popular conception that America is a land of wide open occupational mobility as compared to Europe, where family background is alleged to play a much more important rôle in determining the position of sons. It is important to note, however, that the available data should not be treated as if they were a set of quantitatively comparable censuses of mobility in different countries. All that we can say from the existing survey studies is that they do not validate the traditional assumptions. Considerable mobility occurs in every country for which we have data. Furthermore, available historical material tends to indicate that much of Europe had occupational mobility rates from 1900 to 1940 which are similar to the present, and which did not lag behind the American one.²⁷ Whether there are significant differences among these countries can only be decided after the completion of an integrated comparative research project, which employs the same methods of collecting, classifying, and processing the data. Thus far, no such study exists.

According to our theory, the explanation of these findings has to be sought in structural and motivational factors which are similar on both continents. Both Europe and America have experienced differential fertility, that is, the tendency of those in upper classes to have fewer children, a condition that leaves room for the lower classes to rise. Both have seen an expansion in the number of white-collar positions at the expense of manual workers, thus creating a surge of upward occupational mobility to the extent that new industrial labour is drawn from farm areas. Bendix has compared the ratio of administrative (white-collar) and production (manual) workers over the last half-century in the United States, the United Kingdom and in Sweden, and

finds the parallel in trends very great. Thus, in the United States in 1899 there were 8 administrative employees per 100 production workers while in 1947 there were 22 administrative employees per 100 production workers. The corresponding rise in Britain between 1907 and 1948 is from 9 to 20 administrative employees per 100 production workers, and in Sweden the figures jump from 7 in 1915 to 21 administrative employees per 100 production workers in 1950.²⁸

Likewise, the United States and Western Europe have experienced a parallel process in interchange of ranks. On both continents the majority of non-manual and high-status positions are no longer in the category of self-employment. A bureaucrat father unlike a businessman cannot give his job to his son. Many non-self-employed middle-class parents have little to give their children except a better opportunity to secure a good education and the motivation to attempt to obtain a high-class position. If for any reason, such as the early death of the father or family instability, a middle-class child does not complete a higher education, he is in a worse position in terms of prospective employment than the son of a manual worker who completes college, lycee, or gymnasium. Clearly, some proportion of the children of the middle-class are so handicapped, and many of them fall in socio-economic status. In addition, some simply do not have the abilities to complete higher education or to get along in a bureaucratic hierarchy, and fall by the wayside. Thus, whatever the reason that some persons of middle-class origin move downward, they leave room for others of lower-class background to rise.

Given these structural pre-requisites for mobility, it seems to make little difference that Americans are exposed to stronger norms and more vivid models encouraging mobility. The more visible occupational class distinctions in Europe actually may make for stronger ego-needs pressuring for upward mobility. Thus the resulting motivation to move upward appears approximately equal on both continents. There is, unfortunately, little available data on the aspiration level of men in the same class in different countries.

The more pronounced presence of mobility norms in the American "open class" value system might, however, make for more "planned" mobility in the United States, while mobility in Europe would be more "unplanned". That is, the emphasis placed on mobility in the value system of the United States should lead more Americans than Europeans to make conscious plans to secure the skills necessary to be upwardly mobile. On the other hand, the age of marriage and the age of parents at the arrival of the first child in Northern and Western Europe is somewhat higher than in the United States. Consequently, a European will have a longer period without family responsibilities to take risk or advance his skills. In this sense, "unplanned" mobility may be facilitated in Europe and restricted in America.

The norms dictating class behaviour in a social class oriented society may actually serve to open the occupational ladder for lower strata

individuals since they sometimes operate to inhibit the sons of higher strata families from securing the type of education which will enable them to obtain a high position in the economic structure. The fact that in some European countries engineering and other high level industrial positions appear to have less prestige in the eyes of the upper classes than high posts in the civil service, or the military, has the effect of eliminating from competition for industrial posts some men who could secure them if they so desired. This means that room is left for individuals of lower social origins to secure these high positions.

3. SOME POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF MOBILITY

Earlier, we called attention to the fact that most studies of social mobility have been descriptive in character and have not attempted to relate findings concerning mobility to other aspects of the society. In this concluding section, we shall discuss the relevance of mobility theory and research to political analysis. Our guiding general assumption is that *many of the major political problems facing contemporary society are, in part, a consequence of the conflict and tensions resulting from the contradictions inherent in the need for both aristocracy and equality.*²⁹

Much of the writing in the general area of social stratification has been concerned with the problem of equality. Writers from the time of the Greek civilization on have pointed to the need for tenure in high status positions and the inheritance of social position as requirements for the stability of complex societies. These theorists have suggested that the division of labour requires differential rewards in prestige and privilege as the means of motivating individuals to carry out the more difficult leadership or other positions requiring a great deal of intelligence and training. Also, given a system of differential rewards, the particularistic values which are a necessary part of family organization require high-stated individuals to attempt to pass their gratifications to their children. The simplest way to assure these rewards for their children is to pass their privileged positions on to them. Thus, a strain towards aristocracy, or the inheritance of rank, is, as Plato indicated, a necessary concomitant of a stratified society.

The legitimation of inherited rank immediately gives rise to another problem, that is the problem of reconciling the legitimation of inherited privilege with the social need to encourage some men born into lower status positions to aspire to and attain higher positions. Thus all economically expanding societies such as the United States, most of Western Europe, India, the Soviet Union, South Africa, and many others, must encourage individuals to aspire to higher or at least different occupational positions from those held by their parents. The dilemma confronting a society in doing this may best be seen in the problems faced by the Soviet Union. Soviet writers have complained that most Russian schoolchildren only desire important bureaucratic

and military positions. They have castigated the school system for failing in its obligation of making the children of workers and peasants proud of their fathers' occupations.³⁰ Yet, while the new ruling class of the Soviet Union attempts on the one hand to reduce the ambitions of lower class youth, its goal of an expanding industrial society forces it to recruit constantly from the ranks of the lower classes.

However, social mobility is not only an issue for the politicians, it is also a force generating political and ideological pressures. There can be little doubt that a system of differential rewards and inherited privilege entails internal strains which make for instability. Such a system requires a large proportion of the population to accept a lower conception of its own worth as compared with others (this follows from the first hypothesis we derived from Veblen). This barrier to the possibility of enhancement of the self may in some cases lead to a rejection of self, described as "self hatred" in the analyses of the personalities of lower-status minority group members. Such a rejection, however, is necessarily difficult to maintain, and in all stratified societies, some men have tended to reject the dominant valuation placed on the upper classes. Sometimes this rejection takes the form of lower class religious values which deny the moral worth of wealth or power; at other times it may take the form of rebellious "Robin Hood" bands, or formal revolutionary or social reform movements; often it may lead to individual efforts to improve one's status through legitimate or illegitimate means.

It is entirely conceivable that the political consequences of class deprivation might be different depending on what dimension of class is challenged. Some recent analysts of the development of rightist extremism in the United States have suggested that this movement is, in part, a response to insecurity about social class position.³¹ Essentially, these analyses assume that when the occupational and consumption aspects of stratification are salient, the ideological debate and the political measures will be concerned with the issue of job security redistribution of property and income. Political movements with this motivation are most common in times of depression when many see their economic position decline. On the other hand, when the social class dimension is challenged or confused, the ideological debate will contain endless discussions of traditional values of ascription, often with elements of irrationality and scape-goating. Political movements with this motivation are likely to occur in times of high occupational and consumption mobility when the old upper class feels itself threatened by *nouveaux arrivées*, and when the latter feel frustrated in not being accepted socially by those who already hold high social position.

The political themes related to threats to social class position, or to frustrations in achieving higher position in the social class structure are likely to be more irrational than those related to the desire for

economic security or achievement. Franz Neumann has suggested that the adoption of a conspiracy theory of politics, placing the blame for social evils on a secret group of evil-doers is related to social class insecurity.³² Groups in this position account for the actual or potential decline which they desire to avert by blaming a conspiracy rather than themselves or their basic social institutions. In doing so, they can continue to believe in the ongoing social structure which accords them their status, while at the same time feel that they are taking action to eliminate the threat to their social status.

It might be interjected at this point that the above is not untestable speculation. We already know how to measure the kinds of mobility which are the independent variables of the hypotheses. The dependent variables—the political themes—can also be measured by the conventional kind of public opinion poll questions. In fact, many already existing questions presumed to measure along a conservatism-liberalism continuum would tap some of the themes, and for the others equally simple items can be constructed. It is also easy to ascertain by survey methods memberships in groups or associations known to embrace any of the above political themes.

Short of having survey data, it is possible to present some impressionistic evidence for the hypothesis that strains introduced by mobility aspirations or anxieties will predispose individuals towards accepting more extreme political views. Political literature knows several suggestions that class discrepancies, e.g. high social class and lower economic position, has this effect. Such hypotheses about rank discrepancies are not strictly hypotheses about social mobility. However, it is plain that whenever social mobility occurs, rank discrepancies are likely to occur, since it is extremely rare that a person would rise or decline at the same rate along all dimensions of class. For example, this hypothesis has been suggested in explaining political behaviour in contemporary Canada. In the province of Saskatchewan, governed since 1944 by a socialist party, it was found that the leaders of the socialist party who were either businessmen or professionals, were largely of non-Anglo-Saxon origin, that is, of low social class. On the other hand, the big majority, over 90 per cent. of the middle-class leaders of the Liberal and Conservative Parties, were Anglo-Saxons.

“Socially, the businessmen of the ethnic minority are part of the lower class group of the Saskatchewan population. They are not exploited economically, but they are deprived socially of many of the privileges that usually go with business status. The cleavage between them and the Anglo-Saxon ‘upper class’ is often as great as the split between the farmers and the business community. Subject to the cross pressures of contradictory statuses, many members of minority groups have seen fit to identify themselves with the political party which is opposed by the ‘upper class’ and which promises to strike at the community power of these dominant groups.”³³

Robert Michels, in his analysis of European socialism before World War I made a similar hypothesis explicit:—

“The origin of this predominant position [of the Jews in the European socialist movement] is to be found, as far at least as concerns Germany and the countries of eastern Europe, in the peculiar position which the Jews have occupied and in many respects still occupy. The legal emancipation of the Jews has not been followed by their social and moral emancipation. . . . Even when they are rich, the Jews constitute, at least in eastern Europe, a category of persons who are excluded from the social advantages which the prevailing political, economic, and intellectual system ensures for the corresponding portion of the Gentile population: Society in the narrower sense of the term is distrustful of them, and public opinion is unfavourable to them.”³⁴

Evidence derived from analysis of electoral behaviour, or the composition of the membership or leadership of political parties in different countries, indicates that Jews still react in the same way in more recent times. In the United States the bulk of the Jewish middle-class supports the more liberal or left-wing parties, even though their occupational and economic position would seem to suggest a more conservative outlook.³⁵ It would be interesting to see how well this would hold in countries with relatively little anti-Semitism, for example, Scandinavia. In such countries where presumably Jews are achieving a higher social class position we would not expect them to have the same extent of leftist political orientation.

So far, we have reported hypotheses which have predicted a political orientation to the left when a group's social class position is lower than its occupational or economic position, in spite of the fact that the latter normally would predispose a conservative outlook. It has also been suggested, however, that a rightist orientation also occurs among people in such positions. It has been argued, for example, that *nouveaux riches* are sometimes even more conservative than the old rich, because some of them seek to move up in the social class structure by adapting to the value and behaviour patterns which they believe are common in the class above them, or more simply, perhaps because they have not developed patterns of *noblesse oblige*, characteristic of established upper classes. Riesman and Glazer have argued that the economically successful upwardly mobile Irish in America have become more conservative as a concomitant of their search for higher status.³⁶

The political orientation of a group whose social class position is higher than their occupational-economic class should be also affected by this discrepancy in class positions. We have already reported hypotheses which indicate that this may result in rightist political behaviour. On the other hand, however, are suggestions that a discrepancy in status may lead an old but declining upper class to be more liberal in its political orientation. For example, most observers of

British politics have suggested that the emergence of Tory Socialism, the willingness to enact reforms which benefited the working-class, was a consequence of the hostility of the old English landed aristocracy toward the rising business class, which was threatening its status and power. W. L. Warner reports a situation in which members of old families in an American city characterized by a high degree of emphasis on ascriptive social class supported the efforts of a radical trade union to organize the plants, which were owned by newly wealthy Jews.³⁷

Unfortunately, there is no empirical research and little speculation on the conditions which are related to such varying reactions. Much of the speculation and evidence presented above suggests alternative reactions to seemingly similar social pressures. That is, both rightist and leftist political behaviour has been explained as a reaction to discrepancies in status. Three studies of electoral choice offer a similar dilemma. These studies were made by the Survey Research Centre of the University of Michigan in 1952, by the UNESCO Institute of Social Science in Cologne, Germany, in 1953, and by the Finnish Gallup Poll in 1949. The Finnish and German studies suggest that middle-class individuals of working-class origin are more likely to vote for the more liberal or left-wing party, than are those who are in the same class position as their fathers. The American data, on the other hand, indicate that successfully upward mobile sons of workers are even more conservative in their party choice than those middle-class individuals whose fathers held occupations comparable to their own³⁸ (Table 2).

Table 2. *Left vote of Finnish, German and American middle-class men related to their social origins**

Father's Occupation	Per Cent. Both Left Parties	Finland—1949		Germany—1953		U.S. 1952 Per Cent.	U.S. 1948 Democratic
		Per Cent. Social- Democratic	Per Cent. Communist	Per Cent. Social- Democratic			
Manual	23	20	3 (157)	32 (200)	22 (67)	35 (72)	
Non-Manual	6	5	1 (356)	20 (142)	30 (79)	39 (83)	
Farm	10	10	— (183)	22 (58)	34 (59)	49 (61)	

* The data from which these tables were constructed were furnished by the Finnish Gallup Poll, the UNESCO Institute of Social Science and the Survey Research Center. We would like to express our thanks to them. Non-voters and persons not expressing a party choice are eliminated from this table.

It would be easy to construct some *ex post facto* interpretations for the variations in the consequences of upward social mobility in Finland, Germany and the United States. Rather than do so at this point, we prefer to simply present these results as another illustration of both the complexities and potential rewards inherent in cross-national comparisons.

While the political consequences of upward mobility vary among Germany, Finland and the United States, downward mobility seems to have the same result in the three countries. The working-class sons of middle-class fathers are less likely to back the left parties than are the sons of workers (Table 3).

It is clear from these data that the more consistent the class position of a worker and his father, the more likely he is to accept the dominant political pattern of his class.³⁹ Also, there can be little doubt that the facts of downward social mobility go at least a part of the way in accounting for conservatives among the working-class.

Table 3. *Left vote of Finnish, German and American workers related to their social origins*

Father's Occupation	Finland—1949		Germany—1953		U.S. 1952 Per Cent.	U.S. 1948 Democratic
	Per Cent. Both Left Parties	Per Cent. Social- Democratic	Per Cent. Communist	Per cent. Social- Democratic		
Manual	81	53	28 (1017)	64 (357)	62 (119)	82 (101)
Non-Manual	42	34	8 (50)	52 (58)	54 (37)	64 (36)
Farm	67	56	11 (378)	38 (75)	58 (87)	89 (64)

These two studies like the qualitative and more speculative political analyses reported earlier, only begin to open up the area of the impact of stratification dynamics on political behaviour. The consequences of social mobility, and the determinants of political behaviour are, of course, much more complex than has been hinted above. There is obviously a need for further exploratory research in order to suggest hypotheses that are better than random guesses. From this point of view, it would be gratifying if public opinion surveys concerning political matters see fit to include, in the future, mobility information as a standard category.

NOTES

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² Among the best studies analyzing mobility in large populations are Theodore Geiger, *Soziale Umschichtungen in einer danischen Mittelstadt* (Aarhus Universitet, 1951), Natalie Rogoff, *Recent Trends in Occupational Mobility* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1953), and David V. Glass, ed., *Social Mobility in Britain* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1954).

³ References to various élite studies will be found in Donald R. Matthews, *The Social Background of Political Decision Makers* (Garden City: Doubleday & Co., 1954), S. M. Lipset and Reinhard Bendix, "Ideological Equalitarianism and Social Mobility in the United States," in *Transactions of the Second World Congress of Sociology*, II (London: International Sociological Association, 1954), pp. 53-54.

⁴ Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947), p. 425, see also pp. 424-429, and Max Weber, *Essays in Sociology* (New York; Oxford University Press, 1946), pp. 180-195.

⁵ Talcott Parsons, *Essays in Sociological Theory* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1954), p. 388.

⁶ National Opinion Research Centre, "Jobs and Occupations: A Popular Evaluation," *Opinion News*, September 1, 1947, pp. 3-13.

⁷ G. E. Lenski, "Status Crystallization: a Non-vertical Dimension of Social Status," *American Sociological Review*, 19 (1954), pp. 405-413.

⁸ Alex Inkeles and Peter Rossi, "Cross National Comparisons of Occupational Ratings," *American Journal of Sociology*, January, 1956.

⁹ Richard Centres, *The Psychology of Social Class* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949), p. 86.

¹⁰ Nancy C. Morse and Robert S. Weiss, "The Function and Meaning of Work and the Job," *American Sociological Review*, 20 (1955), pp. 191-198.

¹¹ S. M. Lipset, et al., "The Psychology of Voting: An Analysis of Political Behaviour," in G. Lindzey, ed., *Handbook of Social Psychology* (Cambridge: Addison-Wesley, 1954), pp. 1139.

¹² Unpublished study of Joseph Aymes, former graduate student in the Department of Psychology, University of California at Berkeley.

¹³ Selma Goldsmith, et al., "Size Distribution of Income Since the Mid-thirties," *The Review of Economics and Statistics*, 36 (1954), p. 26.

¹⁴ Fortune Magazine, *The Changing American Market* (Garden City, New York, Hanover House, 1955).

¹⁵ See S. M. Lipset and Natalie Rogoff, "Class and Opportunity in Europe and America," *Commentary*, 19 (1954), pp. 562-568; and David V. Glass, ed., *op. cit.*, pp. 321-338, 344-349.

¹⁶ T. Brennan, "Class Behaviour in Local Politics and Social Affairs," in *Transactions of the Second World Congress of Sociology*, II, *op. cit.*, pp. 291-292.

¹⁷ S. M. Lipset, Martin Trow and J. S. Coleman, *Union Democracy* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1956).

¹⁸ Robert Michels, *Political Parties* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1949), pp. 280-281.

¹⁹ Torngy Segerstedt and Agne Lundquist, *Människan i industrisamhället II: Fritidsliv samhällsliv* (Stockholm: Studieförbundet Näringsliv och Samhälle, 1955), pp. 287-290.

²⁰ For statistical techniques developed to handle this problem, see Donald Marvin, "Occupational Proximity as a Factor in Marriage Selection," *Publications of the American Statistical Association*, 16, 1918, pp. 131-150; Natalie Rogoff, *op. cit.*, pp. 29-33; David V. Glass, ed., *op. cit.*, pp. 218-259; see also Federico Chessa, *La Trasmissione Ereditaria delle Professioni* (Torino: Fratelli Bocca, 1912), for early presentation of the logic of this approach.

²¹ See P. Sorokin, *Social Mobility* (New York: Harpers and Brothers, 1927), pp. 346-377; and Eldridge Sibley, "Some Demographic Clues to Stratification," *American Sociological Review*, 7, 1942, pp. 322-330.

²² Thorstein Veblen, *The Theory of the Leisure Class* (New York: The Modern Library, 1934), pp. 30-32.

²³ H. W. Riecken and G. C. Homas, "Psychological Aspects of Social Structure," in G. Lindzey, ed., *op. cit.*, pp. 787-789.

²⁴ See Lipset and Rogoff, *op. cit.*

²⁵ David V. Glass, ed., *op. cit.*, pp. 260-265.

²⁶ The findings indicating considerable fluidity in the occupational class structure outside of America are buttressed by the results of studies of mobility in individual cities in different countries. A study based on a random sample of the Tokyo population indicates that about one-third of the sons of fathers employed in manual occupations were in non-manual jobs when interviewed, while about thirty per cent. of the sons of men in non-manual occupations had become manual workers. (A. G. Ibi, "Occupational Stratification and Mobility in the Large Urban Community: A Report of Research on Social Stratification and Mobility in Tokyo, II," *Japanese Sociological Review*, 4 (1954), pp. 135-149. We describe the results of this study in general terms since close to twenty per cent. of the men were in occupational categories, which we could not fit into the conventional manual-non-manual farm groups without more knowledge about Japanese occupational titles.) A study of mobility among a group of young residents of Stockholm indicates that over half of the sons of manual workers who grew up in Stockholm were in non-manual occupations at the age of twenty-four. (Gunnar Boalt, "Social Mobility in

Stockholm: A Pilot Investigation," in *Transactions of the Second World Congress of Sociology*, II, *op. cit.*, pp. 67-73. Two excellent studies of social mobility in a Danish (Geiger, *op. cit.*) and an American (Rogoff, *op. cit.*) provincial city permit an even more detailed comparison of mobility between Europe and America, which is presented in Lipset and Rogoff, *op. cit.* It is clear that there is no substantial difference in the patterns of social mobility in Aarhus and Indianapolis.

²⁷ For example, a study which secured questionnaire data from over 90,000 German workers in the late 1920's reported that almost one-quarter of the males in this group came from manual working-class families. (Gewerkschaftsbund der Angestellten, *Die wirtschaftliche und soziale Lage der Angestellten* (Berlin, 1931), p. 43; see also Hans Speier, *The Salaried Employee in German Society*, Vol. I (New York: Department of Social Science, Columbia University, 1939), pp. 86-98). An early British survey of the social origins of the owners, directors and managers in the cotton industry found that over two-thirds of this group had begun their occupational careers either as manual workers or in low status clerical positions. (S. J. Chapman and F. J. Marquis, "The Recruiting of the Employing Classes from the Ranks of Wage Earners in the Cotton Industry," *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, February, 1912, pp. 293-306). Pitirim Sorokin (*op. cit.*) who made an extensive analysis of social mobility research around the world before 1927 also concluded that the assumption that the United States was a more open society in terms of occupational mobility than the industrial sections of Europe was not valid. For early date on mobility in the city of Rome, see Chessa, *op. cit.*

²⁸ Reinhard Bendix, forthcoming book on managerial ideologies.

²⁹ See Talcott Parsons, "A Revised Analytical Approach to the Theory of Stratification," in R. Bendix and S. M. Lipset, eds., *Class, Status and Power* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1953), p. 117; and K. Davis and W. F. Moore, "Some Principles of Stratification," *American Sociological Review*, 10, 1945, pp. 242-249. For a critique of this position and an answer to it, see H. M. Tumin, "Some Principles of Stratification: a Critical Analysis," *American Sociological Review*, 18, 1953, pp. 387-394; K. Davis, "Reply to Tumin," *ibid.*, pp. 394-397.

³⁰ Alex Inkeles, "Social Stratification and Mobility in the Soviet Union: 1940-1950," in R. Bendix and S. M. Lipset, eds., *op. cit.*, pp. 611-621.

³¹ See the various essays reprinted in Daniel Bell, ed., *The New American Right* (New York: Criterion Books, 1955); and Richard Hofstadter, *The Age of Reform* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1955), esp. pp. 131-172.

³² Franz Neumann, "Anxiety in Politics," *Dissent*, Spring 1955, pp. 135-141.

³³ S. M. Lipset, *Agrarian Socialism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1950), p. 191.

³⁴ Robert Michels, *op. cit.*, pp. 260-261.

³⁵ Lawrence A. Fuchs, "American Jews and the Presidential Vote," *American Political Science Review*, 49 (1955), pp. 385-401.

³⁶ David Riesman and Nathan Glazer, "The Intellectuals and the Discontented Classes," in D. Bell, ed., *op. cit.*, pp. 66-67.

³⁷ W. L. Warner and J. O. Low, *The Social System of the Modern Factory* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1947); see also S. M. Lipset and R. Bendix, *op. cit.*, pp. 230-233.

³⁸ Two other American studies suggest similar conclusions. Maccoby found that upward mobile youth in Cambridge were more Republican than non-mobiles in the class to which the upward mobile moved. Eleanor E. Maccoby, "Youth and Political Choice," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Spring 1954, p. 35. The M.I.T. Center for International Studies interviewed a random sample of 1,000 American business executives in 1955. These data show that only 5 per cent. of the children of manual workers are Democrats as compared with 10 per cent. Democratic among the executive sons of middle- or upper-class fathers. Hans Speier in his study of white-collar workers in pre-Hitler Germany estimated that 50 per cent. of the members of the Socialist white-collar union were the sons of workers, while less than 25 per cent. of the members of the two conservative white-collar unions were sons of workers. This finding is similar to the pattern in contemporary Germany, see Speier, *op. cit.*, pp. 92-93.

Hence three American studies agree that the upward-mobile are more conservative than the stationary middle-class, while two German and one Finnish study find that the upward-mobile in these countries are more radical than the stationary non-manual workers.

³⁹ Similar patterns are suggested in other American studies. Richard Centers reported that workers who have middle-class fathers are more likely to give

conservative responses on questions designed to measure liberalism-conservatism, while the successfully upward mobile sons of manual workers do not differ from those in non-manual occupations whose fathers held similar posts. Centers, *op. cit.*, p. 180. A study of the United Automobile Workers Union found that 78 per cent. of the sons of workers were Democrats in 1952 as compared to 60 per cent. of the off-spring of middle-class fathers: Arthur Kornhauser, *Why Labor Votes—A Study of Auto Workers* (Boston: Beacon Press, forthcoming). Two studies of trade union membership indicate that mobile individuals are less likely to belong to, or be active in, trade unions. S. M. Lipset and Joan Gordon, "Mobility and Trade Union Membership," in R. Bendix and S. M. Lipset, eds., *op. cit.*, pp. 491-500 and Arnold Tannenbaum, *Participation in Local Unions* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Survey Research Center, Mimeo, 1954), p. 292. It is interesting to note that one study based on survey materials, which attempted to relate social mobility to ethnic prejudice in an American city found that both upward and downward mobile persons were more prejudiced than individuals who were in the same social position as their fathers. This result suggests that the socially mobile, whether upward or downward, are more insecure in their dealings with others than those who are stationary in the class structure. It is congruent with our findings that the socially mobile in America are more conservative than the non-mobile at the same level. See Joseph Greenblum and Leonard I. Pearlin, "Vertical Mobility and Prejudice: A Socio-Psychological Analysis," in R. Bendix and S. M. Lipset, eds., *op. cit.*, pp. 480-491.

Note on the Analysis of Social Mobility Determinants

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This paper limits itself to a discussion of some possible approaches to the problem posed by the fact that some individuals change their social status relative to that of their fathers while others do not. The solution of this problem will not only provide a predictive tool, but serve as one of the means by which the formal and informal selective devices of a society may be tested. When adequate measures of the social cost of selection processes are available, and the efficiency of these processes as a tool for the utilization of talent to reach well defined objectives may be ascertained, then the achievement of optimal allocation of talent available will be within reach. Perhaps the time is not too distant when linear programming experts may be called upon to answer questions regarding optimal selection of talent in the same elegant manner as they now solve the problem how to produce ice-cream of known chemical composition at minimal cost by selecting one or more raw materials from among a large group of possible raw materials available at given prices.¹

In the meantime sociologists have several major empirical assignments to fulfil, one of which is to account for individual mobility differences. With due recognition of work already done in this field it still appears that we know more about the antecedents of divorce and criminal recidivism than of the antecedents of social ascent and descent.

Original sociological data collection, utilizes one or more of the following three procedures: the experimental method, the interrogational method, and the observational method. However, the quest for mobility determinants is for moralistic reasons chiefly limited to the use of interrogational and, much more rarely, observational procedures.

In spite of this the ideal model of the strictly controlled experiment serves a useful function. It provides a standard for the evaluation of alternate methods towards answering causal questions.²

There are two major possible approaches to the analysis of mobility determinants: the sequential (longitudinal, cohort, panel), and the simultaneous (cross-sectional, correlational) approach.³ For reasons that are obvious most research so far is of the simultaneous type.

Inferences about crucial antecedents to mobility are drawn on the basis of observations made at one point in time only. The chief advantages as well as the drawbacks of the sequential approach has been repeatedly treated theoretically and documented by empirical research.⁴ Very few studies are available using the sequential approach in the field of social mobility. In Scandinavia the only such study that has come to the author's attention is Boalt's Stockholm study.⁵

In terms of approximation to the ideal model of the controlled experiment the sequential methods have the superior advantage of achieving a time ordering of events not subject to errors of recall. The relevance of this advantage to the study of the antecedents of social mobility deserves strong emphasis. Such antecedents will by the simultaneous methods have to be ascertained by recall of events which may antedate the time of recall as much as two centuries, e.g., when a nonagenarian is asked to state the occupations of his grand-fathers.

The increasing regimentation or welfare statism within Western civilization facilitates large scale sequential research. As nations grow increasingly concerned about the implications of the scientific method in the social realm, tolerance for the view that the production of verified propositions on social matters are worth their cost will probably increase.

The most valid answer to our queries regarding cost and consequences of social mobility would probably come from studies based upon reported observations of cohorts from their conception to their death : even a single age class or sample therefrom would, if studied by the best methods now available, yield a mine of data for the testing of hypotheses on human development. Inter-scientific cooperation would not only be desirable but in the author's estimate essential to the success of any large scale from womb-to-tomb research. Would it be premature to suggest that interested groups consider the possibility of selecting the 1960 cohort of infants for sequential analysis ?

The simultaneous approach to social mobility with which most of us are more familiar have in the past rarely been so conducted as to shed much light on the problems posed by the fact that some are mobile, others not. The increased use of the sample-interview-survey will ameliorate this situation. We may confidently expect a growing crop of correlation coefficients showing variables associated or not associated with the fact of being mobile or immobile. There is, however, in the simultaneous survey method a certain amount of waste of effort if our one and only problem is the prediction of individual mobility. This is due to the frequently documented research finding that the majority of a national population are either non-mobile or only modestly mobile relative to their fathers. Long distance mobility such as from top to bottom or bottom to top of the average prestige

scale is a relatively rare phenomenon. Hence follows that sampling with equal probabilities tends to give more non-mobile and slightly mobile people than are needed for efficient correlation analysis. In other words for correlation purposes the method suffers from asking the many too many and the few too few questions.⁶ But the major weakness of conventional surveys on social mobility is their reliance upon the testimony and recall ability of one individual when in fact there frequently exists many individuals who might corroborate or prove false his reports about himself, his family, etc.

Even if sequential analyses were deemed impractical, a remedial procedure seems possible. It might for want of a better word be called the retrospective community cohort method. A semi-operational definition of the method would run as follows : select all those born in a certain community during a certain time interval. Obtain data on present occupations as well as fathers occupations in this cohort. Select a sample of the cohort for intensive analysis. (High selection ratio for highly mobile persons, low for non-mobile.)

The intensive analysis should consist in more detailed interviews with the cohort member himself, but in addition his community of origin including family, neighbourhood, play group, school, church, local administration and associations would be investigated using both documentary, observational and interrogational methods. The aim would be two-fold,

- (a) to check information provided by cohort members,
- (b) to amplify the knowledge of possible mobility predictors.

The method suggested is clearly more efficient the lower the probability that people in the community move when their children are between 0 and 20 years of age. Further, the method is also more efficient the greater the overlap between paternal and filial generation and the more rapidly the sons on the average find their final place in the social hierarchy before retirement.

The need for a more intensive centering on the community or communities of origin of mobile and non-mobile people springs from the observation that education is one of the main social elevators in modern societies. In many countries the most crucial educational decisions affecting a person's career fall very early in his life, thus in Denmark at the age of 12, in Norway at the age of 14, and in Sweden at the age of 11-14. In Denmark 31 per cent. of all males aged 21 and over have received no schooling or other training after their seven years required education.

The Sociological Institute approached a sample (N=789) of this group and asked them why they stopped going to school. Six possible explanations were listed plus an "other"-category. The latter was, however, rarely used.

The frequency of endorsement of each of the six categories was as follows :

Explanation for lack of further schooling	per cent. who offer this explanation
	N = 789
1. Desire : Respondents' lack of desire	49
2. Evaluation : Respondent's low rating of the value of an education	37
3. Ability : Respondent doubted his ability ..	24
4. Community norm : Further education uncommon among his friends	71
5. Family evaluation : Parent's low rating of the value of an education	31
6. Family economy : Parents could not afford it	52

The relative strength and the interconnections of these various personal family and community factors in the determination of mobility through education remain to be investigated. If we take our research clues from such self interpretations as the above an emphasis on the multiple determination of mobility within community of origin emerges. Very few mentioned one factor only, thus even the most frequently mentioned isolated factor (4) had only 12% frequency. Perhaps the most interesting group consists of those who neither refer to lack of ability nor to lack of desire. The greatest amount of talent waste may possibly be concentrated within this group consisting of 40 per cent. of the total group. Among this sub-group the frequency of endorsement of each of the remaining four factors was as follows :

	Per cent. (N = 315)
Personal evaluation (2)	14
Family evaluation (5)	21
Family economy (6)	59
Community norm (4)	78

It is worthy of note that irrespective of personal ability or desire respondents tend in retrospection to perceive the attainment of further education as deviant behaviour. The implications of the view that social mobility, in particular long distance movement, may represent a variety of deviant community behaviour may help explain certain stubborn facts. It has frequently been noted by Danish students of mobility that the proportion of university students of working class origin has changed very little over the last generation in spite of increased welfare state efforts towards achieving equality of opportunity. It may be that the manipulation of social mobility by means of modest economic incentives under certain conditions is no more efficient than efforts to procure criminal behaviour at the market prices of legal behaviour.

NOTES

¹ S. Danø, *Linear Programming in Ice Cream Making*. Nordisk Tidsskrift for teknisk Økonomi, 1955.

² S. Stouffer, "Some observations on study design," *American Journal of Sociology*, 45, pp. 355-361. 1950.

³ Simultaneous studies may be more or less retrospective, thus relying more or less on individual memory and/or documentary aids for the reconstructions of past events. Thus the distinction between sequential and simultaneous studies here used refers to whether the object of interest is approached more than once or not.

⁴ See e.g., P. Lazarsfeld, and P. Kendall, "Problems of Survey Analysis," *Continuities in Social Research*. Ed. Merton and Lazarsfeld, pp. 143-145. Glencoe, Ill. 1950.

⁵ G. Boalt, "Social Mobility in Stockholm," *Transactions of Second World Congress of Sociology*, 2, pp. 67-73, London, 1954.

⁶ The same may be said of the sequential procedure.

Some Aspects of Social Mobility in Western Germany

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In the *Transactions of the Second World Congress of Sociology* (London, 1954), there is a preliminary report on the research-project "Wandlungen der deutschen Sozialstruktur" (Changes in German Social Structure) which has been conducted by the Seminar of Sociology of Kiel University. This report was mainly concerned with the first phases of this project—a study of the prestige of occupations.

The later phases, based chiefly on the above mentioned investigations and their results, deal mostly with problems of occupational mobility, that is, intra- and inter-generation mobility. These investigations are based on a random sample in the district of Schleswig-Holstein (the most northern state of the Bundesrepublik) ; the sample includes all people of two age groups born on May 5 and November 11.

In contrast with some researches already published, in our own research social mobility was considered separately under two aspects; namely as movements between social categories of status and as movements between so-called fields of occupation. The number and the delimitations of the four status categories were drawn from the above-mentioned research on occupational prestige. In categorising occupations, different activities, i.e., agriculture, administrative, mechanical (artisan, *handwerklich*) and technical, etc., were differentiated. Where it was thought to be reasonable, occupational categories were subdivided into farm hands, independent farmers, etc., or combinations of status category and field of occupation were formed, e.g. administrative officials were subdivided into lower, middle, upper-middle and higher positions.

While in the dimension of status category one cannot differentiate into more than four, there resulted more than forty so-called groups of occupation by separating the fields of occupation or by combining fields of occupation with status category.

The main features of this research are as follows :—

A. INTRA-GENERATION MOBILITY

(1) The relations between contact with the occupation (i.e. the very first contact with any work after leaving school), any kind of vocational training and occupation chiefly practised later on.

(2) The frequency and direction of the change of occupational and status categories between 1927 and 1953 with special reference to the movements produced or intensified by World War II.

(3) The relations between certain status categories and education.

B. INTERGENERATION MOBILITY

(1) The social origin of certain occupational groups.

(2) The occupational aims of sons of selected paternal occupational groups.

(3) Relation between fathers' and sons' occupation (index of association (Benini-index).

(4) Relation between fathers' occupation and education of the children. Differences between the sexes.

Since the problems of inter-generation mobility are the most interesting for international comparisons, we shall summarise here some of our results. We will exclude discussion of methods. Their principles, which are also of value for our own research, have been extensively discussed in *Social Mobility in Britain*, edited by D. V. Glass (London, 1954), and space does not allow us to discuss in detail special problems of our own research.

1. (a) Due to lack of space we do not mention here the social origin of the members of the occupational groups. We further ignore

Table 1. *Index of Association (Non-Refugees)*

Occupational groups* of fathers and sons	Fathers' and sons' occupa- tional group identical		Broader filial occupational group		
	older pers.	younger pers.		older pers.	younger pers.
Agriculture	2.79	3.28	—	—	—
Farm-hands.. ..	5.10	5.00	Agriculture ..	2.61	2.29
Farmers	4.34	5.74	Agriculture ..	2.91	3.49
Occupations in handi- craft and technical occupations ..	1.57	1.39	—	—	—
Artisans (journeymen) and skilled industrial workers	1.85	1.33	Occupations in handicraft and technical occupa- tions ..	1.67	1.32
Unskilled and semi- skilled industrial ..	1.59	1.55	—	—	—
Lower and medium ad- ministrative employees and officials	1.14	1.66	Administration in- cluding officials ..	1.45	1.75
Higher administrative and teaching occupa- tions and professions	5.98	6.36	Administration in- cluding officials ..	2.94	2.51
Independent medium and large entrepre- neurs in commerce and industry ..	3.22	3.81	—	—	—

* In this and the following tables some of the groups mentioned are subdivisions of other occupational groups.

the distribution of sons of some paternal occupational groups over the different fields of occupation. We will rather ask how, and to what extent, the sons from certain selected paternal occupational groups have contributed not absolutely but relatively (according to their number) to the formation of certain occupational groups. Table 1 shows the relations, measured by the index of association.

If one takes in the filial generation a broader definition of occupational groups as a basis, the indices nearly always decrease, as is natural. But there exists a very interesting exception. This is to be found among the sons of fathers employed in lower and middle administrative occupations. They tend to go relatively more into the upper administrative fields of occupation than into the lower, which corresponds with their fathers' occupation. The explanation of this may be that, if the sons follow their father's occupation, the choice of occupation is accompanied here by a strong ambition to ascend.

(b) Now of course it is not only interesting to know how many sons strive after their father's field of occupation, but also, if sons choose outside their fathers' occupational group, which fields they prefer and whether there are fields which are especially avoided.

Table 2 shows that for certain groups there are such preferred and avoided fields of occupation. This table resulted from subdividing

Table 2. *Fields of Attraction and Repulsion for Specific occupational Groups.*

Fields of attraction (preferred fields)							Fathers' occupational groups	Fields of repulsion (avoided fields)						
1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.*		1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.*
††			†				Farm-hands	-	-	-	-	-	-	
†	††						Farmers							
			†				Artisans (journeymen)	-	-		-			
			†				Artisans (masters)	-						
			†	†	†		Unskilled non-agricultural work		-					
			†	†	†		Semi-skilled and skilled industrial work		-					
						††	Higher administrative and teaching occupations and professions	-	-	-	-	-	-	
						†	Independent medium and large entrepreneurs in commerce and industry	-		-				
						††	Lower and medium officials	-	-					

* Occupational groups of interviewed persons:

1. Farm-hands.
2. Farmers.
3. Craftsmen.
4. Unskilled non-agricultural workers.
5. Semi-skilled and skilled technical industrial workers.
6. Higher administrative and teaching occupations and professions including higher officials.
7. Commercial occupations without real administrative employees.

the interviewed persons into four groups : older (50-60) non-refugees, older refugees, younger (30-40) non-refugees and younger refugees. For each group the indices of association were calculated.

If in at least three groups of interviewed persons in the same column results were achieved which exceeded 2.0—that is, if twice as many sons of each paternal occupational group were to be found than “probably” would have been expected—this column was marked with †† while values between 1.5 and 2.0 were marked with †. As fields of avoidance each space was marked with —, where at least three values below 0.5 appeared together.

From this we may conclude that, apart from the nearly general preference for the paternal field of occupation, the professions of the sons are not distributed symmetrically in other spheres, but that there do exist certain fields of occupation which are especially preferred or avoided.

(c) Of course the development which takes place in time is interesting also for the problems dealt with by the index of association. For selected groups there resulted changes shown in Table 3.

2. The values discussed above refer only to the relationship between the field of occupation of fathers and sons. However, a relationship

Table 3. *Index of Association in Four Age-Groups*

Occupational field of fathers	Father generation (I)*	Father generation (II)*	Older filial generation (I)	Younger filial generation (II)	Occupational field of sons
Agriculture Farmers	1.59 2.69	2.30 3.43	2.79 4.34	3.28 5.74	Agriculture Farmers
Higher administrative and teaching occupations and professions	5.68	3.55	2.94	2.51	Administrative and teaching occupations and professions
Un- and semi-skilled manual labour, chiefly in industry	2.30	1.84	1.59	1.55	Un- and semi-skilled manual labour
Lower and medium administrative employees	1.03	1.70	1.45	1.75	Administrative and teaching occupations and professions
Artisans (journeymen) and skilled industrial workers	1.32	2.06	1.67	1.32	Occupations in handicraft and technical occupations

* The calculation of the above indices of association contains certain methodical problems. For an extensive discussion see the forthcoming publications of our research.

between status categories has also become apparent. We will now consider the matter separately. It must be borne in mind that the occupational position of the father was taken to be his "typical position", i.e., the position which after his death or at the end of his career was considered to be the characteristic occupation. On the other hand, we investigated the positions of the older interviewed persons in 1939—at that time they were on an average about 40 years of age—and for the younger, their positions in 1953—they were about 36 at that time. Hence it is quite possible that the social ascent which took place in the second half of their working life requires further investigation.

In addition to the four status categories in the following tables, the occupational group "farmers" has been shown. This is not only because the status category of the farmer chiefly depends on the size of

Table 4. *Intergeneration Changes (Non-Refugees)*

Interviewee-group	Direction of change	Actual cases	Possible cases	Actual cases as % of possible cases
Older persons occupations (1939) }	upwards	125	435	28.7
	no change	231	532	43.4
	downwards	105	299	35.1
	unknown*	101	562	18.0
Younger persons occupations (1953) }	upwards	65	256	25.4
	no change	144	318	45.3
	downwards	80	212	37.8
	unknown	46	335	13.7

* Unknown, because change into or out of independent agriculture or because status of father unknown.

his property and because it was not clear whether leased land should be considered or not, but also because equally large properties are valued quite differently in the various regions of Schleswig-Holstein.

In table 4 there are shown, first, ascents and descents in intergeneration changes, related to the present-day scale of status category. But it is interesting that there are more social descents than ascents. For the older groups this may result partly from the fact that a relatively large number of fathers of the present-day workers and lower and middle status employees, were independent master-mechanics, artisans, craftsmen and merchants. As to the younger interviewed persons, they naturally show the effects of the war period, and finally we must not forget that for both groups their careers have not yet finished.

(a) If we now calculate the indices of association for the relations between fathers and sons belonging to the same status categories,

we find the proportions shown in Table 5. The indices are especially high in the upper (IV) and lower (I) social class and also among the farmers. Here we will restrict ourselves to giving the resultant proportions ; it would go too far to comment separately on their various causes. Moreover, they largely correspond to the conditions found in other countries.

Table 5. *Index of Association (Non-Refugees)*

Status category	Older persons	Younger persons
I	2.01	1.75
II	1.30	1.24
III	1.59	1.94
IV	5.89	5.41
Farmers ..	4.34	4.16

I=lowest category of status.

(b) Finally, in this connection, we will also deal with the relations generally resulting from fathers' and sons' status category. Table 6, which resembles Table 2, shows that there exists again quite characteristic relations and that the relationship between fathers' and sons' status category is still closer than between fathers' and sons' occupations.

3. In judging these values of the index of association one should remember that this statistical measure is plainly not a perfect

Table 6. *Fields of Attraction or Repulsion for Specific Status Categories*

Fields of attraction						Occupational groups of fathers	Fields of repulsions					
Status of sons							Status of sons					
I	II	III	IV	SL*			I	II	III	IV	SL*	
††					††	Farm-hands (I)		-	-			
	†					Farmers (SL)					-	
	†	†	†			Artisans (journeymen) and skilled industrial workers (II)						
	†	†				Higher technical occupations (masters and engineers) (III)						
						Unskilled and semi-skilled industrial-workers (I, II)			-	-		
	†	†	†			Lower and medium administrative employees and officials (II, III)		-		-		
						Higher administrative and teaching occupations and professions (IV)		-		-		
						Independent medium and large entrepreneurs in commerce and industry (III)		-				

* Farmers.

expression for the connection between fathers' and sons' positions. In the report "Social Mobility in Britain", edited by D. V. Glass, the assumptions underlying the association-index have already been discussed. It is important to note that the relationship can also be measured by other indices. Each possible index contains a manner of questioning which in some respect diverges from the other indices, so that the choice of one certain index necessarily gives a quite specific point of view to the problem.

In this respect it is very interesting to see how the relations measured by the index of association are valued by the Benini-index. Table 7 contains the same relations already given in Table 1, this time, however, measured by the Benini-index. Both indices show similar tendencies in the relationship between fathers' and sons' occupational groups, but in certain cases, e.g. with the entrepreneurial group, they are given a distinctly different value. Bigger disparities are shown, when the relations between the status positions are measured by both indices. (Table 8).

In order to understand this, one has to note the way in which both indices show high or low values. The index of association especially

Table 7. *Benini-Indices (Non-Refugees)*

Occupational groups of fathers and sons	Older persons	Younger persons
Agriculture	0.643	0.546
Farm-hands	0.505	0.324
Farmers	0.614	0.636
Occupations in handicraft and technical occupations	0.270	0.192
Artisans (journeymen) and skilled industrial workers	0.204	0.123
Unskilled and semi-skilled industrial workers	0.185	0.135
Lower and medium administrative employees and officials	0.044	0.122
Higher administrative and teaching occupations and professions	0.313	0.480
Independent medium and large entrepreneurs in commerce and industry	0.181	0.362

Table 8. *Index of Association and Benini-Index for status categories (non-refugees)*

Status category	Index of association	Benini-Index
I	1.75	0.184
II	1.24	0.278
III	1.94	0.271
IV	5.51	0.312
Farmers	4.16	0.662

stresses the importance of the probability quota. The Benini-index, however, stresses especially the relation between probable and actual cases of identical occupation. This may be illustrated by an example from the occupational group "agriculture". Of a total of 301 interviewed persons in one age group, 100 had fathers employed in agriculture. Of the same total 71 persons were employed themselves in agriculture, and 58 of their fathers also. The index of association is calculated as follows :—

$$\frac{52}{71} : \frac{100}{301} = \frac{52}{100} : \frac{71}{301} = \frac{52}{23.6} = 2.2$$

The sons with fathers in agriculture would have according to this index contributed to the structure of this occupational group 2.2 times as much as would have probably been expected, if there had existed no relations at all of attraction or repulsion between father's and son's occupation. The Benini-index in addition to this considers the cases of possible likelihood; in this case 71, for with this number according to our method of calculation all existing places would be filled in the sons' generation.

The Benini-index is calculated as follows :—

$$\frac{52}{71} - \frac{23.6}{23.6} = \frac{28.4}{45.4} = 0.6$$

It is clear that it is only the relatively small difference between possible and actual cases of identical father's and son's occupation which inflates the values given by the Benini-index. Hence the different indices should be used according to the problem under consideration.

In conclusion, we want to stress that the preceding pages deal only with excerpts from our total research, and that we have intentionally neglected details of method in order to give more of our material results in this limited space.

Some Consequences of Social Mobility in the United States

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What conclusions based on empirical research can be drawn about consequences of the high and persistent rates of social mobility in the United States? Research on social stratification in the United States has focused mainly on the analysis of patterns of group differentiation and more recently on the charting of rates of social mobility. In a complex industrial society undergoing rapid social change, it is indeed an extensive task to isolate the preconditions and barriers to mobility among social classes, religious and ethnic groups. It is a much more complex task to trace out the consequences of social mobility under these conditions. There have been important theoretical analyses of social mobility by both Sorokin and Parsons.¹ Moreover, most empirical research on social stratification makes crucial assumptions about the consequences of social mobility. Yet only a handful of empirical works focus rigorously on tracing out these consequences in the various types of group structures found in the United States. It is the purpose of this paper to report on empirical research into the consequences of social mobility in the United States and to discuss some of the theoretical implications of these researches.

Social mobility research in the United States has set for itself the task of explaining the persistence of social equalitarian values and the relative absence of political extremism. Thereby, a major share of social stratification research, implicitly or explicitly, deals with the consequences of social mobility for the society as a whole. Even many community studies are oriented toward such ambitious objectives. Under the strong influence of economic determinism, the typical model has been to analyze the dynamics of the occupational structure and, the derivative prestige structure, as if here were the only crucial aspects of social organization. Such a model has led to efforts at the direct explanation of American ideology and political behavior in terms of the categories of social stratification. From such reasoning has developed the widespread social scientific and popular assumption, that as soon as, and in fact only when, the possibilities of social mobility decline the essential ideological and political character of the United States would alter. However, there has been in recent years a broadening of theoretical perspectives since it is not possible to assume that occupation

and prestige structures define the entirety of social organization and the social matrix through which social mobility influences operate. As Bendix and Lipset point out : " The existence of widespread social mobility may be compatible with a society in which status differences are emphasized rather than minimized." ² Thus, they add ideological factors to their refined analysis of rates and patterns of social mobility in order to explain " ideological equalitarianism ". In particular, they emphasized the absence of a feudal tradition and the contribution of the educational system to the belief in the value of an " open class society ".

One of the striking facts of recent group social mobility patterns in the United States has been the rise in the standard of living of wide sectors of the working class which has had the effect of minimizing differences between working class and middle class occupations. This rise in standard of living has taken place without equivalent changes in the prestige of working class occupations, despite the similarity in the modes of consumption of these groups. Thus, one step in departing from the economic deterministic model is that of analyzing the relative consequences of social mobility on the various scales of benefits and indulgences that are traditionally thought of as indices of social mobility, such as, income, skill, prestige, residential location, hazardous work, etc. ³ Such an approach is most helpful in that it reveals the greater and greater extent to which status changes are not directly tied to changes in income and occupation. Thereby, the subtleties of the process of mobility are clarified and the indices of social mobility that are employed in historical and cross national comparisons called into question.

However, it is the assumption of this paper that while occupational and prestige structures define the patterns of stratification, the consequences of social mobility are manifested through and modified by the basic group structures in an industrialized society. At a minimum primary groups, community structures and large scale or bureaucratic organizations are involved. In these terms the analysis of effects of social mobility is but one aspect of the basic processes of social change. Social stratification patterns are present in all societies and derive from the fact that in pursuit of group values, social groups differentiate themselves. Social mobility, therefore is a conceptual approach for analyzing fundamental changes wrought in the patterns of influence in a society as a result of modifications in its pattern of production and/or consumption. ⁴ To analyze the consequences of social mobility therefore, implies an explicit and comprehensive delimitation of the group structures through which influence in a modern society operates.

For the purposes of this paper, the simple classical distinction between *primary* group structures and *secondary* group structures suffices to systematize the very limited available empirical research on the consequences of social mobility in the United States. ⁵ In a sense,

there is a parallel to Merton's analysis of social mobility and anticipatory socialization although his approach was designed for social psychological analysis of reference groups.⁶ Merton's theoretical analysis of social mobility of enlisted soldiers, seeks to distinguish between the condition under which anticipatory socialization, that is learning in advance the rules of groups into which they seek to enter through mobility, is functional or dysfunctional for the groups with which upwardly mobile soldiers were affiliated. The consequences of anticipatory socialization and mobility are different for the different group structures through which the individual passes in the process of his mobility.

Likewise, the consequences of social mobility on *primary* group structures (family, work groups, friendship cliques, etc.) can be very different from the consequences on *secondary* group structures (community organizations, large scale organizations and bureaucracies). On the basis of this distinction, the limited findings of empirical research on the consequences of social mobility in the United States assume some convergence in two crucial aspects.

One, social mobility generally has been found to have disruptive implications for the structure of primary group relations and on related social psychological states, and thereby to carry socially maladjustive consequences. While the findings that are available in support of this conclusion hardly permit observations about differential rates of mobility, it is clear that both upward and downward mobility are socially disruptive for primary group structures. Second, while the investigation of the consequences of social mobility for secondary group structures have been mainly limited to a scattering of studies on community organization and political behavior, markedly different order of inferences can be made. Upward social mobility, especially in the middle class, tends to orient and incorporate mobile groups into many types of secondary structures with relative effectiveness. On the other hand, while there are no clear-cut results from downward mobility, if anything, downward mobility does not produce effective involvement in secondary groups structures in pursuit of self interest. It should be kept clearly in mind that these consequences for secondary group structures refer mainly to the post-war period of relative economic security and expansion. Nevertheless, from the apparent contradictory implications of social mobility on primary and secondary group structures emerges a basis for a fuller understanding of the dynamics of social control in the United States.

The empirical research on social stratification in the United States to date makes possible the following observations as to the context for analyzing the impact of social mobility on primary and on secondary group structures.

(a) The United States has been characterized by a high rate of social mobility and there is no clear-cut basis for concluding that these rates are progressively declining.⁷

(b) While social mobility derives either from changes in the occupational structure or from the openness of opportunity in general without regard to such changes, the high rates of upward mobility have simultaneously been accompanied by lower but significant rates of downward social mobility.⁸

(c) Social mobility involves either the movement of individuals from one strata to another or shifts in the relative size and position of whole strata or social groups. It is understandable that with the relatively open social mobility patterns of individuals of the United States, research emphasis should have been placed on an analysis of the movements of individuals from one strata to another at the expense of the analysis of shifts in relative size and position of the various strata. Preoccupation with individual social mobility also derives from the American social science research methodology which emphasizes the sample survey. The sample survey focuses attention on shifting patterns of mobility of individuals and not on the historic changes in the society as a whole. Therefore, in general, data that are available on the consequences of social mobility refer most often to individual not group mobility.

(d) Although for research purposes it is often convenient to describe the occupational or status characteristics of individuals, such an approach does not present a comprehensive base for describing patterns of mobility.⁹ Even before the development of contemporary field methodology, Schumpeter in his brilliant essay on "Social Classes in an Ethnically Homogeneous Environment", focused attention on the family as a basic unit for describing the process of social mobility.

Warner continues this emphasis when he makes the distinction between the family of orientation and the family of procreation.¹⁰ Social mobility which involves all members of a family shifting from one strata to another is likely to have different consequences than social mobility which brings only one or selected members of a family. In an industrialized society it is impossible to describe mobility meaningfully without investigating the occupational pattern of the housewife. Unfortunately, the research studies which trace out the consequences of social mobility on primary and secondary structures usually have described social mobility in individual and not in family terms.

II

Primary Group Structures : Much of the empirical research on the consequences of social mobility on primary group structures and thereby on social psychological mechanisms that has been completed with methodological rigor in the United States in recent years confirms and elaborates the theoretical work of Durkheim.¹¹ In a wide range of subject matters—family organization, prejudice, mental health, and the like—the conclusion repeatedly emerges as to the dysfunctional,

disruptive and disorganising contributions of social mobility. The contributions of social mobility to these processes have been found to be at most statistical associations which link social mobility to other causal factors. Precisely as Durkheim had anticipated the disruptive consequences are to be found not only in downward social mobility but as well in upward social mobility, especially rapid upward social mobility. Contemporary research into social mobility is not oblivious of the complex value problems that confront the analyst when he seeks to trace out the implications of social mobility. To observe the dysfunctional aspects of social mobility on primary group structures for particular strata is hardly to deny the special conditions where social creativity is stimulated in particular groups by the release from traditional norms which is implied by such disruptive processes.

Specifically, Roth and Peck have sought to trace out the types of social mobility which are associated with greater family instability.¹² They recorded social mobility patterns at the time of marriage and found downward mobile spouses produced the most unstable marriage. Upward mobility on the part of one spouse, especially the women, made for poor adjustment after marriage. Interestingly enough, if both spouses were upwardly mobile, there was no negative effect, indicating a special limiting condition to the disruptive implications of mobility. Since intensive case studies can often illuminate these processes, Bossard and Sanger have traced out in detail the effects of social mobility on the child due to marked and sudden changes upwardly in social position.¹³ Not only do they report development of feelings of insecurity and isolation, but also compensatory mechanisms such as increased verbalization. The Indianapolis survey of the social and psychological factors in fertility included an analysis of social mobility.¹⁴ Both upward and downward social mobility was predictive of patterns of fertility planning which tended to be manifestations of rejection of the norms of the strata from which the families were moving and of incorporation of those to which they had arrived. The link was clearer in the case of upward mobility than in the case of downward mobility.

Ethnic and racial prejudice has been repeatedly analyzed as it is conditioned by vertical social mobility. Bettelheim and Janowitz have investigated the consequences of short-term post-war mobility on anti-Negro and anti-Semitic attitudes among war veterans and found that both downward mobility and sharp upward mobility were linked to extreme prejudice beyond the social norms.¹⁵ The research of Greenblum and Pearlin in general confirms these findings and extends the scope to long-term social mobility changes.¹⁶ Competition for status, the insecurities generated by mobility and need to incorporate new norms release tension and hostility toward out-groups. Srole's work on prejudice and social anomie also confirm these hypotheses about prejudice although his conceptual approach was different.¹⁷

Following the specific direction of Durkheim's research into suicide there have been numerous research efforts to describe the social stratification rates of mental illness and psychopathology. Although it is generally accepted that social mobility increases mental strain and mental disease, the empirical validation of such hypotheses is indeed limited. "Summary of studies on the Incidence of Mental Disorders" by Rose and Stub review 65 studies, none of which make reference to social mobility as the basis for delimiting incidence groups.¹⁸ Much of the work on the ecological distribution of mental illness by Faris and Dunham relates to the consequences of social mobility, but mainly by indirection.¹⁹ Hollingshead and Redlich have also sought to describe the class stratification of schizophrenia and their findings confirm those of Faris and Dunham.²⁰ Namely, schizophrenic patients were located mainly in the lowest social strata. However, they found no relationship between social mobility and schizophrenia, but their results are difficult to evaluate since they had 92 per cent. of the patients in the no-mobility category, a percentage at variance with other studies and in no way to be accounted for by their careful sampling procedure.

Ruesch has presented an ingenious analysis pointing to the conclusion that the disruptive consequence of mobility is differentiated as between upward mobility and downward mobility.²¹ Upward mobility he reasons predisposes to psychosomatic illness while downward mobility to alcoholism. Extensive statistical analysis of suicide and homicide by Henry and Short, among specific social groups supplies confirmation of the extreme disruptive consequences of social mobility although again their measures were indirect since they were based mainly on fluctuations in the business cycle.²²

A great deal of research on assimilation of immigrant groups in the United States is relevant for tracing out the consequences of social mobility on primary group structures and social psychological states. The process of assimilation of immigrant groups very frequently involves social ascent. Research on assimilation often does not specifically separate those changes of values and modes of behavior which derive from incorporation into a new society as opposed to those changes which derive from upward social mobility. Nevertheless, these researches are of particular importance because they do not only confirm the general conclusion about the disruptive consequences of upward social mobility on primary group structure but also indicate the social limiting conditions. Thomas and Znaniecki's classic study of *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America* is a dramatic example of the extent to which social mobility among immigrant groups can result in a disruption of primary group structures.²³ Furthermore, Thomas and Znaniecki anticipate subsequent research in that they analyze community structures and large-scale organisations (the church and the benevolent fraternal organizations in their particular case) as social structures for containing and limiting the disruptive consequences of social mobility.

III

Secondary Group Structures : While it is impossible to point to a satisfactory body of systematic data, the case studies of the assimilation of ethnic groups since Thomas and Znaniecki trace out the mechanisms by which, over the short run ecological segregation of these groups operates with integrative effects during the process of upward mobility. With physical separation from the "cultural Ghetto", especially by the sons and daughters of immigrants, family units become especially exposed to the disruptive consequences of upward social mobility as adjustment to new norms and modes of behavior are required. While social mobility creates new rôles for the wage earner in his occupational and professional setting, the consequences of social mobility manifests in the struggle for location in a desirable residential community. But the movement from one residential neighborhood and community to another is not merely a process of social strain and heightened instability. The structure of the community and the large scale organizations that penetrate into it operate as counterweights to the disruptive consequences generated by changes in occupational rôle.

The common problems of child rearing and of consumer consumption orients to varying degree one family to other families and to those bureaucratic institutions which are ecologically based in the residential community. The common requirements of family life create common tasks for parents and establish even in the most industrialized centers, for many families, intimate and relatively stable primary group relations which have some consequences in limiting the disruptive effects of social mobility.²⁴ New patterns of etiquette have to be learned, family and kinship relations decline while participation in voluntary associations and clubs increase. Warner has focused attention on the rôle of friendship cliques in this process of adult socialization.²⁵ While American social scientists are much concerned about the "happiness" of the upwardly mobile suburbanite or housing project family, they have not overlooked the range of secondary group structures which come into existence in support of the family and related primary groups.

Of the various large-scale organizations operating in United States residential communities—old, transitional and new—organized religion is the most persistent element of differentiation and of social cohesion. Thus, instead of assimilation and social mobility leading towards the development of a homogeneous social organization, aside from racial minorities, the restructuring of United States society has resulted not in a "melting pot society", but in a "triple melting pot". Various ethnic groups of the same religion—Catholic, Protestant and Jewish—intermarry and interact.²⁶ Regardless of the evaluation to be placed on the theological content of religion in the United States today, from the point of view of social mobility analysis, it is necessary to underline the fact that religious life is both community based and

highly organized along bureaucratic lines. The many-sided institutions of organized religion have served to supply standards of behavior and as an integrative device for the mobile sons and daughters of lower-class immigrant groups entering into the lower-middle class.²⁷

Of all the secondary group structures, it is in the area of political behavior that the consequences of upward social mobility should become most clear. Despite the rather large number of empirical studies of political participation and political behavior in elections in United States, only a few can be cited which explicitly employ mobility categories. Does upward social mobility, actual or anticipated, create an ambiguity in the individual's class identification and in political behavior? In the United States there is no assumption that occupation explains political behavior since status differences can account for a good deal of the variation in voting behavior which remains when economic factors are held constant. Social psychological variables, particularly attitudes towards authority, are also crucial in voting behavior.

Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that empirical research indicates that upward social mobility produces political behavior which tends to be an expression of the group interest of the higher economic and status strata. Thus, Maccoby found among young people in the Boston area in the 1952 election those who were socially upwardly mobile tended to adopt the political behavior (vote and affiliation) of the group into which they had moved, becoming more Republican.²⁸ Likewise in a study of a national sample of college graduates West found that upward mobile graduates who come from Democratic families as they broke with family traditions to report themselves as independents.²⁹ However, with age and the persistence of higher status they tended to adopt Republican affiliations. Those with Republican backgrounds who were upwardly mobile showed little change. Centers study of the attitudes of social classes, based on a national sample also reports on the conservative drift of the upwardly mobile in political orientation.³⁰ Almond's analysis of "The Political Attitudes of Wealth", focuses on elite opinion and highlights the process by which detached and more "rationalistic" attitudes toward politics develop among those who have risen to the very top of the social structure.³¹ On the other hand Maccoby found that downwardly mobile people did not display similar patterns to their new social milieu in political behavior; they rather remained as Republicans in voting and affiliation or more so than the class from which they came.

Related conclusions about the consequences of mobility for organizational and political behavior were found in a study of trade participation by Lipset and Gordon.³² They found that non-unionists differed from unionists in being more likely to have experienced social mobility either upwardly or downwardly over a generation or during their own careers. Their findings confirm the theory of Sorokin that active trade unionists are those who have inherited their social

position from their fathers. Upward mobility suggests the opportunity they have had in family and occupational background to secure middle-class orientation. Upward mobility had conservative implications. Equally important however is the implication that downward mobility did not increase organizational activity. Their data tends to confirm that downward mobility was related to membership non-participation in trade unions and therefore downward mobility did not imply the development of greater working class cohesion. Again, it is necessary to point out these findings on social mobility and political behavior are limited to a social context of general economic development and expansion. During the depression period at least three studies trace out increased political participation as a result of downward mobility of members of the working class.

The consequences of mobility for political behavior should effect not only behavior and attitudes of the various broad strata but also the political behavior of leadership groups. In general there is an increased interest in the United States in tracing out the social stratification backgrounds and social mobility patterns of professional and élite groups. But as yet in the absence of a systematic body of comparative data few generalizations can be made about the consequences of these shifts. It is indeed striking to note that C. Wright Mill's analysis of the mobility pattern of trade union leadership among the the C.I.O. and the A.F.L. leaders showed no differences.³³ There was however a tendency for A.F.L. leaders to have started their active unionism careers from the status of skilled workers, whereas the C.I.O. leaders entered unionism more often from the status of unskilled or semi-skilled workers. The degree to which social stratification influenced the behavior of these two leadership groups seems less to be a matter of differences of mobility and more a matter of differences in original social status.

Thus, in summary, it can be said that even the limited number of studies on the consequences of social mobility point to important implications of mobility for social structure and social change. It is necessary however to consider the effects of social mobility as being manifested and conditioned through the various central group structures in the society. If this point of view is taken, it becomes clear that the consequences of social mobility are not uniformly in the direction of disrupting the processes of social control and social change. Whereas in primary group relations over the short run, social mobility may well contribute dysfunctionally to both individuals and to the society at large, there is enough evidence to indicate that social mobility creates new social relations in communities and toward large-scale organizations which are functional and integrative both for the individual and the society at large. These processes are closely interrelated and the task of analysing their mutual consequences remains the frontier problem of social mobility research and thereby of social change analysis in general.

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Quelques caractéristiques de la mobilité sociale en Yougoslavie

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I

Pour saisir les particularités de la mobilité sociale en Yougoslavie on doit tenir compte d'une chose. Et précisément du fait qu'à partir du 1941 la société yougoslave traverse sa période révolutionnaire, quand l'économie nationale change de structure en passant de sa phase capitaliste à celle socialiste.

Naturellement cette circonstance fondamentale se répercute sur la composition des diverses classes sociales et aussi sur les fonctions qu'elles exercent dans la société yougoslave.

On doit souligner le fait que la Yougoslavie avant la II^{ème} guerre mondiale était un pays éminemment agricole avec une industrie rudimentaire et insuffisante, qui n'était guère capable de satisfaire aux besoins de la population. En outre pendant la guerre le pays a souffert des dommages très graves. On doit relever en premier plan la perte de 1,700.000 ressortissants yougoslaves, qui sont morts à la guerre et qui représentent 34% des pertes souffertes par l'ensemble des 18 pays alliés. C'est à dire qu'une personne sur neuf est morte pendant la guerre. Environ 90.000 ouvriers qualifiés, plus de 40.000 intellectuels et près d'un million d'agriculteurs morts constituèrent un grave coup pour l'économie nationale et pour la société yougoslave en général. Les dommages de guerre se chiffèrent par 46.9 milliards de dollars sur la base des prix de 1938, ce que présente la valeur des pertes de biens matériels et des dégâts apportés aux bâtiments, aux établissements industriels, à l'agriculture, aux moyens de communication ecc. Il suffit de relever que l'industrie a été détruite ou endommagée dans la mesure de 36.5% de sa valeur.

Les vides laissés dans l'industrie et dans les diverses branches de l'activité intellectuelle ont dû être rapidement comblés après la fin de la guerre. Mais aussi sur le plan économique cette fin a constitué le commencement d'une double activité. Premièrement on a dû éliminer les dégâts causés par les opérations de guerre et remplacer les biens matériels détruits. D'un autre côté, la révolution populaire en Yougoslave a déterminé le changement de la base économique. Et précisément, les efforts ont été dirigés vers la constitution d'une forte industrie lourde qui était complètement délaissée avant la guerre malgré la grande abondance de minéraux de toutes sortes dans le sous-sol yougoslave.

La reconstitution des valeurs matérielles, perdues pendant la guerre et la création de nouvelles sources de la richesse nationale se manifestèrent dans une activité fiévreuse qui absorba toutes les forces du pays en apportant une transformation substantielle de la base économique dans la société yougoslave. Quelques chiffres sont d'une grande éloquence. En prenant pour base la production de 1939—dernière année normale avant la guerre—on voit que la production de fer passa de 101 mille tonnes à 275 mille en 1952 pendant que celle d'acier passa de 235.000 tonnes à 445.000. La production du charbon augmenta environ dans la même proportion de 6,973 mille tonnes à 12,098 mille, et la quantité de l'énergie électrique produite passa de 1.100 millions kilowats à 2.700 millions.

Ces immenses efforts constructifs ont été soutenus par des hommes qui dans un grand nombre de cas ont dû changer de milieu et de condition sociale. D'une part les pertes humaines ont dû être remplacées cependant que d'autre part la création d'un grand nombre de nouvelles entreprises industrielles exigeait l'accroissement du nombre de nouveaux ouvriers et dirigeants. La majorité des ouvriers vient de la campagne, où les conditions de vie sont tous les jours plus difficiles à cause du grand fractionnement de la propriété foncière. Suivant les données du recensement de 1953 il y a en Yougoslavie seulement 0.47 hectares de terre arable par membre d'un ménage paysan.

En outre, la constitution des conseils d'ouvriers qui depuis 1950 prirent en leurs mains la gestion des entreprises industrielles, a contribué aux changements dans la couche des dirigeants dans les usines.

La décentralisation des pouvoirs de l'état, qui représente une phase évolutive de l'organisation sociale yougoslave vers le système des communes a eu comme conséquence l'accroissement numérique de la couche dirigeante du pays.

Ce sont les principaux phénomènes sociaux qui ont exercé une influence déterminante sur les différentes manifestations de la mobilité sociale dans la société yougoslave.

II

Une première caractéristique de la mobilité sociale en Yougoslavie est constituée par le problème des paysans ouvriers industriels. Ce problème a été envisagé par A. Humo (*Les changements sociaux et l'industrialisation dans la Bosnie et Herzégovine*, Notre réalité—Nasa stvarnost, Mai 1953) et élaboré par le Dr. C. Kostic dans sa dissertation *Paysans ouvriers industriels* (Beograd, 1955).

Cette catégorie d'ouvriers se recrute parmi les paysans qui habitent des villages dans le voisinage des villes ou des grandes entreprises industrielles. Ils mènent une double existence, ayant deux sources de revenu. D'une part ils vivent du salaire qu'ils touchent à l'entreprise, où ils sont employés et, d'autre part, ils jouissent du revenu provenant de leurs possessions, qu'ils travaillent personnellement. C'est la situation

d'un grand nombre de personnes qui ne sont ni ouvriers ni paysans conservant des caractères qui sont propres à chacune de ces catégories. Ce fait caractérise la vie économique et sociale en Yougoslavie. Les données statistiques montrent que sur 516.000 ouvriers dans l'industrie en 1952 il y en avait une moitié appartenant aux paysans-ouvriers (Kostic, o.c.). Il y a des auteurs qui inclinent vers l'opinion que la position des appartenants à cette catégorie sociale est transitoire, que c'est seulement une question de temps pour qu'ils deviennent des ouvriers "purs" et que l'agriculture constitue leur occupation accessoire (Humo, o.c.) Mais les faits démontrent que la situation est beaucoup plus complexe. En Serbie, en Croatie et en Slovénie on peut rencontrer facilement beaucoup des paysans qui passent leur vie entre leurs champs et l'usine où ils travaillent. On rencontre cette situation dans les industries agraire, forestière, minière et textile.

Si on compare le nombre des ouvriers dans les entreprises industrielles avant et après la guerre, on trouve des données symptomatiques. En prenant pour exemple l'entreprise minière et métallurgique de Zenica (Bosnie), le rapport de ces chiffres donne la situation suivante. Le nombre des ouvriers de l'entreprise Zenica se chiffrait en 1939 par 5681, dont 1607 étaient paysans qui habitaient leurs villages aux alentours de la ville. En 1952 le nombre des ouvriers passa à 12.689 ainsi subdivisés: 3053 étaient des ouvriers industriels avant la guerre; 5409 sont maintenant des ouvriers, ayant abandonné leur condition d'agriculteur exercée avant la guerre; et, enfin, 4227 sont des paysans ouvriers.

Le langage de ces chiffres est assez éloquent. Premièrement il montre un accroissement de la force ouvrière de 123% en comparaison avec celle d'avant la guerre. Parmi cette force il y a 9636 personnes dont 75% sont des nouveaux venus à l'usine. Ils sont répartis dans la mesure de 42,6% pour les ouvriers et de 32,4% pour les paysans ouvriers. Tous ces nouveaux venus à l'usine sont d'origine paysanne avec cette différence que les premiers ont supprimé les rapports économiques, qui les liaient à la campagne, tandis que les autres ont maintenu leur fondement économique villageois.

C'est à dire que les nouveaux ouvriers originaires paysans sont devenus des citoyens. Ce n'est pas le cas pour les paysans-ouvriers qui travaillent à l'usine tout en conservant sans changements leurs liens avec la vie villageoise. Tandis que les nouveaux ouvriers représentent un accroissement de la population citadine avec tous les changements du train de vie que comporte ce passage d'un groupe social à l'autre, les paysans ouvriers se trouvent au juste milieu entre la ville et la campagne. Naturellement on doit tenir compte que la réalité sociale dans les diverses régions de la Yougoslavie montre de grandes variations dans la position des appartenants à ce groupe intermédiaire. Une grande partie en est constituée par les "hybrides" (polutani), qui habitent les villages construits exprès pour les ouvriers aux alentours de l'usine ou de la ville ou qui arrivent chaque samedi soir à leur village d'origine pour prendre des provisions et pour retourner lundi

matin à leur poste du travail. Il y a d'autres "hybrides" qui viennent à l'usine de leurs villages, parcourant tous les jours de huit à vingt quatre kilomètres pour aller à l'usine et retourner à la maison. Puis ce sont des paysans-ouvriers qui travaillent à l'usine pendant l'automne et l'hiver, ayant terminé leurs travaux champêtres, ou ceux qui s'engagent dans les usines pendant le temps nécessaire pour faire quelques économies, abandonnant ensuite leur poste de travail.

Pour la plupart on peut résumer ainsi les conséquences qui découlent de la situation des paysans-ouvriers. Ce groupe est constitué par les paysans plus pauvres, qui habitent des villages plus ou moins éloignés de l'entreprise industrielle dans la zone, où elle exerce sa force d'attraction en recrutant la main d'oeuvre nécessaire à son fonctionnement. Une partie des ces paysans-ouvriers est destinée à fournir des ouvriers stables et précisément celle qui habite les villages construits pour les ouvriers aux alentours de leur fabrique ou ville. Mais dans toutes les autres catégories c'est l'intérêt économique qui peut déterminer leur assimilation par l'élément citadin. Les données statistiques enseignent que la quantité de la terre possédée par un paysan ouvrier est en rapport inverse avec son attachement à l'industrie. Plus la superficie des terres arables, possédées par les paysans-ouvriers est grande, plus leur intérêt envers les obligations dérivant de leur emploi est petit. Ils ne se soucient guère d'acquérir les nouvelles qualifications nécessaires pour obtenir une meilleure position dans l'usine. Puis ils abandonnent souvent leur poste du travail pour les travaux champêtres. En outre leur rendement est plus faible, car ils travaillent à l'usine fatigués par les travaux champêtres qu'ils accomplissent dans leur temps libre. Et l'intérêt majeur que les paysans ouvriers montrent pour ces travaux a pour effet qu'ils les considèrent toujours comme la principale source de leur existence, tandis que les salaires servent seulement à arrondir le bilan de leur ménage.

Les interruptions d'emploi provoquent des fluctuations dans la quantité de la main d'oeuvre, ce qui représente un problème grave pour les entreprises avec un grand nombre de paysans-ouvriers comme c'est le cas, p.e., dans l'industrie forestière.

Le problème a encore des autres aspects négatifs. C'est la tendance des ouvriers-paysans à arrondir leurs petites propriétés en investissant leurs salaires dans l'achat de nouvelles parcelles de terrain. Divisés entre l'usine et la terre, ils ne peuvent pas la travailler d'une manière satisfaisante. De cette façon ils entravent la modernisation de l'agriculture.

D'un autre coté la catégorie des paysans-ouvriers permet à un nombre considérable de paysans de produire plus qu'ils ne le feraient en s'occupant seulement de leurs parcelles du terrain. En outre, les salaires perçus représentent un afflux périodique de sommes liquides à la campagne, ce qui sert à améliorer les conditions générales de vie. Puis la formation de cette catégorie sociale présente aussi un débouché naturel au surpeuplement agraire de quelques régions yougoslaves.

D'une part la mobilité sociale en Yougoslavie se distingue aussi, par un grand nombre de paysans qui travaillent dans les usines sans abandonner leur train de vie villageoise. C'est un phénomène naturel dans une société en grand partie agraire soumise au processus d'une industrialisation rapide.

III

Qui a l'intention de faire des déductions en partant de divers faits concrets de la mobilité sociale en Yougoslavie doit tenir compte d'une circonstance essentielle. Et précisément que la société yougoslave traverse sa période révolutionnaire en passant de la phase capitaliste de son histoire à la phase socialiste. Et les changements révolutionnaires se développent sous l'empire d'autres lois que les modifications dans des sociétés avec une organisation capitaliste stable. Par conséquent les diverses phénomènes de la mobilité sociale sont évalués de ce point de vue.

L'évolution de la société yougoslave après la guerre a été déterminée par la nationalisation des moyens de production industrielle, des moyens de communication plus importants et du commerce, ensuite par la réforme agraire et un rapide procès d'industrialisation. Pareillement la formation des nouveaux organes du pouvoir populaire a exigé le recrutement d'un grand nombre de fonctionnaires nécessaires pour accomplir ces tâches. Les diverses nécessités de cette nature ont dû être rapidement satisfaites malgré les graves pertes humaines subies pendant la guerre.

Le personnel nécessaire était fourni par des personnes qui furent démobilisées après la fin de la guerre ou qui ont appartenu à l'organisation civile du pouvoir populaire sur les territoires libérés de l'ennemi. D'origine ouvrière ou paysanne ces personnes ont suivi l'école de la révolution sur les champs de bataille ou organisé le pouvoir civil révolutionnaire derrière la ligne du front. Ayant acquis une plus ou moins grande expérience administrative militaire ou civile, elles eurent la possibilité de l'appliquer dans les nouvelles fonctions auxquelles elles étaient destinées après la fin de la guerre.

L'expérience révolutionnaire fut une condition nécessaire pour jeter les fondements d'un nouvel ordre social et éliminer les vestiges de l'organisation économique et sociale du capitalisme. La nationalisation de l'industrie des transports et du commerce exigea aussi la création d'une nouvelle organisation pour la gestion des entreprises nationalisées. Cela signifia l'immixtion d'un grand nombre de nouveaux fonctionnaires sans expérience administrative, qui précédemment faisaient partie des autres groupes sociaux citadins ou villageois. Ces nouveaux venus formèrent le groupe bureaucratique avec le personnel administratif qui fut maintenu en service après la guerre.

Ce groupe bureaucratique, formé en grande partie d'hommes nouveaux aux fonctions administratives, était le produit d'une nécessité

concrète qui imposa une centralisation du pouvoir de l'état. Le pays ruiné par la guerre, l'exécution d'un vaste programme de reconstruction dans les régions qui ont souffert le plus; les nouvelles formes collectives des organismes de l'état; un grand nombre de fonctionnaires dépourvus d'expérience administrative; l'accroissement de l'économie nationale; l'élimination des vestiges du passé—tous ces facteurs exigèrent un guide sûr, provenant d'un centre et capable de concentrer les moyens à sa disposition dans les points les plus importants de l'économie nationale pour obtenir le maximum d'effet possible.

Mais ce groupe d'employés de l'état avait tendance à se renfermer sur lui même et à abuser de sa situation particulière pour renforcer ses positions et améliorer les conditions de vie de ses membres et pour influencer le développement de l'organisation sociale de la manière la plus favorable à leurs intérêts particuliers. Ces tendances—comme l'a relevé le vice-président Kardelj—représentèrent un péril latent de bureaucratisation, menaçant d'étouffer l'initiative des masses ouvrières et de conduire au centralisme et au particularisme bureaucratique.

L'année 1950 marqua le point de rupture après la publication de la Loi fondamentale du 28 juin sur la gestion des entreprises économiques de l'État et des associations supérieures économiques par les collectivités ouvrières. Cette loi constitutionnelle abrogea le principe que l'industrie doit être gérée par des organismes de l'État et confia l'administration des entreprises aux ouvriers et employés qui en font partie. Ce processus a soustrait un grand nombre de compétences aux fonctionnaires d'état en les confiant aux organes locaux qui sont élus par la population et qui se trouvent sous son contrôle. Ces organismes locaux sont composés des personnes qui font partie de la population locale et dont la grande majorité ne reçoit pas d'émoluments pour les fonctions qu'ils remplissent.

Le principe que tous les ouvriers d'une usine doivent prendre part à son administration et que tous les habitants d'un pays participent au règlement de ses affaires indique un profond changement dans la position réciproque des gouvernants et gouvernés.

La couche bureaucratique a été dissoute de telle manière qu'une grande partie de ses membres a dû chercher des emplois dans les organes d'administration locale. De cette manière ces membres ont changé de groupe social, en appartenant aux groupes locaux et non plus au grand groupe de la bureaucratie d'état.

Une autre cause de mobilité sociale est représentée par la participation d'un nombre toujours plus grand de personnes à l'administration soit dans la gestion des usines et des coopératives soit dans l'administration locale. La cloison étanche qui jadis séparait les gouvernés des gouvernants a disparu car tous les gouvernés de ce moment ont la certitude de devenir des gouvernants dans le futur plus ou moins proche après leur élection comme membres d'un organe d'administration locale. D'autre part tous les gouvernés sans distinction jouissant des droits civiques font partie des assemblées d'électeurs auxquelles les

organes de l'administration décentralisée et les députés des assemblées législatives républicaines et fédérale doivent rendre compte de leur activité sous peine de perdre leur mandat si les électeurs la jugent insuffisante ou nuisible à leurs intérêts.

De cette manière il n'y a plus de différence de groupe social entre les gouvernants et les gouvernés. C'est le résultat d'une activité qui a éliminé des causes qui jadis ont provoqué la formation d'un groupe bureaucratique particulier. Les membres de ce groupe ont changé de fonction sociale et la même chose se constata et se constate toujours chez les gouvernés de jadis pendant qu'ils remplissent les fonctions publiques des organismes électifs.

IV

Enfin, on doit faire mention encore d'un phénomène qui est aussi propre de la mobilité sociale en Yougoslavie.

La nationalisation des entreprises industrielles et commerciales, des banques et des sociétés détermina un changement dans la position sociale de leurs propriétaires et dirigeants. Ils durent se résigner à ce fait révolutionnaire et chercher une systématisation conforme à la nouvelle situation sociale fondée sur la propriété collective des moyens de production, des communications, etc.

Une grande partie de ces anciens capitalistes a trouvé la possibilité de contribuer avec leurs efforts au développement des forces économiques du pays. Ils sont entrés dans les rangs de l'administration centrale ou locale, devenant des employés qui mettent au service de la société leur expérience en affaires.

D'un autre côté une partie de ces nouveaux fonctionnaires ne sut pas renoncer à leurs intérêts personnels et a maintes fois violé la loi en arrangeant des affaires douteuses pour son propre compte. C'est la source de la criminalité économique, qui est particulièrement poursuivie par les organes de l'État.

Ces anciens capitalistes, qui n'ont pas voulu contribuer selon leurs possibilités à l'activité sociale, se trouvent à l'écart en vivant de biens précédemment accumulés ou de la pension, qu'ils reçoivent de la société comme ex-employés dans les entreprises. Il y a des cas où ils s'occupent aussi de spéculations occasionnelles, ce qui les porte maintes fois à commettre des infractions à la loi et aux règlements.

En concluant on peut relever que la mobilité sociale en Yougoslavie a ses propres traits particuliers qui sont déterminés par le caractère révolutionnaire du développement de la société yougoslave.

Occupational Mobility in the Netherlands from 1919 to 1954*

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1. FOREWORD

A study of occupational mobility in the Netherlands was carried out by the Nederlandse Stichting voor Statistiek on behalf of the ISONEVO (Institute for Social Research in the Netherlands). The interviewing for this study took place in April/May, 1954. The purpose was to gather information about the horizontal and vertical occupational mobility of the adult male occupational population in the Netherlands. The ultimate object of the study was to get a picture of the circumstances which affect movements in the composition of this occupational section of the Netherlands population.

2. MOBILITY ; THE HIERARCHY-SCALE

Mobility in this enquiry was defined as the change in a man's occupation or in his status in an occupation. In order to establish this change an occupational hierarchy-scale was constructed with six status categories.¹ The categories can be characterized as follows:

- I. Professional; graduated; high administrative
- II. High non-manual; managerial; executive (non-graduated)
- III. Medium and large shopkeepers; middle and high artisans; middle non-manual.
- IV. Skilled manual; small shopkeepers; low non-manual
- V. Semi-skilled manual
- VI. Unskilled manual

Of course there is a kind of occupational mobility which, as it causes no change in status category, cannot be measured by the division into six categories as used by us. This mobility, called horizontal mobility, is not considered in this study, which deals with the various aspects of the so-called vertical mobility, implying a change in status category.

3. THEORETICAL SET-UP OF THE MOBILITY-RESEARCH

The study of occupational mobility distinguishes between three aspects—the historical occupational mobility, the individual occupational mobility and the occupational mobility between generations.

* Based on a national sample enquiry with a statistical reconstruction of the situation from 1919 onwards.

(a) Historical Occupational Mobility

This refers to the changes in the composition of the various status categories in the course of time and the process by which these changes were brought about. This aspect can be studied with reference to the adult male occupational group as a whole as well as to its sub-divisions. If for instance in 1919 status category III consisted of \times -thousand persons, it is possible to find out how many of them were still employed, say in 1933, in the various status categories, and how many of them had in the course of 14 years disappeared from the occupational population group. On the other hand it can be ascertained how many people joined the occupational population and how many of them entered status category III. The same study can be made of other status categories. In this way it is possible to get a complete picture of the movements in the occupational population group, and to find a sociological explanation of these movements. But such a scheme necessitates a reconstruction of the past. Point 4 will indicate the method of making such a reconstruction. It should be noted that such a scheme may include both the rise and fall "TO" and the rise and fall "FROM".

(b) Individual Occupational Mobility

This refers to the changes in a person's career during his lifetime. This aspect of occupational mobility teaches us if and to what extent the possibilities of building up a career have changed in the course of time. It also serves as a starting-point for the third aspect:

(c) Occupational Mobility Between Generations

This aspect has been most studied and refers to the mobility from father to son. The individual occupational mobility has shown us the changes during a person's life-time, which indicate at what points of their lives we may compare father and son in order to get really comparable data. In a comparison of father and son the career element should be eliminated, as a statement of the son's occupation and of the father's occupation should refer to the same point in their lives. A comparison between the son at the start of his career and the father at the summit of his career might yield a fall, which is no actual reality in terms of the occupational mobility between generations. Our study, however, has taken this factor into account. We can avoid the use of the last occupation of the father. The system of an equal time-interval between all fathers and all sons is to be preferred, as a comparison can be made between father and son at about the same age.

4. THE HISTORICAL RECONSTRUCTION

Data relating to situations in the past can be derived from information supplied by the present (April/May, 1954) adult male occupational population group.²

The persons now employed in occupations can first of all supply data about their own career. But practice has proved that they can also with a rather high degree of exactness supply information about the careers of near relatives, even of deceased relatives. If the data supplied refer to a sufficiently large number of relatives, it is possible to make a historical reconstruction by assigning to each datum about a certain career a degree of importance equal to the reciprocal value of the total number of informants. The completeness of the reconstruction is closely connected with the possibility of obtaining data about deceased persons. A simple example may illustrate this.

A father (no longer employed) has four sons, three of whom are employed, the fourth is not. If the whole adult male occupational population is questioned, this father will have three people telling his life story. Then each information is assigned a weight of $1/3$. But the life-stories of the sons themselves also receive a weight of $1/3$, when each gives the life-story of his brothers. For each gives his own life-story plus those of his two brothers. Nine life-stories in all for three men. Should the father still be employed, but the life-stories of his sons not be included in the data he supplies, then the father's life-story would get a weight of $1/4$ (because there are four informants), while the three sons retain their weight of $1/3$. The addition of the careers of uncles and perhaps fathers-in-law yields a rather complicated formula of weights, which can only be applied if the complete data about the number of informants have been obtained through questions especially included in the questionnaire.

Our study has proved that such a reconstruction is possible. A representative sample of 2,500 adult men (18 years and older) belonging to the occupational population group in 1954, was asked to supply data concerning their own occupations, those of their fathers, their brothers and fathers-in-law³ during the years 1919, 1928/29, 1933, 1938, 1947/48, and 1954. The total number of biographies and autobiographies amounted to 11,740.

Table 1 gives the percentages of the adult male occupational population on the basis of 1947/48=100. The second column shows the results of the enquiry, the third column the percentages based on figures of the Central Bureau of Statistics.

Table 1. *Comparison between the historical reconstruction based on our survey and the figures of the Central Bureau of Statistics.*

Year	Survey	Central Bureau of Statistics
1947/48	100%	100%
1938	90%	89%
1933	83%	84%
1928/29	80%	80%
1919	70%	68%

The official data for 1954 are not yet available.

5. THE HIERARCHY-SCALE IN THE SELECTED YEARS

Table 2 shows the percentages of each position in the hierarchy-scale for the selected years.

Table 2. *The percentages for the various status categories in the selected years*

Status Category	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	?	Total
1919	1	6	19	30	31	10	3	100
1928/29	2	6	17	32	31	10	2	100
1933	2	7	18	32	30	9	2	100
1938	2	7	18	32	30	9	2	100
1947/48	2	8	19	33	28	8	2	100
1954	3	8	19	33	28	7	2	100

It should be borne in mind that the scale is only a relative one, valid for the circumstances in 1954.

6. SOME PROVISIONAL RESULTS

We shall now discuss in short two computations with the data concerning careers.

A. *Historical Occupational Mobility*

The percentages of rise and fall "FROM" are derived from the numbers of Table 3 taken horizontally; a vertical derivation gives the rise and fall "TO". It should be remembered that the results always refer to a constant group, belonging to the occupational population group from the beginning to the end of the period examined.

Table 3. *Composition of the status categories from 1919 to 1928/29*

		Status Category							Total
		I	II	III	IV	V	VI	?	
1919 Leavers*		1	6	19	30	31	10	3	100
		1	5	24	28	29	10	3	100
Constant group†	1919	1	6	17	31	32	10	3	100
	1928/29	2	7	22	31	25	10	3	100
Newcomers‡ 1928/29		2	7	11	33	37	9	1	100
		2	7	18	32	30	9	2	100

* Unemployed in 1928/29 and the years after.

† The group of persons already employed in 1919 and still so in 1928/29.

‡ Not yet employed in 1919.

Table 3a. *The mobility of the constant group 1919-1928/29*

1919-1928/29		Status Category						Total (1919)
		I	II	III	IV	V	VI	
Status Category	I	21	—	—	—	—	—	21
	II	2	76	3	—	—	—	81
	III	—	4	230	11	4	—	249
	IV	—	6	43	373	12	7	441
	V	—	1	19	47	348	20	435
	VI	—	—	2	7	18	109	136
Total (1928/29)		23	87	297	438	382	136	1363*

* The weighted number of dates obtained from a sample of 2,500 persons.

The above tables may be compared with the following tables for the years 1938-1947/48, including the war years, a period of 9½ years, just as in Tables 3 and 3a.

Table 4. *Percentages for the status categories in the years 1938-1947/48*

		Status Category							Total
		I	II	III	IV	V	VI	?	
1938 Leavers*		2	7	18	32	30	9	2	100
		2	7	23	33	25	10	—	100
Constant Group	1938	2	7	17	31	31	9	3	100
	1947/48	2	8	22	31	25	9	3	100
Newcomers† 1947/48		3	7	13	37	32	7	1	100
		2	8	19	33	28	8	2	100

* Not employed in 1947/48 and the years after.

† Not yet employed in 1938.

Table 4a. *Mobility of the constant group 1938-1947/48*

1938-1947/48		Status Category						Total (1938)
		I	II	III	IV	V	VI	
Status Category	I	35	1	—	—	—	—	36
	II	3	119	2	—	—	—	124
	III	3	18	292	9	5	3	330
	IV	1	15	66	478	18	8	586
	V	—	4	39	95	415	24	577
	VI	—	—	—	15	29	115	159
Total 1947/48		42	157	399	597	467	150	1812*

* The weighted number of dates obtained from a sample of 2,500 persons.

The percentages of the group of "newcomers" show that those who joined the occupational population group between 1919 and 1928/29 on an average entered at a somewhat lower level than those who entered the world of occupations between 1938 and 1947/48. The status categories I—IV for the first group comprise 53 per cent. of the total figure, 60 per cent. for the second group. It is true that in general the figures of these status categories for the years 1919 and 1938 show a slight difference (59 per cent. as against 62 per cent.), but this difference is smaller than the difference between those who entered the occupational population group during the two periods investigated. So there must have been another factor enabling the newcomers after 1938 to start their career at a somewhat higher level than those starting soon after 1919. One of the causes is the progress made since 1920 in school-education and the training at low technical schools. Another is the increase in the possibilities of education and training, also for those less well-off.

The mobility of the "constant" group may be deduced from the figures of Tables 3a and 4a.

These figures show that in spite of the slightly higher level of the 1938-group as compared with the 1919-group, the rise after 1938 was greater than that soon after 1919. The percentages of the falls are the same.

From the Tables 3a and 4a it appears that the above phenomenon is mainly caused by a greater mobility *from* categories V and VI, the lowest status categories. We also see that in the first period 80 per cent. of the men in these categories retained their status, while in the second period this percentage is 72. The mobility "TO" reveals the greatest difference in status category II, the status of high non-manual, managerial and executive (non-graduated) positions. We see that during the years 1919-1928/29 the status categories II and III show a great difference in that it proved to be much more difficult to rise to

Table 5. *Rise and fall of the groups 1919-1928/29 and 1938-1947/48.*

	1919—1928/29	1938—1947/48
Number of Years	9½	9½
Risen	149	288
No Change	1,157	1,454
Fallen	57	70
Total*	1,363	1,812
Risen	11%	16%
No Change	85%	80%
Fallen	4%	4%
Total	100%	100%

* The weighted number of dates obtained from a sample of 2,500 persons.

category II than to category III. In the period 1938-1947/48 this difference has all but disappeared.

We also see that the fall "TO" category IV in the period just after the first world war is slightly lower than that just after world war II.

It is not possible in this paper to discuss the detailed analyses of urban and rural districts, of regional areas in the Netherlands, of various religions and of the effects of family-size. These aspects will be dealt with in a paper to be published later this year.

B. Transition to Individual Occupational Mobility

To get an idea of the transition from the historical to the individual occupational mobility a special study must be made of all persons belonging to the whole period 1919-1954, i.e. of all those already employed in 1919 and still so in 1954. An analysis of this group will reveal the above-mentioned transition, because of the rather great homogeneity of their ages.

The sum total of the rise in this group during 35 years is 173 ; the sum total of the fall is 49. The category remaining stationary with

Table 6. *Percentages of the status categories from 1919 to 1954*

		Status Category							Total
		I	II	III	IV	V	VI	?	
1919 Leavers*		1	6	19	30	31	10	3	100
		1	6	22	32	27	10	2	100
Constant Group	1919—	1	5	13	29	27	10	5	100
	1954	2	7	23	27	25	10	6	100
Newcomers†		3	9	17	35	29	7	—	100
1954		3	8	19	33	28	7	2	100

* Not employed in 1954.

† Not yet employed in 1919.

Table 6a. *Mobility of the constant group 1919-1954*


1919—1954		Status Category						Total (1919)
		I	II	III	IV	V	VI	
Status Category	I	5	—	—	—	—	—	5
	II	1	26	1	—	—	—	28
	III	—	2	76	3	1	—	82
	IV	—	4	25	134	6	2	171
	V	—	1	15	35	162	13	226
	VI	—	—	1	4	7	46	58
Total (1954)		6	33	118	176	176	61	570*

* The weighted number of dates obtained from a sample of 2,500 persons.

regard to status consists of 348 persons (numbers weighed). The percentages are: rise 30 per cent. ; stationary 61 per cent. ; fall 9 per cent. Besides comparing the figures for the two extreme years (1919 and 1954), we can also find the rise and fall of this group in years between, where data are available.

Of this group of 570 persons it is possible to find their distribution over the status categories in the years 1928/29, 1933, etc., and the way in which this distribution was brought about. Table 7 shows their rise, fall and horizontal mobility.

The graph below shows the relation between percentage and time.



This graph shows clearly that the development of this group was a very gradual process. In the beginning the rise is more rapid than later on. The fall takes place at a more or less equal rate during the whole period. The numbers in the tables and the above graph indicate,

Table 7. *Rise and fall of the constant group 1919-1954*

Period	Length of period	Mobility			Total
		Rise	No change	Fall	
1919					
—1928/29	9½ years	95	499	26	570
—1933	14 „	131	409	30	570
—1938	19 „	149	387	34	570
—1947/48	28½ „	164	358	48	570
—1954	35 „	173	348	49	570

Table 7a. *Percentages of the rise and fall of the constant group 1919-1954*

Period	Length of period	Mobility			Total
		Rise	No change	Fall	
1919					
—1928/29	9½ years	17	79	4	100
—1933	14 „	23	72	5	100
—1938	19 „	26	68	6	100
—1947/48	28½ „	29	63	8	100
—1954	35 „	30	61	9	100

however, that the curves for the rise and fall show an asymptotic approximation to certain levels. In order to simplify a comparison between various analysed groups, the course of the curves must be indicated by some parameters, each with a signification of its own. This indication should not involve the use of too many parameters, as this would not actually simplify the interpretation of the data obtained.

The following logistic curve has been used as a general formula for a curve of approximation.

$$Y=L \left\{ 1 - \exp. \left(- \frac{0.6932}{H} X \right) \right\}$$

The letters used mean:

X = number of years (measured from the start of the group; i.e. 1919)

Y = percentage of rise and fall

L = level which is approximated asymptotically (also a percentage)

H = half level time (in years) = time required to get a percentage of rise and fall equal to $\frac{1}{2} L$ (half level value).

The signification of L is clear. The higher L grows, the higher the final level of percentage of the persons rising or falling in status. The signification of H is as follows: The shorter H , the more rapid is the rise to level L . So the curve rises steeply at first, continuing more or less horizontally. The result is only a slight change in the percentage of mobility (as compared with the initial development). A long H

(in years) results in a less violent development. The course of the curves in the graph justify the expectation that the H of the rise will be shorter than that of the fall. The rise begins rapidly, continuing more slowly; the fall is more gradual.

This impression is confirmed by a calculation. The values for L and H are as follows:

Table 8. *The values of L and H for the rise and fall of the constant group 1919-1954*

	L	H
Rise	32%	8½ years
Fall	10%	12 „

The development of subsidiary groups, such as urban and rural, or religious groups, could also be characterized by the L and H values. This would facilitate a comparison of these groups, which would otherwise be rather difficult on account of the great number of percentage-figures used for the mobility characterization. As a matter of fact, such comparisons are indispensable as a foundation for the structure of sociological interpretation.

NOTES

¹ This hierarchy-scale was obtained by means of a special enquiry made among 500 adult persons—women as well as men—who each after his (her) own choice, ranked 57 carefully selected occupations and positions within certain occupations according to social prestige. From these 500 rankings an average social ladder was constructed, which was divided into six status categories.

² The following argumentation starts from the assumption that the whole present universe is involved in the study. The data were obtained from oral interviews with a questionnaire of a representative sample of 2,500 persons. The consequences of this method will not be dealt with in this paper. Suffice it to state that the argumentation here referring to the universe may also be applied to a sample.

³ In exceptional cases data were asked about sons and about brothers-in-law.

The Vertical Social Mobility of the Chief Executive Groups in the Netherlands

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In research preceding this paper we investigated the executive directors and members of the board of directors of the public limited liability companies: their share-ownership, their discharge in case of financial reorganisation and their interlocking directorates. For want of space we do not publish in this paper the results of this investigation. These will be given in a study on the social position and the vertical social mobility of the chief executives in the Netherlands. These figures which we do not publish in this paper concur with the opinions in the literature that with industrialisation in the Netherlands, as in other countries, a grouping came into being of chief executives, that is to say of those people who conduct the top management in the big concerns but who need not necessarily be the owners.

The question we deal with in this paper is whether this change in the social construction has had repercussions as regards the vertical social mobility of the chief executives. It is namely known that the owners of the big concerns show a slight rise on the social ladder in respect of their fathers and grandfathers, as among others van Heek¹ has shown for the Netherlands. It was also shown to be the case in Germany.² Involuntarily the inclination arises to reverse this statement and to suppose that the non-owners of the big concerns—that is to say, the chief executives—have risen much on the social ladder. This supposition is fed by the suggestions that with the rise of the grouping of chief executives, western civilisation is in a stage of transition.

Schumpeter³ and Burnham⁴ were the examples of this opinion, as well as liberal⁵ and socialistic⁶ tinted epigones. Compared with the investigation of Taussig and Joslyn⁷ there is still a gap in the Netherlands as regards the insight in the social mobility of the chief executives. That also on this point the danger exists of insufficiently founded speculations appears from Geiger's warning⁸ against the idea according to which our society would be characterized by a great possibility and the strong wish for social mobility. These are according to him sooner typical of the transitional stage of capitalism in the preceding century.

All this roused our interest for data about the vertical social mobility of chief executives whose status of wealth is not of decisive significance for their position. Has the fact that they need not belong to the wealthy strata of society contributed to a considerable vertical mobility? And

as for Geiger's remark, the fathers and grandfathers of the chief executives lived in a time in which the transition phase of capitalism of the preceding century had not yet come to an end. Do the chief executives show a considerable social rise in respect of their grandfathers?

To answer these questions we have examined the professions of the fathers and grandfathers of the executive presidents and also those of the directors of all the limited companies existing in the Netherlands (not working overseas) in 1950, the shares of which are on the Stock Exchange and whose nominal stock-capital amounts at least to f.500,000. Their total number was according to van Oss's Stock guide about 300, and 298 of these were included in our investigation. In addition to this we have collected the data of big limited companies which have not called upon the investing public and of which most of the executive presidents and members of the board of directors may be considered to be important shareholders. The total number of limited companies with a nominal stock capital of at least f.500,000—amounted to 944 according to the Central Bureau for Statistics; 176 of these work overseas and have on account of that not been considered, 298 of them quoted on the Stock Exchange were included in our investigation and of the remaining private 470 limited companies a sample of $\frac{2}{3}$ was drawn. Some of these were withdrawn owing to lack of data, so that ultimately a number of 309 private limited companies were examined by us.

Because there was every reason for the expectation that by a direct written inquiry the number of non-respondents might be annoyingly large the data were obtained from municipal registers of population and registry offices. Our inquiry was already started in 1950 and took a lot of time. It appeared only quite recently that Natalie Rogoff⁹ had applied a method of inquiry in America which was the same as ours, but she got the data from the registers of one municipality only, whereas we got ours from those of many municipalities in the Netherlands. First of all we give a survey of the professions of the fathers of the executive presidents and members of the board of directors, following an order of division of a committee of which Professor van Heek is the chairman.

Where it was necessary to know the birth date and the birth-place in order to obtain further information, as for instance what the profession of the executive president's father or grandfather was, etc., and where there were objections to put questions to administrators of birth registers outside the Netherlands, the professions of the fathers of executive presidents abroad were not traced; these cases were included in the category "unknown". The table numbers 13·2% for executive presidents and 15% for members of the board of directors belonging to it are not due therefore to non-respondents. Of the executive presidents included in our inquiry, 12·3% and of the members of the board of directors 14% were born abroad, and according to the separate

countries of birth these percentages were (the numbers in brackets referring to the members of the board of directors): for Indonesia, 2.9% (3.3%), for Germany 3.4% (2.5%), for England 1.8% (1.2%), for Belgium 1.1% (2.2%) whilst for the remaining countries the percentages amounted to less than 1%.

Of the executive presidents in Indonesia it may be supposed that their parents partly belonged to the high social scales and partly at least to the middle scales. The fathers of the executive presidents born in Germany mostly belonged to families which immigrated to the Netherlands as merchants and must probably be considered to belong to the middle scale of society. The unknown ones in Table 1 must for the greater part therefore be allotted a place in the ranks in the middle and higher strata (A, B and C).

Table 1. *Occupational stratification Fathers of Chief Executives.*

	Executive Directors		Members of the Board of Directors	
	Absolute	%	Absolute	%
(A) Upper civil service, university degree, chief executives, etc.	403	23	380	29.6
(B) Remaining intellectual professions, chief executives, etc.	334	19	249	19.4
(B ¹) Merchants	167	9.5	98	7.6
(C) Crafts (independents) middle class civil service	196	11.2	111	8.6
(C ¹) Crafts without further indication independent/workmen, etc.	133	7.6	61	4.8
(D) Subaltern officials, storekeepers, lower-crafts, etc.	134	7.6	91	7.1
(D ¹) Storekeepers, lower-crafts without further indications independent/workmen	30	1.7	14	1.1
(E) Labourers; semi-skilled, shop-assistants, small independents, etc.	61	3.5	36	2.8
(F) Labourers, unskilled, professions in the periphery	30	1.7	7	0.5
(G ¹) Without	37	2.1	39	3.0
(G ²) Unknown	231	13.2	193	15.0
(G ³) Deceased	—	—	6	0.6
	1,756	100	1,285	100

To the collecting of the data about the occupations from the registers of the registry office the objection was inherent that it was not always clear whether the father had been a master or a servant (e.g. master carpenter or servant). Of these dubious cases we give in Table 1 a sub-division in the lists C1 and D1. It is not easy to determine accurately which part of this group belonged to the independent employers, though by means of the profession census in 1909, the oldest in the

Netherlands, at which the male professional population was classified, an approximation can be given. It appears namely that in 1909, that is to say, the last year of the decade in which the majority of the present generation of chief executives was born, of the occupations in the industries 23·9% of the male professional population was head of an undertaking for his own account.

Though the profession census of 1899 does not contain detailed data on this point it may be concluded from the figures that the part of the independent employers was larger at that time. In view of the 23·9% mentioned above it may be assumed that of the C1 group in Table 1 not less than $\frac{1}{4}$ part belongs in group C and $\frac{3}{4}$ part to group D, assuming that the grandfathers of the executive presidents included in our inquiry for the same part as that of the total professional population already belonged to the independent employers. As the executive presidents who were born from these middle groups have risen, and because their rise was probably easier in the cases that their parents or grandparents already belonged to the independent employers, it is likely that more than $\frac{1}{4}$ of group C1 belongs to group C. We cannot ascertain this accurately, but we shall see that it does not detract from our conclusion. For the rest we should like to remark with Cuber¹⁰ because of the necessity of this somewhat rough approximation that $\frac{1}{4}$ of the C1 category must fall under the C category, that every method of inquiry has its disadvantages. It is not to be expected that at present with other procedures than those applied by us a better insight in the social mobility would have been obtained. Another remark made by Cuber we also want to bring to bear on it, namely that the social division may not be looked upon as consisting of sharply-marked divisions but rather as a continuum. This idea of Cuber's also finds its expression in other words in the Dutch profession-census¹¹ of 1920, namely, that a large number of those people classified as independent employers can be put on a level with common workmen as regards their social position.

From the figures in Table 1 a clear line is to be drawn: more than half of the chief executives show in respect of their fathers no rise at all or only a slight one. Not even $\frac{2}{5}$ comes from the middle layer, whilst the majority of them comes from the top part of the middle layer and finally a minute part of $\frac{1}{20}$ comes from the bottom layer. We call this a minute part, because this $\frac{1}{20}$ part must be seen against the background of the profession structure of the whole Dutch population. In the profession census of 1947¹² the professions belonging to the categories group A and B in the table—the top layers—only the so-called free professions (1·2% of the male professional population) and the professors and masters of high school (0·6%) are mentioned by name, the other professions in the groups A and B of Table 1 total a fraction of 1%. Evidently all the professions together in the top layers total only a few per cents of the whole professional population. The census of 1920 shows a similar picture of it. With the help of this

oldest profession-census in the Netherlands which contains detailed data on this point, we come to the well founded estimation of about 2% as part of the professions which was considered to belong to the top layer. Over against this small part stands the considerable percentage of about 70% of the total Dutch professional population in industry of semi-skilled or unskilled labour.¹³

The older population censuses of 1909 and 1889 do not give any details on this point it is true, but there is not anything from which we may expect that in these years the proportions were different. On studying Table 1 one should therefore realise that, whilst more than half of the fathers of the executive presidents included in our inquiry can be placed in the highest scales, the total professional population in the generations of the fathers can only be grouped in these scales with a few percents. At the base bottom of the scale we see the opposite picture.

Besides the professions of the fathers of the executive presidents also those of the grandfathers were examined. The result is shown in the following table :

Table 2. *Occupational Stratification Grandfathers Chief Executives.*

	Absolute	%
(A) Upper civil service, university degree, chief executives, etc.	249	14.2
(B) Remaining intellectual professions, chief executives, etc. . .	226	12.9
(B ¹) Merchants	147	8.4
(C) Crafts (independents) middle class civil service, etc. . .	180	10.2
(C ¹) Crafts without further indication independents/workmen	183	10.4
(D) Subaltern officials, storekeepers, lower crafts, etc.	144	8.2
(D ¹) Storekeepers, lower crafts without further indication independent/workmen	72	4.1
(E) Labourers: semi-skilled, shop-assistants, small independ- ents, etc.	108	6.1
(F) Labourers: unskilled professions in the periphery	38	2.2
(G ¹) Without	24	1.4
(G ²) Unknown	383	21.8
(G ³) Deceased	2	0.1
	1,756	100

As regards the unknown ones and the categories C1 and D1 the same remarks hold good as for Table 1. That the number of unknown ones is 8.6% more than with the fathers is to be ascribed to the same cause. The fathers of a number of fathers born in the Netherlands were in their turn born abroad, with the consequence that also the occupation of these grandfathers born in foreign countries remained unknown. Besides, but this was a great exception, the birth registers in which the names of the grandfathers were to be found were sometimes incomplete. Also in this table the unknown ones must largely be included in the top and middle layers. Although of course the vertical social

mobility of the executive presidents in respect of their grandfathers is larger than in respect of their fathers, the remarkable thing of Table 2 is nevertheless that 27·1% of the grandfathers of the executive presidents belonged to category A and B and about 10% to E and F, over against a total Dutch professional population which in the generations of the grandfathers belonged for some percents to categories A and B and by far the greater number to E and F. Add to this that—as we saw—a larger part of the unknown ones must be added to the scales A and B than to E and F, the number that has remained the same in scale is in other words larger than the table shows. It may be said without exaggeration that the grandfathers belonging to the top scales of society were not much less than 75 times so productive for forming of chief executives as the grandfathers who belonged to the bottom scales.

The second striking feature in Table 2 is that for so far the executive presidents in respect of their grandfathers have risen to a greater extent than in respect of their fathers this larger vertical mobility has had as starting point one of the middle layers (C and D) and not that of the bottom layers, the labourers, shop-assistants, and others.

Also seen over three generations the number of those that rose from labourers to chief executives is very small; the obstacle over the period of two generations is hard to overcome, over the period of three generations it is a little less difficult, although not much easier. Over this longer period the jump from the middle strata to that of the chief executives is really possible.

From a recent Dutch publication¹⁴ it appeared that the jump from labourer in a certain trade or retail business to employer—to the middle strata therefore is not insurmountable in one generation. The Tables 1 and 2 may be a warning against opinions based on a few spectacular cases, that in the big Dutch concerns everyone has the makings of a chief executive. The election of chief executive has certainly something to do with social standing.

In the scope of this paper no comparisons can be made with other studies. We want to make one exception, namely concerning Taussig and Joslyn^{7a}. Should we take from their classification the major executives, owners of large business and professionals together and see them in analogy with the categories A and B in the table then, according to the American investigation, the grandfathers belong for 26·1% and the fathers for 44·3% to the top strata. These percentages are strikingly near those in Table 2. The number of Dutch fathers and grandfathers from the bottom strata whose children would be going to belong to the chief executives groups is larger, but in proportion to the total occupation construction these differences remain limited however. For the sake of completeness we mention that Mabel Newcomer¹⁵ and Taussig and Joslyn show considerable differences, but the first-mentioned, however, includes some kinds of other functionaries than

major executives and owners of large business among those of the business executives.

The question whether the coming into being of the group of the chief executives has enlarged the vertical social mobility we have analysed in yet another way, namely, by comparing whether the social mobility of the executive presidents of public limited companies is different from that of the executive presidents of private limited companies which are comparable with open limited companies.

In the first a clear separation between management and property has come about, but in the private limited companies which did not make an appeal to the Stock Exchange it will largely be the owners who are in control. The mobility of the executive presidents and members of the board of directors in respect of their fathers in the various types of limited companies appear from tables 3a, 3b and 4.

It is out of the question that the executive presidents and the members of the board of directors of the open limited companies show a greater vertical mobility than those of the private ones. It is rather the contrary which is true and the fathers of the chief executives of the public limited companies proceed more from the two highest strata than the fathers of the functionaries in the private ones. As regards the occupations of the grandfathers, subdivided according to the chief executives of the various types of limited companies we see the same.

Here also we see that the executive presidents of the biggest open limited companies, those where the separation between management and property is largest, have in respect of their grandfathers the slightest mobility.

Our final conclusion is that in the Netherlands a change in the social construction did take place in so far that the top management of the big concerns is no longer in the hands of the owners, but that no increase of the vertical social mobility attended it. When drawing this conclusion we involuntarily think of the study of van de Tempel,¹⁶ about the social division of income. His conclusion was that the same forces which raise the total income of society result in the fact that the part accruing to the class possessing the capital, increases relatively. According to van de Tempel the economic formation of power and the exercise of it comes about on the foundations and in the scope of the capitalistic production and exchange process. Exercise of power on the side of the labourer is unable to bring radical change about in the social division of income. In accordance with this, though on a different level, we conclude that the development of the chief executive groups has not resulted in a fundamental increase of the vertical social mobility.

To conclude, we mention the fact that this paper comprises a part of a research on the social and geographical mobility, the great social prestige of the chief executives, their religion and their family-relations mutually.

Table 3a. Occupational stratification fathers executive directors in Companies, shares of which are regularly quoted in the Stock Exchange and Companies not connected with Stock Exchange.

Occupational Stratification Fathers	Companies shares of which are regularly quoted in the Stock Exchange				Companies not connected with Stock Exchange	Total
	1	2	3	4		
(A) Upper civil service, university degree, chief executives, etc.	21.3% 27	31.7% 125	26.8% 91	17.9% 160	22.9% 403	
(B) Remaining intellectual professions, chief executives, etc.	13.4% 17	15.5% 61	17% 58	22.1% 198	19.0% 334	
(B ¹) Merchants	4.7% 6	6.9% 27	8.5% 29	11.7% 105	9.5% 167	
(C) Crafts (independents), middle class civil service, etc.	11.8% 15	10.4% 41	8.5% 29	12.2% 111	11.2% 196	
(C ¹) Crafts without further indication independent/workmen	13.4% 17	8.1% 32	6.2% 21	7% 63	7.6% 133	
(D) Subaltern officials, storekeepers, lower-crafts, etc.	10.2% 13	7.4% 29	8.5% 29	7% 63	7.6% 134	
(D ¹) Storekeepers, lower crafts without further indication independent/workmen	3.9% 5	1.3% 5	1.8% 6	1.7% 14	1.7% 30	
(E) Labourers: semi-skilled, shop-assistants, small independents, etc.	7.1% 9	3% 12	3.2% 11	3.2% 29	3.5% 61	
(F) Labourers: unskilled, professions in the periphery	2.4% 3	2.3% 9	1.2% 4	1.7% 14	1.7% 30	
(G ¹) Without	1.6% 2	3.8% 15	1.8% 6	1.7% 14	2.1% 37	
(G ²) Unknown	10.2% 13	9.4% 38	16.5% 56	13.8% 124	13.2% 231	
	100% 127	100% 394	100% 340	100% 895	100% 1,756	

1 = nominal capital - f. 999,999,-

2 = nominal capital f. 1,000,000,- - f. 4,999,999,-

3 = nominal capital > f.5,000,000,-

Table 3b. Occupational stratification fathers of members of the Boards of Directors in Companies, shares of which are regularly quoted in the Stock Exchange and companies not connected with Stock Exchange

Occupational stratification fathers	Companies shares of which are regularly quoted in the Stock Exchange				Companies not connected with Stock Exchange	Total
	1	2	3	4		
(A) Upper civil service, university degree, chief executives, etc.	29.8% 57	34.2% 131	33.3% 71	24.6% 121	29.6% 380	
(B) Remaining intellectual professions, chief executives, etc.	24.5% 48	18.3% 70	24.4% 52	16.0% 79	19.4% 249	
(B ¹) Merchants	7.7% 15	7.1% 27	7.5% 16	8.1% 40	7.6% 98	
(C) Crafts (independents) middle class civil service	7.7% 15	9.1% 35	8.0% 17	8.9% 44	8.6% 111	
(C ¹) Crafts without further indication independent/workmen	5.1% 10	4.5% 17	4.2% 9	5.1% 25	4.8% 61	
(D) Subaltern officials, storekeepers, lower-crafts, etc.	9.2% 18	6.5% 25	2.8% 6	8.5% 42	7.1% 91	
(D ¹) Storekeepers, lower crafts without further indication independent/workmen	1.0% 2	0.8% 3	0.5% 1	1.6% 8	1.1% 14	
(E) Labourers: semi-skilled, shop-assistants, small independents, etc.	3.6% 7	2.6% 10	2.8% 6	2.6% 13	2.8% 36	
(F) Labourers: unskilled, professions in the periphery	1.0% 2	0.5% 2	0.5% 1	0.4% 2	0.5% 7	
(G ¹) Without	5.1% 10	2.4% 9	4.2% 9	2.2% 11	3.0% 39	
(G ²) Deceased	0.5% 1	1.0% 4	0.5% 1	—	0.5% 6	
(G ³) Unknown	5.6% 11	13.0% 50	11.3% 24	21.9% 108	15.0% 193	
Total	100% 196	100% 383	100% 213	100% 493	100% 1,285	

Table 4. Occupational stratification fathers-fathers executive directors in companies shares of which are regularly quoted on the Stock Exchange and companies not connected with Stock Exchange.

Occupational stratification fathers-fathers	Companies shares of which are regularly quoted in the Stock Exchange			Companies not connected with Stock Exchange	Total
	1	2	3		
(A) Upper civil service, university degree, chief executives, etc.	12.6%	21.1%	17.7%	10.1%	14.2%
(B) Remaining intellectual professions, chief executives, etc.	9.4%	11.2%	13.8%	13.7%	12.9%
(B ¹) Merchants	3.9%	6.6%	7.3%	10.2%	8.4%
(C) Crafts (independents), middle class civil service	14.2%	11.2%	7.1%	10.5%	10.2%
(C ¹) Crafts without further indication independents/workmen	15.8%	10.4%	10.0%	9.8%	10.4%
(D) Subaltern officials, storekeepers, lower-crafts, etc.	2.4%	6.8%	7.9%	9.7%	8.2%
(D ¹) Storekeepers, lower crafts without further indication, independent/workmen	9.4%	4.1%	3.2%	3.7%	4.1%
(E) Labourers: semi-skilled, shop-assistants, small independents, etc.	8.7%	5.3%	5.6%	6.4%	6.1%
(F) Labourers: unskilled, professions in the periphery	6.3%	3.0%	1.2%	1.6%	2.2%
(G ¹) Without	17.3%	20.3%	26.2%	24.3%	23.3%
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	127	394	340	895	1,756

¹ = nominal capital - f. 999,999.- ² = nominal capital f. 1,000,000.- - f. 4,999,999.- ³ = nominal capital > f. 5,000,000.-

NOTES

- ¹ Van Heck, F. *Stijging en daling op de maatschappelijke ladder*. 1945, p. 217.
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- ⁴ Burnham, James, *The Managerial Revolution* (Dutch translation 1947), p. 92-106.
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- ¹² 12e Volkstelling van het Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, serie A, deel 2, p. 80 (1952).
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The Recruitment of the Learned Professions in the Netherlands

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The occupations studied are divided into three groups: free professions (physicians, dentists, veterinary surgeons, lawyers); technicians and economists; and teachers in secondary schools.¹

I. THE PROFESSIONS

It seemed desirable to study the recruitment of the professions, because (a) little or nothing was known about them, although they are very important; (b) their position is at the top of the occupational hierarchy; and (c) rising to these professions is most difficult on account of the cost involved in establishing or buying a practice. It should be noted that the professional groups described in this paper include only the self-employed, i.e. the physicians, lawyers, etc., who have their own practices.

(a) *Original milieu according to professional groups*

Table 1 shows that there is not much difference between the origin of physicians, specialists, dentists and lawyers, though in the case of dentists a difference might have been expected because of the relative youth of the profession and eventually smaller traditionalism. The only marked difference is in the case of the veterinary surgeons, who frequently come from an agrarian milieu. The profession is within the horizon of agrarian youths and their parents; they have a tie with it and the veterinary surgeon is a figure they like to identify with. The veterinary surgeons appeared to be the only academic profession which is not ranked in the highest class, which may be due partly to the rough and dirty work involved and probably also to his origin. The occupational image of the farmer is valued rather low, especially in town, and this also affects attitudes to veterinary surgeons. It may be noted that 4.7% of the veterinary surgeons' friends were from agrarian occupations, and only 0.5% of the friends of members of other professions.

A second point of interest in Table 1 is the extremely small number of professionals who were of working-class origin—viz., 25 men or 0.7% of the total sample (for this calculation drivers, waiters, etc., were grouped as working-class). Each of the professions shows the same picture; even among the grandfathers of the men in the sample, only 3.9% came from the working class. Between 36% and 39% of the *fathers* were managers of industrial, agrarian or commercial concerns, apart from the fathers of the veterinary surgeons, of whom a larger proportion (56%) were managers because of the large number of farmers. Between 53% and 57%, or in the case of the veterinary surgeons, 67%, of the fathers of the men in the sample were self-employed.

Table 1. Occupational groups to which the fathers of the practisers of free professions belong (absolute and proportionally).

Occupational Groups	Dentists		Family doctors		Specialists		Veterinarians		Lawyers		Total free professions	
	abs.	%	abs.	%	abs.	%	abs.	%	abs.	%	abs.	%
Learned professions	98	13	132	19	52	19	32	9	101	15	415	15
Other professions for which university training is required	50	7	56	8	27	10	9	3	64	9	206	8
Big and medium employers	42	6	15	2	26	10	7	2	44	7	134	5
High officials and magistrates	83	11	57	8	25	9	10	3	112	17	287	11
Leisure class	3	—	—	—	—	—	3	1	5	1	11	—
Primary and Secondary school teachers	89	12	82	12	33	12	44	13	69	10	317	12
Artists	6	1	2	—	—	—	2	1	5	1	15	1
Owner small concern (including wholesale dealer)	135	19	126	18	49	18	27	8	126	19	463	17
Medium and lower clerical staff	16	2	18	3	4	2	9	3	14	2	61	2
Medium and lower officials	65	9	53	7	16	6	24	7	35	5	193	7
Medium technicians	14	2	12	2	1	—	5	1	4	1	36	1
Medium and lower employees (no clerks, no labourers)	16	2	16	2	4	2	3	1	12	2	51	2
Farmers	38	5	48	7	9	3	124	36	23	3	242	9
Big retailers and artisans	56	8	61	9	17	6	29	8	43	6	206	8
Small retailers and artisans	7	1	12	2	2	1	7	2	10	1	38	1
Labourers civil services	5	1	2	—	—	—	3	1	4	—	14	—
Labourers	5	1	8	1	4	2	3	1	5	1	25	1
Total	728	100	700	100	269	100	341	100	676	100	2,714	100

(b) Continuity

Retrospective continuity (the extent to which fathers practise the same occupation as the persons inquired) is rather great in these professions: among physicians 16%, lawyers 10·7%, veterinary surgeons 8·5%, specialists 8·2%, and dentists 4·7%. The overall proportion was 10·9%.

The fact that these professions have the highest social rank, and the tendency to identify with the father, cause many to choose their fathers' professions. Physicians and specialists lead the way here: for centuries their importance has been great. Continuity among dentists is relatively low, possibly because the profession is so young. But for a clear statement of this process one would need to know also the prospective continuity (the extent to which sons practise the same occupation as the persons inquired).

(c) Vertical mobility

It may be concluded from Table 1 that a rise over great distances is not frequent. Training is a *sine qua non* for mobility, and this applies to all professions for which a university education is required. The high cost of such training probably prevents many men from joining these professions.

If mobility is weighed and frequency, distance, rise and fall expressed in one number, this number appears to be 595 for those who established themselves in a practice, 585 for those who took over a practice, and 562 for those who entered into partnership in an existing practice. The milieu of the latter is more favourable than that of those who took over a practice and this in its turn is more favourable than that of those who had to establish themselves. Partnership is usually the consequence of connections and these are usually found in the higher classes. Those who established themselves are drawn more than others from the lower classes.

We also tried to discover whether the *Aufstiegsreihen* mentioned in German literature existed. A "series" was entered when at least five cases arose. It appeared that lawyers very often originated from a series which combined judges, notaries and lawyers. A large number of heads of small concerns, members of the retailers and artisans, and farmers was apparent among these series, as was a total lack of office clerks. Teachers appeared very frequently.

II. ECONOMISTS AND ENGINEERS

These two professions were chosen for separate study because they emerged much more recently than did other professions followed by university men.

(a) Milieu of origin

Table 2 shows that there are some noticeable differences between the origins of economists on the one hand and engineers on the other. Other learned professions, high officials and magistrates and educationalists

Table 2. Occupational groups to which the fathers of economists and engineers belong (absolutely and proportionally).

Occupational groups	Economists		Engineers		Total		Free professions	
	abs.	%	abs.	%	abs.	%	abs.	%
Learned professions	28	3	30	3	58	3	15	
Other professions for which university training is required	32	3	80	8	112	6	8	
Big and medium employers	86	9	103	10	189	9	5	
High officials and magistrates	80	8	173	17	253	13	11	
Leisure class	2	—	2	—	4	—	—	
Primary and Secondary school teachers	90	9	152	15	242	12	12	
Artists	6	1	7	1	13	1	1	
Owner small concern (including wholesaler dealer)	265	28	166	16	431	22	17	
Medium and lower clerical staff	46	5	30	3	76	4	2	
Medium and lower officials	88	9	96	9	184	9	7	
Medium technicians	18	2	31	3	49	2	1	
Medium and lower employees (no clerks, no labourers)	29	3	20	2	49	2	2	
Farmers	36	4	31	3	67	3	9	
Big retailers and artisans	94	10	58	6	152	8	8	
Small retailers and artisans	18	2	24	2	42	2	1	
Labourers civil services	10	1	5	—	15	1	—	
Labourers	29	3	27	2	56	3	1	
Total	957	100	1,035	100	1,992	100	100	

are much less frequently found among the fathers of economists than among those of engineers. Economists tend to come from a lower milieu than do engineers. Their fathers include fewer university men, but more managers of small concerns, big shop-keepers and artisans, and medium and lower-grade clerical staff. Among the fathers of both economists and engineers, learned professions were less frequent and managerial occupations more frequent, than they were among the fathers of men in the free learned professions discussed previously.

The proportion of labourers among the fathers of economists and engineers—2·8%—was also small, but somewhat higher than among the fathers of men in the learned professions. This is probably because of the lower college expenses involved so that as an exhibitioner it is easier to study these subjects than, e.g., medicine, and because the cost of establishing a practice does not arise. Consequently, the number of exhibitioners among economists and engineers (17%) is larger than among the learned professions (12%). The number of labourers among the grandfathers was also higher—11% as against 4% among the grandfathers of those in learned professions.

With regard to the *Aufstiegsreihen*, the following became apparent: among the fathers and grandfathers of the economists and engineers there were no practisers of the learned professions for which a university education is required, and no notaries, judges, or ministers. When in these series the grandfathers are managers, then the fathers have the same occupation in almost every case; when the grandfathers are retailers, artisans or farmers, there appears to be much variation in the occupation of the fathers. Where the grandfathers are farmers, the fathers are frequently teachers. We have repeatedly pointed out the agrarian origin of the teachers and the great importance of this profession as a stepping-stone in occupational mobility.² Just as among the learned professions, clerical employees are relatively very few among the fathers of economists and engineers.

(b) *Own career of economists and engineers*

Usually the economist's career begins after passing the examination for candidate for a doctor's degree. But there are exceptions: some students take employment, usually a type of employment connected with their studies. 27% of the economists had not begun as economists. Among them had been several book-keepers, office clerks, medium and lower officials.

Whereas the study of economics has been a recommendation for special occupations for only some twenty years, the engineer has had a specific task for much longer. In other words, whereas there are few or no occupations which can be practised only by a candidate for a doctor's degree in economics, there are a good many occupations where training in engineering is necessary. A career may be begun for which a certificate in economics is a favourable circumstance, but an engineer's certificate is a pre-requisite to special technical careers. It is not

Table 3. *Occupations of fathers: Summary*

Occupational groups	Masters secondary schools		Free professions		Economists engineers		Masters, former teachers	
	abs.	%	abs.	%	abs.	%	abs.	%
Learned professions	12	1	15	15	3	3	—	—
Other professions for which university training is required	38	5	8	8	6	6	4	2
Big and medium employers	12	1	5	5	9	9	—	—
High officials and magistrates	40	5	11	11	13	13	3	1
Leisure class	146	19	12	12	12	12	42	19
Primary and Secondary School teachers	3	1	—	—	—	—	1	1
Artists	6	1	1	1	1	1	—	—
Owner small concern (including wholesale dealer)	82	11	17	17	22	22	13	6
Medium and lower clerical staff	35	5	2	2	4	4	9	4
Medium and lower officials	77	10	7	7	9	9	19	9
Medium technicians	12	2	1	1	2	2	1	1
Medium and lower employees (no clerks, no labourers)	23	3	2	2	2	2	9	4
Farmers	37	5	9	9	3	3	9	4
Big retailers and artisans	120	16	8	8	8	8	49	22
Small retailers and artisans	33	4	1	1	2	2	14	6
Labourers civil services	31	4	—	—	1	1	12	6
Labourers	58	7	1	1	3	3	33	15
Total	765	100	100	100	100	100	218	100

surprising, therefore, that only 10% of the engineers did not start as engineers. The fact that studying in Delft, the only town with a technical school at university level, is more difficult for employed students is also important. Of the 108 engineers who had not started as engineers, 43 had been superintendents, analysts, draughtsmen, medium technicians or foremen, while 22 had been medium or lower officials, office clerks or book-keepers.

III. SECONDARY SCHOOL TEACHERS

Secondary school teachers were chosen for study because their occupation is of great importance as a social stepping-stone.

(a) *Milieu of origin*

In comparison with the previous group analysed, Table 3 shows that among the fathers of secondary school teachers there are many more clerical workers, retailers, artisans and labourers, and fewer members of professions for which university training is necessary.

That the teaching profession is an important rung on the occupational ladder is apparent from the much higher proportion of teachers whose fathers were labourers, viz. 7.5% (cf. learned professions 0.7%, economists and engineers 2.8%). Among the grandfathers of the teachers as many as 16.8% were labourers, compared with 3.9% and 11% among the grandfathers of members of the learned professions and of economists and engineers respectively. On the other hand, managers of industrial, agrarian or commercial concerns appear almost as frequently among the fathers of teachers (37%) as among the fathers of men in learned professions (40%). The total number of self-employed is, however, much higher among the latter than among the former (56% compared with 40%).

Table 4 compares the level of education reached by the fathers of secondary school teachers, economists and engineers, and members of the learned professions. It will be seen that there are considerable differences between the teachers and the other two groups. Very many more of the fathers of the teachers had attended only elementary school, and many fewer had received a university education. It is interesting to note that the levels of education reached by the fathers of university-trained teachers did not differ markedly from the levels of education reached by the fathers of the teachers together. It may be concluded as a matter of course that the occupation of secondary school teacher is most desired by the lower classes, probably because it is not so much beyond their ken as the other professions are.

In accordance with the character of social lift retrospective continuity in this occupation is not great: 4.7% of the fathers practised the same profession as the men in the sample.

(b) *Vertical mobility*

It is not surprising that weighted mobility is greatest among the secondary school teachers who were formerly elementary school teachers

Table 4. *The education of the fathers*

Education of father	Masters Univ. trained		Masters Certificate Secun. Educ.		Masters Training College with Certificate Secondary School		Masters together		Economists Engineers		Learned professions	
	abs.	%	abs.	%	abs.	%	abs.	%	abs.	%	abs.	%
Only element. school ..	211	48	72	59	118	80	416	56	416	31	416	30
Sec. modern school } ..	34	5	10	8	1	1	47	6	47	11	47	9
3 years sec. school } ..	10	3	5	4	5	3	20	3	20	4	20	2
Technical school ..	41	10	11	9	1	1	56	8	56	25	56	18
Secondary school ..	91	21	13	10	20	13	127	17	127	11	127	11
Grammar school ..	58	13	12	10	3	2	76	10	76	18	76	30
Training College ..												
University ..												
Total ..	445	100	123	100	148	100	742	100	742	100	742	100

—558 as compared with 496 (cf. learned professions 490, economists and engineers 482).

The *Aufstiegsreihen* are very interesting, since other occupational groups play a part than among other university-trained men. The labourer for the first time appears in the series. The development takes place via the elementary teacher, clerical employee, retailer or artisan. Again the elementary teacher is often the connecting link between the farmer or retailer-artisan and the secondary school teacher here. Clerical employees play a part for the first time.

(c) *Careers of secondary school teachers*

Two types stand out clearly in the careers of these teachers: on the one hand the man who attended college and was a secondary school teacher in his first employment, and on the other hand the former elementary school teacher, who obtained his certificate for secondary education and then began work in secondary schools. Elementary teacher—teacher in secondary modern school—teacher in secondary school appears 103 times, elementary teacher—secondary school teacher appears 62 times, elementary (or secondary modern) teacher—head-master elementary school—secondary school teacher 14 times.

But not all secondary school teachers had commenced work in the teaching profession: 25% had come from other occupations, and clerical staff contributed 16% of these.

We have repeatedly accentuated the importance of the occupation of teacher as a way of rising in the occupational scale. Further analysis will prevent us from over-estimating this. Excluding those who began as teachers, the weighed mobility is still 454 (if all of them had remained the same it would have been 400). Of high importance are the clerical employees, who read industriously for their secondary education certificates. It is important, however, to examine changes which may have taken place in this situation. The low salary of teachers, and the small chance of getting a place, together with the general uncertainty of the thirties, may have prevented some who could not afford full-time higher study, from attempting to become secondary school teachers via the occupation of elementary teacher. But in the last ten years, possessors of secondary-education certificates seem to have increased, while university-trained secondary school teachers have decreased. In our opinion the over-estimation of the value of university training for secondary school teaching has decreased, and at the same time both elementary teachers and persons in clerical and other occupations are getting increasing chances to rise to the position of secondary school teacher.

NOTES

¹ The research on which this paper is based will eventually be published as part of the study *Social Mobility in the Netherlands*.

² G. Kuiper, *Mobiliteit in de sociale en beroeps-hierarchie*, 1954.

The Social Background of German University and College Professors since 1864¹

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A. STATEMENT AND POTENTIALITIES OF THE PROBLEM

An investigation of the social background (father's occupation) of the academic professions is not a new thing in Germany. The system of continuous reports upon the father's occupation of students set up in Prussia in 1886 could even then be linked up with earlier inquiries. While these full and detailed student statistics permitted a survey of social recruitment to the most important academic professions, the work of Franz Eulenburg *Der akademische Nachwuchs* ("The rising academic generation")² also sets out the occupations of the fathers of academic staff at German colleges and universities³ which may be taken as representative of the situation before the first world war. Apart from isolated applications of this material in other connections, no systematic utilisation from the point of view of a sociology of knowledge has been attempted.

The lack of interest in such use of these analyses seems to arise chiefly from the nature of the question itself. For upon which sociological questions in this field may one expect guidance from a knowledge of the social background of university professors? Have the background circumstances of persons who professionally represent a branch of knowledge at educational establishments some kind of coherent relationship to the aspects of a sociology of knowledge to which attention has hitherto been given? Without in the least desiring thereby to answer these questions exhaustively, we here put forward for discussion some starting points from which it is seen that—in the opinion represented here—some significance in this sociological field also attaches to an investigation into the background conditions of German university and college teachers :

(1) It cannot of course be contended that, to take an example, the devotion to a particular branch of learning or the organisation of learned research depend upon the social background of the scholar; but none will wish to dispute that the relations between learning and society also find expression in the family surroundings of the scholar, which expression moreover possesses the advantage of being reducible to statistics.

(2) Even when it is acknowledged that learning has a place in society which is to a relatively large extent impartial and thereby independent of the individuals concerned in it, yet this in no way excludes the participation of social group-interests in the development

of educational affairs. The normal framework of scholarly attitude can very well be combined with the interests of different social groups. The background circumstances of university and college professors and teachers are thus translated as an expression of social group-interests which may be reconciled with the endeavours which serve to maintain and foster scientific and scholastic institutions.

(3) The change in the relations of learning to the public, which we have been observing since the middle of the 19th century, has not been without influence on prevailing scholastic and scientific trends of interest. The results of erudite reflection find outlet for discussion not only in the limited circle of scholars and members of specialised professions, but, more than that, are as a matter of course related to the by no means "impartial" interests of a wide public. The justness of this theory takes into account the expectation that the background circumstances of the scholar are also affected in a corresponding sense. To the extent that erudition emerges from its "ivory tower" and increasingly fulfils expectations which, to the fundamental principle of "impartial, unbiased research" are, to say the least, alien, so will scholars and scientists be recruited in a greater or less degree from sections of the population which stand nearer to or further from the corresponding ideal.

(4) On the other hand—as it were in reversal of (3)—the fact of a more strongly homogeneous or heterogeneous family background should not be under-estimated as regards the significance of its effect upon the formation of a common status-consciousness among the members of the university teaching body. Particularly in a numerically small professional group marked by an economic trend of interest which is not unanimous, or which is indeed wholly absent, as well as by a continually diverging professional specialisation, the identity of private circle is a uniting factor. If, moreover, a common profession and similarity of personal background combine with a class contrast to other sections of the population, there is consequently formed, out of a feeling of class membership, a professional ethos.

B. ON THE METHOD (SEE TABLE)

The results set out below are part of a larger investigation of the position of the rising academic generation, which was carried out by the Sociological Department of the University of Göttingen with the support of the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft. The details of fathers' occupations, together with the dates relevant to professional careers (graduation, qualification as professor, appointment to established professorships), were obtained from university publications; for 1953 use was made to some extent of the issue of questionnaires.

Available resources were fairly exhausted; greater comprehensiveness of the details (see last column of the table) would hardly be obtainable, even with further effort. Even though an exact test of the extent to

which the present professional details are representative has not up to now been concluded, there already exists sufficient warrant for the assertion that the 15-45% not accounted for in the particular test-years essentially exhibit the same analytical features. This is supported by the fact that the father's occupation could, certainly as a rule, be ascertained when the person examined had been a member of the teaching staff of German universities for a long period. A systematic connection between family background and duration of university service is, however, hardly to be assumed.

The grouping in the table of details according to test-years condenses, on technical grounds,⁴ not only the positions for university professors—both Ordinarien and Nichtordinarien,⁵ but also ages ranging from ca. 25-85 years. Ignoring the incomplete upper and lower groups, there belongs to one test-year one 40-year generation having an average age of 50 years; i.e. the test-year 1890 comprises the years of birth 1820-1860; 1910: 1840-1880; and so on. Due to this overlapping of the test-years, every second test-year, at the earliest, embraces an average new generation.

The condensation of individual occupations in 3 groups :

- I. Academic, artistic and journalistic professions;
- II. Economically independent, executive staffs, military officers;
- III. Economically not independent who have not concluded a university education;

corresponds to the dividing line which in Germany distinguishes the "academically" educated and uneducated and also the economically independent and those not independent, and which was more or less sharp during the period reviewed.

The figures provided for comparison in the table relating to the backgrounds of students (1886/1911/1934) are, so far as their absolute amounts are concerned, incomplete. The reasons are the shortness of the period covered by a test-year (4-6 years) and, as regards 1886 and 1911, the fact of their restriction to Prussia. Despite this, the relative amounts may be regarded as representative, since the circumstances for Prussian universities and colleges may be taken as typical for Germany; and on the other hand, the transient changes for the years preceding and following each test-year are not of importance in connection with the matters considered below. Also the figures may serve to give an approximate picture of the proportions in actual numbers; in these, the future university and college professors in each freshman-year are shown: in the academic year 1886 ca. 7,480 students began study in Germany. After an average of 4 years study, and an average of $5\frac{1}{2}$ years post-graduate preparation for lecture-ship, about 130 of these qualified in 1896 as professors. Similarly, of ca. 11,740 freshmen (1911) ca. 225 qualified in 1923 after $4+7.1$ years. Again, of ca. 15,000 male beginner-students (1934) 165 qualified after $4.5+7.3$ years—on average over the years 1940-1949.

C. RESULTS (SEE TABLE)

The brief survey to which we are limited here does not permit detailed evaluation of the figures supplied. With regard to the statement of the problem, outlined in the introduction, it is only possible to pick out the most important points.

(1) From the point of view of interest-trends, the university teaching profession manifestly possesses a character which fundamentally distinguishes it from the remaining academic professions. For apart from the recruitment within the profession—in this case from university teaching families (8·4–17·5%)—the ratio of the academic groups remains at over 10% higher than in the corresponding student-generations. In isolation, this signifies that university teachers of a faculty are distinguished from their students not only through a two-fold family tradition (e.g. doctors, lawyers, clergy, etc., + university teaching), but also since the wider academic circles contribute in an even greater degree to the recruitment of the teaching body.

(2) The most decisive change since 1864 is observed in connection with the ratio of the academic professions and those closely related to them (I), which an older terminology liked to designate as “higher intellectual professions”. Their percentage falls off, despite a noticeable numerical increase, from a 2/3 proportion to a relative 44·3%. The recession in this population-group, which by its nature is most closely related to the university, is of greater significance in that the distribution of the academic professions among the students—apart from minor fluctuations—has remained almost unchanged, while the number of undergraduates has risen during this time at least as briskly as that of the qualified professors. If one takes into account recruitment from academic circles, which by comparison with other academic professions is considerably stronger, and which constitutes a characteristic feature of the university teaching profession (see the remarks under (1)), it is seen that the incursion has ensued right in the vital field of recruitment of German university teachers, in the course of the past 90 years of university history. It is of value to look at this change in combination with the change in scholastic interest-trends outlined in the introduction (see A (3)).

(3) The proportions of both other groups (II and III) essentially reflect in their change the development of the German professional and social structure since the middle of the 19th century. The particularly high standing of university professors made this profession, especially before the first world war, a suitable alternative for the sons of well-to-do merchant classes, though the landowning class did not show the same interest. This interest of the middle class in the university is an expression of the general alliance of middle class prosperity and culture as they existed in Germany until well into the 20th century.

For the doubling in numbers since 1864 by the economically dependent group (III), a series of factors is responsible. (The figures of manual

The background (father's occupation) of German¹ university and college professors² for the faculties of Protestant and Catholic theology, law, economic and social sciences, medicine, philosophy and natural sciences in the years 1864-90, 1910/31/53, and for comparison the corresponding factors for students³ (1886/1911/34)

Sample year	1864		1890		1886 ⁴		1910		1911 ⁴		1931		1934 ⁵		1953	
	abs.	%	abs.	%	abs.	%	abs.	%	abs.	%	abs.	%	abs.	%	abs.	%
I. Academic, artistic and journalistic professions, in total	484	63.4	794	63.4	2,282	20.1	1,337	55.0	4,130	19.5	2,091	49.1	12,831	21.9	1,819	44.3
of these:																
university and college teachers	134	17.5	209	16.7	367		317	13.0	817		467	11.0			349	8.4
teachers at higher schools	26		58				144				245		2,266		243	
professors at academies and other scholastic institutions .. .	1		26				30				60				63	
higher officials ⁶	63		86		719		163		1,248		258		3,005		268	
judges	28		62				111				172		640		153	
lawyers	19		21				43				64		654		63	
doctors	69		129		352		199		675		320		2,607		197	
ecclesiastical offices, clergy	107		133		698		194		948		240		1,505		203	
artistic and journalistic professions	17		35		146		57		147		92		2,154		72	
others ⁷	20		35				79		295		173				228	
II. Economically independent persons (including self-employed) higher salaried staff and military officers, in total .. .	189	24.7	342	27.3	6,163	54.3	856	35.2	10,055	47.5	1,618	38.0	20,325	34.7	1,402	33.7
of these:																
manufacturers	8		34		1,681		127		1,696		236		1,201		164	
small manufacturers and craftsmen	34		31				71		1,264		129		4,512		171	
wholesalers	18		25				70		580		122		726		86	
shopkeepers, retail traders, "Kaufleute"	74		127		2,028		317		3,290		605		4,306		427	
hotel- and inn-keepers	2		4				5		337		19				23	
of independent or private means	2		13		752		47		159		61		8		17	
higher salaried staff, executives	2		8				41		133		140		3,688		206	
brokers and trade representatives			1				3		29		11		894		27	
military officers	15		22		126		40		336		83		719		85	
landed gentry and crown-land tenants	7		16		1,576		39		318		48		357		25	
farmers and similar	27		61				96		1,913		164		3,922		171	
III. Not economically independent, without a completed university education, in total	91	11.9	117	9.3	2,902	25.6	239	9.8	6,968	33.0	549	12.9	25,434	43.4	914	22.9
of these:																
officials ⁸	43		39		1,490		108		3,544		248		12,678		400	
teachers	27		51		951		99		2,440		216		5,808		110	
salaried staff	5		9		431		11		624		41		4,663		103	
foremen and workmen	16		18		30		21		360		44		2,285		101	
I, II and III in total	764	100.0	1,253	100.0	11,347	100.0	2,432	100.0	21,153	100.0	4,258	100.0	58,590	100.0	4,155	100.0
Percentage of total university and college teachers	55.5		58.1				67.1				73.5				85.6	

1 Formerly German Reich; 1953 Bundesrepublik (West Germany) and West Berlin.
 2 Excluding Honorary-professors and Lehrbeauftragte (tutors for a specific period or task).
 3 From official statistics.
 4 Prussian students at German universities.
 5 Male students at German universities.
 6 Inclusive of technical employees, Post Office and Railways.
 7 Pharmacists, veterinary surgeons, chemists, architects, engineers.
 8 The professional term "Kaufmann" denotes in popular speech as well as retailers also manufacturers; recently also employees. The figures given here are therefore possibly too high.
 9 This figure could not be ascertained.

The professions connected by brackets could not be further analysed.

workers are left out of account in this connection): along with the steadily growing number of such occupations there are chiefly the functional similarity of their activity to that of the corresponding academic professions, and their social position as "lower intellectual occupations", which leads them in succeeding generations directly to study and thus to a scholastic or scientific profession. So long as a conception of social "upper" and "lower" continues to be attached to particular professional positions, one will, moreover, in the case of university teachers who belong in their family background to those professions, be able to speak of improvement in social status connected with a change of social class. This is in direct contrast to those whose background is in the academic or middle class occupations, for whom social betterment is at best achieved within a class.

It is, however, quite decisive that to the extent that German universities have abolished the economic uncertainty that existed between completion of studies (graduation) and fixed appointment as full professor (on average of the years 1900-1909: ca. 14 years; 1920-1929: 16 years), the economically unequal chances for these economically weak professions (III) have at the same time been improved. The sharp rise between 1931 and 1953 seems to reflect this fact. It is further also understandable that in discussion of the "economic uncertainty" of the university teaching profession, the social contrasts between the educational middle class and the landed middle class on the one hand, and the "possessionless uneducated" on the other hand, play their part. In connection with a rational policy for the rising generation, it is here not so much a question of material criteria, as of the approved standards of a past epoch and the underlying principles which arise from changed social conditions.

(4) The fact of the social or functional "nearness" of the "economically independent" as well as of the "dependent" professional positions (II and III) can not diminish the fact that with the stronger level of recruitment from those occupational groups, the unity of the universities and technical colleges, especially of the universities, as it flourished in Germany in the 19th century, has been lost in a quite definite social sense. For the impulse of German university development in the 19th century was, quite as much as establishment and granting of privileges on the part of the state, above all the existence of a special status of scholars, a "scholars' aristocracy" as W. H. Riehl called it in full acknowledgment of this feature. The establishment of the university was, as it were, only the "polishing and setting" of this social natural product, which, in the form of learned societies appeared to wait for its full flowering only upon national encouragement.⁶ To this tradition still corresponds today the collegiate constitution of faculty and university.

In present-day discussion of the educational ideal of the universities, which, even when it takes place within the international framework, links up at least substantially with the Humboldt university concept,

this quite special social background is usually overlooked. The decline and—with the internal changes in the academic professions themselves—indeed even the complete disappearance of the scholastic class, which in its outlook and attitude embodied the standards necessary to an institution so tenuously linked to the state, constitutes—in combination of course with the general social transformation—a grievous loss of tradition in the sphere of the university itself. This understood, there stands behind the changed numerical position of the backgrounds of university teachers the change from the scholar to the professional man, or to put in another way: learning has found in our century, in the personal respect also, the “rational” representative conformable to its own standards.

NOTES

¹ Results of a sociological investigation carried out by the Sociology Department of the University of Göttingen, Director Prof. Dr. H. Plessner.

In connection with the investigation, there are already available some preliminary reports:

Charlotte Lorenz: *Bestand und Strukturwandlungen des Lehrstandes an den wissenschaftlichen Hochschulen in der verbundenen Dokumentar- und Erhebungstatistik*. (“Condition of, and structural changes in, the teaching profession at universities in the related statistics from documents and enquiries”.)

A. Busch, D. Goldschmidt: “Zur Hochschulstatistik 1864–1954” in *Mitteilungen des Hochschullehrerverbandes* (“On university statistics 1864–1954” in *Notices of the University Teachers’ Association*, vol. 3, no. 1, Sept. 1954, page 19 *et seq.*).

D. Goldschmidt: “Die Lage des Hochschullehrernachwuchses” (“The position of the rising generation of university teachers”) in *Deutsche Universitätszeitung (German University Journal)*, vol. 10, no. 12, June 1955, page 8 *et seq.*

Christian von Ferber: “Die Personalstruktur der Universität” (“University teaching staff structure”) in *German University Journal*, vol. 10, no. 13, July 1955, page 8 *et seq.*

The final results will be published in a series of 3 vols. during the course of the year 1956.

² Franz Eulenburg: *Der akademische Nachwuchs* (“The Rising Academic Generation”), Leipzig and Berlin, 1908.

³ The German words “Universität und Hochschule” have been translated as “universities and colleges” or, to avoid repetition, simply as “universities”. Both are educationally of the same level, the university in Germany comprising “Universität” which as a rule is concerned with academic subjects, and the “Hochschule” which is the equivalent in the technical and scientific fields. (Translator.)

⁴ A further census, by reference to the years of obtaining qualification as professor, in which each university teacher is counted once only, had not been concluded at the time of completion of the manuscript.

⁵ “Ordinarien” are those professors who hold positions within the “establishment” of German universities, e.g. chairs; “Nichtordinarien” are similarly qualified, but hold posts extra to that list. (Translator.)

⁶ See Wilhelm von Humboldt’s memoir “Über die innere und äussere Organisation der höheren wissenschaftlichen Anstalten in Berlin” (“The internal and external organisation of the higher scholastic institutions in Berlin”), Sept. 1807–10, in Adolf Harnack’s *Geschichte der Kgl. Preuss. Akademie der Wissenschaften* (“History of the Royal Prussian Academy”), vol. 2, Berlin 1900, p. 361 *et seq.*

Origines sociales et perspectives professionnelles des étudiants en médecine

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Les études de médecine présentent, par rapport à la plupart des autres études supérieures, une caractéristique particulière : les étudiants y sont mis en contact non seulement avec un milieu d'études mais également avec leur futur milieu professionnel. Leur formation se partage entre la Faculté où ils suivent des cours et passent des examens et l'hôpital où se fait, sous la direction des chefs de service, leur formation pratique. L'action du milieu universitaire s'accompagne donc d'une action profonde du milieu professionnel. L'hôpital n'est pas seulement un lieu d'enseignement ; c'est aussi, pour de longues périodes, un lieu de contact entre les étudiants et des médecins installés et même parvenus à une position élevée dans leur profession.

Les opinions et les attitudes qui sont propres au milieu médical doivent donc être assez rapidement et assez profondément communiquées à l'étudiant. Or les médecins ont, dans l'ensemble, en France, un statut socio-économique élevé. Il fait peu de doute que, dans une échelle socio-professionnelle, ils seraient classés dans les deux ou trois premiers rangs. Le fait qu'ils exercent une profession libérale, le niveau moyen de leurs revenus, leur haut degré de qualification professionnelle, leur rôle dans la société concourent à leur assigner cette place. On peut donc se demander comment réagissent à ces études les étudiants d'origine modeste, dans quelle mesure ils adoptent les normes du milieu où ils entrent, dans quelle mesure aussi ces normes sont en conflit avec leur situation actuelle et leur situation future. Pour prendre un exemple précis, la médecine salariée est aujourd'hui considérée par la plupart des porte-paroles du monde médical avec beaucoup de répugnance. Or, l'ouverture d'un cabinet et plus encore l'achat d'un cabinet existant exigent une certaine mise de fonds. Dans quelle mesure les étudiants d'origine modeste partagent-ils ces convictions ? Dans quelle mesure y a-t-il un conflit entre leurs attitudes et les décisions que leur situation financière peut les obliger à prendre ?

Une enquête par questionnaire a été lancée par le Centre d'Etudes Sociologiques. Monsieur Naudin, du Bureau Universitaire de Statistiques a pris part à l'enquête et s'est chargé de rassembler les documents. Les questionnaires ont été remplis par tous les étudiants de la

Faculté de Médecine de Lille et par un échantillon au hasard des étudiants de la Faculté de Médecine de Paris. 1495 questionnaires au total ont pu être dépouillés.

I. L'ORIGINE SOCIALE DES ETUDIANTS EN MEDECINE

Nous définissons le niveau social des étudiants par la profession de leur père. Pour la commodité de l'étude, nous avons regroupé ces professions en trois classes: la classe 1 comprend les ouvriers, les petits agriculteurs et les employés subalternes; la classe 2, les commerçants, les artisans et les fonctionnaires et cadres moyens; la classe 3, les fonctionnaires et cadres supérieurs, les professions libérales, les gros exploitants agricoles et les dirigeants d'industrie.

1—La prédominance de la classe 3

TABLEAU 1

Classe	Nombre d'étudiants			% des pères classés		
1	195	13,8
2	507	35,9
3	714	50,3
divers	28	
n. rép.	51	100
			1495			

Le fait frappant est que la classe 3, qui ne constitue qu'un très faible pourcentage de la population, fournit 50% des étudiants en médecine. La classe 1 qui forme beaucoup plus de la moitié de la population n'en fournit que 14%. Il y a dans notre échantillon autant de fils de médecins que d'étudiants dont le père appartient à la classe 1 (195).¹

2—L'ascension des classes 1 et 2

Dans son ensemble, la population est en montée sociale.

TABLEAU 2

	Père		%		Gds-pères		%	
1	...	195	...	13,8	...	596	...	29,8
2	...	507	...	35,9	...	701	...	35,2
3	...	714	...	50,3	...	698	...	35,0
Total	...	1416	...	100,0	...	1995	...	100,0

N.B. La proportion des non-réponses s'élève à 23, 6% pour les grands-pères paternels et 32, 2% pour les grands-pères maternels.

Cette montée est particulièrement sensible, pour les classes 1 et 2, quand on relève la profession des mères. Une proportion significativement plus élevée des mères des classes 1 et 2 travaillent (36,1 et 41,5% contre 20% dans la classe 3), mais surtout les mères ont fréquemment

un statut socio-économique plus élevé que la père (25,4% des mères qui travaillent dans la classe 1).

Il y a donc dans la population étudiée une nette dominante de la classe 3, non seulement parce qu'elle en constitue plus de la moitié, mais aussi parce que le mouvement ascensionnel des étudiants de classe 1 et 2 a quelque chance de les prédisposer à se conformer aux normes de la classe 3.

II. LA SELECTION AU COURS DES ETUDES

La dominance de la classe 3 est d'autant plus marquée que la sélection opérée par les études joue en sa faveur.

1—*Les interruptions d'études et les craintes d'abandon.*

Les étudiants ont dû interrompre leurs études plus fréquemment dans la classe 1 que dans la classe 3.

TABLEAU 3

	Classe 3 (sauf médecins)		%	Classe 1		%
N'ont pas interrompu leurs études	445		85,7	155		79,5

$z = 2,00$ significatif à 0,05

De plus, les craintes d'abandon sont plus fréquentes à mesure qu'on descend dans l'échelle sociale.

TABLEAU 4

	Classe 1	%	Classe 2	%	Classe 3	%
Ne craignent pas d'avoir à abandonner leurs études	112	57,5	361	68,1	544	76,1

2—*L'évolution des proportions au cours des études*

Les craintes exprimées par les présents correspondent à des abandons réels qui, eux aussi, varient selon les classes et expliquent la variation des proportions au cours des études.

TABLEAU 5

	Classe 1	%	Classe 2	%	Classe 3	%	Total	%
3 premières années de médéc.	119	15,1	295	37,5	373	47,5	787	100,1
3 dernières années de médéc.	76	12,1	212	33,6	340	54,1	628	99,8

$X^2 = 7,13$ significatif à 0,05

Une indication analogue est donnée par l'évolution des proportions d'étudiants ayant passé les différentes séries de baccalauréats. On sait

que la section A (latin-grec) est la section que choisit de préférence la classe 3, et que la section moderne est la section que choisit de préférence la classe 1.

TABLEAU 6

	Série A	%	Série B	%	Série C	%	Moderne	%
3 premières années de médec.	249	30,6	163	20,0	171	21,0	232	28,5
3 dernières années de médec.	249	38,3	117	18,0	155	23,8	130	19,9

$X^2 = 18,61$ significatif à 0,01.
pour la série A, $z = 2,48$
pour la série M, $z = 3,30$

3—La réussite aux concours

Les concours (externat et internat) jouent un rôle important dans l'enseignement médical parce qu'ils constituent la distinction la plus importante à l'intérieur du monde médical. La présentation et la réussite aux concours est également liée de manière significative à l'origine des étudiants.²

TABLEAU 7

	Revenus mensuels des parents ^a		
	moins de 60.000	60 à 100,000	plus de 100.000
N'ont présenté aucun concours	217	166	176
En ont présenté	190	186	240

$X^2 = 17,03$ significatif à 0,01

De même la série du baccalauréat est en relation très claire avec la réussite à l'externat.

TABLEAU 8

	Ont réussi à l'externat	%	Total
Série A	127	25,4	499
Série B	48	16,2	280
Série C	70	17,2	326
Série M	44	12,2	362
	<u>289</u>	<u>19,5</u>	<u>1467</u>

$X^2 = 17,38$ significatif à 0,01

Les étudiants qui ont passé la Série A réussissent plus que la moyenne; ceux qui ont passé la Série Moderne, moins que la moyenne.

On peut donc conclure que la dominance de la classe 3 se renforce au cours des études. La proportion d'étudiants d'origine sociale élevée s'accroît. Dans les grands concours, ils l'emportent de manière plus nette encore. Les étudiants de classe 2 et surtout ceux de classe 1 se trouvent donc dans un milieu étudiant où la prédominance de la classe 3 est bien affirmée.

III. ATTITUDES ET PERSPECTIVES PROFESSIONNELLES

1—Les constatations précédentes sur l'origine sociale des étudiants et sur le rôle de la période des études comme processus de sélection sociale permettent d'attendre deux ordres de résultats concernant les attitudes et les perspectives concrètes des étudiants à l'égard de leur avenir professionnel, de leur mode et de leur lieu d'installation, de leur désir d'être omnipraticien ou spécialiste, du jugement qu'ils portent sur la médecine libérale et sur la médecine salariée. On doit se demander en effet d'une part si les étudiants choisissent leur avenir professionnel selon leur origine sociale et d'autre part si la sélection sociale qui s'exerce au cours des études, s'ajoutant à la dominance numérique des étudiants de la classe 3 entraînent une assimilation des groupes minoritaires aux normes et aux attitudes de la majorité.

2—Les résultats concernant le mode d'installation envisagé sont les plus intéressants de ce double point de vue, mais surtout pour la liaison qu'ils font apparaître entre l'origine sociale des étudiants et leurs perspectives professionnelles. Si l'on élimine en effet ceux qui envisagent de prendre un emploi salarié à temps partiel et qui ne sont souvent que des étudiants désirant une installation libérale mais soucieux de s'assurer un revenu fixe d'appoint pendant la période de lancement de leur clientèle, on voit que la répartition des étudiants entre les deux grands types d'installation qu'ils peuvent envisager—libérale ou salariée—varie significativement selon leur origine sociale.

	Classe 3	Classe 2	Classe 1
Installation libérale	345	211	83
Installation salariée	36	43	14

$X^2 = 8,70$ (significatif à 0,02)

Ce résultats est confirmé par la répartition des étudiants qui espèrent une aide de leur famille au moment de leur installation entre les deux grands secteurs de la profession. Les futurs médecins salariés sont ceux qui escomptent le moins une aide de leur famille, ceux dont la famille est probablement le moins capable de fournir cette aide. De même, les étudiants boursiers et exonérés choisissent significativement moins un mode d'installation libérale que les autres étudiants ($z = 2,11$) mais il faut ajouter, ce qui sera commenté plus loin, qu'ils ne choisissent pas significativement plus souvent un emploi salarié, se réfugiant plutôt dans l'hésitation.

3—Il est moins étonnant de voir le lieu d'installation choisi (campagne, petite ville, grande ville ou Paris) varier en rapport avec le revenu de la famille. Il est néanmoins frappant de constater la très forte signification de ce lien, tel que le montre le tableau suivant

	classe 1	classe 2	classe 3
campagne	45	65	80
petite ville	49	124	173
grande ville ou Paris	45	137	236

On voit que de la classe 1 à la classe 3, la proportion de ceux qui pensent d'installer à la campagne diminue fortement tandis que s'élève inversement la proportion de ceux qui veulent s'installer dans une grande ville ou à Paris. La proportion de ceux qui envisagent de s'installer dans une petite ville ne varie pas d'une classe à l'autre.

4—Enfin, il est net que l'origine sociale intervient dans le choix entre l'installation comme spécialiste ou comme omnipraticien

	classe 1	classe 2	classe 3
pas envisagé ou ne veut pas se spécialiser	91	210	238
veut se spécialiser	92	276	402
$X^2 = 9,85$ (significatif à 0,01)			

Le même résultat se retrouve plus marqué encore, si l'on considère non plus la profession du père de l'étudiant mais son revenu.

Il est intéressant de noter que contrairement à l'idée fréquemment exprimée les femmes envisagent plus souvent que les hommes de se spécialiser.

	Hommes	Femmes
pas envisagé ou non	470	76
oui	605	185

Il est surtout utile d'analyser ces résultats en fonction des classes distinguées: la proportion des femmes et des hommes désirant se spécialiser est, dans la classe 3, non significativement différente, quoique proche de la limite de signification ($z=1,76$) tandis qu'elle est significativement différente dans la classe 1 ($z=2,24$) et surtout dans la classe 2 ($z=3,45$). Or l'importance relative des femmes par rapport aux hommes diffère significativement selon les classes, étant la plus faible dans les classes 1 et 2 ($X^2=8,55$ significatif à 0,02). Ces résultats montrent non seulement qu'en moyenne les étudiantes ont une origine sociale plus élevée que les étudiants mais surtout que c'est dans les classes où leur proportion est la plus faible qu'elles manifestent le plus grand attrait pour la médecine libérale, c'est-à-dire la plus grande assimilation aux normes du groupe dominant.

5—Là est en effet un des principaux résultats de cette étude. Le groupe dominant, celui de la classe 3, rallie à lui un grand nombre d'éléments en provenance d'autres groupes. Il est donc inexact de penser que l'orientation des étudiants à la sortie de leurs études traduit directement leur origine sociale. Le séjour prolongé dans un milieu médical et pré-médical a pour effet de répandre chez les étudiants d'origine modeste des attitudes et des aspirations qui sont celles du groupe dominant, même si elles entrent en conflit avec les exigences de leur situation économique et avec leurs perspectives professionnelles concrètes.

Cette absence de correspondance directe entre le groupe social d'origine et la répartition des modes d'installation envisagés a déjà été montrée par le tableau qui indiquait une déviation des aspirations des

classes 1 et 2 vers celles qui correspondent directement à la classe 3. Bien plus, on constate que la proportion des réponses de ce type croît, pour l'ensemble des étudiants, des premières aux dernières années d'études. Les jugements défavorables à l'égard de la médecine salariée se renforcent à mesure que s'allonge le temps de séjour dans la milieu prémédical.

	Avantages de la médecine salarisée	Désavantages
1° et 2° années	250	434
3° - 6° années	393	791

$z = 3,42$

Le cas des boursiers et exonérés est caractéristique. Significativement moins orientés vers une installation libérale, ils ne sont pourtant pas plus favorables à un emploi salarié. Plus généralement, si les étudiants dont le père a un revenu élevé sont plus hostiles à la médecine salariée, les étudiants d'origine modeste n'y sont pas plus favorables et ici encore se réfugient dans les réponses hésitantes, dont on peut faire l'hypothèse qu'elles manifestent un conflit entre leurs possibilités effectives d'installation et leurs aspirations qui ont subi l'influence du groupe dominant.

6—Ce conflit entre les perspectives concrètes et les aspirations est le fait principal dégagé par cette étude. Il s'accroît au cours des années de médecine, car si les attitudes défavorables à l'égard de la médecine salariée se renforcent du début à la fin des études, parallèlement la proportion de ceux qui pensent choisir un emploi salarié augmente. Ceux qui au début de leurs études ne savent pas encore s'ils se spécialiseront ou non tendent dans une proportion nettement plus importante à s'orienter vers une médecine non spécialisée. Certains espoirs, certaines illusions se dissipent et au moment où l'étudiant s'apprête à s'installer, il est plus sensible aux problèmes économiques qui se posent à lui.

Ce conflit et l'écart de plus en plus grand que l'on constate entre les aspirations et les intentions concrètes apportent un élément de réponse au problème posé au début de cet article. Il est inexact de dire que l'origine sociale des étudiants commande directement leur entrée dans la profession médicale; il est également impossible de soutenir que le temps des études place l'étudiant dans un milieu entièrement nouveau et l'amène à réorienter complètement ses attitudes et ses aspirations. Dans le cas présent, la période des études agit comme un processus de mobilité sociale, faisant pénétrer les normes et les attitudes de la classe supérieure, qui est à la fois la classe majoritaire et celle qui correspond à la majorité des médecins installés, dans le groupe des étudiants d'origine modeste, mais cette action, très efficace comme le montre le tableau sur le mode d'installation envisagé par les étudiants interrogés, et qui se renforce plus l'étudiant avance dans ces études, est limitée par l'importance des problèmes économiques qui se présentent à l'étudiant au moment de son entrée dans la vie professionnelle.

Il serait intéressant de comparer de ce point de vue les divers secteurs de l'enseignement supérieur.

1. dans quel cas la dominance sociale dans les groupes étudiants correspond-elle à la situation socio-professionnelle, au niveau de prestige de la profession préparée?

2. quelle est l'importance de ce qu'on peut appeler l'effet de dominance, c'est-à-dire de l'adoption par les minorités des normes et attitudes de la majorité?

3. Quel est le rapport entre cet effet et l'effet contraire qui est commandé par l'influence de la situation sociale d'origine sur les conditions d'entrée dans la vie professionnelle?

Il faut remarquer que l'importance relative de cet effet et de ce contre-effet dépend en partie des mécanismes de présélection qui s'exercent avant l'entrée dans la vie étudiante. Les étudiants provenant de classe I n'appartiennent probablement pas à des familles représentatives des groupes sociaux qui constituent cette classe. Leur accession aux études médicales représente un processus accéléré de mobilité ascendante et ils doivent être, partant d'une situation marginale, plus aptes à assimiler les attitudes de la majorité à laquelle ils viennent se mêler. Des études plus précises seraient nécessaires pour suivre ces problèmes et étudier l'interaction de l'effet de dominance et de l'appartenance à un groupe socio-économique d'origine. Il est certain que leur conflit doit se traduire par l'inadaptation et l'insatisfaction d'un certain nombre de ceux qui, à la fin de leurs études, choisissent, contre les normes dominantes, un emploi salarié et inversement que l'adoption par des étudiants d'origine modeste de normes élaborées par une majorité appartenant à un milieu social différent doit entraîner pour certains de ces étudiants des difficultés considérables au moment de leur installation. Il n'a pas encore été possible d'analyser les résultats obtenus concernant les spécialités choisies par les étudiants mais ils montrent dès l'abord que les choix effectués ne concordent pas avec les possibilités d'installation: en particulier, beaucoup d'étudiants, surtout débutants, désirent s'orienter vers la chirurgie, désir auquel ils devront renoncer par la suite et qui risque de nuire à la préparation de la spécialité qu'ils choisiront en fait. Là encore, il ne s'agit pas d'un simple problème d'information; c'est en termes d'effet de dominance et de conflit entre cet effet et les déterminants socio-économiques qu'il devrait être posé.

NOTES

¹ Il ne semble pas que d'autres études supérieures diffèrent sur ce point des études de médecine.

² Le tri par classes n'est pas encore disponible. Les indices que nous donnons sont cependant suffisants pour permettre raisonnablement de prévoir les résultats.

³ Indiqué par les étudiants. Les chiffres donnés sont très certainement inférieurs aux chiffres réels mais divers indices marquent que le décalage en respect l'ordre.

Social Origins and Social Mobility of Businessmen in an American City

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Business owners and managers are acknowledged to be the most influential group in America. The "business institution" has been the locus of dynamic forces in Western society. The accumulated information about this one "institution" exceeds that available for any other sector. Paradoxically, knowledge concerning the personnel directing this "institution" is negligible. We have a few studies of the characteristics and careers of managers of giant corporations. But the traits of the operators of smaller and more typical businesses are almost entirely unknown. This gap in our knowledge about a key group is the more important in that there are reasons to believe that in an increasingly bureaucratized society business probably constitutes the most important channel of vertical mobility.

The present study is focused upon these more typical "small" businessmen. Though the entrepreneurs of one city are hardly representative of the nation, they do resemble the majority of such men. There is an advantage in studying the business cadre of one city rather than selecting a sample from numerous communities or regions. Not only are certain less observable factors automatically held constant. In addition one thereby gains an integral picture of the directors of the firms in a distinct market area, men who interact in non-economic as well as in economic affairs. Careers and social origins are less varied in a single city than in the nation as a whole. The amount of mobility up or down the ladder of business success within one community is likewise more limited than in a whole economy. But most businessmen restrict their activities to one community, and a picture of such a corps of men forms a key part of the total picture of the rôle of businessmen in contemporary society.

The Population Studied. The proprietor or chief executive of every business firm in Lexington, Kentucky—a city of 100,000 population with a large trade area—was asked to fill out a questionnaire.¹ Questions covered the following topics: (1) personal history and education, (2) occupation of father, (3) characteristics of the present business, (4) characteristics of first regular job and earlier owned businesses,

(5) business associations with parents or kin, (6) financial aspects of acquisition of ownership.

A sample of non-respondents were interviewed to supplement the questionnaires. Of the estimated 1,500 men eligible for inclusion, a third returned questionnaires. Ten per cent. of non-respondents were chosen for interview ; of these an eighth were out of business, a tenth could not be found for interview, and a fourth refused interviews. Hence two-thirds were interviewed. Nine additional IBM cards were punched for each interviewed case and included to make up the analyzed population of nearly a thousand men.²

This preliminary report is focused mainly on correlates of size of business (which was measured in reported gross annual sales) to facilitate comparison with the existing studies of the atypical heads of giant businesses.³

1. GENERAL ATTRIBUTES AND FAMILY BACKGROUND.

Size and Type of Business. Wholesale and retail trade establishments are the most numerous type in this city, and they spread over the entire range of sizes (Table 1). In three industries—transportation, finance, construction—the distribution of sizes of firms were bimodal.⁴ Compared to the distribution for the nation, firms in this city were quite small. A seventh sold less than \$10,000 in the reporting year, a quarter sold \$10,000—\$50,000, and a third sold \$50,000—\$200,000 ; of the fourth of firms with sales over \$200,000 slightly over a half (or a seventh of all firms) were above the half-million mark.

Age. Half of the businessmen studied were aged 45 to 64, a third were under 45, and a seventh were over 64. There was little systematic relation between ages of businessmen and the sizes of their firms except at the extremes of size ($C=0.20$). In the smallest businesses the ratios of the numbers of young and of old men to the "expected" numbers were 1.2 and 0.7 while in the largest undertakings the corresponding ratios were 0.8 and 1.4.⁵

Correlation between age at which men attained their present positions and business size today was unsystematic even though the value of C , which was 0.23, met the 0.001 probability test. Again the association between age when position was attained and size of business at that time was somewhat closer ($C=0.28$) but showed a systematic pattern only at the extremes.

Place of Birth and Rearing. Over two-thirds of the men were born in Kentucky, 6 per cent. were foreign born,⁶ and the remainder came mainly from north-eastern or north-central states. Size of business and region of birth were unrelated, except that the foreign-born operated none of the smallest businesses and had more than their share of the next-smallest and of the largest firms.

Of the native Americans, three-fourths were born in census-designated rural places. Using an index of urban-folk traits for Kentucky counties

Table 1. Present Size of Business by Type of Business

Present Size of Business	Type of Business										Total			
	Construction	Manufacturing	Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate	Wholesale and Retail Trade	Professional and Related Services*	Business and Repair Services	Miscellaneous	Transport, Communication and Utilities	Personal Services	Mining	Number	Per cent.		
Less than \$5,000	2	5	0.2						41	10.3	60	6.1
\$5,000-9,999	10	2.3†	11	23	0.6						2	0.4	72	7.3
\$10,000-19,999	1	0.2	15	35	0.8						6	1.1	82	8.3
\$20,000-49,999	5	0.6	5	99	1.3	3	0.8				12	6.7	141	14.3
\$50,000-99,999	4	0.4	4	92	1.1	13	2.8				1	0.3	162	16.5
\$100,000-199,999	4	0.4	29	86	1.1						3	0.3	152	15.5
\$200,000-499,999	12	1.7	11	82	1.3	1	0.3				3	0.3	116	11.8
\$500,000 and over	22	2.6	22	71	0.9	4	0.2				3	0.4	141	14.3
No Answer	1	0.3	4	31	1.0	11	1.6				1	0.8	58	5.9
Total	59	27	103	524	28	118	25	22	66	12	984	100.0		
Per cent.	6.0	2.8	10.5	53.2	2.9	12.0	2.5	2.2	6.7	1.2	83	100.0		
Median (000's)	337	192	143	96	73	49	27	19	<5	<5				

* Auxiliary firms; this does not include, e.g., physicians in private practice.

† The decimal numbers are ratios of actual to expected cases.

however, reveals that over half the Kentucky-born originated in "very urban" and another sixth in "urban" counties.⁷ By the age of 18, nine-tenths of the men were Kentucky residents, four-fifths of whom resided in counties now rated "urban" or "very urban". Five per cent. resided in census-designated metropolitan places, half in urban places, and the remainder in rural areas.

Rural-urban residence by the census classification showed little relation to size of firm operated except for some excess of rural men in the smallest enterprises. Using the folk-urban index of Kentucky counties, however, men living in the more folk-like counties at the age of 18 are now running the smallest businesses (1.7 times expectancy) and are under-represented in firms selling over \$50,000.

Father's Occupation. The above-mentioned disadvantage of rural men shows up clearly when father's occupation is related to size of firm (Tables 2A and 2B). Looking at the medians, definitely excelling are sons of professional men. With respect to present size, they are followed after a considerable gap by sons of business executives and business owners and then by sons of clerical workers and farm owners. Below these come manual workers and then, decidedly at the bottom, sons of farm tenants. This represents some important shifts in comparison with size when the respondent became head of his business. Sons of business executives rose from a poor fifth place to second, and sons of farm owners from almost the bottom to about the middle of the distribution.

Certain of the distributions within given fathers' occupations are bimodal both absolutely and in ratios to expectancy. Thus sons of business executives are found disproportionately above \$100,000 and below \$10,000 in both parts of Table 2. Sons of farm owners, though concentrated below \$20,000 in both parts of the Table, have a marked secondary peak above \$100,000 and even, for present size, above \$500,000. Sons of professional men, with a concentration above \$200,000, show a secondary low-size cluster. And despite the modest median size of businesses operated by the sons of semi- and unskilled workers, there is a secondary cluster of these men in the \$100,000—200,000 category in both parts of the table.

Sons of farm owners were found disproportionately operating transportation or communication businesses and in personal services and construction; farm tenants' sons operated finance or related enterprises and repair services. The most striking excess as concerns type of business was among sons of salaried executives—12.5 times expectancy were in mining, which reflects the fact that the fathers in mining were salaried executives and that affiliation with mining has a high "inheritance" rate.⁸

A third of the whole group were sons of business owners or executives (but not necessarily top executives), and another third were sons of farm operators (mainly owners). A sixth of the fathers had been skilled workers, one in twenty was a professional man, while lesser proportions

Table 2A. Present Size of Business by Principal Occupation of Father

Present Size of Business	Principal Occupation of Father										Total	
	Profes- sional	Business Executive	Business Owner	Clerical	Farm Owner	Service	Semi- and Unskilled	Foreman and Skilled	Farm Tenant	No Answer	Number	Per Cent.
Less than \$5,000	2	11	1	1	33		1	10	1	1	60	6.1
\$5,000-9,999	..	2.7	0.1	0.5	2.0		0.6	1.0	0.2		72	7.3
\$10,000-19,999	0.1	0.4	1.7		..	1.1	4.8	1	82	8.3
\$20,000-49,999	..	2	0.7	0.4	1.1		2	0.8	2.6	2.0	141	14.3
\$50,000-99,999	..	11	1.1	0.6	0.3	1	11	2.6	0.5	1	162	16.5
\$100,000-199,999	..	2	1.3	2.2	0.5	3	1	1.4	1.3	0.9	152	15.5
\$200,000-499,999	..	14	1.4	1	0.9	2	12	2.6	0.3	1	116	11.8
\$500,000 and over	..	15	1.5	1.3	0.6	2	3	0.6	0.3	2	141	14.3
No Answer	..	12	1.2	1.7	1.4		3	0.3	0.1	2	58	5.9
	..	1	0.8	0.5	2.2		1.7		0.5	5.0		
Total	45	67	298	33	272	6	30	161	65	7	984	
Median (000's)	276	154	121	92	84	83	49	48	15	350	83	
Percentages:												
Lexington:												
All Businessmen	4.6	6.8	30.3	3.4	27.6	0.6	3.0	16.4	6.6	0.7		100.0
Businesses of \$200,000 and over	10.2	10.6	40.3	5.9*	28.3	*	—	3.5	1.2			100.0
Corporation Executives†	17.8	18.9	36.8	5.6*	13.4‡	*	2.1	5.4	‡			100.0

* Service is included with clerical.

† Newcomer, op. cit., p. 53.

‡ Data do not distinguish between farm owners and farm tenants.

Table 2B. Size of Business when respondent assumed present position by Principal Occupation of Father

Size of Business When Respondent Became Head	Principal Occupation of Father										Total	
	Profes- sional	Business Owner	Clari- cal	Service	Business Executive	Foreman and Skilled	Semi- and Unskilled	Farm Owner	Farm Tenant	No Answer	Number	Per cent.
Less than \$5,000	..	5	2	2-0	2	12	1-0	2-4	10	1-2	31	3-1
\$5,000-9,999	..	52	7	0-7	1	41	0-8	0-9	104	1-3	287	29-2
\$10,000-19,999	..	23	4	0-6	1	34	1-1	1-5	40	1-0	143	14-5
\$20,000-49,999	..	72	11	2-7	2	9	0-2	0-5	21	0-6	119	12-1
\$50,000-99,999	..	31	1	0-4	3	24	0-6	2-0	7	0-3	73	7-4
\$100,000-199,999	..	20	3	0-9	1	35	1-9	2-1	14	0-5	100	10-2
\$200,000-499,999	..	42	2	0-7	1	3	0-3	0-2	21	0-9	87	8-8
\$500,000 and over	..	41	6	2-5	10	1	2-0	0-2	8	0-4	72	7-3
No Answer	..	12	1	0-4	2	2	0-2	0-2	47	2-4	72	7-3
Total	45	298	33	6	67	161	30	272	65	7	984	100-0
Median (000's)	150	46	39	35	19	18	15	11	9	35	19	
Percentages:												
Lexington:												
All Businessmen	4-6	30-3	3-4	0-6	6-8	16-4	3-0	27-6	6-6	0-7		100-0
Business	13-3	52-5	5-7	5-7	7-6	2-5	—	18-4	—	—		100-0
\$200,000 and over												100-0
Corporation Executives*	17-8	36-8	5-6	5-6	18-9	5-4	2-1	13-4	13-4			100-0

* Newcomer, *op. cit.*, p. 53.

were clerical workers and semi- or unskilled manual workers. Thus well over half the fathers had been farm or business owners or executives. But also, over two-fifths of the fathers had been in non-managerial occupations.

The resemblances between origins of chief executives of giant corporations and the heads of the largest Lexington businesses are close so far as parental occupation is concerned (Table 2A and 2B, bottom). The Kentucky sample contains more farmers and small proprietors and fewer salaried executives and manual workers. Taking fathers who were business owners and executives together, the proportion in the Lexington enterprises that exceeded \$200,000 when the respondent became head was 60%, and among those at present over \$200,000 it is 37%, the proportion in Newcomer's study was 56%. Chief executives of giant corporations are more often sons of professional men (18% versus 10% at present and 13% when respondent became head in the larger Lexington enterprises).

II. CAREER PATTERNS

Education. With the exception of father's occupation, the factor most closely associated with size of respondent's businesses was education (Tables 3A and 3B). Ignoring momentarily the men with less than five years of schooling, there is a systematic association of low education and small business, while college men head large businesses and are rarely operators of small ones. Nevertheless the pattern is quite loose. For the college men the tendency is clearer with respect to present than to earlier size, but the reverse is the case among elementary school men, especially those with less than five years of schooling.

Taken as a whole these Lexington business men had more schooling than comparable age groups in the state's population but much less schooling than chief executives of giant corporations: 35 versus 75 per cent. had attended college for one or more years. Even among the heads of the largest Lexington businesses only half had any college education. Among executives of giant corporations 6.5 per cent. of the older and 2.5 per cent. of the younger men had only elementary schooling, whereas 9.4 per cent. of the heads of Lexington's largest businesses and a fifth of the total group were in this category.⁹

The individuals with less than five years of schooling pose interesting questions. Although there were only 25 of these men, 24 operated very small businesses when they achieved their present headships (one man did not report size). At the time of the study, however, 11 of these men operated firms selling over \$200,000 and 22 of the 25 ran businesses selling over \$50,000. This is a remarkable performance not to be explained away by special tutoring. Twenty of these men were sons of farm owners, 3 of farm tenants, and 2 of manual labourers. Eleven had their first jobs in trade and 11 in personal service businesses. Ten of the group were not only foreign-born but had not come to the United States before age 18. None reported receiving any financial

Table 3. *Size of Business by Education*

Size of Business	Years of Schooling						Total	
	1-4	5-8	9-12	13-16	17+	Number	Per cent.	
A. Size of Present Business								
Less than \$10,000	1	55	71	4	1	132	14.3	
\$10,000-49,999	2	34	115	68	4	223	24.1	
\$50,000-199,999	11	68	125	93	16	313	33.9	
\$200,000 and over	11	13	94	112	26	256	27.7	
Total	25	170	405	277	47	924	100.0	
Per cent.	2.7	18.4	43.8	30.0	5.1			
Median (000's)	185	46	49	103	244	83		
B. Size of Business When Respondent Assumed Present Position								
Less than \$10,000	24	106	180	88	10	408	44.9	
\$10,000-49,999	2.3	27	111	59	13	210	23.0	
\$50,000-199,999		20	80	75	17	192	21.0	
\$200,000 and over		1	36	57	7	101	11.1	
Total	24	154	407	279	47	911	100.0	
Per cent.	2.6	16.9	44.6	30.6	5.3			
Median (000's)	<5	<5	15	42	55	15		

aid in starting their first businesses. These individuals are prototypes of the mobile businessman with exceptional energy, ambition, and ability; they testify to the continuing opportunity for advancement through business in today's economy.

Turning now to vocational training (Tables 4A and 4B), three things stand out. Attendance at "business college" (a secondary level school) or taking business courses in a university facilitates becoming head of a large business, though this relation is not definite for size of business at the time of attaining headship. The advantage of taking business courses in a university seems not to exceed that of general university training; approximately the same proportions of college men in each size group had taken special business courses in universities. Second, men who took correspondence courses appear disproportionately in the next to smallest and in the largest size enterprises at the time they became heads. But those starting in the \$10,000—\$50,000 category have split sharply into two groups, half gaining ground and half falling back into the smallest category. No other educational group displays this pattern.¹⁰ Finally, men with "specialist training" are mainly in the smallest businesses. Many of these men (craftsmen, barbers, etc.) are only marginally entrepreneurs with business expenses low relative to receipts.

Compared to other factors considered in this study, schooling is closely associated with business success as here measured. Equally important, however, are the numerous exceptions; these exceptions are asymmetrical: few men of advanced schooling operate small firms but a sizable share of large firms are headed by poorly schooled men.

First Regular Job. Beginning ones' career relatively late has only a moderate association with business success. Men starting work before age 18 are found to twice the expected number in the smallest firms, while those starting after age 25 are distinctly over-represented among large firms and rarely operate small businesses. The age-size relation is looser for size of business at the time when headship was attained. It seems clear that the age-size associations reflect mainly the cumulative effects of schooling and other factors related to age of beginning work rather than to that age as such.¹¹

Of all the Lexington men, 35 per cent. took their first jobs in trade, 15 per cent. in manufacturing, 9 per cent. on farms, and 5—7 per cent. each in construction, professional services, transportation, and personal service businesses. Only 2 per cent. began in mining, and none of these remained in mining. Continuation from first to present job in trade occurred to 1.5 times expectancy, while for other types of business such continuation was four or more times expectancy. Men who are today heads of larger enterprises were more likely to have had their first jobs in finance or in manufacturing than in other fields. Heads of small enterprises were most likely to have begun work in mining, on farms, or in service industries.

Table 4. Size of Business by Vocational Training

Size of Business	Business and/or Vocational Training							Total					
	Business College	Business Courses in College	Specialist Training	Correspondence Courses	Other*	None or No Answer							
A. Size of Present Business													
Less than \$10,000	11	0.8	2	0.2	33	6.2	12	2.1	3	0.2	71	0.8	132
\$10,000-49,999	22	1.0	17	0.9	1	0.1	2	0.5	43	1.9	138	1.0	223
\$50,000-199,999	27	0.9	23	0.9	2	0.2	12	0.9	36	1.1	214	1.1	314
\$200,000 and over	33	1.3	36	1.7	1	0.1	14	1.3	11	0.4	162	1.0	257
Total	93		78		37		40		93		585		926
Per cent.	10.0		8.4		4.0		4.3		10.0		63.3		100.0
Median (000's)	125		180		<10		125		53		113		83
B. Size of Business When Respondent Assumed Present Position													
Less than \$10,000	35	1.1	21	0.8	36	2.8	4	0.3	14	0.4	208	1.0	318
\$10,000-49,999	26	1.0	30	1.4	1	0.1	23	2.0	41	1.6	142	0.9	262
\$50,000-199,999	23	1.3	8	0.6	16	1.2	13	1.9	23	1.3	118	1.1	173
\$200,000 and over	10	0.6	16	1.2	37	4.1	40	4.4	14	0.9	106	1.1	159
Total	94		75		37		37		92		574		912
Per cent.	10.2		8.2		4.1		4.4		10.2		62.9		100.0
Median (000's)	18		28		6		31		32		20		15

* Military training, apprentice training, vocational and commercial secondary schools, and combinations of several types of training.

Most of the Lexington businessmen began their careers in humble positions. The percentage distribution of first-job status and the size of business at the time of attaining headship was as follows : semi- or unskilled manual 40% (\$10,400); clerical 39% (\$36,600); professions 8% (\$9,900); skilled manual 6% (\$141,700); business executive 5% (\$18,600); business owner 1% (\$8,400). (Only one man began as a farm operator). Early business ownership was no advantage, doubtless due to the kind of undertaking involved. The high median size for men beginning as craftsmen represents men in construction who rose to be contractors.

Here again comparison of heads of giant corporations with men running Lexington businesses selling over \$200,000 at the time they became heads is interesting. The respective proportions taking their first jobs in the stated positions were (Lexington percentages first) : professional—11%, 38%; business owner—zero, 2%; business executive—4%, 7%; clerical and service—44%, 40%; skilled—10%, 8%; semi- and unskilled—30%, 5%.¹² The striking contrast is between the larger share of "big" Lexington businessmen beginning as less skilled workers and the larger share of national corporation heads beginning as professionals.

In Table 5 are summarized data relating the type of firm in which a man had his first job to the size of his business now and when he became head. Men starting in family operated non-farm firms have the greatest initial advantage; the few with this background who headed small enterprises initially have moved up, though over time they did not fully maintain their lead within the top-size category. One guesses that better financial backing contributed to growth of the smaller firms but that individual ability and ambition played a larger rôle in growth or decline of initially large units. The distinct disadvantage of men with rural backgrounds is reflected in the careers of men holding their first regular jobs on farms.

Finally, financial aid from the family or kin was received by a fifth of the Lexington men; another fifth received business loans from banks in establishing their first owned business. These two groups (and the 18% who did not answer the question) were more frequently operators of large enterprises and less often of small ones than were the men who reported no assistance or aid of other kinds. However, the association was looser than those with education or with parental occupation.

CONCLUSIONS

(1) The general looseness of the pattern is evident. Men of almost any background could and did rise to the top business positions in Lexington.

(2) The most important single factor favouring business success was education. This factor appears to have cumulative effects over time. Its influence is asymmetrical in that men of high education rarely head small firms, yet considerable proportions of those heading

Table 5. Size of Business by Organization in which Respondent had his first regular job

Size of Business	Organization—First Regular Job					Total
	Family's Non-Farm Business	Another's Non-Farm Business	Corporation	Farm and Other		
A. Size of Present Business						
Less than \$10,000	1	45	37	49	132	
\$10,000-49,999	18	48	113	40	219	1.8
\$50,000-199,999	40	84	138	45	307	0.9
\$200,000 and over	39	61	99	49	248	0.7
Total	98	238	387	183	906	1.0
Per cent.	10.8	26.3	42.7	20.2	100.0	
Median (000's)	162	96	92	58	83	
B. Size of Business When Respondent Assumed Present Position						
Less than \$10,000	17	87	124	88	316	1.4
\$10,000-49,999	14	76	119	47	256	1.0
\$50,000-199,999	19	39	101	11	170	0.3
\$200,000 and over	47	32	49	26	154	0.9
Total	97	234	393	172	896	
Per cent.	10.8	26.1	43.9	19.2	100.0	
Median (000's)	188	26	34	10	15	

large enterprises had few years of schooling. The relation between vocational or business training and business success was in part an indirect reflection of total years of education. However, "specialist training" typically prepared men for service industries in which most enterprises remain small.

(3) Father's position was related to business success. The sons of professional fathers had a decided advantage over all others. Sons of farmers were at a decided initial disadvantage, but the sons of farm

owners caught up to a remarkable extent between the time when they assumed their present positions and the time of the survey. Men who began work in family businesses had an initial advantage and presumably a financial base that lifted them out of the lowest size group, but so far as the largest businesses were concerned this advantage seems to have diminished over time. Family background appears to have been important largely through its implications with respect to schooling and to the degree of urbanization of the environment in which the man grew up—factors that are, of course, closely associated.

(4) Supporting the two previous conclusions with respect to influences of parental background and years of schooling on business success over time is the fact that the relative deviations of the median sizes of business around the median for the entire sample diminished by half for paternal occupation and increased by a third for education between the time of taking over the business and the present.

(5) In many respects the traits of men operating different sizes of enterprises form a continuum from the smallest enterprises up through the locally large establishments to the executives of national corporations.¹³ There are, however, two distinct exceptions. (a) Most of the smallest firms (those starting and remaining in the class below \$10,000 sales) were in the service categories. While a New York Italian bootblack with a flair for business may build up a chain of shops and become a millionaire, most men in such industries are oriented more toward their activities as producers than toward business as such. A comparatively small community does not provide much opportunity for expansion in these spheres, and the few more aggressive entrepreneurs springing from such ranks would probably migrate elsewhere. (b) There is a notable contrast between executives of national corporations and even the biggest Lexington businessmen in the extent of recruitment from the professions such as engineering and law. The contrast here between the modes of advance through success in independent business and through corporate management should be underscored. While business remains exceptional in that unusual men with little schooling may be highly successful, this is primarily through independent business. In general, business success like success in public careers is coming to depend upon education to a far greater extent than formerly. Hence any selectivity in the availability of education to various population groups involves cumulatively selective opportunity for advancement in business as in other spheres of life. Nevertheless, striking success by comparatively uneducated men can remain a continuing feature of the business world.

NOTES

¹ Negroes were excluded. The data for women are not reported here.

² Interviewed non-respondents were compared with those returning questionnaires with respect to age, type of business, aid received in first acquiring ownership, education, father's occupation, and size of business. Only the last factor showed a

difference at the 0.01 level; non-respondents were disproportionately heads of small businesses. Such men also were more likely to be "too busy" to be interviewed.

⁸ Certain gaps in this first report stem from the exigencies of tabulation priorities.

⁴ The most striking cases of father-son "inheritance" a type of business were: mining (25 times expectancy), manufacturing (8 times), finance (over 6 times); inheritance in trade was only 1.4 times expectancy, but in this case the large number of fathers involved limits the expectancy ratio.

⁵ The contingency co-efficient for present age and size of business when the man became head was 0.36, but this pattern was no more systematic. Sizes of business at these two points in time have been adjusted for price levels.

⁶ In her study of presidents and board chairmen of giant railroad, utility, and industrial corporations, Newcomer found 6 per cent. of the 1950 executives to be foreign-born. Mabel Newcomer, *The Big Business Executive*, Columbia University Press. New York, 1955.

⁷ H. A. Aurbach, "A Guttman Scale for Measuring Isolation". *Rural Sociology*, 20, pp. 142-5, 1955.

⁸ See footnote 4. Mining is a major state industry.

⁹ *Op. cit.*, p. 68.

¹⁰ Correspondence courses were favored especially by men in construction firms, and that industry has a bimodal size distribution. These courses are perhaps more a reflection of the individual than a factor in success.

¹¹ Almost a third of all Lexington businessmen and nearly as large a share of those heading the largest firms started work before age 18, but among heads of giant corporations less than an eighth began so young (*op. cit.*, p. 88). On this and other points comparisons of the two studies is qualified by the distinctive educational and demographic traits of Kentucky.

¹² *Op. cit.*, p. 87.

¹³ It should be remembered in making these comparisons that the big corporate chief executives are older, and were older when they were appointed to their offices than were the Lexington men when they became heads of businesses with annual sales above \$200,000. Of the former almost 3/4 and of the latter about 1/6 were 45 years of age or more when they achieved their present positions. (The figure of 1/6 is estimated from Table 52 in Newcomer's study, *op. cit.*, p. 111). The Lexington men have more years of activity still ahead and many have not yet reached the climax of their careers. Also, some of the previously most successful Lexington businessmen have of course migrated and hence are not included in this study. The "top" in Lexington is not the upper limit of business success for Lexingtonians.

Social Mobility in Jamaica, with Reference to Rural Communities and the Teaching Profession

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INTRODUCTION AND METHOD

This paper is concerned with social mobility in terms of occupational ranking and is based on a study¹ made in Jamaica in 1954. The occupational criterion is used for prestige ranking, first because the Jamaicans who were asked to rank individuals used occupation in doing so. (While other criteria were sometimes considered significant, the occupational was always given the greatest emphasis.) Secondly, the primary concern of this study is occupational mobility and next the prestige ranking of these occupations. Thirdly, economy of time and personnel makes it imperative to restrict the scope of an enquiry of this nature.² For the last reason, too, the rural type of community was chosen for the first part of the enquiry because the occupational pattern found in Jamaican villages is fairly simple; and the primary teacher was chosen for the second part because as we shall see later with very few exceptions, male primary school teachers are drawn from the families of small farmers and tradesmen in rural areas. Since the teaching profession is the largest in Jamaica and is one of the few prestige occupations open to the children of these families, in the primary school teacher will be found a direct prestige link with rural occupations.

The data were collected in two parts. First a field study was made of social mobility in a village community. Next, the data on the mobility of teachers were gathered from documents in the teachers' training college and the education department which included short autobiographies of students admitted to the college; and also from interviewing a random sample of 35 students as well as members of the college staff. On interviewing the 35 students, each was asked questions about the occupations of parents, grand-parents, and siblings; and was required to give a brief account of the economic and social structure of the community from which he came. The students were also asked to give the number and kinds of occupations that the children of persons in various occupational groups in their community had entered over the previous fifteen years. Although accuracy in the answers to this last question could not always be expected, nevertheless the information did provide a broad general regional background of sociological conditions in Jamaican rural society.

In the rural communities studied, the following was the system of social ranking used by the people themselves. At the bottom were the "labourers"; above these were the "cultivators", and occupying

a higher status, those called independent cultivators or "farmers". Those described as the "leaders" ranked above farmers, with the "planters" who live on the fringe of the settlement ranking above everybody else. So the order given was labourer, cultivator, farmer, leader and planter.

The labourer hires his services and is an unskilled wage earner, although a few rent plots for farming, and he lives in one or two rented rooms. The cultivator owns one or more small holdings ranging from less than an acre to a few acres, and hires occasional labourers. He is often a tradesman as well and owns a small house. The independent cultivator or farmer is described as having a fair-sized holding of about ten acres or more, and is able to hire one or more regular labourers. The clergyman, teacher, chemist, welfare officer, agricultural officer and district nurse are classified as leaders. A farmer with a large holding may also be classified in the same category as a leader, giving consideration to other prestige symbols as well. The planter owns large estates and draws his labour force from rural settlements.

Turning to the social mobility of male primary school teachers, Table 5, based on the careers of teachers leaving the college between 1929 and 1949, showed that they moved into the following occupations: teaching posts in secondary, technical, vocational or training colleges, in the Civil Service, administrative posts in the Education Department, Agricultural service or Welfare service, law, medicine or politics. In addition, there were a few posts of special distinction. Individuals occupying various social positions were asked to rank these occupations and the pattern emerged as follows, in ascending order—(1) Labourer, (2) Cultivator, Tradesman; (3) Farmer; (4) Teacher, Agricultural Officer, Welfare Officer; (5) Teacher in Secondary School, Training Colleges and Technical and Vocational Colleges, Civil Service; (6) Persons with University degrees, some Administrative posts; (7) Doctors, Lawyers, Members of the House of Representatives and persons with "special" achievements.

A Village Community. The village community which was studied has a population of approximately 1,000. Bananas, coffee, cocoa, and pineapples are the chief cash crops. The average land holding is about half an acre in size although more than one half the total number of holdings are less than the average size. The heads of families are mostly farmers, tradesmen, cultivators and labourers. There are six teachers, a clergyman, a district nurse, a sanitary inspector, chemist and a visiting agricultural officer and a doctor. The church and school are the chief centres of community activities, with the clergyman and teachers playing leadership rôles. Most other organizations in the village are closely attached to the church and school.

Three types of families are to be found. The first is the paternal, in which the couple are legally married. The second is called "common law" family, in which man and wife do not go through a legal form of marriage. In the third, the maternal family, a woman is head of

the household and is usually related to the children under her guardianship as grandmother, mother, aunt or sister. Common-law and maternal types of families predominate in the lower social strata of the society and decrease in the upper strata where paternal families predominate. Most children of common-law and maternal families would be considered illegitimate by 'western' standards, but in Jamaican society they bear no social stigma. Teachers are drawn from all three types of household.

Between 1930 and 1954, ten students, seven males and three females, entered the Teachers' Training College from the community. Four of them were from maternal and the rest from paternal families. The father of three of the ten students was a tradesman-cultivator. In the other seven cases, the heads of households earned their livelihood from cultivation. Other occupations entered were clerical, Civil Service, nursing, etc. (Table 1a).

Table 1a. *Occupational mobility through the educational channel in a rural community from 1930-1954*

Size of Population	Father's Occupation	Occupations of Offspring				
		Teaching	Nursing	Clergy	Clerical	Civil Service
1,000	2 Labourer 6 Cultivator 1 Farmer 2 Grocer's Shop 2 Clerical	10	2	2	8	5

Table 1b. *30 community samples—occupations entered during last 15 years*

Clergy	Politics	Medicine & Law	Teaching	Nursing	Civil Service	Agricultural Officer
5	2	7	188	70	37	33

SOCIAL MOBILITY IN RURAL COMMUNITIES

Agricultural work used to be rated rather low in Jamaicans' system of values, perhaps as a legacy of slavery, abolished in 1838, in which farm work was done by slaves. But since about the time of the last war, a higher value is being placed on agricultural work due to the new curriculum introduced into primary and secondary schools and the recently instituted vocational schools in which emphasis is being placed on farming. A recently introduced farm recovery scheme which is heavily subsidised by the government is also bringing marked

financial benefits to agriculturists. Another factor is the acquired farming techniques and new attitude to farming introduced from the U.S.A. by the Jamaican farm workers who, since the war, have done seasonal labour in that country. Comments such as "there is money in the land now", or "I wouldn't leave my land to work for someone else", are expressions of the new attitude. Farming, therefore, is now being considered a possible channel of social mobility and so we find that some workers returning from the U.S.A. to rural areas invest their earnings in farming. But the buying of land in this way often means the emigration from the community of previous owners.

In the community previously described, which comprises about 160 holdings, more than 60 per cent. owned holdings of less than half an acre. In keeping with the rules of inheritance a father or mother bequeaths the land to the children who divide it among themselves. As time goes on, fragmentation becomes excessive and holdings smaller, while the population continues to increase at a rapid rate. Some families three generations ago owned up to 30 acres and would be classified as farmers, but with this continual sub-division their children and grandchildren have been demoted to the status of cultivators. The economic dependence of most families on farming and the process of fragmentation has been the chief factor in demoting the status of succeeding generations.

Emigration to the towns and overseas, is another channel of social mobility. Indeed, in a large number of cases, rural communities can provide neither the means for maintaining, nor advancing a person's status. The principal motive for emigration is to improve one's economic and social position. As early as 1884 thousands of immigrants were going to Central America to work on the construction of the Panama Canal. Later the movement switched to Cuba and again to Central and South America for agricultural work. But the greatest numbers went to the U.S.A., until the Restrictive Immigration Bill in the U.S.A. of 1924 and again in 1949 all but closed the door to Jamaican immigration. And so at present, the flow is towards Great Britain. From the community under review ninety-two persons emigrated between 1884 and 1920 to Panama, Cuba and the U.S.A. of which sixty-seven returned to the community and settled permanently while the others remained overseas. Twenty farm workers went to the U.S.A. between 1943 and 1953. All but one returned. To the United Kingdom six went during World War II all of whom returned. Between 1939 and 1954, one hundred and twenty persons emigrated to the city and seventy-three to other parts of the island.

The immigrant raises his prestige in the community if he remains overseas, which is usually assumed to indicate success. Those who return to the community usually invest their savings in the purchase of land or livestock or in the setting up of small businesses. The number of grocers' shops in the community increased from two in 1930 to six in 1954.

In addition to communities in which land is owned by small peasant farmers, there is the type of community which is comprised mostly of labourers, who are employed by the estate and live in estate-owned houses. Small plots of land are often rented from the estates to grow food for the family, but labour on these estates is the sole means of earning wages. It is significant that from the 35 community reports given by the students, it was shown that the "estate" type communities, unlike the small peasant farming communities, very rarely produce individuals moving into the prestige type of occupation above the level of cultivator. It follows, too, that the cultivator, farmer, tradesman, and not the labour type of occupation, is the source from which the prestige occupations emerge in rural areas. Only one student in the college sample came from a "labourer" family.

SOCIAL MOBILITY AND THE TEACHING PROFESSION

For persons in low status occupations, education is the main channel of social mobility in rural areas in Jamaica, and the Primary School System is the only available means of fulfilling this need for most of those who would climb the social ladder. Few parents can afford to pay the high Secondary School fees and only a small number of scholarships are offered in these schools. A secondary education leads to the English General Certificate of Education or the Higher Schools Certificate, and is the passport to the Civil Service, Commerce or a University. A primary education on the other hand, leads to the Jamaica Local Examination. A Jamaican Local Certificate has limited value since it may lead only to admission to a Teachers' Training College, and Agricultural College, or to a hospital for training as a nurse.

Each year an average of about 12,000 pupils sit the Jamaican local Examinations, and out of this number about 1,000 are successful. About 100 of these are admitted to the Teachers' Training Colleges, and another 30 enter the other training institutions. Competition for admission to these institutions becomes increasingly more keen each year and for economic and status reasons, the drive to enter the teaching profession, gets more intensive. Parents—especially cultivators, and tradesmen—with large families (Table 3), finding that with the fragmentation of holdings they can scarcely support a family, and having limited scope to earn a livelihood from their own trade, are forced to seek other means of occupation for their children.

Table 3. *Occupation of siblings of 35 students sample.*

Average No. of siblings in each family	Teacher	Nurse	Civil Service	Clerical Jobs	Agricultural Officer	Various: at school, in Agriculture, etc.
7	21	4	5	6	3	the rest

Occupations are sought that will raise the social status of the children as well as the prestige of parents, and with this aim in view parents tend to make great economic sacrifices to get their children through the training college. But the obligation to give economic assistance is not confined to parents. Their children have obligations to other siblings, and not infrequently to members of the wider kinship group such as cousins. The first sibling who becomes a teacher or enters some other profession, is expected to help other siblings or sometimes their cousins, etc. In the student sample there were families in which as many as five and even six siblings were teachers. And in the community which was studied, one cousin, a teacher, tutored and financed another cousin to become a teacher. In other cases the parents mortgaged their land holdings to finance the training of the child. After qualifying as a teacher, he is obliged to repay the loan and probably finance the training of brother and sister. The whole family benefit in prestige from the success of one of its members. Consequently, the practice of assisting children and siblings to improve their occupational position has the effect of raising the status of the family as a whole. And as Table 3 shows, where there is a teacher in the family there are usually found a representative number of siblings who are teachers, Civil Servants, nurses, Agricultural Officers, or in other occupations carrying similar or higher prestige ranking.

There is a considerable gap in social status between parents and their teacher-son (or daughter), so that the period beginning with the pupil's first local examination until his admission to a Training College marks an important transitional stage, occupied not only with academic preparation but also with training for leadership and with acculturation for higher social status. The pupil who is successful in the three local examinations for which he is prepared at a primary school joins the teaching staff as a *Probationer*, and after receiving further tuition sits the entrance examination to a training college. At the same time, the pupil begins to model his behaviour on the pattern of the school teacher, and to assume positions of secondary and even primary leadership in community organizations. His manner of speech, dress and general deportment begins to conform to his rising status. His dialect of common speech changes to proper English and much attention is given to personal appearance. Positions as secretary, vice-president, etc., become available to him in community organizations connected with the Church, Agricultural Society, Youth Clubs, etc. His daily conduct is expected by the community to be a model of approved social behaviour but he is also given deference and esteem. He will be addressed as "Mass" (for Master) George for example, always using the Christian name, which are terms of respect, prestige and affection. The community in a number of ways express their identification with the achievement of a teacher produced from among them.

OCCUPATIONAL MOBILITY

The fathers of teachers (Table 4) are mostly cultivators and/or tradesmen. Twenty-eight of the thirty-five samples fall within the category of cultivators and tradesmen. Only in one case was the father a labourer. Data on the occupations of the teachers' grandparents were incomplete, but what information was available showed that they were also mostly cultivators, tradesmen and labourers.

Next, we turn to the relationship of the teaching profession to other occupations into which teachers have moved. The data for this part of the study are based on the mobility of male teachers who passed out from the college during the period 1929 to 1949. Records of earlier periods were more difficult to obtain although it was learnt from a reliable source³ that 1900 to 1928 was a most favourable period for the upward social mobility of teachers. During this period, that of 1900-1928, the U.S.A., Canada and the Central American Republics kept an open door to British West Indians and a number of teachers

Table 4. *Fathers' occupation of 35 students sample.*

Cultivator	Tradesman-Cultivator	Clerical or Business	Others
16	12	5	1 Labourer 1 Engineer

from Jamaica went to these countries to teach, and to study for professions with higher prestige value. Medicine and dentistry were the main attractions, although Agriculture and Engineering were also pursued. But since the closing of these countries to West Indian immigration, the tendency has been for teachers to get study leave and pursue further studies so that on completion of their course, they may obtain promotion in the teaching profession or in some other branch of the educational system. And so the hiving off to other professions has been reduced to a bare minimum and the Education Department and the teaching profession in particular have gained from this new trend.

At the same time, better opportunities for promotion and greater economic and social rewards are now being offered in the teaching profession than hitherto. Salaries have increased considerably, the scope for promotion has widened, and the gulf between the status of primary and secondary teachers is being bridged. Over the last twenty-five years, teachers' salaries have increased more than 2½ times in all grades and considerably more in some grades. The system of grading schools and teachers has also been re-organised to the advantage of the teachers. Each year a selected number of teachers are given scholarships of six months or a year to further their studies in the

United Kingdom and some use the opportunity to prepare for a University degree. With several new posts created in a re-organized educational system, these more highly qualified and experienced teachers are being promoted in large numbers and with greater rapidity. They may now reach higher levels in the administrative and supervisory sections of the education department, which at one time was reserved mainly for civil servants and University-trained persons who had not passed through the ranks of the teaching profession.

Another change in the educational system which has promoted the social mobility of teachers, is the introduction of new types of schools—the Senior school and the Vocational schools. The number of these schools still remains small. Nevertheless, since their status is above that of the Primary school, additional prestige-conferring posts are thus being created for those who are recruited from the ranks of successful Primary teachers.

Secondary schools too, have begun to draw increasingly from the ranks of Primary School teachers to fill posts on their teaching staff. They are provided from a small but steady stream of teachers who matriculate during or after their college course. Some of these go on to take a University degree. But the serious shortage of Secondary School teachers caused by an increase in the number of secondary schools, and the enlargement of existing ones, as well as a decrease in the number of teachers who used to be sent out from Britain, have caused Secondary Schools to be less discriminating against the employment of Primary teachers. They are now being admitted to the staff of Secondary Schools even without the matriculation or an equivalent certificate. This trend was also influenced by a growing tendency encouraged by a group of Secondary School teachers to work for greater co-operation between the two bodies of teachers. Action was taken about the time of World War II, initiating the practice of inviting representatives to attend the other's conferences. The strengthening of this link continues today in the assistance being given in staff and teaching facilities by Secondary to Primary Schools in a new scheme introduced recently, to prepare a selected number of pupils in Primary Schools for Secondary examinations.

There is a remarkably small percentage of "wastage"—if we so describe students leaving college and the teaching profession to enter some other occupation before qualifying as a trained teacher.⁴ On the other hand, most teachers serve during some period of their career in a Primary School. The services of these teachers are retained because in the first place, each student on entering college signs a 'bond' with the Government by which he promises to serve the Government as a teacher for a minimum period of five years. Secondly, there are very few occupations with equivalent or higher status than the teaching profession to which a Teachers' training will admit an aspirant. At the same time the salaries and other facilities offered to the profession are becoming more and more attractive. Most of

those who move up and out of the profession do so only after obtaining a matriculation, Higher School certificate, or a University degree. Thirdly, the profession offers economic security. Fourthly, the training which the teacher receives in the community and later in the colleges would seem to impress on him such a sense of vocation that a decision to leave the profession cannot be lightly taken.

Consequently, social mobility is to a large extent confined to some branch of the educational system. And so the number of teachers who enter Secondary Schools, Training and Technical Colleges, or Administrative and supervisory posts in the Education Department are 66 compared with 45 entering all other occupations. (Tables 5 & 6).

Table 5. *Occupational mobility of male students entering the training college, 1929-1949*

No. of students admitted to College	Emigrants or persons leaving college before qualifying	Politics	Clergy, Law and Medicine	Civil Service	Welfare and Agricultural Officer	College, Secondary or Tech. School staff	Officer or Administrator in Education Department	Special	Total leaving Primary Schools for other occupations	No. remaining as Primary Teachers
492	25	5	3	39	18	56	10	5	111	356

Table 6. *Educational mobility of primary-trained teachers, 1929-1949.*

Number of students admitted to Training College	No. passing Lon. Univ. Matriculation or Higher School Certificate after admission to College	No. at a University	No. Graduated from a University	Total
492	72	21	26	119

The two occupations—Agricultural Organizers and Welfare Officers—were not usually ranked above the teaching profession. Yet they offered facilities, especially to younger teachers, with higher prestige values than their grade in the school system would give them at the time. For instance, they are given the use of a car and enjoy greater freedom of activity and are placed in charge of a larger area. Law and Medicine are rated as very high achievements. Some teachers have attained positions of high distinction and responsibility. These have been marked as "special" and include a District Commissioner, Deputy Director of Education, a Rhodes Scholar and the Headmaster of a Secondary School.

CONCLUSION

In considering the social stratification of rural communities in Jamaica, we found that prestige ranking was closely tied up with size and ownership of land, and that while fragmentation of holdings resulting from rapid increase in population was affecting downward social mobility, emigration and education, especially the teaching

profession, had become the main channels of upward mobility. We observed the rural and occupational background of primary teachers and traced their occupational mobility within the educational field as well as outside it into other professional and administrative jobs. The fact that the teacher will be training pupils, most of whom will be drawn from the social stratum and sub-culture in which the teacher himself was born and spent his early life, is a significant point which can only be touched on here. The teachers' mobility into various prominent positions has given to the profession increasing power and control in the society as a whole, and is continually raising the status of the profession. Finally, a more intensive and extensive knowledge of teacher and community would provide us with a master-key to understanding the emerging Jamaican society.

NOTES

¹ The research was carried out under the auspices of the Dept. of Social Anthropology. I am grateful to the Colonial Social Sciences Research Council, the Leverhulme Trust and the University of Edinburgh for financing the project, to Dr. K. L. Little, Head of the Department, for planning it, and to the Institute of Social and Economic Research, U.C.W.I., and the staff and students of Mico Training College for facilitating the enquiry.

² Although I made the study before Prof. Glass (ed.) *Social Mobility in Britain*, came to hand, there are many similarities in the general approaches.

³ A retired tutor of the college.

⁴ Table 5 gives 25 cases out of 492 entrants.

Intermarriage and Mobility in Hawaii

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The differential positions of racial or ethnic groups in a social order are epitomized by the volume of associations in marriage. In the Western World intermarriage is a means and an acid test of social mobility. Where ethnic or racial elements occupy markedly different positions of social rank, the cohesive forces of ethnic self-preservation and the tendencies of the larger order to reject ethnically distinct groups reinforce the ordinary tendencies toward class homogeneity.

An ethnic population occupying a narrow stratum in the society experiences a minimum of intermarriage. However, as groups achieve vertical mobility, their out-group associations grow and the probability of intermarriage increases. Characteristically, at least in the Western Hemisphere, the vertical mobility of culturally differentiated immigrant groups tends to coincide with their acculturation, so that class impediments to association decrease at the same time that the cultural impediments are declining. Then amalgamation occurs, ". . . the final solvent of cultural barriers and the best index of assimilation".¹

The Territory of Hawaii has long attracted the interest of students of social mobility and intermarriage because of the racial and ethnic heterogeneity of its population, the rapid incursion of a series of distinct groups, and their more or less rapid vertical mobility. In less than a century the racial composition of the Islands has completely changed. In close sequence a series of culturally distinct groups, which were also more or less racially different, entered the Islands. Caucasians from the Western Hemisphere, Portuguese and Spanish, Chinese, Japanese, and Koreans, Filipinos and Puerto Ricans, as well as Hawaiians, comprise the chief elements of what has sometimes been called the melting pot of the Pacific. With the exception of Caucasians, most of the populations began at the bottom of the status hierarchy, principally in plantation labour. Over a period of time each group improved its position, and the socio-economic status of each population is related to the duration of its residence in the Islands. It is possible to observe in Hawaiian history fairly well-defined ethnic strata which corresponded with strata of social rank. This correspondence is now blurred by time, chance, group size, and cultural differences, but "racial"² identity persists and the groups are by no means randomly distributed through the social structure.

This paper is an extension of the studies of Romanzo Adams³ and his followers and a partial reworking of the early data. The Territorial Department of Health has until recently noted "racial" identity on its

marital records and has annually provided a statistical summary of this aspect of its records. Hawaiian marriages are here analyzed for three periods : 1912—1916, 1928—1934, and 1948—1953.⁴ In order to permit statistical tests, the data are treated in these arbitrary intervals rather than on an annual basis. The first period, 1912—1916, is dealt with only in passing. The marriages contracted by each of the important elements are studied for evidence of homogamy and other selective tendencies. Differences in the three periods are briefly examined for their relevance to change in the Hawaiian social structure.

HOMOGAMY

In Table 1 are summarised the simple percentages of homogamous marriages contracted by brides and grooms. Full interpretation of this kind of table calls for supplementary knowledge. For example, the relatively low homogamy rate for Chinese, Korean and Filipino males compared with females of the same groups in the first period must be interpreted against the special conditions of biased sex ratios. The early immigrant populations were predominantly masculine. Similarly, in the third period the relatively low homogamy rate for Caucasian and Filipino males must be so interpreted. The marked, if declining, homogamy of Japanese stands out, as does the steady homogamous tendency of Caucasian females. The table supports the observation of Adams⁵ that the Hawaiians as a pure racial group are destined to disappear at a comparatively early date. Indeed, if it be borne in mind that the population designated "Hawaiians" includes a substantial number of mixed individuals, the transformation of this population from a biological entity to a sociological one would seem to be well advanced.

Table 1. *Percentages of Marriages Homogamous**

Race	1912-1916		1928-1934		1948-1953	
	Grooms	Brides	Grooms	Brides	Grooms	Brides
Hawaiian	81	60	52	41	23	21
Part Hawaiian	48	34	58	41	59	41
Puerto Rican	76	73	79	58	53	42
Caucasian	83	88	79	86	64	85
Chinese	58	94	73	77	60	58
Japanese.. ..	99	99	96	95	93	82
Korean	73	100	78	82	34	29
Filipino	78	97	69	99	59	71

* "Other races" omitted.

At least this table indicates a decline in the proportions of marriages homogamous for all groups and both sexes except the Part-Hawaiian males and females and Caucasian females. Because the population of Hawaii is so fragmented and the groups vary so widely in size, the significance of these summary data is hard to evaluate.

Table 2 has therefore been prepared and reports separately for two periods the extent to which the observed incidence of marriages of each

TABLE 2. PERCENTAGE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN OBSERVED AND EXPECTED MARRIAGES†

1928-34
1948-53

GROOMS	BRIDES									
	TOTAL (N)	HAWAIIAN	PART HAWAIIAN	PUERTO RICAN	CAUCASIAN	CHINESE	JAPANESE	KOREAN	FILIPINA	OTHER
TOTAL (N)	(15,735) (33,798)	(1,117) (749)	(2,252) (6,105)	(465) (892)	(4,226) (8,220)	(974) (1,905)	(4,992) (12,018)	(209) (545)	(1,384) (3,098)	(116) (266)
HAWAIIAN	(893) (684)	633 960*	155 210	-69 -72*	-79 -70	-65 -46	-95 -86	-67* -36*	-100 -71	14* 20*
PART HAWAIIAN	(1,608) (4,286)	129 154	303 226	-81 -35	-42 -52	-3 9	-91 -75	-81 -38	-92 -40	8* -15
PUERTO RICAN	(342) (699)	-63 -33*	-82 -18	2,590* 1,972*	-46 -41	-95 -72	-99 -90	-100* -55*	-100 3	00* 0*
CAUCASIAN	(4,590) (10,879)	-54 -41	-18 -19	-40 -16	194 165	-80 -56	-95 -75	-75 6	-98 -59	29 -14
CHINESE	(1,031) (1,846)	-51 -63	9 -22	-87 -82	-90 -83	1,072 960	-88 -52	-71* 27	-99 -80	-13* -93*
JAPANESE	(4,966) (10,632)	-92 -90	-86 -83	-99 -96	-97 -95	-89 -80	202 162	-94 -62	-100 -93	-95 -96
KOREAN	(219) (466)	-31* -80*	-42 -38*	-83* -83	-95 -77	-64* 35	-90* 5	5,600* 1,900*	-100* -70	50* -50*
FILIPINO	(1,997) (3,781)	6 62	-50 2	49 40	-70 -73	-94 -67	-91 -84	-74 -44	678 537	-7* -20
OTHER	(89) (525)	33* 83*	108* 65	33* 164*	-8 -27	-50* -50	-96 -87	-100* -13*	-75* -2	2,100* 2,925*

* EXPECTED FREQUENCY < 20 † $\frac{fo - fe}{fe} \times 100$

possible combination deviated in percentages from hypothetical expectancy and the direction of that deviation. The table is a summary of marriages rather than individuals. The expected values express the frequencies that would occur if each sub-population had married with all others according to their proportionate shares in the pool of actual brides and grooms. The expected values are governed by the relative magnitudes of the ethnic sub-categories of potential brides and grooms. This model permits ready comparison, but it does not take into account the reservoirs of individuals of marriageable age who remained unmarried through the period. Originally it had been intended to

compare the 1948-53 marriages with those derived from the expected frequencies of marriages in the 1950 census population. This processing, which must be reported elsewhere, treats as the pool of possible marital partners unmarried individuals between the ages of 15 and 54. Expected values are then calculated as in Table 2, except that separate values must be computed because of the disparate numbers of potential brides and grooms.

The homogamous data (the diagonal) have been extracted from Table 2 and supplemented with 1912-1916 data, and are presented in Table 3. This table reports the percentage of homogamous marriages in excess of the hypothetically expected for the three periods. In all periods all "races" showed proportions of homogamous marriages

Table 3. *Percentages of Marriages Homogamous in Excess of Expected**

	A 1912-1916	B 1928-1934	C 1948-1953	C-B Difference
Hawaiian	596	633	†960	+327
Part Hawaiian	772	303	226	-77
Puerto Rican	†4,867	†2,590	†1,972	-618
Caucasian	354	194	165	-29
Chinese	†2,233	1,072	960	-112
Japanese	85	202	162	-40
Korean	†4,800	†5,600	†1,900	-3,700
Filipino	1,572	678	537	-141

* "Other Races" omitted.

† Expected frequency < 20.

greatly in excess of expectancy, although the trend appears to be downward. The apparent increase in the surplus of Hawaiian homogamous marriages may be a result of the self-definition of Part-Hawaiians as "Hawaiians". The increasing homogamous tendency for Japanese between periods A and B reflects the levelling of Japanese sex ratios. The values for "other races" are statistical artifacts not warranting discussion. Otherwise, although the record indicates a strong trend away from homogamy, homogamy remains the principal marriage arrangement for all "races". The Hawaiian melting pot is a thing of the future, although perhaps the proximate future.

Impressions that amalgamation is an accomplished fact probably derive from implicit comparisons with continental United States. Compared with the amount of racial intermarriage on the U.S. mainland the rate of heterogamy in Hawaii is high. Compared with ethnic intermarriage on the mainland, heterogamy in Hawaii is probably

rather high, although available statistics warrant no comparisons. From the standpoint of our current interest it may be said with confidence that homogamy in the Islands remains large enough to modify chances of vertical mobility for all elements in the population.

ASSORTATIVE MATING

Although homogamous marriages predominate in all periods, heterogamous marriages have increased as follows :

Period	Total Marriages	No. of Marriages Heterogamous	Per Cent. Heterogamous
1912-1916	11,826	1,361	11.5
1928-1934	15,735	3,385	21.5
1948-1953	33,798	10,239	30.5

Although the number and per cent. of heterogamous marriages have increased, so has the absolute number of homogamous marriages. Clearly the heterogamous marriages will have very different social consequences if they are randomly distributed among the various "racial" groups than if they show tendencies to cluster. In the latter case the channels of social mobility will be further complicated, for the several "racial" populations vary in their distributions in the socio-economic strata, in their educational standings, and in their occupational specializations.

To permit an analysis of this problem the homogamous marriages were deleted from Table 2 and the expected values were then recalculated for both brides and grooms, assuming random marriages of the residual population. Space considerations prevent the introduction of these tabular data, but the findings may be verbally summarized.⁶ This discussion, dictated by economy, is arbitrarily restricted to χ^2 values significant at the .01 level and to those cells in which expected or observed values approach three digits. Under these circumstances, statistically significant evidence of selectivity may confidently be interpreted as representing authentic assortive mating. This decision limits the discussion to heterogamous patterns consequential for the entire social order.

One major pattern of intermarriage, Hawaiians with Part Hawaiians, which was apparent in 1912-1916, has persisted to the present, although many of these may be termed intermarriage only in the most nominal sense. The negative associations of Hawaiian brides and Caucasian grooms have also persisted.

In the 1928-1934 period intermarriages of part Hawaiians with Caucasians and Chinese are both statistically significant and demographically important, and these tendencies persist, although in a partially attenuated form. Other such arrangements, which, however, have been less persistent, are the marriages of Filipinos with part Hawaiian and Puerto Rican brides.

In the last period the most interesting phenomena are the increased intermarriage of Caucasian grooms with Orientals, especially Japanese, and the increased intermarriage of Japanese with other Orientals.

CONCLUSION

Assuming that immigration will be small, the future racial composition of Hawaii will be determined by whether or not the following developments occur :

1. A further decline in the proportion of marriages homogamous, extending to an absolute decline.
2. An extension of Hawaiian and Part-Hawaiian heterogamy to include additional Oriental groups, especially the Japanese.
3. An extension of the heterogamy of Caucasian brides, including a larger share of Oriental grooms.

It would be rash to assert that these events will be accomplished in the near future. Therefore, it must be assumed that in so far as the opportunities for marriage affect or symbolize life chances in other fields, Hawaii shares, although to a lesser extent, the structural impediments to mobility of the mainland. The full consequences of homogamy and intermarriage on the stratification of Hawaii can be determined only by a more detailed study than has been possible here. That is, it is necessary to observe to what extent race heterogamy is class homogamy and to what extent intermarriage modifies vertical mobility and for which elements in the population. The statistical analysis presented here should facilitate the elaboration of a research design which could be readily carried out in field studies.

NOTES

¹ Andrew W. Lind, *An Island Community*, 1938, p. 304.

² The terms "racial" and "race" are used here in the loose sense employed in the Islands to refer to populations distinguished by racial or cultural criteria or by both.

³ Especially his *Interracial Marriage in Hawaii*, 1937.

⁴ Tabulations for 1912-1916 and 1928-1934 are from Adams, *op. cit.*, pp. 336, 339, 340; for 1948-1953 from the *Annual Reports*, Department of Health, Territory of Hawaii.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 25.

⁶ Tables showing these data and contributions to χ^2 will be supplied to the participants in the panel discussion and may be procured from the writer upon request.

Le dynamisme des classes sociales

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Le problème du dynamisme des classes sociales se pose en trois directions principales : (a) dynamisme par rapport à d'autres classes sociales, (b) dynamisme au foyer même d'une classe sociale, par exemple par rapport aux groupes et strates qui en font partie, (c) dynamisme par rapport à la société globale où la classe sociale se constitue et agit. On n'a pas toujours distingué ces trois dynamismes et la possibilité de leurs décalages ou même de leurs conflits. C'est la première direction du dynamisme de classe qui a été mise en relief par les conceptions marxistes. Le dynamisme interne des classes sociales a attiré l'attention surtout sous la forme de la discussion récente concernant les strates sociales ; mais, malheureusement, la plupart des auteurs, de préférence anglo-saxons, ont simplement confondu les strates et les classes, en oubliant que toute classe sociale est caractérisée par une hiérarchie des strates qui se meuvent à l'intérieur de la même classe. Quant à la dynamique des rapports entre classe sociale et société globale, elle n'a figuré que soit sous la forme de la prévision de la victoire d'une classe sociale particulière ayant pour mission d'instituer une société sans classe (marxisme), soit sous la forme de la liaison directe entre les strates sociales d'aujourd'hui (prises comme substituts des classes ou confondues avec elles) et la structure sociale présente.

Pour ma part, je considère que les trois problèmes que je viens de signaler doivent être distingués d'une façon très soignée, car le dynamisme des classes est fonction des trois aspects envisagés et, si on les ignore ou qu'on les identifie, on ne peut arriver à aucune clarté concernant l'importance du dynamisme de ces macrocosmes sociaux de grande envergure qu'on nomme classes sociales.

Par ailleurs, j'ai donné la définition suivante des classes sociales : " Les classes sociales sont des groupements particuliers de très vaste envergure représentant des macrocosmes des groupements subalternes, macrocosmes dont l'unité est fondée sur leur supra-fonctionnalité, leur résistance à la pénétration par la société globale, leur incompatibilité radicale entre eux, leur structuration poussée impliquant une conscience collective prédominante et des œuvres collectives spécifiques ; ces groupements, qui n'apparaissent que dans les sociétés globales industrialisées où les modèles techniques et les fonctions économiques sont particulièrement accentués, ont en plus les traits suivants : ce sont des groupements de fait, ouverts, à distance, de division, permanents, restant inorganisés, ne disposant que de la contrainte conditionnelle."¹

Commençons par le dynamisme à l'intérieur d'une seule et même classe. Les classes sociales s'affirment d'abord comme des mondes

entiers à l'exclusion de tous les autres et elles comprennent une multiplicité d'autres groupements et des strates différentes toujours en mouvement. Ces groupes et ces strates, en développant ou en manifestant leur propre dynamisme, entrent sans cesse en conflit entre eux et parfois avec la classe sociale qui leur sert de foyer. De cette façon, au sein des classes sociales, les tensions et les luttes se poursuivent—à divers degrés d'intensité et d'actualité—entre différents groupements d'autres espèces, y compris les familles, les groupes d'âge, les groupements d'affinité économique (strates), les professions, les publics, les groupes de producteurs et de consommateurs, les groupements locaux, les associations amicales, fraternelles, religieuses, politiques, éducatives, sportives, et ainsi de suite. Plus la lutte des classes est forte, et moins la multiplicité des groupements compris dans leur sein est perceptible. En revanche, cette multiplicité gagne en relief et en importance dès que la lutte des classes s'apaise quelque peu.

La hiérarchie des groupements à l'intérieur d'une classe ne se réduit que rarement à une seule échelle, celle des strates résultant de la disparité de richesse ou de salaire, de préparation professionnelle, de besoins et de satisfaction de ceux-ci. À côté de cette hiérarchie des groupements d'affinités économiques, d'autres genres de hiérarchie de groupements sont souvent observables au sein d'une classe. Les critères de cette hiérarchie peuvent être le prestige, le pouvoir, la bonne renommée de certains groupements à l'intérieur d'une classe; ces critères sont souvent complètement indépendants de la stratification économique: par exemple, les syndicats, les partis politiques, les délégués ouvriers, les "minorités agissantes" au sein de la classe prolétarienne. De même, pour la classe bourgeoise, le groupe des "grands patrons", bons organisateurs et entrepreneurs imaginatifs, les associations patronales, les capitalistes éclairés et libéraux à l'époque de l'essor du capitalisme concurrentiel, et ainsi de suite. À l'intérieur d'une classe sociale, l'échelle des groupements indépendants des strates économiques implique une évaluation qui ne peut venir que de la table des valeurs propre à cette classe.

Il faut se rendre bien compte de ce fait saillant que le dynamisme interne des classes montre plutôt la tendance à entrer en conflit avec l'échelle des groupements qui s'affirme sous l'influence des strates économiques, que la tendance inverse. En ce qui concerne la classe ouvrière, ce fait ne peut offrir le moindre doute, car c'est seulement par exception que ses couches supérieures sur le plan économique se révèlent comme les plus dynamiques et les plus influentes dans la lutte de classe; il serait non moins faux—peut-être plus faux encore—d'affirmer au contraire que ce sont les strates économiques les moins favorisées de la classe ouvrière qui imprègnent celle-ci de leur dynamisme spécifique. En réalité, les "minorités agissantes", les militants des syndicats et des partis politiques prolétariens viennent plutôt des strates intermédiaires du point de vue économique. De même, pour autant qu'une classe paysanne existe, ce n'est ni chez les paysans riches ni chez

les paysans très pauvres, mais dans les couches intermédiaires que se recrutent habituellement les groupes représentant le mieux l'idéal paysan et capables de lui servir d'élite active. La question est moins claire pour la classe bourgeoise, dont le déterminisme est souvent dominé par le dynamisme des strates économiquement supérieures, cependant, dans des conjonctures défavorables, il en va tout autrement.

Quoi qu'il en soit, la lutte, les compromis, les équilibres, l'unification enfin des dynamismes des groupes subalternes et des strates à l'intérieur d'une classe sociale ne peut se faire sans l'action de celle-ci comme totalité dynamique spécifique. Cette totalité présente un caractère différent pour chaque classe, pour chaque type de structure sociale globale et même parfois pour chaque conjoncture dans celle-ci. Ainsi, l'unification des dynamismes est bien plus intense s'il s'agit de la classe ouvrière que s'il s'agit de la classe paysanne; elle est bien plus variable lorsqu'il est question de la classe bourgeoise; les classes dites moyennes sont normalement à la limite de la dispersion en ce qui concerne leur dynamisme, sauf dans les conjonctures exceptionnelles. Le dynamisme interne des classes prend donc des formes essentiellement différentes.

Cette constatation peut être confirmée une fois de plus si l'on prend en considération les micro-dynamismes qui se déclenchent dans le sein des classes aussi bien que dans le sein des groupes et des strates qui y sont intégrés. Nous ne prendrons comme exemple que le passage entre les Masses, les Communautés et les Communions—ces trois degrés d'intensité des Nous—à l'intérieur d'une classe envisagée dans son ensemble. On peut faire cette observation générale que les dynamismes des Masses et des Communions ont plus de chance de triompher dans le cadre d'une classe sociale que le dynamisme des Communautés. Nous entendons par Communions la participation la plus intense au Nous, correspondant à la pénétration la plus forte du Nous dans le moi, et qui peut tantôt pousser à des scissions, tantôt au contraire se combiner avec une diffusion très large.

Ce micro-dynamisme des classes sociales montre des régularités tendanciennes particulières. Quant aux classes en général, plus les conflits et les antagonismes des classes sont violents et plus le dynamisme de la Communions s'accroît à l'intérieur des classes correspondantes; inversement, moins la lutte des classes est forte et plus le micro-dynamisme de la Masse ou même de la Communauté s'accroît dans leur sein. Il faut également prendre en considération le caractère actif ou passif de ces micro-dynamismes. Par exemple, les classes sociales montantes, ascendantes, passent rapidement du dynamisme des Masses, Communautés, Communions passives, au dynamisme bien plus efficace et frappant des Masses, Communautés, Communions actives. Un autre exemple: les classes en germe, en formation, sont peu dynamiques. Les classes au pouvoir maintiennent leur dynamisme avec la plus grande difficulté; les classes approchant du pouvoir ou venant d'être privées de leur pouvoir sont les plus dynamiques.

Il faut, pour étudier le micro-dynamisme des classes, les étudier également chacune séparément. Dans la classe bourgeoise d'une part, dans la classe paysanne d'autre part, le micro-dynamisme des Communautés se trouve assez fortement accentué, ce qui peut évidemment changer selon les circonstances particulières. Au contraire, dans le micro-dynamisme de la classe prolétarienne, ce sont les dynamismes des Masses et des Communions qui jouent de préférence. Dans les classes dites moyennes, le plus souvent, le dynamisme du Nous, même à l'état de Masse passive, est très fortement limité par celui des rapports inter-individuels et inter-groupaux.

Lorsqu'on parle du dynamisme interne des classes sociales, il ne faut pas oublier la possibilité de leur éclatement. Cet éclatement, on a pu l'observer à plusieurs reprises déjà. Par exemple, la lutte entre la noblesse d'épée et la noblesse de robe, la seconde débordant la classe des propriétaires fonciers pour s'intégrer dans la classe bourgeoise. Le débordement de la classe paysanne sous l'ancien régime en France, dont un secteur rejoignait la bourgeoisie par le truchement de l'achat des seigneureries qui faisait passer du serf au roturier. On pourrait donner d'autres exemples. Nous ne nous arrêterons que sur celui de la classe prolétarienne d'une part, de la classe bourgeoise d'autre part à l'heure présente. Une partie de la classe ouvrière peut passer par l'intermédiaire de la bureaucratie syndicale ou étatique dans la classe moyenne, sinon dans cette classe en formation et combien inquiétante qu'on s'est accoutumé à désigner comme techno-bureaucratique. Ce fait a déjà été observé avant la première guerre mondiale, quant aux cadres des syndicats et de la social-démocratie allemande. Il s'était produit sur une échelle bien plus impressionnante après la stabilisation du régime soviétique en Russie. Des secteurs entiers de la bourgeoisie peuvent passer dans les classes moyennes ou s'intégrer dans les couches supérieures de la technocratie.

Mais rien ne serait plus faux que de conclure de cette dynamique d'éclatement que, généralement, par ce fait même, les classes sociales disparaissent, ou même que les classes particulières indiquées se trouvent nécessairement remplacées par d'autres. D'abord, il est impossible de se représenter une société industrielle, quelle qu'elle soit : capitalisme concurrentiel, capitalisme organisé, communisme, pluralisme planifié, etc., sans classes. En second lieu, le passage de certaines strates sociales d'une classe à l'autre ne conduit nullement à la désagrégation d'une classe : la mobilité de certaines strates ne peut pas être identifiée avec la dissolution des classes. Enfin, l'éclatement d'une classe peut se manifester dans la division en plusieurs classes nouvelles au lieu de celle qui a sombré. Prenons l'exemple de la classe paysanne en France, qui a été encore une réalité vivante sous la Troisième République et une des bases essentielles de celle-ci. Il n'est pas douteux que le dynamisme interne de la classe paysanne française a complètement désagrégé cette classe. Ses restes se retrouvent dans toutes les classes sociales françaises actuelles : classe prolétarienne,

classe bourgeoise, classe moyenne, classe techno-bureaucratique en formation. Le développement des moyens de transports motorisés a changé les rapports mêmes entre la ville et la campagne. Les membres d'une famille rurale peuvent participer de la façon la plus intense à la production et à la lutte des classes dans un milieu urbain. Et cependant rien ne serait plus faux que de dire que les classes sociales ont disparu de la vie rurale française. Elles ont seulement complètement changé de caractère et on trouve dans la campagne plusieurs classes en lutte, dont aucune ne peut plus être caractérisée comme la classe paysanne.

Mais il est temps d'envisager le dynamisme des classes sociales sous l'aspect de la lutte des classes.

La lutte des classes, qui ne doit pas être confondue avec les conflits de groupements, a tendance à prendre toujours le caractère d'un antagonisme. Cet antagonisme se manifeste aussi bien dans l'irréductibilité des consciences de classes que dans celle des intérêts économiques et politiques. C'est pourquoi, d'ailleurs, une des caractéristiques des classes sociales est la conscience de classe et l'idéologie de classe. De même, les classes se manifestent dans des partis politiques et dans des syndicats qui incarnent, pour ainsi dire, l'incompatibilité dont il a été question.—Le dynamisme de classe sociale, à ce point de vue, est fonction de la virulence de la conscience de classe et de la violence des conflits d'intérêts irréconciliables. Il est peu fructueux, sinon aberrant, de parler du dynamisme de la conscience des classes, de leur idéologie et de leurs intérêts dans l'abstrait.

D'abord, les différentes classes sociales manifestent un dynamisme de leur conscience et de leur intérêt qui prend un caractère essentiellement varié. Dans la classe bourgeoise et dans la classe paysanne, c'est le dynamisme d'intérêt économique et politique, lié le plus souvent à des conjonctures sociales concrètes, qui prime d'une façon visible la conscience de classe et les idéologies qui en sont à la fois les produits et les producteurs. Dans la classe ouvrière, en tous cas à l'état développé, on peut constater le phénomène opposé : la conscience de classe prime les intérêts économiques ; dans la conscience de classe elle-même, l'idéologie et plus largement l'évaluation projetée dans l'avenir priment toutes les autres manifestations de la conscience de classe.

Ensuite, le dynamisme d'antagonisme de classes ne peut pas être détaché des structures et des conjonctures dans la société globale où il s'affirme. C'est pourquoi ce dynamisme n'est pas le même dans le temps tranquille et dans le temps agité, dans les périodes de prospérité et dans celles de crise économique, durant les guerres extérieures et à plus forte raison civiles et aux époques plus ou moins pacifiques. C'est dire que le dynamisme des classes sociales, sous l'aspect de leur antagonisme, admet des degrés. Ces degrés ne sont même pas identiques dans les différents pays relevant de la même structure sociale et se trouvant dans des conjonctures analogues (par exemple, en France, en Grande-Bretagne, en Belgique, etc., à l'heure actuelle). Ces observations

nous préparent au troisième aspect du problème du dynamisme des classes sociales : leur rapport effectif et concret avec le mouvement de la société globale.

Une des caractéristiques de toute classe sociale, comme nous l'avons dit, est son impénétrabilité par rapport à la structure globale où elle se manifeste. Mais cette impénétrabilité elle-même possède des degrés variés. Les difficultés de la conception marxiste ont consisté dans le fait de mettre en relief cette impénétrabilité et d'affirmer en même temps que le dynamisme des classes sociales dominait le dynamisme des structures globales. Cette conception évite de rendre manifeste cette contradiction latente en supposant que c'est toujours une seule classe, montant au pouvoir ou venant d'y arriver, qui commande le dynamisme de la société globale et du mouvement de sa structuration. Cependant, cette présupposition n'a été convaincante que pour l'époque du capitalisme concurrentiel et nous semble contestable pour bien d'autres époques. D'une part, des classes différentes peuvent essayer de monter au pouvoir et peuvent chacune prétendre dominer le mieux le dynamisme de la société globale. Ainsi, aujourd'hui, la classe prolétarienne et la classe techno-bureaucratique en formation expriment la même prétention et se trouvent en compétition non seulement d'idéologie et d'intérêt, mais également dans la montée effective vers une position suprême. D'autre part, le dynamisme de la structure globale peut parfois prédominer sur le dynamisme des classes sociales, même les plus virulentes. Ce serait, par exemple, le cas d'un collectivisme pluraliste qui, par un jeu de compensations et d'équivalence, réussirait à produire un certain équilibre entre des classes reconnues légitimes, tout en éliminant la classe bourgeoise et en dispersant la classe techno-bureaucratique. Il ne s'agirait évidemment pas, dans ce cas, d'une conciliation entre la classe ouvrière et la classe bourgeoise—la disparition de la seconde ferait également disparaître la première—mais des classes sociales nouvelles parmi les travailleurs urbains et ruraux eux-mêmes, dont nous ne pouvons que pressentir les premiers contours. C'est là que, probablement, pourrait se produire un certain rapprochement entre les groupements socio-professionnels et les classes sociales, rapprochement qui n'en saurait être justifié sous aucun autre régime.

D'après ce qui vient d'être dit, on voit combien le dynamisme des classes sociales est une réalité complexe demandant à être étudiée d'une façon empirique et concrète, n'admettant aucune généralisation trop poussée et impliquant en même temps une multiplicité d'aspects qui ne peuvent jamais être ignorés. Il ne s'agit nullement d'une clef qui ouvrirait toutes les portes pour résoudre les problèmes de changements sociaux.

NOTES

¹ Cf. *Déterminismes Sociaux et Liberté Humaine*, 1955, pp. 178-190, et mon cours ronéographié, *Le Concept de Classes Sociales*, 1954, Centre de Documentation Universitaire, pp. 116 et suiv., 133 et suiv.

Social Structure, Class Interests, and Social Conflict

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Many attempts to reduce the sociologically useless abstraction "social change" to manageable categories of empirical relevance have operated with a logically identical model, involving at least the following four steps of analysis: (1) Social change is understood as the outcome of social conflict (class conflict). (2) Social conflict is viewed in terms of the interaction on the political scene of conflicting groups (classes). (3) The issues of social conflict are regarded as the subject matter of certain interests peculiar to these groups (class interests). (4) Group interests are seen as in some way rooted in the structure of societies (class situations).¹ Whilst this "reduction" can hardly claim to constitute a "theory of social change", it does seem to offer some help to the sociologist preoccupied with the historical rather than the structural dimension of society.

The first step of the indicated model of analysis may be regarded as a mere definition. There are, obviously, other types of social change than that resulting from conflict within societies (which we shall call endogenous change)². This definitional limitation understood, the concept of class interests appears central to the model in question. We shall try, in this paper, to discuss some aspects of the notion of class interests in an attempt to clarify its meaning, and to make it fruitful for the analysis of endogenous change.

If it is meant to refer to the explicit aims of structured groups, the notion of interests as common to members of social groups offers little difficulty. Every group, and in particular every political group, has a statute, programme, or charter, a "system of values, for the pursuit of which human beings organise, or enter organisations already existing"³. Interests in this sense are explicit, articulate goals of action, known to the members of groups, and shared by them by virtue of their membership. We shall call such interests manifest interests, and the groups organised in their pursuit interest groups.

The notion of group interests as introduced for the description of the emergence of social conflict is, however, of a different order, or partly of a different order. Manifest interests are manifest only once people have organised themselves in groups. But how do people come to organise themselves in the first place? What unites them even before they organise themselves? At this point, Marx introduced his distinction between—in the case of the proletariat—a "class opposed to Capital" and a "class for itself", and spoke of "a common situation, common interests" as preceding organisation.⁴ Nor is this kind of argument peculiar to Marx. Professor Ginsberg, for example, similarly speaks

of "aggregates, . . . whose members have certain interests or modes of behaviour in common," without them being "definite groups"⁵. And Professor Parsons, here quite Marxian, also refers to common "ideologies" or "attitude systems" among those "who are structurally placed at notably different points in a differentiated social structure".⁶ Plausible as it may seem to employ the category of "common interests" for unorganised aggregates of some coherence as well, this usage involves some problems which demand clarification.

If we use the word "interest" in an unreflective way, it would seem to have at least two implications. First, it appears to be a subjective category of psychological reality. If somebody "takes an interest" in something, or "is interested" in something, this manner of speaking is understood to signify his emotional or intellectual, in any case personal orientation. Interests do not exist apart from him. Secondly, interests are usually related to some definite object. They are articulate in the sense that they do not just constitute undirected energy, but are oriented towards an object of gratification. The category of common interests as applied to unorganised human aggregates in the explanation of endogenous change, however, does not seem to possess either of these characteristics. "It does not matter," Marx asserts in an attempt to elucidate this concept, "what this or that proletariat, or even the whole proletariat, visualises as the aim. Its aim and its historical action are prescribed irrefutably by its own life situation, as by the whole organisation of contemporary bourgeois society."⁷ Elsewhere, Marx explains these "common interests" as "not merely common in the minds of people, but first of all in reality as mutual dependence of individuals"⁸. Professor Parsons' reference to common structural places as causes of common "ideologies" or "attitude systems" is perhaps less dogmatic, but poses the same problem: How can common "interests" of human aggregates be objective (non-personal) and inarticulate? Is it at all legitimate to use the term "interests" for what is meant here?

The situation to which Marx and others refer when they introduce their notion of class or (less precise) group interests is well-known and often observed. Marx had in mind the early decades of industrialisation in England, in which the numbers of both workers and entrepreneurs were increasing steadily. Both these aggregates had, in certain respects, common situations. But they had not yet formed any organisations on a larger scale. Marx felt that something beyond their common situation united these aggregates. There was some community of feeling, of attitude towards the situation, of orientation. No charter had yet been articulated, but there was sufficient community for such a charter, once formulated, to be approved of by these aggregates. The formation of political parties in post-war Germany is another case in point⁹. Thus, there is a genuine need for a concept to describe the common orientation of aggregates which are less than groups, but more than assemblies of isolated individuals ("masses").

Since these common orientations have not yet found articulation, it may seem confusing to call them interests; on the other hand, they are the breeding place of formulated programmes, and as such incipient interests. In contradistinction to explicit, manifest interests I propose to call them latent interests¹⁰. Aggregates united by common latent interests might then, following Professor Ginsberg's use of the term, be called quasi-groups.

The question remains: In which sense are latent interests non-personal, objective in character? Both the word "non-personal" and that "objective" is, to be sure, imprecise. What is meant is that latent interests, as Marx, Ginsberg, Parsons and others used this notion, are not only corollaries or results of objective conditions, but also attach in some sense to these conditions rather than to individuals. Individuals share them only in as much as they find themselves in certain situations, are "structurally placed at notably different points in a differentiated social structure". Marx has—unsuccessfully, it may be said—tried to clarify this rather confusing notion in his Preface to the first edition of the *Capital*, where he says:

"A word to avoid possible misinterpretations. I paint the figures of Capitalist and Landowner by no means in rosy colours. But I am concerned here with *the persons* only, in so far as they are *personifications of economic categories, carriers of certain class relations and interests*. Less than any other one can my point of view, which comprehends the development of the economic formation of society as a process of natural history, make the individual responsible for conditions, the creature of which he remains socially, however much he may rise above them subjectively."¹¹

The emphases in this remark are Marx's own. They can, however, give us the clue to the problem of the "objective" nature of latent interests.¹²

Latent interests are, according to Marx, shared by persons only in so far as they are "personifications of economic categories", "carriers of certain class relations". They are not, in other words, part of persons' character, but, instead, part of their social existence. In modern sociology, we have a category which covers these otherwise ambiguous and obscure characteristics. I mean the category of rôle or, to be more precise, what Professor Parsons calls the "status-rôle bundle". I suggest that what Marx meant was that there are certain orientations towards the major institutions of society which are inherent in the definition of certain status-rôles. The capitalist, to choose Marx's own example, is *qua* capitalist, that is in his rôle and status as capitalist, expected to strive for the profitability of his enterprise, however he may feel about this orientation subjectively. The status-rôle of the industrial workers in early industrial societies involves, analogously, the expectation of an opposition towards the existing property relations.

The example of Marx is, in this context, only an example. More generally, the suggestion might be put forward that interest expectations are attached to certain status-rôles which relate these status-rôles either positively or negatively to the major institutions of society. This does not hold for all status-rôles. The question, which rôles involve this relation will have to be decided in every particular instant. (In industrial societies, occupational rôles may appear to serve this function.) The occupant of such rôles and statuses shares, then, interest orientations with occupants of similar rôles by virtue of the definition of these rôles. Latent interests may also be called rôle interests.

An example may help to clarify this suggestion a little further. An industrial worker, say in a factory of the German steel industry, is as such (in his rôle as industrial worker) part of a large aggregate sharing a certain vague anti-capitalist orientation. This orientation is "his" only in so far as his rôle and status may be called "his". It does not necessarily become part of his personality (although the likelihood of some penetration cannot be denied), but remains something apart from him, of no impact on his behaviour as father, member of a chess club, etc. Under a co-determination scheme, this worker is selected to represent labour on the board of executives. He is made an executive himself, that is, his rôle changes. Thereby, or so I suggest, the rôle interests, the orientations expected of this worker undergo a simultaneous change. Much as his former fellows may resent the fact that the new "labour manager" (or whatever his title) suddenly displays different, even contradictory orientations towards the fate and the structure of the enterprise,—this is the "natural", the inevitable, corollary of a change in rôle and status. Since latent interests attach to rôles and statuses rather than persons, they can in principle be abandoned like rôles and statuses.

The example demonstrates not only the identity, but also some of the problems of latent or rôle interests. Although it may be that what are known as class interests are status-rôle expectations rather than integrated into the personality of individuals, the sociological and the psychological dimension of class interests are closely related. No worker-become-manager can probably entirely free himself from the interests attached to his former status. Perhaps, the problem arising here is that of class consciousness and of its emergence. In the terms tentatively introduced here, this problem could be reformulated in the question: Under what conditions do rôle interests become part of the personalities of individuals? In this context, we shall confine ourselves to posing this question, for which a separate investigation would be required.

Let us, for purposes of recapitulation, return to the model of analysis indicated in the beginning. It appears that we can now state one step of this model in somewhat more refined terms and say: Endogenous social change can be understood as the result of social conflict. Social

conflict often takes the form of a political conflict between organised groups professing a set of manifest interests. These organised groups are recruited from larger quasi-groups united by common latent, that is, vague and unformulated interests. From the point of view of their "members", latent interests are part of the definition of their status-rôles. As occupants of certain statuses and rôles, persons are by necessity recruits for such quasi-groups—although (or, for which reason), upon changing their statuses and rôles, they also change their quasi-group attachment. The direction of rôle-interests (for or against given social institutions) is given in the social situation allocated to certain rôles in a social structure. It is conceivable that further refinement along these lines might yield a connected set of categories for the description and explanation of endogenous social change.

Equally important seems another result of these "refinements" which constitutes the final point I want to make. In recent years, considerable advances have been made towards the elaboration of a set of categories which lends itself to the formulation of a theory of social structure. I am referring here to what is known as structural or structural-functional theory. This attempt has often been charged with a conspicuous neglect or underestimation of "social change". Perhaps its drawback is not so much that it does not account for social change, but that, by implication, it postulates a separate theory of social change (as has, in fact, explicitly been done by Professor Parsons¹³). Conflict theory, on the other hand, has traditionally paid little attention to the analysis of relatively stable social structures. Thus the two central areas of sociological inquiry are held in artificial separation. Distinctions introduced for analytical purposes become empirical postulates¹⁴ and departmentalisation celebrates triumphs where it is least justified. May it not be that by re-formulating the traditional "theory" of endogenous social change, some connection between structural theory and conflict theory becomes possible?

In structural theory, the status-rôle constitutes the elementary category of analysis. It would appear that this category can be equally useful as a point of departure for the analysis of social conflict. For this to be possible, the concept of status-rôle must, however, be extended in one significant respect. There are status-rôles, to which latent interests are attached which aim at the modification of major institutions of an existing social structure. From the point of view of structural theory, as it stands to-day, such status-rôles are inconceivable. Yet there is no reason why the reality of system-disruptive rôle interests should be denied. It would still be possible, for purposes of the analysis of societies as stable "systems", to abstract from this aspect of status-rôles and study the nature of social order. At the same time, the analysis of social conflict could be linked to that of social structure. I suggest that the category of latent or rôle interests may furnish this link and help us to overcome the false dilemma of regarding social conflict as either pathological or all-important.

The suggestions offered in this paper are no more than an unfinished and early contribution to this wider problem. Their elaboration is, perhaps, a matter of thought as much as of empirical study. The latter method may help, in particular, to elucidate the questions of the relation between rôle interests and personality structures, and of the generation of manifest interests from latent interests. However, to seek the aim before the path that leads to it is known, seems an undertaking which needs no justification.

NOTES

¹ This initial presentation of the set of categories in question is, evidently, crude even if it is understood to be a résumé of Marx's unfinished considerations. As a point of departure for the present paper, however, such a crude résumé seems both justified and sufficient.

² Notably social change by enforced or free diffusion, for which a separate analytical scheme would have to be employed. Cf. B. Malinowski's study of the "Dynamics of Culture Change".

³ B. Malinowski, *A Scientific Theory of Culture and Other Essays* (Chapel Hill, 1944), p. 52.

⁴ K. Marx, *Das Elend der Philosophie* (Berlin, 1947), p. 187.

⁵ M. Ginsberg, *Sociology* (London, 1953), p. 40.

⁶ T. Parsons, "Social Classes and Class Conflict in the Light of Recent Sociological Theory" in *Essays in Sociological Theory, Pure and Applied* (revised ed., Glencoe, Ill., 1954), p. 330.

⁷ K. Marx and F. Engels, *Die Heilige Familie oder Kritik der kritischen Kritik*, MEGA I, 3, p. 207.

⁸ K. Marx and F. Engels, *Die deutsche Ideologie*, in *Der historische Materialismus*, ed. S. Landshut (2nd ed., Stuttgart, 1954), vol. 1, p. 23.

⁹ And at the same time an indication of the limitations of the type of analysis suggested in this paper. What I mean by this reference to German political parties is that, after the war, certain political formations were "in the air". There were aggregates with common "interests" waiting for articulation and organisation. The limitations mentioned emerge, if we ask: Why did they not organise themselves earlier? The answer is, in the case of Germany: They could not in a state, in which non-conformist organisation was prohibited. Whilst I do not think that the conditions specific to totalitarian societies invalidate the kind of analysis suggested here, it would require some qualification for such societies.

¹⁰ For this question of terminology and the relation between "manifest" and "latent" interests in my sense and R. K. Merton's concepts "manifest" and "latent functions" (both of which ultimately stem from Freud's usage of the terms "manifest" and "latent" in connection with dream contents) cf. my article on "Klassenstruktur und Klassenkonflikt in der entwickelten Industriegesellschaft" in: *Die neue Gesellschaft*, II/4.

¹¹ *Das Kapital*, vol. 1 (Berlin, 1947); p. 8.

¹² Unfortunately, the sociologist quoting Marx has to defend himself, to-day, against the charge of being a "Marxist". If I say that the quoted passage "gives us the clue to the problem" I do not mean to imply that Marx's words are gospel truth, or that quoting Marx makes all further thought unnecessary. Rather, it would seem that—in this as in many other cases—recognition of the imperfections or mistakes in Marx's position enables us to give a rendering of the problem which appears clearer and more useful.

¹³ In chapter XI of *The Social System* (Glencoe, Ill., 1951).

¹⁴ A point which has been nicely demonstrated by R. Bendix and S. M. Lipset in their much-hailed and much-scorned essay on "Social Status and Social Structure" (*British Journal of Sociology*, II, 1951).

Dynamique idéologique et structure de classe

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S'il est impossible de négliger la critique marxiste des idéologies, il faut convenir que les transformations sociales advenues depuis le temps où Marx rédigeait son oeuvre imposent de la soumettre elle-même à une nouvelle critique. Nous nous proposons d'indiquer brièvement quelques uns des points sur lesquels celle-ci devrait porter.

Il nous paraît incontestable que le principe de Marx selon lequel les idées ne peuvent être considérées en elles-mêmes, indépendamment du cadre social dans lequel elles se manifestent, a inspiré de plus en plus efficacement la recherche sociologique. Il est à l'origine de cette discipline particulière qu'on appelle sociologie de la connaissance, alors même qu'elle diverge de la théorie marxiste tant par ses préoccupations que par ses modes d'interprétation. Au surplus, les sciences, et tout spécialement les sciences humaines, ont accordé une attention croissante aux conditions dans lesquelles elles s'exercent, liant à ces conditions aussi bien l'orientation de leur recherche que la méthodologie qui les inspire. L'affirmation de cette perspective nous paraît d'ailleurs, non pas tant au succès de la théorie marxiste dont les propositions demeurent largement contestées, voire souvent rejetées par les sociologues, qu'aux changements qui ont affecté simultanément toutes les sphères de la vie sociale depuis trois quarts de siècle : à la fois les anciennes structures de l'économie capitaliste concurrentielle et celles de la pensée scientifique, philosophique, littéraire et artistique. On peut dire que les changements qui ont bouleversé et continuent de bouleverser la société ont imposé—indépendamment des interprétations qu'on en donnait—l'idée d'une unique historicité du monde moderne, l'exigence d'une exploration des multiples interdépendances des divers secteurs de la totalité sociale. En même temps cette historicité, parce qu'elle se manifestait à la fois sur tous les terrains et dans le cadre donné d'une *culture commune* rendait de plus en plus vaines les considérations en faveur au XIX^{ème} sur la culture considérée comme entité métaphysique, sur l'esprit des peuples et orientait de façon décisive la recherche sur la solidarité des transformations structurelles de la vie sociale et culturelle.

Affranchi du contexte particulier du marxisme le concept d'idéologie s'en est-il trouvé confirmé ou en tout cas clarifié par l'usage constant qu'en font le sociologue et le sens commun? Constatons d'abord qu'il s'est trouvé de plus en plus chargé de significations politiques. Dans une époque qui a vu l'avènement du fascisme et la rivalité des grandes nations s'exprimer, au lendemain de la dernière guerre, dans tous les secteurs de la culture le concept d'idéologie politique est

devenu familier à de larges couches de la société. Il est devenu clair—indépendamment de la critique scientifique de Marx—que des propositions de caractère politique concernant le rôle de l'Etat, l'organisation de la production et de la répartition des biens, la fonction des individus et des groupes dans la société sont associées à des significations philosophiques, religieuses, morales, voire scientifiques et esthétiques (qu'on se rappelle les accusations lancées contre certaines formes d'art, une certaine psychologie, ou une certaine génétique au nom d'une cause prétendue révolutionnaire). Si l'on reconnaît qu'il y a chez Marx au moins une tendance à tout réduire au dénominateur commun de l'idéologie politique il faudrait convenir que celle-ci a été confirmée par l'évolution ultérieure.

Cependant cette constatation ne doit pas dissimuler deux questions, déjà sensibles à la lecture de Marx, mais qui n'ont fait que s'approfondir.

En premier lieu, on est en droit de se demander si la dénonciation d'une idéologie "bourgeoise" dont le noyau serait politique peut s'énoncer en termes scientifiques, si elle peut se fonder sur un mode de pensée vrai (qu'on présentera comme non idéologique ou comme idéologie du prolétariat selon l'acception plus ou moins large qu'on voudra bien accorder à ce terme). Une telle question pouvait paraître s'accommoder d'une réponse en sursis tant que le proche avenir historique était chargé de démontrer sur tous les terrains à la fois la condamnation du capitalisme. Le marxisme se présentait alors, dans le champ de la théorie, comme le pendant du prolétariat dans le champ de la praxis: anticipation d'une pensée vraie comme celui-ci l'était d'une société nouvelle. En revanche la persistance et la transformation des structures capitalistes et des modes de pensée dominants met en demeure de remanier l'ancienne interprétation et ce remaniement, par tout ce qu'il met en question enveloppe une nouvelle fondation de la critique. Il faut en effet reconnaître que les traits de la pensée bourgeoise tels que Marx les indiqua (dans ses œuvres de jeunesse et dans *Le Capital*) ne caractérisent plus les doctrines, les conceptions ou les courants de pensée dominants à notre époque. Le libéralisme, tant dans le contenu de ses propositions que dans les catégories qu'il implique, ne peut être considéré comme l'idéologie politique des classes dominantes ou du moins de leurs couches les plus actives. S'obstiner à répéter littéralement la critique marxiste du fétichisme idéologique serait aussi vain que de s'en tenir à l'analyse de l'économie concurrentielle sans s'apercevoir que le développement des monopoles et l'intervention croissante de l'Etat dans la production et le marché ont bouleversé les lois du capitalisme. En outre—et cette seconde constatation n'est pas de moindre portée—il ne peut être dissimulé que le marxisme n'a pas lui-même duré, n'est pas devenu l'idéologie officielle d'un groupe d'Etats et de partis de masse, sans subir des changements importants. Tant en ce qui concerne la nature de la révolution prolétarienne, que le rôle du parti, que la fonction de l'Etat dans la société

“socialiste”, que la répartition des revenus, que les rapports entre nations “socialistes” et capitalistes, l'écart de l'idéologie présente et de la pensée marxiste ou léniniste est assez net pour être au moins objet d'interrogation.

Une première tâche est donc d'analyser le développement historique des idéologies qui se réclament du capitalisme et du socialisme, et de repérer l'ampleur des transformations qu'elles ont subies. Cette analyse implique une constante confrontation des unes et des autres en vue de corconscire leurs divergences et leurs accords et doit viser à la fois le contenu des propositions et les catégories de la pensée idéologique dont les hommes n'ont le plus souvent pas conscience. Cependant, un tel travail serait vain et sans doute impraticable s'il ne visait en même temps à lire les modifications idéologiques aux modifications économiques et sociales qui les ont accompagnées. Ce n'est qu'en regard d'une analyse historique des classes sociales et de la production industrielle que les changements de l'idéologie politique peuvent gagner une signification. C'est à dire qu'on doit s'interdire toute présupposition qui affecterait, à l'origine de la recherche une idéologie à une classe ou à une couche sociale donnée. Le fait qu'une doctrine politique prône l'avènement du prolétariat comme classe dominante ne saurait à lui seul signifier que le prolétariat s'exprime à travers cette doctrine. D'une part une proposition ou un corps de propositions de cette nature doit s'interpréter en fonction des autres propositions de la doctrine, de son architecture d'ensemble, se rattacher à son histoire. D'autre part et surtout, on ne saurait postuler qu'une doctrine doive exprimer nécessairement une seule classe ni que le prolétariat doive nécessairement s'exprimer par une idéologie à l'instar des couches sociales dominantes. L'étude de la situation du prolétariat dans la société et de son comportement peut nous enseigner que sa relation aux idées est d'une autre essence que celle qui unit les couches dominantes à leurs propres idées. L'étude des idéologies peut nous amener à circonscrire des milieux sociaux plus restreints que les classes, qui tout en participant à une classe n'en sont pas un simple échantillon et révéler un mode de participation de classe très différent selon qu'il s'agisse du prolétariat ou de la bourgeoisie. Bref c'est la recherche elle-même qui doit découvrir, en allant et venant constamment du champ des structures socio-économiques, au champ des structures de pensée en quoi telle idéologie s'inscrit dans un phénomène social total. Et, dans le va et vient d'un plan d'analyse à un autre, l'idéologie doit servir de détecteur de la réalité sociale en même temps qu'elle doit se définir dans le cadre de cette réalité.

Le second ordre de questions que nous voulions évoquer concerne la relation des diverses sphères idéologiques dans le cadre d'une société de classe. C'est une chose en effet de mentionner l'envahissement apparent de tous les domaines de pensée par des considérations politiques, mais c'en est une autre de savoir si dans la réalité il y a une “politisation” croissante de tous les ordres de connaissance ou si

l'idéologie politique ne fait que les contaminer superficiellement. En fait, aucune critique sérieuse de la philosophie, de la science ou de l'art n'a pu opérer à partir de critères politiques et l'on constate seulement la tendance de la pensée politique à annexer des significations qui lui sont apparemment étrangères pour les utiliser dans sa propre perspective. Cette annexion prend la forme le plus souvent d'un jugement sommaire (comme le montrent par exemple les attaques lancées contre la psychanalyse, la phénoménologie ou une certaine génétique) sur les prétendues implications d'une doctrine.

C'est cependant d'une manière beaucoup plus profonde que Marx mettait en question l'autonomie des divers ordres de connaissance. Il s'agissait pour lui non de les réduire au dénominateur politique, mais de dévoiler une problématique commune, propre à la structure d'une société où la division du travail isole radicalement les individus dans la totalité sociale et transforme la praxis humaine en mystère. Située dans cette perspective l'analyse des antinomies de la pensée bourgeoise par un Lukacs (*Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein*) montrait bien que la critique des philosophies ne pouvait se développer qu'en termes philosophiques, que viser à intégrer la problématique philosophique dans une symbolique plus large qui est celle de la société globale, non à la nier.

Une telle entreprise ne peut avoir caractère scientifique qu'à deux conditions, que le développement de fait des idéologies depuis un demi-siècle semble imposer. En premier lieu, le marxisme est devenu lui-même objet de critique pour la pensée philosophique ultérieure. Si l'on ne se résoud pas à annuler la phénoménologie ou à la considérer comme une simple répétition des philosophies bourgeoises antérieures à laquelle on appliquerait sans changement les critiques de Lukacs il faut reconnaître que le marxisme, tout en représentant une attitude de pensée radicalement nouvelle, participe de la dialectique philosophique plutôt qu'elle la domine. Marx avait certes déjà conscience que ses propres réflexions procédaient de celles des philosophes qui l'avaient précédé et que sa propre tâche était de réaliser la philosophie en la supprimant. Mais que la philosophie ne se supprime pas, que la pensée présente mette en demeure le marxisme de dialoguer avec elle a une portée que ne soupçonnait pas Marx : c'est qu'il y a une irréductibilité de l'idéologie philosophique, c'est que celle-ci ne peut être considérée ni comme la simple expression d'une classe ni comme la simple transposition de la problématique sociale. En étudiant les transformations de la pensée philosophiques dans leur relations avec les transformations qui ont affecté les structures socio-économiques il ne peut donc s'agir de se fonder exclusivement sur ces dernières pour rendre compte des premières. Toute philosophie, même celle qui privilégie le rôle de la praxis sociale, relève d'un ordre propre de réalité à comprendre dans le cadre de la société globale et dans sa forme spécifique de théorie de la réalité, ordre fondant et fondé.

En second lieu, l'analyse des idéologies ne peut se développer rigoureusement que si l'on se débarrasse du préjugé, si manifeste chez Marx et chez Lukacs, selon lequel la diversité des langages idéologiques recouvrent une identité de significations. La structure même de la société moderne, comme Marx l'a lui-même aperçu dans certains de ses propos sur l'aliénation, est fondée sur la contradiction des divers secteurs de l'activité humaine en même temps que sur leur absolue solidarité. La confrontation des dialectiques idéologiques—étudiées dans leur histoire empirique—peut seule nous enseigner dans quelle mesure elles manifestent une problématique commune et dans quelle mesure elles se contestent radicalement. Pour ne prendre qu'un exemple, le problème des rapports de la psychanalyse et du marxisme s'éclairerait, si l'on confrontait leur méthodologie, les débats aux quels leur histoire a donné lieu et si l'on corconscrivait le terrain sur lequel elles se dépossèdent mutuellement de leur objectivité. La détection des incompatibilités est aussi riche que celle des compatibilités pour la compréhension de la réalité sociale totale.

Par ces quelques réflexions nous voulions seulement montrer que seule une analyse historique et diacritique est susceptible d'utiliser l'apport essentiel de Marx en le dégageant des préjugés réalistes et mécanistes.

The Rise of a Salaried Professional Class in Israel

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1. Modern social classes are often distinguished by levels of income. Although this is not an adequate index to account for all class differences, and is always qualified by various considerations as to the source of the income, nevertheless it is extremely useful. As a criterion of evaluation it reflects the liberal ideology, which encourages the individual to develop his potentialities to the utmost, and recognizes his right to the economic rewards for his achievement and the free enjoyment of his property.

The pattern of stratification is set here by the competitive market activity, the mentality of which penetrates also into the professions and the higher levels of salaried employees, especially in business. In this sense one speaks in America of a "so-many-dollars doctor" or "man", and although language usage does not everywhere encourage such description, the concept is not unknown elsewhere in what can be broadly described as "individualist" countries (usually referred to as "free enterprise" or "capitalist"). It should be added further that in all these countries these market type mechanisms of stratification are modified by collective forces, such as trade unions and professional organisations, whose actions are guided by considerations of collective interest and security rather than individual competition.

The situation, however, is different in those societies where a deliberate socialist policy was pursued in an attempt to establish a state of equality. Class differences based on wealth are in these countries regarded as both unjust and a hindrance to material development, which is supposed to be most efficiently furthered by collectivization and central planning. However, after a more or less short revolutionary period, these countries too have tended to develop a system of differential wages and standards of living. The most conspicuous amongst the new strata thus created are the bureaucrats and managers on the one hand and the technicians and members of the professions on the other. This development is often compared to the rise of the middle-classes in the Western societies during the 19th century, the individualist, bourgeois features of the behaviour and the values of the new classes having been often emphasised. However, it is questionable whether the two phenomena are really comparable. The fact that the rising classes here are salaried groups, and not private entrepreneurs, and the entirely different social ideology prevailing in the new collectivist societies, make the validity of such comparisons at least questionable. One method of exploring this question might be through case studies of such class developments in collectivistic societies—the category to

which Israel largely belongs. Such a case study will be attempted in this paper. After describing the main characteristics of this society, we shall try to analyse:

(a) the typical status structure of administrative organisations in this society at the equalitarian base line;

(b) the causes of the subsequent class formation; and

(c) the suitability of the—primarily economic—class concepts of individualistic societies for describing the nature of the new strata.

2. In order to be able to draw some general conclusions from the Israel case, its distinguishing, a-typical features must first be stated. These seem to be as follows:

(a) The leveling of the classes was here achieved by no violent means, but to a large extent voluntarily and through immigration.¹

(b) The "revolutionary period", which preceded the growing articulation of the society into classes, was here of comparatively long duration, as the semi-autonomous status of the Jewish Community during the whole Mandatory period—i.e., for about 30 years—may be regarded in a number of respects as a revolutionary period. For this reason—and because this was a comparatively small society—equalitarianism became here more firmly entrenched (e.g., in collective settlements, etc.) even than in the initial stages in communist countries. It is especially noteworthy that here also comparatively large administrative organisations were based on equality or near equality of remuneration. The status of the professions too was influenced by this spirit of equality and collectivism. There was a general tendency—most conspicuous in medicine—to socialize professional services, a tendency to seek salaried employment, rather than private practice, and professional organisations often co-operated with the General Federation of Labour. The latter always endeavoured to secure the affiliation of all professional organisations, as it regarded their members as "intellectual workers". Some of these organisations, e.g., those of the teachers, university instructors and assistants, engineers, etc., indeed joined the Federation, and many professional people whose organisations remained outside the Federation, became members individually. The fact that the Organisation of University Instructors and Assistants, for example, after joining upon its own initiative the G.F.L., became within it part of the Union of Clerical and Administrative Workers, may throw some light on the situation.²

(c) Although the collectivistic spirit and institutions have been dominant, Israel has not known any period of enforced socialization. A "private sector", inspired by individualistic ideals and status arrangements, has been in existence all the time. This sector, although a minority, and hardly possessing a well developed social ideology, has been particularly important in the field of banking, commerce and industry.

Thus, while on the one hand there was probably more voluntary acceptance of equalitarianism in Israel than in other present-day collectivistic societies, there has been present here, on the other hand, an always available alternative. Although this makes Israel conditions markedly different from those prevailing in the communist group of collectivist countries (however, somewhat similar tendencies seem to be at work in India and Burma), it does not appear to impair the value of the Israel case as an example. On the contrary, it can be assumed that the opposing tendencies of individualism vs. collectivism in class formation could develop here more freely, which makes possible the isolation of certain factors which it would be difficult to identify elsewhere.

3. The administrative framework of Israel had been inherited from the Mandatory Government, but the Civil Service, especially in its higher grades, was not, generally speaking, enlisted from among the Mandatory administration. They came mainly from Jewish national and public institutions. According to a count made on 31.3.55, the distribution of senior Civil Servants (grades 1-5) by previous employment was as follows:³

Table 1. *Senior Civil Servants (grades 1-5) by Previous Employment.*

	Nos.	%
1. Jewish National and Public Institutions	302	41.9
2. Mandatory Government	151	20.9
3. Agriculture (mainly collective settlements)*	78	10.8
4. Teachers	62	8.6
5. Liberal Professions	31	4.3
6. Employed in Commerce and Industry (private sector) ..	24	3.3
7. Studies	22	3.1
8. Self-employed in Commerce and Industry	18	2.5
9. Not known	33	4.6
	721†	100.0

* The category "agriculture" includes mainly former (some even present) members of collective settlements, a number of whom were in fact engaged in administration of the settlements or in party work rather than in agriculture.

† The actual total was 762 but the personal files of 41 were not available at the time.

Accordingly 61.3 per cent. of the higher Civil Service (categories 1, 3, 4) were employed prior to taking up their present positions, in the organisational framework of the Jewish community, which was more or less equalitarian in structure and bureaucratized only to a very small extent. This implied in practice a variety of arrangements: In the communal settlements, and partly also in the numerous institutions of the Israel Federation of Labour, posts (including those of an administrative and economic character) were filled by election and everyone received the same pay. In the national institutions, the principle of grading was accepted, but the system adopted tended to diminish

relatively the importance of the formal function as against such factors as seniority and family size in determining the salary—and sometimes even the grade—of officials. The personnel establishments of the various departments were drawn up and constantly changed on the basis of political or personal considerations rather than according to the needs of administrative efficiency.

As relevant data for the period before the establishment of the State are lacking, we shall try to exemplify the structure of a service based on such principles by the administrative machine of the Israel Federation of Labour (which is not merely, and not even primarily, a trade union, but a large network of socialist enterprises and services). Grades were only introduced in this organisation in 1955, salaries having been uniform for all functions before then, and varied only according to seniority and size of family—i.e., for example, the Managing Director of the largest agricultural marketing organisation received precisely the same salary as the doorkeeper, provided that both had the same seniority and that their families were of the same size. Analysis of a sample of the newly graded officials of this organisation shows that the most important factors for getting a higher grade were age, seniority and party membership.

Table 2. *Various Characteristics of Senior and Middle Grade Officials in the Institutions of the General Federation of Labour, 1955.*

	Senior Grades	Middle Grades	Difference between the Percentages
Size of Sample	549	594	—
of which:			
possessing secondary or higher education	81·9%	73·1%	8·8
50 years or over	36·8%	22·1%	14·7
working in the same office since 1947 or before	56·4%	28·8%	27·6
Mapai members*	60·5%	35·0%	25·5

* The largest of the various labour parties (and also the largest political party) in Israel.

Although officially the grades were linked to administrative functions, the comparatively slight differences in the educational qualifications of senior and middle grade officials on the one hand, and the very considerable differences in age, seniority and party membership on the other hand, show that senior grade was in fact given to those who were politically active and according to seniority; i.e., the representative status rather than technical function and/or considerations of social justice (age, seniority) were the decisive factors of advancement. This is not a picture of a bureaucracy graded and paid according to

functions, but of a socially and educationally more or less homogeneous body split into a rank and file and an élite.

4. The establishment of the State of Israel in 1948 did not seem to indicate a turning point in respect of equalitarianism. The political success was laid at the door of the labour parties, which received in the 1949 elections a fairly clear popular mandate to pursue a vigorously socialist policy. The newly created state bureaucracy was certainly no exception in this respect, as it can also be inferred from Table 1 and from the widespread influence exercised by the labour parties, which held the key portfolios in the cabinet during 1949-50, on appointments. Indeed the first salary scale adopted by the Government was based on a comparatively small differential between high and low grades,⁴ while raising considerably the salaries in general. There has also been a general tendency to reduce officially any other kinds of status differentiation between the grades. The numerous delays in carrying out the grading were not unconnected either with the reluctance to accept the hierarchic principle. Amongst the professions too, there was an increased tendency to join the General Federation of Labour.

But the establishment of the State more perhaps than it offered an opportunity to realize the collective socialist purpose, created unprecedented opportunities for individual initiative and talent. New fields of activity opened up almost daily and the meteoric rise of formerly humble officials of national and public institutions or of members of collective settlements in the new Civil Service (or in the Army) was not an unusual occurrence. Division of labour became a much more complex affair than ever before with the following consequences:

(a) Great differences of power were created between persons who yet a short while ago worked side by side;

(b) Functional differentiation diversified the *kinds* of power exercised—i.e., the new bureaucratic élite became more and more specialized and, in consequence, different from the all-round élite, which formerly had fulfilled simultaneously important political and administrative functions, and from which the new bureaucrats themselves derived to a large extent.

(c) For the same reasons of functional differentiation there was a growing demand for professionally-trained persons and, relative to the previous period, there was some scarcity in a number of professional specialities. Thus both the higher Civil Servants and the salaried professions gained a new prestige, based on specialized rather than representative functions, and were put in positions of considerable power which distinguished them increasingly from the previously much less differentiated class of "workers" (i.e., salaried employees of all categories). The sense of social distance may well have been accentuated by the growing scale of the society, as immigration more than doubled the size of the Jewish population of the country within a span of about four years (1948-1952)⁵.

However, these differences of prestige and power were not reflected either in the salaries or in any other kinds of institutional reward, nor were the means of attaining the positions of power institutionalised. There were, of course, some semi-institutional means of compensating for this, such as wangling allocations of flats, foreign travel, expense accounts, etc. All this led to a general feeling of instability and "lack of justice", which resulted in demands for creating formal rules of appointment on the one hand and for introducing a more formal method of differential reward on the other. This tendency was subsequently underlined by two more or less accidental factors: the inflation and a clash between professional and party interests. Inflation obliterated even to a greater extent the income differentials between higher and lower grades at a time when the real income of the salaried employees decreased and the comparative affluence of 1949-50 gave way to some hardship⁶. The clash between the party machines represented mainly by the General Federation of Labour on the one hand and the professions and higher civil service on the other hand began by the high handed and unsuccessful (or unsuccessful, because high-handed) attempt of the G.F.L. to represent doctors employed by the Government in their wage disputes with the latter. The successful resistance of the doctors to this attempt produced a crop of organisations within the various professions in Government Service (lawyers, engineers, scientists, etc.) to which the higher Civil Service also attached itself, leading in the end to the establishment of an action committee of all these categories of officials (i.e., professions and higher officials in all public institutions, and not only in the Civil Service), the aim of which is to press claims for higher remuneration for the salaried professions as a whole.⁷

This organised action on the part of the higher Civil Service and the professions constitutes a significant break with certain aspects of the ideology of the Israel Labour movement, notably with the principle of extreme "industrial" as opposed to "craft" unionism, and with the spirit of equality described above. As far as the professions, with the exception of teachers, nursing and social work, are concerned, the common representation of all "workers" (i.e., all salaried employees) by the politically organised Israel Federation of Labour has become—at least temporarily—a fiction. This is all the more remarkable, as some of the professional organisations and a large number of the individuals involved, have remained members of the Federation, and still identify themselves with important parts of the general Labour ideology.

5. A few words must now be said about the differences between the various groups involved in this movement for higher status. The fact that the first group to come into open conflict with the G.F.L. and to insist on an entirely different professional scale of salaries were the doctors, is—besides the historical circumstances of the case—indicative of the nature of these differences. The doctors' acceptance of their

essential equality of status with the rest of the employees of the medical institutions, seems always to have been a half-hearted one, notwithstanding the political ideology of the individual doctor. However, dissatisfaction was kept under the surface before the establishment of the State, both because of overcrowding of the profession and because of the prevailing conditions of comparative equality. Under the changed conditions of the early years of the State they were therefore the first to express in an organised manner their opposition to the tendency of leveling out of status differences. The reason for this was not only their improved bargaining power—in this respect they were not in a better position than many others—but rather the specialised nature of their function, which made it easier for them to disattach themselves from equalitarian ideology, and to claim openly a special status. As at an earlier stage, and without any public argument, special and much higher scales of salary than any of the officially accepted ones in Israel were accorded to the judges, their main argument now was that the same status is due to the doctor as to the judge, both carrying an onerous responsibility in matters of life and death, and by many doctors this argument was certainly not regarded as merely a slogan used in a wage dispute. All this is in accord with our hypothesis that the claims for higher status were a result of growing functional differentiation. Therefore rôles of a more specialised nature were the first to be openly accorded differential rewards and status. The rest of the salaried professions—with very few exceptions^a—immediately followed suit.

The position of the higher Civil Service, however, has been somewhat ambiguous. It originates to a great extent in the old élite group of the "collective and public sector" (cf. Table 1) and, as pointed out already, it was at first a representative rather than a professional group. The re-definition of the rôle in this case took some time and there were also some doubts about creating a separate organisation. The trend, however, is unmistakably in the direction of professionalisation of this part of the Service. This is apparent from the increasing insistence upon higher education as a qualification for employment. Thus while on 31.6.1953, only 8.6 per cent. of the officials in the senior and the middle grades of the Civil Service possessed higher education, the corresponding percentage for those appointed between 1.4.53 and 31.3.54 was 29.6, (39.2% of those newly appointed to the highest grades and 27.4% of those appointed to grades 7-9). There are other signs too, of the increasing importance of professional rather than party qualifications in appointments, and also a manifest tendency in the behaviour of the Civil Service to make administrative practice independent of party influence.

6. In conclusion we shall deal with the last question posed: In what way does the emergence of professional classes alter the social structure of what was here called a collectivistic society? Perhaps the best way to answer this question will be a comparison of this professional

class with its parallels in individualistic societies. Such comparison shows that, in spite of the demand for differential reward, this does not imply that income should become a *meaningful* criterion of status. Accordingly there is hardly any demand for the introduction of *personal* differences of pay. There are few people who have individual contracts and the bargaining for better pay and status is almost exclusively a collective one. In the professions of law and medicine there has not been any appreciable tendency to exchange the prevailing or growing public employment pattern to private practice. Although there has been some demand for the "right" of doing additional work outside office hours in various professions and also in the administrative Civil Service, these earnings are as a rule regarded as an unstable supplement to the salary and not as a fully institutionalised pattern of work. Therefore the income differences from such private arrangements have not become status criteria. Furthermore, as it has already been pointed out, there has been no real alienation of the professional classes from the collective ideology, in favour of an approach to the conservative-liberal "private sector", and this is all the more significant, as this sector is a legitimate alternative in Israel, which can be freely chosen.

Thus, at least as far as Israel is concerned, the emergence of the professional classes has to be regarded as part and parcel of the articulation of the power structure and of the functional differentiation of a collectivist society, which, though contradicting equalitarianism to some extent, does not imply a departure from the values of collectivism. Competition and free enterprise are not important elements in the class ideology of the new professional strata. The criteria according to which they try to differentiate themselves and seek to be rewarded are the importance of their service to the community and the special characteristics of their occupation rather than the "market value" of the individuals involved. The criterion of stratification is therefore the *particular quality* of the social function (which has something in common with the conceptions underlying the system of estates) and not the basically *quantitative* factor of achievement.

NOTES

¹ Partially, at least, this was the result of international (mainly Jewish) economic support, which ensured that leveling did not entail a too drastic reduction of the standards of living of broad strata of the population.

² The percentage of G.F.L. members of all the salaried employees in the Jewish population of Palestine was about 70-75% during the 30 year-period 1921-1950; cf. Preuss W., *The Histadruth in Numbers*, Tel Aviv, 1951 (Hebrew), p. 7.

³ The data subsequently quoted regarding the Civil Service and the employees of the General Federation of Labour are taken—if not otherwise indicated—from a study of the demographic composition of these groups made by the author, as part of a larger study of factors affecting occupational mobility in Israel. The project was directed by Dr. S. N. Eisenstadt of the Hebrew University for the Falk Project for Economic Research in Israel.

⁴ The ratio of the salary of the highest official to that of the lowest varied between 1 : 3.4 in the case of unmarried personnel and 1 : 2.5 for married officials having 3

children. *State of Israel, Civil Service Commission, Grading and Job-Allocation*, Jerusalem, 1954 (Hebrew).

⁵ For a more detailed analysis of the general sociological background, cf. Eisenstadt S.N., "Le Passage d'une société de Pionniers à un Etat Organisé; Aspects de la Sociologie Politique d'Israel", *Revue Française de Science Politique*, vol. iv (1954), pp. 545-63; Ben-David, J., "Professions and Social Structure in Israel," *Scripta Hierosolymitana*, vol. III, Jerusalem, 1955, pp. 126-52.

⁶ This was to an extent the result of the index of the cost of living arrangement, according to which high cost of living allowances were paid only on part of the salary. This arrangement is now in the process of being changed.

⁷ As pointed out both these factors have been more or less accidental: the inflation was probably caused to a large extent by mass immigration and the cost of defence. But then the sense of elation and of unlimited possibilities characteristic of the first two years of the State, which caused the creation of power differences, was certainly not a disincentive to public spending and constituted probably a precipitating factor of the inflation. As to the clash between party and Government bureaucracy the causes here are perhaps even more structural. Although wiser tactics might probably have delayed the clash, party considerations, which regarded the salaried professionals and higher bureaucrats as part and parcel of a "working class" were essentially at variance with the realities of bureaucratic power structure and the nature of the professional rôle.

⁸ As noted above, the exceptions were teachers, social workers (including secondary school teachers and social workers possessing academic qualifications) and nurses.

Le rôle des employés et des petits fonctionnaires dans la structure sociale française contemporaine

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En France, comme dans les autres pays occidentaux, l'importance croissante prise par le groupe social des employés et des petits fonctionnaires—ceux que dans les pays anglo-saxons on appelle les *white-collar*—est une des composantes majeures de la structure sociale contemporaine.

Un tel phénomène requiert naturellement l'attention du sociologue. Il l'intéresse même à un double titre. D'une part en effet, il constitue en lui-même un fait considérable dont il importe de connaître l'étendue et les répercussions—en particulier en ce qui concerne la dynamique des classes sociales. Et d'autre part, il offre une excellente occasion de renouveler la discussion sur la théorie des classes sociales, car le groupe des employés et des petits fonctionnaires, à cause de son caractère ambigu, présente en gros tous les éléments d'incertitude des différentes théories.

C'est dans ce double dessein que nous avons lancé nous-même personnellement en France une série d'enquêtes sur le comportement de ces catégories dans leur milieu de travail et sur leur situation dans le processus d'ensemble de la vie sociale. Les résultats de ces enquêtes sont encore beaucoup trop fragmentaires et dispersés pour qu'il puisse en être fait état ici. Aussi, nous contenterons-nous de résumer dans les remarques qui vont suivre nos hypothèses de travail et nos premiers essais d'interprétation.

I

Ce qui nous frappe tout d'abord dans le monde des employés et des petits fonctionnaires, c'est le caractère contradictoire de leurs réactions qu'on pourrait schématiser ainsi : devant l'ouvrier, l'employé et le petit fonctionnaire se sentent comme lui des travailleurs, devant le patron ou devant l'Etat, ils se sentent des collaborateurs participant de la puissance directoriale¹. Mais cette contradiction, il importe de le constater, n'est pas une contradiction théorique, un manque de cohérence intellectuelle qu'un dévoilement rationnel pourrait dissiper, c'est une contradiction profonde vécue dans sa situation même par l'employé.

Au fond—et ce serait là notre première hypothèse de travail, *la situation d'employé est une situation qui facilite l'identification au monde des classes dirigeantes et qui offre des résultats appréciables si l'on y parvient*. Mais en même temps, *c'est une situation de travailleur*

souffrant de la plupart des limitations dont souffrent les autres travailleurs en ce qui concerne aussi bien la rémunération que le manque d'autonomie et la subordination.

En ce qui concerne leur identification aux classes dirigeantes, on peut noter en effet rapidement que les employés et les petits fonctionnaires sont physiquement plus près de celles-ci que les ouvriers. Ils les cotoient tous les jours dans leur travail même puisqu'ils sont les auxiliaires de ceux qui dirigent l'orientation des entreprises et des différentes activités sociales. Ils ont généralement comme lieux de travail des villes et dans les villes, les quartiers les plus animés et les plus affectés du "complexe de capitale". La tenue qu'ils peuvent et souvent doivent revêtir est une tenue qui signifie leur assimilation aux classes "supérieures". Leur fonction enfin participe toujours, très indirectement certes, mais tout de même d'une façon suffisamment marquée de ce qu'on pourrait appeler "le complexe d'état-major"; ils préparent les éléments qui permettent de décider, ils mettent les décisions en forme; ils les transmettent plus qu'ils ne les exécutent. Tous ces facteurs divers, et on pourrait en citer d'autres, les poussent à s'assimiler la culture du groupe supérieur et leur rendent beaucoup plus facile cette identification.

Mais d'autre part, cette proximité physique de la classe dirigeante se double d'une sorte de proximité hiérarchique qui a pour conséquence que l'employé a plus de chances d'accéder à des postes supérieurs que l'ouvrier. Il est au bas de l'échelle, mais au moins il est sur l'échelle. On s'étonne souvent du prestige dont jouit l'employé et du fait qu'il a tendance à se considérer comme supérieur à l'ouvrier qui bien souvent gagne plus que lui. Des sondages nous montrent par exemple que si on l'interroge sur la classe à laquelle il appartient, il répond bien plus souvent: la classe moyenne ou même la classe bourgeoise que le groupe des ouvriers qualifiés.² Mais ce prestige, cette anticipation de leur possible ascension sociale n'est pas si illégitime qu'il peut le paraître. L'employé connaît tout de même un peu mieux le grand patron et ceux qui le conseillent. Il sait mieux ce qui risque de plaire et ce qu'il faut faire pour avancer. Il se modèle sur la classe supérieure parce qu'il est soumis à son influence mais il accepte cette influence parce qu'il sent bien que celle-ci a tendance à choisir pour les promotions ceux qui se rapprochent dans leur comportement de ses propres standards.³

Nous trouvons des manifestations plus ou moins directes de ces attitudes premières dans les résultats des enquêtes d'entreprises et des sondages d'opinion touchant la catégorie "employés—petits fonctionnaires".

D'un certain nombre d'enquêtes effectuées dans des entreprises françaises ces dernières années que nous avons pu analyser à ce sujet, il ressort par exemple que dans tous les cas, les employés ont un niveau d'aspiration plus élevé que celui des ouvriers (non pas sur le plan matériel car les ouvriers ont tendance généralement à exiger des rémunérations plus fortes, mais en ce qui concerne les possibilités d'ascension sociale); ils se préoccupent plus de leur avenir; ils accepteraient plus

facilement d'être mutés dans une autre région pour avoir une promotion ; ils souhaitent à une beaucoup plus forte majorité que leurs enfants ne fassent pas le même travail qu'eux. Leur proximité du milieu dirigeant se marque à leur sensibilité au " moral " de l'entreprise ; ils sont toujours ou bien plus enthousiastes ou bien plus critiques que les ouvriers ; ceux-ci sont constamment les plus indifférents.

Nous retrouvons ces mêmes contrastes dans les enquêtes générales d'opinion. D'une étude que nous avons pu effectuer sur les résultats des sondages d'opinion opérés par l'Institut Français d'Opinion Publique de 1947 à 1953, nous avons pu tirer par exemple les quelques conclusions suivantes :

1. Le niveau d'information des employés et des fonctionnaires paraît nettement plus élevé que celui des ouvriers et des paysans, il est plus faible que celui des membres des professions libérales mais il est légèrement plus élevé et en tous cas au moins égal à celui des commerçants, des industriels et des cadres ; par information il faut d'ailleurs aussi bien entendre connaissance des produits présentés par la publicité (telle qu'elle nous est révélée par les études de marché) que connaissance des faits politiques et sociaux.⁴

2. Le type d'intérêt que les employés manifestent pour les événements politiques est différent de celui manifesté par les ouvriers et les paysans et il tend à les rapprocher des habitudes des cadres et des professions libérales. Les employés s'intéressent davantage aux problèmes de politique extérieure et aux problèmes d'ordre général alors que les ouvriers et surtout les paysans sont beaucoup plus sensibles aux questions intérieures ayant une incidence matérielle.⁵ Comme les classes dirigeantes donc, les employés auraient tendance à prendre facilement un point de vue abstrait et général, un point de vue d'homme d'Etat.

3. Si le niveau d'information élevé du groupe employés—fonctionnaires et si le type d'intérêt qu'il manifeste tend à le rapprocher des classes dirigeantes, son niveau de participation politico-social est très faible. Il est nettement plus faible que celui des catégories ouvriers et paysans. Dans tous les secteurs politiques sauf peut-être le R.P.F. (gaullistes) ce sont les employés et fonctionnaires qui présentent le plus gros pourcentage de personnes ne donnant pas d'argent aux partis pour lesquels ils votent, ne faisant pas de prosélytisme et adoptant une attitude critique et inquiète devant le programme et les dirigeants de ces partis.⁶

4. La culture semble apparaître un autre élément très important du comportement des employés et fonctionnaires ; leur niveau culturel tel du moins qu'il peut être atteint par des études de marchés et des sondages d'opinion les classe dans le groupe supérieur avec les cadres et les professions libérales aussi bien pour les livres (ils lisent plus et davantage de livres réputés sérieux) que pour les magazines (ils lisent davantage les organes ayant un certain prestige) que pour les journaux

(en province ils lisent davantage les journaux de Paris; partout ils semblent s'intéresser davantage que les ouvriers aux faits politiques et sociaux).⁷

5. Quelques indices enfin permettraient déjà de formuler des hypothèses sur le mécanisme de diffusion des modes. Il semble ressortir en effet d'une étude sur la diffusion d'un magazine ayant connu rapidement un grand succès que dans le cours d'une année le pourcentage des lecteurs a sensiblement baissé chez les membres des professions libérales (il était arrivé au point de saturation) et qu'il a plafonné chez les employés et fonctionnaires alors qu'il a continué à augmenter sensiblement dans la catégorie commerçants et qu'il a augmenté énormément dans la catégorie ouvriers qui n'avait guère été touchée jusqu'alors; l'engouement pour les vedettes de cinéma enfin semblerait devoir aussi obéir à cette sorte de loi de diffusion qui voudrait que les membres de la catégorie employés suivent avec un certain retard les modes du groupe des professions libérales et précèdent sur cette voie les membres de la catégorie ouvriers.⁸

Engagé dans la voie de l'ascension sociale, sollicité en vue de cette ascension par les impératifs de la morale et du goût officiel, l'employé semble se conduire au fond comme une sorte de *stagiaire de la bourgeoisie*. Il interprète sa situation comme une situation de transition: il s'agit pour lui de faire ses preuves afin de pouvoir accéder définitivement au statut "bourgeois".

Mais les voies de l'ascension sociale peuvent être fort diverses et une remarque supplémentaire s'impose ici qui nous permettra de légitimer la distinction que nous avons tenu à conserver entre les employés et les petits fonctionnaires tout au long de cet exposé. Une telle distinction en effet n'apparaît pas nécessaire ni dans les pays anglo-saxons, ni dans les pays scandinaves, ni en Allemagne. En France par contre, nous nous trouvons en présence de deux groupes qui ont des réactions absolument opposées au point de vue religieux, au point de vue politique et même au moins en apparence au point de vue de l'orientation sociale générale.

Ce fait capital pour la compréhension du système socio-politique de la France contemporaine nous conduit à donner une grande importance aux "filières" d'ascension sociale—laïques, presque anticléricales d'un côté; paternalistes et souvent confessionnelles de l'autre. Certes nous sommes loin à l'heure actuelle du système de patronage à demi féodal qui était en honneur encore au début du 20ème siècle et grâce auquel s'est constitué le noyau du monde "employé" actuel. Mais s'il n'est plus demandé au candidat à la promotion sociale la véritable allégeance morale qu'exigeaient aussi bien par exemple les potentats plébéiens des grands magasins que les aristocrates des assurances et des banques, la plupart des établissements qui recrutent des employés examinent encore attentivement les antécédents, l'apparence et même la filiation des candidats à l'embauche de façon à s'assurer qu'ils sont

capables de bien jouer le rôle social qu'on attend d'eux. Le recrutement des administrations publiques ignore ce système subtil de jugement. L'insistance des républicains avancés, radicaux et socialistes qui ont assumé les charges du pouvoir pendant la plus grande partie de la Troisième République a finalement abouti à la création d'un système minutieux et rigoureux de concours ne laissant plus aucune place à l'arbitraire. Mais la barrière n'est pas pour autant supprimée. Si le concours ne fait pas appel aux mêmes critères d'adaptation que ceux qu'utilisaient les patrons privés, son caractère académique et formaliste le rend beaucoup plus comparable à une épreuve d'entrée dans le monde de la hiérarchie et de la responsabilité qu'à un examen de sélection professionnelle.⁹ Et on aurait tort de croire qu'il ouvre plus largement la porte succès à la personne étrangère qui ne veut pas ou ne peut pas s'adapter au moule conformiste qu'on lui propose.

II

Mais si l'employé et le petit fonctionnaire sont extrêmement sensibles à l'attraction des classes " supérieures ", ils n'en restent pas moins des travailleurs affectés comme tous les travailleurs par les conditions particulières de leur situation. Surtout et c'est là un des éléments fondamentaux de la dynamique de leur groupe social, ces conditions tendent de plus avec le progrès technique à les rendre semblables aux ouvriers.

Sur tous les points importants, niveau de rémunération, discipline, conditions de travail, types de satisfaction offerts par le travail lui-même, les avantages que l'employé pouvait avoir vis-à-vis de l'ouvrier il y a cinquante ans semblent avoir disparu.

Il y a cinquante ans, le vendeur, le comptable qualifié pouvaient espérer une rémunération assez considérable. Leurs collègues d'aujourd'hui débutent beaucoup plus haut mais plafonnent très rapidement. Ils sont moins payés qu'un ouvrier professionnel très qualifié.

Sur le plan des conditions de travail, de la discipline et du métier lui-même, le machinisme et l'organisation scientifique du travail ont complètement transformé le travail de bureau et même partiellement le travail de vente. L'introduction des machines comptables, puis des machines statistiques ont introduit de petites *révolutions industrielles* dans tous les grands services administratifs publics et privés. De plus en plus une scission est en train de s'opérer entre un petit nombre de professionnels hautement qualifiés chargés de traiter les affaires nécessitant un jugement responsable et une masse d'employés sans qualification qui sont de véritables O.S. chargés de la production en série qui effectuent une suite d'opérations simples toujours les mêmes et dont le caractère automatique va croissant.

Inventions nouvelles aussi bien que méthodes d'organisation du travail vont dans le même sens. Même le secrétariat en est affecté. La pratique des " pools " de dactylographes et de secrétaires tend à se répandre de plus en plus. La secrétaire particulière apparaît

condamnée; à sa place on aura une (ou un) secrétaire de direction déjà un véritable "cadre" et une dactylo travaillant en équipe dans un "pool"; l'usage du dictaphone accélère encore cette évolution. Désormais, la nouvelle secrétaire n'aura même plus l'occasion de voir son chef et d'utiliser sa qualification de sténographe, elle se verra livrer en bandes enregistrées son matériau de travail. Tout contact humain à ce moment aura disparu.

Dans un tel contexte la discipline et les conditions générales de travail sont naturellement complètement transformées. Comme dans l'industrie, on voit disparaître l'ancien système arbitraire et souvent humiliant mais en même temps relativement humain, tandis que se développe de plus en plus une discipline égalitaire certes mais beaucoup plus impérative et impersonnelle. L'autoritarisme d'autrefois cède la place et avec lui les attachements personnels, l'usage constant du favoritisme, les passe-droits et abus de pouvoirs divers qui faisaient le cauchemar du gratte-papier et de la vendeuse de 1900. Mais en revanche, l'horaire est plus strict, le contrôle est plus sévère et le rythme du travail ne laisse plus de place aux bavardages et à la fantaisie personnelle. On est en train de passer de la "discipline du respect à la discipline du rendement".

Une autre transformation liée aux précédentes doit être analysée car ses répercussions peuvent être à la longue encore plus importantes, du moins pour le problème qui nous préoccupe, c'est celle qui affecte l'apprentissage et la relation au métier lui-même. Autrefois le jeune garçon qui entrait dans le vieux bureau enfumé où trônaient le comptable ou le premier commis en manches de lustrine commençait par faire ce qu'on appelait le "grouillot", c'est-à-dire à servir de commissionnaire, de femme de ménage et de souffre-douleur de la communauté des employés puis il s'élevait petit à petit dans la hiérarchie des tabourets et pouvait s'il avait du talent et de la chance finir par intéresser le patron. L'apprentissage était long et personnel. Il correspondait à la lente assimilation par le nouveau venu des habitudes et des moeurs aussi bien que des techniques de sa spécialité. Actuellement nous l'avons vu, le fossé s'élargit de plus en plus entre les techniciens et les O.S. de la profession. Les techniciens sont formés dans les écoles et les universités; ils ont déjà au départ un statut bourgeois; le petit employé se trouve de plus en plus séparé des gens qui ont le droit d'exercer leur jugement dans leur travail; il ne peut plus se former sur le tas; ses possibilités de promotion deviennent aussi faibles que celles de l'ouvrier; sa seule supériorité tiendrait au fait que pour le moment la proportion des agents de maîtrise semble généralement beaucoup plus grande dans une administration que dans une usine. Il tend donc à devenir sur ce point aussi—et nous avons vu l'importance capitale qu'il revêtait pour lui—un prolétaire. Mais les traditions, les habitudes et le climat général de ces professions ont conservé suffisamment d'emprise sur le milieu en général pour pallier en partie les effets des transformations techniques et d'organisation sur les possibilités de promotion. Les

banques et les assurances françaises par exemple ont mis sur pied des cours professionnels pour les jeunes employés qui doivent permettre aux mieux doués de franchir en quelques années les échelons inférieurs de la hiérarchie. L'ampleur de ces réalisations est sans commune mesure avec ce qui a pu se faire dans l'industrie. Dans les administrations publiques le système des concours en cascades permet aussi la promotion des personnes d'origine la plus humble aux plus hautes fonctions. Cette sorte de réaction plus ou moins consciente du système tout entier qui tend à conserver son équilibre traditionnel est passionnante à observer. Encore ne faudrait-il pas trop s'illusionner sur ses résultats. Seules des enquêtes approfondies pourront nous renseigner à ce sujet.

Une des conséquences de cette évolution générale a été l'apparition en France comme dans les autres pays occidentaux d'un syndicalisme employé. Son origine est lointaine dans le monde des grands magasins (vers 1860), plus récente chez les petits fonctionnaires (les années 1900) et assez proche dans le monde des bureaux (les années 1920). Mais de toute manière sauf dans la fonction publique où il est devenu tout de suite une puissance, il est resté et reste encore à l'heure actuelle sporadique et minoritaire, n'entraînant la masse du personnel que dans des occasions particulières d'enthousiasme national. Comme lors du grand mouvement social de juin 1936. Car au fond même dans le syndicalisme, si l'employé se déclare un travailleur au même titre que l'ouvrier pour profiter des avantages que cette situation peut lui permettre d'obtenir et aussi pour participer à l'événement, il n'en continue pas moins, pour le moment, à jouer " le bourgeois " auprès du patronat pour sauvegarder sa place dans la hiérarchie.

III

Mais n'avons-nous pas tort de toujours traiter du groupe " employés " par référence aux classes " bourgeoise " et " ouvrière ". Les employés et les petits fonctionnaires ne sont-ils pas après tout en train de se constituer eux-mêmes en classe autonome ? Leurs difficultés à s'intégrer au monde bourgeois aussi bien qu'au monde ouvrier ne peuvent-elles pas s'interpréter comme les malaises et les contradictions d'un groupe qui s'apprête à rejeter les idéaux qu'on lui avait jusqu'à présent proposés.

Le problème vaut d'être posé, étant donné le gonflement des effectifs employés et assimilés et toute la littérature " tertiaire " qu'il suscite. Au moment où se développent à une allure vertigineuse de nouvelles techniques d'action de plus en plus raffinées aussi bien dans le domaine du pouvoir de l'homme sur la nature que dans celui de l'homme sur l'homme lui-même, on commence à s'interroger sur la naissance d'une classe techno-bureaucratique. Dans une telle perspective, la classe des employés pourrait facilement apparaître alors comme le prolétariat de cette nouvelle classe dirigeante et former avec elle un couple dialectique destiné à remplacer le vieux couple bourgeoisie-classe ouvrière.

Une telle rêverie n'est pas sans séduction. Elle anticipe certes encore beaucoup sur la quotidienne réalité de la vie de l'homme au travail et de l'homme en société; mais de nombreuses observations assez disparates pourraient être faites à son actif.

Il n'est pas douteux par exemple que l'influence des nationalisations dans un pays comme la France a tendu à élargir très considérablement le champ d'expansion du comportement "employé". Les ouvriers de l'Electricité de France, comme les cheminots de la S.N.C.F. sont devenus, en partie au moins, des petits fonctionnaires. Ils se sont trouvés rattachés au grand continuum qui mène du balayeur jusqu'au directeur général. Le système des promotions et des concours commence à les toucher et dans une certaine mesure on peut dire qu'ils s'installent eux aussi dans cette situation transitoire d'apprentis bourgeois que nous avons décrite. Il serait passionnant d'étudier l'influence de ces nouveaux facteurs de comportement non seulement dans les secteurs qui ont été directement touchés mais même dans le reste de la classe ouvrière qui ne manque pas finalement d'être, elle aussi, influencée par cet état d'esprit nouveau. D'autres facteurs plus importants encore d'ailleurs agissent dans le même sens, facilitant l'intégration du monde ouvrier dans la société globale. Au fur et à mesure donc que la situation de l'employé tend à se prolétarianiser, celle de l'ouvrier devient plus "petite bourgeoise". Une fusion progressive apparaît donc possible, mais il est important de constater qu'elle ne semble devoir se produire qu'au moyen d'une transformation profonde des deux groupes.

L'employé étant par excellence l'homme manipulé, celui que visent les mass-media et tout ce qu'on a appelé le "social engineering", on pourrait s'effrayer d'une telle évolution. Nous avons tendance à penser quant à nous, et ce serait une autre de nos hypothèses, que toute forme de persuasion imposée comme celles-là implique une relation de subordination et qu'à partir de cette relation se développe forcément une réaction spécifique, un "feedback" qui constitue la résistance authentique du groupe considéré.

L'étude de ce "feedback", de ses conditions d'apparition et de ses très diverses possibilités d'expression, constitue un des objectifs essentiels de nos enquêtes.

NOTES.

¹ Ce schéma pourrait très bien être inversé, c'est plus souvent face à l'ouvrier que l'employé se sent collaborateur et face au patron qu'il se sent travailleur. Mais ce n'est pas l'occasion de la contradiction ou de l'ambivalence des réactions de l'employé qui est importante, c'est cette ambivalence même.

² D'une enquête menée en 1950 par l'I.N.E.D. il ressort en effet que se considèrent comme appartenant à :

	La classe bourgeoise	La classe moyenne	La classe ouvrière
Employés petits fonctionnaires . . .	9·4%	52·2%	32·8%
Ouvriers qualifiés, artisans . . .	5%	36·4%	52·9%

(Cité par Natalie Rogoff: "Social Stratification in France and the U.S.", *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. LVIII, p. 350).

³ Kinsey a bien montré que les personnes de naissance modeste qui se sont élevées dans la hiérarchie sociale ont présenté dès leur adolescence, c'est-à-dire avant que

cette ascension n'ait pris place, un comportement sexuel tout-à-fait semblable à celui de la catégorie à laquelle ils sont parvenus et très différent de celui de la catégorie dont ils sont issus.

Il ressort d'autre part des résultats d'une enquête menée en France sous la direction du Dr. Heuyer sur le niveau intellectuel des enfants d'âge scolaire qu'à tous les âges envisagés (de 6 à 12 ans), les enfants des employés sont nettement en avance sur ceux des ouvriers et des paysans et suivent de près les enfants des cadres industriels et commerciaux; le milieu dans lequel ils se développent semble donc bien favoriser l'élévation de leur niveau intellectuel, et comme ce niveau est déterminé par les normes de la classe dirigeante, on peut y voir un phénomène d'*acculturation*.

⁴ Par exemple: sondage de l'I.F.O.P. de février, 1950.

⁵ Jean Dubost, "L'intérêt du public pour la politique", *Sondages*, 1952, no. 2, p. 52 et suiv.

⁶ D'après une enquête effectuée en 1952 et dont les principaux résultats ont été analysés dans le no. 3 de la revue *Sondages* (année 1952). Nous avons pu grâce à la courtoisie de l'I.F.O.P. consulter certains tris par catégorie socio-professionnels qui n'avaient pas été publiés.

⁷ Enquêtes de l'I.F.O.P. de 1949 et 1950 (non publiées).

⁸ Enquêtes de l'I.F.O.P. de 1948 et 1949 (non publiées).

⁹ Nous voulons parler des concours institués pour le recrutement de tous les grades petits et moyens où les connaissances n'ont absolument rien à voir avec les nécessités de la profession.

The New Middle Class in the Power Structure of Great Britain

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Does the new middle class¹ possess any significant measure of power in contemporary Britain? If it does, to what extent is this power exercised in a unified way? These are the questions we shall attempt to answer in this paper. We shall first consider the organisation and activities of new middle class occupational associations and then discuss the position of the new middle class in the political power structure.

I. OCCUPATIONAL ASSOCIATIONS

The occupational groups which constitute the new middle class show great diversity in the extent and nature of interest group formation. Amongst the highest status groups it has often proved possible for the individuals concerned to achieve their aims without group action. Examples of this in the private industrial sector are salaried managers and scientists. In both cases the relative scarcity of highly skilled personnel in relation to ever-increasing demand has created a situation in which individuals find it unnecessary to protect their interest by concerted action. Increased rewards for such people can be justified on the ground that their loyalty to the firm must be maintained; while the cost of such concessions is normally small by comparison with the total salaries and wages bill of the firm. In the case of the managers, there are additional reasons why organised action has not developed; their proximity to the decision-makers and their opportunities of upward mobility would alone form an adequate explanation. In the sphere of nationalised industry and public employment, however, both groups have found it desirable to form associations to press their claims for salaries and conditions comparable with those paid in outside employment. It is here that the managerial union is found.² And in the case of higher civil servants, any difficulty that might arise from the blurring of the employer/employee distinction is overcome by a typically British compromise; when an official reaches the top of the career ladder and may have to act as Treasury spokesman in salary negotiations, he tends to withdraw from active membership of the First Division Association.³

In many of the other professions the nature and policy of the occupational association is profoundly influenced by the extent to which its members have become state servants. In architecture and law, for example, the professional bodies pursue the traditional objectives, including the maintenance of the rewards of their members by restricting entry; the divergent interests of employers and employees are resolved within an organisation nominally representative of both; and those in public employment often have to depend on "mixed unions" to press their claims.⁴ In medicine and dentistry the traditional objectives have not been forgotten, but public interest has naturally been focused on the negotiations between the professional bodies and the State to determine the terms and conditions of doctors and dentists in the National Health Service. In the course of these negotiations the possibility of strike action by members of these professions has been an important factor, and the necessary institutional changes to permit such action have been made by doctors, and seem likely to be made by dentists. If there was ever any doubt on the matter, the power of these highly-organised middle-class professional interests has been amply demonstrated in the last ten years.

In the upper range of occupations, then, absence of organisation is not symptomatic of lack of power, but rather of the individual's ability to achieve his ends without formal union with his fellows. Where conditions are such as to warrant organisation, powerful interest groups have invariably arisen. If their methods have not yet included mass withdrawal of the services of their members, this has been because other effective means (e.g. political pressure) were open to them. It must not be forgotten that many of those who belong occupationally to the upper sections of the new middle class are socially very closely tied—by origins, education, or marriage—to the upper, and propertied, class. Linkages of this kind undoubtedly augment the formal power of the managerial and professional groups in the private and public sectors of the economy; because of these ties, the salary claims of such groups are assured of a sympathetic hearing at least from those directors of industry and Members of Parliament who are themselves of equal or higher social status.

In the lower ranks of the salariat, occupational associations in bewildering variety are to be found. It is virtually impossible, in a short paper, to generalise on the basis of such divergent types as the National Union of Teachers (220,000 members), the Civil Service Clerical Association (148,000), the National and Local Government Officers Association (230,000), and the trade-union oriented Railway Clerks Association (91,000).⁵ It is possible, however, to explain the development of these occupational associations in terms of two closely-related conditions leading to their emergence and influencing their policy.

Bureaucratisation and unionisation have gone hand in hand. It is perfectly clear why this should be so. The efficiency of a bureaucracy depends on the absence of internal conflict, and this is achieved largely

by the framing and enforcement of impersonal rules. In promoting solidarity among black-coated workers, therefore, bureaucratisation has played an analogous rôle to that of the labour market in the case of factory workers by establishing universalistic standards of recruitment, competency, promotion and remuneration. Where such a common identification is precluded by the personal and particular nature of the work relationship, as in the general clerical field, employee organisation has been correspondingly weak; probably not more than ten per cent. of such workers are organised. Furthermore, if the bureaucratic rules are to be acceptable and friction in their operation is to be reduced to a minimum, they should clearly have been formulated in consultation with organised groups representative of all the main interests involved. In such circumstances unions of the main salary and skill groups into which the working force is divided become a virtual necessity with or without the accompaniment of Whitleyism.⁶

A second, and related, factor fostering the organisation of the lower salariat has been that of blocked or "once-for-all" mobility. In teaching and in the civil service, for example, the process of bureaucratisation has been accompanied by a policy of recruitment from outside at two or more levels, with little or no opportunity for those recruited at low level to surmount the internal barriers blocking their promotion. "Elementary" school teachers, and civil servants without a university training who entered the clerical or executive classes, have had such poor chances of upward job and social mobility that their efforts to improve their lot have inevitably taken the form of creating powerful interest groups restricted to those whose promotion was virtually barred in this way. As the lower salariat often attracted socially aspiring individuals for whom the blockage of their upward mobility was especially frustrating, they often became the leading spirits in the formation and running of such organisations. By contrast, in industry and commerce, where the mass of clerks are employed, dual intake and blocked mobility have not been institutionalised to the same degree, and there is evidence of considerable mobility between this occupation and the managerial and manual grades, all of which is unfavourable to group organisation.⁷

The tactics of the white-collar unions have naturally varied according to the nature of the membership they sought to attract. The use of the strike weapon has, except under great provocation, normally been avoided, so as not to jeopardise their claim to professional status, and to avoid alienating potential members.⁸ Results had, however, to be obtained if membership was to be maintained and increased. The methods most usually employed have been to make the fullest use of Whitley Council and arbitration board machinery (N.A.L.G.O. has been particularly successful in this way), to exert political pressure, and to marshal public opinion.⁹

In spite of their eschewment of the strike weapon middle class occupational associations have succeeded in achieving many of their

ends. They have gained pension schemes, promotion opportunities, job security, better working conditions, and agreed arbitration procedures. Some of them have fought for more general reforms and the teaching profession in particular has played a decisive part in securing better educational facilities for the working class child.¹⁰ Each occupational association has, however, defended the particular interest of its members rather than any "class" interest. There have been some attempts to bring the new middle class occupational associations into loose alliances, but without much success.¹¹ In general, the new middle class has neither entered completely into the general trade union movement, nor yet united outside it or in opposition to it.¹² It is true that there is a general middle class disquiet at the diminishing of income differentials between black-coated and semi-skilled workers. While income differentials are diminishing (and have been for some seventy years) the black-coated worker has still an undiminished advantage with regard to job-security and social status.

II. POLITICAL POWER

Before one can analyse the place of the new middle class in the political structure it is necessary to distinguish between two basic ways in which power is exercised. In the first, the individual or group under discussion is itself the ultimate *decision maker* while, in the second, the individual or group constitutes an *influence* or a significant part of the *environment* of the decision maker. A further important distinction is that between the actions of *individual members* of the new middle class, the actions of new middle class *occupational and interest groups* and the actions of the class *as a class*.

(a) *The Political Activities of Individual Members of the New Middle Class.*

Enfranchised by the Second Reform Act (1867), the new middle class did not begin entering parliament in large numbers until the end of the nineteenth century. By then they were already participating in Liberal cabinets and they were included in Conservative cabinets in significant numbers from 1916 onwards. From the foundation of the Labour Party, members of the new middle class have played an important rôle in leadership and policy making. Both C. R. Attlee and H. Gaitskell were middle class in origin. At the present day members of the new middle class form a large proportion of the active members and leaders of both Conservative and Labour constituency parties. However it is only in the marginal and hopeless seats that they tend to dominate the local party. In safe Labour seats the skilled manual workers are in the majority and choose the parliamentary candidate while in safe Conservative seats there is a tendency for leaders and candidates to be chosen from the "upper class". Thus the safe seats are held among the Conservatives by barristers, company directors and propertied regular army officers, and among the Labour Party by manual workers.

In order to obtain a majority and form a Government both parties strive to gain the marginal seats. It is in the marginal seats that new middle class members tend to dominate the local party and that new middle class candidates tend to be chosen. Thus when in power the parliamentary party tends to include a larger proportion of new middle class M.P.s than in opposition.

Until recent years it was held by political scientists that the "floating voters" who decided the issues of elections were drawn largely from the new middle class. Studies of voting behaviour have shown that, in the post-war period, very few voters have changed their political allegiance and that those who have changed are drawn fairly proportionately from all classes. Elections are decided, it appears, mainly by the preferences of new voters and by the proportion of abstainers. Although the new middle class is no longer considered to constitute an independent floating vote it is of especial importance for two reasons. Firstly, the marginal constituencies which decide the issue of elections tend to have a large proportion of new middle class voters. Secondly, new middle class individuals play a key part in the political process as campaigners and canvassers in "getting out the vote".

The most accurate assessment of the relationship between social class and voting behaviour is to be found in Dr. John Bonham's recent study of *The Middle Class Vote* and the following table is taken from his work.

Great Britain. Estimated Distribution of Votes in the General Election, 1951 (Thousands of Adults)			
		Conservative	Labour
Top Business		600	60
Middle Business		1,290	180
Small Business		550	130
	TOTAL	2,440	370
Managerial		650	190
Higher Professional		700	50
Lower Professional		780	360
Higher Office		640	130
Lower Office		1,280	770
	TOTAL	4,050	1,500
Intermediate Group		720	680
Working Class		6,200	11,300
	TOTAL	13,410	13,850

More than a quarter of the new middle class vote for the Labour Party and they provide some 11 per cent. of the total Labour vote. Just under three-quarters vote for the Conservatives providing some 30 per cent. of the total party vote. One cannot assume from these

figures that the new middle class is less important in shaping Labour Party policy than in shaping the policy of the Conservative Party. In the Labour Party new middle class individuals play a key rôle as active members of constituency parties and are thus an exceptionally important part of the "environment" which the leaders of the parliamentary Labour Party have to consider in making decisions. They also provide about half of the Labour Party parliamentary candidates, members of parliament, and cabinet ministers. While these individual members of the Labour Party would not consider themselves as "representing" their class, there is no doubt that significant sections of the Labour Party ideology and programme stem from their presence in the party.¹³ The Conservative Party has three times as many new middle class supporters and many of its local party workers are drawn from the new middle class. However, because of their general conformity and their willingness to accept upper class leadership¹⁴ it is possible that they are less important in shaping party policy than are the middle class supporters of the Labour Party in shaping the policy of the Labour Party.¹⁵

(b) The Political Activities of New Middle Class Occupational Groups

We have previously discussed the reasons why new middle class occupational associations have sometimes been forced to enter the political sphere. Unfortunately, detailed information is lacking on the part played by pressure groups in British government. It is known that the teachers, railway clerks and civil servants have financed party candidates at elections and have paid M.P.s to watch over their interests and act as their spokesmen. A much larger number of middle class occupational groups have friendly associations with individual M.P.s and keep them "informed" of their desires and demands. Canvassing, both at elections and between elections, is used by all occupational interest groups. While these groups cannot promise to deliver the votes of their members in return for favours received, the balance of votes between the two parties means that neither party can afford to annoy unnecessarily any voters or canvassers. Middle class unions, as a whole, have been forced by the political divisions among their members to play a politically neutral rôle. The political behaviour of an individual member of a new middle class occupation is affected by both "occupational" and "class" interests and these two interests often conflict. The member of a social service occupation may feel that the social services will be safer under a Labour Government but at the same time his desire for lower taxation, for the maintenance of differentials and prevention of inflation, his "patriotism" and "respectability" will be pushing him towards the Right. It is possible that one would find more Labour voters among the younger, active and more vocationally conscious members of a profession than one would among the total rank and file.¹⁶

Up to the time of writing (February, 1956) the Conservative Government has preserved the social services virtually intact although there is

a general dislike among its members of excessive expenditure and a fear that the "indiscriminate giving" of the welfare state tends to sap enterprise and morale. Isolated upper class Conservatives have expressed hostility towards the lower middle class and have attacked teachers and civil servants. From the other side there is no evidence that the watchful hostility between the mass of the manual workers and the mass of the non-manual workers is lessening to any significant extent.¹⁷

(c) *The Political Activities of the New Middle Class as a Class.*

Each of the three political parties, which have played any important part in British politics since 1867, has on occasions appealed specifically to the middle class for support on the grounds that it alone represented its "real" interest. The middle class has, however, refused to act as a united group. While a majority accept the leadership of the upper class, a substantial minority have, from the beginning, identified themselves with the Labour Party as voters, members and leaders. The few attempts to organise a "Middle Classes Union" have all proved abortive. The structure of British politics makes the foundation of a new party extremely difficult and any individual or group rejecting the two main parties is likely to end in frustrated bitterness or apathy. There is a good deal of room for pressure activities *inside* the main political parties and there were signs at the last Conservative Party conference that rank and file Conservatives may be growing restive at the continual domination of their party by upper class leaders.

CONCLUSION

We are now in a position to answer the two basic questions posed at the beginning of this paper. New middle class individuals and new middle class groups possess a substantial measure of both economic and political power. They have not, however, organised to use their power in any unified way either in the economic or the political spheres. This failure to organise as a class is in large part due to the fact that they have gained many of their ends without organisation. The depression of the 1930's left the vast majority of them untouched and enjoying higher real incomes than ever before. The Welfare state has benefited their lower ranks more than it has benefited the manual worker. Another reason for their failure to organise as a class has been the diversity of their incomes, statuses, and social origins and the divergence of their occupational interests.

Finally, the wider context of their "disunity" should be remembered. Even among the manual workers some 35 per cent. vote Conservative and a large proportion are not in unions or are apathetic unionists. While any analysis is bound to recognise class as the most important single factor in British social structure, the relation between economic position and power is too complex to be explained in terms of one factor alone.

NOTES

¹ In the "new middle class" we include those occupations whose members gain their livelihood neither from property holding nor from manual employment, e.g. managers, technicians, scientists, professionals, bureaucrats and clerks.

² Acton Society Trust, Nationalised Industry, no. 8, *The Future of the Unions* (1951), p. 7.

³ R. K. Kelsall, (1955) p. 179.

⁴ E.g. The Institution of Professional Civil Servants.

⁵ Now the Transport Salaried Staffs Association.

⁶ Whitley Councils, comprising equal numbers of representatives of organised workers and employers, meeting regularly and discussing a wide variety of problems, were first introduced in the civil service and in a number of industries after the 1914-18 war. Where the original plan is in full operation the Whitley structure is a three-storeyed one, and the committees and councils play a major part in the formulation of an agreed wage-and-salary programme as well as in arriving at an amicable settlement of collective disputes.

⁷ See *Labour Mobility in Great Britain, 1945-1949*, by Geoffrey Thomas.

⁸ Even the most radical white collar union, the Railway Clerks Association, struck only to gain recognition, and in support of the general strike of 1926. Irish and Scottish bank clerks have struck, but the Bank Officers Guild, although its case for recognition has had substantial public support, and its constitution allowed for it, has never seriously contemplated the step. Local associations of the National Union of Teachers were goaded into strike action between 1895 and 1924 by the refusal of local authorities to recognise them or accept the results of national wage agreements.

⁹ By contrast with manual unions, in the white collar unions the leadership is generally more activist. This has something to do with their more recent growth and their younger, less "experienced" leaders. But it is also partly understandable in terms of the timid conservatism of the membership with regard to industrial struggle. White collar unions, to a greater extent than manual, have to deal with a membership that wants gains without getting its hands dirty.

¹⁰ A. Tropp (1956).

¹¹ For example, during the interwar period, the National Federation of Professional Workers was the nucleus of a loose alliance of blackcoat unions (representing over 800,000 members). The alliance clarified the "non-manual outlook" on such issues as unemployment insurance and taxation.

¹² The two largest black-coated unions outside the Trades Union Congress, the National and Local Government Officers Association and the National Union of Teachers have both decided against joining the T.U.C. by votes of two to one.

¹³ Their influence is not necessarily in Conservative direction. The Bevanites draw a good deal of their support from among the middle-class Labour Party members.

¹⁴ Walter Bagehot in the second edition of *The English Constitution* (1872) noted the "deference" of the lower middle class to their "betters" as the only way in which "our old system" could be maintained. This desire to be guided and represented by men of rank and wealth was uninfluenced by the fact that their chosen representatives ignored their interests and treated them harshly in the imposition of taxes. (See W. Bagehot, *The English Constitution*, World Classics Edition, Oxford University Press, 1949, pp. 263-65).

¹⁵ At the 1955 General Election the teacher vote was roughly 2: 1 in favour of the Conservatives. However, 44 members of the National Union of Teachers were chosen as candidates by Labour constituency parties of whom 21 were elected; while only 8 stood for Parliament as Conservatives, of whom 2 were elected.

¹⁶ One should note the distinguished support given to the minority left-wing groups in the professions, e.g. the National Association of Labour Teachers, the Socialist Medical Association and the Haldane Society (Lawyers). There is also a strong tendency for the leaders of a professional body or occupational association to be more left-wing as well as being more militant than the rank and file.

¹⁷ Although there are signs that at the margin between the two groups there is a substantial degree of class fusion.

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Peasant-Worker: Some Aspects of Social Mobility in Post-war Poland

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(1) URBANISATION PROCESSES IN POST-WAR POLAND

Post-war Poland is characterised by rapid changes in social structure, resulting from the implementation of the postulates of socialism. The most important ones are: industrialisation of the country, spreading of education, levelling down of the abysmal differences in living conditions between town and country. From the complex of problems that might be called "town versus country" I have selected the process of transformation of peasants into workers. This process is intimately connected with social mobility and its forms, the emergence of new social categories and the transformation of old ones, gradual disappearance of class barriers and a number of other questions resulting from changes in social structure.

These changes are most striking in the field of large-scale urbanisation. Prior to World War II Poland was a typical agricultural country where 75 per cent. of the population lived in the rural areas and 61.4 per cent. lived on agriculture. By 1950 the latter figure had fallen to 45.7 per cent.

In the period 1918-1939 Polish rural areas were extremely overpopulated, and the number of superfluous peasants was calculated to be some 8-9 million. Economic stagnation, poor industry, and industrial unemployment prevented the peasants from going to town, so that annually a mere 100,000 peasants settled in towns. The nature of this process and the prospects of finding employment in towns can be illustrated by the fact that nearly one half of that number were peasant girls engaged as maids. Equally typical was the fact that when, in 1950, the Polish Radio organised a competition for a life story of a Polish worker in pre-war times, the vast majority of the 4,000 contributions came from people of peasant origin who described their difficulties in finding a job in town.

The overpopulation of the Polish rural areas is being eliminated chiefly through industrialisation; new factories are being built in the existing towns, and new towns are growing up around new industrial projects. The rapid and constant development of Polish industry, whose production increased 3.6 times as compared with pre-war times, naturally promotes urbanisation.

Industrialisation requires not only more workers in the strict sense of the word, but also more technical and office personnel, whose number, growing steadily as it is, still proves insufficient for the needs of industry.

Along with economic reforms, the social revolution has in view the spreading of education and culture among the population. The implementation of this principle is in itself an important factor, instrumental in the transformation of the social structure. Radical changes have taken place in the field of education, which is now widely accessible to peasants and workers. Practically all children have the opportunity to attend the elementary school and the number of secondary and university schools of various kinds has signally increased. The number of students in the schools of university standard rose from 48,000 in 1938 to 136,000 in 1954, even if not all of these schools have attained, as yet, the pre-war university level. When comparing these figures one must bear in mind that the population of Poland decreased from 35 million in 1938 to 26 million in 1954, i.e., by nearly 30 per cent. It must also be added that whereas in 1936 only 13 per cent. of all first-year students were of worker and/or peasant origin, in 1953 this figure amounted to 59.1 per cent.

The post-war years saw the most strongly marked rise in the number of schools training technical staff for industry. Poland has now nine technical schools of university standard, as compared with two before the war. There are also eleven Evening Engineering Schools in which outstanding industrial workers can take degrees. The number of pupils in secondary vocational schools rose from 87,000 in 1938 to 405,000 in 1954.

Although the number of young peasants who leave secondary schools or take degrees in university schools is many times higher than it used to be before 1939, yet the majority of peasants who come to towns have only elementary education, and in older age-groups even the seven-form school is not the rule. They come to towns as unskilled workers and learn a trade only in their work places. It is for this category of workers that various evening vocational schools and courses of different levels, including the above-mentioned Evening Engineering Schools, have been organised.

(2) RESEARCH IN A WORKERS' HOSTEL

The settling of peasants in towns and their transformation into workers was the subject-matter of our research in a Warsaw workers' hostel, one of many which can be found not only in the capital but in all other industrial centres as well. Initial research in the factory and on the building site where the inhabitants of the hostel are employed, has also been started.

Workers' hostels are an institution closely connected with industrialisation and the post-war reconstruction and redevelopment of cities and towns. In more or less destroyed towns and in new towns developing alongside industrial plants, the hostels are housing those people who have come from the rural areas to build houses and new factories or to work in the existing ones. This institution is, of course, temporary, until adequate housing conditions will permit every new arrival to settle normally together with his family.

Most workers who have just come from the country live in these hostels which are thus a convenient place in which to observe the transformation of peasants into workers.

The hostel described in this paper is one of the largest in Warsaw. It consists of 12 buildings, inhabited jointly by over 3,000 workers, all men, aged from 18 to 60, but mostly from 20 to 40.

The research is still in the initial phase (detailed formulation of problems, collection of statistical data, preparation of a questionnaire for selected problems). Apart from the collection of this type of material, the author has resorted chiefly to observation and interviews. He takes part in the community life in the hostel, attends lectures and discussions of books, and visits regularly the hostel clubs. He has also held, beside many casual talks, over 100 interviews with the inhabitants of the hostel, with the manager of the hostel, teachers from the evening school attached to the hostel, the librarian, etc. A number of data have also been obtained at the two work places where some of the inhabitants are employed.

About 30 per cent. of the inhabitants are skilled workers in engineering and precision apparatus factories, who in most cases have elementary or secondary vocational education. In the hostel they represent the big industry group, certainly most important at the present level of industrial technique.

About 70 per cent. of the inhabitants are bricklayers, carpenters, concrete workers, electricians, etc. Building workers form the largest group not only in the hostel in question but in Warsaw in general. Already before the war work on the building sites was relatively easy to obtain and attracted unskilled workers who often found there only temporary employment and returned to their villages for winter and in the periods of joblessness. At present also the majority of peasants coming to towns are people without a trade, with education limited to a couple of years in a rural elementary school, sometimes hardly literate.

Yet the building-workers who live in the hostel also include skilled workers, foremen and even graduated engineers, either with regular education or trained (and subsequently examined) on the job.

Thus the building workers' group, on whom special attention was centred during the research, combined with big industry workers, provide an excellent object of study of the gradual transformation of peasants into workers. (In view of the space limit the preliminary results are given without supporting data.)

(3) NEW SOCIAL CATEGORY: PEASANT-WORKER

Rapid industrialisation and resulting urbanisation are being accompanied by the rise of a specific social category, which in the hostel is represented by those building workers who came to Warsaw from the country, and whose education at the time of arrival did not exceed the

elementary school level. They are peasants aged from 30 to 50, from all parts of Poland, owners of small farms which are left in charge of their families: wife, school-age children, parents, etc. The members of this group do not break contacts with their villages and farms; they are consequently better off than those workers who, having the same wages, live in Warsaw with their families. They are characterised by a temporarily intensified strengthening of the petty bourgeois attitude, which causes them to be to some extent disliked by the other workers, permanent town-dwellers, especially the former urban proletariat.

Together with the numerous workers living in suburban villages and coming every day to factories in towns, they form a specific category of people with two backgrounds, namely peasant-workers. Those members of this group who live in the hostel in question visit their families in the country every week or every second week, and when on leave they help on their farms. All cases of a permanent return to the country of peasants employed in Warsaw, recorded in the hostel, fall within this category of workers.

Peasant-workers undergo changes connected with their stay in Warsaw and in the worker milieu, but these changes are rather slow since they do not want to lose their status of peasant. They greatly value their employment in towns and assimilate many elements of urban civilisation, but much more slowly than do the workers settled permanently in Warsaw. They do not take an active part in social, political and cultural life of the hostel or the work place, and their contacts with the general community life of the workers are much looser.

The same applies to their contacts with the village, for which they have ceased to be peasants and have become workers. They are not particularly animated by desire for social promotion, although they often learn a trade. Themselves not willing to settle in town for good, they want their children to be educated in town and to prepare for urban occupations.

(4) FLUIDITY OF THE WORKING CLASS AND DISAPPEARANCE OF CLASS BARRIERS

The transformation of peasants into workers means not only the adoption of customs that are typical of the workers, but also the assimilation of peasants in the working class with its definite place and rôle in the society. In to-day's Poland this process is very complicated in view of both the heterogeneous character of the Polish peasantry and the violent transformations which the working class is undergoing itself. Peasants are not being assimilated in a socially static working class, but in a class which, after coming to power, is going through dynamic changes.

As a result of social revolution a considerable percentage of that class has been promoted to the ranks of the intelligentsia by becoming

civil servants or holding responsible party and trade union posts. Apart from large numbers of peasants, the working class has been absorbing part of the former small bourgeoisie, chiefly craftsmen, and at the same time producing a new intelligentsia, both young people of worker background who since the war have had the opportunity to acquire a regular education, and actual workers who through large-scale vocational training have joined the growing group of highly skilled workers and who often can hardly be classed as workers in the usual sense of the word since they more closely resemble brain workers.

Under these circumstances the Polish working class is now extremely fluid.

The new social status of the working class and its dynamic character are strongly reflected in the processes of transformation of peasants into workers. The pattern of the worker, as seen by the peasants, is not a static one, it is the pattern of the worker in the process of social promotion. For the workers themselves the dominant pattern becomes that of a highly skilled person with formal technical education.

The fluid character of the working class and the workers' aspiration to social promotion are finding strong response among those building workers, inhabitants of the hostel in question, who are comparatively young, have no farms and intend to stay in town for good. They usually start as unskilled workers, mostly with elementary education only. Their adjustment to urban forms of life is both the quickest and the most complete; they are doing their utmost to learn a trade, they are attending evening schools and various courses (for drivers, electricians, etc.) and they are eager to deserve promotion in work. In a paper which, on the initiative of the author, they were asked to write in the evening school attached to the hostel, "What Do You Want To Be?" the pupils replied: engineer, factory manager, mechanic, etc. Members of this group often resign from work on the building sites to enter schools for pilots, sailors, officers, etc. They serve as an example of the new way in which peasants are penetrating the ranks of the intelligentsia.

In pre-war Poland there was a small group of the intelligentsia of peasant origin. Those people had acquired regular secondary or university education, but, characteristically enough, they most often chose the career of a priest or a teacher. At present, apart from the fact that young people of peasant origin acquire secondary or university education on an incomparably larger scale and thus join the ranks of the intelligentsia, a new phenomenon can be observed: large numbers of young peasants first became workers and through social promotion within that class finally tried to find their way to the intelligentsia, chiefly as people with technical education, secondary or higher.

In the hostel in question, the latter group of young people comes close in its aspirations to the skilled building workers and foremen

and the highly skilled workers of the engineering and precision instruments industries (30 per cent. of the hostel's inhabitants), who on the whole consider themselves to belong to the intelligentsia and who in their cultural life follow the pattern of that social category.

The question arises whether a member of the intelligentsia who is of peasant origin but whose social promotion took place when he was a worker, feels connected with the working class or dissociates himself from it. This problem, which also covers the intelligentsia of working class origin in general, is very complicated. We see that certain members of that new intelligentsia are still thinking in terms of the old social stratification and fail to realise that mass education is changing the character of the whole working class and that rapid changes are taking place in the whole of the social structure in Poland. Consequently, they consider the workers to be socially inferior as compared with the intelligentsia. This is quite understandable if we bear in mind the pre-war position of the Polish intelligentsia which, so far as social status, income, kind of employment and opportunities to study were concerned, was privileged in comparison with the peasants and the workers. In capitalist Poland, to become a member of the intelligentsia meant for a peasant or a worker a difficult but attractive form of social promotion. It requires further investigation to decide whether the above-mentioned attitude of some workers in post-war Poland is only a survival of the old habits of thinking or whether it is a more lasting phenomenon, in spite of changes in the status of workers.

On the other hand, we observe that former workers who have become members of the intelligentsia continue to think of themselves as members of the working class, or at least to feel themselves to be most closely linked with that class. The growth of the intelligentsia of working class origin as well as of the group of skilled workers who can hardly be classified in terms of the former disjunctive categories of "working class" and "intelligentsia" results in the general disappearance of barriers between these two categories, i.e., between manual work and white collar work. A similar process is taking place, though at a much slower rate, in the rural areas where the contrasts between the peasants and the new intelligentsia are fading.

The gradual disappearance of barriers in social life is illustrated in cases of marriages between workers and members of the intelligentsia, observed in the hostel in question. We have noted marriages and engagements between girl students and workers who after acquiring elementary vocational education continue their studies with a view to joining the intelligentsia.

The numerical growth of the intelligentsia, which is undoubtedly due to a conviction of the superiority of white-collar jobs as compared with manual work, is to a certain degree limited by the level of wages. A number of inhabitants of the hostel, young clerks with secondary education, have abandoned clerical work in favour of the trades they learned previously when employed on building sites. Characteristically

enough, they were followed by several members of the clerical staff of the hostel, since some types of manual work offer better opportunities in terms of money.

(5) CHANGES IN ATTITUDE

The settling in towns is followed by a number of changes in social psychology. All peasants who come to town desire to assimilate urban civilisation, namely dress, manners, command of standard Polish, etc.; they want to frequent cinemas and theatres, to read papers and books regularly. Such assimilation is, of course, much quicker in the case of those who went to at least the elementary school in town than in the case of those who came to their work places directly from the country.

Peasants who settle in towns have the feeling of social promotion. In pre-war Poland there was an abysmal difference in living standards between town and country, and the impoverished peasants, who found it very difficult to leave their overpopulated villages, developed a myth of happy and easy life in towns. At present, although conditions in the rural areas have changed and the peasants have now opportunities of social promotion and access to culture in the rural areas, this opinion persists and the peasants often fail to notice their new opportunities and still think of towns as the only places where social promotion and better living conditions are possible. It must be said, however, that the full transformation of more backward Polish rural areas will still take many years.

The social attitude of the peasants who have settled in towns is being changed. Whereas formerly their ideal was to buy some land, now, on becoming members of the urban proletariat, they come to the conclusion that in the socialist system they can be sure of work and of the future, that education will secure their children better prospects than a plot of land would do. It does not mean that they have completely rid themselves of petty bourgeois mentality. This can best be seen in the choice of certain social patterns. The inhabitants of the hostel in question very often go to the best cinemas in Warsaw, which means a loss of time when queuing for tickets (there are still too few cinemas in Warsaw), although they could quite comfortably see the same films in the hostel club. The desire to show off by going to the cinema, to display, or boast of, a new watch, bicycle, motorcycle or clothes, to impress friends by spending much money at dancing parties, etc., is quite common, and it is most strongly marked in those who have just recently come to Warsaw.

The social and political consciousness of the workers of peasant origin is a very complicated problem, much less simple than in the case of workers with some working class traditions. New attitudes are combined with deeply-rooted old ones. Religious feelings are incomparably stronger in the new-comers than in the town-born. Delay in developing new attitudes is partly due to the fact that town-born workers often show contempt for the peasants.

(6) CONCLUSIONS

The present paper passes over in silence a number of such essential problems as the loosening of family ties, the formation of a certain social margin among the people who have become separated from their former milieu, moral standards, etc.

The investigations carried out so far in the hostel permit the formulation of certain preliminary general statements, whose validity will have to be confirmed by later research, both in Warsaw and in other towns. The results of such research will show what is the scale of the processes discussed in this paper.

Poland is undergoing rapid structural transformations, with resulting culture changes. These changes are combined with social levelling down. Former classes disappear and there is growing interconnection between the three basic social strata: workers, peasants and the intelligentsia. Families whose various members belong to all the three strata are increasing in numbers.

Social mobility of peasants and workers is connected with the decline of social barriers. Lines of division between workers and the intelligentsia, so clear before the war, have been partly obliterated. The numerical growth of the intelligentsia through the spread of education and its growing links with the working class reflect social levelling down and the fading of contrast between white-collar and manual work. Disappearance of class barriers is connected not only with economic processes but also with general democratisation of society, elimination of illiteracy, and access to education and culture for those classes which were handicapped in pre-war Poland. All these problems must not, of course, be oversimplified. There are also certain tendencies to maintain various hierarchies of social groups and strata, or to build some new hierarchies on new criteria. This might be the subject-matter of a separate study.

Some Aspects of the Social Origin of Indonesian Political Decision Makers

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1. INTRODUCTION

The Japanese occupation (1942-1945) and the national revolution (1945-1949) created a virtually new group of political decision makers in Indonesia. In general it can be said that political power passed into the hands of Indonesians who had been able to enjoy secondary and university education in the pre-war period. It is the aim of this paper to throw light on some aspects of the origin of this new group of political decision makers. It represents the results of a study based mainly on official publications of the Indonesian Ministry of Information.

Included as political decision makers for the purposes of this paper are cabinet members (among them the president and the vice-president), parliamentarians and highest level government servants. Cabinet members under consideration here number 146 persons and include those who were in one or more cabinets of the "Republic of Indonesia" proclaimed in 1945, the federal "Republic of United States of Indonesia" established by the Round Table Conference of 1949, or the unitary Republic of Indonesia of 1950. Counting no further than the Ali Sastroamidjojo cabinet which fell in July, 1955, when this paper was being written, the number of cabinets of which these 146 were members is sixteen.

The 234 parliamentarians considered here are those who were members of the temporary House of Representatives in July, 1955. 23 of these had been appointed members in 1954 and 1955, in most cases as nominees of their parties, in replacement of parliamentarians who had died or resigned. The rest are former members of one of the four bodies which were fused to constitute the new unicameral legislature when the unitary state was re-established in 1950: the Senate and the House of Representatives of the U.S.I. (with 24 and 135 members) and the Working Parliament and the High Advisory Body of the (then members state) R.I. (with 43 and 9 members). Looking back at the different ways in which membership of these four bodies had been attained it is clear that election had played a minor part and nomination by government and parties a much greater one. Members of the Working Parliament of the R.I., and representatives of the R.I. in the two houses of the parliament of the Republic of the U.S.I.,

owed their position to sponsorship by a party or organization and to appointment by President Soekarno acting together with the currently active cabinet in estimating the relative strength of different groups. The members of the federal houses who represented member-states other than the R.I. included some who had earned their position in their own states through election, but in very few cases were these elections such as would measure up to democratic requirements.¹

The third group of 61 highest-level government servants is not a clearly-delineated category as are the other two. The group about which information is available includes all administrative-heads of ministries, ambassadors, presidents of state-banks and universities and heads of other central agencies such as the Supreme Court of Justice and the Council for Supervision of Finances. Unfortunately it does not include the important group of persons ranking immediately below these.

By collective tabulation it has been possible to come to a number of conclusions about these three groups of policy-makers, such as their age groupings, their areas of ethnic origin, their education and their non-political occupations. Certain other important factors such as father's occupation have had to be omitted in this paper because of the nature of the information available at the present time. Efforts are being made however to compensate for such shortcomings.

2. DISTRIBUTION OF AGE

To understand Table 1, one should bear in mind that the time of appointment is different in the case of each of the three groups. The ministers and the highest government officials could have come to

Table 1. *Age distribution of Indonesian Political Decision Makers, at their appointment and in 1955 (in percentages)*

Age groups	at appointment			in 1955		
	C.M.'s	M.P.'s	H.L. G.S.'s	C.M.'s	M.P.'s	H.L. G.S.'s
26-30	1	7	8	0	0	0
31-35	13	18	17	1	7	0
36-40	21	28	33	6	18	10
41-45	25	27	26	19	35	31
46-50	18	12	14	20	19	26
51-55	10	3	2	19	13	21
56-60	3	2	0	15	3	8
61-65	1	0	0	3	2	2
66-70	1	3	0	2	3	2
Deceased ..	—	—	—	8	—	—
Unknown..	7	0	0	7	0	0
Total ..	100 (n=146)	100 (n=234)	100 (n=61)	100 (n=146)	100 (n=234)	100 (n=61)
Average age	42.5	39.7	37.8	46.9	45.2	45.1

occupy their seats at any time between 1945 and 1955. In the case of the parliamentarians on the other hand 91 per cent. came to be included in this category in August, 1950, when the temporary parliament of the unitary Republic of Indonesia was established, and the rest were appointed in 1954 and 1955, to replace parliamentarians who had died or resigned.

As the table shows, the highest ages at appointment are among the ministers, with 25 per cent. in the age 41-45 group. The largest percentages of parliamentarians and high level civil servants are in the 36-40 group, i.e., 28 per cent. and 33 per cent. respectively. The figures for the average age at appointment (42.5 for the ministers, 39.7 for the parliamentarians and 37.8 years for the highest level civil servants) suggest the same pattern as do the figures for the average age in 1955, i.e., respectively 46.9, 45.2 and 45.1 years, though to a considerably lesser extent.

3. AREA OF ETHNIC ORIGIN

Looking at the picture which emerges from Table 2, one striking fact is that the order of frequency of the various areas of origin is almost identical for each category of political decision maker. Central Java, East Java, Sumatra and West Java. Only in the case of members of parliaments is there a deviation from this order, with Sumatra the

Table 2. *Area of ethnic origin of Indonesian Political Decision Makers (in percentages)*

Area of Ethnic Origin	Cabinet Members	Members of Parliament	Highest level Civil Servants	Total ethnic-population* (1930)
1. Sumatra	20	26	18	8
2. West Java	12	7	11	16
3. Central Java	29	19	38	27
4. East Java	22	17	20	27
5. Lesser Sunda	1	2	1.5	3
6. Borneo (Kalimantan)	1	8	0	3
7. Celebes (Sulawesi) ..	2	10	7	5
8. Molucas	2	3	3	1
9. Chinese origin	3	4	1.5	2
10. Arabic origin	0	1	0	0.2
11. Dutch origin	1	2	0	0.4
Unknown	7	0	0	
Total	100 (n=146)	100 (n=234)	100 (n=61)	

* The figures for total ethnic population are based on the 1930 census in the Statistical Abstract of the Central Bureau of Statistics and it should be pointed out that these are incomplete, leaving out as they do a number of ethnic groups including Bengkuluans, Lampongers and Minahasans, but are nevertheless of some use for purposes of comparison.

most heavily "represented" area. This may be explained by two facts: that Sumatrans were numerous in the representative organs of the original Republic of Indonesia, and that considerable numbers of them entered the parliament of the Republic of the United States of Indonesia via the two federal states established in Sumatra.

The strong position relative to their population, of other areas such as Sulawesi and Kalimantan within the group of parliamentarians, is also in large measure a result of the over-representation of the federal area in the parliament of the Republic of the United States of Indonesia.

The parliamentary percentage is three times the population percentage in the case of Sumatra (26%: 8%), two and a half times in the case of Kalimantan (8%: 3%) and twice in the case of Sulawesi (10%: 5%). The very opposite is true in the case of West Java where the ratio of parliamentary representation to population is 7:16. One factor helping to explain this, is that of the parliamentarians who came from the federal state of Pasundan within West Java, almost 50 per cent. are not Sundanese (members of the ethnic group corresponding with the province of West Java). Such historical explanations do not preclude but merely supplement explanation in terms of the general level of development of particular areas and the existence or non-existence of circumstances conducive to political action.

Not only has West Java few members of parliament relative to its population, but the same is true for Central and East Java where the percentage ratios are 19:27 and 17:27. The minorities on the other hand may be grouped together with Sumatra, Kalimantan, Sulawesi and Moluccas in having a parliamentary percentage which is greater than their population percentage. This is due in large part to the constitutional provisions for minimum parliamentary membership for the three minorities, Chinese, European and Arab, nine, six and three members respectively.

It should be clear in all this that no ethnic group or geographical area is in a literal sense represented in the Indonesian parliament, as parliamentary representation is on the basis of parties and organizations, not of ethnic or geographic origin.

In the case of the cabinet ministers and highest level civil servants the picture of areas of ethnic origin is rather different. Here again Sumatra's percentages are much higher than its population percentage, 20 per cent. of ministers and 18 per cent. of highest level civil servants compared with 8 per cent. of population. Central Java too is better situated with ratios 29:27 and 38:27. On the other hand the opposite is true of West Java, with 12:16 and 11:16, and of East Java, with the two ratios 22:27 and 20:27. Also unfavourably situated are Lesser Sunda and Kalimantan. Celebes' civil servants' ratio is favourable, but not so its ministers' ratio. Moluccas in both cases has favourable ratios. The percentage ratios in the case of the three minorities are not favourable except in the case of the Chinese.

Generally speaking, then, Sumatra has a higher ratio of policy-makers to population than any other area. Central Java follows. East Java has a low ratio, and the same is, significantly, true in even greater measure of West Java. For the moment it is not possible to do more than to mention a few suggestions of factors which may contribute to an explanation of this situation. One may mention the general level of development of the different areas, the need for and inclination towards political activity, and historical and political facts such as the situation of the capital of the revolutionary Republic in Central Java (Jogjakarta), the situation of the emergency capital of 1948-49 in Central Sumatra (Bukittinggi), and the distribution of the polyglot federal states.

4. LEVEL OF EDUCATION

In explanation of Table 3a, it should be said that categorization has been as far as possible on the basis of the pre-war educational structure, which still prevails in large measure. This structure provided for six to seven years of primary education, three of junior secondary school, two to three of senior secondary school and five to seven years for the completion of a full university degree.

Table 3a. *Educational level of Indonesian Political Decision Makers (in percentages)*

Educational Level Attained	Cabinet Members	Members of Parliament	Highest Level Civil Servants
<i>University</i>	68	27	87
Fully trained ..	58	19	67
Partially trained ..	10	8	20
<i>Secondary</i>	32	64	13
Senior Certificate ..	15	32	13
Junior Certificate ..	17	32	0
<i>Primary Certificate</i> ..	0	9	0
Total	100 (n=146)	100 (n=234)	100 (n=61)

The most striking feature of the table is the contrast between members of parliament on the one hand and the ministers and civil servants on the other. Less than a fifth of parliamentarians are fully-trained graduates and almost a tenth have no more than primary certificates, whereas among the ministers and civil servants the full graduate group is more than half and the group with no more than primary education non-existent. Among the parliamentarians it is the secondary

schools category which is dominant (64%), with equal numbers in its senior and junior ranges. But in the case of the two other groups it is the tertiary category which is dominant (68 and 87%), with full graduates in a clear majority (58 and 67%). The fact that the highest civil servants have had higher education than the ministers becomes clear when we look at the percentages of those with no more than secondary education. Only 13 per cent. of the civil servants are in this category, but 32 per cent. of the ministers, and whereas 17 per cent. of the ministers have no more than junior secondary schooling, all the civil servants have proceeded beyond this stage.

One may suggest a number of possible causes of these differences. First of all there is clearly a difference between the civil servant group and the other two in which capacity is evaluated in relation to political acceptability. Again vertical mobility is naturally greater on the political ladder than in the civil service, however influenced the structure and procedure of the latter have been by the rapid political changes of the last thirteen years. If one considers the small number of persons able to obtain secondary and especially tertiary education in this country before the war, it becomes all the more clear that the last 13 years have afforded staggering opportunities to the members of this group. Educational qualifications having become a vital part of the social ladder, the hunger for diplomas has naturally increased.

Table 3b. *Country of education of Indonesian Political Decision Makers (in percentages)*

Country of Education	Cabinet Members	Members of Parliament	Highest Level Civil Servants
<i>Indonesia</i>	73	93	50
University	42	19	44
Non-university ..	31	74	6
<i>Netherlands</i>	25	5	42
University	24	5	42
Non-university ..	1	0	0
<i>Other Country</i>	2	2	8
University	2	2	2
Total	100 (n=146)	100 (n=234)	100 (n=61)

In the above table no distinction is made between persons with higher degrees and those who attained only the bachelor or equivalent stage.

It should be said that of those who studied in overseas countries other than the Netherlands, the great majority went to Egypt, India or Arabia for an Islamic education.

In most cases, as this table shows, overseas education was university education. Although no figures are available of the absolute total numbers of persons studying overseas, it is clear that their number remained very much smaller than that of those obtaining University education in Indonesia. Taken in conjunction with this fact, the above table suggests that those with overseas degrees, in the great majority of cases Dutch ones, have attained a relatively very favourable position among the policy-makers. It is significant too, that their position is stronger in the groups for which educational qualifications are generally more important: they represent two-fifths of the highest level civil servant group, a quarter of the group of cabinet members and only a twentieth of the parliamentarians.

The present importance of those with overseas education is not merely a function of their degrees or certificates. Their position among the highest civil servants results in part from the pre-war practice of sending to Dutch Universities persons who had held government legal positions after completing a secondary-level legal training. Again the effects of residence in Holland in sharpening political consciousness cannot be underestimated. In general, however, the facts appear to bear out the popular belief that overseas study provides greater career possibilities than study in Indonesia.

Finally we come to the small group of those who had had a specific Moslem education of the *pesantren* type. This includes 8 per cent. of the parliamentarians and 6 per cent. of the ministers but it does not include any of the highest level civil servants.

Table 3c. *Secular and Religious Education of Indonesian Political Decision Makers (in absolute numbers)*

	Cabinet Members	Members of Parliament
Secular Education	137	215
Islamic Education	9	19
	2	2
University*	7	10
Secondary	0	7
Elementary		
Total	146	234

* *Partially trained.*

No clear picture has yet emerged of the rôle played by persons of Islamic education in political life, except that the Ministry of Religious Affairs has always been in the hands of a member of this group. A glance at the candidate list in the 1955 elections shows a greater number of *Kiais* or Islamic teachers (which is the occupation entered by most of those with Islamic *pesantren* education above the primary level) competing for membership of the Constituent Assembly than for the

House of Representatives. This suggests that they are more concerned with the passive than the active side of politics.

5. NON-POLITICAL OCCUPATIONS

The reader will notice that the basis of Table 4 is a three-fold division into civil servants, professionals and "persons in private occupations". Within the civil servant group there are the "administrators", which category includes all officials of the general civil administrators, regents, district officers, mayors and so on, and the "other civil servants" which includes all other employees of government except teachers. In the professional group are included teachers, journalists and all persons with academic training *working independently as professionals*, i.e. not as civil servants. Between and within the three main categories used in Table 4 the reader will notice a second

Table 4. *Non-political Occupation of Indonesian Political Decision Makers (in percentages)*

Occupation	Cabinet Members		Members or Parliament		Highest Level Civil Servants	
	Pre-war	Jap. Occ.	Pre-war	Jap. Occ.	Pre-war	Jap. Occ.
I. CIVIL SERVICE	37	48	34	42	62	83
1. Civil administrators	4	8	6	9	15	24
2. Other Civil Servants	33	40	28	33	47	59
II. PROFESSIONALS	45	35	40	36	23	8
3. Governmental teachers ..	4	5	10	10	3	0
4. Non-governmental teachers ..	15	10	16	12	10	2
5. Newspapermen ..	11	8	9	8	0	1.5
6. Lawyers ..	9	6	5	6	5	1.5
7. Physicians ..	5	5	0	0	3	1.5
8. Engineers ..	1	1	0	0	2	1.5
III. "PRIVATE" OCCUPATIONS	4	4	16	16	8	7
9. Landowners and/or small business	3	3	10	13	5	0
10. Employees ..	1	1	6	3	3	7
IV. LABOUR ..	0	0	2	2	0	0
V. Not occupied* ..	6	5	3	1	7	2
VI. Unknown ..	8	8	5	3	0	0
Total.. ..	100	100 (n=146)	100	100 (n=234)	100	100 (n=61)

* Before the war: still taking courses or just finished education; during the Japanese occupation: entirely engaged in nationalistic movements or underground.

division into government and non-government occupations. These two patterns of division were in a socio-political sense basic to the situation of pre-war Indonesia.

The table makes it clear that the pre-war civil servants and professionals account for a very large number of the policy-makers of the present period.

Somewhat over a third of the ministers, about a third of the parliamentarians and three-fifths of the highest-level civil servants were civil servants before the war, whereas almost half of the ministers, two-fifths of the parliamentarians and a quarter of the civil servants were in the professional group. It is interesting that the number of those who were "persons in private occupations" before the war is largest among parliamentarians (16%), four times as large among them as among ministers and twice as large as among highest-level civil servants.

It appears that there is a tendency though not a very marked one for political leaders in a narrow sense, i.e. ministers and parliamentarians, to have been recruited from the pre-war professional group. The tendency for the highest level civil servants of the present period to have been recruited from pre-war civil servants is considerably clearer.

The Japanese occupation occasioned a marked increase in the number of civil servants and a corresponding decrease in the number of professionals. Partly this is explained by the fact that a number of the pre-war "non-cooperating" nationalists ceased to regard boycott of government service as one of their political principles.

The very small number of pre-war members of the *pamong-pradja* or the general civil administration (regents, mayors, etc.) in the present-day group of political leaders in the narrow sense—4% of ministers and 6% of parliamentarians—is probably to be explained in terms of the privileged aristocratic character of the general civil administration before the war and the consequences of this in terms of its functionaries' political consciousness and acceptability. In the Japanese occupation the *pamong-pradja* rose to between one and a half times and twice its previous size, as a result of "new blood" from the professions, and specially from the sub-group of non-government teachers and doctors.

The relevance of the division made between government and non-government teachers of the pre-war period can be seen in the much greater rôle of pre-war non-government teachers in the present-day policy-making group. The explanation of this is to be found in the fact that non-government schools of the pre-war period, and particularly the so-called wild schools, provided a channel, albeit limited, for the expression of nationalist aspirations, particularly for those without academic training. In this respect they paralleled the profession of journalism.

It should also be explained that the category of "not occupied" persons includes those who were still at school or University when

the Japanese occupation began or were subsequently involved full-time in nationalist political activity, legal or underground, in Indonesia or in Holland and so cannot be said to have had any non-political occupation.

6. CONCLUSIONS

Through collective tabulation of very brief, highly abstract and incomplete biographical material it has been possible to gain some basic information on the social origin of Indonesian political decision makers.

Firstly, the conclusion may be drawn that the political decision makers of Indonesia at the present period belong to the generation which had been able to enjoy secondary and university education in the pre-war period, since at the outbreak of the war they were between 20 and 45 years old (Table 1). The figures further reveal that the majority of the parliamentarians are high-school graduates, but that the majority of the cabinet members and top level civil servants consist of people who have completed university training (Table 3a). It has been suggested that in the case of the parliamentarians the question of political acceptability has been the more decisive factor, while in the case of the cabinet members and the top level civil servants considerations of capability and efficiency have been more important. If educational qualifications are to be taken as a prerequisite of vertical mobility, the conclusion may be drawn that overseas study, especially in Holland, provided greater career possibilities than study in Indonesia (Table 3b). It is further evident that a very small group among the parliamentarians and ministers have had a specifically Moslem education (Table 3c).

Secondly, the tables reveal that the order of importance of the various areas of ethnic origin within each category of policy-makers is almost the same : Central Java, East Java, Sumatra and West Java. However, if the size of these ethnic groups relative to the whole population is taken into consideration, it seems that the following order of importance may be discerned : Sumatra, Central Java, followed by East Java and West Java both with low ratios. A variety of factors may have contributed to these differences, such as the level of development of the various ethnic groups, the need for and inclination towards political activity and some historical facts such as the siting of the capital of the revolutionary Republic of Indonesia in Central Java and in 1948-49 in Central Sumatra, while other areas were dominated by the Dutch-sponsored federal states.

Thirdly, a division of the non-political occupations makes it clear that pre-war civil servants and professionals account for a very large part of the policy makers of the present period. Included in this group are those professionals who during the Japanese occupation gave up their attitude of boycotting government service which previously they had considered as one of their nationalist political principles.

Finally, it is to be regretted that certain important factors such as father's occupation, had to be omitted because of the nature of the information available at the present time. However, a glance at the results of the distribution of non-political occupations seems to indicate that the political decision makers of Indonesia emerged from those social strata usually called the middle class or bourgeoisie.

NOTE

¹ For general reference on Indonesian political development, see: *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia* by G. McT. Kahin, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, 1952.

Social Structure and Differentiation in Rural Lebanon*

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Status differentials may affect "life chances", aspirations, interactional patterns and processes, values, ethnocentrism, familism, social mobility and a host of other factors which may be expected to play a vital rôle in social change now going on in the Arab world. If the villages are perfectly "flat" and oriented toward maintaining that condition, it may be hypothesized that they will be relatively impermeable to progressive influences, internal or external. If, on the other hand, there are groups which are changing their ways, defying the "cake of customs", economizing in number of children, making capital investments, repressing emotional release through immediate consumption;¹ if, in short, there is anything in the nature of an emerging opportunistic middle class in these villages, its existence can be revealed through studies of the social structure. The present study endeavors to measure the socio-economic status structure of a segment of the Arab village society.

The hypotheses can be presented as follows:

1. An eleven village universe located along the river bottom lands of the Southern Beqa'a Valley of Lebanon is uniform in occupational distribution and socio-economic status structure.

2. Distinct cross-village occupational categories can be defined which are significantly differentiated in terms of :²

- (a) socio-economic status;
- (b) size of household;
- (c) number of children.

It is often contended that because of village autonomy and isolation, generalizations based on village surveys are limited to the boundaries of the specific village. Also, while there have been many individual village studies, no composite picture is yet available in Lebanon because such studies have been widely scattered in time and geographic location and are non-comparable methodologically. The first hypothesis implies that villages may be considerably more alike than unlike. If so, and if cross-village sub-categories can be objectively defined, then

* A paper based on the same data, "Social Differentiation in Selected Lebanese Villages", was read at the Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Society, August 31-September 2, 1955.

generalizations based on such categories should be possible. If this is borne out, it will lend support for the practicality and utility of quantitative sociological research in under-developed "folk-village" societies.³

RESEARCH PROCEDURE

The Beqa'a survey was constructed with the above conceptions in mind.⁴ An area approximately 35 kilometers long and 2 to 5 kilometers wide falling on the east side of the river in a narrow valley was selected as the universe for this study. Wheat and barley are the major crops, although some potatoes, watermelons, legumes, and grapes are also grown. Of the eleven villages only one is connected with main highways by a paved road. The others are joined by dirt roads which are impassable by motor cars during winter months. With only rare exceptions, the residents live tightly together in compact mud-house villages. The exceptions include a few well-to-do citizens who have built stone houses on the village outskirts.

The Sample. Because size of village might be a determining factor, the eleven villages, having a range of 200 to 3,500 population, were classified into three size categories: small, medium, and large. There were two large villages, two medium, and seven small ones, of which one large (Jib Jineen, 3,500), one medium (Ghazze, 1,800), and three small villages (Houche el Hareem, El Marj, and Istabl, 200-1,000) were selected for survey purposes.

The next step included correction by a dwelling census of each of the five village *mukhtar's* (mayor's) household listings, which were inaccurate in every case, sometimes by as much as 15% for both excess inclusions and exclusions. From the corrected listing a randomized 15% sample of all households in each village was selected.

The resultant overall sample contains 169 households averaging 4.4 persons apiece. The overall sex ratio was found to be 110 and heavily male concentrated in the under 25 years-of-age category. The population is young, some 50% being under 20 years of age. 55 households were sampled in the largest village, 44 in the next largest, and 70 were from the small villages.

Defining occupational composition. An occupational distribution list containing nine categories was constructed after careful analysis of the scheduled descriptive information on the sample households, plus verification with the *mukhtars* and other villagers. The nine occupational categories are presented below along with data on number of household members and mean per capita household socio-economic status scores.

Category I	Simple Land Operators—may operate from 11-25 <i>dunums</i> * of land. (21 households); (Mean Status Score—217).
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* (a *dunum* is approximately $\frac{1}{2}$ acre).

- Category II Simple Land Operators—may operate 25 *dunums* and up. (45 households); (Mean Status Score—591).
- Category III Part-time Farmers. Operators of over 10 *dunums* supplemented by some profession or higher skilled or proprietorial activity. (12 households); (Mean Status Score—662).
- Category IV Simple Agricultural Laborer—*fellahin*. May own up to 10 *dunums*, but has no supplemental income from skills or trade. (61 households); (Mean Status Score—138).
- Category V Agricultural Laborer. May own up to 10 *dunums* supplemented by trades or skills such as in the case of the tractor driver. (5 households); (Mean Status Score—232).
- Category VI Non-Agricultural Laborer. Without skills. (Road workers, domestics, peddlers, etc.). (7 households); (Mean Status Score—287).
- Category VII Non-Agricultural Laborer. With skills (the miller, shopkeeper, or blacksmith). (13 households); (Mean Status Score—363).
- Category VIII Non-Agricultural Elite. Professional and administrative occupations (doctors, teachers, lawyers, *mukhtars*, *kaimakams*, i.e., “County chiefs”, etc.) (2 households); (Mean Status Score—635).
- Category IX Retired and Dependent Persons. Living on dole or remittances from relatives. (3 households); (Mean Status Score—339).

Due to the small size of the sample (169 household heads), the original nine occupational groupings were regrouped into five categories. The resultant categories are shown in Table 1 along with their mean status scores.

It can be observed that category A is the largest membership classification. Here are the ordinary *fellahin*, distinguished from their brothers in categories B, D and E only by the degree of their land and monetary poverty and their lack of skill. A typical household includes the head, his wife and three or four living children and not infrequently his mother.

In category B are the more successful *fellahin*, and in category D the term *fellahin* becomes inappropriate; “farmer” is more accurate and acceptable.

Category C includes all those in marginal economic activities other than farming. Actually there is considerable range in economic

well-being between those with and without income based on skills or proprietorship in this category, but they have been lumped together because of their numerical insignificance if separated.

Table 1. *Occupational categories and their mean status scores.*

Regrouped Occupational Categories ^a	No. of households	Mean Status Scores		Coefficients of Variation	
		Gross	Per Capita	Gross	Per Capita
A. <i>Fellahin</i> — Simple Agricultural Laborers	61	468.6	126.6	9%	8%
B. Small Land Operators—skilled and unskilled ..	26	739.6	218.0	12%	7%
C. Non-Agricultural Laborers—skilled and unskilled ..	20	752.7	330.8	15%	12%
D. Moderate Sized Land Operators	45 ^b	1427.0	385.0 ^b	8%	14% ^b
E. The Elite — Professional, Administrative and Part-time Farmers	17 ^c	2092.0	589.7 ^c	16%	20% ^c
TOTAL	169 ^d	952.4	248.0 ^d	10.5%	20% ^d

^a The regrouping was done as follows:

Category A is the same as the former category IV.

Category B combines the former categories I and V.

Category C combines the former categories VI and VII.

Category D is the same as the former category II.

Category E combines the former categories III, VIII, and IX.

^b After dropping two extreme cases (to be discussed later) from this category the results become:

Number = 43.

Mean = 362.

cv. = 1%.

^c After dropping one extreme case from this category the results become:

Number = 16.

Mean = 471.

cv. = 11%.

^d After dropping the three extreme cases from the whole sample the results become:

Number = 166.

Mean = 213.2.

cv. = 8%.

Category E is of course the resident élite of Southern Beqa's society and would be expected to include some absentee landlords as well.

The qualifications (b), (c) and (d) described below Table 1 indicated that coefficients of variation are lower when certain cases are eliminated. Two such cases were found in occupational category D. One of these was a single male, 34 years of age, whose only dependent was his mother. He operated 500 *dunums* of land, all irrigated, and he owned a goat herd. Another case operated 1,600 *dunums* of land and owned considerable wealth in the form of motors and stone houses. A third case, found in occupation category E, owned over 100 *dunums* of land, had a full-time grocery store and owned 180 sheep and two tractors.

These three extreme cases conceivably might be considered remnants of a passing caste structure. However, this is not a crucial concern of this study which seeks to determine the amount and kind of differentiation that characterizes the great bulk of the peasant population in Lebanese agricultural villages.

Definition of Socio-Economic Status. The status scores for this study were constructed on the basis of an evaluation of a variety of characteristics whose value could be roughly estimated in monetary terms. On the basis of field observation, it was estimated that the ordinary *fellah* (singular for *fellahin*) could count on 90 full days of work per year for which, at an average rate of 4 Lebanese pounds (\$1.25) per day, he would earn 360 Lebanese pounds per year. This estimate may be slightly high⁵ but it does not detract from the value of establishing a relative index figure. The figure corresponding to average labor-day year, 90, was used to measure all items of wealth. For example, a small tractor estimated at 1,800 Lebanese pounds was, at the rate of 4 Lebanese pounds per work day, equivalent to 450 units which meant that an average laborer would have to work five years to earn the necessary amount.

The value of land is also reflected in the status factor attributed to it and this factor is adjusted in terms of whether the operator is an owner or a tenant, and whether the land is irrigated or non-irrigated. Among items whose occurrence was rather frequent were the following, with their index scores:⁶

—dwelling room, mud	60	—hen	2
—dwelling room, field stone	120	—Owned irrigated <i>dunum</i>	
—dwelling room, cement . .	300	of land	100
—cow	75	—Owned non-irrigated	
—camel	100	<i>dunum of land</i>	50
—donkey	50	—Rented irrigated <i>dunum</i>	50
—goat	10	—Rented non-irrigated	
		<i>dunum of land</i>	20

Conditions of employment were rated on the same scale. For example, these basic equivalents were used:

—blacksmith	400	—teachers and minor	
—tractor driver	500	officials	1,500
—shopkeeper	600	—lawyers and profes-	
		sionals	3,600

Two household status scores have been computed. They include a gross and a per capita status index. The per capita score was compiled by dividing the gross score of each household by a weighted value for the number of dependent members in the household. The weighting followed the principle that two can live more economically together than apart. That is, each dependent was considered 6/10ths rather than as a whole liability.

RESULTS OF THE SURVEY

As for inter-village uniformity of occupation and status no significant difference was found between the three smaller villages, nor between the two larger villages.

Table 2. *Status differentiation per capita by size of village.*

	Two large villages combined		Three small villages combined
	Three extreme cases included	Three extreme cases eliminated	
Number of households	99	96	70
Sum of the Scores	29400	22725	16800
Mean Village Score	297	236	240
Standard Deviation	375	186	166
S.E.M.	38.2	19.1	20.0
cv.	0.128	0.102	0.083

Again, when the two larger villages were grouped together and compared with the combined three smaller villages no significant difference was found. These suggest that the size of the village is not a factor in studies of village structure.

Regarding cross-village occupational categories there was found no significant difference as regards size of household.

Table 3. *Size of household and number of children.*

Occupational Category	No. of households	Size of households	Avg. no. ^a in each household	Total no. of children	Avg. no. ^b of children from each household
A	61	259	4.24	208	3.41
B	26	118	4.54	109	4.19
C	20	66	3.30	49	2.45
D	45	222	4.93	197	4.38
E	17	77	4.52	62	3.65
TOTAL	169	742	4.39	625	3.70

^a S.E.M.=0.16; cv.=0.03.

^b S.E.M.=0.19; cv.=0.05.

However, differences were noted when compared with status and number of children.

Differences in *per capita* household status significant at the 5% level were found between certain occupational categories. For example, the ordinary *fellahin* (group A) were significantly differentiated from all other occupational categories except the small land operators (group B), just above them. The Elites (group E) were significantly higher in status than all others except for the moderate sized land owners (group

D) just below them, and the latter, in turn, were significantly differentiated from all other groups below them (see Table 1).

As regards the number of children, the ordinary *fellahin* (group A) had significantly fewer children than the moderate sized land operators (group D), while the non-agricultural laborers (group C) had fewer children than the small land operators (group B). Although not significant at the 5% level it was interesting to note that the *fellahin* had fewer children than any other group except the non-agricultural laborers. This relationship suggests the obverse of the Western experience where number of children is usually negatively associated with socio-economic status.

CONCLUSION

Data from an extensive socio-economic random sample of an eleven village agricultural area in Lebanon have been analyzed for degree of differentiation and stratification in terms of occupation, capital assets, size of household, and number of children. The major methodological problem arose out of lack of reliable census type data. This was resolved through the use of a general dwelling census in the sampled area. However, in view of the uniformity of certain structural components from village to village observed in this study, the painstaking and costly census-taking process would not appear to be an essential prerequisite for scientific analysis of social organization in homogeneous multi-village agricultural areas.

This study confirms the hypothesis that the vast lower echelon in this segment of Arab village society is not undifferentiated. Furthermore, this differentiation is more complex than is sometimes assumed. Five occupational groupings, which were formulated from nine separate categories identified in this survey, were found to be significantly differentiated in terms of socio-economic status. Significant differences were also found between some of these occupation groups in terms of family size.

These villages are, therefore, no longer flat with simply a few prominent families at the top and the mass at the bottom. The differentiation indicates the presence of intermediate groups, especially the moderate sized land operators and the non-agricultural laborers, which is suggestive of an emerging middle class.⁷

General patterns of cross-village uniformity in both horizontal and vertical structure revealed in this study implies the possibility of generalizing from one village to another within a homogeneous area provided the sample is adequate. However, this proviso would probably disqualify the adequacy of nearly all single villages for studies involving strata except for the *fellahin* group at the bottom. Thus, it would appear that cross-village quantitative studies based upon stratified samples are necessary for an analysis of social stratification.

NOTES

¹ George A. Theodorson, "Acceptance of Industrialization and Its Attendant Consequences for the Social Patterns of Non-Western Societies", *American Sociological Review*, vol. 18, no. 5, October, 1953, pp. 477-484.

² A related paper, Armstrong and Hirabayashi, "Educational Participation in Selected Lebanese Villages", Section V 2, analyses the relationship of education to cross-village occupational categories.

³ Bryce Ryan, "Socio-Cultural Regions of Ceylon", *Rural Sociology*, vol. xv, 1950.

⁴ The Department of Sociology at the American University of Beirut (AUB) conducted an extensive survey of an homogeneous rural area of Lebanon during 1954. The methodology and the initial content report is available in Lincoln Armstrong, *Beqa'a Socio-Economic Survey: Methodological Report* (mimeographed), Department of Sociology, A.U.B., Beirut, Lebanon, 1954.

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⁵ Albert Badre, "Income Arising in the Agricultural Sector," *Economic Research Institute Publications* (mimeographed), Beirut: Monograph no. 1, 1951.

⁶ A graduate student of Economics and two graduate students of Sociology at A.U.B. in collaboration with village elders constituted the judges in formulating these relative index scores.

⁷ Two of the on-going studies conducted by the Social Research Center of the American University at Cairo attempt to define such an area in two different sections of the Middle East. Also, these two studies will examine the adequacy of the Methodological approach suggested in this paper by the further use of this approach as well as by other methods used in field studies, such as carefully selected intensive interviews and participant observation.