TRANSACTIONS OF THE THIRD WORLD CONGRESS OF SOCIOLOGY

ACTES DU TROISIÈME CONGRÈS MONDIAL DE SOCIOLOGIE

AMSTERDAM, 1956

VOLUME IV

INTERNATIONAL SOCIOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION
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Koninklijk Instituut voor de Tropen, Amsterdam
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General Theme

PROBLEMS OF SOCIAL CHANGE IN THE 20TH CENTURY
LE PROBLÈME DU CHANGEMENT SOCIAL AU 20ÈME SIÈCLE

VOLUME IV

Changes in the Family
Changements dans la Famille

INTERNATIONAL SOCIOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION
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1956

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PART ONE

Factors in Changing Family Patterns

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INTRODUCTION

Scientific study of the family may be said to be just about one generation old, as it has developed to its present strength largely since the First World War. The somewhat earlier achievements in anthropology and psychoanalysis may be considered as preparative and contributory, although they were important enough in themselves.

This period of growth of what may now claim to be called a new science certainly coincides with a period of change. Who could ask for more than two world wars, a stupendous social revolution which now encompasses more than a third of mankind, an economic expansion that is outrunning all our expectations and an unforetold awakening of regions hitherto not only underdeveloped but seemingly lethargically lagging centuries behind " our ", i.e. the Western civilization. As these changes have reached cultures of so many different hues and with such differences in their timing of change, there was certainly provided a giant laboratory for this new science which has set out to study the family. We ought to have had ample answers to our query of to-day: how does social change affect the family? Because all possible changes working on and in the family could have been observed and compared. All factors of influence could have been isolated and time sequences established. All possible hypotheses could have been tested.

It is not merely an accidental fact that family sociology has not so benefited from this rare opportunity. The tragic truth is that social science has rarely if ever been built up in advance so as to be able to undertake its analysis when new content offers itself. It is not even considered as having the status of a science until after drastic changes in society have occurred, sometimes playing havoc with established social forms and values to such an extent that countervailing social action is called forth, asking for guidance from a science which then has too little knowledge to offer. Because social science has not become equipped early enough—either in terms of methodological tools or in terms of operational resources—to deal with its own substance matter when that is developing in its full dynamic force.

ACHIEVEMENTS IN DEMOGRAPHY

The one branch of the scientific study of the family which is just about catching up with the main trends of social change is demography. It can be safely asserted that now in the 1950's we have reached a level where, due to systematic collection and scientific analysis of data, human society has at its command a body of knowledge about the

massive phenomena of population change which might even be considered sufficient for aiding policy or at least for influencing the general direction of policy thinking. With regard to the macrocosmos of world population we possess now—but also only now—quite reliable information on the main curves of change in regard to mortality, fertility, their inter-relationships and even their connection with economic and social conditions.

This knowledge is also fairly efficiently broadcast throughout the world. Thus, there is universal recognition of the fact that both mortality and fertility are reduced in the process known as economic development, the former leading with a considerable margin. The scientific tools have been sharpened so as to allow a quite elegantly precise measuring of how this process evolves in individual countries. The body of knowledge available even permits some firm predictions, such as the one that the fall in mortality will be much more precipitous in countries which are in our days starting their economic development process than it was in the corresponding era in Western countries. In the case of the latter countries industrialization preceded the development of medical science which is now such an important factor, as is also the new planning ideology of the present time. On this basis it will also be possible to foresee that in these newer countries arguments will accumulate in a much more forceful way for speeding up, through specially planned social measures, the fall in fertility which is the counterpart to the fall in mortality. Instead of waiting for the two trends to attain some precarious balance in the long run, action will be undertaken to match them more perfectly as the two halves of a system of population control. The scientific knowledge is available, and is sufficient to guide this main direction of policy-making. We can here see illustrated what is implied when a social science reaches the mature stage at which it can clarify our picture of the universe in which we live—as do the natural sciences so often—and when it can guide planning, as do also so often the natural sciences.

In regard to family problems, our satisfaction with the level of scientific development does not go far beyond this point. Even in demography itself there remains a score of problems, connected with what still must be called changes of a macroscopic order, about which our knowledge is imperfect, if not totally lacking. This is true, first, with regard to such major syndromes of change as war, revolution, genocide or attempts at such, mass flight of refugees, fevers of nationalism. While we may possess some knowledge as to how such mass phenomena affect mortality—although even this knowledge is curiously scanty, or inaccessible—their effect on fertility is far from explored. And if we continue to ask for more detailed knowledge as to how demographic trends are moving within nations, regions, social groups, yes, within different decades, regarded as levels in the development process, such knowledge becomes quite uncertain and incomplete. An example is the awkwardness, or belatedness, with which the so-called baby boom

in the war and post-war years in the Western countries has been interpreted. This demonstrates that there is still far from a generally accepted knowledge about the pendulum oscillations between high and low birth rate in what is often called the third phase of the demographic evolution, namely the low mortality-low fertility phase. We can again assert that social science is late in coming to our aid in understanding the society of our own time.

This last example leads us further. When it becomes a question of understanding those phenomena which are less massive, more unique or microscopic, demography must take recourse to family sociology, and this family sociology has been but incompletely developed. The cyclical swings in the birth-rate which are dependent on repercussions of earlier periods of change, will of course be recognised, belonging as these effects do to the domain of demography proper. Of those there are many elements in the recent war- and post-war period of high fertility as well as in the present one of a declining number of births. But there was never available enough of a solid, scientific ground for predicting, although some of us dared to do so anyway, that the disorganising, disintegrating phase in regard to the family which was typical of the low fertility period before the war, might come to be a transitional phase. After the long centuries when a peasant family type was living in some kind of balance between actual conditions and professed values, had emerged a " Victorian " family, actually torn to disorganisation by its inability to cope single-handedly with the social change moving in from all sides while it was still unwilling to give up stereotyped values. It reacted with a family limitation which became severe when it reached the large population strata. But in the future beyond it could well be discerned a possible " new " family, organised more appropriately around the personalized family values which might come unscathed if not actually enhanced through the period of reorganization. Such a family may well reach a new kind of " harmony ". Anyway, it might be quite willing to have some two, three or four children—on certain conditions about society's support—conditions which are beginning to be fulfilled in several economically advanced countries.

Problems unsolved in the Socio-psychology of Family Life

The urgent question of our period is: can science help us to understand where we are just now? What is actually happening to the family today? In the old Western World and in the newer countries? As social action is everywhere undertaken on such a scale that it influences the very conditions for family life, we would need to have recourse to considerably detailed knowledge on many issues, hitherto little studied, if at all. I am led to make this somewhat brusque statement and to continue to raise questions rather than give answers because of the paucity of the material made available for this Congress of Sociology. I had rather expected that as chairman of a section on family and social

change I should be besieged with a flood of contributions, revealing the manifold secrets of how the family in our time reacts to change. It is with regret that I notice that instead the contributors to this section have been forced by circumstances to talk, like myself, more about research needed than about results obtained. Perhaps the most important service which the discussions during the Congress could render would be exactly the one to establish an inventory of those problems in the field of family research which are most urgently calling for clarification. For the field of demography such a summary of " gaps of knowledge ", useful as a mapping of desirable research, was established for the United Nations, and a priority order for the organization of such research established by the U.N. Population Commission at its last session.

There is, to be sure, a fair stream of family research forthcoming in monographs and articles, but it seems as yet to be concentrated either on descriptive material—which is in itself highly laudable as the dynamic character of our time risks otherwise to cause loss of the very subject matter—or it consists of spot studies of groups and situations for which the limits of generalization are too narrowly circumscribed. Perhaps more dangerous as a general feature of present-day sociology is that so many of the studies are " pilot studies ", rarely repeated, and thus more notable for interesting research designs and suggestive hypotheses than for tangible results.

Not only is research of sufficient scope and intensity lacking but it may be forgiven if it looks to an outsider, who comes as an administrator rather than a research executor, as if the very coordinates of a system for scientific studies of family problems were as yet lacking. (I am purposely not calling for a theory or even a theoretical frame of reference for family studies. Where we are, in the beginning of developing a science, it is much more imperative that we just delineate certain axes along which to organise our observations.) The lack of such a surveyor's kit is probably due to the unfortunate division of interest and training into a sociological and a psychological discipline, with anthropology as a third bidder. It is exactly in order to organise and evaluate from the point of view of their contribution to permanent and socially useful knowledge the multifarious studies achieved in the wide field of family research, that we need now such a system of coordinates, connecting the observed and observable demographic changes, and particularly changes in fertility patterns, with the socio-psychological day-to-day realities of family life.

It is possible that such a system of coordinates could best be derived from a discussion of the elements of cause and effect which can be found in studies of the inter-relationships between fertility and economic and social change. A challenging possibility to compare the effect of these factors in markedly different situations could then be obtained if studies were organised, not only of the effect on fertility, but of the variegated effects on the family as an institution of some of the major

changes, more unique in character, which have overtaken our societies and which were mentioned above in relation to the narrower field of demography, namely the reactions to *war*, to *revolution*, to *genocide* or *racial persecution*, to *refugee exodus*, to *occupation by military forces* and to onsets of feverish *nationalism*. Knowledge thus obtained would correspond to the knowledge we do have in somewhat more sufficient measure as to how the family reacts to times of unemployment, of economic crisis and depression.

In order to be of interest to everybody and of specific value for an intelligent discussion of possible counter-balancing action to the longer-run trends of economic and social change, the compilation of knowledge about the family would, however, have to move considerably closer to changes which not only, as in the case of those just mentioned, take certain population groups in their grip with coercive force, but are changes which affect practically all our families at the present time. So complete is the coverage of change just now that it threatens not even to leave enough families unaffected in order to serve as control groups.

Ideological Changes and the Family

Some of these factors of change have a fairly general permeating character. This is true particularly of changes in the impact of religion which are most often experienced by us in the Western world, and particularly in Sweden which is my vantage point when no geographical reference is given, as a phenomenon of secularization. However, the occurrences of revival also seem to offer an interesting opportunity for comparative study. Again, it is true that some studies of great interest have been made with regard to fertility patterns, e.g. comparisons between different denominational groups. But first, these studies are not dynamic enough, the rapidity and direction of *change* in the various groups rarely having been compared. And, secondly, family life consists in so much more than fecundity. To take just one burning problem: do families of a certain religion provide for more or less of intimacy between family members? between husbands and wives? between parents and children? Does secularization tend to increase or decrease exchange of confidences? The questions need only be posed in order to show what enticing studies could be made of some of the subtlest problems which hitherto have been hidden under stereotyped moralizing characterizations.

The ongoing changes in other than religious ideologies belong in the same category. I stress here *changes* in ideology, not just comparisons between families living in cultures with different ideologies, although that field of study is interesting enough and unexplored enough. But of particular importance would be to study the effects of that seemingly unidirectional change towards "rationality" which is now reaching ever larger parts of humanity. Thanks to the Indianapolis study ("Social and Psychological Factors affecting Fertility", published in

the *Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly*, New York) there exist a few notes on the relation of such " rationality " to fertility and to fertility planning. But it is far from enough. In relation not only to fertility but to family life this trend is one of the major new facts. It means that everything within the family domain loses its unquestioned character, its self-evident right of just going on as before. Everything is being surrounded by question marks, consciously so by husband and wife first, but increasingly so also by the children.

As this " rationality " means that everything in family life is being made the subject of choice, it brings the dimension of duration into focus. Choice is in its very nature a short-perspectived affair. If mates are not chosen for us but by us, we choose rather much as of today. Similarly: if a house is not provided for us by the mere fact of it having been the family abode for generations, we are apt to choose according to the circumstances of the present. Thus the risk of wanting to make another choice under different circumstances is inherent in the family situation of today. This opens the fundamental question of how permanency, in the family itself and in marriage, can be maintained in a world of flux and considering also our new rationalistic awareness of that flux, our deliberations as to how to fit our many divergent desires into it so as to create a tenable whole.

The new longitudinal studies of family problems undertaken by the Office of Population Research at Princeton (see the paper in this section by Westoff) might be geared to give us some answers to these problems. Here belong also Nelson Foote's discussion, in a following paper in this section, of the dynamic view on mate selection and his reference to studies showing lower divorce rates in the professional groups where rationalistic attitudes would be expected to prevail. But the very mention of these examples shows how few are the studies in the dynamics of family life. At the same time such studies would be of crucial importance just because when the new ideological trend towards rationality allows everybody in the family constantly to raise and re-raise problems, which in a traditional setting were left much more as once they were, new patterns and social institutions are being developed which call for guidance from a science about the interdependence of various factors.

The cardinal question is broached here: what promises to remain? Is the family strong enough to survive as a social institution under conditions of rationality? Even if it would be an illusion to think that any definite answer to such a general question could be obtained by any kind of research, it would be highly rewarding to study forms and degrees of satisfaction under conditions of " rationality ". They might reveal what happens under the present-day competition and conflict between, on one hand, a conventional over-romanticization of family values—often manufactured by quite cynical advertisers—and, on the other hand, a perhaps equally conventional " rationalistic " hesitation to confess a deep personal attachment.

Economic Changes and the Family

There is no intention to minimize the effect of economic change on family life by dealing with it at this fairly late stage. But while some of the changes just discussed are of a general character, permeating in a rather diffuse manner large groups of people, economic conditions can fairly easily be measured in relation to each individual unit concerned. The coordinates for a comprehensive study of economic change and the family would be, first, the one of the relation between changes in family levels of living and the content of family life. Again, the effect on fertility has been studied and interesting conclusions of a universal validity are being drawn. Planned reduction of family size seems to start in the well-to-do families, although this is mainly because that group can be equated with the educationally-culturally advanced. As a more final result is discernible a situation where family size will be in positive correlation with level of living. However, the actual family size achieved in any one society or social group will be a function of a delicate balancing of several factors which only have in common that they were mute during a period of non-controlled fertility: liking for children, state support in cases of economic emergency, wife's possibility to distribute her lifetime between children and other tasks, etc.

The very flow of family life as influenced by changes in the level of living should be an equally interesting object of study. A beginning is made in connection with studies of consumption patterns. We have fascinating explorations of the differences in standard of life for different family members such as Gerh. Herzberg : *Ernaering, Helse, Miljoe* (*Nutrition, Health and Environment*, Bergen 1934) which it would be highly interesting to see followed up in other countries. There are other more frequent and more recent studies about the influence of the automobile, of the radio, of the television on family life. But certainly we have far from satisfactory knowledge on a large number of even more fascinating problems: how does the quality of family life change with changes in different material variables? And how is it affected in particular by the transgression of thresholds between poverty, experienced as poverty by the individuals concerned, and easier circumstances? What has happened to family stability, to the level of irritability, when the Western world has so largely moved from a state of economic insecurity to one of security?

Social mobility is but another modality of recent economic development. With the interested support of the International Sociological Association it is being studied in a coordinated way in several countries, most systematically so far in Great Britain, as revealed in a first publication under the editorship of David Glass. But the question remains open how completely these studies will answer the queries about what happens to the family: to its cohesion, to the relative status and rôles of its members, to their satisfaction or anxiety under the influence of various processes of social mobility. We should particularly note the difference which is occurring in regard to the stress caused by social

aspirations. While in the old-time family it happened—how often is impossible to say—that ambitious children had to fight their parents' lack of understanding for their desire to study, or to go out in the world, in one word, to be different, it must now happen more often that parents cause stress in the children by their insistence on social ambitions. How does that drama unfold itself within the family? The tensions created by the introduction of social distance between members of a family is perhaps less important from the point of view of prospected social action, but it is impossible to understand our time without a full light on them.

A similar rather complete turn-around seems to have been made in relation to the identification with work. Here it has been fairly abundantly observed that the separation of the father's working place from the home is of direct consequence both for his duties in relation to child-rearing and for the conceptualization of men's and women's rôles. What has been less observed is the tendency especially for manual workers nowadays to lose the complete identity with their work as a central factor in life and to gain time and energy for leisure activities which might include family life. On the other hand, the once so-called leisured classes are disappearing and the higher social strata of our day, engaged in business, administration or free professions, are increasingly engulfed in their work, their work responsibilities and work anxieties. How does this change reflect itself within the different families?

Problems such as those raised here by way of illustration are not listed only because it would give intellectual pleasure to know more about them but primarily because our societies will need to know much more about aspects like these if they are not going to " misplan " the social situation for families.

Changes in Social Organization of Family Life

The most portentous changes such as those brought about by geographical mobility, by urbanization and by the organization of a number of recreational, educational and social service institutions have, like those previously discussed, been brought in for description in general books on family sociology. Likewise, they have been noted for their effect on fertility. What is still lacking are much more detailed and diversified morphological studies of how these changes affect families under different conditions, and secondly an analysis as to what precisely can be isolated as operative factors in this causation of new patterns of fertility.

Even more interesting, however, would it be to have studies of these external factors in their relation to what has been called the day-to-day life of the family. How do they satisfy the different members of the family? Is, for instance, suburban life more satisfactory to children than to wives? Further, do these institutions bring confusion and competition between scales of values? And what are the weights of

effects involved? How many "worlds", governed by different laws and concepts, do the children of our time live in (family, neighbourhood, school, etc.)? Do the new institutions substitute for need satisfactions which family members previously derived from each other—the playground giving to the child what he was supposed to get from following his father into the field? Or do they conversely require that family members provide vicarious satisfaction derived from other persons or institutions in earlier times? Is it true, for instance, that the type of relationship which neighbouring relatives provided in earlier days is now often sought within the family, e.g. the husband seeking in his wife also the counselling mother, to whom he used to have recourse even as an adult.

It seems to me that in two particular respects we should need considerable further research in order to guide policies which are now being established without the benefit of basic rational considerations. One refers to the problem of housing, the very habitation patterns which modern society forces upon the family. Sociologists working with townplanners can give many indications of problems ripe for study or actually under study. But visualizing the change that has taken place in our societies I would stress particularly the need for studies of the composite picture of what are the wants of solitude and gregariousness. Regrettably enough, in crowded quarters in many of our cities ample opportunity exists to study family situations where solitude is practically annihilated. It is hard to compare directly with conditions in earlier peasant societies where both solitude, mostly out-of-doors, and togetherness, were probably available in rather solid portions. It is possible that the need in our days is not for more of the one or the other but for more frequent shifts between them, for more diversified use of privacy according to the increase in leisure activities and to the general multiplying of choice, referred to above.

Demographic Effects as Causes of Further Change

So fixedly have social scientists gazed on the size of the family as a consequence of demographic change that there has been little or no interest in getting to know exactly how life in settings of different size is experienced by the family. What is the typical life of a four-child family as against the life of a two-child family? How does work distribution within these families differ? How do social aspirations distribute themselves? This kind of study of different sized families in their global context should rightly precede studies of the effects of differing positions on the individual child. Of course, one would not just want to have a comprehensive picture which can better be given by a novelist than even by a gestalt-psychologist, but real studies, diagnosing points of strength, margins of indifferent characteristics and differential needs of societal support and supplementation.

Perhaps the most important of all changes is the one of increased length of life and life expectancy concomitant with the demographic

revolution the world is going through. It is difficult to select the statistical measurement which might most vividly and most concretely express the fact that marriage in our days is a much more long term affair than in earlier days. This becomes, however, the striking conclusion if we choose to compare life expectancies from the age of 20 which is close to the time when marriage is concluded and when the knowledge of how many years it is probably going to last ought to have a considerable influence on people. Roughly speaking, this prospective period is now close to 55 years for young women in advanced Western societies, while a century ago it was hardly 40. Another way of looking at the same phenomenon is to indicate the experience gained in countries like the Netherlands and Sweden, but indicative of what is in store for most of the Western world, namely, that three-quarters of our population lives to 62½ years, one-half to 77·5 years, and one-quarter to 82½.

This change in length of life is so portentous that it seems to me that as long as it is not fully taken into account, a most important feature of the family problem is being overlooked. When sociologists often conclude that the family as a social institution is becoming reduced to the functions of " affection-giving, sex-regulation and child-rearing ", they seem to bypass that most important of all functions, namely, of simply " living together ", of sharing a residence, of spending day and night in each other's company. This requires not only a " friendship of life-long duration " but must be a very specific form of human life. The constant opportunity for communication provided by family life may be one of its most unassailable assets. Consequently, studies of family inter-communication should be a most rewarding field. And it is particularly desirable that such inter-communication be studied at all different levels of family evolution, as such studies may throw light on what remains one of the greatest secrets: how silent were people in bygone days? How much is the capacity for change in our time conditioned by our possibility to experiment with attitudes by way of constant private discussions? It is in this connection highly appropriate that the most crucial middle years of marriage now come in for intensive studies, such as those in progress at the University of Chicago under the direction of Burgess and Havighurst. By such studies might be revealed what are as yet some of the most sacred of our social secrets, namely, how do men, women and children experience this prolongation of family life? How are they changing their life orientation potentially and actually? This is socially most important in relation to women's orientation in relation to the long post-motherhood period. There are also more easily observable changes to study, such as the difference made to the number of years of economic dependence of children.

The psychological reorientation of parents as " young " instead of " old " people must have many fascinating facets. It is, for instance, quite probable that young people of today are just as shocked by having

parents youthful in looks, sexual activity, etc., as the young people of yesterday were by having parents of an authoritarian type. Anyway, that a considerable change in " age rôles " is taking place and that stress is created by the transition is as evident as the lack of studies of its significance.

Some of these changes cause change also in socially introduced or sanctioned institutions such as those relating to inheritance. The family is under our eyes giving up its close identification with property interests. On one hand children are largely losing their value as an old-age insurance. On the other hand, parents are less and less the object of children's hopes, worries and conflicts in regard to inheritance. As Sverdlov remarks in his contribution to this section, this is a very important change from older peasant societies, certainly worthy of searchlight attention in different nations and social groups. It is one of the not infrequent indications that modern families might make for more rather than less harmony. Whether the same effect is obtained by the loosening of family ties among adults in our time—nearly amounting to a loss of kinship ties already at the sibling level—remains an open problem.

In another category of " consequences " of the demographic revolution belong the numerous policy measures instituted to lend support to the family, as well as the abundant public discussion of family policy, family problems, family limitation. One of the most moot questions in the whole field of family research and of family policy is exactly this one of what weight to give to the economic and institutional factors as such, e.g., the payment of family allowances, and what to the influence of expectations, of ideological by-effects, of the changed mental climate surrounding the family. This is exactly the kind of problem which so admirably lends itself to comparative empirical studies. It is a pity that such important problems have largely to be left to the guess-work of speculation or the exploits of moralistic exhortations.

Receptivity to Change

The situations of social change which must act as stimulus factors on the family have in the foregoing been set out along certain axes which might be utilized for assembling our future knowledge. However, the response factors should also be clustered into categories, so that true systems of coordinates can be obtained. Which of these more primary sets of factors should be chosen may be judged differently according to different theories in psychology and sociology. Here it suffices to indicate what are the broad fields of reaction to change which must be covered, if we are to have socially useful information.

The variegated types of change must first be studied far more than hitherto in relation to the *age structure* of the family including nuptial age, age discrepancies between husband and wife, timing of children, etc. Likewise they must be made to refer to the *income-earning activities*

of various family members and to the forms of *economic dependence* of children, adolescents, adult children and other relatives. In these respects we have far from sufficient knowledge as to the new state of affairs which has been brought about in most Western countries in the last generation or two, and which must be of direct importance when economic life is being organised more and more by society (social security schemes, taxation, planned saving, etc.).

The social changes also work on the *allocation of duties* between family members. This is in turn not unrelated to the amount and character of *time spent together* by the different family members in work or in leisure, respectively, or on the amount and character of time spent separately, leading to new sets of outside contacts. Also influenced, both in a primary and in a secondary way, is the whole network of *rôle perceptions*, of status, of " power " for various family members, where nobody from the infant to the old widow remains in anything like the old situation. The same goes for the *aspirations* that each family member possesses, as well as for the composite aspiration for the family itself, for its size and its life-plan. Finally, of course, there would be needed even more studies than the ones already forthcoming as to the *patterns and extent of sex satisfaction*, the forms of sex regulation inside the family, e.g. the actual extent of true and faithful monogamy, and outside the family, through substitutions and deviations.

Final Remarks

If I have here raised demands for more research in a rather monotonous row, this seems to me justified by the great social need, not to have more pieces of research, however ingenious, but to have solid blocks of accumulated knowledge. Nobody, and the present author last of all, would have any right to complain about what is being done in family sociology. But everyone has a right and even a duty to demand that social science be given the opportunity of an incomparably widened coverage of all social problems and also of a very much closer observation following change when it actually occurs. After all, such change is as important as any other branch of history. Also, the possibilities are by no means small to gain at least suggestions for guiding all the social plans which are now influencing the conditions for family life.

With regard to the methods to be used if we should want to build up a complete body of knowledge of the family, a most fruitful discussion could take place at the Congress of Sociology. A main viewpoint must be that such research may have to be much less " original " than what is now fashionable in academic circles. It may have to be repetitive, and perhaps even bureaucratically organised for extensive data as is statistics in a country like mine. It would obviously have to rely on sampling, but systematic sampling. It would also have to use to a large extent some form of sample recording of the flow of

family life, e.g. by repeated records for certain time limits, or 24-hour inventories indicating how the various family members spent how many time-units doing what. Perhaps new techniques are being evolved to make possible a kind of " content analysis " of family inter-communication. Anyway, one of the most promising avenues is to extend the new communications research to family sociology.

The need for comparisons is no less than the need for wide coverage. Comparisons in space must be facilitated through joint organisation of research by the social scientists of various countries; one will have to look to international organisations like ISA and UNESCO for support in this work. But comparisons in time are equally important. It would seem to be quite feasible to organise three-generation studies in order to encompass the present period of transition while the last chances to do so remain. The middle generation has certainly something to offer by way of inventorizing its own family phenomena together with those of its parents and its grown-up children's generations. And controls can be secured by cross-examining at least the third young generation. Thanks to the prolongation of life, however, there are also quite a few survivors of the first generation who have certainly not as yet told the story of the change they have witnessed and to a considerable extent enacted in the form and content of family life.

Trends in the Psychological and the Sociological Study of the Family

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Historically there has been an interesting division of labour between psychology and sociology. Research in psychology, until recently, has focused almost entirely on the child with little or no attention to the family. But studies by sociologists have been almost entirely devoted to an understanding of marriage and the family and, only lately, have given any consideration to the child. There are many courses in colleges and universities on the psychology of the child but very few on the psychology of marriage and the family. Sociology departments almost always include in their curriculum a course on the family and generally one or more on marriage, but courses on the study of the child are conspicuous by their absence.

It was, perhaps, to be expected that the study of the child as an individual should precede research on the child as a member of a social group. The family was not only a social group it was an institution. Therefore it was natural and perhaps inevitable that it should first be studied by sociologists and cultural anthropologists.

This sharp division of labour between psychologists and sociologists could not continue indefinitely. The study of the child sooner or later led discerning psychologists to consider the influence upon him of parental and sibling influences. The explanation of much of child behaviour could not be exclusively or entirely discovered in the constitution or the mental processes of the individual. Much of his behaviour appeared to be determined by the culture of the family and by the rôle of the child in the family and his reaction with other family members. Reality compelled the psychologist to take family relations into account.

Similarly the sociologist could no longer be content with the study of the family as a social institution. Perforce, to understand family behaviour, particularly in the flux of social change, in modern society, the family had to be studied as a group of interacting personalities. The rôles of family members were not merely those of custom and convention although these had their significance. They were also intimate and personal, arising out of informal interaction in the interpersonal relations of family living.

This introductory statement provides the background for the consideration of two main questions in this paper.

First, what has been the relative growth of research on marriage and family from the psychological and sociological approaches during recent years?

Second, what have been the major contributions of psychological and sociological studies of marriage and the family?

Relative Growth of Psychological and Sociological Research

The following procedure was used to obtain a rough estimate of the recent growth of research on marriage and the family by psychological and sociological approaches. All entries in *Psychological Abstracts* were examined under the three headings of the "Family", "Marriage", and "Divorce" in the four volumes for the years 1938 and 1939 and for 1953 and 1954. Only items on research projects and methods of research were selected. Excluded were textbooks on marriage and the family and articles on family life education and marriage counselling. Surveys were also omitted.

The distinction between psychological and sociological research was made on the basis of the conceptual framework and methods of inquiries. It was not decided by the discipline to which the investigator was identified. The term "psychological research" was broadly used to cover psychiatric as well as more narrowly psychological studies. Similarly, the term "sociological research" was expanded to include those in cultural anthropology, population, and human ecology.

The survey in changes in research in the past fifteen years indicates that the marriage and the family research is still predominantly in the field of sociology. In fact, sociological studies in this area have increased their relative position in relation to psychological research. Interestingly, studies of marriage have increased more rapidly than family studies.

A review of marriage and family research for the year 1954 by W. W. Ehrmann[1] indirectly confirms this finding of the predominance of sociological over psychological research in this field. He classified articles reporting research by the nature of the publication in which they appeared. He discovered that practically 40 per cent. of research articles appeared in *Marriage and Family Living*, a multidisciplinary journal. Those published in sociological journals were 30 per cent. of the total. Only 10 per cent. were printed in psychological publications, broadly defined to include those in psychiatry and mental hygiene as well as psychology. The remaining 20 per cent. appeared in all other journals with half of this proportion appearing in the *Eugenics Quarterly*, the *Journal of Home Economics*, and the *Quarterly Journal of Alcoholism*.

Marriage and the family have both psychological and sociological aspects. The quantitative amount of research in these two fields relative to each other is not of primary importance. It is much more significant to ask what each discipline has contributed or can contribute to an understanding of marriage and the family. The remainder of the paper will be devoted to this subject.

Distinctive Foci of Psychological and Sociological Research

No hard and sharp line needs to be drawn between psychological and sociological research on marriage and the family. Yet certain differences in conceptual framework and methods of research are

evident. The centre of interest in psychology is on the individual and in sociology on the group. Psychological research tends to focus on mental processes while sociological studies concentrate on social interaction. Psychology emphasises individual differences. Sociology stresses the uniformities in the attitudes of the members of any given group and at the same time explains divergencies in behaviour in terms of collective group action.

As will be seen later in this discussion the psychologist, beginning with the behaviour of the individual, sooner or later finds that he needs to take into account the family or other groups of which the person is a member. Similarly, the sociologist, starting with family behaviour, discovers that he is concerned with the interpersonal relations and the interaction of the members of this group. But in spite of this tendency to overlap the psychologist retains his central interest in the individual just as the sociologist holds to the group as the primary object of his research.

Trends in Psychological Research

The psychological study of marriage and the family has developed in relation to the emergence of a succession of conceptual systems and research methods.

Instincts provided the stock explanation of human behaviour in the first decade of this century. McDougall, Thorndike, and other psychologists listed, among others, sexual, domestic, and parental instincts and explained their expression in family behaviour.

The limitations of the instinct theory for the understanding and study of behaviour was soon recognised. The main interest in psychology shifted to experimental studies in the laboratory. This research was heavily weighted with animal studies with little or no direct attention to marriage and the family. One aspect of these studies was research on learning which had implications for the rearing of the child.

Psychoanalytic methods as developed by Freud and his associates uncovered the unconscious motivations in behaviour and presented an entirely new conceptual system for the study of the individual in emotional interaction with family members. The Oedipus complex, the Electra complex, and sibling rivalry were new formulations of family relations. Psychologists did not think in terms of instincts but rather of a chief instinctual drive such as sex, power, security, etc. Flügel in his book *The Psychoanalytic Study of the Family*[2] organised Freudian conceptions into a systematic treatise on the family.

Psychoanalytic theories proved more valuable for clinical diagnosis of treatment of social and personal problems than as a guide for research. Sears, who surveyed the findings of research which used objective methods of investigation, reported rather disappointing results. He advises other research approaches as more promising for future studies. He says: [*Survey of Objective Studies of Psychoanalytic Concepts* (excerpts)[3]]

"If psychoanalysis is viewed as a science of personality, there is reason to ask whether future research should follow in the same framework or whether some different theoretical orientation holds more promise. . . . It would seem desirable, therefore, that future research should be designed to aid in the development of a science of personality that is not structured along the same lines as psychoanalysis, but has a systematic structure of its own based on the triumvirate of influences loosely defined as *growth*, *learning*, and the *social milieu*.

First, there is crying need for the results of longitudinal research on personality development.

Second, fruitful research concerning the influence of learning on motivation is indicated.

Third, cross-cultural comparisons of personality development can assist in evaluating the significance of the social milieu as a source of motivation and trait characteristics. If the basic assumption of both psychoanalysis and behavioural personality science is correct, i.e., if the conditions of childhood learning largely determine adult characteristics, it is evident that the social milieu in which the child grows up is of pre-eminent significance in determining the nature of his secondary motives and his basic personality structure.

The further analysis of psychoanalytic concepts by non-psychoanalytic techniques may be relatively fruitless so long as those concepts rest in the theoretical framework of psychoanalysis."

Personality tests had a rapid development in psychology, beginning in the twenties and continuing to the present. It was generally assumed that personality characteristics were either inborn or became fixed early in the psychogenic interaction of the infant and child with members of his family. Psychiatric and psychoanalytic theories were drawn on heavily in organising a theoretical framework for the tests. For example, Jung posited the extrovert and the introvert types of personality. This distinction was utilised in the selection of questions the answers to which would be indicative of one or the other of these types. Subjects taking the tests could then be scored on an extraversion-introversion continuum. The Bernreuter Personality, and the Minnesota Multiphasic Inventories and other tests have been used both by psychologists and sociologists in certain studies of marriage and the family.

The limitations of paper and pencil tests in the measurement of personality characteristics—the doubtful aspects of self-reports, their superficial nature—led to the development of projective techniques such as the Rorschach and the Thematic Apperception tests. Projective techniques are designed to evade conscious recognition of their purpose and to probe to the deeper levels of personality structure. They have also been employed in studies of marriage and the family.

Basic personality structure research is a relatively recent field combining the insights of psychoanalysis and cultural anthropology. A chief assumption of this new type of inquiry is that child-rearing practices—time of weaning, nature of toilet training, breast or bottle feeding—mould the basic personality structure of children in a given culture in a way that prepares them for the conditions of adult life. In a penetrating statement Erik H. Erikson makes the following intriguing analysis that the parents by their attitudes and behaviour in child rearing "systematically though unconsciously establish in the infant's nervous system the basic grammar of their culture's pattern. The very ministrations that help the newborn to survive thus helped his culture to survive in him and—if history will have it—through him".[4]

The specifics of these findings have been called into question by a carefully designed statistical study by William H. Sewell.[5] In a comparison of rigid versus permissive methods of child rearing he found no significant differences in personality adjustment in children brought up by different methods of feeding, nursing, toilet training, and discipline. Further research is desirable to determine if certain attitudes are more important than the specific methods of infant rearing.

The *developmental* approach in the study of parent–child relations utilises learning theory but places it squarely within the framework of the objectives of the family, the school, and the community. It recognises the autonomy of family members and the rôle of problem solving and planning.

In all of the above changes in point of view and research methods psychological studies have concentrated not on the family but on individuals as influenced by the family. The recent trend to a more direct approach to marriage and the family will be considered under the section of this paper on research areas of common interest to psychologists and sociologists.

Trends in Sociological Research

Sociological research on marriage and family will be defined broadly enough to include studies in a wide area including pertinent studies in cultural anthropology.

The *institutional* study of the family was introduced by George E. Howard in his work *History of Matrimonial Institutions.* Institutional studies of the family tend to be historical and comparative in character. The first natural history of the family preceded Howard and was presented by Edward Westermarck in *The History of Human Marriage.* He explained family life and marriage of the higher apes and of man in terms of instincts, as the sexual instinct, the instinct against incest, the true monogamous instinct, and by parental and filial instincts. Since Westermarck several volumes have been published by cultural anthropologists which have interpreted marriage and the family in the context of the social organisation of primitive peoples. One of the most recent of these by G. P. Murdock[6] has utilised the cross

cultural and statistical method of analysing the nuclear and extended family and patrilineal and matrilineal lines of reckoning descent.

The most comprehensive study of the development of the family in this country is still *The Social History of the American Family from Colonial Times to the Present* by Arthur W. Calhoun. The description of changes in family behaviour are well documented but his interpretative framework is skewed in favour of economic explanations of his data. Only relatively few systematic studies of family organisation among contemporary historical people are now available. Perhaps the most sociological of these in their theoretical conceptions and methods of investigation are *The Negro Family in the United States* by E. Franklin Frazier and *The Family and Civilization* by C. C. Zimmerman.

The institutional aspects of the family have been studied in recent years in terms of the concepts of authority,[7] familism,[8] and family ritual.[9]

Social changes resulting from technological discoveries in their effect upon the family have been most thoroughly explored by William F. Ogburn.[10] He organised a wealth of quantitative data to document the loss of functions by the family—economic, health, protection, education, recreation, and religion—and their transfer to other institutions in society. He pointed out that reduction in extrinsic activities has made it possible for the family to concentrate on its intrinsic activities of child rearing, the giving and receiving of affection, and the personality development of its members.

The study of the family as a unit of *interaction* of its members received its impetus from the epochal work of W. I. Thomas and Florian Znaniecki, *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America*, published in 1918–20. They developed almost single-handed a social-psychological conceptual system in terms of social attitudes, values, family rôles and life organisation. They introduced new methods of investigation by means of personal documents such as letters, diaries, and life histories.

Sociologists stimulated by the work of Thomas and Znaniecki have carried further the study of the family as a group of interacting and intercommunicating persons with distinctive rôles subject to change in modern dynamic society. Changes in rôles, status, and authority of family members have been studied in the context of the emancipation of women in the economic, educational, political, and social areas of American society and in crisis situations such as depressions and wars.[11] The trend of the family in this country from an authoritarian institutional form to a democratic companionship group has been formulated by Folsom, Burgess, Locke, and others.[12] In Germany, a slower trend of the family in the same direction has been accelerated during and since World War II as reported in a series of studies.[13]

A successful attempt to integrate sociological conceptions of social interaction and psychoanalytic theories of emotional interaction was provided by Willard Waller.[14]

The *social class structure* as a conditioning situation in affecting family organisation and behaviour has been the subject of a series of significant studies in several countries. In the United States W. Lloyd Warner and his associates,[15] A. B. Hollingshead and others[16] have provided not only important descriptive data but have devised methods of ascribing class position and have indicated the rôle of the family in maintaining class position and in achieving social mobility. European studies include in their analysis of social stratification the relation between social class and family attitudes and behaviour.[17]

Research Areas of Common Interest

No hard and fast line can be drawn between research areas to be assigned respectively to the psychologists or to the sociologists. Nevertheless each in general, as we have seen, tend predominantly to cultivate areas congenial to their different points of view and distinctive research methods.

But there remain certain areas in which psychologists and sociologists are more or less equally active. Four of these will be mentioned: mate selection and the prediction of success in marriage; small group research; sociometry, psychodrama and sociodrama; and action research.

Studies of *mate selection and prediction of marital success* have been carried on both by psychologists and sociologists. The scores of studies of assortative mating are in agreement that homogamy or the tendency for like to mate with like predominates over heterogamy whether the characteristic studied is physical, psychological, cultural, or social.

Research in the prediction of success in marriage developed almost simultaneously in pyschology and sociology. It was a fortunate example of interdisciplinary collaboration that Lewis Terman, psychologist, utilised the index of marital success designed by E. W. Burgess and L. S. Cottrell, sociologists, for his study. Quite naturally, psychologists have stressed mental and sociologists social factors in their inquiries.

Small group research under this name is a recent development in psychological and sociological studies. The modern family is preeminently a small group. But the term "small group research" does not merely mean that the group studied is small but refers also to exact and standardised methods of observing and recording its behaviour. In a recent book Talcott Parsons and Fred Bales[18] apply a generalisation derived from small group research to the family. Observing that there are two types of leaders in a small group they ascribe the executive type to the husband and father and the expressive type to the wife and mother.

Sociometry, psychodrama, and sociodrama are three methods of research developed by Jacob L. Moreno, a psychiatrist, that have a wide use among sociologists and psychologists. The graphic presentation

of social relations in the family by sociometric techniques permit measurement and analysis in a new perspective. Psychodrama and sociodrama have been utilised mainly for therapy but their research potential has not yet been fully realised.

Ecological analysis of family organisation in certain of its aspects might be included under sociometry. Mowrer, for example, has plotted the correspondence of types of family organisation with certain urban ecological areas: bohemia with the broken family, the rooming house area with the emancipated family, the immigrant area with the semi-patriarchal family, the working man's area with the patricentric family, the apartment house district with the equalitarian family and the commuters' zone with the matricentric family.

Action and planning based on psychological and sociological theories and research took place earlier in psychology than in sociology.

The application of psychological insights to practical problems of family life has taken place in the rise of child guidance clinics and marriage counselling centres. These new institutions are generally dominated by a psychoanalytically-oriented staff with a subordinate rôle assigned to psychological testing. The team of psychiatrist, psychologist, and psychiatric social worker has become the core staff of the majority of child-guidance centres. Only recently has a demonstration been made of the value of a sociological consultant in bringing into the picture of diagnosis and treatment an understanding of cultural and social factors in the situation.[19]

The interest of sociologists in action research in the field of the family is very recent. The most systematic statement of the point of view and programme of this new trend is contained in the book *Identity and Interpersonal Competence, a New Direction in Family Research* by Nelson N. Foote and Leonard S. Cottrell Jr.[20] Their basic concepts of identity and interpersonal competence are derived from the sociologically-oriented psychiatrist, Harry Stack Sullivan, and, as developed by them in their practical implications, provide the theoretical foundation for their programme. They maintain that sociological methods of research need to take into account the fact that their human data are always in a process of change, a process accelerated by the very act of research. They also point out that prevention and planning are becoming the basis of policy and practical programme in all areas of human life. A research method to be fully effective should therefore take into account the dynamic character of our society and the reality of the way in which social science should enter into the social process. One method that is now being demonstrated to be effective in changing the attitudes and behaviour of husbands and wives is that of the rôle playing of life situations.

Other areas where psychological and sociological theories and research methods are being utilised in family planning are in fertility control, classes for expectant fathers and mothers, and in family life education.

The Future of Research

Psychology and sociology have now passed out of the pioneer period in family research. One indication of this mature stage is the establishment of two family study centres in this country to plan and carry out research programmes. There is now available a body of psychological and sociological theory relevant to family behaviour. Research methods have been devised of increasing value for studies of marriage and the family.

Research on marriage and the family will undoubtedly continue to increase. It is not the province of this paper to formulate a programme of studies for the future. It is sufficient, perhaps, to suggest certain features which will probably characterise it.

1. Even more than in the past research will be organised within a theoretical framework out of which working hypotheses can be developed to guide the particular project.

2. Psychology and sociology will both continue to conduct studies within their own frameworks, but collaboration between these two disciplines may also be expected to a greater degree than in the past.

3. Research both in its practical and theoretical phases will be progressively directed to the understanding of problems affecting the family and to ways in which husbands and wives, parents and children may plan the design of family living.

4. Comparative studies of marriage and the family which have been lacking in the past will have a high priority in the future. Our understanding of the family will be greatly increased by carefully planned comparative studies of the similarities and the differences in family organisation and behaviour of subcultural groups within a country and in those between countries.

NOTES

[1] *Marriage and Family Living*, 16, May 1955.
[2] London: International Psychoanalytical Press, 1921.
[3] Robert R. Sears, pp. 140–43.
[4] In Clyde Kluckhohn and H. A. Murray (editors), *Personality in Nature, Society and Culture* (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1948), p. 180.
[5] "Infant training and the personality of the child", *American Journal of Sociology*, 58: 1952–53, 150–59: 419–20.
[6] *Social Structure* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1949).
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[8] C. C. Zimmerman and M. E. Frampton, *Family and Society* (New York: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1935).
[9] J. H. S. Bossard and Eleanor S. Boll, *Ritual in Family Living* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1950).
[10] (With Clark Tibbitts) "The Family and Its Functions, in *Recent Social Trends in the United States* (McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1933).
[11] Robert C. Angell, *The Family Encounters the Depression* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1936). E. W. Bakke, *Citizens Without Work* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1940). Ruth Cavan and Katherine Ranck, *The Family and the Depression* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938). Mirra

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[13] H. Schelsky, *Wandlungen der deutschen Familie in der Gegenwart* (Dortmund: Ardey Verlag, GMBH, 1953). G. Wurzbacher, *Leitbilder gegenwärtigen deutschen Familienlebens* (Dortmund: Ardey Verlag, 1951); and C. Baumert, *Jugend der Nachkriegszeit* (Darmstadt: E. Roether, 1942) and *Deutsche Familien nach dem Kriege* (Darmstadt, E. Roether, 1954).

[14] *The Family, a Dynamic Interpretation* (New York: The Dryden Press, 1951) (revised edition) and *The Old Love and the New* (New York: Liveright, 1930).

[15] W. Lloyd Warner and Paul S. Lunt, *The Social Life of a Modern Community* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1941). *Social Class in America, a Manual of Procedures for the Measurement of Social Status* (Chicago: Science Research Associates, 1949).

[16] A. B. Hollingshead, *Elmtown's Youth, the Impact of Social Classes on Adolescents* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1949). Allison Davis, Burleigh Gardner and Mary Gardner, *Deep South* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1941).

[17] E.g., Roy Lewis and Angus Maude, *The English Middle Classes* (London: Phoenix House, 1949).

[18] *Family Socialization and Interaction Process* (Glencoe, Illinois, Free Press, 1954).

[19] Otto Pollak, *Social Science and Psychotherapy for Children; Contributions of the Behavior Sciences to Practice in a Psychoanalytically Oriented Child Guidance Clinic* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1952).

[20] Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955.

Matching of Husband and Wife in Phases of Development

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Scientific thought about the Western family in recent decades—due to decline of economic and protective interdependence among its members—has tended to stress the quality of the marital bond as the principal basis for family stability.[1] Another way of stating the trend has been to speak of the tendency toward reduction of the family's functions to affection-giving, sexual regulation and child-rearing.[2] Studies of marriage for the past generation have tended to emphasise mate selection as the principal basis for explaining happy or unhappy outcomes.[3]

To go from broad historical and institutional interpretations of change in the family to considerations of the matching of traits of individuals is to utilise polar modes of analysis. In the postwar decade an approach to marriage has emerged which lies somewhere between these extremes. The keynote of this most recent approach is sounded by the term "interpersonal relations", although equally important in defining its novelty is its emphasis upon personality development of the partners to the marriage, and not simply of their children. It is the purpose of this paper to assess the contribution of this newer point of view to the understanding of marriage as a developmental process.

Matching Versus Matchmaking

Worthy of first note is the assumption that matching is a continual process; a corollary of the assumption that throughout its development the personality of each partner is subject to continuous variation. This assumption is contrary to the familiar hypothesis that whether a marital union is a good match or a poor one, as judged by later outcomes, can be ascertained at the time of marriage. The evidence supporting the newer assumption has been steadily accumulating for some time; moreover, once it is made explicit, some data gathered under the previous assumption can be reinterpreted with a gain in understanding. Studies in the following areas can be cited:

I. WAR SEPARATION AND REUNION

Despite correspondence and visits, the hazards that mates who are separated because of military service will grow apart are quite substantial.[4] At best their reunion requires reweaving the skein of interconnection between the hundreds or thousands of events in the life of one and the life of the other, through conversation and non-verbal

communication. This problem, however, can be generalised. When persons marry who have only known each other a short time, they have much of their pasts to recount and interrelate, similar to the exchange of biographies that goes on in courtship. Not only returning soldiers but others who have been apart—due to employment, migration or confinement—have much re-relating to do in order to get fully back together, and long separation increases the hazard that they cannot get back together as they were.[5] Almost equivalent in its effect, though not identical in form, is the situation in which husband and wife have elaborate careers of interaction with separate groups of others outside the family for much of each day, without sufficient opportunity to assimilate their experience apart within their marital relationship through the intimate, incessant processes of family interaction.

II. Middle Years of Marriage

One of the less helpful influences of psychology upon the study of the family has been the example of treating physiological maturity as the end-point of personality development. This means that the development of children within the family has gotten attention almost to the exclusion of the continuous development of husband and wife as a product of their interaction with each other.[6] To present knowledge, the first two and only systematic studies of adult development during the middle years of marriage are currently in progress at the University of Chicago, under the direction of Ernest W. Burgess and Robert J. Havighurst. The idea of studying the middle years of marriage arose primarily as a consequence of their having studied old age. Conceptual tools and measuring instruments adequate for analysis of the phenomena peculiar to these middle years still suffer from paucity and encumbering connotations of biological growth, not to mention the cost and difficulty of longitudinal studies. As the developmental approach takes further hold, however, this lack is certain to be remedied. Most promising are the developments in techniques for microscopic analysis of the segments of interaction.[7]

III. Divorce and Separation

Persons who took the initiative in seeking divorce, in explaining their experience, and likewise observers of broken marriages, speak frequently of a mate's having outgrown the other. It is the husband who usually outgrows the wife; the opposite is theoretically possible, however, and in a few cases seems to occur. The husband is exposed to more stimulation and new experience outside the home—not to mention members of the other sex—than is the wife who is confined to domestic affairs. In time a man in business may come to feel that his secretary is closer in step and sympathy with his personal development than is his wife; the irony often is that he married his wife on the same account, and that having married his secretary, he removes her from his office and immures her in his home, there to await the fate of her predecessor.

Some understanding of this phenomenon has become popularised among the affected classes and may be leading to preventive actions.[8]

One of the most obvious yet under-appreciated facts about divorce is that the parties at some previous point without exception did get married. And while divorces tend to occur more frequently during the first few years after marriage, as Jacobson says, "even after the golden wedding anniversary, some marital ties (are) dissolved by divorce."[9] The same goes for desertions, annulments and legal separations. Normally a rather substantial period of time, measured in years instead of months, elapses between getting married and getting unmarried. For the United States in the 1950's, the modal length of marriages broken other than by death has been estimated as low as one year; but the median is approximately three years, and the mean may be as high as ten.[10] These are high figures relative to the notion that marital failure results from mismatching; it takes quite some time for the average divorced couple to discover that it was mismatched. Monahan's evidence suggests that the chances of divorce at any time after marriage are not as dissimilar as hitherto supposed.[11] Considering that many marriages are still broken by mortality, quite a few people who married the wrong person must die before finding it out. A better hypothesis would be that those who were sufficiently matched to marry became sufficiently unmatched to unmarry.

IV. Friendship and Sociability

Studies of adult friendships are exceedingly few, and these are static or cross-sectional, rather than longitudinal. Nevertheless informal observations indicate that lifelong friendships are few; most friendships run for a term, subside and expire. While friendship is usually a more segmental relationship than marriage, it seems logical to expect that friendship is a component of marriage, and that the problems of creating and maintaining a friendship of unlimited duration have to be met wherever marriage must rely upon the quality of interpersonal relations between husband and wife. The origins of friendships in connection with the development of new interests, and their expiration with the arrest or decline of previous common interests, suggest that an ample supply of successive and concurrent common interests must be forthcoming, to maintain the friendships of long duration. Cause and effect here are hard to distinguish, however.

Midway in quality between friendships which end and marriages which end are courtships which end, that is, which do not end in marriage. Most people have a narrowly restricted range of choice of marriage partners, contrary to the free-market assumption of considerable writing on mate selection. Nonetheless a substantial minority, especially in our favoured classes, enjoy a number of tentative affairs which approach but do not culminate in marriage. These vary a great deal in both intensity and duration of the relationship. So far not a

single study of their typical course appears to have been reported, despite the plethora of studies of student dating. Taking each as a pilot replica of a marital career, instead of a non-involved process of shopping around for the other who fits best, might be hypothesised to offer a fruitful basis for prediction of the structure of the later marital career; in the relative durations of these pre-marital sequences, the capacity for extending them through evolving consecutive phases of joint development might be reliably exhibited.

A current study of the sociology of sociability at the Family Study Center has suggested that, for people to enjoy being together when they have no work or purposeful functions to perform, they must—as the good hostess knows—be properly matched. It appears, moreover, that persons who seem matched for a time do not forever remain well-matched; pairs of persons who never grow tired of each other are few and far between. There is no *a priori* basis for assuming that male-female pairs who do enjoy each other indefinitely are the people who always get married to each other.

To the extent that married life consists of sociability, these observations when extended and verified may prove helpful to its understanding. In view of such recent social changes as the growth of leisure, the longer hours of the husband in the home, and the reduction of household work, it seems reasonable to infer that sociability forms a larger portion of family living from day to day than ever before (save in the highly favoured classes, where complaints of boredom were heard long ago). There is nothing from this study ready to report as yet about matching in sociability which directly applies to marriage. It seems justifiable, however, to suggest that when marital relations are considered by other investigators with an eye to the quality and extent of their sociability, and within a developmental frame of reference, matching of husband and wife will appear more complicated than implied in earlier studies of assortative mating.

It may be that some previous findings will also be illuminated. Thus Bowerman's interesting demographic observation that in remarriage widows tend to remarry widowers, and divorcés to remarry divorcées might be interpreted as matching in terms of similar developmental tasks.[12] And the steady reduction in age differentials at marriage during recent years may also imply that in order to enjoy each other's companionship when there is no work to do at home, husband and wife find matching easier if they are similar in age.[13]

Simple identity of social characteristics (homogamy), as time passes, may tell us less and less about the likelihood of matching in respect to the abilities whereby each may hold his own with his partner in sociability. Who makes good company for the other is mainly a function of prior and current experience, which conventional indices may only obliquely or inaccurately signify. To be even more exact yet speculative, the fringe of novelty in the experience of the other which is stimulating to the self may be poorly indicated by what is held in common,

and what is common may be utterly boring to both. Homogamy, furthermore, is only one conception of matching. Others found in family research literature include conceptions of complementarity, equality of possessions or talents, and compatibility in the simple sense of agreement or absence of conflict. Yet these diverse conceptions of matching all predicate two sets of static attributes brought into some kind of conjunction at the time of marriage. The study is rare which takes into account the adaptability of one partner to a range of situations and to a range of relationships with the other partner. It is only these less specific abilities which equip the person for dealing with changes imposed on his family situation from without, or with changes in the character of the other person. It appears that these various modes of matching need analysis within the assumption that not one but all of them, and perhaps others besides, operate in marital interaction.

Perhaps some of the ambiguity involved in defining matching in terms of common phases of development can be dispelled by an analogy to the choice of a chum ("best friend") by the preadolescent or adolescent: he rarely chooses a sibling as his chum, because the sibling—unless a twin—is almost necessarily behind him or ahead of him in mastering the successive problems of each phase of development. The sibling is obviously more "homogamous" than the chum, but only one who is matched in phase can be the fully sympathetic and understanding—and therefore most cherished—audience for the performance of the other. The analogy becomes less close in later life, because the association of developmental tasks with physical growth ceases, and personality development proceeds along increasingly diverse lines. Nothing may be directly added to the analysis by making another analogy to resonance, yet the bearing of this figure of speech may be subjectively recognised. A multitude of colloquial terms abound for the phenomenon involved—"we click", "he rings a bell", "sympatico"—but as yet we have no accepted scientific concept for it, and, except actual trial, none but the crudest means for predicting its occurrence.

In our studies of sociability we are seeking to discriminate what makes the difference between dull and exciting episodes, and how these get connected through recurrence in personal careers. For it is clear that there is a cumulative feature—whether beneficent or destructive—about the experiences of people in sociability. Destructive trends in marriage have often been observed also, but the possibility of beneficent cumulative trends—what might be called successful careers in marriage—has been almost ignored.

Growing Together and Growing Apart

Dr. Bernard Farber of the University of Illinois has put forth a definition of marriage as a pair of intercontingent careers. Some of the conventional connotations of "career"—as a sequence of promotions within a bureaucratic hierarchy, or as any female employment outside the home—may be misleading. The concept of career is intended here

to refer to the process of orderly development of the person within the context of his relationships to others over time; it is thus neither wholly subjective nor wholly objective. Many persons' lives cannot be described as careers, for lack of continuity of development of organising themes. It is logical to speak of marriage not as static but as a pair of careers, since marriage conceived in the sense of development may evolve through the enrichment or impoverishment of interpersonal relations over time. A marriage is not likely to stand still or continue unchanged for very long. Arrest in development of either partner makes it vulnerable to breakdown. Strengthening it by this definition consists of multiplying the number of overlapping sequences or matching phases of development in which they are involved either as collaborators or as performer and significant audience.

To expect a marriage to last indefinitely under modern conditions is to expect a lot. The conception of marriage as continually requiring the incitement of new episodes of shared activity will have more consequences than can be foreseen, but a few implications can perhaps be inferred. Happiness as a criterion of success, for instance, is inherently unstable over time. And even at a given time, the prospect of future achievement of aims may have more effect on the judgment of a marriage by its partners than their current state of gratification. Certainly marriage counselors report many cases of mates who disclose no specific cause of dissatisfaction yet complain that they have lost interest in their marriages. Successful marriage may thus come to be defined, both by married people and by students of marriage, in terms of its potential for continued development, rather than in terms of momentary assessments of adjustment. The progressive revisions in the Burgess-Cottrell-Locke-Wallin-Farber-Litwak scale of marital adjustment tend to support this interpretation of this trend. The view of several writers that adjustment may take some time to achieve in marriage, but once achieved may be expected to endure, is thus perhaps only a half-concession to the developmental point of view.[14]

In particular the notion of matching careers need not imply that husband and wife pursue identical professional careers outside the home (although some scattered evidence available to us indicates that this is beneficial except where the wife's superiority causes the husband to suffer gibes by other men). Though their careers be differentiated both in and out of the home, the point that seems decisive in understanding the quality of their marriage appears to remain the degree of matching in their phases of distinct but comparable development. A simple test may be this, how much do they have to communicate when they are together? The study of communication in marriage has only begun.[15] There may be some optimum ratio of time together and time apart, but only given that in the sense here crudely sketched one is not too far ahead or behind the other in development.

The self-conscious appetite for a marriage that will lead to further development of the partners, it must be conceded, has emerged

unequally among the several classes of society. In rural and working classes—except at the lowest levels where there is no stable joint economic enterprise—the relative prominence of functional interdependence as the basis for family stability seems much greater than in the more leisured white collar, business and professional levels. The trend, however, is for more and more of the working force to move over from agricultural and manufacturing into the service industries, where employment is more concentrated in the higher occupations. So what is found in the upper groups is probably prototypical.[16]

It may seem a grim prospect, therefore, to state that the kind of marriage in which stability most depends upon mutual development is on the increase. But lest it be thought that the concept of mutual development is a weaker basis for stable marriage than the erstwhile reliance on economic and protective interdependence, scrutiny of divorce statistics by occupational class in the United States seems to offer some basis for the contrary view. In all the studies of the last two decades, and most conspicuously in the latest,[17] divorces are consistently lowest in the professional class. To the extent that the developmental outlook is identified with the concept of career, moreover, professional persons are the exemplars *par excellence* of the career concept.

The demographers who repeatedly demonstrate the pre-eminence of the professional class in marital stability may not have fully appreciated the significance of their findings. For instance, attitude studies have often shown that in terms of preference for strict or liberal divorce laws, the professional group is the most liberal in its views. It is also the most equalitarian in its views on the propriety of employment of married women and the desirability of freer access of women to jobs. The professional group avows most fully the notion of equal authority for husband and wife within the family as well. In this group husband and wife are closest in ages at marriage. It appears to be the most cosmopolitan in the range of its choice of marriage mates; most heterogamous in crossing ethnic, class and religious lines; least affected by propinquity (which qualifies the simple correlation between homogamy and stability). The standard reactionary view that industrialisation and urbanisation are inexorably destructive of family stability and solidarity is contradicted by the fact that the professional group is probably the fullest beneficiary of such aspects of industrialism and urbanism as the reliance on science, spatial and social mobility, and emphasis on the welfare and freedom of the individual. Voluntary commitments may be stronger bonds for marriage than economic and legal sanctions. Were they as genuinely concerned to magnify marital stability as to preserve certain vested ideological interests, the traditionalists ought realistically to become champions of professionalisation. To adapt an old saying, what is poison to the rural, traditional man may be meat to the urban, professional man, or woman.

Interpersonal Relations

Among professional people there is also found—in America at least —the highest favour for the belief that the preparation of persons for marriage can be improved, and their chances for success increased, by education for family living. In a recent work, this writer in collaboration with Leonard S. Cottrell has set forth a systematic programme for the development of interpersonal competence.[18] It utilises in a practical way the emerging psychology of interpersonal relations.

The study of interpersonal relations as a distinctive approach to the data of marriage was explicitly crystallised by Harry Stack Sullivan in 1938, and in his later writings, although many others have contributed to its elaboration since.[19] Its central proposition is probably this: the self is the cumulative product of a process of attribution of identity by significant others, among whom in general own family members are the most influential. These attributions may occur in the form of nouns and adjectives, verbs and adverbs, explicitly applied, or in the form of attitudes taken in non-verbal interaction which imply characteristic definitions and expectations. Because these attributions and appraisals of behaviour are usually more or less inconsistent, the developing person has a continual task of adopting, adapting or rejecting them—of integrating an ever-changing conception of self—and a need to validate his identity through obtaining some working consensus among those others upon whom he depends for collaboration in the course of living. Thus characterisation is a co-operative process—though not in the happy sense of everyone working towards the same goal. At any given time persons vary in their abilities to adjudicate their interpersonal relations and in the complexities of the problems with which they are confronted; moreover, the failures and successes in interaction tend to cumulate in terms of product. This final proposition particularly contributes toward a developmental theory of marriage.[20]

Mates as Agents in Mutual Development

After the parents, the marriage partner is in the most strategic position to affect adult development in a beneficent or a destructive way. Within the zone of changing self-conceptions (between what is completely accepted and what seems impossible), many characterisations given by another are not manifestly either true or false; it is their acceptance by the self and the premising of action upon them that makes them true. By analogy to living things, this process of assimilating novel and effective attributions is the growing edge of personality. One's direction of growth as well as the rate of learning are powerfully affected by the responses of those particular others upon whom he inescapably depends for evaluations of his behaviour. Depending upon the rôles they play, they may convince him that he is basically a faker or a budding genius, a leader or a clown, or multitudes of other potential identities; either way his resulting actions are likely to prove them right.

Now wives in general have had much practice in playing the rôles of friendly critic and stimulating audience. When their expectations sensitively and confidently run slightly ahead of their husband's performances, they account for many prodigies in male careers. But husbands are hardly prepared by cultural history to reciprocate as the most beneficent other in the development of wives for whom the performance of household duties no longer seems to challenge their capacities.

The usual husband whose wife is discontented, or who has become discontented with his wife, rarely analyses the situation in developmental or interactional terms. In counseling he may expostulate that if he only knew what she wanted, he might be able to supply it. That is, he makes the simple and misleading motivational assumption of many psychologists, that discontent arises from unsatisfied wants and requires only their gratification to disappear (a view that can work havoc in parent-child relations as well). There are no books on the adult masculine rôle to compare with the torrent of works on the problems of women. In fairness, however, it should be pointed out that few of the books on women exhibit the interpersonal approach, so that men might be no better off if there were simply a duplicate series.

Future studies of marriage, if guided by the interpersonal approach, will not basically correct the imbalance in treatment of masculine and feminine rôles by merely shifting attention to the undernoticed adult male, but by analysis of the reciprocal rôle he plays in his wife's development—or underdevelopment. To repeat, there are marriages in small number wherein the wife outgrows the husband, through expanding her interests and activities while he becomes narrow, deformed or arrested—sometimes despite her efforts to stimulate his social or intellectual growth. And there are also those happy few prototype pairs in which each is successful in facilitating the career of the other.[21] But the commonest picture in American marriage is that in which the husband has no concept whatever of contributing by his manner of speaking and listening to the elaboration of his wife's career, particularly when she has no ostensible professional career. While her constructive achievements with home and children may be honoured, her ventures in other directions appear more often to be subject to insensitive disparagement than to insightful and competent facilitation. If husbands and wives are to become and remain matched in phases of development, therefore, scientific and professional understanding of the processes involved cannot too quickly become disseminated among at least those portions of the population who are demonstrably ready for it.

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Les rapports entre le milieu social et la famille en relation avec l'organisation de l'espace

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Les rapports entre le milieu social et la famille (au sens restreint ou au sens large), dépendent de multiples variables. Ils peuvent être étudiés en fonction des formes de culture, des conditions d'existence et de la conjoncture économique, en fonction de la stratification sociale et des classes sociales, en fonction de la cohésion des groupes de voisinage, de parenté et de "relations", ... Dans toutes ces recherches une voie d'approche nous parait particulièrement fructueuse, mais encore mal précisée: c'est l'observation de la famille dans l'espace organisé en fonction des structures sociales et des modèles culturels. Les quelques notes qui sont présentées ici donnent seulement des indications très schématiques sur des travaux en cours dans une équipe de recherche avec références à des travaux d'autres chercheurs, en particulier à des articles récents.

1. L'ÉVOLUTION DES RAPPORTS ENTRE LA FAMILLE ET L'ESPACE

Il nous faut d'abord préciser les distinctions habituelles entre la famille restreinte et la famille étendue. Dans l'ancienne France la "mesnie" désignait l'ensemble des personnes qui vivaient sous l'autorité du chef de famille dans la maison, tandis que le lignage désignait la famille au sens large.[1] Nous verrons plus loin ce que sont devenues ces deux groupes dans la vie urbaine actuelle. Dans d'autres régions du monde ils peuvent se présenter sous des formes très différentes suivant les règles de mariage et les structures de la parenté. Mais ils existent toujours d'une manière ou d'une autre, et l'organisation de l'espace dépend des formes qu'ils prennent.

L'implantation de la famille restreinte sur le sol indique presque toujours les relations de ses memberes entre eux et avec leurs voisons. Dans diverses Sociétés Africaines chaque personne a sa case et l'ensemble des cases forme un espace clos à l'intérieur duquel on trouve par exemple un homme, ses femmes, les enfants de celles-ci, parfois des serviteurs, des animaux, qui font partie de la même unité sociale.[2]

D'autre part, le partage du sol dépend des règles d'héritage et de parenté. En Afrique encore, même lorsque la terre n'est pas la propriété des familles (mais celle d'un personnage mythique, réprésenté par un chef), la distribution des parcelles pour le travail est basée sur

les rapports de lignage.[3] La simple étude des divisions agraires ne peut être entreprise sans les connaître. A l'échelon du village la distribution des champs reflète soit les formes de la vie communautaire liée à la vaine pature et aux redistributions périodiques, soit le plus ou moins grand individualisme des exploitations familiales fermées (en France champs ouverts du Nord-Est et champs clos du Sud-Ouest, etc.)[4] Les rapports entre la famille et ses voisins dans le hameau sont liés au plus ou moins grand isolement de celui-ci, et à sa situation par rapport aux autres. Mais cette distribution même des hameux ou le regroupement en village unique dépendent des structures sociales. L'étude des villages Kabyles, des oasis du Mzab, des zadruga slaves[5] montrent ces liaisons de façons très différentes.

Dans l'étude des clans, les rapports entre le groupe de parenté et l'espace apparaissent non moins nettement, et les règles d'endogamie et d'exogamie dans la plupart des sociétés sont en rapport avec les divisions de l'espace. Certains traits de la structure sociale liée aux lignages qui en sont, comme dit Fortes[6], le cadre permanent, apparaissent déjà sur le sol. Cette structure sociale considérée comme un système (Firth, Redfield)[7] et la place qu'y occupe la famille et le lignage peuvent parfois être étudiées très largement à partir des divisions de l'espace. Ainsi les plans commentés des "lédetchals" et le plan des hameaux qui les regroupent dans la tribu Kokomba du Nord Togo, constituent un tableau des relations entre les membres de la famille et entre les familles d'un même hameau.[8] De même les villages Kissi sont divisés en 2 ou 3 cours ou "lignages", eux-mêmes divisés en foyers.[9]

A une autre échelle, si on compare entre elles diverses sociétés, il est possible de déterminer des aires de distribution de certains types de famille correspondant à des rapports complexes entre le milieu naturel et les structures sociales. Mais à l'intérieur du territoire occupé par chaque société ou même à l'intérieur du territoire occupé par les membres d'une société ayant les mêmes traits culturels, les degrés de résistance des mêmes structures familiales varient considérablement suivant les régions. Les études de pathologie sociale en font foi. La géographie des formes de la famille doit en compléter l'histoire.

Dans la phase d'évolution actuelle des rapports entre la famille et l'espace le problème dominant est celui du passage d'un type de civilisation rurale à un type de civilisation urbaine.[10] L'espace occupé par une famille est rapidement devenu beaucoup plus étroit; la famille restreinte s'est trouvée en général plus séparée de son groupe de parents; elle s'est trouvée plus rapprochée matériellement d'autres familles dans des habitations en hauteur tout en étant parfois plus séparée d'elles socialement (par suite des déplacements fréquents, ou des écarts de niveau de vie). De nouveaux regroupements se font dans l'espace en fonction de nouveaux critères. Les systèmes de relations des familles changent en conséquence, ainsi que la résistance des structures internes et les comportements.

2. Familles, niveau de vie et Classes Sociales, dans l'espace Urbain au XXème Siècle

Dans les grandes cités de la civilisation industrielle les rapports entre la famille et le milieu social dans l'espace urbain dépendent principalement du niveau de vie. Les études écologiques montrent les oppositions entre les secteurs urbains suivant les revenus et les catégories socio-professionnelles[11]. Liée à ces faits une ségrégation des classes sociales dans l'espace tend à se produire. La vie des familles dans l'un ou l'autre secteur varie très considérablement et leurs systèmes de relations et de parenté ne sont pas les mêmes. Cela apparaît dans l'étude des distributions des parents et des amis de chaque groupe familial qui s'écartent rarement des secteurs où dominent les représentants de leur classe. D'autre part des groupes de voisinages n'ont pas la même importance ni les mêmes structures dans les quartiers populaires et dans les quartiers bourgeois.[12] Comme nous le verrons plus loin les relations entre eux et les familles sont très différentes.[13]

Les rapports entre la famille et les autres groupes sociaux est donc en relation avec une certaine structure de l'espace dans les villes modernes. Mais les positions des familles changent à la fois dans les strates sociales et les classes[14] et dans l'espace. A ce sujet les rapports entre la mobilité sociale et la mobilité résidentielle font l'objet d'études particulières dans notre équipe.[15]

Enfin la transformation des structures familiales n'est pas sans rapports avec la transformation des structures urbaines liées elles-mêmes à l'histoire économique. A diverses reprises on a souligné la liaison entre l'apparition de certaines formes de vie familiale et le développement rapide des banlieues. Si les études écologiques sur la variation systematique de la vie familiale en s'éloignant du centre de l'agglomération (suivant le gradient) nous paraissent prêter à discussion, il n'est pas moins vrai que les conditions matérielles de vie qui sont propres à certaines zones expriment ou imposent (suivant les cas) certains types de relation à l'intérieur même du petit groupe familial. Entre autres les études sur la détérioration de la famille en relation avec la position des groupes ethniques dans l'espace et à leurs conditions de vie suivant les quartiers sont sur ce plan instructives.[16] Il faut alors étudier le petit groupe familial, l'espace qu'il occupe, c'est-à-dire dans son logement.

3. Famille, Ménage et Logement

En observant le groupe familial dans le logement, nous sommes alors amenés à revenir à la distinction entre la famille large et la famille restreinte. D'un côté l'ensemble des parents (ascendants, descendants, frères, cousins, alliés) forme de moins en moins un véritable groupe social sous l'autorité d'un aïeul. Sans doute en France même certaines grandes familles (du Nord par exemple) forment de véritables unités de plusieurs centaines de personnes dont les biens matériels répartis

dans diverses régions et dans divers pays sont rattachés les uns aux autres à la fois par les liens des personnes et par certaines communautés d'intérêt (succursales industrielles ou commerciales tenues par des parents, trusts familiaux). Mais dans les quartiers ouvriers surtout les rapport sociaux entre membres d'une même famille étendue se limitent beaucoup plus à des relations affectives avec des parents proches. Les attaches dans l'espace hors de la ville qui peuvent garder une réelle importance sont limitées en général à un ou deux villages habités par les ascendants.

D'un autre côté la famille restreinte prend deux aspects différents qui peuvent être distincts ou confondus. Le "ménage", au sens administratif du mot, désigne en France les personnes "vivant sous une même clef" dans un même logement. C'est la reconnissance d'un groupe défini par sa position dans l'espace qui peut comprendre, sous l'autorité d'un "chef de ménage", des personnes qui ne sont pas parentes entre elles. En revanche les membres du groupe mari-femme-enfants peuvent être séparés dans l'espace. C'est le ménage et non la famille restreinte qui est en rapport avec les voisins. C'est la famille et non le ménage qui est en rapport avec le groupe de parenté. La conception du logement et de son aménagement et la conception des habitations comprenant plusieurs logements doit tenir compte de ces faits.[17]

A l'intérieur du logement la surface occupée par le ménage commande certains comportements. Diverses études de notre équipe ont montré qu'il était possible de determiner ses seuils d'indices de surface par personne, au dessous desquels il n'était pas possible de descendre sans provoquer des perturbations graves en particulier chez les enfants. Il est même possible de distinguer un seuil critique et un seuil d'insatisfaction (vers $8m^2$ et $14m^2$ par personne dans les ménages étudiés jusqu'ici)[18]. Comme nous constatons aussi certaines perturbations dans les logements très grands appartenant à des familles riches, il semble que, pour les enfants tout au moins, il soit possible, dans une société donnée, de déterminer certains optima. D'autres études en cours sur l'àménagement du logement et les relations affectives donneront des résultats plus complets, sur lesquels nous ne pouvons pas nous étendre ici.

4. Voisinage, Parenté et Système de Relations

Les rapports entre le ménage et le milieu social ont lieu alors sur trois plans principaux: celui du voisinage, celui de la parenté, celui d'un système plus ou moins large de "relations". Dans l'évolution actuelle la pression des groupes de voisinage[19] dans un espace limité paraît dominer dans les familles ouvrières. Mais les pressions exercées à la fois par les relations mondaines et un groupe restreint de parenté dans les familles bourgeoises est parfois tout aussi grande. Les deux types de pression sont différents par nature et la position des sujets dans l'espace géographique tend à agir plus ou moins directement sur les distances sociales proprement-dites.

Certains auteurs ont insisté sur la liaison d'une part entre les familles ouvertes à l'entourage et les communautés fermées de quartiers ou de village, d'autre part entre les familles fermées à l'entourage et les communautés ouvertes.[20] Dans nos propres constatations les types correspondent à des classes sociales différentes. Les aspirations des ménages bourgeois à une indépendance de plus en plus grande du voisinage et à un choix des relations dans leur propre milieu, en général d'ailleurs dans les quartiers définis, peuvent apparaître aux ménages ouvriers comme une incapacité d'ouverture aux voisins proches. En revanche les échanges constants entre voisins dans les quartiers ouvriers paraissent insupportables aux ménages bourgeois. Il y a là des traits culturels différents qui ont pour conséquence une utilisation différente de l'espace.

2. La Nécessité des Etudes dans ce Domaine

Ces trop brèves indications relatives aux milieux urbains ne doivent pas nous faire perdre de vue la nécessité d'études plus générales dans divers pays en comparant les familles des villes à celles des campagnes. D'un côté, dans les civilisations non machinistes, il faudrait remonter à certaines coutumes telles que celles du mariage et des échanges de parenté pour comprendre leur influence sur l'organisation de l'espace. Levi-Strauss, parlant des oppositions entre les règles de parenté et les règles de résidence, montre qu'elles tendent parfois à se réger par la juxtaposition des unités échangistes (clans ou villages), d'où une organisation dualiste. Les deux unités sociales une fois rapprochées dans l'espace, les difficultés liées à la résidence sont éliminées.[21] D'un autre côté dans les civilisations industrielles il importerait de voir comment l'opposition des structures nouvelles de la famille tend à organiser l'espace. On se rendrait compte alors que certains problèmes très larges d'urbanisme sont dépendants de mécanismes sociaux qui en paraissent très éloignés. L'ignorance des détails de ces liens pourrait aboutir à des erreurs fondamentales.

NOTES

[1] Dans la perspective qui nous intéresse ici, voir parmi les études récentes: P. Petot, *La famille en France sous l'ancien régime*, in *Sociologie comparée de la famille contemporaine*, Paris, Editions du C.N.R.S., 1955, chap. I.

[2] P. Chombart de Lauwe, *Le mariage Fali*, rapport inédit, 1938. Dans d'autres régions il s'agit d'une seule pièce, cr. par exemple: D. Paulme, *Les gens du riz*, Paris, Plon éd. 1954, p. 55.

[3] J. C. Froelich, *La tribu Konkomba du Nord Togo*, Dakar, I.F.A.N.; 1954, p. 140.

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[11] P. Chombart de Lauwe, L. Couvreur, S. Antoine, *et al.*, *Paris et l'Agglomération Parisienne*, P.U.F., 1952, Tome I.

[12] Au sujet des groupes de voisinages, voir Festinger, *Social pressure in informal groups*.

[13] Voir *Paris et l'Agglomération Parisienne*, *op. cit*, chap. III, Cartes des relations de familles bourgeoises et de familles ouvrières.

[14] P. Chombart de Lauwe, *Strates, classes et mobilité sociale*, in Actes du Deuxième Congrès Mondial de Sociologie, 1954.

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[16] E. W. Burgess, "Economic, cultural and social factors in family breakdown", *The American Journal of Orthopsychiatry*, vol. XXIV, no. 3; July 1954.

[17] P. Chombart de Lauwe, *La Vie quotidienne des familles ouvrières*, Paris éd. du C.N.R.S., 1956, chap. III. Voir aussi *Le logement et l'espace familial*, in *Informations sociales*, Paris, Oct. 1955.

[18] *Ibid.*, chap. III. Voir aussi Mme. M. Chombart de Lauwe, "Milieu social et psychiatrie infantile" in *Revue de Neuro-psychiatrie infantile*, Mai-Juin 1956.

[19] Festinger, *op. cit.*

[20] Cf. Dr. Sall, commenté par E. W. Burgess, "Crucial problems in family research", *Séminaire International de recherches sur la famille*, Cologne, 1954 (ronéo), pp. 1, 2.

[21] C. Lévi-Strauss, *Les structures élémentaires de la parenté*, Paris, 1949.

Social Change and Fertility in the United States: Theory and Research

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INTRODUCTION

The downward trend of fertility in the United States up until the Second World War has become a well-documented fact. The recovery of the birth rate since this time has become the subject both of considerable demographic and sociological attention. Throughout both of these periods, but mainly in the period of fertility decline, a substantial body of literature has been produced attempting to assess the social and economic factors responsible for the obvious changes in reproductive behavior. [7, 8, 9, 10, 16] A small but significant segment of these speculations has, in both periods, been incorporated into large-scale researches and plans for new studies. The purpose of this paper is to enumerate the most plausible of these speculations, to introduce some new speculations, and to describe the main body of relevant research in the United States. Because of restrictions on the length of this paper, only a very superficial survey of this field can be undertaken.

THEORIES OF FERTILITY DECLINE

The underlying theme of most of the theories advanced to account for the 19th and early 20th century declines in fertility is best described in terms of the forces contributing to a reorganization of the family. One set of hypotheses contend that as a result of the industrialization of the American economy, the family unit was deprived of one of its main integrative functions and activities ; the economic activity became increasingly centered outside the home. With the concomitant urbanization of the population and the expansion of tertiary industry, this trend was gradually extended to include other institutional functions that had been heretofore at least partly familial responsibilities. The areas of education, recreation, religion and protection become more and more formalized as discrete institutions. The effect of these developments was to weaken the traditional foundations of the family unit.

A further ramification of these forces, similar in its presumptive effects on fertility, was the undermining of the economic value of large families in an agrarian economy and the disintegration of the extended three-generational household. In the latter stages of this period (following the First World War) the family was attacked from still

other quarters. This was the period of the emancipation of women movement which is still in process today, although it has lost much of its militant and formal character. An ideology of equal status for men and women was propounded, which carried with it a rebellion against the traditional rôles of mother and housekeeper and which legitimized the subsequent entry of women into higher education and the labor force. Coupled with this movement, although its origins can be traced to other factors as well, was the dissemination of another ideology—that the main criterion for marriage should be love and its purpose companionship. This further undermined the ideology that marriages should be contracted on the grounds of traditional expectation and that their chief function should be procreation.

The social changes that have been outlined thus far have had many social psychological implications. The urbanization of the population, for example, is obviously more than simply a demographic fact. People living in cities do not have fewer children just because they no longer live in the country. Involved in this transition is a whole complex of changes in life values and styles as well as changes in such environmental factors as housing space. One of the main factors accompanying this process of urbanization has been a reduction in the influence yielded by the primary and small community reference groups of neighbors, relatives and friends. The married couples of the twentieth century are much more insulated from these pressures and " censors " than their parents and grandparents were. This, together with the growing ideologies of self-determination and individualism, may have removed the younger generation effectively from the impatient group expectations for children and manifestations of " virility ".

Of presumptive significance for understanding fertility decline in this early period, and central to the popularization of individualism, was the ideology of competitive success—an ethos functionally based on rapid industrial expansion in a capitalistic economy and reinforced by the geographic expansion of the nation, Protestantism, and an ideology of a classless society. The requirements of individual success—training and education, self-effort, single-mindedness, lack of affectional commitments to others, and freedom to capitalize on opportunity—tend to be incompatible with early marriage and large families.[2, 3, 11] Work demands time and energy which diminishes the extent to which familistic values can be exercised.

All of these ideological developments have produced a secularization of values, that is, a relaxation and frequently a repudiation of traditional values surrounding marriage, the family, religion, the authority of the older generations and, a subscription to materialistic values, individual success, self-reliance and a growing emphasis on " rational " criteria of behavior. The transition to a " rationalization " of reproduction was a logical consequence of the new social and ideological climate. The development of inexpensive, relatively effective contraceptives and their subsequent mass production provided the necessary means to

effect the postponement of early childbearing and the restriction to smaller families.

There is little doubt that many of these changes in values were initiated by the white-collar and upper educational classes of American society. Indirect evidence for this can be inferred from the trends in fertility differentials by socio-economic classifications.[4, 12] Studies of these trends generally reveal a sharp inverse relationship between fertility and occupational status in the early period (women who had their children in the 1870-1910 period), followed by a levelling of fertility differences in later decades with some evidence that a direct relation will emerge in the future. This trend probably represents the joint process of a democratization of the new ideologies and a differential dissemination of birth control knowledge and techniques.

By 1933 the birth rate in the United States had fallen to the lowest level in this country's history. This decline, in addition to reflecting the long-time changes in social and economic structure, was accelerated by the depression of the early thirties which was characterized by widespread economic anxiety and an increasing disenchantment with and alienation from the *laissez faire* ideologies of former decades. For the first time, serious apprehensions over the threat of an ultimately declining population were expressed and needs for a population policy were voiced. There was ample statistical evidence of what was happening to fertility over the years, but there was no extensive knowledge of the social and psychological factors affecting fertility upon which to formulate an intelligent population policy should it become necessary. It was against this background that the first large-scale study of social and psychological factors affecting fertility, the Indianapolis Study,[15] was initiated.

The Indianapolis Study

Prior to the collection of four sets of interview data from a sample of 860 couples (native-white, Protestant, and married from 12 to 15 years) living in the City of Indianapolis in 1941, twenty-three hypotheses were formulated in an attempt to isolate the factors influencing both the extent of fertility planning and the size of planned families. These hypotheses included such variables as feeling of economic security, the difference between the actual level of living and the standard of living desired, interest in and liking for children, the feeling that children interfere with personal freedom, adherence to traditions, interest in religion, feeling of personal adequacy, marital adjustment, and others. Many of these hypotheses had been derived from the speculations about the causes of fertility decline which were enumerated above. There were many enlightening findings from the Indianapolis Study, but only a few of the more significant ones can be summarized here.

Some mode of contraception was practised by virtually every couple in the sample (not unexpected considering the Protestant, urban sample).

However, slightly over half of all the pregnancies occurred while some method was being used. The total sample of couples had experienced a mean number of 2·3 pregnancies per couple, but it is clear that this average would have been significantly reduced had contraceptive practises been more successful. The highest rates of unplanned pregnancies were found, as was hypothesized, in the lower income classes. Of singular significance was the finding that among couples who had no unplanned pregnancies, the higher income, occupational and educational classes had the larger families. This finding is directly relevant to the general hypothesis that the reduction in socio-economc fertility differences has its immediate antecedent in the democratization of birth control.

The central finding with respect to the social psychological analysis of the extent of fertility planning revealed that socio-economic status was the prime determinant. The higher the income, occupational status, education and the like, the greater the proportion of couples practising contraception effectively. Also related to successful fertility planning, though to a much lesser degree, were good marital adjustment, high feelings of personal adequacy, and low interest in religion; in short, the " successful, rational, modern " family.

The *size* of *planned* families, on the other hand, tended to be influenced most by such factors as interest in children and social respectability as well as feelings of economic security and socio-economic status.

The Post-Depression Era

It should be emphasized that the Indianapolis Study was restricted to couples whose reproductive years were largely confined to the depression decade. A radical change in fertility habits was soon to take place. Commencing in the late thirties, the national birth rate began to make a slow recovery. It increased steadily through all but the last two years of the war (1944–1945) and then, following a high marriage rate in 1946, reached a level in 1947 higher than that of any year in the preceding twenty-five years ; an increase of over 50 per cent since 1933.

This unforeseen recovery provoked much speculation. Some observers saw an increase in size of completed families ; others more cautiously indicated that the evidence was not yet conclusive and that high marriage rates, a declining age at marriage, the making up of births postponed during the depression, and earlier childbearing might account (demographically) for the increase. Nevertheless, the high level of annual fertility has persisted through the 1950's and even the most conservative observers are willing to admit that an increase in completed family size seems evident. As a matter of fact, the general fertility rate (the annual number of births to women of reproductive age) in 1954 was even higher than in 1947.

What social changes have occurred in this era that might account for this change in reproductive behavior? To be accounted for is

the apparent fact that couples are marrying younger, are having their children earlier in marriage and are having more children than their predecessors.

The changes in the functional interdependence of the family group and the basic changes in the economic system that were outlined above in connection with the pattern of declining fertility are developments that have not been reversed in any radical way. Nor have women relinquished any of the gains made in their drive for equality with men. On the contrary, a rapid rate of technological innovation has further enhanced their freedom by reducing the proportion of their time which must be devoted to housekeeping and familial responsibilities. On the basis of these considerations, one might have expected either a stabilization of fertility at the low levels probably of the late 1920's, or even further declines.

What factors have changed during the last twenty years, however, which might be relevant to the " new look " in fertility styles ? The first and most obvious change has been a result of national economic recovery. With the preparation for war, war-time production, and post-war prosperity, unemployment disappeared as a major factor. In addition, all classes in the population have experienced substantial (though unequal) increments in real income in this period. Feelings of economic security returned and a general optimism about future economic conditions prevailed. More profound ideological and structural changes were taking place however. Federal legislation introduced over the period produced fundamental changes in the whole ideology of *laissez faire* economics and individual self-reliance. Such innovations as social security benefits on retirement, unemployment and disability compensation, minimum wage laws, federal insurance on bank deposits, subsidization of agricultural production, the principle of government responsibility for full employment, federal housing legislation, and the like, combined to legitimize the new ideology of the right to a minimal protection from economic need. The rapid growth of labor unions and the increasingly security-conscious content of their contracts with industry also contributed to the new ideology. This whole substitution of a system of institutional security for individual responsibility was further enhanced by all kinds of industrial retirement pensions, group medical insurance plans, disability insurance, and many other miscellaneous contractual welfare provisions.

The consequence of these developments for marriage has been to remove one of the primary reasons for postponement—the economic. The implications for fertility are that the return of some modicum of economic security relieved many couples of the anxieties which are conducive to the effective practice of contraception (thus presumably increasing the incidence of pregnancies which though not deliberately " planned " were not " unwanted ") as well as to promote higher rates of consciously planned pregnancies. In short, a climate unfavorable to early or greater fertility was effectively modified.

Concomitant with the return of economic security in the last fifteen years or so, other more basic structural changes were taking place. The new economic expansion has involved an increasing division of labor and specialization of occupational function, and an increasing bureaucratization of economic organization with formalization of qualifications for employment and advancement. Ceilings on mobility have become more visible in the sense that individual advancement (at the occupational levels where it was possible to some realistic degree) became a more orderly and predictable process.[1] For the mass of industrial workers at the lower skill levels whose next step upward would be that of foreman (an unrealistic aspiration for most in probability terms) this meant increased perceptions of blocked mobility except group mobility in the sense of income and peripheral benefit terms by virtue of the efforts of industry-wide collective bargaining. At higher occupational levels, that is in the white-collar managerial and professional levels which have expanded the most in the occupational composition of the country in this period, bureaucratization has not absolutely blocked the channels of mobility in this sense but rather has institutionalized the process so that advancement (or lack of it) becomes assured in terms of an orderly sequence of steps.[6] The force of these developments for the lower occupational classes has resulted in a partial rejection of the work-mobility drive ; a rejection of the job and work life as the central focus of meaningful activity for the individual. For the higher occupational classes, bureaucratization can be viewed as offering some diminution of the levels of anxiety required previously in less structured mobility situations. To the extent that fertility is related to mobility aspirations, these changes in the structure of economic organization may be thought of as forces undermining the competitive advantages perceived to accrue from fertility postponement and restriction.

Bureaucratization has other social psychological implications for factors presumably affecting fertility than simply mobility perceptions. At the higher occupational levels there is a visible effort being made by many large corporations to provide a large number of " non-economic " services for its employees, particularly in the social and recreational fields. The corporation as a social institution is increasingly providing some of the integrative functions previously supplied by the family. In addition, the trend from a status of self-employment and an economy of small business to one of employee and large-scale organization has had the effect of stabilizing the family-work relationship. The routinized forty hour week, for example, is to an important degree replacing the situation of almost total absorption of the family head in his work.

The resultant increases in leisure time and the stabilization of family-work relationships are visible in the new post-war communities—the suburbs—which have spread rapidly in an era of economic prosperity, mass production, and government insurance of mortgages

through veterans' benefit programs. With little investment and long amortization schedules it has become possible for millions of people to gratify home ownership ambitions, to escape the city, and to have a "better place for the children to grow up". The home and community have become more separated, both physically and psychologically, from the work and job environment. The age and socio-economic homogeneity of the new suburbs and the physical proximity of houses almost identical in space and appearance have been conducive to the re-establishment of the community and neighborhood as a primary group. In addition to the re-affirmation of family values that the suburban movement as a whole has both reflected and fostered, the pattern of conformity resulting partly from the loss of privacy typical of metropolitan life has no doubt been a positive factor for fertility. Pregnancy and maternity no longer signify a withdrawal from social life. In some circles there are times when it seems that pregnancy is almost fashionable. The status of being a mother certainly provides an entree into many social groups that might be otherwise blocked. In the new child-centered suburban life, childlessness is a social deviation and provokes speculation as to its causes. Sterility is probably a more socially acceptable justification for childlessness than an expressed lack of interest in or desire for children.

Most of these developments which have been treated here as causes and symptoms of increased fertility have by no means counteracted the full force of the long-term changes in the structure of the economy, the ideologies it has engendered, and the resultant reorganization of family functions. It seems clear that the popularity of families of seven or eight children, for example, is permanently past. What the developments of the last fifteen years do seem to indicate is a growing inclination to regard third and fourth children as desirable or at least to perceive a contraceptive failure after two children with less anxiety.

A New Study of American Fertility

In order to further the accumulation of basic knowledge about the social and psychological factors affecting fertility that was initiated on a large scale by the Indianapolis Study, two new major inquiries into the subject are currently in process. One study,[14] by Ronald Freedman and P. K. Whelpton, is a national sample survey of women, focused mainly at the level of expectations of completed fertility. This study hopes to provide information both for understanding what has actually happened in the post-war baby boom, that is, how much of the fertility increase has been a function of changes in the size of completed families and how much can be attributed to changes in the timing of children and ultimately, aims at providing data for the improvement of population forecasting. This study is currently in the preliminary stages of analysis.

Another study,[13] focusing more intensively on the basic cultural and personality aspects of fertility, is in the initial stages of an extensive

pretesting program. This research, which is being conducted by the Office of Population Research at Princeton University with the Milbank Memorial Fund, has been confined to women who have recently had their second child. A sample of 1,500 such women who live in metropolitan and suburban areas in the United States will be interviewed three times over a period of five years in an attempt to isolate the social psychological and motivational factors relevant to the practice of contraception and the occurrence of a third birth. On the basis of the Indianapolis Study experience, which was mainly an *ex post facto* study of couples who had virtually completed their families, it was thought desirable to have a longitudinal study which would study motivations before the fact (in this case the addition of a third child to the family), and a research design that did not require covering the entire range of birth orders, which frequently involved motivations unique to the birth order itself. The specific rationale for selecting the interval between the second and third child for study is the fact that this interval is the crucial point in the difference between an ultimately increasing or decreasing population, and seems to be one of the main focal points of change in the recent fertility transition.

A number of the general sociological speculations advanced earlier have been incorporated into the study as specific hypotheses.[5] This includes such variables as level of economic anxiety, mobility aspirations, career and work orientations, division of labor within the family unit, satisfaction with familial rôles, the perceived benevolence of the environment, affective attitudes toward children, and others. At the level of psychological and personality characteristics, factors such as intelligence, impulsivity, emotional stability, needs to give and receive affection, and the like, are to be included. The results of the pretest stages of this study will be ready for discussion by early 1956.

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Changes in Family Relations in the U.S.S.R.

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I

Family relations have greatly changed in the U.S.S.R. since October 1917.

Before the Revolution, in the Russia of capitalists and landlords, private property ideology marked every aspect of family life. It influenced the very creation of the family, the entry into marriage and the matrimonial choice. Natural human feelings like love and mutual sympathy of man and woman were often thrust into the background by sheer pecuniary considerations. So-called uneven marriages, involuntary marriages or marriages of convenience were quite a frequent occurrence. Private property was the decisive factor governing the mutual relations inside the family after marriage. The inferior position of the woman in the family of those times can be attributed to the same general causes which made for her inequality of all spheres of activity. Father and husband reigned supreme in the family. Their property formed the stock of the family, they were its chief providers. This made the despotic rule of husband and father one of the main features of a pre-revolutionary family. A woman is a creature by her very nature subject to man—thus taught since time immemorial all the states, juridical and clerical institutions, as well as art. This ideology fully corresponded to the position actually occupied by women.

Children were also completely dependent on their fathers. The relations between parents and children were to a very great extent governed by problems of inheritance, which often led to conflicts inside the family. Private property interests isolated it from society and made for philistine self-sufficiency and egoism of its members. The family came to be considered a fortress walled off from society.

All these traits of family life were more or less pronounced depending on the rôle played by property in the given class of society. The family relation of toiling classes, and of the proletariat specifically, was entirely different in character. Working women were brought with ever increasing force into the social process of production outside the family sphere, and this fact tended to make them more equal with men. At the same time, however, poverty, insecurity of existence pauperism, unemployment, a roughness of manners resulted in many negative features in family life—wives badly treated by their husbands, children not looked after, etc.

Especially hard was the lot of children born out of wedlock. They were destitute of all social rights and despised by society.

The influence of the church and church ideology was very strong in all spheres of matrimonial and family life. The church occupied a prominent position in the state and could settle at will the most decisive problems of wedlock and family life; it set up clerical rules of marriage and divorce to be strictly followed by all.

In some regions of pre-revolutionary Russia (mainly its outlying parts of Kazakhstan, Turkmenia, Uzbekistan, etc.) the family still bore distinct traces of the gens system, and of feudal serfdom : child marriage, abduction of wives, polygamy and kalym-paying were widely practised. Such was the family relation in pre-Revolutionary Russia.

II

The Great October Socialist Revolution brought about a radical change in the mutual relations of people in society, and in the entire mode of the peoples' life. The new social order wrought drastic changes in the living conditions of the people and in the life and the very essence of the family.

The successful building up of socialism completely transformed the status of the country so that the socialist system triumphed in all the branches of its national economy. Exploitation of man by man was abolished. Public, socialist ownership of means of production was proclaimed to be a basic principle of the new socialist order. Crises and unemployment became things of the past. All these factors made for a constant improvement in the family's material well-being.

Ever-growing production made it possible for all capable members of the family to find appropriate work. The constantly progressive industrial techniques and the wide spread of education brought about a general rise in the cultural and technical level of the workers, collective farmers and employees. In almost every Soviet family one can find now either a skilled industrial worker, or an expert in agriculture and other trades—all of them receiving the highest pay according to the existing scale of wages. Systematic reductions of prices for consumer goods and the consequent increase in the value of the rouble, serve to raise the real income of the family. It also greatly benefits from the help rendered by the state in the form of ever-increasing funds going for social insurance, pensions, free medical aid, scholarships for students and the growing network of rest homes, sanatoria, and the like.

The great change in family status may find an additional explanation in the fact that the woman has assumed quite a different position in the public and social spheres of activity. The Soviet power did not merely proclaim that woman and man are formally and legally equal. Steps were taken to guarantee to women active participation in the whole political, cultural and economic life of the country.

The total number of women employed in transport, various industries, agriculture, public health services, science and culture, runs into many millions. Hundreds of thousands of women serve as engineers and technicians at factories and plants.

Moreover, Soviet women actively work in all the sections of the State Administration. Three hundred and forty eight of them are Deputies to the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. ; over 2,000 are Deputies to the Supreme Soviets of the Union and Autonomous Republics; more than half a million are Deputies of the local Soviets, and 2,235 have been elected peoples' judges and assessors. About 3,000,000 women are busy in diverse scientific, cultural and educational establishments ; more than 1,400,000 study at universities and secondary special schools. Soviet women enrich Soviet science and techniques with new discoveries and inventions and greatly contribute to literature and the arts.

Soviet women can work freely in any field of activity. They are entrusted with skilled and responsible work on a par with men and are equally paid for it ; quite a number of women in the Soviet Union are managers of big enterprises, office heads, secretaries of Party organizations, Ministers, Deputy Ministers, etc. Soviet women widely participate in social production. This fact, as it is, does not warrant the opinion, sometimes expressed by ill-informed people, that every Soviet woman has to work either in an enterprise or an office. The Soviet reality gives a lie to this assertion. A great number of Soviet women devote themselves to household duties and the up-bringing of children. In the soviet Union it is considered an honourable task to bring up children, and many women are awarded Decorations for their work as mothers. Those who excel in this noble task are awarded the title of " Mother-Heroine ".

Every Soviet woman is fully aware of the fact that she can choose any job she likes at any time, the pay being not a single rouble less than that of a man. No restrictions are imposed on women in this respect no matter whether they are married or not. Effective help rendered the family by the Soviet State is also a factor of major importance. In actively involving Soviet women into the social process of production, the Soviet State takes every precaution so as to preclude any damage to the family and especially to children. A whole system of labour guarantees protecting the interests of women is effective in the U.S.S.R. A woman is allowed a fully-paid leave 77-days long during the period of pregnancy and a certain time after childbirth. Additional intervals during the working-day are allowed for suckling the child.

It is prohibited to dismiss pregnant women and reduce their pay, although they may be transferred to easier jobs. Various rules exist specially stipulating that the work carried out by women should not tell on their health or on their ability to bear children. The state has instituted allowances for single mothers and for those having many

children. The sums paid out total 6,000–7,000 million roubles each year. There exists a wide network of free mother-and-child protection centres (maternity homes, childrens' and women's medical advice centres, special centres at plants rendering advice to women on problems of hygiene, mother-and-child welfare centres, etc.). The ramified network of crèches is supplemented in the countryside by special nurseries additionally opened up only for the fieldwork season. Kindergartens contain more than four million children.

It is important for families living in towns that the children spend the summer in the fresh air of a country-house or a camp. For many years numerous official and public organizations of the Soviet Union have been taking out into the open a great number of children. In 1955 alone Pioneer camps provided summer rest for 2,750,000 school children.

A comprehensive schooling system for all children of school age is also of vast importance for the family. Seven-year education has become obligatory throughout the country and a transition to an obligatory ten-year education is being gradually effected.

Our trade-union, Young Communist and Pioneer Organizations sponsor numerous sports, technical and amateur artistic circles for children.

In 1940, a special system of training cadres for industry and transport was introduced in the country in the shape of various trade and transport schools to which the parents may freely send their children.

Boys and girls enter these schools, beginning at the age of fourteen, and all the teaching and maintenance expenses in them are met by the state. The young people studying in these schools acquire both general education and professional training, and after graduating, they are given work at factories, railways, or plants. This is a measure of paramount importance not only for the social economy as a whole, but for the family as well—it serves to alleviate its financial problems and guarantees a comprehensive education for its younger members. Eight million professional workers have already graduated from these trade schools.

The Soviet Government always takes into consideration the interests of the family and grants certain privileges to married people in taxation (amount of income tax paid) or when defining their civic duties (army service).

This new status enjoyed by the family in the Soviet society has brought about a radical change in all aspects of married life.

III

The liberation of the family from want and suppression, the steady improvement of the living standards, equality of rights for women, the concern of the state for mother and child, and state assistance to the

family have come to be the principal condition of freeing the family from the ugly influence of financial considerations, from the pressure of " callous cash payment ".

For the first time conditions have been created for real freedom of choice in marriage. The overwhelming majority of marriages have ceased to have anything in common with involuntary marriages or marriages stimulated by base or self-seeking considerations. Marriage ceased to be a legal bargain or a matter of convenience—a way of fixing one's financial affairs. People no longer regard marriage as a means for a woman to gain financial support, as a sole way to " a position in society ". A person who makes marriage subject to career, business, dowry and other such considerations has become in Soviet society an odious personage, condemned and ridiculed by the public. The predominating feature of family relations is mutual sympathy between man and women, love for and attachment to the children, mutual intellectual and economic concern for and assistance to the near ones. This is the circumstance which primarily ensures the firmness and the stability of the overwhelming majority of Soviet families.

The relations between man and wife in the Soviet family have also changed radically. These relations are no longer based upon seniority and submission ; the economic independence of the woman, her full political and legal equality determine her authority within the family, her feelings of self-respect, respect for her will, needs and wishes.

In socialist society a person is not appraised by descent or property inherited from his or her parents, nor by the position held by his or her father. The principle of the socialist system is remuneration in accordance with the work done. A man is appraised by his individual merits, by his usefulness for the society.

This circumstance which springs from the very nature of socialist society predetermines the relations between the parents and the children within the Soviet family. The right of succession as one of the forms of transition of personal property is provided in the Soviet state by a law, carefully safeguarding the succession rights of the members of the family (children, parents, husband and wife, etc.). In the socialist state, however, in which a man wins his welfare and his position in society by his personal merits, talents and work, the inheritance of property is no longer a decisive factor determining relations in the family, particularly between parents and children. Natural solidarity, harmonious combining of interests, mutual care and attachment arising from feelings of kinship, bearing no influence of financial considerations, become evermore typical of the relations between the parents and the children in the Soviet family of our days.

It would be proper to note in this connection the significant change in Soviet family life with regard to the problem of parents' consent for the marriage of their children. As a rule, children in the Soviet family marry with the consent of their parents. But this is no longer a

manifestation of parental power, which has lost its financial foundation in the Soviet state. It is only a manifestation of children's natural reverence for their parents.

The liberation of family relations from the influence of financial considerations, economic suppression and want, creates another feature characteristic of the life in the Soviet family—the birth of a new member of the family is no longer a matter of alarm and concern for its future. Procreation—this eternal function of the family—may be most freely manifested, unaltered by economic considerations. The above is vividly manifested by a steady growth of the population in the U.S.S.R., and by a permanent increase in the number of families with many children. According to spring 1955 data, the number of mothers decorated with Orders of Mother Glory—those who have five and more children—exceeded four and a half million.

Another important feature of the Soviet family is mutual assistance as regards financial and economic matters. There is an assistance within the family to disabled members—sick, old, children. In the village, of great importance in the life of the Soviet family is its individual farming plot which, alongside with the principal, decisive, i.e., commonly-owned, collective farming, is cultivated by an individual collective farm family.

This aspect of family life undergoes noticeable changes with the development of public services meeting the requirements of the family, with the growth of the collective farm economy, and with an increase of social insurance funds.

The Soviet state is greatly interested in mechanizing whatever possible in the household: industry is increasing the output of electric appliances ; the network of laundries, as well as public dining halls, restaurants and other catering establishments is being enlarged. The output of all sorts of semi-prepared foodstuffs has increased ; more and more state tailor shops are being set up. All these measures bring about a radical change in the family household, they result in liberating the family, mainly women, from the burden of petty household obligations.

As we have mentioned before, the family in the Soviet state is charged with the important task of helping such of its members who are unable to work—old people or children. In this field too, however, the situation is undergoing a significant change owing to the fact that the Soviet state allocates ever-increasing funds for pensions to the aged, for disablement insurance, for medical and other aid to the sick (for instance, while state social insurance expenditures were 8.9 thousand million roubles in the First Five-Year Plan, in the Second they were 32.1 thousand million roubles, in the Fourth—79·1 thousand million roubles, and during the three years of the Fifth Five-Year Plan they ran as high as 66 thousand million roubles).

The significance of a family as an educating body has changed radically.

The Soviet family is characterised by comradeship and socialist mutual assistance, which permeate all social relations within the socialist society. In this case, again, the question of the economic foundation of the Soviet state is of decisive importance. The economic foundation of the Soviet state is the socialist system of economy and public socialist ownership of the instruments and means of production. It follows that the interests of private property no longer make people oppose one another, do not oppose one family to another or a single family to the society as a whole.

This, in its turn, promotes the formation of a concept of unity of interests of family and society, frees the family from reticence, egoism and philistinism. It creates the principal prerequisites for the fulfilment by the Soviet family of the task of bringing up in the spirit of Communism all its members, children first and foremost.

The work of the adult members of the family at the state and social enterprises ; the school, the Young Communist League, the organization of Young Pioneers, children's institutions where children spend their time; art, cinema, radio, press—all this brings to the family such features and sentiments as promote in people the concept of their unity with the nation, the concept of their duty as citizens.

Communist morality does not differentiate between the behaviour of a person at home in the family from his behaviour in society. On the contrary, the unity of both principles constitutes a foundation of the communist outlook.

The Soviet state attributes great importance to the tasks it entrusts to the family regarding the upbringing of children. Nothing can be more wrong than the opinion that socialist society abolishes the family education of children, giving it only secondary importance and belittling its significance. Extending the sphere of social education with every year, socialist society does not proceed from the idea of counterpoising social and family education, does not proceed from the idea of ousting family education by social education. It proceeds from the idea of a harmonious combination of both. The Soviet state is concerned to avail every person of a possibility to give vent to his or her most deep-rooted paternal sentiments ; it is concerned that the child may enjoy one of the most precious blessings—a happy childhood within a family. The peculiarity of Soviet approach to the family and children is the extension of state influence upon the education of a child, such as the extension of the network of institutions for children of pre-school age, of schools, etc. At the same time it encourages in every way the importance of a correct, sound education by the family.

By the way, this explains the great significance attributed in the Soviet Union to the propaganda among parents of pedagogic knowledge through the so-called " Parents' Universities ", lectures, special magazines, papers, and conferences held in schools, broadcast over the radio, etc.

In their overwhelming majority Soviet families are precisely of the above-described type. This manifests the achievements of Soviet society in organizing life on new socialist principles, on the principles of socialist morality and ethic. Alongside of these new family relations, however, survivals of the past in the sphere of family life are still strong in the conscience of the people. These survivals reveal themselves in the cases of breach of monogamy, in the cases of rude, haughty and negligent attitude to woman on the part of man. In a certain number of cases these survivals reveal themselves in base motives for marriage, in the choice of a husband. They are also revealed in certain cases when parents shirk their duties to their children and vice-versa, in bringing up children in the spirit of philistine money-grabbing and egoism, in light-minded attitudes towards the family and family obligations. In a number of eastern areas of the country, some ancient humiliating customs are still not done away with (bride price, polygamy, etc.).

Such facts and people of such behaviour are strongly condemned by public opinion and are subjected to criticism in press, literary works, in plays and cinema. Soviet law on marriage and the family is combating such manifestations of the survivals and is directed to strengthen the socialist system of family relations.

IV

The task of the Soviet law on marriage and the family in the U.S.S.R. is to give every assistance to a stable and firm Soviet family.

Marriage, under the Soviet law, is a lay institution. The Church in the U.S.S.R. is separated from the state and thereby legal regulation of marriage is free from influence of any religion. The exercise of any religious belief is free in the U.S.S.R., a church marriage ceremony has no legal significance ; legal rights and obligations are imposed only by civil marriage authorized by state institutions. The marriage ceremony is performed at a Bureau of registration of civil acts, the ceremony being arranged in a festive manner so as to emphasize the importance attributed to this act by the state.

Marriage is absolutely voluntary. It is in no way subject to consent of parents, superiors, or guardians. The marriage age in the majority of republics is 18 years, while in some regions (the Ukraine, Moldavia and in the Caucasian republics) the marriage age for women is 16 years. The principle of monogamy is observed. Marriage is not allowed if one of the parties is married. Marriage of near relatives is also prohibited.

The Soviet State has freed man and woman from numerous estate, national, religious and other restrictions which influenced the relations between them prior to the revolution. Marriages between people of varying nationalities have become a rather frequent occurrence in

Soviet life and reveal the deeply-rooted ideology of friendship among the people of our country.

The principle of full equality of rights and obligations of man and woman in family life can be traced throughout all Soviet laws on marriage and family. Soviet law does not give a man any privileges or advantages as husband or father. Whatever concerns family life, household affairs, choice of occupation or profession, right to the property acquired in wedlock, right to succession, the parent or guardian right with regard to children—the family rights of the wife, are absolutely equal to those of the husband. The property owned by the husband and wife prior to marriage continues to be their separate property, while the property acquired in wedlock is their common property.

The regulation of legal relations between parents and children is conducted by Soviet legislation with the aim of consolidating the family, imposing the responsibility upon the parents for the upbringing and support of the children, and consolidating the principles of mutual assistance. Soviet laws safeguard parental rights, classing them among the most significant rights of the citizens.

The safeguarding of children's interests by the state is a constitutional law (Article 122) and is a guiding principle of the entire Child Legislation. In the Soviet state the maintenance of children born out of wedlock is free from discrimination and humiliation of children and their mothers. An unmarried mother is assisted by the state in the maintenance and upbringing of her child.

Guided by the principle of mutual assistance within the family, Soviet laws have established important alimony obligations not only for the husband and wife, or the parents and their children, but for the other members of the family, too (grandfather, grandmother, grandchildren, brothers and sisters, stepfather and stepmother, stepsons and stepdaughters).

The law has detailed rules for the adoption of under-age children.

Soviet legislation covering the problem of divorce is also guided by the principle of consolidating the family, by the idea of preventing unnecessary severance of family bonds. Divorce is admitted provided there are sufficient grounds, but the divorce procedure, as established by the law, is such as to cut short a light-minded attitude to marriage, divorce and family obligations. Divorce is executed only by the courts. The court is charged with the task of reconciling the husband and the wife. If this is not attained the marriage is annulled, provided there are serious grounds.

Soviet legislation on marriage and the family is promoting a stable and firm family. In doing so it is guided by the principles of socialist morality. Striving for this end, it has to overcome many difficulties engendered by the survivals of the past in the minds of the people. On the other hand, this struggle is facilitated by the absence in the Soviet Union of factors ruining the family. Soviet life does not know prostitution or the propaganda of Malthusianism, the Soviet land is

alien to propaganda of so-called "free-love", eulogy of adultery, and no such thing as pornographic literature exists here.

Such is the general outline of the marriage and family legislation in the Soviet state. Denying all petty regimentation of family relations, it is meant to guarantee every freedom of self-determination regarding marriage and family life. At the same time it safeguards the interests of the society as a whole—in due accord with the social significance of the family in the socialist system.

PART TWO

Changes in the Western Family

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The subject of this section assumes that there exists a family type which is more or less common to all Western civilizations as opposed to the family types prevailing in the Far Eastern or Middle Eastern civilizations. It is understood, of course, that the specific problems encountered by the family in various countries may vary very widely. However, the structural-functional pattern of the modern family type seems to be the same throughout the area we define as " Western civilization ". We shall have to enquire in our introductory remarks whether or not this is the case and, if so, to what extent this general assumption can be accepted. However, before raising this essential question, we have to mention some related facts which, at first sight, might seem of minor importance and are, therefore, mostly overlooked, but which to us, seem to be rather illuminating and indicative of some peculiar features of differentiation in the area of Western civilization, commonly accepted to be rather homogeneous.

When looking through the material which has been collected as the result of an extensive correspondence with colleagues in different countries of Western civilization, we simply cannot overlook the rather irregular distribution of our reports. We know, of course, that gathering a team for a Congress section, in general, follows along the lines of personal contacts and, hereby, becomes in some way more representative of the chairman's preferences than of the real situation. On the other hand, it seems to be the rule that, although many people are quite willing to present a report, very few are capable of keeping their promises, given that sociologists, in our days, are at least as busy as business managers. Therefore the following reports must be looked upon as a rather haphazard sample of contemporary research in family sociology. It would be only too easy to point to the essential gaps. If we still want to attempt some general inferences from our material, we must rely as much on a general conception of family evolution in the highly industrialized Western societies as on our actual material. On the other hand, we also hope that these remarks might perhaps provoke some comments and further information so that the final discussion could be conducted on a more universal basis than these preliminary remarks.

Whereas it is fairly easy to get interesting material on the family from certain European or North American countries, it seems relatively difficult to get similar information from other countries. We could even imagine a scale where countries with a high scoring in general industrialization produce also a rich material in the field of family

sociology and research, and where countries which are just taking the first steps in industrialization seem less interested in family research. This fact, taken in itself, becomes rather significant, in so far as it points to the general circumstances which have originated family sociology in general, namely the disorganizing effects of industrialization on family life. Therefore, one could say that the fact that some countries do not produce any research in the field of family sociology is perhaps to be looked upon as a sign of a rather integrated family life. Where family life develops along the traditional lines of the old folk society, no family sociology seems to be needed. We also could put it in the following way: where no real changes or just a few, occur, the problem of social change in general becomes obsolete and loses its sense. All we can expect in such a case is a folkloristic interest in describing the particularities of family life in a given cultural area, but no sociological analysis under the heading of social change.

On the other hand a warning seems necessary: a relatively integrated family life by no means implies that no other changes have occurred, e.g. in economic life. We could even say that such changes might have occurred already some time ago without having been noticed in the dimension of family life. Therefore the lack of family sociology can only be interpreted as a lack of consciousness of changes in the social system as a whole, and never as a lack of actual changes as such. It might even be that these assumedly well-integrated family types present already internal tensions which, however, become known to the sociologist exclusively and not so much to the people involved. From this point of view the paper of Professor E. W. Hofstee and G. A. Kooy from Wageningen is of a special interest in so far as it stresses the hidden tensions in the traditional family type in certain Dutch regions near the German border. Even though this area might in itself still present the features of traditional family life with its large kinship groups, the fact that other parts of the country have changed to modern urban and industrial civilization provokes a growing feeling of restlessness and " restraint " in the younger generations. It seems clear that this situation, for Holland, must present important problems since " the power of the old norms is great ". This power is so great that we have, in Dutch, two different words to denominate these two family types, the word " family " meaning " larger family " in the sense of a kinship group, whereas the word *gezind* is used when only the " nuclear family " is meant, i.e. the family typical for Western civilization. As far as I can see, this usage appears only in the Dutch language, and some Slavic languages, the other European languages having reduced the meaning of the respective words to the " nuclear family " only. In the Swiss Civil Code of 1912 the old French word *raffrarage* (*Gemeinderschaft* in German) has been artificially brought to life again in order to designate a special kind of this large or extended family, the joint family of two or more brothers living together, and working together, with their respective families under a common roof

and on a commonly owned family estate. But these words have never become popular again either in French or in German.

It can reasonably be assumed that the family as a large kin-group (sometimes even on a territorial basis) is still more or less typical for the Southern European countries like Spain and the " Mezzogiorno " in Italy where the old agricultural system is still in vigour. The same was true for the South-east where the Yugoslav *Zadruga* presented a classical case of the larger family as a kinship group working on a common economic basis (mostly agricultural). But it is quite clear that this family type also has been more and more disappearing under the impact of changes in the agricultural economy and of industrialization during the last one hundred years. Professor Rudolf Bićanić from Zagreb has stressed in his very interesting paper how this larger family disappeared with changes in agriculture long before industrialization started. The old ploughing system with two or three pairs of oxen operated by four or five men needed a large family for supplying the necessary manpower and maintenance for the family members and the animals. With the second half of the 19th century horse traction became more and more common in the most advanced parts of the country. " It required two horses, and only one man with an iron plough, so that a small family was enough to cope with it ". Professor Bićanić shows that the results of this change are still to be seen today in so far as the average family size grows with the use of oxen or cows, and he concludes that: " There is no doubt that the introduction of tractors will have a great effect on the optimum size of the family ". We have, however, to keep in mind that the first steps towards the disruption of the old extended family type were taken in the period of change from the old ploughing system with oxen to the newer one with horses. Therefore it can be stated that the " old Slav *Zadruga* was destroyed not by moral decay, or women's quarrels, but by horses ". The most important point is, however, that this obviously happened in a pre-industrial stage of economy !

Even though these statements are quite clear and corroborated by the facts, I would like to stress the point that we must carefully discriminate between the structural meaning of the word " size of the family " and its purely numerical meaning. In the *structural* sense, " size of the family " means a kinship group of varying size in which some of the members are children, but an increase in structural size does not imply a greater number of children in the average nuclear family. On the other hand, an increase in numerical size arises from a greater number of children in the nuclear family without any necessary relation to the presence of an extended family or kingroup. It is understood, of course, that most of the time the statistical data available are related to average size in the purely numerical sense without any bearing upon the structural type of the family. Therefore we would prefer to put these problems in terms of size of *households* in order to show the structural changes. Professor Bićanić has done this in another table, in which the enormous

increase of single persons (from 62 to 341 and to 380, from 1931 to 1948 and 1953 respectively) in non-agricultural households as against 78 to 110 and 102 in the same period in agricultural households is duly underlined.

Dr. Knut Pipping from the Swedish University of Abo, is quite aware of this difference between family size and size of the household. Therefore his paper on " Changes in the Family Structure in the Baltic Islands " is rather illuminating and might very well be compared with Professor Bićanić's paper. In Finland as in Yugoslavia, economic changes seem to have provoked important structural changes in the family. For the older economic system, a large family was an asset rather than a burden; therefore, the prevailing family system was more or less of the extended family type. With the decline of the fishing or fishing-farming economy and the increase in farming on a more intensive basis, together with a replacement of a subsistence economy by a money economy producing for the market, the size of the family is no longer an advantage " since the yield cannot be increased beyond a given maximum irrespective of how intensively these holdings are cultivated ". The profit becomes then inversely proportionate to family size, so that eventually a large family is a burden rather than an asset. With a growing disintegration of the extended family, the family type changes definitely to the nuclear family with but few relatives under the same roof.

Here we would like to draw attention to the fact that, apparently, the essential changes in family structure have occurred long before the appearance of industrialization. This supposition should be controlled by more historical studies and by further enquiring of the kind made by Pipping and Bićanić. It is quite obvious that much of the material dealing with under-developed areas could here be taken into consideration. We would like to suggest as an hypothesis that the effects of industrialization on family structure might become apparent earlier and in a more intense way if changes of the above-mentioned kind have been taking place for some time previously. Thus it could be said that the effects of industrialization on family structure might be different according to different starting points. At least some of the effects usually attributed to industrialization exclusively, like insulation of the nuclear family, might be due to particular changes in the pre-industrial system of advanced agricultural economy as, e.g., in Yugoslavia and in Finland.

Another pertinent question has been raised by Professor Howard Stanton in his paper on changes in the Puerto Rican family. At first sight it would seem that the family patterns are different following the predominant types of economy. We find the classical patriarchal family especially among the population of the mountains, the Jíbaros, who are the descendants of the extended families of the old semi-feudal land-owning class from 50 years ago. We have as well the rural lowlands laborer families with less pronounced patriarchal authority and

with greater freedom for wives, however far from North American concepts. Finally, we find the family of the urban laborer, whose standard of living in general is following the usual way of modern urban life; here there is still greater freedom for the wife, who usually has a job of her own. Here the question arises whether this rather simple concept of three different family types departing more and more from the " Jíbaro " norm is sufficient to explain the actual situation. Dr. Stanton emphasizes the need for continuity and " the very existence and acceptance of contrary orderings of values " which might prevent the new style of life from coming into being although many items and features of the industrial and urban way of life have been taken over. This effect might be rather superficial, whereas the old value patterns are transformed to a new autonomous system where, e.g. the deference of the wife toward her husband is transferred to her male " boss " outside the family. Thus the change, if there is any real change, " threatens to be a change only to new levels of stability and at times these new forms can become as apparently constricting as the old ". This would be an example of what I would like to call an abortive social change due to a lack of the type of preparation described above. In this case the highly adaptive and mobile nuclear family would perhaps come into being among the immigrants to the mainland exclusively, and not in the home country. On the other hand, the situation on Puerto Rico itself could only be clarified, or at least simplified, if a decent solution could be found for the ambiguous identity of its population wavering between the American way of life and the Spanish tradition.

Among the future desiderata we want to stress the necessity of an increase in family research in Southern European countries like Greece, the Italian Mezzogiorno, and Spain. We know that some work of this kind has been successfully undertaken by Dr. Franco Ferrarotti from Rome, and we sincerely hope that this material will be ready for the Congress. Unfortunately, we have very little information about Greece, and it seems that nothing has been done so far in this field in Spain. (At least we did not find any important traces in the *Revista Internacionál de Sociologia* apart from the interesting studies of Severino Aznar on the differential birth-rate in Spanish families.)

A first acquaintance with Dr. Ferrarotti's research material suggests that the prevailing structural type of the South Italian family can easily be analysed by following the different degrees of parentship relations, especially the duplication of existing parental relations through intermarriage, e.g. between cousins, and the establishing of many artificial parental bonds like the *comparato* which is usually initiated on occasion of a baptism and is rather related to the Catholic " spiritual kinship ". It seems that this kind of extended kinship plays an important rôle in Spain also, and in the Iberoamerican cultural area, e.g. the Lusitanian culture in Portugal and Brazil.[1] We sincerely regret that we could not get any real information about this family

type. Perhaps we can assume that family integration, in these culture areas, is still so strong that no need is felt for analytic research. On the other hand, we want to stress again that this does not mean that no changes have occurred in the respective countries which counteract this family stability. Therefore we can state that more research in these parts of the Western world would be highly desirable, not only for curiosity's sake but in order to prepare a rational family policy when the disintegrating effects of progressive industrialization come to be felt even in these countries of rather traditional folk societies.

Very interesting problems of the structural implications of social change can be found in the case of Turkey dealt with in the paper of Professor Hilmi Ziya Ülken from the University of Istanbul. In the year 1925 the Swiss Civil Code was translated into Turkish and has operated especially in family law and family reform. It was, however, to be expected that most of the regulations would not be accepted by those sections of the population which had not been under the impact of Western industrialization. Consequently, the new law has been accepted first by the westernized population in the big cities and in Western Turkey in general, whereas in the countryside and in the more Eastern parts of the country the tendency to keep to the old law of polygamy is still rather strong. New legal provisions have been made to cope with this peculiar situation, e.g. with the children born from a second wife out of wedlock, with changes in inheritance, etc. Again, the need arises for further research in this field in order to get more information about the actual behavior of the people who live under three different cultural systems; pre-islamic custom, the law of Islam, and the influence of a Western-oriented social and economic policy with industrialization transforming at a growing speed rather important sectors of the country.

It might sometimes be rather difficult to decide whether or not a country belongs to Western Civilization. For Turkey, it may be taken for granted that she clearly belongs to Western Civilization at least so far as we may encounter, in Western countries too, a typical conflict between traditional folk society on one side and the fully industrialized type of society on the other. But for countries like Egypt, Lebanon, and Syria the case seems to be different even though Western influence has been quite strong for centuries. It is clear that secularization has swept away very important parts of the old religious law, but on the other hand it seems that these countries are building up a cultural type of their own which combines in an interesting and quite autonomous way pre-islamic custom with the special demands of a slowly-industrializing society. Therefore we could state that Turkey belongs to Western Civilization mostly owing to her own wish, whereas the other countries of the Middle East, again owing to their own desire, and owing to special conditions which brought them in contact with industrialization before they had produced a folk society, seem to develop in another

direction. It is understood that statements of this kind need further checking by empirical research.

A very interesting essay in this direction is presented by Mrs. Nazahat Tanç from the University of Istanbul. She gives a comparative study of the suicide rates in the married and the non-married population. An old law, first discovered by Emile Durkheim, and corroborated by Maurice Halbwachs, shows a decrease of frequency of suicides among married people in contrast to bachelors of both sexes. Now, Mrs. Tanç, in analyzing the Turkish statistics from 1926 to 1946, discovers that this relation is inverted, in Turkey, in so far as married people show a much higher suicide rate than the bachelors. As a tentative explanation, she points to the fact that during the same period marriage in general, but also the status of women, and many other features of traditional Turkish life have undergone such profound changes that a crisis was to be expected. She therefore defines this wave of suicides among married people as " anomic suicide " due to revolutionary changes in the social system. I feel that further comparative research of this kind should be developed in order to check this hypothesis.

Another example of family life under conditions of violent change is given by Mrs. Y. Talmon-Garber in her analysis of the Israeli family in collective settlements. Here it could have been expected, in some analogy with the Russian experiences immediately after 1917, that the family in the traditional Western sense as a separate unit closed together by bonds of an intimate relationship would break down under the impact of the ideology of the collective settlement. It appears, however, curiously enough, that this is certainly not the case everywhere. In some of the settlements it can be noticed that the family tends to separate itself from the collectivity. As a matter of fact, Mrs. Talmon-Garber underlines " a strong tendency towards a more familistic pattern " so that some of the collective settlements had to change their policy towards the family. The most important point, to us, seems to be the different degree of intensity in identification with the collective settlement and its proper values. We know from other experiences that the structure of collective settlements shows a remarkable tendency to become modified following the lapse of time that people have been living together. In newly established settlements, identification with the collectivity as such seems to prevail while, as time goes on, other problems may arise. The *Bund* changes into a village community. We wonder whether Mrs. Talmon-Garber's material could be evaluated by taking into consideration the time variable. This, too, should be done on a comparative basis, perhaps in comparing collective settlements in Israel with others in the U.S.A. and Soviet Russia.

Here we very much regret to confess that we have been unable to get more comparative research material from Soviet Russia, and also from Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria and Eastern Germany. It would be an interesting question to know whether or not the experiences in these countries with regard particularly to the

development of the family in collective settlements, will go into the same direction as in Israel. Of course, family policy is by no means the same in these different countries. However, we have to face the fact that Soviet Russia, from 1917, to 1926, and again from 1926 to 1934 and eventually in 1944, has changed several times the course of her family policy. This has been done by abandoning the claims of a collectivist ideology and replacing it by a more realistic policy protective of the nuclear family. I personally feel that this fact, taken in itself, means that at least in this regard the conformity in family development between Soviet Russia and Western Civilization, notwithstanding the differences of political orientation, is perhaps more substantial than it might seem at first sight. On the other hand, we cannot reach a real conclusion so long as no research materials are available.

In comparison with this situation it can be said that research materials in family sociology in the United States are quite abundant. We also want to stress the point that this research by no means limits itself to the United States properly speaking but shows a remarkable tendency to spread out over other countries as well. While this movement, about a generation ago, was mainly concerned with the family types in the immigrants' former home countries, new orientations have arisen, especially during the last 15 to 20 years. Of course there is still a very great interest in the provenance of new immigrants like, e.g. the Puerto Ricans. But on the other side, American family sociology has lately been engaged a good deal in family and community research in Central and Southern America and has, in this way, contributed very interesting analyses of family types in folk societies. More important, however, seem to be a series of surveys dealing with the conflict of different types inside the U.S.A. as, e.g. the Northern and the Southern family. Professor Reuben Hill from the University of North Carolina has contributed an important paper on " Family Patterns in the Changing South " which is a good sample of the rather realistic trend in comparative research of this kind. Irrespective of all stereotyped patterns of the larger family in the South, Dr. Hill starts from the assumption that the large planters' family in the South was nothing but a very small minority group. On the other hand, this minority pattern created the stereotype for the Southern family, whereas it seems that the average Southern family type is not so much different from the average agrarian form of family organization found in all regions of the U.S. and in many non-industrial countries of the world. The real problem, again, results from the rapid industrialization and urbanization of the South during the 20th century. The facts seem to show that the effects of both industrialization and urbanization, are quite " disproportionate to the region's level of urbanization ". Thus, fertility has decreased more rapidly in the South than in the rest of the country, the divorce rates are remarkably higher, etc. This, in my eyes, is an interesting hint for a general

theory of family development in a changing society, in so far as it seems to indicate that adjustment to the conditions of the industrial and urbanized way of life become easier the longer people have lived under these conditions, and that heavy disorganizing effects become felt only when the clash between the two modes of life, the traditional and the modern, is too sudden and without a transitional stage of a certain duration. Again, the time variable seems to play an important rôle in this regard. We would also like to stress that, in Europe, this problem has been raised in analyzing the respective effects of industrialization and urbanization on the more progressive Protestant populations on one side and the more traditionally-minded Catholic populations on the other. The facts seem to indicate a higher rate of disorganization with Catholic populations under the impact of industrialization than with the Protestant populations which have taken up the industrial mode of life more than a century ago and have more or less become adjusted to it.

Mr. Lucien Brams from the Centre d'Etudes Sociologiques in Paris, gives another interesting example of the relationship between the cohesion of the family and its general social integration. His sample analyses two distinct populations, one from a suburb of Paris, the second from an industrial village of 1,500 inhabitants which is rather isolated from the nearest urban center. In this case it can easily be shown that the pattern of the extended family still survives even though the kinship group no longer lives under the same roof. In general, participation in community affairs and other associations is rather high given that the formal gatherings are duplicated by familiar and neighbourly acquaintanceship. On the other hand, the family type in the suburb of Paris is, most decidedly, an individual insulated nuclear family. Under these circumstances, community participation is no longer personal and direct, but is rather of a functional kind, with more or less well-defined special goals of the different associations. It is interesting to notice that the industrial way of life is very suitable for building up a new traditional order; in that particular case, the main industry in the village in question has been operating for 50 years already so that a rather well-balanced order has emerged. On the other hand the suburban families are fighting against a hostile and ever-changing environment and are in a continuous state of gestation and in search of an appropriate family type which has to be consciously and newly conceived in contrast to the traditional way of life of the former group.

Dr. Gerhard Baumert, one of the former assistants of the Darmstadt Study, takes up a related topic in discriminating between short-range changes and long-range trends in family life. It seems quite clear that this approach is of an utmost importance for a country like Germany where, in the period from 1933 to 1945 and then from 1945 to 1955, radical changes have taken place in the entire social system. This raises the question whether or not Germany, and especially the

German family, is developing in the same direction as other Western Civilizations. During the last 20 years it was more or less taken for granted that a particular tendency towards patriarchalism in the German family had been the main reason for a certain authoritarian trend in the political dimension of German society. On the other hand, most of the research materials in family sociology in Germany show that the patriarchal family pattern, as in many other industrialized societies, has become less common, at least during the last decade. Further studies were able to show that this is a long-range trend which had started already in the middle of the 19th century.[2] Thus, the typical authoritarian attitude of German politics under the rule of National-Socialism had much more to be reduced to an ideological pattern than to the reality of family life. The tremendous wave of divorces after the second World War is also interpreted as a short-range adjustment to the special circumstances after 1945, and not so much as a long-range trend.

A similar discrimination between short-range adjustments and long-range trends is made in Professor M. F. Nimkoff's paper on " The Increase in Married Women in the Labor Forces ". It seems that most of the motives behind this development take into consideration short-range adjustments exclusively, as e.g. the wish for a higher standard of living, or the need to help pay off the indebtedness incurred in the purchase of a house or a new automobile, etc. On the other hand we have to take into consideration more constant motives which are more or less connected with far-reaching changes in our economic and social system. The same point is stressed by Professor Judson T. Landis from the University of California in his very interesting study on " Some Aspects of Family Instability in the United States ". Again, the difference between the isolated nuclear family and the extended family as a kinship group is used as an important theoretical device for explaining the different results of the break-up of a family through divorce. Marital happiness, today more than at any other time, depends upon very personal qualities of the respective partners. This also means that the real causes for divorce cannot be found in the final stage of a marriage which is breaking down but have to be looked for much earlier. " A better understanding of the marriage relationship shows divorce as the legal termination of a marriage which failed two or three years earlier ". This, of course, to the family sociologist means first of all a new difficulty in building up an effective research design. But it also opens a new perspective for understanding the problems and difficulties of marriage in our time. These are more or less connected with the more general question of creating new personality patterns in a changing world where one of the greatest difficulties seems to be the creation of a lasting bond between persons of different sexes. Thus, unhappiness in the family and divorce may be much more traumatic for children and parents alike in a rather individualistic society of isolated nuclear families " than in societies where the children can be

absorbed by a larger kinship group"; and the parents likewise, we would like to add to these important statements of Dr. Landis.

By concentrating on the long-range trends in family life, one gets a quite different overall picture of the meaning of contemporary family development than by keeping to the short-range adjustments. This is also the clear-cut result of Dr. J. A. Ponsioen's paper on the Dutch situation. Given that Holland is one of the most industrialized countries of the European continent, we would have expected an acute state of crisis, especially when we combine the long-range trends with the post-war difficulties of economic change in Holland. But it seems that a new family type has come into being which has adjusted fairly well to the new conditions of economic life in the modern community. We want to draw attention to the fact that the position of women in economic life, in contrast to the situation in the U.S.A., has not changed considerably during the last 50 years. The most striking fact is perhaps the considerable decline in employed women who have been married during this period. The reason for that might very well be the growth of life insurances for widows and the stress laid on the duty of paying alimonies to divorced women, as Dr. Ponsioen puts it. Another interesting fact is the high percentage (10%) of families which include other relatives, e.g. grandparents. Whereas a similar tendency has been explained, in Germany, by an acute lack in housing caused by the heavy bombing of the second World War, this argument cannot be used in the same way in Holland where damages by bombing were much less frequent than in Germany. We wonder whether this fact could, then, be accepted as a general symptom of a changing family pattern, or if it is just a short-range adjustment to special post-war conditions of life.

Although the author admits himself that the main interest of the new research program in Holland was to gather more information about leisure-time activities, Dr. P. Thoenes, in his paper on "Interviews on Leisure, a Starting Point for a Family Typology" stresses the point that important knowledge can be acquired by this means about the average and normal family life in a given society. The very fact that these interviews were not focussing primarily on family problems, created an unconstrained opportunity for getting a substantial insight in the average family patterns of everyday life. In his findings, Dr. Thoenes emphasizes the stability of the average Dutch family; this result fits well with analogous findings in Germany and France, and supports our conclusion that the contemporary situation differs from the situation of the beginning of the century in so far as the stabilizing factors in family life have gained strength even though industrialization and urbanization have developed at an ever-growing speed during the first 50 years of our century. This means perhaps that the adaptability of the family to the conditions of modern life, as seen under the perspective of long-range trends, is apparently much greater than an expert observer would have supposed a generation ago.

I would like to summarize some of the results of the foregoing discussions and the papers which have been presented to our section in terms of the theory of social change. The first hypothesis would run as follows: it seems that, under certain circumstances the shift from the extended family to the nuclear family takes place already in pre-industrial stages. The second hypothesis, very closely related to this first one, is that the effects of industrialization become felt more intensely when and where the above-mentioned shift has happened before the main period of industrialization, the persistance of an extended family acting as a brake to the disorganizing effects of industrialization, at least for a certain time. But once industrialization is generally under way the time variable becomes of the utmost importance in so far as we have to discriminate fundamentally between short-range adjustments and long-range trends: this is our third hypothesis. Even though it is obvious that the first effects of industrialization were disastrous for family organization, this fact can by no means be taken as a final trend, since it does not exclude by definition a subsequent adjustment after a period of acute crises and attempts towards readjustment. This leads us to a fourth hypothesis which I would like to put in the following words: those sections of the population which have first suffered under the impact of industrialization, i.e. those which have first shifted from the extended family structure to the nuclear family, have also been the first to recover from this strain and to develop systematic adjustment to the new conditions of life. On the other hand those sections of the population which have first resisted industrialization, and have therefore kept alive the old extended family structure eventually go through greater crises than the former ones in so far as they are quite unprepared to meet the impact of industrialization. But there is a fairly good chance that these groups too will eventually recover, provided that no other elements come into play. It is understood, however, that all this is nothing but a provisional and purely hypothetical frame of reference which needs further discussion and above all further checking by research.

NOTES

[1] See Emilio Willems, in *Köln Zeitschr. f. Soziol. und Sozialpsych.*, VII (i), 1955.

[2] See René König, " Family and Authority: The German Father in 1955 ", paper read at the 50th Anniversary Meeting of the American Sociological Society, Washington, D.C., Sept. 1955; to be published in *Marriage and Family Living*, 1956.

Traditional Household and Neighbourhood Group: Survivals of the Genealogical-Territorial Societal Pattern in Eastern Parts of the Netherlands

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" It does not matter whether marital relations are permanent or temporary; whether there is polygyny or polyandry or sexual license; whether conditions are complicated by the addition of members not included in our own family cycle : the one fact stands out beyond all others that everywhere the husband, wife and immature children constitute a unit apart from the remainder of the community." This is the conclusion of R. H. Lowie, the well-known and outstanding American cultural anthropologist. So the group consisting of husband, wife and immature (unmarried) children—with a living Dutch term called " gezin " and with an Anglosaxon artificial term called " nuclear family "—is according to Lowie, a social unity in every society. This unity, however, has often been integrated in a larger familial group sometimes with such a functional importance that the " gezin " is totally over-shadowed by it. In the non-Western world, we generally find, not only such an integration, but also such an over-shadowing. A " gezin "-autonomy hardly exists there. The " gezin " has to respect and to obey the norms and decisions of the larger kin group and it also has to comply with the rules of the local community. (It hardly needs mentioning that the larger kin group and the local community in many cases are wholly or for the greater part identical.) This societal type, in which the individual is more a member of its extended family and the neighbourhood than of its " gezin ", can be defined as a type with a genealogical-territorial pattern.

Where the spirit of individualism and the social-economic process of differentiation go together, this pattern grows weaker and gives way at last to interpersonal relations which for a considerable part are based on individual, revocable choice. If one only has a superficial idea of Western history and of the acculturation in these regions, where whites and non-whites meet each other, one knows that this is true. As to the Western world, here we find in the early Middle

Ages—at least in the country—the genealogical-territorial pattern. Today the individual family typically determines its destination itself. The group consisting of husband, wife and unmarried children liberated itself from the formerly extended family and neighbourhood. Ideological, social and economic factors caused the loss of the most important functions of these larger units and at the same time a decrease of their power over the smallest kin group, which—becoming a more autonomous unity in a society, characterized by increasing individuation—acquired a unique meaning. Modern Western " gezin "-life does not deviate from that of previous generations, only because the " gezin " underwent a very important functional and structural change; it also deviates from it, because the relation between the " gezin " and the other institutions changed fundamentally.

As in other Western countries, the process of " gezin "-individualization in Holland did not start at the same time and did not show the same pace everywhere. In general the city led the way and the country followed ; the bourgeois class was more progressive in this respect than the nobility and the labourers. The rural regions along the Dutch coast, already taken up in the world economy for many centuries and relatively prosperous, showed clear indications of " gezin " individualization in the middle of the nineteenth century ; in the rural regions along the German boundary, long isolated and poor, one can still discover vestiges of the genealogical-territorial pattern. As such may be considered the *traditional household* and the *neighbourhood group*.

We define the traditional household as that type of household which embraces more related individuals than a " gezin "-household and this not by incidental individual circumstances, but as a result of an old locally or regionally rooted cultural view. A " gezin "-household can embrace only three categories of related persons (father, mother and children), a traditional household can include many more categories. In a traditional household may live together a " gezin " and the parents of the husband, but also a " gezin " and the widowed mother of the wife, plus the unmarried brother of her mother. The traditional household can contain ; (*a*) several nuclear families, (*b*) a nuclear family and one or more individuals, who are not members of a " gezin ", (*c*) two, possibly more, nuclear families and one or more individuals, (*d*) two or more individuals. These four sub-types are all present in those parts of the Netherlands, where the traditional household exists. Are they primarily a consequence of poverty? This question has to be answered in the negative. For in those Western regions, where the agrarian population has the same standard of living as that near the German boundary, the traditional household does not exist any longer as it does in the Eastern regions. It is clear that the continuance of the traditional household finds its most important reason in a familistic spirit, which belongs to a phase of culture in which the process of social differentiation has not yet reached the modern

stage and in which the individual does not yet know the same longing to follow his own ways as contemporary urbanized man.

The neighbourhood group is a group arising from and conforming to rules in the minds of the members of a local or regional society. As contrasted with many other neighbourhood groups this neighbourhood group has its sharp limit ; one belongs to it or one does not. One joins it according to a certain rule and one likewise leaves it. The rights and duties of the neighbour are fixed and everyone knows them. One can possess a special status in the neighbourhood group, which gives rights and duties not shared by the other group-members. In short, this neighbourhood group is not at all an amorphous group with a vague limit, but on the contrary a social unit with a specific structure, specific functions and a clear outline. Beyond the special rights which the individual can derive from his membership of the neighbourhood group (help during child-birth, wedding, death, harvest, etc.), he also gains a place in local society through this membership. If the newcomer does not take the step necessary to become the neighbour of a number of surrounding people, he will stay an outsider. He cannot be " one of us " if he fails to ask for the neighbour-bond. From the social point of view he stands isolated from these who are geographically his neighbours and this implies that he is a stranger in the community. Therefore it is not surprising that hardly any newcomer dares to settle down in the agrarian community, where the neighbourhood group still exists, without asking for neighbourhood according to the rules in force.

It was not before August 1955 that we were really confronted with the two phenomena which form the subject of this paper. During a study among the agrarian population of the municipality of Winterswijk, situated near the German border, we also had the opportunity to consider the traditional household and the neighbourhood group. The situation at Winterswijk is perhaps not representative in all respects for the part of the Netherlands where these phenomena stemming from an earlier phase of culture are still perceptible. On the other hand it is probable that the problems for the individual, caused by the collision of old norms and new individualism, is the same at Winterswijk as in other places where the genealogical-territorial pattern still exists as an influential " survival ". Therefore we can take Winterswijk as an example.

Winterswijk has about 21,000 inhabitants, of whom 10,000 are living in the 9 predominantly agrarian hamlets, situated in a circle around the town (which everyone calls " the village "). In the town agriculture has not yet disappeared ; even along the main street one can find farm houses. But the important source of livelihood is the textile-industry. The largest of the 7 textile mills has a labour force of 1,000. The agrarian population is predominantly Protestant. Only in the hamlet of Meddo near the Roman Catholic municipality of Grol we find a strong minority of Catholics. Type and size of the

farms in Winterswijk are rather representative for agriculture on the Dutch sandy soils. The small family farm prevails, and the farm is a so-called mixed farm on which the products of agriculture are used for animal husbandry. There are 1,514 farms of which 589 are smaller than 5 ha., of which 638 are larger than 5 but smaller than 10 ha., of which 187 lie between 10 and 15 ha., and of which 100 are over 15 ha.

It was possible to obtain data about the structure of the household on 497 farms at Winterswijk. These 497 farms may be considered as representative for all agrarian enterprises larger than 2 ha. It appeared that a " gezin "-household occurs in 252 cases, so this type of household is somewhat more represented in the total sample than the traditional household. It is *not* so, that, if one comes nearer to the " village ", one finds fewer traditional households. Nor do we find a decrease of traditional households in connection with an increase of farm size. If we join together all farms, smaller than 15 ha., and we compare them with those over 15 ha., the percentage of traditional households in the first group is 46·5 and in the second one 53·5. From the data obtained at Winterswijk, one cannot state that increasing farm size (and so probably increasing material prosperity) causes decrease of traditional households. The data suggest a connection between traditional household and religious denomination, but the members of the Dutch reformed Church form such a majority, that it is dangerous to suppose a stronger inclination among the Dutch Reformed to accept the old type of household than among other groups. Moreover the Dutch Reformed Church is a dwelling with many compartments.

An exact knowledge of the structure of the traditional household is important, because every structure causes its own psychological difficulties. It appeared then, that in 125 cases a married couple lives together with the parents-in-law and that in 100 cases a couple lives together with the father or mother of one of the partners. It rather seldom happens, that a " gezin " lives together with an individual of the husband's and wife's generation. A " gezin " and an " uncle " (wife's or husband's brother) were found together 14 times, a " gezin " and an " aunt " only 6 times. Probably the relatively high frequency of the three generation-household must be explained by the old rule of primogeniture. Although modern Dutch law gives every child a similar portion of the legacy, the old idea of primogeniture is not dead at Winterswijk. If possible, the eldest son inherits the farm and the other children, compensated by money, leave it. But the successor accepts the duty " to bring his parents to their end ".

The type of traditional household, so frequently found at Winterswijk, has the following consequences :

(*a*) the child is educated by its parents, its grand-parents and possibly by their still unmarried children (the child's uncles and aunts),

(*b*) if the younger pair lives together with the parents of the husband, the young woman has to adapt herself to the mother of her husband, who is, in her opinion, the master of the house,

(*c*) if the younger pair lives together with the parents of the wife, the young man has to adapt himself to his wife's father, who will claim to be the " farmer " until his last gasp of breath,

(*d*) the partner who lives with his or her parents, is in danger of remaining in the position of a " child " until his old age.

It is impossible here to consider these consequences more thoroughly but it is clear that there is an interesting psychological and sociological problem in the structure of the traditional household. It depends on the sort of structure which problems will arise. If the household consists of a " gezin " and a brother or sister of one of the partners, one may mainly expect difficulties between brother and sister-in-law, whereby the unmarried one of these two is in the weakest position.

Nearly every agrarian family at Winterswijk has accepted the neighbour bond, from which it derives rights on the one hand, but from which arise duties on the other hand. Rights form an agreeable side of human existence, but man is inclined to under-estimate them. The duties, which man has, are not seldom experienced by him as a heavy restraint. When a child is born in one of the neighbouring families, it may be experienced as very pleasant to visit mother and child with 10 or 11 other near-by women; but when one has a baby herself and she is obliged to see 11 or 12 ladies, the situation has a fundamentally other character. When one of the members of a person's family dies and his neighbours pay (in accordance with their neighbour duty) the death announcements, then this is hardly noticed by him, for it is a matter of course; but when someone dies in a neighbouring family and he is obliged to pay the death announcements, then this is not always a task which he fulfils with all his heart. Especially younger people feel it as a burden, but they do not dare to throw it off, for the norm lies deeply anchored.

The traditional household and the neighbourhood group are acceptable for the individual as long as he considers himself primarily a member of the larger genealogical unit and the local unit. They are acceptable for man in " primitive " society, in societies geographically and socially isolated, little differentiated and lacking a money-economy. When the " primitivism " of society is broken through, however, there grow tensions in and between members of this society, which may be hidden from the eyes of outsiders, but which are intensive. Traditional household and neighbourhood group are today considered by many younger people in the eastern parts of the Netherlands as serious restraints. Modern culture has awakened wishes and desires which do not reconcile with the old norms and forms. There are indications that those old norms and forms give way to entirely other ones, but it seems that many and long-lasting tensions are reserved for the agricultural population in the Eastern parts of the Netherlands, for the power of the old norms is great.

Occupational Heterogeneity of Peasant Families in the Period of Accelerated Industrialisation

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I. INTRODUCTION

The rapid change from the traditional large family to the modern small family in Yugoslavia to-day is particularly interesting to follow, because of the different stages of this process found in various parts of the federal state.[1] The industrialised and westernised type of family is found in the North West (Slovenia), and in the northern parts of Croatia the small family prevails. In the south the large family is still frequent, and in the Danubian plain of the Voyvodina we find the typical small peasant family, in the lesser developed Serbia the traditional family is stronger and the disintegration more felt. The autonomous district of Kosmet is inhabited to a large extent by Shiptars (Albanians) among whom the family is patriarchal. On the other side is Bosnia, a melting pot of the influences of industry on the traditional family. There is Macedonia, where patriarchal institutions are still strong, and Montenegro which until recently had strong remains of tribal organisation and is now turning quickly to the small family.

Over all this background of different stages of social, economic, demographic, cultural and national development, a political system is superimposed with the purpose of building a new society based on socialist economy, whose impact on social institutions is very great. The basis of its programme is industrialisation of the country, which in the occupational field means a rapid increase of the working class. The family, and particularly the peasant family, has been affected by all these changes,[2] which in Professor König's sense[3] add disintegration to disorganisation of the traditional family so that there is a cumulative effect of many factors.

II. A SHORT SURVEY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PEASANT FAMILY IN YUGOSLAVIA

The general trend of development of the peasant family in Yugoslavia follows the evolution of the west European family with a more accentuated lag as we move from the West and North to the South and East, and from the valleys to the mountains.

The size of the peasant family is decreasing with all the consequences to family authority, internal division of labour, and the expansion of extra-family relations. We have followed this decrease in Croatia[4] for about one hundred years. The peasant family had an average

size of 8.4 members in 1857 ; this fell to 5·4 members in 1910, and is at present no more than 4·4 members on an average. The development for different parts of Yugoslavia during the last 43 years is as follows :

Number of peasant family members

	Slovenia	Croatia[5]	Bosnia	Serbia
1910 ..	5·5	4·9	4·9	7·0
1953 ..	4·3	4·4	5·6	5·1

This decline of the number of members of the family is due to well known causes : the penetration of market economy and the cessation of traditional production, the different stage of demographic pressure of population due to improvement of hygiene and food production, etc. We should like to emphasise one influence in particular. The well-known theory that the social organisation of the family is historically determined in the long run by the mode of production, as brought forward by Morgan and Engels, has been reinforced by more recent investigations.[6]

The old large peasant family was based on the technique of the plough (*Pflugbauerntum*), which on the whole determined the optimum size of the peasant family holding. We think we can go a step further in this direction and make a distinction based on the kind of animal traction used with the plough. Until the second half of the nineteenth century, ploughing was done by at least two to four pairs of oxen, operated by four or five men. Therefore only a large family could supply the necessary labour and maintenance for the animals. The switch-over to horse traction for ploughing became widespread in the second half of the nineteenth century. It required two horses, and only one man with an iron plough, so that a small family was enough to cope with it.[7] But there is still a third phase of development : the small peasant poorly endowed with land is to-day compelled to use cows for ploughing. The same positive correlation of the size of the family with the type of animal traction used in ploughing is noticeable to-day in the different parts of Yugoslavia, at different levels of economic development. There is no doubt that the introduction of tractors will have a great effect on the optimum size of the family. But the number of people required for the old method of cultivation remain on the land and have a retarding effect on the application of new methods.[8]

In the long term development there have been various shorter term influences that either accelerated or retarded the general process of evolution. The strongest of these was the Second World War which cost Yugoslavia 11% of its total population. The liberation movement and the subsequent revolutionary changes caused great movements of population, to which the migrations that followed land reforms must be added. The industrialisation drive opened new prospects for the employment of the surplus peasant populations, and more

than one million people moved to towns. There are some more particular reasons for the decrease in the size of family, such as the introduction in the 1947–53 period of a progressive income tax and a progressive rate of compulsory deliveries of agricultural products. Land reforms on the other hand had a retarding effect on the dismemberment of small family holdings, but an accelerated one on the large ones.

In Table 1. we can follow the changes in the size of the agricultural family in Yugoslavia since 1931 according to the censuses of population of 1931, 1948 and 1953 which registered the families according to the occupation of the head of the family. We see that the increase in the number of non-agricultural families is much greater with smaller families, which tendency prevails also with small agricultural families, where the curve inflates as we approach the smaller number of members.[9]

Table 1—*Size of the family households (in thousands)*

	Number of members										
	(a) agricultural households										
	Total	1	2	3	4	5–6	7–8	9–10	11–15	16–20	21–×
1931	1,963	78	197	250	299	571	322	134	92	13	5
1948	2,198	110	235	298	356	645	341	121	68	8	3
1953	2,009	102	231	273	321	597	305	111	59	7	2
	(b) non-agricultural households										
1931	746	62	132	142	132	175	66	20	9	1	2
1948	1,412	341	274	263	219	220	67	17	11	1	1
1953	1,975	380	347	381	351	348	116	38	14	1	1
Number of households in 1953 (taking 1931=100)—											
(*a*) agricultural	103	131	117	111	107	105	95	83	64	54	40
(*b*) non-agricultural	265	613	263	268	266	199	176	191	156	100	50

Large families of more than two conjugal units are disappearing in more developed areas. They are still fairly large in Serbia, Macedonia and Kosmet (5–9%). In Slovenia they are no longer in existence, and the number in Croatia and Voyvodina is very small (1–2%).

III. How Many Heterogeneous Occupations in the Peasant Families?

In Yugoslavia the process of accelerated industrialisation has created a situation where spatial migration is lagging behind occupational migration. People move faster from agriculture to industry, and other employment, than they leave their land, houses and families in the villages. This has created a special problem of peasant workers, not only in the case of part-time workers, seasonal or non-qualified. The problem is much wider.

In Yugoslavia two-thirds of the population (67%) live in agricultural households. Of these households a relatively great number have members with heterogeneous occupations, amounting to 1·3 million people, or 12·7%.

Population in Households (000)[10]

	Agricultural	%	Non-agricultural	%	Total
Agricultural ..	10·021	88	0·268	5	10·288
Non-agricultural ..	1·313	12	5·326	95	6·639
Total..	11·334	100	5·594	100	16·927

(Source: *Statistički bilten*, No. 28, p. 17.)

96% of all agricultural households own land, and 94% live in their own houses. The number of non-agricultural households owning land amounts to 45%, and of those living in their own houses to 42%. Taking the non-agricultural households (i.e. those in which 50% of working time is spent on non-agricultural activity) we find that the percentage of the households that own land and live in their own houses is as follows :

Occupation	Percentage of households Owning land	Living in their own houses
Miners	63	60
Manufacturing industries and trades	48	42
Transport workers ..	37	33
Commercial workers ..	40	36
Public protection	25	20
Public administration ..	32	24
Scientific and technical ..	20	15
Non-qualified workers ..	49	48

(*Stat. bilten*, No. 30, p. 23.)

Thus a great part of their economic activity is devoted to agriculture although they do not figure among the agriculturally occupied.

We are, however, more interested in the other group, i.e. the people with non-agricultural occupations living in agricultural households. The 1953 census registered as living in agricultural households the following percentage of all people engaged in various occupations :

	%
Miners	38
Manufacturing industry and trades ..	21
Non-qualified workers	32
Transport workers	17
Commercial workers	13
Public administration	15
Public protection	12
Scientific and technical	5
Total	20

(*Stat. bilten*, No. 30, p. 18.)

The census registered a total of 20% of all non-agricultural population as living in agricultural households, this percentage being greatest in

the groups of physical workers, and smallest in the tertiary industries (services).

Turning to the households we note the fact that 20·8% of all agricultural *households* have members engaged in heterogeneous non-agricultural occupations. The table below gives us the respective figures.

Agricultural Households according to homogeneous or heterogeneous occupations 1953 (percentages).

	Yugo-slav	Slov.	Croat.	Serb.	Voyv.	Kos-met	Bosn.	Maced.	Montn.
Occupation of all members of household	100·0	100·0	100·0	100·0	100·0	100·0	100·0	100·0	100·0
Head of the family only	25·6	20·3	28·3	14·8	42·1	31·4	27·7	21·8	39·3
Head and other members	46·5	45·5	45·2	62·3	35·2	46·1	31·3	52·8	37·0
In agricultural occupation off holding	2·9	1·3	0·9	0·5	4·7	1·1	11·2	0·7	1·8
In heterogeneous non-agricultural occupations	20·8	32·4	20·3	19·0	15·8	18·0	21·6	21·1	18·2
Heads of families, dependent members	4·2	1·4	5·7	3·4	2·1	3·3	3·1	3·5	5·5

(Source: *Stat. bilten*, No. 30, p. 27.)

People occupied in non-agricultural occupations, and living in agricultural households can be found in one-fifth of all such households. Their number varies from 15–32 per cent. according to different regions of Yugoslavia. There are two distinct tendencies. One is that the number of heterogeneous occupations is more frequent in developed parts of the country where a varied economy is already established (as in Slovenia and Croatia). The second tendency is marked in the republics where the industrial development has started recently. Here the number of heterogeneous occupations is comparatively greater because of the shortage of "hereditary" industrial workers, who have to be substituted by peasants from the villages, and by those who have not yet consolidated their position and occupation in the new environment.[11] In the Danubian plain (Voyvodina), the agriculturally most favourable endowed area, where division of labour was most advanced and the class distinctions in agriculture left from the capitalist era were strongest, the number of heterogeneous occupations in the agricultural families is the smallest of all regions of Yugoslavia.

The Paradox of Heterogeneity of Occupations in Peasant Families

Analysing the heterogeneity of occupations in peasant families from the 1948 census, we obtained some results which at first glance

might appear paradoxical. We refer to both : (*a*) the interrelation between the percentage of households with members in heterogeneous occupations, and the size of family holding, and (*b*) the relation between the percentage of heterogeneity and the size of family (number of members). In Table 2 we first of all present the facts.

Table 2—*Percentage of heterogeneity of occupation of agricultural households 1948*

(a) According to the size of the family holding		(b) according to the size of the family	
Hectares	Percentage of occupational heterogeneity	Number of family members	% age of occupational heterogeneity
0·05– 0·5	18·4	1	0
0·5 – 1·0	15·6	2	5
1·1 – 2·0	13·4	3	11
2·1 – 3·0	12·4	4	13
3·1 – 4·0	12·7	5	15
4·1 – 5·0	12·4	6	16
5·1 – 6·0	12·3	7	18
6·1 – 7·0	11·4	8	19
7·1 – 8·0	12·6	9	20
8·1 – 9·0	12·8	10	21
9·1 –10·0	13·4	11	22
10·1 –15·0	13·3	12	22
15·1 –20·0	16·3	13	21
20·1 –25·0	20·4	14	21
25·1 –30·0	21·5	15	20
30·1 –35·0	25·0	16–20	21
35·1 –40·0	26·8	21–25	20
40·1 –45·0	28·2	26–×	20
45·1 –50·0	29·8		
50·1 –×	33·1		

(Source: Federal Statistical Institute.)

(*a*) *Heterogeneity and the Size of the Holdings*

The table shows that the number of occupationally heterogeneous peasant families is greatest among small holdings. The percentage of heterogeneity increases with the increase of the size of the holding. This negative correlation starts with the beginning of the group having up to =0·5 ha. of land, where the percentage is 18·4. The percentage of heterogeneity then gradually decreases to 11·4% with those having between 6 and 7 hectares of land. After reaching this minimum the number of heterogeneous households begins to rise again, slowly in the beginning, but more and more sharply with the increase of the holdings. For instance, the holdings with 9–10 ha. of land have a percentage of 13·4, and those of more than 50 ha. reached 33·1%.

The same phenomenon can be observed in all Yugoslav republics and autonomous areas. The following table gives the critical points of maxima and minima for 1948.

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Heads of families, dependent members	4·2	1·4	5·7	3·4	2·1	3·3	3·1	3·5	5·5

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0·05– 0·5	18·4	1	0
0·5 – 1·0	15·6	2	5
1·1 – 2·0	13·4	3	11
2·1 – 3·0	12·4	4	13
3·1 – 4·0	12·7	5	15
4·1 – 5·0	12·4	6	16
5·1 – 6·0	12·3	7	18
6·1 – 7·0	11·4	8	19
7·1 – 8·0	12·6	9	20
8·1 – 9·0	12·8	10	21
9·1 –10·0	13·4	11	22
10·1 –15·0	13·3	12	22
15·1 –20·0	16·3	13	21
20·1 –25·0	20·4	14	21
25·1 –30·0	21·5	15	20
30·1 –35·0	25·0	16–20	21
35·1 –40·0	26·8	21–25	20
40·1 –45·0	28·2	26–×	20
45·1 –50·0	29·8		
50·1 –×	33·1		

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The same phenomenon can be observed in all Yugoslav republics and autonomous areas. The following table gives the critical points of maxima and minima for 1948.

Percentage of occupationally heterogeneous peasant families on different sizes of holdings.

	0–0·5 ha.	Minimum group		50–× ha.
Yugoslavia.. ..	18·4	6–7 ha.	11·4	33·1
Slovenia	45·7	6–7 „	32·0	50·2
Croatia	27·8	8–9 „	14·1	26·0
Macedonia.. ..	21·6	30–35 „	10·8	(10·8)
Bosnia	18·7	6–7 „	9·4	14·2
Voyvodina ..	14·0	10–15 „	9·0	8·0
Serbia	14·2	15–20 „	8·7	11·4
Montenegro ..	11·2	4–5 „	8·6	10·3
Kosmet	8·2	10–15 „	5·7	8·3

(Source: Census of Population, 1948. The group 50–× ha. is taken as the biggest if the number of cases is more than 100 holdings, in other cases the group where such number is above 100 is taken, and for Montenegro above 50.)

The areas where industrial development is strongest show the biggest influence of this paradox of heterogeneity. In Slovenia it is most marked, and Macedonia does not show it at all, showing the negative correlation all the time. We notice also that the agriculturally poorer the area, the smaller the size of the holding (the turning point), at which the minimum of heterogeneity is achieved.

This quite unexpected result is confirmed by other research. There are two distinct tendencies, as can be seen from the diagram. The first is represented by a straight line descending to the minimum of 6–7, and then moving in a tangential direction upwards.[12]

Our explanation of this apparent paradox is that the heterogeneous occupations in smaller holdings have a different function. In these holdings the occupational heterogeneity is the function of the smallness of the holding, and serves as a complementary source of income to keep the family. In the larger family holdings the rôle is reversed. These holdings have been able to remain larger because people had some income from heterogeneous occupations. The income from the holding covered the expenses for the family consumption, and the income from the heterogeneous occupations served as supplementary income to improve the family economy, to invest in agriculture, and to keep the family together. This reasoning is confirmed by the analysis of the peasant-workers' family budgets later in this paper.

(*b*) *Size of the family and heterogeneous occupations*

The relation between the number of members in a peasant family, and the degree of occupational heterogeneity again shows two tendencies. Firstly, the number of occupationally heterogeneous family households increases with the number of members of the peasant family. This positive non-linear correlation ends with the number of 10 members of the family. From this group the percentage

of heterogeneity no longer increases with the number of the family members. The parabolic curve turns into a horizontal straight line.

We are inclined to think that in this case direct economic explanation is not applicable, and that we should turn to bio-social and demographic factors.

IV. How Much Occupational Heterogeneity?

How much has the heterogeneity of occupations affected the internal life of the peasant family, and how deep has it penetrated intra-family relations?

1. *Evolution from a property and production unit, to an income-earning and income spending unit.*

We want to emphasize first the general change in the peasant family. Its self sufficiency is receding, in spite of some temporary reverses of the general trend as a result of the war and land reforms. Many more goods previously supplied by the family holding are now bought at the market, and many services have become commercialised, monetized and socialized. The family functions are gradually being reduced.

At present (1953–54), in Yugoslavia only 38% of agricultural production is brought to the market. There are some more detailed figures for Croatia. The average peasant family buys for money 82% of its clothing, all of its footwear, and 92% of its medical and hygienic services, etc. But it still supplies from its own production 72% of its requirements for fuel, 81% of all food, and 92% of alcoholic drinks.

Moreover the land is no longer either the common property of the family " zadruga ", or the exclusive property of the head of the family. There are more and more individual members of the family who own land, mostly because of the real division of inherited land. The number of land proprietors was in 1937 on an averge 2·2 per family, and their number was increasing at the rate of 2% per year. Most of these owners operated their land in common as one family economic unit.[13] Thus the peasant family is being gradually reduced from a legal property unit to an economic production unit, organizing joint production on land owned by one, two, or more members of the family.

As there is a strong surplus pressure of population on land, the total labour force of the peasant family cannot be employed in the family holding. A survey made in 1952 showed that in Croatia an average peasant worked 1,115 hours per year on his holding (out of a possible 3,000 hours), and even this small number of hours per head was spent at an exceeding high rate of 730 hours per hectare per year (as compared to 54 hours in the U.S.A.).

The search for additional income earnings extends the economic sphere of the family far beyond the holding. The family is ceasing to be an exclusive production unit, and gradually becoming an income-earning unit, while remaining a spending and consuming unit. This process involves a qualitative change in intrafamily relations, and greatly

affects family authority. There is less and less need in the family for an organizer of production on a family basis. The qualitative appreciation of the work of the family members turns into a quantitative measurement of how much money the members bring home to the family. This process has gradually strengthened the rôle of the mother as the main organiser of the family as a consumption unit. It is more and more the mother, rather than the father, who keeps the family together as in urban families. On the one hand family authority spread over the boundaries of the family holding. On the other hand the possibility of earning money made the members of the family more independent of the father's authority. Nevertheless they still had an interest in remaining as a family.

2. *Intrafamily relations in cases of occupational heterogeneity*

In analysing the changes in intrafamily structure we must make distinctions among the different functions in the family. The habitual division of the population into economically active ; independent ; hired labour; unpaid family members; and the dependent members of the family, no longer satisfies the present requirement of analysis, as the tendency for there to be more than one income-earner in the family is becoming more and more widespread, in both rural and urban families all over the world. We propose therefore to distinguish the following five functions in such complex families :

(*a*) the income *producers* or income earners (recipients), i.e. persons who get their income from their personal economic activity.

(*b*) the income *providers* or persons who contribute the whole or a part of their income to the family.

(*c*) the income *disposers* or the persons who allocate the income according to the various needs of the family.

(*d*) the income *spenders*, i.e. those persons who actually spend the income by disbursing specific sums of money in exchange for goods chosen by them, or who decide which goods to sell for what sum of money.

(*e*) the income *consumers* are the members of the family who actually and finally consume the goods in the literal sense.

3. *Types of families*

In the traditional large peasant family all adult members are income earners working jointly on the family holding. They are also income providers of the family. According to the type of family authority practised the income disposer is either the father, or the father and mother together, or the community of adult members. In most cases the income spenders will be different persons according to the kind of requirements. For instance the peasant will buy horses, taking his son with him to the market. When buying a cow the mother will have a great say. The purchase or sale of land will be the affair of the

whole household. Dairy products and poultry will be sold by the mother, but if the sale grows into a major source of income, it will be taken over by the father, or by the family as a whole, etc.

The question becomes more complicated when there are members of the family with different occupations. We have been able to establish four types of such intrafamily relations :

(*a*) *The community family.* The individual income earner provides his family with the total of the income he earns, getting in exchange his entire keep in the family, and some pocket money. All decisions about spending the income are made in the family by the father, father and mother, or all adult members jointly. The income of the family, and all particlar incomes of individual members are considered as one bulk sum or fund, which is distributed according to the needs of all members of the family. In this type of family the structure of the traditional peasant family is very strong. The community family as an earning unit is still widespread in many villages, and even in towns and large cities (including many workers who work in Zagreb, capital city of Croatia, and live in the neighbouring villages).

(*b*) *The partnership family.* The individual earners of income provide the family with a part of their personal earnings. In most cases they keep for themselves a fixed sum agreed upon by the family, and give all the rest to the family funds. Usually the individual members keep a part of their income for some " luxuries ", and undertake to look after themselves in satisfying certain definite needs, often buying clothing (particularly with girls) to keep up to the standard of their colleagues in the new occupational environment. But they still help the family and the family helps them. The family is the joint income disposer on a partnership basis, and the community of interest is mutually felt. There is no calculation of give and take in terms of bilateral equivalent transactions, i.e. exchange of goods and services for payment. The father and mother are the income spenders for the family income, and the individual members for their share. Such cases are most frequent with adult, employed children, or with the collateral adult members living in the family. Relations between husband and wife are less frequently put on such a basis.

(*c*) *The associational family.* In a family of this type the extra-employed income earners are the income providers on a rational, almost contract basis. The provider contributes a fixed sum agreed upon in advance, to the family funds and considers himself a quasi-lodger, paying for his board and lodging, and having certain " rights " to demand family services because he " brings money into the house ". He is still a member of the family, with a say in the family economy, working on the holding, but with some individual rights as a consumer with special standards of his own. He keeps the rest of his earnings for himself, spends and consumes it, not contributing for the consumption of the other members of the family above the agreed sum. But

he lives in the family household, sharing the meals and premises, and the family services. . This is most often the case with male adult members of the family (when they finish military service), who are skilled workers with higher than average wages, or of heavy workers requiring special diet.[14]

The relationships very often vary within the same family, and with different members of the same family. They also differ with the permanency of the heterogeneous occupation, and with its purpose,[15] there being many transitional types. For instance, if the purpose of such an occupation is a complementary income, in order to meet the essential needs of the family, or to keep the family consumption up to

Table 3. *Income and Expenditure of Peasant Families in Yugoslavia*

Size of the holding	Yugoslavia					
	0–3 ha.	%	3–8 ha.	%	8–× ha.	%
% of the holding in the group	28·5		48·2		23·3	
Family members per holding	4·6		5·9		7·8	
Agricultural area (in ha.)	2·0		4·5		11·8	
—of it: arable land (in ha.)	1·0		2·5		4·6	
I. Total receipts in cash	101·5		119·8		175·7	
II. Income from agricultural holding	+32·0	100·0	+64·0	100·0	+109·1	100·0
Taxes	−5·9		−17·4		−37·6	
Family consumption expenses	−58·5		−58·1		−76·6	
Balance I (agricultural holding)	−32·4	−101·3	−11·5	−17·9	−5·1	−4·7
III. Income from extended agricultural activity	+8·4	+26·3	+9·0	+14·0	+8·1	+7·4
Balance II (agricultural activity)	−24·0	−75·0	−2·5	−3·9	+3·0	+2·7
IV. Income from heterogeneous occupations ..	+42·9	+134·1	+23·8	+37·2	+23·8	+21·8
—of which: work in state enterprises and government agencies	(+28·7)		(+16·4)		(+16·6)	
Balance III.	+18·9	+59·1	+21·3	+33·3	+26·8	+24·5
V. Investments	−15·5	−48·5	−26·4	−41·2	−31·1	−28·5
VI. Balance (final)	+3·6	+11·3	−4·9	−7·6	−4·4	−4·0

(Source: *Statistički bilten*, No. 48 (Federal Statistical Institute, Beograd).

an established standard, then the first two types of organization will prevail. If the purpose is a supplementary income, in order to increase the level of consumption, then the third type of family may be more frequent. If the purpose of the heterogeneous occupation is investment in the family holding (and only for the period necessary to provide enough savings), then the family authority will be more strictly felt than in other cases.

V. The Function of Earnings from Heterogeneous Occupations in the Peasant Economy

1. *Earnings and the representative average family budget*

With the present structure of the agricultural family holding, the productivity of labour, and the prices of agricultural products, the

average peasant family in Yugoslavia can cover from the income from the agricultural holding only a part of family expenses and investments ; for the rest it must look for other sources of income. In Table 3 we present the structure of the peasant family income, as given by a representative sample Survey made by the Federal Statistical Institute in 1954.[16] We have arranged the various items according to the way of thinking of the peasant family, and in order to measure the rôle of the different sources of income we shall take as the standard basis (100·0) the agricultural income from the peasant family holding. The table includes the income in cash only, leaving aside non-monetary items, i.e. the non-marketed goods of auto-consumption.

953–54 (per agricultural holding, in cash only, in thousands of dinars)

		P.R. Croatia							
Average	%	0–3 ha.	%	3–8 ha.	%	8–× ha.	%	Average	%
100·0 5·7 4·7 2·3		28·8 4·2 1·9 0·9		52·8 5·0 4·8 2·4		18·4 6·3 11·2 4·9		100·0 4·7 3·8 1·8	
121·9		114·8		139·0		212·1		132·2	
+59·4 –16·4 –61·2	100·0	+31·4 –6·8 –66·7	100·0	+48·1 –18·9 –69·8	100·0	+87·9 –38·7 –100·8	100·0	+42·5 –14·1 –70·8	100·0
–18·2	–30·6	–35·3	–112·2	–21·7	–43·4	–12·9	–14·6	–28·2	–66·3
+8·7	+14·6	+9·1	+29·0	+15·7	+31·4	+5·8	+6·6	+11·4	+26·8
–9·5	–16·0	–26·2	–83·2	–6·0	–12·0	–7·1	–8·0	–16·8	–39·5
+30·9	+52·0	+36·2	+115·0	+20·4	+40·8	+34·7	+39·2	+29·9	+70·3
(+21·0)		(+22·4)		(+18·3)		(+25·8)		(+21·1)	
+21·4	+36·0	+10·0	+31·8	+14·4	+28·8	+27·6	+31·2	+13·1	+30·8
–23·1	–38·9	–14·7	–46·7	–31·7	–63·4	–37·5	–42·4	–23·1	–54·3
–1·7	–2·9	–4·7	–1·5	–7·2	–34·4	–10·3	–11·6	–10·0	–23·5

(*a*) *The deficit of the family agricultural holding*

Family consumption expenses in cash and tax in Yugoslavia are on an average greater than the income in cash of the agricultural holding. The balance of the income from the family holding against the expenses for family consumption and taxes (balance I of the table) is negative on an average by 37% (66%).[17] In the smallest group the expenditure on these two items is twice the income from the holding (–101% and –112% respectively), and in the largest group the deficit is still 5% (15%).

(*b*) *Income from extended agricultural activities*

The peasant family tries to cover this deficit first by extending its agricultural activity as hired labour (in the smaller group of incomes) and by selling the services of its draft animals for work on the

neighbours' fields, for cartage of goods, particularly for transporting logs out of the forests (in the middle and larger group). Some find additional employment working in the co-operatives for pay. This kind of extended agricultural activity reduces the negative balance by 14·6% (11·4%) in the average, ranging from 26% in the smallest group to nearly 7·4% in the largest. The remaining balance is still negative because the smallest group cannot find enough employment for its labour force as there are not enough jobs available where all holdings are small. Only the third group spends 4·9 (7·7) thousand dinars a year on hired labour. Therefore the income from wages for agricultural work is very small. This item corresponds to not more than 9% (5%) of the amount of income from the holding

Balance No. II shows the result of total income from agricultural occupation, including the extended activity. It is still negative by 16% (40%), the first group having a deficit of 75% (83%) and the largest just managing to even out its expenditure (in Croatia the balance is still 8% negative). This shows also the serious structural crisis of agriculture based on small family holdings.

(*c*) *Income from heterogeneous occupations*

In such a situation other sources of income must be sought. Only by earning money from some non-agricultural occupation can the contemporary peasant family in Yugoslavia redress its balance of payment and complement its expenditure for personal consumption and taxes, and improve its agriculture by investment.

The income from such heterogeneous occupations is derived from work for private employers (craftsmen, etc.). The second group of activities is work as independent craftsmen or as cottage industry workers. But by far the greatest income of all heterogeneous activities in the peasant family comes from work in the State enterprises and government agencies. By taking such heterogeneous employments the smallest group of peasants more than doubles its income from the family holding (134% in Yugoslavia and 115% in Croatia). The middle group get the equivalent of more than one third (37% and 41%) of the agricultural income from the family holding, and the largest group one fourth (22% and 32%). Altogether more than one half (52%) of average peasant families' income equivalent comes from these sources in Yugoslavia as a whole (and even more in Croatia +70%)

These earnings are also the source of peasant investments. Only by taking some non-agricultural occupations can the peasant family based on the small holding make some investment. In this way these earnings fulfil more than just the function of complementary incomes, contributing more or less to the balancing of the family consumption expenses at the present level. The investments made from such sources gives them partly too the character of supplementary incomes. If we assume that the share of the family income spent on consumption is entirely used for keeping the present level of consumption, then the

ratio of the complementary and the supplementary part of the non-agricultural incomes from heterogeneous occupations in peasant families would be :

	Average	I. group	II. group	III. group
Complementary income ..	60 (70)	62 (82)	77 (57)	(32)
Supplementary income ..	40 (30)	38 (19)	23 (43)	100 (68)

The larger the group, the greater the share spent on investment. But even in the smallest group the percentage of such supplementary income is 40% (30%)

The difference between Yugoslavia as a whole, and Croatia as its more developed part shows that the importance of heterogeneous occupations as a source of complementary income is greater in the more industrially developed area. The difference from the point of view of the size of the holdings is still more characteristic. Peasants used to emigrate to America and other overseas foreign countries to earn money to support their families and to make some investment for improvement of their agricultural holding. A peasant's surplus labour, caused by hidden unemployment, was the only source which could be used to increase his capacity for investment, and improve his agriculture. Now the place of emigration to foreign countries is taken by the industries and mines in his own country.

We want to emphasize that we are analysing only the position of those peasants working in non-agricultural occupations, remaining members of their families and living on their agricultural holdings. We shall see later what interest the peasant has in keeping this hybrid situation, how permanent we can consider such relations and what rôle the family plays there.

2. *The advantage of having a worker in a small peasant family*

In order to show what interest the small peasant family (and in Yugoslavia all holdings are limited to a maximum of 10 hectares) has in having wage-earners in non-agricultural occupations we have compared the family budgets of an average worker's and of a peasant's family in Croatia with the budget of a peasant family having one worker working in a state enterprise. We have combined this budget from both previous average budgets[18]. (Table 4.)

The comparison shows that the average worker in Croatia had a small surplus of 2,500 dinars in 1953–54. The average peasant family had (including investments) a deficit of 10,000 dinars. But the peasant family with one worker had, in our model budget, a cash surplus income of 64,500 dinars. This surplus is due mainly to the fact that the worker's expenses for food are covered by the family holding, and he can therefore keep the wages in cash for other expenses. The difference would be even more marked if the workers's rent was higher than it is nowadays in Yugoslavia. Here again the peasant-worker family would benefit more then proportionally.

Our model is made under the assumption of average wages for the peasant worker. Usually their skill is less and their wages smaller. But nevertheless this example shows what an advantage it is for a small peasant family to have a wage-earner in the family. The advantage is still greater if we take into account that this income is in cash, in a peasant economy where the share of the product brought to the market is small and therefore the family is constantly in need of ready money.

Table 4. *Peasants' and Workers' Family Budgets in Croatia, 1953–54 (in thousands of current dinars)*

	Workers	Peasants			Peasants (one full worker included)			
Average number of family members	4·0	4·7			4·7			
Expenditure	Total	Total	In kind	In cash	Total	In kind	In cash	of it additional*
Food	110·3	157·6	128·2	29·4	157·6	128·2	29·4	—
Beverages and Tobacco	13·7	27·4	21·9	5·5	31·0	21·9	9·1	3·6
Clothing and Footwear	27·6	25·7	3·5	22·1	30·7	3·5	27·1	5·0
Rent	5·2	6·0	6·0	—	6·0	6·0	—	—
Fuel and Light	13·7	31·0	20·2	4·8	31·0	20·2	4·8	—
Household and Furniture	5·0	4·2	—	4·2	4·2	—	4·2	—
Hygiene	5·7	2·5	0·3	2·2	3·4	0·3	3·1	0·9
Others	18·2	5·1	—	5·1	5·1	—	5·1	—
Repayment of consumers credits	15·4	—	—	—	15·4	—	15·4	15·4
Health or social insurance	6·0	1·5	—	1·5	7·0	—	7·0	5·5
Total	220·7	261·6	186·1	74·9	292·0	186·1	105·3	30·4
Income		Income from heterogeneous occupations						
Wages (inclusive profit sharing)	136·1	29·9			Wages	136·1		
Children's allowance	62·8						—	
Income from work off enterprise	4·5	Extended agricultural activity	11·4				—	
Other incomes	9·7	Income from agricultural holding (net)	42·5		Income from agricultural holding (net)	42·5		
Social insurance (imputed)	6·0		—				6·0	
Consumers credit	4·1		—				4·1	
Total income	223·2		83·8				188·7	
Expenditure	220·7		74·9				105·3	
Balance (current)	+2·5		+8·9				+83·4	
Investment	—		−18·9				−18·9	
Balance (total)	+2·5		−10·0				+64·5	

* Additional expenditure for one member working in a factory. Source: The workers family budget—*Statistički godišnjak*, 1955, p. 298. The peasant family budget for 1953–4—*Statistički bilten*, No. 48. The peasant-worker budget is a constructed model.

VI. Effects and Prospects

Our analysis has shown that one-fifth of peasant families in Yugoslavia already have some members in heterogeneous occupations as independent workers, government employees, etc. The income of peasant families is derived in a great part from such occupations, amounting on an average to one-half of the income from the family holding.

The hybrid situation of peasant workers has also some negative effects. Its effect on agriculture is that the fields of such peasant-workers are sometimes not so well tilled, and they begin to lose the skill of working in agriculture.[19] The industries complain that such workers interrupt their work in factories too often, usually in order to give a hand in seasonal work on their holdings. Their absenteeism is more frequent, and their situation is often considered by them as only a temporary one, and therefore not much effort is made to improve their skill in their new jobs. For the workers themselves this journeying from home to working place is very tiring. Sometimes they consider the walk to and from work as more exhausting than the work itself. They stop working at an earlier period of life than permanent workers.

For this reason one should expect that with accelerated industrialization the division of labour will progress, and a way of life develop more in harmony with the mode of production. The town population in Yugoslavia in towns of over 20,000 inhabitants amounts to only 11%, and even if doubled would not reach the European average.

Nevertheless there are certain factors that act in the direction of prolongation of such a hybrid situation;

(*a*) the interest of peasant families in non-agricultural earnings, in the present structure of peasant family economy;

(*b*) the very difficult housing conditions in towns and industrial settlements, which it will take a long time to alleviate;

(*c*) the process of decentralization of industries, and the motorization of transport which can greatly improve the position of such peasant-workers.

Already in the more industrialized parts of Yugoslavia, in Slovenia and Croatia, many workers of the second and third generation still live in their own peasant homes and keep their land.[20] The experience of some old industrial countries or areas such as the Rhineland, or Belgium, northern France or Italy shows that such arrangements can evolve into permanent institutions changing peasant fields into workers' allotments and counterbalancing the bad effect of work in an unhealthy environment.

NOTES

[1] The statistical material now available from the 1948, and particularly from the 1953 census of population gives ample material for a quantitative analysis. In this paper the author limited himself mainly to the economic field. He feels obliged

to apologise to his fellow sociologists for using so many figures, and hopes to be pardoned for his attempt to be a sociologist without ceasing to be an economist.

[3] In 1946 a new law on the family was issued, strengthening the family in the post-war period, and at the same time secularising and liberalising its institutions, introducing socialist elements in it.

[4] *Bernsdorf-Bullow, Wörterbuch der Soziologie*, p. 114, under Familie.

[5] Ancient Kingdom of Croatia and Slavonia (pre-1914).

[6] People's Republic of Croatia (since 1945).

[7] See Mackenroth, *Bevölkerungslehre*, p. 357.

[8] On this technical change Quesnay started his Physiocratic school, and the same arguments used to-day to show the advantages of tractors over horses were used by him advocating the use of horses as against oxen.

[9] Following this reasoning the old South Slav " Zadruga " was destroyed not by moral decay, or women's quarrels, but by horses.

[10] The sudden increase in the number of single persons shows what a great change the war, and post-war development, introduced in the structure of the family, especially during the period of accelerated public works and building of industries. The 1953 census noticed a tendency towards normalization. The young men and women coming to town had begun to form their families.

[11] Unfortunately we have no data on the distribution of the economically active *persons*. It might be that the number of those occupied in non-agricultural occupations belongs to a much larger extent to the group of economically active than those in agricultural occupations.

[12] In some areas only peasants from certain villages go to work in the factories. They are called the " workers' villages ". Sometimes a group relationship develops between a village and a factory " their factory " in a nearby town. Cf. Kostić, *Seljaci Industrijski Radnici*, p. 153, 144.

[13] The minimum of heterogeneity for 8–family members is around 15·3% at 8·4 hectares, and the minimum for 4 members is at 10% of heterogeneous households and 8·4 hectares. The minimum for a 6–member family is at 6·0 hectares and 15·3% of families.

[14] Recent legislation had to take this fact into account. The law on land reform of 1945 gave land to individuals of agricultural occupation (poljoprivrednik). But this law had to be revised early in 1946, giving land to the agricultural households. Also the income tax on agricultural incomes is levied on the incomes of agricultural households as such, and not of its members as individual owners.

[15] The next stage where the individual member of the family breaks the family ties to such an extent as to stop cohabitation, and to have his own or her own " room " is outside the scope of this paper.

[16] Heterogeneous occupations are often closely connected with the family life cycle with those worker-peasants who take some temporary work (or work that so begins). The fact that they stop working early in their life (at 40) indicates that either they have achieved the desired improvement of their holdings, or they have children who can take over, and provide the family with some off holding earned income.

[17] *Statistički bilten* No. 48.

[18] To show the difference in importance of the heterogeneous occupations in the more developed parts of Yugoslavia, we are adding in brackets to the Yugoslav averages the corresponding figures for the republic of Croatia.

[19] The assumptions taken were as follows: 1. The income of the peasant family from its holding remains the same, because of excess labour force, and because of the fact that the non-agricultural labour had already been partly taken into account in the " pure " peasant budget. 2. The income from off farm activities is reduced to the workers wages plus the imputed income from social insurance. 3. The worker's off enterprise income is reduced to nil, but the income from the family holding is added. 4. The expenditure of the worker in cash is increased by some estimated additional sums for tobacco, clothing, hygiene and imputed social insurance benefit (which *de facto* is entirely paid by the enterprise).

[20] Cf. Kostić, *Seljaci Industrijski Radnici*, p. 204 ff.

[21] In a new metallurgic factory in Slovenia workers from an old industrial establishment would not move even when given nice new flats, until they were also given a piece of land each to work on.

Changes in Family Structure in the Baltic Islands

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Between the south-west corner of Finland and the east coast of Sweden lies, like a bridge, a vast archipelago measuring nearly 200 kilometres from east to west and some 75 kilometres from north to south. It consists of 50 to 60,000 islands, varying in size from a few square metres to about 800 square kilometres. The western part, the Stockholm archipelago, belongs to Sweden; the central region, the Åland Isles, and the eastern part, the Åbo archipelago, are Finnish territory. In 1940 the population of this area totalled about 65,000 people, of which 12,000 live in the Stockholm archipelago, 22,000 in the Åland Isles, and 31,000 in the Åbo archipelago. The vast majority of the population speaks Swedish, and there is much ethnographic and archaeological evidence to show that the forebears of the present-day inhabitants came from Central Sweden during the first centuries after Christ.

The geographic conditions of this region have always in many ways restricted the means of livelihood of its population. Agriculture, for instance, has been possible only in the large islands, and there, too, only on a rather modest scale; even in the most fertile islands the majority of the population had to rely also on fishing, seal-hunting, or coasting. Owing to the land-elevation, the topographical features of the archipelago are continually changing; bays, straits and channels which once served as fishing grounds or harbours are now used for pasture or farming.

The land-elevation, being a rather slow process (it is calculated that the shore-line rises ·45 metres per century), has, however, caused no radical changes in the economic structure of the archipelago. Its main effect has been to replace fishing, hunting or coasting by stock-raising or agriculture; but only in villages, which are situated in the centre of large islands, have the people completely turned away from the sea. At the beginning of this century there were but a few villages in the mainland of Åland and in some of the largest islands in the Stockholm and Åbo archipelago which could be classified as purely agricultural villages, and a somewhat larger number of hamlets which relied solely upon fishing; most of the island communities lived by both fishing and agriculture.

Up till the First World War, the islanders lived almost exclusively from what they produced at home, and nets, boats, sails, clothing, etc. were all home-made. Commodities and raw materials which were not produced in the islands they obtained by selling, or rather, by bartering their surplus of salt herring or cattle products. Agriculture was still

underdeveloped; most villages were not even self-supporting with respect to grain.

The extensive herring fishing and the making of most implements at home required many hands, and so did the dairying. Most islands are small, and therefore the cattle must be moved from island to island to graze, and the hay has to be gathered from small fields in several islands. Since these extensive means of livelihood were the most important, it is obvious that a large family was an asset rather than a burden, which is evident also from the fact that most fishermen-farmers used to employ hired hands, especially if they had few children or while their children were small.

After 1920 the demand for salt herring decreased rapidly, partly because the Esthonian and Russian markets were closed, partly because the increasing use of motor boats made it possible to transport fresh herring to the towns. Fishing began to pay less at the same time as the need for cash rose as a consequence of the introduction of marine engines, machine-made nets, ready-made clothing, and other mass products. In those years the agrarian reform laws which were passed in the early 'twenties made many crofters into independent smallholders, and many of them turned from fishing to agriculture. Other government measures, too, which aimed at promoting Finnish agriculture, made farming appear more profitable than before to the land-owning fishermen-farmers. Thus the former extensive subsistence economy is gradually, but at a rapid pace, being replaced by an intensive money economy. Because most holdings in the archipelago are small, few people are needed to work them, and since the yield cannot be increased beyond a given maximum irrespective of how intensively these holdings are cultivated, the profit is inversely proportionate to family size. Nowadays a large family is a burden rather than an asset, and this may be one of the reasons for the depopulation, which started about 1915 and has continued ever since.

An analysis of the census returns, taxation lists (*mantalslängder*) and parish registers (all of which go as far back as about 1750) enables us to follow the population trend in great detail, and to study the changes in family structure which have occurred. So far I have analysed the figures from only one parish, Kumlinge, in the Åland Isles, but I have good reason to believe that they are representative for most other island parishes. This analysis has shown:

(1) Between 1750 and 1915 the total population rose, almost continuously, from 450 to 1079 people, i.e. by 140 per cent. After 1915 it dropped sharply, by 27 per cent. to 788 persons in 1950.

(2) The crude birth rate has continuously declined, from 45 pro mille in the 1750's to 11 pro mille in 1940–45. The natural increase, i.e. the excess of births over deaths, also shows a downward trend, but the sharp decline does not start before the first decade of this century.

(3) Emigration has always been rather heavy, particularly in the earlier half of the 19th century, when the annual net loss by emigration amounted to 9–10 pro mille. During the last decades the net loss has been on the average 5–6 pro mille annually.

(4) The average number of children per married couple has also declined from 4·7 in the years 1760–90 to 2·8 in 1880–1910 and to 2·0 in 1910–40. The size of the households—which is not the same as family size—went down from 6·5 persons per household in 1805 to 5·4 persons per household in 1900, and dropped to 4·0 persons per household in 1950.

(5) In contrast to the population figure, which dropped sharply after 1915, the number of households has steadily increased from 104 in 1805 to 197 in 1950, i.e. by 89 per cent.

The population trend and the economic development tally so nicely that it is difficult not to declare the former to be a direct consequence of the latter. Assuming that previous generations of islanders behaved as rationally and economically as the islanders of today, such an explanation would be reasonable also from the psychological point of view.

The extensive subsistence economy which prevailed in the archipelago till the last quarter of the 19th century required a large household. Fishing, work in the fields, wood-cutting and carting jobs were done by the men, while herring-gutting, milking, tending the cattle, cooking, weaving and other household duties were carried out by the women. The children and old people were expected to bind nets, to help with herring-gutting and to do household chores. The households of this period consisted of father, mother, four to eight children, grandparents and usually an unmarried uncle or aunt, and perhaps several, either from father's or mother's side. (The kinship system in the Baltic Islands was patrilocal only in theory; in actual practice the son-in-law frequently went to live in his wife's home, and eventually succeeded his father-in-law as owner of the farm.) Many farmers and even crofters had, in addition, one or two hired hands, sometimes a married couple with children of their own.

Most of the hired hands, who usually stayed one year or two with the same farmer, were either from the same or from a near-by village; those who came from the mainland were few in number, and most of them had been employed at the rectory before they were hired by a farmer. Though there was a class-difference between the land- and water-owning farmers and the landless crofters (which may have been upheld chiefly by clashing economic interests), there existed, as far as I have been able to ascertain, no sharp social cleft between farmers and farmhands, which may be due to the fact that the islanders practiced a sort of exchange of labour. At the age of 17 or 18, i.e. after confirmation, the young people, boys as well as girls, went off and took jobs as servants, with relatives in the same or neighbouring villages, and to replace them their father hired children of his own, or his wife's,

relatives. Since the hired hands usually were relatives of the farmer or his wife, and thus members of the same social stratum as they, it was neither possible—nor necessary—to maintain a social distance between employer and employee. It seems thus as if all members of the household formed one extended family.

I wish, however, to point out that, so far, I have not been able to prove that there existed such an exchange of labour, but while studying the population records of Kumlinge village I was impressed by the large number of data pointing in this direction. It is, of course, quite possible that this impression is due to chance factors, i.e. to the fact that most villagers are related by blood—because the total population always has been small and because the islanders generally have been endogamous. But whatever the customs may have been, the fact remains that the hired hands usually were related by blood to the rest of the household, which, in turn, affected the interpersonal relations between the members of the household.

During the last decade of the 19th and the first decades of the 20th century the number of hired hands decreased as a consequence of the falling birth rate and of the diminished demand for hired labour. Nowadays this class has vanished completely; the only ones to employ servants are the district doctor, the rector and some bachelor farmers. Today most island households consist of the nuclear family only, i.e. of father, mother and one to three children. As long as the grandparents live, they stay with one of their children, but unmarried siblings of the husband or wife prefer not to remain at home. If they cannot get a part of the family holding for themselves they move out of the village, usually to town. The very tight net of kinship relations which formerly bound the villagers together seems also to have grown looser as a consequence of the increasing exogamy and of the fact that the islanders do not count kinship beyond the third generation (third cousins are, in their usage, *utsläktade*, out-of-kin).

These changes are only one aspect of the growing atomisation of the islanders' social life. Several instances could be quoted to show that other institutions, too, are subject to the same process. In my opinion it is yet too early to say whether this atomisation is a sign of social disorganisation and decline. For the time being we can only register the facts and see how the islanders are going to react to this change.

Puerto Rico's Changing Families

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The Puerto Ricans are a people with an identity, with a history, and with hopes for the future. Their present circumstances are strongly influenced by a number of factors: that they live on a small distant Caribbean island—about 35 by 100 miles in size, 500 miles from South America and 1,000 miles from North America; that there are many of them—2,200,000 according to the 1950 census and increasing at the rate of five births for every death; that they are of Spanish heritage but are today and have been since 1898 subject to the laws of the United States. These factors give Puerto Ricans a rather anomalous political, economic and cultural status. The effort to clarify their ambiguous status largely shapes the forces now changing their family life.

The political anomaly arises from Puerto Rico's relationship to the United States. The clearest political arrangements would be federal statehood or complete independence, but neither of these ideals has been able to win much support as an immediate program—the two political parties in Puerto Rico representing these alternatives each have received less than one fifth of the total vote in recent elections. On both the mainland and the island the present status of " Free Associated State " is tentatively and somewhat uneasily accepted. The sources and consequences of this political ambiguity are evident in the general uncertainty as to Puerto Rico's future, economically and culturally as well as politically.

The anomalous economic position of Puerto Rico has absorbed most of the government's attention in recent years. In comparison with the world as a whole, Puerto Rico is not especially poor. It is richer than Italy, though poorer than France. Few countries in Asia, Africa or South America have a higher standard of living than Puerto Rico. But in comparison with the rest of the United States it is very poor. Its *per capita* income is about one fourth that of the United States average. This enforced comparison of economies fosters feelings of inferiority. Nevertheless, economic advantages constitute the strongest single attraction toward unity with the mainland.

In this setting of felt economic inferiority and political ambiguity, the cultural anomaly of Puerto Rico has become a salient and sensitive topic. The United States has been led to an oversimplified expectation of convergence of ethnic differences toward a common norm. In the " melting pot " all " foreigners " are expected to become " Americanized ". In truth, however, it is a rare event in the history of the world for any considerable society on its own home ground to substantially

adopt another society's body of custom. The early optimism of the first Commissioners of Education had 98% of Puerto Rico's public schools using English as the language of instruction within 14 years after the island had been taken. Forty years of failure and puzzled retreats ended with the universal use of Spanish as the language of instruction. This naïve expectation and the reaction against it makes Puerto Rico's cultural anomalies the island's most explosive political topic today.

This, then, is the setting for our discussion of changes in family life: a proud and resourceful people densely packed on a small, distant island, and holding citizenship in a country which does not share their culture. The struggle of Puerto Ricans for a clarification of their identity—for a less ambiguous statement of who or what they are—comes to a focus in the area of family life. I offer here an hypothesis: if family income remains low but family life should rapidly converge, Puerto Ricans will almost certainly, although not without qualms, come to think of themselves more or less fully "American". If, on the other hand, family income increases, while family ways remain constant, Puerto Ricans can more easily commit themselves to a separate future identity.

Actually, neither of these clearcut alternatives is likely to occur. Both economically and culturally, Puerto Rico is changing fast. The government's massive program for economic betterment has had amazing results. Real income per family (after allowing for price increases) has doubled in the 15 years since 1940—and it is continuing to increase at a faster rate than that of the United States as a whole. Factories have been opened since the end of the war at a net rate of one every two weeks, with two thirds of the new jobs held by women workers. Over half a million Puerto Ricans have migrated to the mainland and another 10—15,000 go north each year to work in the harvest. One out of every four island families has been rehoused in either public housing or resettlement communities. Less than half the 6 to 18 year old children attended school in 1940, but 80% do today, and the University of Puerto Rico's 14,000 students nearly triple the enrolment of 15 years ago.

There is no slackening in these programs, but there is coming to be an increasing concern over the concomitant cultural changes. Some of these latter changes are easily documented—juvenile delinquency rates and divorce rates are increasing and Puerto Rico has almost the world's highest suicide and homocide rates—but most information on family change is decidedly impressionistic. To discuss these changes we must first briefly describe the family life of three sub-cultural types: mountain, lowland and urban lower class. These types constituted the bulk of all families prior to 1940. The base line, as we draw it here, ignores more recent variations and considers life apart from the resettlement communities, the factories and offices, the public housing projects and the complex of educational efforts.

The Jíbaro Family. More than one-third of all families on the island are scattered through the mountainous interior, where tobacco and coffee are the major crops. These are the *jíbaros*, whose ways of work and play are romanticized in poetry and song and serious essay. A voluminous literature attributes to them an astounding array of folk virtues—generosity, endurance and wisdom being the most agreed upon. In isolated wooden shanties they raise the biggest families on the island —the average completed family has eight living children. To a stranger the children show shy grins from around a door casing or under a bed. The husband stops whatever he is doing and welcomes the visitor with dignity and hospitality. Interviewers are never refused and the questions, even when very personal, are answered thoughtfully and seriously. Although the wife participates less than her husband, she does so freely, and although she is somewhat worn by work and childbearing she is likely to do more joking and laughing than he.

Here in the highlands we find the closest approach to a traditional ideal. It is an authoritarian ideal, in which the husband is an unquestioned master and the wife is a subordinated housekeeper. Children are closer to the mother than to the father, but they do not get a great deal of attention from either. Girls especially, but boys also, are kept close to home. For women, marriage may promise freedom from parental supervision. For men, it may be a search for someone who can be a second mother. Fear and respect as well as affection holds the family together. A rigid line divides the world of women from that of men. Husband and wife do not eat together. Men eat at the table and women in the kitchen or perhaps at the table after the men have finished. The man comes and goes from the house whenever he pleases, but his wife stays at home. Few families today completely match this picture.

The Rural Lowlands Laborer. Around the central mountainous interior of the island is a narrow coastal plain, extending fingers inward in many small valleys and a few large ones. This land, where the soil and rainfall are right, is usually planted to sugar cane. The cane workers live in crowded clusters of shanties close to town, or along a river or railroad bank, or on a small patch of useless land, or out on the rim of the cane land—sometimes miles away from the fields they must work.

The children are more apt to spend the day in school than are those who live in the hills, and although they grin as readily at a stranger they do not grin as shyly. The close quarters of the housing gives the wife a companionship with her neighbours that her *jíbara* sister lacks. Occasionally, too, she may go down to town to shop or to another settlement to visit relatives. An anthropologist says, " Women appear to share equally in familiar authority and to not fear the break-up of their marriage . . . [this] appears to reduce the tensions between husband and wife and to permit women greater freedom and security in the home ". The man in this family usually shares in the tasks of child

care but refuses to participate in the purely feminine jobs—preparation of food, sewing, dishwashing, etc. The economic importance of the woman in this group is to a great extent responsible for her greater freedom. It is not hard for women in the lowlands to find a way in which to add to the family income.

The Urban Laborer. There are 77 towns in Puerto Rico, ranging in size from San Juan with a population of almost 400,000 to little Las Marías with fewer than 600. Only about a dozen of these towns show pronounced urban characteristics and all of this dozen have pockets of unattractive housing where lower-class families live. At night the porches and streets and pathways between the houses are crowded with life—men and women laughing, children running, dogs barking, old cars with racing motors and clusters of volunteer mechanics.

Here is found an even more equalitarian status for women, more division of family problems than in the rural lowlands. But women tend to verbalize more their dissatisfaction and seem to feel more strongly about the inequalities of male and female rôles. In these areas are concentrated the majority of the island's broken homes. They have the example of the numerous women heads of households to refute the standard assumptions of female inferiority. The urban working-class couple are more concerned about their children, and their children's future. In the urban area education is seen as a crucial determining factor in status. Often the family has moved to the city and stays in the city despite the harder, more violent, life because their children have a chance for better schooling.

The urban family, as well as the rural lowland family, may be thought of as representing increasingly greater departures from the *jíbaro* norm. What was true of the *jíbaro* family was true as a background tradition also of the other two sub-cultural types. It would be difficult to say that any one of these types more closely approaches the United States norm than any other. The salient fact, for our purposes, is that they are all variants of a common European type of family life—relatively unaffected by native Indian or African Negro customs. They are essentially similar to types of family life found among the working class in the United States about 50 years ago.

Comparison with the United States Family. Here, then, is a society of considerable size, undergoing rapid change, and in ambiguous relationship to a larger society whose family life is different but not radically so. To a considerable extent the future status of Puerto Rico is foreshadowed in the response of its families to this situation. Before considering the effects of certain major social forces on family life, let me suggest what I believe to be the critical dimensions along which significant changes will or will not take place:

(*a*) *Increase in General Intimacy.* The United States family tends toward an ideal of maximum intimacy between members—a nearly

complete sharing of experiences and decisions without regard for age or sex differences. The Puerto Rican traditional ideal is one of age and sex graded compartmentalization of rôles, often with conflicting basic values.

(*b*) *More Equalitarian Interpersonal Distinctions.* In the traditional Puerto Rican family, members differentiate themselves from each other in terms of authority, status and rôles. The modern United States ideal is in terms of differential skills, and in practice often involves competitiveness between family members.

(*c*) *Diminished Family Continuity.* The United States family is moving in a direction of minimal continuity. There is little family ritual or contact with extended family kin. The family life cycle is breaking into segments—(1) family of orientation (2) extra-familial interlude (3) family of procreation (4) contracted family. The traditional island norm fosters greater continuity through extended family relationships and by the non-existence of the second and fourth segments of the family cycle.

(*d*) *Greater Emphasis on Personal Growth.* Increasingly the emphasis of modern United States family life is on the personal growth of its members—so much so that the term "developmental family" is sometimes applied to it. This is not a traditional concern of the Puerto Rican family except in a limited degree with respect to children.

Effect of Educational Program. One powerful source of change in family life is the educational program. Almost 30% of the total budget is expended on education. In addition to the university and the public school system, there are programs of vocational education, health education, adult education, university extension, agricultural extension, and community education. The ideals expressed in these programs are congruent to mainland ideals. The community education program, for example, specifically tries to foster a climate favorable to maximum personal growth, rationalist rather than traditionalist decision processes, equalitarian rather than authoritarian community and family structure, and greater intimacy and companionship across age and sex lines. These programs have had an undeniable success in altering conceptions of family life—at least at the verbal level and during the period of participation in the programs. Moreover, surveys show that as educational level increases, ideals and practices of family life become increasingly similar to those on the mainland.

Effects of Housing Program. About one fourth of Puerto Rico's 400,000 families are directly affected by the large-scale housing program—35,000 families living in resettlement communities and 60,000 families living in public housing. These programs include an interest in the family life of their clients. Changes do appear to be taking place, but they do not appear to be in the direction of mainland ideals. Interviewers find that families living in the housing projects are more

responsible, more stable, more family centered than those living in the slums or in the rural lowlands, and at the same time are somewhat more docile and dependent.

Effects of Migration. Most families in Puerto Rico have one or more relatives among the estimated 600,000 islanders now living on the continent. If the present rate of migration continues for another generation, there will be more Puerto Ricans living on the mainland than on the island. There are at least two reasons why migration might be expected to alter Puerto Rican family life in the direction of United States ideals: (1) surveys and census data indicate that the migrants are a more readily influenced group—i.e., tend to be young adults of higher than average educational and occupational levels, and are more likely to have lived in an urban area. (2) Since no passports are needed and since air travel is both quick and cheap, 500,000 trips, both ways, take place annually. However, the greater part of the migration has occurred in the last ten years, and the migrants still live primarily in areas of first settlement and in greater contact with each other than with continentals. No special studies have been made, but it is generally agreed that to date there has been little effect on family life on the island.

Effects of Industrialization. Puerto Rico is and has been primarily agricultural. Since the war, however, industrialization has been a major goal and incentives have been offered to induce new factories to the island. A net gain of 250 factories—most employing women workers—has resulted. It is evident from observation and is verified by studies that women employed in factories differ significantly from those employed as domestic servants or those who are not employed. Factory workers dress better, are more independent and more mobile. They come from higher than average educational and economic backgrounds to begin with, and are more apt to migrate. It is not clear, however, that this represents any change from pre-war patterns. The decision to seek a factory job is itself a selective factor, and because of the rapid population increase the percentage of women employed in manufacturing is not higher now than it was in 1940.

Summary and Conclusions

Puerto Rico is in transition, but it lacks a clearcut notion of preferred destinations. To a large measure this is a function of its anomalous political, economic and cultural relationships with the United States. If one set of conditions (either the economic or the cultural) were to change markedly while the other remained relatively stable, clarification of Puerto Rico's ambiguous identity would perhaps be simplified. Economic conditions have changed markedly in the past 15 years and the change appears to be continuing. Cultural changes too have been taking place but probably at a slower rate. In general, the educational programs seem to have successfully fostered an ideal of family life

similar to the United States norm. The housing programs appear to foster changes in a new direction. The effects of migration and industrialization seem to lie more in the future than in the present. The net effect has been the creation of points of increased plasticity—of susceptibility to change—which may, but have not yet, had large-scale consequences. If these trends have been accurately assessed, and if they are to continue unchanged, then Puerto Ricans must wrestle with the problem of their identity for some time to come, perhaps tending toward a gradual reinforcement of a conception of themselves as unequivocally different from, but by no means inferior to, their continental cousins.

Le changement du Code Civil et sa répercussion sociale en Proche-Orient

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Il y a un quart de siècle que le Code Civil turc est en vigueur, depuis l'adoption du Code suisse en 1926. Mais il faut constater qu'il y a toujours un conflit entre les mœurs et les coutumes des pays et les lois adoptées. C'est un problème essentiel qui ne manquait pas d'attirer l'attention de nos sociologues et de nos juristes. M. Z. F. Findikogku, prof. de sociologie à la Faculté des sciences économiques à Istanbul, a étudié la transformation du code familial en Turquie.[1] M. Rechat Kaynar a étudié le résultat de l'enquête faite par le gouvernement sur le problème de l'inadaptation de la loi à la condition sociale.[2] Les réponses de 24 gouverneurs étaient publiées par le Ministère de l'Intérieur, et nous pouvons les résumer en ces termes : " Après l'adoption du Code Civil, le nombre des unions illégales et des enfants bâtards était très sensiblement accru. Pour empêcher les différends et les difficultés juridiques surgissant en ces cas là, on a promulgué en 1933 une loi selon laquelle les unions accomplies en absence du Maire de la ville ou du préposé du village, seront tenues comme légales et auront les mêmes conséquences juridiques ". Une autre enquête du Ministère de la Justice nous révèle que, de 937 articles du Code Civil turc, seulement 335 articles étaient en vigueur jusqu'à présent, c'est-à-dire que deux tiers des articles n'ont pas pu trouver de champ d'application.[3]

Ce problème a attiré l'attention des professeurs de l'Université d'Istanbul. A cette occasion, on a soutenu deux thèses opposées : pour la première, cette inadaptation nous oblige à faire l'étude des mœurs et des coutumes du pays pour remanier la loi selon les besoins de de l'existence sociale ; pour la seconde, l'adoption est, avant toute choses, la conséquence d'une modernisation de notre pays qui était indispensable pour redresser la condition non suffisamment développée dans un proche avenir. C'est-à-dire que pour la première il faut mettre l'accent sur les mœurs tandis que pour la seconde sur les réformes sociales.

L'antinomie apparente entre ces deux thèses peut être résolue de cette manière : toute réforme ne peut être réalisée que si elle est accompagnée par une certaine évolution de l'existence sociale ; alors que cette évolution donne à la réforme une puissance vitale, d'un autre côté, l'effet des réformes sur la condition sociale peut l'améliorer. Cette action réciproque rend possible le remaniement successif de la loi et de l'évolution des conditions sociales.

En outre, il faut faire cette remarque qu'une constitution de Code Civil original, ou bien une synthèse de lois s'inspirant de plusieurs codes de peuples évolués, ou enfin, des emprunts éclectiques et l'adoption totale d'un Code Civil étranger sont assez différents et produisent des effets sensiblement divergents.

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Le Tanzimat apparaît comme un mouvement de réforme sociale d'occidentalisation en Turquie. Mais, la loi civile, rédigée sous la direction de Djevdet Pacha, au lieu d'avoir un caractère européen, se contente de rapprocher plusieurs doctrines du droit divin musulman et de rester comme une compilation des siècles passés. C'est pour cela que le Tanzimat n'avait aucune influence sur la modernisation du code civil en Turquie. Pour la première fois, ce fut Ziya Gökalp, le sociologue turc, qui proposa l'adoption d'une loi européenne par l'adaptation à la loi divine—Fiqh, et, il a soutenu la possibilité d'une telle synthèse; car, selon Z. Gökalp la loi divine est conforme à la loi naturelle, puisque la volonté divine n'est que l'habitude de la nature—cette conception est inspirée de Gazzali, et peut-être d'Emile Boutroux. Ainsi, selon lui une évolution de la nature et particulièrement de la nature sociale est incluse dans la loi divine. Cette interprétation sociologique très large du droit divin rendait possible, envers les juristes scolastiques turcs, la modernisation du code civil. Mais la durée très courte de la première guerre mondiale n'a pas donné d'occasion d'application de cette intérpretation théorique. Après 1925, Atatürk n'a conçu aucun compromis entre la Législation islamique et la loi moderne, il a promulgué le code civil turc, traduit textuellement du code suisse.

Parmi les résultats obtenus par l'adoption du code civil, les plus intéressants se trouvent dans plusieurs régions rurales du pays. Dans les grandes villes la vie familiale était déjà assez préparée pour s'adapter au code européen; depuis presqu'un siècle les familles polygames sont exceptionnelles, et malgré la tolérance religieuse pour la polygamie, la plupart des citadins blâmaient ceux qui se mariaient avec plusieurs femmes. Dans les villages aussi, la monogamie était effectivement en vigueur. Seulement, dans les régions orientales l'esprit féodal dominait avec sa conception de la supériorité de l'homme sur la femme, et la fréquence de la polygamie dépendait de la richesse de l'homme. Dans les autres endroits, surtout à l'ouest du pays, la famille se rétrécissait et prenait la forme monogamique. Cependant, avant et après l'adoption du code civil il y avait des phénomènes sociaux régionaux ayant une grande influence sur la vie familiale. Dans certaines régions nous observons la polygamie, comme un des élements des mœurs. Tandis que dans les villages et les petites villes dans lesquels la tapisserie est développée, nous observons la polygamie; car, chaque atelier de tissage est dirigé par une femme. Les hommes riches, pour avoir beaucoup d'ateliers, devaient avoir plusieurs femmes, ce qui ne produisait aucun sentiment de jalousie. Dans les régions de terres arides

la propriété communale du village était consacrée par alternance à certaines familles, et par conséquent, celles qui sont dépourvues provisoirement de terre à cultiver doivent chercher des travaux dans les autres régions. Ce sont parfois les hommes qui sont des emigrés du travail, mais surtout les femmes cherchent du travail dans les villes, et ainsi il y a des femmes qui vivent avec deux hommes, l'un au village et l'autre dans la ville. C'est une sorte de famille taisible, en même temps une forme particulière de polyandrie née de la nécessité sociale, sans être jamais légale. L'enquête des gouverneurs et certaines observations personnelles ont constaté non seulement les conflits juridiques surgissant de ce phénomène, tels l'enfant bâtard, les déviations du droit successoral, etc., elles ont constaté aussi ces phénomènes conciliables ni avec le droit civil, ni avec le droit islamique. Pour remanier le droit civil il faut étudier toutes les déviations de la vie familiale et s'il s'agit de faire des retouches dans le droit adopté, il ne faut pas oublier l'effet des normes et des lois sur les faits sociaux, avec l'étude approfondie de ces conditions sociales.

. . . .

M. Bousquet, en étudiant l'évolution juridique des populations musulmanes, y distinguait trois groupes[4] : (1) Dans le premier le statut religieux a été complétement détruit aprés la guerre de 1918: ce sont la Turquie, la Russie et l'Albanie. En Turquie le droit civil a été simplement européanisé par l'adoption d'un code étranger, en Russie le code religieux des peuples turcs était bolchévisé, en Albanie la laïcisation de la loi était réalisée par des emprunts à des codes étrangers très variés: français, allemand, suisse, italien, conciliés avec les dispositions purement nationales. (2) Le second groupe pour M. Bousquet, représente la tendance conservatrice des pays arabes: Suudî Arabistan, La Syrie, l'Iraq, etc. Quelques uns avaient montré même, une certaine tendance réactionnaire en s'enlisant dans le " Fiqh ", plus dogmatique relativement au code civil de l'Empire Ottoman. Nous pouvons citer, à cet occasion, le type Zélote de l'historien Toynbee. (3) Le troisième groupe comprend les pays dans lesquels, sans aucune révolution profonde, se réalise un changement sensible du religieux vers le politique. Ces pays sont les Indes, Hindistan et Pakistan—l'Egypte—et la Yougoslavie. Contrairement à l'opinion courante, dit-il, les Anglais ont modifié le statut juridique religieux dans l'Inde. L'Egypte, à l'exception du statut personnel et successoral religieux, a organisé son code sur le modèle européen. Le code civil, moins la loi familiale, a été rédigé sous la direction de Soliman Marcos.[5]

Cette étude comparative du droit des peuples musulmans nous révèle qu'il y a une évolution, plus ou moins sensible, dans chaque pays respectif. Cette évolution, avant qu'elle soit juridique, est une évolution des conditions sociales. Seulement, les pays du Sahara résistent encore à toute modernisation spontanée ou provoquée, sauf dans la vie entièrement séparée des chefs de tribus, comme un mirage dans le désert.

Ce changement social aura pour conséquence juridique ou bien un changement original du code civil, ou bien une réforme visant une adaptation partielle et éclectique, enfin par l'effet de l'hétérogénéité sociale au point de vue de la stratification ou des classes, un changement brusque réalisé par des révolutions.

Quant au droit musulman, il faut rappeler qu'une multitude de peuples gardent leur survivance de coutumes préislamiques sous la Législation de l'Islam. La doctrine hanéfite confirmait déjà les nécessités de l'évolution et considérait les coutumes comme un élement indispensable du droit musulman. En outre, certains peuples gardent leurs coutumes anciennes, au dessus de toute présomption. M. Bousquet a étudié par exemple dans un autre livre la relation des coutumes indonésiennes et du droit islamique, et il a montré que la loi religieuse reste limitée au statut personnel et un peu au wakif. Son influence sur le droit successoral a été des plus minimes. Le droit foncier, le droit pénal, etc., sont restés en dehors de sa sphère.[6]

M. Köprülü a montré l'influence assez profonde du droit coutumier turc sur l'organisation de l'Empire Ottoman.[7] L'étude des Fetawâ et des lois ottomanes nous atteste qu'il y a beaucoup de cas juridiques interprétés par les jurisconsultes turcs—Müfti, conformément aux exigences politiques plus qu'aux principes des doctrines de Fiqh. Le même cas était arrivé par dessus le marché, dans le Fiqh chiite en Iran, étudié par M. Djalal-Abdoh.[8]

Cela signifie que l'application de la loi religieuse dans les pays musulmans n'était jamais unanime, et chaque pays avait gardé son caractère national. Alors, la laïcisation du Code Civil ne peut pas être considéré comme un mouvement commun; chaque pays a son caractère particulier et doit être étudié dans ses conditions sociales. Bien que l'Islam soit un système métaphysique et social pénétrant les détails de la vie et ne laissant aucune distinction entre le spirituel et le séculier, la modernisation et la laïcisation sont des faits indéniables. Les doctrinaires fanatiques et les anti-religieux s'accordent sur ce point que l'Islam ne peut jamais être laïcisé.[9] Mais la réalité sociale montre qu'une infiltration des mœurs et des coutumes anciennes, aussi bien qu'une pénétration des idées modernes par le changement dans les conditions d'existence se sont réalisées et se réalisent encore. Comme un système de valeurs vivantes, en changement continuel, il ne faut pas y chercher de discordances et de contradictions.

Un remaniement du Code Civil turc sera nécessaire d'abord, au point de vue de l'étude des conditions d'existence et de son évolution, puis, au point de vue de l'esprit juridique de la civilisation européenne qui n'est pas aussi homogène qu'on le croit de prime abord; au contraire elle se compose de nations dont chacune a le même problème de conflits et de synthèse entre son droit coutumier et son code civil. Cette seconde étude peut nous conduire à un remaniement de l'adoption pour arriver à une synthèse originale.

NOTES

[1] A. Ziyæddin Fahri, "Essai sur la transformation du code familial en Turquie", thèse complémentaire pour le doctorat d'Etat, présenté à la Faculté des Lettres de Strasbourg, Imp. Berger-Levrault, Paris, 1935.

[2] Rechat Kaynar, "Içtimaî realite ve medenî kanunumuz," article paru en turc dans la *Sosyoloji Dünyasi*, Le Monde sociologique, 1952 ; Le même auteur a publié plusieurs articles sur le même sujet dans le quotidien *Akşam*.

[3] Les réponses des gouverneurs et des professeurs de l'université d'Istanbul sont parues en deux fascicules. Le même problème est traité dans la Conférence du droit comparé, par des juristes de plusieurs pays, en Septembre 1955, à Istanbul.

[4] Bousquet, "Droit et mœurs des pays musulmans" (*Orient et Occident*, 1936).

[5] S. Marcos, bien qu'il soit chrétien, a rédigé le code civil, sous l'influence des doctrines juridiques (Fiqh) musulmanes.

[6] Bousquet, "Introduction à l'étude de l'Islam Indonésien" (Extrait de la *Revue des Etudes Islamiques*, An. 1929, cah. II.)

[7] F. Köprülü, "Institution de Vakouf, sa nature juridique et son évolution historique (*Vakiflar Dergisi*, 1942, Istanbul).

[8] Djalal-Abdoh, *L'élément psychologique dans les contrats suivant la conception iranienne*, Paris, 1937.

[9] Mustafa Sabri, *Mavqif-al-ilm va'l aql va'l ma'qûl*, Cairo, 1948.

Note sur la famille Turque et le taux de suicides des gens mariés

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INTRODUCTION

Les statistiques de suicides de différents pays ainsi que les recherches faites au sujet des suicides par différents sociologues nous portent à croire que les suicides sont plus fréquents chez les gens vivant seuls (célibataires ou veufs) par rapport aux gens mariés. Selon Durkheim le fait s'explique par l'intégration assurée par les liens du mariage, l'intégration étant considérée par cet auteur comme une assurance contre le suicide. La validité de cette assertion pour plusieurs pays de l'Europe a été demontrée par Halbwachs.[1]

Or, dans les recherches faites à Istanbul sur les cas de suicides, nous avons obtenu des *résultats contraires à ceux* signalés dans les autres pays, *à savoir, le taux de suicides des gens mariés est nettement plus élevé que celui des gens vivant seuls.*[2]

Le Tableau I indique les nombres relatifs (par rapport ‰ à la population) de suicides réels et de tentatives d'après les groupes d'âges et l'état civil des femmes et des hommes.

Tableau I. *Nombre de suicides selon les groupes d'âge et l'état civil (par rapport ‰ à la population). Istanbul 1927–1946.*

Groupes d'âge	Femmes				Hommes			
	Mariées		Vivant seules (célib.+veuves+ divorcés)		Mariés		Vivant seuls (célib+veufs+ divorcés)	
	T	S	T	S	T	S	T	S
10–20 ..	1·28	0·17	0·34	0·02	0·73	0·13	0·14	0·03
20–30 ..	0·27	0·01	0·39	0·04	0·11	0·03	0·17	0·04
30–40 ..	0·12	0·01	0·25	0·04	0·07	0·03	0·23	0·10
40–50 ..	0·06	0·01	0·05	0·02	0·07	0·04	0·13	0·08
50–60 ..	0·05	0·03	0·02	0·01	0·06	0·07	0·19	0·08
60–70 ..	0·07	0·05	0·01	0·009	0·07	0·08	0·05	0·08
70–80 ..	0·06	0·13	0·03	0·007	0·07	0·13	0·07	0·07
80+ ..	0·62	0·62	—	0·02	0·11	0·10	0·05	0·05
10–80+	2·53	1·03	1·09	0·166	1·29	0·61	1·03	0·53

T: Tentatives de suicides n'ayant pas abouti à la mort. S: suicides réels, terminés par la mort.

D'où il ressort que, les facteurs d'âge et de sexe laissés de côté, les gens mariés ont un taux de suicides plus élevé que les gens vivant seuls (presque le double).

INTERPRÉTATION DES RÉSULTATS PAR LA RÉPERCUSSION DES CHANGEMENTS SOCIAUX

La période qui nous intéresse est justement celle qui suit la Guerre d'Indépendance (1921–1922), la Proclamation de la République (1923), les grands mouvements de révolution apportés dans les relations sociales et les mœurs par la laïcisation de l'Etat (1924), l'acceptation du code civil au modèle de celui de la Suisse (1925), code qui mettait fin à la polygamie en prescrivant la monogamie. D'autre part avec le même mouvement de révolution la femme avait acquis des droits égaux à ceux de l'homme à tous les points de vue: elle avait désormais droit à toutes les professions, au vote comme au choix de son mari. Par la laïcisation de l'Etat elle quittait le harem et se voyait émancipée de la tutelle de son père et de son mari. Le droit musulman en usage jusqu' en 1924 donnait au mari le droit de répudier sa femme quand il le voulait. D'autre part la laïcisation apportait un bouleversement dans les relations familiales, car la religion dominait en Turquie avant la révolution; toutes les mœurs et la force du groupe familial était fondée sur la religion. Brusquement ces liens disparurent pour céder la place à de nouvelles mœurs et chacun devait désormais créer les liens de famille par ses propres forces d'après de nouvelles valeurs.

Donc la révolution turque a eu une double répercussion, d'abord sur l'individu, surtout sur la femme (par la laïcisation et le code civil), et sur l'institution qu'est le mariage, par la prescription de la monogamie et l'émanicipation de la femme. Tous ces mouvements avaient également une répercussion sur les conditions économiques de la femme qui désormais pouvait choisir une profession, gagner sa vie; ainsi, à son émancipation au point de vue religieux et au point de vue mœurs s'ajoutait son émancipation économique.

Le mariage comme institution avait subi des changements très importants: de religieux il était devenu civil, de polygame il devenait monogame, auparavant il donnait le droit de divorce et avec une facilité étonnante à l'homme, après la révolution on reconnaissait des droits égaux aux conjoints pour l'union (le choix) comme pour le divorce. Or ceci devait sans doute avoir sa répercussion sur la psychologie des hommes: d'une part ceux-ci se voyaient diminués dans leurs droits d'époux, droits accordés auparavant par la religion et par les mœurs en leur faveur. Ils se voyaient diminués dans leur autorité dans la famille et comme individus devant la femme qui gagnait de nouvelles possibilités à tous les points de vue. *Et l'union de deux êtres dont les droits sociaux, individuels, et réciproques étaient profondément bouleversés devaient susciter sans doute de graves problèmes.* Les recherches faites sur le suicide portent il est vrai sur une période qui suit immédiatement la révolution et la génération qui fut notre objet

d'étude n'était pas celle qui entrait dans l'institution du mariage munis de ces nouveaux droits. Seulement il reste vrai que les répercussions de la révolution sociale devaient se faire sentir sur les relations des conjoints même de ceux mariés avant la révolution, par son action sur la nouvelle conception de la vie de chacun des conjoints. Même les gens mariés avant la révolution selon l'ancienne coutume voyaient leur ego chargé de nouvelles normes et se reconnaissaient de nouveaux droits.

Selon le point de vue sociologique, et durkheimien en particulier, l'élévation du nombre des suicides en Turquie au lendemain d'une révolution concernant les mœurs, et l'élévation du taux des suicides qui se trouve être accentuée parmi les gens mariés peut s'expliquer par des changements sociaux dus à la révolution. On peut considérer cette élévation comme une forme de suicide anormale due à un déséquilibre subit survenu dans les conditions sociales.

NOTES

[1] Halbwachs, *Les Causes du Suicide*, Paris.

[2] Notre étude porte sur les suicides à Istanbul entre 1927 et 1946. Nos statistiques ont été établies d'après des fiches preparées par nous et remplies par la Direction de la Police.

The Family in Collective Settlements[1]

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I

The purpose of this paper[2] is an analysis of the interrelation between changes in communal structure and concomitant modifications of family organization. We have found that changes in communal structure have a direct effect on the definition of family rôles and on the conception of the position of the family in the community.

Basically the process of change in the collectives may be described as a transition from " Bund "[3] to " Commune ". The main characteristics of the collectives of the " *Bund* " type are: (*a*) whole-hearted devotion to the common cause; (*b*) intense collective identification; (*c*) spontaneous and informal primary group relation between all members; (*d*) homogeneity. The collectives were usually founded by nuclei of young and unattached individuals who shared a comparatively long period of social, ideological and vocational training.

The main characteristics of the full-fledged " *Commune* " are: (*a*) redefinition and accommodation of collective values; (*b*) decrease of the intensity of collective identification; (*c*) formalisation; (*d*) differentiation. The original homogeneity of the " Bund " stage is disrupted by division of labour and by the establishment and growth of families. The commune is further differentiated by the crystallization of the various groups of settlers which join the core of founders of each community at different stages of its development.

The collectives of the " Commune " type fall into sub-categories. For purposes of our analysis we will distinguish here between " *Federated* " and " *Unified* " Communes. Our main criterion for these distinctions is the extent of amalgamation of the various groups of settlers in each commune. A " Unified " Commune is one in which the sub-groups have assimilated and have lost their separate identity. A " Federated " Commune is an aggregate of distinctive sub-groups. Each group retains its identity and constitutes a semi-separate unit within the framework of the collective. The members of each sub-group have a strong " we " consciousness and a distinctive sub-culture. Most of them have almost no close contacts with members of sub-groups other than their own.

It should be stressed that the collectives do not fall into sharply differentiated types. In reality there is a continuum. Some collectives approach one type, while others come closer to the opposite one.

We will deal first with the transformation of family organization entailed in the transition from " Bund " to " Commune ". We will

then proceed to compare and analyze the rate and extent of change (*a*) in " Unified " and " Federated " Communes; (*b*) in different categories of members.

II

We start our analysis with the assumption that there is a certain basic incompatibility between intense collective identification and family solidarity. Examination of the first stages of the history of the collective movement and the first stages of the development of each collective reveals a tendency to curtail family obligations and attachments.[4]

Joining a group of settlers entails a conscious and voluntary break with families of orientation. The members of the collectives agree voluntarily to subordinate their personal interests to the attainment of communal goals and to seek self-expression only through service to their community. The conception of an all-absorbing task dominates their life and defines every aspect of it. The absolute devotion to the realization of communal ideals gains precedence over kinship obligations. The intimate person-to-person relationship, the intense togetherness, the unity which permeates all contacts become more significant than family loyalties. The cohesion of the new primary group and the identification with the common cause replace former family ties. Relatives who are not members of the Collectives are by definition outsiders, almost strangers. It is felt that external ties should not be allowed to interfere with internal unity.

The formation of families of procreation introduces an internal conflict. Deep attachment to the family may weaken the primary group characteristics of the " Bund " and disrupt its unity. The families may tend to become competing foci of intensive emotional involvement and to infringe upon the complete devotion to the community.

From its inception the collective movement realized the danger inherent in external contacts and conflicting loyalties and hoped to counteract centrifugal tendencies by a re-definition of the position of the family. The communities tried to replace the family and took over most of its functions. The non-familistic tendency is clearly evident in ideological pronouncements as well as in actual behaviour.

The *ideology* of the collective movement concerning family matters was based on the following tenets:

(*a*) Family interests should be subordinated to the common weal. The collective should always come first.

(*b*) Family relationships should be based on complete equality and genuine companionship.

(*c*) Women should share equally in every type of work. They should participate in hard productive work as well as in defence. We found a flat denial of basic sex differences, and a predominantly masculine image of the feminine rôle.

The basic principles of this conception of the family were clearly expressed in the organization of every aspect of family life.

The main characteristics of *patterns of internal relations* were:

(*a*) Informality. A couple who maintained a permanent relationship for some time and decided to establish a family would apply for a room of their own. They would then start to live together without any formalities or celebrations. The wedding was usually deferred and performed only in order to legitimize the children. It was as short and as informal as possible and was celebrated in most cases outside the community. The wife would continue as a rule to live under her maiden name.

(*b*) Full co-operation and flexibility in executing intra-familial tasks. There was hardly any internal rôle-differentiation.

(*c*) Both conjugal- and parent-children-relationships were dominated by a pattern of comradeship on equal terms. The collectives tried to eliminate the authoritarian element in husband-and-wife relationship. They also disregarded differences of age and minimized them in parent-children relationships.

(*d*) Disruption of wider kinship-ties.

The strong non-familistic bias was clearly manifested *in patterns of recreation and informal social relations:*

(*a*) Members spent most of their free time together. They used to meet every evening in the communal dining-hall, in the reading-room or on the central lawn and to spend their time in committee-work and in heated discussions. Spontaneous community singing and folk-dancing were their main recreational activities.

(*b*) Any tendency to stay away in the family rooms and to build up a segregated family life was strongly condemned. Private radios and electric kettles were banned for a long time because, among other reasons, they enhanced the attraction of the home and undermined full participation in communal affairs.

(*c*) Public opinion discouraged constant joint appearance of the couple in public. Husband and wife who stuck together and were often seen in each other's company were viewed with ridicule. Each member of the family was likely to have close friends of his or her own.

(*d*) There was very little of either family entertaining or joint visiting.

(*e*) Family celebrations and reunions were very rare. Birthdays and wedding-anniversaries meant very little, and were not, as a rule, commemorated.

The most important feature of communal organization was, however, the *delegation of most functions to collective institutions.*

(*a*) Husband and wife were allotted independent jobs. There was a strict ban on assigning members of the same family to the same place of

work. The collectives did not succeed in eliminating sex job-differentiation, but quite a number of women participated in production and men shared work in non-productive occupations. Quite a number of women were responsible for overall administration and some held leadership positions.

(*b*) All meals were taken in the common dining-hall and served from a common kitchen. Members' needs were provided by communal institutions. Families looked after their own rooms but had few other household responsibilities.

(*c*) Children lived apart from their parents and were attended mainly by specialists assigned to this task. From their birth they slept, ate and later on studied, in special children-houses. Each age-group led its own life and had its autonomous arrangements. Children met their parents and siblings in off-hours and spent the afternoons and early evenings with them. On Saturdays and holidays they stayed with their parents most of the time. Parents put their young children to sleep. There were thus frequent and intensive relations between parents and children. The main socializing agencies were, however, the peer age-group and the specialized nurses, instructors and teachers. The age-group substituted the sibling group. It duplicated the structural lines of the community and inculcated communal norms. It is mainly through the age-group that the children came into definite and structured relations with the adult world. Basically the children belonged to the community as a whole.

The core of internal family activities which looms so large in other types of family thus diminished considerably. The collectives went further in this respect than any other non-familistic society. The family almost ceased to be an autonomous unit from the point of view of division of labour.

Examination of the *policy* of the collectives concerning family matters reveals additional non-familistic features. The collectives tended to disregard the special needs of the family and devised many mechanisms in order to prevent its becoming an independent and isolated unit.

(*a*) Capital was invested mainly in expansion of productive enterprises and in construction of communal institutions. The expenditure on personal needs and housing was kept as low as possible. Couples had to wait often for many months before they were allocated a room of their own.

(*b*) Families had to accommodate a lodger in their one-room apartment whenever the scarcity of housing became very acute. The temporary but recurring violation of conjugal privacy expressed very clearly the precedence of collective over personal considerations.

(*c*) Examination of the type of houses built in the first collective affords another indication of the same tendency. The houses resembled barracks. The dwelling unit consisted of one single room. All rooms in each house led to one long and narrow corridor. Bathrooms and

sanitary facilities were built in the centre of the compound and were shared by all members. Segregation of family life was made almost impossible with this type of house-planning.

(*d*) A disregard of family relationships in job allocation was another important feature of this policy. Husband and wife were often assigned jobs with different time-tables and saw very little of each other. Members who were delegated to élite positions outside the community had to leave their families at home and were deprived of their company most of the time.

(*e*) Vacations and holidays of husband and wife were not co-ordinated. Their days off fell very often on different days of the week so that they could not spend their free time together.

(*f*) The patterns of celebrating festive occasions symbolized the overall importance of the community. The collectives changed the familistic patterns of most Jewish traditional festivals and adapted them to the new collective framework. Except for Passover, which has become the culminating festival of the year, children did not participate in the general celebrations and had their special festivities in which parents took part only as passive observers. The family ceased to function as an independent and active unit in all ceremonies.

III

Up to the present we have described the family organization during the revolutionary phase of the history of the collective movement. Many features, of this extremely non-familistic pattern, can still be found today in newly established collectives, which still retain " Bund " characteristics. Examination of family structure in longer established collectives reveals that though the basic principles remain intact there have been considerable changes in the position and organization of the family. *The further the collective is from the " Bund " type, the more marked and far-reaching are changes in this respect.* The main tenets of the *ideology* emerging now in the collectives are:

(*a*) The family constitutes a basic and important social unit and should be accorded independence and privacy.

(*b*) Women should be assigned mainly to jobs that will not interfere with their basic functions. One can discern a considerable weakening of opposition to sex-rôle differentiation and signs of an emergence of a markedly less masculine image of the feminine rôle.

The main changes in patterns of *internal family relationships* are:

(*a*) Formalization. Marriage normally now precedes the establishment of a family. Most couples attach considerable importance to the wedding celebration and want it to be a memorable event. Most wives tend to discard their maiden-name and adopt their husband's name.

(*b*) The emergence of a fairly fixed, albeit flexible and fluctuating, internal division of labour. The husband helps willingly, now and then, in the housework and takes a lively interest in the children, though most of the work will be done by his wife. It is mainly her responsibility.

(*c*) Joint decisions and authority differentiation.

1. It is felt that internal discussions should be kept in the family and that a common front should be maintained towards outsiders.

2. Regional division of spheres of authority. Intra-family authority is determined by the manner in which obligations and reponsibilities are distributed between marital partners. The wife has usually more say in internal family matters, in matters concerning service institutions and children's houses. The husband deals with central committees and has, as a rule, more say in external matters.

3. Important decisions are reached by joint consultation and repeated readjustment. It is stressed that neither of the spouses should give orders or disregard the opinion of the other. There are, however, some indications that while the wife has more say in routine matters, it is the husband who decides on matters of principle. Analysis of family decisions shows that husbands are usually more strict in their adherence to community-norms and that they try to impose conformity on their wives. Public opinion ridicules a " weak " husband, who gives way to his wife and does not have enough influence to prevent deviation from norms.

4. It should be stressed, however, that the emerging pattern is not clear-cut and that it does not enforce institutionalized positions of pivotal authority for either of the spouses. The authority balance in each family depends therefore primarily on the interaction of the personalities of husband and wife and on the influence which they exercise on each other at different stages of the family cycle.

(*d*) The main changes in *parent-children* and *sibling*-relationships are:

1. Intensification of parent-children-relationship. The family has delegated most of its functions to the community. Emphasis lies therefore on affective ties and personal relationships within the family. It is mainly within the family that both parents and children have intimate relations unpatterned by their position in the community and that they are free from routine duties. The child's position outside the family is ascribed only to a small extent. He has to compete with his age peers for a position in his group and for the approval of the adults in charge of it. All children in the same age-group have the same claim to attention. It is only in the family that they get love and care which they do not have to share with many others.

In so far as the family has ceased to be the prime socializing agency, it avoids to some extent the inevitable ambivalence towards the agents of

socialization. Parents do not have to play the two-sided rôle of ministering to the children's needs for care and security on the one hand and of thwarting their wishes in various ways on the other. Parents do not carry the main responsibility for disciplining their children and can afford to be permissive. The petty quarrels and persistent disagreements which pester parents-children-relationships in other types of families are quite rare here. Parents endeavour to make the few hours that their children spend with them as pleasant and carefree as possible. They will abstain from making too many demands on their children and from severely penalizing misdemeanour, so as not to mar the happy hours of their daily reunion.

Examination of our material indicates the overall importance of the parents-children-relationship. The children have come very often to occupy the emotional centre of the parents' life. They have become a major preoccupation with most mothers. Young children are deeply dependent and very often over-dependent on their parents. It is to them that they turn for reassurance and security. The children outgrow eventually their over-dependence. They gradually become fully integrated in their age-group and drift away from their parents. Parents resent this estrangement and will often blame it on the usurpation of communal institutions. Many feel bereaved of function and crave for closer contacts with their children.

2. There are some signs of the strengthening of ties between siblings. Parents tend to encourage their children to spend their time together while they are at home. Older children are often entrusted with the care of younger ones.

The renewal and strengthening of wider kinship ties is perhaps the most outstanding feature of the process of change.

(*a*) Relatives living in the same community maintain close contacts through frequent visits and mutual help. In some of the longer established collectives, where the children of the first founders have already married and established families of their own, there are many indices of the emergence of cohesive kinship groupings. Relatives tend very often to cluster and form united family blocks which have a considerable influence on community affairs.

(*b*) The collectives have accepted economic and social responsibility for ageing or sick parents and either transfer them to the collective or help to maintain them outside it. Old parents used to live concentrated in separate blocks of dwellings but it is becoming more customary to set them up in rooms adjoining their children's flats.

(*c*) Members of the collectives tend to renew their contacts with relatives outside the community. Kinship ties have broken through the self-imposed isolation from the outside world. Members will stay with their relatives when they go to town and will invite them to visit their settlement. They accept personal presents from them and reciprocate by sending farm produce from time to time.

The wider kinship category is amorphous and ill-defined, but there is quite a strong moral obligation to maintain amicable relations with kin.

The tendency towards a more familistic pattern may be also discerned in the subtle transformation of *recreation and informal relations:*

(*a*) Free time spent in public has diminished considerably. Members are not as eager as they used to be to participate in public discussions or to attend public meetings. Spontaneous dancing and community-singing sessions are rare. Members tend to retire to their rooms and to stay at home most of the time.

(*b*) Husband and wife will spend most of their free time together. They usually sit near each other during evening meals and on all public occasions.

(*c*) Entertaining and visiting are joint family affairs. It is now considered impolite to invite only one of the spouses. Friends who are not congenial to both husband and wife, are gradually dropped.

(*d*) Many families regularly celebrate birthdays and wedding anniversaries and attach considerable importance to such family reunions.

There are certain crucial changes in the definition of the *relations between the family and communal institutions.* The border line between external and internal family activities has shifted in many cases.

(*a*) The family has regained some of its functions in the sphere of housekeeping. Most families will have their afternoon-tea with their children at home. In some of the collectives it has become customary to eat the evening meal too, at home. Some families do so only once a week as a special treat for the children while others do so regularly every day.

Couples spend a considerable part of their personal allowances on their flats. To many of them, especially to the wives, the flat has become a symbol of the togetherness of their family and a physical manifestation of its separateness. They tend their flat with care and have a passionate desire to make it as neat and as pleasant as possible. The collectives refer to the somewhat exaggerated preoccupation with this daily routine as the " home cult ".

(*b*) Parents tend to take a more active part in the upbringing of their children. There is a much closer co-operation between nurses, instructors, teachers and parents. Parents help in looking after their young children. They take turns in watching them at night and nurse them when they are ill. They help in the preparation of festivals arranged for the children and attend most of them.

Parents also take a more active interest in what their children do at home. They supervise their children's behaviour, their choice of friends and their reading habits. They try to influence their choice of

future occupations and insist on their right to be consulted on this matter.

Some of the collectives have introduced a more radical reorganization. Children in these collectives no longer sleep in the children-houses. They stay with their age-group during the day but return home every afternoon. Duties of child-care have thus partly reverted to the family.

(*c*) There is now a fairly clear-cut sex-rôle differentiation in work-organization. Women are mainly concentrated in occupations more closely allied to traditional house-keeping, such as cooking, laundry service, nursing and teaching. An increase in the number of children and in the average age of the mothers has resulted in a marked decrease in the number of women employed in production and overall administration. The scarcity of women in the collectives (they number between 30 to 45% of the total) has accelerated this process. At first the collectives tried to stem this trend since it ran counter to their principles. The emergence of a feminine rôle prototype has, however, weakened their resistance. The change is reluctantly accepted and has come to be regarded as inevitable.

(*d*) The same tendency may be observed in the sphere of voluntary participation in community affairs. One of the main reasons given for reluctance to accept nominations on committees is the unwillingness to lose touch with one's family in spending too much time on communal work in off-hours. Women are, as a rule, more inactive in this respect than men. Most women try to avoid nominations and are therefore under-represented in committees. They hesitate to accept responsibility in central committees and to assert their authority there. Women are found now mainly in committees in charge of health and education.

No less marked are the changes in the *policy* of the collectives towards the family.

(*a*) The collectives no longer put such an exclusive emphasis on productive investment and on construction of public institutions. They no longer postpone the building of dwellings indefinitely. Even when they cannot really afford it, they spend much more than they used to on housing and furniture.

(*b*) A typical dwelling unit now consists of a semi-detached flat containing one or two rooms, kitchenette and sanitary facilities.

(*c*) Families get special consideration. Married couples have a priority in the distribution of flats, equipment and furniture. Unmarried members are more likely to be assigned to tasks which entail overtime or night-work.

(*d*) There is a far better co-ordination of holidays and vacations. Most families are able to spend their vacations and their holidays together.

(*e*) Patterns of celebrating festive occasions symbolize and manifest the change of the position of the family:

1. Members of the collectives are entitled to invite their relatives to all important festivals. Older children tend to participate in the general celebrations with their parents.

2. Weddings have become important events. Marriages are celebrated by the whole community and are made the occasion of big parties. The couples are entitled to an additional and exclusive party for their friends and relatives.

3. Family celebrations are fully legitimized by now. The family invites friends and relatives and is entitled to a special allocation of provisions on such occasions. There are large gatherings of relatives at all important family reunions.

IV

Up to this point we have concentrated on substantiating our hypothesis that the transition from an extremely cohesive community to a less cohesive one entails a considerable modification of the pattern of family organization. We have described the general trend, disregarding differences between different types of communes and between categories of members within each commune. Comparative analysis of our material clearly indicates considerable variation as to the rate and extent of change.

(*a*) Change in family norms and behaviour is more prevalent in "*Unified*" than in "*Federated*" communes. We have found that "Unified" collectives are basically aggregates of families. Husband and wife work in communal enterprises. They come in touch with communal institutions and use their services. They maintain friendly but not too close relations with a few other families. But relations within the family and with relatives have gained precedence over any relation with outsiders. There is a strong opposition to any encroachment on the family's privacy and independence.

"Federated" communes are typically aggregates of sub-groups and not so much of families. Members of each sub-group maintain close contacts with each other and identify with their group. Their identification with their sub-group is often much stronger than their identification with the collective as a whole. But it still operates against the splitting up of the collective into semi-closed and loosely connected family units. Friends are still more important than relatives. The stronger cohesion of the sub-group, the more stubborn the opposition to the familistic trend and the slower the process of change within it.

(*b*) Changes in family norms and behaviour are less prevalent in the *élite* than in the *rank* and *file*. Differences of opinion and behaviour cut across this distinction but, on the whole, members of the élite tend to be less familistic. Within the category of the rank and file—

peripheral and passive individuals are more disposed to change than more integrated and active members.

(*c*) *Women* are much more familistic than *men*. Many women have retreated to the private sphere and are engrossed in family affairs. Most of them are primarily members of their family, while most men are primarily members of their sub-group or of their collective. Women are the main agents of the familistic trend and initiate the changes in this sphere.

Limitations of space do not permit a full analysis of these variations. Suffice it here to say that the most important, though by no means the only variable, operative in this process is the degree of intensity of identification with the collective and its values. The less pronounced the primacy of communal ideals, the weaker the diffuse solidarity and the sense of togetherness, the stronger the appeal of the familistic innovations.

NOTES

[1] The main features of the collective settlement are: common ownership of all property except for a few personal belongings, common organization of production, consumption and care of children. Members' needs are provided by communal institutions on an equalitarian basis. All income goes into a common treasury. Each member gets only a small cash allowance for personal expenses. The community is run as one economic unit and as one household. Collectives may vary in size from 40 to 50 members in the newly founded settlements—to over 1,000 in the larger and older ones. There were 227 collectives in Israel in 1952 with a total population of 69,039.

[2] The paper is a summary of the results of a research project on one of the federations of collectives conducted by the Research Seminar of the Sociology Department of the Hebrew University. We have concluded the field-work in only 5 out of a representative sample of 12 collectives. The conclusions are therefore tentative and will be re-examined in the course of further research. I wish to express my gratitude to my students who participated in this research, to Mr. Eli Ron and Mr. Yoseph Scheffer, who did a considerable part of the field work and to Mrs. Rivka Bar-David and Mr. Amitai Ezioni who assisted me in the summing up of the first stage of our project.

[3] For lack of a better term, we make use here of the term " Bund ", which was coined by the German sociologist Schmallenbach for similar purposes.

[4] The same tendency may be observed in both religious and secular communities established in America. See—M. Holloway, *Heavens on Earth*, London, 1951. A more or less anti-familistic bias seems to be characteristic of most revolutionary movements; see R. Schlesinger, *The Family in the U.S.S.R.*, London, 1949.

Family Patterns in the Changing South[1]

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A wide variety of sources has been tapped to prepare this paper on families in the southern United States. To do the task justice I should have been able to call upon social scientists for descriptions of majority and minority patterns of southern families at three significant points in the South's history, antebellum, postbellum and postindustrialization. Needless to say, no such complete descriptions of family patterns exist. Very occasional glimpses of these phenomena are provided, to be sure, but true to the emphasis of their craft the historians' eyes have been on events of greater sweep and have rendered almost residual the details of courting, marrying, and conducting family affairs.

The richest materials available are to be found in the variegated writings of the regional novelists who have portrayed patterns which make up the colorful stereotype of Southern family life today. Unfortunately the novelists' very emphasis on color makes them poor photographers of the social scene. Any generalizations from novels are therefore suspect, although the insights obtained may be quite penetrating.

Other sources of data worthy of mention are (1) collections of letters and diaries, still in too raw a form to be useful; (2) census data which are both valid and reliable but are of infrequent relevance ; and (3) occasional surveys of families in communities in the South. Census data provide information on changing family composition, marital status, participation in the labor force, fertility, family size and similar demographic items. The few surveys of family living by social scientists have not been region wide but are usually limited to one community. The generalizations made apply best to middle and upper class families

Obviously, few definitive interpretations appear defensible from such a literature, and such generalizations as are made should be treated as hypotheses requiring later verification. I can provide most fruitfully in this paper a backdrop for the understanding of how regionally distinctive family patterns developed in the South, a statement about the variety of patterns presently coexisting in Southern communities which deviate from the commonly held stereotypes about Southern families, and a delineation of changes that have occurred concomitant with the urbanization of the region.

BACKGROUNDS FOR REGIONAL PATTERNS OF FAMILY LIFE IN THE OLD SOUTH

Rupert B. Vance, in describing the Southern Family seven years ago, made the point that everything that can be said about the family in

Western culture can be said with equal truth about many families in the southern United States.[2] That the basic orientation of this paper is on the distinctive patterns of the South should not be permitted to becloud the presence of similarities among regions. Two sources of the characteristics which set southern families off from their neighbors are their regional traditions and the peculiarities of the South's economy based on slave labor and its consequent social structure.

Regional traditions. The South, more than any other region, has built a set of family traditions. It obtained a headstart on other regions by virtue of its relatively early settlement, and the fortuitous development of a leisure class of planter families which had the time to elaborate patterns of gracious living. These families maintained contact with the centers of culture in Europe, often providing continental education for their youth, and are credited with establishing distinctive patterns of hospitality, manners, chivalry toward women and a sectional pride in the Southern way of life. In contrast to the Puritans of New England and the Quakers of Pennsylvania, they made a virtue of the enjoyment and utilization of leisure. Most of the South's regional aristocratic traditions were built around this small collection of planter families. The planters have been replaced in the South's economic saddle by wealthy merchants and by lumber barons, and most recently by industrialists. The continuity of the traditions has been assured, however, by a socio-genetic chain of intermarriage which also insured the continuity of family lines carrying the model of gracious family living through a sequence of " best families " down the ladder of culture from generation to generation. These " best families " have also been model setters for other families who aspired to emulate the upper class family patterns, thus assuring a pervasive dissemination of the patterns among thousands of families in each generation who had the financial resources to follow them.

Social Structure and Family Patterns. With the introduction of slavery and establishment of the plantation economy a system of stratification involving both classes and castes was created. A small group of planters and members of the learned professions constituted the upper white class. Other groupings in order of their prestige were (1) Merchants, small planters, and lesser professionals, (2) Artisans and yeoman farmers, (3) Laborers and servants and (4) slaves.[3]

Numerically the planter class was never more than one per cent. of the population of the south. To afford the luxuries of unlimited hospitality which made the plantation into a country seat for visiting kin and travellers, a planter had to be the master of 50 or more slaves. In 1850 no more than 8,000 planters qualified and those owning more than a hundred slaves numbered less than 1,800 persons out of the population of 1·25 million families. The master of the plantation, moreover, was more of a business man who depended upon slave labor to produce substantial profits than he was an aristocrat of inherited

wealth. The mass were men who had carved fortunes for themselves from a new country.[4] Most of them had little time to be ostentatious, leaving to their descendents the creation of the myth of gentility, and to their imitators the privilege of dressing like the Prince of Wales.

Although the planter class was a small minority group, its patterns had tremendous appeal to the merchants, yeoman farmers and small landowners who aspired to participate in, or to arrange for their children to participate in, the aristocratic pattern. The ambition of Southerners has never been to pull down their betters but to climb into their circles, writes Simkins. These middle class merchants and non-slave owning farmers helped build up the legend that all planters were gentlemen endowed with aristocratic virtues of generosity, elegance, tact, and good breeding. Eventually, the merchants replaced the planters but by that time they too had absorbed the pattern of the country gentlemen, had located ancestors which reflected credit upon them, and had learned the arts of leisure and unlimited hospitality.

Majority and Minority Family Patterns of the Old South

Perhaps enough has been written to indicate that there was no single pattern which typified Southern families. A powerfully pervasive upper class pattern has been seized upon as a model by middle class people and has been romanticized widely by regional novelists until it approximates the one stereotype of the Southern family most widely accepted by the rest of the world. A second minority pattern created largely out of the adjustments required in serving the master class's needs, is the mother centered Negro family so brilliantly analyzed in Franklin Frazier's monograph.[5] By contrast, the majority pattern is actually not peculiar and distinctive of the Old South but is rather the familiar pattern of the frontier farm family, self sufficient and all encompassing in its social functions. It is closely akin to the agrarian form of family organization found in all regions of the United States and in many non-industrial countries of the world. Limitations of space permit no more than a cursory identification of these three family types before turning to the changes in family patterns which have occurred in the twentieth century.

Upper Class Planter Family Pattern. The setting of this family type was a large plantation located in the section of the South devoted to the cultivation of cotton or tobacco. As a collectivity the Southern upper class family was large, with several children of different ages, parents and grandparents, unmarried aunts, and a retinue of Negro servants performing a variety of services, nurses, housemaids, cooks, cooks' helpers, bulter, coachman, yardmen, caretakers, and others. Kinfolk out to third cousins could be counted on dropping in not just for a few hours but for days or weeks. There was interminable visiting. Life in the home was organized around gracious living, the elaboration of the virtues of leisure, the development of arts, and the attainment

of poise and charm which endows a home with good feeling and warmth.

Outside the home, the Southern male actively pursued the aristocratic activities of hunting, the cultivation of horses and dogs, and the maintenance of the family's good name. Honor, courage, and paternalism were values the male elaborated to complement the high values in the female of virtue, purity and dependence. Beware to the stranger who casts doubt on the family achievements in these sacred areas of development. To assault either of these sets of values might bring on explosive reactions and bloodletting.

The relations between the sexes were carefully regulated. The South is the area which has held on longest to the sex segregated school. The double standard of sex morality requires sheltering of good girls from all contact with men until their debut into society. and thereafter supervising their conduct carefully until marriage. Fathers and brothers undertook to protect their women folk from men of questionable intentions. Boys, under this system, grew up with the expectation that they would obtain sexual experiences prior to marriage from servant girls or from girls of other classes, but that they would never touch upper class girls in any except the most circumspect ways.

The quality of interpersonal relationships within the family are not clearly covered by the descriptions available of upperclass family living. The father was the source of ultimate authority and as such maintained a somewhat distant relationship from family members. His companionship was reserved for his brothers and age peers and on occasion for his sons. The mother by contrast was the source of immediate authority within the household, the manager of the children and the servants, yet was sentimentalized by the family as the genteel saintly embodiment of virtue and love. She gave and received affection, and may have controlled the family by affection. So far as day-to-day companionship was concerned, she was probably closer to her children and to her sisters and cousins than to her husband.

Finally with respect to the value orientations of the upper class Southern family, we have a group orientated to the creation of traditions and to the glorifying of the achievements of the family's progenitors. The ancestral home and its furnishings, its pictures and heirlooms ; the family's careful genealogical records and the records of legendary exploits of the family in the past were living evidence of the depth in time provided to persons reared in Southern homes. Family pride was a collective thing solidifying members of the family and motivating action if slurs were made about downward mobile members. It was also called upon to bring about conformity to the traditions when family members strayed from the established standards.

Needless to say this pattern of family life was found more frequently as a " model of what ought to be " than practised by flesh and blood families. Social historians, operating from letters and newspaper

accounts of family life on the plantations describe a great range in refinement and culture from the beauties of Monticello to cottages with false fronted porticoes and log houses without structural pretensions or domestic conveniences. If this were true of the physical amenities we can be sure there was also great variation in the amount of conformity to the interpersonal patterns described above.

The Mother-Centered Negro Family Pattern. Stripped of the relatively simple preliterate culture in which he had been nurtured, the American Negro had to acquire a rather complex civilization from the peculiar and unfavorable angle of the slave. Treated at first merely as an " animate tool " he was gradually incorporated into the larger family of the master. The constant buying and selling of slaves prevented the development of strong emotional ties between the mates, but where slavery became a settled way of life, opportunity was afforded for the development of strong attachments. The strongest attachments, however, were those between slave mother and her children. Kingsley Davis is quotable on this point :

> Back in the days of slavery it was the father's rather than the mother's authority that was primarily usurped by the master. The master had the privilege of having sexual relations with the slave, of disciplining her children, of determining her residence, and of owning and controlling her children—all privileges which the husband would normally have. She was left largely in control of her own cabin, however, and within this abode her mate, deprived of his authority, was likely to take orders from her. Since she, not her mate, was essential to rearing the children, the master protected her in her domestic privileges; and since mates might come and go in her life, while the children belonged to her master anyway, she was independent of any particular male who might presume to be her husband.[6]

Thus was established the Negro matriarchy, a form of maternal-family organization which persisted on a fairly large scale after emancipation had destroyed the *modus vivendi* between the two races. The waywardness of the Negro male left the mother and her children vulnerable, since the master had by now withdrawn economic support. She paid dearly for her matriarchal position, while the male reaped the advantage of sexual freedom and economic irresponsibility. Throughout the Negro family's subsequent history this pattern of maternal dominance at home and male irresponsibility abroad has persisted.

The Negro family is today moving toward a higher degree of control, dropping some of the looseness of the past and acquiring the patterns of the responsible white middle class families of the United States. Vance points out that upperclass white youth in the South began experimenting with the moral code just as the Negroes for their part were beginning to accept the rightness of the mores of responsibility and chastity.[7]

The Yeoman Farm Family: A Majority Pattern. The pattern of family life most frequent in the South was that of the farm family ; less than a fourth of Southern families ever owned a slave, although many aspired to do so. They did not know that white people were not supposed to be able to endure the Southern sun and that the slave system had placed a stigma upon manual labor. They despised the Negro and shared with the planter the superiority feelings which justified exploitation of men of color.

The yeomanry varied in their economic and social achievements from the squatter family, living in incredible poverty, to substantial landowners and farmers comparable to the well-to-do farmers of the middle west.

As in other parts of the United States the dispersed farm mode of settlement fostered an intensely isolated type of familism which made family life the center and core of all life. Its solidarity was in part a function of the fight for survival against the hostile elements of vegetation, weather and disease. Isolation of the farmstead due to poor systems of transportation and communication and the meager school and church services of the time encouraged provinciality of thinking but also made functional the hospitality patterns. Virtually all families in the South until very recent years have reflected these twin features of solidarity based on economic interdependence and hospitality mixed with provinciality of outlook.

Authority in the farm family was lodged in its male head, not because of an abstract principle of male superiority but because of the necessities of the situation of the farm enterprise.[8] The division of labor was divided along gender lines with the wife doing everything inside the house, the husband everything in the field and both sharing the intermediate duties of the yard and barn. The wife led an integrated existence, her rôle of wife and mother gearing directly with her rôle as economic producer. She was part of *a family enterprise.*

Sharing the familism, the solidarity and the authority patterns of the majority family pattern were hundreds of thousands of poor whites virtually as depressed economically as the slaves. As " crackers " and " hillbillies " in Georgia, " sand-lappers " in South Carolina, " rag, tag, and bobtail " in Virginia and " po' white trash " and " po' buckra " to the Negroes, they have been the subject of accounts of travelers and storytellers.

In the foregoing pages two minority patterns and one majority pattern of family life in the Old South have been identified. It should be noted that all three patterns were essentially rural in setting and orientation.

Using these all too brief statements of family patterns in the Old South as a backdrop let us turn to the changes which occurred as the region urbanized. The South at the turn of the nineteenth century was ninety-eight per cent. rural; that is fewer, than two per cent. of

the families of the period lived in communities with 2,500 inhabitants or more. Decade by decade growth occurred in the New South but always the region lagged the rest of the United States by about 50 years in urban and city development. By 1900 the South had urbanized to 15 per cent., the level of the U.S. in 1850; meanwhile the U.S. had leaped to 40 per cent., a level reached only by the southern region in 1945. In the pages which follow evidence will be presented, however, that the values of urban life have been absorbed much more rapidly in the South than its rates of urbanization would suggest. The virus of urban values has spread among rural as well as urban dwellers in the South and these have had direct effects on family life, disproportionate to the region's level of urbanization.

Changes in the Contexts of Family Life in the New South

A number of changes have been concomitant with the shift of concentration of population from the open country and villages to cities : (1) Migrations of families from farms to towns, and from towns to cities have uprooted millions of families. Women appear to have migrated more frequently than men, suggesting a new freedom of movement for Southern women. (2) Child labor laws and compulsory schooling have changed the status of children from that of potential assets to financial liabilities. In 1900 compulsory schooling was nowhere required in the Southern states but by 1950 all 13 Southern states had compulsory attendance laws for children up to age 16. (3) Occupational differentiation of the population has greatly increased as the proportions of breadwinners in agricultural pursuits has declined. In 1890 sixty-five per cent. of the labor force was in agricultural pursuits, ten per cent. in manufacturing and 25 per cent. in the tertiary services. By 1950 this pattern had shifted to 21 per cent. in agricultural pursuits, 18 per cent. in manufacturing and 61 per cent. in the tertiary services.

This increase in occupational differentiation has constituted a revolution in the ways of supporting families, and has great implications for family integration and stability, since the traditional family enterprise of farming has ceased to be the majority and has become a minority pattern. The father now leaves the home to earn a living, the children go to school to get preparation for understanding the more complex world about them and to prepare for earning a living themselves, and the mother spends a greater and greater portion of her married life in the labor force. Women constituted 43 per cent. of the additions to the labor force 1940–50 in the South and the proportion of women in the labor force increased 37 per cent. over the decade. Today more than 30 per cent. of Southern women, 14 years of age and over are in the labor force. (In Negro families even more mothers work, roughly 45 per cent. in 1950.)

Negro families carry disproportionate burdens in the New South since their dependents, the number of children under 18, are 20 per

cent. higher, and their family income roughly half that of white families. Add to this the fact that a substantial minority of Negro families have no responsible male breadwinner, and the burden becomes even less bearable.

Nevertheless, the past decade has been encouraging in this regard for Negro families and throughout the South there have been increased appropriations for Negro services in health, education, and general welfare.

The contexts of family living in the New South depicted above are not uniformly favorable for the maintenace of stable domestic institutions. Earlier in non-Southern regions of the United States the same phenomena of occupational differentiation and large scale migrations brought strains to traditional ways. Now the South too is feeling these strains keenly. We turn at this point to some of the special consequences of urbanization discernible from the data of the census. We will look especially at the trends in rates of formation of families, reproductive achievements and success in fertility control. We will conclude with an analysis of the rates of family dissolution through divorce.

Variability of Family Performance in the New South

The urbanization of the South has not decreased the region's valuing of the marriage status. Both men and women marry at an earlier age in the South than in the United States. In 1940 Southern white men married at 23·5 (Negro males at 22·7) compared to 24·3 for the average American male. Southern white women married at age 20·9 (Negro females at 19·7) compared with 21·6 for the average American woman. No other regions reported marriages so young as the south. Moreover, the rate of family formation in recent decades in the South measured by the marriage rate per thousand population is consistently higher than the United States. This is the more remarkable since Americans are the most marrying people in the world.

Family Replacement. Closely related to the marriage rate is the birth rate of a region. Children have long been regarded as wealth in the South, and the Southern states with high rates of natural increase have been for a century or more the " seed bed " of the nation. Under the impact of urbanization and the accompanying dissemination of birth control information the South, 1910–1950, has decreased its fertility more rapidly than has the rest of the nation. Fertility in the South in 1910 was 19 per cent. higher and in 1940 14 per cent. higher than in the nation. Southern Negroes in 1910 had a fertility rate from five to 13 per cent. higher and in 1940 had dropped to two to four per cent. higher than that of southern whites. The country as a whole experienced a reversal of fertility trends 1940–1950 but the South increased its fertility for the period less than the country as a whole, increasing by only 22 per cent. compared with other regions' increases of 25 to 47 per cent. Fertility-wise the impact of urbanization on the

South has been to bring about a convergence with the reproduction patterns of other states in the Union.[9]

Fulfilment of the Protective Function. When the number of dependents are viewed, the South is still supporting more children under 18 per family than the U.S. as a whole. In 1940 there were 2·20 children of the dependent ages per 1,000 in the U.S., and 2·43 in the South. Negro families in the South were supporting 2·79 and farm families, 2·76 children. Negro farm families averaged 3·20 children. Yet the per capita income in the South is still the lowest in the nation. With the exception of Texas and Oklahoma the lowest per capita income states in 1949 were the Southern states, Mississippi, Alabama, Arkansas, South Carolina, North Carolina, Kentucky, Tennessee, Georgia, West Virginia and Louisiana in that order, ranging from $750 to $1,000 annually. These states accordingly spend about one fourth what the highest-income states spend for educating children, and even this amount places heavy financial strain on the Southern states' economies.

Socialization. One crude index of the effectiveness of family performance in socialization is the amount of juvenile delinquency and crime found in the region. Adult crime rates show the South to be much more lawless than other regions. Especially is this true for murder and acts of violence which are especially high for 43 Southern as compared with 43 non-Southern cities of similar age and sex composition studied by Porterfield and Talbert.[10] The non-Southern cities tended more to suicides than to crimes against persons than Southern cities, suggesting that families in the South provide to family members a better feeling of belonging than do families in the other sections of the country. Murder, however, was five times as frequent, robbery one third more frequent, and aggravated assault was more than four times as high in Southern as in non-Southern cities. Larceny, burglary and auto theft are committed at the same rate in the South as elsewhere.

We turn now to another measure of family adequacy, a measure of the stability of Southern families, the extent to which, once married, couples remain together, seen best in the divorce rates per thousand population.

Family Stability. One Southern state, South Carolina, permitted no divorces legally until April 1949. The South has traditionally had lower divorce rates than the U.S. although the influences of the Catholic church in this regard have been minimal except in Louisiana and Kentucky.[11] It is therefore somewhat surprising to find the 13 Southern states averaging higher divorce rates in 1950 than did the United States as a whole. A comparison between these states and the United States in 1928, 1940 and 1950 is made in Table 1, demonstrating an increasing propensity to solve the problems of marriage by divorce in the states of the South compared with other regions.

Although the South has urbanized in terms of proportions of its population living in urban places only about as much as the United States in 1900, no Southern state has a divorce rate as low as the divorce rate in the U.S. in 1900 (0·7 per thousand). In this respect the Southern region has not performed like a lagging rural society, but demonstrates symptoms of secularization which exceed those of the larger more urbanized society.

Table 1. *Divorce Rates per Thousand Population for the United States and Thirteen Southern States, 1928, 1940, and 1950.*[12]

	1928	1940	1950
United States	1·63	2·0	2·6
South	1·81	2·3	3·2
Alabama	1·48	1·6	2·9
Arkansas	2·31	2·7	4·6
Florida	2·49	5·9	6·5
Georgia	0·68	1·4	2·8
Kentucky	1·81	2·1	2·8
Louisiana	0·98	1·4	2·0
Mississippi	1·68	1·5	2·8
North Carolina	0·55	1·1	1·6
Oklahoma	3·20	4·2	6·2
South Carolina	0·00	0·0	1·1
Tennessee	1·99	1·9	2·4
Texas	3·29	4·3	4·9
Virginia	1·15	2·0	1·8

From census data we have distilled above answers to questions of family performance in the New South. Affirmation of the value of marriage and the family continues high with higher marriage rates in the South than elsewhere. Children are still highly valued, although fertility control is increasingly apparent among Southern families. The ratio of dependents to wage earners depicts disproportionate burdens falling on the shoulders of Southern breadwinners. Higher crime rates suggest poorer socialization of Southern children by families. Finally, all evidence points to increasing family instability with divorce rates higher than those of the U.S., and much higher than would have been predicted for a region still as rural as the United States in 1900.

To conclude this discussion of family patterns in the changing South we turn now to a description of the family composition, and patterning of domestic living in a Southern town in 1951–1953. It will demonstrate the range and variability of family patterns which co-exist within a single community, and will provide in more detail the meaning of some of the statistical data summarized for the South as a whole. The community has been given the disguised name of Eddyville and is to remain anonymous to respect the confidentiality of the data provided by its citizenry.[13] It was just large enough to be called urban in the

1950 census, but not large enough to be entirely urban in its outlook. It is located somewhere in the Carolinas about a hundred miles inland from the Atlantic seaboard.

Variability in Family Patterns in One Southern Community

It would be hard to find one community which would be representative of the region. Eddyville is more representative of the many small country towns that resisted the tide of industrialization and efforts to boost business development than it is of the rapidly growing mill centers of the New South. It has struggled to remain an eddy on the outside side of the stream of social change and industrialization taking place throughout the South, hence its pseudonym of Eddyville.

Eddyville's general structure is based on its functions as a rural trade center and as the county seat. The town is a railroad shipping point for a local area, and provides a small variety of retail trades and services. Its two major industries are a small branch plant for the manufacture of slide fasteners, and an agricultural products company which processes and sells seed, produce, and cotton. The town has functioned as a rural trade center for many years, a source of liquid capital and credit. The credit and lien systems of the cotton economy resulted in a relatively stable set of relationships involving mutual dependence and obligations.

The research team found white Eddyvilleans grouped informally into three general "sets", of differing social status. By local definition, the community knows these groups as "the social set", "the sober set," and the "poor whites".

Poor Whites. The cluster which constitutes the "poor whites" are members of families who have lived in the community for sufficient time to be considered "folks who've never amounted to much". Housing is of unkempt, ramshackle nature ; occupations cluster in unskilled manual categories ; values rarely include thrift or conservation, and the families may lack religious affiliations or be active in the evangelical cults.

Sober Set. The numerically largest group in town is known as the "sober set". Their general behavior is characterized by rather ostentatious adherance to a Calvinistic morality. They are not tightly knit or self-conscious as a group. The goals of members are largely moral in nature and personally orientated; members are predominantly of the Baptist persuasion. The groups' way of life is characterized by conservatism and respectability; values and attitudes believed to be traditional acquire a normative aspect in their own right. Individuals and smaller groups from within the sober set sometimes originate ideas for community action or improvement, but they lack the power to implement their plans without enlisting the aid of power leaders, most of whom are members of the "social set".

Social Set. The " social set " includes most of the power leaders in the community and most of the surviving " best families " with family names extending back into the past history of the community. There is the widespread conviction that members of these families are destined to lead politically and socially. The group gets its name, the " social set ", from the endless series of parties of various types. Social contacts are exclusively with other members of the set. For the social set, religious values function as general guides rather than as strict prescriptions of behavior. Attendance at church is not stressed as a prerequisite to high status achievement, indeed a child born into the "social set " obtains his social position at birth, rather than as a consequence of achievement. Members of the " social set " are permitted greater deviations in behavior than sober set people, both in drinking, business practices and moral conduct without risking severe community censure.

The Negro segment of the population generally appears to be divided into three groups, " highly respectables," " respectables," and " non-respectables ". The highly respectables hold the best occupations, but are too few to constitute a real set and as an unique group will die out with this now rapidly ageing generation. Their children have all left the community and none appear to be planning to return to continue the work carried out by the old family line. The respectables are Negroes whose behavior and economic conditions compare with those of the lower group of the sober set whites and the best poor whites. The respectable Negroes differ from the whites, however, by their greater interest in upward mobility as evidenced by material possessions. The non-respectables are a small group of economically impoverished Negroes who live at a bare subsistence level and are behaviorally amoral.

This is the social and economic setting for family life in Eddyville. Space does not permit a more detailed picture. Our major objective, however, is to note the variability in family composition, ideologies and instrumental organization and practices which one community presents at mid-century as a contribution to the overall view of family patterns in a changing South.

Data on all Eddyville families are drawn from the U.S. Census of 1950, from a staff survey of all Eddyville families in 1951, and from a twenty per cent. sample of all Eddyville in 1952. In addition detailed data were obtained from a panel of 77 families meeting the following criteria : (1) Homogeneous with respect to the stage of the family life cycle (rearing children ages 1–18); (2) Intact without damaging dismemberment breaks (father and mother present and all living children at home); (3) Conjugal units without sub-families or boarders, relatives or grandparents; (4) Resident of Eddyville for five years or more ; and yet (5) Representatively heterogeneous with respect to location in the community class structure.

Family Composition. What is the adult-child composition of Eddyville households? How many dependants are cared for in

Eddyville families ? In 1951 the distribution of adults and children by combinations can be caught in the Table 2 below.

Table 2—*Membership Composition of Eddyville Families, 1951*

Family Composition	White		Negro	
	Number	Per cent.	Number	Per cent.
Lone Females	32	10·1	39	16·9
Lone Males	7	2·2	11	5·2
Couple, children gone	25	7·9	28	12·2
Couple with no children	33	10·4	17	7·3
Mother and children only	19	6·0	38	16·3
Father and children only	1	0·03	4	1·7
Couple with children	160	50·6	47	20·2
Couple with children and with other relatives in home	37	11·7	44	18·1
Brother, sister or individuals only	2	0·06	4	1·7
Total	316	98·99	232	99·7

Any notion that the families of Eddyville conform to one type of membership composition is rudely dispelled in the table above. Among Negroes especially, the variety of household types is extensive. Lone females, and households of mothers and children without fathers constitute two of the most frequently-cited households. Only twenty per cent. of all Negro households conform to the picture of the conjugal nuclear family regarded as normal in middleclass America. Indeed very nearly as many households conform to the picture of an extended family with relatives as part of the family group (18·1 per cent.).

The white families in the community are less variable in composition, indeed fifty per cent. are of nuclear family, husband-wife and children type. A substantial proportion of the white households are without children, roughly thirty per cent. The varieties of household types are all represented among white families, so that we must conclude that normality as a statistical phenomenon is hard to establish.

Still another expression of family composition reveals the distribution of numbers of dependent children within our Eddyville families. Table 3 compares this distribution for all white families and all Negro families.

Table 3—*Number of Children by Negro-white, 1951*

Number of Children	White		Negro	
	Number	Per cent.	Number	Per cent.
No children at home	107	33·9	107	46·1
One child	71	22·5	40	17·2
Two children	82	25·9	30	12·9
Three children	36	11·4	21	9·1
Four children	10	3·2	8	3·5
Five children and over	10	3·2	26	11·2
Total	316	100·1	232	100·0

The range of family size is manifestly much greater among Negro families where the proportion of households without children and with five or more children is substantial. There is no clear-cut modality of one or two children as in the white families. Nevertheless there is ample evidence that family size is controlled.

Monthly Family Income. How do Eddyville families fare economically? Distribution of income ranges widely among white families but is concentrated in the lower income brackets among Negro families; see Table 4. Sixty-eight per cent. of white families draw monthly incomes of $300 a month or over, but only three per cent. of the Negro families fall in this income group. By contrast eighty-three per cent. of Negro families have a monthly income of $200 or less, whereas only twenty-four per cent. of white families are so poorly paid.

Table 4—*Distribution of Income of Random Sample of Resident Eddyville Families, 1952*

Income	White		Negro	
	Number	Per cent.	Number	Per cent.
0–$200	17	23·6	29	83·0
$201–300	5	6·9	2	5·8
$301–400	13	18·0	1	2·9
$401–450	6	8·3	0	0·0
$450 and over	30	41·6	0	0·0
No information	1	1·4	3	8·6
Total	72	99·8	35	100·1

We can infer that the monthly income understates the economic hardships suffered by Negro families since they not only are concentrated in the lower income brackets but are rearing more children per family than white families. When income per capita is computed, the economic differences are compounded.

This exhausts our information on all Eddyville families, but enough has been presented to suggest great variability in family orientation, composition, and resources to meet and deal with pressing family tasks. To further illustrate this phenomenon of family variability we turn to data collected from seventy-seven co-operating families in the study panel which is representative both economically and ecologically of Eddyville.

Family Goals and Ideologies. One of the first tasks of the research team after moving into Eddyville was to learn the basic ideologies and expectations which motivate family life. Six indentifiable goals were inferred from interviews with Eddyvilleans :

1. To preserve the traditional " Old Eddyville " way of life.
   (*a*) To preserve the male-female differentiation.
   (*b*) To preserve the traditional white-Negro relationships.

2. To preserve and continue the family name and line.
3. To maintain family prestige.
4. To rear children to be acceptable adult men and women.
5. To maintain a good home.
6. To keep good relationships with other townspeople.

A host of associated values and practices are linked with these goals, and the major social status groups in the community view these goals from different vantage points. In order to achieve any of these goals families must have an effective organisation and procedures for attaining them. This is another source of the variety in family forms which a community can provide.

Instrumental Family Organization and Practices. Organizationally the panel families provide a number of distinct types. The distribution of power within families as reported by family heads is more dispersed than our team members would have reported it based on their day-to-day observations of behavior in the community. Family heads reported almost no father-centeredness or mother-centeredness in making decisions affecting the family. Decisions are allegedly made by husband and wife consulting together (56/77) or by use of the family conference with children participating (13/77).

Another expression of family organization is the distributive order of essential family tasks. There is first of all relatively infrequent utilization by Eddyville families of servants for the performance of basic family tasks. Forty-two families report no tasks performed by servants. In eleven families servants were called upon to perform 1–3 tasks regularly, in thirteen families 4–6 tasks, and in only nine families were servants carrying out seven or more tasks. Viewed in this fashion, our families are organized to carry out most of the family tasks within the husband wife-children team.

Husbands were frequently commandeered into carrying out these tasks, twenty husbands carrying roughly fifty per cent. of the tasks for the family, and thirty-three husbands averaging about a third of the tasks performed. Moreover there appears to be a marked pattern of sharing of family tasks between husband and wife in our panel families. Thirty-eight families reported the husband and wife sharing from 9–20 of the twenty-four possible tasks. Sharing was especially high in the areas of the affectional and the socializational as against the housekeeping, nursing and economic, but was found in all five areas in some families.

Very closely related to a family's distribution of tasks are the conceptions held of what it is proper and right for a good mother to do, a good father to do, and a good child to do. Our panel families faced with a choice of ten statements each for the good mother, the good father and the good child, made revealing preferences. The thirty statements divided equally between *traditional* conceptions of proper

rôles for parents and children and the newer *developmental* conceptions of parent education literature. In general, *traditional* conceptions lean to scriptural and Emily Post expressions of the past : Parenting consists of making children be good and mannerly. The good mother keeps the child neat and clean and maintains an orderly house ; the good child is obedient and respectful, polite and socially acceptable ; and the good father provides well and keeps things peaceful. The *developmental* conceptions in contrast emphasize the importance of growth and development of the child's personality, of the wife's similar rights to growth, and of the father's gains from seeking to understand the child as a growing person and hearing him " speak up ".

From the statements most frequently checked and most frequently omitted listed in Table 5 we see that Eddyville families tend to reveal a mixture of traditional and developmental beliefs about proper rôles for parents and children.

Table 5. *Conceptions of Parenthood and Childhood held by 154 Eddyville Parents*

Good Children:	
Should	*But it is not important for them to*
1 Obey and respect adults (traditional)	1. Enjoy growing up (developmental)
2. Share and co-operate with others (developmental)	2. Work hard at home and school (traditional)
3. Love and confide in parents (developmental)	3. Keep clean and neat (traditional)
A Good Mother:	
Should	*But it is not important for her to*
1. Show love and appreciation for her children (developmental)	1. Help her child develop socially (developmental)
2. Take care of her children physically (traditional)	2. Train her children to regular habits (traditional)
3. Make her children good—builds character (traditional)	3. See to her children's emotional well being (developmental)
A Good Father:	
Should	*But it is not important to*
1. Seek to understand his children (developmental)	1. Give presents to and do things for children (traditional)
2. Support his family by earning a good income (traditional)	2. Work with his wife and children on household tasks (developmental)
3. Develop habits of obedience in his children (traditional)	3. Encourage children to grow up in their own ways (developmental)

Of thirty possible statements those on the left were checked most frequently and those on the right omitted most frequently. It is apparent that traditional statements are checked most frequently (5/9 statements) and developmental statements are omitted most frequently (5/9 statements). The conception of proper rôles for children were more frequently developmental since there was a positive affirmation of two out of three, and a rejection of two out of three traditional statements. Fathers are expected to be traditional in their rôle-playing in Eddyville in that the emphasis on proper rôles for fathers is traditional in two out of three cases and the rejection of

rôles is heavier for the developmental than the traditional statements. We suspect that the statement ascribed to the father, " seeks to understand his children " is not truly developmental, but is interpreted by fathers as " seeks to understand in order to control ", since the developmental complement of this statement, " encourages children to grow up in their own ways " is rejected.

Viewed from the conceptions of parenthood they hold, Eddyville parents are more traditional than their practices with respect to decision-making, and task allocation would indicate.

Family Togetherness. Time spent together as a family was treated as an index of sentiment formation in this study binding the family by common activity. Our records show a distinct propensity toward family centerdness on weekends with twenty-six families reporting some specific family activities organized for weekends. A minority of families break up each weekend into peer groups, or into clique-centered activities (17/77 families).

When sheer hours together as a family are calculated for an average week a range of five to eighty-five hours together captures all families. The distribution of families is as follows :

Number of Hours together in Average Week	Number of Families
5–19 hours	19
20–29 hours	24
30–44 hours	21
45–85 hours	12

Children are in school many hours, parents are engaged in community activities in the evening which do not attract families as families, hence it is remarkable to discover so high a record of family togetherness achieved by so many families.

Meaning of Kinship. Blood ties are strong in Eddyville and serve as a major means of ordering interpersonal relationships for many families. Kin lines are commonly traced to all the blood relatives one may have met or heard about. An Eddyvillean is obligated to show interest in the affairs of kin and to extend hospitality if they choose to come " visiting ". He extends the same courtesies to the mates of his " close " relatives, siblings, aunts and uncles. Moreover, he expects the same courtesies from all of these people in return.

Kinfolks serve as the major group about whom people build their visiting relationships. From data gathered on our 77 panel families it appears that few families indicate other people before listing the kinfolks, in answer to the question " With whom do you visit most frequently ? " Only nineteen of the white families did not indicate relatives among the people they visit most frequently. Of these, eight did no visiting at all and five have no relatives in Eddyville they could visit.

Finally kinship acts as a resource for family use in meeting problems and emergencies. Family matters are reserved for "family ears". Among panel families we found that most people felt that the "right place" to take family matters was to immediate kinfolks if you were going to go outside the immediate family unit. Kinship looms as a large source of security for many Eddyvilleans, giving them a significant and powerful group to which to turn for support and help.

Majority Patterns in Eddyville. It would be difficult from the foregoing tabular presentations of family patterns to identify clearly any one majority pattern. When viewed from the standpoint of household composition there are three competing patterns of roughly equivalent importance among Negro families ; namely, couples with children, couples with children and relatives living together, and female head with children only. The majority pattern for white families in contrast is quite clearly that of couples with children, the familiar nuclear family of procreation.

At best we can construct a synthetic pattern from the many modal expressions in the tables just reviewed. Such a synthetic family pattern would group together the following characteristics :

(1) With respect to family goals the majority in Eddyville is aligned with that of the "sober set", even the "respectables" among Negro families sharing these values—the goals are orientated to maintaining the values of the past, goals of conservation, preserving the family name, preserving the Eddyville way of life, rearing children to become acceptable adults, and getting along with neighbors and friends socially, which includes selective hospitality.

(2) Organizationally the majority families are adult centered with the power of policy formulation and decision-making located in the parents—husband and wife consult one another, if not the children, on vital matters of policy.

(3) The division of labor in the home has departed from the traditional lines of man's work and women's work, of jobs for master and for servants. The majority pattern appears to be servantless with father and children sharing in the household tasks with the mother.

(4) The conceptions of parenthood of the majority group are traditional, making parents more restrictive than permissive in their relations with children.

(5) The majority family is tied together by many shared activities in the course of a week, with togetherness peaking at the weekends.

(6) It is also more orientated to spending time visiting with kinfolk than with non-kin neighbors or friends, and has a variety of mutual obligations with close relatives.

There is some hint in this synthetic majority pattern in Eddyville of the persistence of a style of family living described earlier in the paper as distinctive of the Old South, especially the continued emphasis on kinship obligations, respect for one's progenitors, and the perseveration of the complex of hospitality and sobriety among the majority group.

It should be unnecessary to point out that family life in Eddyville is only partially represented by this synthesized majority pattern. One gets another equally valid impression of the patterns in the community by taking into account the variety and diversity of family forms living in symbiotic interdependence together. As the South urbanises and its communities become more and more differentiated occupationally the significant impression will be that of a mosaic of families of differing outlooks and services rather than a model uniformity of patterns. Alternative forms of organization to meet family problems and alternative procedures and practices are increasingly possible in an urbanizing society. We can safely predict, therefore, that the shadings of family organization in the South will increase in number and quality. This is a major conclusion to be derived from the trends deduced from the census and from these excerpts from the Eddyville Story.

NOTES

[1] For help in preparing this paper I wish to acknowledge the many suggestions of my colleagues in the Institute for Research in Social Science, especially Dr. George Simpson and Dr. Rupert Vance.

[2] Rupert B. Vance, "Regional Family Patterns: The Southern Family," *The American Journal of Sociology*, vol. LIII, 6 (May, 1948), p. 426.

[3] W. E. Moore and R. M. Williams, "Stratification in the Antebellum South," *American Sociological Review*, vol. VII (June, 1942), pp. 343–55.

[4] Francis Butler Simkins, *A History of the South* (New York: Knopf, 1953), p. 134.

[5] E. Franklin Frazier, *The Negro Family in the United States* (New York: Dryden Press, 1948).

[6] Kingsley Davis, "Changing Modes of Marriage," in Howard Becker and Reuben Hill, *Marriage and the Family* (Boston: Heath, 1942), p. 124.

[7] Vance, *op. cit.*, p. 428.

[8] John Sirjamaki, *The American Family in the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953), p. 41.

[9] For a brilliant analysis of differential fertility in the South by race, occupations, and residence categories, see Robert M. Dinkel, "Peopling the City: Fertility," in Rupert B. Vance and Nicholas J. Demerath, *The Urban South* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1955), pp. 78–107.

[10] See Austin L. Porterfield and Robert H. Talbert, "Crime in Southern Cities," in Vance and Demerath, *op. cit.*, pp. 180–200. It is not valid to attribute the higher crime rates of urban places in the South to the greater proportion of Negroes in the region, the authors tell us, since there is high variability among Southern cities and the variations in incidence of crimes are not in positive relation to the proportion of Negroes in the total population, see especially their Table 2, p. 189.

[11] Vance, "Regional Family Patterns: The Southern Family," *op. cit.*, p. 426.

[12] Sources for this table are as follows: 1928 figures from U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Marriage and Divorce*, 1928, p. 17; 1940 and 1950 figures from *Statistical Abstracts of the United States*, 1954, Table 88, p. 85.

[13] For a description of the community setting see Reuben Hill, J. Joel Moss and Claudine G. Wirths, *Eddyville's Families: A Study of Personal and Family Adjustments to Rapid Urbanization of a Southern Town* (Chapel Hill: Institute for Research in Social Science, 1953, mimeographed).

Structures sociales et famille ouvrière

(Recherches sur la cohésion de la famille en relation avec son intégration Sociale)

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Nous présentons dans cette communication quelques résultats d'une enquête comparative menée concurremment dans un village industriel et dans une localité de la proche banlieue parisienne sur deux fois 80 familles.

Le but de cette étude était de mesurer le plus rigoureusement possible *le degré d'isolement de la famille ouvrière* (et de ses membres) par rapport à des individus, à des groupements, à la société globable, et cela dans deux milieux très différents.

L'analyse systématique de la documentation sur les structures d'ensemble et sur la famille pour toute la période de 1900–1950 nous avait permis de dégager un certain nombre d'hypothèses que nous avons voulu "tester".

Ce rôle de "test" attribué à l'enquête explique:

(1°) Les dimensions restreintes des échantillons (2 fois 80 familles)

(2°) Que nous avons choisi systématiquement 2 populations placées dans des conditions extrêmes et opposées par rapport à ces hypothèses (cas-limites) ce qui devrait nous permettre de saisir les phénomènes avec le maximum de netteté

(3°) Que l'étude a porté non seulement sur l'isolement mais aussi sur les conditions d'existence et la vie familiale dans son ensemble (enquête intensive-entretiens cliniques répétés)

(4°) Etant donné les perspectives historiques dans lesquelles nous nous plaçons, le fait que 3 générations ont été interrogées (20–25 ans, 35–40 ans, 55–60 ans) sur leur vie actuelle et sur leur vie passée.

L'évolution des structures économico-sociales (développement des forces productives-progrés technique-urbanisation) ne s'applique pas partout en France au même rythme: Elle peut être freinée ou accélérée par un certain nombre de facteurs. Il y a géographiquement des centres où l'offensive des structures s'est trouvée freinée, et d'autres centres où elle s'est trouvée renforcée; des centres où par conséquent les structures familiales sont restées plus ou moins figées parce que les milieux dans lesquels vit la famille restaient eux-même plus ou moins à l'écart des grands courants de transformation et d'autres centres où les attaques des structures ont été portées au maximum sur les milieux et les familles. L'étude de l'isolement social de familles placées dans un milieu "conservateur" et dans un milieu "ultramoderne" nous a paru

importante: l'isolement social est une des conséquence principales des conditions d'existence et explique jusqu'à un certain point la vie familiale.

CARACTÉRISTIQUES GÉNÉRALES DES 2 POPULATIONS

(1) *Village industriel.* (1 500 habitants). Usine unique de la localité installée depuis 50 ans, population active fixée par cette usine depuis cette époque, population *ouvrière* majoritaire qui *travaille, vit,* et *habite* dans la localité et cela depuis *au moins* 3 *générations.* Liaisons réduites au minimum avec la ville voisine (10 km.), malgré la route nationale, le chemin de fer, les facilités des transports en commun (mesure: trafic voyageurs S.N.C.F. autobus).

Commerces "de necessité". *Aucun commerce de confort et de luxe.* Degré de pénétration des "valeurs de civilisation" minime (nombre de postes de radio, nombre de journaux vendus, fréquence des séances de cinéma, moyens de transport individuels, appareils électro-ménagers etc.).

Congés payés en général pris sur place.

(2) *Proche banlieue.* Familles isolées; familles voisines appartenant à d'autres milieux sociaux (commerçants-employés etc.). Distances foyer-entreprise importantes (l'entreprise est implantée dans une autre localité).

Maximum de "pression" des "valeurs de civilisation" (matérielles et culturelles) dans les déplacements, dans l'environnement (affiches, radio, cinéma, journaux, commerces de confort et de luxe, mais aussi confrontations multiples avec d'autres familles ou individus "nantis").

L'inventaire a porté sur les relations de la famille (et de ses membres) avec des individus, des groupes, des organisations; il a porté également sur le degré de participation de la famille aux valeurs matérielles et culturelles de civilisation.

Nous avons voulu dégager les rapports pouvant exister entre les relations de la famille et sa cohesion (entente entre conjoints, relations parents-enfants, statut de la femme, des enfants, des "vieux").

DEGRÉ D'INTÉGRATION SOCIALE DE LA FAMILLE

Le nombre, la fréquence, le degré de réciprocité des relations sont des données essentielles mais insuffisantes. Il faut de plus, connaître les circonstances et motifs des rencontres, la nature et la qualité des relations. Nous avons, pour "qualifier" ces relations, pour établir un classement hiérarchique, posé entre autres cette question, "quand vous avez eu "un coup dur", à qui en avez vous fait part, à qui avez-vous demandé de l'aide? qui s'est proposé spontanément, avez vous accepté l'aide offerte"?

Mais la plupart des relations sont contractées par l'un ou l'autre membre du groupe familial. Il faut savoir alors si les autres membres

en ont connaissance, s'ils sont capables de situer l'interessé avec précision, s'ils sont capables de formuler à son égard des jugements de valeur. S'il pénètre dans le groupe familial par la "petite porte", s'il fait l'objet de conversations, de discussions, il sera pourvu d'un "coefficient de liaison familiale". De même pour les groupements et organisations, en dehors des déplacements en bloc de la famille à l'occasion de fêtes, anniversaires, goguettes etc. . . . il faut savoir si les "autres" sont mis au courant par le "messager" ou si celui-ci tait ce qu'il y fait. Il s'agit en fait de plusieurs paliers de participation de la famille: connaissances formelles, connaissances sur le contenu, jugements de valeur, recommandations.

Nous ne donnons ici que des indications non chiffrées sur les caractéristiques des 2 populations, il est bien entendu que ces résultats concernent *la majorité* des populations étudiées. Un petit nombre de familles échappent plus ou moins à ces conduites du plus grand nombre.

Dans le village industriel.

(1°) Les générations coexistent dans le même lieu de travail, d'habitat, de vie; en particulier, les grands parents, parents, enfants ont des relations trés suivies parce qu'ils vivent dans le même lieu, le même milieu, ils sont ouvriers dans la même entreprise, ils ont le même genre de vie, ils connaissent les mêmes gens.

(2°) Tout le monde connait tout le monde. ("un tel fils d'un tel, classe 24", travaille avec un tel dans l'atelier x). Chacun est le représentant d'une famille large, mais aussi le représentant d'une classe d'âge; enfin il est situé par rapport à d'autres qu'on connait mieux.

(3°) C'est lui qu'on fréquente et non le groupe familial qui est le sien. Ce n'est pas le groupe familial qui le fréquente mais un membre de ce groupe. Cependant les familles "profitent" indirectement de ces relations (connaissance, jugement de valeur).

(4°) Les liaisons découlent du genre de vie, elles sont plus ou moins fatales, elles dépendent au minimum d'un choix volontaire, elles ne sont pas recherchées. Il existe, étant donné l'homogénéité du milieu, suffisamment de camarades et d'amis possibles, virtuels pour que les circonstances, les évenements de la vie quotidienne entraînent plus ou moins nécessairement le choix.

(5°) Ces relations varient assez rapidement dans le temps (les camarades et amis sont assez nombreux virtuellement pour être interchangeables). D'autre part l'automaticité relative de ces relations, et le nombre d'individus concernés ou susceptibles de l'être expliquent jusqu'à un certain point le très petit nombre d'amis et le grand nombre de camarades "fonctionnels" (camarades d'atelier, de bistro, de pêche, de chasse).

(6°) En dehors des relations verticales entre la famille conjugale et la famille large, on assiste à une nette prédominance des relations horizontales par classe d'âge.

Dans les familles de proche banlieue parisienne.

(1°) La famille conjugale n'a que de très faibles relations avec la famille large: distance géographique, distance professionnelle, distance entre le genre de vie, mais aussi conditions d'existence matérielle (revenus, logement, fatigue et manque de temps dûs aux heures supplémentaires, aux distances foyer-entreprise etc.).

(2°) Les individus et familles qui ne sont connus que fragmentairement (camarade d'atelier, famille voisine d'autre milieu) restent dans leur ensemble des mondes étrangers qui ont leur propre histoire.

(3°) Recherche volontaire des relations: L'extraordinaire complexité de la vie urbaine, le nombre et la variété de milieux côtoyés tout au long de la journée isolent l'individu et la famille. Loin d'être automatiques, les liaisons avec les autres exigent un effort, une prise de conscience, la volonté de trouver des camarades, des amis.

(4°) Cet éparpillement de l'activité, cette densité de l'emploi du temps, peuvent expliquer la recherche souvent *fébrile* d'amis, c'est à dire d'individus ou familles que l'on fréquente à tout propos, et qui participent à un nombre important de secteurs de la vie familiale.

(5°) Ces amis sont assez souvent plus âgés ou plus jeunes que les intéressés (éclatement des liaisons par classe d'âge).

(6°) Ces amis ont très souvent des professions, des genres de vie différents (éclatement des liaisons par groupe professionnel).

(7°) Grosse importance de "l'accidentel" dans les origines des rencontres (vacances, bals, etc.).

(8°) fréquentations de famille à famille.

En résumé, on connait, on est connu d'un minimum de gens. On *recherche* le contact avec les autres (soif de relations humaines) on a peu de relations mais elles sont de qualité (amitié) ces relations s'opèrent de famille à famille, sans considération d'âge ou de classe.

Degré de Participation aux groupements et organisations

Dans le village industriel.

(1) Il n'y a pas de fossé entre les relations interpersonnelles et la participation aux groupements et organisations. Ce sont les mêmes qui se retrouvent: souvent le fait de se retrouver est plus important que les objectifs à atteindre.

(2) Participation formelle ("Copinerie") le principal est "d'être ensemble".

(3) Tendance aux groupements de distraction et de Commémoration (pêche, chasse, boules, belotte, anciens Combattants (classe d'âge) fanfares, pompiers).

(4) Le succés ou l'échec de l'organisation dépend assez étroitement des qualités de personnalités; les "autres" attendent les consignes.

Dans le milieu urbain considéré.

(1) Les individus rassemblés ne se connaissent pas. Ils ont des mentalités, des préocupation différentes; le seul point commun est précisément l'objectif du groupement.

(2) Participation fonctionnelle, engagement volontaire et conscient.

(3) Tendance aux groupements qui engagent la personnalité, sports, loisirs culturels, organisation syndicale et politique.

(4) Recherche de responsabilité, attitude active, l'individu cherche à être efficace, à montrer sa valeur.

DEGRÉ DE PARTICIPATION AUX "VALEURS DE CIVILISATION" (matérielles, culturelles)

Nous nous sommes limités à quelques aspects.

(1) Connaissance des derniers produits nés de la technique (appareils électro-ménagers, vêtements, meubles, jouets, automobiles) degré d'utilisation.

(2) Connaissances des performances sportives, et degré de participation.

(3) Connaissances des derniéres créations artistiques (film, mode, littérature) et degré de participation.

(4) Connaissance des faits-divers.

(5) Connaissance des évènements politiques, et degré de participation; l'investigation implique le recensement des "agents transmetteurs de cette culture" (journaux, radio, cinéma, commerces, réclames, fréquentations, voyages, organisations). Des "épreuves de connaissance" de type figuratif ont été proposés aux enquêtes (cette partie de l'enquête est en cours d'exploitation).

ENTENTE DES CONJOINTS ET "STATUT" DE LA FEMME

Une des méthodes utilisées pour "cerner" au plus près ces problèmes a été "l'experience de groupe".

L'enquêteur a posé des questions concernant d'autres aspects de la réalité familiale devant *les deux* conjoints. (On a pu mesurer ainsi le degré d'autonomie, d'indépendance de la femme: répond-elle ou laisse t-elle parler son mari, est-ce qu'elle complète, corrige, contredit? Le mari sollicite t-il son avis? accepte t-il les interventions de sa femme).

Nous pouvons déceler de cette façon, au fur et à mesure des questions posées, le degré de responsabilité de la femme dans les différents secteurs de la vie familiale, les secteurs "démocratisés" les secteurs dont le mari reste le responsable incontesté (ou contesté).

Bien entendu les réponses fournies et le comportement durant l'entretien sont confrontés avec les réponses directes à des questions directement liées au statut de la femme (budget-travail domestique, vêtements, temps libre, sorties, éducation des enfants, démarches, etc.).

Un certain nombre de questions sont posées aux époux séparément, elles sont du type "est-ce-que votre mari vous parle de ses rencontres, de ses préocupations, des évènements de sa journée, est-ce-qu'il sollicite vos propres confidences? Les lui faites-vous spontanément?"

Enfin nous demandons une relation précise de ce qui s'est passé (rôles de chacun) à l'occasion d'évènements exceptionnels de la vie familiale (deuils, maladie, naissance, chômage, etc.).

(Nous ne donnerons ici encore que des indications générales.)

A—VILLAGE INDUSTRIEL

Longue coexistence jusqu'au mariage dans le même milieu, grande identité de genre de vie des parents, connaissance approfondie avant le mariage.

Le statut de la fille est fixé traditionnellement, elle apprend depuis l'enfance son futur métier d'épouse et de mère, elle voit comment sa mère et les autres mères sont traitées. Elle enregistre aussi le comportement du père et des autres pères. Elle apprend à faire la cuisine, à tenir un intérieur, à élever de nombreux enfants. Tout est fixé, le terrain est propice pour une vie harmonieuse dans un cadre traditionnel.

D'autre part le jeune ménage est entouré de milieux initiateurs et protecteurs (lente évolution vers l'autonomie du jeune ménage).

Le travail de la jeune fille et de la jeune femme à l'extérieur, n'entraîne pas de transformations sensibles dans son statut, le plus souvent ce travail au dehors cesse dès que l'enfant parait malgré les possibilités de placement (crêche, grands-parents).

Echanges, discussions, confidences, réduits au minimum.

La femme est clouée au foyer très rapidement, pas ou peu de sorties, de participation sociale, toilettes non renouvelées, pas d'argent de poche, pas de "temps libre"; chargée plus spécialement de l'éducation de la fille, responsable de la santé, de la nourriture, de l'hygiène, des vêtements des enfants, c'est elle qui commande *à la maison* (on lui reconnait cette autorité dans la mesure ou c'est elle seule qui fait le travail) mais son mari, ses enfants mâles sont les maîtres pour toute la vie au dehors.

En résumé: *Cohésion, harmonie* du groupe familial dans *l'inégalité traditionnelle* des statuts.

B—FAMILLES ISOLÉES DE LA PROCHE BANLIEUE

Les conjoints se sont rencontrés la plupart du temps accidentellement, dans des secteurs de leur vie "hors travail" (bals, voyages quotidiens, vacances . . .) Chacun a une histoire qui n'est pas connue de l'autre, ils ne se connaissent pas au départ. Coupûre radicale des générations (éclatement de la famille large) plus de "modèles". Il faut réinventer une vie familiale (avidité pour tous les "modèles familiaux, diffusés par radio, presse etc.). Ménages d'adolescents

prolongés, s'appuient sur leurs anciennes connaissances, font une grande consommation de divertissements. Leurs conditions d'existence sont beaucoup plus précaires (logement, distance travail-foyer, fossé entre les ressources et les aspirations).

Travail à l'extérieur des 2 conjoints dans des *univers différents.*
Temps à consacrer à la vie commune réduit au minium.

Le travail de la femme à l'exterieur se prolonge malgré les naissances, bien que les placements soient difficiles et couteux (enfants en nourrice) les attaques des structures, la précarité des conditions d'éxistence matérielle, l'isolement de la famille qui se présente seule face à la société globale, entraînent cependant une prise de conscience des difficultés, un resserrement des liens entre conjoints, un partage des ennuis, des tâches, une distribution plus démocratique des rôles (grand nombre de discussions communes, échange de confidences).

La femme a un trousseau (renouvellement relativement fréquent du vestiaire) elle prend souvent l'initiative des sorties, de la répartition du budget, elle est responsable de l'éducation des enfants, elle participe avec son mari aux rencontres et aux réunions de groupements et organisations.

Cependant cette émancipation de la femme, et l'entente entre conjoints sont sans cesse remises en question par les conditions de vie; le groupe est plus démocratique mais il est aussi beaucoup plus menacé, l'équilibre, l'harmonie du ménage sont étroitement dépendants de la conjoncture, et par conséquent très précaires.

LES ENFANTS

A. *Village industriel.*

(1) Fratrie importante.

(2) Vont en bande à l'école, connaissent bien tous leurs camarades de classe, les retrouvent dans la rue, et dans la cité, ils se suivent pendant toute leur scolarité (classe d'âge).

(3) Il *faut* qu'ils aillent à l'école jusqu'à un certain âge, les adultes qui les entourent, le milieu dans lequel ils vivent ne constituent pas des "modèles" accessibles seulement par voie d'étude.

Pour les parents, l'enfant fera ce qu'ils ont fait eux-mêmes, ils laissent faire leur progéniture et ne sanctionnent que les écarts par rapport au comportement du groupe (la seule consigne "faire comme les autres", ne pas s'en distinguer). L'enfant est toujours le représentant d'une classe d'âge. Les parents le perçoivent comme tel, on lui laisse une grande liberté, à condition qu'il en profite avec les autres enfants du même âge. Le milieu social est ici protecteur et initiateur au même titre que le milieu familial, c'est un prolongement de ce milieu (identité de genre de vie, de mentalité) D'autre part "l'espace physique" ne manque pas. Différence de traitement cependant vis à vis des filles, lesquelles sont très tôt attelées aux tâches domestiques.

B. *Familles isolées de proche banlieue.*

Milieu scolaire hétérogène (écoles "casernes", classes surchargés, milieux très mêlés) les enfants d'une même classe sont d'origine différente, sont vêtus différemment, leur milieux familiaux (profession des parents, dimensions du logement, emploi du temps des parents, genres de vie) sont très variables.

Minimum de "centres de rassemblement" protégés (rues, circulation, minimum d'espace physique).

Pour les parents, la scolarité est considérée comme importante (perfectionnisme). Il faut que l'enfant se débrouille seul plus tard (plus de milieu homogène protecteur). D'autre part les conditions d'éxistence (exiguité du logement, fatigue, tension nerveuse des parents surmenés), les dangers de la rue, l'isolement de la famille sont autant d'obstacles à des relations parents-enfants logiques et harmonieuses: scolarité considérée comme importante mais ni la place, ni le temps, ni la patience de veiller aux progrès scolaires de l'enfant.

Nous assistons d'une part à des essais de relations réfléchies, conscientes entre les parents et les enfants, mais ces essais sont sans cesse contrecarrés par les répercussions de conditions matérielles précaires (attitude de type "douche écossaise" vis à vis de l'enfant).

La fille voit sa scolarité prolongée, elle doit pouvoir vivre par ses propres moyens plus tard (avoir une situation).

Relations, frères, soeurs, relativement plus importantes que dans le village industriel, aide familiale mieux répartie entre les enfants des deux sexes.

LES VIEUX

Village industriel.

La retraite pose peu de problèmes. Matériellement il y a en général un logement, un carré de jardin et l'aide des enfants habitant à proximité.

Psychologiquement, l'homme quitte son travail à peu près au même moment que toute sa classe d'âge, il n'est pas seul à subir son sort. De même il est entouré de sa famille, enfants, petits enfants à qui il peut rendre des services.

(Nous manquons de données sur la situation de vieux travailleurs isolés en milieu urbain.)

EN CONCLUSION

Nous voyons que les familles du type A (village industriel) présentent les caractéristiques suivantes: relative adéquation à un mode de vie traditionnel, avec distribution traditionnelle des rôles, importance déterminante du milieu humain (homogène) harmonie, cohésion du groupe familial qui est partie intégrante du milieu social, aucune opposition entre ce milieu *de vie* et la vie familiale.

Par contre les familles du type B (isolées dans la ville) sont seules dans un milieu de vie étrangère, face aux structures d'ensemble.[1] On

assiste alors à une gestation douloureuse et sans cesse remise en cause d'un nouveau type de famille, avec distribution démocratique des rôles, émancipation de la femme, relations humaines et conscientes entre conjoints et parents-enfants.

Il est possible que ce milieu humain protecteur dans lequel "baignent" les familles du village industriel constitue un intermédiaire essentiel entre l'individu, sa famille et la société globale, et qu'ainsi s'explique la relative *santé mentale*, l'harmonie du groupe familial et de ses membres.

Bien entendu nous faisons toutes les réserves d'usage sur le bien-fondé de cette hypothèse (les populations étudiées sont trop peu nombreuses, les résultats exposés ne s'appliquent qu'à la majorité des familles envisagées).

D'autres enquêtes sont en cours ou vont être lancées (usine installée en 1950 en milieu rural, enquête dans les localités ouvrières plus importantes, mais répondant aux mêmes caractéristiques que le village industriel, chantiers navals, forges, mines ; c'est à dire industrie unique ayant fixé depuis des générations la population ouvrière dans le même lieu).

NOTE

[1] Nous n'avons pas pû dans cette communication, développer les résultats de l'enquête sur les besoins et aspirations comparés de ces 2 populations, cependant indiquons ici parmi les aspirations le plus souvent conscientes et prioritaires en ville, le besoin de sécurité, la soif de rapports humains, le besoin de repos, le besoin de rêver.

The Working Class Family in England

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England differs from many continental countries, France for example, in that some 95 per cent. of her gainfully employed population work under a contract of service, and of this number about 70 per cent. is dependent upon a weekly wage. As the 1951 Census figures show, the worker on his own account, both in industry and in the professions, is fast disappearing, and these workers plus the employers make up the remaining 5 per cent. of the gainfully employed. In view of this economic structure and the corresponding social structure, a study of the English family may profitably begin with an examination of the factors which have influenced the situation of the wage earner and his family in the post war world.

England, up to recent years, was a country in which gross inequality of incomes prevailed, and related to this income distribution was a wide difference in the manner of living displayed by her social classes. It would not be true to say that England in the post war years has become an economic democracy, in the sense that she is a political democracy, but that immense strides have been made towards this goal cannot be questioned. The outstanding characteristic of post war society is the change in the material circumstances of families in the lower income groups. This change is to be attributed to a redistribution of the national income in favour of these groups, to government social policy and to the effect of family limitation.

Since 1945 England has moved into a condition of full, even overfull employment. This situation contains within itself a danger to the economic stability of the country, but it has enabled the trade unions to ensure that an increasing share of a higher production should be attributed to the workers.[1] Prices have risen but, on average, earnings have exceeded the rise in the cost of living. A study of the distribution of incomes since the war brings out the extent to which redistribution has taken place.[2] A larger share, even before tax, is now attributed to the wage earner, and after tax the bunching of incomes in the middle ranges and the reduction in the number of incomes at both extremes of the scale is still further emphasised. Direct tax, rather over half of total taxation, hardly affects the family of the average wage earner.

A secondary redistribution of the national income is achieved through the social services, though here little statistical evidence is available. After the war, England introduced far reaching changes in the pattern of her social services. These services, with the exception of house building subsidised from public funds, are available to the whole population as a citizen right. Indubitably certain services are more

valuable to the families in the wage earning group. Certain monetary benefits have to be included for income tax assessment, and hence are of more value to those groups in the population which pay no direct tax, for example, family allowances, small as they are, provide a worth while addition to the family budget of the London bus driver earning about nine pounds a week. They are of little value to the university teacher paying an income tax of eight shillings and sixpence in the pound on a large proportion of his income.

Since 1948, practically the whole of the population is legally compelled to pay national insurance contributions, neither benefits nor contributions varying with income. The workers have certainly gained greatly from the National Insurance Act, for the hazards of unemployment, of sickness and old age, affected them more than other groups in the population. Basic provision at a minimum level has now been provided for all contingencies, and the sickness or unemployment of the main breadwinner no longer confronts the family with the same dire insecurity as before the war.

There is no doubt that families in all sections of the community, except the wealthiest, have gained appreciably from the national health service. A medical practitioner has no longer to be paid by the patient and there is a mere token charge for medicine. But the service has been of particular value to the women in the working class family. Previous to the passing of the act other members of the family were assured some medical care—children through the school medical service and the workers through insurance. But the mother of the family, unless she were attending an ante-natal clinic, had to go to the hospital or pay for her medical care. The health of many women has greatly improved through the care which is now available, free of charge, from the family doctor.

It was stated above that, whilst post war social services are provided as a citizen right, the exception to this universality has been housing. The local authorities are now permitted to provide houses for all income groups, but the vast majority of houses has been built for the workers' families. In recent years some 300,000 houses have been built annually with the aid of public funds, and preference in allocation is given to families with children. The subsidy reduces the rent by some forty per cent., so that the fortunate families who occupy these houses enjoy a valuable indirect addition to the family budget.

And finally, the average worker who now has a larger income than he had in pre war days, has fewer dependents to support; in recent years the fall in the birthrate has been steepest in the wage earner's family. The early social surveys, those of Rowntree for example, all enphasise the connection between large families and primary poverty; wages were not adequate to provide for the large number of dependent children. But to-day, as the 1951 Census returns show, the number of dependent children is much the same in all classes of society. The national average is 1·72 children per family, and where the mother is

under forty-five there is little difference in the average family size between the various social classes in the community.

The total result of these measures has been greatly to increase the spending power of the average family in the weekly wage earning section of the community, and one method of measuring changes in family well-being is to estimate the amount of income available after the basic necessities of food, housing, clothing, fuel and light have been paid for. A study of the official Interim Index of Retail Prices, commonly regarded as a measurement of the cost of living, supports the facts already adduced to show the changed circumstances of the worker's family in the post war world.[3] This Interim Index sets out to measure changes in the expenditure of the working class family, and is based on a sample of family budgets collected from families in this section of the community. Criticism is often advanced against the Index, but it is accepted by the trade union movement as an indication of the rise and fall in the cost of living of its members. At the present time it is estimated that the average family spends only 64 per cent. of income on the basic necessities of food, rent and rates, fuel and light, and clothing. The wide range of goods included in the analysis of the remaining thirty-six per cent. of family income demonstrates the extent to which the higher income of the worker's family permits of an expenditure approximate to that of the middle classes. For included in the Interim Index is to be found not only the goods essential for running a home such as furniture, cleaning material and so forth, but also a number of goods previously regarded as luxuries such as vacuum cleaners, petrol and tyres for cars and motor cycles.

It would, of course, be disingenuous to suggest that all the families in the weekly wage earning section of the community are now adequately housed and have an income which allows expenditure on such luxuries as a television set. Some families are still living in wretched houses, some fathers are working in industries in which the pay is below the national average, some families have more than two children. But these families now constitute an exception, and it is true to say that there has been a rise in the standard of living for the great majority of those families in society which were once the most depressed, and that gross material need has been practically eliminated.

Since 1945, the national income has been increasing so that the gain of the worker's family has not been wholly at the expense of other families in the community. But, in fact, the standard of living of many middle class families has certainly been reduced. Salaries were not adjusted to rising costs of living as promptly as were wages and in some professions still lag behind, the civil service for example. Moreover, direct taxation bears hardly on the middle class father. Allowances for wife and children have recently been increased, but the relief is nothing like so adequate as that accorded under the family quotient system of assessment which prevails in France; the majority of middle class families has gained appreciably from the national health service.

For it was these families which had a higher standard of medical care, and the bills of doctors and dentists often made serious inroads on the family budget. I discuss the effect of changes in the post-war education system later in this paper. Here it is sufficient to note that middle class families with children in the grammar school financed from public funds now pay no fees. But a minority of fathers belonging to the higher professional and administrative classes still make superhuman efforts to send their sons to the famous public schools, and frequently draw on their small reserves of capital for this purpose.

Not all middle class families have seen their standard of living deteriorate. The welfare state itself has created a number of posts in the medical services, and doctors as a class have seen their standard of living rise appreciably in the post war world. Farmers have gained appreciably from the government policy of subsidy and price control. Shopkeepers as always in a period of full employment and the resulting tendency to inflation are certainly not worse off than in the pre-war days. But certain sections of the middle class have a struggle to maintain the standard of living which was accepted without question before the war. And, of course, the almost entire absence of domestic help, the corollary of high wages and full employment amongst the women of the working class, has placed an immense burden on the middle class housewife who strives to maintain a high standard in her home.

Very wealthy families still exist, a very small minority of families may thus be classed to-day; after direct taxation has been paid the National Income and Expenditure figures for 1954 give no incomes over £6,000 a year. Some families strive to maintain some elements of their ancient style of living by drawing on capital, but even if funds are available to run the large houses servants are not, and the silent revolution which has so dramatically raised the standard of living of the workers has had an inverse effect on the families of the wealthy.

The sociologist will wish to know to what extent these economic changes have modified social relations. Is greater equality of income leading to less class distinction? Has the new education system introduced after the war facilitated the entry of children from the wage earner's family into the grammar school? Since a grammar school education is the gateway to the universities and the professions equality of opportunity in education should affect social mobility and social status.

Greater equality of incomes has certainly reduced obvious class distinctions. The dress of women and children, less so for men, provides no guide to the social class of the wearer. And higher incomes have enabled many families to refurnish their homes. If the house is a modern one there will be little difference in the appearance of the rooms from that of many a middle class home. Indeed, the kitchen may well be better equipped. But the more subtle differences remain and the barriers raised by differences in education have not been lowered

by the greater equalisation of incomes. Will they be for the present generation of children whose school days are ordered by the Education Act of 1944 ?

This Act has brought about fundamental changes in the education system; the school leaving age has been raised to fifteen, ultimately the age is to go up to sixteen. After an examination at the age of about eleven every child passes into one of three types of secondary school; all secondary education provided by schools maintained from public funds in now free. This division into three types of school has in itself been criticised as likely to hinder and not to promote social integration; the future clerk, the skilled craftsman, the unskilled labourer are separated from the future doctor and higher civil servant even at the age of eleven. It is not surprising, therefore, that ambitious parents from all social groups desire to see their children pass into the grammar school and competition for the limited grammar school places is now intense. It may be asked to what extent higher family incomes and the abolition of school fees have diminished financial obstacles and increased the proportion of children from the weekly wage earners' families to be found in the grammar schools. Certainly more children from the families of the skilled and unskilled workers are being admitted into the grammar schools but not in proportion to their numbers in the community.[4] A recent government publication analyses the occupational groups to which belong the fathers whose children have been awarded grammar school places. The children of fathers in the professional and administrative groups account for twenty-five per cent. of the children in grammar schools though they make up only fifteen per cent. in the grammar school age group of the population. Moreover, if the analysis is carried still further it will be found that these children account for forty-four per cent. of the boys and girls in the top forms. Not only is there a smaller proportion of children from the weekly wage earner groups, in relation to their total number, found in the grammar schools, but a higher proportion of these children tend to leave before the completion of the academic course. It is interesting to note that the chief reason for early leaving is not a financial one but is to be found in the influence of the home background on a child's performance at school. It is accordingly clear that whilst there will certainly be some increase in the number of boys and girls who overcome the handicap of their social origins, the present system of education is unlikely to lead to a marked change in the social origins of men occupying posts of high social status some twenty-five to thirty years hence. Greater equality of income is only slowly going to bring about greater social mobility.

Finally, account must be taken of the influence of those independent schools which remain outside the state system and which provide a grammar school education for about four per cent. of children in this age group. The fees in these schools are high but many parents in the professional and administrative classes make immense sacrifices

to enable their sons to benefit from a public school education. Though a small minority of boys pass through the independent schools these schools have furnished in the past, and presumably will continue to furnish in the future, a large proportion of men who hold high office in church and state.

NOTES

[1] September, 1955, page 307. *Ministry of Labour Gazette*, Base year, 1947=100 April, 1955. Earnings, 176. U.K. Index of Retail Prices, 149.

[2] *National Income and Expenditure.* H.M.S.O., 1955. Table 28. Distribution of personal income before and after tax.

[3] H.M.S.O. REPORT on the working of the Interim Index of Retail Prices, 1952. CMD. 8481.

[4] *Early Leaving.* A report of the Central Advisory Council for Education, 1954. H.M.S.O.

Some Observations on Current Trends in the German Family

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Within the framework of a discussion centering on changes in the "Western Family", the development in Germany deserves special attention. It may be said that hardly another country in the Western world witnessed such disintegration of traditional patterns in the years immediately following World War II and their gradual restoration since the time when the German currency was reformed in 1948.

In a relatively short period of history a series of drastic events such as economic depression, the national-socialist régime, war and destruction and finally military occupation afflicted German society. How did the family as an institution survive under these circumstances? In what way and to what extent did catastrophes of this order bring about changes in the structure of the family? Much has been said with regard to these questions and family research in post-war Germany has been mainly concerned with them. The lapse of time and increasing distance from the events of the thirties and forties, however, permit a detached view of the development and the re-assessment of some of the theories formulated under the immediate impression of the post-war situation. Steadily gaining in actuality are the questions whether structural changes under observation at present may be related back to the influence of war and post-war times, and in how far they reflect the general tendencies of the social development in the Western hemisphere. In fact, this appears to be the most significant problem facing family research in Germany.

Evolutionary trends emerge from studies already available as well as research projects in operation at present. The following presentation deals with observations gathered on the subject of the changing rôle of family members and the factors of stability and instability in German family life. Both of these questions have gained considerable significance with respect to the development of theories and of official policies concerning family matters in the Federal Republic. Specifically under study are the urban middle class and working class families rather than the rural population, although the latter too reveals some of the trends described.

THE CHANGING RÔLE OF FAMILY MEMBERS

The differing views held by scholars in recent years about the development of the social-psychological structure of the German family may be largely conditioned by distinct premises and situations. On the

other hand, the deviations in results are also attributable to the vast scope of variations in family structure and to manifold transitory forms, which have developed particularly in present-day Germany. Let us, for example, reflect upon the conclusions arrived at by *Schaffner*[1] and *Rodnick*[2], who were the first to contribute to family research in post-war Germany: Schaffner stated that family life still revolves around the figure of the father, who is omnipotent, omniscient and the source of all authority. He also expressed the opinion that the basic factors of German family life have remained practically unchanged during the last seventy years. Rodnick in obvious contrast reports that a great deal of comradeship is found between husbands and wives, and that any patriarchal pattern that may have existed in German protestant families has become obsolete.

Both Schaffner and Rodnick conducted their investigations in 1945 and 1946, a period marked by particular confusion and disarrangement of social conditions. More recent investigations such as the survey by *Hilde Thurnwald*[3] on Berlin Families, the revealing studies by *Schelsky*[4] and *Wurzbacher*,[5] as well as the studies contained in the *Darmstadt Survey*,[6] only completed in 1954, and the latest one conducted by *König*[7] in Cologne, arrive at varying conclusions. However, they agree in the basic finding that the diminution of the father's authority as it was once exercised in the bourgeois-patriarchal family, has considerably advanced and apparently received strong impetus by war and post-war events.

It is not surprising that some of the early investigations concluded that both the patriarchal and the authoritarian pattern are maintained in no more than a small proportion of all German families in the Federal Republic, and that in most families either no predominance at all of the husband or only a pseudo-predominance was observed. In this conception the psychological situation of the immediate post-war period needs to be reconsidered. It was marked by a substantial loss of prestige on the part of the German male. Most of the men had been soldiers and returned as the vanquished. Many were former members of the national socialist party and, therefore, lost both social esteem and their professional position. There is no doubt that this drastic change in the position of men in society bore on the relationship between husband and wife in the family. However, many of the phenomena of the time immediately following the war proved to be of a temporary nature only, and observations made during these years should be assessed very cautiously.

When in the interpretation of our findings one attempts to concentrate on long-range evolutionary trends in contrast to short-range adjustments to war and post-war events, certain general characteristics of development are recognizable: in Germany, as in other Western countries, we find many symptoms of a development which shifts from a patriarchal institutional type of family to a more equalitarian companionship of family members. Yet, the majority of families appears to

show a more or less marked predominance of the husband and father, but the rôle of the father has changed fundamentally and there is little resemblance between his present standing and the authoritarian position once occupied by the fathers in the old bourgeois-patriarchal type of family prior to World War I. It was further found that in most families the father supports the family with his earnings while the mother has charge of the household. Nevertheless, the traditional division of work and duties within the family is changed in a good many cases. Wives are no longer only the administrators of the household; they are in addition equal partners of their husbands and contribute to the financial support of the family. Approximately every fourth married woman is in some employment, today. By the same token more and more husbands are sharing the burden of housework with their wives, even performing duties which were once considered as clearly unmanly. In a recently conducted survey,[8] housewives were asked to indicate the activities in which their husbands assist them. Almost three in ten women stated that their husbands help them wash the dishes, about every fourth referred to shopping ; cooking and potato-peeling were also cited, as well as the laundry and child nursing. The rigid division of activities, which once appeared to be characteristic for the authoritarian family, dissolves and changes into a partnership of both family support and household maintenance.

It is difficult to foresee at present whether the development in Germany as described above, will continue along the same lines. Particularly in the recent past some restorative tendencies have become rather strongly apparent. They are visible, for example, in the demand of certain groups to restore the traditional family order and to leave the authority of the father untouched. And they also lead to the opinion that in a " good family " the mother should not be engaged in a trade or employment. They obviously all contribute to the rehabilitation of the shattered prestige of the men, completely neglecting the changes that have occurred in social conditions.

On the other hand, even in this restorative striving we find, apart from the growing influence wielded by industrialisation and urbanization, some tendencies which give much stimulus to the economic partnership of husband and wife. All efforts are directed towards a return to former social prestige and the standard of living of that time with the aim of being " well-respected citizens " again, after all the humiliations and material losses suffered. These endeavours of the older generation communicate themselves to the young people, and we thus recognize as one of the most characteristic signs of German post-war society a very pronounced pursuit of social advancement. In many families it is this pursuit that causes the wife to seek employment and that leads to a corresponding adjustment of the husband-wife or father-mother relation within the family.

In this connection we also find contradictory tendencies with respect to the position of the aged people in the family circle. On the one

hand, the gradual disintegration of patriarchal notions and the increasing support of the aged by institutions other than the family seems to generally lead to a loosening of the ties between parents and grandparents. The old people, who formerly used to live with their children, are often found to run their own financially independent household. On the other hand, it can be observed that grandparents play an essential rôle in families which are making strong efforts for social advancement. The grandmother is often found running the household and nursing the children, thus enabling both husband and wife to seek gainful employment and provide for the means required for the desired social status.

Even more obvious than the change in the rôles of husband and wife seems the change in the position of the child in the German family. This is true especially of the rôle of the child in the upper class as heir of family property and family tradition. At a time when the hereditary property of families are shrinking and for this and other reasons the idea of family tradition is becoming more and more insignificant, this rôle has somewhat lost its meaning. A similar process is noticeable in the lower classes : while in former times the children were thought of and raised as the prospective supporters of the aged parents it is the government today that has increasingly taken over the support of the aged. At least in the economic field the rôle of the children as future supporters is gradually on the decline. The position of the child is gradually becoming freer and more individual. The relations and ties between the parents and the child are of a more personal and less institutional nature than they used to be in former times. Just as the adult tends to consider himself less a limb of a larger clan, the children are thought of rather as individuals and respected for their particular traits. Educational practices are changing accordingly. Education within most families still aims at unlimited submission to parental determination. However, the great many discussions on educational questions and problems nowadays held at home and in public show that the personality and wishes of the child are being given more consideration. In earlier days casual physical punishment was considered a routine part of good education. Today, public opinion on this issue is divided and in many cases where parents resort to physical punishment we can observe a definite feeling of guilt toward the child. Altogether, a development seems to have set in that moves the child more and more into the centre of the family while the father somewhat recedes. The situation can as yet not be compared to the structure of the American middle class family, but a similarity in the development is evident.

The events of the last decade have done much to further such trends. The rôle of the child had already changed decidedly during the years of war. In many families children had to assume the duties of adults and were granted more privileges in return, while today, in many cases the struggle for social advancement is transmitted to the children.

Wurzbacher[9] in his analysis of the parent-child relations, describes how this transmission of hopes for social improvement leads to a central position of the child, particularly the son. Very similar observations were made in the studies on youth within the Darmstadt survey This tendency proved to be most evident in refugee families ; in these, all efforts were often directed at the attainment of better school education for the children.

The predominantly economic change in the relationship between parents and children of the working class families also appears to be characteristic. In former times it was quite customary that children in the teen-age groups surrendered their earnings to the parents. This is still true of many families. Frequently, however, the children keep the larger portion of the money for their own consumption and moreover expect the parents to support them. This, indeed, marks a reversal of the earlier situation : the economic exploitation of children by the parents, which was once frequent in the lower classes, is gradually changing into a relation of mutual independence or even an exploitation of the parents by the chidren.

In summarizing we find that in both relations—husband and wife, and parents and children—the formal, more institutional ties, are loosening. Two particularly obvious tendencies of the present development deserve to be stressed : firstly, the greater emphasis on the individuality of each family member, and in connection herewith increasing affection, and secondly, a tendency which *Schelsky* in his analyses so appropriately termed objectification.[10]

These two tendencies are strangely conflicting with one another; upon more profound analysis the impression arises that we are concerned with a serious problem with respect to the future pattern of family and society as a whole. On the one hand, we find a steadily growing demand for affection while on the other hand objectification of human relations is advancing. Of course, material considerations motivating certain marriages or economic considerations in interfamily relations, to cite only two of the frequently mentioned indications of objectification, are by no means new phenomena. We need only to recall the notions and rules of conduct in former bourgeois and rural families. By and large, however, this very evolution seems to evidence a growing demand for affection and simultaneously a diminishing ability to give affection. Human relations are arranged more reasonably but much of the original warmth in the family is lost in the process.

Factors of Stability and Instability in German Family Life

At this point we turn to an analysis of the condition in which we find the family after the social catastrophes of the past years. Do we observe signs of disintegration or signs of stability ?

At first glance a rather distinct trend appears. Like other Western countries, Germany shows a tendency towards the smaller family, consisting only of the parents and their children, a community much

more brittle than the larger family association of earlier days. We distinguish a loosening of institutional ties and an accentuation of the individuality of each family member, also promoting greater instability.

A number of modern studies, however, lead to the assumption that there are tendencies in Germany which are in obvious conflict with this development. Once more we face the question whether these tendencies constitute long-range evolutionary trends rather than mere adjustments to the unusual situation of a post-war period. In any case it appears necessary to devote attention to these observations and to re-examine the established claims.

Schelsky deserves the credit for having emphasized these conflicting processes in the German post-war society. In particular, he stresses the often neglected tendency toward social isolation of the families and family group egotism, known to have accompanied the collapse of political and social order. The family often was felt to be the last factor of stability in a world of wanton destruction, and vital interests returned to the sphere of the family as a result. From all this *Schelsky* deduced rising stability of the German family[11].

Prior to further scrutiny of this theory it seems opportune to discuss several other phenomena which are closely connected with the problem of family stability, such as divorce frequency and the general attitude of the German society toward marriage and the family as an institution. Ever since divorce statistics have become available they show a steady increase in the divorce rates. While 9 divorces occurred per 100,000 inhabitants in 1881, the corresponding ratio for 1914 was 26 and 89 for 1939. After World War II, the number of divorces climbed rapidly and reached a peak of 187 per 100,000 inhabitants in 1948. Inasmuch as divorce rates reflect the condition of the family, statistics of post-war years do not seem to point to family consolidation. Yet, after 1948, divorce frequency steadily declined and led to a development that to date cannot be properly assessed. In 1950, the divorce rate decreased to 158, in 1952 to 105, and by 1954 reached the level of 1939 with 90 divorces per 100,000 inhabitants.

It may be presumed that in general a normalization of social conditions is the cause of such development. However, the trend may be attributable also to a certain change in judicial decisions rendering divorce more difficult. Law courts are in line with a change of public opinion, which is best reflected in the comparison of results obtained in several studies: Asked in a survey conducted in Germany in 1949 whether divorces should be facilitated or rendered more difficult, 13% of the respondents spoke up in favour of rendering divorce more difficult.[12] In the Darmstadt survey the very same answer was given by 28% of the urban and 26% of the rural respondents.[13] In a representative study conducted in Germany in 1955, 46% of the respondents felt divorces should be rendered more difficult.[14]

In view of the great differences of percentage, variations in sampling methods need not be considered. It can be assumed that the findings

express the general desire of a large segment of the population to counteract social disintegration. While this may be regarded as a stabilizing factor, it should not be overestimated. Analyzing public opinion more carefully we achieve inconsistent results. To cite only one example : present German divorce law does not provide for a divorce on the ground of mutual agreement. However, 73% of the population expressed the opinion that a divorce should be granted if both husband and wife desire it.[15] The catholics are somewhat less liberal than the protestants in this respect, and the rural population is also somewhat less liberal than city folk. Yet, the deviations are inconsiderable. Basically the long observed tendency to appreciate the right of free decision of individuals rather than to respect the enforced continuance of marriage as a formal institution seem to prevail in spite of some inconsistency.

Let us follow once more the two different tendencies after the war. As an immediate effect of war and post war events we find on the one hand acute signs of disintegration. The long separation of spouses, economic distress, and other influences of the time in many cases led to a disturbance in family conditions and, as is shown by divorce rates, frequently to separation or divorce. On the other hand, however, we observe in many families a return to family interests and an intensified cohesion of family members, particularly strong among refugees and people who for political or other reasons were uprooted ; the latter because of resignation or out of temporary passivity toward their environment, and the refugees on the contrary because they wanted to gain and maintain a position in a new social environment through united efforts of all family members.

From these observations may be concluded that the war has intensified tendencies of disintegration as well as of stability. It must not be forgotten, however, that these were immediate effects of the war permitting no definite conclusion at the time of observation as to whether or not they would have a bearing on the long-range trends. Thus it is imperative to view the entire development on a larger scale and without reservations determined by temporarily dominating influences. Eliminating the short-lived inconsistencies of post-war times, the already familiar symptoms of the profound metamorphosis and adjustment process in the contemporary family remain. The gradual disintegration of the former family rules of conduct, in particular the decline of the father's authority—once so decisive for the solidarity of the society in Germany—continues. The general attitude toward marriage and family is also subject to a continuous process of change. Neither are trends unmistakably reversed nor do we discover the birth of new conceptions.

In respect to long term development, it can be said that war as such has only been of secondary significance for the basic changes observed in family life and structure, no matter how great its influence appeared to be at first sight. A more detailed analysis of the specific

situation of the German family, originating from the events during the past decades, must be the subject of prospective and more intensive research.

NOTES

[1] B. Schaffner, *Fatherland, A Study of Authoritarianism in the German Family*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1948, page 15.
[2] D. Rodnick, *Post-War Germans, An Anthropologist's Account*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1948, p. 122.
[3] Hilde Thurnwald, *Gegenwartsprobleme Berliner Familien*, Berlin, Weidmannsche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1948.
[4] H. Schelsky, *Wandlungen der deutschen Familie in der Gegenwart*, Stuttgart (2nd ed.), Enke Verlag, 1954.
[5] G. Wurzbacher, *Leitbilder gegenwärtigen deutschen Familienlebens*, Stuttgart (2nd ed.), Enke Verlag, 1954.
[6] G. Baumert, *Jugend der Nachkriegszeit*, Darmstadt, Roether Verlag, 1952. *Deutsche Familien nach dem Kriege*, Darmstadt, Roether Verlag, 1954.
[7] R. König, "Family and Authority, the German Father 1955"; paper read at the Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Society, August 1955.
[8] Undertaken by DIVO, Frankfort-on-Main, September 1954.
[9] Wurzbacher, *op. cit.*
[10] Schelsky, *op. cit.*
[11] H. Schelsky, *op. cit.* See also the article "The Family in Germany", *Marriage and Family*, vol. XVI, no. 4, November 1954.
[12] v. Friedeburg, *Die Umfrage in der Intimsphäre*, Ferdinand Enke Verlag, Stuttgart, 1953.
[13] G. Baumert, *Familien, op. cit.*, p. 173.
[14] Survey in the framework of an international study under the auspices of the University of Chigaco Comparative Law Research Center undertaken by the Institut für Sozial-und Wirtschaftsforschung, Bad Godesberg.
[15] Survey of the Institut für Sozial-und Wirtschaftsforschung, Bad Godesberg.

The Increase in Married Women in the Labor Force in the United States

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This paper is mainly concerned with an analysis of causes of the increase in the employment of married women in the United States during the past half century. Such an analysis is important, because the employment of married women greatly affects the status of women, as well as various aspects of the relationship between the sexes, and is not without significance for the size of family and family rôles.

Before considering the factors underlying the changes in the employment of married women, it is necessary briefly to set forth the data of the change. There are two ways in which this is generally done. One is to show the changes in the per cent. of the total female labor force that is married. In 1890 it was 13·9 per cent. and in 1940, 36·4 per cent. Late in the 1940's it rose above the 50 per cent. mark, and for the first time in the history of the United States most working women were married. In 1953 the figure had risen to 56·5 per cent.[1] These data, however, are less satisfactory for showing the increase in working wives than those that follow, because the per cent. of women workers who are married is affected by the per cent. of women who are married ; and during recent decades, especially during the 1940's there has been a considerable decrease in the proportion of single women and a corresponding increase in married women.[2] More satisfactory for our purpose is the per cent. of married women in the labor force, which rose from 4·6 in 1890 to 27·0 in 1953, about a sixfold increase.[3] A projection of the trend line shows that if conditions remain unchanged we may expect a further increase in the near future.

CAUSES

The reasons why married women work, whatever these reasons may be, do not tell us why more married women work than formerly. A factor in a situation is not necessarily the same as a factor in a changing situation. We wish to know why there has been such a marked increase in the percentage of married women in the labor market. The reasons can be grouped into three categories : (1) the removal of obstacles, (2) pushes, and (3) pulls.

FEWER OBSTACLES

Maternity and the care of young children are probably the major obstacles to the employment of married women. Among primitive

peoples and in agricultural societies, these obstacles are minimized, because woman's work is in or about the home, which permits her to do her work while attending to the needs of her children. What chiefly prevents this arrangement in modern industrial society is the separation of place of residence and place of employment. Alternative solutions are the use of kin or the employment of a servant to look after the children while the mother is at work, or the provision of child care in day nurseries. The number of domestic servants in the United States has decreased sharply since 1890, hence this cannot be a factor in the increased employment of married women. There has, however, been an increase in the number of day nurseries.

If one takes the entire period 1890–1950 as the unit, one observes that biological families became smaller, while the proportion of working wives became larger. So a decrease in young children in the home is associated with an increase in working wives. But since 1940, we have had an increase both in families with children and in families with more children ; yet this has been a period of spectacular increases in the number of married women at work. Traditionally in the United States the view has been that mothers of young children should not work outside the home, if it can be prevented. With about 1 in 7 mothers of children under 6 in the labor force,[4] possibly one or both of two changes has occurred, namely, greater tolerance of working mothers of young children or more ample provision for care in day nurseries.

Less work at home. If there are many household duties confronting the wife, it is easy to see that they might act as a deterrent to employment outside the home. Housekeeping is less taxing and time consuming than formerly because of smaller houses and more labor-saving machines for the household. Housework is, of course, elastic ; and even though it exists, it need not be done, or not done regularly. It is interesting to learn that, according to sample studies, the average city housewife spends more time in housekeeping than the average farm housewife. Labor-saving devices may be used to save labor ; but, by being used more often, they may also be used to raise the standard of housekeeping. Housekeeping has also been greatly simplified by the radical innovations in methods of food preservation and preparation.

Child care is also easier for many mothers, what with the availability of such aids as diaper services and processed food for infants ; but the education of children has become more difficult in our complex society.

More favorable public opinion. It is clear also that public opinion in the United States is more favorable to the employment of wives than formerly, and this has not been without affect on the increase in working wives. The traditional view has been that woman's place is in the home, a view easily understood in the light of the fact that in the household economy woman's place was in and about the home,

if not just in it. The first major shift in public opinion on this issue occurred after the turn of the century, with the fuller development of the industrial society. Now the view became that a woman's place was in the home if she was married but that a woman should work before she marries. And more recently a further change has occurred, which may be expressed as follows : a woman's place need not be in the home unless she has small children. That this is now the prevailing view is suggested by the fact that in 1900, 17 per cent. of working women were 45 years old or older, whereas in 1954, the percentage was 33. The typical pattern in the United States is for most women to work before marriage. A year after marriage, the chances are about even that a wife will be at work for pay. If she has pre-school children, the chances are 1 in 7 that a mother will work. But more mothers return to the labor force when their children enter school ; and even more do so when their children have grown up and left home for jobs of their own. The largest concentration of working wives in 1950 was between 25 and 45 years of age, whereas in 1900 it was the age group 14 to 24 years old. This trend is influenced also by the relative increase in the older age groups in the population.

We can speculate as to why these changes in public opinion regarding women's rôles have occurred. An important factor, no doubt, is the greater freedom of the individual in the city than in smaller places, coupled with the fact that an ever greater proportion of the population of the United States lives in large centers of population, or in centers to which the urban perspective has been diffused. There are, of course, other reasons for the more favorable public opinion, such as the greater attractiveness of jobs for women in terms of comfort and convenience, hours of work, and the like. There is some evidence that a job does not generally interfere with marital happiness, although this fact is probably not widely known and is therefore not much of an influence on employment. One of the more important reasons for the more favorable public opinion is doubtless the vast increase in the number of jobs open to women, for the demands of the expanding economy have been such that if women, married women included, failed to take employment, the economy would be constricted and would suffer. What we need urgently, we tend to sanction.

Pushes

Certain obstacles to the employment of women like housekeeping responsibilities and children have thus been diminished. In addition, there has been a push from behind which has moved many women into work away from home. This push has consisted mainly of discontent with housekeeping, which has been aggravated in relatively recent times by the availability of more interesting occupations outside the home, so that housekeeping seems dull by comparison. When occupations for women were few and less attractive, dissatisfaction with housekeeping was not so great. So the cause is a feeling of relative deprivation,

Especially do college-trained women feel that if they are housekeepers, they are wasting their time. It is a common observation for a college-trained woman who is a housekeeper to say, when asked her occupation, that she is "not doing anything", although she may have a large house to manage and a big brood of children. The number of women college graduates in the United States increased about 38-fold from 1890 to 1950, whereas the female population increased only 250 per cent.

PULLS

The removal of obstacles to employment and greater dissatisfaction with housekeeping are significant causes of the increase in working wives, but the most important single cause appears to be the increase in the number of jobs available to women and the pressure exerted by the economic system for them to take jobs, that is, the increased demand for labor. This is borne out by the situation which arose during both World Wars when the shortage of labor was particularly great and occupations ordinarily closed to women were opened up to them. This was, for example, how women first obtained employment as bus drivers and bank tellers. After the war, the men returned to their jobs in large numbers, but all of the women were not displaced. It is during wars that ideologies regarding woman's proper rôle are rendered less operative and are thereby weakened.

A demographic factor in the greater employment of women is the change in the sex ratio. In 1954, women of working age outnumbered men by more than 2 million, whereas in 1900 men outnumbered women by over $1\frac{1}{3}$ million. The excess of women in the population has occurred since 1940.

Since 1940, there have been increases in the number of women in every occupation save household and farm employment, which have decreased. The decline in private household workers, 1940–1953, was from 18 per cent. to 10 per cent. of employed women. Professional and technical workers increased slightly in number but decreased as a percentage of all employed women. Service workers almost doubled in number, but the proportion of employed women in service jobs remained unchanged, as was true also for sales workers. Operatives, mainly semi-skilled factory workers, increased in number and proportion. But the spectacular increase has been in clerical workers, as a result chiefly of the growth of the social service state, the garrison state, and large-scale industry. A great many of the operations of these organizations call for the keeping of records. For instance, the Social Security Administration in the United States, which did not exist before the 1930's, is now the world's biggest book-keeping operation with more than 120 million accounts. Small wonder, then, that the number of female clerical workers increased from 13,369 in 1870, to 2·5 million in 1940, to 5·1 million in 1954, nearly a 400-fold increase.[5]

It is sometimes said that while the increase in jobs provides the opportunity for more women to work, the immediate motivation for work is the desire for a higher standard of living. In so far as the desire for a higher standard of living is a constant factor, it cannot be a cause of a change. If the desire for a higher standard of living is not constant, we would still have to explain the presumed increase in the desire. Perhaps modern advertising, with its urge to spend more dollars, increases the desire for a higher standard of living, as does the availability of a larger variety of attractive goods. The great increase in consumer credit in recent years is probably a factor stimulating the desire for employment. It is said that many married women work in order to help pay off the indebtedness incurred in the purchase of a home or an automobile or household appliances. The abnormal increase in consumer indebtedness is, however, a phenomenon of the middle years of the 1950's, whereas the increase in the employment of women is a long-term trend, covering the whole of the last half-century. Again, it is often said that married women work because of economic need. To explain an increase in employment, the economic need must increase too. Has the economic need of American married women increased ? It scarcely seems so, since the real wages of husbands, that is, wages in terms of constant purchasing power, have generally increased since the turn of the century.

To sum up, the great growth in the proportion of married women at work for pay in the United States is to be attributed partly to the reduction in the number of traditional obstacles to their employment and to the increase in dissatisfaction with housekeeping as the only occupation. For the most part, however, the increase in employment is a response to the increase in the supply of jobs consequent to the expansion of the economy and the great growth of government. If one is interested in pressing back still further and in asking what has induced the expansion of the economy, the answer has been given, based on evidence[6] that the expansion of the economy is due partly perhaps to improved organization but mainly to innovations in technology which increase productivity.

NOTES

[1] *Statistical Abstract of the United States.* 1955, p. 194.

[2] In 1954, there were over 8·5 million more married women and 3 million fewer single women than in 1940.

[3] Women's Bureau, *1954 Handbook on Women Workers* (Washington : Government Printing Office, 1954), p. 13.

[4] In 1952, the figure was 13·9 per cent. where the women were married, with husband present ; it was 40·7 per cent. for the widowed, separated, and divorced. Woman's Bureau : *Women as Workers, A Statistical Guide* (Washington : Government Printing Office, 1953), Table 32, p. 75.

[5] Considerably larger proportions of single than married women are in clerical and professional jobs, and the reverse is true in the operative and managerial groups. Widowed and divorced women predominate in the service occupations.

[6] W. F. Ogburn, " Population, Private Ownership, Technology, and the Standard of Living," *American Journal of Sociology*, LVI, 314–19, January, 1951.

Some Aspects of Family Instability in the United States

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Many social changes have been taking place during the 20th century which have had effects upon family life in the United States. It is not possible to measure the degree to which each of these changes has affected the family but it seems reasonable to assume that some of these changes are basic factors in family stability and in family disintegration. The divorce rate in the United States increased from 7·9 divorces per 100 marriages in 1900 to 23·0 divorces per 100 marriages in 1950.

SOCIAL CHANGES AND FAMILY INSTABILITY

One of the major social changes is in the nature of marriage itself, from a relationship in which the man was the dominant figure and the woman and children were submissive to him, to a relationship more nearly approaching equality. The family is moving toward a companionship group in which all members have a voice and away from a group in which rights are assigned according to sex, age or parent or child status. A factor bringing about changes in family life has been the increase in the rights of women. As women gained the right to vote, to work outside the home, and to an equal education through universal free education, the trend tended to be toward equality in marriage. There is much discussion of the changing rôle of women in the United States, and a noticeable lack of discussion of the changing rôle of men. But, of necessity, with female rôle changes there has been a corresponding change in rôles of men. The tendency toward equality means that as women work outside the home husbands share in many household tasks and in family responsibilities that formerly were exclusively women's sphere.

A resulting development is that with greater freedom from economic dependence upon a husband, women can more readily seek divorce if a marriage is not satisfying. Thus, the increasing divorce rate from the turn of the century can not be considered a true index of marital unhappiness. It is possible that the level of happiness in marriage is in general higher today than it was 50 years ago. Possibly, with greater freedom of women and a changing attitude toward divorce, many unhappy marriages that would have remained legally intact 50 years ago, are today dissolved.

Other social changes have also had their influence on marriage stability. The United States has been changing from a predominantly

rural nation to a predominately urban nation. Family instability is more characteristic of an urban population. The population has become highly mobile in this country. Two world wars have accelerated the fluid movement of the population from country to city and from city to city, so that young people from widely varied backgrounds meet and marry. The fluidity of the population also makes it easy for a person to divorce, move to another place and start life over without his background being known by his associates.

Divorce laws examined as a whole have not become more lenient. However, administering of laws has become more liberal so that although the laws are the same or in some cases more strict, a divorce has become easier to obtain in most states.

Public opinion has changed so that today there is a more liberal acceptance of divorce as a way out of an unhappy marriage. It might be argued that concepts of marriage have changed so that now marriage is more often looked upon from the individual viewpoint than as an obligation to society, the assumption being that if the individual does not find happiness in his marriage he has a right to end it and seek happiness elsewhere.

Legislative bodies, religious groups, leaders in public life, and educators are greatly concerned with family instability in the United States.

During the past 20 years most colleges have instituted courses in Family Sociology and in preparation for marriage. Students have welcomed these courses and enrolments are large. With the rapid rise in divorce during and after World War II, high schools throughout the nation started courses in family life for seniors. Today the trend is to include family life education from the elementary school through high school and college, and parent education classes at the adult level are given in most larger cities.

The Facts about Family Breakup

Sociologists have contributed much to an understanding of the broader social changes taking place in the family. For the past 20 years studies of the family have been an important field of sociological research. These studies have revealed some basic information about family interaction and about family instability.

Marriage failure comes in the early years of marriage. Approximately half of all couples who divorce, do so within the first five years of marriage. The divorce rate reaches a peak during the third year after marriage and then gradually decreases for the next 40 years.

Separation, or the psychological breaking of a marriage reaches a peak during the first and second years of marriage. In cases of divorce during the early years there seems to be an average delay of about a year between the psychological break in a marriage, and the legal termination of the marriage. If a marriage does not end in divorce until its tenth or fifteenth year then there is a longer period of time between the

psychological break and the divorce. It has been estimated that for all divorces there is a delay of from two to three years between the psychological break and the legal termination of the marriage.

In considering divorce reform there is often confusion because legislators consider divorce itself to be the evil they are attacking rather than the factors which resulted in the psychological breakup of the marriage. A better understanding of the marriage relationship shows divorce as the legal termination of a marriage which failed two or three years earlier.

Divorce rates differ by socio-economic level. Publicity is given to divorces among the upper socio-economic classes and especially to multiple divorces among the wealthy. It is a common saying that desertion is a poor man's divorce but divorce and desertion are both higher among the lower socio-economic groups. In general, the divorce rate rises with descent in occupational level. An exception is that the divorce rate among rural farm people, regardless of economic level, is low compared to the rate among urban residents.

A trend toward earlier marriage appears to be a factor in family instability. The average age at first marriage has been lower in the United States than in most western countries, and this age has been decreasing during the 20th century. In 1900 the average age at first marriage for the male was 25·9 years and for the female 21·9. In 1950 the average age of the male was 22·8 and for the female 20·3. A lower happiness rating and a higher divorce rate is found among couples who marry while in their teens. It is not possible to know definitely factors that might contribute to the higher divorce rate among those married at young ages. However, some factors may be: more marriages forced by pregnancy, greater parental interference in very young marriages, and the emotional immaturity of youth.

Divorce rates differ by regions in the United States. In general the divorce rate increases as one goes from the Atlantic seaboard to the Pacific. For years the divorce rate has been highest in the Mountain states in the west. Such explanation are offered for this as: the conservatism in the eastern United States among people in general, the freedom of the west to break away from traditional mores and the more favourable sex ratio for women in the west which enables them to declare their independence.

Religious affiliation is a factor in the divorce rate. People who claim no religious faith have the highest divorce rate. Those who have a civil marriage rather than a religious have a higher divorce rate. Those who come from homes in which the children did not go to church have higher divorce rates than those who were participants in a church. Divorce rates are from three to four times higher in marriages between Catholics and Protestants. This higher divorce rate has been found to be in marriages in which the wife is Protestant and the husband Catholic; the divorce rate in marriages of Protestant men to Catholic women is about the same as in marriages between people of the same

faith. Jews and Catholics have a lower divorce rate than Protestants have.

Length of courtship is related to the stability of marriage. Dating and courtship are universally accepted in the United States as a necessary prelude to marriage. Dating and pairing off in couples without parental supervision begins in junior high school, from ages 12 or 14 and continues until marriage. There is almost no parental dictation about whom a child shall marry although there is parental guidance in mate selection, especially in families in which there is a close parent-child relationship.

Several research studies have sought to determine the relationship between how long couples had known each other and their divorce rate. Most of these studies show that the divorce rate is lowest among those couples who had the longest acquaintances and who had been engaged longer.

Evidence seems to show that second marriages of divorced persons tend to be unstable. Detailed analyses of data in two states revealed that in those states second marriages are not so enduring as first marriages. In the states studied (Iowa and Missouri) the divorce rate increases with successive marriages. This finding is supported by information collected by the Bureau of Census on previous marital status, which shows a higher divorce rate in second marriages after divorce.

The majority of couples divorcing have no children. In 1930, 62 per cent. of couples divorcing were childless and in 1948, 58 per cent. The divorce rate decreases as the number of children in the family increases. This information has sometimes been interpreted to mean that children hold a marriage together. However, a more accurate interpretation is that divorce comes early in marriage before couples have had a child, or certainly before they have had more than one or two. It may also mean that if a marriage is not going well the couple avoids pregnancy. There are still no adequate answers to the effect of children upon the marital relationship. Some research indicated that it is not the presence or absence of children which is associated with marital happiness but rather the desire of the couple for children. The unhappiest couples are those with one or more undesired children.

Children and Family Break-up

Concern about the divorce rate in the United States centres about the welfare of children. More than 300,000 children under 21 years of age were involved in the over 400,000 divorces granted in 1948 and the trend is for more couples with children to divorce. In the past, counsellors, judges, ministers, social workers and writers on marriage problems have generally encouraged couples to stay together for the sake of the children, regardless of the failure of the marriage relationship between the parents. Some states have laws which make it more difficult for couples to separate if there are minor children, the

assumption being that the couple should stay together for the sake of the children.

The belief that a marriage should be held legally intact for the sake of the children was based upon the belief that divorce and the stigma of divorce was harmful to children. Sociologists are now seeking to learn whether conflict and unhappiness in the home may do more damage to the emotional development of the child than a parental divorce or separation.

A close relationship has been found to exist between marital happiness of parents and the happiness of their children in marriage.

Research now in progress among children of divorced parents shows that some children felt more secure, and happier, after their parents' divorce was final. There was also a group who felt less secure and less happy after the divorce. Research is needed to help answer the question, " How bad should a marriage be, before a divorce is recommended for the sake of the children ? " One city, Toledo, Ohio, has a compulsory counselling service in connection with the family court. It is part of the function of the counselling service to determine in cases of divorce involving children under 14 what is best for parents and children, and to make recommendations to the Court.

Divorce is probably more of a crisis for parents and children in the Western countries than in some other parts of the world, because of differences in family make-up. The small family group of parents and children isolated from close relative, is a contrast to family organization elsewhere which may have the large kinship group where the child has others than his parents to turn to in time of trouble. In the United States, because of the great mobility of population, urban families are often living among strangers and only casual acquaintances. Unhappiness in the family and divorce may be much more traumatic for children and parents than in societies where the children can be absorbed by the larger kinship group.

Evidence indicates that unhappiness and divorce of parental marriages may affect the child and his outlook on marriage. Children from happy homes tend to have more successful marriages than children from unhappy homes or homes broken by divorce or separation. A recent study of divorce in three generations revealed that if both sets of grandparents had divorced the ratio of divorce to marriages among their children had been 1 to 2·6; if one set had divorced the ratio was 1 to 4·2; if neither set of grandparents had divorced then the ratio was 1 to 6·8. It is possible that the example of failure and unhappiness in the home previous to and following divorce, conditions the child to enter marriage with attitudes and feelings more conducive to marital failure than to success.

A study of 3,000 university students indicates that the child from unhappy or divorced parents is handicapped in his efforts to establish heterosexual relationships during the adolescent years. Young people from unhappy, non-divorced parents or from unhappy divorced parents

had less confidence in their ability to have a successful marriage. On several developmental items aimed at measuring progress in establishing heterosexual relations during adolescence the children from happy homes had the advantage over those from divorced parents and from unhappily non-divorced parents.

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Qualitative Changes in Family Life in the Netherlands

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1. EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL FACTORS OF CHANGE IN FAMILY LIFE

Recent literature on family life in all countries strongly stresses the influences of total society, so that one might easily get the impression that family life is merely a function of culture and society. Experience in the Netherlands with various types of families under similar social and cultural circumstances has shown that today we are apt to overrate the social and cultural determination somewhat, while underestimating the originality of the family as an institution. The originality of every family, appears most clearly perhaps in family care, within the limits of a social welfare policy. The assistance given by the social worker is digested by each family in a non-predictable way. This originality arises from the two great social facts determining the development of Dutch society, namely the rapid industrialisation and urbanisation of the last fifty years.

Both these factors are a result of the growth of the population. (In 1897 it passed five million and in 1950 ten million). This is a factor which in its turn is based on the behaviour pattern of family life. Although this pattern has the semblance of remaining unchanged it appears on closer inspection that there is after all a change in the different groups of the population. As a general trend, which does not hold good for each group separately, a tendency may be observed in the various provinces and among the various religious denominations towards a greater similarity, and as regards the grouping based on income a tendency towards adjusting the number of children to the economic possibilities. Now these changes have sometimes been explained as a result of the industrialization process, and this may be partly true ; the curious reaction to the war shows that the psychological attitude of the population is much more important in explaining the number of children born, and that industry only has an influence on it via its psychological consequences. Family life in itself has quite as important an effect as industrialized life, at least in some types of families.

Helmut Schelsky has shown how the family reacted in Germany to the insecurity of the outside world, by shutting itself off and retiring into itself.[1] Such a study is lacking for Holland, but there also two factors attract attention, namely the rise of the closed family in an open society in the beginning of the industrialization process in the first half of the 19th century, and the greater consolidation of the family

during the war and especially the tightening of bonds with the circle of acquaintance. These facts derived from common observation are in keeping with Schelsky's conclusions. The very low percentage of married women in occupational life round about 1920 probably shows that the zenith of the isolated family is to be found at about that time.

Of greater importance is the fact that six types of families may be distinguished in Holland to-day. A number of them may be found in areas of a similar degree of industrialisation and urbanisation, so they cannot be directly related to degrees of industrialisation. Perhaps this can be explained by a tendency to have the pattern of family life of the previous generations as one's ideal and to make that the standard to live by.[2] Nevertheless the entire originality of family life cannot very well consist in remaining a few paces behind in social development, because to-day we see new, better-adjusted patterns of family life developing. But we must not only record the adjustment of the family to external factors, but also the development of what Burgess and Locke[3] called "from institution to companionship", in other words the emancipation of women and their increasing share in public life, as well as the longer period of youthfulness in the parents and the more rapid maturing of the children. All these are factors in present day families, and they are not wholly to be explained as the results of industrialisation and urbanisation. They are autonomous trends in development that may be observed in the whole of our western culture, and they manifest themselves both in the industrialisation process and in family life.

2. Types of Family Life

Systematic research into Dutch family life, the nature of family relations, the extent of integration and the norms of diverse groups is entirely lacking, let alone systematic field research into the changes that have taken place during the last fifty years. Partial data may be gathered here and there from reports on investigations, but these usually relate to problem areas or problem groups, so that they easily give rise to a lop-sided view. It is possible to get some information all the same. For instance it is amply clear that the young people in all the various social groups, especially those from 14 to 18 years of age, have become a social problem group of their own during the last decades, and every one is convinced that the family as such is no longer capable of solving it. Initiation into adulthood, has escaped from family guidance. It has passed into the hands of institutions for the young (youth organisations and especially secondary schools) or alternatively it does not take place at all, a thing which has lately caused a great deal of anxiety.

By the side of these clearly observable facts the intuition of the sociologist is perhaps also of value, even without its being tested by a formal investigation (although that of course remains the ideal). This leads

me to believe that in our Dutch society six types of family may be distinguished.

(*a*) *The patriarchal type*

Under this heading I would not include the joint family under the supreme authority of a grandparent. This no longer occurs in Holland.[4] But the patriarchal conjugal family, in which the children have no rights as against the father until their majority, whilst he has the disposal of his children as if they were his property, can still be found sporadically in rural districts. From this it does not necessarily follow that the woman is subject to the man ; she may be his partner. The children, however, are not free to choose their own vocation and their choice of a matrimonial partner is strictly limited by the authority of the father. This patriarchal type, however, is disappearing and seems to be pre-industrial.

(*b*) *The open family within a closed village or neighbourhood*

In this type the local community prevails over the individual family. This community has its male society which gathers in the evening to discuss the day's events over a drink, and its female society whose members solve household problems in neighbourhood chats during the day. The children are fed, clothed and sent to school under the watchful eye of the community. The children from about their twelfth year to the time of steady courtship often form a communal group of their own, with the boys and girls segregated, which forms a strong check on the behaviour of its members and thus develops a powerful character-shaping influence. Neighbourhood and family life intermingle freely. This type of family with its small inward concentration is mostly found in small rural hamlets or in the so-called slum areas of the towns.[5] This seems to be another pre-industrial type, and displays a resemblance to the conjugal family within the joint family. The milieu in which this type of family occurs has consequently been called the proletarian rearguard by van Doorn.[6] The suggestion which this term implies is that as the proletariat advances this type of family life will disappear. The resistance these areas in the towns put up against the process of individualisation of industry and urbanisation is so strong, however, that this assumption is rather dangerous.

(*c*) *The closed family in an open society*

This type of family lives in a certain amount of isolation in an industrialised and urbanised society, and as an institution it displays a certain amount of enmity towards that society. It attempts to safeguard its members from the dangers threatening it from without. Those dangers are especially considered to lie in the system of standards which industry and the town together have built up as social ties which threaten to disturb the traditional system of standards of the family. This antithetic attitude also often reveals itself in regard to the school youth organisations and societies for grown-ups, because all these

make calls on the time which the family considers its own. But just because this type of family does not provide any social training, the school, the youth organisation and the societies for grown-ups are starting to demand more time, because they are taking over this social education. Thus the conflict, in which the family is converted into a bastion, is increasing. The function of this type of family is perhaps to maintain traditional values in times of rapid change. But the family only exercises a function of sociability without making its members do something in common. Few outsiders enter such a family. In spite of the idea of wishing to be pleasantly together the result as often as not is pure boredom. This closed type of family undoubtedly has a fertile breeding-ground in Dutch culture, which is of the typically domestic sort. In this connection one should note the curious pattern in which Catholics, Protestants, Liberals, Socialists all have their own party, their own press, radio corporations, television companies and trade unions. Most schools are denominational, as well as many sports clubs and recreation centres.

The number of families of this closed type cannot be established without an accurate investigation. Perhaps the figures for the percentage of married women in employment show that this type reached its zenith in the years round about 1920 since when there was a decline.

(*d*) *The counterfeit family in an open society*

Included in this type is the family whose avowed ideal is the closed family and which pretends to be one to the outside world, but which cannot really realize this ideal of integration within the home on account of the pull society has on it. This kind of family lives in a situation of conflict because it accepts the system of standards of the closed family whilst its members have already unconsciously accepted the system of standards of society, i.e. working milieu, recreation milieux and urban ways of life. The emancipation of women and the right of self-determination on the part of the children where work and the choice of their friends is concerned, has made its entry in such families without their altering their system of standards. It then becomes an inner conflict of a neurotic nature. In addition a large number of the children receive an education which is higher than that of the parents, with the result that the milieux of the parents and the children grow apart so that they have difficulty in understanding each other. Moreover the new society gives ample opportunity of rising in the social scale, in which rise the man often takes part but not the woman. Notwithstanding all this there is a persistent effort to appear a " decent " family to the outside world, by which is meant the closed, firmly integrated family. Here again we cannot fix the number of these families, without closer investigation. My personal impression is that this type occurs mostly in families whose religious denominations have identified their system of standards too much with a type of family in which this system of standards was safe.

(e) The boarding-house type

This is a type of family that sociologically speaking is hardly a family, a social unit, at all. There are still affective ties between the blood-relations but there is no or very little integration. There is only the house in common, but joint meals are not regularly taken, nor is leisure time spent together, nor do the members of such a family do any work in conjuction. They eat and sleep at home as it happens to be convenient to them. They do not know of the others where they are or what they are doing. This does not happen between husband and wife and seldom between the mother and the children under twelve, but it does happen between the parents and the children over fourteen and among brothers and sisters.

This type of family is restricted to the town, especially large towns. It is to be found in working-class milieux, especially of the unskilled type ; sometimes in the new lower middle classes as well, but not in the older type of middle class. It seems that when the slum areas of the towns lose their closed character it is the open families who are the first to be ready to sink into the boarding-house type.

(f) The open family in an open society

A new type of family is developing which seems to be succeeding in combining family life with participation of all its members in social functions such as work environment, the school as social institution and community on its own, recreation and games, trade unions and social and charitable activities.

Family life is then no longer looked upon as a natural self-evident fact, but as a definite task for which time should be found or set aside and for which trouble should be taken. It is a task for all the members, the father and the mother as well as the older children. The house-work is done by all, whilst in the older types of families it fell to the mother and/or the eldest daughter. In the new type there is much more comradeship, also between the parents and the children, in fact more of democracy than in the older types. They often make an appointment with each other for the whole family to be together, setting aside the time for it. But this does not prevent each separate member from moving in his own social milieu as well. On the contrary it is considered an enrichment that each makes a contribution from his own milieu.

With the rise and growth of this type of family one also often finds that the circle of acquaintance is of increasing importance: similar families which call upon each other, go out together, where the children can be brought when a set of parents wishes to go on holidays, a circle in fact that helps each other in word and deed. It is as if the joint family, after having fallen apart in autonomous families, has risen again in the circle of acquaintance, which often means more to these families than their relatives do. This open type of family, which has succeeded in its integration, seems to be increasing. Perhaps one may

look upon it as a family that is matured, that has overcome industrialisation and urbanisation and that is a new form in which an equilibrium has again been attained.

It is not necessary to stress the fact that the above types are ideal types in Max Weber's sense of the word. Field research will have to prove their validity and it will very probably discover traits of more than one type in particular cases. Research will finally have to settle whether and how the types also succeeded each other in history.

NOTES

[1] Helmut Schelsky, *Wandlungen der deutschen Familie in der Gegenwart*, Dortmund, 1953.
[2] René König, *Materialen zur Soziologie der Familie*, Bern, 1946.
[3] Ernest Burgess and Harvey Locke, *The Family*, N.Y., 1950.
[4] A few remains of this type still appear to exist in Drente, see the (strictly confidential) report Zuid-Oost Drente of the Ministry of Social Welfare.
[5] Dr. I. Haveman, *De ongeschoolde arbeider*, Assen, 1952.
[6] Jac. A. A. van Doorn, soc. drs., *De proletarische achterhoede*, Meppel, 1954.

A Starting Point for a Family Typology

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INTRODUCTION

The need of practical objective family description

Whereas in most sociological branches a fairly great number of descriptive studies are at our disposal, this is far less the case with regard to studies relating to family sociology.[1] One would look in vain for a fairly extensive study, let alone a typology, of the present-day Dutch family. This is really remarkable in a country where in the first place the descriptive aspect of the social sciences has always been given special attention, and where family life is flourishing and generally admitted to be of vital importance in the social structure. In the foreign literature much more data is to be found, relating to sociological family studies. However it is notable that these are generally lacking descriptions of normal family life in particular social groups, based on direct, more or less systematic observation.

Very often specific problems have been the starting point of family research.

1. Many studies of family life are not based on family life as such but are only concerned with certain factors, supposed to be sufficiently important to affect it, e.g. the car, television, cinema, birth control, emancipation of woman.

2. The family in difficulties has often been the subject of research. There is e.g. Schelsky's excellent study of the present-day German refugee-family. However, for an investigator who is not particularly interested in the problem of refugees, or some other specific problem, the difficulty remains that he does not get information about the average normal family.

3. Another similar example is the description of the family life of primitive tribes. The studies on this subject are often very interesting (e.g. Mead & Benedict) as, on account of their ethnological aspects they may open new perspectives. However, they are neither meant for, nor applicable to, a total comparison with a situation elsewhere.

4. The first mentioned disadvantage of one-sidedness is also found in the studies, which have been taken up on account of prospective Government regulations, e.g. on birth control or old age pensions. They, too, emphasise one particular aspect, i.e. the subject that the regulation will deal with. From this point of view they consider the consequences for family life.

5. Perhaps the historical approach has been more popular than any other one. Nearly always, at least in Europe, the Victorian

middle class family is taken as the starting point and the development pursued till the present day. It goes without saying that in this case "field work" plays only a modest part. Another no less serious disadvantage, however, is that here, for the sake of comparison, often the middle class family is presented as the family *par excellence*, thus assuming its evolution to be normative for every type of family.

The above enumeration should not be misunderstood. All these studies are excellent in themselves and suited to their purpose, but it would not seem unreasonable to point out that their approach is too much specialised for them to give a reliable idea for anybody wishing to know something of normal family life in the different social strata in a particular country today. The general comments on the subject in text-books, etc., are mostly too vague, because accurate data are lacking.

Far from underrating existing studies, it is suggested that family sociology should do full justice to :

(*a*) The specifically national element ; this is bound to be very important in family sociology and tends to decrease the value of foreign studies as sources of knowledge ;

(*b*) the need for information on the life of the normal (at any rate, not *a priori* abnormal) family ;

(*c*) an adequate and fundamental class discrimination ; even an extensive work like "The Family" by Burgess and Locke pays little attention to class differentiation ; only the differences between urban and rural communities have been worked out in detail. Such an unorthodox presentation of facts as is found in "Profiles from Yankee City" or in "The Social Life of a Modern Community" by Warner and Lunt is virtually more instructive as far as class differences are concerned.

A practical difficulty in the realisation of these, somewhat pretentious, ideals may be that the normal family has no reason for admitting sociological investigators to their home. Social workers, jurists, ethnologists and historians have no business here.[2] A solution might be to aim at an inconspicuous family investigation associated with some other more obvious and more justifiable inquiry into other conditions.

At this point the present paper moves from criticism, to a very tentative, more constructive contribution.

The Double Use of Free Interviews

1. *Free interviews in research on radio-listening and the spending of leisure*

In 1953, 1954 and 1955 the Netherlands Central Bureau of Statistics made two statistical investigations on this topic.[3] Being aware that many of the chosen objects were not easily measurable and quantifiable it added to the 14,000 fixed questionnaires about 350 free interviews,

one hundred and fifty of which were family interviews.[4] The families were chosen at random, the only restriction being, that a sufficient number of families were chosen from the most important social strata. The investigators were only guided in this sense, that in each interview they raised a number of points on radio listening and leisure activities, but for the rest the respondent was allowed to start a discussion on any point he considered important. For this idea, the investigators are greatly indebted to the studies of B. Seebohm Rowntree and G. R. Lavers, who in their book " English life and leisure "[5] followed this method, be it in a much more generous and thorough-going way. The results of the Dutch interviews were not meant to be treated in a statistical way, but served :

i. as an illustration of the statistical results.

ii. as a pilot-study for the lay-out of the questionnaire.

They opened unexpected possibilities to ascertain special traits in Dutch family life, in the sense as mentioned above.

2. *From leisure research to family research*

In a further gauging of the actual spending of leisure time of a family, the family situation in a limited sense soon proved to be of great importance. A case in point is the family with young children who are tied to their home. Also, it proved that a correct opinion on the employment of the radio set could only be formed, if some idea could be got of the authority situation within the household.

Another interesting fact was the difference in opinion and attitude of children, who were first interviewed individually and afterwards in their homes together with their parents (eventually by a different interrogator).

Also important is the location of the radio set in the house. In a farm house, e.g. where radio was more or less regarded as part of the farmer's equipment (weather forecast and market reports), the apparatus was put rather high up on the wall, where it could not be reached by the children. In another rural home it was found to stand between the wall and father's own chair (in front of the stove). So in the team of interviewers the tendency grew to distinguish particular family types, in order to interpret the various statements and wishes against a comparable background.

Much more surprising was the inclination of many of the interviewees to submit freely certain family problems to the investigators ! Undoubtedly the method adopted for the interviewing has tended to further this. If the interviewee is requested to speak freely about the spending of leisure time of his family, he often out of his own free will proceeds to give an outline of his family life ; he informs the investigator how certain habits have originated, and why other things which are " en vogue " elsewhere, are for some reason or other not done in his family.

When he has started speaking freely he very soon passes on to his own problems in connection with his family and he expects that the interrogator will at least be a willing audience, and often an expert adviser.

It was somewhat alarming to discover how many interviewees appeared to be relieved, because at last there was a visitor to whom they could unburden themselves.[6]

3. *The scientific value of the interviews*

We should beware of overestimating the factual value of the 150 available interviews for defining a justified opinion. The merits of this family research are certainly not to be found in the great thoroughness or in the purposefulness of the conversations. Before everything they were meant to support a correct conception of ways and means of recreation. The opinions of the family, which were heard at the same time, were only an additional feature. But it is just this casualness, which guarantees in a greater measure an absence of bias on the part of the interviewer and the interviewee and in this way inspires more confidence about the reliability of the acquired information. It is the personal contact between interrogator and interrogated that because of a fitting environment and a certain confidential atmosphere may lead to an " Aha Erlebnis " which e.g. the reading and filling in of a questionnaire could never produce.

These interviews might be characterized as a useful fund of suggestions for a typology.

Suggestions Drawn from the Interviews

1. *Method of interpretation*

i. The ideal interpretation.

If a non-statistical application of a number of family interviews is aimed at in the attempt to get a more general insight, it is obvious that in order to create types the families should be combined into groups. We should not start from existing groups or types. All the interviews should be arranged into small groups, based on similarity. Then the small groups should be combined into larger ones, etc.

ii. The actual interpretation.

As these interviews were also intended to form a practical support to a statistical investigation with an arrangement made previously, the latter was retained. Therefore, the following should be regarded as a survey of characteristic features of family life in various social classes rather than as a pure typology.

2. *A few introductory remarks with regard to family life in the Netherlands*

Before starting on a more detailed recording it may be just as well to outline a few general peculiarities of family life in Holland for the benefit of the reader outside Holland.

i. Generally speaking Dutch family life shows in its daily manifestation a high degree of cosiness, as demonstrated, e.g. by drinking tea and coffee at any and all times of the day ; and often biscuits and chocolates are taken at the same time. The domestic equipment is meant to be comfortable rather than efficient. Any amount of ash trays, lamps, small tables and easy chairs are found in the average middle class home. The wife is house-proud, though the story about the traditional Dutch cleanliness is often exaggerated.

ii. The husband is generally not decidedly patriarchal, at any rate less so than the German husband, but he is definitely more patriarchal than the American husband. Also in this case the husband-wife relation is probably connected with the small surplus of women which has prevailed for many centuries. Burgess's companionship marriage is generally only applicable to more progressive families.

iii. The average family size is 4·2. The 2–3 children family is fashionable in the middle classes. The respect for the School Certificate or some other qualification is remarkable. The general tendency of parents is to give their children a better education than they had themselves. The extent of parental authority is possibly rather similar to that in Scandinavia and Great Britain.

iv. Dutch family life is characterized by a high degree of stability. Great value is attached to certain fixed rules and practices, e.g. the collective celebration of birthdays and festival days, the joint partaking of meals, etc.

3. Special groups

Working class families

This class can be roughly divided into three groups :

1. The proletarian rearguard.
2. The middle group.
3. The proletarian vanguard.

i. The proletarian rearguard.[7]

This is the world of hawkers, pedlars, dishwashers, casual labourers, etc., living in the old quarters of the town centre or in backward hamlets. Although this group has many interesting different traits of family life, it will not be treated here. It is one of the beloved hunting-grounds for social workers, etc., many aspects of the family life being abnormal in the eye of the official society. On the contrary the following remarks aim to give some material about the " normal " and exactly on account of their normality less studied ways of family life.

ii. The middle group

This is the traditional, in other aspects so thoroughly studied labour-class. The factory-hands, truck-drivers, wage-earning artisans, living

in the vast labourer-quarters of the big towns.[8] The way of living of this group tends to become more and more similar to the style of the lower middle classes and, as to their outer appearance, especially to that of the independent shopkeeper, tradesman, etc.

This seems rather amazing, since the character of factory-work is quite different, e.g. from that of shopkeeping. Undoubtedly this results in a different pattern of behaviour of the men working in these jobs. But maybe many male investigators often paid too little attention to the fact that the style of family life is to the larger extent determined by the mentality and the possibilities of the wives. And, at least in the Netherlands, living conditions for the wife of the labourer so far as social security, housing, spending patterns[9] and spatial mobility are concerned for the generation of to-day resemble to an amazing degree those of the lower middle class.

In fact the working-class family is not a very special world of its own, but nevertheless a sufficient number of interesting special points remain : The husband-wife relation is certainly more than in other classes, characterized by the authority of the husband. He leads the conversation with the guests, there is no need for him to be courteous, he has an acknowledged right to be admired and behaves like a " grand seigneur ", especially during the first period of the marriage. The consequence of the accent on physical performance is that, when later on this " he man "-appearance is maintained only with difficulty, the wife, who by then (particularly when the children are married) has an occasion to earn some income of her own, succeeds in acquiring a more independent position.

Much attention is paid to the small children (sometimes with a kind of emotionally directed irregularity that resembles the family life in the proletarian rearguard). The children are rather soon grown-up (16, 17 years), get some income of their own and go their own way. Parental authority then lessens rather quickly.[10] The influence of the parents upon the choice or the change of a job or the marriage-partner is pretty small. The relationship with the older children, who are still living in the house of the parents, often becomes businesslike as in a boarding house.

When the children are younger, family-ties are generally strong. The families are rather big and the pretty limited intellectual horizon enforces the need for reciprocal emotional support, within this primary group.

iii. The vanguard

The interviews showed the existence of a small, insufficiently investigated proletarian vanguard. It does not adopt many ideals and habits from the middle class but tries to create its own style of living, often inspired by a religious or political background. Too few representatives of this group were interviewed to make an adequate picture possible.

Middle-class families

It is not in the first place in the sociological treatises that one can find pictures of the Dutch middle-class family but in the Dutch " belles lettres ". These detailed accounts by well-known authors and especially authoresses are often extremely valuable, particularly where other sources fail. But many of them describe bygone times, and moreover they do not, from a systematic point of view, fit into a scientific description. The preference of these authors for the town-dwelling middle-class family is perhaps not an accidental one. If one tried to characterize the Dutch way of living, very probably one would astonishingly soon produce a sketch of the life of a Dutch middle-class family. The birth of the Dutch nation in the trading-towns of the 16th century and the traditions of the merchant-republic of the 17th century undeniably contributed to this coincidence of national and class-bound type.

The middle-class can be divided into old and new middle-class.[11] The " old " one is the classic middle-class, merchants, shopkeepers, independent artisans, etc. The new one consists of the wage-earning groups : " white-collar workers ", officials, teachers, etc.

i. The old middle-class

The relation between husband and wife is determined by two factors, each of them working in an opposite direction.

(*a*) In this group one finds relatively many orthodox religious groups (Roman Catholic and Protestant), with strongly founded masculine authority.

(*b*) The assistance of the wife in all kinds of business-matters and the responsible task of the rather complicated household-budget give her a much more important task than, e.g., in the new middle class. It often lends to the marriage the character of a partnership, as one may find, e.g., in farmer families.

The combination of those two traits gives a very special flavour to family life in this group. It often results in a safe position for the wife, whose rights are guarded by the reciprocal dependency and who is shielded against too heavy responsibilities by the authority of the husband. Much attention is paid to the education of the children, particularly to their outward comportment (polite behaviour, dress, school reports, family duties). The authority of the father is often less obvious than in the working-class family, but in fact it is much more firmly founded. It is this that entitles the parents to influence the choice of jobs and of acquaintances and possible marriage-partners. Generally speaking, family ties are firm, firmer than in any other group, farmer families excluded.

ii. The new middle-class

In this group an element becomes apparent which in many textbooks is described as a general trend in the development of family

life, but which is, according to the experience of the interviewers, particularly found in the new middle-class (and possibly in the upper class). The family being rather small and the household much simplified,[12] the wife,[13] who has no special ideas or wishes on home-building of her own often has not more than a half-time job, especially when the children are old enough to go to school. In this class the wife does not very often obtain a sufficient education to be able to create her own style of housekeeping and often has only little work to do. In this stage a certain tension may enter the relation between husband and wife.

The husband, between thirty and forty, possibly a busy career-builder, comes home to find rest. The wife, who has been tied down to the house (with just an occasional gossip with the neighbours) expects her husband to offer some distraction, and may put forward proposals for activities to be undertaken. If the husband is not minded to do so (and generally he isn't !) the partnership has been changed into its counterpart. Instead of feeling cared for mutually, both parties feel neglected. If anywhere, one finds here a fertile soil for therapeutically directed family-research. It is exactly in this kind of families that the authority-obedience relation between parents and children has been frequently replaced by the worry-revolt relation. Family ties seem to be less firm especially in those cases where the lack of common interests of a more business-like kind is not compensated in social or cultural topics.

Peasant families

The peasant family has been more often the subject of sociological study. Moreover the farmers' life has such a style of its own, that sociological literature from abroad can be used here more successfully for comparisons than in other fields. For these reasons no description of peasant family life has been given here although the interviews give some interesting details of family life in the newly reclaimed *polders.*

Upper-class families

These include the families of directors, managers, the learned professions, university graduates, college teachers, officers and so on. Compared with the other groups in the field of family sociology, this one has the most differentiated structure. More than anywhere else these families have a style of their own, making it much more difficult to find out certain basic values and critical points of comparison. For the distinction of clear types the interviews were by far insufficient in number. The following points can be mentioned as pilots for a closer study.

i. In this group too the observation of the wife's position seems to be a good starting point. Generally speaking in this group household duties have diminished nearly as much as in the new middle class. At any rate the house and the style of living have grown less pompous

and a certain fashion of informality has replaced much of the former custom.

Nowadays three main types are to be distinguished :

(*a*) *The partnership relation*

The wife has no job of her own but takes an active part in the work of her husband (e.g. the wives of mayors, physicians, clergymen). This type reminds one of the old-middle-class wife. Indeed her partnership gives her a more solid position and a stronger tie with her husband. But because many of her duties oblige her to leave the home, the relation with the children tends to be less tender than in middle-class families.

(*b*) *The wife with a job of her own*

Situations may be so different and interviews were so scarce that no generalisations can be made.

(*c*) *The housewife*

Especially in the lower strata of the upper class the wife who is just a housewife in every stage of her marriage, tends to the position of the new middle class women. In a way the dangers are still greater here because the upper class husbands often work under a heavy strain and consequently cling more tightly to moral support from the family, or on the contrary they are still more apt to neglect their family life. On the other hand the wife, if she has had the advantage of a better education, often finds easier ways in creating a world of her own than her middle class sister does.

ii. The authority of the parents in the upper class family often is, in the popular opinion, a rather delicate question.

This may be the case particularly where official duties prevent both parents from spending a sufficient quantity of time on education. Here cases of self-inflicted authority-recession are frequent. But the interviews generally give quite another impression : authority seems to be well founded: children are during many years financially dependent on their parents and need moreover much time to reach a cultural level which enables them to discuss a sufficient number of questions with their parents on equal terms.

Conclusions

1. For all sorts of comparative studies it would be helpful if a larger number of detailed pictures existed on *normal* family life in the various social classes and the various countries.

2. Observation of normal family life is lagging behind because the professional observer usually has no vocational reasons to examine normal cases.

3. Detailed investigations, made in other countries, are, in the field of family sociology, less valuable than in many other fields, because family life often has such outspoken ***national*** characteristics.

4. Observations on subjects such as radio-listening, use of leisure, spending habits, can be employed as a useful approach to the actual family problems.

5. In such cases free interviews made by trained investigators, seem to be a reliable method.

6. Many processes, supposed to occur generally in family life, on closer examination seem to prevail only within restricted groups.

7. The study of the task and the position of the wife is a reliable starting-point for research in the field of family-sociology.

NOTES

[1] See Prof. R. König, *Materialien zur Soziologie der Familie*, S.2: ". . . sie bestehen in einer erschreckenden Unkenntnis auch der primitivsten Tatbestände, ohne die man das Leben der Familie gar nicht begreifen kann".

[2] König, op. cit., S.4 : " Die Familie in der Gegenwart ist im wesentlichen ' Intimgruppe ' . . . Zum Wesen der Intimgruppe gehört es, dass sie sich weitgehend vor dem Eindringen allgemeingesellschaftlicher Interessen versperrt".

[3] *Radiobeluistering en vrije tijdsbesteding*, Utrecht, 1953 (English summary). Second one not yet published.

[4] This work was done by a team of seven sociologist-interviewers: Mrs. M. Burgers-Molendijk, Miss M. C. S. de Jager and A. R. Goudswaard, D. Hazelhoff, J. Moeliker, A. H. Symons and P. Thoenes.

[5] London, 1951.

[6] This is quite in accordance with G. R. Lavers' experiences in England.

[7] From J. A. A. van Doorn, *De proletarische Achterhoede*, Meppel, 1954.

[8] The factory-hand in small towns or in the country is not mentioned here.

[9] Budget investigations, Central Office of Statistics, Utrecht, 1953.

[10] This is perhaps more obviously the case with the boys than with the girls.

[11] J. P. Kruijt, *Arbeiders en nieuwe middenstand*, 1947.

[12] Household mechanization is in the Dutch middle class in steady progress, though it has not by far reached the English and U.S.A. stage.

[13] Especially the one living in a flat in town.



Introduction to the Family System in Japan, China and Korea*

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This article was originally intended as a survey of the transition taking place in the family in Japan, China and Korea in the 20th century. In some academic circles of the past, it was believed that the culture or social structure of the three Far Eastern nations was very similar or even identical. In this introductory article, therefore, I wish to point out the differences in the family systems of these three countries in relation to their social structure, and I have requested each writer to describe the recent changes in the family system of each country in a separate section which follows.

The comparison of such a small group as the family has little significance if it is treated separately from the national social structure which envelopes it. I believe we can reach a broad understanding of the family by a survey of the way in which it is influenced by the social structure, as well as how the family affects the rest of society, and by utilizing results of this survey as the basis for comparisons.

Among the common features of the family system in the three countries, the first thing to point out is the great importance of the family in the social structure. Since the 19th century, under the influence of the Western capitalistic economy, the social structure of each country has experienced significant changes. Even then, as far as the importance of the family in it is concerned, no remarkable change has been observed. Recently Communist governments were established and new laws were passed in China and North Korea, but since we cannot see how the family in those countries has actually changed, our attention will naturally be focused on the picture of former conditions before the end of World War II.

The need for dependence upon the family is tremendous in any country whose central government has quite poorly developed social policies—especially those relative to a social security system. In the Western world where Christianity, the capitalist economy and socialism have appeared one after another and have developed in their correlationships, individualism was established, and based upon it, the idea of social solidarity has grown up dynamically within each country. Thus social policies in those nations have made remarkable progress, and the role of the family in the welfare of its individual members has been reduced so as to be comparatively insignificant. This is, however, not the case with Asian societies. The family system has to take care of the welfare of individuals, and naturally the burden upon the family was quite heavy. Needless to say, the paucity of social

welfare policies on the part of the central government was chiefly responsible for this. In spite of the high prestige in the field of culture, the social policies of the central governments of the three Far Eastern countries were quite poor, though that does not necessarily mean a complete lack of social policies in the full sense of the word. It was because the government played so small a role of this kind and shifted social welfare responsibilities to other institutions. This was a stumbling block in the way of the development of social policies for the state as a whole. It is almost impossible to explain the situation in this short essay. In short, because of the comparatively low productivity, each family in general was not fully capable of securing a satisfactory livelihood for its members. It then became necessary to organize many kinds of groups consisting of families, with the purpose of helping each family to care for its members. Such groups of families maintained reciprocal and complicated relations with each other. Among them, the *tsung-tsu* in China, the *jongjung* in Korea and the *dōzoku* in Japan show the characteristics of the family system of the three countries, and reveal their differences most distinctly. This is because both the nature of the families making up these groups and the nature of the combination of the families are different among these three countries. Nor must we neglect the fact that they are the basic political units in the local district in each country, and have had some influence upon the political structure of each.

The remarkable transformations of Asian societies occurring during the 19th century and the 20th century were initiated by the strong influence of Western civilization. In this respect there was a distinct similarity between the three countries. But, since the changes have taken place within the framework of special historical and social conditions in each nation, going back to antiquity, their various differences appear as well. While the three Far Eastern countries are superficially alike, in their inner aspects they are remarkably different from one another. To make this point clear I should like to describe the basic differences among the family system of China, Korea and Japan.

1. Ancestor Worship and Lineage

When we compare the three Far Eastern countries, we must observe that the relations of Korea and Japan to China were quite different. Though it is evident that until the 18th century, the influence of Chinese culture upon Korea and Japan was very great, the degree of Chinese influence was not the same. On the one hand, the influence of Chinese culture upon Korea was profound, and its social structure was altered significantly as a result. On the other hand, the Chinese influence upon Japan was much less significant, and in the deeper aspects of social structure almost no influence can be observed.

As far as ancestor worship is concerned, Korea was under the influence of China from antiquity, and particularly since the 15th

century, has come to have almost the same pattern of worship as China. Ancestor worship was very important in the Chinese and Korean families. Comparing ancestor worship for the two with that in Japan, in the Chinese and Korean systems, the ancestor must be strictly consanguineous for the present family members. On the contrary, this is not always the case with the ancestor in the Japanese form of ancestor worship. This difference arises from the differences in the nature of the lineage of the Japanese family from that of Chinese and Korean families. It should be noticed further that this in turn led to many other major differences in various features in the Japanese family system.

Tsung-tsu in China, *jongjung* in Korea and *dōzoku* in Japan were special groups of families the purposes of which were to help each family through various kinds of cooperative activities among the families belonging to the group. In China and in Korea the membership in these special groups was confined to the family of patrilineal succession from common ancestors, in other words, to those who had kinship relations to each other expressed by the same family name. Accordingly, people worshipped their common ancestors at ancestral halls (temples of the whole *tsung-tsu* or *jongjung*), who were the guardian deities of the *tsung-tsu* or *jongjung*, and at the same time, the symbol of the integration. In addition to this, people worshipped their own ancestors in their own homes. In the worship of common ancestors in China, a leading family of the *tsung-tsu* was often lacking, in which case, an able man of the older generation was appointed the leader of the *tsung-tsu*, and ancestor worship was chiefly conducted by this old man. In Korea, the main family of the *jongjung* was called *jonga*, and the family head of the *jonga* (*jongson*) carried on ancestor worship. Besides him, an elder in the *jongjung* was usually appointed the *jongjang*, for the administrative business of the *jongjung*. These differences arose from differences in the custom of succession. That is, in China, the father who was the family head divided the family property equally among his sons. This mode of inheritance was often followed while the father was alive. Sons who inherited an equal share of the property maintained an equal position in the *tsung-tsu* and helped each other even when they began earning independent livelihoods after their father's death. Thus, none of the family secured particularly a higher status and controlled the rest. In Korea, such equal distribution of family property did not occur. The first son would take the bulk of the property, and the rest of the sons used to establish branch families with quite small properties which were given to them. Therefore, the *jonga* retained a larger share of property, and enjoyed a higher status than the branch families. Thus, the *jongjung* was integrated around the *jonga* as its centre. The *jonga* used to occupy such powerful positions as *yang-ban* (government officials), establishing their great political authority in a local district, and in such cases the *jongjung* formed a local community.

On the contrary, ancestor worship in Japan had an entirely different character. Ancestors were not necessarily consanguineous with the family members. This was because the lineage in Japan did not mean the kinship of an individual, but it was considered to indicate the succession of the family itself. The lineage of the family was manifested in an incessant succession of positions of the family head, who as its representative, was regarded as the bearer of the family continuity. And the succession used to be borne by one of the sons of the family head. When he had no sons, he adopted a spouse for his daughter from another family and appointed him as the successor. If he had no child at all, he adopted a boy and a girl from other families, making them a married couple, and appointed the husband as his successor. Whether the adopted son or daughter were relatives of the family head or not did not matter, and whether they belonged to his *dōzoku* or not was unimportant. What did matter was the social status of the boy's or girl's original family which should be equivalent to that of the adopting family. This is explained partly by the fact that the *dōzoku* was not an exogamous group at all. On the contrary, the *tsung-tsu* in China or the *jongjung* in Korea was strictly an exogamous group, which prohibited the adoption of a boy with a different family name from outside the *tsung-tsu* and the *jongjung* for the family successor. Therefore, when the head had no boys, he selected the successor from among boys of the same family name. This is quite different from Japan. Accordingly, Japanese lineage should be expressed in the strict sense as the lineage of the family itself, and not that of individuals. While the genealogy in China and Korea records all members of a *tsung-tsu* or a *jongjung*, that in Japan is shown as a line connecting successive family heads. The continuity of the family was believed to be necessary for the welfare of family members, and contributions from family members to support the continuity of the family were recognized as one of the highest moral obligations. They worshipped ancestors of the family lineage as the guardian deity of the family. The family head was the priest in this worship, and at the same time, the representative of the family and its administrator. Therefore, the moral rule that the family members should obey and serve the head for continuing the family, governed them fairly strongly. In Korea and in China, where consanguinity was thought of more highly and the ancestor was regarded as the fountainhead of the family, the absolute obedience to and service for ancestors and parents was one of the highest moral obligations. In old China, for example, the custom of withdrawal from the world and mourning for three years when one's parent died was widely observed.

In this way, the meaning of the ancestor, and accordingly ancestor worship in Japan, is evidently different from that in China and Korea. In fact we should not overlook the much more important worship of the family deity in Japan which exists alongside the rite for the ancestor. To make only a brief comment on the relation between the two, the

family deity rather than the ancestor is acknowledged as the original and orthodox guardian of the family, and the ancestor is regarded as having one of the functions of the family deity. The Buddhist altar was established in the family for ancestor worship only after the introduction of Buddhism into Japan. A new branch family was permitted to establish an altar of its family deity as a branch altar of the main family's guardian deity, for the family deity of *honke* (main family) was, at the same time, the guardian deity and the object of common worship of the whole *dōzoku*. The altar of the *honke's* ancestor was built separately from that of the family deity, and was worshipped jointly by the families in the *dōzoku*, and this was also true of the case of the grave-site of the *honke*. Whatever the nature of ancestor worship might be, the coexistence of the ancestor with the family deity is found only in Japan. This characteristic originated in the different nature of the lineage in Japan than that in China and Korea, but a further explanation would be out of place here.

2. Family Property

As already pointed out, the family system in the three Far Eastern countries had a great responsibility for securing the welfare of family members, so that family property was a matter of great importance. Family property did not mean all possessions of individual members of the family. In China, family property customarily was equally divided among the sons. Even then, because family property was considered indispensable for the existence of the family—that is, for the welfare of family members, the family head administered the property which eventually would be divided equally among his sons. In other words, it was thought to be the joint property of the family members, and it was probably from this that the convention of the equal distribution of family property was derived. In contrast, neither in Korea nor in Japan were the family possessions the joint property of the family members. In Korea, it was the property of the family head, but in Japan, at least since the 12th century, it has been thought to belong to none of the family members nor to the family head, but to the family itself. Therefore, in Korea and Japan, all of family property preferably would not be distributed, but in reality it was difficult to maintain this institutional demand, because ordinarily most of the sons customarily established branch families except the son who would succeed to the headship of the main family. Upon the establishment of a branch family, it was considered necessary to give a portion of the property of the main family to the branch family as the minimum basis of its welfare. But some differences in branch family-conventions existed between Japan and Korea. In Korea, family property belonged to the family head, and only a small amount of property was given by the family head at the start of a branch family. In Japan, since the personal earnings of sons were often put at the disposal of the household, the family head had to give them a fair amount of property at the start of

their new independent careers. But the amount of this donation depended upon the wealth of the family, so we cannot oversimplify the situation. In Korea, when lineal ascendants like the great-grandfather or the grandfather were still living, sons not infrequently continued to reside in the same household with the family head, thus forming a composite family. But in Japan, as the boys grew up, the father made them start new independent homes in the form of branch families. Even with this situation, the composite family sometimes appeared, though the reasons for it were much different than in Korea, and cases were less frequent. In Korea and Japan, when a branch family was established, a great part of the family property was retained for *honke* (in Japan, and *jonga* in Korea) and only a small part was shared with the branch family. Through such an unequal division, *honke* in *dōzoku* (*jonga* in *jongjung*) acquired a higher social status than a branch family. If the *honke* of the *dōzoku* or the *jonga* of the *jongjung* were politically powerful and occupied a high social status, the distinction in the social status between the main family and branch families appeared most sharply.

These are the phenomena which reveal a strong resemblance between the family systems of Japan and Korea. It must be admitted that in other aspects of branch family conventions, there are considerable differences between the two countries. They derived from the different nature of the lineage of the family. That is, in Korea, a branch family had to be connected with the *jonga* through patrilineal descent. In other words, a *jonga* and a branch family belonged to the same *jongjung* through the relation of patrilineal descent with the same family name. On the contrary, in Japan, non-consanguineous existed as well as consanguineous branch families. That is, the relation between the *honke* and the branch family was not necessarily combined by consanguinity from the beginning, so we cannot consider it as a pure consanguineous relation. For example, a powerful family often had a servant (not consanguineously related) establish a branch family, and counted him as a member of the *dōzoku*. Such a branch family had a lower social status than the consanguineous branch families, but had close relationship in various phases of life as a member of the *dōzoku*. In many cases, such a family participated in the management of the *honke* and through its service to the *honke* secured its livelihood. Hence, its relation was, in a sense, that of a serf. The fact that such a non-consanguineous relationship was involved in the *dōzoku* meant that the *dōzoku* was based on different criteria from either the *tsung-tsu* or the *jongjung*. It is therefore to be noted that the nature of the mutual aid within the *dōzoku* differed from that in the *tsung-tsu* or *jongjung*, and that the guardian deity of the *dōzoku* were not purely consanguineous ancestors.

3. Family Head and Other Family Members

The fact that the power of the family head was strong was almost the same in the three cultures. It cannot be satisfactorily explained

only because of the fact that there were many enterprises which were operated as family undertakings. The power of the family head is better understood in connection with the social structure of the whole nation. There were differences in the strength of control by the family head and in the ways it is exercised in the feudal age and in the age of the capitalistic economy. Both the feudal age and the age of the capitalistic economy sharply differ from those of the Western world, and differences will be found even among the three Far Eastern countries during the two periods. Thus, the explanation is not so simple. But attention is called to the fact that all through these periods, the family was acknowledged as an important unit in social life. The family was considered important as a unit rather than as a system of relations among its individual members, and the family head was considered to be the symbol of the family as an integrated whole. In short, it meant " the family head is equivalent to the family itself ". The more powerful was this way of thinking, the more sharply did the control by the family head appear. Several facts will substantiate this. For instance, though an occupation might belong to an individual, the occupation managed by the family head was customarily regarded as the family's. In various forms, this management was supported by the labour of the whole family. Some of the family members might participate in other enterprises with the development of a capitalistic economy; in spite of this, the occupation of the family head was recognized as the real occupation of the family. Being the manager in the family enterprise, the family head employed, commanded and led the other family members. When he administered the family property and played the rôle of a priest in ancestor worship and in other rites of the family, he ruled the family members for those purposes. He had the right to determine the course of action of family members, too. In other words, he was responsible for their upbringing, and had the right to decide the selection of their mates, the school they were to attend, the job they were to have, etc. In a poor family, when the son or the daughter was put out for an apprenticeship because of poverty, the family head received their wages in advance; he received the money sent from those working outside the family. The family head could also arrange the sale of a son or daughter. In China, the family head divided the family property equally among his sons, and in Korea and Japan, he had his sons establish a branch family. In Korea and Japan, which were greatly influenced by Chinese culture for a long period, the impact of Confucianism upon family morals was conspicuous. One of the most important doctrines of Confucianism was the insistence upon absolute obedience of children to their parents. Confucian doctrines as well as the complexities of family composition and the prevalent political system promoted the concentration of authority in the family head, in the period when a feudal form of society was firmly established, i.e., since the 15th century in Korea or the 17th century in Japan. Even with the effects of the capitalistic economy

in weakening the family head's control, the authority of the family head over the members was often acknowledged because of his position as the manager of the family enterprise, as long as the family enterprise was maintained.

The unequal status of the sexes was a common phenomenon in the family system of the three countries. In China, girls had no right to share the family property as boys did. Girls were only given a relatively small fund for marriage by the family head. In Korea, no branch family could be based on a daughter, who lacked a son's qualifications to receive a small part of the family property, and she was only given a relatively small fund for marriage. In Japan, a daughter was at times allowed to establish a new branch family, but generally speaking, she was given only a small fund for trousseau, excepting the period before the 17th century when a girl had the right to inherit a part of the estate left behind by the family head. As seen in the practice that girls were merely given a marriage fund from the family head, there was distinct inequality in the right of inheritance as between the sexes.

In the three countries, common features can be also seen in the manner of classifying the family members into members on the family line, and members outside the family line; but each culture had its own characteristics. In China, the term *dishi* was used for the family head, the sons, sons of the latter and their wives so long as they stayed in the same household, and the term *chushi* for the couple of the family head's brothers and their offspring living in the same domicile with the family head. The family head divided the family property equally only among the sons of *dishi*, and not among the sons of *chushi*. The family head played the role of *chu-hun-tse* (the master of the wedding ceremony) only at the marriage of *dishi* boys. In the case of *chushi* boys, their fathers (family head's brothers) played the rôle of *chu-hun-tse*. In Korea, the family head, the eldest son who succeeds to the headship of the family, son's first son and their wives are called *chik-ke* relatives, and other family members are included in the *bang-ke* relative. In Japan, almost as in Korea, the family head, the successor, the first son of the successor and their wives are *chokkei* members, and all others are considered to be *bokei*. Even a servant who stayed in the same house for a long time was recognized as a *bokei* member of the family, and in this particular Japan is different from the other two countries. In China, there was no difference in social status of the *dishi* and *chushi* members. On the other hand, members in an older generation enjoyed a higher social status than those in the younger one, and those in the same generation were arranged in order of the age from the oldest, and the order of their status was recognized in accordance with the number included in their names. In Korea and Japan, the *chik-ke* and *chokkei* relatives were acknowledged to occupy a higher social status than the *bang-ke* and *bokei* relatives. In case of an upper class family, the difference in status between *chokkei* and *bokei* was quite remarkable. Even in the daily life of the family, there was

discrimination in treatment, the seating was hierarchically ranked, and clothing and food distinctions were made between the two. The fact that the *jonga* of a *jongjung* in Korea and the *honke* of a *dōzoku* in Japan occupied a higher social status than the branch family was derived from the peculiar concept of *chik-ke* and *bang-ke*, and that of *chokkei* and *bokei*. With the growth of a capitalistic economy, however, such discriminations were dropped somewhat earlier than the system of control by the family head.

A comparative study of the family system in the three countries would require more detailed discussions of these problems, which are omitted here because of the limitation of space.

* *Editor's Note.*—Professor Ariga has prepared a second introductory paper which discusses the other contributions to this Section. Copies of this paper will be available at the Congress, and it will be published later in the *Supplementary Volume* of the *Transactions*.

The Family System in China

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I. THE TRADITIONAL FAMILY SYSTEM

(*a*) *Ancestor Worship.* Ancestor worship was of great significance in the traditional family system in China; the most important duty of the descendants was the performance of ritual services for the ancestors, generation after generation. According to the strict interpretation of the ritual, only the male descendants could conduct the ritual services. By the rule of exogamy prohibiting a marriage between members of the same *tsung-tsu*,[1] the husband of a daughter was necessarily an outsider. It was regarded as conduct contrary to the orthodox ritual to adopt the husband of a daughter as a successor to the ancestor cult, although such cases were sometimes seen in practice. When a Chinese family had no male offspring, it was preferred to adopt a male member of the same *tsung-tsu* who belonged to the next generation, for example, a son of the brother or a son of the patrilineal cousin.

In the ancient ritual system, only the eldest son held the privilege of officiating at memorial services for the ancestors, and other sons only helped the eldest, but this privilege of the eldest son became less prevalent and all the brothers came to participate in rituals on an equal basis in later times. The ancient ritual prescribed that one honoured only the four predecessors in the family line in the ancestral halls, but again in later times, this came to have less binding power, and it became a custom to honour the more distant ancestors in the ancestral halls which were kept by the *tsung-tsu* in common. Such a custom was especially popular in Central and Southern China. Ancestor worship not only strengthened the unity of the individual families, but it was one of the most important factors in uniting these families into a larger group of the *tsung-tsu.*

(*b*) *Genealogy.* Genealogy was important in order to avoid the mistake of adopting an outsider into a family. The compilation of the genealogy was also greatly esteemed as a means of strengthening the unity of a large *tsung-tsu* beyond the range of an individual family. Since the spread of printing techniques, the genealogies of a large *tsung tsu* have sometimes been printed. The genealogy of a *tsung-tsu* had the tendency to include horizontally all the members of the *tsung-tsu* living at that time, while the genealogy of an individual family put a stress on the vertical relationship between a father and sons.

The male line was the one considered to be important in the genealogy. The names of females (daughters or wives) appeared only with secondary significance, or they were sometimes omitted. It was a matter of course that the family name was transmitted to the descendants of

the male line. The female usually did not change her own family name by marriage, but it was sometimes the practice to call herself by two family names—her own and her husband's family name combined.

(*c*) *Inheritance.* Although there were some exceptions, the property was, as a rule, equally divided among sons. Daughters did not have the right to a share of the family property, although they sometimes received a dowry and trousseau for their marriage.

Partition of the parent's property among the sons while the parents were alive was not forbidden by law so long as it was conducted by the parents themselves. But it was regarded as an important item of traditional filial duty for the sons not to live apart from their parents and not to divide the property before the parents' death. Therefore, as a rule, the sons divided the property and lived apart after the parents had died. When they did not divide the property and lived together even after the parents' death generation after generation, the size of the family increased, and its composition became more and more complicated. Thus, the famous Chinese "composite family" with joint residence of successive generations came into existence. The problem of this composite family will be discussed in the following sections.

(*d*) *Authority of the Family Head.* It was common that a person of an older generation held a higher position irrespective of age. So in the family where many collateral relatives of the head lived together, it was not necessarily the case that the son of the family head succeeded directly to the headship of the family.

As the filial duty toward the parents was highly respected, the power of the family head was very strong in the family where only his lineal descendants and their wives lived together, although the ancient Roman right of killing one's own children was not recognised. On the other hand, when the collateral relatives of the family head lived together and shared the property in common, the power of the family head was much weaker. According to the traditional law, when the parents were unjust, the children could not go to court against them at any time. A collateral member of the family, however, could sue the head in court, especially for unjust handling of the family property. In the family, which included collateral members and especially the married collateral adults, the family head was the head of the association of small families, heads of which were collateral male adults included in the composite family. The authority of the head was limited to such business as to represent the family externally, and internally to adjust the interests among the small families which composed the composite family, and to do certain work necessary for the guidance of the composite family as a whole.

The mode of life in a composite family varied very much. In the composite family where joint life was highly developed, all lived the same life to the extent of wearing the same type of clothing and eating

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the same kind of food. But in the composite family where this tendency was less dominant, each small family unit lived its own life, in regard to food, clothing and other consumption aspects. Even then it was regarded as a composite family through the fact that the incomes from the family property were distributed among the small families, say, once year. Anyway, in the composite family where several scores of men lived, the task of the family head was so difficult to fulfil that often a man was appointed the family head because of his ability and virtue irrespective of generation or age. In some composite families of large size, several persons in charge of helping the family head were elected, and in not a few families was seen the system that males and females in the family took charge in turn of domestic tasks of various kinds.

The responsibility or the right to nurture the immature child seemed to be held by the real parents in any type of family. To become a *chu-hun*[2], when the child married, was a formal matter and it could differ from the usual relations in daily life. Even so, parents became the *chu-hun* oftener than the head who was neither father nor grandfather of the child. When a grandchild of the head married, sometimes the grandfather became the *chu-hun* and sometimes the father did, according to the custom of the area.

(*e*) *Position of Man and Woman.* Distinction and disparity of positions between the sexes was, needless to say, very great. One avoided entering into direct contact with the opposite sex as much as possible, and women were supposed to devote themselves to household chores and to be obedient to men. "Women's virtue is to be not so intelligent". This proverb expresses most clearly the Chinese way of thinking.

Premarital sexual relations were strictly prohibited. Chastity on the part of women was expected to be maintained most strictly. It was the general rule that men and women had not seen each other's faces before their marriage and that parents or other elder relatives arranged the marriage for them through match-making.

Although, in some exceptional cases, a man had two or more wives, or there was no clear distinction between the wife and concubine, the number of the wives was, in principle, limited to one and the distinction between the wife and concubines was clear. The wife was responsible for the housekeeping and also had the right to command concubines and servants. Some women acted contrary to the woman's virtue of obedience by taking advantage of the proverb that the woman be ignorant. In the family the woman was generally obedient to the man, but it should be remembered she was not always so. Only a well-to-do man could possess a concubine, so it is natural that statistics showed few concubines.

(*f*) *Family Property.* When the collateral relatives of the family head lived together, they held the property jointly, portions of which were to be divided among brothers by the rule of the equal distribution of property. There are two legal interpretations of joint property: first:

that it could exist as between father and son as well as among brothers, and second, that there was no joint property between father and son. But both seem to have existed in practice. At any rate, joint possession of property is the most important indicator of family formation. A Chinese residence, in many cases, consists of several buildings on one site, and as there is a thick mud-wall between rooms, each room is used separately even in one building. Therefore, even after they received their portion of the property to start independent life, it is not unusual for several different families to live together in one residence. In this case, according to Chinese common sense, they are independent families even if they live in the same domicile. On the contrary, before they get their portion, they are looked upon as a part of the composite family, even if some of the family members travel or migrate to some other localities. In such extreme cases as the polygamous family, for example, in which the oversea-Chinese leave their wives in China for work in South-Eastern Asia, and marry native women, it may be hard to answer the question whether there is only one family or two. However, it may be said, the Chinese establish their own family upon division of joint property, and as long as they do not divide it they are included in one family.

II. TSUNG-TSU

(*a*) *Main Family.* I have already mentioned that there existed a *tsung-tsu* group of very wide range in China. It is not going too far to say that there did not exist the hereditary main family in the *tsung-tsu* group as was seen in Japan, excepting in the case in which feud and rank were transmitted by primogeniture. When a younger brother set up a new family he might respect the elder brother, but it was rare that respect for the main family continued for several generations. After equal division of the family property, changes would take place in the relative wealth and social position of each family, and the wealth and the position which one got by his own endeavour and good luck after he set up the new family were more important. So, several influential families generally existed in one *tsung-tsu* group because of their position and wealth. It was from among these influential people that the head of the *tsung-tsu* and other officials were elected. The expansion of the sphere of the *tsung-tsu*, and an intensification of its functions owed much to the existence and the endeavour of these influential people. A Chinese *tsung-tsu* is hence not a homogeneous group of families with the same level of wealth and social position.

(*b*) *Mutual Aid.* The *tsung-tsu*, in its highly developed form, possessed common ancestral halls, common wealth and a school to educate all the children of the *tsung-tsu*. The common wealth of the *tsung-tsu* was used to pay for ancestor worship, school expenses, wedding and funeral ceremonies, to help the poor, and for the compilation of a common genealogy. Some wealth existed for general purposes and some for particular purposes as listed above.

Where the *tsung-tsu* groups were powerful, the people who did not belong to the influential *tsung-tsu* could rarely live at home in the district without the acknowledgement of these *tsung-tsu* groups. Troubles between the influential *tsung-tsu* groups sometimes intensified themselves and continued for generations, and were sometimes accompanied by violent fighting. It is quite natural, in the districts where the influence of a *tsung-tsu* was strong, that people worked very hard to strengthen *tsung-tsu* unity. For example, the building of ancestral halls or increase of the common property was promoted more actively than in in other regions. Some people recognised a famous man of the same family name as having a common ancestor, by reason of the fact that they simply had the same family name even though they were not related by blood, and built an ancestral hall which gave a common basis for the unity of the people with the same family name. This is one of the manifestations of the endeavour to expand the sphere of a *tsung-tsu* group.

The mutual aid relationships within a *tsung-tsu* group were by no means homogeneous. First, there was a considerable difference between "go-into-mourning relatives" and "no-mourning relatives". Go-into-mourning relatives were those whose ancestors four generations back were common and who had to wear the mourning dress when one of the ancestors died. This is the sphere of the regular relatives which the orthodox rite prescribed as such. Among the go-into-mourning relatives there were several subdivisions, such as "three-year-mourning", "one-year-mourning", "seven-month-mourning", "five-month-mourning", and "three-month-mourning" according to the relative degree of intimacy. There was a great difference in mutual aid between the closer relatives like brothers or uncles and the distant relatives like the second cousins.

In case of a large *tsung-tsu* group, the sons in a few generations down from the common ancestor sometimes became the nuclei of the subgroups of the *tsung-tsu* and were worshipped in the ancestral halls by their descendants, and, furthermore, these subgroups were differentiated into several sections. Within the *tsung-tsu* group, some subgroups were powerful and others were less influential; thus there existed differences in power, wealth and prestige among these subgroups.

III. Transitional Phases in the Twentieth Century

After the Chinese realised the technological superiority of Western Civilisation as a result of the Opium War (1840–1842) and several succeeding defeats, and began to plan the import of Western technology, they were still confident of Chinese superiority in non-material culture. Even when the establishment of the constitutional government was advocated after the experiences of the Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895), they thought that they should maintain and strengthen the family system which supported Chinese morality rather than change it into Western ways. It was true that changes took place in

the family system through contacts with Western culture, but in those times there was a remarkable tendency to strengthen and to expand, not only the individual family, but also the *tsung-tsu* system as is seen in establishing ancestral halls, common properties and compiling common genealogies.

This tendency was changed after the republic was established by the revolution of 1912, especially after the May Fourth Movement (1919). It came to be insisted that the spiritual and moral reforms were necessary to save China. Democracy and science were the two representative slogans that the progressivists of the time proclaimed. Confucianism, the spiritual backbone of the old times, had never been attacked in the open so far, but the May Fourth Movement brought about a rapid decline of its influence. The family system, closely connected with Confucianism, has been severely criticised since this time. The *tsung-tsu* group was also blamed as the stronghold of old traditions and as the system which maintained the power of the selfish rural gentry, the nucleus of the *tsung-tsu* group.

In the media of public opinion, the Chinese family system has been severely attacked since World War I, and the idea that the family system should be kept as it was completely lost its appeal. Taking into consideration social and economic changes, such as the growth of cities, the development of commerce and industry, progress in communications and transportation and the increase of migration, it is quite proper to say that not only the doctrinal dispute but also social and economic factors heavily influenced the change in the Chinese family system. It is difficult, however, to say how much the Chinese family system actually changed in the thirty years from World War I until national unification by the Communist Party. It might be more accurate to say that although the strict observance of the old system gradually faded among intellectuals and in the cities, there have been no great changes at least in its basic structure, particularly in the rural areas.

Among the traditional customs, the most remarkable change occurred in the position of women. The movement to abolish footbinding which restricted the physical freedom of women, and to give girls a school education, had arisen even before the revolution of 1912, and it obtained a fair success by the beginning of World War II. Women's activities outside the family became much more extensive, and the number of women working in commerce or industry increased. With the emergence of communist China, women seem to be expanding their activities more than before.

It is hard to say how the family system actually operates in communist China. No one doubts, however, that the tempo of change has become much more rapid. The constitution and the marriage law of the new China recognise the complete equality of both sexes and forbid anyone to interfere with the freedom of marriage choice. The marriage law prescribes the mutual inheritance of the property of a husband and a wife, and of parents and children, which, too, is quite different from

the traditional custom. The land reform law prescribes the opening up of the land which belongs to the ancestral hall. This is intended to deprive the *tsung-tsu* of its material basis. A civil law except for the marriage law has not been enacted as yet. It is worth noting that the communist government encourages the trial of parents and other relatives in open court for their crimes, whereas by the old custom concealing the misconducts of relatives from the outside world was regarded as a virtue. The policy of the Communist Party is said to aim at breaking up familism, that is, behaviour primarily for the benefit of one's own family, and at intensifying the love for the state and the people as a whole. It is evident that the Chinese family system, which has been in transition in these one hundred years, especially since World War I, is about to undergo its greatest transformation under the strong direction of the communist government.

NOTES

[1] *Tsung-tsu* in Chinese means the group of families connected with each other through patrilineal descent and with the same family name.

[2] *Chu-hun* is the man who takes charge of a marriage contract.

The Contemporary Japanese Family in Transition[1]

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The Meiji Restoration in 1868 was the great turning point in the development of modern Japanese society. Since that time great changes in Japanese society in the 20th century have taken place. There were two very important periods in this transition. One was the prosperous period after World War I, and the other was the period of occupation by the Allied Powers after World War II. Politically, victory in the Russo-Japanese War at the beginning of this century was followed by Japanese expansion onto the continent, making use of the capitalistic economy borrowed from the West in the latter decades of the 19th century and rapidly developed by the beginning of the 20th century. Japan's capitalistic economy had another period of remarkable progress during World War I. Following that, colonisation of Formosa, Saghalien, Korea, expansion into Manchuria and penetration into the world market brought about a prosperous era for Japan. She lost all these economic resources, however, as the result of her defeat in World War II and the national economy collapsed for a time. But the foundations for her reconstruction were provided by the Occupation Forces. Reforms initiated by the Occupation Forces penetrated deeply into her political and social structure; among them reforms in the legal system have been particularly striking, yet it should be remembered that the actual transformations were brought about by the Japanese themselves and were based upon Japanese tradition. A good illustration of this is the transition of the Japanese family.

I. FAMILY PROPERTY

As stated in the introductory paper, the Japanese family was a unit of living and an entity represented by the family head. Westerners may understand it better if I say that it is similar to a "juridical person". Though it is not entirely identical with the juridical person in modern law, there is a similarity in that both are thought to behave as a unity. Families living in the same community often helped each other in various ways in their daily life. Though in reality aid was given by individual family members, this was regarded as given and received by the family itself. Besides co-operation by the family itself there were personal relations between individual members of two or more families. A variety of mutual aid relations between families, which were prescribed by custom, were accumulated in a community one above the other, e.g., communal work in the fields, common worship (worship of the guardian deity of the *dōzoku*[2] and the *buraku* or

the community and other kinds of rites), marriage and funeral ceremonies, construction and repair of houses, prevention and repair of damages, repair of roads, reforestation of communal mountain areas, rationing of materials, payment of taxes, finance, regular meetings and elections of officers, etc. Among these matters, the family head took care of the important business by himself, while business of minor significance might be handled by another acting as an agent of the family head.

Family property was not regarded as the total sum of the individual property of each family member. As is clear from the characteristics of the family mentioned above, it was rather the property possessed by the family itself and administered chiefly by the family head. All members of the family endeavoured to contribute to the maintenance and increase of family property, for the continuance of the family was possible through its maintenance. And without and outside of the family, the welfare of family members could hardly be protected. This underlies the high value set on the family system.

The following are regarded as family property: dwelling houses, house sites, cultivated fields (paddy fields and upland fields), woodlands, hayfields, ponds, swamps, furniture, agricultural tools and machines, domestic animals, cash, negotiable papers, grain, the right to tenant land and the co-ownership of land possessed by village community, etc. No statement will be made about the fisherman's family, the merchant's family and the craftsman's family, but obviously the special items needed for their occupations were included among the family property. As mentioned above, the family head administered the family property and he also dealt with major income and expenditure. Daily minor expenditure was managed by the housewife. It was also her duty to administer the daily grain-consumption, and even when the heir's wife came into the family, she never transferred this duty until her retirement. Although the family head gave the members pocket money, they rarely held property of their own. Possession of real estate by individuals was extremely rare, and when it did occur, it was possible only with the family head's approval and under his control. Therefore, individual property of family members was chiefly movable estate, especially currency. If the family head did not approve, no one could possess much money in secret. As long as the family property and family members were under the control of the family head, the individual property of a member rarely reached a large amount. This was the general situation of families below the middle class before the beginning of the 20th century. Even in the 20th century this custom has continued in rural communities.

During 1873–76, the government carried out the great task of land-tax reform through which the national tax-system was firmly founded and the private ownership of land was legally established. At this time, the government began the codification of the Meiji Civil Law which was an imitation of the French Civil Code, and naturally the concept of

private ownership was based on that of the Code. What had been regarded as family property came to be considered as the family head's personal property by being registered in his name. This is a legal reform of great importance which made possible a gradual change in the concept of family property, though it was not accompanied immediately by a real change. Therefore, since the beginning of the 20th century, when an individualistic economy began to flourish with the development of capitalism, a gradual but great change has taken place in the way of thinking about family property and a new concept of property has appeared—that property is owned by an individual. This change was noticeable first in the cities. But the traditional family system has not disappeared as a result of this change, so it is not correct to say that the idea of personal property, in the full sense of the term, has been established. As I remarked in the introductory paper, the traditional family system was, in a sense, a result of a socio-political structure lacking well-developed social policies. The government, for which centralisation of authority and increase of military power were matters of immediate necessity, had no funds to spare for the development of strong social policies. Under these circumstances, the development of the capitalistic economy did not entirely break down the traditional family system but rather played a part in maintaining it in one form or another. The power of the family head was reinforced by the provision that family property should be registered in the name of the family head. The family head in Japan is, therefore, not regarded as feudalistic, but it does exist as such, being conditioned by the development of the capitalistic economy, governmental policies and by administrative processes. The rapid increase of employment enabled some of the family members to work and make a living outside the family enterprise. In most cases, however, the family was so poor that it was necessary for individuals to stay at home and to put their earnings into the household fund. If the family was not too poor, a considerable part of the individual's income was acknowledged as his own property and could be saved for starting a new, independent household of his own.

In most cases, the first son succeeded to the headship of the family, and the rest of the sons established branch families, or were adopted into other families as eventual successors to their heads. Ordinarily the marriages of the younger sons involved the establishment of new branch families. When the *honke* or the main family had enough reserves, the family head of the *honke* gave a certain amount of immovable and movable property to these branch families. Usually the amount of property allotted to them was small and at most amounted to one-third of the property of the *honke*. Therefore, it differed according to time and circumstances. In the case of tenant farmers, a part of their tenant-land with its tenant rights was sometimes given to branch families. As the total amount of arable land cultivated by them was small, the amount which could be spared was extremely slight. The

share of property bestowed on branch families was given them as the basis for their independent life, but since it was quite inadequate, they were obliged to supplement their incomes by earning further income. The development of capitalism increased employment on the one hand, and the *honke* decreased the reserve to be shared with branch families on the other hand. Thus sharing of property notably decreased.

Such situations as described above have gradually changed the relation between a main family and its branch families. Formerly, a branch family was given houses, house-sites, cultivated fields, and so on, by the main family. When it existed in the same community with the main family, it received various kinds of protection from it, and in turn, enhanced the political power of the main family. The main family and its branch families (collectively named the *dōzoku*) were connected with each other by various forms of mutual aid. But with the development of capitalism and the establishment of banks and industrial associations, changes took place in the relationships between the *honke* and the branch families, and the economic dependence of a branch family upon its *honke* lessened. Since most emigrants from rural villages into urban society managed to make an independent living, they maintained only weak ties with their main families back in the rural villages.

After the surrender in 1945, the Occupation Forces carried out far-reaching reforms of the Japanese legal system. Among them, the legal abolition of the traditional family system is an important item. In the abolition of the traditional family system, the most crucial points are: (1) Abolition of the headship of the family; (2) equality of husband and wife; and (3) equal distribution of parents' estate among children. The traditional concept of family property was legally abolished in the latter half of the 19th century, and the family property came to be regarded as the personal property of the family head. However, in the peasant family, the traditional concept has not yet completely disappeared. Even at present, when the family head transmits his property to his successor, he is ashamed if the inherited property has decreased for any reason other than that of establishing a new branch family and selling a portion of the farm necessitated by the Land Reform Act. This indicates that the traditional concepts are still maintained. The Land Reform, which was carried out during 1947–49, achieved a great redistribution of arable lands among farmers. The Occupation Forces spoke of this as the abolition of "feudalistic" land ownership, but the effects of the Land Reform seem questionable when we see farmers who are doing their best to maintain their redistributed land as their family property, the very foundation of the traditional family system. Farmers are strongly opposed to the new Civil Code which provides for equal distribution of the parents' (chiefly the father's) property among children. One of the main reasons is that the family property, particularly real estate, is too small to divide further.[3] Under such circumstances, sons who are to inherit a part of the parents' estate usually abandon the right voluntarily.

This will indicate how intensely they desire the continuance of the main family. There is another reason : sons have firm confidence that if they lose their jobs or find themselves in poverty after they leave their home seeking for a new life, the source of help will be the family in which they were brought up. In fact, we have seen this happen quite frequently in times of panic following prosperous periods. In spite of the appearance of various social insurance schemes and the fairly rapid progress in social work in the postwar period, these projects are still far from the stage at which they will be ready to lift the burden from the family. Because of financial difficulties, it has been very difficult for the government to achieve striking progress in its social policies. These factors have encouraged the retention in one form or another of the traditional family system which was legally abolished.

II. Wives, Concubines and Marriage, etc.

The power of the family head over the members is illustrated in his ability to decide matters concerning his children's marriages. Though the power of the head was not appreciably weakened with the rise of the capitalistic economy, nevertheless estrangement between parents and children in thought and action was sometimes clearly evident; this resulted from the development of the Christian evangelism, the liberal and socialistic movement, the organisation of labour unions in big industries in the cities and of farmers' unions in rural villages, and the vigorous growth of political parties since World War I. The rapid increase of employment in rural and urban communities absorbed many of the younger generation and contributed more or less to the emancipation of the youth from the control of the family head. Those who were attracted by radical ideas in the formative period of such movements, came not from the ranks of industrial labour nor from among peasants with small holdings, but rather they were recruited from the intellectuals of the upper class. In their homes, therefore, conflicts between new and old ideas took place. Marriages through the go-between system were still dominant and mates had to be selected from within the same class; this was true particularly in upper class families. This is why romantic attachments raised a serious problem in one way or another.

In this connection, the lineage is an important factor in the Japanese family. The *lineage* meant the continuity of the family. The successor to the headship was the candidate for the priesthood in the worship of the family deity, as well as the heir to the family property. Accordingly, he acquired a special social status suited to the status of the family, and the family head had responsibilities in selecting an adequate successor. Customarily it was the first son, but this son's qualifications had to be approved by the head himself and by the community as well. If the family of the head's wife was of equal status with his own family, the community approved his son an adequate successor to the headship. If he had no child, he adopted a boy from another family

so as to provide a successor for the family. Although it did not matter whether the boy was his relative, and whether he had the same family name, it was necessary for the boy to be taken from a family which possessed a similar social rank to the head's own family. After the adoption of a boy, when the head selected his spouse, the same considerations prevailed, and this was also the case when he had to adopt a youth to marry his daughter and to become his successor. Sometimes, when the family head's wife had no son, he made one of the concubine's sons his successor. In most cases the position of the wife was higher than that of a concubine who usually came from a lower-class family, so that the concubine's son could not become the successor, unless he was recognised as the wife's son. From these practices, we conclude that a marriage within the same class met the requirements of the lineage, and that the nature of the family lineage did not mean personal relations by blood, though at times it might coincide with kinship.

In connection with marriage within the same class, attention is called to the complicated structure of the social strata. In feudal society before 1867, the family rank system was based on the complexities of the feudal political structure. It has been much simplified since the Meiji Restoration. The Imperial Family was considered to form the highest class, followed by several ranks of the nobility. Under these classes several strata appeared in each community and enterprise. As the ranking of the individual family fluctuated with the changes in its political and economic power, family rank was not fixed. A family which had enjoyed authority for a long period, however, occupied a relatively superior position, even after it had become less influential; on the other hand, it took a fairly long time for a newly rising family to attain a higher social rank. At any rate, through such vicissitudes family rank was re-evaluated, so that the class system in Japan was essentially different, for example, from the Indian caste system in its greater possibilities of change. On the one hand, with the development of the capitalistic economy, capitalists had formed a powerful new class, and on the other hand, a powerful class of bureaucrats and military leaders had developed since the Meiji Restoration. They intermarried with the families of the old feudal lords or the nobles, thus raising their family rank; and finally they occupied positions as high as those of the old distinguished families. Similar phenomena on a small scale were seen in local communities. In 1945, the system of Princes of the Blood and that of the nobles was abolished; the plutocracy was dissolved and the Land Reform resulted in the downfall of the landowner class. Thus the upper families of the prewar periods have been demoted and the newly rich have risen out of the postwar confusion. A few old families have retained their positions in these ten postwar years, but most of them have fallen by the wayside, and remarkable changes in inter-family relations by marriage are to be seen in both rural and urban communities. In addition to this, young men and women inspired by the new legislation which does not acknowledge

the power of the family head over mate-selection and which provides for freedom of marriage, strongly desire freedom of romantic attachment. But in reality, the authority of the head and the concept of family rank never have been entirely destroyed, and marriages arranged by go-betweens are still frequently experienced.

The traditional inequality between men and women and the custom of concubinage became the objects of criticism, as a result of such changes as the legal acknowledgement of the freedom of faith in 1873, the active campaign of Christian evangelism and the introduction of other Western ideas into Japan. The custom of concubinage especially was most severely attacked in the 20th century, so that it almost became extinct, but the inequality of men and women still persisted. After World War I, many women began to penetrate industry, and during the last war, the number of women working in industry increased enormously. This has offered an argument for abolishing the inequality of women. The equality of men and women was legally sanctioned only after World War II, and to some extent, is actually being achieved. Hence the position of women in their homes has been elevated and the inequality of *chokkei* and *bokei* has almost disappeared.

NOTES

[1] Kizaemon Ariga, "The Family in Japan," ***Marriage and Family Living***, 16: 4 (November, 1954).

[2] Cf. K. Ariga, T. Nakano and K. Morioka, "The Japanese Family," *Transactions of the Second World Congress of Sociology*, vol. 1.

[3] In 1949, 74 per cent. of all farm families in Japan cultivated lands amounting to 10 tan or less; 43 per cent. 5 tan or less; 31 per cent. 5 to 10 tan. (1 tan equals 0.245 acres). Source: National Agricultural Statistics, 1949.

The Family System in Korea

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During the period extending from the late nineteenth century to the early twentieth century, the power of the Korean government was so weakened that the government found it difficult to maintain internal order. International relations as well as domestic relations became extremely complicated, and wars and disturbances occurred one after another. The nation underwent great social as well as political changes during the period. During the next 35 years under Japanese administration, following the annexation in 1910, the political situation became more stable than ever before, and the Koreans experienced an era of public order, though imposed by a foreign power. Striking progress was made in various fields of national life such as administration, industry, transportation, education, art, public health, and so on.

Korea, which had been under the overwhelming influence of Chinese culture, especially of Confucian moral principles, began to introduce Japanese civilisation from the time it was annexed by Japan, and her industries were rapidly modernised through the development of a capitalistic economy. Eventually, a great change in social and economic conditions was brought about in Korea.

The author of this article intends to make clear how the Korean family has changed under these social and economic impacts.

I. ANCESTOR WORSHIP

In Korean society, where a high value was set on the family itself rather than on each family member, nothing was so important as performing a religious service for the worship of the spirits of the ancestors. Generally speaking, the funeral services and worship were conducted in an elaborate manner, and as a rule, they were exclusively for the spirits of lineal ascendants. Lineal descendants were never honoured with such ceremonies except in cases in which the descendant happened to have finished the coming-of-age ceremony and had been selected as a successor to the headship of the family before his death. Worship was offered to the spirits of the lineal ancestors by the family head in respect, sorrow and affection for them. The priesthood for ancestor worship was considered not only an important right but also the solemn duty of the family head. The scale of funeral rites varied in accordance with the social status and wealth of a family. Also there were various categories, such as one-day funerals, three-day funerals, seven-day funerals, and nine-day funerals. The funeral which began

at the death of a person featured several consecutive rituals, before the entire ceremony was completed. The spirits of the ancestors for five generations back were worshipped by the family, while more distant ones were removed from worship by the burial of their mortuary tablets alongside their graves. In addition to a number of worship rituals which the family head conducted every year, the housewife was charged with worshipping family deities of a shamanistic nature, such as the deity of the house, of the house-site, of wealth, of longevity, of pregnancy, and so on.

The site of the grave used to be selected in accordance with the geographic doctrines of diviners or geomancers. The Koreans never spared expense in connection with burial; some moved the grave several times in accordance with indications from divination, and some even dared to bury the bodies illegally in the cemetery of another family if they were not able to find and purchase an appropriate graveyard, thus causing frequent lawsuits. Since 1910, however, the authorities rigidly enforced the law regulating the use of graveyards and consequently such cases were to some extent reduced. People of the lower class sometimes made use of the public cemetery. Cremation was looked upon with disfavour by people in general.

The higher the social standing of a family, the more expensive the funeral service and the more magnificent the graveyard. Moreover, people spent disproportionately large sums of money on the observance of various kinds of rituals including the shamanistic ones, eventually reducing themselves to so-called "ritual poverty." Expenses for ceremonies ranked first in the classified accounts in the expenditure of petty loans for the lower classes. This was true only of some Korean families, but it shows what a heavy burden those services were for the descendants.

II. *Jokbo*, OR GENEALOGY

The Koreans who worshipped their ancestors and set a high value on the history of a *jongjung*[1] naturally respected and even tended to embellish the *jokbo*, or genealogy of the *jongjung* group. The form of the *jokbo* was primarily patterned after that of the Chinese. The custom of keeping *jokbo* prevailed throughout from the royal families and families of high rank and high prestige to the general public. It was so extravagant that surprisingly great amounts of money used to be spent for its compilation and publication. Genealogy is classified into two categories; the first, the genealogy of the main group in the *jongjung*, and the second, that of the branch groups in the *jongjung*. The genealogy of the former type described the relationships between the main group and its branches down to the minutest details including descendants of every generation from the founder of the *jongjung*. The latter recorded its own lineage after it had settled down apart from the main group. The *jokbo* was compiled every ten or twenty years. When the decision to compile a *jokbo* was made in a conference of the

jongjung, each subgroup was requested to forward a detailed report on kinship relations, dates of births and deaths, official positions, husbands and children of daughters, of every *jongjung* member. Based on the materials thus secured, an accurate *jokbo* was edited.

People paid high regard to the *jokbo* and some of them kept it in their ancestral halls. A *jokbo* occupied the first place in the total annual number of all publications in Korea, amounting to as many as two hundred, and they were considered more important than the publication of both academic and popular works. This reflects the high respect paid to family names and the deeply rooted consciousness of a *jongjung*.

III. Succession and Adoption

Succession in Korea is classified into three categories. (1) Succession to the family priesthood. The continuity of ancestor worship was considered so important that every effort was made to carry it on incessantly from father to son. (2) Inheritance of property. This meant inheritance of property left behind by the deceased. When the deceased happened to be the family priest the property inheritance took place at the same time as the succession to the priesthood. Persons eligible for the inheritance were not limited to the successor to the family priesthood, but other descendants also were able to inherit a portion of the property. When the successor to the priesthood was not available, it was possible for the mother or the wife of the late head to succeed temporarily to the family headship and to inherit the property. (3) Succession to the family headship. Generally speaking, the successor to the priesthood was at the same time the successor to the family headship. When a married man died, a person was appointed to take care of memorial services for the deceased even if he had only been a member and not the family head; his property, if he had any, was inherited by the man in charge of the memorial services and other descendants. The lineage of a family was carried on by the person holding the priesthood; therefore, a woman was not counted as one generation in the family lineage even if she had once held the position of the family head.

The adoption of a son took place when the family head had no male offspring or when he died and no heir was available to conduct the religious service in honour of the ancestor. Whereas only male members of the same *jongjung* were considered eligible to be an adopted son, adoption of a male in the next generation of the head was preferred. An adopted son acquired a status equal to the real son of his foster-parents on the day of the adoption and developed the same relationships as those of a real son with his foster-parents and their kinsmen. Among the families of the lower class, adoption of a daughter and of a son from a family not bearing the same family name was also practised, although no kinship relationship developed between such foster-children and the kinsmen of the family into which they were

adopted. In 1939 the Governor-General of Korea enforced a law requiring the Koreans to use Japanese family names as a means of expediting their assimilation, and allowed Korean families to adopt Japanese as heirs or as their daughters' husbands, thus making possible the adoption of sons from families bearing surnames different from those of their own, although this was never widely practised.

IV. Power of the Family Head

The family head was invested with a great power. Family morals were prescribed by Confucian principles, and some families had rigid constitutions of their own to regulate the family members. Marriages of sons and daughters were arranged by their superiors and seniors, such as fathers and grand-fathers, and they were never performed without the consent of the family head. The adoption of a son also required his consent. The head designated the residence of the junior members, and his permission had to be sought by them in the selection of their occupations. He also had the right to educate, protect and discipline the members, and at the same time he was responsible for taking care of them.

In the Korean family, a rigid distinction in treatment was maintained between young and old; man and woman; wife and concubine; children born of the wife and those born of the concubine. The family head and the superior being bestowed with such great powers, other family members were compelled to live a life of obedience and perseverance. Consequently, the emotional ties between man and wife or between parents and children or brothers and sisters were not strong, and warmness and charm were likely to be absent from family life.

V. Distinction between "Chik-ke" and "Bang-ke" and between Children of the Wife and those of the Concubine

Primogeniture was prevalent in Korea, that is, the eldest son succeeded to the headship of a family as well as to the right and responsibility of worshipping the ancestors. In the event of the family head's death, one of his *chik-ke* or lineal descendants succeeded to the right and responsibility. If his eldest son should die leaving no children, the second son succeeded to his position. When there was no son born by his wife, or, when a son born by her had already been adopted by another family, a son by his concubine was made the successor. Sons born by the wife enjoyed a higher status than those by concubines in the local community as well as in their own family, and the latter were placed behind the former in the order of possible succession to headship.

Brothers of the family head and their offspring were recognised as *bang-ke*, or those outside the family line, and when the family head had no heir at all, he adopted a boy from among *bang-ke* relatives and appointed him heir. The range of a *jongjung* was quite large, and kinsmen were arranged in order according to a strict discrimination

between lineal and collateral, young and old, children of the wife and those of concubines.

VI. Distinction between Male and Female, and between a Wife and a Concubine

In Korea the ascendants held absolute authority over the descendants. Every utterance and movement of younger people was watched and strictly regulated by the older people: the young people were supposed to refrain from drinking or smoking in the presence of their seniors. Regardless of sex, those who had celebrated their coming-of-age and those who had already been married were recognised as full-fledged adults even though they were not mature yet, and they were no longer treated lightly by the people. Such social discrimination in treatment more or less encouraged early marriage and not a few got married when they were still in their early teens or at the middle of their teens. Recently, however, the spread of school education and the increase in the number of working women contributed to lessen the number of such harmful marriages at very young ages.

Husbands demanded an absolute obedience from their wives, and wives were not permitted to dispose of their own property without obtaining their husband's approval. Formerly, divorce was not permitted at all and even remarriage was looked down upon among the upper and middle class families. One made it a rigid rule to refrain from marrying a girl having the same family name as his own, and not to select his mate among members of the patrilineal kinship group to which he belonged. After the annexation of Korea by Japan, both nationalities came to have contacts with each other more frequently than ever and a number of cases of inter-marriage were reported. The domination of man over woman was taken for granted by a majority of the people; the personality of women was not respected. Women were not eligible for ancestor worship and for succession to the headship. They were not entitled to attend an official meeting in the village nor were they allowed to have their own way in domestic activities. Moreover, when a woman went out of doors, she was expected to wear a veil lest her face should be exposed in public. Males and females were separated from each other on every occasion; rooms in a house were divided into men's and women's apartments. A woman was supposed to refrain from speaking to a man and she was trained not to speak even to her husband in the presence of others if it could be avoided. For wives, family life was almost like that of a slave, extremely dull and uneventful.

The custom of keeping concubines was practised very widely particularly in upper class families, where a number of concubines used to live under the same roof. In the case of a wife and a concubine living in the same house, there was great discrimination between them; usually the concubine was abhorred by the wife and was despised by other family members.

VII. Family Property

According to Korean custom, the family property was not owned jointly by all members of the family but was rather owned solely by the family head. When individual members of a family earned a certain income, they usually turned it over to the head. But we must not arrive at the hasty conclusion that private property of the family member was forbidden under all circumstances. For instance, individual members were permitted to keep such property as an inheritance, a gift or a legacy. However, the family head was authorised to dispose of private properties of the individual members as he saw fit. It was usually considered necessary for individual members to seek the head's approval in the event of disposing of such private properties as houses and land. The head was the sole owner of the family property, so that he distributed property among his sons at will, unconcerned with such an idea as equal division. When the head distributed the family property among his sons, from 60 per cent. to 70 per cent. of the property was reserved for the eldest son who was responsible for maintaining the family property and observing ancestor worship, and the rest was set aside for the other sons, while daughters inherited no property excepting a certain amount of money to be spent for the preparation of their marriage.

VIII. "Jonga" or Main Family and Branch Families

In every part of the country the *jongjung*, or the patrilineal kinship group, formed a local community. The number of communities consisting of one or more *jongjung* amounted to no less than 15,000 according to the census of 1930. Every *jongjung* forming a community established an institution for social control in accordance with the time-honoured custom. Meetings of all family heads in a *jongjung* were held to discuss such matters as the *jonga* graveyard (such as its removal), the amendment of the *jongjung* genealogy, and so on. There was also a conference attended by all family heads in a subgroup to decide such matters as the issue concerning its graveyard, the adoption of a son, the selection of a guardian and anything else which had a bearing upon the entire subgroup. Each *jongjung* had a constitution of its own only slightly different in nature from that of other *jongjung*. By attaining peaceful control over the group, such a constitution aimed primarily at encouraging ancestor worship and reinforcing the unity of the whole *jongjung* group.

In the Korean family, the family head retained his position up to the day of his death, and a branch family was seldom established while the head, the senior, was alive. Thus, a composite family, e.g., coresidence of three generations, including wives and children of brothers in one household under the headship of the great-grand-father, frequently occurred in every part of the country.

The position of *jonga*, or the main family of a *jongjung*, was highly respected. The family head of the *jonga* was called *jongson*; he was

charged with taking care of the ancestral halls of the *jongjung* and presiding over the worship. Besides the central main family which was established by the founder of the *jongjung*, secondary main families, which were established by brothers of the heads of the central main family, appeared with the passage of time, as the nuclei of subgroups of the *jongjung*, and in the same way, tertiary main families with their own subgroups came into existence. Being the founder of the *jongjung*, the central main family was regarded as most important among all the families of the *jongjung*, but in some cases, branch families became influential and prosperous on account of outstanding personages or wealth. In addition to the *jongson*, the *jonga* and some of the subgroups elected a man as a representative, or a *mungjang*, who was considered fit from the standpoint of knowledge, moral influence, age, property and order in genealogy. A *yusa*, who worked under the supervision of a *mungjang*, executed the business routines.

Precedence was strictly observed in the succession to the priesthood. But as time went by, bitter disputes occurred between the main family and the branch families as to the holder of a right to take custody of such things as the tablets of the deceased, ancestral halls and *jongjung* property. Now and then such disputes were taken to court when negotiation could not be reached within the *jongjung* group.

IX. Mutual Aid Systems

A neighbourhood mutual aid system was well-developed in Korea and the spirit of cooperation was widespread. Particularly, in *jongjung* groups, solidarity and co-operation were firmly established and various kinds of associations called *ge* were organised for the purpose of undertaking cooperative enterprises. Among cooperative activities of a *jongjung*, ancestor worship was apparently regarded as most important, and a considerable number of the *jongjung* owned such joint property as paddy fields, upland field, woodlands, and so on, for the observance of worship. According to the 1930 nation-wide survey of 1,685 well-known village communities consisting of *jongjung*, co-operative enterprises found in such communities could be classified as follow: for ancestor worship, 809; for mutual aid in the *jongjung*, 232; for the encouragement of agriculture, 57; for encouragement of education, 34; for improvement of the mode of life, 26; for strict observance of the deadline for tax payment, 14.

Other activities reported were honouring of the aged, public acknowledgement of virtuous wives and dutiful children, awarding scholarships, simplification of ceremonies and rituals, and so on. These activities often exerted a favourable influence upon family life.

On the other hand, because of excessive consciousness of one's own *jongjung* and a well-developed mutual aid system, some people were apt to rely too much upon the *jongjung* to which they belonged, and to seek help from their wealthy relatives or from those who are of high social

standing. It might be proper to say that some of them lacked the spirit of self-help, independence, thrift and diligence.

In short, the Korean family had both merits and demerits. A summary of what impressed the author most concerning the Korean family in the first half of the twentieth century is as follows:

1. Progress in female education has somewhat improved the position of the wife in the family and has brightened up a certain phase of family life. But the treatment of children and concubines has not been improved to any noticeable extent.

2. On account of the "country life" and "home making" movements, various kinds of ceremonials, such as the coming-of-age ceremony, the wedding ceremony, funeral services and ancestor worship, have been simplified to some extent, and a saving of time, labour and money has been effected. An example of the effect of these movements is the celebration of joint weddings which is being practised in various parts of the country.

3. Cases of early marriage have gradually decreased in number, and young people have been awakened to the significance of marriage. In the event of divorce and remarriage, the personal preferences of the persons concerned have been taken into consideration more and more. The family head's control over the disposal of private property of a family member has probably weakened.

4. With the development of capitalism, various industries other than agriculture have become prosperous, and the freedom of travel and migration has been established. Such changes have encouraged young men to set up new branch or independent families, and moreover, they have caused a gradual disintegration of the composite family system where one lived a gloomy life rigidly regulated by the family constitution.

5. The traditional class system has been destroyed; the social status of the common people was raised and the privileged people, such as the hereditary class of civil and military officers and Confucian scholars, have been reduced in numbers. With a greater number of women working outside the family, the total income of the family has increased. Yet, the level of living remained much lower than in Japan, to say nothing of European or American countries.

6. Social intercourse between the sexes has increased among students in the cities, and some of them attend chapel or go to concerts with friends of the opposite sex. It is noteworthy that women have been emancipated and are taking an active part in social activities.

7. The features which have been characteristic of the Korean family, such as ancestor worship, filial duties to parents, chastity of women and the principle of *seniores priores*, are still rigidly maintained. However, with the advance of the times, conflicts between the Confucian morals supported by the older people, and the new moral code favoured

by the younger people occur now and then, and resistance against the family head's control has also developed.

When World War II ended in 1945, Korea became independent of Japan, but was divided along the 38° parallel into North and South Korea. In 1950 the Korean War broke out. This war inflicted great damage upon the people and their houses, the rural and urban areas, the transportation system, industries, education, medical installations, sanitation facilities and Korean culture generally. Changes in such various aspects of the nation's life are believed to have affected family life to a great extent, though recent information on such changes is not available.

NOTES

[1] *Jongjung* means the patrilineal kinship group in Korea and it is quite similar to the *tsung-tsu* in China.

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Changes in Matrilineal Families in Assam

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The Garos, who occupy the western hills in Assam, south of the Brahmaputra River, practise matrilineal descent and matrilocal residence. Before dealing with changes in their families due to culture contact, since the Garo society is unfamiliar to most scholars, I would like to explain the outline of their original social structure, focussing on the family.

In the Garo social system, *Nokkrom* is the most important figure. *Nokkrom* is the particular son-in-law who succeeds to the house after the death of his father-in-law, as the husband of *Nokna*, the heiress, and sometimes, if the father of the heiress is dead, her mother at the same time. In the Garo family the gaps caused by the death of the head of the family are always filled by his *Nokkrom*. *Nok* means house, *krom* indicates an important place or post which one cannot leave. *Nok* is not the house in the sense of a building; it means the social position of the family. The house building is only its temporary location. It has exactly the same meaning as the Japanese *Iye* which is often translated into English as " house " or " family ". In such a society every member of a nuclear family is considered as a molecule of *Nok* in a firm social constellation, rather than as an individual in a nuclear family. Every family of the Garo is formed in a balance of two matri-clans which practise traditional cross-cousin marriage.

The Garo being matrilineal, the heiress is one of the daughters, chosen by the parents with their *Chras* (wife's brothers and her maternal uncles who are supposed to be the back-bone of the family). She is called *Nokna*, whose husband is *Nokkrom*. Though the Garos are matrilineal, the husband, especially the *Nokkrom*, is ranked higher than the wife as a manager, gardener and controller of all the family affairs with the consent of the *Chras*. To find the best *Nokkrom* is most important for a Garo family. He is always chosen from among the *Nokna's* father's sisters' sons. Uncle-nephew, mother-daughter, the combination of these two parallel lines forms one family successively, which is called *Nok* in Garo.

The Garos are divided into two main composite clans, Marak and Sangma (another additional clan is Momen, which is a new and smaller composite clan). Each of them consists of many sub-clans. A marriage is usually arranged between a member of one of the sub-clans of the Marak clan and a member of one of the sub-clans of the Sangma clan. In the village Rombagiri where I worked, most of the houses belong to the Chambugon Marak who intermarry with Agitok Sangma. Though there are many Agitok villages in the Garo

Hills, most of the Chambugon families at Rombagiri find husbands from a particular Agitok clan who reside at Demitigiri village, which is about two days' journey away from Rombagiri.

Fundamentally, each Garo village has only one matri-clan. This has close connection with the economic system. Each village possesses one common jungle area. For instance, Rombagiri village, which contains 53 houses, has a jungle area which they can use for their *Jhum* fields. This particular jungle area which is called " *Rombagiri Chambugon Akin* ", is owned by the *Nokma* (headman) of Rombagiri.

Most of the Garo, except those who live near the plain, practise *Jhum* cultivation, as shifting cultivation is called in Assam. Every winter a certain jungle area is cut and in March it is fired. After clearing the field they sow all kinds of seeds, rice, millet, cotton, beans, yams, sweet-potatoes and chillies, etc. According to crop, the harvest time differs, covering from July to December. Round the village they have a vast jungle area, which is divided into several sections, so that they can change fields every year in turn. At Rombagiri, the rotation is usually one of seven years.

Christianity began to spread slowly into the Garo Hills from the end of the last century. In Rombagiri, one of the most interior places in the Garo Hills, one man was converted to Christianity in 1932. I shall put focus on this man, as an instance of the kind of change which occurs everywhere in the Garo Hills when they face contact with Christianity. His name was Gobang Lusker, and he was one of the most influential persons in that area. He was a *lusker*, i.e. a head of 12 villages including Rombagiri. Following the common practise of powerful, wealthy *luskers* in the Garo Hills, he had four wives who belonged to the Chambogon clan, though none of them were sisters. Since Christianity is strongly against polygyny, he left three wives, taking the third wife as his Christian wife. One of the great changes due to the introduction of Christianity is thus the abolition of customary polygyny.

This kind of polygyny is comparatively rare, because only a few unusually energetic and capable men can practise it. However, as I have mentioned, because of the institution of *Nokkrom*, most of the Garo men have two wives at some time of their lives, viz. mother and daughter. When they become Christians, this custom is totally abandoned. They have to choose one of them. Usually if the husband becomes a Christian after his marriage, he leaves the older one. If it is before the marriage he chooses a spouse fit for his age. The present *Nokma* (headman) of Rombagiri, aged 33, married the last *Nokma's* widow, aged about 40, who had three daughters, the eldest about 22 years' old. The two younger daughters were already married. So far as public opinion goes, he could marry his step-daughter, the *Nokna*, after the death of the present wife. Such cases are many among Garo families. This shows that the traditional social concept of *Nokkrom* is still strongly functioning, in spite of outward changes due to individual conversion to Christianity. The only difference

is that he marries the old wife and the younger wife at different times.

In Garo villages the spread of Christianity tends to flow along the ramifying channels of kinship ties. At present in Rombagiri, most of the Christians, who comprise about one third of the population, belong to an offshoot of the family of Gobang Lusker, the first Christian. The present Christian families, of the second or third generation from the Gobang Lusker, show an interesting process of change. One of the grand-daughters of the Gobang Lusker, being *Nokna*, was supposed to marry one of her father's sororal nephews. Actually, she married one of the Agitok, who had never married Rogambiri women before. Her parents and *Chras* (her brothers and uncles), finally agreed to this, but such a case is very rare among orthodox Garo families. Under the *Nokkrom*-ship the individual is not so important; and the relationship of husband and wife is over-shadowed by clan consideration. In their society, marriages sometimes take place between a young boy and a woman the age of his grandmother, between a grown-up man and a baby, etc. They associate sexual rights, not with the husband-wife relationship established by marriage, but with Chambugon-Agitok relationship established by the foundation of a family. The introduction of Christianity plays a rôle which strengthens the tie between husband-wife in place of that between mother-daughter and uncle-nephew. The important point is, in the case cited, that all members of the girl's family and her *Chras* are Christians. Their orientation of interest goes more to their own nuclear family affairs than to their kinsmen's affairs.

Another factor which strengthens the nuclear family, leaving kinsmen less firmly bound is the exclusion of unmarried Christian boys from *Nokpante* (the bachelors' dormitory) and the non-participation of Christians in village religious activity. As soon as a boy becomes a Christian he begins to sleep in his own home with his parents. New groups centered on the church are growing, differentiated from the traditional group of a village community.

Contact with neighbouring Hindu and the advance of Christianity and education have greatly affected the political organisation of the Garo Hills. Soon after the independence of India was declared, a new political body, the District Council (Garo autonomy), which consists of 24 members, was formed at Tura, capital of the Garo Hills. This political integration stimulates individual migration, expansion of trade, etc. A comparatively large number of Garo clerks are found in various offices; District Council, Assam Provincial Government and Deputy Commissioner's (Central Government). Owing to this political growth in the Garo Hills, the capital, Tura, is increasing its population. This attracts educated Garo Christians especially. This growing population, except for a small percentage of the original Tura inhabitants, come from all over the Garo Hills where *Jhum* or wet-cultivation is practised and social organisation is comparatively compact. As soon as they get a job in a town like Tura, they shift their residence

there with wife and children, parting from all kinsmen in the matrilocal residence, thus forming neolocal residence.

This change of residence affects quite a great psychological change, which in turn affects the entire social organisation. Now the young man is free from all the *Chras* to whom he had to adjust himself with great effort. On the other hand, he has great confidence in himself. Now he can get his property by himself without the help of his kinsmen. Boys are sent to school at their own parents' expense. So long as they live in a village education is shared with all village folk. After leaving the village education is concentrated in each nuclear family. The father sends his boy to school as a sort of investment, expecting his son to succeed him in his line. His psychological attachment is to his son who shares his daily life, rather than to his sister's son who lives far away and knows nothing of his new life. This situation is reflected in the problem of transmission of property. Men now have the means of accumulating moveable property as individuals, completely independent of their kinsmen. According to traditional Garo laws sons never inherit property from their parents, even property which a man may have acquired before marriage has to be left at his mother's home. Today educated Garo, particularly, would like to bring about a change to patrilineal inheritance. This tendency is encouraged to some extent by their inferiority complex, since all the civilised societies which they know well—e.g. Hindu society and European society, are patrilineal. Patriliny appears to them to be some indication of civilisation.

This is the active factor which strengthens the father-son relation in the nuclear family. On the other hand, there is an important passive factor which tends to weaken the matrilineal social structure. Whereas matrilocal marriage was practised formerly, today the wife leaves her own parents' home. This makes the wife more subordinate and more firmly attached to her husband. At the matrilocal residence she is much attached to her parents and maternal uncles and brothers; her husband attaches to her as an additional family member, on the foundation of *Nok* (family altogether). As a man, her husband of course can work harder than she can. But her economic contribution is large, and she shares in his work in the jungle. In town, on the other hand, the husband's economic activities are far more important. All outside activities are concentrated on him, leaving the wife as a domestic help. This has an important effect on the husband-wife relationship, and greatly strengthens the tie between them.

The change of residence also affects the *Nokkrom*-ship. With the nuclear family adopting neolocal residence, the wife's mother is left at her village, i.e. she does not marry her son-in-law after her husband's death. Thus the very important and fundamental line of *Nok*, uncle-nephew, mother-daughter, is greatly weakened. Again, sons and daughters may find marital partners among those who share their urban life and with whom they feel more at home than their cousins in the village. The development of individualism makes the marriage

bond much weaker. The concept of *Nok* becomes obscure, and in place of it a firm nuclear family which tends to patri-society is emerging. As a whole these factors lead to disintegration of clans and the weakening of the unilineal tie.

Although there have been rapid changes in Garo society, matriliny is still strong. In urban areas marriage between particular clans occurs less often, but exogamous marriage between clans is still the rule. It is still possible, even after the great economic, cultural and social changes which have taken place in the Garo Hills, to gather all clansmen together for an important clan event. In spite of the tendency towards patri-society the matrilineal clan system is strong among the majority who still live in the compact villages of the interior.

Changes in the Status of the Individual in the Family in the Indo-Pakistan Sub-continent

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The history of the status of the individual in the family in Asia is embedded in the philosophy of life of the East and the social structure which was based on it.

This philosophy of life, though influenced to a certain extent by biological necessities, was moulded by religious beliefs and ideas of reward and punishment in the after-life. Primitive communities in Asia aimed at fulfilment of the aspirations set before them by their philosophy of life, which in many fields of human endeavour denied the individual the enjoyment of the fruits of his exertions in this life, either for the sake of reward in the hereafter or for the benefit of others in his community or family.

The life of this world was considered to be a period of probation during which one was expected to conduct oneself in such a way as to merit by one's actions the approbation of the gods or the Creator and thus secure happiness in the hereafter. The social structure was shaped according to the religious system prevailing in the community, and in turn regulated the status of the individual in the family. For example, in ancient India it was an article of faith that the primary object of marriage was the birth of a male child who alone was competent to offer the sacred oblations and thereby save the parents from damnation in the next world. (Institutes of Manu, VI: 36, 37; IX: 45). This belief more than anything else accounts for the inordinate disparity of status between the male and female in the Hindu family.

In ancient times the family was patriarchal and took its form from the pattern of the community to which the family belonged. Thus the position of each family in a tribe was comparable to that of an individual member in his family. The head of each family was a miniature tribal or village head man. The joint family system was the prevailing pattern which regulated social life. This was a sort of commonwealth in which the interests of the individual were subordinated to those of the family. While the development of the individual to his full stature was thus curbed, the deficiencies or shortcomings of backward members of the family were compensated by the efficiency of the more fortunate members.

For historical reasons the superior classes of people in India prescribed and maintained the caste system, which in the course of time became an article of faith. The components of each caste were families. Each caste or tribe in the community, each family in the

caste or tribe, was circumscribed by the rights and duties assigned to it. The caste or tribe was responsible to the community at large, which was usually co-extensive with a political state.

The individual had corresponding rights and duties in relation to members of his family and he was responsible to the head of the family for his actions and conduct. The resources of the family had to be utilised according to the needs of the different members of the family. The earnings of each member had to be deposited in the common pool which was under the control of the family head. There was no restriction on the size of the family. Cousins separated by several degrees continued to live in the same family until it broke up by its own weight. The position of the individual was more or less the same whether the family belonged to the more civilised society in the plains or to the nomadic or tribal society in the hills. In matters of marriage and inheritance the will of the individual found more obstruction than in any other sphere of family life.

The first impact from outside on Indian social life was provided by the arrival of the Muslims, starting in the eighth century. The Muslim with a distinct philosophy of life and socio-religious system presented new ideals and new spiritual and social values. One of the cardinal principles of Muslim philosophy was individual responsibility (Holy Koran IV–III, VI–70. VIII–29, IX–70, X–30, 108). The cult of vicarious atonement was unknown to Islam. The Muslim ideology did not recognise any caste and a society which was co-extensive with the Muslim faith itself was held out as an ideal. Even in practice Muslim community life was generally uniform and extensive across the boundaries of a variety of countries and states.

The tribal or clan system was foreign to Islamic ideals, which included the universal brotherhood of man. The Prophet of Islam was however born in a community in which the clan system was deep-rooted. Individuals were knit in families with strong consanguine ties. Families had well-defined obligations to the clan or the tribe. The individual could not act in variance with the wishes of the family or the clan. The faith that was preached by the Prophet cut across the bounds of family and clan. The result was that with the broadening of the basis of the community the clan system disintegrated and the family in its turn lost its strong hold on its members. Under the Islamic system, the individual, while having rights and duties in the family, had absolute freedom of action untrammelled by limitations. The process by which, in pagan Arabia at the time of the Prophet, families and individuals broke away from their parent clans to embrace Islam and thus form a new society was also characteristic of subsequent progress of Islam in Asia and Africa. Wherever Muslim civilization spread, the Muslim personal law prescribed by the Koran and the Hadis prevailed over the local systems.

In Muslim society the individual was allowed to assert himself, and the family as the social unit lost its ancient significance and importance.

As soon as a member of the family, whether male or female, attained majority he was invested with all rights of independent action. He could marry at his will, claim his inheritance or break away from the family without let or hindrance. But, just as in Europe, urged by the desire to build up or preserve aristocracy for themselves, wealthy and powerful people founded classes of families and practised endogamy. This aristocracy crumbled as a result of economic changes in the twentieth century.

When the Muslims came into contact with the racial or cultural groups of India in the Middle Ages many of the latter embraced Islam and adopted the Muslim social pattern. Profound changes took place in the family and in the status of its members in many parts of India. But the groups which remained outside the Muslim fold continued to retain the family traits of the rigid caste system. The structure of the family among such groups in India underwent little change throughout the periods of Muslim Rule in India, and it was only with the advent of the British in India in the 18th century and the consequent spread of western education that changes took place in the pattern of the family among the Hindus. Several social reforms were carried out in the nineteenth century. Two of them deserve notice. The system of Sutee, i.e., burning of the widow alive with her deceased husband on the funeral pyre, was abolished and widow marriage, which had hitherto been a social taboo, was legalised. The joint family system was no longer considered sacrosanct and young men who received western education freely broke away from the parent family and established a separate unit even during the life-time of a father or an elder brother. The changes were accelerated by openings in peacetime employment which the British Administration offered. Young people who accepted employment under the British in their commercial or administrative establishments in cities and distant localities left their native villages and thus got separated from the ancestral home and property in the village. The individual found a safety valve for expression of his latent talent.

The next stage came when, in the nineteenth century, the Industrial Revolution which had started in Europe in the eighteenth century spread to the East. Agriculture, which necessitated traditional joint employment of the members of a family, or sometimes an entire local community, on a common parcel of land, had to release a large proportion of workers for employment in industrial concerns. Thus a large number of men and women from rural areas moved to cities and suburbs for employment and settled there. The old family unit was weakened and the hold of the head of the family over many members who would be otherwise under his control, was lost. The collateral branches which came to the cities became completely separate units in a short time. Simultaneously with the spread of western ideas, the rigidity of the traditional caste system was giving way to democratic social ideas.

These factors contributed to the disintegration of the joint family in the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent. Since Independence, further social reforms have been carried out. Provision is being made for divorce in unhappy marriages and for giving property rights to women. The special Marriages Act (1955) and the Indian Succession Act (1955) passed by the Indian Parliament have made considerable changes in this direction. As a result the freedom of the individual is asserting itself in Hindu Society to a much greater extent.

The clan system still prevails among the hill tribes of the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent. Biological necessity is perhaps the primeval cause of the formation of the clan. As a result of absence or ineffectiveness of organised government in isolated and inaccessible areas, natives resident therein were urged by the instinct of self-preservation to unite in a clan or tribe. Though the tribal communities of the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent are varied, yet it may be said that generally under their systems the individual status both in the family and the tribe are circumscribed by a variety of customary regulations. Among many of the tribes, e.g., the Garos and the Khasis in East Bengal, and some other parts of the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent, the matrilineal system prevails. Property descends in the female line and the male on his marriage becomes a member of the family of his wife and leaves his parents' house to live in the house of his wife.

In recent times Government and philanthropic bodies have been making increasing contacts with the tribal people and as a result of their activity, education is spreading among the people and opening up fields of employment for them. For the same reason large groups of people from different tribes are leaving their habitat in search of employment elsewhere. When they settle down in their new environment they adopt to a large extent the ways of life of the new community in which they come to live. Large sections of the Santal tribe in Eastern India have migrated in recent times to the tea plantations in Assam and settled there. They have lost old values and adopted an urban way of life. They have thus received a fillip to the expression of their individualism. The spread of education has brought also other changes in the social life of the people. Persons who have received modern education are also modifying their native ways of life. Educated young men of the tribes which follow the matrilineal system of inheritance are now reluctant to go to live in the house of their spouses. They prefer to continue to live in their parents' house or set up an independent establishment.

The changes that have taken place in the Asian family in this century and in the last are more rapid and momentous than the corresponding changes in Europe. The advent of the trading and colonial activities of the European nations in the East and the spread of the ideas brought by them, the Industrial Revolution, scientific inventions, improved communications, rapid dissemination of Marxist and democratic ideas, the two World Wars in quick succession and weakening of

religious beliefs, are responsible for the changes. The Asian family in general is no longer patriarchal in character nor unwieldy in size. It is becoming more individualistic and smaller in size.

The individual is shaking off the shackles imposed on him by his family, caste, clan or tribe but, on the other hand, the control of the nation or state over him is increasing in that he is being subjected to new laws, new obligations and to a new social order brought about by Governmental or national activity.

Principles of social justice which must be considered radical in comparison with those of the past have been operating in Asia since the close of the first World War. Far-reaching land reforms have been carried out in almost every country. Landed aristocracy is rapidly disappearing. In the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent, the Zemindary system which was the bulwark of this aristocracy has been abolished. In Egypt vast holdings of big landowners have been parcelled out and given away to the tillers of the soil. In China, the landowning war-lords have disappeared. On the other hand large-scale industrial concerns have grown up in every country. Innumerable workers have moved from rural areas to industrial areas. The franchise has been extended to the proletariat. These events have wrought tremendous ideological changes in the family of every community. The old "commonwealth" type family has disintegrated—the old values are being lost or disregarded. The individual is increasingly coming into direct contact with the state and seeking fresh adjustment in society. The complementary character of family life is giving way to individual responsibility. The shortcomings of an unlucky relative are no longer made good by the lucky kinsman. The state is expected to come to the assistance of the needy.

New values are replacing old values. The resultant adjustment has not always been easy and happy. The individual, cut off from traditional family ties, has failed sometimes to awake to the realisation of the existence of his obligations to the community at large, to prevent individualism running riot.

Patterns of Authority in the Family in Malaya

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It is proposed in this paper to give a brief discussion of authority-relations in the Chinese and Indian families in Malaya—the Asian country best known to the writer. Unfortunately, the amount of sociological research which has so far been done in Malaya is relatively small, and this is true of questions of family structure and function. On the Chinese family, it is true, Mr. Freedman's monograph will be a work of great value. As this, however, is not yet published at the time of writing, no more can be done than to make a general acknowledgement of the benefit which the writer has derived from it, while absolving Mr. Freedman from responsibility for any errors in fact and interpretation which may appear below. Little comparable work exists on the other groups. Thus, the present paper must be regarded as tentative and eminently subject to later correction.

By Malaya is meant both the Federation of Malaya and the Colony of Singapore. Both of these share certain significant characteristics with other South-east Asian countries : thus, for instance, both were subject to Japanese invasion during the Second World War, and since 1945 have seen almost continuous Communist activity, armed and otherwise ; further, in recent years, this has been accompanied by an increasingly articulate nationalism. But, what is more relevant, both also have been recipients since early in the Nineteenth Century of large immigrant populations, Chinese particularly, and also Indians. Indeed, about eighty per cent. of the present population of Singapore is Chinese, and about eight per cent. Indian. In the Federation, the proportions are about forty per cent. and twelve per cent. respectively. The social problems connected with immigration, citizenship, nationality, the conflict of traditions and so forth, thus assume considerable importance in these countries.

Of the three main groups in the Malayan population—Malays, Chinese and Indians—the influence of one upon another has so far on the whole been relatively superficial, and this in spite of some inter-marriage and not infrequent inter-group adoption, especially of Chinese children. Perhaps the main cause of this superficiality has been not only that immigration was, until a few years ago, continuous and ample, so that always a considerable proportion of the population had been born abroad ; but also that, from the first, most immigrants aspired to stay in Malaya only until they had made their money, and then to return to what they still regarded as their homeland. The Chinese thus wished to remain Chinese and the Indians Indian.

In studying authority patterns, one must attempt to distinguish the effect of changes which have flowed from the fact of migration

to Malaya, from the effects of more widespread technological or ideological change. Among the former may be included these :

Firstly, a weakening of the idea of place, of territorialness—the weakening of the influence of the village or neighbourhood—as the thing which helps to bind the group together, and which helps to solidify and strengthen authority relations within it and within the families which make it up.

Contemporary writers on India have stressed the interdependence of the family and its habitat : as Desai says[1] " The Indian village still remains a cluster of joint families ": the village and families thus support one another, and village elders may act as a support to the father's authority in his family. Levy[2] notes a similar interdependence in China. With emigration, all this clearly must change. Many of the links between the Chinese emigrant and his ancestors in China are severed. (Sometimes startling attempts are made to preserve the sense of continuity : the *Kongsi* or meeting place of the Khoo Clan in Penang contains ancestral tablets stretching back some twenty or more generations ; but this sort of device is rare.) Or the filial links between the Indian adult in Malaya and his parents in Madras and Travancore are weakened, even if he intends to return to look after their old age. If indeed he migrates to some large town, such as Singapore City, it is still more likely that local attachment will be lost, and that traditional customs and mores will be rubbed away. (This is to some extent counteracted by the fact that some linguistic groups may tend to inhabit specific areas of the city, their members having rather few contacts outside. But this is certainly not always so.) In such a fashion the traditional strength of the family as a means of social control, which in any case is tending to become weakened in the countries of origin, particularly in China, is reduced still more. Some of its functions of social control and individual assistance may be passing, so far as emigrant Chinese are concerned, to the Clan associations and groups, such as have been described, for instance by Ju-K'ang T'ien[3] in relation to Sarawak

Secondly, there are problems turning upon the recognition or otherwise of the marriage laws and customs of the immigrant communities.

In some aspects of human relationships English administrators, in Malaya as in other Colonies, have attempted not to impose English law cut and dried upon their subjects irrespective of race, but rather to interpret and follow, as far as they could, the latter's own customs. This is the case, for instance, in the field of marriage and family law. Malayan courts and officials attempt, so far as may be, to follow Chinese law and custom where Chinese are concerned, and Indian law and custom where Indians are concerned.

Two classes of problem, at least, arise here. One is that the legal provisions relating to marriage have not kept up with the changing conceptions of the marriage tie, and with the flux into which marriage

customs in Malaya have fallen. This is particularly the case with the Chinese. Chinese custom, of course, allows polygyny, and custom in this respect has been recognised by Malayan courts. Now, it is a reflection of changing attitudes towards marriage and to the husband-wife relationship among younger Chinese, that a larger and larger proportion of young Chinese women are bent on monogamous marriages. Such a woman may feel that the fact of her husband's having taken a second wife is a ground for divorce. It would be so if she had been married under the Civil or Monogamous Marriage Ordinance. Marriage under this ordinance prohibits the husband from taking a secondary wife. But no such prohibition attends the Chinese " customary marriages ", and the woman who has been married by such a ceremony may find, to her dismay, that she has no legal grounds for action against a polygamously-inclined husband. Confusion on this point not only provides much work for the Counselling and Advice Section of the Singapore Social Welfare Department,[4] but again tends to weaken the position of the family as an agent of social control, and a conveyor, through generations, of the notion and purpose of authority.

Further, this " Conflict of Laws " and this conflict between changing customs and legal codes has led to a state of confusion, in which, for example, many so-called marriages, entered into in good faith, are valid neither by established custom, nor by the law of China, nor by the written law of Malaya. It has led, apparently, to a belief among Chinese young people that they can effect a legal marriage simply by inserting an announcement in a local Chinese-language newspaper ; and to a belief among Indians that they can divorce their spouse merely by notifying the fact in a Tamil paper.

All this is the result of a kind of " ideological dyarchy " in Colonial systems ; and while this " dyarchy " has no doubt in the past been valuable, it may be that some simplification and codification of law and custom may now be necessary to avoid disharmony and tension.

There are, in addition, factors which are not due directly to migration but are connected with urbanisation and the growth of industry. We shall discuss some of these in their bearing on the Chinese family.

Customarily, a considerable number of Malayan Chinese families, either in rural areas or near towns, have been based on more than one type of occupation. That is, the household has owned, rented, or squatted in a small-holding and grown vegetables on it for sale ; may also have reared livestock for sale ; while in addition, some of the members may have worked in a tin mine, rubber estate, or some industry. Its at least partial dependence on agriculture and livestock rearing, economic activities which normally are carried on by the whole family, made the latter to some degree an economic unit, and thus made it relatively easy to see where, within the family, authority lay. The eldest male would, more likely than not, be the person to decide the pattern of economic activities : the traditional head of the family, he would thus also be the effective head.

But this system is now undergoing change. It is being altered by the growth of industrialisation, and it has been altered to some extent by the process of resettlement of squatters. Of recent years the latter, who numbered some hundreds of thousands, mostly in the Federation, have been regrouped and settled in moderate-sized or large villages. This was mainly, though not wholly, a military matter connected with the Malayan Emergency. Sometimes, though not always, the villages possessed insufficient accessible arable land. In the case both of industrialisation and of resettlement, one result is the likelihood that agriculture will play a less important part in the family's economy. Its income will be brought in more and more by wage-earners in factory or business, who will be more independent and less amenable to the authority of the elderly male. It is thus often difficult, at the present time, to determine who is the real head of any given family, as field workers on household surveys and the like have good cause to know. Here, as in other matters relating to the family, the changes are not essentially different from what Marion Levy and others show to have been happening in China itself before 1949.

Public health and welfare services, for instance the introduction of Western drugs and health procedures under the ægis of the Government, also help to support the younger people in their resistance to the traditional ideas of their parents, as research, so far unpublished, by the Social Studies Department of the University of Malaya has shown.[5]

How far have the changes in authority patterns gone ? It would seem as if the changes have gone much further in the Chinese than in the Indian family in Malaya. Valid generalisations are difficult to make, however, since one has to distinguish between stereotypes and actual practice, and between the habits of different social classes.

In both groups, the joint or extended family is virtually non-existent. How far this represents a departure from the actual practice (as distinct from the ideal) in those parts of China whence the Malayan immigrants came, is a moot point.

In the Malayan Indian community it is still considered proper that the father should choose his son's occupation. It must, however, be remembered that the son's range of choice is in any case restricted for all but the minority. If he is from the working-class, the educational opportunities open to the sons of Tamil-speaking labourers are not very wide. Furthermore, the small family business is still of great importance among Indians of Singapore and Malaya, and there is a strong pull on young people to follow their father's trades, or go to the shop of some relative or neighbour. Thus, for instance, among the Marican group of Tamils, a youth may be apprenticed by his father to the proprietor of a shop or small business, with whom he lives in a quasi-filial relationship for some three years, during which time the proprietor sends the greater part of the employee's wages to his parents, to be given to him in a lump sum at the end,

and the apprentice lives in the shop-house, probably sleeping under the counter. The traditional object of such a forced saving is for the young man to have money to start his own business with at the end of his apprenticeship.

Betrothal is also regarded as a family affair, though again there are exceptions. The young man is expected to take someone of his father's choice ; though he may be allowed to reject or accept his parents' choice, he may not choose for himself. This applies still more to the daughters. The correct thing is that daughters should not have friends of the opposite sex after the end of childhood. In one, more " modern " family, of my acquaintance, where this rule was relaxed, it was relaxed only to the extent that friends had to be other than Indian, and so presumed to be outside any possible consideration for marriage. In this connection, it is probably true that recreation, outdoor as well as indoor, is largely a family affair with the Malayan Indian : girls at least, if they go to the cinema or amusement parks at all, will go with their parents.

The position of the wife in the family seems to have undergone much less departure from traditional patterns than it has among the Chinese. Here there is of course much variation as between different families. Also, the traditional pattern itself was by no means wholly one of male dominance. The wife, especially after she had become a mother, had a position of respect, and indeed of power, in the household. Not only was she the household manager, but the training of the young children and the daughters was her responsibility. Today in Malaya, with the decline of the joint family, she suffers less from mother-in-law dominance.

Nevertheless, in general, Indian wives in Malaya appear to be in a position of greater subservience than are the Chinese. Such information as I have suggests that it is much more common for the husband to retain the family income and even do the marketing himself, rather than give it to the wife. Moreover, among some groups, such as the Malayali (Muslim) Chulias, purdah is strict, both on married and unmarried women ; when attending such functions as weddings, they have to occupy a special place. Here, compromise with modernism sometimes involves the husbands in inconvenience : one man told me that cinema-going was expensive for him, because he had always to take his women folk in a taxi.

One Indian Muslim, who, as sometimes happens, had married a Malay Muslim woman, said that he had taken great pains to train her in the proper rules of social and religious conduct, before he took her back with him to India ; since, if she did not follow them, he and his family would not be allowed to stay with his parents or in their village. This remark appears to indicate one of the reasons why the pattern of authority relations seems to have been less disturbed in the Indian family than in the Chinese. It is that the links between the Indian and his motherland are much stronger than is the case

with the Chinese ; and that he consistently thinks of himself as one who is destined sooner or later to go back to his own village.

There is probably another reason, which is that with the Hindu, marriage is a sacred rite, and still largely remains so, despite recent legislation by the Government of India [6, 7]. The traditional Chinese view on the other hand, is that marriage is a purely secular contract.

Chinese tradition explicitly recognises the superiority of the male ; and more or less definite rules of social behaviour and etiquette fix a gap between husband and wife. Tradition would expect the husband to give orders and the wife to obey ; and the women to efface themselves before visitors. There is no doubt that these ' ideals ' have been widely departed from in Malaya. Chinese women in Malaya are certainly not expected to seclude themselves ; many, indeed, are to the fore in public life, and have their portraits in the newspapers. All too often, in this transitional culture, behaviour patterns may lend themselves to misinterpretation. Where, at a dinner, the males and guests sit down first, while the women do not, this may be because the wife is steeped in ideals of female effacement; but it may be due to the presence of a well-to-do but traditionally-minded elder, whom husband and wife want to please, in the hope of favours; or it may simply be that the wife wants to cope with the serving up. Further, it is not impossible that the stereotypes of male superiority are more closely approximated to in middle- or lower-middle class households than in working-class ones. In the latter, women not infrequently take a prominent part not only in house-management, but in the provision of household income; and where, as sometimes happens, the men of the family work at some distance from the home and may be away for fairly extensive periods at a time, the wives are undoubtedly the effective heads of the household.

In regard to the relations between parent and child, the traditional stereotype is of course of the rigidly authoritarian parents exercising complete control over their sons and daughters. This system, if it ever existed widely in China, was in process of breakdown there some time ago. In Malaya it certainly does not exist to any degree, but what is found is a kind of transitional phase. A duty is recognised to respect and support the older people, though not necessarily to obey them. But there seems to be some likelihood that this cultural change, at any rate in the environment of Singapore, may be a factor in the psychological tensions, resulting in rather prevalent suicides and gestures of suicide, among young girls. On this rather complex problem some work has been done,[8] which is hoped will be followed up.

Perhaps the most interesting aspect of authority changes in the Malayan Chinese family is to be found in the Communist-inspired activities of Chinese school pupils, adolescent and early adult in Singapore. Crowds of these pupils, several hundreds strong, played an active part in fomenting strikes and riots in 1955. Subsequently,

the pupils formed a trade-union of their own which the Government was virtually forced to recognise. On several occasions they staged sit-down strikes, for political motives, and defied not only their teachers, but their parents too. By virtue of their solidarity and their leadership, they were completely beyond any parental control. At the present time they constitute, in Singapore, a political force of considerable potential importance.

This phenomenon might be considered from various stand-points. One remark only will however be made about it, by way of conclusion.

It is a commonplace that the structure and functions of the family vary according to the type of government in the political units of which it forms part. The predominant political feature of contemporary Asia is the rise of totalitarian democracy, derived largely, though not wholly, from Western models, and characterised by the existence of leaders of mass parties, using techniques of propaganda and manipulation, sophisticated as well as primitive, upon the public.[9] This totalitarian democracy necessarily operates mainly through associations, rather than through more stable and comprehensive groups, since its character is dynamic and generally in some sense anti-traditional. Furthermore, its appeal is largely to the young. Therefore, not only does some of the traditional socio-political significance of the family-group diminish, but there is also a marked shift of balance as between generations : young people become important, rather than old.

How far this development will go, and what long-term effects it will have on the position of the family as an organ of social control, is impossible to say as yet. One interesting fact is that, while it is blatant among the Chinese, nothing remotely resembling it seems to exist among Malayan Indians. An inquiry into the reasons for this would be interesting. They may be purely matters of organisation : there are exclusively Chinese High Schools, but as yet no exclusively Indian ones, in Malaya. And yet this hardly seems an adequate explanation. A comparative study of reactions against family-authority in such different and yet complementary cultures as the Indian and the Chinese might be an illuminating piece of work.

NOTES

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[2] Levy, Marion J., *Family Revolution in Modern China.* Harvard U.P. 1949.
[3] Ju-K'ang T'ien, The Chinese of Sarawak. London School of Economics : *Monographs on Social Anthropology*, No. 12. n.d. (?1954).
[4] Colony of Singapore, Social Welfare Department: *Annual Report for 1954*, pp. 4, 5.
[5] Goh Soon Phing: *A Chinese Fishing Village in Singapore* (unpublished Dissertation: University of Malaya).
[6] Lingat, R., *Les Regimes Matrimoniaux du Sud-Est de l'Asie.* Paris/Hanoi: 1952.
[7] Mulla, D. F., *Principles of Hindu Law.* 11th Edn. Calcutta, 1952.
[8] Murphy, H. B., The Mental Health of Singapore, Part I—Suicide. *Medical Journal of Malaya*, Vol. 9, 1954.
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La famille Arabe

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INTRODUCTION

Si géographiquement le domaine de l'Islam n'est pas un, les quatre cents millions d'êtres, qu'il régente de part le monde, sont néamoins et par dessus les frontières unifiés. Ils communient dans la même religion, participent à la même civilisation, adoptent les mêmes institutions et collaborent à la même culture. Ces humains forment dans le monde une entité compacte qui, sans être complètement distincte des autres, se distingue cependant et se reconnait à certaines marques spéciales. L'une de ces marques est le statut personnel, dont la famille forme le centre principal.

Avant de devenir universel, l'Islam s'est adressé aux arabes, parmi lesquels il est né. Son action s'était concentré, en premier lieu, sur leurs institutions immédiates dont il a transformé les bases. Mais le cadre est resté arabe, et les tribus qui ont propagé la nouvelle religion ont propagé avec elle des formes qui lui sont étrangères.

D'autre part, il y avait aussi les institutions juives dont on ne pouvait pas ignorer la présence et contre lesquelles il fallait nécessairement réagir.

Ainsi, l'Islam eut à lutter, dès sa venue au monde, contre trois fléaux:

1°—L'idolatrie, comme culte domestique;

2°—Les moeurs barbares engendrées soit par ce paganisme lui-même, soit par la vie au désert où la vie elle-même est une perpétuelle aridité;

3°—Le judaisme dégénéré, dont les adeptes, "figés dans leurs croyances ésotériques et leurs préjugés de race", ajoutaient un autre facteur de décomposition à une société déjà gravement atteinte.

CARACTÉRISTIQUES DE LA FAMILLE ARABE ANTÉISLAMIQUE

I—*Exogamie et Totémisme.*—Mr. Abdallah el-Yafi, dans sa thèse sur "La condition de la femme dans le Droit de l'Islam" (Paris, 1926), a étudié d'une façon magistrale la question de totémisme et de matriarcat dans la famille arabe. (Cette étude se complète par celle d'un autre savant historien, Georgi Zaidan, dans sa célébre *Généalogie des anciens arabes*, ainsi que par les travaux de C. Huart, *Histoire des arabes* et de L. G. Léni, *La famille dans l'antiquité Israélite*).

Voici leurs conclusions :

1°/—L'exogamie n'existait chez les arabes que sous une forme bien définie : se marier en dehors du clan, pour ne pas affaiblir la race. Le Prophète lui-même conseille, dans ce but, à ses compagnons d'épouser des femmes étrangères, ce que prouve l'exogamie n'était recherchée que sur plan déterminé et que les arabes ne l'avaient pas pratiquée dans le sens que les sociologues modernes ont découvert chez d'autres peuples.

2°/—Il ne faut pas voir un vestige de matriarcat dans le fait que certaines tribus portent des nommes de femme. Ces noms sont une infime minorité. On retrouve presque toujours en tête de l'arbre généalogique le nom d'un grand ancêtre masculin.

3°/—Même argument pour les hommes portant à la suite de leur nom celui de leur mère. C'était pour les distinguer des enfants d'autres femmes, épouses du même père.

4°/—Le terme *Dourrah*, rivale, se retrouve en arabe, en araméen et en hébreu. Il établit que la pluralité de femmes existait avant la séparation de sémites. Il ne pouvait y avoir de matriarcat, car la polygamie est bien l'opposé de cette institution.

5°/—L'attachement des arabes à la généalogie (*al-ansâab*), démontre qu'ils n'aspiraient nullement à faire remonter leur origine à un animal. Ils ne donnaient le nom d'un animal à une tribu ou à un enfant que pour marquer le désir que ces enfants possédassent les caractères de ces animaux : courage pour le lion, fidélité pour le chien, grace pour la gazelle.

Il en va de même pour les dieux animaux. D'ailleurs ces dieux n'étaient pas des animaux vivants, comme le veut la règle totémique.

II.—*Mariage.*—Un mariage, *Ziwaje*, était à la base de cette famille. Il affectait des formes différentes.

A.—La forme la plus répandue, la plus commune, était celle connue sous le nom de *Ziwaje el-Mehr, mariage avec paiement de dot.* Son rituel se composait des éléments suivants :

(*a*) une demande en mariage faite au tuteur de la jeune fille ou de la femme,

(*b*) paiement du *Mehr*, dot, à ce tuteur et non à la femme. C'était une formalité essentielle. Par la perception du *Mehr* le tuteur marquait la fin de ses droits sur la jeune fille ; le paiement, par le mari, signifiait, d'autre part, les débuts des droits que le mariage conférait sur la personne de la mariée. D'où deux conclusions auxquelles la pratique et les mœurs donnaient un caractère absolu : la première c'est que le consentement de la mariée n'était pas nécessaire pour la conclusion du mariage, et, la seconde, c'est que le rapt pouvait remplacer le paiement du *mehr*. D'une autre manière, la violence mettait fin au droit du tuteur et faisait naître les droits du mari.

(*c*) transport de la femme dans la maison de son mari.

B.—Une autre forme de mariage, assez répandue, mais plus restreinte que la précédente, était "le mariage provisoire".

L'homme, de passage dans un endroit, se mariait dans une tribu et y laissait sa femme. Il pouvait, en y repassant, habiter chez elle. Les femmes riches ou de condition élévée, préféraient ce genre de mariage: c'étaient, pour elles, le meilleur moyen de veiller sur leur fortune ou de rester parmi les gens de leur condition. Les enfants issus de ce mariage restaient avec leur mêre et portaient son nom et s'apparentaient à sa tribu.

Le mariage provisoire pouvait affecter cette forme, aussi curieuse qu'étrange: la femme avait, si elle le voulait, le droit de rompre les liens du mariage. Pour cela, il lui suffisait de changer l'emplacement de la porte de sa tente. Ce geste faisait comprendre à l'homme qu'il a perdu la qualité d'époux (Ibn Batouta raconte dans son "voyage" avoir vu des cas de ce mariage, lors de son passage dans les "quartiers" de Zobeid, à Yamen). A Yamen exista également, à une certaine époque, cette pratique de la communauté de la femme entre les différents membres d'une même famille. C'était le *Damd*, mais ce n'était pas la polyandrie.

C.—Le mariage des "femmes à étandard" était plus étrange encore. L'étandard, dont disposaient certaines dames, était signe de leur puissance; elles étaient à la tête d'une puissante tribu ou d'une grande fortune. Or, elles pouvaient contracter mariage avec plusieurs hommes, simultanément et ensemble. L'enfant qui naissait était attribué par la mère à l'homme qu'elle indiquait elle-même, ou à celui de ses maris qui présentait le plus de ressemblance avec l'enfant.

D.—Dans ce même genre était le mariage dit *Istibdah* (littéralement: commande d'une marchandise). Dans le but d'avoir une descendance "noble" ou "forte", un mari stérile donnait en mariage sa propre femme à un autre homme, de condition noble ou de force physique supérieure à la sienne. Il avait le droit de reprendre sa femme dès qu'elle se trouvait en état de grossesse. Il s'attribuait ainsi la paternité de l'enfant, comme si il était son propre père.

Cette pratique hideuse était tempérée par la pratique de l'adoption. Cependant, on ne pouvait adopter que les garçons, les filles n'étaient pas aptes à être adoptées. L'enfant adoptif était placé, par les parents comme par la tribu, au même rang que celui de l'enfant légitime.

III.—*Condition de la femme.*—Ces formes de mariage indiquent suffisamment ce que pouvait être la condition de la majorité des femmes, dans quel esprit on les traitait. Mais elles subissaient d'autres humiliations. Ainsi, les héritiers pouvaient se marier avec les femmes du défunt (sauf pour les fils qui ne pouvaient se marier avec leur propre mère). Pour s'en emparer, il suffisait à l'homme de jeter son manteau sur la veuve et de lui constituer, ensuite, une dot. C'est le mariage que le Coran qualifie de *Makt* (ignoble) et qu'il interdit formellement (Coran, IV, 32).

L'héritier pouvait encore donner la veuve de son père en mariage, s'il lui plaisait de le faire, et toucher lui-même son *Mehr*. Il pouvait aussi l'empêcher de se remarier pour en hériter à sa mort.

La veuve ne pouvait échapper à ce sort qu'en se réfugiant dans sa famille, avant que le nouveau chef ne l'appréhende. Son nouveau mariage pouvait alors s'effectuer par son tuteur d'origine, ou par elle-même.

IV.—*Cessation du mariage, héritage et succession.*—La femme ne pouvait rompre les liens du mariage que dans les mariages provisoires, comme on l'a vu plus haut. Dans les autres cas, cette rupture se faisait soit par *Khoulh*, soit par répudiation, *al-Talak*. Le *Koulh* se faisait par entente amiable entre le mari et le tuteur de la femme. La répudiation était un acte unilatéral, accompli par l'homme qui manifestait par trois fois sa volonté de rompre.

La femme n'héritait pas de l'homme—qu'elle soit mère, épouse, fille, soeur ou proche parente. Les arabes disaient: sont seuls successibles et aptes à hériter ceux qui peuvent guerroyer avec la lance, défendre l'héritage, et gagner le butin. Les enfants mâles héritaient par parts égales. L'ainé avait seul le privilège de choisir sa part, le premier. Quelquefois les mâles, en bas âge, n'héritaient pas, eux aussi. Ils pouvaient attendre pour hériter la mort d'autres personnes plus agées.

L'autorité du père sur ses fils était considérable; elle était plus considérable encore et inhumaine quand elle s'exerçait sur les filles. Le *Waad* était la facultée que les pèress' accordaient, sans subir aucune honte ou réprobation, d'enterrer vivantes leurs filles, au moment de leur naissance. (Un arabe sur dix se livrait à cette horrible pratique, cependant que quelques tribus et quelques régions ne l'ont pas connue). C'était la peur de la "honte" et de la "pauvreté" qui justifiait ce massacre.

Al-Adl consistait à condamner au célibat perpétuel une orpheline ou une héritière, en s'opposant à son mariage ou en l'empêchant de se marier. (L'Islam interdit formellement l'une et l'autre pratique. Coran S. el-Annam, A. 151– S. el-Nissâa, A. 126.)

La jeune fille n'avait à manifester aucun consentement ou un refus lors de son mariage. Ni sa mère pour elle. Seul le père détenait ce pouvoir. Aussi, lui incombait-il toujours l'obligation de la protéger, même après son mariage, qu'elle soit mariée dans sa propre tribu ou dans une autre. Divorcée, répudiée, ou veuve, elle rentrait dans la maison paternelle. Le jeune homme pouvait choisir une fiancée, mais ne pouvait se marier sans le consentement de son père. S'il continue à vivre avec sa famille, l'autorité paternelle reste entière; dans le cas contraire, cette autorité se relâchait.

Présence du système Juif

Pour se faire une idée approximative de l'enseignement des rabbins de Médine, auxquels le Prophète s'est heurté, il convient de se reporter

à l'ouvrage de A. Cohen, rabbin de la synagogue de Birmingham, intitulé *Le Talmud*—(Traduction française de M. Jacques Marty, Payot, Paris, 1950. Plus particulièrement au chapitre V, "La vie de famille", p. 211 à 237). Loin de repousser le monothéisme juif, l'Islam, au contraire, l'intensifie. Mais, de peur que les moeurs juives (qui sont quelquefois plus barbares que celles des arabes paiens), ne soient adoptées par les nouveaux convertis, l'Islam établit un nouveau système qui constitue une réfutation complète du système juif. C'est là qu'on retrouve l'explication de certaines dispositions très particulières de la loi musulmane qui ne sont, en réalité, que des moyens de protection contre la loi juive.

Apports de l'Islam

Définition.—La famille musulmane est une agrégation d'individus unis par la communauté du sang. Cette communauté, qui prend racine directement dans le mariage, exige que ce mariage soit régulier et elle ne saurait être conçue sans lui. C'est donc, en même temps qu'une famille conjugale, une organisation "parentale" où l'on prend en considération les liens que crée l'alliance, fait qui élargit considérablement son cycle, c'est à dire le nombre des personnes qui en font partie. Si l'Islam constitue le "souffle inspirateur et organisateur" de cette famille, c'est pour la soustraire à tout paganisme d'abord, et c'est, ensuite, pour lui conférer des bases solides: son but étant d'en faire l'élément de fond de la *Oumma*, la grande Communauté, dans laquelle doivent fondre individus et familles. Ses principes fondamentaux sont: le libre choix, la volonté autonome et concourante des ses membres, leur soumission volontaire aux obligations de secours et d'assistance réciproques et mutuelles que chacun doit à l'autre.

Ses fondements religieux lui conférent d'autres attributs. Elle est charitable, équitable et égalitaire: l'autorité humaine qui veille à sa direction morale n'est jamais livrée à elle-même; elle s'exerce sous la surveillance du juge qui peut y intervenir et jouer un rôle souvent décisif.

Enfin, elle est conçue d'une manière qui lui permet d'évoluer avec le temps, les circonstances et les lieux, mais seulement, à l'intérieur de ses propres préceptes qui sont d'ailleurs très larges et profondément humains.

Etapes de sa formation.—"La famille musulmane, dit Maurice Gaudefroy-Demombynes, n'est pas une création de Mahomet; c'est l'ancienne famille arabe dans le cadre d'une religion supérieure. . . . On distingue mal l'histoire de ses débuts. Certains faits précis indiquent que les usages de la vie matromoniale étaient différents à Mekke et à Médine, où ils avaient été sans doute influencés par les juifs et les premiers rapports avec les *muhajirin* (les premiers émigrés) causèrent des hésitations et des heurts." (*Les Institutions musulmanes*, 3° édit. Flammarion, Paris, 1946.)

Le point de vue du grand Orientaliste doit être interprété et rectifié par tout ce qui a précédé. Que "l'ancienne famille arabe" ait été maintenue, c'est possible et il ne pouvait en être autrement. Mais dans quelle mesure cette famille a été renouvelée dans "le cadre de cette religion supérieure" dont parle M. G. Demmombynes ? Toute la question est là. Et il est, surtout, inexact de prétendre que l'histoire de ses débuts se distinguent mal. Car, justement, cette histoire peut se retrouver écrite en toutes lettres dans le Coran lui-même.

Les premières révélations, brèves, nettes et hallucinantes, semblent tendre, avant tout, à mettre l'homme en présence de son créateur. L'être faible et oublieux est violemment secoué, comme pour lui faire reprendre conscience. Les bienfaits de son Dieu lui sont rappelés, ainsi que les formes de l'adoration, qui, toutes, sont conçues pour son propre bien. Les rappels s'addressent aux hommes et aux femmes. Les uns et les autres sont déjà classés suivant leur degrés de croyance: en hypocrites, idolâtres, fidèles, infidèles, charitables. (Coran, chap. 8°, n° 67, 68 et 71 ; chapitre 47° ; n° 7 ; chap. 56° n° 18.)

Dans ces mêmes premières révélations les femmes sont, ensuite, désignées du'une façon particulière. Ordre est donné au Prophète de recevoir le serment d'allégence des femmes touchées par la grâce nouvelle. (Coran chap. 59°, n° 12.) Un autre exemple, plus frappant encore, est ce verset où il est dit que Dieu lui-même entend la plainte de la femme maltraitée par son mari.

Puis l'homme et la femme sont mis sur le même pied d'égalité, quand ils font le bien : (Coran, chap. 15°, n° 59 ; chap. 2° n° 2.) D'une façon plus particulière encore, il est rappelé à l'homme que la femme, son épouse, lui a été créé de son essence même. Elle lui sert de réfuge moral ; Dieu préside à cette affection et à cet amour réciproques qui s'établissent entre les époux. "C'est là, dit le Coran, l'un des signes de Dieu" (Coran, chap, 29°, n° 21). Enfin le *Waad* est formellement interdit, dans les termes solennels. Les devoirs religeux sont imposés. aux hommes, comme aux femmes, sans distinction.

Dans ces premières révélations il est simplement fait allusion au mariage et à la vie de famille. Il serait long d'énumérer tous ces passages. Mais c'est là qu'on relève les termes, les qualificatifs les plus délicats qui se disent à propos des femmes: mères, épouses, soeurs, enfants.

Dans les dernières révélations (à Médine), toutes les données sont reprises et confrontées avec la réalité. Il y a une sorte de synthèse aiguë, qui se présente comme la volonté définitive de Dieu. Tout est repris, et la déclaration de la dignité de l'homme et de la femme figure en tête du tableau. Ni le monde, ni les humains n'ont été crées inutilement. Il y a un but à la base de la création.

L'homme sur la Terre.—Il y a, en effet un sens musulman du monde, un sens musulman de l'homme: deux notions fondamentales qui conditionnent la vie des adeptes de l'Islam, à quelque degré de l'échelle sociale qu'ils appartiennent. L'absence de l'idée du péché originel et

la gestion du monde pour le compte de Dieu. C'est dans les toutes dernières révélations (Coran, I, 34 à 39) que ces notions sont mises en évidence. Après avoir pardonné à Adam sa désobéissance du paradis, Dieu fait de l'homme son vicaire, *Khalifa*, sur la Terre, malgré les protestations des Anges. On croit assister à un sacre, une intronisation ou à une apothéose.

Et, pour marquer la supériorité de sa plus noble créature, Dieu ordonne aux anges de se prosterner devant Adam, à qui il a, par ailleurs "conféré la science"; Adam est doté du savoir alors que les anges n'en disposent pas. Puis, en lui assignant la Terre comme demeure provisoire, Il lui remet son gouvernement. Il en est le maitre absolu après son Seigneur. Il ne s'agit donc pas d'une chute, d'une damnation, mais d'une mission divine à accomplir. Et c'est pourquoi tout ce qui touche à cette mission est divin et sacré en Islam. Aussi, Mohammed Ikbal, le grand poète des Indes, dans un poème admirable, fait parler ainsi l'Esprit de la Terre qui accourt pour recevoir Adam: "Voici les nuages, les firmaments et les horizons tranquilles, les montagnes, les déserts et les souffles des vents. Tous sont à ta disposition, à la portée de ta main. Hier tu apercevais les réticences des Anges, mais, aujourd'hui, regarde la gloire de ton âme dans le miroir du monde. Ne te laisse pas attirer par les paradis faciles, donnés sans échange, ton paradis à toi est caché dans les plis de ton être. O! créature faite d'argile, essaie donc le fruit d'une action sans relâche."

L'homme et son complément.—Mais l'homme ne saurait faire le chemin tout seul. Sa compagne naturelle est la femme qui a été créée de lui-même, de ses côtes "fragiles et délicates", suivant un propos du Prophète.

Devant Dieu les deux compagnons sont égaux. Leur esprit libéré ne reconnait d'autre maître que l'Unique. Volontairement ils se soumettent à Lui et Lui vouent leurs actes et leurs pensées. Plus ils se consacrent à Lui, pour accomplir sa volonté, plus ils se trouvent heureux. "Dire en vérité et non pas seulement des lévres: Allahou-Akbar, Dieu est le plus grand, c'est fermer la porte à toute servitude, c'est se proclamer et se réaliser fondamentalement libre. L'esclave de l'être absolu, le Abdoullah, le serviteur des attributs d'Allah, ne peut être véritablement l'esclave d'aucun être. Plus il est son esclave, plus il est libre à l'égard de tous les autres." (Emile Darmengheim, Le Témoignage de l'Islam.)

Le pacte le plus solennel, le plus grave, le plus lourd de conséquences que la femme est en droit d'exiger de l'homme, c'est le mariage.

Société d'hommes et de femmes.—Dans d'autres textes Coraniques antérieurs au chapitre IV (*Al-Nissa*, les femmes) qui fait partie de la Révélation médinoise, il est affirmé d'une façon catégorique et définitive que la société à laquelle Dieu convie ses adorateurs est une société d'hommes et de femmes. Il est constamment rappelé aux humains qu'ils ont été crées, tous, hommes et femmes, d'une seule et unique

essence et que les plus dignes de la grâce de Dieu sont ceux qui observent ses Commandements. Exemple: (Coran, Chap. 49, n° 13).

Il est hors de doute, qu'en plus de leur portée générale, ces textes visent également à achever la réhabilitation de la femme. Ceci résulte d'un ensemble d'actes, de comportements, de *hadith* (propos du Prophète) dont l'authenticité n'a jamais été contestée et qui mettent les données coraniques en pratique.

Dieu vous recommande vos mères (par trois fois), ensuite vos proches parents.

Le Paradis est sous les pieds des mères.

Seuls les hommes aux grands coeurs respectent les femmes. Les vils les maltraient.

Les parfaits fidèles sont les hommes aux mœurs douces. Les meilleurs d'entre eux sont ceux qui se comportent généreusement avec leurs femmes.

Donnez équitablement à vos enfants. Si j'avais à favoriser quelqu'un je favoriserai les femmes.

J'en prend Dieu à temoin : je suis là pour faire respecter le droit de deux faibles : l'orphelin et la femme.

Dans son dernier discours à la Mecque, lors du pélerinage d'adieu, quelques mois avant sa mort, le Prophète n'a pas oublié les femmes dans ses recommandations aux fidèles.

QUELQUES ASPECTS DE LA FAMILLE MUSULMANE

Le Contrat de Mariage.—Le mariage est un acte par lequel deux personnes s'unissent pour fonder un foyer. Comme tout acte de la vie humaine conclu entre deux êtres que rien au préalable ne réunissait, il est soumis à des conditions de formes et de fond. Les conditions de formes sont très simples: une demande en mariage est formulée. Si elle est agréée, elle pourrait se terminer tout de suite par la conclusion du contrat de mariage. Il y a donc: un consentement mutuel et réciproque, d'égal à égale—la femme pour elle-même ou par son mandataire, l'homme pour lui-même ou par son représentant. Un paiement de dot, mehr, par le mari est prévu. La femme doit avoir, en principe 17 ans révolus, l'homme 18 ans révolus. Consentement réciproque, âge, paiement de la dot, sont les conditions essentielles de fond. Il faut y ajouter une autre: la notion de Kafaat, ou parité de rang social, d'état ou de condition, et qui sera étudiée plus loin.

C'est donc un contrat.

Caractère du contrat de mariage.—"Le contrat de mariage n'a point un caractère spécialement religieux dans un mileu social qui confond le spirituel et le temporel; on peut le conclure à la mosquée, mais aussi dans la maison des parties", dit M. Gaudefroy-Demombynes (*Les Institutions de l'Islam*, p. 133, 3° édit.)

M. Gaudefroy-Demombynes se trompe.

Non seulement le Coran lui-même confère à ce contrat le caractère le plus grave, le plus solennel, en l'appelant: "l'acte capital", du fait

qu'il engage tout l'être humain, mais il ne faut jamais oublier que tous les actes de l'homme musulman et de la femme musulmane, tous les comportements de leurs sens (la vue, l'ouïe, les palpitations du coeur), sont d'ordre religeiux. (Coran, XVII, 35.)

D'autre part, il n'y a pas d'autorité religieuse en Islam, comme dans le Christianisme et le Judaisme, pour l'opposer à l'autorité non-religeuse ou civile, comme on dit habituellement. Le spirituel et le temporel sont deux notions qui, appliquées à l'Islam, ne provoquent que confusion. Il faut se contenter de dire Islam.

Enfin, ce n'est pas la mosquée qui confère aux actes une qualité religeuse. D'une part la mosquée n'est pas l'unique lieu de prière; c'est seulement le lieu de prière en commun. D'autre part, la Terre, toute entière, étant pure pourrait servir de mosquée; elle purifie et sert de lieu de purification, comme le dit un hadith.

Ages.—Pour contracter mariage, l'homme doit avoir 18 ans révolus et la femme 17 ans révolus. Cependant le juge peut, après examen et enquête, accorder une dispense aux garçons de moins de 18 ans qui prétendraient avoir atteint la puberté avant l'âge légal. Même possibilité pour la jeune fille de moins de 17 ans. Mais il est absolument interdit d'accorder des dispenses d'âge aux garçons de moins de 12 ans et aux filles de moins de 9 ans. La demande de dispense est adressée par la personne intéressée elle-même, ou par toute personne proche-parente ou honorable de l'endroit.

Consentement.—Il est exigé, sous peine de nullité. Rien ne saurait y suppléer. Même si le tuteur du mineur (fille ou garçon) consent, le mineur devenu majeur peut dénoncer son défaut de consentement et faire déclarer le mariage nul.

La dot.—Elle est donnée à la femme elle-même et non à ses parents. Si, pour une raison quelconque elle est confiée à une personne autre que la femme elle-même, cette personne doit la garder intacte ou la gérer comme on gère un dépot légal, c.à.d. équitablement, consciencieusement et on doit la restituer intégralement.

Le Coran, ainsi que la Tradition, insistent d'une manière persistante sur l'accomplissement de cette formalité de base. Il faut offrir n'importe quoi—à condition que la femme l'accepte—mais il faut offrir. Pas de somme ou d'objet déterminé: depuis le simple anneau en simple métal ou de l'unique pièce en or, jusqu'aux sommes les plus exagérées. On peut s'entendre, c'est une affaire de dames entre elles. Mais il est de bon ton de rester (quelquefois d'affecter de rester) dans une coutume, déclarée honorable, en se limitant au chiffre cinq (cinq pièces or, cinq objets de valeur etc. . .) Le renonciation de la femme à la dot ne dispensera point le mari du versement du minimum qui a été fixé par la coutume ou les juristes.

Le *Mehr*, propriété exclusive de la femme, pourrait être versé intégralement d'avance ou divisé en tranche (tiers ou moitié) et payé à la cessation du mariage. La première tranche sert à aider la jeune

fille à compléter son trousseau, la deuxième à l'établir honorablement et provisoirement jusqu'à son retour dans sa famille primitive. La 2° tranche est due à la femme quels que soient les causes du divorce à moins que ce soit pour adultère. Dans ce cas elle en est privée, mais le Coran conseille de lui en faire don.

Malgré son caractère obligatoire, le non paiement de la dot n'entraine pas la nullité du mariage, comme le ferait le défaut de consentement. Mais dans ce cas, le paiement d'une dot dite coutumière n'en reste pas moins obligatoire. Elle est fixée en tenant compte des usages locaux, de la condition de fortune de la femme, de la condition de sa famille, de son âge.

Al Kafaà, ou parité de rang et d'état des époux.—C'est une notion sociale dont on retrouve les origines dans la hiérarchie anti-islamique et dans la morgue des arabes récemment convertis à l'Islam. L'union de deux lignées est une pratique vieille comme le monde et qui a existé partout. L'Islam a nivelé la société, mais longtemps les arabes refusaient de se marier ou de marier leurs filles à des musulmans non-arabes, à plus forte raison à des esclaves libérés ou à des *mawalis* (des clients arabisés). Mais tout de suite et déjà au premier siècle de l'hégire, on s'est arrêté à une notion de "niveau", d'"affinité", de milieu social. Une femme lettrée ne saurait être mariée à un homme illétré, ou se livrant à une profession dégradante ou mal vue.

Non seulement la femme peut refuser le mariage mais elle peut le faire annuler. Le juge peut contraindre le tuteur d'une femme consentante. Mais il ne peut jamais obliger la femme à consentir. (Observons que c'est toujours l'intérêt de la femme qu'on prend en considération.) L'échange du consentement se fait devant le juge ou son délégué, en présence de témoins. Un acte écrit est dressé et enregistré immédiatement, portant la signature des partis ou de leurs représentants, ainsi que celles des témoins.

Notions d'autorité et questions de préséances.—L'Islam proclame le droit naturel à la vie; il en fait même un droit divin. Il insiste d'une façon particulière sur cette idée d'égalité devant Dieu et devant cette Loi, émanation de la volonté divine.

En principe tous les membres de la famille sont égaux. Ils participent au même culte, adorent le même Dieu, et se trouvent soumis à la même Loi. Il y a certes, un chef de famille, mais *Rab el-Beit*, le maître du Foyer, n'est plus qu'un imam provisoire, qui ne rappelle en rien le monstre terrassé. Le nouveau maître se trouve placé à la tête d'une unité compacte, homogène et nivelée et avec laquelle il finit d'ailleurs par se confondre.

On connait cependant les deux célèbres versets du Coran (II, 228 et IV, 33) où il est question d'un degré de préséance en faveur des hommes. Comment faut-il comprendre ces textes? Pour les interpréter, on part de cette idée qu'il faut pour chaque agglomération un chef responsable, un bon pasteur, un imam, qui en assure la direction et la maintien. Or,

cet imam a besoin d'un minimum de prestige. Et en se référant à la Tradition, on s'aperçoit que cette supériorité, d'essence toute morale, ne s'exerce qu'à l'interieur du ménage ou au sein de la famille, dans un but parfaitement moral, que la nature des choses commande.

D'autre part, en approfondissant l'examen des institutions familiales elles-mêmes on constate aussi que cette supériorité, du fait qu'elle est toujours secondée, et souvent suppléée, par l'autorité spéciale de la femme (la loi donne des préséances personnelles à cette dernière), se trouve pratiquement encadrée, limitée, et devient par là, pour ainsi dire, imperceptible. Car une autorité qui s'appuie sur une autre, laquelle peut prétendre aux mêmes droits qu'elle, n'est, en fait, jamais absolue.

Mais comment les deux versets en question ont reçu application en pratique? (Car, rappelons que les Commandements du Coran, à la différence des autres livres saints, étaient mis en application immédiatement quelquefois le jour même de leur révélation.) Comment ils ont été intégrés dans la loi positive? Il convient de signaler, tout d'abord, qu'ils sont les seuls textes relatifs à ce sujet. Ils ne sont pas suivis, dans le Coran, par d'autres textes explicatifs ou limitatifs, comme il est procédé souvent ailleurs. On doit remarquer, d'autre part, que le laconisme de leurs termes semble être calculé et prémédité. Enoncés à la suite d'une préparation intense, ils forment comme une sorte de point de repère, d'indication. Mais ils annoncent l'esprit nouveau. "Leurs droits (ceux des femmes) valent leurs obligations, en toute équité. Et les hommes ont sur elles un degré" dit le premier texte. "Les hommes ont un avantage sur les femmes, conformément à une hiérarchisation établie par Dieu, et pour (dédommager) les dépenses en bien consenties par eux" dit le deuxième texte.

Or tout est là: Droits et obligations se réglent en équité.

Et c'est tout. Il s'agit donc d'une morale nettement dessinée, dans son énoncé général. Mais c'est dans la pratique qu'on s'aperçoit à quoi le nouveau système voulait faire face. S'agit-il pour un père de marier sa fille? La pratique arabe faisait du père le maître absolu. Telle était aussi la règle chez les juifs: "Le père a le devoir capital de donner de bonne heure un mari à sa fille. Ce verset: "Tu ne profaneras pas ta fille en la livrant à la prostitution" (*Lévit.* 19, 29), était appliqué au père" "qui tardait à marier sa fille d'âge nubile" (*Sanh.* 76 a) (A. Cohen, *op. cit.* p. 215).

S'agit-il d'éduquer le fille? Les arabes initiaient leurs filles à leur religion—du moins ils ne pouvaient pas les en exclure. Mais il en allait autrement chez les juifs. ". . . Un docteur déclarait: Un homme est tenu d'enseigner la tora à sa fille." Mais on lit aussitôt après (dans le Talmud): "Quiconque enseigne la tora à sa fille agit comme s'il l'initiait à l'obscénité" (*Sot.* 3, 4). La majorité, il faut l'admettre, professait et pratiquait cette dernière opinion. . . . Un rabbin disait: "mieux vaudrait que les paroles de la tora fussent consumées par le

feu que communiquées à des femmes (p. Sot. 19 a) (A. Cohen, *op. cit.* p. 233).

L'autorité du mari sur la femme, chez les arabes, était absolu. Il en était de même chez les juifs. (A. Cohen p. 220). Et le mariage lui-même qui, chez les arabes, avait une certaine dignité, n'était pour les juifs qu'une façon de "purifier" la femme. (A. Cohen, p. 217.)

L'Islam devait donc réagir violemment contre tous ces abus. Le "degré de préséance" qu'il attribue aux hommes devra rester de pure essence moral pour le bien de tous. C'est ainsi que les fidèles ont compris la chose. Le système élaboré de très bonne heure autour des fameux versets met si bien leur portée morale en évidence qu'il en constitue la meilleure interprétation. Il est également permis de dire que cette interprétation a donné naissance à une système de protection qui favorise les femmes à un degré qui n'existe dans aucune législation moderne. (Voir les notions de *Hildana,* garde des enfants en bas âge par la mère, notions de succession etc.)

Obéissance au mari.—La tradition l'admet. Mais pour ce qui est légal seulement. En fait, il s'agit d'une situation toute morale où chacun des époux a des obligations envers l'autre. Au vu des textes positifs on pourrait se demander si le mari ne doit pas lui-même obéissance à sa femme.

Conclusion.—Tout ce qui précède démontre que la femme n'est pas étrangère à la direction de la famille. Ses droits comme ses obligations commencent en même temps que ceux du mari et ils s'enchevêtrent. Il en résulte cependant une situation trop claire: il faut parler de respect mutuel et réciproque plutôt que de subordination d'un époux à l'autre. Comparée à celle des femmes de certaines sociétés occidentales, la condition de la femme musulmane peut être qualifiée de supérieure. Elle n'est pas tenue de travailler pour vivre, pour ne citer que cet exemple. Un *hadith,* aussi célèbre que les textes coraniques cités plus hauts, fait de la femme la directrice de la maison de son mari.

L'Imam, le mari et la femme, tels sont les piliers de la famille musulmane. Et voici, à titre comparatif, une disposition de la loi française. Elle pourrait donner une idée de la situation de la femme au lendemain de la Révolution. Le code Napoléon stipulait (art. 213 du code civil des Français) "Le mari doit protection à sa femme, la femme obéissance à son mari".

Ce texte a été modifié récemment comme suit:

"*Art.* 213.—Le mari est le chef de la famille. Il exerce cette fonction dans l'intérêt commun du ménage et des enfants.

"La femme concourt avec le mari à assurer la direction morale et matérielle de la famille, à pourvoir à son entretien, à élever les enfants et à préparer leur établissement.

"La femme remplace le mari dans sa fonction de chef s'il est hors d'état de manifester sa volonté en raison de son incapacité, de son absence, de son éloignement ou de toute autre cause."

TANGENTES ET SUITES DU MARIAGE

I. *Polygamie.*—Le Coran, tout en indiquant la possibilité pour l'homme d'un mariage qui pourrait aller jusqu'à avec quatre femmes (S. 4, A. 3) semble indiquer que la monogamie serait seule la règle (même S. Ayates suivantes). Le but immédiat du Coran était de mettre fin à un désordre social que plusieurs siècles de *Jahilia* avait favorisé. Son but lointain, qui se réalise rapidement avec les transformations de la vie, était et reste une stabilisation des mœurs où l'exception serait un remède plutôt que fin en soi et ne prend pas allure de scandale. (L'étude la plus complète et la plus moderne sur cette question est celle de Abdul Aziz Fehmi Pacha, paru dans *Al Sakafa*, n° 467, 9 décembre 1947.)

Les textes Coraniques relatifs à cette institution se trouvent dans le chapitre IV du Coran, n° 3, 4, 129 et 130). Ils comportent que:

1°. la Polygamie est conditionelle;

2°. une notion de justice intégrale s'attache à l'acte;

3°. un avertissement très catégorique suivant lequel il est presque impossible de se conformer à cette idée de justice.

Naturellement cette réglementation de la polygamie était destinée à remplacer les mœurs arabes. Les textes du Coran se dressent surtout contre les textes juifs, d'ailleurs étrangement interprétés. (Quelques-uns de ces textes sont cités dans Cohen, *op. cit.* pp. 218 et 220.)

II. *Rupture du mariage.*—On peut mettre fin au mariage par:

(*a*) *la Répudiation* qui est prononcée par le mari et pour des raisons qu'il n'est pas tenu de dévoiler. Elle est portée à la connaissance du juge qui la sanctionne.

(*b*) *Le Divorce.* C'est la demande en séparation définitive que porte le mari ou la femme, devant le juge, généralement sans indication de motifs. Le juge nomme deux arbitres, proches parents des deux époux, qui tentent une reconcilation et examinent secrètement les vrais mobiles de la demande. Le juge prend en considération le procès verbal qui mentionne leur échec (non motivé toujours) et prononce le divorce.

Dans tous les cas le mari est tenu de verser le restant du Mehr, dont le paiement est prévu pour la dissolution du mariage par la mort, la répudiation ou le divorce. Il verse pension à la femme, quelque soit sa situation dans le procès.

Là aussi, cet acte grave, aussi grave que celui du mariage lui-même, est placé directement sous l'autorité de Dieu. " Si les epoux décident de se séparer, dit le Coran (II, 227) Dieu entend et connait ". Il ajoute: " La séparation aura lieu dans la digneté et la charité, comme doit l'être la vie en commun " (Coran II, 229). Les autres textes (Coran II, 229 et 230) réglementent la forme du divorce et indiquent les motifs et les mobiles (de conscience) qui peuvent déterminer les deux conjoints à se remarier. On doit ajouter

que dans leur sens le plus élémentaire, le plus direct, ces versets s'addressent à la conscience des fidèles ainsi qu'à l'autorité du juge. Si certaine pratique les déforme quelquefois, la faute en revient aux praticiens. Ici encore, il est important de préciser que les textes coraniques font face aux notions juives sur la matière (V. Cohen, *op. cit.* pp. 219 et 220).

Conclusion générale

1—L'historique de la famille musulmane explique l'origine de certaines particularités.

2—La structure intérieure lui confère une force et une résistance à toute épreuve.

3—Son caractère religieux hausse sa digneté et lui permet de s'imposer sans résistance.

4—Aucun problème de la vie moderne ne saurait l'atteindre dans ses racines, ses cadres étant larges, mais très souples et profondément humains.

5—En fait, aucune révolution n'est nécessaire pour l'emmener à se transformer suivant les exigences des époques. Elle comporte, dans ses plis, des réponses satisfaisantes, à des questions déjà posées ou qui sont en train de l'être.