TRANSACTIONS OF THE THIRD WORLD CONGRESS OF SOCIOLOGY

ACTES DU TROISIÈME CONGRÈS MONDIAL DE SOCIOLOGIE

AMSTERDAM, 1956

VOLUME VI

TRANSACTIONS OF THE THIRD
WORLD CONGRESS OF SOCIOLOGY

ACTES DU TROISIÈME
CONGRÈS MONDIAL DE SOCIOLOGIE

VOLUME VI

TRANSACTIONS OF THE THIRD
WORLD CONGRESS OF SOCIOLOGY

ACTES DU TROISIÈME
CONGRÈS MONDIAL DE SOCIOLOGIE

Koninklijk Instituut voor de Tropen, Amsterdam
22–29 August, 1956

General Theme

PROBLEMS OF SOCIAL CHANGE IN THE 20TH CENTURY
LE PROBLÈME DU CHANGEMENT SOCIAL AU 20ÈME SIÈCLE

VOLUME VI

General Survey of the Problems of Social Change
Tableau Général des Problèmes du Changement Social

·

INTERNATIONAL SOCIOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION
ASSOCIATION INTERNATIONALE DE SOCIOLOGIE

1956

Contents

The Moral Web in Social Change

ROBERT C. ANGELL

(Professor of Sociology, University of Michigan)

The interrelations of changes in different areas of society are facts of the empirical world. They exist before we begin to think about them. They are so complex and difficult to grasp, however, that we need to have some guide lines in mind even to explore them. Without theory to orient our observation and our accumulation of evidence, we would be lost in the infinite variety of the social world. Our first task is to obtain a model which, from sociological analyses to date, seems to be close enough to the way societies operate to yield fruitful hypotheses.

Although most schools of sociology have long since forsaken Spencer's analogy to the biological organism, they do not reject the notion that society is, like each of its included groups, a system. Sociologists appear to be widely agreed that a society adjusts to its problems as a whole, that the parts are interrelated, and that they perform specialized tasks for the whole. Where we part company with Spencer is in his supposing that the necessary functions are closely analogous to those required in a biological organism or are allocated in any fixed way to particular structural parts.

The thesis of this paper is that one portion of the societal system, that which I shall call the moral web, plays a key role in the readjustments that constitute social change. It will be argued that the changes which occur in different areas of society are brought to adjustment through this moral web. This makes it like the hub of a revolving fan, a place where different parts are securely joined.[1]

The term moral web as used here includes cultural features that control conduct in the interest of the welfare of the society. It is made up of societal institutions, moral norms, and that part of law which is derivative from moral norms. Institutions are differentiated from moral norms by the fact that institutions represent the greater degree of nucleation of structure. The family, the school, the state as cultural entities are systems of rôles that have been developed because they fit both the common values of the culture and the practical exigencies of life in the particular habitat. They are social structures in which persons find their places. Moral norms, on the other hand, are rules for conduct in specific situations which are internalized in persons and which are put in practice when the appropriate situation arises. One could state the difference between the two baldly by saying that persons are embedded in institutions whereas moral norms are embedded in persons. They are different ways of seeing to it that action conforms to what the society believes to be right.

A

Some writers find the moral web essentially in law. This is true not only of scholars of jurisprudence but of sociologists like Sorokin[2] and Timasheff.[3] The objection to this position is that there is a great deal of law that is either too technical to be labelled moral at all or that has become morally obsolete through social change. It is certainly true, however, that a large part of the law is a buttress to moral norms and institutions and is therefore part of the moral web.

It is clear that the study of societies in equilibrium can tell us little about the relative influence or power of the various structural elements. If the economy is adjusted to the habitat and the moral web to both so that the round of life goes on much the same from one generation to the next, one cannot obtain any leverage for analysis. Such a society is a system whose processes are so nicely adjusted to one another that it goes on indefinitely like an electric motor supplied with perpetual current. One does not know what would happen if there were a change in climate, or technology, or religion, and cannot therefore assess the causal importance of such factors in the processes of change.

The strategic rôle of the moral web in social change arises from the fact that in its operation two great streams of experience are adjusted to one another—the society's experience with persons and its experience with things. Here the common values which have developed through the long ages of interaction of its members confront the technological developments which have increased man's efficiency in dealing with inanimate nature. System-oriented values on which there is consensus, like loyalty, truth, kindness or freedom, are reconciled with processes of production and distribution. Each society does this in its own way because both its value orientations and its practical requirements are different from those of other societies. This is to say that each has its own moral web.

This view of a societal system might be described as bi-polar, with common values at one pole and sustenance relations at the other, if it were not that such a view seems to assign to the moral web only a passive rôle. It is my feeling, to the contrary, that the mediation of influences coming from the two poles poses a creative task, and that it is here that the strategy of the society is worked out. Legislators, judges, statesmen as well as humbler servants like social workers and city planners are constantly engaged in this operation. They are reweaving the moral web.

This conception of the moral web does not require that one adopt any dogmatic position on whether causation in history flows from the material to the ideal or vice versa. It simply assumes that there is a mediating process at work. No causal issue arises unless the common values and the habitat-bound factors cannot be reconciled. Such irreconcilability is indeed rare. A particular set of common values can be realized under widely varying conditions, and a particular set of conditions can become part of life under widely varying value schemes.

Usually, therefore, neither has to give way to the other. Only in exceptional situations is the moral web so strained by its relation to each of the poles that one of the poles, as it were, forces change in the other. History seems to show that influence has at times been exerted in both directions. In the famous case of the Tanala of Madagascar the adoption of the wet method of cultivating rice changed the property norms from a communal to a small-family type, and ultimately affected the system of common values.[4] On the other hand, when the so-called Pilgrims could not find a way in which to realize their common values in England or in Holland, they migrated at great hardship to a different habitat in the New World. Such instances do not prove the dominance of either pole over the other but only show that under special circumstances one or the other exerts the greater influence.

This conclusion is, of course, contrary to the analysis of Marx, who felt that the relations of production—the sustenance base so to speak—were always determining, and that common values tended to be merely a reflection of them. Although Ogburn does not believe that technological changes always precede changes in the moral web, he inclines to the view that this is much the more frequent order of events and almost all of his examples of cultural lag are of this kind.[5]

Rather than speculate on the generally greater causal efficacy of common values or of ecological factors—which rarely come in direct conflict—I think it more profitable to consider the key processes that take place as changes exert influence on the moral web.

In non-literate, isolated societies these processes are scarcely discernible. There is usually a slow process of cultural drift at work which may alter a good many aspects of the society over a long period of time but which is unnoticed by the participating generations. Sumner identified the " strain for consistency " as the process by which the dovetailing of various elements of life, including the mores, occurred.[6] Under these circumstances institutions and moral norms exist and function but they represent such a stable adjustment that they hardly appear as the solution to problems at all.

In modern civilized societies, however, the moral web is quite evidently a place where the pulls from various directions are being accommodated. The refashioning of institutions and moral norms and law is a most complex and difficult affair, requiring the participation of many sorts of people and many kinds of skill.

In terms of the analysis made in Dr. Becker's searching paper, what will be discussed here is the interrelations of changes in different areas of what he calls principled-secular societies. The pursuant secularity and the consequent secularity of Dr. Becker represent attempts to embody the common moral values or principles of such societies in their moral webs in such a manner as to take advantage of technological change. As he points out, these processes will not work unless the common values are held at a highly abstract level. He emphasizes more than I would the elements of discreteness and fission in the value

systems of such societies, but it is certain that there are strong tendencies in this direction that are curbed only with difficulty.

The most frequent type of change that poses problems for the moral web of civilized societies is that stemming from natural or technical causes. If such changes are large and lasting, the existing moral web may be inadequate to deal with some of the repercussions. Dr. Walker in his paper on race relations in the Unites States points out that the traditional moral web which embodied the " separate but equal " doctrine for Negroes has been slowly undermined by two forces, one demographic, one occupational. The sectional shift of Negro population from South to North together with their urbanization, and the penetration of the Negro into occupational niches formerly closed to him have so changed the whole situation that the old moral web has become inadequate. The United States Supreme Court has taken the leadership in the transition to new moral ground.

Another but rare type of influence on the moral web is also brought out in Dr. Walker's paper. This is the moral pressure which the United States as a world power is feeling from other nations which regard our traditional treatment of Negroes as hypocritical. This very real influence does not fit well into the bi-polar scheme outlined above because that scheme was developed to deal with processes taking place inside the social system. It would appear that the moral indignation directed at the United States from abroad is neither aiming to change common values—which are admittedly free and humanitarian—nor to change ecological processes, but to affect precisely those moral norms and institutions which have inadequately embodied the society's common values.

Perhaps more frequent even than population changes in causing readjustment in the moral web are technological developments. When an invention like the automobile penetrates the way of life of a society, there are certain to be consequences not anticipated at first, some of which may create real problems from the standpoint of the societal common values. The automobile begins killing too many people, for instance. It is this general tendency to accept material change and later attempt to solve any problems thus created that gave rise to Ogburn's theory of cultural lag.

Though less frequent, change affects the moral web from the side of values too. Either because of the ideas of some seminal thinker or because of the inflow into the society of persons of different culture, there may arise new images of the good society. This is particularly likely to occur if the differentiation of occupations or of regions is already great, so that subcultural points of view are established in the population. Some of these differentiated segments will be more prone to accept the new ideas than others. Each will then assume that its interpretation of the societal common values is the right one and that other segments are deviating in their orientation. This poses a serious problem, since the moral web cannot be reconciled with different

conceptions of the good society. Just as in the case of technological change, a process of problem-solving ensues. But, whereas in the former instance inadequacy of the moral web was the main concern, in this case it is the incompatibility of elements working with it.

However the problem arises, whether from technological change or value differentiation, the society will not function satisfactorily until the moral web is broadly and consistently enough woven to solve the problem. The processes by which this is accomplished will have some elements of similarity in all complex societies, but there can be no doubt that the nature of the political regime will so affect these processes as to make a general analysis of little value. For that reason I will confine myself to a discussion of societies toward the democratic end of the authoritarian-democratic continuum.

From the work of sociologists concerned with public opinion and social change there appears to be considerable agreement on how the moral web is altered. We shall recognise six aspects of problem-solving: detection, communication, analysis, proposal or essay, evaluation, and consensus. Although these terms have a rationalistic flavour, it should be understood that the members of the public are not necessarily aware of what is taking place or how they are serving the societal cause.

Detection here does not refer to the detection of deviation from norms—which, of course, is an everyday occurrence. It refers specifically to the detection of lack of fit among elements of the moral web or between elements of the moral web and ecological factors. It is incompatibility or inadequacy that is being detected. This is the start of problem-solving.

The function of communication is one that must be performed at almost every stage of the readjustment process. Since the reconstituted web must meet societal needs, it must represent general consensus. The problem itself must be widely shared; analyses of it must be communicated; there must be discussion of various proposed solutions; the achievement of consensus itself requires interaction; and, finally, the new norm or institutional arrangement must become publicly known.

Although we are talking here about democratic societies, it should be pointed out that even very authoritarian societies cannot avoid some communication through informal channels about societal problems and their solutions. Law may be made by a few or even by an absolute monarch but the moral web to which the members of the society feel attached is always in some degree responsive to their communicated values and beliefs.

Analysis is perhaps the process in which civilized societies differ most from non-literate ones. Modern man wants to understand the causes of the dilemmas in which he finds himself. He is not satisfied with the pronouncement of a medicine man that the way of doing things which has become problematic is unacceptable to ancestral spirits. He

therefore studies the roots of the difficulty; he tries to learn how the lack of fit has come to pass because he feels such knowledge is part of an intelligent solution.

Proposal or essay is the process by which solutions to the problem are tried out. This is a necessary aspect of the larger readjustment cycle because we never know enough to move surely in a new direction. Our steps are always tentative. Usually this function is first carried out symbolically by the proposal of changes in the moral web. In a complex society it is sometimes hard to find the persons who make the original proposals. Suggested solutions are so quickly communicated and so often reshaped that it is difficult to give specific credit for any of them, even the one around which consensus ultimately forms.

Proposal passes over almost insensibly into essay. The more convinced a special segment of the population becomes that it has found the solution to a societal problem, the more likely its members will try to carry it out in practice. Be it noted, however, that the more complex a society becomes, the more difficult it is to try out a plan without general societal consent. Thus essay is likely to occur after consensus is well developed.

In heterogeneous societies, where the moral web must function over areas quite diverse in culture, moral norms and basic features of institutions are commonly incorporated into law. Proposals for changes in norms and institutions therefore become almost immediately proposals for changes in law. As soon as a suggestion gets into the arena of public discussion, it is recognized that legal issues are involved. From that point forward the problem-solving seems to take place with reference to law, though actually it is moral norms and institutions that are being shaped too.

The paper by Dr. Rose is relevant at this point in our analysis. His is a careful attempt to cumulate and systematize what is known about the feasibility of using law as an instrument of social change in democratic societies. Dr. Rose believes that law is not merely a final product of problem-solving but may on occasion be a sort of essay which influences the later stages of that process. His conclusions supplement most interestingly the treatment in this paper of evaluation and consensus.

The evaluation of proposals and essays winnows the wheat from the chaff. It is carried out by simple people as well as intellectuals, it takes place from the neighbourhood group to the parliament itself. Discussion is the chief means of evaluation, for it is in the interaction with others that one sees all around a problem.

Leadership plays a great rôle in both the processes of proposal and evaluation. Once the masses realize that there is an important moral problem facing the society and have some understanding regarding its nature, they feel great need for guidance in finding their way out of the difficulty. It is the rôle of leaders to frame clear alternatives of

action and, through public discussion, to bring out their strong and weak points.

In large and complex societies consensus on a moral issue is never complete. No moral readjustment, on the other hand, is possible without convergence of sentiment and opinion after a problem has been detected and analyzed and new paths explored.

The word consensus is apt for what needs to be denoted because, where values are motivating the development, sentiment is quite as important as thought. Almost literally, the members of a society must feel their way toward readjustment. This is a process that may have its ups and downs, its unfulfilled promise, its sudden and dramatic closure.

Consensus may be achieved by many means. In an important address Louis Wirth, the first president of the International Sociological Association, listed persuasion, discussion, debate, education, negotiation, parliamentary procedure, diplomacy, bargaining, adjudication, contractual relations, and compromise.[7] His list is rather heavily weighted toward formal methods of reaching agreement. Certainly these are the methods most in evidence in modern urbanized societies. It would be a mistake, however, to assume that the more informal processes of reaching consensus are not important too. After proposals have been evaluated by leaders, there is much interchange among the common people. Sometimes the strong factions which are implicit in Wirth's formulation do not develop, so that the enlargement of consensus is more like the growth of a rolling snowball.

The achievement of consensus is no guarantee that it will last. For one thing, too much crude power may have entered into its seeming establishment. Sometimes a ruling group limits contact of the people with the problem and puts forward its own proposal for solution without allowing opportunity for adequate evaluation. Even in the absence of such restrictions, an evaluation, though participated in widely, may be inaccurate. The new features of the moral web may not work as had been confidently expected. Then the later phases of the problem-solving have to start again.

It is by some such processes as those outlined that a modern democratic society refashions its moral web. It is common knowledge, however, that these processes are frequently halting and sometimes ineffective. It may perhaps be worth while to examine two of the reasons why this is so.

Perhaps the prime difficulty in refashioning the moral web under modern conditions is that there has to be constant growth in scale as well as substantive changes in moral norms and institutions. The whole Western World has been moving to broader levels of organization during the past two centuries. Whereas formerly almost all necessary controls could be exercised at the community level, now relationships have become so far-flung and complicated that many have to be exercised at the societal level. As men find themselves involved

in this wider range of contacts, they discover that relationships tend to become more impersonal and contractual. The moral web is no longer knit easily by the informal contacts of daily life. Norms have to be programmatically inculcated and institutions have to be planned. Even if the substance of the moral web otherwise remained the same, this change of scale would pose a great problem of readjustment. Coupled with the substantive changes, it creates untold difficulties.

Dr. Den Hollander's paper points out a particular change in a particular city, Dacca, which fits into this picture. The traditional controls there are having to give way to more bureaucratic ones as the city is flooded with immigrants and as the population becomes literate. The sardars are strangely out of place in a modern metropolis.

Dr. Ossowska, though the subject of her paper seems as distant as possible from Dr. Den Hollander's, is pointing out another consequence of the increasing scope of social relationships in modern life. When those Europeans whose rôle was to fight were a small enough group to feel a sort of occupational honour, they enforced standards of fair fighting. Duels were fought in an almost primary-group context. With the development of mass armies and the advent of wars the opponents in which come from opposite sides of the world, professional humanitarianism in battle all but disappears.

It is this enlargement of life that has brought on the frequent occurrence of what Robin Williams has called " patterned evasion ".[8] This is a situation in which a segment of the society which dissents from a particular norm is large enough to make it unenforceable, but is not large enough to obtain its modification. In the United States this is illustrated by groups that wish to gamble freely. This sort of impasse was rare when the small local community was the focus of social life. Now that the scale has increased, the populations that are expected to live together under the same moral web are more diverse. Consensus is less easily achieved.

A second important reason for the inability to keep the moral web functioning smoothly is that social change in our day has accelerated and ramified in a bewildering manner. In European countries there has been nothing that could be called a " steady state " since the eighteenth century, and in America, since the middle of the nineteenth century. Before one problem is solved two others have sprung up to plague the society.

One result of this pressure for change is that the moral web itself has begun to extend its readjusting mechanisms. This is most obvious in the realm of government. Where originally only the parliament or legislature was thought able legitimately to alter the moral web, now theories of judicial interpretation have developed which enable judges to adapt the law to somewhat changing circumstances. In addition a whole new set of agencies with administrative flexibility have grown up—called administrative tribunals in the United States— which regulate private enterprise in fields affected with a public interest,

such as railroads, communications, electricity and gas for heating and power, and security exchanges. These mechanisms make possible the solving of many problems within specialized areas without referral to the public or even to legislatures. There are also many organs which aim to prevent the development of problems beside solving those that have arisen. Planning commissions at all levels of government are the most conspicuous examples.

Flexibility in the moral web is achieved not only through government, however. Other institutions are beginning to take some responsibility for determining the course of moral readjustments. At the community level—in the United States at least—there is a particularly rich growth of this kind. Community funds and councils of social agencies are entrusted with the improvement and readjustment of non-governmental welfare services. In another sphere, the number of professional associations which not only regulate the conduct of their members in accordance with an occupational ethic but take responsibility for changing that ethic as required by altered circumstances is steadily increasing. The moral web as it becomes more complex, is also becoming more self-directing.

This incorporation of dynamism into the moral web itself affords an answer to those who believe that moral integration is a necessarily rigid concept—that if a society tries to increase its moral integration it will at the same time become less able to adapt to new situations. This view seems to stem from the premise that men are creatures of habit, that once they have found an answer to a problem they will tend to cling to that answer long after it has ceased to be satisfactory. There is certainly ground for this view if one thinks of the moral web solely in terms of norms. A moral norm is a prescription for what one is expected to do, or a proscription of what one is expected not to do, under defined circumstances, with the implication that there will be a sanction for failure to perform. Norms can and do become habitual, and no doubt many people are traditionalists about them. Perhaps, therefore, one safeguard against rigidity is to keep the number of societal norms to a minumum, and to replace them by sub-cultural norms wherever possible. This will make for variety and an experimental orientation. With institutions, however, it is different. Since they are systems of rôles into which people fit, any leadership that develops within them can affect the whole societal pattern in forward-looking ways. Hence, in changing times, leaders tend to work through institutional groups to achieve the necessary readjustments of the different parts of the social structure.

Although there is already considerable flexibility in the moral web of modern societies, there is an evident need for more. Altogether too many problems, like juvenile delinquency in the United States, find no adequate solution through the present organization of life. The needs welling up from the ecological base have not yet been judiciously combined with the aspirations set by societal common values. It is

perhaps my prejudice as a sociologist that makes me think our profession has a significant rôle to play in improving matters at this point.

Of the six tasks that were earlier identified as contributing to societal problem-solving, three seem particularly amenable to aid from the sociologist: detection of the problem, analysis of it, and evaluation of proposals and essays. No doubt we can make contributions at other points, but in these areas our scientific attitude and our research abilities should be of special importance.

One of the unfortunate aspects of rapid social change is that problems are not sufficiently foreseen. They are often full-blown before they are detected. This is a clear opportunity for sociologists to be of service. We should be able to keep track not only of the principal statistical series that indicate social change but of the qualitative developments, both material and non-material, which are the forerunners of change. From our knowledge of the interplay of forces in society we should be competent to estimate with some accuracy what the probable consequences will be of the trends noted. Ogburn has done useful pioneering in this field, his latest effort being *The Social Effects of Aviation*.[9] Some of the consequences will no doubt fit smoothly into the existing pattern of life. But others will almost certainly cause friction and maladjustment. Armed with knowledge of the societal common values, the sociologist can tell in advance in what areas the problems will occur, and can thus anticipate their nature. Provided that he has some connection with powerful institutions or has otherwise a status that will ensure that he is listened to, such anticipatory detection of problems would save the society much in cost and travail.

Social scientists are experts in analysis. Since one of the best guarantees of a good solution to a problem is knowledge of its causes, the tracing of the causation either on the ecological side or the side of human values or both is an obviously needed service. Of the three contributions we have singled out for comment, this is the one best understood by the layman and the one already most frequently performed by sociologists.

Finally, there is evaluation of the various tentatives reaching toward solution. Again because he knows how a society operates, the social scientist should be able to estimate the consequences of a particular proposal, or measure the consequences of a particular trial, with greater accuracy than anyone else. His knowledge of the ramifying effects of particular changes will lead him to expose what the layman is most prone to overlook—the results in fields other than those intended to be affected. Such unanticipated consequences have been the bane of many reform movements. The prohibition amendment to the United States Constitution had to be rescinded because the side effects of prohibition in the way of criminal activities were not sufficiently foreseen. This is the kind of waste that better evaluation could eliminate.

This paper has been concerned only with the moral web within national societies. Difficult of achievement as national moral integration is, international integration is far more difficult. The higher level of organization makes for the emergence of new obstacles and dangers. At that level there is hardly the beginning of a moral web, and yet nothing is so desperately needed. The United Nations as now operating is a political and legal mechanism resting on shifting sands. It cries for a moral foundation.

Organizations like our own are making a small contribution by meeting together amiably, forming friendships across national boundaries, and discussing such important topics as Problems of Social Change in the 20th Century. Our contribution might be even greater if we could carry forward co-operative researches bearing upon the possibilities and the strategy for weaving a world moral web. We are not yet well prepared to do this. Neither our theory nor our research tools nor our influence in the world are equal to the task. But surely the day of readiness will come. And when it does, it is safe to predict that the International Sociological Association will play a prominent rôle.

NOTES

[1] In addition to giving my own position, I have attempted to relate to it the leading ideas of those other papers written for this Section that have been received to date (January 15, 1956).

[2] *Society, Culture and Personality* (New York: Harper, 1947), pp. 71–85.

[3] *An Introduction to the Sociology of Law* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1939).

[4] See Ralph Linton, *The Study of Man* (New York: Appleton-Century, 1936), pp. 348–355.

[5] *Social Change*, Rev. Ed. (New York: Viking Press, 1950).

[6] *Folkways* (New York: Ginn, 1906), pp. 5–6.

[7] " Consensus and Mass Communication," *American Sociological Review* 13 (1948), pp. 1–15.

[8] See *American Society* (New York: Knopf, 1951), Chap. 10.

[9] Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1946.

A Note on Statics and Dynamics in Society

T. W. ADORNO

(Professor of Philosophy and Sociology, Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität, Frankfurt)

Ever since sociology has existed as a separate discipline and as an institutionalised, classifying science, it has distinguished between static and dynamic laws of society. This dichotomy can already be found in the writings of Comte, who demanded that "in sociology we must, in connection with any social matter, distinguish between the fundamental study of the conditions of society's existence and the study of the laws of its continuous movement". A result of this distinction is that "social physics may be divided into two main branches, which may be called, say, social statics and social dynamics". Comte sees, once and for all, two principles at work in the world: order and progress. He transfers their pattern to society and postulates a "scientific dualism" corresponding to the pattern:

"For it is clear that, ultimately, a study of the statics of the social organism must coincide with a positive theory of order which cannot exist but in a true and lasting harmony of the various conditions of the existence of human society; similarly, it is even more evident that a study of the dynamics of human society will necessarily form a positive theory of social progress, which, avoiding every useless thought of an absolute and unlimited perfectability, points to a pure conception of this fundamental development."[1]

This is one of those questionable distinctions of which common sense is capable. Unreflecting social experience leads, or, until the 20th century at least, used to lead to seemingly static types, such as the frequently quoted model of peasant economy, and to dynamic types, such as the capitalist system of economy; expansion and change belong to the inherent nature of this economy, and it can only continue to live by expansion and by the destruction of opposing forces; its very existence, its invariable static essence, demands dynamics. This distinction is backed by the whole tradition of Western philosophy, ultimately by Socrates who distinguished between that which exists by nature (*physei*) and that which owes its existence only to man (*thesei*). The first corresponds to the static, the latter to the dynamic. Whatever in society is based on fundamental needs, or, in the modern jargon of existentialism, on the being of man as such, seems to come under static categories and to obey static laws; any further differentiation, however, of all the forms corresponding to specific types of society, is dynamic. Such criteria appear adequate to arrive at a first, drastic classification of social phenomena. There exists a certain temptation, well known and constantly emphasised by to-day's "sociology of knowledge", of metaphysically glorifying the static and, especially, the institutional aspects,

owing to the pretence of their eternal existence, and to label as changeable and accidental the dynamic aspects and often, therefore, the concrete contents of society's life process. In this mode of thinking, philosophical tradition again plays its part, a tradition which identifies the essence with the lasting and the merely phenomenal with the transient. Comte was not so naive as to give way to this temptation without further ado. He does not omit to mention that a relation of order and progress, their "intimate and indissoluble union, represents henceforth the fundamental stumbling block and chief aid of every genuine political system".[2]) But his political leanings, as well as his quasi-scientific method, interfere with his programme. He tends to put order above progress, static laws over dynamic ones, because the whole development of bourgeois society, so he maintains, is drifting towards its anarchic dissolution. This alone is sufficient reason for looking more closely at this dichotomy.

First of all it is clear that either an urge for classification, or a latent philosophy, arbitrarily brings to actual and concrete society the distinction between statics and dynamics. The phenomena themselves do not, in any way, come under the categories of such a distinction. It is as if at this point, amid modern, critical science, the archaic methods of scholasticism had survived, methods which hoped to catch the existing by a mere agglomeration of universal concepts such as essence, accident, existence, the principium individuationis, haecceitas, and others. It is easily forgotten that certain aspects are thus hypostatised which, though they may have some objective basis, certainly also contain the mechanism of abstraction and subjective reflection and which cannot be ranked, therefore, as something existing *per se*. The same holds true for the hypostasis of static and dynamic laws. Let us assume as an *Idealtypus* of "static" law, that is, regardless of whether it is applicable or not, the axiom that all social domination consists of the appropriation of other people's labour; and let us equally assume as a "dynamic" *Idealtypus*, the axiom that under the feudal system domination materialised by means of land tenure. It is obvious, that the tenant does not obey two different laws, the "general" law of "social domination" and, at the same time, the "particular" law of "domination by land tenure", which, as it were, would be added to the general law. In actual fact, the tenant surely does not experience domination as such, *in abstracto*, but the domination of a feudal lord, however convenient it may be for a sociological typology to subsume feudal tenure under the general concept of domination. The reason why this is not a mere theoretical and methodological nicety is that the problem of whether one can extract certain laws as invariant and others as variable and thus arrive at conclusions regarding the principles of society, depends on it. There is no justification for this as long as the so-called invariants occur only in the form of variants, not in isolation and not in themselves: otherwise the scheme only substitutes the matter itself. This tendency, with all its consequences, extends even to the modern sociology of

knowledge; for instance, to Mannheim's conception of *principia media* which are intended to mediate between the so-called fundamental law and the mere facts; it was not realised that these *principia media* are a mere construct which does not correspond at all to any real forces within society.

Sociological common sense, which distinguishes between the static and the dynamic, without at least recognising the point of their unity, naively transfers its own definitions and analysis to its object. The distinction of natural needs on the one hand and of needs merely assumed by man on the other is a mere product of classification and quite abstract in itself. The distinction of those types of needs is invalid because society itself is not easily reducible to needs. It is true that the needs of self-preservation by the individual and by organised society enter into the social process, but this they do only in a form determined by society. What a man needs to live and what he does not need, is not a mere question of nature, but depends on the state of social conditions and of productive power. It is likely that members of a highly developed civilisation would perish if they had to satisfy their historically given needs with the resources available to a primitive community maintaining its minimum standard of existence. At least in modern, if not in earlier, society, human needs are decisively determined by society, if not even, as in the modern era of over-production, created by society. Whoever wished to reduce the laws of capitalist society to the needs of man and accordingly wished to distinguish between static and dynamic laws, would make the satisfaction of needs the primary factor, that is something which, to-day, is a mere concomitant of economic interest; just as if the acquisition of three cars by a family of two came under the same category as the gathering of fruit in a primitive society. Such a view disregards an essential aspect of social dynamics, that of the production and modification of needs. Even the models of static categories themselves appear to be dynamic. For society's process does not consist merely in society or merely in nature, but takes place between both of them. Nature plays a part in all its stages but it cannot be severed from its social form without perverting the meaning of social phenomena. Certain social types, such as agrarian production or agrarian society could, as late as the 19th century, and with good conscience, be regarded as invariant; the technical development of the last decades, however, has revealed these types as being dynamic and has disproved all dogmas pretending that, for instance, certain anthropological invariants of the so-called peasant type would set limits to the mechanisation of agriculture. In the neon-light of recent dynamics one loses all faith in former statics. It is somewhat surprising, and only to be understood from the viewpoint of a critique of ideologies, that sociology still clings to the idea of static laws, although concrete research has long proven that even phenomena apparently quite unrelated to history, such as the said agrarian production, which had survived until quite recent times, are, in fact, the result

of manifold historical processes and anything but "natural". The more untenable the idea of natural origins in the analysis of society is becoming, the more invariance is reduced to philosophical and anthropological theses and withdraws from social reality. Finally, the theory of invariance seeks its justification in an ontology, the validity of which many experts in the fields of the various sciences in Germany take for granted as though proven by philosophy, while ontology remains utterly problematic within philosophy itself. Such an ontology is quite incompatible with the understanding of a society which has been imposed on men rather than having emanated from their nature and in which there is nothing constant other than a dynamic which destroys again and again men's feeling of security and drags them into a vortex.

Society itself, being the totality of the relationships of human beings with other human beings and with nature as a means of preserving human life, is altogether more action than "being", that is, a dynamic category. The mere fact that at the end of each cycle of an economic production there tends to remain on hand a larger social product than was there at the beginning, points to a dynamic ingredient. It is to such dynamics that Herbert Spencer refers in his *The Principles of Sociology*: "But we may conveniently mark it (the superorganic evolution) off as including all those processes and products which imply the co-ordinated actions of many individuals—co-ordinated actions which achieve results exceeding in extent and complexity those achievable by individual actions".[3]   This increase in social activity and all the changed possibilities, needs and conflicts which it brings in its train, necessarily involves changes regardless of whether or not they are desired by peoples or their rulers. Social wealth, however, owes its growth partly to the fact that institutions and social forms, that is, all organisations confronting human beings as something lasting and independent, were no longer identical with them, but rather maintained themselves against them. The formative principle of social development was largely that of conflict between living achievement and "static" elements, such as the established institution of property. There were definite reasons why, at the beginning of industrial society, the contrast of *Nomos* and *Physis* as applied to society was taken to be that of labour and property. This occurs as early as in St. Simon. Hegel, his contemporary, was influenced by classical economics and elaborated carefully the new relationship. For him the satisfaction of the needs of the individual is only possible on account of the "general dependence by all on all"; "the satisfaction of the totality of needs is a task for all". "This activity of labour and of needs, the social process, has also its reposing aspect, 'seine ruhende Seite', in property". The dialectical relationship of labour and property results not only in the "general", in society, but also in the existence of the individual as a human being, as a person.[4] The "static" aspect itself is a product, an element of the dynamic. As compared to economic theory, however, Hegel's terms of reference do not refer to changes of

environment, achieved by working together, and the distribution of various functions to the members of society, but also to the history of the individual and to his "development".

Marx, finally, puts the concept of labour into the centre of social theory and adopts a dynamic conception as opposed to any theory of statics or of invariance. It is all the more surprising, therefore, that it is just in his writings that we can find traces of the former separation of statics and dynamics. He distinguishes between the invariant natural laws of society and the specific laws of a certain stage of development, "a more or less developed stage of social antagonisms", and "the natural laws of capitalistic production".[5] One can hardly account for such sentences by assuming that Marx has committed a logical error and has confused differing levels of abstraction with causes of differing degree. The apparent anachronism of such sentences, its incompatibility with a radically dynamic conception of society actually springs out of the contents of Marx's conception itself. According to this, all society so far has been one of exploitation; its members are not yet their own masters. In so far, therefore, social process goes on irrationally and according to blind nature, despite all rationalisation. In a certain sense, the real dialectics of history—in Hegel as well as later in Marx—can be called the eternity of transitoriness. It proves the saying of Goethe's Mephistopheles that everything which comes into existence is worthy of perishing—a development of the contradiction inherent in every phenomenon until its own destruction. In this sense, "dynamics" itself becomes a principle of "pre-history", as Marx calls it with melancholy hope; this term pertains to no less than the sum of all, hitherto known, history, which even Hegel, frequently misunderstood as being "affirmative", compared to a shambles, not much differing, in this, from his arch-enemy, Schopenhauer. Prehistory, in this sense, represents the domain of bondage. But in as much as the dynamic blindly repeats the everlasting itself, as already Anaximander and later Heraclitus taught, it is dialectical theory which insists on certain lasting categories. In the modern, rational form of class society those categories merely changed their mode of appearance. Marx's terms, such as "wage slavery" for modern, free labour, therefore, are not mere metaphors. Even Hegel includes in his conception of dialectics the knowledge that dynamics—as may well be thought by present-day sociological nominalism—do not dissolve everything fixed and enduring, but that to speak of change always requires something identical within which changes take place. It is only by reference to the enduring that change can be spoken of. This dialectical construction of history is as far removed from ideas of the so-called philosophy of life, such as flux and continuity, as from any form of Platonism. It implies, rather, a negative ontology. A kind of theory of invariance springs from the mortal transitoriness of everything individual. Such a view, however, does not deify the hitherto unchanging, but rather denounces it. According to this theory, there is indeed something of

the kind which, to-day, is called existentials; only these are domination and bondage, and, as long as they rule, all change and all transition can only mean that nothing, so far, has changed. Not only Hegel, but Goethe also, is vindicated; all striving, all endeavour is eternal rest, but not, as he thought, in God the Master. If modern existential ontology, presenting dynamic categories themselves as invariants, believes that it is bridging the gap between static and dynamic, and what philosophers call "the ontological difference", then it expresses, though in falsifying form, the true feebleness of the existing; an existing, over which this ontology, as the science of pure being deems itself, quite wrongly, exalted.

Having once entered into such considerations, it may be permissible to summarise a few ideas on statics and dynamics in society; ideas, however, which do not conform easily to the logical principle of contradiction. The dichotomy of static and dynamic sociology, of invariants and changes, and, therefore, the striving for an unchanging sameness is fruitless. It is incompatible with the conception of society itself. The historical laws of a certain period are not mere modes of appearance of more general laws; historical and general laws belong to two different levels of abstraction, although, however, reality itself cannot be considered to be constructed of such levels. Hence it is not the least we can demand of modern sociology that it rid itself of the tenacious antithesis of social statics and social dynamics, an antithesis which manifests itself to-day as the contrast between the formal concepts of theoretical sociology on the one hand, and stubborn empiricism despising all concepts as mere *flatus vocis* on the other. The science of society cannot obey the dualism of a concrete, but blind Here and Now and an empty everlasting, if it does not wish to deform its object *a priori* by the choice of its conceptional apparatus. Per contra, a true insight into the dynamic structure of society demands a constant striving for the concrete constellations of what is called, again problematically, the general and the particular. This concreteness is absent where sociology limits itself to formal definitions and relationships and excludes the real life process of human beings. Such a methodology can easily link itself with the "concretism" of mere factual research. In the division of social understanding into these two spheres, dynamics is abolished, even if a place is reserved to it again afterwards in a complementary conception of social totality. The most general categories of "interhuman relationships" are as static and removed from time as is, at the other extreme, an empirical fact which, severed from any historical consciousness, exhausts itself in the moment, in the *hic* and *nunc* of its discovery. Ultimately, one will have to get altogether beyond this sterile alternative. In this sense Benjamin has postulated a "decisive repudiation of the concepts of a timeless truth, without, however, making truth a mere temporal function of understanding"; he insists on finding a "temporal core" in the matter itself. Such an approach will not accept any more concepts

like progress and decline, but will criticise the concept of social dynamics itself as it will that of statics. For both complement each other; absolute dynamics fits into the theory of invariants like a counterpoint into its *cantus firmus*. This, however, means nothing less than that social dynamics has always been the same, until the present day, and that the new has not yet occurred. To-day's horror is no exception to the norm of progress, but rather the rule. Progress has hitherto obeyed this horror, and horror has lived on progress. The faulty abstraction of the contrast between statics and dynamics only reflects the negative invariance of history up to now, the blind "social dynamics" of to-day.

NOTES

[1] See Auguste Comte, "Cours de philosophie positive". Quoted from "Soziologie", Jena 1923, vol. I, p. 233.
[2] Op. cit. p. 7.
[3] H. Spencer, *The Principles of Sociology*, vol. I, London 1876, p. 4, paragraph 2.
[4] See Hegel, *Jenenser Realphilosophie* (1803-4) pp. 236 seq.
[5] See Karl Marx, *Das Kapital*, vol. I, p. 6; *Grundriss der politischen Oekonomie*, pp. 7, 10, 364 seq. and the review by Engels of *Zur Kritik der politischen Oekonomie* in *Kapital*, p. 217.

A Sacred-Secular Evaluation Continuum
of Social Change

HOWARD BECKER

(Professor of Sociology, University of Wisconsin)

Let us begin by saying that the concepts of sacredness and secularity are most fruitful when embodied in constructed types, but that we do not here have space to justify such a statement or to make more than passing reference to procedures and techniques of empirical sociological research bound up with constructive typology.[1] The next best place to get under way with a drastically abridged presentation is probably the array of terms and their referents comprised in the widely inclusive concepts of sacredness and secularity.

When conduct is designated as " sacred ", the sociologist is pointing to certain evidence of unwillingness or inability to respond to the new as the new is defined by the members of the society in question. Otherwise put, societies that impress upon their members change-resistant value-systems and accompanying modes of conduct making for a high degree of such resistance may be termed, in shorthand fashion, " sacred societies ". Stated still differently, the cultural context that in any society whatever governs the range and permissibility of social actions (the patterns of which are likewise cultural) is, where a sacred society is concerned, of a sort that strongly checks change.[2] Formulated in yet another way, using a few recently fashionable terms, the " pattern variables " setting the evaluational alternatives of social actions are, in a sacred society, of kinds that lead to the transmitting, learning, and sharing of norms that inhibit change.[3]

There doubtless is a virtually endless array of varieties of conduct that can be grouped under the notion of the sacred ; distinctions are after all based on the evidence, the designating symbols available, the level of abstraction, and the purpose of the particular study, and in permutation and combination these may yield what would seem to be an utterly unlimited number of possibilities. For some generalizing ends, however, a useful set of distinctions comprising no more than eight has been worked out ; the sacred is split into holy, ceremonial, loyalistic, intimate, commemorative, moralistic, fitting, and appropriate. This roughly represents an intensity range extending from zeal for martyrdom in defence of the holy to quiet humour on behalf of the appropriate.

As used here, *only* the holy involves a definite " religious " orientation (i.e., toward what is held to be the supernatural).[4] Here, and *nowhere* else in what can justifiably be advanced as sociologically useful usage, sacred as a term including the holy necessarily has to do with a god or gods, the divine, the spiritual, and so on. Throughout the

19

rest of the range,[5] the more or less emotionalized resistance to change that is of the essence of the sacred may have no reference to religion in the supernaturalistic sense (and to which sense the writer has for many years restricted the meaning he assigns to religion).

Take the fact that the ceremonially sacred may have little or no definitely religious bearing : there are technological, military, legal, economic, and bureaucratic ceremonies. These, to be sure, are often loaded with nonrational content, and even in form may also be non-rational—but can the nonrational be restricted to religion ? Certain aspects of the conduct of English judges, with their wigs and wool-sacks, are ceremonial in high degree, and also nonrational, but they are not significantly supernaturalistic. *Ceremonial is sacred, but not necessarily holy ;* when primarily holy ceremonial is to be designated, " ritual " is readily available and has long been properly used.[6]

The loyalistically sacred is likewise not the same as the holy. Pat-riotism is a powerful sentiment; men have gladly died for the sake of loyalty to a flag. Solemnity may surround its symbolism, but rarely is this solemnity identified with that manifesting devotion to the super-natural. The same is true of other varieties of the loyalistic ; " team spirit," for example, has led to infliction of mayhem on members of the opposing team or to increasing the gravity of one's own injuries by continuing to " play the game " when rational considerations would call for prompt medical treatment. Occasionally the nonrational language used by the loyal sportsmen involved in such episodes is studded with holy words, but they are not ordinarily viewed as evidencing holy sentiments. It would still be safe to say that the loyalistically sacred is not usually evocative of the reverence that is peculiarly holy.[7]

Still another example is afforded by the bonds of the intimately sacred. What have long been called " primary groups " provide ample scope for the sacrednesses of friendship, parental and filial affection, romantic and conjugal love, and similar ties. Yet however much holy blessings may be invoked in reinforcement of the intimately sacred, it is clear from all we know of primary groups that they often have no recourse to such reinforcement. They are both self-integrated and extremely resistant to any change seeming to threaten that inte-gration—and few changes are interpreted as other than threatening and hence to be resisted. In short, the intimate is usually sacred, but is much less frequently holy.[8]

The commemorative, the next kind of sacred conduct to be considered, may centre on many aspects of social life, but among the more frequent points of focus in most societies we find the crisis of bereavement and, in particular, its various aftermaths. Here, given the example of several of the world religions, with Christianity prominent among them, there might be thought to be a necessary link with the holy. Yet, avowed atheists have been known to commemorate departed relatives with tombstones inscribed " Sacred to the memory of . . . . ." That is,

there may be explicit *rejection* of supernaturalistic belief and equally explicit *affirmation* of the sentiments associated with intimacy plus the effort, through commemoration, to maintain the intensity of these sentiments among the survivors. Moreover, there is a great deal of commemoration that is less crisis-laden and evocatively intimate than bereavement ceremonial; birthdays, wedding anniversaries, and so on. The commemorative, although frequently holy, is not always so; here again the wider category of the sacred is more suitable when the reference is general.[9]

Of a somewhat lower degree of intensity, in many although not all instances, than most other aspects of the sacred heretofore discussed, and yet strongly supporting all other aspects as well as receiving support from all, is the moralistic. This comprises a large proportion of those formulations that were epitomized by Sumner, possibly following Emerson's usage in his famous Manchester speech, in the well-known term, the mores. They loom so prominently in the literature of sociology that little of our scanty space need be devoted to them. It should be noted, however, that the mores as " folkways with built-in morals " may and often do powerfully reinforce religion, and are in turn reinforced by it, but that they are not necessarily bound up with the supernatural. They too are always marked by general sacredness in distinct degree; their specific holiness is much less evident and frequent.[10]

It was noted above that the moralistic is often of less intensity than the holy, loyalistic, and so on, " in many although not all instances ". The reservation was imposed because of the fact that the ethical, as the moralistic at a more general level, may on occasion call forth exalted and passionate devotion. Abstract ethical precepts, in other words, sometimes approach the holy in the zeal they elicit. Further, their form is often highly rational (in the discursive sense of that term), even though their content is, in origin at least, of non-rational character. Moreover, the intensity with which such ethical precepts are held may sometimes lead to rejection of ritual, as when the Hebrew prophets declared that Yahveh desired justice rather than sacrifice. That is to say, ethical precepts may be closely identified with the transcendent demands of the holy ; hence the inclusion of the ethical in the moralistic is to some degree arbitrary.

The ambit of the sacred is great, for as stated earlier it encompasses any social action in which some measure of emotionalized reluctance to change is manifested. Hence we may properly include quite low intensities of this reluctance, such as those coming under the heading of the fittingly sacred. Designations for these are many ; a brief list takes in fitting—unfitting, " done "—" not done "—" good form "— " bad form," proper—improper, and the like. The list clearly draws on " social " ceremonial in the sense of etiquette, but there are equivalents, likewise representing a low intensity of the sacred, for all the realms of conduct. (On occasion, however, there may be a high degree of reluctance to change even in what those of us inclined toward

informality call " mere manners ". Men may not die for the sake of the fitting, but they may undergo extreme discomfort, and sometimes danger.) Obviously enough, the fitting is not oriented toward holiness —yet can the reluctance to change, which it often elicits, be categorized as other than sacred ?[11]

Of lowest intensity, and yet definite enough to be worth explicit listing, the appropriately sacred is the last in our list. The line between it and other low-intensity reluctances to change is admittedly a vague one, but it appears to be worth drawing because of the marked difference in the social controls applying to the fitting on the one hand and the appropriate on the other.

The hazy band lying between the mores and the folkways *per se* is occupied by the fitting; there is little readily identifiable moralism, but sentiments outraged by conduct that is " out of place " may nevertheless make themselves quite clearly evident. The almost imperceptible shrug of the shoulders, the raised eyebrow or even the curled lip, the sudden and noticeably continued silence when the obtrusive " outsider " enters the clubroom frequented only by the long-established members, are adverse judgments even though unspoken.

Where the appropriate is concerned, however, the range of the " mere folkways " has been reached ; there is a minimum of any controls that could be called implicitly moralistic even by quite strained inference. Nevertheless, the transition to secular controls has not yet been effected; a tinge of the sacred remains. Appropriate, suitable, customary, expected, usual, established, wonted, and similar words indicate that " right " and " wrong " ways of doing things are not matters of indifference, and that there is some reluctance to abandon, or see others abandon, the right ways.

At the same time, those who chose the wrong ways are not viewed as unworthy in the moralistic sense. Instead, they are regarded as simply uninstructed, and their remediable ignorance may elicit no more then mild and courteously concealed amusement. Defense of the appropriate, which is to say of the sacred on the fringe of fadeout, here amounts to no more than a twitch at the corners of the mouth. The impassioned readiness to martyr others or oneself on behalf of the holy (which, it will be recalled, may be a useful way of estimating the intensity of sacred zeal in its most extreme form) seems so remote from the suppressed smile when the appropriate is disregarded as to be utterly incommensurable—and yet they represent the poles between which sacred controls may range.[12]

Holy, ceremonial, loyalistic, intimate, commemorative, moralistic, fitting, and appropriate—these eight subdivisions of the sacred are of course arbitrary. For some purposes just the broadly general concept of sacredness might suffice ; for others, three or four less inclusive terms ; for still others, as many as the resources of English and other widely used languages would enable us to list; and finally, for certain easily envisaged but often not readily attainable measurement objectives,

an array of points, mathematically designable, along an infinitely divisible continuum.[13]

There are of course several other ways of dealing with the concept of sacredness. Some of its subordinate divisions, for example, may be singled out for special attention.

Take ceremonial : in varying amount, and of various kinds, it is involved in many aspects of sacred conduct, especially when such conduct is passed on to at least one succeeding generation. We readily recognize this when holiness is involved ; e.g., the personal charisma of those believed to be supernaturally gifted soon becomes the charisma of office inherited by successors and is deposited, as it were, in ritual practice. Jesus's blessing of the bread and " fruit of the vine " in the Last Supper becomes the function of the priest in the ritual of communion, with its consecrated wafer and wine transmuted in the miracle of the mass. Were it not for the fact that only recently and as yet dimly has it dawned upon us that sacredness is by no means confined to religious ceremonial, it would be quite easy to recognise that flag ceremonial, as in evening retreat, exemplifies the loyalistically sacred, or that embrace ceremonial, as in old-fashioned Highland Scottish family leave-taking, exemplifies the intimately sacred, and so on. In other words, ceremonial pervades most aspects of sacred conduct (particularly those that are directly observable). It may find a place, therefore, anywhere along the continuum from the holy to the appropriate.[14]

Another way of dealing with the sacred is to make distinctions with reference to the characteristic conduct. Holy, loyalistic, intimate, and commemorative conduct, for instance, often show a positive self-other orientation, i.e., there is an emotionalized reluctance to change favorable or potentially favorable relations believed, rightly or wrongly, to prevail between a given person and another person or persons, or with entities (including abstract collectivities) presumably endowed with some of the attributes of personality.[15] A worshipper clings to his god, a patriot to his nation, a husband to his wife, and a mourner to the departed. Ceremonial, moralistic, fitting, and appropriate sacredness, on the other hand, are not so clearly self-other-oriented ; they chiefly refer to certain of the ways in which reluctances to change are kept in force, and to the explicit expression by the persons concerned of sentiments linked with such reluctances. A god is worshipped by means of approved ritual and by manifestation of " holy dread " ; loyalty to a nation is made evident by saluting its flag whenever occasion demands and by showing great fervor against traitorous conduct; devotion to a wife calls for definite avoidance of unfaithfulness and for open disdain of adulterers; continuing attachment to a dead friend brings with it often-repeated visits to the place of burial and high praise of comradeship.[16]

Thus, the self-other-oriented aspects of sacred conduct can be usefully distinguished, for some analytic purposes, from the social control

aspects, but of most immediate value in several important kinds of social research, it would seem, is the treatment of sacredness as on a continuum of reluctance to change ranging in intensity from zealous willingness to accept or inflict martyrdom to gentle protest in the form of implicit ridicule.

This same kind of treatment applied to secularity also appears likely to be worthwhile. Extending the continuum, we can begin to make the shift from mild reluctance to change to qualified acceptance of change (or even restricted readiness to initiate it), thus, as it were, passing the midpoint, and consequently moving from sacred to secular. Otherwise put, the full range of " the evaluation of social change continuum " (as it may here be phrased) reaches from maximum minus to maximum plus : from the nth degree of unwillingness and/or inability to change this reluctance progressively lessens until a transitional center of indifference (the midpoint) is reached, and from there acceptance of change sets in and steadily increases to the nth degree of this willingness and/or ability. Still another and somewhat drastic way of stating the matter is that loathing of the new is at one pole and craving for the new at the other—neophobia and neophilia, or misoneism and philoneism. Even more drastic is the formulation that obsessive incapacity to respond to the new yields to obsessive incapacity to refrain from responding to the new—paleomania passes over into neomania, archaism into futurism.[17]

The worthwhileness of such continuum treatment of the evaluation of social change of course depends on the problem in hand ; for some problems, rigid adherence to what amounts to a scaling technique may be advantageous, whereas for others it may amount to an unwarranted forcing of the evidence into a predetermined mold.

Assuming worthwhileness for many purposes, however, let it nevertheless be noted that the continuum should *not* be viewed as always proceeding from maximum minus to maximum plus, from intense sacredness to intense secularity.[18] *The reverse has often manifested itself*; history is replete with examples. Here mention can be made only of the German " turning back the clock " from Weimar secularity to Nazi sacredness ;[19] many other equally documentable transpositions from plus to minus might be cited if space did not forbid.[20]

Such warnings issued, it now seems reasonably safe to proceed with a survey of some of the varieties of secularity. In the analysis of sacredness, implied or directly stated antitheses were evident at many points, and most of these were clearly secular. Hence, in spite of the fact that secularity is *not* a mere opposite or " photographic negative ", at this point it is neither necessary nor desirable to pay attention to a number of distinctions as large and as finely shaded as those made in the case of sacredness. In many instances the reader need only think of kinds of social change evaluation directly contrasting with those previously analyzed, and then prefix " non -" (or, on occasion, " anti-"), or use a convenient antonym. In addition to or in qualification of

these, let us list four sorts of secularity : the pursuant, the consequent, the comfortable, and the thrilling.

Pursuant secularity gives limited scope to social change. This limitation is imposed by those presumably essential parts of the prevailing value-system that are viewed as inviolable and in fact are held relatively inviolate. Whatever changes are permitted or initiated must be definable as not essentially altering the basic system—i.e., to be admitted, they must be viewed merely as extensions, or at most as implementing amendments, of the unalterable premises.[21]

Given the assumption of the divine right of the ruler, for example, there may develop a kind of secular absolutism that makes use of derivative legal precepts in administering " the king's peace ". Such legalistic secular absolutism may then undergo many adaptations called for by changing circumstances, until finally a limited constitutional monarchy, in which " the king reigns but does not govern ", is established. Much of the ceremonial attending the coronation of the monarch may still be ritual in the strict sense, which is to say that it is oriented toward the deity who presumably grants and guarantees divine right, but many other aspects of the ceremonial may be merely loyalistically and commemoratively sacred, and some of it may be pursuantly secular. In the latter case, the monarch takes an oath to do nothing that contravenes the supreme law of the realm ; " pursuant to the British constitution," he accepts the changes that have led to limitations of his own power, and his subjects also accept them. There may be protest, as when the commoner Stanley Baldwin forced the abdication of Edward VIII, but the protest is often ineffectual ; the pursuantly secular wins out over the prescriptively sacred. Yet the sacred core of the monarchy still remains, surviving abdication in the person of legitimate successor, George VI, and at the latter's death the cry goes up, " The king is dead—long live the Queen ! " Even though strongly qualified by the sacred aspects of the value-system, however, acceptance of change such as that represented by a limited constitutional monarchy obviously carries us past the midpoint of the continuum ; we are effectively in the domain of the secular.

Still more apt, possibly, is the example provided by manifestations of the pursuantly secular in American society, likewise in the realm of government. In the Declaration of Independence and in the Constitution (particularly in the Bill of Rights), there occur several references to the " laws of Nature ", to " Nature's God ", to " inalienable rights ", among which are " life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness," to " the right of the people to bear arms ", and so forth. The orientation toward the supernatural is not very definite, unless Nature should be construed as evoking holy sentiments,[22] but however this may be, there can be little doubt of the essential sacredness that the writings of the Founding Fathers, and particularly the Constitution, have acquired in American society.[23] They are viewed as inviolable,

and as forever to be kept inviolate. Here is the sacred core of American government. Nevertheless, there are provisions for the amendment of the Constitution, and those provisions have issued in practice some twenty-two times. As long as an amendment is pursuant to the basic principles, the change it represents is permissible, and is explicitly recognized as definite albeit constitutionally limited change.

Here lies the difference between change inadvertently resulting from application of sacred prescriptions and change intended as implementation of sacred principles. The first is *de facto* and unavowed ; the second is *de jure* and avowed. The first is implicit and not recognized as such by the subjects concerned; the second is explicit and viewed as " according to plan ". The first is sacred but unwittingly adaptive ; the second is secular and pursuantly alterative.[24]

It is at this point that the earlier mention of abstract ethical precepts, as distinguishable from the relatively concrete mores, again becomes relevant. The ethical saturation of concepts such as " justice ", " equality," " liberty," and " brotherhood " may be quite high, and they may serve as pursuantly alterative guides not only for slow reform but also for sudden revolution. Nevertheless, even revolutions call upon them or their like as principles, however often the ensuing violence negates their very nature. In short, revolutions not infrequently start as efforts to establish some kind of principled-secular society ; the normlessness that often follows is an aftermath of the use of pursuant secularity in the mistaken enthusiasm for realization of the ends of principle by the use of any and every means.

Next in the list comes consequent secularity. The reference here is to readiness to change of which the manifestations are rigidly consequent, i.e., " following as a result, inference, or natural effect."[25] This readiness has been expressed in scores of phrases such as: " govern justly if you can, but govern "; " don't stand on ceremony "; " anything to get the work out " ; " don't let anyone make you do a two-handed job with your little finger "; "put a horseshoe in your boxing-glove for luck " ; " rules were made for the right man to break " ; " do it regardless "; and " results, not precedents ". Here also belong many maxims of scientific activity of the sort stressing freedom from preconceived limitations: " science, not sentiment "; and " if science shocks you, that's just too bad". [26]

Consequent secularity places no restrictions on the scope of change. It is the clearest of all expressions of readiness to change that is expedient in the sense of *expedire*, " to free the feet, to release, to extricate "[27]—which is to say, that is unlimited. Moreover, it is definitely rational in the sense of planfully utilizing any and every available means for the attainment of a given end in ways consonant with economy of effort, absence of undesirable secondary effects, and the like. It is technical, instrumental, efficient, unbiased calculating, dispassionate, detached, impersonal, unemotional, calm, " objective," scientific—pile up the adjectives ![28] Modern total

warfare, where humane limits previously prevailing, or at least rendered lip-service, are openly rejected, is the quintessence of consequent secularity ; all bonds between societies are severed. " Nothing sacred " is, in effect, the watchword.

Following this, for expository purposes, is comfortable secularity. Here there is not only absence of sacred reluctances, but also of the restraints imposed by the relatively systematic amendment processes of pursuant secularity and the even more rational requirements of consequent secularity. There is no feeling that the comfortable need be justified by appeal to anything other than the comfortable itself; " I like it because I like it " is be-all and end-all. Although some of the social-psychological theory lying back of Thomas and Znaniecki's use of the terms " sensual and vanity values " may perhaps be viewed with suspicion, the phenomena to which they validly referred were those attendant on comfortable secularity.[29] It should be pointed out, of course, that all societies, however " tight ", have their ostensibly forbidden but tacitly permitted kinds of " looseness "; Saturnalia, Fasching and Carnival escapades are, literally, accepted ways of escaping ordinary restrictions.[30] When, however, such comfortable relaxations pass beyond customary confines, there results a good deal of social disorganization that causes those thus socially unbuttoned no particular concern and that accelerates the pace of social change—" back and side go bare, go bare, both foot and hand go cold, but belly, God send thee good ale enow, whether it be new or old ".

Close to the comfortable in many respects, but distinct enough to warrant separate treatment, is the thrillingly secular. This may range all the way from the decadent plutocrat's effort to cast off the boredom resulting from excessive indulgence in the comfortable by resorting to the thrills of sexual perversion or drug addiction, to the small boy's attempt to get out of the doldrums of compulsory school attendance by reveling in the thrills of playing hookey. Other examples abound on every hand, but they can only be hinted at here by adducing a few phrases and adjectives associated with them : " I'll try anything once " ; " for only drunk is man divine, and only mad can he forget " ; " ride 'im, cowboy ! " ; " you can't raise me out, pardner " ; " roll them bones—I'm feelin' lucky " ; rousing, stirring, hair-raising, spine-chilling, blood-curdling, pulse-quickening, breathtaking, inspiring, challenging, and so on and on.

This is a jumble, but from it at least one thing is clear ; namely, that not all thrill-seeking is of the " forbidden fruit " sort. Gambling, horse-racing, cock-fighting, and many similar sources of thrill—which, however often elicited, remains in effect new—are seductive in societies that are by no means " puritanical ". Further, the thrill of witnessing and perhaps participating vicariously in extraordinary feats of skill, strength, endurance, bravery (and even foolhardiness), orgiastic abandon, asceticism, exaltation, virtuosity, memory, oratory, or improvisation is perenially popular as novelty.[31]

In sum, the thrillingly secular is by no means exceptional or rare, even though it represents—indeed, embodies—a kind of readiness to change. Everything depends, where extent and effectiveness of change *vis-à-vis* the society as a whole are concerned, on the structural and functional significance[32] in that society of the conduct in which novelty is sought and found. Some kinds of thrill-seeking introduce no disorganizing factors, or at the very least do not accelerate disorganization already under way ; others do. Merely to label something " thrillingly secular " does not *ipso facto* indicate that a society is loose or is likely to loosen rapidly ; a good deal of analysis may be necessary before the assertion of QED is warranted—if at all.

But in spite of these necessary qualifications, and the amazingly varied character of thrill-seeking conduct, it is demonstrable, in many cases that have been carefully described and analyzed,[33] that the thrillingly secular *is* sought and found in societies that are already loose, and that are loosened still further by this search and discovery. There is also much to show that when there ensues a continuously circular process of such extreme secularization, and when this goes on for some time, what was earlier called obsessive incapacity to refrain from responding to the new may appear among a large proportion of the members of a society, and that widespread normlessness (*anomie*, to mention a recently fashionable term) is an inevitable consequence—but we both digress and anticipate. Suffice it to say here that thrilling secularity, along with other extreme sorts, may simultaneously represent and evoke social change that occurs virtually at random. The value-system involved hardly merits the name of system, for the values sought are not discernibly accrete but rather highly discrete.[34] The maximum plus pole of " the evaluation of social change continuum " is being approached ; paleomania is far away, but neomania is close at hand.

Obviously, all the kinds of conduct here discussed have been passed on, in some measure, from at least part of one generation to the next, and to be passed on have had to be learned by some members of that next generation. Moreover, in so far as they affect any significant part of any such succeeding generation, they do not remain peculiar to any single person, but are participated in by a substantial number, and hence can, on comparison, be recognized as essentially similar although not necessarily identical. Such passing on, learning, participation in, and similarity of various kinds of conduct is the essence of what has long been called the social heritage, " the cake of custom," and, more recently, culture.[35]

Further, it has long been a sociological commonplace that concrete social actions cannot be justifiably dealt with as though they ran their course in utter separation from customary actions providing the necessary compass points, as it were.[36] In other words, all actions are oriented in some direction, and culture provides that orientation. This has been recently dealt with in the " pattern variables " schema,[37]

and the writer also dealt with it in a now outmoded typological presentation.[38]   Turning now to sacred-secular typology as recently developed attention can perhaps best be given to certain aspects of the folk, prescribed, principled, and normless societies to which reference has already been made.   " Certain aspects," and no more—the writer has elsewhere described and analyzed such societies at some length.

By folk society is here meant *any* society bearing a sacred value-system that is in very high degree traditional, implicit, and uncodified. Hence all of the " primitive " societies with which anthropologists chiefly concern themselves are included—when and if these societies, however " primitive ", have value-systems that *are* traditional, implicit, and uncodified.   This proviso is necessary because of the fact that a great many so-called " primitive " societies have characteristics that are by no means exclusively of folk character—prescription, expediency of both limited and unlimited varieties, and even normlessness may well be evident.   Further, the same proviso holds for many of those " backward " portions of the larger " developed ", " advanced," or " civilised " societies with which sociologists have much to do.   Everything depends on the proportion of folk and other traits respectively manifested.   Given these provisos, it may then be said that for us the Australian Arunta represent a folk society, and so also do the American inhabitants of the remoter Ozarks—the term is quite comprehensive.[39]   The constructed type of " isolated sacred society " presented by the writer in 1930 has far more folk than prescribed criteria.   (Indeed, this is so much the case that it would serve as adequate characterization of folk society for many present purposes—but this is unnecessary, for better constructs are today available).[40]

The members of a folk society manifest a great deal of traditional nonrationality.   This has been aptly described, for New England folk, by Robert Frost :

> There where it is we do not need the wall :
> He is all pine and I am apple orchard.
> My apple trees will never get across
> And eat the cones under his pines, I tell him.
> He only says, " Good fences make good neighbours." ...
> He moves in darkness, as it seems to me,
> Not of woods only and the shade of trees,
> *He will not go beyond his father's saying. ...*[41]

But a word of warning !   The assertion that anyone is traditionally nonrational—" he moves in darkness "—must always include the " as it seems to me " unless the presumably nonrational person so conducts himself, in speech or otherwise, that direct evidence, not the observer's inference, is provided.   Again in terms of the illustration : the mere quoting of the proverb by the farmer who insists on apparently needless wallbuilding is not enough to prove that " he moves in darkness ".   Other evidence showing that " he will not go beyond his father's

saying " *simply because it is his father's saying*, and hence is imbued with intimate and commemorative sacredness, would have to be furnished.

Lacking this evidence, it would also be possible to infer that the farmer was acting in accordance with pursuant or consequent secularity —that is, with limited or unlimited expedient rationality—and was merely referring to his father as the inventor or promulgator of a cause-and-effect formula: " Good fences *make* good neighbours ". The formula might not be accurate, but that would be nothing more than a scientific error, as it were, and could be corrected without reluctance. The fundamental evaluation of change would still lie on the secular side of the continuum.

To repeat : only if the farmer's actions, in word or deed or both, clearly showed that he built stone fences where they were not needed as barriers simply and solely because he was devoted to his father during his lifetime and revered him after his death, and/or was controlled by other relevant kinds of sacredness, could the diagnosis of traditional nonrationality be made.

The study of folk society should therefore include within its scope evidence going beyond direct statement and drawn from the full range of the cultural context : " overtones " of speech, " non-verbal gestures," work skills, tools, the graphic and plastic arts, song, dance, poetry, myth, humor, and a hundred-and-one other repositories of " congealed evaluation ".[42] Attention to the implicit may at the very least supplement the explicit, and now and again may supply grounds for inference that would otherwise be wholly lacking.

Yet, though many folk evaluations are implicit, it is sometimes true that they are both explicit and unambiguous. In most cases, however, one evaluation has little or no clearly expressed connection with another. That is to say, " implicit " may not always be warranted with regard to the evaluations themselves, but is usually warranted with regard to their systematization.

Specifically, " good fences make good neighbors " is but one of thousands of proverbial evaluations operating toward the control of conduct in folk societies : in some, such relatively explicit statements make up a substantial proportion of the relevant cultural context.[43] Nevertheless, these pithy and pointed normative formulations, no matter how numerous and definite they may be, remain, in the context of folk life, without benefit of codification. They have not been set in ordered array, so to speak, and on occasion may resemble an undisciplined mob rather than an army ; hence if the general situation is confused, like such a mob they may straggle off in a dozen directions at once, or even fight at cross-purposes.

Under fortunate circumstances—and, given the relative isolation of folk societies, circumstances are ordinarily fortunate—the general situation is itself so standard, as it were, that most items in the varied assortment of standard normative formulations have long since found

a suitable traditional place in it.   Indeed, they do much to constitute it, and largely for that very reason, the abstract rationale of the situation, its explicit systematic inter-connectedness, is rarely if ever put into words or other easily communicable symbols by the persons incorporated in it.   They are too much engrossed in the concrete content of the multifarious values to devote attention to their abstract form.

Stating the matter differently, the value-system of a folk society is not only traditional but is also characterized by the fact that although the values are sometimes explicit, the system is usually quite implicit. Putting it in still another way, folk-sacred evaluations are largely uncodified.

To be uncodified, clearly enough, is not necessarily to be devoid of inter-connectedness, but merely of explicit systematization.   Further, there may be a great deal of systematization that is not explicit, and of which the persons involved in it are wholly ignorant.

The most obvious illustration to be found among cultural phenomena is perhaps that of grammar ;   many of those using language are unaware of the high degree of implicit systematization that even the simplest or most " incorrect " types thereof possess.   The same is true of the evaluation of social change ;   complex systems of this-is-preferred-to-that—i.e., permutation and combination of rankings in the evaluation continuum, of self-other and social control orientation, of hierarchical arrangement within holy, loyalistic, or other categories of sacredness and secularity, and so on—may in the daily practice of all concerned be quite as elaborate and quite as unnoticed as the grammar of the language that is in part used to express them.   Only the observer may be aware of either.

This unawareness on the part of the members of the systematization of the evaluations prevailing in folk societies helps to make them even more resistant to change than sacredness alone could, and this resistance is heightened when the evaluations are also implicit, as they not infrequently are.

There comes about what may be called, again speaking in terms of linguistic analogy, a kind of holophrasis or extreme agglutination, wherein a phrase or a sentence is expressed by a single word, as exemplified by the Santali *dalochoakantahentaetinae*, " he, who belongs to him who belongs to me, will continue letting himself be struck ". Leaving the analogy, it may be said that the implicit evaluations so fuse with each other, and with the system that incorporates them, that it is virtually impossible for the naive participant to do any comparison, classification, analysis, and abstraction : everything is unique, concrete, and personal.

In other words, the value-system, understanding thereby both the evaluations and their systematization, is accrete, fused, grown together, rather than discrete, fissured, separable,[44] and the society embodying such a system is closed rather than open,[45] tight rather than loose.   As Mrs. Poyser in George Eliot's *Adam Bede* might have put it, " Among

simple, honest folk, everythin's all mixed in with everythin' else, and rightly so ; it's only sly tradesmen who tell us that we can have yellow in the vat without good milk, wise makin', and hard stirrin'. When all's said and done, sir, cheese is cheese ".[46]

Folk sacredness being characterized by the traditional, implicit, and uncodified, as well as by the nonrational, what of prescribed sacredness ? (It will be remembered that reference was earlier made to prescribed-sacred societies.) Well, there often is a good deal of the traditional in prescribed sacredness, but it is not justified by appeal to tradition only ; instead, it is pointed out that the traditional is the rational. "What thoughts of old the wise have entertained "[47] represent the best way to do things—" best " being interpreted as accurately corresponding to some design or plan presumably deriving from a supreme value or, usually amounting to the same thing, a supreme value-giver. Accuracy of correspondence with the design is determined by reasoning of the kind standard in the given society, going backward or forward as such determination requires,[48] and hence in this sense rationality governs. With such rationality necessarily goes a fairly high degree of explicitness, both of evaluations and systematization, and almost by the same token a high level of codification is frequently reached. As the writer has put it elsewhere :

> Those versed in the sacred ways of doing things are explicitly charged with their transmission, and deliberate indoctrination follows. This is done by means of prescription ; that is, everything of key sociative significance is linked into a system, and every item in the system is specifically enjoined. It is not a case of secular deduction from a supreme principle, for this leaves room for novelty ; rather, the crucial sacred values are linked together, the links are sacred, and from the resulting system a supremely sacred prescription is induced that is then deductively used to intensify the sacredness of the subordinate prescriptions that have produced it. A prescribed value-system is like a house built of stones, boards, shingles, panes of glass, and the like that have accumulated over a long period. They must not be in any way cut or trimmed to fit, and they must all be used somewhere in the structure. Given sufficient ingenuity, a surprising degree of system and even of symmetry may be the outcome, and yet inspection will reveal the antiquity and essentially inviolate character of each unit.[49]

Rationality of a sort, explicitness, and codification, then, may all mark the prescriptions of such a society. (It should be noted that the passage quoted refers specifically to a subtype of prescribed sacred society ; namely the articulated—but this is only one of six.[50] For present purposes, however, the articulated subtype will serve reasonably well to depict the main type.) In these respects it is in considerable measure the reverse of the folk-sacred variety, but in at least one

important respect it is not, for both folk and prescribed societies have value-systems of primarily fused or accrete kind.

In the case of prescribed society, to be sure, the fusion of the various evaluations with each other and with their systematization is not so complete that its naive members are incapable of making distinctions, particularly when these distinctions are indicated and inculcated by members who, for whatever reason, are sophisticated in some degree.

Both clergyman and lay parishioner, for example, may be thoroughly identified with an accrete value system that was, in their earliest experience, nonrational, implicit, and uncodified ; it was " learned at mother's knee ". Then, in later childhood, they both receive formal catechetical instruction, this rendering some of their implicit evaluations explicit, subjecting them to a certain kind of sanctioned rationality,[15] and incorporating them in a standard code. Still later the clergyman, having been taught the holy language or languages and the less rudimentary aspects of theology, and having undergone several other vocational sophistications,[52] begins to exercise the teaching function forming a part of his calling. This he does by expounding the more detailed features of the code of the confession he represents, comparing it favorably with those of other confessions, and linking this or that hitherto implicit item of the accrete value-system with major or minor prescriptions and thereby expanding the scope of codification—in short, by making explicit and rational for his parishioners various aspects, not adequately dealt with in the simple childhood catechism, of what is still for all concerned an essentially accrete value-system.

Using the term without praise or blame, even the sophisticated subjection of evaluations to " a certain kind of sanctioned rationality " is often equivalent to what we now call rationalization. We learn to give good reasons for what we would believe in any case. Nevertheless, if those good reasons and their accompanying conduct can be put in any sort of order that fits in with the supreme belief and practice, a code that is highly effective in reinforcing the total system may be the result, and the society is tightened or kept tight.

Manifestly, what has just been said about prescribed sacredness in its holy aspects applies, *mutatis mutandis*, to other aspects as well ; the loyalistic, the intimate, and the like may all be explicated, rationalized, and codified, and at the same time remain accrete.

In fact, discreteness, fission, or separability of value-systems as systems[53] first plainly shows itself when attention is turned to principled-secular societies. Several pages back, mention was made of pursuant and consequent secularity ; these are simply other terms for secular conduct governed by expedient rationality of, respectively, limited and unlimited range. It is as a result of internal contradictions arising from the tendency of the limited to pass over into the unlimited that there appears fission of principled-secular value-systems and the societies that embody them.

The principles to which conduct, whether of word or deed or both, is more or less clearly pursuant must necessarily be somewhat abstract to begin with, and are likely to become more so. Otherwise, there is no way to preserve principle and, at the same time, to make deductive extensions and implementing amendments over a long time-span. Such extensions and amendments are devised in order successfully to meet changing circumstances of quite concrete kind, and the methods and criteria of success are those of expedient rationality—the amendment works, or it doesn't.

Rationality of this kind continually presses hard against the limits of principle, for to handle drastically changed situations drastic measures must often be taken, and these drastic measures frequently can be brought within the scope of supreme principle only by a great deal of elaborate interpretation in which principle is dealt with so abstractly that it may be almost " interpreted away ". Often, heroic efforts are made to show that principle still prevails, but response from the cynical may be that " the Suprame Coort follies the iliction retoorns," or " the Constitution is what the courts say it is ".

Cleavage then runs deep between advocates of principle and all its applications as basically sacred—which pushes them toward prescribed evaluation—and advocates of change despite any limits of principle —which pushes them toward consequent evaluation.

The contradictions are reconciled, if at all, only by making the principle still more abstract and, in many cases, identifying it with some category or categories of the sacred additional to the one from which it initially derived.

When accessory categories of the sacred are not effectively in use, principled-secular societies may be very greatly weakened by abstraction. The rank and file of the society's members find it more and more difficult to understand the increasingly remote principle or principles, and hence are more and more easily persuaded to permit adoption of measures based on drastically consequent secularity. Expedient rationality in practically unlimited form is thereupon applied.

Recent polls, for instance, seem to show that an amazingly large proportion of the American populace does not understand the Bill of Rights. Developed in the face of thoroughly concrete misuse of kingly and ecclesiastical authority, these first ten amendments of the Constitution of the United States were generally understandable while that misuse lived in the memories of those who had directly suffered under it or while oncoming generations could be given effective instruction about it.

As time went on, one or another part of the Bill of Rights was invoked in cases having little or no concrete similarity with those first confronted, and sometimes in cases having no great amount of abstract similarity. The upshot was that effective instruction became harder and harder to give ; the historical references seemed increasingly remote or even antiquarian, and the necessity for demonstrating similarity between

earlier and later cases led to ever greater reliance on abstractions capable of being firmly grasped only by those well equipped, by special aptitude or education or both, so to grasp them.

Today it is very doubtful whether the Bill of Rights would gain much popular support if it were up for adoption. Under the terrifying threat of total warfare, coupled with an ongoing " cold war " making use, among other things, of traitors, the temptation of the terrified is to resort, in effect, to total warfare against all foes, external and internal, and hence to disregard or defy abstract restrictions devised to prevent misuse of authority—any misuse, by any authority. Magna Carta seems so far; Yalta seems so near; and the Fifth Amendment seems so good a shield for traitors. " Liberty ? That's a statue."

Considerations such as these may provide some warrant, then, for the earlier assertion (p. 33) that " discreteness, fission, or separability of value-systems as systems . . . shows itself when attention is turned to principled-secular societies ". Conservatives hoping to sacralize[54] along prescriptive lines, and radicals (of either right or left !) hoping for sweeping pseudo-sacralization or secularization, beleaguer the upholders of principle on every side. Only resolute efforts to show that the issues involved are by no means " antiques ", and to bring the increasingly remote abstractions back to a level of general comprehensibility, can counter the drift toward fission.

And when fission is far advanced, there begins to develop a state of affairs in which every man does what he pleases regardless of the value-system, with which he no longer feels identified. Almost everything will be resorted to for the attainment of ends when the limits of principle are passed; the sheerly expedient or consequent becomes the order of the day.

The consequent, however, is the expression of readiness to change that is unlimited *and* that employs rationality in the sense of economy of effort, avoidance of undesirable " by-products ", and so on. Some restraint is necessary for such use of rationality ; there can be no following of any and every impulse. Ends and means are still distinguishable ; the ends may be entirely nonrational, but the utilization of means still conforms to rational requirements. Normlessness, in other words, is partially held in check ; the society is loosening, but evaluation of change has not yet reached the farthest stretch of the maximum plus range. " *Almost* anything " is resorted to, yet " almost" remains.

It begins to disappear only when nonrationality of affective type pervades evaluation of both means and ends—in fact, only when means and ends so merge as to be virtually indistinguishable, and when the merger crowds out rational considerations. When this happens, comfortable and thrilling secularity have become dominant in the society ; general looseness then makes even expedient rationality impracticable, for there are too many unpredictable personalities and situations.

" I like it because I like it," and " anything for a thrill " express the evaluations of representative members of a normless-secular society —but of course, societies never become altogether normless. Either a few essential traditions, prescriptions, principles, and utilitarian expedients remain to prevent increase of looseness beyond tolerable limits, or there sets in what the writer has called " the normative reaction to normlessness ".[55] In the latter case, the result may be a *very* thorough and rigorous tightening—in many instances, amazingly so.

Omitting, for present purposes, further discussion of these qualifications, let it be said that in an at least relatively normless-secular society the traditions of folk-sacred society have become " believe-it-or-not " curiosities providing petty thrills, the prescriptions of prescribed-sacred society are resented and discarded as hampering to comfort, the principles of principled-secular society are cynically disregarded, held not to be worth effort at comprehension, or, even at the level of expedient restraint, viewed as " just too much trouble ".

Widespread looseness prevails, but little worry results, or at most expedient rationality in the form of science or its equivalents is believed to furnish solutions for any conceivable social difficulties.[56]

Plainly enough, various societies giving a great deal of scope to affective nonrationality of all kinds have survived for long periods ; a high degree of disorganization is not synonymous with immediate collapse. In fact, what we know of social and cultural continuities indicates that societies and the value-systems they incorporate do not so much rapidly collapse as slowly dissolve, and that their components are usually absorbed, in quite considerable degree, in their successors. Insoluble and unabsorbable residues remain, of course, but with time these are drained off and dispersed. The " new " society may then seem to have come into being without benefit of predecessors, as it were, and still further lapse of time produces the illusion of sharp and unmitigated transition.

Occasionally, to be sure, external or internal conquest, or both, in the forms of overwhelming invasion, mass revolt against a dominant but fundamentally impotent minority, and so on, does bring about change of tremendous extent and depth in a very short time indeed. Only those wedded to a kind of gadualism that ultimately rests on Darwinian assumptions of small-incremental evolution (as contrasted with DeVriesian mutation) would attempt to deny the part sometimes played by what Teggart[57] and others have called catastrophic change.

When this occurs, however, the prior state of social organization, tight or loose, of the society undergoing such change is often not so directly relevant as are sheer proportional numbers, conquest efficiency of material culture, innovations in martial discipline, and the like. Even if they had been well organized, politically and in other ways, the North American Indians would have been subjected to the

catastrophic changes induced by sudden and thorough conquest. The same is true of the Negroes wrenched by force from their African homes and flung into the lower levels of American society ; no matter how tightly their own societies may have been organized—although we know that there was much variation in this respect—they inevitably suffered catastrophic alteration.

Concern at this point, however, is chiefly with the relatively slow dissolving of societies and their value-systems, and with the combined cause-effect influence thereon of affective nonrationality of comfortable and thrilling character, particularly the latter. We possess, in the literature of social and cultural history, sociology, and social psychology, a vast number of studies of fads, crazes, widespread deviations, and licit and illicit relaxations and stimulations ; there is no dearth of empirical materials. Yet, there has thus far been relatively little analysis of these materials with an effort to determine to what extent they evidence that obsessive incapacity to refrain from responding to the new that in some instances both shows how far dissolution has already proceeded and itself acts as a further solvent.[58] Ultra-rapid affectively nonrational secularization, in other words, has not received the attention that its demonstrable importance warrants.

Further, there has been little study of " the normative reaction to normlessness " that sometimes represents the almost convulsive effort of a society to reconstitute its vanishing value-system. Moreover, " the normative reaction to normlessness " occurs not only when secularization reaches comfortable and thrilling extremes, but also, for instance, when one rigidly prescribed-sacred society clashes with another, or when one of principled-secular variety too brusquely invades folk or prescribed bailiwicks.

This calls attention to the fact that *societies are not necessarily " all of one piece "*. That is to say, most societies, and especially those of complex variety, usually incorporate *several* value-systems, not one only, and these may destructively clash.[59]

The likelihood of such conflict is diminished, it may be granted, when there is at least tacit agreement on those aspects of the several value-systems, or on those aspects of a general value-system abstracted from or infusing them, that makes for mutual accommodation. An effective principled-secular society, for example, operates with principles sufficiently abstract and sufficiently recognized by the various folk and prescribed subsocieties it virtually always encompasses to be able to reconcile contending opposites, or at least to prevent issues from being so sharply drawn that conflict to the point of destructive violence comes about.

The often-evidenced plurality of value-systems within an inclusive society is obviously a fact of major practical significance, but it also has crucial theoretical bearing. Many of those adversely criticizing sacred-secular formulations, for example, attribute assumptions to the formulators that the latter in no way hold. One of these erroneously imputed

assumptions is that any given society incorporates only one value-system. Nothing could be further from the minds of sacred-secular theorists. Park, Hughes, and the present writer, to name no others, have always assumed the contrary ; namely, that any given society that is *empirically* manifested may be found, on examination, to embody *several* different and even discrepant value-systems. Everything that we know about social stratification, for example, bears witness to this. Only in folk-sacred societies of the most isolated[60] and simple sort is there much probability of finding only one value-system, and even in such cases what the investigator is prepared to call " one " depends on the level of abstraction that serves his purposes. For some purposes he might well assert and demonstrate that each person in the society has a different value-system,[61] and that each of these value systems varies as the life-history of its representative undergoes successive changes. *Everything depends, to repeat, on the level of abstraction that is viewed as suitable for the particular research problem.*

Here, then, has been presented an " evaluation continuum of social change ", together with a few of its necessary qualifications. Continued use alone will show whether or not it is a valuable tool.

NOTES

[1] John C. Doby *et. al.*, *Introduction to Social Research* (Harrisburg, Pa. : Stackpole Press, 1955), chapter by J. C. McKinney, " Constructive Typology ". This is the best presentation of recent date in English.

[2] Howard Becker and Reuben Hill, eds., *Family, Marriage, and Parenthood* (Boston : D. C. Heath and Co., 1948), chapter by Becker, " Interpreting Family Life in Context ". This has been somewhat simplified and improved in the 2nd ed., 1955, hereinafter FMP (1955). See also Howard Becker, *Man in Reciprocity* (New York: F. J. Praeger, Inc., 1956); and Sanders *et al.* and Becker, *Societies around the World*, shorter edition, one vol. (New York: The Dryden Press, 1956).

[3] Talcott Parsons and E. A. Shils, eds., *Toward a General Theory of Action* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1951). See index for pattern variables, etc. Hereinafter TGTA.

[4] Rudolf Otto, *The Idea of the Holy : An Enquiry into the Non-Rational Factor in the Idea of the Divine and its Relation to the Rational*. Trans. by J. W. Harvey, 2nd ed. (London : Oxford University Press, 1950). Howard Becker and Harry Elmer Barnes, *Social Thought from Lore to Science*, 2nd ed. (Washington D.C. : Harren Press, 1952), Vol. 1, p. xxxiv of notes, herinafter STFLTS. This also appeared in the 1st ed. (1938). See also Robert F. Davidson, *Rudolf Otto's Interpretation of Religion* (Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1947).

[5] This has been presented, with much detail and analysis not touched on here, in STFLTS (1952). " 1951 Commentary on Value-System Terminology ".

[6] Unfortunately, this distinction is not observed in the otherwise excellent book by J. H. S. Bossard and Elinor H. Boll, *Ritual in Family Living* (Philadelphia : University of Pennsylvania Press, 1950). Moreover, as recently as FMP, 1955, the present writer failed to make the distinction.

[7] Of course, the stress is here on reverence, on the *sensus numinis*. Zeal for martyrdom, either for oneself or others, may carry the loyalist as far as the devotee of the holy.

[8] The best treatment of primary groups, for all its characteristic optimism, is still to be found in the " Cooley trilogy " : C. H. Cooley, *Human Nature and the Social Order* (New York : Scribner's 1902) ; *Social Organization* (New York: Scribner's 1909); and *Social Processes* (New York; Scribner's 1918).

[9] Evidence bearing on this point has been assembled in Howard Becker ; *Social Psychology of Bereavement*, unpublished M.A. thesis, Northwestern University, 1926, hereinafter SPOB, appendix 2. This thesis also includes an elaborate bibliography.

[10] Here see the classic treatment, W. G. Sumner, *Folkways* (Boston : Ginn and Co., 1907), *passim*.

[11] *Ibid.*, contains many references to what is essentially the fitting.

[12] Paul Radin, *Primitive Man as Philosopher* (New York, D. Appleton, 1927), pp. 50–51, has an interesting passage on ridicule.

[13] Such a continuum, clearly enough, is thought of by the writer as heuristic. No ultimate philosophy of science is here implied.

[14] Here see the classic treatment, Herbert Spencer, *Principles of Sociology*, II, 1, 2nd, reprinted (New York : D. Appleton, 1897), chapter on " Ceremonial Institutions ".

[15] Extensive discussion of abstract collectivities is to be found in Howard Becker, *Systematic Sociology on the Basis of the* Beziehungslehre *and* Gebildelehre *of Leopold von Wiese* (New York : Wiley, 1932 ; reissued Wisconsin edition, with a new preface, Gary, Ind. : Norman Paul Press, 1950), hereinafter Wiese-Becker, pp. 556–642.

[16] See SPOB for numerous references.

[17] A. J. Toynbee, at various points in *A Study of History* (London : Oxford University Press, 1934–1954), discusses archaism and futurism, but especially in Vol. 6.

[18] Just how erroneous such a view is may be seen in the writer's *Through Values to Social Interpretation* (Durham, N. C. : Duke University Press, 1950), hereinafter TVTSI, pp. 70, 91, 165. Still earlier, this statement was made :
" There is ample evidence to show that societies that have once been highly secular may be poured back, so to speak, in sacred molds. Witness Nazi Germany : the first stages of the pouring are already in evidence, ...
... " the street leading from sacred to secular is not one-way ; all around us can be seen ample evidence of the fact that societies—even ' modern ' societies— can journey from secular to sacred. Ease of exposition and illustration alone has governed our choice of the sacred-to-secular route ; we are not advocating such a route, much less laying it down as a philosophy of history " (in Becker and Hill, eds., chapter entitled " Changing Societies as Family Contexts ", *Marriage and the Family* (Boston : D. C. Heath and Co., 1942), pp. 16, 21–22, hereinafter MF.

[19] See Howard Becker, *German Youth : Bond or Free* (New York : Grove Press, 1946), *passim*, hereinafter GYBOF.

[20] A number of these have been mentioned in TVTSI, pp. 57–61. Contemporary Israel, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain might be added to the list.

[21] See FMP (1955), for further discussion, pp. 37–39.

[22] Carl Becker, *The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth Century Philosophers* (New Haven : Yale University Press, 1932), shows that Nature *did* evoke such sentiments. Basil Willey, *The Eighteenth Century Background* (New York : Columbia University Press, 1941), shows the same thing.

[23] The elaborate vaults, etc., in which they are kept make the protective devices surrounding the earliest Biblical manuscripts, the relics of saints, the fragments of the " true cross ", the stone of Scone, and the like seem utterly amateurish.

[24] See TVTSI for Kolb reference, p. 75, footnote 109 and p. 278, footnote 49.

[25] *Merriam-Webster New International Dictionary.*

[26] See STFLTS (1952), " 1951 Commentary on Value-System Terminology ", p. XVII.

[27] FMP (1955), p. 9, footnote 7. A closely related meaning, also free of moralistic bias, is illustrated in the following. :
" The Eskimo culture is the growth of centuries . . . . . Survival has been the criterion. The succession of variations, followed by the elimination of the inexpedient, and the selection and retention of the expedient, has perfected . . . . . [a great deal].
" . . . . Expediency or inexpediency in most culture traits is not a matter of immediate life or death. Yet selection continually goes on." (New Haven : Yale University Press, 1932), pp. 65–66.

[28] Please note that many more adjectives might be piled up, and that most of them would carry a heavy freight of value-judgment. The writer has discussed this in his " Supreme Values and the Sociologist ", TVTSI, ch. 6.

[29] W. I. Thomas and Florian Znaniecki, *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America* (Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 1918), esp. sections on "Social Disorganization " and " Disorganization of the Immigrant "

[30] Those who have experienced a Rhineland carnival can testify to the astonishing lengths to which ordinarily staid and sober persons will go during this period, and how much this is taken for granted by all concerned.

[31] See STFLTS (1952), pp. VIII–XXII.

[32] For a treatment of structure and function quite independent of Spencer, Durkheim, Radcliffe-Brown, and their imitators, and that dates from 1924 and before, see Wiese-Becker, pp. IX, 6-7, 111–113, 119, 215, 252–257, and many scattered references thereafter, 364, 401–412, 430, 443, 476, 487, 493–495, 500–501, 502–505, 526–527, 540–541, 578–582, 594, 599–600, 602, 606, 618–619, 649, 650–651, 656, 698–699.

[33] The extensive literature on social and personal disorganization is replete with cases.

[34] TVTSI, p. 67.

[35] See John Gillin, ed., *For a Science of Social Man* (New York : Macmillan, 1954), pp. 115–128.

[36] References might be carried back indefinitely, but a good nineteenth-century treatment is Walter Bagehot, *Physics and Politics* (New York: D. Appleton, 1872).

[37] Talcott Parsons, *The Social System* (Glencoe, Ill. : Free Press, 1951) ; and E. A. Shils, eds., TGTA, chapters 1–4.

[38] Wiese-Becker, pp. 222–226, footnote 6 and 319–344 ; Howard Becker, " Processes of Secularisation ", *Sociological Review* (British), 24, April–July and October, 1932, pp. 138–154 ; 266–286.

[39] Clearly, this wider usage diverges from the earlier treatment of " folk " as representing simply the naive, rustic, archaic, old-fashioned, or provincially conservative contingents of " modern " societies. Folklore, folkdance, and folksong all bear this more limited meaning, as does also Howard W. Odum's " folk sociology ". The wider usage makes irrelevant the excessively concrete distinctions set up by Gideon Sjoberg, " Folk and Feudal Societies ", AJS, 58, 3 (Nov., 1952), pp. 231–239.

[40] See TVTSI, chapters 1 and 5.

[41] " Mending Wall ", in Louis Untermeyer, ed ; *Modern American Poetry, Mid-Century Edition*, (New York : Harcourt Brace and Co., 1950), pp. 185–186.

[42] See GYBOF for use of such material.

[43] Any good reference library contains many handbooks of proverbs demonstrating this *ad nauseam*.

[44] " Accrete " is a botanical term meaning fused or grown together. It has been borrowed for sociological purposes.

[45] Karl Popper, *The Open Society and its Enemies*, 2nd ed. (New Jersey : Princeton University Press, 1950) is an interesting polemic treatment of " closed " and " open " societies, by which Popper means, essentially, prescribed–sacred and principled–secular.

[46] Obviously, this is the present writer's equivalent, for his purposes, of the redoubtable Mrs. Poyser.

[47] Wagner in Part I of *Faust*.

[48] Here the reference is to reasoning from " effect " to " cause " or from " cause " to " effect ".

[49] TVTSI, p. 268, p. 277.

[50] *Ibid.*, pp. 264, 268–274.

[51] *Ibid.*, pp. 22–23, 57–66, 200, 223, 233–234.

[52] This term is not intended to be derogatory. It merely designates the indoctrination, specially imparted knowledge, etc., that a member of a learned calling receives.

[53] What is meant here is that certain value-systems, because of their special kind of systematization, and not because of their value-content, may be inherently unstable. The idea is as old as Aristotle.

[54] TVTSI, p. 67, footnote 96 ; p. 92.

[55] *Ibid.*, p. 76–78 ; STFLTS (1952), pp. XX–XXII.

[56] TVTSI, p. 73 ; STFLTS (1952), p. 42.

[57] F. J. Teggart, *Theory and Processes of History* (Berkeley : University of California Press, 1941), *passim*.

[58] One of the few studies that has really come to grips with this matter, even though in over-brief form, is the classic Chapter IX of P. A. Sorokin's *Social Mobility* (New York : Harper's, 1927).

[59] The adverb " destructively " is inserted with definite intent, for not all conflict, in the long run, is destructive. See STFLTS, using index for " Turgot " and cross-references.

[60] The isolation that is involved may be of all three sorts currently distinguished : vicinal, social, and mental. See TVTSI, using index, or any of the references in Note 2 above.

[61] C. W. M. Hart, " The Sons of Turimpi ". *American Anthropologist*, 56, 2, part 1 (April, 1954), pp. 242–261. This is a striking piece of evidence directly bearing on the above point.

Social Progress and Law

S. F. KECHEKYAN

(Professor, Moscow Law Institute, Academy of Sciences of
the U.S.S.R.)

I

When studying the changes occurring in society, it is impossible to ignore the idea of progress which subordinates every social phenomenon. Those thinkers who strove for the creation of sociology as a science dealing with the law-governed processes of social life were firmly convinced that the transition from the old to the new, which constantly takes place in society, represents the progressive movement of human society. Auguste Comte included the word " progress " into the " motto " of his " System of positive politics ". His attempts to disclose the meaning of this concept and to discover the laws of social development failed. However, both he and his followers shared the correct idea that social life is subordinated to a law-governed development, though they mistakenly believed that progress did not go beyond the capitalist system which they considered as the final state of human society.

The science of society will not fulfil its task, unless, without confining itself to a statement of changes occurring in the life of society, it directs its efforts to establish the law-governed processes subordinating those changes.

Law, like all social phenomena, changes in a law-governed way ; it is inseverably bound up with other aspects of society's life and reflects in its content and progress the general law-governed processes of social development. Being established by the State and expressing the will of the economically and politically ruling class, law is conditioned in the final analysis by the economic system of society. It is there that one should search, above all, for the cause of changes occurring in the norms of law. These changes are based on the shifts which take place in the relations of production and in the alignment of class forces.

Law radically changes as the mode of production changes in the given country. Thus, the appearance of the slave mode of production resulted in the formation of slave law, and the formation of the feudal system brought into being feudal law. Under the capitalist mode of production a special new type of law arises, bourgeois law. The Socialist Revolution which abolished private ownership of the instruments and means of production and which called into being new unprecedented production relations and firmly established socialist ownership and the social system of economy, resulted in the appearance of a new, socialist type of law.

Law does not, however, remain invariable even within the historical bounds of domination of a given mode of production. Sometimes it undergoes rather considerable changes in the course of development of production relations of a definite type. For example, the French feudal law of Bodin's times, when the disintegration of feudalism began, greatly differed from the one of Beaumanoir's times. The bourgeois law of the epoch of imperialism relinquished a number of principles put forth during the period of victory of the capitalist system, but this is to be dealt with below.

Jurists not infrequently conceive the process of establishing law norms as being arbitrary or caused only by the motives of the law-maker, and consider law norms as something self-contained and independent of other phenomena of social life. Repeated attempts have also been made to base law norms on and explain their development by phenomena of human consciousness, by a peculiar " sense of law ", sense of justice and by special emotions of individuals. Attempts have been made to interpret law as proceeding from primitive aspirations and instincts, to disclose the " psycho-physical " reality of law, and to build the science of law as some branch of social psychology. At one time the historical school of law tried to interpret law and its development as a manifestation of the " nation's spirit ", asserting that all the peculiarities of the given people and its historical destinies are reflected in law.

However, most frequently the influence of ideas is referred to, and attempts are made to explain the development of law by the appearance and consolidation of some or other views. In this conception the fact is overlooked that the ideas themselves reflect the views of some or other social classes and groups and that their appearance requires certain historical premises. It is impossible to comprehend the causes of appearance of any ideas or doctrines without referring to the economic and social system. Thus the critical attitude towards the institution of slavery which the Roman jurists exhibited during the Empire period was a reflection of the crisis which the slave system of economy underwent in Rome. The popularity and influence of the doctrine of " natural " law in the 17th–18th centuries (Milton, Lilburne, Rousseau, Locke and others) resulted from the development and consolidation of capitalist relations within feudal society.

The conceptions of justice, which sum up the appraisal of the existing social order and of the system of law which confirms this order, also result from the economic development of society. They are different with representatives of different classes. According to Aristotle, justice is quite compatible with a legal recognition of slavery, while Rousseau's conception of justice requires freedom and equality for every citizen of the state ; and Thomas Münzer's idea of justice is incompatible with the preservation of private ownership.

The conceptions of justice often come near, and are even identical with, the ideas of special natural law whose interpretation and content

also varied considerably throughout the centuries. The idea of natural law was used by representatives of various classes under diverse historical conditions. In order to understand the significance of this idea at any one historical period, one has to refer to the economic system of society and the relationship of class forces in the given society. It can hardly be denied, for example, that contemporary doctrines of natural law, which express the views of ideologists of imperialism and are principally based on religious conceptions and which strive to justify the existing law and the institutions of capitalist countries by references to divine order, have little in common with the teachings about natural law evolved by the philosophers of the enlightenment in the 17th–18th centuries. The latter, referring to the requirements of mind and " nature " advocated that it was necessary to abolish privileges and inequality and to establish democratic rights and freedoms for the citizens. As to the idea of natural law, one should bear in mind that as a matter of fact law is inseverably bound up with the state, representing rules of conduct which are secured by the state. It is impossible to conceive any law existing independently of and outside the state. Therefore, when " natural " law is referred to, what is really meant are the views on law and wishes related to the realm of law.

The above is a confirmation of the fact that though ideas naturally exert a serious influence on the development of law, the appearance of some or other ideas depends on the development of the relations of production. Consequently, what underlies the development of law is, in the final analysis, not the ideas, but the material conditions of life of society at the given stage of its development. The new needs of society which arise in connection with the development of production relations call into being new ideas, including new ideas of law. Their appearance testifies to the fact that more or less substantial changes, reflected in social consciousness, have occurred in the economic structure of society.

II

The history of society in the 20th century was marked by a major change in the realm of law, the appearance of socialist law, a law of a new historical type. It arose as a result of radical changes in the economic system of a number of countries. Its appearance is connected with the Great October Socialist Revolution and the formation of socialist property and of the socialist system of economy in the U.S.S.R., and later in a number of other countries of Europe and Asia.

The Socialist Revolution called forth the formation of new, socialist relations of production. A state of a new type arose, a socialist state, which represents state leadership of society by the working class, as well as law of a new type, the socialist law. The norms of socialist

law, established by the socialist state, express the will of the working class and of all the working people and consolidate the order which meets their interests, i.e., the interests of all the people, and not of the insignificant minority of the population. The new law has been socialist from the very day of its appearance, since it has from its very beginning been aimed at implementing the idea of building socialist society. But it has been in permanent development. With the elimination of the capitalist elements in town and country and the building of socialism, it has entered a new phase of its development in conformity with the changed tasks and functions of the socialist state. All the peculiarities of new, socialist law, as law of a new historical type, are definitely and fully disclosed in this new phase.

The economic foundation of socialist law is the socialist ownership of the land, its mineral wealth, forests, factories, mills, mines, large agricultural enterprises and other instruments and means of production, as well as the socialist system of economy, firmly established as a result of liquidation of the capitalist system of economy and the abolition of private ownership of the instruments and means of production. Socialist law reflects the principles of socialism, the principle that work is the duty of everyone (" He who does not work, neither shall he eat ") and that compensation corresponds to the quantity and quality of labour spent. The norms of socialist law enhance the material interest of enterprises, and of each worker, in the results of the labour invested. By stimulating the maximum possible productivity of labour, socialist law guarantees to everyone an income which corresponds to the work performed.

While obliging the citizens to preserve and consolidate socialist property, which is the basis of the well-being of every citizen in the socialist state, the norms of socialist law at the same time protect the personal property right of citizens in their incomes and savings from work, in their dwelling houses and subsidiary home enterprises, in articles of domestic economy and use and articles of personal use and convenience. The citizens of the U.S.S.R. are permitted by law to purchase and build their own dwelling houses, and to build in town outskirts country houses on their own or in co-operatives. Every household in a collective farm, in addition to its basic income from the common, collective-farm enterprise, has for its personal use a small plot of household land and, as its personal property, a dwelling house, livestock, poultry and minor agricultural implements.

The U.S.S.R. laws provide for the right of inheritance of personal property. They guarantee the citizens full freedom of disposing of their incomes, savings and property, precluding, however, any possibility of personal property becoming a means of enrichment and exploitation of man. The laws of the socialist state are aimed at fully protecting the personal property and all the lawful interests of citizens, related to its purchase and transfer to other persons. They are aimed

at the maximum possible satisfaction of the material and cultural requirements of every citizen.

By firmly establishing the fact that socialism is being built in the U.S.S.R., Soviet socialist law guarantees the citizens of the U.S.S.R. the right to work, the right to rest, the right to maintenance in old age, and the right to education.

Not only does socialist law proclaim the rights of citizens, it also ensures their practical implementation and firmly establishes the material conditions which guarantee the citizens the use of opportunities provided by the law. Their rights are a reality ensured by socialist ownership and the socialist system of economy. Soviet socialist law firmly establishes the full power of the people and is characterized by deep-rooted democracy. This finds its expression in the electivity of all the organs of power from top to bottom, in the electivity of courts of justice, in the democratic electoral law, and in the wide participation of citizens in governing the state.

The democratic nature of Soviet socialist law is also manifested in the equality of rights of all citizens and in the equality of their basic duties. Real equality of rights of every citizen has been put into practice as a result of abolition of exploitation in socialist society where no one has the right to expropriate the fruits of someone else's labour, and where there is neither unemployment nor poverty.

According to the U.S.S.R. Constitution (Article 122), women in the U.S.S.R. are accorded equal rights with men in the spheres of work, payment for work, rest, education, and maintenance in case of disability or in old age. Women in the U.S.S.R. are accorded maternity leave with full pay while mothers with large families and unmarried mothers are provided with state grants.

The equality of citizens, firmly established in the norms of socialist law, does not, however, mean equalization either of the amount of payment for work or in the field of needs and everyday facilities, as sometimes some ill-informed people imagine. Equality under socialism means equal relation of everyone to the means of production, and equal duty on the part of everyone to work according to his or her abilities and an equal right of all the working people to receive compensation in accordance with their labour. Such a proposition does not exclude any property differences among the citizens of the socialist state or considerable differences in the organization of everyday life and the character of the requirements that are to be met. These property differences result, however, not from the fact that the sources of the citizens' incomes are different, but exclusively and wholly from the fact that the compensation paid is fixed according to the quantity and quality of the work performed. It is individual work that is the source of income in every case.

Socialist law is permeated with profound and consistent internationalism. All nations and races are considered as being equal in rights. The citizens are accorded equal rights irrespective of nationality or

race in all spheres of economic, government, cultural, political and other public activity. According to the U.S.S.R. Constitution, any restriction of the rights or privileges on account of race or nationality, as well as any advocacy of racial or national exclusiveness or hatred and contempt, is punishable under the law. Every condition has been created in the Soviet Union and in other countries of socialism for the economic and cultural progress of all nationalities. The laws practically ensure these conditions. Thus the U.S.S.R. Constitution has firmly established the federal organization of the Soviet state whereby all the national union and autonomous republics make part of the Union.

One of the most important principles of socialist law is the principle of legality. Strict and steadfast observance of the laws and of other normative deeds of the state issued on the basis of the laws by all the organs of the state, officials and social organizations, has repeatedly been proclaimed and firmly established in the deeds of the Soviet state and in the directives of the Communist Party. Already in the first years of existence of Soviet power, Lenin repeatedly and forcibly stressed the significance of the principle of socialist legality and the necessity of unfailingly carrying it out into practice when applying the norms of Soviet law.

Soviet juridical science does not uphold the notion that any person applying law norms has the right to refer to the existing order with the object of solving the problem of law, or that the judges and administrative bodies have the right to amend law norms expressed in state acts, as a result of some " sociological " investigation. As early as the beginning of this century, the Austrian jurist Ehrlich in his book the " Sociology of Law " voiced the opinion that above all, practical relations which have taken shape in society should be considered, and not commands contained in the acts of the state. Today the " sociological " school of jurists in the U.S.A., headed by Roscoe Pound, and a school of jurists who call themselves realists, recommend that judges should be endowed with a wide margin of discretion, referring to the practice of applying the norms of law, and to the necessity for the judge to take into account the interests of individuals and social groups which merit protection.

Soviet juridical science refutes such propositions aimed at justifying the arbitrary actions of the judge and administrative discretion. Both are considered inadmissible and are condemned by theory and practice in the socialist state. Socialist law proceeds from the precept that it is the duty of the judge and administrative bodies to follow exactly and implicitly the directives comprised in law and in the normative acts issued on the basis of the laws.

Soviet science devotes much attention to the creative rôle of socialist law in the building of socialism. The transfer of power from one class to another and the appearance of new law, as has been stated above,

result from the development of the economic system and the growth of the productive forces of society. However, having arisen as a result of economic development, the new state and the law it creates, in its turn influence the economic basis of society, contributing to its consolidation and further progress, as well as all the other aspects of social life.

Soviet science demonstrates what part the new socialist law has played in the organization of the new state power, in crushing the resistance of the classes that have been overthrown, in abolishing the old basis and in organizing the economy on new principles. This end was already served by the first decrees of the Soviet state adopted during the first year of existence of the new power. The decrees on land, peace, the Declaration of Rights of the peoples of Russia, and the R.S.F.S.R. Constitution of 1918 played a major part in liquidating the old society and in building new social relations and a new state organization.

The active creative rôle of socialist law is particularly great in virtue of the fact that, first of all, the socialist state appears as the organizer of the productive activity of citizens. Based on the economic law of balanced development of the national economy, the socialist state by all its legal acts organizes production according to a definite plan. The acts of planning are laws juridically valid for the institutions and officials, for every employee and worker of state and co-operative enterprises and bodies.

Secondly, the creative rôle of socialist law is of major importance in virtue of the fact that the activities of the socialist state are directed by policies based on the knowledge and utilization of economic laws, of the laws of social development in the interests of society. This leads to the effective influence of the socialist state and law on the life of society and the purposefulness of the measures taken by the socialist state and firmly established by law. In influencing the economic life as well as the consciousness of citizens, the socialist state makes wide use of law, which is one of the cardinal means of implementing the functions of the socialist state.

Socialist law helps to carry into effect the organizational and economic, cultural and educational activities of the bodies of the socialist state as well as to protect socialist property. The management of state industries, the control of relations among state enterprises, the order of granting credits, and the methods of business accounting by which they are guided in their activities—all this is effected by the laws of the socialist state. The socialist laws lay down methods of training skilled workers and specialists for industry. Soviet laws have laid down the conditions for carrying out the collectivization of agriculture, ensured the organization of machine-and-tractor stations and approved the model regulations of collective farms. Soviet laws exercise wide control over trade within the country by establishing the volume and direction of turnover and the prices of

goods ; they have firmly established and ensured the implementation of the monopoly of foreign trade.

Soviet socialist law has likewise contributed to the enormous successes of the Soviet state in the development of culture, in re-educating the working people, rooting out the survivals of capitalism from the minds of the people, and developing a new, communist consciousness. Of great importance in building a new culture in the very first years of the Soviet power were the decrees on the separation of church from state and of school from church (January 1918), on the elimination of illiteracy (December 1919), on compulsory education, on the new organization of secondary and higher schools, and the decree on the organization of workers' faculties. An important rôle in the building of socialist culture was played by the laws aimed at the development of culture of the peoples of the U.S.S.R., which helped in combating the survivals of patriarchal-feudal relations in a number of outlying districts of the U.S.S.R., and in the flourishing of the culture of the U.S.S.R. peoples, national in form and socialist in content.

III

When dealing with the changes which took place in the law of capitalist countries in the first half of the 20th century, one cannot but note, first of all, that capitalist countries relinquished the democratic principles of state organization proclaimed in the period of birth of bourgeois law. These principles were considerably limited or even completely refuted in the practice of individual capitalist countries.

The democratic rights and freedoms of citizens, as well as the system of representation and the parliamentary system are a substantial victory of the working people against feudal rightlessness and arbitrariness. The onslaught of fascism on these democratic institutions, and their abolition in fascist countries was an event of major importance in the legal life of capitalist countries. It has been vigorously resisted by the working people. The struggle for the preservation of democratic rights and freedoms and of all democratic institutions plays a great positive rôle and unites at present all the progressive forces of mankind.

These changes in the state law of capitalist countries are related to the transition of capitalism into the monopoly stage of capitalism characterized by the appearance of large monopolies which establish their economic and political domination and strive to eliminate democracy, replacing it with oligarchy. The considerable changes in the economic life of capitalist society, which occurred with its transition to monopoly capitalism could not but leave a trace on the most diverse branches of law. However, they could not and did not affect the basis of bourgeois law, private property, though, on the other hand, they did bring about some changes in legal institutions which were influenced by the unbridled penetration of monopolies into the various aspects of life of capitalist society.

D

An attempt is sometimes made in legal publications of capitalist countries to interpret the limitation of rights of petty and middle-class property owners in the interests of the monopolies, brought about by this penetration, as a certain " transformation " of property in the interests of the whole of society, as " socialization " of law, etc. The limitation of freedom of agreements, their standardization, and the appearance of model agreements and " merger " agreements—all these changes once more testify to the formidable rôle of the monopolies, which dictate their will to the contractors.

The enhanced rôle of monopolies also accounts for the attempts to subordinate the economic life of capitalist countries to undivided leadership, to institute " dirigism " in economic life, as this trend is termed by some sociologists and jurists. As a matter of fact, these attempts are by themselves nothing more than a reflection of the aspirations of the monopolies to subordinate the state and use it to their ends. " To place the power of the state at the service of economic life is precisely what the essence of dirigism is," says Professor George Ripère in his work " Juridical Aspect of Capitalism ", published in 1946. " It attempts," Ripère continues, " to conciliate contradictory conceptions while retaining private enterprise and subordinating it at the same time to guidance " (p. 217). The attempts to subordinate, and so much the more to plan the economy of capitalist society encounters insurmountable difficulties of which Professor Ripère himself furnishes convincing proof. These attempts are of importance only in so much as they reflect the ambition of the monopolies to use the state organization in their own interests.

While recording the changes in the law of private property and contract in capitalist countries, Western jurists do not sufficiently disclose the initial cause of these changes, namely the transition of capitalism to the stage of monopoly capital domination, and represent these changes, I repeat, as the limitation or transformation of the right of private ownership. Noting the enlarged tasks and activities of the state bodies, which occur in the epoch of monopoly capital, they view these phenomena as an independent factor, without analysing the source, the transition of capitalism to the stage of imperialism, and ignoring the subordination of capitalist governments to monopolies, which has been manifested everywhere.

*   *   *

In the world of today there exist in the main two different types of law, the socialist type and the capitalist one, in the same way as there exist two different systems of economy, socialist economy and capitalist economy.

The international character of activities of the monopolies and their striving to penetrate into every corner of the world, without any regard for the independence and sovereignty of the countries in question, have brought into being the cosmopolitan idea of world law. This

idea covers up the onslaught of the most powerful imperialist countries on the independence of nations, and their striving to subordinate these nations to their rule. It is for this reason that suggestions are put forth and particularly stressed to create first and foremost a world state and law institutions : representative institutions, judicial organs, and a single government. All these plans are aimed at undermining the independence and sovereignty of nations and at subordinating the weaker countries to the mighty powers of the world.

International agreements, which determine the application of some or other norms of law to relations arising among citizens and organizations of various countries, are a most important way of establishing and consolidating economic ties and cultural exchange among countries. The experience of co-existence of socialist and capitalist countries has convincingly proved that agreement exchanges, made on the basis of strict reciprocity and sovereign equality of every country, open up long vistas for an extensive development of relations among these countries.

The Use of Law to Induce Social Change[1]

ARNOLD M. ROSE

(University of Minnesota)

Philosophers of the law have been so concerned with theories of the nature and origin of law that their studies have often failed to provide the progressive increment to knowledge without which scholarship soon ceases to be worthwhile. Sociologists, on the other hand, have been so cavalier in their observations of the law that they have produced even less that is worthwhile. A few anthropologists, like Adamson Hoebel,[2] have made significant studies of law in the so-called primitive societies, but their findings have yet to be paralleled by knowledge about law in the advanced cultures. In this paper we shall advance a theoretical sociological framework for the study of law in the advanced cultures as it relates to social change. It is a framework that looks forward to future research, and makes assumptions about the nature of law and of society not as proved generalizations but as useful premises to be extended or abandoned as later research verifies or disproves them.

Roscoe Pound has defined law as " social control through the systematic application of politically organized society ".[3] Every culture defines certain matters as of public concern and certain matters as subject to individual choice, even though the line between them may not be precise and may be changing. Law operates when the dominant power in the society pronounces the rules of behavior in the area of public concern and claims legitimacy for these rules. Law thus includes more than legislative statutes; it also includes executive orders, administrative rules, judicial precedents, and customary practices of law-enforcement bodies. If the society knows how to write its language, it usually writes its law, so that there can be common agreement at least as to the wording of the law. (Occasionally, advanced countries do not write all of their law, as in the case of the United Kingdom with regard to a large part of its " Constitution ").[4] Whether laws are written or not, the society contains certain individuals who are recognized as the proper ones to state, interpret, and apply the laws which have previously been formulated, and certain individuals who are recognized to be the proper ones, or the ones powerful enough, to formulate new laws. These two functions may be performed by the same individuals, but advanced democratic societies generally divide the functions—the former being the task of a specialized profession of judges and other law-enforcement officials, while the latter is assumed by the chief holders of the ultimate sources of power in the society.

A few other definitions relevant to the nature of society will be necessary preliminaries to the statement of our theoretical framework.[5]

A *culture* may be said to consist of " meanings " and " values " about which a certain number of people have common understandings.

1. The word " *meanings* " is used as equivalent to definitions such as would be found in dictionaries except that they are in our heads, and we act on the basis of them even if they do not quite always match what is in the dictionary. A meaning indicates how its referent is to be used, how it reacts if sensed or stimulated in certain ways, and all the other kinds of information about it which a good dictionary provides.

2. A " *value* " is an attitude held by an individual or group toward an object—material or non-material, " real " or " imaginary "— such that the object is esteemed, as something worthy of choice, so that in relation to the behavior of those who hold it the value has a " should " or " ought " quality. Negative values may also be recognized, for which the definition applies by adding a negative throughout.

In these terms, a law is an expression of a value held by a society, or by the dominant power in the society, and enforced in respect to the relevant behaviors of specified categories of the population. The law specifies a number of meanings, the most important of which distinguishes the behavior about which the value is expressed from all other behaviors. Criminal laws are usually expressions of negative values, but many kinds of laws express positive values.

A *society* is a number of people who bear a common culture, although there are sub-groups within the society who also have specialized subcultures. A society also has characteristic modes of interaction among its members, which allow them to act together, or at least to act with some reference to each other. Some sociologists have distinguished four modes of interaction, although it is conceivable that others may be discovered or that another classification of the modes of interaction may sometimes be found to be more useful.

1. A *traditional integrated group* mode of interaction occurs where the members of the society are acting toward one another in terms of common understandings of the meanings and values of the culture which each has learned from other members of the society.

2. An *audience* mode of interaction occurs where the members of the society are acting together in terms of similar understandings given to them individually by a single source, which may be called the *propagandist*.

3. A *public* mode of interaction occurs where the members of the society are acting together in terms of common understandings established by means of direct communication.

4. A *crowd* mode of interaction occurs where the members of the society are acting together in terms of similar feelings and physiological states.

Among the many propositions sociologists have discovered to be true of these four modes of interaction, two will concern us immediately: (1) While the crowd mode of interaction is practically the only one found in agglomerations of subhuman species of animals when they act together, it is found only occasionally and temporarily as the dominant mode of interaction among humans. Since it does not permit the establishment of laws, or even of conformity to laws when it is dominant, its chief relevance to the study of law consists of this fact. (2) While the audience and public modes of interaction can be dominant under certain circumstances, they presuppose some degree of the traditional integrated group mode of interaction to provide common understandings of at least certain cultural meanings necessary for communication. Thus the traditional integrated group mode of interaction may be regarded as basic to all human society, although obviously we do not follow the lead of some sociologists and anthropologists in regarding it as the sole mode of interaction. The law which is received, pronounced, interpreted, and applied by judges is always, by definition, an element in the culture of a society when it is acting as a traditional integrated group. When *new* laws are created, however, we find ourselves in either an audience or public mode of interaction among the lawmakers and between the law makers and the other members of the society.

Finally, we would define *social change* as modifications in the meanings and values held by the society or by important sub-groups in the society. This definition, like the preceding ones, assumes a high degree of relationship between observable behavior and mental states, in the language of which our definitions have been couched. (We cannot, obviously, take up here the complicated question of the relation between mind and body). Another assumption is that all parts of a culture are intricately related, although we need not go so far as the functionalists in conceiving of society as a vast and complicated machine in which each part has a necessary and specific relationship to every other part. By this inter-relationship we mean that a change in one part of the culture will usually result in one or more of a great many possible changes in other parts of the culture, and that a change in one part of the culture may[6] result from a change in one or several other parts of the culture. It should be noticed that we do not equate change with " progress ": Change can also be in a " negative " direction according to one's values. We also limit ourselves to a consideration of law's relationship to social change, but this does not in the least imply that law generally makes for social change or that changes in law are most closely related to general culture change. It is quite likely that law is more frequently a mere expression and a buttress of the existing social structure, and that social conditions other than law are more intimately related to social change. While it is quite probable that statutory law " lags " behind changes in other areas of life, we restrict our interest to the conditions under which legislation and judicial interpretation of law is more " advanced " than changes in other areas of life. Thus,

two questions are posed for us: (1) How do laws get changed?; (2) How do laws change other parts of the culture?

It is not the task of a sociologist to list the formal ways in which the societies of the world provide for changes in laws. The relevant task of the sociologist is to specify the social conditions under which laws are likely to be changed. We shall consider only those laws to which people conform and which are enforced in some significant degree. The first condition under which laws are changed is the exercise of force and the fear of force. Modern dictatorships make extensive use of force to create and to enforce new laws, of course, but even the most democratic state uses force and the threat of force with those who violate the democratically enacted law. It is to be noted that the use of force within a state and the " willingness " to accede to it are a function of the condition of society. We hypothesize that when the meanings and values of a culture are quite commonly accepted—which is a state of society which approximates the ideal types of either the public or the traditional integrated group—there is little intention or need on the part of the dominant power of the society to use force and little willingness on the part of the subordinate members of the society to accede to force.

A major apparent exception to this proposition occurs when the values of the culture themselves include a positive orientation toward force in certain respects. It is said, for example, that the Corsican custom of vendetta traditionally sanctions violence on the part of an extended family, one of whose members has been insulted or injured in a certain way, toward another extended family which includes as a member the alleged insulter or offender, and that the latter are expected to reciprocate the violence. Force is acceptable if the power of the state is accepted as legitimate, but if force is applied in the integrated group form of society for purposes or in ways that are contrary to the values of the culture, the state will no longer be regarded as legitimate. The exception is not particularly important for us, as the society which approximates the traditional integrated group is not disposed to change much (except insofar as events external to the culture force change), and force as a value in the culture is seldom invoked for the purpose of creating a new law.

Our general proposition is important, however, since it implies that it is to the extent that the society takes the form of an audience, that force can readily be used to change the meanings and values, including the laws. The audience mode of relationship is either imposed forcefully on a society by a certain sub-group in order to change the laws, or it is a result of a long process of slow disorganization of the society.[7] Large numbers of persons in our society live in an audience mode of relationship. Hence they will be passive receivers of almost any kind of new law, even if they think the law to be improper and objectionable, because opposition requires mutual support and organization while these people do not effectively communicate with anyone. These

members of our society who live as in an audience, however, do have a restraining effect on law as an instrument of social change in another way: Many of our laws require individual initiative to set the legal machinery for enforcement into operation, and audience members are too passive to do so, even when they favor the law and are unhappy when it is violated.

Force as a means of social change, however, must be regarded as marginal and of limited potentiality. Those who would change a culture by force are practically always themselves practitioners of that culture, and thus have limited perspective on possibilities for change. They are much more likely to use force for its own cultural value or to bolster their personal power and ego needs than to use it as a conscious instrument of social change. In the extreme case when the dominant mode of relationship is that of an audience, the society is disorganized anyway, and it is questionable to speak of social change in this state when there are few definite and widely accepted meanings and values to begin with. Nevertheless, the outside observer can see many striking changes of behavior among most members of an audience when force is used to modify the laws and require conformity to them. This is what happens when the modern dictatorships create drastic changes in their societies. Still, it must be recognised that revolutions usually make drastic changes by means of force. But they are able to do so under principles we have already considered: (1) the society is already significantly operating under the audience mode of interaction and so is open to controls, and means of exercising these controls, which any-one who seizes the propagandist's rôle would use; or (2) the former government is no longer recognized as legitimate by the masses of the people, and the revolutionary leadership successfully claims legitimacy for its use of force by announcing its basic adherence to the values of the culture which the overthrown government is believed to have flouted.

Sociologists have made many studies of the processes by which specific social changes occur, although seldom have they studied the changes in laws. They seem to have arrived at three general explanations, or theories, of social change: (1) the progressive cumulation of technolo-gical invention, (2) culture contact and conflict, and (3) the social move-ment. We cannot here go into the many ramifications of these theories, but shall have to confine ourselves to their probable relationship to laws. In all of them the law is a product rather than a cause of social change, and a relatively secondary or minor product at that. The technological theory, best expressed by William F. Ogburn,[8] considers mechanical invention the prime mover in social change since it tends to breed itself. Economic organization is regarded as the second link in the causal chain since men are primarily motivated toward the economic gain which is made possible by the technological change. Law is part of the super-structure of culture which merely reflects the technological and econ-omic base. In a less empirically based but more politically oriented

form, this of course is the theory of Marx. One difficulty of the theory is that it denies the fact that social change sometimes originates in law and ideology.

The culture contact and conflict theory, expounded by many anthropologists and sociologists, holds that innovation occurs only when two cultures come into contact, not only because of imitation and imposition, but also because the appearance of alternatives opens minds to all sorts of possibilities hitherto unrealized because of cultural blinders. To a certain extent at least, coming into contact with other cultures involves a shift from the integrated group mode of interaction to the public mode of interaction, and the latter is much more conducive to change than is the former. New laws, under this theory, can come from observation of the merits of the other culture (as the Japanese are said to have copied some Western laws after 1870), or from the observation of the absence of merit in the other culture. A major difficulty of the theory is that it explains so little that is specific in modern cultures since they are all in constant and intense culture contact and conflict.

The social movement theory, best expressed by Herbert Blumer,[9] is that some dissatisfaction with the existing culture gives rise to unrest which in turn gives rise to an increasingly organized attempt to change the culture. Very often the change takes the form of a new law, and thus new laws are conceived of as the major end products of social change. A significant difficulty of the theory is that it does not adequately explain the circumstances which gives rise to the dissatisfaction in the first place, or how the law gives rise to further changes in behavior and culture.

As indicated in the above remarks, law plays differing rôles in the three leading theories of social change, but in every one it is considered as an end-product, a result of change rather than a producer of change. I would suggest that this is contrary to observable fact, and results from the sociologist's failure to study the relationship between law and other aspects of social behavior. It is true, of course, that laws are seldom made without some preparation for them in public opinion and social structure, although this does actually happen in modern dictatorships to an extent which some sociologists have declared to be impossible. Let us grant that there is a period of preparation for social change, in which new common meanings and values develop, and that the forces molding this period of preparation are technological invention, culture contact, and minority social movements. Laws are enacted, and forward-looking court decisions are pronounced, often before the behavior envisaged by them is widely adopted throughout the society. Historians have noted that some laws are enacted when the older values are breaking down, and presumably represent an effort to buttress these values that no longer command the respect of a large segment of the population. Enacted statutes, and sometimes judicial decisions,[10] are capable of being used to hinder social change which would otherwise

occur because of other forces in the society. A complementary observation, of greater significance for the study of social change, is that when there is a trend toward the acceptance of a new value, the leaders of the society—who include the legislators, the judges, and the government executives—are likely to be among those early influenced by it,[11] and are likely to put it into law. Then the value has the sanction and the legitimacy of law, and it becomes more and more widely accepted and adopted in behavior. A great deal of law in our society is created by judges and administrative agencies and is not known even to many legislators. Not infrequently judges and administrators are, consciously or unconsciously, creators of social change through their power to interpret and mold the law by slow degrees, without the positive sanction of the majority of the people or of representative legislatures.

Americans, including American sociologists, are inclined to scoff at this proposition, and to cite the failure of the prohibition amendment, the law prohibiting the commercial manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors, as proof that laws cannot change the attitudes and behaviors of a society. But for every prohibition law that can be cited against the proposition, I can cite a dozen other laws that support it. Let me reiterate a suggestion for research that I first made several years ago.[12] There needs to be a comparative study of laws, emphasizing the pertinent conditions under which they are first enacted and their reception and enforcement among the masses of the people. The United States affords a unique opportunity to do such a study using the superior method of controlled field experimentation, since most laws are first adopted separately by one or two of the forty-eight states and gradually are adopted by many of the others and perhaps by the federal government. American sociologists have ardently praised the method of controlled field experimentation, but have scarcely taken advantage of this unique opportunity to employ the method.

It was Gunnar Myrdal, the Swedish social scientist, who first pointed out the discrepancy in American culture between higher ideals and everyday behavior.[13] In its general form, this proposition would be true of any culture, and even when giving the higher ideals the specific content of democratic values it would still be true for at least many of the Western nations. Sometimes the higher ideals are in conflict among themselves, which Myrdal did not discuss, and at least one such case is particularly pertinent to the understanding of Western law: There is, in Western democratic cultures at least, an accepted value endorsing majority rule and another accepted value limiting it. It is essential, of course, for any political democracy to endorse and practice majority rule, and our Western democratic cultures accept it for the election of political leaders. But they also have the value that there is a significant area of individual freedom which governments should not invade. Voltaire could even have been speaking for modern democratic government when he said " I do not agree with what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it ". This value has been

extended in the United States to a defense of minority rights, although Voltaire probably would not have favored such an extension.[14]   If individuals have certain rights independent of the state, they can expect recognition of these rights when they form into groups or categories. It is on this value, I believe, that minority rights are defended in the United States.

An important but curious evidence of the simultaneous acceptance of the values of majority rule and minority rights can be seen in the public reaction to President Franklin Roosevelt's efforts to " pack " the Supreme Court in 1937.   Roosevelt was undoubtedly one of the most popular presidents in recent times, and most of his legislative measures seemingly had the strong support of the majority of the people.   Yet a good number of the new laws were declared invalid by the " nine old men " on the Supreme Court, all of whom had been appointed by previous Republican presidents and had life tenure and many of whom had openly acknowledged their allegiance to a now-unpopular social and economic philosophy.   After some four years of rebuff by the Court, Roosevelt felt he could save his legislative program only by making additional appointments to the Court and he sought legislative permission to do so.   While there was widespread criticism of what the Court had done, and none of Roosevelt's opponents on the Court had a personal following among the people or among the Congressmen, there was a strong protest against Roosevelt's attack on the Court as an institution, and he suffered his first major legislative defeat.[15]   The basis of support for the Court was, in part, a sentimental respect for a traditional institution, but it was also a widespread belief that the Court must be maintained as a protector of minority rights against the majority.   The incident was a clear and significant illustration of the simultaneous holding of two apparently opposed popular values—for majority rule and for protection of the rights of minorities—by the bulk of the American people.

Thus, the law and law-enforcement institutions are protectors of minority groups and as such are protectors of innovators.   Whether social change comes from the adoption of a new technology, of elements of an alien culture, or of the goals of a reform or revolutionary movement, there is always a section of the society—a minority group—which adopts the change first and then by example or influence, passes it along gradually to other members of the society.   It is the law which, in Western culture, permits the innovator to function.   To realise the importance of this fact in our society, we have to compare it with the situation which prevails in societies where the law does not express the social value of individual freedom and minority rights.   In most of the pre-literate cultures, law seems to express only the demands of the society on the individual; law protects the society from the individual but not the individual from the society.   In such a situation, innovation is not only not aided by the law but is often suppressed by the law.   Innovation can come only as a result of the weakening of social

values and social bonds, often as a result of essentially *illegal* activity. In the modern dictatorship, the law is an instrument to gain conformity from the masses to the will of the leaders of the state. Social change may be directed by these leaders and the law is usually one of their instruments for achieving it, but this always involves a social change that is planned for, never one that arises spontaneously from the needs and the experiences of people. An important source of innovation and social change is thus inevitably stifled by the modern dictatorship.

Western democracies, however, do not rely solely on innovations introduced by minority groups under the protection of laws safeguarding individual freedom as a source of social change. They also use planning and law as an instrument to translate the plan into social reality. Sociologists and perhaps the public generally are still prone to think of the law as a repressive force, as criminal law, when actually the great bulk of contemporary legislation consists of positive acts to make certain social changes possible. Quite often these laws contain no clauses providing sanctions against nonconformity; they simply set up certain facilities or provide funds and expert personnel to be used by any citizen who wishes to participate in the activity which the legislation envisages as desirable. Participation by the individual citizen under these circumstances is a voluntary matter, and he need consult only his own interests to join in an activity which may result in far-reaching social changes. Even if the majority of the members of the society were opposed to joining personally in this activity, they might still be willing to see a law enacted making it possible for a minority to participate. It sometimes occurs that the majority—observing the benefits accruing to the minority by participating in the activity—themselves choose to take advantage of the opportunities provided by the law, and the social change has thereby become much more pervasive.

In democracies where there is a strong tradition of local government—notably Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States—laws may be effectuated by local majorities to govern themselves even when the great bulk of the country is opposed to such laws. Many of the most important reforms in the United States were enacted by certain states and cities long before they had any chance of acceptance by the rest of the nation. Foreign visitors who probe beneath the surface standardization in American life are often startled to discern the great variety of local experiments in social change in various corners of the country. Even socialism, supposedly taboo in a nation devoted to free enterprise, is not unknown in some of the states which have large numbers of descendants of Scandinavian immigrants. Sometimes these experiments prove successful in the eyes of those Americans who have not adopted them, and they spread from one state to the next until the whole country has adopted laws to compel their acceptance. The nineteenth century saw this occuring for legislation providing, for example, for compulsory education, compensation for industrial

accidents, and restrictions on child labor. The twentieth century is now seeing it go on in regard to legislation providing for non-discrimination in employment and the scientific treatment of the mentally ill.

Equally important, in democratic society, is the direction given to social change by the minority of the population consisting of the political leaders and the leaders of communication. If the society is operating dominantly in terms of the *audience* mode of interaction, they provide direct control of social change through legislation and propaganda favourable to the legislation. In the long run they may abuse their power for their personal advantage, but in the short run the diversity and opposition of interests among them may keep the changes in line with the whole society's needs. If the society is operating dominantly in terms of the *public* mode of interaction, the political and communications leaders serve as originators and disseminators of new ideas. If these ideas are in accord with the higher ideals of the society, as they often are, the leaders who propagate them can evoke a public opinion favorable to the enactment and enforcement of laws embodying the ideas, even though current customs of the masses are not in conformity with them. In pluralistic modern democratic society—in which people tend to belong to many groups and publics—an innovation in law is typically met with by a variety of reactions; some are favorable, but most are indifferent or only mildly hostile. If the majority of opinion leaders are behind the change, the opposition remains a minority and most of the people gradually accommodate themselves to the change. This is perhaps the most important way by which laws create social changes in a democracy.

The question as to whether law can change behavior may be considered in a broader context. Social causation is seldom a direct one-to-one relationship; it is much more often a multi-variable interaction in which effect reacts back on cause and modifies it just as cause creates effect. One of the best descriptions of this process is that by Myrdal, who calls it " dynamic cumulative causation " or " the vicious circle mechanism ".[16] We cannot assume from this principle, however, that there is any direct or immediate carryover from changes made in one area of life into other areas of life. Studies showing changes in attitudes toward minorities created by legal or other policies affecting one institutional setting do not show equivalent changes in attitudes in other institutional settings.[17].

For reasons we have already examined, there is a better chance that law will receive an initial push than public opinion or many basic social institutions, although this is not always true. New laws, because they have force and prestige behind them, are more likely to reach and affect a larger number of citizens quickly than are other institutions. Laws generally control behavior where it may be readily observable, less often do laws seek to control behavior in purely private situations such as the home, and still less often do they seek to control attitudes. Thus, laws are more likely to achieve changes in what may be called " external

behavior ".   However, changes in external behavior are, after a period of time, usually followed by changes in attitude.

That the change in attitude is only partial and not whole-hearted at first does not make it any the less a change.   There are no laws, and very few customs, that have complete and whole-hearted acceptance, and enforcement is always a matter of degree.   Attitudes toward laws, like attitudes towards any social object, are neither monolithic nor dichotomous, but reflect different distributions covering a wide range. Poll data show that when an opinion is not solidly structured, the passage of a law on the subject of the opinion gains it immediately about 10 per cent. of the population in the direction of acceptance.[18]   Increasing enforcement tends to shift the opinion farther along, as people have a tendency to adjust their opinions to their behavior—in other words, to rationalize what they must do.[19]   People always fear and resist new situations somewhat, especially those that come upon them suddenly such as those created by the rendering of a court decision.   But the majority very quickly finds new directions for behavior, new securities, new meanings and values, in the new situation.

All this should not lead us to exaggerate what law can do.   Legislators in a political democracy can step far ahead of their constituencies only when the issue is too minor for the constituencies to be aware of or concerned about it, or when they expect that the opinion of the majority of their constituency will have caught up with them before the next election.   The deviations of legislators from the majority of their constituency is not always in the direction of the trend of social change but may actually be " reactionary " in the literal sense, as is well known. Judges and administrators are limited in several additional ways in effectuating social change, as Frank and Maslow point out: (1) legal and administrative procedure is slow and often cumbersome with red tape; (2) it is limited to the instant case; (3) it is subject to circumlocution—to devices for appearing to comply with orders without actually doing it; (4) it is limited by fear—whether based on good estimation or not—that the orders " may be publicly and contemptuously disregarded ".[20]   We have given cursory attention to other factors reducing the influence of law on general social change: (1) the demagogues, whether sincere or not, can sometimes gain more influence over the passive masses of people than can the prestige of the law and of society's leaders; (2) there seems to be little carryover from changes resulting from a law governing one area of human behavior to other areas of behavior; (3) there exists a minority of persons, who have been studied under the label of " authoritarian personalities ",[21] who resist change in any form.

Democratic societies are mostly law-abiding, and they provide a variety of means for changing the law.   Under these two conditions, and under other conditions which we have examined in the course of this paper, it can be expected that law would be a major means of effecting social change.   The exact process by which this occurs—

namely, the relation of the abstract law to individual behavior—needs to be further investigated.

NOTES

[1] This paper was prepared while the author was working under a research grant from the Rockefeller Foundation.

[2] E. Adamson Hoebel, *The Law of Primitive Man: A Study in Comparative Legal Dynamics* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954).

[3] Quoted by A. R. Radcliffe Brown, " Primitive Law ", *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. IX (New York: Macmillan, 1933), p. 202.

[4] W. Ivor Jennings, *The Law and the Constitution* (London: University of London Press, 4th edition, 1952).

[5] For some background and fuller exposition of these concepts, see my *Theory and Method in the Social Sciences* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1954), chapters 1 and 2.

[6] We use the possibilistic form of expression here as social change may also result from physical and biological events completely external to the culture.

[7] I have attempted elsewhere to specify the historical conditions leading to the audience form of modern society. See chapter 2 of my *Theory and Method in the Social Sciences, op. cit.*

[8] *Social Change* (New York: B. W. Huebsch, 1922).

[9] " Collective Behavior " in Alfred M. Lee (ed.), *New Outline of the Principles of Sociology* (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1946), pp. 185–193.

[10] The power of American courts to declare duly enacted statutes " unconstitutional " is a major means of retarding social change in the United States.

[11] This statement probably should be limited to American society, since the positive correlations between class, education, and progressive attitudes may not be true everywhere else.

[12] Arnold M. Rose, " Needed Research on the Mediation of Labor Disputes ", *Personnel Psychology*, vol. V, (Autumn, 1952), 187–200. Also see: Arnold M. Rose, " Problems in the Sociology of Law and Law Enforcement ", *Journal of Legal Education*, vol. VI (no. 2, 1953), 191–202.

[13] Gunnar Myrdal, with the assistance of Richard Sterner and Arnold Rose, *An American Dilemma* (New York: Harper, 1944), esp. chapter 1.

[14] Voltaire was opposed to group interests which intervened between those of the government and those of the individual, for the groups he was able to observe—the guilds and the religious *congregations*—deprived the individual of his rights. He is quoted as saying " When society is well governed, there is no need for private associations " (*Larousse du XXᵉ Siecle* [Paris: Librarie Larousse, 1928], vol. I, 396; my translation).

[15] It was not a complete defeat, however, since some of the anti-Roosevelt members of the Court offered to resign so as to permit the President to appoint new judges who would be more favorable to his policies.

[16] *op. cit.*, p. 1067.

[17] For evidence, see Dietrich C. Reitzes, " Collective Factors in Race Relations ", unpublished Ph.D thesis, University of Chicago, 1950; Arnold M. Rose, *Union Solidarity* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1952), chapter V; John Hope III, unpublished study of Packinghouse Workers union, Fisk University, 1952; *Journal of Social Issues*, vol. VIII, no. 1 (1952) and vol. IX, no. 1 (1953).

[18] Hadley Cantril, *et al.*, *Gauging Public Opinion* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944), p. 228.

[19] See, for example, the interesting study by Gerhart Saenger and Emily Gilbert, " Customer Reactions to the Integration of Negro Sales Personnel ", *International Journal of Opinion and Attitude Research*, vol. IV (1st issue, 1950), 57–76.

[20] John P. Frank, with comment by Will Maslow, " Can the Courts Erase the Color Line ", *Journal of Negro Education* (Summer, 1952), 304–316.

[21] T. W. Adorno, *et al.*, *The Authoritarian Personality* (New York: Harper, 1950).

Changing Social Control in a Bengal City

(The " Mahalla Sardars " and " Panchayats " of Dacca, East Pakistan)

A. N. J. den Hollander

(Professor of Sociology, University of Amsterdam)

In Dacca, since the Partition of 1947 the capital of East Pakistan, can be found the remains of a curious neighbourhood organization that must once have been important for the Muslims of the city. Little is left of the institution. During the author's stay of seven months in Dacca (1952–53), for a different purpose, it proved difficult to gain a clear and complete picture of past and present functions of the organization. The description offered here is based on interviews with local people in various walks of life. In the absence of archive materials the method used was the only feasible one. It has obvious shortcomings. Those of the interviewees who could understand and speak English were more or less marginal to their own culture. In some interviews a Bengali interpreter was used whose questions and reported answers the author could not check. On the whole it was surprising how inadequately informed most of the people questioned were, and how quickly and completely many things of the past had been forgotten. Nor could even Oriental courtesy and patience on the part of the interviewees leave the author the illusion that any one of those questioned shared his interest and did not consider the conversation a waste of time.

* * *

For administrative purposes Dacca is divided into seven wards. Better known by the inhabitants is the division in *mahallas* or *tolas*, neighbourhoods with sharply defined boundaries that are generally known. The Muslims in each one of those mahallas used to be organized in a *panchayat ;* in many mahallas they still are more or less so organized. The purpose of the panchayat organization must have been to maintain peace and order among the Muslims of the mahalla, to punish misbehaviour and petty crime, to mediate, to prevent as much as possible intervention by the police and the official lawcourts, to render mutual aid and to take care of festive occasions.

The village panchayats of India and Pakistan are well-known, as are the panchayats of Hindu castes. Governing bodies called " panchayats " were known by several Muslim occupational groups of low descent having caste-like traits in Bengal. Although the resemblance between the functions of these panchayats and those in the mahallas of Dacca is evident, an important difference is, that Dacca's

panchayats are (or were) territorial organizations, comprising all Muslims of the neighbourhood with the occasional exception of the most prominent and wealthy. The urban neighbourhood organization of Dacca is probably unique in the sub-continent, although the author admits that his knowledge at this point is not conclusive.

When the institution was still flourishing, the traditional Dacca panchayat was governed by a council of five elected members, experienced elderly men of good reputation (*panch laeq birader*). The *sardar*, the governing head of the panchayat, was likewise elected by general vote of the mahalla, although in some panchayats the office of sardar had become hereditary. There are sardas now in Dacca who are sons or grandsons of sardars. However, election seems to have been the rule.

The sardar had to preside over all meetings of the council or of the entire panchayat. He had to attend all marriages in his mahalla and to assist with the marriage arrangements between the families concerned. He had to concern himself also with all burials. He helped those who wanted to present a petition to the authorities. Sources of revenue of the panchayat were the entrance fees from new members, fees paid by the bridegroom to the panchayat of his bride (*panchayat raqam*) as well as those paid by him for the upkeep of the mosques of her mahalla (*haqq-allah*). Then there were the fines paid by those the sardar and his council had found guilty of misbehaviour. Civil suits could be brought before the panchayat council, including rather serious crimes considered " compoundable ". Such sessions usually took place in the panchayat *bangla* on Thursday evenings. Parties and witnesses were heard, any panchayat member could speak up, voice his opinion, and the sardar pronounced sentence. The panchayat system provided justice quickly, inexpensively and democratically.

The offender or civil parties had to accept the decision of the sardar unconditionally. Ignoring his sentence could be punished, after due warning, by *bund:* excommunication of the recalcitrant member by his panchayat. The members formed a closed community. Everyone had daily contacts with many other panchayat members. Life depended to a much larger extent on the goodwill of others than in a modern city. During daytime the men lived and worked almost without exception outside their dwellings. General poverty prevented almost everyone from being independent. Under such circumstances bund was an unbearable punishment. As one informant put it : " it meant being dead whilst living ". The sardar whose authority had been challenged informed the other sardars of Dacca and unless the offender left the city, he had to give in. If, at a special gathering of his panchayat, a large majority voted for his readmittance, he could resume normal life.

One could appeal from the decision of one's sardar to the general assembly of the 133 sardars in Dacca, at least after the two traditional sections of the Bengal speaking " Bara " panchayats and the Urdu speaking " Bais " panchayats had been united in 1907.

E

Available data would allow a more detailed account of the old panchayat system than can be given here. Mention could be made of the fate of the sardar found guilty of a crime, of the ingenious decisions of famous sardars, the originality of the punishments they meted out, recounted with glee in mosques and suks all over Dacca. The picturesque figure of the *gurid*, the messenger of the panchayat, would merit description; the controlling force of *tashhir*, being exposed to public shame and derision; the nomination of *salwati*, honorary members of the panchayat ; the function of the bangla as a community centre ; the rôle of the panchayats at Muslim festivals, especially *Muharram* and *Fatiha-i-Dowaz-dahum ;* the recital on Fatiha, by panchayats, of *Mowlud* (Praise of the Prophet) on Chowk Bazar. Some contours of the ancient institution come out fairly clearly in the jig-saw puzzle one can piece together from the stray bits of information. Other lines remain blurred. Some aspects of the old system pose questions that have to remain unanswered.

The panchayats seem to have been flourishing during the reign of the father of the present Nawab of Dacca. This " prince ", a figure of feudal origin, enjoying traditional power and prestige, was of old the first and largest of the zemindars. He owned extensive property in Dacca, had to collect taxes and possessed executive power. His title was highly respected. His semi-feudal rights assured him considerable influence in the affairs of Dacca and adjacent districts. To-day his wealth and power have declined and his position is becoming anachronistic, but he is still a most prominent man.

The grandfather of the present Nawab established a " charity estate " for the care of needy panchayat members, the distribution of food and sweets, the illumination of streets on festive occasions. According to several informants, the active interest in the panchayats on the part of the grandfather and the father of the present Nawab increased the political power of the prince. A brother of the present Nawab told the author : " He ran the town. The sardars were a tremendous political instrument for the power of the Nawab against the British. No case ever went to the British courts."

However this may have been, it is certain that the former Nawab attempted a reform of the panchayat system. There is a curious brochure, written by Khan Saheb Khwaja Mohamed Azam, published probably about 1910, describing the innovations the Nawab intended to bring about at the time. Among these were the nomination of a " Superintendent of Panchayats ", Mohamed Azam, who wrote the pamphlet, in praise of the wise Nawab Salimollah and his reform which aimed at a more efficient organization and administration of Dacca's panchayat system.

No one in Dacca could tell the author anything about these changes. They probably remained a dead letter. It is clear that later the panchayats declined. The process cannot be traced. The old Nawab died in 1915. His son, according to his grandson, showed less interest

in politics and did not continue control of the panchayats. The " charity fund " disappeared, the Fatiha festival is no longer subsidized. There still are sardars in many mahallas but they have lost much of their prestige and power. There still are banglas where Muslims gather in the evening. Some sardars still mediate in their neighbourhood but formal interference by police and the courts has become the rule in criminal cases, although families still frequently succeed in reaching settlements out of court. In not a few quarters of Dacca sardars have retained influence in keeping their mahallas quiet in periods of tension. It is said that they contributed to the prevention of riots and Hindu persecution in Dacca in the years 1946–48. One magistrate stated that attempts to organize protection against air raids in Dacca during World War II were unsuccessful because the authorities had failed to consult the sardars. On the whole the sardars do not render any liasion service to the government any more.

The present authorities do not consider the panchayats, or what remains of them, important. The official attitude is one of indifference. Of the new administrative élite few had ever heard of the organization. It should be stated that many, if not most of the government officials questioned came from elsewhere, frequently from West Pakistan. A magistrate of local antecedents, whose family had long resided in the old part of the city, described the present sardars as old, ignorant, frequently corrupt persons, shrewd, quaint figures who provide for themselves in doubtful ways. They are said to have contacts with the local underworld, to act as informers to the police, besides doing an occasional bit of blackmailing. There still is a good deal of mutual help in the mahallas, but this is only what commonly can be found in the poorer parts of any Eastern city. It is no longer organized and supervised by the panchayats. Dacca now has professional Muslim gravediggers and bodywashers, occupations that were reputedly unknown in former times.

ᘓ   ᘓ   ∗

How should we comprehend this rapid disintegration of an institution that must once have been strongly established in Dacca ? Again, concrete data as to the process of decline are largely lacking. Still, circumstantial evidence allows a fairly good idea, that probably is not far from the truth.

Nothing is known about the origin of Dacca's panchayats. From the beginning their aim must have been to provide mutual assistance and protection and by self help to prevent interference by powerful outsiders. The first Muslim group in Bengal constituted a weak minority of very humble people, converts from the lower Hindu casts or outcasts. This " explanation " fails to account for the absence of similar Muslim organizations in other Bengal towns. Any sociologist is well acquainted with this " problem of the negative "; the author has no solution to offer.

The Dacca panchayats realized a Muslim ideal : living like " brothers " in small, closely knit communities of their own in voluntary submittance to *ijmā'*, the consensus of the local group considered infallible by orthodox Islam. Islam was always more than a religion; it intends to pervade the social, economical, political sphere. The Dacca panchayats illustrate how real self-government and absence of power as a problem perhaps are possible only for small groups. In Dacca these groups were extremely poor. Contributions and fines decided upon by the panchayats are a matter of a few rupees. Poor artisans, shopkeepers, hucksters, coolies, boatmen, carters, mosque attendants, servants, beggars, storytellers inhabited the mahallas. Left to itself, such a milieu knows little social change. Everywhere in the world poor people cling with desperate conservatism to existing securities and provisions. From these they will not depart till they see clearly where change will bring them. Meanwhile they just try to maintain themselves, leaning on each other, subordinating the individual. This faculty of Muslim groups in diaspora is well-known. " S'il s'agit de groupes musulmanes exilés hors de la terre d'Islam, on peut dire que l'entraide devient alors totale, jusqu'à l'héroisme au besoin." (Louis Gardet, " La Cité Musulmane," 1954, p. 236.)

In its desire to pervade the whole culture Islam does not differ from other world religions. It could continue doing so in the Muslim world, because this world changed so little. As long as Dacca was a quiet provincial town the panchayat system could remain what it was and wanted to be : an efficient institution for maintaining the quiet, never ceasing discipline over everybody by everybody, so general in the East and so different from social control in a Western city.

But change came to Dacca. Its population has increased from 90,542 in 1900 to more than a half million in the present urban conglomerate. The partition of Bengal in 1905 made Dacca a provincial capital. After this partition was undone, World War I brought commotion. In 1922 a university was established in Dacca. North of the railway a new section, Ramna, was developed, with government offices, university buildings, dwellings of officials, professors, wealthy businessmen. Ramna never had panchayats. Then came the unrest when the British left, and secession from India. Overnight Dacca became the capital of a province of more than 40 million people. For this region Dacca took over several of the economic functions Calcutta had performed thus far. The population of Dacca increased rapidly. Its composition changed. Tens of thousands of Hindus fled. Muslim refugees from West Bengal flocked to the city. Before Partition Dacca's trade centre was preponderantly Hindu ; it is now filled by Muslim refugees, with the exception of enclaves like *Sakaripukti*, the Street of Shellworkers.

The " cottage industries " of East Bengal, producing with extremely simple techniques textiles, mother-of-pearl buttons, fans, sandals and such products, have been declining sharply since World War II,

swelling the stream of rural migrants to the city. Dacca has needed considerably unskilled and trained labour. Some industry has developed in Tejgaon. There are other, less evident " pull " factors. The new government offices, the university, the railway station, the airport, business offices, etc., need personnel, unnecessarily numerous according to Western standards. The families of middle class people employ numerous servants : bearers, sweepers, ayahs, watercarriers, chauffeurs, gardeners, watchmen. Subtle status considerations are frequently involved. The output of work per capita is small, the tempo is universally low. An office peon may actually work one or two hours a day, yet he will be fully employed, eight or ten hours a day. Typing a letter may easily take a " qualified typist " one hour or longer, if he does it correctly the first time. The level of expectation on the part of the employers conforms to the habitual achievement level of employees. Low standards of achievement, together with low standards of living explain why in Asia the emergence of even moderate employment opportunities causes a much larger displacement of people than in the West. The size of the movement is again enlarged because, in Asia not less than in the West, a city provides living possibilities for many " extras ". Dacca has many inhabitants whose existence remains enigmatic. Numerous rickshaw coolies seem to be able to earn enough to subsist on. Shoeshine boys, hucksters of cigarettes and pān leaves manage to live on earnings that cannot exceed a few rupees a day. Beggars do not reach this income. Yet, the cost of living is high in Dacca. How all these people exist is puzzling, but they are there. With their dependents such occupationally marginal people count many thousands. They manage somehow, a numerous fringe hanging on to the more or less regularly employed.

It is not difficult to imagine what recent trends did to the traditional panchayat system. The numerous newcomers cared little for it. The panchayat sanctions had no grip on them, dependent as they were on a low degree of spatial mobility. Mentally the refugee is little inclined to conform readily to existing institutions lacking formal power of enforcement. He may do so because he is aware of his weakness or because he is eager to be accepted. Essentially however his attitude will be opportunistic. He does not share the traditions of the new place. After some time the feelings of pity on the part of the receiving group are apt to change into negative sentiments. The refugee irritates. He is considered unscrupulous, he is less concerned about public opinion, rationalizes that he cannot afford to bother too much about it. Besides he is not certain that he will stay. Frequently refugees have more ready capital than local people, because they sold everything they owned before leaving. In Dacca they gave offence by opening shops without bothering about local prices. They were uprooted, fearful, bewildered, embittered, resentful. Their arrival in large numbers must have dislocated the social framework in the tranquil mahallas of old Dacca,

Since Partition the Muslims of Dacca are citizens of a Muslim State. The Hindu zemindars have been expropriated; most of them left for India. There is less need for a self help organization of socially weak Muslims. Their informal neighbourhood self-government is out of place in a state that aims to provide a modern administration, concerning itself more directly and formally with more affairs than the colonial administration of the past cared to do.

Departure of many Hindus offered opportunities to young Muslims, from the numerous B.A.'s and " failed B.A.'s " down to the just-literate, to all of whom employment possibilities were opened by the government bureaus, customs, army, police, railways, river transport, postal service and banks. Even without the creation of a new state a shift would have occurred in the relative position of the generations because society had begun to move. The authority of the old in Dacca was based on their knowledge of " how it had always been done ", their familiarity with much and with many, their scarcity caused by a high death rate. Old age has been devaluated, in Dacca as elsewhere in the East. Improving health conditions have decreased the rarity value of the aged. Most people in Dacca are poor, dependent on children and nephews. Some prosperity, at least some cash income, counts considerably in modern Dacca. Urban experience is important for success. The present criteria of esteem and status symbols differ from what they used to be. " The people of Dacca have become more sophisticated ", the District Magistrate stated.

The remaining sardars enjoy little respect from the young generation. Only those who possess considerable moral authority in their neighbourhoods, still make themselves felt. The young people now are frequently able to read and to write. They shrug their shoulders when discussing the ignorant, shabby sardar, whose services they do not need, whose knowledge of traditional ways and means becomes irrelevant when the norms of the past are rejected. The educated and semi-educated youth generally consider themselves bearers and exponents *par excellence* of the national spirit, and, since Pakistan's independence, also of regional sentiments and sensitivities. During the language riots of February 1952 the mahallas of old Dacca remained quiet. Their inhabitants seemed little concerned about the position of Bengali in the new State. The students revolted, in Ramna. They went on strike and demonstrated in the spring of 1953. On one occasion, shortly after Partition, they almost overthrew the existing provincial government, according to reports.

Young people are active in non-political issues in most of the old mahallas. They have started clubs that perform many of the functions the old panchayat used to take care of. Such clubs are especially prominent in Wards 2 and 7. They make their own rules. The president is invariably a young man. He will try to retain the cooperation and a certain patronage of the sardar, but the old man exerts no real influence. Members of the club do gymnastics, play cards, buy books,

visit the movies in groups, organize boat trips, try to keep undesirable persons away. All this the panchayat would have taken care of formerly.

Increased spatial mobility impairs consciousness and recognition of social distance. The younger people dress differently from the older ones, favour coloured bush shirts, jackets and pyjamas of modern textiles, tightly fitting pants and shining shoes. They covet a wrist watch, a fountain pen, sun glasses, despise the traditional *longi* and sandals. Thus they symbolise their rejection of the old prestige hierarchy. Dress in Dacca as elsewhere affords a means of expressing status. Older people are annoyed by this divergent behaviour of the young, object to the nonchalant manner in which older people are now greeted by young relations and neighbours. Social etiquette suffers in the hurry and bustle of modern city traffic, the crowds in front of movie theatres, at bus stops, in railway stations.

The factors mentioned have not completely upset the traditional social structure and social atmosphere in Dacca. For the alien observer, Dacca outside its business districts is still semi-rural. Yet, a more " urban " mentality is arising that old Dacca did not know. Spatial and social mobility, heterogeneity, anonimity, instability, insecurity are on the increase. The relations between people comprise less than formerly their entire personalities, tend to become more transitory, segmentary, utilitarian, rational. Tradition is losing ground, social control is exercised increasingly by formal means. All this tends to lessen the importance of local belonging. The place of residence and the place of work of many are now separated ; much more frequently so than used to be. Money wages and salaries reorient interests and human relations, directing them away from the neighbourhood, again decreasing the local " sense of belonging ".

These changes have by no means gone so far that one could call Dacca a " city " in the Western sense of the word. But Dacca is definitely not what it used to be a few decades ago. Interviews with middle-aged and old people clearly brought out their consciousness of change. In this respect, sufficient evidence remained after discounting the normal disgruntlement of old age. It is partly from interpretation of such material that the picture presented here has been drawn. The trends mentioned here cannot be proved, statistically or otherwise. Essentially all this remains largely a matter of interpretation and opinion. It also means that the conceptual equipment of the author, his previous experience and findings in comparable situations, may have directed his perception. This is readily admitted. Trying to discover the causes of the decline of the panchayats, a fair degree of general probability is about all one can obtain. Still the surmise seems justified that accelerated social change disrupted the ancient institution and deprived it of its main function, social regulation.

The Basic Principles of Morals in Soviet Society

A. F. Shishkin

(Professor, Moscow Philosophical Institute, Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R.)

Morals or ethics constitute one of the forms of social consciousness. Moral standards and rules express the requirements of a society or of a certain community with regard to the conduct of an individual towards the society (as well as towards the Motherland, the state, a certain class etc.) and towards other members of society. History tells that people's concepts of morals, the principles and standards of their conduct are determined by their social status in a given society and change with every new epoch following the changes in economic relations. A progress in morals is one of the aspects of general social progress. The main basis of this progress is the productive labour activities of the popular masses, their struggle for their liberation from the social yoke.

The great social and economic changes brought about in the U.S.S.R. such as the establishment of public property in the means of production, the abolition of exploitation of man by man, signified the victory of a new social system, the prerequisites of which had been ripening within the framework of the old society. In the course of the struggle for the new social system, in the course of the up-building of the new society the people themselves were changing too, as well as their moral concepts and standards of conduct. The new morality characteristic of the Soviet society is a natural result of the moral development of humanity.

The development of public property in the means of production signified the establishment of collective principles in the life of the society. The Soviet social system has created the conditions necessary for a rational combination of personal and social interests. The personal interests or requirements of the working people are the better satisfied the more each individual is concerned about the public interests and the more efficiently he works for the benefit of the socialist economy. The rational application of the principles of socialist ways of economic management and in particular the principle of personal material interests, as well as the systematic educational activities conducted by the Soviet state and the Soviet public organizations, train each working individual to be concerned about public interests, to combine his personal interests with public interests and to regard the struggle for public interests as his chief interest, his moral duty. In accordance with

that, the moral concepts of Soviet society and the conduct of the Soviet people are permeated with a collective spirit expressing the solidarity of the people in their struggle for common welfare and their devotion to the public interests.

The education of the people in accordance with the collective spirit does not to any extent mean the suppression of personality. The socialist country which created all the conditions for the development of the collective spirit, for a close contact between each individual and society, thereby created conditions for the development of personality. Talents and abilities, formerly suppressed, have been given extensive opportunities for development in all fields of technology, science and culture. Never before in the history of our country have the workers and peasants displayed such a thirst for knowledge, such readiness to master all the achievements of world culture, such creative daring and such striving for the continuous advancement of science and technology as at the present time. That is a vivid proof of the flourishing of the individual in very broad masses of working people who formerly had no access to science and culture. But an individual reared by the Soviet system does not place himself above others, above the masses, does not consider himself to be exceptional. The individual realizes that he owes his accomplishments to society and is inseparable from it. The individual considers his service for the benefit of the public cause as his supreme moral duty.

The most advanced philosophers of humanity who expressed the interests of the broad masses struggling for freedom taught people to be primarily concerned about public welfare. Baruch Spinoza, the great Dutch philosopher, who regarded cognition of nature as a supreme human virtue, combined it with public interests and social progress. Claude Adrian Helvetius, an outstanding representative of French enlightenment, regarded service for the benefit of common welfare as a supreme virtue. Proceeding from the principle that personal interest is the motive for human conduct—a principle issuing from the concept of personal interest as constant and independent of the social conditions, and which reflected the relations of the growing bourgeois society—he insisted on the adaptation of personal interests to public ones by issuing rational laws and by education. Nikolai Chernishevsky, a distinguished representative of Russian classical philosophy, an irreconcilable enemy of despotism and serfdom, taught all honest people to subject personal interests to the struggle for the interests of people. " It would be better if an individual did not advance at all rather than advance without the priority of his concern for a social cause ", wrote Chernishevsky. " Should ideas and motives directed towards the welfare of society, that is, the civil motives, be excluded from the orbit of my observations, from the sphere of activities where I move, what would there be left for me to observe ? " he asks further, " What would remain for me to take part in ? There would remain for me a fussy bustle of separate individuals with their narrow

petty personal cares about their pockets, their bellies and their amusements . . ."

But to enable not only separate individuals but the broad working masses to live by wide public interests it was not sufficient to have good wishes alone, nor to have good laws, education and the like. What was necessary was the remodelling of society on the basis of public property in the means of production; and the advanced philosophers of the past, due to the conditions of their time, either could not even conceive such ideas or had only very vague Utopian ideas. The social changes which took place in the 20th century resulted in the formation of such a kind of society in the U.S.S.R. The People's Democracies in Europe and Asia also took the path of socialist construction.

In educating the people in the spirit of devotion to public interests, Soviet morality gives priority to the idea of public duty. However, the idea of duty in Soviet ethics has a meaning different from that implied in many old-time ethical conceptions, for instance, that of Immanuel Kant.

The defect of old ethical conceptions of social duty was that they included an abstract conception of "eternal" duty, a conception lacking concrete historical content. Therefore, the requirements of duty, which would be true for all times and nations, turned out to be useless in practice. According to these theories, the source of duty was to be God or the inward world of the individual, who was considered apart from the existing social relations.

The theory of morals elaborated in Soviet society considers the source of duty as existing, not in the shape of God or in an abstract " human nature " taken apart from the social history of nations, but in the objectively existing ripened needs of progressive development of a society. The Soviet theory of ethics, though denouncing abstract concepts of duty and other moral conceptions considered apart from concrete historic conditions, is far from following the trend of ethical relativism. In accordance with this theory, in each historical epoch the objective criterion of morals lies in the struggle for a social and, hence, moral progress. Therefore this theory treasures the moral values acquired by humanity in the course of past historical epochs and constituting stable acquisitions of humanity.

Thus, the requirements of the UNO Charter, such as the struggle to avert war, the institution of belief in the basic rights of man, in the dignity and value of the individual, in the equality of rights of man and woman, promotion of social advancement and betterment of living conditions, under greater freedom, etc., constitute moral values which are highly treasured by Soviet people. Morals exist to help humanity to rise higher, to get rid of exploitation, said V. I. Lenin. Everything in the conduct of an individual that is aimed at serving the cause of human advancement, freedom and prosperity of all the millions upon millions

of working people—all that can be classified as good morals, while everything that impedes all that is bad morals or immoral. Such is the measure of the morals which guide the Soviet people in their actions, in their everyday labour to build up a Communist society, in their struggle for peace among nations. This supreme law of morals is the incarnation of the best democratic aspirations of the masses and is therefore accepted by all the progressive people in all countries, who are guided by it in their understanding of duty, their obligations in the struggle for peace and democracy.

Soviet morals require that the individual in his conduct should be guided above all by broad public interests. Soviet morals admit the tremendous importance of duty placed upon the individual by such relations as friendship, comradeship, and family membership, but these relations cannot run counter to public duty in the broader sense of the word, but are to be determined by it. Friendship, comradeship, family life are permeated with a deep moral sense when all the people are guided in their lives by social interests instead of being completely absorbed in their narrow personal interests.

The requirements of duty are not infrequently severe, especially in the conditions of war, in an atmosphere of endangered lives. The more unbreakable should be the will to the fulfilment of one's duty. As Stendhal, a French writer, said, through one of his characters, " Duty is severe. . . . But should it be easy to fulfil, how would heroism be possible ? ", and these words are filled with a profound moral sense.

Supreme sense of duty and its honest fulfilment are necessary not only in special exceptional circumstances. They are equally necessary in everyday routine work in any field of social activity. It is just in an atmosphere of everyday labour, in the course of the long struggle to overcome difficulties for the sake of success of a common cause, that a sense of duty is forged, men of duty are shaped, men ready for any heroic feat in the name of the people, in the name of the interests of humanity.

When the Soviet individual is striving for a continuous rise in the productivity of his labour, when he takes care of the machinery entrusted to him, is concerned about technological progress and the safeguarding of the output which he produces not for himself or for his kin but for all people, that is, for the society as a whole, all this time he is fulfilling his social duty. And all this time it is not only material considerations that stimulate his productive labour, but moral considerations as well. He regards labour not only as a means of existence, but also as a matter of great social importance, a matter of duty and honour. And such an attitude towards labour raises the moral standard of the individual. The greater the development of such an attitude towards labour, the better, the more noble and pure, more humane becomes the individual himself, the greater respect he deserves. Soviet society overcomes habits of the past instilled by the conditions of

enforced labour for the benefit of the rich, the survivals of parasitism, self-seeking, and similar phenomena. Soviet society rears the young generation in the spirit of love of labour, including physical labour as a matter of course, from an early age, and teaches boys and girls to regard labour as the basis of life.

The sense of patriotism, a feeling of love for the Motherland, is one of the basic principles of Soviet morals. This feeling is alive in every nation and has deep historical roots. Patriotism is an integral feature of the morals of the individuals devoted to their nation, and struggling for the welfare of the people. There can be no room for patriotism where the love for the Motherland is not displayed in deed. It is even more manifestly absent from the minds of people who trample upon the vital interests of the people. The patriotism of the Soviet people follows from the patriotism of the popular masses who in the past struggled for the honour and independence of their Motherland, for their liberation from the yoke. Soviet patriotism expresses the devotion of our people to the socialist system that they have created, its political institutions, its ideology and culture, as well as a respect for the best traditions and values created by the people in the course of its past history. This patriotism has not a trace of national snobbism, intolerance, conceit, not a trace of racial or national discrimination, which is characteristic of fascism which has aroused world-wide hatred by propagating its bestial inhuman morality, the theory of racial superiority, the policy of genocide pursued with regard to "non-Aryans" and coloured races, the cult of war, etc.

The Soviet people, however loving their Fatherland, their language and their culture, do not oppose their national interests to the interests of humanity as a whole. Genuine feeling of love for one's mother country suggests respect for the rights of other peoples, the recognition of the equality of their rights. It does not run counter to but coincides with the advancement of international relations, with the advancement and consolidation of friendly ties among nations. That means that the patriotism of the Soviet people is inseparable from internationalism. The aspirations to peace and co-operation among all nations, respect for the rights, culture and traditions of other nations, solidarity with the oppressed peoples in their just aspirations for national independence, hatred of all forms of national and racial oppression—such are the characteristic features of the ethics of the Soviet people. Nor are these features characteristic exclusively of the Soviet people. They are typical of all the progressive people of mankind, who are struggling for peace, democracy and national independence. These features are instilled in the working masses in all the countries of Peoples Democracy, where workers, peasants and intellectuals having freed themselves of exploitation and oppression have become masters of their own destiny.

The morals of the Soviet people are profoundly humane, permeated with a deep optimism, love for man, trust in his creative abilities,

Soviet ethics insist on respecting the dignity of man, concern for him, development of his creative abilities, and struggle against everything that cripples man—such as triteness, hypocrisy, hooliganism, etc. Soviet people are reared in the spirit of considerateness for the interests of the community with its age-long traditions and customs, which were not formerly observed because of greediness on the one side and poverty on the other.

Soviet people highly treasure and advance the humane traditions of the progressive culture of the past. As is the case with all other principles of Soviet ethics, Socialist humanism has its roots in the relations of mutual assistance and co-operation among working people free of exploitation. As Karl Marx prophesied, on the basis of socialism all human feelings and qualities are freed from the relations of exploitation and oppression which used to distort them, and these feelings are remodelled into genuinely humane ones. These genuinely humane feelings find their expression both in the labour activities of people and in other spheres of life such as cultural recreation, self-education, home and others. Soviet society attaches great importance to cultural accommodation for the working people, development of their creative activities in the numerous fields of technology, science and arts, considering all these to be a mighty means of intellectual, æsthetic and moral education.

Of great importance is also the problem of moral principles of marriage and family closely connected with the up-bringing of future citizens of the state. Marriage in the Soviet society has ceased to be a mercenary or political deal which is often the case in a society where money, career and the like constitute the aim of a person's life. The prophecy of F. Engels has come true—a prophesy to the effect that in a society based on the public ownership of the means of production monogamy springing from real love will be fully and actually realized and that there will grow up " a generation of men who will never have to buy a woman either for money or for any other means of social power and a generation of women who will never be moved to give themselves to a man for any other motive except for real love ". Soviet people are resolutely struggling against all shapes and forms of immorality still lingering from the past, such as a lightminded attitude towards the family, sexual wantonness, etc. These survivals of the past in the minds and the conduct of the people seriously injure social and personal interests. Soviet people suppress these immoral phenomena by mobilizing public opinion against them, in certain cases resorting to the power of law, carrying on educational activities among youth. But this is done without establishing petty control over the people's private lives. The morals of the Soviet people are based on the trust of and respect for a person.

The task of elaborating the principles of morals is not confined to a person's learning and accepting a number of moral conceptions and standards. A person's moral convictions must become his ethical

standards and find their expressions in his practical deeds and conduct. Patriotism, internationalism, humanitarianism and the collective spirit are not only principles of morals but supreme ethical senses of the Soviet people as well. The realization of social patriotic duty must at the same time become a sense of duty, the understanding of honour—a sense of honour. Of tremendous importance in the moral make-up of a person are a sense of dignity and comradeship.

On the other hand, Soviet morality does not separate the moral senses of a person from the convictions which direct his conduct, and make him genuine and morally balanced. In such cases when a person is guided solely by feelings and senses not rationalized by a knowledge which enables him to reasonably apply moral principles in a given situation—the person may do a lot of harm despite his " good intentions ".

A person's moral conceptions and senses finding expression in his practical conduct, in voluntary observation of moral standards, by force of habit, tradition, natural need to act in this particular manner and not a different one, become the person's ethical senses. Soviet morality highly values such moral qualities of a person as truthfulness and honesty, simplicity and modesty. And all of these as well as other moral qualities take their source from the people, from its labour activities, its struggle and heroism.

Soviet people value such features of character as will, perseverance, endurance, persistence, bravery, etc. Though all these features are closely connected with the moral aspect of a person's conduct, taken separately, they do not give a complete picture of the person's moral qualities. Will means ability to overcome difficulties and remove obstacles on the way to the aim set. The *moral* qualities of will depend on the aim it is called upon to attain, on the motives underlying this aim. What is called an " iron will " in certain cases might turn out to be a dull, mechanical, senseless and, hence, immoral will. It may be a will to attain riches, career, to oppression and enslavement of other people and in such cases it has nothing to do with a genuinely humane morality. The training of a will as well as of bravery, courage, heroism and other qualities as ethical categories can be possible only as a result of submission of the will and conduct of the person to social interests. These qualities are trained only in a collective body on the basis of submission of personal interests to social nationwide interests. History witnessed quite a few remarkable examples of heroism displayed by the masses in their struggle for freedom and the independence of their Motherland. In the conditions of the Soviet society heroism is also displayed in everyday labour by many people. This is the heroism of everyday life, the heroism of persistent creative endeavour, courageous struggle to overcome difficulties for the solution of this or that task in any economic or cultural field.

Under certain circumstances heroism necessitates self-sacrifice. Self-sacrifice in such cases when the hero in question realizes the just aim of the struggle and is closely linked up with the people does not imply a feeling of pessimism, depression or doom, but instead is permeated with optimism, a deep love of life. Such were the heroic feats performed by Nikolai Gastello, Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya, the young heroes of Krasnodon and many other sons and daughters of our Motherland who have sacrificed their lives for the freedom and the happiness of the people, for the honour and independence of the socialist Motherland, for the liberation of other peoples from the fascist yoke during the Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945.

The mighty source feeding the moral qualities of the Soviet people is in their *profound confidence* in the triumph of the cause of peace, democracy and socialism, the supreme ideological clarity of aim which, as it were, illuminates the entire inward make-up of the Soviet individual, directs all his thoughts and actions, and mobilizes his will to heroic feats in the name of the great aim. Without the firm confidence in the historical and moral rightness of this noble aim, without knowing the ways leading toward its triumph, there can be no genuine upbringing of man, there can be no genuinely cheerful spirit, no bright optimism characteristic of all real fighters for peace and happiness of peoples.

The education of our working people, and our youth, in the spirit of Soviet morality is by no means confined to the propagation and assimilation of advanced ideas. This process is inseparable from the everyday labour of the Soviet people, labour creating not only new material and cultural values for the society, for the working people, but remodelling these working people too. Soviet public opinion is a mighty force of moral influence : it encourages examples of service for public interests, the best examples of conduct in both the social and the private lives of people ; it is directed against the lingering traditions of the oldtime society in the shape of grabbing and other survivals of the psychology of private property in the minds and the conduct of the people. What has been said above about the morals of the Soviet society should not be understood in the sense that all the members of the Soviet society have been completely remodelled in the spirit of the new morality. To suggest this would mean to substitute the desirable for the existing. No, it is not yet the case; in the Soviet society there is still work underway—and will be for a long time in the future—to eliminate many past traditions, survivals and prejudices instilled by the old régime, a work inseparably connected with the future development of the national economy and culture, with the further rise of the material and cultural standards of the working people. No matter how long-lived these survivals might be, they are being successfully overcome and will eventually be completely eliminated. Soviet society has created all the necessary prerequisites for the remodelling of people's minds and possesses sufficient means

for it. It has reared millions of people with a new spiritual and moral make-up and herein lies one of the greatest achievements of socialism. The Soviet people through their own everyday experience become convinced of the vitality and necessity of the above-mentioned moral principles and standards for the triumph of genuinely humane relations both among individuals and among nations.

Changes in the Ethics of Fighting in the Course of the Last Century

Maria Ossowska

(Professor of the History of Morals, University of Warsaw)

There is a widely spread opinion that the ethics of fighting have, in the course of the last century, undergone a great change towards ruthlessness. In fact, crematoria, atom bombs destroying whole cities and their populations, the use of men for *in vivo* experiments in concentration camps, and some of the methods applied in political struggles, are phenomena which can be considered new, not only because of their scale. These phenomena cannot be explained by mere changes in the technique of fighting due to scientific inventions. In order to find out which ideological changes might have had their share in giving a new aspect to modern forms of fighting, the author tries in the first part of her paper to review the main factors which have contributed in the past to make fighting more humane. The second part traces their further development in contemporary Europe. Although examples given in this paper refer generally to warfare, the author defines " fighting " in the broad sense adopted by a Polish writer, T. Kotarbinski: " John is fighting with Peter whenever they aim at conflicting ends, whenever they know it and therefore in their activity take into account the moves of their adversary ".[1] In this sense, fighting does not necessarily involve enmity. We have to do with it in games, in scientific polemics, in parliamentary discussions, in business competition.

Let us start by a quotation taken from chapter VII of the law of Manu. The quoted passage, addressed to the warriors (the *kshatrias*) has often been considered as one of our earliest codes of fair play.

> " When he (the warrior) fights with his foes in battle let him not strike with weapons concealed (in wood), nor with (such as are) barbed, poisoned, or the points of which are blazing with fire. Let him not strike one who (in flight) has climbed on an eminence, nor a eunuch, nor one who joins the palms of his hands (in supplication), nor one who (flees) with flying hair, nor one who sits down, nor one who says: ' I am thine '. Nor one who sleeps, nor one who has lost his coat of mail, nor one who is naked, nor one who is disarmed, nor one who looks on without taking part in the fight, nor one who is fighting with another (foe). Nor one whose weapons are broken, nor one afflicted (with sorrow) . . . ".

This text, and rules of fair play elaborated in succeeding ages, suggest that the following five psychological factors have been of major

importance in checking the brutality of warfare and of fighting in general:

1. The feeling of humaneness.
2. Respect for the adversary.
3. Self respect.
4. Play spirit.
5. Fear of reciprocity.

It is plain enough that these factors differ in kind; some are of the moral order, others are not. Yet they are so interconnected in practice, that it is impossible to treat them in isolation.

(1) We cannot enter in this short paper into details concerning the rôle played by the feeling of humaneness in different codes of fighting. We think it played but a secondary rôle in the code of fair play of medieval chivalry. The knight was expected to protect the oppressed, persecuted virgins, widows and orphans. But compassion is accompanied by a feeling of superiority and no one of two fighting knights would like to be its object on the part of his adversary. The proverbial magnanimity of chivalry was an affair of pride and prestige rather than of humaneness. The rôle of the latter, however, increased over the years and in the second half of the 19th century, humanitarianism was strong enough to express itself *in an institutionalised form* of international conventions. The Red Cross was brought to life in 1864. The conventions of Geneva, Petersburg, London and The Hague, which concerned the treatment of the civilian population, the sick and the wounded during the war, and which also recommended respect for monuments of art and religious worship in the enemy's territory, were dictated by genuine goodwill and were intended to alleviate the cruelty of war as much as possible.

(2) The knight, as was said above, did not wish to be the object of his adversary's compassion, but what he expected and required of him was respect. In very different cultures, fighting begins by proofs of mutual esteem on the part of the combatants. We remember in Homer's Iliad the compliments paid by each duellist to his foe and the gifts exchanged after the fight (Diomedes—Glaucos, Hector—Ajax). One of the common conflicts in novels and dramas of the bourgeois literature of Romanticism, known for its cult of chivalry, arises from the clash of the requirement of efficiency on the one hand, with the obligation to respect one's enemy on the other. As in Victor Hugo's novel " *Quatre-vingt Treize* ", efficiency is usually sacrificed to moral values.

(3) The rules of fair play do not allow the killing of a man who is unarmed or wounded, the attack from behind, etc. These rules seem to be dictated by self-respect rather than by charity. A man of dignity does not wish a triumph achieved without risk or effort. He looks for

an adversary at least equal to himself if not superior. Analogously, self-respect forbids the hunter to kill a sleeping hare, or to shoot lions from a car.

(4) The search for an equal adversary can also arise from the play spirit. There is no fun in playing tennis, bridge or chess with a beginner. Amateur hunting as distinct from professional hunting, has to be an autotelic activity, and therefore must evolve quite definite rules. From the point of view of efficiency, a declaration of war instead of taking one's enemy by surprise is nonsense. It can, however, constitute an essential item in a ritualized play-activity. There is no need to dwell any longer upon ludic elements in fighting. Huizinga in his *Homo Ludens* has given us enough convincing examples.

(5) A declaration of war has more than this play function. He who declares a war expects his adversary in turn not to take him unawares on a similar occasion in future. Fear of reciprocity prevents some agricultural tribes from attacking one another in harvest time. The same fear prevents people from using poisonous gases in war or from killing war prisoners.

Of these five factors which have contributed to make fighting more humane, it was primarily the second, third and fourth, viz., respect for one's adversary, self-respect and the play spirit which contributed the code of fair play of our medieval chivalry. Although similar rules of fair play are encountered in different cultures, feudalism has been especially favourable to their formation. The Japanese *bushido*, with its obvious analogies with the code of European chivalry, was also a product of feudalism. In fact, the existence of an élite class of professional warriors, free from any share in economic productive processes and concentrated on their own glory, was very favourable to the creation of such a code.

It is a well-known fact that this code was binding only with regard to adversaries of equal social status. It was a product of two conflicting attitudes: *combat and class solidarity:* the latter formed a link between fighting parties, in spite of their enmity, and was a guarantee of their mutual respect. The exceptional ruthlessness of civil wars provides evidence that national bonds have not been as strong as class solidarity.

The existence of an élite class of professional warriors also stimulated the development of a sense of dignity, of a thirst for personal distinction and personal prestige. The knight would not care for an easy prey. It was unworthy of him to attack an unarmed man, to take advantage of the weakness of his adversary, to attack in company a single foe. The economic position of combatants belonging to an élite helped the development of a play spirit which could make warfare hardly discernible from tournament.

One might readily object that the rules of fair play have never really been practised in warfare. A well-known anecdote relates that in the battle of Agincourt (1415) the French troops were so gentlemanly as to

invite the English to shoot first, yet Froissart, the historian of the Hundred Years' War, deplored the lack of observation of the rules of fair play. No sceptic, however, can deny that models elaborated in the age of chivalry and revived in the bourgeois literature of Romanticism exercised a considerable influence on the education of youth. The Scout Movement respected the traditions of chivalry as did also—till the last war—the military schools, where pupils were taught the war conventions established by international law. This training was not without effect on professional German soldiers even during the last war. But the traditions of chivalry were binding neither on para-military organisations like political parties of the type of N.S.D.A.P. nor on organisations like the S.S. troops or the Hitler Jugend.

II

Let us now consider what has happened to our five factors in the last decades.

(1) We should not over-estimate the rôle of the humanitarian slogans of the late nineteenth century. It is well known that, while international law concerning warfare was being elaborated at Geneva and The Hague, civil wars in America and France were ruthless, and imperialism with equal ruthlessness made its way in the colonies. But cruelty was masked, it was not glorified, as it was later glorified by Hitler, whose educational programme was, in his own words, to train men and women as young, wild beasts who would instil fear. Kindness was denounced as unpardonable weakness, and books like those by Remarque were condemned to the flames. Rudolf Hoess,[2] the head of one of the largest concentration camps in Europe, describes in his autobiography, how he was taught to repress all humane feelings. His career proved this education successful. Whoever doubts whether humanitarian doctrines have any practical effects cannot doubt the immediate effects of an anti-humanitarian ideology openly professed.

Those who stimulate hatred towards adversaries, usually stress the great value of solidarity towards allies. They hold that he who loves his enemies betrays his friends, and recommend that if one has to make a choice between the two conflicting values: humanity towards the enemy and loyalty to the interests of one's group, one should choose the latter. If it is still found difficult to silence the voice of the heart, powerful support can be derived from the creed that the fight now going on, with all the atrocities, which may be necessary to bring success, is the " war to end wars ". This creed is suggested by the very scale of modern conflicts: two wars of the present century were world wars; the revolution predicted by the Communist Manifesto had to be a world revolution, the last and decisive battle in human history.

(2) Whoever allows his heart to be overpowered with human feelings towards his adversary loses a chance of subduing him. Whoever admits the existence of noble enemies, places an argument in their

hands. This is why respect for the enemy, an important factor of fair play, has been so seldom indulged in contemporary propaganda. The use of slander as a weapon in fighting is old, but the means at the disposal of modern propaganda give a new aspect to the problem.

(3) *a.* Self-respect, which contributed, as was said above, to make fighting more humane, *was connected with a particular system of values, a particular idea of personal worth.* This system of values has been undermined by social changes which made the concern for personal distinction and personal prestige unworthy of attention, as compared with the importance of serving a great common cause. According to moral standards which have a great appeal for many, our personal worth is to be judged from a historical point of view by our share in the achievement of a common goal. This impersonal attitude is incompatible with the chivalric code, which was born from thirst for personal distinction.

b. We have been considering the chivalric code from the point of view of a system of values other than that in which it developed, a system where personal worth is measured by different criteria. But even *within the same system of values* it may be considered a code fitted rather for a private duel than for a fight in which we act not only for ourselves but also to defend other people's interests. Socrates in " Gorgias " could prefer to be injured rather than to inflict injury, but if he happened to represent the interests of the Athenians, his choice would probably be different. When offended, we may offer the other cheek, but when our neighbour is offended we may go to his defence rather than encourage him to follow our example. In the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists of April, 1951, we read: " Even if as individuals we should choose rather to be destroyed than to destroy in such measure, we do not believe it would be right for us to urge policies on our government which would expose others to such a fate ".

This dualism in ethical rules is misleadingly thought of as a contrast between individual and group morality. The contrast is misleading since we always act individually, and the difference lies rather in the fact that in the first case we act for ourselves, while in the second we protect the interests of others. In the latter case we are not only allowed but even *required* to give first consideration to efficiency. " Group morality " was always considered the morality of politicians. When political activity was the business of few, there were always people left to defend moral values sacrificed by politicians in the name of efficiency. Now, where politics is expected to pervade the life of all citizens, the sacrificed moral values have nobody to support them.

(4) Play spirit, which can display itself only in fights regulated by definite rules, gradually disappeared from modern warfare to die out completely in total wars, i.e., wars directed not only against the army of the enemy but against the whole population. It has to some extent disappeared also from games and art. Amateurs in sport are more and

more replaced by professionals, who are paid to serve their respective countries, and whose success is sometimes treated as a political triumph. Painting, poetry and music are also called to serve political ends, ceasing to have the autotelic qualities characteristic of play. Thus our fourth factor which contributed to make fighting fair also loses its importance in our age.

(5) Let us pass to the last factor quoted in the first part of our considerations. Its position is peculiarly influenced by the invention of new weapons of unprecedented destructive power. The fear of reciprocity under new conditions seems to play a double rôle: it prevents people from starting an attack, but on the other hand makes it imperative for an attacking party to be completely ruthless, since only quick extermination of the enemy would allow the agressor to survive. This concerns warfare. In political verbal struggle, the fear of reciprocity can be lessened by forcing one's enemies to silence.

This short paper does not pretend to exhaust the ethical problems which fighting may present. It endeavours only to trace changes in some factors which are said to have checked its brutality in the past. These changes seem to account in some measure for the ruthlessness attributed to our age.

This paper has been confined to the statement of facts, and has abstained as yet from expressing approval or disapproval. As a partisan of humanity and peace, the author would like to draw attention to one, rather comforting fact: up to the first European war of 1914–1918, people believed, on the one hand, that war was necessary, and on the other hand, that the rules elaborated by international law were efficacious. After that war international legislation visibly dwindled since people ceased to believe in its efficacy. As the second world war has shown, they were to some extent justified. To-day, while still sceptical about rules, we have some reason to believe that the very enormity of the destructive power of the new weapons will make war an absurdity. The hope that there can be no more war thus receives unexpected and rather paradoxical support in the development of science-sponsored means of destruction.

NOTES.

[1] T. Kotarbinski, *Some Problems of a General Theory of Fighting* (in Polish), Warsaw, 1938.
 Not to be confused with Rudolf Hess.

The Effect of Social and Economic Changes on Race Relations in the United States

HARRY J. WALKER

(Associate Professor of Sociology, Howard University)

The pattern of race relations which emerged after the Civil War and Reconstruction in the United States has been undergoing a marked change as a result of fundamental social and economic developments taking place in American society.

The racial pattern which developed in the South following the emancipation of Negro slaves constituted a form of accommodation in which the Negro group was subordinated to the white. An important aspect of the racial system was the restriction of Negroes generally to traditional occupations. These were predominantly in agriculture, unskilled work and domestic service. By the turn of the century, a system of racial segregation based on custom and tradition stemming from the slave period developed and became defined and supported by law. Thus, when Stephenson published his *Race Distinctions in American Law* in 1910, he concluded : " Race distinctions do not appear to be decreasing. On the contrary, distinctions heretofore existing only in custom tend to crystallize in law."

Segregation extended throughout all areas of public contact, including education, recreation, places of public assembly, hotels and eating places. In the South, Negroes were generally disfranchised, being permitted to vote in some places in national elections. However, the Negro had practically no influence in local politics and government.

In 1900, the Negro in the North constituted only a small proportion of the total Negro population, nine-tenths of the Negro population being located in the South. In the North, the Negro found employment chiefly in unskilled occupations and domestic service. Although a rigid pattern of separation of the races did not exist in the North, the Negro group was to a great extent socially isolated from the white group because of racial animosity and prejudice. The low economic status of Negroes resulting from their inability to gain a foothold in industry contributed to this isolation.

During the first fifty years of this century fundamental changes in American society have produced a marked change in the relationship of the Negro to the American social order. The most significant of these changes occurred in the economic organization which brought about (1) a sectional shift and urbanization of the Negro population, and (2) changes in the employment pattern of Negroes with a resultant rise in the standard of living of a significant proportion of the Negro

87

population.   Related to these developments have been the rise in the general level of education of Negroes and the development of political power in Negro communities primarily in northern cities.   These developments are a reflection of the dynamic character of American society.

Of great importance in the changing status of the Negro is the new rôle of the United States as a leader in world affairs.   The struggle of the western nations to preserve democratic institutions in the world has focused attention on racial discrimination in the United States. All of these developments have constituted significant influences in creating a climate of opinion favorable to change in race relations.

INDUSTRIALIZATION AND CHANGES IN THE OCCUPATIONAL PATTERN OF NEGROES

The general exclusion of Negroes from the high status occupations, requiring skills and yielding higher pay which existed during the early part of this century, rested upon the traditional assumption that Negroes were inferior to whites.   The changes which have occurred in the employment pattern of Negroes since that time have taken place primarily in response to the need for a larger labor force.   It was not until the outbreak of World War I that Negroes found employment in industry in large numbers.   The gradually expanding industries of the North relied chiefly on European immigrant labor.   The curtailment of immigration as a consequence of the war created a labor shortage in industries at a time when production was being expanded.   The demand thus created in northern industries resulted in a mass migration of Negroes from the South in response to the attraction of high wages in the North.   During the period from 1915 to 1918, about a half million Negroes migrated to northern centers.

Thus, as a result of the war-time industrial expansion, Negroes gained an important foothold, largely as unskilled workers in the heavy, basic industries of the North.   They entered such industries as iron and steel, automobile manufacturing, chemical and related enterprises, and slaughtering and meat packing.   For example, from 1910 to 1920, the percentage of unskilled workers in the steel industry who were Negroes increased from 6·4 per cent to 17 per cent.   During this period, the number of Negroes employed in agriculture decreased by 24·7 per cent.[1]   Moreover, in this decade the number of Negro women employed in manufacturing industries rose from 68,000 to 105,000.[2]

The South during this period also experienced an increase in industrial expansion which drew a considerable proportion of the rural Negro population to cities.   They found employment as unskilled workers in iron, steel, fertilizer and transportation industries.   The growth of industrial centers in both the South and North created an increased demand for workers in service industries and domestic service pursuits.[3]

The high level of employment in the prosperous decade following the first World War prevented large-scale unemployment of Negroes,

despite the fact that the entrance of Negro workers into industry brought them into close competition with white workers. However, with the development of the economic depression which followed the relatively prosperous years of the twenties, racial animosities and discrimination increased with the impact of widespread unemployment. Not only did the depression result in an increase in racial animosities, but it revealed the insecure position of the Negro worker in industry—the rates of unemployment for Negroes rose much higher than those for white.

From 1930 to 1936, about half of the skilled Negro workers in the nation were displaced from their usual type of jobs. A third of these shifted to unskilled jobs, and over 17 per cent were unemployed. In the South there was acceleration in the displacement of Negro skilled workers in the building trades, a trend which had been observable for some time.[4]

The development of welfare programs under the New Deal Administration to improve the national economy led to a relatively vast expansion of governmental functions. The masses of workers who supported the New Deal came to depend more and more on the federal government for aid during the depression. Later, there developed among this group support for programs to improve the general welfare. Inasmuch as these programs to a large extent were directed to the improvement of the working classes, they included a large proportion of the Negro population.

The New Deal Administration constantly had to face the problems of racial discrimination. The growing importance of the Negro group as a political force, especially in urban centers of the North, together with the influence of whites with liberal racial views, were factors which forced recognition of the social disabilities of the Negro group. Thus, while racial discrimination occurred in the administration of New Deal programs, particularly in the South, there was recognition that it was in violation of federal policy.[5] Thus, when World War II began, the federal government was becoming to a great extent committed to a policy of non-discrimination.

The demand for workers in the expanding defense industries gave a great impetus to the trend toward the utilization of Negro workers in industry. In general, mobilization for war brought about an increase in the utilization of Negro labor in skilled work in industry along with a decline in the importance of the Negro as an agricultural worker. These changes were accompanied by (1) an acceleration of the process of urbanization of the Negro population, (2) an increase in the influence of the federal government on racial employment policies of industry, and (3) the development of a trend toward the relaxation of discriminatory practices of organized labor.

From 1940 to 1950, there was an increase in the total Negro population of 15·8 per cent. However, as a result of population shifts there was a differential increase by regions. The Northeastern region

increased by 44·2 per cent, the North Central by 50·2 per cent, and the Western by 237·4 per cent. The increase of the Negro population in these regions resulted almost entirely from migration from the South. In fact, the number of Negro workers in the South actually declined by 115,000, or 3·3 per cent.

Not only was there a migration of Negro workers from the southern region, there was also a significant movement from rural areas to cities within the South. Between 1940 and 1950, the proportion of Negroes engaged in agriculture in the South declined from 40·4 per cent to 29·8 per cent. The migration to cities of both the North and South was in part also a result of basic changes in the agricultural economy, including farm mechanization, crop diversification and a shift in some areas from crops to livestock.[6]

The changes which occurred during this period in the employment pattern of Negroes were not achieved without great resistance. The utilization of Negro labor in occupations outside of the traditional jobs meant the destruction of racial barriers which had long roots in the past. In general this was accomplished as a result of organized pressures from the Negro group, the growing shortage of labor and resultant pressures exerted by federal agencies. Important among these was the Fair Employment Practices Committee created by executive order of the President to eliminate racial discrimination in employment in industries handling defense contracts.

Although these efforts by no means succeeded in extensively eliminating discriminatory practices, the Negro worker during the war period " secured more jobs at better wages and in a more diversified occupational pattern than ever before ".[7] Although Negro workers are employed to a greater extent throughout the nation's industries, in 1950 one-half of the Negro male workers and two-thirds of the females were employed in occupations below the semi-skilled level. This is in contrast to the situation for white male and female workers as only one-sixth of them were employed in occupations below this level.[8]

URBANIZATION AND CHANGES IN POLITICAL STATUS

The urbanization of the Negro population has been an aspect of the urbanization of the nation's population which has been a consequence of industrial expansion. In 1806, 60 per cent of the total population and 77 per cent of the Negro population resided in rural areas. By 1950, only 36 per cent of the total population and 38 per cent of the Negro population were located in rural areas.

A large proportion of the Negro population, like the white population, is becoming concentrated in large metropolitan centers. In 1910, there were no cities with a Negro population as large as 100,000. However, by 1940, there were eleven cities with a Negro population of 100,000 or more. Moreover, from 1940 to 1950, largely as a result of population movement from rural areas of the South, there was a great increase in the urban Negro population. For example, for New

York City the Negro population increased during this period from 458,000 to 748,000 ; Chicago from 278,000 to 492,000 ; and Philadelphia from 251,000 to 376,000. In these cities the proportion of Negroes in the total population ranged from 10 per cent in New York to 18 per cent in Philadelphia.

In 1950, in each of fourteen cities in the South which had a total population of 100,000 or more, Negroes comprised nearly 30 per cent of the population. There were three southern cities in which the proportion of Negroes was about 40 per cent.

The urbanization of the Negro population has been accompanied by an increase in residential segregation of Negroes. The spatial segregation of the Negro population has occurred partly as a result of the competitive process which has also been responsible for the growth of immigrant communities. It has also been a result in large measure of racial restrictions which have confined Negroes to specific areas of the city despite their desires and ability to afford homes in other sections.

The growth of large, distinct Negro communities in cities has provided a basis for the emergence of a more defined class structure, only a semblance of which was possible in a rural society where the vast majority of Negroes were employed as farm laborers and tenant farmers. The acquisition of skilled jobs in industry, the opportunities for training and education have resulted in the entrance of Negroes into white-collar occupations and the professions. This inevitably has given rise to the development in the Negro community of social classes based on occupation, income and education.

One of the consequences of the development of a class of Negroes with skills and professional training has been the rise of a Negro leadership in many areas of community life. Moreover, in the urban environment the Negro has come into contact with a variety of new experiences. The new rôles which the Negro has played in a more diversified occupational structure, and the impact of the influences of mass media of communication, have given him a new conception of himself and his place in American society. The general rise in the educational level of Negroes and the development of leadership which more effectively articulates the interests and aspirations of the Negro group have been factors in developing a consciousness of minority group status.

In the urban community, these changes have made possible a greater organization of protest movements and have increased their effectiveness in exerting pressure for changes in the status of the Negro. One of the most important developments which has made possible the development of programs and pressures to eliminate racial discrimination and segregation has been the emergence of the Negro as a political force in local communities in the North, which, in turn, has contributed to his political influence in the nation.

Since 1860, there have been virtually no restrictions on Negro voting in the North. At that time, the Negro population in the North

numbered less than one person in fifty. As the Negro population increased in northern cities the Negro vote became more important in local and national politics. The segregation of the Negro population in distinct areas of the city made possible a more effective utilization of the voting power of the group. The anonymity of city life together with the fact that city politics was often dominated by political machines meant that the Negro group like immigrant groups, provided a source of votes which could be controlled by machines. These factors contributed to early acceptance of the Negro as a voter in the North.[9]

Many of the earlier Negro politicians were underworld figures who became allied with the city political machines because of the payment of graft and the need for protection.[10] Their significance in the political development of the Negro lies in the fact that to some extent they organized the masses of Negroes and contributed to the development of the consciousness of the importance of the Negro vote in relation to the aspirations and economic needs of the group.

About 1933, Negro voters in the North began to shift from their traditional allegiance to the Republican party to the Democratic party. The shift of the majority of Negro voters to the Democratic party followed the development of the New Deal welfare programs. The entrance of the Congress of Industrial organizations into politics about 1943 was also a factor in organizing the Negro vote to support the New Deal. The CIO, early in its development began to include Negro workers in its expanding organization. The CIO had established a policy of non-discrimination for reasons of race and its Political Action Committee strongly supported federal legislation to deal with the problem of racial discrimination in employment.

In the South, following Reconstruction and the rise of the Democratic party to control of southern politics, the Negro was eliminated from any effective participation in the political life of the region. A small number of Negroes continued to vote as Republicans in national elections. With the passage of time and the subsiding of racial animosities generated during the turmoil of the period following the Civil War, there was some relaxation of restrictions on Negro voting in some communities scattered throughout the South. Despite these developments, until 1940, the number of Negroes who were permitted to vote in local and national elections remained small. In this year, in a report of a study of the political participation of Negroes in Southern states, it was concluded that " for all practical purposes, Negroes are disfranchised in the South ". It was estimated at this time that in eight southern states with a combined population of 3,650,000 Negro adults, only 80,000 to 90,000 Negroes voted in the general election of 1940. Moreover, only a negligible number voted in the primary elections.[11] However, since 1940 there has been a marked increase in the participation of Negroes in southern politics. This change has taken place as a result of a number of developments. These include the growing influence in the North of the Negro vote on the policies of

the national Democratic party, the increase in effectiveness of Negro protest organizations, the development of public opinion favorable to the elimination of restrictions to the political participation of Negroes, and the effect of the increased urbanization of the Negro population in the South.

From 1900 to 1950, the urban Negro population in the South increased from 14.7 per cent to about 47 per cent. Not only has the experience of living in the urban environment given the Negro new interests, new oulooks, but it has intensified his consciousness of his subordinate status. It has also produced changes in the white group. The anonymity of city life, together with the secularization of life which takes place in the urban world tends to emancipate whites from the tradition of the Old South. Thus, they do not show the same concern for the maintenance of the racial system which controls the action and thinking of whites in rural communities.[12]

The greatest barrier to Negro participation in southern politics was the " white primary " system. The maintenance of virtually a one-party system by the white South made it possible to exclude Negroes from voting by the simple procedure of passing state legislation making Negroes ineligible to vote in the primary elections, a device developed to enable a political party to select its candidates for a general election. After a long series of law suits by Negroes, exclusion of Negroes from primary elections was held to be in violation of the constitutional rights of Negroes.

Other restrictive measures still operate to prevent Negroes from voting in large numbers in the southern states. Among these are the poll tax requirement which prevents both low-income whites and Negroes from voting, the so-called literary tests under which Negroes are required to read and interpret a portion of the Constitution to the satisfaction of an election official, and the resort to intimidation and violence against Negroes. Despite these restrictive measures there has been an increase in Negro voting in some of the communities of the South. Estimates of the number of Negroes voting in eleven southern states comprised nearly a million in 1950.[13] Another estimate made in 1952 places the number of negroes registered to vote in southern states in excess of 1,250,000.[14]

CONCLUSIONS

The most dramatic evidence of the change in the status of the Negro in American society is the decision of the Supreme Court in 1954, outlawing segregation in publicly supported schools. This decision constitutes a high point in a trend in court decisions toward the recognition of the Negro as a citizen. This decision was followed by another decision of the United States Supreme Court abolishing segregation in publicly maintained recreational facilities. Recently, the Interstate Commerce Commission ruled that segregation cannot be maintained

in waiting rooms and restaurants operated by railroad and bus companies engaging in interstate transportation.

The decision abolishing segregation in public schools represents a departure from a long established tradition of the maintenance of segregation with insistence only upon the provision of equal facilities for Negroes. It is significant also because it reflects a change in the climate of opinion regarding the status of the Negro in American society. This change has come about chiefly as a result of (1) a new orientation of the Negro to American life, and (2) of America's position as a leader in world affairs.

The rapid industrialization of the nation with its consequent urbanization of the population has gradually undermined the caste-like racial system which developed primarily in the predominantly agricultural society. During periods of national crises changes in the relationship of the Negro to American society have occurred more rapidly. As a consequence of the impetus given to industrial development and population shifts to cities by two world wars, the Negro has acquired a new outlook on life. The New Deal program which was initiated during the great depression resulted in a closer identification of the interests of the masses of Negroes with the interests of the masses of whites. During this period a significant change occurred in the conception of the rôle of government in community life. In this situation there developed a public opinion favorable to the extension of minority rights. Writing of this period, Berger states : " the climate of American opinion has become such that official enforcement of minority rights is not only permitted but is even demanded ".[15]

This change in opinion with respect to the treatment of minorities was in part a result of World War I which tended to bring about a reexamination of basic American values. World War II, which Myrdal has described as " an ideological war fought in defense of Democracy ", served to bring into even sharper focus the values of equal opportunity, fairplay, and security which are inherent in American society. These developments together with America's rôle in the present world situation have made the position of minorities in the United States of national concern.

In a situation in which public opinion is becoming more favorable to a change in the status of the Negro in American society, protest movements and organisations designed to reduce discrimination have had the greatest success. Movements to eliminate discrimination and segregation have been increasingly supported by and carried on by a growing number of whites and organizations with which they are affiliated. Both major political parties in recognition of the power of the Negro vote and the growing necessity for bringing practices in line with American values have become committed to a policy of fuller inclusion of the Negro minority in the institutional life of the nation.

As a consequence of these developments there has been an increasing disposition on the part of governmental agencies and especially the courts to take action and render decisions which further the trend toward the more complete integration of the Negro group in American society.   Finally, it should be recognised that the elimination of racial discriminatory practices and segregation in one area of social life inevitably tends to develop pressure for abolishing segregation in other areas.

NOTES

[1] Sterling D. Spero and Abram L. Harris, *The Black Worker* (New York, 1931), p. 153.

[2] United States Department of Labor, *Women's Bureau Bulletin*, No. 20 (Washington, D.C., 1922), pp. 5–6.

[3] Robert C. Weaver, *Negro Labour*, (New York, 1946), pp. 4–5.

[4] Weaver, op. cit., p. 9.

[5] Morroe Berger, *Equality by Statute* (New York, 1952), pp. 14–15.

[6] Lewis W. Jones, " The Negro Farmer," *The Journal of Negro Education*, vol. XXII, 1953, pp. 322–328.

[7] Weaver, op. cit., p. 306.

[8] John Hope, II, " The employment of Negroes in the United States by Major Occupation and Industry ". *The Journal of Negro Education*, Vol. XXII, 1953, pp. 308–309.

[9] Gunnar Myrdal, *An American Dilemma* (New York, 1944), p. 439.

[10] Harold F. Gosnell, *Negro Politicians* (Chicago, 1935), p. 361.

[11] Myrdal, op. cit., p. 475.

[12] V. O. Key, *Southern Politics* (New York, 1949), p. 672.

[13] Alexander Heard, *A Two-Party South* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1952), p. 181.

[14] Henry L. Moon, " The Negro Vote in the South," *The Nation*, September 27, 1952, p. 248.

[15] Berger, op. cit., p. 14 .

A Change in National Relations in the U.S.S.R.

M. D. KAMMARI

(Professor, Moscow Philosophical Institute, Academy of Sciences of
the U.S.S.R.)

During 39 years since the Great October Socialist Revolution of 1917
the Soviet Union has realized a profound change in political, economic
and cultural relations among nations : there were completely and
forever abolished national oppression, inequality, animosity and dis-
trust among nations and instead developed and gained strength un-
precedently stable friendship and collaboration among peoples based
on their complete equality.

We think that the social sciences should not limit themselves to
describing how this happened ; they should answer vitally important
questions stirring to-day the overwhelming majority of the world popu-
lation and, first of all, the oppressed peoples of dependent and colonial
countries ; namely, (a) what are the social reasons, sources and
bases of national oppression and racial discrimination from which the
oppressed nations and races for ages suffered and still suffer to-day ?
(b) how can these oppressions be eliminated, how can freedom, equality
and friendship among peoples be ensured ? (Nobody now doubts
that this is realizable.)

The science and the whole experience of history indisputably testify
to the fact that all social, class and national oppression of the many
systems—slave, feudal and capitalist—was based on private property
in the means of production, on exploitation, class antagonism, animosity
and class oppression. Having abolished these factors, the Soviet
state eliminated oppression and animosity among peoples inside
the country.

National relations in all countries are determined by the character
of their social system and State power. This can be illustrated on the
example of any country. Let us take, for instance, Russia. The
radical change in State power and social system that took place
in the U.S.S.R. as a result of the victory of the Great October Socialist
Revolution, and the building up of a socialist society radically changed
the whole system of national relations which existed in the country
before October 1917.

The old pre-revolutionary Tsarist Russia was a scene of national
oppression. Lenin called Tsarism " a prison of peoples ". The ruling
classes, landlords and capitalists headed by Tsarism were the main
organizers of national oppression in various forms; from forced assimi-
lation, russification and oppression of national cultures and languages,
to brutal colonial robbery and oppression of peoples of Middle Asia,
the Caucasus, Siberia, and the Extreme North.

The best advanced representatives of the great Russian people from Radishev, the Decembrists, revolutionary democrats—Hertzen, Belinsky, Chernyshevsky, Dobrolubov, and especially the leaders and public men of the Russian working class vigorously struggled against national oppression and inequality, for freedom, friendship and equality in rights among all peoples of Russia.

The great founder and leader of the Soviet state and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Lenin, from the first steps of his revolutionary activity, angrily held up to shame the oppressive policy of Tsarism, resolutely raised the banner of struggle for liberation not only of the Russian working class and peasantry but also for the emancipation of all other peoples of Russia from social and national oppression and substantiated the right of all peoples to free self-determination up to separation and formation of their own independent state. No privilege was given to any nation. All nations have equal rights and every one is sovereign, must itself freely determine its fortune, its social system. All the citizens of a state, irrespective of their nationality, are equal in their rights, have a right to speak their native language, to develop freely their national culture. Such are the really democratic principles of the programme of the Russian Social-Democratic (now Communist) Party proclaimed more than half a century ago. On the basis of these principles all the peoples previously oppressed by Tsarism united round the Russian working class and its Party and overthrew social and national oppression in their country.

It was on the first day of the October Revolution that the Second Congress of Soviets proclaimed that " Soviet power would ensure all the nations living in Russia the genuine right to self-determination ". This right was also confirmed in the Decree on Peace adopted on the second day of the Revolution. The Peoples' Commissariat of Nationalities was formed immediately. This commissariat was entrusted with the realization of the national policy of Soviet power. On Nov. 15, 1917, a " Declaration of the Rights of Peoples of Russia " was adopted which again emphasized that the emancipation of all peoples of Russia should be carried out resolutely and irrevocably.

The Declaration proclaimed :

" 1.   Equality and sovereignty of the peoples of Russia.

" 2.   The right of the peoples of Russia to free self-determination up to separation and formation of an independent state.

" 3.   Abolition of all national and religious privileges and limitations.

" 4.   Free development of national minorities and ethnographic groups living on the territory of Russia."

Following these really democratic and socialist principles, the Soviet power ensured free self-determination of all peoples of Russia, gave complete freedom and independence to Poland and Finland and state autonomy to all peoples who expressed their desire to remain in the

Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic on the basis of complete equality and voluntariness. The peoples living near the Baltic Sea—Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia—established Soviet power in their countries as far back as 1919 but it was suppressed by the interventionists who had thrust a bourgeois system on them. The Soviet state also recognized the independence of these bourgeois republics. But in 1940 the peoples of these republics overthrew the power of reactionary bourgeois governments and again established Soviet power in their countries and voluntarily joined the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics.

The Soviet power abolished all the treaties unequal in rights which Tsarism together with other imperialist countries had imposed on China, Iran and other countries.

Thus the Soviet Socialist state, as a state of workers and peasants, resolutely put an end to the Tsarist and imperialist policy of national oppression, emancipated all nations, both great and small, advanced and underdeveloped from any social and national oppression, national and racial discrimination. It carried out a land reform and new division of the country into districts, taking into account the interests of all previously oppressed nationalities. The lands which belonged to these nationalities and were seized by Tsarist officials, banks, colonizers and local exploiters, were nationalized by Soviet power and given to peasants free of charge. The old bureaucratic administrative division of Russia into provinces and territories which cut across economic and cultural relations among nations, was abolished. Instead of this autonomous national districts, regions and republics were formed, taking into account the national composition of the population. Every national republic included big industrial and cultural centres to promote successful development of the nationalities. This created conditions for a rapid consolidation of tribes and nationalities into nations, for unification of all nations under formation into a single whole. Thus, for example, there were unified (in different periods of time) previously separated parts of the Kazakh, Uzbek, Turkmen, Kirghiz, Ukrainian, Byelorussian and Moldavian nations. The Russian Federation and 15 other Union Republics making up the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics were formed. In the Union Republics there were created many autonomous republics—Mordovian, Chuvash, Mari, Komi, Udmurt, Jakut, Buryat-Mongolian, Osetin, Daghestan and others. The essence of socialist autonomy is that power belongs to the working people of the nationalities living on the territory of these republics.

For a more complete account of the common and particular interests of all peoples of the U.S.S.R., both great and small, the Supreme Soviet—supreme legislative organ of power—has two chambers with equal rights : the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities. To the Soviet of the Union deputies are elected in proportion to the quantity of population—one deputy from every electoral district. To the Soviet of Nationalities all the Union Republics irrespective of

the quantity of population elect equal numbers of deputies. Equal numbers of deputies are correspondingly sent by autonomous republics, regions and national districts.

The Soviet national autonomy and federation proved to be so resourceful that they could take into account the whole variety of national relations in the country, the level of economic, political and cultural development of every nation and nationality, peculiarities of national life, psychology and culture. Owing to this the Soviet system which had come from the womb of the Russian people, became accessible, kindred and understandable to all peoples of Russia.

The most important feature of Soviet national policy is that it did not limit itself only to the realization of political freedom and equality of nations (though this is a great historical achievement.) The Soviet state went further and made a decision of historical magnitude that could not have been made by any other state in the world. We mean the realization of actual economic, political and cultural equality among nations, the creation of really friendly collaboration and friendship among peoples. To understand how difficult and complicated this problem was, we should recollect first of all how strongly the age-old oppression, both social and national, influenced the whole life of peoples.

The Soviet Union is inhabited by more than 60 nations, national groups and nationalities. Prior to the Great October Revolution they were at different stages of historical development. The most developed and advanced was the Russian nation. It had a comparatively developed heavy industry, revolutionary working class and skilled cadres of intelligentsia. Then followed the peoples of Poland, Ukrainia, the Baltic countries, Finland, Georgia where capitalist development had already begun. But more than thirty million people of Middle Asia and the North and East territories of Russia did not pass through the stage of industrial capitalism and lived in semi-feudal conditions. The population of these areas was by many centuries, whole epochs of history, behind that of Central Russia, for it still lived in a patriarchal tribal system and led a nomadic mode of life ; many nationalities did not have their own industry, State organization, cultural cadres. Nomadic cattle-breeding—the main occupation of these nationalities—was very primitive ; agriculture was under-developed and used primitive, primeval instruments—wooden plough, hoe, etc. The population of the outlying districts of Russia was almost totally illiterate. Many nationalities had neither literature nor a written language of their own. Medical assistance was almost absent, people died from epidemics, poverty, starvation.

In order that these nationalities could use the great rights and liberties given to them by the Soviet Revolution, it was necessary to render them fraternal assistance on the part of more advanced and econonomically and culturally developed peoples. The Soviet State successfully settled this task. Leaning on the Russian proletariat and intelligentsia, the Soviet

State helped the underdeveloped peoples to create their own national state organization, modern heavy industry and agriculture, supplied them with modern machinery, helped them to create a national working class and intelligentsia. The Soviet state ensured power institutions which used the native language of every nationality, such as courts, administration, various economic, cultural and educational institutions (schools, libraries, clubs, theatres, cinemas, publishing houses for books and newspapers, etc.). For 48 nationalities for the first time in their history, a written language was created. Illiteracy was eliminated. Universal compulsory seven-year education was introduced and realized for children of all nationalities. Realization of universal secondary (ten-year) education began. The nationalities whose population was almost entirely illiterate now have their own intelligentsia, scientists, writers, painters, actors, teachers, physicians, engineers, military specialists. Thus the Soviet Union opened *a new era in history, in relations among peoples, the era of socialism, the era of genuine equality and fraternal friendship* among peoples.

The results of Soviet national policy can be illustrated by a great number of various facts and figures. Here we shall cite the main, decisive ones. In order that the underdeveloped peoples could overtake the economically developed centres of Russia, the Soviet state speeded up the economy of all underdeveloped national outlying districts of the country. As a result of this, the gross output of industry increased in 1955, as compared with 1913, in the Kazakh S.S.R. by 33 times, in the Armenian S.S.R.—41 times, in the Tatar A.S.S.R.—93 times. In conformity with the industrial raw materials available on the territory of the National Republics, still faster was the growth of their manufacturing and heavy industries (Azerbaijan, Georgian, Kazakh, Estonian, Karelo-Finnish, Ukrainian, Byelorussian S.S.R., Bashkir, Tatar and Komi A.S.S.R.; engineering, shipbuilding and device-building industries in the Latvian, Lithuanian, Estonian S.S.R. and in other Republics).

In spite of the great damage caused by fascist invaders to the Baltic Soviet Republics, they by far surpassed with the aid of fraternal republics the pre-war level of production: in 1954 this level was surpassed by the Lithuanian S.S.R. by 4·2 times, Latvian S.S.R.—5 times, Estonian S.S.R.—6 times.

Not less important are the achievements in the field of *national culture* of the peoples of the U.S.S.R. Already in the academic year 1938–39 the number of pupils became in the Ukrainian S.S.R.—3 times, Byelorussian S.S.R.—4 times, Armenian S.S.R.—more than 88 times, Kazakhstan—almost 11 times, Turkmenia—30 times, Uzbekistan—64 times, Tajikistan—680 times greater than in the 1914–15 academic year. Behind these dry figures stands the enormous work of the Soviet state in the field of elimination of illiteracy, preparation of national intelligentsia, building of shools, training of teachers, creation of text-books and books in native languages of many peoples of the U.S.S.R.

Since 1949 in all Soviet republics a universal compulsory seven-year education system was introduced and now in the capitals of the national republics, in big industrial and district centres universal, ten-year education is being realized. The number of pupils in *secondary* schools already in the 1939–40 school year became in the Ukrainian S.S.R.—24 times, Byelorussian S.S.R.—41 times, Azerbaijan S.S.R.—50 times, Georgian S.S.R.—64·6 times, Kazakh S.S.R.—87·7 times, Russian S.F.S.R.—88·9 times, and Armenian S.S.R.—110 times greater than in 1914. The Kirghiz, Tajik and Turkmenian S.S.R. did not have secondary schools at all, whereas in 1939–40 they had 96 schools with 16,600 pupils. Since that time and especially after the war secondary education in the U.S.S.R. advanced much further in all republics.

In Tsarist Russia there were only 91 schools of higher education with 112,000 students. Of them, 60 per cent. were in Moscow and Petrograd, while in Middle Asia, on the territory of the Byelorussian, Armenian, Azerbaijan and Karelo-Finnish S.S.R. there were no schools of higher education at all. In 1941—before the war—in the U.S.S.R. already more than 657,000 students studied in schools of higher education. According to the census of 1939, per every 10,000 *of population* the U.S.S.R. already had 64 people with *higher education*, the Russian S.F.S.R.—65, Ukrainian S.S.R.—72, Azerbaijan S.S.R.—67. Since then higher education in the U.S.S.R. has taken another large step forward. Only in comparison with the pre-war period, the number of specialists with higher education in 1955 increased in Estonia by almost 3 times, Turkmenia—3·3 times, Tajikistan and Moldavia—3·4 times, Kazakhstan—3·8 times and Kirghizia—4·8 times.

In 1955 in the U.S.S.R. there are 818 schools of higher education with more than a million-and-a-half students representing all the nations of the U.S.S.R. About 60 million people—more than one fourth of the total population of the country—study in various types of school and out of school education.

The population of pre-Soviet Kazakhstan, Turkmenia, Tajikistan was almost entirely illiterate. There were no schools of higher education, secondary schools, theatres, books and newspapers in the native language. Now almost the whole population of these republics is literate ; in the Kazakh S.S.R. for example, there are about 9,000 schools, 108 technical schools and 28 schools of higher education which during the years of their existence prepared more than 70,000 specialists of various types. Among the Kazakh now there are doctors, professors and academicians. The Turkmenian S.S.R. has now more than 6,000 schools, many technical schools, 6 schools of higher education, scientific-research institutes, 80 newspapers and magazines, 5 theatres including opera-and-ballet houses, music-colleges and schools. The Tajik S.S.R. now has 2,500 primary and secondary schools, 9 schools of higher education, an Academy of Sciences comprising 43 scientific-research institutes. Academies of Sciences exist in 12 Union Soviet Republics, the rest have affiliates and branches of the

Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R. in which local national scientists work. The number of scientific workers, in comparison with the pre-war period, increased in Ukrainia by 1·5 times, Latvia and Azerbaijan—more than 2 times, Kazakhstan—more than 2½ times, Estonia—almost 3 times, Lithuania and Karelo-Finnish S.S.R.—more than 3 times.

According to the Sixth Five-Year Plan, the industrial production of the U.S.S.R. will increase by 65 per cent.; in the majority of Union Republics it will become by 60–70 per cent. greater, and in the Kazakh S.S.R. it will grow by 120 per cent. The total number of graduates with secondary and higher education will become half as much again. The number of workers and employees will grow to approximately 55 million people. The national income will increase in five years by approximately 60 per cent., which will provide 30–40 per cent. greater incomes for workers, employees and collective farmers, as well as further development of production.

In conjunction with the growth of industry, culture and the number of trained cadres in the National Republics, the rights and functions of the Union Republics and their ministries in managing industry are extended. They were given to manage more than 11,000 industrial enterprises which had previously been under the authority of the Union ministries. This will contribute to still greater development of creative initiative in the provinces, to the strengthening and growth of the Union Republics and to further consolidation of friendship among peoples.

All the nationalities in the U.S.S.R., even those which have small populations, have their scientists, engineers, technicians, physicians, teachers, agronomists, writers, painters. The works of national writers are translated into Russian and become the possession of all peoples of the U.S.S.R. and famous abroad. Such are the works of Ukrainian writers : Pavlo Tychina, Mykola Bazhan, Olesya Gonchar ; Byelorussian writers : Jakub Kolas, Yanka Kupala ; Lithuanian writers : Rainis, A. Upit, Villis Lacis ; Estonian writers : August Jakobson and Vilde ; Tajik : Tursun-zade and Sairriddin Aini ; Turkmenian writers : Berdy Kerbabayev ; Azerbaidjan writers : Samed Vurgun and Metkhy Gusseinov and other writers, famous to the whole country and even abroad. Books and magazines are published in the U.S.S.R. in 122 languages.

The radical political and economic changes in the U.S.S.R., the establishment of the power of workers and peasants, the creation of socialist economy, the elimination of exploitation, entailed radical changes in the class structure of society and the social nature of old nations. Instead of old bourgeois nations there grew up nations which are entirely new socially, politically and spiritually, socialist nations.

Socialist nations are nations of a new type. They are really popular, for they comprise the whole people; there are no exploiter classes and, consequently, none of the class antagonisms which rend the old bourgeois nations. Socialist nations arise and form on the basis

of a socialist economic system.   They are headed by the working class
and its Marxist Party educating the whole nation in the spirit of friend-
ship among peoples.

These nations also create a new culture, socialist *in form* and national
in content. The epoch of formation and development of such nations
commenced at the Great October Socialist Revolution. Now such
nations exist not only in the U.S.S.R., they are also being formed and
developed in all countries of people's democracy, in the great Chinese
People's Republic where in addition to Chinese about 60 other nationa-
lities and nations live.

In the conditions of capitalism, private property in the means of pro-
duction and exploitation of one part of a society by another, of majority
by minority, inevitably engender class inequality and antagonism,
social and national oppression, robbery and exploitation of one nation
by others, division of nations into ruling and oppressed, racial and
national discrimination, mutual animosity and distrust among nations.

Everybody present in this congress knows very well facts of national
oppression and discrimination in various countries—facts of brutal
racial oppression, racial discrimination and genocide in the Union of
South Africa, in colonial countries of Asia, Africa, Australia and in
a number of American countries including the U.S.A., with respect to
Negroes, Indians and other peoples. It is also known that the best
advanced progressive public men of France, England, Holland, the
U.S.A. and other nations have carried on and are carrying on a just
struggle against the national oppression policy pursued by reactionary
imperialist circles of their countries against other peoples. It is this
policy that causes the oppressed peoples to revolt and has already broken
down many colonial empires; it undermines the freedom, honour and
dignity of the peoples of those countries on whose behalf this policy
is realized. Soviet people of all nationalities profoundly honour
and respect those public men who vigorously fight such a policy.
With a special respect and admiration we read books written by a
vigorous Dutch writer Multatuli who passionately held up to shame the
colonial oppression of the imperialists in Indonesia and praised all
those who actually struggle for complete equality and friendship among
peoples.

In the conditions of socialism, domination of public property in the
means of production, in the absence of exploitation, exploiter classes,
class and national oppression and inequality, relations among nations
develop *in the direction of greater voluntary intimacy of nations, the
strengthening of mutual confidence among them, and friendly collabor-
ation in all fields of social life.* Such is the *main, objective regularity in
development of national relations in the U.S.S.R. and countries of people's
democracy.* Friendship among peoples is the source of strength of every
multi-national socialist state and of the whole camp of socialist countries.

The experience in construction of national relations in the U.S.S.R.
and countries of people's democracy definitively refutes theories to

the effect that the cause of national oppression, enslavement, struggle and enmity among nations in capitalism lies in " human nature ", " properties of blood " or in so-called " national spirit ". This experience completely disproves reactionary racial, nationalist, chauvinistic theories which state that the world from time immemorial is divided into " superior and inferior " races and nations, that the former are allegedly called to dominate (" to rule ") and exploit, rob and enslave the latter, thus " civilizing " them.

The practice of socialism has broken and refuted theories to the effect that some nations and races are capable of developing civilization and culture, whereas others are allegedly incapable of doing this. The experience of the Middle Asia Soviet Republics and the Asiatic countries of People's Democracy, the experience of the Chinese People's Republic irrefutably proves that non-European peoples are capable of developing and really develop advanced civilization and culture, not a bit worse than the peoples of Europe and the white race.

The experience of Socialist countries proves that enmity, discord and struggle among nations is by no means the " eternal law of nature ", but a phenomenon engendered by the social system of exploitation and oppression ; socialism eliminates class antagonism and with it antagonism among nations, replacing them by friendship and friendly collaboration among all peoples irrespective of their racial or tribal origin.

The experience of the U.S.S.R. shows that many smaller and underdeveloped nations and nationalities (doomed in Tsarism and capitalism to forced assimilation, to disappearance) *regenerated in conditions of socialism to new life, overtook other more advanced peoples and are going forward to complete prosperity.*

The experience of the U.S.S.R. and countries of people's democracy proves that a really *stable* union of peoples can be achieved only on the basis of their complete equality, voluntariness and mutual benefit. Russian people won a complete fraternal confidence of all other peoples of Russia (and not only Russia) by the fact that it was first to show the example of genuine disinterested fraternal aid to other peoples in their economic, political and cultural development. It was the first to resolutely put an end to social and national oppression, to emancipate all the peoples of our country from the yoke of Tsarism and imperialism.

The source of strength and invincibility of the multi-national Soviet Socialist state lies in the fraternal friendship among peoples. The experience of the U.S.S.R. and now of countries of People's Democracy shows that the epoch of socialism is an epoch of complete emancipation of all oppressed peoples from the yoke of imperialism and colonialism, an epoch of complete prosperity of creative forces, talents, culture and languages of all peoples, both great and small.